Following their takeover in August, the Taliban did not establish a clear and cohesive legal framework, judicial system, or enforcement mechanisms.  The Taliban conveyed that those laws enacted under the former government of Afghanistan that were in effect prior to their takeover remained in effect unless the laws violated sharia.  Taliban leaders issued decrees specifying acceptable behaviors under their interpretation of sharia, but variously described them as “guidelines” or “recommendations” and unevenly enforced them.  Press reports following the Taliban takeover raised fears the group would consider Christian converts as apostates.  These reports, combined with statements from some Taliban leaders starting in August reserving the right to enforce harsh punishments for violations of the group’s strict interpretation of sharia, drove some Christian converts into deeper hiding, according to International Christian Concern, an international nongovernmental organization (NGO) that focuses on persecution of Christian communities.  At year’s end, there were no reports of Taliban representatives having directed sharia-related punishments.  According to Amnesty International, Taliban fighters killed 13 Shia Hazaras in Daykundi Province on August 31; the Taliban denied the allegations.  In November and December, the Taliban detained 28 members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in Kabul.  According to members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community, the Taliban falsely accused them of belonging to ISIS-Khorasan (an affiliate of ISIS and a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, also known as ISIS-K).  The Taliban held 18 of them through year’s end.  The NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW)reported the Taliban expelled Shia Hazara members from their homes in several provinces in October, in part to redistribute land to Taliban supporters.  In August, Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen said in an interview with National Public Radio (NPR) that the group would respect the rights of members of religious minority groups, including Shia Hazaras.  On November 16, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid told the press, “We are providing a safe and secure environment for everyone, especially the Hazaras.”  Both prior to and immediately following the Taliban takeover, predominantly Shia Hazara communities expressed fear the Ashraf Ghani administration and the Taliban lacked the ability to protect them from violence and discrimination.  According to Hazara community and NGO representatives, Shia Hazaras continued to face longstanding and widespread discrimination by Ghani government officials in public service delivery, public sector hiring, and other areas before August 15.After the Taliban takeover, Taliban leaders publicly pledged to protect the rights of Sikhs and Hindus, although some Sikhs and Hindus reported they had ceased to congregate at their gurdwaras (places of worship), and others sought to resettle abroad due to fear of violent attacks by the Taliban and ISIS-K.  In November and December, high level Taliban representatives held meetings with leaders of Shia, Sikh, and Hindu communities, reportedly to offer protection and improve relations.  According to community representatives, in these meetings the Taliban laid out rules for the behavior of women, forbade the playing of music, and presented restrictions on businesses owned by minority religious group members.  Some Hazara political figures expressed continued concern over the Taliban’s commitment to support freedom of worship but commented that this engagement represented a shift from the Taliban’s approach between 1996 and 2001.  According to civil society groups, at year’s end, approximately 150 members of the Sikh and Hindu communities remained in the country, down from approximately 400 at the start of the year.  The Taliban closed the Ministry for Women’s Affairs in September, announcing the reconstituted Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, charged with enforcing the Taliban’s interpretation of sharia, would be housed in the same building.  While enforcement varied by province and district, local Taliban representatives enforced decrees on gender segregation, women’s dress and head covering, men’s facial hair, unaccompanied women, and music.  On December 3, Taliban “Supreme Leader” Hibatullah Akhunzada issued a decree stating that women should not be considered property and must consent to marriage.  Media reported the Taliban framed the decree as a call to adhere to broader Islamic law on women’s rights.  Some observers praised the decree; others said it did not go far enough because it did not mention a woman’s right to work or to access education and other public services.

the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (ISIS-K claimed responsibility.  ISIS-K also conducted such attacks against other groups.  In total, for the first six months of the year, 20 incidents targeted the Shia Hazara community resulting in 143 killed and 357 injured, compared with 19 attacks attributed to ISIS-K and other anti-government elements in 2020.  According to UNAMA, during the second half of the year, attacks claimed by or attributed to ISIS-K increased and expanded beyond the movement’s previous areas of focus in Kabul and the eastern part of the country.  Between August 19 and December 31, the United Nations recorded 152 attacks by the group in 16 provinces, compared with 20 attacks in five provinces during the same period in 2020.  In addition to targeting the Taliban, ISIS-K also targeted civilians, in particular Shia minorities, in urban areas.  ISIS-K claimed responsibility for suicide attacks on two Shia mosques in Kunduz and Kandahar cities on October 8 and 15.  On October 8, an ISIS-K suicide bomber killed 70 to 80 members of the Hazara community at a mosque in Kunduz.  On October 15, a suicide bomber attack targeting the largest Shia mosque in Kandahar, the Fatima Mosque (also known as the Imam Bargah Mosque), killed more than 50 worshippers and injured at least 100.  Two December 10 attacks in western Kabul targeting a predominantly Shia Hazara neighborhood remained unclaimed at year’s end.  Prior to the Taliban takeover, antigovernment forces carried out several attacks on religious leaders that resulted in fatalities.  According to the Ministry of Haj and Religious Affairs (MOHRA), over the last two decades, the Taliban and other extremist groups had killed 527 religious scholars, including approximately 50 Sunni and Shia religious leaders killed between February 2020 and July 2021.  Prior to their August takeover and as previous years, the Taliban killed and issued death threats against Sunni clerics for preaching messages contrary to the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam.  Taliban fighters killed progovernment imams and other religious officials throughout the country, and the Taliban warned mullahs not to perform funeral prayers for Ghani administration security officials.  On May 8, unidentified individuals detonated a car bomb in front of the Sayed ul-Shuhada school in a predominantly Shia Hazara community, killing at least 85 civilians and injuring another 216.  No group claimed responsibility for the attack.  According to press interviews in October, Shia Hazaras struggled to take what some characterized as a “life or death” risk to go to mosque on Fridays.

Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, and other non-Sunni Muslim minority groups continued to report that some Sunni Muslims verbally harassed them, although Hindus and Sikhs stated they still were able to practice their respective religions in public prior to August 15.  According to international sources, Baha’is and Christians continued to live in constant fear of exposure and were reluctant to reveal their religious identities to anyone.  Christian groups reported public sentiment, as expressed in social media and elsewhere, remained hostile towards converts and to Christian proselytization.  They said individuals who converted to or were studying Christianity reported receiving threats, including death threats, from family members.  Christians and Ahmadiyya Muslims reported they continued to worship only privately and in small groups, at home or in nondescript places of worship, to avoid discrimination and persecution.  Prior to the Taliban takeover in August, observers said local Muslim religious leaders continued their efforts to limit social activities, such as concerts, which they considered inconsistent with Islamic doctrine.

The U.S. embassy in Kabul suspended operations on August 31.  In October and November, the U.S. government condemned ISIS-K attacks on Shia mosques and engaged Taliban leadership to press for the protection of religious minorities from repression and violence.  On November 29-30, a U.S. government delegation met with senior Taliban representatives in Qatar.  The U.S. delegation expressed “deep concern regarding allegations of human rights abuses and urged the Taliban to protect the rights of all Afghans, uphold and enforce its policy of general amnesty, and take additional steps to form an inclusive and representative government.”  After August 31, the U.S. government also conveyed this message consistently in meetings with the so-called Taliban Political Commission in Doha, Qatar, through the Afghanistan Affairs Unit.  efore the Taliban takeover in mid-August, U.S. embassy officials worked with the government to promote understanding of religious freedom and the need for the acceptance and protection of religious minorities.  To enhance the Ghani administration’s capacity to counter violent religious extremism and foster religious tolerance, embassy representatives met with the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC) and MOHRA, among other government agencies.  The embassy regularly raised concerns about public safety and freedom to worship with security ministers.  Until the Taliban takeover, embassy officials continued to meet regularly with leaders of major religious groups, as well as religious minorities, scholars, and NGOs, to discuss ways to enhance religious tolerance and interreligious dialogue.  While working with the Ghani administration, the embassy sponsored programs for religious leaders to increase interreligious dialogue, identify ways to counter violent religious extremism, empower female religious leaders, and promote tolerance for religious diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 37.5 million (midyear 2021).  According to Pew Forum data from 2009, Sunni Muslims constitute approximately 80-85 percent of the population, and Shia make up approximately 10-15 percent.

According to religious community leaders, the Shia population, approximately 90 percent of whom are ethnic Hazaras, is predominantly Jaafari, but also includes Ismailis.  Other religious groups, mainly Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is, and Christians, together constitute less than 0.3 percent of the population.  According to Sikh leaders, there are fewer than 150 members of the Sikh and Hindu communities remaining in the country, compared with an estimated 400 at the start of the year and 1,300 in 2017.  Most members of the Sikh and Hindu communities are in Kabul, with smaller numbers in Ghazni and other provinces.  Hindu community leaders estimate there are fewer than 50 remaining Hindus, all male and primarily businessmen with families in other countries.

The Ahmadiyya Muslim community in the country numbers in the hundreds.  Reliable estimates of the Baha’i and Christian communities are not available.  There are small numbers of practitioners of other religions.  There are no known Jews in the country, following the departure of the country’s last known remaining Jew after the Taliban takeover.

Hazaras live predominantly in the central and western provinces as well as in Kabul; Ismaili Muslims live mainly in Kabul and in the central and northern provinces.  Followers of the Baha’i Faith live predominantly in Kabul, with a small community in Kandahar.  Ahmadi Muslims largely live in Kabul.

Religion and ethnicity in the country were often closely linked.  Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, and other non-Muslim minorities reported continued harassment from Muslims, although Hindus and Sikhs stated that prior to the Taliban takeover, they continued to be able to publicly practice their religions.

According to international sources, Baha’is and Christians lived in constant fear of exposure and were reluctant to reveal their religious identities to anyone.  According to some sources, converts to Christianity and individuals studying Christianity reported receiving threats, including death threats, from family members opposed to their interest in Christianity.  They said fears of violent societal repression had further increased since the Taliban takeover.

According to Christians and Ahmadi Muslims, members of their groups continued to worship only in private to avoid societal discrimination and persecution, including harassment from neighbors and coworkers.  They also said that following the Taliban takeover in August, relatives and neighbors who were aware of their identities were more likely to treat them harshly or report them to the Taliban, whether out of self-preservation or to curry favor with the Taliban.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, women of several different faiths, including Sunni and Shia Islam, continued to report harassment from local Muslim religious leaders over their attire.  Clerics in numerous provinces preached that woman must wear modest dress and that the faithful should publicly enforce a strict implementation of sharia law.  As a result, some women said they continued to wear burqas or other modest dress in public in rural areas and in some districts in urban areas, including in Kabul, before the Taliban takeover, in contrast to other more secure, Ghani administration-controlled areas, where women said they felt comfortable not wearing what they considered conservative clothing.  Almost all women reported wearing some form of head covering.  Some women said they did so by personal choice, but many said they did so due to societal pressure and a desire to avoid harassment and to increase their security in public.  Prior to the Taliban takeover, observers said local Muslim religious leaders continued their efforts to limit social activities, such as concerts, considered by the religious leaders to be inconsistent with Islamic doctrine.  Following the Taliban takeover, media reported instances of local Muslim religious leaders becoming more prohibitive of such activities.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, Ahmadiyya Muslims said they did not proselytize due to fear of persecution.  Ahmadiyya Muslims reported an increasing need to conceal their identity to avoid unwanted attention in public and their intent to depart the country permanently if there was a peace agreement with the Taliban.  Before the Taliban takeover of Kabul, members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community said they were able to intermittently perform weekly congregational prayer at a nondescript location in Kabul.  According to international Ahmadiyya Muslim organizations with close ties to Ahmadi Muslims in the country, following the Taliban takeover, fear of persecution by the Taliban and its sympathizers had driven community members to refrain from worship at their center in Kabul.  Approximately 100 Ahmadi Muslims departed the country in the aftermath of the Taliban takeover.  As of year’s end, hundreds remained in country.  Ahmadi Muslims said they received direct as well as indirect threats against their safety in the form of notes, telephone messages, and other menacing communications because of their faith.  Ahmadi Muslim representatives said they did not initially report or publicize these threats because they feared additional verbal harassment and physical abuse from Taliban representatives.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, Christian representatives reported public opinion, as expressed in social media and elsewhere, remained hostile toward converts to Christianity and to the idea of Christian proselytization.  They reported pressure and threats, largely from family, to renounce Christianity and return to Islam.  They said Christians continued to worship alone or in small congregations, sometimes 10 or fewer persons, in private homes due to fear of societal discrimination and persecution.  The dates, times, and locations of these services were frequently changed to avoid detection.  There continued to be no public Christian churches.  Following the Taliban takeover, Christians described raids by Taliban on the homes of Christian converts even after they had fled the country or moved out.  Christian sources stated the Taliban takeover emboldened intolerant relatives to threaten them with violence and inform on converts should they continue their practice of Christianity.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, some Sikhs and Hindus had refused to send their children to public schools because other students harassed their children, although only a few private school options were available to them due to the decreasing sizes of the two communities and their members’ declining economic circumstances.  According to community members, since the Taliban takeover, the small number of remaining Sikh and Hindu children did not attend school due to school closures related to COVID-19 and inclement winter weather.

Until the Taliban takeover, Kabul’s lone synagogue remained occupied by the self-proclaimed last remaining Jew in the country, and a nearby abandoned Jewish cemetery was still utilized as an unofficial dump; reportedly many abandoned Islamic cemeteries were also used as dumping sites.  The lone known Jew departed Afghanistan in late August, saying he feared the Taliban would be unable to protect him from an ISIS-K attack.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, NGOs reported some Muslims remained suspicious of development assistance projects, which they often viewed as surreptitious efforts to advance Christianity or engage in proselytization.

On August 31, the U.S. embassy in Kabul suspended operations.

In October and November, the U.S. government condemned ISIS-K attacks on Shia mosques and engaged Taliban leadership to press for the protection of religious minorities from repression and violence.  On November 29-30, a U.S. government delegation met with senior Taliban representatives in Qatar.  U.S. government officials expressed “deep concern regarding allegations of human rights abuses and urged the Taliban to protect the rights of all Afghans, uphold and enforce its policy of general amnesty, and take additional steps to form an inclusive and representative government.” U.S. representatives also expressed concern over the status of religious minorities in a meeting with senior Taliban representatives in Islamabad, Pakistan, in December.  The U.S. government also conveyed this message consistently in meetings with the “Taliban Political Commission” in Doha after August 31 through the Afghanistan Affairs Unit.

Before the Taliban takeover in mid-August, U.S. embassy officials worked with the government to promote understanding of religious freedom and its importance as well the need for the acceptance and protection of religious minorities.  In meetings with members of the President’s staff, the ONSC, MOHRA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs, and the Ulema Council, embassy officials promoted understanding of religious freedom as well as the need to enhance the government’s capacity to counter violent religious extremism.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, senior embassy officials engaged leaders of the Sikh and Hindu communities in June to understand their concerns and their ability to practice their faith freely.

Until the Taliban takeover, embassy officials met with both government and religious officials to promote cooperation with ulema councils and emphasize the potential strong impact international Islamic scholars could have on moderating the Taliban.  The embassy coordinated with the ONSC, as well as other governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders, to promote respect for religious diversity.  While working with the Ghani administration, the embassy sponsored programs for religious leaders to increase interreligious dialogue, identify ways to counter violent religious extremism, empower female religious leaders, and promote tolerance for religious diversity.

Prior to the Taliban takeover, the embassy also used social media to support religious freedom.  On May 20, the Ambassador, responding to a Taliban-attributed attack in Ghor in which three Hazara shopkeepers were killed, condemned via Twitter the Taliban’s and ISIS-K’s targeting of Hazaras.  This followed the Ambassador’s condemnation of the May 8 attack on a Kabul girls’ school in a Hazara community that resulted in the deaths of more than 80 persons.

Following the Taliban takeover, the United States continued to support the Afghan people.  The United States remained committed to providing humanitarian assistance and basic needs support to the Afghan people and continued to advocate for the need to respect the human rights, including religious freedom, of all Afghans through its engagements with the Taliban.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.1 million (midyear 2021). According to the most recent census, conducted in 2011, Sunni Muslims constitute nearly 57 percent of the population, Roman Catholics 10 percent, members of the AOC 7 percent, and members of the Bektashi Order (a form of Shia Sufism) 2 percent. Other groups include Protestant denominations, Baha’is, Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and Jews. Nearly 20 percent of respondents declined to answer an optional census question about religious affiliation. According to Boston University’s 2020 World Religion Database, there are approximately 1.71 million Muslims (59 percent of the population), 1.01 million Christians (38 percent), 73,000 atheists or agnostics (2.5 percent), and 16,000 Baha’is. The World Jewish Congress estimates there are 40-50 Jews.

Legal Framework

The constitution states there is no official religion, recognizes the equality of all religious communities, and articulates the state’s duty to respect and protect religious coexistence. It declares the state’s neutrality in questions of belief and recognizes the independence of religious groups and their status as legal entities. According to the constitution, relations between the state and religious groups are regulated by agreements between these groups and the Council of Ministers and ratified by parliament.

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and guarantees freedom of conscience, religion, and expression. It affirms the freedom of all individuals to choose or change religion or beliefs and to express them individually or collectively, in public or in private, and it explicitly recognizes the right of persons belonging to national minorities to freely express their religion without prohibition or compulsion. The constitution states individuals may not be compelled to participate in or be excluded from participating in a religious community or its practices, nor may they be compelled to make their beliefs or faith public or be prohibited from doing so. It prohibits political parties and other organizations whose programs incite or support religious hatred.

The criminal code prohibits interference in an individual’s ability to practice a religion, and it prescribes punishments of up to three years in prison for obstructing the activities of religious organizations or for willfully destroying objects or buildings of religious value.

By law, the Office of the Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination receives and processes discrimination complaints, including those concerning religious practice. The commissioner may issue decisions and impose fines, which the affected parties may appeal in court.

The law specifies that the State Committee on Religion, under the authority of the Office of the Prime Minister, is charged with regulating relations between the government and religious groups, protecting freedom of religion, and promoting interfaith cooperation and understanding.

The government does not require registration or licensing of religious groups, but a religious group must register with the Tirana District Court as a nonprofit association to qualify for certain benefits, including opening a bank account, owning property, and exemption from certain taxes. To register, a group must submit information on the form and scope of the organization, its activities, the identities of its founders and legal representatives, the nature of its interactions with other stakeholders (e.g., government ministries and civil society organizations), and the address of the organization as well as a registration fee of 2,000 leks ($19). A judge is randomly assigned within four days of submission to adjudicate an application and typically starts and finishes the adjudication in one day.

The government has agreements with the AMC, Bektashi community, Catholic Church, AOC, and VUSH. These bilateral agreements codify arrangements pertaining to official recognition, property restitution, tax exemptions on income, donations and religious property, and exemption from submitting accounting records for religious activities. A 2009 law directs the government to provide financial support to the four religious communities with which it had agreements at the time – the AMC and Bektashi communities, Catholic Church, and AOC. This law does not include VUSH, whose agreement with the government dates from 2011. There is no provision in the law to provide VUSH with financial support from the government.

Although the government’s agreements with the five religious communities stipulated the government would return religious objects and property, subsequent legislation delegated this role to the courts. Religious communities must file claims in court for restitution of, and compensation for, property confiscated by the former communist government, as must all other claimants. To reclaim property, the religious community must first obtain ownership title from the court, and then register the properties with the SAC, the official register established in 2020 to show quantity, value, and ownership of real estate. By law, bailiff offices must execute court rulings in property cases. If the property cannot be restituted because it is occupied, in use by the government, or otherwise unavailable, the community may, upon demonstrating ownership title, petition the Agency for the Treatment of Properties for financial compensation, which, until February, the government paid based on a legislatively determined formula. A February Constitutional Court ruling abrogated the formula, requiring a legislative amendment to re-establish the compensation formula.

The law allows the five religious communities with agreements with the government to operate educational institutions, as well as to build and manage religious cemeteries on land the communities own.

Religious groups, including religious communities, foundations, and missions, must have building permits to construct new houses of worship. The law allows the government post facto to legalize “informal” buildings constructed prior to 2014 without permits.

Public schools are secular, and the law prohibits instruction in the tenets of a specific religion. The law allows the teaching of the history of religion or comparative religions as part of a humanities curriculum. Private schools may offer religious instruction. Religious communities manage 113 educational institutions, including universities, primary and secondary schools, preschools, kindergartens, vocational schools, and orphanages. By law, the Ministry of Education and Sport must license these institutions, and nonreligious curricula must comply with national education standards. Catholic, Muslim, AOC, and VUSH communities operated numerous state-licensed kindergartens, schools, and universities. Most of these do not have mandatory religion classes but offer them as an elective. The AMC runs four madrassahs that teach religion in addition to the state-sponsored curriculum.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued the process of legalizing buildings built by religious groups, primarily Sunni mosques, Catholic and AOC churches, and Bektashi tekkes (centers of worship) built without government approval after the fall of communism in the early 1990s. The SAC reported that during the year, it legalized 62 such buildings (compared with 92 in 2020): six Catholic churches and other buildings of the Catholic church, 46 mosques and other buildings of the AMC, two Orthodox churches, four tekkes, and four buildings used for religious purposes – a Catholic church belonging to the International Association for Solidarity, an addition to a mosque belonging to the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Qatar Charity, a privately owned worship space, and a church of the Protestant NGO Little Family. Twenty-five other buildings, mainly belonging to the AMC, remained under review. There were some discrepancies between the figures reported by the SAC and those of the religious communities. The AMC reported it obtained legalization papers for 32 mosques during the year, with 368 applications remaining. The Orthodox Church reported no new legalizations during the year.

Among the six Catholic Church properties legalized during the year were the Church of Koplik and the Franciscan Albanian Province Zonja Nunciate’s Museum against Genocide, both located in the northwest of the country. On December 25, SAC General Director Artan Lame presented the certificates of legalization for the two properties to Catholic Archbishop of Shkoder-Pult Angelo Massafra. According to Lame, “It is absurd that the Albanian state has not been able to provide permits before the construction of at least religious buildings, making us face the need for legalization for houses of God.”

The SAC reported challenges in returning property to religious communities seized under the former communist regime, providing physical compensation by means of other property, or paying cash compensation. According to the SAC, these challenges included refusal by current owners (including private owners and the government) to relinquish property, necessitating time-consuming litigation, and lack of government funds to pay compensation in cases where the government had transformed the properties into space that was no longer useable for religious purposes.

As of year’s end, the legislature had not acted to re-establish a formula for property compensation, as required by a February Constitutional Court ruling. According to the AMC, the Agency for the Treatment of Properties, which was responsible for paying compensation, stopped processing new applications once the Constitutional Court made its ruling and would not begin again until the legislature set a new formula.

Religious communities criticized the SAC’s approach to legalizing property, stating the process was bureaucratic, produced delays, and was hampered by the SAC’s inability to locate relevant documents in state archives. The AOC said the SAC’s refusals of applications were perfunctory and lacked documentary explanation or supporting arguments, making further pursuit of property registration in court difficult. Religious groups said that even in cases where the SAC approved applications, it often failed to provide the groups with supporting documentation, making it difficult for the groups to register the property or protect their rights in the future.

The AMC again expressed concern that the SAC gave it title only to buildings and not to the land on which they were built.

The AMC, the Bektashi community, and the AOC continued to state there were lengthy delays in court proceedings that could make it difficult to enforce an eventual restitution ruling before the 10-year statutory limit on the execution of civil judgments expired. The AOC said it won some property cases in court, but Church representatives stated outside influence on bailiff offices by interested parties, including businesses, private individuals, or government officials, was slowing the bailiffs’ execution of court rulings and that such influence often involved corruption. Bektashi representatives reported that at least four cases of property restitution and compensation between the Bektashi and the government or individuals were still pending in court at year’s end, while the AMC reported it had 67 property cases pending in court.

The Catholic Church and the AOC stated that the government had not implemented its agreements with these communities to return religious objects and properties. The Catholic Church said the government had not created the ad hoc commission stipulated in the agreement to handle restitution of objects and property, nor had it returned properties. The AOC reported it was still seeking restitution for several properties formerly owned by the Church but currently owned by different government ministries. The AOC informally proposed to the government and the Interfaith Council that special legislation be created to handle religious communities’ properties confiscated by the former communist regime, and that a special structure be created within the SAC to implement that legislation.

According to some government officials, officials in the human rights NGO Albanian Helsinki Committee, as well as media reports, corruption, lack of government knowledge of competencies and jurisdiction over property cases and large caseloads in the court system hampered religious communities’ ability to advance claims to their property or compensation. Thousands of cases were with the Supreme Court, which was still in the process of replenishing its quorum with judges who passed a comprehensive vetting process. Lacking a quorum, the Supreme Court was unable to decide cases for most of the year. The AMC reported that since 2016, it had submitted approximately 500 applications for restitution or claims for compensation encompassing approximately 23,000 hectares (57,000 acres) of property worth what AMC estimated to be approximately six billion euros ($6.8 billion). The AMC reported the government had not yet paid compensation on four judgments in its favor from 2020. The Bektashi community reported that during the year, the government paid it 146 million leks ($1.38 million) in compensation for “informal” (not legally recognized) properties others had built on Bektashi land. The community used the compensation to build new tekkes in Elbasan and Gjirokaster and to buy shares of the Continental Hospital, previously owned by a former member of the AMC. The SAC, however, reported the government had paid the AMC 13.88 million leks ($131,000) in compensation for land with an area of 510 square meters (5,490 square feet), and the Bektashi 12.33 million leks ($116,000) as compensation for land with an area of 2,534 square meters (27,276 square feet).

The AOC again said that despite numerous requests, the government had not returned all sacred objects, relics, icons, and archives confiscated during the communist regime. The AOC said that on April 12, the Ministry of Culture returned the remains of Saint John Vladimir to the Monastery of Shijon in Elbasan, and in October 2020, the ministry returned the land in Tirana on which Saint Procopius Church stands. AOC representatives said the government continued to oppose some of the Church’s claims on monasteries and churches, stating the properties were cultural monuments that fell under the purview of the state. The Ministry of Culture stated that although the law allowed religious communities to possess title to religious property listed as cultural heritage or a cultural monument, in some cases such property would remain property of the state, due to its national importance. According to the Ministry of Culture, in some cases, religious communities did not seek property title because the law on cultural heritage places the burden of restoration, rehabilitation, and maintenance primarily on the owner, with potential for additional financial penalties if not fulfilled as prescribed by law.

Bektashi leaders reported continued problems dealing with local property registration offices. The community again reported the government had not responded to its complaints at the central and local level that the government, without the community’s permission, built apartments for individuals who lost their homes during a 2019 earthquake on Bektashi property. In addition, the Bektashi community reported that four cases it had filed contesting a decision by the Agency for the Treatment of Property not to recognize the community’s property claims on tekkes in Frasher, Alipostivan, Permet, and Turan-Tepelene continued to work their way through the court system.

The Bektashi community and the AOC again objected to paying the value-added tax, as well as other taxes and fees, stating those payments violated their agreements with the government. The AOC reported it paid the government 113 million leks ($1.07 million) in annual taxes and social and health insurance but had not been reimbursed as called for in its agreement with the government. The Bektashi community reported it had held meetings with the government on the value-added tax (VAT) paid for its buildings but had not yet reached a resolution. It reported that in previous years it had paid 124 million leks ($1.17 million) in VAT on construction of the Odeon, a multipurpose center at the World Bektashi Headquarters in Tirana, and that it also had VAT disputes over the ongoing construction of the Grand Tekke of Elbasan and the tekke of Shtuf in Gjirokaster. Religious communities said public services and support received in return were not commensurate with the taxes paid.

VUSH stated the government again failed to respond to a request it submitted in 2017 for land on which to build a main church similar to the main cathedrals and mosques of other faith communities.

VUSH reported it remained unable to register its ownership of most of the property of one of its churches with the local registration office in Korca. VUSH’s case against the Tirana municipal government for issuing construction permits for others to build residential and commercial buildings on VUSH land after refusing permits for VUSH to build on its own land remained pending in the Tirana District Court. VUSH also filed a case in Tirana District Court against the construction company that built on its land, which was also pending at year’s end.

In March, the Ministry of Education and Sports approved the establishment of a bachelor’s degree program in Islamic studies in English, a master’s program in Islamic Sciences in Albanian, and a master’s degree program in Religious Studies in English at AMC-affiliated Beder University College. The programs began during the year. The master’s degree program offered degrees in Interreligious Dialogue, Religious Leadership, and Religious Education. The government continued not to recognize diplomas in theology and religious studies issued by foreign institutions.

The Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination reported one case of discrimination based on religious grounds in which the director of a school in Laprake, Tirana, asked a girl to leave the school because she wore a hijab, which the director said violated the dress code. The commissioner worked with the school and the family to enable the girl to continue attending school and took no action against the director.

Religious communities said they continued to face financial problems during the year due to COVID-19 containment measures that they had urged members of their communities to follow. They stated they felt discriminated against because the government did not respond to individual or collective requests through the Interfaith Council for additional financial support to pay religious workers during COVID-19 restrictions, such as lockdowns. They also said the limits on the size of gatherings, which applied to secular venues as well, inhibited their fundraising capabilities.

The Catholic Church complained of discrimination to the chair of the Technical Experts Committee on COVID-19 after the government, without consulting with the Church, decreed a COVID-19-related curfew at the last minute on Christmas Eve in 2020 that interfered with midnight Mass, but the Church received no response. The government’s anti-COVID-19 curfew remained in place throughout 2021, including on Christmas Eve, which passed without comment by faith communities.

The Council of Ministers again failed to adopt regulations to implement a 2017 law providing additional protection for minority rights, including freedom of religion. The AOC again raised concerns over the missing regulations, particularly in the south of the country, home to many members of the Orthodox faith.

The State Committee on Religion census of religious organizations counted 195 organizations, 174 of which were evangelical Christian. The AMC had one organization, the AOC four, and the Catholic Church 16. The then committee chair said responding to the census was not required by law but that the committee hoped through the initiative to gain better understanding of the religious communities.

The government postponed the 2020 population census to 2022 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Religious communities again expressed concern that the postponement would reduce their groups’ reported numerical strength, with a corresponding reduction in government support. The communities stated they had sought to participate in focus groups to help explain the religion questions in the census, but the government had not responded to their request. For the first time, AOC Archbishop Anastasios in a Mass in October instructed Orthodox parishioners publicly to confirm their religion during the 2022 census.

The Catholic, AMC, AOC, and Bektashi communities reported receiving government financial support totaling 113 million leks ($1.07 million), four million leks ($37,800) more than the previous year and the first increase since 2015. The AMC received 33.12 million leks ($313,000), an increase of more than one million leks ($9,400) over 2021, while the other remaining communities received 26.64 million leks ($251,000), a slight increase from the previous year. The communities continued to use the funds to cover part of the salaries for administrative and educational staff, as stipulated by a Council of Ministers’ decision in April. The Bektashi community used some of the funds to pay part of the wages of its staff; it used the rest to continue building the Grand Tekke of Elbasan and raise awareness of the Bektashi community domestically and internationally. The communities stated that the government should provide financial support according to the size of each community. The government did not indicate the basis on which it allocated the funds among the four communities.

VUSH continued to seek changes to the law that would allow it to receive financial support from the government.

On International Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27, the Ministry of Culture, the Albanian American Development Fund, and the Municipality of Vlora committed to building a museum in Vlora dedicated to the country’s efforts to protect persecuted Jews during World War II. The government and the Albanian American Development Fund opened the bidding process for the project in September but had not announced a winner by year’s end.

On March 22, President Ilir Meta awarded the Interfaith Council with an Honor of the Nation medal “in appreciation of the comprehensive contribution to preserving and promoting the spirit of harmony, understanding, and coexistence between religions in Albania.”

Religious communities said interfaith relations were excellent.

Authorities reported that on April 19, Rudolf Nikollaj attacked individuals at the Dine Hoxha Mosque in Tirana with a knife following afternoon prayers, wounding five persons before police arrested him. Nikollaj, whose father is Catholic and mother is Muslim, had converted to Islam, according to his father, but was often prevented from entering mosques by worshippers who told him he was Christian. Nikollaj’s father told media his son had been depressed. In July, the Tirana prosecutor asked the Tirana District Court to put Nikollaj in a medical institution due to his history of mental health problems. In November the court accepted the prosecution’s recommendation.

According to an IRI report entitled Antisemitic Discourse in the Western Balkans released during the year, antisemitic statements in domestic media were rare, although there were some conspiracy theories regarding a Jewish American businessman’s role in influencing domestic politics and Jews controlling the world order and economy. Of 457 online media items studied between January 2019 and May 20, 2020, 17 (3.7 percent) contained what IRI determined was antisemitic content. Most media focused on Holocaust remembrance and the country’s good relations with Israel.

The Interfaith Council held several online and in-person meetings domestically and internationally on faith-related issues, such as a discussion on the country’s communist past and religion, as well as other topics, including the role of religious groups in combating trafficking in persons and countering violent extremism.

Together as the Interfaith Council and individually, religious communities provided books, food, and other donations to support institutions such as hospitals and families in need during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In meetings with the State Committee on Religion, embassy officers continued to urge the government to accelerate its handling of religious property claims and to restore to religious groups their property confiscated during the communist era.

Embassy officials met with representatives of religious communities, including the AOC, AMC, Bektashi community, Catholic Church, and VUSH, to discuss interfaith and governmental relations, the challenges they faced regarding property legalization and restitution, and financial challenges caused by COVID-19 restrictions.

The embassy funded local organizations through grants to implement programs focused on developing community inclusivity, promoting women’s empowerment in religious communities, and emphasizing the compatibility of religious faith and democracy. The embassy continued its programs and engagement with youth and religious communities to promote religious tolerance and harmony. As part of these programs, students at Islamic and AOC religious schools and students from public schools planned and carried out projects highlighting religious diversity and tolerance, focusing on youth activism and common civic values.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 43.6 million (midyear 2021), more than 99 percent of whom are Sunni Muslims following the Maliki school.  Religious groups together constituting less than 1 percent of the population include Christians, Jews, Ahmadi Muslims, Shia Muslims, and a community of Ibadi Muslims who reside principally in the Province of Ghardaia.  Religious leaders estimate there are fewer than 200 Jews.

Christian groups include Roman Catholics, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, members of the EPA, Lutherans, the Reformed Church, Anglicans, and an estimated 1,000 Egyptian Coptic Christians.  Religious leaders’ unofficial estimates of the number of Christians range from 20,000 to 200,000.  In 2020, the Christian advocacy nongovernmental organization (NGO) International Christian Concern estimated there were approximately 600,000 Christians.  According to government officials and religious leaders, foreign residents make up most of the Christian population.  Among the Christian population, the proportion of students and immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa without legal status has also increased in recent years.  Christian leaders say citizens who are Christians predominantly belong to Protestant groups.

Christians reside mostly in Algiers and the Provinces of Kabylie, Bejaia, Tizi Ouzou, Annaba, Ouargla, and Oran.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam to be the state religion and prohibits state institutions from engaging in behavior incompatible with Islamic values.  The new constitution, effective December 30, 2020, removed language from the 2016 constitution guaranteeing freedom of conscience.  The previous constitution said, “Freedom of conscience and freedom of opinion shall be inviolable.  Freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in compliance with the law.”  The new constitution’s language reads, “The freedom of opinion is inviolable.  The freedom to exercise worship is guaranteed if it is exercised in accordance with the law.  The state ensures the protection of places of worship from any political or ideological influence.”

The law does not prohibit religious conversion, including from Islam, but proselytizing of Muslims by non-Muslims is a criminal offense.  The law prescribes a maximum punishment of one million dinars ($7,200) and five years’ imprisonment for anyone who “incites, constrains, or utilizes means of seduction intending to convert a Muslim to another religion; or by using establishments of teaching, education, health, social, culture, training…or any financial means.”  Making, storing, or distributing printed documents or audiovisual materials with the intent of “shaking the faith” of a Muslim is also illegal and subject to the same penalties.

The law criminalizes “offending the Prophet Muhammad” or any other prophets.  The penal code provides punishment of three to five years in prison and/or a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 dinars ($360-$720) for denigrating the creed or prophets of Islam through writing, drawing, declaration, or any other means.  The law also criminalizes insults directed at any other religion, with the same penalties.

The law grants all individuals the right to practice their religion if they respect public order and regulations.

The constitution establishes a High Islamic Council and states the council shall encourage and promote ijtihad (the use of independent reasoning as a source of Islamic law for issues not precisely addressed in the Quran) and shall express opinions on religious questions presented for its review.  The President appoints the members of the council and oversees its work.  The constitution requires the council to submit regular reports to the President on its activities.  A presidential decree further defines the council’s mission as taking responsibility for all questions related to Islam, for correcting mistaken perceptions, and for promoting the true fundamentals and correct understanding of the religion.  The council may issue fatwas at the request of the President.

The law requires any group, religious or otherwise, to register with the government as an association prior to conducting any activities.  The law requires all organizations registered prior to 2012 to reregister.  The Ministry of Interior grants association status to religious groups; only registered associations are officially recognized.  Unregistered associations have no legal status, and may not own property, open bank accounts, convene gatherings, or raise funds.  Members of active, unregistered groups are often subject to criminal prosecution.  The ministry registration requirements for national-level associations stipulate

The law requires the Ministry of Interior to provide a receipt for the application once it has received all required documentation.  The ministry has 60 days to respond to applicants following the submission of a completed application.  If the ministry does not respond within the 60-day timeframe, the application is automatically approved, and the receipt may be used as proof of registration.  If the ministry considers the application incomplete, it does not issue a receipt for the application.  The law grants the government full discretion in making registration decisions but allows applicants to appeal a denial to an administrative tribunal.  For associations seeking to register at the local or provincial level, application requirements are similar, but the association’s membership and sphere of activity is strictly limited to the area in which it registers.  An association registered at the wilaya (provincial) level is confined to that specific wilaya.

The MRA has the responsibility to review registration applications of religious associations, but the Ministry of Interior makes the final decision.  The law does not specify additional requirements for religious associations or further specify the MRA’s role in the process.

The National Commission for Non-Muslim Worship is charged with facilitating the registration process for all non-Muslim groups according to law.  Non-Muslim religious leaders report no contact with the government committee.  The MRA chairs the committee, composed of senior representatives of the Ministries of National Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs; the Presidency; national police; national gendarmerie; and the governmental National Human Rights Council (CNDH).

The constitution requires a presidential candidate to be Muslim.  Under the law, non-Muslims may hold other public offices and work within the government.

The law prohibits religious associations from receiving funding from political parties or foreign entities.  The constitution prohibits the establishment of political parties based on religion.  Membership in the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a political party banned since 1992, remains illegal.  Islamist insurgents, FIS guerrillas, and the government fought a bloody civil war in the 1990s.

The law specifies the manner and conditions under which religious services, Islamic or otherwise, must take place.  The law states that religious gatherings, for worship or other purposes, are subject to regulation, and the government may shut down any religious service taking place in private homes or in outdoor settings without official approval.  Except for daily prayers, which are permissible anywhere, Islamic services may take place only in state-sanctioned mosques.  Friday prayers are further limited to certain specified mosques.

Non-Islamic religious services must take place only in buildings registered with the state for the exclusive purpose of religious practice and be administered by a registered religious association, open to the public, and marked as such on the exterior.  A request for permission to observe special non-Islamic religious events must be submitted to the relevant wali (governor) at least five days before the event, and the event must occur in buildings accessible to the public.  Requests must include information on three principal organizers of the event, its purpose, the number of attendees anticipated, a schedule of events, and its planned location.  The event’s organizers must be identified and must also obtain a permit from the wali.

The wali may request the organizers move the location of an event or deny permission for it to take place if he deems it would endanger public order or harm “national constants,” “good mores,” or “symbols of the revolution.”  If unauthorized meetings go forward without approval, police may disperse the participants.  Individuals who fail to disperse at the behest of police are subject to arrest and a prison term of two to 12 months under the penal code.

The penal code states only government-authorized imams, whom the state hires and trains, may lead prayers in mosques and penalizes anyone else who preaches in a mosque with a fine of up to 100,000 dinars ($720) and a prison sentence of one to three years.  Any persons, including government-authorized imams, who act “against the noble nature of the mosque” or in a manner “likely to offend public cohesion, as determined by a judge” may be fined as much as 200,000 dinars ($1,400) or receive a prison sentence of three to five years.  The law states that such acts include using the mosque to achieve purely material or personal objectives or with a view to harming persons or groups.

The MRA provides financial support to mosques and pays the salaries of imams and other religious personnel, as well as healthcare and retirement benefits.  The law also provides for the payment of salaries and benefits to non-Muslim religious leaders who are citizens.  The Ministry of Labor regulates the amount of an individual imam’s or mosque employee’s pay and likewise sets the salaries of citizen non-Muslim religious leaders based on their position within their individual churches.

The Ministries of Religious Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Commerce must approve the importation of all printed materials, including religious texts and items, except those intended for personal use.  Authorities generally consider “importation” to be approximately 20 or more religious texts or items.

The law gives authorities broad power to ban books that run counter to the constitution, “the Muslim religion and other religions, national sovereignty and unity, the national identity and cultural values of society, national security and defense concerns, public order concerns, and the dignity of the human being and individual and collective rights.”  In accordance with a governmental decree, a commission within the MRA reviews importation of the Quran.  The decree requires all applications to include a full copy of the text and other detailed information about the applicant and text.  The ministry has three to six months to review the text, with the absence of a response after that time constituting a rejection of the importation application.  A separate decree covering religious texts other than the Quran states, “The content of religious books for import, regardless of format, must not undermine the religious unity of society, the national religious reference, public order, good morals, fundamental rights and liberties, or the law.”  The importer must submit the text and other information, and the ministry must respond within 30 days.  A nonresponse after this period is considered a rejection.  Religious texts distributed without authorization may be seized and destroyed.

The law states the government must approve any modification of structures intended for non-Islamic collective worship.

The family code prohibits Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim men unless the man converts to Islam, although authorities do not always enforce this provision.  The code does not prohibit Muslim men from marrying non-Muslim women.  Under the law, children born to a Muslim father are considered Muslim regardless of the mother’s religion.  In the event of a divorce, a court determines the custody of any children.

The law requires that couples present a government-issued marriage license before imams may conduct religious marriage ceremonies.

The Ministries of National Education and Religious Affairs require, regulate, and fund the study of Islam in public schools.  Religious education focuses on Islamic studies but includes information on Christianity and Judaism and is mandatory at the primary and secondary school levels.  The Ministry of National Education requires private schools to adhere to curricula in line with national standards, particularly regarding the teaching of Islam, or risk closure.

The law states discrimination based on religion is prohibited and guarantees state protection for non-Muslims and for the “toleration and respect of different religions.”  It does not prescribe penalties for religious discrimination.

The law prohibits all forms of expression that propagate, encourage, or justify discrimination.  The government passed a separate hate speech law in 2021, and religious belief or affiliation are not among the categories covered by the law.

The CNDH is responsible for monitoring and evaluating human rights issues, including matters related to religious freedom.  The law authorizes the CNDH to conduct investigations of alleged abuses, issue opinions and recommendations, conduct awareness campaigns, and work with other government authorities to address human rights issues.  The CNDH may address religious concerns to appropriate government offices on behalf of individuals or groups it believes are not being treated fairly.  The CNDH does not have the authority to enforce its decisions but may refer matters to the relevant administrative or criminal court.  It submits an annual report to the President, who appoints the committee’s members.

By law, individuals who convert from Islam to another religion are ineligible to receive an inheritance via succession.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In February, Ahmadiyya Muslim community leaders said there were 50 Ahmadi Muslims who were defendants in cases in the court system, a decline from their October 2020 estimate of 220.  According to Ahmadiyya Muslim leaders, the authorities failed to pursue many of the cases predating 2018, and the cases were dismissed.

In February, a court in Algiers convicted Said Djabelkhir of blasphemy for “offending the precepts of Islam” and sentenced him to three years in prison and a fine of 50,000 dinars ($360).  Djabelkhir is an expert on Sufism and founded the “Circle of Enlightenment for Free Thought,” an association for thinkers and academics who advocate a progressive Islam.  Authorities reportedly summoned Djabelkhir to court after a fellow academic filed a complaint that his writings on various Islamic rituals, such as the Hajj and animal sacrifices on Eid al-Fitr, among other critiques, constituted “an attack and mockery of the authentic hadiths of the Sunna [the custom and practice] of the Prophet” and had caused persons psychological harm.

On August 2, Ahmadiyya Muslim community leaders reported that the court tried and convicted two of its community members in Adrar on charges of holding an unauthorized gathering.  Their Algiers-based lawyer was unable to attend the court proceedings due to COVID-19-related travel restrictions, and the judge refused the defendants’ request to postpone the proceedings.  The authorities first imprisoned the two Ahmadis in November 2020, where they remained in pretrial detention until their trial.  The court sentenced them to six months’ imprisonment and a 50,000 dinar ($360) fine.

In August, authorities placed Christian convert Soulimane Bouhafs in pretrial detention on terrorism-related charges.  According to press reports, plainclothes agents abducted Bouhafs in Tunisia in August and transferred him to Algeria.  Bouhafs was a member of the MAK, a political group advocating political autonomy for the Berber region.  Authorities designated the MAK a terrorist organization in May.  Bouhafs spent two years in prison for insulting the Prophet Muhammad, but the President pardoned him in 2018.  Upon his release, Bouhafs fled to Tunisia, where he obtained refugee status from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.  He was arrested upon his return to Algeria.

In October, Ahmadi Muslim leaders reported courts had convicted several of its community members on charges of holding unauthorized gatherings and unauthorized fundraising.  In Batna, a court sentenced an Ahmadi to one year’s imprisonment and a 50,000 dinar ($360) fine; in Tizi Ouzou, a court sentenced an Ahmadi to two months’ imprisonment and a 20,000 dinar ($140) fine; and in Constantine and Tiaret, the court convicted two other Ahmadis who were awaiting their sentences.

In January, during an interview with daily newspaper Liberte, Catholic Archbishop of Algiers Paul Desfarges said he was worried about the removal of the article on freedom of conscience from the constitution, a decision that “greatly grieved and saddened” him, and he said that he could not understand it.  He added that he believed the article, along with one on freedom of religion, would “again find its rightful place one day.”  The day after the interview, the MRA sent the Catholic Church a letter that said the reporter’s question had misled the Archbishop, and that the conscience clause “provision does not exist in the 2016 constitution nor does it in the previous ones,” adding that the Archbishop had misunderstood the constitution’s translation from Arabic.  Other religious leaders also expressed concern about the removal of this language from the constitution.

On March 22, an Oran court upheld the five-year prison sentence and fine of 100,000 dinars ($720) of Hamid Soudad, convicted in 2018 of “denigrating the dogma or precepts of Islam” for reposting a cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad on his Facebook account.  Soudad’s lawyer, Farid Khemisti, attributed the severity of the sentence to Soudad’s conversion to Christianity.

In April, an Algiers court sentenced Said Djabelkheir, a well-known Islamic Sufi scholar, to three years in prison for “offenses to Islam.”  Djabelkheir wrote that the sacrifice of sheep predated Islam and denounced child marriage.  Djabelkheir told the newspaper Le Soir d’Algerie that he was surprised by the severity of his sentence and that he planned to file an appeal.

In April, authorities sentenced Hirak political protest activist Walid Kechida to three years in prison for insulting President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and “offending the precepts of Islam.”  Authorities arrested Kechida in 2020 after drawing attention by sharing memes that depicted the Prophet on the internet.

NGOs and Ahmadi Muslim religious leaders said the group remained unregistered because the Ministry of Interior never provided the Ahmadi community with a receipt acknowledging a completed registration application that the community submitted to the government in 2012 to reregister the group as the law required.  In September, the Ministry of Interior said it had never received a registration application from the Ahmadiyya Muslim community, and Ahmadi leaders reported they were preparing to file another application.

In September, Ahmadi Muslim leaders said they sent a letter requesting to meet with President Tebboune about their registration problems but had not received a response.

In September, the Ahmadi community again reported administrative difficulties and harassment since the community was unregistered and therefore unable to meet legally and collect donations.  Members of the community stated that after their initial attempt in 2012, the community again tried to reregister with the MRA and Ministry of Interior as a Muslim group in 2016 and in 2020, but the government refused to accept those applications because it regarded Ahmadis as non-Muslims.  The government said in 2019 it would approve the community’s registration as non-Muslims, but the Ahmadis stated they would not accept registration as non-Muslims.

The EPA, the United Methodist Church (UMC), and the Seventh-day Adventist Church said they still had not received responses from the Ministry of Interior to their 2012 and subsequent applications to reregister.  According to a pastor associated with the EPA, the Church resubmitted its 2014 registration application in 2015 and 2016, but despite several follow-ups with the government, the Ministry of Interior never accepted its application.  None of the churches received receipts for their registration attempts.  In March, the EPA said the MRA had told it that the Ministry of Interior was responsible for registration-related decisions and that the MRA could not get involved with the EPA’s registration issue.

In April, EPA leaders reported the Church had sent four letters to President Tebboune requesting to meet with the MRA to address their registration problem.  At year’s end, they said they had not received a response.

Some religious groups stated they functioned as registered 60 days after having submitted their application, even though they had not received a Ministry of Interior confirmation.  Such groups stated, however, that service providers such as utilities and banks refused to provide services without proof of registration.  As a result, these groups faced the same administrative obstacles as unregistered associations.  They also had limited standing to pursue legal complaints and could not engage in charitable activities, which required bank accounts.

Numerous Christian leaders stated they had no contact with the National Commission for Non-Muslim Worship, despite its legal mandate to work with them on registration.  A Christian NGO and Christian publication stated that the government disproportionately targeted Protestant groups for unfavorable treatment.  Some Christian leaders in the country attributed this to the emphasis of some Protestant groups on proselytizing and conversion, as well as to the EPA’s primarily Algerian composition.

The MRA said it did not view Ibadis as a minority group and considered the Ibadi religious school a part of the country’s Muslim community.  Muslim scholars stated Ibadis could pray in Sunni mosques, and Sunnis could pray in Ibadi mosques.

On February 14, then Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djerad reopened mosques, Catholic and Anglican churches, and other public places that the government had closed for a second time in November 2020 as part of its COVID-19 mitigation strategy.  On February 28, after the EPA asked the MRA if the reopening applied to other churches, the MRA told EPA leaders that it did not have the authority to authorize churches to reopen, calling the EPA’s request a “political issue.”  In March, the MRA told EPA president Pastor Salah Chalah the MRA was not able to authorize its churches to reopen.  In March, the EPA reported that local officials denied the Church’s request to resume in-person worship in Oran.  When the Church questioned the decision, local authorities showed them a signed authorization to seal the churches – which they threatened to do if the Church did not stop asking for permission to reopen.  Despite the restrictions, some EPA churches opted to hold Easter services on April 4.  The authorities did not react to the decision, and some churches besides Catholic and Anglican ones continued to hold in-person worship services.  In April, Chalah reported that the EPA-affiliated Protestant Church of the Full Gospel in Tizi Ouzou, which Human Rights Watch described as the largest Protestant church in the country, remained closed.  Police closed the church in October 2019.

According to Catholic Church officials, the government changed the procedure in January for applying for authorization to conduct non-Islamic religious events.  In previous years, the Church submitted its written requests to the local police station, which then stamped the request with a receipt to show the request was registered and approved.  Beginning in January, the Church said police stations stopped issuing the receipts.  Church leaders also said the police began frequenting one church to inquire about its activities, even though Church officials provided written notification of those activities to the local police.

Some Christian citizens said they continued to use homes or businesses as “house churches” due to government delays in issuing the necessary legal authorizations.  Other Christian groups, particularly in the country’s primarily Berber Kabylie region, reportedly held worship services discreetly.

According to the MRA, the government continued to allow government employees to wear religious attire, including the hijab, crosses, and the niqab, at work.  Authorities continued to instruct some female government employees, such as security force members, not to wear head and face coverings that they said could complicate the performance of their official duties.

According to media reports, authorities continued to arrest, jail, and fine Christians on charges of proselytizing by non-Muslims, which prompted churches to restrict some activities, such as the distribution of religious literature and holding events in local community centers that Muslims might attend.

On June 30, a court in Ain Defla charged Christian convert Foudhil Bahloul with distributing Bibles, printing religious brochures to distribute to Muslims, and “agitating the faith of Muslims.”  Bahloul had been in detention since his initial arrest in April for allegedly receiving donations illegally.  At that time, police did not question him about the June 30 charges but reportedly questioned him about his religion and decision to convert from Islam.  They also searched his house and confiscated religious materials and his identification documents.  On July 7, the court sentenced Bahloul to six months’ imprisonment for illegally accepting donations and for proselytizing.  On December 7, the court of appeal in Ain Defla sentenced Bahloul to a six-month suspended prison term and a fine of 100,000 dinars ($720).

Non-Islamic religious texts, music, and video media continued to be available on the informal market, and stores and vendors in the capital sold Bibles in several languages, including Arabic, French, and Tamazight.

In April, EPA leaders reported that the MRA routinely limited the number of Bibles it approved for importation.  For example, in late 2020, the Biblical Society, which imported religious texts for all Christian denominations, requested to import 300 Bibles, and the MRA approved 30.  The EPA told the MRA there were more than 100,000 Christians in the country and that they therefore needed more than 30 Bibles.  The MRA responded by asking for a list of the names and exact number of Christians living in each community, village, and city.  The EPA declined to provide this information, and the MRA increased the approved number of Bibles by an additional 5 percent, i.e., by one or two Bibles.  The EPA said the import fees cost more than the Bibles themselves but that it would continue to import Bibles only through official channels to avoid legal problems.

On June 6, a judge sentenced Christian Pastor Rachid Seighir to a one-year suspended sentence and a 200,000-dinar ($1,400) fine for “shaking the faith of Muslims” with Christian literature at his bookstore.  On June 2, the authorities ordered the sealing of Seighir’s Oratoire City Church in Oran.  Bookstore salesman Nouh Hamimi also received a one-year suspended sentence and a fine of 200,000 dinars ($1,400) in the same case.

On November 16, authorities charged EPA President Chalah and three Christian members of his leadership team with proselytizing on social media, practicing non-Muslim religious rites without authorization, and inciting an unarmed gathering.  Authorities postponed their trial to 2022.

MRA officials again said the government did not regularly prescreen and approve sermons before imams delivered them during Friday prayers.  They also stated the government sometimes provided preapproved sermon topics for Friday prayers to address the public’s concerns following major events or to encourage civic participation through activities such as voting in elections.  The MRA said it did not punish imams who did not discuss the suggested sermon topics.

Because of the COVID-19 pandemic and limited resources, it was unclear if the government continued monitoring sermons delivered in mosques.  According to MRA officials, in the past, if a ministry inspector suspected an imam’s sermon was inappropriate, particularly if it supported violent extremism, the inspector had the authority to summon the imam to a “scientific council” composed of Islamic law scholars and other imams who assessed the sermon’s “correctness.”  The government could relieve an imam of duty if he was summoned multiple times.  The government also monitored activities in mosques for possible security-related offenses, such as recruitment by extremist groups, and prohibited the use of mosques as public meeting places outside of regular prayer hours.

On July 7, the authorities sealed three additional EPA affiliated churches in Oran:  the Oratoire City Church in Oran, the House of Hope Church in Ain Turk, and an EPA church in al-Ayaida.  In 2020, courts had upheld a 2017 government order to close the City Church in Oran.

At year’s end, there were a total of 20 EPA churches that the government had closed, including 16 that the government had physically sealed off.  The government said the churches it closed were operating without government authorization, illegally printing evangelical publications, and failed to meet building safety codes.

The UMC continued to own and maintain Methodist properties throughout the country, despite the absence of an in-country bishop.  The government denied the previous bishop’s residency renewal in 2008.  Until 2019, the UMC maintained a power of attorney to manage the properties’ legal affairs, although the foreign-based Methodist bishop overseeing the UMC in the country reported that Algerian embassies abroad had regularly delayed the approval process to obtain the power of attorney.  In 2021, the UMC continued its attempts to establish another power of attorney since the previous one expired in 2019.

Christian leaders said courts were sometimes biased against non-Muslims in family law cases, such as divorce or custody proceedings.

According to religious community leaders, some local administrations did not always verify religions before conducting marriage ceremonies.  As such, some couples were able to marry despite the family code prohibition against Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men.

EPA leaders reported public and private institutions fired some of its members due to their Christian faith and that in the public sector, the government frequently withheld promotions from non-Muslims.

Religious and civil society leaders again reported that the Jewish community faced unofficial, religion-based obstacles to government employment and administrative difficulties when working with government bureaucracy.  The MRA said it had not received requests to reopen the synagogues that closed during the period of the country’s war for independence.

Church groups continued to say the government did not respond in a timely fashion to their requests for visas for foreign religious workers and visiting scholars and speakers, resulting in de facto visa refusals.  Catholic leaders continued to say their greatest issue with the government was the long and unpredictable wait times for religious workers’ visas.

Catholic and Protestant groups continued to state the delays significantly hindered religious practice.  One religious leader said the lack of visa issuances was a major impediment to maintaining contact with the Church’s international organization.  Higher-level intervention with officials responsible for visa issuance by senior MRA and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials at the request of religious groups sometimes resulted in the issuance of long-term visas, according to those groups.

In February, Catholic Church leaders reported that COVID-19-related entry requirements further exacerbated existing visa issues related to the Church’s foreign clergy.  In January, for example, a Nigerian priest bound for a parish in Oran received his visa, but the government subsequently denied his entry request.

In February, the government denied the Anglican canon’s residency permit and visa renewals.  The MRA told him that he was not eligible to renew his visa and had to submit a new application.  The MRA also said the Cairo-based Anglican bishop must submit a letter reappointing the canon to his position.  The government approved the canon’s visa in May but by year’s end had not approved a visa for his successor.

In April, the foreign-based Methodist bishop overseeing the UMC in the country stated that the UMC “gave up” on requesting clergy visas for its pastors.  He said that UMC-affiliated clergy were regularly denied tourist visas.  The last official UMC visit to the country took place in 2013.

During a May 5 speech to the Algerian Muslim Ulemas (scholars) Association, Bouabdellah Ghlamallah, former Minister of Religious Affairs and head of the High Islamic Council, stated, “Algerians can only be Muslim.”  Ghlamallah said “The seeds sown by France are still germinating,” and he told Muslim scholars to “eradicate these residues.”

In October, local media reported that Algerian Radio management fired Mourad Boukerzaza, the director of the Cirta radio station in Constantine, as well as several other employees, because the station broadcast a Christian-themed song, “Oh Jesus, Life in the Tomb,” by Christian Lebanese singer Fayrouz.  Algerian Radio disputed the reports as “fake news” and told state-run Algerie Presse Service (APS) that it fired the director in late September for “malfunctions and errors.”

Government-owned radio stations continued to broadcast Christmas and Easter services in French and Arabic.  The country’s state-run dedicated religious television and radio channels broadcast messages against religious extremism and integrated messages of religious moderation into mainstream media.  After Friday prayers, state broadcasters aired religious programs countering extremism.  Some examples included Au Coeur de Islam (At the Heart of Islam) on Radio Channel 3 and Dans le Sens de l’Islam (Understanding the Meaning of Islam) on national television.

Senior government officials continued to publicly condemn acts of violence committed in the name of Islam and urged all members of society to reject extremist behavior.

The government and public and private companies funded the preservation of some Catholic churches, particularly those of historical importance.  The province of Oran, for example, continued to work in partnership with local donors on an extensive renovation of the Catholic chapel at Notre Dame de Santa Cruz and its large statue of the Virgin Mary as part of its cultural patrimony.  Catholic Church leaders in Oran reported a good relationship with the authorities and ongoing interfaith dialogue with Muslims there.

According to the government, the MRA contributed to the renovation and restoration of non-Islamic places of worship, specifically Notre Dame d’Afrique in Algiers, the Saint-Augustin Basilica in Annaba, and the Santa Cruz Chapel in Oran.  The MRA also said it organized an initiative, in partnership with the Ministry of Interior and local neighborhoods, to clean up Christian cemeteries as part of an ongoing effort to maintain historical and cultural landmarks

According to the government, the authorities regularly invite accredited religious representatives to attend the national holiday ceremonies.

Some Christian converts said they and others in their communities continued to keep a low profile due to concern for their personal safety and the potential for legal, familial, career, and social problems.  Other converts practiced their new religion openly, according to members of the Christian community.  In January, Catholic officials reported that because of what they believed was growing intolerance of Christians, the Archdiocese of Algiers was unable to find a person willing to engrave a cross on the tombstone in Algiers of Archbishop Henri Teissier, who died in Oran in December 2020.

Several Christian leaders said some Muslims who converted or who expressed interest in learning more about Christianity were assaulted by family members or otherwise pressured to recant their conversions.

According to religious leaders, some individuals who openly engaged in any religious practice other than Sunni Islam reported that family, neighbors, or others criticized their religious practice, pressured them to convert back to Islam, and occasionally insinuated they could be in danger because of their choice.

Media criticized religious communities they portrayed as “sects” or “deviations” from Islam or as “foreign,” such as Ahmadi Muslims and Shia Muslims.  Ahmadi leaders said news outlets continued to amplify what they considered government misinformation portraying Ahmadis as violent.

EPA leaders continued to say when Christian converts died, family members sometimes buried them according to Islamic rites, and their churches had no standing to intervene on their behalf.  Christian groups reported some villages, for example in the Kabylie region, continued to prohibit Christians from being buried alongside Muslims.  In these cases, Christians opted to be buried under Islamic rites so their remains could stay near those of their families.

Some Christian leaders stated they had good relations with Muslims in their communities, with only isolated incidents of vandalism or harassment.  Christian and Muslim leaders hosted each other during the year.  The Notre Dame de Santa Cruz, site of a fort and Catholic chapel, and the Pierre Claverie Center, a Catholic church and community center, in Oran hosted frequent nonreligious community events and reported Muslims frequently participated alongside Christians.

Protestant leaders said other faiths privately expressed support, and the EPA again reported excellent interfaith dialogue within the religious community.  The EPA reported some local authorities expressed regret for church closures but stated they were duty bound to follow government directives, regardless of their personal opinions.

Embassy officials met with representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, and Religious Affairs to discuss the difficulties Ahmadi and Shia Muslims, Christian, and other minority religious groups faced in registering as associations, importing religious materials, and obtaining visas.  They also discussed church closures, registration concerns related to minority religious groups, the impact of constitutional changes, and jailed activists.  In April, embassy officials requested to meet with the National Commission for Non-Muslim Worship to discuss the inability of some religious groups to register, but they did not receive a response.

The then Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officers met during the year with government-affiliated and independent religious leaders and with representatives of Muslim and Christian communities, including the Catholic and Anglican Churches, the EPA, and the Ahmadiyya Muslim community, to discuss interreligious dialogue and tolerance and, in the case of religious minorities, their rights and legal status.

Embassy officials discussed the practice of religion, its intersection with politics, religious tolerance, and the religious roles of women with religious and political leaders, as well as with the Muslim Scholars Association and the High Islamic Council.  The embassy used special events, social media, and speakers’ programs to emphasize a message of religious tolerance.  Specifically, the embassy used its cultural engagements to emphasize tolerance and its social media engagements to promote the benefits of diversity and inclusion, and it held iftars during Ramadan with members of the country’s different religious communities.

On November 15, in accordance with the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as amended, the Secretary of State placed Algeria on the Special Watch List for having engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 86,000 (midyear 2021).  The Andorran government estimates the population at 78,000 (2020 data), including 38,000 citizens and 40,000 other residents, mostly from Spain, France, and Portugal.  The local government does not provide statistics on the size of religious groups, and there is no census data on religious group membership.  In 2019, government officials estimated that 92 percent of the population was Roman Catholic.  Muslim leaders estimate their community, largely composed of recent immigrants, has approximately 2,000 members.  The Jewish community reports it has approximately 100 members.  Other small religious groups include Hindus, Anglicans, Seventh-day Adventists, the Baha’i Faith, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, the New Apostolic Church, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees “freedom of ideas, religion, and worship.”  It prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion and stipulates no one shall be required to disclose his or her religion or beliefs.  The constitution states such freedoms may be limited only to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, as prescribed by law or to protect the rights of others.  The constitution acknowledges a special relationship with the Catholic Church “in accordance with Andorran tradition” and recognizes the “full legal capacity” of the bodies of the Catholic Church, granting them legal status “in accordance with their own rules.”  The Catholic Bishop of Urgell in Catalonia, Spain, whose diocese includes Andorra and is one of two constitutionally designated princes of the country, serves equally as joint head of state with the other prince, the President of France.  The current Bishop of Urgell is Archbishop Joan Enric Vives i Sicilia.

The law provides for the right to equal treatment and nondiscrimination, including for members of any religious group.  The law establishes judicial, administrative, and institutional guarantees, which protect and provide compensation for victims of discrimination.  The law also provides for fines of up to 24,000 euros ($27,200) in cases of discrimination, including on the basis of religious affiliation, and stipulates the burden of proof in such cases rests with the defendant, who must demonstrate there has not been discrimination.

Faiths other than Catholicism do not have legal status as religious groups.  The government registers religious communities as cultural organizations under the law of associations, which does not specifically mention religious groups.  To build a place of worship or seek government financial support for community activities, a religious group must acquire legal status by registering as a nonprofit cultural organization.  To register, a group must provide its statutes and foundational agreement, a statement certifying the names of persons appointed to the board or other official positions in the organization, and a patrimony declaration that identifies the inheritance or endowment of the organization.  A consolidated register of associations records all types of associations, including religious groups.

The national ombudsman is responsible for investigating complaints of racism, discrimination, and intolerance, including those involving a religious motivation, in the public and private sectors.  The ombudsman makes recommendations to the public administration to correct problems and reports annually to parliament.  The ombudsman is a member of the commissions established by the Observatory on Equality, which is tasked with collecting and analyzing data and advising the government on issues pertaining to equality and discrimination, including those involving religious issues.

The law requires individuals applying for official documents, such as residence permits, passports, and driver’s licenses, to appear and be photographed with their heads uncovered.

According to the law, municipalities are responsible for the construction, preservation, and administration of cemeteries and funerary services.

Government regulation permits ritual slaughter as required by the Islamic or Jewish faith, as long as it takes place under the supervision of the veterinary services of the country’s slaughterhouse.

Instruction in the Catholic faith is optional in public schools.  The Catholic Church provides teachers for religion classes, and the government provides space in public schools for Catholic religious instruction and pays the teachers’ salaries.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Catholic Church continued to receive special privileges not available to other religious groups.  The government paid the salaries of the eight Catholic priests serving in local churches and granted all foreign Catholic priests citizenship for as long as they exercised their functions in the country.

Despite longstanding requests by Muslim and Jewish community representatives for cemeteries where they could bury their dead according to their rituals and traditions, the government had not identified by year’s end a location for a multiconfessional cemetery, despite the announcement in 2020 that it had begun a search for public land on which to build such a cemetery.  Government officials stated that the Ministry of Territorial Planning was still looking for a suitable site on public land.

Muslim community representatives stated they were disappointed by the lack of government response to their requests.  According to municipal authorities, Jews and Muslims could use existing cemeteries, but these did not allocate separate burial areas for these communities to use.  As a result, most Jews and Muslims continued to bury their dead outside the country.  Muslim community representatives, however, stated that the COVID-19 pandemic made it more difficult to bury their dead outside of the country due to pandemic travel and health restrictions.

The government continued to fund three public Catholic schools at the primary and secondary level.  These were open to students of all faiths.  Catholic instruction was mandatory for all students attending these schools.

The Ministry of Social Affairs, Housing and Youth stated that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Observatory on Equality stopped work during the year, but the work of the national ombudsman continued.

During the year, the national ombudsman’s office did not report receiving any complaints of religiously motivated discrimination or intolerance in the public or private sectors.  The principal religious groups said they had not reported any incidents of discrimination to the ombudsman.  The Ministry of Social Affairs, Housing and Youth said it had not received any complaints of religiously motivated discrimination.

In September, a Muslim family accused the French school Lycee Comte de Foix of discrimination and racism after the school required the family’s daughter, aged 11, to remove her headscarf while in school.  Government officials stated that French law prohibiting students from wearing “conspicuous religious symbols,” including the Islamic headscarf, Jewish skullcap, Sikh turban, and large Christian crosses, was applicable, as the school was part of France’s public school system, per a bilateral agreement.

At the time of the complaint, the country had no overarching laws regulating the use of religious symbols in its educational system.  On October 4, following the complaint, the government modified the public school regulations nationwide to include a ban on the use of conspicuous religious symbols in public schools, including headscarves, kippahs, and large crosses.

The government continued to maintain a policy of issuing religious work permits for foreigners performing religious functions only to members of the Catholic Church.  Foreign religious workers belonging to other groups said they could enter the country with permits for other positions such as schoolteachers or business workers and carry out religious work without hindrance.

Catholic rituals, such as priests blessing those gathered for an event or leading a Mass before an event, continued to be a part of many state ceremonies, including annual national day celebrations.

In the absence of a mosque in the country, the Muslim community continued to rely on two Islamic prayer rooms that it rented in Andorra la Vella and in Escaldes-Engordany.

The Catholic Church of Santa Maria del Fener in Andorra la Vella continued to lend its sanctuary twice a month to the Anglican community so that visiting Anglican clergy could conduct services for the English-speaking members of that community.

The U.S. Ambassador, resident in Spain, and the Consul General and other officials from the U.S. Consulate General in Barcelona reiterated the importance of religious tolerance in periodic in-person and virtual meetings and other communications with officials in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs; Social Affairs, Housing, and Youth; and Justice and Interior, as well as the Office of the Ombudsman.  Consulate general staff discussed the implementation of the law pertaining to equal treatment and nondiscrimination with representatives from the Ministry of Social Affairs, Housing, and Youth and raised continued concerns about the lack of cemeteries for the Jewish and Muslim communities with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials.

In periodic communications and meetings with representatives and human rights NGOs, consulate general officials discussed the groups’ views on issues pertaining to their exercise of religious freedom in the country, including the lack of legal status for religious groups other than the Catholic Church and the lack of cemeteries for the Jewish and Muslim communities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 33.6 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2014 national census approximately 41 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 38 percent Protestant.  Individuals not associated with any religious group constitute 12 percent of the population.  The remaining 9 percent is composed of animists, Muslims, Jews, Baha’is, and other religious groups.  Among Protestants, Tocoists (members of the Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ in the World) are the largest group, with 2.8 million adherents, according to the Ministry of Culture’s National Institute for Religious Affairs (INAR).  The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD) reports 500,000 members.  Other major Protestant denominations include Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, Baptists, and the Assembly of God Pentecostal.  There is also a small number of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the country.  INAR reports that in 2018, the most recent data available, there were 122,000 Muslims.  INAR states the number has grown considerably since that time.  A leader of one Muslim organization estimated there are 800,000 Muslims in the country, of whom approximately 95 percent are foreign migrants, mainly from North and West African countries.  There are approximately 350 Jews, primarily resident foreign nationals.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the state as secular and prohibits religious discrimination.  The constitution requires the state to protect churches and religious groups as long as they comply with the law.  The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, religious belief, and worship, and it recognizes the right of religious groups to organize and carry out their activities as long as they adhere to the law.  The constitution permits conscientious objection to military service for religious reasons, prohibits questioning individuals about their religious beliefs for reasons other than anonymous statistical purposes, and specifies the government may not suspend rights related to religion even if the state declares a state of war, siege, or emergency.  It recognizes the right of prisoners to receive visits from, and correspond with, religious counselors.  The law establishes that conscientious objectors may perform civilian service as an alternative to military service.

The penal code increases the penalties for crimes committed because of religion or religious belief, including homicide, verbal or physical assault, discrimination, persecution, defamation, and genocide.  Penalties for such crimes are variable and not based on a formula.  For example, the punishment for willful homicide is 14-20 years in prison, while the punishment for willful homicide carried out on the basis of religious hatred is 20-25 years in prison.  Hate speech, or inciting hate by other forms of communication based on religious belief, is punishable by imprisonment between six months and six years in prison.  Impeding or disturbing a religious service or a funeral also carries criminal penalties.

The law requires religious groups to register to receive government recognition and allows the government to close the premises of unregistered groups.  Legal recognition gives a religious group the ability to purchase property and use its property to hold religious events, exempts it from paying certain property and import taxes, and authorizes the group to be treated as an incorporated entity in the court system.  The law requires 60,000 member signatures from legal residents to apply for registration and requires that at least 1,000 signatures originate from members residing in each of the country’s 18 provinces.  Each signature and resident declaration must be notarized separately.  Religious groups must also submit documents defining their organizational structure, location, methods and schedule of worship, financial resources, and planned construction projects.  The law also establishes qualification requirements for clergy and requires religious doctrine to conform to the principles and rights outlined in the constitution.

The Ministry of Culture, through INAR, is the adjudication authority for the registration process and has an oversight role for religious activities.  INAR assists religious groups through the registration process and analyzes religious doctrine to ensure that it is consistent with the constitution.  There are 81 recognized religious groups and more than 1,100 unrecognized religious groups in the country.  The Baha’i Faith and the World Messianic Church remained the only two non-Christian registered religious organizations.  The other recognized religious groups include 50 Protestant denominations such as Anglican, Baptist, Evangelical, Lutheran, Mennonite, Methodist, and Seventh-day Adventist; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; 28 African Messianic denominations; and the Catholic Church.

Religious instruction is not a component of the public educational system.  Private schools are allowed to teach religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In January, the government recognized new leadership of the IURD temples separate from leaders loyal to IURD’s Brazilian parent denomination.  This followed a 2020 dispute between Brazilian and Angolan IURD pastors, which included allegations of tax fraud and money laundering made by Church members and pastors against the Church’s Brazilian leadership.  Based on those allegations, the government closed all IURD temples in 2020.  In March, the government allowed 11 temples under the new leadership to reopen.  As of December, INAR reported that 340 IURD temples remain closed pending conclusion of criminal investigations and court cases.  In May, the government expelled 55 Brazilian Church leaders who were not members of the newly recognized local IURD denomination.  During the year, leaders loyal to IURD’s Brazilian denomination across the country filed multiple lawsuits in provincial courts to regain control of the denomination.  The lawsuits were pending at year’s end.  Some IURD Church members demonstrated against the government closure of their churches.

INAR reported that the government did not officially recognize any new religious organization during the year and had not done so since 2000.  Unregistered religious groups continued to state that the notary and residential declaration requirements (60,000 total signatures, including 1,000 signatures from each of the country’s 18 provinces), which they estimated to cost approximately 3,300 kwanza ($6) per signature, were too expensive and burdensome for their congregations.  In addition to the signature requirement, the large number of undocumented residents and an unreliable residential registry system continued to present obstacles to registration, according to religious group leaders.

According to INAR, since registration requirements were changed in 2019, which included lowering the number of member signatures required from 100,000 to 60,000, 97 religious groups submitted applications; all were pending government approval at year’s end.  Among those pending, 17 groups had not yet provided the requisite 60,000 signatures but had met the other criteria for approval.  While the law states the government may close the premises of religious groups that do not meet the registration requirements, government officials generally allowed groups with pending applications to hold religious services.

The government continued not to recognize any Muslim groups or issue any licenses to Muslim groups to practice their religion legally.  Requests for official registration submitted in 2019 by two Muslim organizations, CISA (Islamic Community of Angola) and COIA (also translated as the Islamic Community of Angola), remained among the 97 pending applications.  INAR officials said the primary reason Islamic groups had not been recognized was their lack of a single governing body.  In July, COIA leadership held a congress to form the Islamic Council of Angola (CONSIA) to satisfy this requirement but failed to gain enough participation from CISA for INAR to consider it as the single body governing all mosques in the country.  In the past, government officials stated that some practices allowed by Islam, such as polygamy, contradicted the constitution.

The INAR director and Ministry of Culture officials continued to state concerns regarding the proliferation of religious “sects,” some of which they said exploited vulnerable populations with limited financial means by requiring them to provide recurring payments or dues in order to worship or belong to these organizations.

In March, the government relaxed its COVID-19 preventative measures and allowed religious groups to meet on any day of the week instead of just on Saturday and Sunday.  Gatherings for religious services were limited to 50 percent occupancy of the facility used, the same as for nonreligious gatherings.  Churches and mosques generally adapted to the new restrictions; some held multiple smaller services during the day to avoid exceeding the occupancy limits.  Unlike in 2020, there were no arrests or major protests related to COVID-19 restrictions.

During the year, several religious groups, in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Communication, held an ecumenical dialogue and participated in an interfaith social action initiative called Abraco Solidario (Solidarity Embrace), which provided food to vulnerable populations affected by the severe drought in the southern provinces of Cuando Cubango, Cunene, Namibe, and Huila.  Participants included the Council of Christian Churches in Angola, the Evangelical Alliance, and Catholic organizations Caritas, and Justice and Peace.

Several faith-based organizations linked to the Catholic Church and the Protestant religious group Congregational Evangelical Church in Angola formed the Plataforma Sul (Southern Platform) to advocate for more efficient government and social responses to problems affecting rural communities and minority ethnic groups resulting from the widespread drought, such as food shortages.

In August, the human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) Friends of Angola (FOA) organized a roundtable on religious freedom in the country.  Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim leaders participated, as well as representatives of other NGOs.  FOA presented recommendations from the participants to President Joao Lourenco, members of the National Assembly, and INAR, all calling for changes, such as recognition of Islam as an official religion, improved government dialogue with mosques around the country, no preferential treatment for any religious group by the government, creation of an independent body to regulate national religious affairs, and updates to the 2004 law on religious freedom.  The government had not responded to the recommendations by year’s end.

In addition to the Catholic radio station Ecclesia, which broadcasted in 16 provinces, other Catholic (Vatican Radio and Maria Radio), Methodist, Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Tocoist radio stations also operated in the country under government licenses.  Several religious groups had radio shows on secular radio and TV stations, such as the Jehovah Witnesses and the IURD.

Embassy officials engaged with government officials throughout the year.  In meetings and communication with officials from INAR and other government agencies, embassy officials encouraged the government to further ease registration requirements for religious groups and discussed the status of religious groups pending their official recognition, the implementation of religious freedom legislation, continuing COVID-19 restrictions on places of worship, and the status of closed mosques and IURD temples.

Embassy officials also engaged with religious communities and civil society representatives throughout the year.  They spoke with religious leaders and NGOs from several provinces, including Luanda, Benguela, Huila, Cuando Cubango, and Cunene, as well as with representatives of multiple religious groups and organizations such as the Congregation of Christian Churches in Angola, the IURD, the Order of Angolan Evangelical Pastors, Jesuit Refugee Services, COIA, and the Jewish group Chabad-Lubavitch.  In these meetings, the main topics related to government recognition of religious groups, the IURD intradenominational split, and the effect of COVID-19 restrictions on religious groups.  In August, embassy officials participated in a roundtable discussion on religious freedom organized by FOA.

The embassy promoted religious freedom on its website and through social media platforms.  It used social media posts to promote the principle of religious freedom as a universal right on International Religious Freedom Day.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 99,000 (midyear 2021).  According to the 2011 census, the most recent, 17.6 percent of the population is Anglican, 12.4 percent Seventh-day Adventist, 12.2 percent Pentecostal, 8.3 percent Moravian, 8.2 percent Roman Catholic, and 5.6 percent Methodist.  Those with unspecified or no religious beliefs account for 5.5 percent and 5.9 percent of the population, respectively.  Members of the Baptist Church, the Church of God, and the Wesleyan Holiness Consortium each account for less than 5 percent of the population.  The census categorizes an additional 12.2 percent of the population as belonging to other religious groups, including Rastafarians, Muslims, Hindus, and Baha’is, without providing percentages for each group.  Based on anecdotal information, these four religious groups are listed from largest to smallest.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of thought and religion, as well as the right to change and practice one’s religion or belief.  The constitution protects individuals from taking oaths contradictory to their beliefs or participating in events and activities of religions not their own, including participating in or receiving unwanted religious education.  These rights may be limited in the interests of defense or public safety, order, morality, or health, or to protect the rights of others, unless actions under such limitations can be shown “not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.”  The constitution prohibits members of the clergy from running for elected office.  No law may be adopted that contradicts these constitutional provisions.  The government does not enforce a law outlawing blasphemous language in a public place or any other place that would “cause annoyance to the public.”

Religious groups must register with the government to receive tax- and duty-free concessions and to own, build, or renovate property.  To register, religious groups must fill out an online tax form that describes the group’s activities.  The government uses this form to determine the group’s tax status.  The Inland Revenue Department reviews and approves the completed form, usually granting registration and tax concessions.

The law prohibits religious instruction in public schools.  Private schools may provide religious instruction.  Public schools require parents to immunize their children to attend school.  Some private schools do not require immunizations for their students.  The law also permits homeschooling.

The law decriminalizing marijuana for any use also recognizes the government’s responsibility to uphold the religious rights of persons of the Hindu and Rastafarian faiths.  The law allows these persons to apply for a special religious license to cultivate the plant within their private dwelling, use the plant for religious purposes within their private dwelling or within their approved place of worship, and transport the plant between their private dwelling and approved place of worship.  The special religious license, however, does not permit any commercial or financial transaction involving any part of the cannabis plant.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government established a vaccine mandate in October for all public sector and government workers.  Some religious leaders requested an exemption to the vaccine mandate, but Seventh-day Adventist leaders said they would not support exemption requests from their members.  While its restrictions to address the COVID-19 pandemic were in effect throughout the year, the government on occasion granted curfew exemptions to religious leaders to engage in religious activities.

Some members of the Rastafarian community said they continued to object to the government’s requirement of vaccinations for all children attending public schools.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The Turkish Cypriot “constitution” refers to the “state” as secular and provides for freedom of religious faith and worship consistent with public order and morals.  It prohibits forced participation in worship and religious services and stipulates religious education may be conducted only under “state” supervision.  Although the “constitution” grants the Vakf the right to regulate its internal affairs, it is subordinate to the “Prime Minister’s” office and not an independent organization.  Turkish Cypriot authorities continued to grant access to Greek Orthodox religious sites, although visits declined due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  The “Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)” said during the year it approved 37 of 66 requests to hold religious services between July-October 2021, compared with 26 of 33 requests in 2020.  The “MFA” said, “18 could not be facilitated as they fell outside the pre-determined criteria.”  Turkish-Speaking Protestant Associations (TSPA) representatives continued to report police surveillance of their activities, although the surveillance was somewhat reduced, primarily due to a reduction in church activities as a result of the pandemic.  According to Greek Orthodox representatives, police monitored their church services.  They reported plainclothes police officers present during services checked priests’ identification and monitored the congregation.

The TSPA said Turkish Cypriots who converted to other faiths often experienced abuse, insult, criticism in society, and workplace discrimination.  The TCCH reported completing conservation and structural support to five churches and the walls of Nicosia’s historic city center.  Mufti of Cyprus Talip Atalay and Church of Cyprus Archbishop Chrysostomos II and their representatives continued to meet throughout the year until Atalay was removed from his position in July.  During a July weekend days before Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to the area administered by Turkish Cypriots, then “TRNC Prime Minister” Ersan Saner named Ahmet Unsal to succeed Atalay as the Mufti of Cyprus.

The Ambassador and embassy officials continued engagement with the office of the Mufti of Cyprus, who was also head of the “Religious Affairs Department,” to discuss cooperation among religious leaders and access to religious sites.  Embassy officials met with representatives of the “MFA” and the Vakf to discuss unrestricted access to religious sites.  Embassy officials continued to meet with leaders from the Sunni and Alevi Muslim, Armenian and Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Roman Catholic, and Protestant communities to discuss access to religious sites and instances of religious-based discrimination.

According to a statement from the “Statistics Council,” as of August 2021, the population of the area administered by Turkish Cypriots is 382,836.  The census contains no data on religious affiliation.  Sociologists estimate as much as 97 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim.  The Alevi Culture Association estimates approximately 10,000 immigrants of Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab origin and their descendants are Alevi Muslims.  The TSPA estimates there are 1,000 Turkish-speaking Protestants.  The government of the Republic of Cyprus estimates 290 members of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and 48 Maronite Catholics reside in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots.  According to sociologists, other groups include the Russian Orthodox, Anglican, Baha’i, Jewish, and Jehovah’s Witness communities.  According to “Ministry of Education (MOE)” statistics for the 2020-21 academic year, there were approximately 94,381 foreign students enrolled at universities in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots.  Of these, 60 percent were Muslim Turks and the rest were predominantly Christians and Muslims from more than 140 countries.

Legal Framework

The Turkish Cypriot “constitution” states the territory is a “secular republic” and provides for freedom of conscience and religious faith and unrestricted worship and religious ceremonies, provided they do not contravene public order or morals.  It prohibits forced prayer, forced attendance at religious services, insulting others’ religious beliefs, and compelling individuals to disclose their religious beliefs.  It stipulates religious education requires “state” approval and may only be conducted under “state” supervision, but the “law” allows summer religious knowledge courses to be taught in mosques without “MOE” approval.  The “law” does not recognize exclusively any specific religion, and individuals cannot “exploit or abuse” religion to establish, even partially, a “state” based on religious precepts or for political or personal gain.

According to the “constitution,” the Vakf has the exclusive right to regulate and administer its internal affairs and property in accordance with Vakf laws and principles.  Although the “constitution” states the Vakf shall be exempt from all taxation, its commercial operations are subject to applicable taxes.  The “constitution” does not explicitly recognize religious groups other than the Vakf.  According to the “constitution,” Turkish Cypriot authorities shall help the Vakf in the execution of Islamic religious services and in meeting the expenses of such services.  No other religious organization is tax-exempt or receives subsidies from Turkish Cypriot authorities.

The 1975 Vienna III Agreement covers the treatment of Greek Cypriots and Maronite Catholics living in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots and the treatment of Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area.  Among other provisions, the agreement provides for facilities for religious worship for Greek Cypriots.  The agreement states they are free to stay and “will be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practice of their religion.”

Turkish Cypriot “regulations” stipulate Greek Orthodox residents may conduct liturgies led by two priests designated by the Orthodox Church at three designated functional churches on the Karpas Peninsula Maronite Catholic residents may hold liturgies or masses led by Maronite-designated clergy without seeking permission at three designated functional Maronite churches:  Agios Georgios Church in Kormakitis/Korucam, Timios Stavros Church in Karpasia/Karpasa, and Panagia Church in Kampyli/Hisarkoy.

Greek Orthodox, Maronite Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox worshippers must submit applications to authorities for permission to hold religious services at churches or monasteries other than the six designated churches, including at restored religious heritage sites.  Although the “MFA” reported 78 churches open for religious services in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, these churches were only available for religious services upon “government” approval.  The “MFA” continued to evaluate requests for religious services based on certain criteria.

For authorities to consider an application, the day of the requested service must be a religious day (Christmas, Easter, the church’s name day – sometimes referred to as its feast day) and should be of significance to that religious group.  The church or monastery must be structurally sound and not be located in a military zone, with exceptions for some Maronite churches.  It must not have a dual use, for example, as a museum, and there should be no complaints from local Turkish Cypriot residents, and police must be available to provide security.

Permission is also necessary for priests other than those who were officially predesignated to conduct services.  Specific permission is required for individuals who do not reside in the Turkish Cypriot-administered area, including members of the Greek Orthodox, Maronite Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox Churches, to participate.  UNFICYP coordinates these applications, which religious groups must submit 10 days before the date of the requested service.

The “government”-appointed Mufti of Cyprus heads the “Religious Affairs Department” in the “Prime Minister’s Office,” which represents Islam in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots and functions as a civil authority.  Whereas the Vakf manages Muslim-donated property as an endowment for charitable purposes, the “Religious Affairs Department” oversees how imams conduct prayers and deliver Friday sermons in mosques.

Under the section “Offenses Against Religion” in the “TRNC Criminal Code,” any person who, with the intention of insulting the religion of any person, or knowing that any destruction, harm or defilement of any person will be an insult to their religion, destroys, damages or pollutes a place of worship or any property considered sacred by a certain group people, commits a minor offense.

Religious groups are not required to register with authorities as associations to assemble or worship, but only associations registered with the “Ministry of Interior (MOI)” have the right to engage in commercial activity and maintain bank accounts.  Religious and nonreligious groups have the same registration process, and they are required to submit the founders’ names and photocopies of their identification cards to the “MOI” along with a copy of the association’s rules and regulations.  Associations do not receive tax-exempt status or any “government” benefits or subsidies.  Religious groups are not permitted to register as associations if the stated purpose of the association is to provide religious education to its members.

There is mandatory religious instruction in grades four through eight in all schools, public and private.  These classes focus primarily on Sunni Islam but also include sessions on comparative religion.  The “MOE” chooses the curriculum, which is based on a textbook commissioned by the Ministry of Education in Turkey.  Students may opt out of mandatory religion courses in grades six through eight.  At the high school level, religion classes are optional.

There are no provisions or “laws” allowing conscientious objection to mandatory military service, which requires a 12- to 15-month initial service period and one-day annual reserve duty.  The penalty for refusing to complete mandatory military service is up to three years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to 10,800 Turkish lira ($830), or both.

“Government” Practices

The “MFA” reported that despite the rule to submit religious service applications at least 10 days in advance for religious services, it granted three that were requested seven days in advance of the service.  The UNFICYP office responsible for facilitating these requests said Greek Cypriot religious service applicants often complained “MFA” approvals were granted a few days before the requested service, causing organizers to cancel.

According to statistics reported by the “MFA,” authorities continued to grant access to Greek Orthodox places of worship.  UNFICYP reported the “MFA” approved 21 of 38 requests it received to facilitate religious services at churches in the northern part of the island between August and December.  In 2020, UNFICYP reported 15 approvals of 18 requests.  The “MFA” reported it approved 37 of 66 total requests (including both UNFICYP-facilitated requests and requests submitted directly to the “MFA”) to hold religious services, compared with 26 of 31 total requests in 2020.  The “MFA” also reported 18 requests were denied because they could not be facilitated, as they fell outside the predetermined criteria.

Three Greek Orthodox churches, Apostolos Andreas, St. Barnabas, and St. Mamas, were again open for individual prayers throughout the year, but Turkish Cypriot authorities continued to require advance notification for religious services.  While St. Mamas and St. Barnabas Churches functioned as museums and were only open during working hours, individuals could still pray at the churches during those hours.  The “MFA” reported that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, no additional Greek Orthodox churches were reopened for services for the first time since 1974.

According to a church representative and media reports, on January 27, authorities raided the home and business of an expatriate American pastor living in the “TRNC,” seizing Bibles and Christian literature in various languages.  Police said the pastor’s business, including a cafe, operated without a license.  Kibris Postasi, a daily newspaper, published an article linking him to another American pastor who had been imprisoned in Turkey for two years on charges of espionage.  After detaining him for 11 hours, the “government” released the pastor on a 160,000 Turkish lira ($12,300) bond and confiscated his passport.  They charged him in March with illegally importing Christian materials.  Authorities assessed a fine against the pastor of 5,000 Turkish lira ($390).  He was required to apply for court permission to travel.  At year’s end, he awaited trial.

The TSPA reported police continued to monitor its activities, asking specific questions about TSPA members and ceremonies.  The TSPA said there was less monitoring during the year due to a reduction in church activities resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.

A Greek Orthodox representative stated 72 religious sites remained inaccessible due to their being located within Turkish military zones or the buffer zone.

A Maronite community representative said the Turkish military continued to restrict access to the Church of Archangelos Michael in the village of Asomatos/Ozhan.  Maronite representatives continued to report being required to submit by the preceding Tuesday a list of persons planning to attend Sunday services.  The “MFA” said this was because the Church of Archangelos Michael is located within a military zone.  The “MFA” said it required only advance notification, not a request for access, to hold Sunday services and that no one was refused admittance during the year.  According to the “MFA,” the Turkish military again allowed Maronites to celebrate Mass in Ayia Marina in July and denied Maronites access to the Church of Marki near Kormakitis/Korucam.  The “MFA” reported that the physical and structural condition of the Church of Marki was not safe to hold a religious service and that the church was located in a military zone.

As a result of a UN Development Program- and TCCH-facilitated tender, restoration and maintenance work began at the Armenian Sourp Magar Monastery during the year.  Although completion had been expected during the year, technical problems that emerged between the contractor and the UNDP cancelled the project.

The TCCH reported that during the year it completed 16 projects, including the restoration of two archeological sites, two cemeteries, two fountains, and 10 conservation and support projects at various religious sites.

In March, the TCCH announced completion of conservation efforts at the Afendrika archaeological site in Karpaz.  The site, situated in the ancient settlement known as Urania, includes Panagia Church, Asomatos Church and Agios Georgios Church.  The committee carried out conservation work at these sites with technical support from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and EU financing.  As part of the conservation work, the committee cleared the site of shrubbery, strengthened the structures, and opened water drainage for improved rainwater management.  In June, the TCCH announced the completion of conservation work on Panagia Church and its perimeter wall.

During the year, the TCCH also announced the completion of conservation work at Agios Artemon Church in Afentaia/Gaziköy; Panagia Church and its perimeter wall in Askeia/Pasakoy; and the St. Epiphanos, Kampanopetra, and St. Barnabas basilicas at the Salamis archeological site.

In July, the TCCH announced a contract had been signed for conservation work at the church of Agios Synesios in Karpaz and that mobilization of the construction site had begun.  The conservation work is expected to last nine months and be completed in the first quarter of 2022.

The TCCH also continued restoring other religious sites.  It and the UNDP Partnership for the Future also continued restoration work on the Greek Orthodox Apostolos Andreas Monastery on the Karpas Peninsula, a popular destination for pilgrims.  The TCCH reported preparations for initiating the tendering process for the second phase of the restoration.

According to local press reports, the Turkish government provided significant support to Sunni Islamic activities in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots.  Such programs supplied iPads and bicycles as rewards to youth for participating in Islamic activities and funded community programs and iftars during Ramadan.  According to press reports and the Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Foundation, the Turkish “embassy” distributed 5,000 bicycles to children for attending online religious courses and praying twice a day at a mosque.  The program brochure, a photo of which was published in Yeniduzen, reportedly said, “Come to the mosque, get your bicycle.”  Human rights activists called the program an “imposition of religion” and a “manipulation of children.”

Secular Turkish Cypriot groups and teachers unions continued to criticize a protocol with Turkey announced by the “MOE” in 2019 that opened a Turkish Anatolia Religious High School program within the premises of Hala Sultan Religious High School, a public school.  They said the protocol imposed Islam on secular Turkish Cypriots.  The Secondary Education Teachers Union reported the administration of the Hala Sultan Religious High School and the “MOE” enrolled 200 students in the school without the usually required entrance exams.

The Alevi Culture Association reported Alevi children were subject to mandatory Sunni Islam religious instruction at school and could not opt out.

The “Religious Affairs Department” continued to appoint and fund all 225 imams at the 210 Sunni mosques in the northern part of the island.  “TRNC Prime Minister” Saner informed Mufti of Cyprus Atalay July 17 that he would be replaced as “Head of Religious Affairs” and Mufti of Cyprus effective immediately.  While Atalay had exceeded the official but previously unenforced limit of 10 years in office (two five-year terms), local media commentators and other sources said they were surprised by the abrupt timing.  Since it came immediately before Kurban Bayram (Eid al-Adha) and the July visit by Turkish President Erdogan, many observers assessed the change was politically motivated.  Then “TRNC Prime Minister” Saner named Ahmet Unsal to succeed Atalay as Cyprus’s Mufti.

A representative of the Church of Cyprus again stated that some religious sites to which Church officials had little or no access were deteriorating.

Greek Orthodox religious groups continued to report authorities placed religious items, including icons, in storage rooms or displayed them in museums, against the wishes of the communities to whom they were sacred.

According to Greek Orthodox representatives, police monitored their church services.  They reported plainclothes police officers were present during services, checking priests’ identification and monitoring the congregation.

In March, the Kurdish community living in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, together with leftist unions and left-wing political parties, including the main opposition Republican Turkish Party and “MPs,” gathered at the Kyrenia Gate in north Nicosia to celebrate Nowruz (the arrival of spring and new year in Kurdish culture).  Press reported participation was low due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but there was a “very heavy police presence” at the event.  Kurds lit a Nowruz fire and gathered around it singing songs.  There were no incidents at the event.

On April 15, the Turkish Cypriot “Constitutional Court” ruled Quran lessons organized by the “Department of Religious Affairs” at mosques were unconstitutional, overturning legislation that gave authority to the “Department” to organize such courses.  According to the decision, the “Department’s” organizing Quran courses without the approval of the “Ministry of Education” had violated the “constitutional” provision on secularism of the “state.”  Head of the Turkish Cypriot Bar Association Hasan Esendagli said the court’s decision was a turning point and that it was the first time the “Constitutional Court” examined whether a law regarding religious belief and practice was permitted under the country’s secular constitution.  He said the overturned “law” had been problematic, since it granted limitless powers to the “Department,” which is comprised of a group of religious figures.  Turkish President Erdogan (along with other Turkish officials including the Vice President) criticized the decision, saying, “It is impossible for us to accept this.  The head of the Constitutional Court should learn secularism.”  Making a call to the head of the Constitutional Court to correct the mistake, Erdogan said, “North Cyprus is not France.  They have to adopt the practices in Turkey. …otherwise, the steps we will take will be different.”

On April 19, Turkish Cypriot lawyers staged a demonstration to protest Erdogan’s remarks.  Speaking at the protest, Esendagli said Turkish officials, including the Turkish President himself, had either spoken without knowing the details of the verdict or had deliberately distorted the facts.  Chief Justice Narin Ferdi Sefik and several other Supreme Court judges supported the protest, saluting the lawyers from the court building.

Because religion and ethnicity often overlap, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

A video posted April 7 on YouTube showed an electronic music event recorded on March 20 on the grounds of the Saint Magar Armenian Monastery, the only Armenian monastery in Cyprus.  According to the RTCYPP, the video stirred negative reaction online among the Armenian community and news outlets.  In a RTCYPP-released joint statement, the five constitutionally recognized religious leaders of Cyprus condemned what they termed the monastery’s misuse and called for protection of all places of worship against vandalism, misuse, and desecration.

The TSPA continued to report societal discrimination, including verbal harassment, toward Protestants.  The TSPA again said Turkish Cypriots who converted to other faiths, particularly Christianity, faced societal criticism and feared losing their jobs.  The TSPA continued to report many members preferred to remain silent about their faiths and beliefs.  The TSPA also reported police continued to closely monitor its activities and occasionally visited representatives to inquire about church activities and attendance levels.

During the year, there were few pilgrimages and meetings across the “green line” due to pandemic mitigation measures.

The embassy promoted religious freedom on social media and met with representatives of the “MFA” and the Vakf to discuss unrestricted access to religious sites.  Embassy officials continued to meet with leaders from the Sunni and Alevi Muslim, Armenian and Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Roman Catholic, and Protestant communities to discuss access to religious sites and instances of religious-based discrimination.

Embassy officials continued to engage with the office of the Mufti of Cyprus, who also heads the “Religious Affairs Department,” to discuss cooperation among religious leaders and access to religious sites.

The Ambassador hosted an iftar on May 10 for Mufti of Cyprus Talip Atalay and other prominent members of the Turkish Cypriot community, which highlighted the U.S. commitment to advancing freedom of religion and interfaith dialogue and reinforced the Secretary of State’s April 12 message that the United States is committed to strong relationships with Muslim communities around the world.

The Ambassador met the Head of Religious Affairs and Mufti of Cyprus, Ahmet Unsal, on October 19 to reiterate U.S. support for religious freedom, encourage Unsal’s participation in the religious leaders’ dialogue, and stress the importance of interfaith cooperation for the Cyprus peace process and building trust between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Following the posting to YouTube in April of the “techno party” at the Saint Magar Armenian Orthodox Monastery, the Ambassador stated publicly her deep dismay about the incident and expressed support for religious leaders’ call that all places of worship across Cyprus be protected.  She issued a statement that the embassy “strongly condemns the misuse” of the monastery, and “Freedom of worship is a fundamental value, and we echo the call from religious leaders that all places of worship, in use or not, be protected against misuse, vandalism, and desecration.”

All references to place names within this report are for reference purposes only and are meant to convey meaning.  They should not be interpreted as implying or indicating any political recognition or change in longstanding U.S. policy.

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Republic of Cyprus

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 45.9 million (midyear 2021).  According to a 2019 survey by CONICET, the country’s national research institute, 62.9 percent of the population is Catholic; 15.3 Protestant, including evangelical Christian groups; 18.9 percent no religion, which includes agnostics; 1.4 percent Jehovah’s Witnesses and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ); 1.2 percent other, including Muslims and Jews; and 0.3 percent unknown.  Other sources state Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Lutherans, Methodists, and members of the Church of Jesus Christ together total 3 percent of the population.  According to the Jewish Virtual Library, Jews numbered 180,000 in 2019.  The Islamic Center estimates the Muslim population at 800,000 to 1,000,000.  Evangelical Christian communities, particularly Pentecostals, are growing, but no reliable statistics are available.  There are also small numbers of Baha’is, Buddhists, and adherents of indigenous religions.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the right to profess, teach, and practice freely one’s faith.  It declares the support of the federal government for “the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith,” but the Supreme Court has ruled that it is not an official or state religion.

The government provides the Catholic Church with tax-exempt subsidies, institutional privileges such as school subsidies, significant autonomy for parochial schools, and licensing preferences for radio frequencies.  The law does not require the Catholic Church to register with the Secretariat of Worship in the MFA.  Registration is not compulsory for other religious groups, but registered groups receive the same status and fiscal benefits as the Catholic Church, including tax-exempt status, visas for religious officials, and the ability to hold public activities.  To register, religious groups must have a place of worship, an organizational charter, and an ordained clergy, among other requirements.  To access many of these benefits, religious groups must also register as a civil association through the IGJ.

Registration is not required for private religious services, such as those held in homes, but it is sometimes necessary to conduct activities in public spaces pursuant to local regulations.  City authorities may require groups to obtain permits to use public parks for events, and they may require religious groups to be registered with the Secretariat of Worship to receive a permit.  Once registered, an organization must report to the secretariat any significant changes or decisions made regarding its leadership, governing structure, size of membership, and the address of its headquarters.

The mandatory curriculum in public schools is secular by law.  Students may request elective courses of instruction in the religion of their choice in public schools, which may be conducted in the school or at a religious institution.  Many Christian, Jewish, and Muslim religious groups operate private schools, which receive financial support contingent on registration with the government.

Foreign officials of registered religious groups may apply for a specific visa category to enter the country.  The validity period of the visa varies depending on the purpose of the travel.  Foreign missionaries of registered religious groups must apply to the Secretariat of Worship, which in turn notifies immigration authorities to request the issuance of appropriate documents.

The law prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, nationality, ideology, politics, sex, economic or social condition, or physical characteristics, and it requires those found guilty of discriminatory acts to pay damages or serve jail time.  Discrimination may also be an aggravating factor in other crimes, leading to increased penalties.  The board of the National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Racism (INADI), a government agency under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, includes representatives of the major religious groups.  INADI investigates suspected and reported incidents of discrimination based on religion.  INADI is not authorized to enforce recommendations or findings, but its reports may be used as evidence in civil court.  The agency also supports victims of religious discrimination and promotes proactive measures to prevent discrimination.  INADI produces and distributes publications to promote religious tolerance.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Representatives of several religious groups continued to state that a government requirement for religious groups to register first with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship and then with the Ministry of Interior as a civil association was redundant, noting the Catholic Church faced no such requirement.  The groups said these legal processes were prerequisites for seeking tax-exempt status, visas for foreign clergy, and permission to hold public activities.  Religious group representatives said they deserved a unique process, separate from that for civil associations.

Representatives of some religious groups continued to criticize a 2020 IGJ resolution requiring all civil associations, including religious groups, to have gender parity on their administrative and oversight bodies.  Several religious groups continued to state this requirement was unconstitutional and violated religious freedom.  They also said the government had not implemented the resolution by year’s end and they knew of no religious organizations penalized for failing to comply with it.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government limited through September the size of religious activities nationwide to a maximum of 20 persons in enclosed or private open-air spaces, and to 100 persons in public open-air spaces.  It similarly limited cultural, social, and recreational activities but did not limit to the same degree professional gatherings, government events, and educational events.  On October 1, the government allowed full capacity for religious activities, although events of more than 1,000 persons required stricter protocols.

On May 2, provincial police halted and dispersed an open-air Mass in Androgue, Buenos Aires Province, attended by approximately 120 persons.  According to a police statement, the event was “openly in noncompliance” with national anti-COVID-19 restrictions.  Local media reported that attendees said the Mass was broken up “on very good terms.”  In a May 4 statement, CALIR president Juan Navarro said these police actions were not an isolated event and that local and national authorities had repeatedly violated the right to religious freedom throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.

On September 7, CALIR released a statement objecting to some municipalities’ prohibitions on religious services on Sunday, September 12, because of nationwide primary elections and related COVID-19 precautions.  Although federal law prohibits large gatherings and acts of proselytism on election days, authorities generally allowed religious services.  Local media reported that the municipalities of Merlo and Bahia Blanca, in Buenos Aires Province, issued prohibitions on religious gatherings for September 12, but Merlo’s authorities retracted the order after consulting with local religious leaders.

According to Jewish community leaders, there was no progress in bringing the accused perpetrators of the 1994 AMIA bombing to justice.  On July 18, the 27th anniversary of the AMIA bombing, AMIA president Eichbaum urged the government to “intensify pressure on Lebanon and the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate on the investigation and extradite the accused that they are currently protecting.”  On July 14, President Fernandez and Secretary of Worship Guillermo Oliveri hosted AMIA leaders at the presidential residence to discuss the pursuit of justice and Fernandez told them he wanted to see progress in bringing to justice those responsible for the 1994 bombing.  On July 18, Fernandez tweeted his support for families of the victims, writing, “In 27 years since the AMIA attack, the families of the 85 victims stand firm in their call for truth and justice.  In memory of each one of them and in honor of those that lost their loved ones, we should stand united against impunity.”  In response to Fernandez, dozens of individuals criticized what some called the “hypocrisy” of his message because of their perception that the government was complicit in allowing the impunity to occur.

In August, the MFA denounced the Iranian government’s appointment of two suspects in the AMIA bombing to senior positions in a new Iranian government.  According to the MFA statement, the appointments of Ahmad Vahidi as Interior Minister and Mohsen Rezai as Vice President for Economic Affairs were an affront to the Argentine justice system and to the victims of the bombing, adding that both Rezai and Vahidi played key roles in the decision making and planning of the AMIA attack.  It called on the Iranian government to cooperate fully with Argentine judicial authorities and to allow the suspects to be tried by a competent court.

According to press reports, on October 7, judges dropped obstruction of justice charges against Vice President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner in relation to a Memorandum of Understanding signed with Iran in 2013 when she was president.  The court stated that the memorandum, “regardless of whether it is considered a political success or a failure, did not constitute a crime or an act of cover up.”  On October 25, DAIA appealed the ruling, which remained pending at year end.

On January 24, a law entered into effect legalizing abortions through the 14th week of pregnancy and in later stages if the pregnancy was the result of rape or threatened the life of the mother.  Many religious organizations, including the Catholic Church and the Christian Alliance of Evangelical Churches (ACIERA), criticized the law, and a growing number of medical professionals – especially in rural areas – refused to perform abortions on religious and ethical grounds.  Most of the 120 gynecologists in the province of Jujuy, for example, declared themselves as conscientious objectors, as permitted in the law.

On March 27, approximately 50,000 persons, according to organizers, participated in marches in 14 of the 23 provinces to express their support for overturning the abortion law.  With the encouragement of ACIERA, marchers demonstrated in Rio Negro, Tucuman, Chubut, Entre Rios, Cordoba, Buenos Aires, Chaco, Corrientes, Salta, Mendoza, Chaco, Corrientes, Santiago del Estero, and Santa Fe Provinces.

Catholic Church representatives continued to discuss measures to reduce their use of federal funding following a 2018 agreement between the government and the Argentine Episcopal Conference (CEA), representing the Catholic Church, that delineated a formal, mutually agreed plan to gradually reduce the state’s direct financial support to the Church.  Under the agreement, government funding primarily allocated for the salaries of bishops and stipends for seminarians decreased from almost 157 million pesos ($1.46 million) in 2019 to 150 million pesos ($1.39 million) in 2020.

On May 20, Juan Carlos Giordano, a representative of the lower house of congress and member of the Socialist Left Party, stated during a session of congress, “An end must be brought to the Zionist state and a unified state must be imposed across the entirety of the historical territory of the Palestine – lay, not racist, and democratic.”  DAIA denounced the statement, stating that it met the IHRA definition of antisemitism, as adopted by the lower house of congress in June 2020.  By year’s end, the lower house had not sanctioned Giordano.

On January 6, Pablo Ansaloni, a representative of the lower house of congress and a leader of the Argentine Union of Rural Workers (UATRE), told a virtual meeting of the union, “We are more united than ever, no one can break us – no one from beyond our province, because they are like the Jews, they have no homeland, they don’t know where they are or who they represent.”  Ansaloni faced criticism for his comments from several civil society actors, including DAIA and UATRE.  On January 20, UATRE dismissed Ansaloni, stating his dismissal was due to his antisemitic statements.

Numerous public and private entities adopted the IHRA definition of antisemitism during the year, including the government of Santiago del Estero Province, according to a representative of the Simon Wiesenthal Center.

Secretary of Worship Guillermo Oliveri, Human Rights Secretary Horacio Pietragalla, and other government representatives again participated in religious freedom conferences, interreligious dialogues, Catholic services, and Rosh Hashanah observances, as well as other religious activities, including those held by Protestant and Orthodox churches.  They often did so virtually or through recorded videos, due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions on public gatherings.

During the year, media reported the country experienced overall increases in antisemitic incidents.  According to media and DAIA, in January, individuals forcibly stopped an Orthodox Jewish family traveling by car from to La Falda to La Cumbre in Cordoba Province and yelled “[expletive] Jews, get out of here.  Death to the Jews!”  When the father of the family left his vehicle to attempt to calm the situation, the assailants beat him and continued to shout epithets.  After his children tried to intervene, they too were beaten.  According to the report, the father and children managed to get back into the car and later filed a police report.  Authorities later arrested the suspected assailants but took no further action through year’s end.  DAIA denounced the incident.

On February 19, actor and singer Nicolas Pauls posted on Instagram a cartoon depicting a gigantic sleeved arm with a Star of David on it and a hand pressing down on dozens of persons with the caption, “To know who rules over you, simply discover whom you may not criticize.”  Martin Souto, a television host and friend of Pauls, reposted the picture.  Both faced intense criticism from social media, and both later apologized publicly.

According to vis-a-vis news portal, in March, an unidentified woman rammed her car into another car in which two Orthodox Jewish women were traveling in downtown Buenos Aires.  According to a witness, after the Orthodox Jewish women exited their car, the assailant pulled off the sheytl (wig worn by Orthodox Jewish women) of one of the women and then pushed her to the ground, shouting, “You [expletive] Jew.  I’m going to kill you; you should all have died in the Holocaust!”  Police at first ordered the female assailant to leave but later arrested her after she tried to run over the two Jewish women.

On March 2, unknown vandals damaged the sanctuary of Our Lady of Peace Cathedral in Lomas de Zamora, Buenos Aires Province, stealing crowns from statues of the Virgin Mary and the infant Jesus.

On May 22, journalist Hugo Ojeda published an article entitled, “Song to Palestineuschwitz,” that compared Israeli actions in Palestinian territories to Nazi concentration camps, adding that Israel’s “ethnic cleaning operations … exceeded the crimes that the genocidal Nazis of the past century inflicted on gypsies, communists, homosexuals and jews [sic].”  DAIA condemned Ojeda’s article, and the publisher Pagina 12 later deleted the article.  Ojeda made no public apology.

In June, the Israeli Ambassador remarked during a panel at the College of Law in La Plata that the country was breaching its trade obligations by restricting shipments of meat to Israel.  In response, the owner of a chain of butcher shops and former Justicialist Party politician, Alberto Samid, tweeted, “The best that could happen is that the Jews no longer buy meat from us… the world does not want to sell them anything.  They are a disaster as clients.”  Samid did not apologize for his remarks despite receiving widespread public criticism.  In April, Samid accused pharmaceutical company Insud CEO Hugo Sigman of selling COVID-19 Astra-Zeneca vaccines to the “gringos.”  Samid wrote on Twitter, “This MOISHE has no limits.  He never gets tired of stealing from us!!!!  When are we going to go to Garin [the town where Insud is located] to block his laboratory?”

On June 3, unknown individuals spray-painted an evangelical Christian church in Neuquen Province and several Catholic institutions in San Luis Province during a day of nationwide protest against gender-based violence.  The Secretariat of Worship decried the vandalism in a statement on social media, noting that it distracted from the demonstrators’ message promoting women’s rights.

On July 26, DAIA objected to the use of Anne Frank’s likeness during an episode of Showmatch, a gameshow on the private television station El Trece.  Producers projected a photograph of Anne Frank alongside a contestant singing about women “who don’t leave the house.”  This incident was reported to the public defender.  The show’s producers issued a joint communique with the Anne Frank Center in Buenos Aires calling the episode an “unintentional error” and pledging to use it as a “learning experience.”

In August, evangelical Christian groups, including ACIERA, denounced a television production for Netflix entitled El Reino (“The Kingdom”), stating it fomented stereotypes and prejudices against evangelical Christian groups.  The plot depicted a fictional evangelical Christian pastor of questionable ethics who runs for president.

On August 23, prominent lawyer Alejandro Fargosi attacked parliamentarian and human rights activist Myriam Bregman as a “militant leftist Jew.”  Fargosi’s comments were widely criticized on social media, both by political figures and Nobel Laureate Adolfo Perez Esquivel, and President Fernandez expressed his solidarity with Bregman on Twitter.  Bregman told local media that Fargosi never apologized.

On August 27, lawyer Gregorio Dalbon made antisemitic comments during a radio interview.  Dalbon, whose clients included President Fernandez and Vice President Fernandez de Kirchner, accused the Jewish community of bribing a prosecutor in charge of the investigation of a violation of quarantine by President Fernandez, his wife, and friends.  DAIA condemned Dalbon’s comments.  On August 31, Dalbon publicly apologized, after apparently meeting with DAIA officials.  According to media, on September 2, a group of judges requested Dalbon’s suspension from the Argentine Bar Association for these and what they stated were other offensive comments.

In September, individuals were caught trying to steal 223 bronze plaques from headstones in La Tablada Jewish Cemetery in Buenos Aires.  The week before, more than 100 headstones had been smashed.  AMIA leaders implored local authorities to provide more security at the cemetery, saying it appeared to be a “free zone.”

A September 15 article from the University of Buenos Aires’ student media criticized the lack of Muslim viewpoints in local media during events in Afghanistan.  The article, noting a rise in anti-Muslim sentiment, described an incident in which a Muslim student was heckled as she stepped from a bus with, “Be careful, she has a bomb!”

On September 24, unknown vandals damaged the sanctuary of the Cathedral of San Maron in the Retiro neighborhood of Buenos Aires and stole items from the church.  The CEA and Secretary of Worship Oliveri denounced the vandalism.

Interreligious groups such as the Interreligious Committee for Peace in Argentina, whose members included Catholic, Protestant, evangelical Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Baha’i, as well as indigenous religious groups and CALIR, continued to work on increasing opportunities for interreligious action on common societal challenges.  CALIR issued statements denouncing acts of vandalism against religious institutions and sponsored local conferences, including a regional forum on religious freedom held on October 28-29.

In October, Jews, Christians, and Muslims jointly painted over Nazi symbols that had been placed on Jewish gravestones in the Jewish community of Santa Fe cemetery.  According to Horacio Roitman, Santa Fe’s DAIA representative, this response to the acts of hatred was “owed to the whole society.”

According to a University of San Martin study released in June, nearly 40 percent of the population believed that “Jewish businessmen” were benefiting from the COVID-19 pandemic.  Asked whether they agreed with the statement, “Behind the coronavirus pandemic, there are figures such as Soros and laboratories of Jewish businessmen who seek to profit financially,” 30 percent of respondents said they concurred “strongly.”  An additional 7 percent agreed to some extent with the statement.  Of the 43 percent of respondents who disagreed, 38 percent completely rejected the statement, and 19 percent said they either did not know or were indifferent.  The study’s main author, Ezequiel Ipar, said he was surprised by the “magnitude of antisemitic sentiment,” particularly among youth.

Embassy officials met with government representatives, including from the MFA’s Secretariat of Worship and human rights office, to discuss ways to promote respect for religious minorities and interfaith cooperation.  In meetings with government officials, the Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials discussed tolerance and understanding among the country’s many religious groups, the country’s interfaith movement, and measures to counteract religious discrimination.

In July, the Charge d’Affaires toured a COVID-19 vaccination center hosted by the King Fahd Islamic Cultural Center in Buenos Aires and met with its leaders.  They discussed the relationship of members of the center with the government, the community, and other faith groups.

In July, embassy officials attended an online commemoration to mourn the victims of the 1994 terrorist attack on the AMIA.  The embassy and AMIA also collaborated in September for an AMIA-produced remembrance video for the victims of 9/11, and the Charge d’Affaires delivered remarks alongside AMIA president Eichbaum at an in-person memorial event.  The Charge said, “In our grief, the spirit of unity with like-minded partners like our friends at AMIA strengthens our resolve to continue to fight extremism and make the world a better, safer place for our children.”  In September, embassy officials met with DAIA, AMIA, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and the Simon Wiesenthal Center to discuss the state of religious freedom in the country and ways in which the embassy could support communities of all faiths.

Embassy outreach included virtual conversations with religious and community leaders, including those of the CEA, the Church of Jesus Christ, ACIERA, the Islamic Center of Argentina, the NGO Islam for Peace, DAIA, and AMIA.  In the meetings, embassy officials discussed the status of religious freedom and interfaith dialogue and ways to promote them.  The embassy’s social media accounts also promoted respect for religious diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.0 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2011 census, approximately 92 percent of the population identifies as Armenian Apostolic.  Other religious groups include Roman Catholics, Armenian Uniate (Mekhitarist) Catholics, Orthodox Christians, and evangelical Christians, including Armenian Evangelical Church adherents, Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, charismatic Christians, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.  There are also followers of the Church of Jesus Christ and of the Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian Church of the East, as well as Molokan Christians, Yezidis, Jews, Baha’is, Shia Muslims, Sunni Muslims, and pagans who are adherents of a pre-Christian faith.  According to a poll the International Republican Institute released in February, 87 percent of respondents identified as Armenian Apostolic, 2 percent as Roman Catholic, and 2 percent as Orthodox Christian.  According to members of the Jewish community, there are approximately 800 to 1,000 Jews.  According to the census, there are more than 35,000 Yezidis, with more recent estimates by Yezidi human rights activists and academics suggesting a figure of 50,000.  Yezidis are concentrated primarily in agricultural areas northwest of Yerevan around Mount Aragats.  Armenian Uniate Catholics live primarily in the north.  Most Muslims are Shia, including Iranians and temporary residents from the Middle East.

Legal Framework

The constitution states everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.  This right includes the freedom to change one’s religion or beliefs and the freedom to manifest religion or belief in rituals of worship, such as preaching or church ceremonies, either alone or in community with others, in public or in private.  The constitution allows restrictions on this right to protect state security, public order, health and morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion and establishes separation of “religious organizations” and the state.  It recognizes the “exclusive mission of the Armenian Apostolic Church” as the national church in the “spiritual life, development of the national culture, and preservation of the national identity of the people of Armenia.”  The constitution prohibits the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms to incite religious hatred.  It stipulates that national minorities shall have the right to preserve and develop their traditions, religion, language, and culture.

The law prohibits, but does not define, “soul hunting,” a term describing both proselytism and forced conversion.  The law prohibits religious organizations with spiritual centers located outside the country from receiving funding from those foreign centers, but there is no mechanism to enforce the law.  The law also prohibits religious organizations from funding or being funded by political parties.

The law does not categorize or regulate the residence status of foreign religious volunteers.

By law, a registered religious group may minister to the religious and spiritual needs of its faithful; perform religious liturgies, rites, and ceremonies; establish groups for religious instruction; engage in theological, religious, historical, and cultural studies; train members for the clergy or for scientific and pedagogical purposes; obtain and utilize objects and materials of religious significance; use media; establish ties with religious organizations in other countries; and engage in charity.  The law does not require religious groups to register, but they must do so to conduct business in their own name (e.g., to own property, rent property, and establish bank accounts).  The law does not stipulate rights accorded to unregistered groups.

To register as a legal entity, a religious community must present to the Office of the State Registrar an assessment from the Office of the Prime Minister’s Division of Religious Affairs and National Minorities stating its expert opinion on whether the community complies with the requirements of the law that it be based on “historically recognized holy scripture.”  It also must be “free from materialism and [be] of a spiritual nature,” have at least 200 adult members, and follow a doctrine espoused by a member of the “international modern system” of religious communities.  The law does not define “free from materialism” or state which religious communities are part of the “international modern system.”  The law specifies that this list of registration requirements, to which the Division of Religious Affairs and National Minorities must attest, does not apply to a religious organization based on the faith of one of the groups recognized as national minorities, including Assyrians, Kurds, Russians, and Yezidis, among others.  A religious community may appeal a decision by the Office of the State Registrar through the courts.

The criminal code prohibits “obstruction of the right to exercise freedom of religion” and prescribes punishment ranging from fines of up to 200,000 drams ($410) to detention for up to two months.

The Office of the Human Rights Defender (ombudsperson) has a mandate to address violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of religion, committed by officials of state and local governments.  The ombudsperson may make recommendations but does not have the power to enforce them.

The law prohibits employees of the National Security Service (NSS) from being members of a religious organization, but does not define the meaning of “membership” in a religious organization.  The law prohibits members of the police, military, and the NSS, as well as prosecutors, diplomats, and public servants, from using their official positions for the benefit of “religious associations” or from preaching in support of them.  While the law defines a “religious organization” as an association of citizens established for professing a common faith as well as for fulfilling other religious needs, it provides no definition for “religious associations.”  A military service member may not establish a religious association.  If a member of the military is a member of a religious association, the member does not have the right to preach to other service personnel during military service.  The law also prohibits police, prosecutors, diplomats, and community servants (employees of local municipalities) from conducting religious activities while performing official duties.  The law has not been interpreted as barring affected individuals from attending worship services or participating in other religious rituals.

The penitentiary code allows penal institutions to invite clergy members to conduct religious ceremonies and use religious objects and literature.  Prisoners may request spiritual assistance from the religious group of their choice.  A joint Ministry of Defense-AAC agreement allows only AAC clergy to serve as military chaplains.

The law allows the AAC free access to, and the right to station representatives in, hospitals, orphanages, boarding schools, military units, and places of detention, while other religious groups may have representatives in these locations only with permission from the head of the institution.  The law also stipulates the state shall not interfere with the AAC’s exclusive right to preach freely and spread its beliefs throughout the entire territory of the country.

The law mandates public education be secular and states, “Religious activity and preaching in public educational institutions is prohibited,” with the exception of cases provided for by law.  A course on the history of the Armenian Church (HAC), which extends beyond the teaching of history to include AAC values and practices, remains a part of the recommended school curriculum for 2021-22 and 2022-23.  If a public or private school chooses to include the course, it becomes mandatory for all students in grades five to 11, with no opt-out provision for students or their parents.

The AAC has the right to participate in the development of the syllabi and textbooks for the HAC course and to define the qualifications of the teachers.  While the Church may nominate candidates to teach the course, HAC teachers are state employees.  The law grants the AAC the right to organize voluntary extracurricular religious instruction classes in state educational institutions.  Other religious groups may provide religious instruction to their members in their own facilities but not within the premises of state educational institutions.

The labor code prohibits employers from collecting and analyzing data on the religious views of employees.  The labor code authorizes up to four days of unpaid leave for observing national and religious holidays or remembrance days, regardless of religious affiliation.

The law provides for two types of service for conscientious objectors as an alternative to compulsory, two-year military service:  alternative (noncombat) military service for 30 months or alternative labor service for 36 months.  Evasion of alternative service is a criminal offense.  Penalties range from two months’ detention to eight years’ imprisonment, depending on the circumstances of the case.

The criminal code prohibits incitement of religious hatred by calling for violence through public statements, mass media, or using one’s public position and prescribes punishments ranging from fines of 200,000 to 500,000 drams ($410-$1,000) to prison terms of between two and six years.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The trial continued of Edward Manasyan, a lawyer and prominent member of the Baha’i community, who was charged in 2017 with facilitating illegal immigration by advising Iranians wishing to settle in the country.  Members of the Baha’i community said authorities initiated the case because of Manasyan’s religious beliefs.  On March 26, the Court of Cassation, the highest court of appeals in the country, rejected the community’s appeal of a lower court’s 2020 decisions rejecting appeals by the community alleging the NSS had illegally wiretapped its secretary and its office and used the information gathered to charge Manasyan.  On September 25, the Baha’i community filed an appeal with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on behalf of the secretary of the community.  The community filed two additional appeals with the ECHR, one on behalf of the chairman of the community and another as a religious organization, on October 5.  At year’s end, Manasyan’s trial, presided over by Judge Arman Hovhannisyan in Yerevan’s First Instance court, was continuing.

On July 29, Yezidi human rights activist Sashik Sultanyan was indicted on charges of “inciting hatred,” punishable by three to six years’ imprisonment, for comments he made to a journalist (that he said were supposed to be “off the record”) criticizing the treatment of Yezidis in the country that the journalist surreptitiously recorded and then published.  On May 26, a group of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including Transparency International, published a joint letter stating the case set a precedent that would “hinder any public discussion of problems related to discrimination or human rights of minorities by anyone, including members of national or ethnic minority communities.”  Human Rights Watch issued a statement calling the prosecution malicious and the criminal indictment spurious.  On August 6, the ombudsperson issued a statement saying that his office shared these concerns and that, even if some of Sultanyan’s criticisms were inaccurate, he should not be held criminally liable.  The first hearing in the case took place on November 24 in Yerevan’s First Instance Court, presided over by Judge Karen Farkhoyan.  At year’s end, Sultanyan’s trial was ongoing.

Almost all public and private schools continued to teach the HAC course throughout the country in grades five through 11.  However, on February 4, as part of a larger education reform effort, the government approved new state standards for public education that would remove the HAC course from the mandatory curriculum, inserting the history of the AAC into a broader curriculum on Armenian studies.  The new standards were undergoing pilot studies in Tavush Region during the academic year.  The Ministry of Education stated it planned to implement the revised standards in full beginning in 2023 after training teachers and revising the existing educational materials.

The government’s decision to eliminate the HAC course generated significant public debate.  While many individuals, including parents, teachers, and AAC clergy, said the course helped to develop a value system based on Armenian identity, others said schools should remain secular and moral values could be developed outside the HAC course.  Various civil society actors, who had long criticized the HAC course as religious indoctrination, welcomed the decision.

On April 28, following reports that there would be a decrease of approximately 75 percent in the academic hours allocated for the HAC course as a result of the education reforms approved in February, the AAC issued a statement expressing strong disagreement both with the decision to alter HAC course instruction and the educational reform in general.  The statement said, “Considering the anti-national policy of excluding the subject ‘History of the Armenian Church’ from the curriculum of the required subjects implemented by the authorities, the Subgroup on Educational Issues of the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin will make every effort to prevent this destructive approach and to achieve the fulfillment of its historical, moral and legal imperative to serve the vital interests of our people.”

According to official information from the Ministry of Justice, to satisfy the spiritual needs of detainees and convicts, AAC clergymen regularly visited penitentiaries, organized baptisms, offered liturgies, and celebrated holidays with them.  The ministry did not indicate whether clergy of other religious groups were able to provide spiritual services to detainees or convicts.

Although the law prohibiting membership in a religious group remained in effect for employees of the NSS (the government eliminated such restrictions for police and members of penitentiary and rescue services in 2020 in advance of a Constitutional Court ruling that the prohibition was unconstitutional), government officials did not report any dismissals of NSS staff during the year for membership in, or association with, a religious group.  According to one religious minority group, most of its members did not seek public employment despite the 2020 liberalization, due to an ingrained fear that they might eventually have to give up their faith if they worked in the public sector.

On October 4, a trial court ruled in favor of restoring the rights of an evangelical Christian schoolteacher in Sevan in a court case brought on her behalf by the Center for Religion and Law, an NGO.  The school principal fired the teacher in January, after what the NGO said was years of pressure and persecution due to her disagreements with the principal; according to the NGO, the principal used her religious affiliation as one of the reasons for her dismissal.  The NGO said that in 2020, the principal invited a city AAC priest to a pedagogical council session during which there was a discussion of the teacher’s religious views and the priest described evangelical Christian churches as destructive sects, spies, and a “threat to national security more dangerous than the coronavirus.”  The trial court declared the teacher’s dismissal invalid, restored the teacher to her position, and ordered the school to pay back wages.

Although there was no mechanism for enforcing the legal provision prohibiting funding of religious organizations by spiritual centers located outside the country, several religious organizations said they complied with the ban and restricted their operations because they did not want to violate the law.

According to experts, the absence of legal provisions regulating the invitation and stay of foreign religious volunteers affected several religious minority groups, whose foreign volunteers had to leave the country after 180 days and then return to renew their tourist status.  Such travel was particularly difficult under restrictions related to COVID-19.

There were reports of unsubstantiated rejection of religion-based asylum claims during the year.  According to individuals familiar with asylum procedures, religious background was not a major factor in the rejection of asylum claims in initial asylum procedures.  However, the same sources stated the government’s national security assessment of cases continued to be a major factor in rejections at the stage of judicial review, and negative security assessments were reportedly more likely where non-Christians were concerned.

As of October, 124 Jehovah’s Witness conscientous objectors to military service were working in the alternative civilian labor service program, a number similar to previous years, and 302 had finished their service in the program.  The alternative service appointments included positions in various hospitals, local utility companies, park maintenance services, boarding schools, eldercare facilities, and orphanages.  According to government sources, Jehovah’s Witnesses were the only individuals participating in these civilian labor programs, and none chose to serve in alternative military service.

On May 19, the government announced an amnesty for those who failed to undertake military or alternative service or had not taken advantage of a government program allowing men who had not undertaken military service before age 27 to pay a fine to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in order to avoid criminal prosecution.  The program allowed men who fled the country to avoid military service to return.  Jehovah’s Witnesses, however, stated that there was no mechanism to pay the fine to another agency if a person had a religious objection to contributing funds to the MOD.  The amnesty allowed at least one Jehovah’s Witness who had refused to pay the fine to the MOD for reasons of faith to avoid criminal prosecution.

Human rights groups assessed there was a public deterioration in relations between the AAC and the government during the year.  In December 2020, Catholicos Garegin II, the head of the AAC, called on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to resign.  On June 12, at an election campaign rally, the Prime Minister stated that corrupt AAC clergy were discrediting the Church.  In response, the press service of the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin (the governing body of the AAC) stated that Pashinyan “continues making unfounded accusations against the Armenian Apostolic Church during his election campaign,” adding that “the attitude of current government toward the Church and national and spiritual values is well-known to our people.”

On November 17, parliament approved changes to the law on holidays and memorial days, removing January 5 (Christmas Eve) and 7 (Remembrance Day of the Dead) from the list of public holidays, despite an AAC appeal to parliament to retain them.  January 6, AAC Christmas, remained an official holiday.  The Ministry of Economy, which proposed the legislation, stated that the reduction in public holidays during the New Year’s/Christmas period from eight to four days would reduce the negative effect on the economy.

There were no reported sessions during the year of the official working group on government-AAC relations, a group established in 2019.

The government invited AAC priests to perform religious rites at the funerals of individuals who died during the fall 2020 conflict, even if they were not members of the AAC.  While most religious minority groups affected said they did not see this practice as problematic, one religious minority group noted it would have appreciated being asked first.  The group stated some families were bewildered by the AAC priest’s presence but did not speak up to identify their loved one’s faith; the group said families may have worried such a statement could affect the government’s decision to provide funerals and grave sites.

In a resolution on “Humanitarian consequences of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” adopted on September 27, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated that “the long running conflict has had a catastrophic impact on the cultural heritage and property of the region, for which both Armenia and Azerbaijan have a responsibility.”  The assembly condemned the damage and destruction for which it said Armenia was responsible in the areas previously controlled by Armenia-supported separatists, which became again under Azerbaijani control, “and in particular the almost total destruction and looting of Aghdam, Fuzuli, and other areas over the last 30 years, as well as the transfer of cultural heritage.”

According to diplomats, civil society representatives, and journalists who visited the territories, while under the control of Armenia-supported separatists, hundreds of sites, including most mosques, shrines, and cemeteries used by the region’s ethnic Azerbaijani communities – approximately 400,000 people – were looted, vandalized, desecrated, and/or destroyed while under Armenian control.

An international photojournalist, Reza Deghati, know professionally as “REZA,” documented the systematic destruction of dozens of Azerbaijani cemeteries in Fuzuli, Aghdam, Zangelan, Kelbajar, and Jebrayil.  Graves were desecrated; in some instances, holes were dug out to rob graves, while other sites showed evidence of the destruction and exhumation by heavy construction equipment.  The methodical vandalism of headstones left few individual graves untouched.  Many graves had the carefully hewn faces of the deceased (carved into gravestones) destroyed by hammers or similar objects.  Additionally, the remains from Azerbaijani graves were exhumed and gold teeth removed, leaving skulls and bones strewn across Azerbaijani cemeteries or in some cases completely removed.  According to Deghati, Armenian graves remained virtually undisturbed.

According to civil society representatives, the United Nations Development Program, and the Azerbaijani government, extensive mining of the territories returned to Azerbaijan made it impossible to access a vast majority of hundreds of religious sites in towns and villages, and the extent of any damage to these sites might remain unknown for years.  Examples of known damage to significant religious sites include the 19th-century Haji Alakbar Mosque in Fuzuli District, which was destroyed, and the Juma Mosque in Aghdam, which was vandalized with Armenian-language graffiti and whose mehrab (the niche in the wall that indicates the direction of Mecca) was riddled with bullet holes.  Cemeteries throughout Aghdam were desecrated, looted, and/or destroyed, including the sacred and historic 18th-century tombs of Imarat Garvand Cemetery, the city’s “Martyrs’ Alley.”  Western diplomats visiting Martyrs’ Alley reported seeing holes where bodies were once interred and that only one broken headstone remained in the cemetery.  Because religion and ethnicity are closely linked, it is difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Some religious minorities, such as Seventh-day Adventists and several evangelical Christian groups, as well as Jehovah’s Witnesses, reported that public attitudes toward them had generally improved compared with the previous year and said there was little or no negative media coverage concerning them.  While NGOs said there were fewer antisemitic social media posts than in the previous year, there were some antisemitic references in posts criticizing a Jewish, U.S. citizen businessperson.

The evangelical Word of Life Church, which members of the prior government accused of having a role in organizing the 2018 revolution, however, was the object of ongoing hate speech and vilification by anonymous social media accounts opened specifically to target them, according to Church leaders.  The hate speech – including accusations of links with Azerbaijan and vilification for supporting anti-Covid-19 vaccination efforts – was posted on platforms such as Telegram, YouTube, and Facebook.  Unknown individuals also created a Facebook account falsely attributed to the Church’s leader, Senior Pastor Artur Simonyan, that espoused offensive views.  The Church reported the hate speech and the falsified account to the relevant social media companies, but the companies said they did not find evidence that their standards had been violated.  Simonyan said he had requested an official verified badge for his Facebook account – an emblem Facebook adds to pages to verify that they are authentic – to prevent the creation of more accounts falsely attributed to him but that the company had told him that his social media traffic was not sufficient to warrant a badge.

On February 18, the NSS terminated a criminal investigation it had launched in 2018 – on charges of incitement of religious hatred – into the creation of a Facebook page that falsely presented itself as associated both with the Word of Life Church and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party.  The NSS concluded the case lacked the elements of a crime.

Members of the Jewish community reported a rise in antisemitism since the onset of intensive fighting with Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, an increase that the Jewish community and public media largely attributed to Azerbaijani use of Israeli-produced weapons.  Jewish community members stated that antisemitic slurs were again posted on social media platforms, in some cases together with cartoons depicting Jews in an offensive manner.  The use of offensive slurs was particularly prevalent in posts on Facebook by anonymous, antigovernment individuals targeting the Jewish leader of an international foundation.  Members of the Jewish community also reported antisemitic comments directed at them on public transport.

According to representatives of religious minorities, there were fewer instances of groups targeting religious minorities for political purposes during campaigning for parliamentary elections in June than in prior elections.  Religious minority activists stated that during the campaign, an opposition figure who had never held elected office and whom a representative of a civil society group characterized as increasingly irrelevant, stated that religious organizations took an active part in overturning the government in 2018 and would play a key role in the elections.  He singled out Word of Life as particularly active.  He also stated that “pastors tell the congregations whom to vote for, and they all do,” and that “even Jehovah’s Witnesses interfere in the political process,” adding that minority religious groups were funded from abroad.  He referred to both the Word of Life and Jehovah’s Witnesses as “sects,” a term these religious groups did not use to describe themselves and which was generally perceived as pejorative.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, some religious groups increased their online presence, generating both positive and negative reactions in online comments.  Religious minority leaders stated that since the beginning of 2020, there had been less verbal targeting of religious minorities, both on and offline, as the individuals who had previously targeted them largely pivoted to discussing the aftermath of the 2020 fall fighting and the COVID-19 pandemic.

In December 2020, the International Republican Institute released a nationwide poll examining public opinion on topics including human rights and hate speech, with a specific focus on social media.  The poll was conducted in August 2020.  According to the poll, 6 percent of the respondents agreed that freedom of thought, conscience, and religion was always violated (the question did not specify by whom), while another 45 percent said the violation occurred during a specific period; 33 percent said it occurred before the 2018 revolution, 6 percent said after April 2018, and 6 percent said during the 2020 state of emergency decreed because of the COVID-19 pandemic.  The same poll found that 55 percent of respondents believed that the rights of religious minorities were either very protected or somewhat protected in the country, and 18 percent believed that religious minorities were not at all protected or somewhat not protected, with the rest refusing to answer.  There was a difference in the perception of protection between members of the AAC (74 percent said they were protected) and members of other religious groups (58 percent said they were protected).  Of those surveyed, 77 percent indicated that they had not seen cases of insulting, threatening, or hostile behavior toward a person based on his or her religion or belief.  According to 35 percent of those surveyed, religious minorities were often or sometimes targeted by hate speech, while 53 percent said that religious minorities were never or rarely targeted.  Forty-one percent believed religious minorities needed special protections from hate speech.

A minority religious group again reported societal and family pressure as the most significant deterrent to its members’ freely practicing their belief.

Both the Hebrew- and Armenian-language sides of Yerevan’s Holocaust and Genocide Memorial were defaced on February 12, for the third time in five months.  In contrast to similar incidents in 2020, government officials criticized the act, restored the monument, and arrested a suspect.  Then Yerevan mayor Hayk Marutyan issued a statement saying, “The desecration of any monument is completely unacceptable, especially memorials related to minorities living in our city.”  Then Parliamentary Vice Speaker Alen Simonyan also condemned the act, calling it a “crime against universal values” and saying that “those who committed this crime should be held to account.”  Former Prosperous Armenia Party member Naira Zohrabyan, a member of the Armenia-Israel friendship group, said that “regardless of our attitude – and it is definitely negative – towards Israeli arms sales and overt military and political support to Azerbaijan … [the] memorial cannot be desecrated,” adding, “I bow before the memory of the innocent victims of the Holocaust.”

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, as in the previous year and contrary to years prior to 2020, there were no incidents of verbal harassment toward the group’s members.  The group halted all public activities in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

On July 6, the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), a local NGO, held its Annual Media Award Ceremony for the best coverage of issues related to the freedom of religion or belief, awarding nine winners for their coverage of tolerance, peaceful coexistence, and diversity in the country.  According to human rights NGOs, EPF’s religious tolerance and nondiscrimination initiative, which began in 2015, had had a positive impact on media coverage of religious issues in the country.

One Shia mosque, located in Yerevan, served all Islamic groups.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials continued to advocate religious tolerance and interfaith dialogue during meetings with government officials, including from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, members of parliament, and political party representatives.  Embassy officials engaged government officials from the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport and the Office of the Human Rights Defender to discuss the impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on religious groups and religious sites of significance to Armenian communities.  Embassy officials raised with government officials the cases of criminal prosecution of Yezidi and Baha’i leaders and monitored their trials.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials regularly consulted the AAC, as well as minority religious groups, including evangelical Christians and other Protestants; Jehovah’s Witnesses; the Church of Jesus Christ; Yezidis; the Jewish community; Apostolic Assyrians; Pentecostals; and Baha’is, as well as individual Muslims, to discuss the state of religious freedom in the country.  On social media, the embassy posted messages by the President and Secretary of State of the United States highlighting the importance of religious freedom and tolerance.  Embassy officials also discussed religious freedom with human rights NGOs, including addressing religious discrimination faced by minority religious groups and the impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on religious groups and religious sites that were significant to Armenian communities.  Embassy officers participated as members of the EPF Annual Media Award jury and spoke on the importance of religious freedom in the ceremony to support coverage of religious tolerance in the media.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 25.8 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2016 census, 52.1 percent of residents are Christian, including Roman Catholics (22.6 percent of residents), Anglicans (13.3 percent), Uniting Church (3.7 percent), Presbyterian and Reformed (2.3 percent), Baptist (1.5 percent), and Pentecostal (1.1 percent).  Muslims constitute 2.6 percent of the population, Buddhists 2.4 percent, Hindus 1.9 percent, Sikhs 0.5 percent, and Jews 0.4 percent.  An additional 9.6 percent of the population either did not state a religious affiliation or stated affiliations such as “new age,” “not defined,” or “theism,” while 30.1 percent reported no religious affiliation.

Revised figures from the 2016 census indicate that indigenous persons constitute 3.3 percent of the population, and that there are broad similarities in the religious affiliation of indigenous and nonindigenous individuals.  In 2016, less than 2 percent of the indigenous population reported adherence to traditional indigenous religions or beliefs.  Fifty-four percent of indigenous respondents identify as Christian, and an estimated 36 percent report having no religious affiliation.

Legal Framework

The constitution bars the federal government from making any law imposing a state religion or religious observance, prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or establishing a religious test for a federal public office.  The constitution’s protection of the “free exercise of any religion” may be limited only when deemed necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  Individuals who suffer religious discrimination may have recourse under federal or state and territory discrimination laws and bodies such as the Australian Human Rights Commission.

The state of Tasmania is the only state or territory whose constitution specifically provides citizens with the right to profess and practice their religion.  In Queensland, Victoria, and the Australian Capital Territory, freedom of religion is protected in statutory human rights charters.  The antidiscrimination laws of all states and territories, with the exceptions of NSW and South Australia, contain a prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of religious belief.  NSW prohibits discrimination on the basis of “ethnoreligious origin,” and South Australia protects individuals from discrimination in employment and education because of religious dress.  Complainants may seek redress through state and territory human rights bodies.

Religious groups are not required to register with authorities.  To receive tax-exempt status for income or other benefits and an exemption from the goods and services tax (sales tax), however, nonprofit religious groups must apply to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO).  Registration with the ATO has no effect on how religious groups are treated, apart from standard ATO compliance procedures.  To receive tax-exempt status, an organization must be a nonprofit entity.  An organization’s activities, size, and permanence are some of the factors considered when determining its tax-exempt status.

State and territory governments share responsibility for education policy with the federal government, and they generally permit religious education in public schools that covers world faiths and beliefs.  Instruction in the beliefs and practices of a specific religion may also be permitted, depending on the state or territory.  In some jurisdictions, instruction may only occur outside regular class time, while in others, alternative arrangements are made for the children of parents who object to religious instruction.  The federal government provides funding to state and territory governments to support the employment of chaplains in public schools.  Chaplains may represent any faith and the government bans them from proselytizing.  Thirty-four percent of students attend private schools; approximately 94 percent of these schools are affiliated with a religious group.  The NSW government requires schools to provide “meaningful alternatives” for students whose parents withdraw them from Special Religious Education, which could include courses in ethics.

In Victoria, laws require religious leaders and workers to report suspected child abuse, including where discovered through confession.  The law carries a sentence of up to three years in prison if a mandatory reporter (which includes persons in religious ministries) fails to report abuse to authorities.  In Queensland, laws require adults to report knowledge of child sexual abuse, including where information is gained during “a religious confession.”

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On November 25, the Prime Minister introduced a bill in the House of Representatives to prohibit religious discrimination.  The bill proposed to prohibit discrimination on the basis of a person’s religious belief or activity in a wide range of areas of public life, including in relation to employment; education; access to premises; the provision of goods, services, and facilities; and accommodation.  It contained provisions allowing religiously affiliated schools, hospitals, or aged care facilities to take religion into account in staffing decisions.   The bill also proposed protections for “statements of belief” (i.e., statements of an individual’s religious beliefs) from the application of certain provisions of federal, state, and territory antidiscrimination laws that might otherwise make the statement of belief unlawful, so long as such statements do not harass, threaten, intimidate, or vilify a person or group.

Anglican, Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim faith leaders welcomed the bill in a joint statement that said the bill would “protect people of faith from discrimination on the basis of their religious beliefs.”  LGBTQI+ advocacy group Equality Australia said the bill’s proposed protections for statements of belief would “undermine everyone’s right to respect and dignity at work, school, and wherever they access goods and services like healthcare” and called on parliament to oppose the bill in its entirety.  Two parliamentary committees began studying the bill and were expected to conclude their work in 2022.  The committees removed several provisions from the bill proposed in earlier drafts, including a prohibition on large employers penalizing employees for religious statements made outside work hours, and protections for health providers who refuse treatments due to a conscientious objection.

Separately, the Australian Law Reform Commission continued its inquiry into religious exemptions in antidiscrimination legislation.  Its report is due to the federal government 12 months after religious freedom legislation passes the federal parliament.

In February, the Victoria state government passed a law banning practices that encouraged individuals to change or suppress their sexual orientation or gender identity.  A person found to have conducted practices that caused serious injury faces criminal charges, including fines of up to 10,000 Australian dollars ($7,300) and 10 years in prison.  Some religious leaders, including Catholic and Baptist clergy, criticized the law prior to passage, saying its language was too broad and could cause restrictions not only on practices considered harmful but also on the free speech and free choice of those following their religious beliefs.  In February, Reverend Peter Barnes, leader of the Presbyterian Church, said his denomination would ignore the “authoritarian” law on the basis that Church leaders “don’t get our instructions from parliament house.”  He said he would not turn away someone who came to him for prayer or help.

In August, a Queensland tribunal found that former senator Fraser Anning had broken antidiscrimination laws by vilifying Muslims and ordered him to remove 141 pieces of online content including memes, links to interviews featuring Anning, and calls to ban Islam in the country.  The tribunal also ordered Anning to remove a press release issued the day of the March 2019 Christchurch mass shootings in New Zealand that blamed Muslim immigrants for the attack.

In December, the Victoria state government passed legislation prohibiting a religious body or school from discriminating against an employee based on sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, or other protected attributes.  Religious organizations and schools remained able to make employment decisions based on an employee’s religious beliefs where they were critical to the subject matter of the job, such as a religious studies teacher.  The new laws prohibit religious organizations that receive government funding to provide services from denying these services based on a person’s sexual origination or gender identity.  The Human Rights Law Alliance, a Christian charitable law firm set up to protect and advance religious freedom, stated that the law would result in religious schools being “unable to make hiring decisions that preserve the Christian ethos and mission of the school.”

Most state and territory governments at varying times imposed temporary restrictions on movement to control the spread of COVID-19, including requiring residents to stay at home unless commuting for a designated purpose, such as to purchase groceries or for essential work.  These restrictions, typically put into effect in response to specific outbreaks, affected religious gatherings, including funerals and weddings, although many religious groups continued to hold services online.  While a small number of religious leaders expressed concern, most of the religious community accepted the restrictions, which supported state and federal health measures as necessary for keeping the pandemic in check.

COVID-19 restrictions enacted by NSW on June 25 for the Greater Sydney region included bans on all in-person gatherings including those at churches.  Churches and congregations moved to a virtual format for services.  In August, police fined 31 parishioners from the Blacktown Christ Embassy Sydney Church 1,000 Australian dollars ($730) each, and the church 5,000 Australian dollars ($3,600) for an August 22 service.  On September 9, the NSW government announced that on the first Monday after the state achieved the 70 percent fully vaccinated rate, churches could welcome in-person fully vaccinated worshippers.

The Sydney Morning Herald reported that in September the NSW health minister said anyone going to church unvaccinated would be “committing a breach of the public health orders.”  Religious leaders including senior Anglican and Catholic clergy requested exemptions from the vaccination requirement, saying they had a responsibility to minister to all regardless of immunization status.  Although authorities allowed places of worship to open on October 11 for fully vaccinated individuals, Catholic churches, some Anglican churches, and the largest mosque in Sydney announced they would delay reopening until the 80 percent vaccination threshold was reached on October 18, so that unvaccinated worshipers would not be turned away.  As of October 18, when the state had reached 80 per cent vaccination rate, all worshippers were welcome regardless of vaccination status.

The Victoria government continued to restrict all public gatherings in Melbourne, setting a goal of having at least 70-80 percent of the eligible population fully vaccinated before lifting restrictions.  Religious organizations conducted services online, supported by religious community and church leaders, except for several Orthodox Jewish leaders, who insisted on in-person service.  In August, Melbourne Jewish leaders urged the community to maintain compliance with all COVID-related public health measures after a widely publicized engagement party attended by dozens of members of the Orthodox Jewish community in contravention of public health orders.  In September, Melbourne’s Orthodox Jewish community wrote a letter to the state government signed by nine rabbis calling on the government to allow small prayer groups to gather during Yom Kippur.  The state denied this request, citing public health concerns.  Police issued 11 fines of 5,452 Australian dollars ($4,000) each in response to several small Orthodox Jewish gatherings that breached COVID public health restrictions during Rosh Hashanah in September.

On September 19, the Victoria government announced its road map to exit the lockdown, maintaining some restrictions on density and numbers allowed to attend religious services, restrictions that sources stated were slightly more accommodating than requirements imposed on industries.  In September, Bishop Paul Barker of the Anglican Diocese of Melbourne told media he feared the unvaccinated would be treated like “the lepers of Jesus’ day,” noting tensions between public health measures and religious values.  Also in September, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne Peter Comensoli said he was not comfortable with a “vaccine passport” requirement for attending worship.  During the same month, the head of the Islamic council of Victoria, Adel Salman, said he supported a “no double-jab, no entry” policy for mosques.

State and territory governments administered grant programs supporting multicultural and multifaith communities throughout the country.  In response to the COVID-19 pandemic and an increase in incidents of antireligious behavior, such as abuse targeted at the Islamic and Jewish communities, the Victoria state government continued its interfaith community fund, offering up to 50,000 Australian dollars ($36,400) to faith-based organizations, including funding for the Islamic Society of Victoria and the Uniting Church Synod of Victoria, for activities that supported harmonious relations among faith communities.

In March, the Victoria state parliament published a report that examined the potential for expanding or extending protections under the anti-vilification laws, vilification being defined as engaging in conduct against another person or group in public that incites hatred, serious contempt, revulsion, or severe ridicule.  Parliament examined the effectiveness of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001, sought evidence of increasing vilification and hate conduct in Victoria, and examined online vilification.  The Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council praised the report, specifically its recommendation “to establish a criminal offence that prohibits the display of symbols of Nazi ideology, including the Nazi swastika with considered exceptions to the prohibition.”  The parliament in Victoria completed soliciting public comments on laws that would strengthen protections against religious discrimination and vilification.  In response, in September, the Victoria government announced it would make Nazi symbols including the swastika illegal and make civil and criminal vilification easier to prove so that victims could seek justice through the courts more easily.  Following the Victoria government’s announcement, the Tasmania state government suggested in September that it would observe Victoria’s implementation of the anti-swastika law with a view to potentially enacting similar laws in the future.  The NSW Labor Party in September proposed a bill to ban the display of Nazi symbols including swastikas and Nazi flags, with exceptions for swastikas used in connection with Hinduism and Buddhism.  The proposal included sentences of six months and fines ranging from 5,500 Australian dollars ($4,000) for individuals to 55,000 Australian dollars ($40,000) for organizations who violated these guidelines.

The parliament in NSW completed soliciting public comments on laws to strengthen protections against religious discrimination.  In March, an NSW state parliamentary inquiry recommended an amendment to the state antidiscrimination law that included the protection of individuals from discrimination on the grounds of religious beliefs or activities.  In September, the NSW government committed to support legislation outlawing religious discrimination – but only after the enactment of proposed federal antireligious discrimination legislation, citing the need to understand interaction between the two and address any constitutional inconsistencies.  Equality Australia opposed the NSW bill and criticized it for “allowing people to use religion to hurt others (including other people of faith)” and making it “harder for employers and educational institutions to respond to inappropriate, offensive or discriminatory conduct” when that conduct was motivated by religious belief.

Special Religious Education remained in place in NSW public schools.  Government-approved Special Religious Education providers included representatives of Christian denominations, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and other religious groups.  During the year, the NSW government provided assistance to public schools to implement religious and ethics classes.

In March, Western Australia Premier Mark McGowan stated that his government would ban gay conversion therapy.  The Australian Christian Lobby (ACL), a group which seeks to bring Christian influence into politics, criticized the proposed ban as “draconian,” stating it could interfere with parental rights.  At year’s end, the ban remained unimplemented.

In May, the state government-run Perth Theatre Trust (PTT) rejected an application from the ACL to use the publicly-owned Albany Entertainment Centre.  The PTT originally defended the rejection on the grounds the ACL’s event was politically motivated and did not represent the views of the Western Australia government.  Several LGBTQI+ advocacy groups welcomed the ban, including Albany Pride, which said the ACL had “a long history of opposing and speaking out against any kind of advancement in LGBTQIA+ rights and freedoms”.   The PTT later reversed its decision.

The Australian Multicultural Council continued to provide guidance to the government on multicultural affairs policy and programs.  The government’s national multicultural policy, entitled “Multicultural Australia – United, Strong, Successful,” continued to be based on a government-wide approach to maintaining social cohesion, and included religious freedom as a component.

The government continued to begin each session of parliament with a recitation of a short prayer, followed by the Lord’s Prayer, as has been the practice since 1901.  Participation in the prayers remained optional.

In February, a group of men in Western Sydney, purportedly members of the Indian community, attacked four Sikh students.  Police investigated the attack but did not label it a hate crime.  Community leaders said divisions within the Indian-Australian community had grown, accusing “Hindu nationalists” of using Facebook and WhatsApp to spread divisive rhetoric targeting minority religious groups within the community, including Sikhs and Muslims.

In August, after a cluster of COVID-19 cases emerged at the Islamic al-Taqwa College, Principal Omar Hallak told media that for the second year running, families and students received “racial comments” on social media, blaming the Muslim community for Victoria’s sixth lockdown.

Twenty to thirty white supremacists rallied in a Victoria national park in January, chanting white power slogans and “Heil Hitler.”  The group timed the rally to coincide with the 76th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp.  Police did not charge the group, stating the individuals did not break any laws; however, state Premier Daniel Andrews told media there was evidence “evil and wicked” antisemitism was on the rise in Victoria.

In August, the Victoria government’s “COVID Commander” apologized to Melbourne’s Orthodox Jewish community after naming the group among those who tested positive for the virus during a COVID-19 media briefing, saying it was a “poor choice of words.”

Melbourne Jewish organizations reported an increase in antisemitic messages and social media posts after news reports emerged featuring video footage of an engagement party in August in the Jewish community that broke the state’s COVID lockdown rules.

In March, the Australian Muslim Advocacy Network filed a complaint with the Australian Human Rights Commission against Facebook under the national Racial Discrimination Act for direct and indirect discrimination and liability for hate speech.  At year’s end, the commission continued to investigate the complaint.  The network also sent Facebook a letter in March outlining its concerns about the spread of hate speech and dangerous conspiracy theories directed towards Muslims on the site.

In Melbourne, Victoria, an antisemitic group placed stickers during an August 21 anti-lockdown demonstration with the Star of David and a QR code linking to a video claiming the Jewish community was responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.

The ECAJ reported 447 antisemitic incidents involving threats or abuse during the period October 1, 2020 to September 30, 2021, compared with 331 in the October 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020 period.  According to the council, incidents increased in several more serious categories, including direct verbal abuse, harassment, and intimidation (147 compared with 128 in 2020), graffiti (106 compared with 42 in 2020), and stickers/posters (72 compared with 28 in 2020).  Physical assaults remained at the same number (eight).

The Community Security Group (CSG), which oversees the specialized and specific security needs of the Jewish community in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and Western Australia under the auspices of the ECAJ, released a report on antisemitic incidents in 2020 in which it stated there were 356 reported incidents throughout the country.  The CSG recorded a 21 percent decrease in antisemitic incidents compared with 2019.

In May, police opened an investigation after closed circuit television recorded an unidentified man wearing a balaclava putting up posters around Perth’s northern suburbs that included imagery that was hostile towards Jews.  By year’s end, the perpetrator had not been arrested due to what police described as difficulties in identifying him.

The federal census form included “Greek Orthodox” as the only Christian Orthodox religious group, omitting other groups such as Coptic, Macedonian, Russian, Serbian, and Ukrainian.  In Perth, the Orthodox religious groups that were omitted raised concerns about the form.

Uyghur Muslims reported harassment and threats in the country from the Chinese Communist Party.

The Australian Human Rights Commission published a study in July entitled, “Sharing the Stories of Australian Muslims,” based on a national survey of the country’s Muslims.  The study found 80 percent of survey participants experienced some form of unfavorable treatment based on their religion, race, or ethnicity.  The most common situations in which respondents experienced unfavorable treatment were when dealing with law enforcement (50 percent); in the workplace or when seeking employment (48 percent); at a shop or restaurant (43 percent); or online (43 percent).

The Victoria State Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission received 44 complaints involving religion from July 2020 to June 2021, an 18 percent increase from the previous period.  Of these complaints, 19 occurred in the provision of goods and services, 13 in education, eight in employment, and four in accommodation.

Embassy and consulate staff engaged with government officials to advance religious freedom issues and promote religious tolerance, including use of social media in response to COVID-19-related pandemic restrictions and lockdown measures that had an impact on the religious community.  They also engaged with religious leaders, faith communities, and groups on religious tolerance issues and to promote religious freedom.

On May 23, the president of the Uyghur Association of Victoria hosted the Melbourne Consul General for an event with community members, discussing the importance of countering threats to religious freedom.  Social media posts on the embassy and consulates’ engagement related to Uyghurs reached 110,000 persons with 8,000 engagements.

In September, the Perth Consul General spoke at the Multicultural Eid al-Adha Carnival in Perth, one of the largest multicultural events held in Western Australia with more than a thousand attendees, highlighting the importance of religious tolerance and the important role religious diversity plays in Australia and the United States.  In May, the Perth Consul General attended the University of Western Australia Muslim Students Association community iftar and discussed ways to promote diversity, inclusion, and religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 8.9 million (midyear 2021).  According to religious groups and government estimates, Roman Catholics constitute 55 percent of the population, and Muslims – predominantly Sunni – 8 percent, while approximately 25 percent is unaffiliated with any religion.  According to estimates from religious groups, Eastern Orthodox churches (Russian, Greek, Serbian, Romanian, Antiochian, and Bulgarian) constitute 5 percent of the population, and Protestants (Augsburg and Helvetic confessions) 3.2 percent.  Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, and other Christian and non-Christian religious groups.

Legal Framework

A combination of historical and modern constitutional documents guarantees freedom of “conscience and creed.”  The law provides for freedom of religious belief and the rights of all residents to join, participate in, leave, or abstain from association with any religious community.  The law stipulates, “Duties incumbent on nationals may not be impeded by religious affiliation.”

Several constitutional provisions protect religious freedom.  The main pillars are historical laws on fundamental rights and freedoms, including religious freedom, and treaties and conventions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which form part of the constitution.  Antidiscrimination legislation prohibits discrimination on religious grounds.  Citizens have the right to sue the government for constitutional violations of religious freedom.

The law prohibits public incitement to hostile acts against a church group, religious society, or other religious group if the incitement is perceivable by “many people,” which an official government commentary on the law and the courts interpret as 30 or more individuals.  The prohibition also applies specifically in the case of incitement in print, electronic, or other media available to a broad public.  The law also prohibits incitement, insult, or contempt against religious groups, if such action violates human dignity.

The law divides registered religious groups into three officially recognized legal categories (listed in descending order of rights, privileges, and legal responsibilities):  religious societies, religious confessional communities, and associations.  Members of religious groups not legally recognized may practice their religion at home, “insofar as this practice is neither unlawful nor offends common decency.”

There are 16 recognized religious societies:  the Roman Catholic Church; Protestant churches (Augsburg and Helvetic confessions); the IGGO; Old Catholic Church; IKG; Eastern Orthodox Church (Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, and Antiochian); The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; New Apostolic Church; Syrian Orthodox Church; Coptic Orthodox Church; Armenian Apostolic Church; Methodist Church of Austria; the Buddhist Community; Jehovah’s Witnesses; Alevi Community in Austria; and Free Christian Churches.

The law grants registered religious societies the right to public practice and independent administration of their internal affairs; to participate in the program requiring mandatory church contributions by church members; to bring religious workers into the country to act as ministers, missionaries, or teachers; and to provide pastoral services in prisons and hospitals.  Under the law, religious societies have “public corporation” status, permitting them to engage in several public or quasi-public activities, such as government-funded religious instruction in both public and private schools, which the government denies to confessional communities and associations.  The government grants all recognized religious societies tax relief in two main ways:  donors do not pay taxes on donations, and the societies receive exemption from property tax for all buildings dedicated to the active practice of religion or administration of such.  Additionally, religious societies are exempt from a surveillance charge, otherwise payable when the state provides security to religious groups, and administrative fees for garbage collection and other municipal services.  Responsibilities of religious societies include a commitment to sponsor social and cultural activities that serve the common good and – like all religious groups – to ensure their teachings do not violate the law or ethical standards, which the law does not define.

Religious groups seeking to achieve religious society status for the first time must apply for recognition with the Office for Religious Affairs in the Federal Chancellery.  Religious groups recognized as societies prior to 1998 retained their status.  The government grandfathered in 14 of the 16 recognized religious societies under this provision of the law.  To gain recognition as a religious society, religious groups not recognized prior to 1998 must have membership equaling 0.2 percent of the country’s population (approximately 17,700 persons) and have existed for 20 years, at least five of which must have been as a confessional community.  The government recognizes Jehovah’s Witnesses and Alevi Muslims as religious societies under these post-1998 criteria.  Groups that do not meet these criteria may still apply for religious society status under an exception for groups that have been active internationally for at least 100 years and active as an association in the country for 10 years.  Groups sharing a broad faith with an existing society or confessional community, for example Christianity, may register separately as long as they can demonstrate that they have a different theology.

The law allows religious groups not recognized as societies to seek official status as confessional communities with the Office for Religious Affairs.  The government recognizes 10 confessional communities:  the Baha’i Faith, Movement for Religious Renewal-Community of Christians, Pentecostal Community of God, Seventh-day Adventists, Hindu Community, Islamic-Shia Community, Old-Alevi Community in Austria, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, United Pentecostal Community of Austria, and Sikhs.

A recognized confessional community has the juridical standing needed to engage in such activities as purchasing real estate in its own name and contracting for goods and services, but it is not eligible for the financial and educational benefits available to recognized religious societies.  Contributions to confessional communities’ charitable activities are tax deductible for those who make them and tax free for the groups receiving them, but the communities are not exempt from property taxes.  Confessional communities may provide pastoral care in prisons and hospitals.

To gain government recognition as a confessional community, a group must have at least 300 members and submit to the Office for Religious Affairs its statutes describing the goals, rights, and obligations of members as well as membership regulations, a list of officials, and financing information.  A group must also submit a written description of its religious doctrine, which must differ from that of any previously recognized religious society or religious confessional community.  The Office for Religious Affairs determines whether the group’s basic beliefs are consistent with public security, order, health, and morals and with the rights and freedoms of citizens.  A religious group seeking to obtain confessional community status is subject to a six-month waiting period from the time of application to the chancellery.  After this period, groups that have applied automatically receive the status unless the government issues a decree rejecting the application.

Religious groups not qualifying for either religious society or confessional community status may apply to become legal associations, a status applicable to a broad range of civil groups.  Some groups organize as associations while waiting for the government to recognize them as confessional communities.

The Church of Scientology and several smaller religious groups, such as Sahaja Yoga and the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, have association status.

According to the law, any group of more than two persons pursuing a nonprofit goal qualifies to organize as an association.  Groups may apply to the Ministry of Interior to obtain such status.  To become an association, a group must submit a written statement citing its common, nonprofit goal and commitment to function as a nonprofit organization.

Associations have juridical standing, the right to function in public, and many of the same rights as confessional communities, including the right to own real estate and to contract for goods and services.  Associations may not offer pastoral care in hospitals or prisons or receive tax-deductible contributions.

Pursuant to the law governing relations between the government and the Roman Catholic Church, the Church is the only religious group to receive government funding for pastoral care it provides in prisons.  The law also makes various Catholic holidays official national holidays.

The law governing relations between the government and the IGGO and Alevi Muslim groups stipulates that funding for the day-to-day operations of mosques must be derived from domestic sources, Islamic teachings and practices must not violate federal law (compliance with which is determined by the Office for Religious Affairs), and Islamic institutions should “take a positive stance” toward the state and society.  The law provides an explicit legal definition of, and legal protection for, Islamic practices, such as circumcision and preparation of food in conformity with religious rules, and states Muslims may raise children and youth in accordance with Islamic traditions.  Muslim groups with at least 300 members and a theology not distinct from a pre-existing Islamic religious society or confessional community are considered cultural communities and fall under the umbrella of the pre-existing, legally recognized Islamic religious society or confessional community.  This includes the IGGO and the Alevi Community in Austria, which are both religious societies, or the Islamic-Shia Community and the Old-Alevi Faith Community in Austria, both of which have confessional community status.  The law allows for Islamic theological university studies, which the University of Vienna offers.

An amendment to the law pertaining to Muslims passed in July as part of an antiterrorism package provides for stricter annual government monitoring of the finances of mosques and Muslim cultural associations, focusing on financial flows from abroad.  The legislation, which entered into force September 1, also allows the Federal Chancellery to request a list of all Muslim officials and associations and makes it easier to close mosques to “protect public security,” with the approval of the IGGO.  The IGGO must report changes in Muslim associations, such as changes in by-laws, leadership, and funding to the Office for Religious Affairs, so that authorities have up-to-date information on such associations.  The law also empowers Ministry of Interior officials, who already review requests to establish new associations, to scrutinize such requests to ensure that they are not “cover organizations” for religious groups attempting to bypass the transparency requirements for mosques.  The antiterrorism package also introduced a new statutory offense banning “religiously motivated extremism.”

Separate laws govern relations between the government and each of the other 14 state-recognized religious societies.  The laws have similar intent but vary in some details, since they were enacted at different times over a span of approximately 140 years.  As with the Muslim community, a law provides explicit protections for Jewish religious practices, including circumcision and ritual slaughter.

The law bans full-face coverings in public places as a “violation of Austrian values,” with exceptions made only for artistic, cultural, or traditional events, in sports, or for health or professional reasons.  Failure to comply with the law is an administrative violation.  The law prescribes a 150 euro ($170) fine but does not entitle police to remove the face covering.

In accordance with a Constitutional Court ruling in 2020 that overturned a headscarf ban for children in elementary school, children of all ages may wear headscarves and other head coverings in schools.

The government funds, on a proportional basis, religious instruction for any of the 16 officially recognized religious societies by clergy or instructors provided by those groups for children in public schools and government-accredited private schools.  The government does not offer such funding to other religious groups.  A minimum of three children is required to form a class.  Attendance in the respective religion classes is mandatory for all students who are members of those religious groups unless they formally withdraw at the beginning of the school year; students younger than age 14 require parental permission to withdraw from religion classes.  Religious instruction takes place either in the school or at sites organized by religious groups.  Some schools offer ethics classes for students not attending religious instruction.  Religious education and ethics classes include the tenets of different religious groups as comparative religious education.

The curriculum for both public and private schools includes compulsory antibias and tolerance education, including religious tolerance, as part of civics education across various subjects, including history and German-language instruction.

Holocaust education is part of history instruction and is also part of other courses such as civics.

The Equal Rights Agency, an independent agency falling under the jurisdiction of the Federal Chancellery Minister for Women, Family, Youth, and Integration, oversees discrimination cases, including those based on religion.  The agency provides legal counseling and mediation services, and it assists with bringing cases before the Equal Treatment Commission, another independent government agency.  In cases where it finds discrimination, the commission makes a recommendation for corrective action.  In a case of noncompliance with the recommendation, the case goes to court.  The commission may issue expert reports for plaintiffs to present before the court.  Only a court may order corrective action and compensation.

The law bans neo-Nazi activity and prohibits public denial, belittlement, approval, or justification “of the National Socialist genocide” or other Nazi crimes against humanity in print, broadcast, or other media.

The law prohibits incitement, insult, or contempt against a group because of its members’ race, nationality, religion, or ethnicity if the statement violates human dignity, and it imposes criminal penalties for violations.

On January 1, a law on hate speech, including religiously motivated hate speech, went into effect requiring online platforms to identify and delete posts that can be classified as hateful or defamatory.  It broadens the definition of hate speech to include single offenses, cyberbullying, and photographs taken surreptitiously, for which a person may be prosecuted in court.  The law also facilitates means of recourse by allowing individuals subjected to online hate speech to seek redress directly with the relevant communication platform, rather than go through civil courts.  It mandates companies to designate a contact person to whom affected individuals and government authorities can send complaints, and it requires platforms to issue annual reports on how they received and processed hate speech complaints.  Repeated failure by the platform to comply could lead to fines of up to 10 million euros ($11.34 million).  The law applies only to large for-profit communication platforms with more than 100,000 users and revenues of 500,000 euros ($567,000) or more per year.  Videos on video-sharing platforms such as YouTube or Facebook are excluded, as they are subject to a separate EU law, but comments on the videos fall under the new law.

The law extends citizenship to direct descendants of Austrian victims of Nazi crimes.  Descendants may obtain citizenship by reporting to Austrian consulates.  Dual citizenship is also possible.

The law bans certain symbols the government considers extremist, including those pertaining to the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, al-Qaida, Hizballah, and the Croatian Ustasha.

The government requires a visa for visitors from non-visa-waiver countries or individuals who would stay beyond 90 days, including religious workers of confessional communities or associations.  Foreign religious workers of groups recognized as confessional communities or associations must apply for a general immigrant visa that is not employment or family based and is subject to a quota.  Foreign religious workers belonging to religious societies also require immigrant visas but are exempt from the quota system.  Religious workers from Schengen or EU-member countries are exempt from all visa requirements.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The IGGO expressed objections to the amendment of the law pertaining to Muslims enacted in July as part of the government’s antiterrorism legislation, stating it was discriminatory and interfered with religious freedom and the internal affairs of the Muslim community.  The provisions in the amendment pertained only to Islam.  IGGO president Umit Vural said he was also disappointed the government did not engage with the IGGO on the provisions of the amendment.  Responding to his criticism, both Justice Minister Alma Zadic and Integration Minister Suzanne Raab stated the new legislation was in no way designed to target a specific religious group.  The Office for Religious Affairs stated all religious groups in the country must adhere to the same restrictions concerning foreign funding and violating federal law and that only Islamic groups had violated either of these restrictions.

The Federal Chancellery’s Documentation Center for Political Islam, which was established in 2020, continued its research on what it described as politically motivated Muslim extremism.  It stated that it made its research available to the general public to promote awareness of Muslim extremism, pluralism, and religious freedom, while also staging workshops and publishing studies relevant to Muslim extremism.  In October, the Federal Chancellery hosted the Vienna Forum on Countering Segregation and Extremism in the Context of Integration, which brought together officials from Austria, Denmark, Belgium, and France as well as experts in the field to find avenues for cooperation on fighting “political Islam.”  The four countries agreed to begin joint cooperation projects in fighting radicalization and Islamic extremism, focusing on exchanging best practices and cooperation in research.  The Federal Chancellery said it would host the forum annually and seek cooperation with other countries as well.

In May, the Documentation Center for Political Islam created a website featuring an “Islam Map” compiled by the University of Vienna’s Institute for Muslim Theological Studies, listing Islamic institutions in the country, including mosques, Muslim associations, and prayer rooms.  The Islam Map had already been available through the university’s website, but it only became widely known publicly after the government posted it to the Documentation Center’s website in June.  Religious, political, and civil society groups criticized the map.  Green Party integration spokeswoman Faika El-Nagashi called it “the opposite of what integration policy and dialogue should look like on an equal footing,” while IGGO President Umit Vural called it dangerous and said attacks against Muslims rose after the posting of the map.  Cardinal Christoph Schoenborn, the head of the Catholic Church in the country, called it “dangerous to give the impression that one of the religious communities is under general suspicion,” and asked why one of the country’s many religious communities was singled out.  In June, following the posting of the map, individuals began to use the map to “out” certain locations as Muslim with posters and signs reading or “Beware!  Political Islam is here.”  The government briefly took the map down in June before reposting it online a few weeks later.  Also in June, the Muslim Youth Organization of Austria filed a complaint against the University of Vienna professor who compiled the map, the University of Vienna, and the Documentation Office on Political Islam, stating the map violated data privacy rules.

In January, the Federal Chancellery Minister for the EU and Constitution, Karoline Edtstadler, presented a national strategy to combat antisemitism and established an office in the Federal Chancellery to coordinate measures by all ministries to implement the new strategy.  The strategy focused on addressing antisemitism when educating new refugees and establishing security for the Jewish community, guidelines for tracking and prosecuting antisemitic incidents, and standards for EU-wide data comparison.  It recommended increasing protection of synagogues, improving education about Judaism in schools and awareness campaigns, more vigorous prosecution of hate speech, and closing loopholes in the law pertaining to right-wing extremist groups and their symbols.  Edtstadler stated that combatting antisemitism was a central priority of the government.  Vice Chancellor Werner Kogler said the strategy reflected the country’s historic responsibility to combat antisemitism, and he warned against right-wing extremists exploiting protests against COVID-19 restrictions to spread antisemitism.  Jewish community president Oskar Deutsch welcomed the strategy, saying it would ensure the security and continuity of Jewish life in the country.

The Federal Office of Sect Issues offered advice to persons with questions about groups that it considered “sects” and “cults.”  The office was nominally independent but government funded, and the Minister of Women, Family, Youth and Integration appointed and oversaw its head.

In June, the government declared it had fulfilled the responsibilities of the Arbitration Panel for In Rem Restitution under the Law on the General Settlement Fund for Victims of National Socialism.  Parliament unanimously took note of the Final Report of the Arbitration Panel.  The Arbitration Panel was established in 2001 under the provisions of the Washington Agreement to decide on applications for in rem restitution of publicly owned property and movable assets for the previous owners and their heirs.

In August, an appellate court in the Styrian provincial capital of Graz ruled that nine police raids against Muslim Brotherhood individuals and associations in 2020 were illegal.  The Graz appellate court ruled that raids targeting terrorist financing were illegal because they were not based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.  The court said there was no evidence that every member of the Muslim Brotherhood was “also a member of or promoted a terrorist organization, in particular Hamas.”  Individuals detained in the raids, who were reportedly questioned and released, had told media the raids were “mere guesswork by the police” and that there was no evidence of terrorist financing.

Revenue authorities continued to investigate Islamic associations that they said might have evaded taxes, which would result in the loss of charity status for those associations.  At year’s end, authorities had not stripped any Islamic associations of their charity status.

The Federal Office for Foreigner Affairs and Asylum (BFA) continued to refuse to issue or renew residence permits for foreign imams financed by foreign sources.  There were no reports that other religious groups faced similar problems in obtaining residence permits for their foreign clerics, as those clerics are not financed by foreign sources according to the BFA.

At year’s end, the Vienna-based, Saudi Arabia-funded King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue remained open, despite a foreign ministry announcement in 2019 that it would close the center, consistent with a nonbinding parliamentary resolution calling on it to do so because of Saudi Arabia’s human rights record.  In October, Saudi Arabia announced it would move the center to Lisbon, although it did not indicate a timetable for the relocation.

In January, four online platforms, not publicly identified, sought an exemption from the new law on hate speech, stating it should not apply to them because they had offices in Ireland, but the Vienna Commercial Court rejected the claim.  Officials in the Ministry for Digital and Economic Affairs and the Federal Chancellery reported companies were complying to varying degrees, and some proceedings to penalize noncompliant companies were underway, but they did not provide details.  By year’s end, KommAustria, an independent telecommunications supervisory authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the law, had not levied penalties on any companies.

Following the IKG’s April presentation of its annual report on antisemitic incidents in 2020, EU and Constitution Minister Edtstadler said much remained to be done and that it was important to implement the government’s strategy to fight antisemitism adopted in January.  Vice Chancellor Kogler also stated combatting antisemitism remained a major challenge.

In March, Parliamentary President Wolfgang Sobotka presented the results of a survey of citizens commissioned by parliament that found antisemitism had become more visible during the COVID-19 pandemic due to the circulation of conspiracy theories regarding the pandemic’s origin.  Of 2,000 persons polled in late 2020, 28 percent agreed with the statement that “Jews today try to take advantage of the fact that they were victims during the Nazi era.”  Another 26 percent agreed that “Jews dominate the international business world.”  Forty-nine percent of respondents agreed that it was citizens’ “moral responsibility to stand by Jews” in the country.  The study’s authors, the Institute for Empirical Social Research and the Demox research institute, said that, despite better efforts to combat antisemitism in the country, a vocal minority exploited public frustration with health and safety restrictions and demonstrations against COVID-19 restrictions as public platforms to make antisemitism more visible and exploit the right to assemble to spread conspiracy theories against Jews.  Sobotka praised the study, saying it offered a chance to “grow awareness of the problem of antisemitism, which in turn is the basis for an actual change in the attitudes of Austrians,” adding that the country could not afford to view antisemitism as just a marginal phenomenon in society.  Sobotka also criticized opposition Freedom Party (FPOe) Floor Leader Herbert Kickl for his participation at demonstrations in March against COVID-19 restrictions, where Sobotka said right-wing extremists had spread antisemitic messages equating persons affected by COVID-19 restrictions with Holocaust victims.  In his speech at a demonstration against COVID-19 restrictions, Kickl accused Israel of “vaccination apartheid.”

The international NGO Anti-Defamation League continued to conduct teacher-training seminars on Holocaust awareness in schools in the country, reaching approximately 100 teachers.  School councils and the Ministry of Education, Science, and Research continued to invite Holocaust survivors to talk to school classes about National Socialism and the Holocaust.

In September, Parliamentary President Sobotka presented the restored grave of the Epstein family, a renowned Jewish family that lived in Vienna in the 19th century, at the historic Waehring Jewish cemetery in Vienna to the IKG.  Parliament had financed and organized the restoration project.  Sobotka stated the cemetery was a “unique memorial for Jewish life in Vienna.”

The Vienna Prosecutor’s Office declined to prosecute the FPOe for incitement after the party posted slogans that equated traditionally dressed Muslims with radical, violent Islamism during Vienna municipal elections in October 2020.  The Association of Social Democrat Academics had sought incitement charges against the FPOe.

In May, Education Minister Heinz Fassmann announced the establishment of a research office on right-wing extremism and antisemitism with the Documentation Center of the Austrian Resistance Movement, an NGO that monitors right-wing extremism.  The center also provided schools with material for Holocaust education and supported investigations into right-wing extremists.

The government continued to allow headwear for religious purposes in official identification documents, provided the face remained sufficiently visible to allow for identification of the wearer.

According to statistics presented by Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg in September, the government granted citizenship to 6,600 descendants of Austrian victims of Nazi crimes, including persons from the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom.

The city of Vienna continued work on the Campus of Religions, which it financed and launched in 2019.  Vienna unveiled the winning design for the campus in September, which contains eight buildings on 2.5 acres of land and is expected to be completed in 2028.  The campus is planned as a site where the Catholic, Evangelical, and Orthodox Churches, as well as Sikhs, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and members of the New Apostolic Church will exercise their own religious activities, while also working together.  Its designated function is to serve to promote faith, respect, diversity, and ideological tolerance.  Alongside the interfaith University College of Teacher Education of Christian Churches Vienna/Krems, the campus is designed to be a meeting point that encourages dialogue between religions, science, and education, and it will include access for the general public.

The government did not impose any COVID-19 restrictions on religious gatherings, relying on religious organizations to regulate their own gatherings.  Religious groups worked with government officials to establish COVID-19 guidelines that mirrored each other, which Catholic and Muslim leaders stated helped create unified restrictions that eliminated confusion and risk among their congregations.  There were no reports of widespread dissatisfaction among religious community members about the restrictions.

In October, the country opened its redesigned exhibit at the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum commemorating the victims and acknowledging the role of Austrian perpetrators in the Holocaust.

The government inaugurated the Shoah Wall of Names Memorial in Vienna in November listing the names of the country’s 66,000 Jewish Holocaust victims.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

According to the Ministry of Interior, there were 20 antisemitic and three anti-Muslim crimes reported to police in the first half of the year.  In all of 2020, there were 36 antisemitic and 16 anti-Muslim crimes, compared with 30 and six such crimes, respectively, in 2019.  The ministry said its figures included only incidents that were reported to it and in which authorities filed criminal charges, and the ministry attributed all the crimes in the three years to right-wing extremists.  Most incidents, according to the ministry, involved hate speech.  The ministry did not provide details on any of the incidents.

The IGGO’s Documentation Center on Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Racism reported that there were1,402 anti-Muslim incidents in 2020 (1,051 in 2019).  The 2020 data were the most recent available.  In 2015, the first full year in which it collected such statistics, IGGO reported 156 anti-Muslim incidents.  The IKG reported 585 antisemitic incidents (550 in 2019) in the same year.  From January to June, the IKG recorded 562 incidents, more than twice the 257 in the first half of 2020.  Most incidents in 2021 consisted of hate speech or insults on the internet, although there were also 11 cases of violent threats and eight physical assaults.  The data were the most recent available.  Both groups included incidents regardless of whether they were reported to police or criminal charges were filed.  Most 2020 antisemitic and anti-Muslim cases concerned hate speech and insinuations of violence on the internet (1,019 cases), followed by insulting language and property damage.  Eight cases involved physical assaults.  The IGGO reported men were more likely to experience anti-Muslim behavior on the internet, while Muslim women were more likely to experience it in person in significant part because of their visible face or head coverings.

The IKG reported antisemitic incidents in the first half of the year included eight physical assaults, 58 cases of property damage, 154 mass mailings, and 331 threats.  Examples of antisemitic incidents included one in Vienna in May in which a group of teenagers were apprehended for throwing rocks at a Jewish family in traditional clothes, and antisemitic graffiti at the Vienna Jewish Museum in May.  The IKG attributed the increase in incidents in part to antisemitic messages at demonstrations against COVID-19 restrictions.

In July, the Ministry of Interior presented its first report on hate crimes.  The report listed 1,936 hate crimes between November 2020 and April 2021, primarily directed against persons of a different religion, opinion, or ethnicity.  The report stated 309 of the cases were religiously motivated.

In May, two days before the annual event commemorating the liberation of the Mauthausen concentration camp, police disbanded a demonstration against COVID-19 restrictions attended by approximately 30 persons in Mauthausen after the organizer played a Hitler video.

In May, on the International Day against Racism and Violence, the Ministry of Interior reported several antisemitic postings on its Facebook site and launched investigations to identify the authors.

In May, demonstrators chanted “Allahu Akbar” and “Child Murderer Israel” and waved Palestinian flags during an anti-Israel/pro-Palestinian rally in Vienna.  The IKG appealed to its members to stay away from the area of the demonstration and warned that the political situation in Israel could pose a threat to Jewish communities in Europe.  Police launched investigations into the use of antisemitic slogans during the demonstration, while Integration Minister Raab and then Interior Minister Karl Nehammer warned that the right to assemble should not be abused to make antisemitic statements.  Authorities arrested and questioned 11 individuals but released them without filing charges.

In May, the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement against Israel held demonstrations with pro-Palestinian groups to protest Israeli house evacuations in East Jerusalem.

In a video on Twitter that became publicly known in January, Martin Sellner, head of the pan-European nationalist Identitarian movement, widely described as right-wing extremist, called People’s Party member of parliament Martin Engelberg an infamous hypocrite, antipatriotic traitor, despicable person, and “destroyer of the homeland” who has “abandoned any Christian values.”  Sellner was reacting to a December 2020 statement in which Engelberg criticized FPOe Parliamentary Floor Leader Kickl for not distancing himself from the Identitarian movement.  Sellner also praised Kickl for “taking a stance” against persons like Engelberg.  EU and Constitution Minister Edtstadler condemned Sellner’s message as antisemitic and also called upon the FPOe and Kickl to distance themselves from the Identitarian movement.  In June, Engelberg obtained an injunction from the Vienna Commercial Court that ruled that Sellner must cease the slanderous statements about Engelberg.

In September, the Brussels-based NGO Action and Protection League issued the results of its European antisemitism survey based on data from December 2019-January 2020.  According to the survey, 18 percent of 1,000 respondents ages 18-75 in Austria said they had negative feelings towards Jews, and 26 percent said they would be “totally uncomfortable” or “uncomfortable” with having Jewish neighbors.  The survey cited stereotypical statements about Jews and asked respondents the degree to which they agreed or disagreed.  The proportion who responded “strongly agree” or “tend to agree” with the following statements were:  “The interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population” (26 percent); “there is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world” (30 percent); “Jews have too much influence in this country” (21 percent); “Jews will never be able to fully integrate into this society” (28 percent); “Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals” (22 percent); “many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later” (17 percent); “Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them” (19 percent); “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes” (40 percent).

At the July presentation of a Council of Europe survey on online hatred against Muslims conducted among Muslim associations in eight European countries, the council’s special representative on antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred cited the country’s “Islam map” as a negative example fueling discrimination.  The study stated the authors of hate postings were usually “anti-migration, right-wing groups, and – especially in Austria – the Identitarian movement.”

A counseling center in Vienna managed by the Society Against Sect and Cult Dangers, an NGO that described itself as an organization working against harm caused by “destructive cults” such as Scientology, continued to distribute information to the general public and provide counseling for former members of such groups.  All provinces funded family and youth counseling offices that provided information on “sects and cults.”

In October, the Graz Provincial Court for Criminal Matters convicted a Syrian man of assaulting Graz Jewish Community president Elie Rose in Graz in 2020 and vandalizing the Graz synagogue and a lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex community center.  The court sentenced him to three years in prison, stating the man could not be dissuaded from his anti-Jewish sentiments.  In response to the attack, the Graz Jewish Community continued to receive additional police protection, and the government continued to provide orientation and values courses on antisemitism for refugees.

According to the IGGO report covering 2020, in June of that year a woman insulted and hit a Muslim woman on the head with a newspaper, causing her hijab to slip off on one side.  The woman complained that none of several persons sitting in a nearby sidewalk cafe came to help her.  In September 2020, a woman assaulted another woman wearing a headscarf on a city bus in Vienna, spitting on her, pulling on her headscarf, and shouting she should go back to Turkey.  Property damage cited in the report included an arson attack against a Somali cultural association and prayer room in Vienna in May 2020.

A report presented in June by the NGO Initiative for Discrimination-Free Education listed a total of 186 cases of discrimination in schools in 2020 (403 cases in 2019), of which it attributed 15 percent to anti-Muslim sentiment and 2 percent to antisemitism.  While the NGO said the sharp drop in total discrimination cases was due to the reduced physical presence of students in schools due to COVID-19, the percentage of incidents motivated by anti-Muslim sentiment (approximately 31 percent of total discrimination cases in 2019) and antisemitism (approximately 11 percent of total cases) also dropped significantly.  Examples included statements by a physics teacher in Vienna who said in 2020 in front of her Muslim students that Muslims were responsible for a November 2020 terrorist attack in Vienna by a man police identified as an ISIS sympathizer.  In another example, a sports teacher suggested to a 12-year-old student who was wearing a headscarf that she should go to another country if she wanted to continue wearing it.

The organizers of the annual May gathering of Croatians and Bosnians in Bleiburg, Austria to commemorate Nazi-allied Croatian troops and civilians killed in 1945 canceled the event after parliament passed a resolution in 2020 prohibiting the event.

In June, a court in the Carinthian provincial capital of Klagenfurt convicted a man of neo-Nazi activity and illegal possession of weapons and sentenced him to a 19-month prison sentence.  The man had a Nazi symbol tattoo on his testicles.

In January, the court in Klagenfurt convicted a man of neo-Nazi activity and sentenced him to 24 months in prison, 16 months of which were suspended.  The man had performed the Hitler salute in 2019 and had a swastika tattoo.

In January, the Vienna Criminal Court issued a six-month suspended prison sentence on incitement charges for an imam whom it convicted of making antisemitic statements in a sermon in 2018.  The imam said, “Allah hates the Jews; they are the worst kuffars (unfaithful).”

Fourteen Christian groups, consisting of the Roman Catholic Church, various Protestant denominations, and eight Orthodox and Old Oriental Churches, continued to meet twice a year within the Ecumenical Council of Churches in Austria to discuss religious cooperation.  The Christian groups coordinated with other religious groups and the government to create a unified set of COVID-19 restrictions on all religious services in 2020 and 2021.  Baptists and the Salvation Army had observer status on the council.  Two permanent working groups on “Religion and Society” and “Media” remained in place.

The Ambassador, Charge d’Affaires, and other embassy representatives met regularly with government officials – including from the Federal Chancellery’s Office of Religious Affairs; the Federal Chancellery’s Ministry for Women, Family, Youth and Integration; the Division of Dialogue of Cultures at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Ministry of Interior – to discuss religious freedom and the protection of religious minorities.  Topics included the concerns of religious groups, integration of Muslim refugees, cooperation with religious groups in combating terrorism, and measures to combat antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiment.

The Ambassador and Charge d’Affaires met with religious group representatives from the IGGO, IKG, and Roman Catholic Church to discuss their relations with the coalition government, instances of discrimination, and interreligious dialogue, as well as how their communities were handling the COVID-19 pandemic.  Embassy officers also met with religious youth groups, such as the Muslim Youth Organization of Austria and the Jewish Student Association, to discuss issues such as antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiment.  Embassy officers met with Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim leaders to discuss interreligious relations, especially relating to the rise of antisemitism and the government’s strategy combating “political Islam.”

Embassy representatives continued to serve on the International Advisory Board of the Mauthausen Memorial Agency to promote Holocaust remembrance and education.

The embassy continued its engagement with the Muslim Youth Organization of Austria (MJOe) to promote religious dialogue and tolerance both in-person and virtually.  In February, the embassy cohosted a virtual live event with the MJOe featuring an American professor who spoke about the important role of youth in social movements.  The speaker shared lessons from the U.S. civil rights movement with religiously diverse youth audiences across the country.

In continuing to highlight members of diverse faith groups, the embassy’s Women’s History Month social media campaign featured two Muslim Austrian women, including the president of MJOe, as well as a youth reporter and former participant in an embassy-sponsored exchange program.  Their video commentaries were shared across embassy platforms to an audience that is not often exposed either to Muslims or to women from other religious groups.

The embassy also continued to work closely with the Jewish community to promote religious tolerance and fight antisemitism.  In April, the Charge d’Affaires was interviewed for a Mauthausen Committee video created as part of World War II commemoration events.  In September, together with a local NGO that focuses on antisemitism and the Holocaust, the embassy hosted a discussion with a group of Holocaust survivors.  Family stories and personal memories shared during the program are to become part of a podcast project to reach younger audiences.  The embassy amplified the event on social media, which garnered attention from several influential Jewish entities in Vienna.

In July, embassy staff hosted an event with representatives of the Jewish community to discuss Holocaust education.  In May, the embassy again supported the annual commemoration of the liberation of the Mauthausen concentration camp through messages on its social media channels that focused on the importance of religious freedom and Holocaust remembrance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 10.3 million (midyear 2021).  According to 2011 SCWRA data (the most recent available), 96 percent of the population is Muslim, of which approximately 65 percent is Shia and 35 percent Sunni.  Groups that together constitute the remaining 4 percent of the population include the Russian Orthodox Church; Georgian Orthodox Church; Armenian Apostolic Church; Seventh-day Adventists; Molokan Church; Roman Catholic Church; other Christians, including evangelical churches, Baptists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses; Jews; and Baha’is.  Ethnic Azerbaijanis are mainly Muslims, and non-Muslims are mainly Russians, Georgians, Armenians, and other national minorities.  Others include the International Society of Krishna Consciousness and those professing no religion.

Christians live mainly in Baku and other urban areas.  Approximately 15,000 to 20,000 Jews live in Baku, with smaller communities throughout the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates the separation of religion and state and the equality of all religions and all individuals regardless of belief.  It protects freedom of religion, including the right of individuals to profess, individually or together with others, any religion, or to profess no religion, and to express and spread religious beliefs.  It also provides for the freedom to carry out religious rituals, provided they do not violate public order or public morality.  The constitution states no one may be required to profess his or her religious beliefs or be persecuted for them; the law prohibits forced expressions or demonstrations of religious faith.

Under the legal code, a nonviolent crime is considered an administrative offense.  An administrative arrest may last up to three months.

The law requires religious organizations – termed “associations” in the country’s legal code and encompassing religious groups, communities, and individual congregations of a denomination – to register with the government through the SCWRA.  The SCWRA manages the registration process and may appeal to the courts to suspend a religious group’s activities.  A religious community’s registration is tied to the physical site where the community is located, as stated in its application.  A subsequent move or expansion to other locations requires reregistration.  Registration allows a religious organization to hold meetings, maintain a bank account, rent property, act as a legal entity, and receive funds from the government.

To register, a religious organization must submit to the SCWRA a notarized application signed by at least 50 of its members, a charter and founding documents, the names of the organization’s founders, and the organization’s legal address and bank information.

By law, the government must rule on a registration application within 30 days, but there are no specified consequences if the government fails to act by the deadline.  Authorities may deny registration of a religious organization if its actions, goals, or religious doctrine contradict the constitution or other laws.  Authorities may also deny registration if an organization’s charter or other establishment documents contradict the law or if the information provided is false.  Religious groups may appeal registration denials to the courts.

The Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) is registered by the SCWRA as a foundation and oversees the activities of registered Islamic organizations, including training and appointing clerics to lead Islamic worship, periodically monitoring sermons, and organizing pilgrimages to Mecca.  Muslim communities must receive an approval letter from the CMB before submitting a registration application to the SCWRA.

The law bans activities by unregistered religious groups, punishable by fines or imprisonment.

While the law prohibits the government from interfering in the religious activities of any individual or group, there are exceptions for suspected extremist or other illegal activity.  The law states government entities and citizens have rights and responsibilities to combat “religious extremism” and “radicalism.”  The law defines religious extremism as behavior motivated by religious hatred, religious radicalism (described as believing in the exceptionalism of one’s religious beliefs), or religious fanaticism (described as believing no one outside of one’s religious group may criticize that group).  According to the law, this behavior includes forcing a person to belong to any specific religion or to participate in specific religious rituals.  It also includes activities seeking to change by force the constitutional structure of the country’s government, including its secular nature; setting up or participating in illegal armed groups or unions; and engaging in terrorist activities.  The law penalizes actions that intend to change the constitutional order or violate the territorial integrity of the country on the grounds of religious hatred, radicalism, or fanaticism, with prison terms ranging from 15 years to life.

The law specifies circumstances under which religious organizations may be dissolved, including if they act contrary to their founding objectives; cause racial, national, religious, or social animosity; or proselytize in a way that degrades human dignity or contradicts recognized principles of humanity such as “love for mankind, philanthropy, and kindness.”  Other grounds for dissolution include hindering secular education or inducing members or other individuals to cede their property to the organization.

Amendments signed into law in June include a new requirement for the SCWRA to approve the appointment of all non-Islamic religious leaders.  The new amendments forbid individuals from forcing children to practice religion; prohibit the promotion of religious extremism; disallow religious leaders from engaging in religious activities when employed by the state; provide government-approved religious centers the sole right to grant religious titles; require religious centers to coordinate with the government when opening religious education institutions; restrict religious ceremonies (with exceptions) to places of worship; require believers to inform the government about travel to foreign countries to visit religious sites; grant the government authority to approve the appointment of religious figures in non-Islamic religious communities; require religious communities to suspend activity when they lose a religious leader until a new one is appointed; and allow military service members to worship in their spare time, with the exception of during combat operations.  The law also contains a new requirement for the reattestation every five years of Muslim clerics who are appointed by the CMB; reattestation is conducted with the involvement of State Committee officials.  Smaller communities without a “religious center” are not allowed to grant religious titles or ranks to the clergy; apply for permission to have foreign citizens as religious leaders; establish religious educational establishments; organize visits by their adherents to shrines and religious locations abroad, or exercise other rights that are attributed only to “religious centers.”  Mass religious worship, rites, and ceremonies (with some exceptions) may as a rule be held only in places of worship and shrines.  SCWRA permission is required under the June amendments to hold religious “mass events” anywhere other than at state-approved places of worship or shrines.

Rituals and ceremonies related to Islam may be performed only by citizens of the country.  The law allows foreigners invited by non-Islamic registered religious groups to conduct religious services, but it prohibits citizens who received Islamic education abroad from leading religious ceremonies unless they obtain special permission from the CMB.  Penalties for violating the law include up to one year’s imprisonment or fines from 1,000 to 5,000 manat ($590-$2,900).  A longstanding agreement between the government and the Holy See allows foreigners to lead Catholic rituals.

The administrative code prohibits “clergy and members of religious associations from holding special meetings for children and young people as well as the organizing or holding meetings by religious bodies of organized labor, literary, or other clubs and groups unassociated with holding religious ceremonies.”

The law restricts the use of religious symbols and slogans to inside places of worship.

According to the law, the SCWRA reviews and approves all religious literature for legal importation, sale, and distribution.  Punishments for the “production, sale and distribution of religious literature (on paper and electronic devices), audio and video materials, religious items, and other informational materials of religious nature with the aim of importation, sale and distribution without appropriate authorization” are proscribed by law.  Punishments for first-time offenders include a fine of between 5,000 and 7,000 manat ($2,900-$4,100), up to two years’ restricted freedom, or up to two years’ imprisonment.  Violations by a group of individuals “according to a prior conspiracy,” an organized group, an individual for a second time, or an official carry a fine of between 7,000 and 9,000 manat ($4,100-$5,300), between two and four years’ restricted freedom, or imprisonment of between two and five years.  In June, amendments to the criminal code entered into force that added the alternative punishment of “restriction of freedom” (probation) – two to four years in cases involving an individual first-time offender and two to five years in aggravated cases – to the preexisting punishments.

There is no religious component in the curriculum of public or private elementary or high schools; however, students may obtain after-school religious instruction at registered institutions.  Students may study religion at higher educational institutions, such as the Azerbaijan Institute of Theology, and the CMB sponsors some religious training abroad.  The law prohibits individuals who pursue foreign government-supported or privately funded religious education abroad without permission from the government from holding official religious positions, preaching, or leading sermons after returning to the country.

Although the constitution allows alternative service “in some cases” when military service conflicts with personal beliefs, there is no legislation permitting alternative service, including on religious grounds.  Refusal to perform military service is punishable under the criminal code by imprisonment of up to two years or forced conscription.

The law stipulates the government may revoke the citizenship of individuals who participate in terrorist acts; engage in religious extremist actions; undergo military training abroad under the guise of receiving religious education; propagate religious doctrines in a “hostile” manner, which the law does not further define; or participate in religious conflicts in a foreign country under the guise of performing religious rituals.

According to the constitution, the law may restrict the participation of “religious officials” in elections and bars them from election to parliament.  The law does not define “religious officials.”  The law prohibits religious leaders from simultaneously serving in any public office and in a position of religious leadership.  It proscribes the use of religious facilities for political purposes.  By law, political parties may not engage in religious activity.

The constitution prohibits “spreading propaganda of religions humiliating people’s dignity and contradicting the principles of humanism,” as well as “propaganda” inciting religious animosity.  The law also prohibits threats against, or expressions of contempt for, persons based on religious belief.

The law prohibits proselytizing by foreigners but does not prohibit citizens from doing so.  In cases of proselytization by foreigners and stateless persons, the law sets a punishment of one to two years in prison.

The law prohibits the use of headscarves in passport photos.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On June 16, President Aliyev signed into law amendments to the religious freedom law.  Among other provisions, the new amendments prohibit the promotion of religious extremism, disallow religious leaders from engaging in religious activities when employed by the state, provide government-approved religious centers the sole right to grant religious titles, and require religious communities to suspend their activities in the absence of a government-approved religious leader.  The government justified the amendments by the need for security.  Civil society said the changes provided the SCWRA even more control over religious groups.  Parliament passed the amendments into law on June 4, following closed door discussions.  Human rights groups criticized the laws as lacking public scrutiny and increasing restrictions on the exercise of freedom of religion or belief.  When speaking to the international religious freedom NGO Forum 18, lawyer Asabali Mustafayev called the amendment regarding mass religious worship “dangerous” and noted the absence of a requirement regarding the number of participants for a meeting to be considered “a mass event.”  The amendments also specified, “It is forbidden to force children to believe in religion.  The religious upbringing of children shall not adversely affect their physical and mental health”; the provision was challenged by civil society as a vague one that could lead to abuse and the limitation of freedom of religion.  A representative of the CMB said the amendment would not apply to the “traditional” religions of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, but only to “certain religious movements whose participation in rituals and religious conversations is not considered appropriate by the state,” such as “satanic currents.”

According to Forum 18, registered religious communities, including Jews, Georgian Orthodox, Baptists, Pentecostals, Lutherans and other Protestants, Baha’is, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and International Society of Krishna Consciousness Krishna devotees (who are considered religious communities) seemed unlikely to gain the status of a religious center under existing laws.  The government considered only the CMB, the Russian Orthodox diocese of Baku and Azerbaijan, and the Roman Catholic Apostolic Prefecture to be religious centers.

he government continued to physically abuse, arrest, and imprison religious activists.

In a judgment issued on June 10, the ECHR ruled the government had violated the rights of seven appellants, followers of the late Turkish religious scholar Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, after what the court ruled was their unlawful detention and their subsequent fines in June 2015.  The appellants, Emin Alakbarov, Javanshir Ismayilov, Elmir Jabrayilov, Sabuhi Mammadov, Samir Huseynov, Rovshan Gasimov, and Parvin Yunusov, were followers of Said Nursi’s teachings of Islam.  They were gathered at the private home of one of the appellants in the city of Gadabay when several police officers raided the premises, taking the group to the Gadabay District Police Department and detaining them for 14 hours.  Six were subsequently fined for violating public order and the man hosting the gathering was fined for violating the legislative rules on organizing and holding religious meetings.  The ECHR found that the applicants’ deprivation of liberty was unjustified, arbitrary, and unnecessary, and it ruled that the government had violated the right to liberty and security contained in the European Convention on Human Rights.  The ECHR awarded compensation of 3,000 euros ($3,400) to each of the seven, plus costs of 1,000 euros ($1,100) for all the cases jointly, to be paid to their main lawyer, Rustam Mustafazade.  The ECHR rejected the complaint of unlawful interference by the domestic authorities with the right to freedom of religion because the appellants failed to exhaust domestic remedies.  According to Forum 18, Asabali Mustafayev, a Baku lawyer who also worked on the cases, said all involved were “a little dissatisfied” with the ECHR judgments, as the court had not looked at all aspects of the violations included in the cases.  He described the 3,000 euros ($3,400) awarded to each individual as “a highly miserly sum,” especially as it included recompense for the fines that each had paid.  He also described the sum awarded for legal costs as “very little, given that it covered legal costs for seven cases.”

On May 20, the ECHR adopted a judgment in favor of Afruza Maharramova and Sadaya Huseynova, who founded the NGO Religion and Women’s Rights.  National authorities had rejected their application for state registration, thus denying their organization legal status.  The two women, from the southern town of Masalli, applied in 2011 to the Justice Ministry for registration of the NGO.  The ministry twice in 2011 and twice in 2012 sent the application back, citing what it said were irregularities in the documentation.  The NGO challenged the denial through the courts, finally losing in the Supreme Court in November 2013.  Maharramova and Huseynova filed a case with the ECHR in April 2014.  According to Forum 18, the ECHR examined the case, together with 11 others involving NGOs in which the government had denied legal status, and awarded compensation of 4,500 euros ($5,100) jointly to Maharramova and Huseynova, plus costs of 6,000 euros ($6,800) for all the cases together, to be paid to their lawyer, Intigam Aliyev.

On May 27, the ECHR ruled that the case of Protestant Christian Rahim Akhundov was inadmissible on grounds of his failing to comply with timelines for filing court proceedings.  Akhundov had filed a case before the ECHR concerning his dismissal from his job as a parliamentary staffer in Baku in 2018.  He stated that after he met friends and relatives at his Baku home for Christian worship, study, and discussion, he was dismissed from his job at the Milli Majlis (national assembly) on the orders of the State Security Service.  Akhundov lost his final appeal in 2020 before the Supreme Court.

On April 26, the United Nations Human Rights Committee published a report that found the government had violated the rights of six Jehovah’s Witnesses in Aliabad in the northern Zagatala District in 2013.  The six were detained in a police raid, taken to a police station, had religious literature seized, and were then fined (or in one case, given an official warning).  The committee found that “by arresting, detaining, convicting, and fining [six Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2013] for possessing religious literature and holding a peaceful religious service in a private home, the State party [Azerbaijan] violated their rights under article 18 (1) [“Freedom of thought, conscience and religion”] of the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].”  The committee defined an “effective remedy” for each (including reimbursement of the 1,500 manat ($880) fines handed down on five of them and any court fees) and called on the government to amend laws and practice to avoid future violations.  According to Forum 18, Jehovah’s Witnesses from the country have six other freedom of religion or belief cases pending with the United Nations Human Rights Committee.

Throughout the year, national courts continued reviewing appeals and held a trial for the final 10 individuals detained after a 2018 assault on Elmar Valiyev, the then head of the Ganja City Executive Committee, and a related demonstration against local government authorities.  In response to the 2018 events, police killed five persons and detained 77 others during special operations in Ganja, Shamkir, Sumgait, and Baku.  The government said the convicted individuals were part of a Shia “extremist conspiracy” to destabilize the country.  Civil society activists and human rights advocates considered the majority of the verdicts to be politically motivated.  The Union for Freedom for Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan identified as political prisoners 47 individuals in prison at year’s end who were connected to the events in Ganja.  Human rights groups reported that three persons imprisoned in connection with the Ganja case were released by presidential pardon in March.  The sentences of several others were reduced, and/or some charges dropped during appeals hearings during the year.  The final trial connected to the Ganja events ended in August.  According to the judgment, nine persons considered political prisoners received sentences ranging from 18 to 20 years.

Authorities continued legal action against individuals associated with the unregistered group MUM.  Authorities maintained the movement mixed religious and political ideology and said they were concerned about its ties to Iran.  As in prior years, human rights advocates and other civil society activists characterized the charges as baseless and designed to preclude political activity.  According to data collected by human rights advocates, at year’s end, the estimated number of political prisoners who were members of religious groups was 21 (not including the 47 who were arrested in Ganja), compared with 41 to 48 in 2020.  According to human rights defenders, the decrease in the number of those defined by human rights groups as “religious activists” in detention was largely due to a Presidential decree adopted in March that pardoned 38 political prisoners overall, including 30 individuals arrested during 2015 raids in Nardaran that targeted individuals whom the government said were fundamentalist, had external support, and wanted to establish an Islamic state.

On May 24, the Agjabadi court placed MUM member Vugar Hajiyev in pretrial detention for a four-month period after he was arrested on drug-related charges on May 21.  MUM said the drug charges were baseless and called his arrest politically motivated.  Following his arrest, MUM issued a statement blaming the government for “going back to its Islamophobic attitudes” and demanding the release of Hajiyev.  Another MUM member, Razi Humbatov, was arrested on June 7, and on June 9, he was placed in pretrial detention on drug-related charges.  He told his family that he had been tortured and had signed a confession under duress.  Human rights groups said they considered both Hajiyev and Humbatov to be political prisoners.

MUM member Elvin Murvatoglu, who was arrested in March 2020 for illegal possession of weapons and sentenced to two years and three months in prison, was released on September 13 before the completion of his prison sentence.  According to MUM, Murvatoglu was known as an activist and was also the author of many poems and songs about Tale Bagirzade, the chairman of the MUM.  Human rights groups included him in their list of political prisoners and linked his arrest to his songs in praise of Bagirzade.

On October 19, law enforcement detained several Shia clerics, including Ilgar Ibrahimoglu and theologian Sardar Babayev.  Ibrahimoglu was released; Babayev was criminally charged for treason under the criminal code.  Babayev rejected the treason charges, saying they were politically motivated.  The court ruled to place him in pretrial detention for four months pending trial.

Some Christian communities again stated that the SCWRA had made efforts to create more favorable conditions for their activities than in prior years, such as by becoming more responsive to their requests and concerns and establishing closer communication with them.  In the past, Jehovah’s Witnesses were among those targeted by the police and other state officials.  “At the moment we don’t have any problems with the police or the State Committee,” a community member from Baku told Forum 18 on June 15.  He said, “Even before the pandemic, the State Committee’s representatives were very cooperative if we had problems with the police or other state agencies.”

The government again did not implement a civilian alternative to mandatory military service for conscientious objectors, despite being required to do so by the constitution.  On October 7, the ECHR adopted a judgement in the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses Emil Mehdiyev and Vahid Abilov, who were convicted in 2018 and received one-year probation sentences for criminal evasion of military service.  The ECHR accepted the government’s admission that it had violated the human rights of both men and ordered that they be paid compensation and costs in the amount of 3,500 euros ($4,000) for each defendant.  The ECHR’s October decision brought to seven the number of conscientious objectors from the country whose human rights had been violated by the government according to the court, and to whom the government had to pay compensation.

During the year, the government articulated its potential readiness to change its policy towards conscientious objectors.  The head of the SCWRA, Mubariz Gurbanli, who had previously opposed such accommodation, said after the country’s victory in the 2020 conflict with Armenia that the time had come for the country to adopt a religious exemption to military conscription.  He expressed his willingness to promote this idea to members of parliament.  Later in the year, however, a representative of the Presidential Administration stated that alternative service was not under discussion.

At year’s end, the SCWRA registered 16 new religious communities (all Muslim), compared with 14 religious communities registered in 2020 (12 Muslim and two Christian).  There were a total 971 registered communities at the end of the year, of which 37 were non-Muslim – 26 Christian, eight Jewish, two Baha’i, and one International Society of Krishna Consciousness.  The SCWRA also said 2,253 mosques, 16 churches, seven synagogues, and 11 religious education institutions were registered.  There were 23 Christian prayer houses (worship spaces that did not have the status of a church), one Baha’i house of worship, and one Krishna Consciousness house of worship in the country at year’s end.

The SCWRA said it continued to provide letters authorizing previously registered communities to operate, based on their pre-2009 registrations.  While the SCWRA maintained its prohibition on these communities’ religious activities in locations not covered under their pre-2009 registration status, it occasionally granted exceptions upon request.

The government said the inability of some groups to obtain registration stemmed solely from the groups’ inability to meet the law’s requirement of 50 members and that the government did not take administrative action against unregistered religious communities.  The government said reducing the minimum number of members below 50 would invite religious extremist groups supported by Iran and would cause security concerns.  Religious communities continued to state frustration with government registration requirements, particularly the 50-member minimum.  However, the government did allow small religious communities to band together under one organization’s umbrella, even if they were based in different cities, which facilitated the successful registration of some groups.  A Baptist minister visiting the country said he met with several small, unregistered Baptist groups that were able to hold services based on the registration of another Baptist community.  Jehovah’s Witnesses remained registered only in Baku.  Regional branches of Baptists and Jehovah’s Witnesses stated they were unable to obtain legal registration, although they stated they were able to worship openly despite being unregistered.  Some Protestant and home-based church leaders stated their inability to obtain legal registration forced them to keep their activities quiet for fear of government repercussions.

The government continued to control the importation, distribution, and sale of religious materials.  Some smaller non-Muslim communities reported no difficulty in importing religious literature and described continuing improvement in relations with the government.

During the year, Kamala Rovshan, a student, launched a social media campaign advocating for women and girls to be able to submit passport photos while wearing a headscarf.  In March, Commissioner for Human Rights Sabina Aliyeva stated her support for lifting the restriction and permitting the wearing of a headscarf in passport photos.

The government continued to allocate funds to “traditional” religious groups.  On July 8, President Aliyev signed a decree allocating two million manat ($1.18 million) to the CMB for Muslim communities and 350,000 manat ($206,000) each to the Baku Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church and the religious community of Mountain Jews, the same amounts as in 2020.  The decree also allocated 150,000 manat ($88,200) each to the European Jewish community, the Albanian-Udi community, and the Catholic Church of Baku, and 100,000 manat ($58,800) to the Moral Values Promotion Foundation, the same amounts as in 2020.  The Moral Values Promotion Foundation used the funds to support some smaller non-Muslim religious communities.

In a resolution on “Humanitarian consequences of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” adopted on September 27, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) stated, “The long running conflict has had a catastrophic impact on the cultural heritage and property of the region, for which both Armenia and Azerbaijan have a responsibility.”  PACE condemned the damage “deliberately caused to cultural heritage during the 6-week war, and what appeared to be the deliberate shelling of the [Holy Savior Cathedral] in Shusha and the destruction or damage of other churches and cemeteries during and after the conflict.”  The resolution also stated PACE remained “concerned, in the light of past destruction, about the future of the many Armenian churches, monasteries, including the Dadivank monastery, and cross-stones and other forms of cultural heritage which have returned under Azerbaijani control.”  The resolution expressed “concern about a developing narrative in Azerbaijan promoting a ‘Caucasian Albanian’ heritage to replace what is seen as an ‘Armenian’ cultural heritage.”  There were numerous reports during the year of vandalism and destruction of Armenian cultural and religious sites, as well as deliberate actions by the government to sever and distort the connection of religious sites to their Armenian heritage.  Government actions and rhetoric stating churches were “Caucasian Albanian” prompted international observers, Armenian officials, civil society representatives, and the Armenian Apostolic Church to express grave concerns about the preservation of Armenian ties to historical and religious sites now under Azerbaijani control.

For example, on May 4, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the Azerbaijani-funded reconstruction of the Holy Savior Cathedral in Shusha was “in accordance with the original architectural style in order to restore the historical image of Shusha” and attributed renovations of the site to reflect “Caucasian Albanian” heritage.  Armenian officials said such statements attempted to conceal the church’s Armenian roots and structure, including the original spire.  In a letter to UNESCO, Armenia’s acting Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sports Vahram Dumanyan accused Azerbaijan of actively implementing “a policy of falsification of historical facts” by calling the sites of Armenian cultural heritage in newly returned territory “Caucasian-Albanian.”  On September 27, Caucasus Heritage Watch (CHW) reported the Azerbaijani government embarked on an extensive campaign after the November 2020 ceasefire to claim Armenian heritage sites either do not exist or have “Caucasian Albanian” origins.

Following the November 2020 ceasefire, leaders of the Armenian Apostolic Church requested Russian peacekeepers protect the medieval Dadivank Monastery in the district of Kealbajar.  The government initially allowed Armenian pilgrims to visit the church, but access became increasingly difficult throughout the year.  According to media reports and Armenian Apostolic Church authorities, two groups of pilgrims were denied access to the monastery in February and April; Forum 18 reported in July that no Armenian pilgrims had been able to visit the monastery since May 2.  Azerbaijani authorities cited COVID-19, flooding, and road damage as reasons for denying access to groups of pilgrims who were ready with Russian peacekeeper escorts to visit the monastery, according to the Armenian Apostolic Church.  By year’s end, in addition to the monastery, no Armenian pilgrims had been permitted visits to any religious site in Azerbaijani-controlled territory (where no Russian peacekeepers were present) since May 2.

CHW’s June and September reports identified other religious and historical sites under the government’s control that were destroyed, damaged, or under the threat of destruction due to proximate construction.  CHW reported the complete destruction of Mets Tagher Cemetery, an inscribed stone of Holy Savior Cathedral, and the Sghnakh Cemetery.  CHW also reported damage to the Holy Savior Cathedral, St. John the Baptist Church (Kanach Zham), Surb Meghretsots Church, and Shushi Northern Cemetery.  According to CHW, the following religious sites were threatened by nearby large-scale construction projects:  Saint Astvatatsin Church, Vankasar Church, and Amenaprkich Church.  In addition, CHW reported the destruction of the 18th century Aygek Mosque as a result of the construction of the Khudafarin-Gubadli-Lachin road along the Hakari/Aghavno River valley, following the November ceasefire.

CHW said it was concerned about the government’s reconstruction of the St. John the Baptist Church (also known as Kanach Zham/Green Church) located in Shusha.  Footage after the November 2020 ceasefire showed partial destruction of the dome and bell tower of the church.  According to a CHW analysis, the church previously had two cupolas; the analysis cited a February image taken from Google Earth showing a portion of the eastern cupola was still standing at that time.  CHW said that based on satellite imagery from April 10, the eastern cupola had been destroyed.

On May 26, BBC reported the removal of a cross atop St. Yeghishe Armenian Church in Sugovushan (Mataghis).  A video reposted in March by Armenia’s ombudsman Armen Tatoyan on social media had shown soldiers wearing Azerbaijani and Turkish insignia desecrating the church.

In June, The Art Newspaper published a report using satellite images that detailed the destruction of medieval Armenian churches in Agulis, Nakhchivan.  The churches were seen in 1977 images but were missing in images from 2016 and 2019.  The destruction included Surb Stepanos (Saint Stephen), likely founded in the 12th to 13th centuries, the medieval Surb Tovma (Saint Thomas), Surb Kristapor (Saint Christopher), Surb Hovhannes Mkrtich (Saint John the Baptist), and other ancient churches, such as Mets Anapat Surb Astvatasatsin (Greater Hermitage Holy Mother of God) and Surb Hakob Hayrapet (Saint Jacob of Nisibis).  The Art Newspaper also chronicled the destruction of Armenian heritage throughout Nakhchivan, which once included 89 churches, 5,840 cross-stones, and more than 22,000 tombstones, according to documentation from 1964-87 collected by independent researcher Argam Ayvazyan.  Because religion and ethnicity are closely linked, it is difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Local experts on religious affairs and civil society representatives stated citizens and civil society organizations continued to tolerate and, in some cases, support financially “traditional” religious minority groups, such as Jews, Russian Orthodox, and Catholics.  These sources also said that some individuals viewed groups with less of a historical presence in the country, such as Baptists and Jehovah’s Witnesses, with suspicion and mistrust.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers engaged government officials to advocate for the release of individuals that NGOs stated were imprisoned for their religious beliefs.  The Ambassador and embassy officers also continued to press the government to implement a civilian alternative to military service for conscientious objectors, as stipulated in the constitution.  They met with SCWRA and CMB officials to urge resolution of longstanding problems in the registration process for smaller religious communities and other obstacles faced by religious minorities.  The Ambassador advocated at the highest levels of government for the protection of religious and cultural sites in the newly returned territories.  The Ambassador consistently underscored to the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the importance of granting unimpeded access to religious and cultural sites to UNESCO representatives and international journalists.

The Ambassador and embassy officers continued to meet regularly with leaders of registered and unregistered religious communities and with representatives of civil society to discuss issues related to religious freedom, a civilian alternative to military service, and relations with the SCWRA.  The embassy protested the expulsion of a U.S. citizen who was active in the religious community because of an expired (nonrenewed) visa.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 352,000 (midyear 2021).  According to the most recent census in 2010, more than 90 percent of the population practices a religion.  Of those, Protestants make up 70 percent of the population – Baptists, 35 percent; Anglicans, 14 percent; Pentecostals, 9 percent; Seventh-day Adventists, 4 percent; Methodists, 4 percent; Church of God, 2 percent; and Brethren, 2 percent.  Twelve percent of the population is Roman Catholic.  Other Christians are 13 percent of the population, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Greek Orthodox Christians, and members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.  According to the census, 5 percent is listed as other, having no religion, or unspecified.  Other religious groups include Jews, Baha’is, Rastafarians, Muslims, Black Hebrew Israelites, Hindus, and followers of Obeah, which is practiced by a small number of citizens and some resident Haitians.  According to a leader of the Rastafarian community, there are more than 13,000 Rastafarians in the country.  The leader of the Jewish community estimates there are 1,000 Jews.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, thought, and religion, including the freedom to practice one’s religion.  It forbids infringement on an individual’s freedom to choose or change his or her religion, and prohibits discrimination based on belief.  Parliament may limit religious practices in the interest of defense, public safety, health, public order, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  The constitution refers to “an abiding respect for Christian values” in its preamble; however, there is no state-established religious body or official religion.

The practice of Obeah, an Afro-Caribbean belief system with some similarities to Voodoo, is illegal.  Those caught practicing it or attempting to intimidate, steal, inflict disease, or restore a person’s health through the practice of Obeah may face a sentence of three months in prison.  The publication and sale of any book, writing, or representation deemed blasphemous is punishable by up to two years in prison, but opinions on religious issues “expressed in good faith and in decent language” are not subject to prosecution under the law.  The government typically does not enforce this law.

The law does not require religious groups to register, but they must legally incorporate to purchase land.  There are no legal provisions to encourage or discourage the formation of religious communities, which have the same taxation requirements as profit-making companies if they incorporate.  To incorporate, religious groups follow the regulations applicable to nonprofit entities, requiring the “undertaking” of the religious organization to be “without pecuniary gain,” and that the group maintains a building for gathering.  In accordance with value-added tax (VAT) legislation, religious organizations seeking VAT exemptions must register with the Ministry of Financial Services, Trade and Industry and with the Department of Immigration and apply for exemptions on a case-by-case basis.

The law prohibits marijuana use, including for religious rituals.

Religion is a recognized academic subject at government schools and is included in mandatory standardized achievement and certificate tests.  Religion classes in government-supported schools focus on the study of Christian philosophy, Biblical texts, and, to a lesser extent, comparative and non-Christian religions.  Religious groups may establish private schools.  The constitution states no one shall be compelled to participate in religious instruction or observances of a religion other than his or her own.  It allows students, or their guardians in the case of minors, to decline to participate in religious education and observance in private schools.  Vaccinations are required to attend school.  The government permits home schooling and regulates it under the Ministry of Education.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The practice of Obeah remained illegal, but reports of violations were infrequent, as Obeah was generally practiced in private on remote islands with no discernable organizing body.  The Royal Bahamas Police Force, however, stated it investigated credible reports of its practice.

Some Rastafarians continued to state the government violated their constitutional right to religious freedom by prohibiting the legal use of marijuana in ceremonial rituals.  Rastafarians said police continued to arrest them for possessing small quantities of marijuana used in ceremonial rituals.  In August, the previous government received the final report of The Bahamas National Commission on Marijuana, a preliminary version of which recommended allowing medicinal and religious use, and it had advanced legislation to that end.  It was unclear at year’s end if the new administration of Prime Minister Davis would pursue the same or similar legislation.   In October, the government began reviewing expungement applications from individuals convicted of possession.

The Rastafarian community voiced concerns about possible mandatory COVID-19 vaccination requirements.  A Rastafarian leader said leaders of his community submitted a request to government officials in July to allow community members a religious exemption when accessing private institutions that required COVID-19 vaccinations.  He said the government did not respond to their request for a religious exemption by year’s end.

The leader of the Jewish community, Rabbi Sholom Bluming, expressed appreciation that the government allowed the Jewish community to utilize government-run networks to donate food to families throughout the country.

The government continued to include Christian prayer in significant official events. Government officials and members of parliament normally quoted religious teachings during speeches, and senior government officials in their official capacities occasionally addressed assemblies during formal religious services.

Some private entities required employees to either be vaccinated against COVID-19, which Rastafarians said they viewed as a violation of their religious beliefs, or pay for their own weekly tests.  Rastafarian leaders said those entities discriminated against employees who did not comply.

Embassy representatives met regularly with government officials from the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Discussions included promoting inclusive communities with a respect for human rights and religious diversity in the country.

Embassy officials met with representatives from the Muslim, Rastafarian, and Jewish communities, and with civil society leaders to discuss religious freedom, including the importance of governmental and societal tolerance for religious diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.5 million (midyear 2021).  The NGO World Population Review estimates the population is 1.7 million.  According to the national government, there are approximately 712,000 citizens, constituting less than half of the total population.  According to 2020 national government estimates, Muslims make up approximately 74 percent of the total population.  The Ministry of Information Affairs website states 99.8 percent of citizens are Muslims, while the remainder of citizens are Christians, Jews, Hindus, and Baha’is.  The ministry website states 70.2 percent of the total (citizen and noncitizen) population is Muslim and 29.8 percent adhere to other religions and beliefs, such as Christians (10.2 percent), Jews (0.21 percent), Hindus, Baha’is, Buddhists, and Sikhs.  According to Jewish community members, there are between 36-40 Jewish citizens (six families) in the country.

The government does not publish statistics regarding the breakdown between the Shia and Sunni Muslim populations.  Most estimates from NGOs and the Shia community state Shia Muslims represent a majority (55 to 65 percent) of the citizen population.

Most foreign residents are migrant workers from South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and other Arab countries.  According to national government 2020 census data, approximately 401,500 foreign residents are Muslim; 387,800 are Hindu, Buddhist, Baha’i, Sikh, or Christian (primarily Roman Catholic, Protestant, Syrian Orthodox, and Mar Thoma Syrian from South India).  According to Boston University’s 2020 World Religions Database, the population includes approximately 1.4 million Muslims, 205,000 Christians, and 109,000 Hindus.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, Islam is the official religion, and the state safeguards the country’s Islamic heritage.  The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, the inviolability of places of worship, freedom to perform religious rites, and freedom to hold religious parades and religious gatherings, “in accordance with the customs observed in the country.”  The constitution provides for the freedom to form associations as long as they do not infringe on the official religion or public order, and it prohibits discrimination based on religion or creed.  All citizens have equal rights by law.  According to the constitution, all persons are equal without discrimination on the basis of gender, origin, language, or faith.  The constitution states that sharia forms the principal basis for legislation, although civil and criminal matters are governed by a civil code.

The labor law pertaining to the private sector prohibits discrimination against workers on grounds of gender, origin, language, religion, or belief.  The labor law deems dismissal for religion to be arbitrary and illegal but does not provide an automatic right to reinstatement.  The law also prohibits wage discrimination based on religion, among other factors.  The Ministry of Labor and Social Development (MOLSD) investigates claims of discrimination where there is an existing labor relationship; it can escalate violations to the Public Prosecution Office.  The MOLSD does not have the authority to receive or manage complaints of religion-based discrimination in hiring.  There is no law on discrimination in public sector employment.

The constitution guarantees the right to express and publish opinions, provided these do not infringe on the “fundamental beliefs of Islamic doctrine” and do not prejudice the “unity of the people” or arouse discord or sectarianism.

The law prohibits anti-Islamic publications and broadcast media programs and mandates imprisonment of no less than six months for “exposing the state’s official religion to offense and criticism.”  The law states, “Any publication that prejudices the ruling system of the country and its official religion can be banned from publication by a ministerial order.”

Islamic religious groups must register with the MOJIA to operate.  Sunni religious groups register with the ministry through the Sunni Waqf (endowment), while Shia religious groups register through the Jaafari (Shia) Waqf.  MOJIA endowment boards supervise, fund the work of, and perform a variety of activities related to mosques and prayer halls.  Non-Islamic groups have the status of civil society organizations and as such must register with and receive a license from the MOLSD to operate.  To register, a group must submit an official letter requesting a license to operate; copies of minutes from the founders’ committee meeting; a detailed list of founders and board members, including names, ages, nationalities, occupations, and addresses.  It must also submit other information, such as the group’s bylaws, candidates who seek election to the organization’s governing board, a physical address, and bank account in a bank registered with the Central Bank of Bahrain.  The group must also request permission to receive funding or transfer funding.  Religious groups also may need approval from the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Information Affairs, or MOI, depending on the nature of the group’s intended activities.  The law prohibits associations from engaging in politics.  The law prohibits activities falling outside an organization’s charter.  The penal code does not specifically address the activities of unregistered religious groups but provides for the closing of any unlicensed branch of an international organization plus imprisonment of up to six months and fines of up to 50 dinars ($130) for the individuals responsible for setting up the branch.

According to the MOLSD’s website, the following non-Islamic churches and spiritual groups were registered with the ministry:  the National Evangelical Church, Bahrain Malaylee Church of South India Parish, Word of Life International Church, St. Christopher’s Cathedral, Church of Philadelphia, St. Mary and Anba Rewis Church (St. Mary’s Indian Orthodox Cathedral), Jacobite Syrian Christian Association and St. Peter’s Prayer Group (St. Peter’s Jacobite Syrian Orthodox Church), St. Mary’s Orthodox Syrian Church, Sacred Heart Catholic Church, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Church of Christ, Greek Orthodox Church, Pentecostal Church, Baps Shri Swaminarayan Mandir Bahrain (Hindu Temple), Indian Religious and Social Group (Hindu Temple), Spiritual Sikh Cultural and Social Group, St. Thomas Evangelical Church of Bahrain, Marthoma Parish, House of Ten Commandments Synagogue, Shri Krishna Hindu Temple, and the Baha’i Social Society.

The penal code calls for punishment of up to one year’s imprisonment or a fine of up to 100 dinars ($270) for offending one of the recognized religious groups or their practices or for openly defaming a religious figure considered sacred to members of a particular group.

There is no explicit legal prohibition against apostasy.  The penal code punishes any individual who insults another religious sect with up to one year in prison and a fine of up to 100 dinars ($270).  It punishes an individual for desecration of religious books with up to one year in prison and a fine of 100 dinars ($270).  The law also prohibits any person from imitating in public a religious ritual or ceremony with the intention of ridiculing it.

The law stipulates fines or imprisonment for insulting an institution, announcing false or malicious news, spreading rumors, encouraging others to show contempt for a different religious denomination or sect, illegally gathering, or advocating for a change of government, among other offenses.  The MOI’s Office of the Ombudsman, the Prisoners’ and Detainees’ Rights Commission, and the National Institute for Human Rights address the rights of prisoners, including the right to practice their religion.

The law allows prisoners to receive “alternative non-custodial sentences” in lieu of custodial sentences, provided such a sentence would not endanger public security.  The MOI supervises individuals following their release on an alternative sentence, and the trial judge and the public prosecutor determine their eligibility and conditions for an alternative sentence.  Alternative sentences may include community service, home detention, electronic surveillance, no-contact orders, or participation in rehabilitation programs.

The MOJIA oversees the activities of both the Sunni Waqf and the Jaafari Waqf, which are appointed by the King with recommendations from the president of the government-run and funded Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (SCIA).  The respective endowment boards supervise the activities of mosques and prayer halls, review and approve clerical appointments for religious sites under their purview, and fund expenses for the building and maintenance of religious sites.  The government allocates 2.7 million dinars ($7.16 million) annually to each endowment board.  Zakat (Islamic tithes), income from property rentals, and other private sources largely fund the remainder of the endowment boards’ operations.  The endowment boards may pay flat commissions and bonuses to preachers and other religious figures.

On January 20, the King issued a royal decree restructuring the Sunni and Jaafari Waqf directorates.  According to the decree, the Sunni and Jaafari endowments are overseen by two independent councils that fall under the direct supervision of “a minister in charge of endowments affairs.”  Each council manages its respective endowment, disburses revenues, and has full authority over endowment assets, including places of worship.  The endowments were previously under the direct supervision of the Minister of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Endowments.

The SCIA oversees general religious activities taking place within the country as well as the publication of Islamic studies school curricula and official religious texts.  The council consists of a chair, a deputy chair, and 16 religious scholars – eight Sunni and eight Shia, most of them prominent preachers or sharia judges.  The King appoints all council members to a four-year term.  Independent of other government scholarship programs, the council offers university scholarships to low-income students for advanced Islamic studies.  The SCIA reviews all legislation proposed by parliament to ensure that draft laws comply with sharia.  The council also consults with other government entities before issuing permits to new Islamic societies or centers.  The council is responsible for reviewing the content of Islamic programs broadcast on official government media, such as the official television station and official radio programs.  The council also organizes interfaith conferences and workshops.

The King has sole legal authority to allocate public land, including for religious purposes, although he may delegate this authority to government officials.  By law, construction of Islamic places of worship requires MOJIA approval.  Non-Islamic groups must obtain MOLSD approval.  Municipal authorities provide final approval for construction.  Citizens may also offer private land to build mosques.  Permission for construction of a new mosque, whether Shia or Sunni, requires a government determination of the need for a new mosque in the area.  The government also determines the need for non-Islamic houses of worship.  The law permits non-Islamic houses of worship to display crosses or other religious symbols on the outside their premises.

The law regulates Islamic religious instruction at all levels of the education system.  The government funds public schools for grades one through 12; Islamic studies based on Sunni doctrine are mandatory for all Muslim students and are optional for non-Muslims.  Private schools must register with the government and, with a few exceptions (for example, a foreign-funded and foreign-operated school), are also required to provide Islamic religious education for Muslim students.  Private schools wishing to provide non-Islamic religious education to non-Muslims must receive permission from the MOE.  Outside of school hours, Muslim students may engage in religious studies sponsored by the MOJIA, as their parents deem fit.

In coordination with the SCIA, a team of MOE-appointed experts routinely reviews and develops the Islamic studies portion of the public school curriculum to emphasize shared Islamic values between different Sunni and Shia schools of thought, reject extremism, and promote tolerance and coexistence.  According to the government, the SCIA provides financial assistance to the six registered hawzas (Shia seminaries); other hawzas choose to be privately funded.  The government does not permit foreign donors to contribute to privately funded hawzas.  There are no restrictions on religious studies abroad.  The government also permits non-Muslim groups to offer religious instruction to their adherents in private schools.

Specialized MOE-run religious schools provide more thorough religious instruction – the Jaafari Institute for instruction in Shia Islam and the Religious Institute for instruction in Sunni Islam – for students from elementary through high school.  The remainder of the curriculum is consistent with the nonreligious curriculum in other public schools.

Regarding family and personal status matters, the constitution states inheritance is a guaranteed right governed by sharia.  The constitution also guarantees the duties and status of women and their equality with men, “without breaching the provisions” of sharia.  The personal status law states that either the Sunni or Shia interpretation of sharia, depending on the religious affiliation of the parties, shall govern family matters, including inheritance, child custody, marriage, and divorce.  Mixed Sunni-Shia families may choose which court system will hear their case.  The provisions of the law on personal status apply to both Shia and Sunni women, requiring a woman’s consent for marriage and permitting women to include conditions in the marriage contract.  Non-Muslims may marry in civil or religious ceremonies; however, all marriages must be registered with a civil court.  Civil courts also adjudicate matters such as divorce and child custody for non-Muslims.

The government does not designate religious affiliation on national identity documents, including birth certificates.  Applications for birth certificates and national identity documents, however, record a child’s religion (either Muslim, Christian, Jewish, or other), but not denomination.  Hospital admission forms and school registration forms may also request information on an individual’s religion.

The constitution says the state shall strive to strengthen ties with Islamic countries.  It specifies that succession to the position of king is hereditary, passing from eldest son to eldest son.  The royal family is Sunni.

The law prohibits any individual from being a member of a political society or becoming involved in political activities while serving in a clerical role at a religious institution, including on a voluntary basis.

By law, the government regulates and monitors the collection of money by religious and other organizations.  Islamic organizations wishing to collect money must first obtain authorization from the MOJIA.  Non-Islamic organizations must obtain authorization from the MOLSD.  On August 4, the MOJIA issued an amendment to a royal decree regulating fundraising that requires the Sunni and the Jaafari endowments to submit to the ministry annual reports on funds they collect for religious purposes, including for the construction or renovation of places of worship.  The endowments must also deposit collected funds in a bank accredited by the Central Bank of Bahrain and notify the MOJIA.  The amendment bans the endowments from receiving money from abroad without MOJIA approval.

The law guarantees inmates of correctional facilities the right to attend burials and receive condolences outside prison.

The country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with reservations stating it interprets the covenant’s provisions relating to freedom of religion, family rights, and equality between men and women before the law as “not affecting in any way” the prescriptions of sharia.

Government Practices

Because religion and political affiliation are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

According to media, on November 21, the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal of a Shia preacher and upheld a one-year suspended prison sentence against him for “insulting religious figures revered by a group of people” (i.e., Sunni Muslims) during a sermon.  Authorities also charged the preacher with organizing an illegal gathering of more than five individuals during the pandemic.

NGOs, media, and opposition outlets reported the government continued to question, detain, and arrest Shia clerics.  NGOs reported prison authorities routinely denied Shia prisoners needed medical treatment more often than Sunni prisoners.  The MOI confirmed that on April 5, Shia inmate Abbas Hassan Ali Malallah died of a heart attack in Jaw Prison.  Shia Rights Watch stated that according to fellow prisoners, Malallah requested medical treatment on April 4, complaining of chest pains, but authorities denied his request.  The National Institution for Human Rights (NIHR), a quasigovernmental organization responsible for investigating human rights complaints, including complaints of abuse in prison, said it found no evidence prison guards deliberately denied Mallalah medical services.

On June 8, Hussain Barakat, who was serving a life sentence in connection with a terrorism case involving the Shia militant group “Zulfiqar Brigades,” an entity associated with armed religious groups, died in prison after being diagnosed with COVID-19.  Human rights activists reiterated their calls to release other prisoners and said prison authorities failed to properly counter the pandemic.

According to local media, on November 15, the Higher Criminal Court of Appeals upheld the prison sentences of 10 Shia individuals to prison terms ranging from three years to life in prison.  They, along with four other men, were convicted of forming a terrorist cell that was affiliated with al-Ashtar Brigades (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization that is also known as the military arm of the al-Wafa Islamic movement) and planting bombs inside Bahrain National Bank ATMs in Naeem and Jid Hafs areas in February.  The four other men escaped after their trials and remained at large at year’s end.

According to the government, on September 16, the MOI arrested four Shia individuals and charged them with attempting to plant a bomb inside a Bahrain National Bank ATM in Muharraq.  The government said the men were suspected members of the February 14 movement, a branch of the al-Wafa Islamic movement.  Opposition sources said authorities arrested 14 individuals.

A human rights activist on Twitter stated that on July 1, Shia cleric Sheikh Abdullah Isa “Mirza” al-Mahroos, who was serving a 15-year sentence in Jaw Prison, undertook a hunger strike to protest mistreatment, lack of proper medical care, and being prevented from seeing his son, who also was incarcerated in Jaw prison.  Authorities sentenced al-Mahroos to 15 years in prison in 2011, along with 13 others identified as leaders of the 2011 antigovernment protests and hundreds of other opposition activists.  His family said he was eligible for an alternative sentence and had chronic medical issues.

Several Shia clerics arrested during the 2011 antigovernment protests remained in prison at year’s end.  They were serving prison sentences ranging from 15 years to life imprisonment on charges related to terrorist activity or inciting hatred.  Some human rights NGOs considered them to be political prisoners.  According to the NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW), activists commemorated the tenth-year anniversary of the protests amid what HRW described as “continuing heavy repression.”  According to sources, protests on February 13 and 14 included slogans targeting King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and pictures of exiled and jailed opposition figures.

The MOI’s Office of the Ombudsman stated the office resolved 664 grievances from inmates and detainees, constituting 94 percent of the total 691 complaints filed during the year.

In March, the Special Investigation Unit (SIU), part of the Public Prosecutor’s Office responsible for investigating complaints filed against security forces, reported receiving 33 complaints in the first quarter of 2020 and interrogating 13 MOI officers.  On March 15, the SIU referred three security officers to the criminal court for mistreating inmates in 2020, and on April 15, the court found the three officers guilty.  Two of them received prison sentences and one officer received a fine.  The SIU received 68 formal complaints alleging torture, mistreatment, and excessive force by members of the police.  It interrogated 107 MOI officers tied to the complaints and prosecuted 16 in criminal court for police misconduct.  The SIU referred at least 11 MOI officers to the forensic and psychiatric departments; it referred three others to military courts for disciplinary measures.  As of September, military courts took disciplinary action against nine other MOI officers in cases previously referred to them by the SIU.

During the year, according to government announcements, the MOI prosecuted a woman for blasphemy and defamation of Islam and other religions on social media platforms.  The government did not release additional details about the nature of the incident.  The case was ongoing at year’s end.

According to the MOI, during the year, the ministry investigated 26 individuals for defamation of religions, a charge usually stemming from statements made during sermons, and the government prosecuted six of them for inciting religious hatred and sectarianism.  Courts convicted two of the six, but authorities did not announce their sentences.  The other four cases remained ongoing at year’s end.  The government also prosecuted 11 of the 26 individuals for “despising other religions” and convicted one person of blasphemy.

The government continued to attach witchcraft and sorcery charges to some cases involving charges of theft and fraud.  In March, the director-general of the Capital Governorate Police announced authorities arrested a woman for practicing sorcery and stealing money and personal items from clients.  In October, the General Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Forensic Science arrested two men on a charge of practicing witchcraft and sorcery.  Authorities also accused the men of violating public morals.  The case was referred to the Public Prosecutor’s Office and remained pending at year’s end.

On May 23, the MOI Anti-Cyber Crime Directorate arrested a Sunni woman and charged her with inciting sectarian hatred.  According to the government, the woman said Shia Muslims were responsible for the spread of COVID-19.  She appeared before the criminal court on May 27.  At year’s end, there was no further information available on the disposition of her case.

Zuhair Ebrahim Jassim and Hussain Abdulla Khalil Rashid, two prisoners convicted of involvement in targeting security forces and killing one police officer in a police bus explosion in November 2017 and killing another officer in a bomb explosion in Damistan in 2014, remained on death row at year’s end.  In June 2020, the Court of Cassation upheld their appeal of the death sentence.  NGOs said their confessions were obtained through torture and that the trial proceedings were unfair.  A 2020 New York Times report identified the men as members of the Shia community who previously expressed opposition to the government.

According to media, on December 9, the MOI announced it had arrested a male citizen for blasphemy and for inciting immoral activities on social media.  The MOI referred the case to the public prosecutor, and it remained pending at year’s end.

On February 24, a court sentenced two employees of the Jaafari Waqf to seven years imprisonment and a fine of 68,000 dinars ($180,000) for embezzlement related to renovating Shia mosques.  On March 14, a Council of Representatives inquiry committee on the misuse of the Jaafari Endowment’s funds and properties submitted its final report to the committee’s office board.  The inquiry committee, established in September 2020, consisted of six Shia and three Sunni members of parliament.  The report’s findings had not been made public by year’s end.

On January 21, authorities released Shia preacher Abdul Mohsin Mulla Atiyya al-Jamri after he spent one year in prison for a 2019 sermon “defaming a [historical] figure that is revered by a religious group.”  The preacher reportedly spoke against the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, Mu’awiya I, who assumed the caliphate after the assassination in 661of the Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law, Ali, who is revered by Shia Muslims.

According to the Twitter post of a supporter, on April 9, authorities released prominent Shia cleric Sayed Kamel al-Hashemi from prison under an alternative noncustodial sentence after he served more than two-and-a-half years for contempt of the King and inciting sectarian hatred based on his comments criticizing the government.

On April 2, the government released Shia citizen Abdulnabi al-Sammak from prison under an alternative sentence.  Authorities arrested al-Sammak in 2020 for publicly reciting Ziyarat Ashura, a Shia prayer deemed defamatory of religious figures that Sunnis revere.  They charged al-Sammak with publicly insulting symbols and defaming the Islamic faith.

The government announced that on April 12, King Hamad pardoned 91 prisoners at the start of Ramadan via royal decree.  On May 12, the eve of Eid al-Fitr, the King pardoned 203 prisoners.  On July 18, the eve of Eid al-Adha, he pardoned 32 individuals, including some foreigners.

The NGO Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) stated that on January 1, Shia prisoner Mohamed Abdulnabi Abdulla (also known as Mohamed Abdulnabi Juma al-Khoor) undertook an 11-day hunger strike to protest access to medical facilities.  Authorities sentenced Abdulla to life in prison with revocation of citizenship on charges related to a blast in Karranah village in August 2015 that killed one policeman and injured seven others.  According to ADHRB, his health declined in prison, and from July 2020 until he undertook the hunger strike, he requested medical treatment by a specialist.  On January 11, a prison doctor examined Abdulla and transferred him to Qala’a Hospital to see an orthopedist, who, according to ADHRB, did not order an x-ray.  Abdulla continued to state he was not receiving adequate specialized medical treatment and remained in prison at year’s end.

The government continued to monitor and provide general guidance on the content of sermons by sending circulars to mosques, and to summon for questioning clerics who spoke on unapproved topics.  The MOJIA continued to monitor clerics’ adherence to a pledge of ethics it created for individuals engaged in religious discourse.  According to the MOJIA, preachers who diverged from the pledge were subject to censure or removal by authorities on the grounds that their actions jeopardized national security.  The MOJIA reported reviewing on a weekly basis sermons preachers submitted to the government.  The MOJIA reported regularly visiting mosques on unannounced visits to ensure preacher’s sermons were “moderate,” avoided discussing controversial topics, did not incite violence, and did not use religious discourse to serve political purposes.  According to Shia community representatives, during Ashura, police again summoned some Shia chanters and preachers and required them to sign pledges that they would avoid discussing politics in their sermons.

On August 24, supporters posted on Twitter that authorities summoned Shia chanters Mohamed al-Gallaf, Salih Sahwan, Hasan Norooz, Mahdi Sahwan, and Sayed Ahmed al-Alawi for religious songs they chanted during Ashura and clerics Abdelmohsin al-Jamri, Mohamed al-Rayyash, Hani al-Banna and Aziz al-Khadhran for sermons they gave during Ashura.  The men were released shortly afterwards without charges.  Supporters posted on Twitter that on June 12, Hoora authorities summoned Shaikh Majeed al-Meshaal to the police station; they released him the same day without charges.

International and local NGOs reported that police summoned three Shia clerics in August during the days leading up to and following the commemoration of Ashura.  Authorities interrogated the men because of the content of their sermons and specifically for “inciting sectarian hatred.”  Authorities released two of the men the day after their detention.  The third cleric remained in police custody at year’s end.

Political opposition figures on social media stated police summoned clerics and community leaders during the year for the content of their sermons or for creating or distributing publications deemed anti-Islamic.  The MOI denied these reports, saying police did not summon or arrest anyone during the year for those reasons.

In January, the family of imprisoned Shia cleric Zuhair Jasim Ashoor, also known as Sheikh Zuhair Jasim Abbas, released a statement describing inhumane treatment by prison authorities.  They said Ashoor experienced extended stays in solitary confinement, beatings, sleep deprivation, limited access to water, death threats, as well as authorities confiscating Ashoor’s religious books, including texts he was writing, and prohibiting him from practicing religious rituals.  Authorities had arrested and convicted Ashoor in 2013 on terrorism charges.  Ashoor’s family stated authorities had tortured him in prison for taking part in a protest inside the prison, a charge the government denied.

According to local social media accounts, on April 20, Jaw Prison authorities allowed Shia scholar Abduljalil al-Meqdad, who was serving a life sentence, temporary release to attend his mother’s funeral.  Authorities sentenced al-Meqdad to life in prison after his arrest in March 2011 with other political figures on charges of attempting to overthrow the government.  At least five of his relatives, including his brother Habib al-Meqdad, continued serving prison sentences ranging from 10 to 15 years.

The MOI stated its community policing program enlisted individuals directly from communities to act as informal community police, with the goals of maintaining local peace and security, resolving local issues at the community level, and avoiding escalating conflicts to law enforcement authorities.  The MOI stated these informal community police monitored religious gatherings and funerals to prevent those gatherings from degenerating into protests or acts of violence.

The NGO Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded one incident of harassment, one incident of threat, and nine incidents in which authorities prevented religious practice during Ramadan, although the NGO did not provide details.  ACLED also reported authorities denied iftar meals to inmates in Jaw Prison.

According to ACLED, authorities regulated Laylat al-Qadr (Night of Power) celebrations by an ad hoc decree issued May 2 that restricted the capacity of mosques and limited attendance to men who had received the second dose of the coronavirus vaccine.

ADHRB reported that police arrested or summoned for questioning several Shia Muslims related to Ashura observances.  These included multiple summons sent to individuals who had raised black flags on the roofs of their homes during the holy day on August 18, as well as interrogations, arrests, and detentions of, and fines levied against, other members of the community throughout the country.  ADHRB stated, “The violation of fundamental freedoms and religious rites [was] not an isolated occurrence… The pandemic has offered an opportunity to authorities to continue such repression under the guise of preventing the spread of COVID-19.  This has dangerously extended the powers given to state security forces and has seen the systematic denial of religious freedom in the country.”

In August, family members and supporters posted on Twitter that inmates at Jaw Prison went on a hunger strike to protest religious discrimination and a lack of access to medical facilities, among other complaints.  Some detainees said prison officials, citing COVID-19 mitigation efforts, limited time for practicing Ashura rituals.  The NIHR said, however, authorities gave inmates additional time to practice Ashura rituals in common areas.  Officials confirmed that religious rituals were not permitted in prison cells as a matter of general policy, and that religious commemorations were only permitted in designated prison common areas.

Activists and opposition media outlets criticized the MOI for taking down Ashura banners in Ras Rumman, South Sehla, and Hamad Town.

In a study released in October, ACLED stated Ashura commemorations in the country were “rooted at the community level and bear religious, social, and political meaning” and, “What lies at the core of the dispute between the Sunni regime and Shiite citizens is Ashura’s political potential.”  According to the report, in August, authorities introduced several religious practice restrictions aimed at curbing the spread of COVID-19 that effectively repressed Ashura practice and expression, including limiting attendance at houses of worship to 30 vaccinated adult individuals, and banning children from attending Ashura rituals.  ACLED stated these restrictions were enforced by means of “judicial harassment” (35 incidents) and the removal of Ashura banners (31 incidents).  Authorities arrested and summoned preachers, religious singers, and maatam (a Shia prayer house, sometimes called husseiniya in other countries) directors for taking part in Ashura commemorations.  According to the study, officials denied Shia prisoners the right to celebrate Ashura and punished them if they performed rituals, including with discriminatory acts like preventing them from contacting their families.

Dissolved Shia political society Al-Wifaq issued a report on the government’s actions during the first 10 days of the month of Muharram, which culminate in the observance of Ashura, marking the death of Hussein at the battle of Karbala.  In its statement, Al-Wifaq said security forces summoned Shia scholars, preachers, officials of religious centers, and others during this period and tore down Ashura banners and flags throughout the country.  The statement also said the government used the COVID-19 pandemic to restrict religious activities.  According to Al-Wifaq, the government investigated 100 citizens and arrested three for “practicing their religious freedoms,” and there were 45 government actions that disrupted Ashura rituals, including confiscating banners or flags and other “provocative practices.”

The government stated special rooms were available to prisoners for worship and prayer regardless of religious affiliation.  On August 22, the NIHR released a statement on its findings from prearranged visits during Ashura to male and female detention centers.  The NIHR stated officials at these facilities said inmates could practice their religious rites “with ease.”  NIHR stated it spoke at random with inmates who said officials provided them with necessary facilities and services to practice their religious rites.  Independent NGOs, however, cited instances where authorities denied prisoners their right to perform religious rituals.

An overseas-based human rights group stated that in at least one case, a judge prohibited an alternative noncustodial sentencing beneficiary from participating in social, cultural, and religious activities, including visiting mosques and maatams, or attending religious commemorations while serving his sentence.

According to an August 24 report by ADHRB, the National Task Force to Combat COVID-19 (COVID-19 taskforce) announced two days before the start of Muharram that it would allow Ashura processions in the vicinity of mosques and maatams, provided participants observed social distancing and other precautionary measures, such as wearing face masks and regularly using disinfectant.  The ADHRB report stated these precautionary health measures “were supposedly in accordance with recommendations by the government’s medical team…. However, the authorities have instead utilized these measures to whitewash restrictions on religious freedoms in the country, alongside concealing the systematic violation of various other human rights.”  ADHRB also reported that King Hamad’s son, Shaikh Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, appeared in media joining in the Indian Onam festival, among large crowds, without employing any obvious public health measures.

Other restrictions on maatams and mosques included a ban on children’s attendance and limits on capacity (30 persons), hours of operation, and geographical boundaries for processions.  Additionally, the government prohibited leaders from moving from one maatam to another.  Some Shia religious leaders and opposition politicians stated these restrictions were stricter than those applied to other public buildings, such as shopping malls.  A video that circulated on social media of a large crowd of spectators at a basketball game caused some members of the Shia community to question whether the COVID-19 taskforce was applying more scrutiny to maatams than other establishments.  Media commentators negatively compared the MOI’s response ahead of Ashura to more permissive government preparations for Hindu and Christian holidays.

Media reported that on August 14, a group of 65 maatams issued a joint statement requesting the COVID-19 taskforce review the requirement to limit Ashura processions to certain areas, saying the requirement contributed to overcrowding and ran counter to the goals of the COVID-19 precautionary measures.

After the observance of Ashura, the King thanked the Shia community on August 19 for taking steps to limit the spread of the coronavirus during observances, saying in a statement that he “praised the awareness and national responsibility shown by everyone during Ashura commemoration towards themselves, their surroundings, and society.”

Women’s prayers halls and restrooms remained closed until the end of September, while male prayers rooms opened in April.  Media reported that on September 5, parliamentarian and head of the Services Committee Ahmed al-Ansari said the continued closure of women’s chapels and toilet facilities and the government’s directive that the Quran should not be opened as anti-COVID-19 measures were not justified when restaurants and shops were open, where groups congregated and were more vulnerable to objects being touched by multiple individuals.  On September 23, the MOJIA announced all female prayer halls and toilet facilities in mosques would reopen, with appropriate health measures in place.

Adherents of minority religious groups reported they were able to produce religious media and publications and distribute them in bookstores and churches, although the government did not permit publications it perceived as criticizing Islam.  The Ministry of Information Affairs reviewed all books and publications prior to issuing printing licenses.  The MOJIA also reviewed books that discussed religion.

According to representatives from the Christian and Hindu communities, the government did not interfere with their religious observances and publicly encouraged tolerance for minority religious beliefs and traditions.

The government reported there were 598 licensed Sunni mosques and 91 Sunni Islamic centers, the same numbers as in 2020.  Authorities decreased the number of licensed Shia mosques to 763 (from 764 in 2020) and increased the number of maatams to 624 (from 618 in 2020).  During the year, the government granted permits to build three Shia mosques, three maatams, and 23 new Sunni mosques.  Authorities temporarily closed 49 Sunni mosques, five Shia mosques, and nine maatams during the year for violating COVID-19 guidelines.  MOJIA closed three older mosques for renovation.

The MOLSD reported it did not receive new requests from religious groups for land or construction permits.  There was no registered Buddhist temple; however, Buddhist groups reported they met in private facilities.

After the completion of construction, the new Catholic cathedral, Our Lady of Arabia, opened in December in Awali.  The government donated the land for the cathedral, intended to serve as the main church for the Catholic Apostolic Vicariate of Northern Arabia, which includes Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.  As of year’s end, the municipality of Awali had not granted approval for the construction of three proposed Christian churches, citing unspecified security concerns.  In 2014, the King donated land for the churches.

In December, the government allocated land for a new Christian cemetery in Salmabad, acting on the Christian community’s longstanding request since the country’s second Christian cemetery filled its last burial plot in 2014.

The government permitted both registered and unregistered non-Muslim religious communities to maintain identifiable places of worship, hold religious gatherings, and display religious symbols such as crosses outside churches.

According to a December 13 report by the Canadian-American magazine Vice, the government did not fulfill its promise to rebuild 38 Shia mosques destroyed in the 2011 uprising.  An ADHRB official told the magazine, “Every year there are instances where they [Shia worshippers] pray on the land of these destroyed mosques and they end up being summoned and forced to sign pledges they won’t do it anymore.”  Another ADHRB official said, “The mosques that have been rebuilt are mainly rebuilt by the community themselves.  A lot of them are not being maintained properly.”  In response to the article, the government said in an email to Vice, “All 30 unlicensed … structures used for religious purposes referred to in your inquiry have been regularized and rebuilt to the standards of other Muslim places of worship in Bahrain (over 1,456 mosques and 625 maatams), except for three which remain under study.”

In March, the Minister of Justice confirmed that maatams were considered places of worship and therefore exempt from paying utility bills.

In November, some commentators declared that a photograph in a 10th grade family education textbook promoting positive self-image and self-esteem deviated from Islamic values by promoting homosexuality.  The photograph showed a boy looking in the mirror surrounded by hearts.  Assistant Undersecretary for Curricula and Educational Supervision Ahlam al-Amer released a statement defending the photograph as linked to Islamic and educational values.  Members of parliament unanimously voted to start a probe into alleged homosexual content in secondary schools and suspend the family education classes until the “offensive” content was removed.

The independent but government-affiliated King Hamad Global Centre for Peaceful Coexistence (King Hamad Centre) reported it offered student exchanges and educational programs centered on dispelling ignorance, discrimination, and intolerance, including religious intolerance.  During the year, the center’s Cyber Peace Academy developed an online “interfaith dialogue tool” and mobile app, Growing Peace, for young persons to explore scenarios and case studies on themes of violence, discrimination, hate speech, racism, and religious rights.  The King Hamad Centre’s Board of Trustees comprised representatives of the country’s Sunni, Shia, Christian, Catholic, Baha’i, Hindu, and Buddhist communities.

The University of Bahrain continued to offer degree programs in religious studies and Islamic jurisprudence for Shia and Sunni students.

All students, regardless of religion, were eligible to participate in the Crown Prince International Scholarship Program (CPISP); the government did not provide a statistical breakdown of participants by religious affiliation.  CPISP published a list of scholarship recipients’ names, fields of study, and schools on its website.  Some Shia community leaders continued to state the MOE favored Sunni students in granting scholarships rather than distributing them based solely on student merit.

Human rights activists continued to report discrimination against Shia students in university scholarship distribution.

There were reports that the MOE refused to recognize the foreign degrees of some students, primarily those who studied in China.  Some activists said these refusals disproportionately affected Shia students, a higher proportion of whom obtained degrees in China.

The government-run television station Bahrain TV broadcast Friday sermons from the country’s official Al-Fateh Mosque and other Sunni mosques, such as Sabeeka bint Ebrahim Mosque and Sabeeka al-Nusf Mosque, but not sermons from Shia mosques or clerics.  Some Shia activists said this was discriminatory, while others said it was better not to be subject to government broadcasting restrictions.  Many Shia mosques disseminated sermons via social media.  A government-affiliated human rights monitoring organization said Shia prisoners could view Shia sermon videos on their mobile phones.

On February 6, Shia cleric and the spiritual leader of the dissolved Al-Wifaq political society, Sheikh Isa Qassim, who was stripped of his citizenship by the government in 2016 and had been living in Iran since 2018, issued a statement rejecting the restructuring of the Waqf directorates by royal decree, a move that subordinated the directorates to independent councils.  He stated the move was “illegitimate” and “hostile” to Jaafari jurisprudence.  Qassim also criticized the fact that the budget allocated to the Jaafari Waqf Directorate was dependent on the government.  He characterized both actions as the government’s “manipulation” of the Jaafari Waqf.  In April, Qassim issued a statement that said a new constitution was the only way to resolve the country’s divisions.  In May, hundreds of supporters gathered at Qassim’s home village of Diraz on the anniversary of a 2017 police raid on his home that resulted in the deaths of two protestors.

While by law Arab applicants with 15 years’ residence and non-Arab applicants with 25 years’ residence were eligible to apply for citizenship, arbitrary implementation of the law from the application stage to approval remained a common criticism of both Shia and Sunni citizens, as well as migrant rights activists.  The government stated foreign residents applying for citizenship were not required to report their religious affiliation.  Shia politicians and community activists, however, continued to state the government’s naturalization and citizenship process favored Sunni over Shia applicants.  They said the government continued to recruit Sunnis from other countries to join the security forces, granted them expedited naturalization, and provided them with public housing, while excluding Shia citizens from those forces.  According to Shia community activists, the continued recruitment and expedited naturalization of Sunnis represented an ongoing attempt to alter the demographic balance of the country’s citizens.

The government did not maintain official statistics on the religious affiliation of public sector employees, members of parliament, or ministers.  According to informal estimates, the 40-member Shura Council included 19 Shia Muslim members, one Jewish member, and one Christian member, while the remaining 19 members were Sunni Muslims.  Following parliamentary elections in 2018, of 40 seats on the elected Council of Representatives, 25 were won by members identified as Sunnis and 15 identified as Shia.  Five of the 22 cabinet members, including one of the four deputy prime ministers, were Shia.

According to Shia leaders and community activists, the government continued to give Sunni citizens preference for government positions, especially in the managerial ranks of the civil service, military, and security services.  They also said Sunnis received preference for other government-related employment, especially in the managerial ranks of state-owned businesses.  Few Shia citizens served in significant posts in the defense and internal security forces.  According to Shia community members, senior civil service recruitment and promotion processes favored Sunni candidates.

Shia community members said educational, social, and municipal services in most Shia neighborhoods remained inferior to those in Sunni communities.  The government stated it made efforts to support public schools in Shia and Sunni neighborhoods equally.  The MOLSD organized expositions, job fairs, professional guidance, and assistance to needy families in predominately Shia neighborhoods.

The MOLSD, which has a supervisory role in implementing labor law in the private sector, again said there were no reported cases of religious or sectarian discrimination during the year.  Shia community activists again responded that they lacked confidence in the effectiveness of government institutions to address discrimination and therefore did not utilize them.

NGOs reported the government continued to closely monitor the collection of funds, including charity donations, by religious organizations, with some NGOs describing this as government overreach.  NGOs said religious leaders and organizations not authorized to collect money, or whom the government believed handled the money in improper ways, were potentially subject to legal action.

On July 7, the government announced it had created a new medal for peaceful coexistence named after King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa to recognize leading personalities and international organizations supporting interfaith and coexistence in the country.  The Board of Trustees of the King Hamad Centre said the medal would “contribute to enhancing regional and global awareness of the importance of respecting religions and accepting others to achieve peace and harmony among different peoples and societies.”

Media reported that on August 22, King Hamad’s son, Shaikh Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, participated in the celebration of the Hindu festival of Onam, where he said the observance confirmed the importance of dialogue and understanding in the country.

On September 13, Minister of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Endowments Shaikh Khaled bin Ali Al Khalifa, speaking during the G20 Interfaith Forum in Italy, highlighted the importance of establishing the rule of law without differentiating between persons of different beliefs.

The Baha’i World News Service and local media reported that on October 30, Hamad Centre chairman Shaikh Khalid bin Khalifa Al Khalifa and foreign diplomats attended a ceremony in Manama marking the centenary of the passing of Abdu’l-Baha, head of the Baha’i Faith from 1892-1921.

The government said developments connected to the signing of the Abraham Accords and to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel promoted tolerance and acceptance of Jews in Bahrain.

Non-Muslim religious community leaders again reported that there was ongoing societal pressure on individuals not to convert from Islam.  Those who did so were unwilling to speak publicly or privately to family or associates about their conversions out of fear of harassment or discrimination.

Both anti-Shia and anti-Sunni commentary appeared in social media.  Anti-Shia posts described Shia opponents of the government as “traitors,” “agents of Iran,” “terrorists,” “killers,” “criminals,” plotters,” and, occasionally, “rawafid” (a derogatory term describing Shia who refused to accept the early caliphs).  Anti-Sunni posts described the royal family and its supporters as “nawasib” (a derogatory term describing Sunnis who are hostile to the family of the Prophet Muhammad).

NGOs working on civil discourse and interfaith dialogue reported Sunni-Shia tensions and historical political divisions continued to have a negative economic effect.  Shia representatives stated the persistent higher unemployment rate among members of their community, limited prospects for upward social mobility, and the lower socioeconomic status of Shia, exacerbated by ongoing private sector discrimination against them, added to the tensions between the two communities.  Because religion and political affiliation were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize these effects as being solely based on religious identity.

In February, the Jewish communities in the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia announced the formation of the region’s first communal organization, the Association of Gulf Jewish Communities (AGJC), incorporated in Dubai.  The AGJC president was Ebrahim Dawood Nonoo, a citizen of Bahrain.  On August 22, Bahraini Jews held services in the newly renovated synagogue in Manama for the first time since 1947, with the participation of diplomats, members of Jewish communities throughout Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and Bahraini and Emirati Muslims.  In October, the AGJC organized the first Jewish wedding in the country in 52 years.  The event, conducted under the auspices of the Orthodox Union, which identifies itself as “the world’s largest kosher certification agency,” was the first strictly kosher wedding in the country’s history.

The government-supported NGO King Hamad Global Centre for Peaceful Coexistence held a conference in December entitled “Ignorance is the Enemy of Peace,” focusing on religious freedom.  The center conducted programs on combating antisemitism in the wake of the government’s normalizing relations with Israel under the 2020 Abraham Accords.

According to minority religious groups, there was a high degree of tolerance within society for minority religious beliefs and traditions, although not for conversion from Islam or for atheistic or secularist views.  Holiday foods, decorations, posters, and books were widely available during major Christian and Hindu holidays, and Christmas trees and elaborate decorations remained prominent features in malls, restaurants, coffee shops, and hotels.  The news media continued to print reports of non-Muslim religious holiday celebrations, including Christmas celebrations and Hindu festivals such as Diwali and Holi.

Anti-Zionist commentary in social media peaked with announcements of government normalization efforts with Israel, alongside protests employing antinormalization slogans such as “Death to the Zionists” and “Death to Israel.”  After the normalization took place, there was negative public reaction to a Twitter post by Houda Nonoo, a former Bahraini Ambassador to the United States, inviting Jews from abroad to visit and settle in Bahrain.

The UAE research and consulting firm PSB took a June poll of youth between the ages of 17 and 24 in 17 Arab states and reported 37 percent of Bahraini respondents said their religion was the most important factor in their personal identity, slightly higher than the regionwide result of 34 percent and the result from the previous year’s survey of 32 percent.  Other choices offered by the poll as possible responses included family/tribe, nationality, Arabic heritage, political beliefs, language, and gender.

The Charge d’Affaires, other senior U.S. government officials, and embassy representatives met with senior government officials, including the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Endowments, and national human rights monitoring institutions to urge respect for freedom of religion and expression, including the right of clerics and other religious leaders to speak and write freely.  Embassy officials encouraged continued government efforts to counter religious extremist narratives and to ensure full inclusion of all citizens, including members of the Shia majority, in political, social, and economic opportunities.  U.S. officials publicly and in private meetings advocated for the government to pursue political reforms that took into consideration the needs of all citizens regardless of religious or prior or current political affiliation by, for example, ensuring voting districts were drawn to promote a representative elected lower house of parliament, encouraging an impartial application process for government positions, and allowing individuals previously connected to religiously based opposition political groups to run for public office.

The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials met regularly with religious leaders from a broad spectrum of faiths, representatives of NGOs, and political groups to discuss freedom of religion and freedom of expression as it related to religious practices.  Embassy representatives and senior U.S. officials visited various houses of worship and attended religious events during the year, including observations of Ashura, Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr, Christmas, Hannukah, and Diwali.  At these events, they discussed issues related to religious tolerance with participants and emphasized the U.S. government’s commitment to religious freedom.

The embassy continued to encourage the participation of religious leaders in exchange programs in the United States designed to promote religious tolerance and a better understanding of the right to practice one’s faith as a fundamental human right and source of stability.  In August, the Charge d’Affaires and the chair of the King Hamad Centre met to discuss potential opportunities for cooperation under the 2020 U.S.-Bahrain memorandum of understanding on combating antisemitism.  The embassy also supported religious freedom through its online presence, regularly highlighting on social media high level engagements with religious leaders and the embassy’s participation in religious observances, for example, during Diwali and hosting a virtual event for Ramadan.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 164.1 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2013 government census, the most recent official data available, Sunni Muslims constitute 89 percent of the population and Hindus make up 10 percent.  The remainder of the population is predominantly Christian, mostly Roman Catholic, and Theravada-Hinayana Buddhist.  The country also has small numbers of Shia Muslims, Ahmadi Muslims, Baha’is, animists, agnostics, and atheists.  Leaders from religious minority communities estimate their respective numbers of adherents to be between a few thousand and 100,000.

Ethnic minorities concentrated in the CHT and northern districts generally practice non-Islamic faiths.  The Garo in Mymensingh are predominantly Christian, as are some of the Santal in Gaibandha.  Most Buddhists are members of the indigenous populations of the CHT.  Bengali and ethnic minority Christians live in communities across the country, with relatively high concentrations in Barishal City and Gournadi in Barishal District, Baniarchar in Gopalganj District, Monipuripara and Christianpara in Dhaka City, and in the cities of Gazipur and Khulna.

The largest noncitizen population is Rohingya.  Human Rights Watch estimates approximately 1,500 Rohingya in the refugee settlements are Christians.  A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said approximately 400 refugees are Hindu, while activists and leaders on the ground say the number is closer to 550-600.  According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, more than one million Rohingya refugees have fled Burma in successive waves since the early 1990s.  Since August 2017, approximately 769,000 Rohingya fleeing violence in Burma have taken refuge in the country, bringing the total to more than 918,000.  Nearly all who arrived during the 2017 influx sought shelter in and around the refugee settlements of Kutupalong and Nayapara in Cox’s Bazar District.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, “The state religion of the Republic is Islam, but the State shall ensure equal status and equal rights in the practice of the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and other religions.”  The constitution stipulates the state should not grant political status in favor of any religion and bans religiously based political parties.  It provides for the right to profess, practice, or propagate all religions “subject to law, public order, and morality” and states religious communities or denominations have the right to establish, maintain, and manage their religious institutions.  The constitution states no one attending any educational institution shall be required to receive instruction in, or participate in ceremonies or worship pertaining to, a religion to which he or she does not belong.

Under the penal code, statements or acts made with a “deliberate and malicious” intent to insult religious sentiments are subject to fines or up to two years in prison.  Although the code does not further define this prohibited intent, the courts have interpreted it to include insulting the Prophet Muhammad.  The criminal code allows the government to confiscate all copies of any newspaper, magazine, or other publication containing language that “creates enmity and hatred among the citizens or denigrates religious beliefs.”  The law applies similar restrictions to online publications.  While there is no specific blasphemy law, authorities use the penal code, as well as a section of the Information and Communication Technology Act and the Digital Security Act, to charge individuals for acts perceived to be a slight to Islam.  The Information and Communication Technology Act criminalizes several forms of online expression, including “obscene material,” “expression(s) likely to cause deterioration of law and order,” and “statements hurting religious sentiments.”  The Digital Security Act likewise criminalizes publication or broadcast of “any information that hurts religious values or sentiments,” by denying bail to detainees and increasing penalties on conviction of up to 10 years in prison.

The constitution prohibits freedom of association if an association is formed for the purpose of “destroying religious harmony,” the peaceful coexistence of religious communities, or creating discrimination on religious grounds.

Individual houses of worship are not required to register with the government.  Religious groups seeking to form associations with multiple houses of worship, however, must register as NGOs with either the NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB) if they receive foreign assistance for development projects or with the Ministry of Social Welfare if they do not.  The law requires the NGOAB to approve and monitor all foreign-funded projects.  The NGOAB Director General has the authority to impose sanctions on NGOs for violating the law, including fines of up to three times the amount of the foreign donation, or closure of the NGO.  NGOs are also subject to penalties for “derogatory” comments about the constitution or constitutional institutions (i.e., the government).  Expatriate staff must receive a security clearance from the National Security Intelligence, Special Branch of Police, and Directorate General of Forces Intelligence; the standards for these clearances are not specified.

Registration requirements and procedures for religious groups are the same as for secular associations.  Registration requirements with the Ministry of Social Welfare include certifying that the name being registered is not already taken, and providing the bylaws/constitution of the organization; confirmation of security clearances for leaders of the organization from the National Security Intelligence; minutes of the meeting appointing the executive committee; a list of all executive committee and general members and photographs of principal officers; a work plan; a copy of the deed or lease of the organization’s office and a list of property owned; a budget; and a recommendation by a local government representative.

Requirements to register with the NGOAB are similar.

Family law concerning marriage, divorce, and adoption contains separate provisions for Muslims, Hindus, and Christians.  These laws are enforced in the same secular courts.  A separate civil family law applies to mixed-faith families or those of other faiths or no faith.  The family law of the religion of the two parties concerned governs their marriage rituals and proceedings.  A Muslim man may have as many as four wives, although he must obtain the written consent of his existing wife or wives before marrying again.  A Christian man may marry only one woman.

Hindu men may have multiple wives.  Officially, Hindus have no options for divorce, although informal divorces do occur.  Hindu women may not inherit property under family law.  Buddhists are subject to the same laws as Hindus.  Divorced Hindus and Buddhists may not legally remarry.  Divorced men and women of other religions and widowed individuals of any religion may remarry.  Marriage between members of different religious groups occurs only under civil law.  To be legally recognized, Muslim marriages must be registered with the state by either the couple or the cleric performing the marriage; however, some Muslim marriages are not registered.  Registration of marriages for Hindus and Christians is optional, and other faiths may determine their own guidelines.

Under the Muslim family ordinance, a Muslim man may marry women of any Abrahamic faith; however, a Muslim woman may not marry a non-Muslim.  Under the ordinance, a widow receives one-eighth of her husband’s estate if she is his only wife, and the remainder is divided among the children; each female child receives half the share of each male child.  Wives have fewer divorce rights than husbands.  Civil courts must approve divorces.  The law requires a Muslim man to pay a former wife three months of alimony, but these protections generally apply only to registered marriages; unregistered marriages are by definition undocumented and difficult to substantiate.  Authorities do not always enforce the alimony requirement even in cases involving registered marriages.

Alternative dispute resolution is available to all citizens, including Muslims, for settling out of court family arguments and other civil matters not related to land ownership.  With the consent of both parties, lawyers may be identified to facilitate the arbitration, the results of which may be used in court.

Fatwas may be issued only by Muslim religious scholars, and not by local religious leaders, to settle matters of religious practice.  Fatwas may not be invoked to justify meting out punishment, nor may they supersede existing secular law.

Religious studies are compulsory and are part of the curriculum for grades three through ten in all public government-accredited schools.  Private schools do not have this requirement.  Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian students are supposed to receive instruction in their own religious beliefs, although the teachers are not always adherents of the students’ faith.

The code regulating prisons allows for observance of religious commemorations by prisoners, including access to extra food on feast days or permission to fast for religious reasons.  The law does not guarantee prisoners regular access to clergy or regular religious services, but prison authorities may arrange special religious programs for them.  Prison authorities are required to provide prisoners facing the death penalty access to a religious figure from a faith of their choice before execution.

The Restoration of Vested Property Act allows the government to return property confiscated from individuals, mostly Hindus, whom it formerly declared enemies of the state.  In the past, authorities used the act to seize property abandoned by minority religious groups that fled the country, particularly following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In response to the violence and destruction that occurred in October following a Facebook post that spurred attacks against Hindus, government officials at the highest levels, including Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, condemned the attacks and called the violence and destruction of Hindu temples and property un-Islamic.  The Ministry of Religious Affairs donated building supplies and food packages to Hindu families, and the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society, in conjunction with the government, provided tents to displaced victims.  To stop the further spread of violence, the government took action to remove postings from social media that it considered provocative, such as fake pictures that triggered attacks on Hindus.  Some human rights organizations, however, said the government’s actions to arrest and charge thousands of individuals were overbroad and, in some cases, deliberately targeted political rivals.  By October 26, police arrested 583 suspects for their roles in the violence and brought 102 criminal charges against 20,619 individuals, including the local man who first publicized the supposed desecration on Facebook.  Authorities charged a Hindu youth under the Digital Security Act for alleged anti-Islamic speech he posted online October 17, which they said angered Muslims and led to anti-Hindu reprisals in the northwestern city of Rangpur.  On October 20, the government announced formation of a National Human Rights Commission panel to investigate October 17 attacks on Hindu establishments in the Peergang area of the northwestern district of Rangpur.  The government stationed border guard forces and Rapid Action Battalion units around the country to prevent violence and successfully maintained peace during the subsequent Hindu holiday, Diwali, on November 4.

Some Hindu community leaders said the actions the government took in response to the communal violence helped calm the situation.  Other Hindu organizations disagreed, saying the government took insufficient measures to quell the violence and stated the government’s failure to punish perpetrators of previous periods of religious violence contributed to October’s events.  When the Foreign Minister stated four Muslims and two Hindus died during the violence but neither Hindu died due to communal attacks and no temples were destroyed, Hindu organizations strongly protested, noting this contradicted other official government statements.  The Bangladesh Hindu Law Reform Council said the Foreign Minister’s statement was an attempt to cover up anti-Hindu attacks, and some human rights activists said the Foreign Minister’s statement enabled further violence.  One international Hindu organization said police stood by in many locations rather than protecting Hindus from mob violence, and that the government arrested several Hindu individuals, which the organization called “prisoners of conscience,” for sharing information about the ongoing violence on social media.

On February 10, a judge of the Anti-Terrorism Special Tribunal in Dhaka sentenced to death eight Islamic militants for killing a publisher in 2015.  Two of the eight sentenced men remained at large at year’s end.  The tribunal convicted the men, members of the Islamic militant group Ansar al-Islam, of hacking to death Faisal Abedin Deepan, a publisher of books on secularism and atheism.

On February 16, a court sentenced five men to death and one to life in prison for the 2015 killing of atheist blogger Avijit Roy.  The trial began in the Anti-Terrorism Tribunal in April 2019 and was delayed several times due to COVID-19.

A special tribunal in Dhaka sentenced to death 14 members of the banned Harkak-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Islamist group on March 23 in a case involving a conspiracy to assassinate Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2000.  Prosecutors alleged the defendants, members of a group that was banned in 2005, planted a bomb at a political rally where Hasina was scheduled to address supporters the following day.  Of the 14 sentenced, five remained fugitives at the end of the year.

On November 23, the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty of Salauddin Salehin, a member of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), who was convicted in the 2004 killing of Goni Gomez, a Christian convert from Islam, in Jamalpur.  The Dhaka Speedy Trial Tribunal initially sentenced Salauddin to death in 2006.

On November 1, a tribunal in Rajshahi that handles cybercrimes sentenced three individuals to 10 years in prison under the Information and Communication Technology Act for sharing a satirical cartoon and comments the tribunal deemed obscene about the Prophet Muhammad in 2013 from a Facebook account.  According to the prosecution, two of the convicted defendants allegedly shared a distorted picture of the Prophet on a Facebook account in the name of a Hindu man who had nothing to do with the posting.  The third defendant then printed and sold copies of the cartoon to Muslim villagers.  In response, local Muslims set on fire the home of the Hindu man.  In addition to the three individuals sentenced to prison, authorities charged seven others in the wake of the incident, but the court acquitted them.

In April, police arrested more than 300 members of the Islamist group Hefazat-e-Islam over deadly protests around the March visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.  Accusing Modi of stoking religious discrimination against Muslims in India, the group led violent protests across several districts during Modi’s two-day visit.

On February 25, Forest Department officials tore down a Sathirampara Seventh-day Adventist church in Bandarban District.  The congregation was replacing the bamboo hut they had been using for many years with a more permanent brick building.  A Forest Department official said the community did not have a permit to build on the land, and that in the village “there are only three or four Christian families; there is no need for a church.”

In October, the Bangladesh Cyber Tribunal formally charged Baul folk singer Rita Dewan with blasphemy stemming from a February 2020 incident when a lawyer accused her of making derogatory comments against Allah during a musical competition, for which she issued an apology afterward.  Criminal charges were brought against Dewan that same month under the penal code and Digital Security Act, and a court issued a warrant for her arrest in December 2020.  Dewan surrendered to authorities and was granted bail in January.

Human rights organizations reported an increase, compared with 2020, in the use of extrajudicial fatwas by village community leaders and local religious leaders to punish individuals for perceived “moral transgressions.”  The incidence rose from eight cases in calendar year 2020, to 12 cases from January to November.  One organization which closely tracked the issuance of these fatwas attributed the rise to a deterioration of law and order and unrest due to COVID-19.

Thousands of mosques, including Baitul Mukarram National Mosque in Dhaka, operated under the direct authority of the Islamic Foundation; imams and employees of those mosques were funded by the government.  Mosques not overseen by the Islamic Foundation still operated with oversight from a governing committee that was dominated by local ruling party politicians and administration.  Islamic leaders said the government continued to influence the appointment and removal of imams and to provide guidance on the content of sermons to imams throughout the country.  This included issuing written instructions highlighting certain Quranic verses and quotations of the Prophet Muhammad.  The government also instructed imams to denounce extremism.  Religious community leaders said imams in all mosques usually continued the practice of avoiding sermons that contradicted government policy.

The BHBCUC said property-restitution cases were on hold, as tribunals and appellate tribunals were not in session from March 2020 to October 2021.  According to the Ministry of Land’s 2018-2019 report, the most recent figures available, as of 2018, authorities had adjudicated 26,791 of 114,749 property-restitution cases filed under the Restoration of Vested Property Act.  Of these judgments, the owners, primarily Hindus, won 12,190 of the cases, recovering 10,255 acres of land, while the government won the remaining 14,791 cases.  Media reports and rights activists attributed the slow return of land seized under relevant legislation from Hindus who had left for India to judicial inefficiency and general government indifference.

Freedom House’s 2021 report assessed religious minorities remained underrepresented in politics and state agencies, and that members of ethnic and religious minority groups faced some discrimination under the law, as well as harassment and violations of their rights in practice.

Religious minorities continued to state that religious minority students sometimes were unable to enroll in religion classes because of an insufficient number of teachers for mandatory religious education classes for students of non-Islamic faiths.  In these cases, school officials generally allowed local religious institutions, parents, or others to hold religious studies classes for such students outside school hours and sometimes exempted students from the religious education requirement.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs had a budget of 22.4 billion taka ($260.47 million) for the 2021-2022 fiscal year, which covers July 2021-June 2022.  The budget included 19.35 billion taka ($225.0 million) allocated for development through autonomous religious bodies.  The government provided the Islamic Foundation, administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 17.58 billion taka ($204.42 million).  The Hindu Welfare Trust received 1.724 billion taka ($20.05 million), and the Buddhist Welfare Trust received 32 million taka ($372,000) from the allocation.  While the Christian Welfare Trust did not receive development funding from the budget, it received 10.3 million taka ($120,000) to run its office.  For comparison, in 2020, the ministry had a budget of 16.93 billion taka ($196.86 million), including 14.25 billion taka ($165.70 million) allocated for development through autonomous religious bodies.  The government provided 8.12 billion taka ($94.42 million) for the Islamic Foundation, 1.435 billion taka ($16.69 million) for the Hindu Welfare Trust, 46.8 million taka ($544,000) for the Buddhist Welfare Trust, and seven million taka ($81,400) for the Christian Welfare Trust.

Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and members of other minority religious communities, who are also sometimes members of ethnic minority groups, continued to report property and land ownership disputes and forced evictions, including some involving the government, that remained unresolved at year’s end.  Some human rights activists said it was often difficult to determine whether these disputes and evictions were a result of deliberate government discrimination against religious minorities or of government inefficiency.  The government continued construction projects on land traditionally owned by indigenous communities in the Moulvibazar and Modhupur forest areas.  In January, more than 1,000 ethnic Garo and Koch individuals, mostly Christians, rallied at a bus stop in Tangail to protest a notice from the Forest Department ordering them to vacate their ancestral lands in the Modhupur forest.  According to minority religious associations, land disputes occurred in areas near new roads or industrial development zones, where land prices had increased.  They also stated local police, civil authorities, and political leaders enabled property appropriations for financial gain or shielded politically influential property appropriators from prosecution.  Some human rights groups attributed the lack of resolution of some of these disputes to ineffective judicial and land registry systems and the targeted communities’ insufficient political and financial clout, rather than to government policy disfavoring religious or ethnic minorities.  Indigenous groups in the CHT, in particular, have large communities of Buddhists, Hindus, and Christians.  Some of these communities speak tribal languages and do not speak Bangla, making it difficult for them to access government services and further marginalizing these groups.

The government continued to place law enforcement personnel at religious sites, festivals, and events considered potential targets for violence, including during Diwali, Christmas, Easter, and the Buddhist festival of Buddha Purnima.

Due to COVID-19, President Abdul Hamid did not host his usual annual receptions to commemorate principal Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian holidays.

Freedom House in September assessed that members of religious minorities – including Hindus, Christians, Buddhists, and Shia and Ahmadi Muslims – faced harassment and violence, including mob violence against their houses of worship.  According to the BHBCUC and the Hindu American Foundation (HAF), communal attacks against ethnic and religious minorities occurred throughout the year.

From October 13-24, during and after the Hindu festival of Durga Puja, national and local media reported that mobs attacked and destroyed Hindu homes and temples after a local man publicized a post on Facebook that showed the Quran on the lap of the deity Hanuman inside a Hindu temple in the city of Cumila.  The post went viral and sparked violent reactions across the country.  According to the World Hindu Federation (WHF) and the HAF, mobs vandalized more than 340 Hindu temples and Buddhist monasteries, vandalized or burned nearly 1,650 Hindu owned houses, and looted Hindu-owned shops and businesses.  Reporting about the numbers of deceased varied:  The Guardian reported seven persons died but the WHF said more than 14 Hindus died in the violence.  According to media and official estimates, at least four Muslims were also killed through clashes with police.  The UN attributed four deaths to the anti-Hindu violence but said others died due to subsequent law enforcement measures to quell the violence.  The BHBCUC said communal violence against minorities continued throughout the year, stating mobs destroyed 70 temples and 100 homes and businesses.  Ain o Salish Kendra, a domestic human rights organization, estimated that 3,769 attacks had taken place against Hindus since 2013, including those in the October violence.  In response to the violence, there were several interfaith demonstrations throughout the country that denounced the attacks.  Hindus refrained from public celebrations of Diwali on November 4 in favor of private ceremonies in their temples and homes.  Hindu worshipers covered their faces with black cloth to protest the lack of security for Hindus.

According to Al-Jazeera, on June 19 in Bandarban in CHT, activists from an indigenous minority group killed an indigenous man because he converted to Islam.

Asia News reported the attack and death of Joy Haldar, a Christian student at St. Joseph’s High School and College.  Eleven Muslim students sent Haldar death threats by phone before later attacking him and three other Christian students on May 16.  Haldar sustained blows to the head and eventually died after 22 days in the hospital.  The students attacked Haldar in a dispute over Pubg, an online video game.  After Haldar’s brother filed a police complaint, the accused were detained and released on bail.  “As Christians, we are a long way from enjoying security and justice,” the brother said.

On May 31, according to various media reports, two men with machetes attacked and left for dead Augra Jyoti Mahasthabir, a Buddhist monk from an indigenous community, at a monastery in Khagrachari in the CHT.  The attackers, two Bengali construction workers who worked at the monastery, also looted money from the temple.  The officer-in-charge of the Panchhari police station said police opened an investigation for attempted murder in the case.

On February 10, a group of Muslims destroyed the church sign of Emmanuel Church in Lalmonirhat District in the northern part of the country, cut down trees, vandalized the entrance to the church, and stole chairs and carpets.  The local pastor said Muslims in the area were angry with Christians because new members had joined their faith community as converts from Islam.  Media reported the destruction was spurred by anti-Christian propaganda at a local Islamic meeting place where Muslim religious leaders engaged in hate speech.  The Bangladesh Christian Association condemned both incidents of violence.

According to media reports, on March 17, a crowd of Muslims vandalized dozens of Hindu residences and temples in Noagaon village in Sunamganj District after a Hindu man criticized Hefazat-e-Islam joint secretary general Mamunul Haque on Facebook.  The media reported police arrested 113 persons, including a Jubo League (the ruling Awami League’s youth wing) party leader, following the attacks, and many of were released on bail.  On March 25, police filed a Digital Security Act case against the man whose Facebook post sparked the attacks.  The court granted his release on bail in September.

In September, Freedom House assessed recent violent incidents were “part of a pattern in recent years in which violence against religious or other minorities appears to have been deliberately provoked through social media.”   Human rights organizations and religious leaders echoed this assessment, saying social media contributed to religious polarization and an increase in attacks on religious minorities.

On May 8, numerous individuals sent abusive comments to actor Chanchal Chowdhury’s Facebook account after he posted a photo with his mother to celebrate Mother’s Day.  In the photo, his mother is wearing a vermilion bindi mark on her forehead.  Numerous followers expressed surprise at Chowdhury’s religion, and some made abusive comments about his mother being Hindu.  Some individuals also made negative personal comments about Chowdhury, and the comment thread was characterized by negative back and forth postings between Muslims and Hindus.  In response, Chowdhury said, “What do you stand to gain or lose if I am a Hindu or Muslim?  The biggest identity of everyone is that we are human beings.  May these vulgar questions and embarrassing discussions stop everywhere.  Come and let’s become human beings.”

Human rights activists expressed concerns regarding the wellbeing of Hindu and Christian groups, including the Rohingya Christian Assembly, in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar.  They said the Hindu community was segregated from the rest of the camp in response to an increase in violence against the community.  Hindu leaders said they struggled to hold festivals, as these were prohibited without special permission, which was rarely given.  Hindu leaders said there was inadequate access to the established temple, as access was only allowed for a maximum of 24 persons.  Government officials, however, said limits on gatherings or building new permanent structures were a result of overall restrictions in the refugee camps.  Authorities rarely granted permission to any group in the camps to gather during the year due to COVID-19 restrictions.  Camp authorities did not allow any permanent structures, such as shelters, houses of worship, or learning centers, regardless of religious affiliation.

On September 29, unknown assailants killed prominent Rohingya leader Mohammed Mohib Ullah in Cox’s Bazar.  Although authorities did not ascribe a motive for his killing, Mohib Ullah was known for being an active Rohingya community defender and rights advocate, including for religious freedom.  The media reported police arrested up to a dozen suspects in October and November.

In November, the New York Times reported Rohingya Christian refugee families relocated to the island of Bhasan Char in the Bay of Bengal due to what they reported was persecution and violence against them in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar.  Members of the Christian minority in the camps stated the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, a militant Rohingya group present in the camps, had temporarily abducted and tortured some Christian refugees.

Media reported that in September, Rohingya Muslims protested the burial of Mohi Uddin, a Christian Rohingya refugee, in the Kutapalong refugee camp, preventing the burial from taking place for 30 hours.  According to the pastor of the Baptist church in Chattogram where Uddin was eventually interred, the burial of individuals of different faiths in the same place had not been an issue of contention at the camp in the past, but despite the intervention of the camp manager and UN staff, on this occasion Muslim Rohingya refugees formed a barrier to protest Uddin’s burial.

According to media, large protests took place before and during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Bangladesh on March 26.  On March 19, 500 Muslims protested in the street outside the Baitul Mokarram Mosque in Dhaka and 200 student activists marched through the streets on Dhaka University’s campus.  The protestors said Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party were oppressing Muslims in India.

Media reported that on June 9, Christians and other religious minorities continued their annual observation of “Black Day” protests against the 1988 constitutional amendments establishing Islam as the state religion in the country.

According to local human rights organizations, a growing group of Hindu activists inside the country campaigned to reform Hindu family law to allow for greater rights for Hindu women, including female inheritance of property and provisions for divorce.  According to media reports, Hindu groups they characterized as conservative protested in August the submission of a set of reform proposals to the Law Commission by the NGO Manusher Jonno Foundation (Foundation for Human Beings).  The Bangladesh National Hindu Grand Alliance urged the government to take legal action against The Daily Star editor Mahfuz Anam and his wife Shaheen Anam, executive director of Manusher Jonno Foundation, who advocated changes in the law, for hurting religious sentiments of the Hindu community and creating chaos in Hindu families.  These tensions among different elements within the local Hindu community continued through the end of the year, without changes to the family law.

Human rights NGOs continued to report harassment and social isolation of, and physical violence against, converts to Christianity from Islam and Hinduism.  The NGOs said individuals commonly associated a person’s faith with his or her surname.  Despite constitutional guarantees protecting an individual’s right to change faiths, the NGOs stated that when someone’s professed faith deviated from the faith tradition commonly linked with his or her surname, harassment, threats, and social isolation could ensue.

The Ambassador and other embassy representatives regularly met with officials from the Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Social Welfare, and local government representatives to underscore the importance of religious freedom and tolerance.  They discussed the importance of integrating religious freedom and other human rights into security policy and stressed the importance of respecting religious minorities’ viewpoints, minority religious inclusion within society, and protecting religious minorities from attacks.

Following communal anti-Hindu violence in October, the Ambassador visited several places of worship to meet with leaders of major religious communities to support interfaith harmony.  He visited a Catholic church on October 26, Dhaka’s Star Mosque and madrassah on November 1, and the Hindu Dhakeshwari Temple on November 2.  After his visit to the Shakyamuni Buddhist Temple on November 10, the Ambassador tweeted “The United States stands with everyone, everywhere, supporting interfaith harmony and the fundamental right of freedom of religion.”  On November 17, a senior Department of State official met with interfaith community leaders for a discussion in which she emphasized that the United States deeply values religious tolerance and stands with Bangladeshis of all beliefs who were promoting diversity, unity, and mutual respect.

The United States provided $302 million in fiscal year 2021 for humanitarian assistance funding for programs in the country to assist Rohingya refugees and their host communities, emphasizing U.S. support for protecting vulnerable religious minority groups.  In September, at the meeting of the UN General Assembly, the U.S. government announced nearly $180 million in additional funding.  With this new funding, the U.S. response to the Rohingya crisis has reached more than $16 billion since August 2017.

As part of U.S.-funded training for community policing, the embassy continued to encourage law enforcement officials to protect the rights of religious minorities.

Throughout the year, the embassy continued public outreach programs encouraging interfaith tolerance among religious groups.  On October 29, Department of State officials participated in a virtual meeting with Hindus and Christians, including the Bangladeshi diaspora community in the United States, to discuss communal attacks, possible causal factors, and appropriate response measures.  Embassy officials attended religious festivals celebrated by the Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim communities and emphasized in these events the importance of tolerance and respect for religious minorities.

Throughout the year, the embassy published messages highlighting the U.S. government’s commitment to advancing religious freedom, including amplifying the Department of State’s Twitter messaging on International Religious Freedom Day.  Embassy social media messages on religious tolerance reached more than 2.5 million individuals.  The embassy released a statement on October 19 sending condolences to the families of victims of anti-Hindu violence and supporting freedom of religion.

Embassy and other U.S. government officials expressed support for the rights of religious minorities and emphasized the importance of their protection.  Embassy officials continued to meet regularly with a wide range of religious organizations and representatives, including the Islamic Foundation Bangladesh, BHBCUC, HAF, Bangladesh Christian Association, Buddhist Religious Welfare Trust, Christian Religious Welfare Trust, World Buddhist Association Bangladesh, Bangladesh Buddhist Federation, Christian Freedom International, International Buddhist Monastery of Dhaka, and the Aga Khan Foundation.  In these meetings, embassy officials, other U.S. government representatives, and representatives from the groups, discussed the state of religious freedom in the country, underscored the importance of religious tolerance, and identified challenges religious minorities encountered.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 287,000 (midyear 2021).  According to the most recent census in 2010, approximately 76 percent of the population is Christian, including Anglicans (23.9 percent of the total population), Pentecostals (19.5 percent), Seventh-day Adventists (5.9 percent), Methodists (4.2 percent), Roman Catholics (3.8 percent), Wesleyans (3.4 percent), Church of the Nazarenes (3.2 percent), and the Church of God (2.4 percent).  Religious groups with 2 percent or less of the population each include Baptists, Moravians, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Other religious groups, together constituting less than 3 percent of the population, include Muslims, Jews, Rastafarians, Hindus, Buddhists, and Baha’is.  Approximately 21 percent of respondents do not identify a religious affiliation.  According to the leader of the Jewish community, many Jews are part-time residents or periodic visitors to the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, including the freedom of individuals to change their religion, and the prohibition of discrimination based on creed.  A law criminalizing “blasphemous libel” is not enforced.

The government requires religious groups to register only to obtain duty-free import privileges and tax benefits.  A religious group must file the relevant customs and tax forms with the Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office, along with a resolution passed by a majority of its board of trustees expressly authorizing the application, plus the group’s related statutory declaration.

The constitution grants religious groups the right to establish and maintain private schools and provide religious instruction.  The government provides subsidies or financial assistance to some of these schools to help cover the cost of students who could not find space in a public school.  The public school curriculum includes religious “values education” as part of the historic association of schools with Christian missionaries, who founded many of the schools.  At the primary school level, the focus of religious instruction is nondenominational Christianity.  At the secondary school level, all major religions are included.  The constitution protects students from mandatory religious instruction, ceremony, or observance without personal consent or, if younger than 21, consent of parents or guardians.

By law, vaccinations for certain diseases are required for all school-age children attending both public and private schools, as well as those who are homeschooled. There are no exceptions for religious beliefs.  The vaccination program is administered through the Ministry of Health, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education.  Homeschooled children must be registered with the Ministry of Education.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

No further legislative action occurred during the year on the government’s 2020 announcement to legalize same-sex civil unions or on holding a referendum on same-sex marriage, but some religious groups, including Anglican, Pentecostal and Seventh Day Adventists, continued to oppose the legislation.  These organizations said there was a growing social acceptance of same-sex relationships, but said they were committed to following their beliefs and were opposed to the idea of their churches sanctioning same-sex relationships.  Media reported sporadic small-scale protests, some organized by religious groups opposing the legalization of same-sex unions.  In 2020, the government announced it would legalize same-sex civil unions, a decision criticized by most religious leaders.

To control COVID infections, the government continued to limit public gatherings, including attendance at in-person church services based on a church’s physical capacity.  Most religious leaders continued to say that COVID-19 public health restrictions on gatherings, although applied equally in the country, adversely impacted their organization’s finances, limited their ability to conduct in-person services, and hampered their membership growth prospects.  Several religious organizations reported they had successfully implemented online services to offset the public gathering limits.  A leader of the Jewish community said that her organization connected with new members by conducting online services.  Government officials continued to engage with religious leaders to support their public messaging to emphasize the importance of COVID-19 vaccinations.

In March, with the stated intention of making better use of police and court resources, among other reasons, the government decriminalized the personal possession and use of up to 14 grams of marijuana, a change in the law that the Rastafarian community supported.  According to media, Attorney General Dale Marshall said that cannabis possession of 14 grams or fewer would result in a fine rather than criminal charges.

Rastafarians continued to object to the government’s vaccination requirement for school enrollment.

Religious leaders representing the Anglican, Pentecostal, and Seventh-day Adventists churches, among others, acknowledged the growing social acceptance of same-sex relationships but said they were committed to following their beliefs and were opposed to the idea of their churches sanctioning same sex relationships.

Following a sharp increase in COVID-19 infections that threatened the medical system’s capacity, religious leaders called for all to pray to help reduce the surge.

Some church leaders said they had to defend their continued provision of limited in-person services following COVID-19 outbreaks among their members.  Church leaders said that following these outbreaks, social and media criticism called for the complete closure of all facilities involving public gatherings, including places of worship.

The Anglican Church provided space for a shelter for victims of abuse, regardless of religious affiliation or belief.

Most religious leaders said they were not seeing growth in their membership and were concerned that the demographic profile of their membership continued to skew to older individuals.

Embassy officials met with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss respect for religious diversity and tolerance and how to further advance these values.  On September 22, the Ambassador hosted an event with religious leaders to discuss their communities’ activities and hear their religious perspectives on social issues and on the proposed legislation to allow same-sex civil unions.  Representatives from the Anglican, Pentecostal, Catholic, Seventh-day Adventist, Church of the Nazarene, and Jewish communities participated.  The Ambassador inquired about the religious organizations’ involvement in and advocacy for other social issues such as alleviating poverty and protecting vulnerable members of society.

The embassy promoted National Religious Freedom Day and extended greetings on Chinese Lunar New Year, Holi, Easter, and Ramadan via the embassy’s official social media platforms.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 9.4 million (midyear 2021).  According to a 2016 survey by the state Information and Analytical Center of the Presidential Administration (the latest such data available), approximately 53 percent of the adult population belongs to the BOC, and 6 percent to the Roman Catholic Church.  According to the state survey, 8 percent of the adult population is atheist, and 22 percent is “uncertain.”  Smaller religious groups together constituting approximately 2 percent of the population include Jews, Muslims (who number approximately 20,000), Greek Catholics (members of the Belarusian Greek Catholic Church, also known as “Uniates”), Old Believers (priestist and priestless), members of the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and other Orthodox Christian groups, Lutherans (approximately 1,500), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Apostolic Christians, Presbyterians and other Protestant groups, Armenian Apostolics, Latin Catholics, members of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Baha’is, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and Buddhists.  Jewish groups state there are between 30,000 and 40,000 Jews.  Most ethnic Poles, who constitute approximately 3 percent of the population, are Roman Catholic.

Legal Framework

The constitution grants individuals the freedom to profess or not to profess and spread any religious belief and to participate in acts of worship and religious rituals and rites that are not prohibited by law.  It stipulates all faiths are equal before the law.  The constitution states relations between the state and religious organizations shall be regulated by the law “with regard to their influence on the formation of the spiritual, cultural, and state traditions of the Belarusian people.”  It prohibits activities by religious groups that are directed against the country’s sovereignty, its constitutional system, and civic harmony; involve a violation of civil rights and liberties; “impede the execution of state, public, and family duties” by its citizens; or are detrimental to public health and morality.  It also prohibits the creation of political parties or other associations, or political activities that propagate religious hatred.  The constitution states the law shall determine conditions for exemption from military service and the performance of alternative service as a substitute.  It stipulates the state may grant asylum to persons persecuted in other states for their religious beliefs.

The Office of the Plenipotentiary Representative for Religious and Nationality Affairs (OPRRNA), subordinate to the Council of Ministers, regulates all religious matters.  The office takes part in drafting and implementing state policies on religious affairs, enforces and protects religious rights and freedom, monitors activities of religious organizations and compliance with their charters, regulates relations between the state and religious organizations, liaises with state agencies and religious organizations upon their request, promotes tolerance and mutual understanding between religious organizations of various faiths and nationalities, and researches dynamics and trends in interdenominational relations to prevent “religious exclusiveness” and disrespectful treatment of religions and nationalities.  The executive committees of the country’s six regions and Minsk city have departments for ideology and youth engagement that include coverage of religious issues.  These departments are independent from OPRRNA but share information with it.  The plenipotentiary representative heading OPRRNA is appointed by and may be dismissed by the President, based on a nomination from the Council of Ministers.

The law recognizes the “determining role” of the BOC, an exarchate (affiliate) of the Russian Orthodox Church, in the development of the traditions of the people, as well as the historical importance of four other religious groups commonly referred to as “traditional” faiths:  Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, and evangelical Lutheranism.  The law does not consider as traditional faiths newer religious groups or older groups such as the priestless Old Believers, Uniates, and the Calvinist churches, which have roots in the country dating to the 17th century.

A concordat between the authorities and the BOC provides the Church with autonomy in its internal affairs, freedom to perform religious rites and other activities, and a special relationship with the state.  The concordat recognizes the BOC’s “influence on the formation of spiritual, cultural, and national traditions of the Belarusian people.”  Although the concordat states that it does not limit the religious freedom of other religious groups, it calls for the authorities and the BOC to combat unnamed “pseudo-religious structures that present a danger to individuals and society.”  The BOC, unlike other religious communities, receives state subsidies pursuant to presidential orders.  In addition, the BOC possesses the exclusive right to use the word “orthodox” in its title and to use as its symbol the double-barred image of the Cross of Saint Euphrosyne, the country’s Orthodox patron saint.

The concordat serves as the framework for at least a dozen cooperation agreements between the BOC and individual state agencies, including with the Ministries of Defense, Healthcare, and Information.  There is also an agreement with the Ministry of Education through 2025 that provides for joint projects for the “spiritual and moral education” of students based on BOC traditions and history.

The law establishes three tiers of registered religious groups:  religious communities, religious associations, and national religious associations.  Religious communities must include at least 20 persons older than 18 who live in one or several adjoining areas.  Religious associations must include at least 10 religious communities, and one of these communities must have been active in the country for at least 20 years.  National-level religious associations have the ability to establish regional and local religious associations.  National religious associations may be formed only when they comprise active religious communities in at least four of the country’s six regions.

According to OPRRNA data, as of January 1, there were 25 religious faiths and denominations registered in the country, encompassing 3,395 religious communities and 174 religious associations, monasteries, missions, brotherhoods, sisterhoods, and schools.  The BOC has 1,714 religious communities, 15 dioceses, six schools, 35 monasteries, one mission, 15 brotherhoods, and 10 sisterhoods.  (The latter two are clergy-led lay organizations.)  The Roman Catholic Church has four dioceses, six schools, 11 missions, nine monasteries, and 499 communities.  Protestant religious organizations of 13 denominations encompass 1,039 religious communities, 21 associations, 22 missions, and five schools.  There are 34 registered religious communities of Old Believers.  There are three Jewish religious associations – Orthodox, Chabad-Lubavitch, and Reform Judaism – comprising 51 communities.  There are 24 Muslim religious communities – 23 Sunni and one Shia – registered.

The national religious associations are the BOC, Roman Catholic Church, Old Believers Church, Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists, Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith, Confederation of Christian Seventh-day Adventists, Association of New Apostolic Churches, Union of Full Gospel Christian Churches, Association of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Union of Evangelical-Lutheran Churches, Jewish Religious Union, Association of Jewish Religious Communities, Union of Reform Judaism Communities, Muslim Religious Association, Spiritual Board of Muslims, and the Religious Association of Baha’is.

To register, a religious community must submit an official application containing the following information:  a list of its founders’ names, places of residence, citizenship, and signatures; copies of its founding statutes; the minutes of its founding meeting; and confirmation from regional authorities of the community’s right to occupy or use any property referenced in its founding statutes.  A religious community not previously registered by the authorities must also submit information about its beliefs.  The law stipulates authorities may take up to six months to review a new registration application due to an additional evaluation of the religion by a state-appointed religious commission of experts.  The commission evaluates the fundamental teachings of the religion, as well as its rituals, practices, history, and forms and methods of activities; welfare and charitable services; proselytizing and missionary activities; approaches toward marriage and family; educational activities; attitudes toward health care; and compliance with legal requirements.  In addition, the community must submit any texts written by its founder or considered sacred by the followers of the religion, information about prohibitions on clergy or adherents, a list of countries where the religion is widely practiced, and a list of countries officially recognizing the religion.  It also must submit information about countries that have refused to recognize the religion and information about court cases against followers of the religion in other countries.

Regional authorities, as well as Minsk city authorities or local municipal authorities (for groups outside of Minsk), review all registration applications.  Permissible grounds for denial of registration include failure to comply with requirements for establishing a community, an inconsistent or fraudulent charter or other required document, violations of the procedures to establish religious organizations, and a negative evaluation by the state-appointed religious commission of experts.  Communities may appeal refusals in court.

To register as a religious association or national religious association, a group must provide an official application with a copy of the founding statutes, a list of members of the managing body with biographical information, proof of permission for the association to be at its designated location, and the minutes from its founding congress.  Religious associations have the exclusive right to establish religious educational institutions and to organize cloistered and monastic communities.  All applications to establish religious associations and national associations must be submitted to OPRRNA, which has 30 days to respond.  Grounds for refusal are the same as for religious communities, except they also include failure to comply with requirements for establishing an association rather than a community.  Refusals or a failure by OPRRNA to respond within the 30-day period may be appealed in court.

The law confines the activities of religious communities and associations to the jurisdictional area where they are registered.  The law permits state agencies in charge of registration to issue written warnings to a registered religious group for violating any law or undertaking activities outside the scope of responsibilities in the group’s charter.  The authorities may apply to a relevant court, depending upon jurisdiction, to shut down the group if it has not ceased the illegal activity outlined in the written warning within six months or if the activity is repeated within one year of the warning.  The authorities may suspend activities of the religious group pending the court’s decision.  The law does not contain a provision for appealing a warning or suspension.

The law prohibits all religious activity by unregistered groups.  Under the administrative code as amended on January 6, individuals may be fined up to 870 Belarusian rubles ($340) for organizing, running, or participating in unregistered religious organizations.

The housing code permits registered religious groups to hold services at residential premises if local authorities grant permission.  Local authorities must certify that the premises comply with a number of regulations, including fire safety, sanitary, and health code requirements.  The authorities do not grant such permission automatically, and the law prohibits religious groups from holding services in private residences without prior permission from local authorities.

By law, all religious groups must obtain permits to hold events outside of their premises, including when proselytizing.

The law penalizes organizing and participating in unauthorized gatherings, the announcement of an intention to hold a mass event before securing official authorization, training protesters, financing public demonstrations, or soliciting foreign assistance “to the detriment” of the country.  Included in the definition of “mass event” are religious events held in places not especially intended for this purpose, whether in the open air or indoors.  The law requires organizers to request permission from authorities to hold a mass event, including those involving religious groups, 15 days before the event.  Some violations of the law prohibiting unauthorized mass events may be punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment.  Authorities must inform organizers of a denial no later than five days before the event.

The authorities have a system of reimbursements for security, medical, and cleaning services required from organizers of mass events, including religious events held outside of religious premises and sites, rallies, competitions, cultural events, festivals, concerts, and similar occasions.  Authorities cover costs associated with events that are officially sponsored at the local and national levels.  A July 28 amendment requires organizers to sign contracts for services before applying for a permit to hold a mass event and reimburse all costs within 10 days.

The law requires all religious groups receive prior approval from the authorities to import and distribute religious literature.  The approval process includes official examination of the documents by state-appointed religious studies experts.

Although there is no law providing for a systematic restitution process for property, including religious property, seized during the Soviet and Nazi periods, groups may apply for restitution to local authorities.  The law on religion specifically bans the restitution of, or compensation for, seized property that is being used for cultural or sports purposes.

The law permits associations and national associations to establish schools to train clergy but does not permit religious communities to do so.

The law permits only registered religious groups that are members of national religious associations to organize extracurricular religious activities at educational institutions.  The law states the national religious association must first conclude an agreement on cooperation with the Ministry of Education; the BOC is the only religious group to have such an agreement.  Even with such an agreement in place, students who wish to participate in voluntary “moral, civic, and patriotic education” in collaboration with religious groups must either provide a written statement expressing their desire to participate or secure their legal guardians’ approval.  According to the law, “Such education shall raise awareness among the youth against any religious groups whose activities are aimed at undermining Belarus’s sovereignty, civic accord, and constitutional system or at violating human rights and freedoms.”

The law prohibits religious groups from conducting activities in any school without identifying themselves, regardless of whether there is an agreement with the Ministry of Education.  It also prohibits visits from representatives of foreign religious groups; missionary activities; collections of donations or fees from students for religious groups or any charity; distribution of religious literature, audio, video, and other religious materials; holding prayer services, religious rituals, rites, or ceremonies; and placing religious symbols or paraphernalia at educational institutions.

The law does not allow private religious elementary, junior, or senior high schools or homeschooling for religious reasons.

The law establishes penalties ranging from fines to five years in prison for failure to fulfill mandatory military service, with an exemption for conscientious objectors for religious reasons.  The law allows alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors.  Military service typically lasts from six to eighteen months; alternative service can last up to 36 months.  By law, individuals who evade alternative civilian service may face up to five years in prison.

Only registered religious associations may apply to OPRRNA for permission to invite foreign clergy to the country.  OPRRNA must grant permission before foreign clergy may serve in local congregations, teach or study at local institutions, or participate in charitable work.  The authorities generally grant such permission for a period of one year, which may be reduced or extended.  OPRRNA has 30 days to respond to requests for foreign clergy permits (religious visas) and may deny requests without explanation.  If OPRRNA does not respond, permission is not granted.  There is no provision for appeals.

By law, the authorities permit foreign missionaries to engage in religious activity only in the territorial area where their religious association is registered.  Transfers of foreign clergy within a religious association, including from one parish to another, require prior permission from the authorities.  By law, foreigners may not lead religious groups.  Authorities may reprimand or expel foreign citizens who officially are present in the country for nonreligious work if they lead any religious activities.  Law enforcement agencies on their own initiative or in response to recommendations from other state agencies, such as the security service, may require foreign clergy to depart the country – a decision which may not be appealed.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Throughout the year, in response to peaceful protests following a 2020 presidential election that local and international civil society groups and governments stated was fraudulent, authorities responded with what most observers described as a brutal crackdown on what the regime stated were “unauthorized mass events.”  The prodemocracy movement continued to peacefully call for an end to violent action by state security services, the unconditional release of all political prisoners, a facilitated national dialogue with civil society and the democratic forces, and new free and fair elections under international observation.  The authorities punished clergy, along with others, who supported the prodemocracy movement.  For example, on July 6, Roman Catholic priest Vyachaslau Barok, based in the town of Rassony in the Vitsebsk region, wrote on social media that he had left the country after police threatened to search his office and confiscate computer equipment in follow-up to an earlier July 1 search at his home.  Police reportedly charged Barok with repeatedly violating the law pertaining to mass events, under which they could have arrested him for up to 30 days and had summoned him for interrogation several times during the year for criticizing the Lukashenka regime’s response to protests.

According to the international nongovernmental organization (NGO) Forum 18, which focuses on religious freedom, on August 27, a Rechytsa district court fined Council of Churches member Andrei Tryfan, a Baptist, 580 rubles ($230) for holding an unauthorized baptism of his son in a lake on August 1 that was attended by 25 associates and family members.  Reportedly, a person driving by took a photo and reported it to the police.  In October, the Homyel Regional Court dismissed Tryfan’s appeal.

On October 20, the Prosecutor General’s Office refused a request from Russia to extradite Jehovah’s Witness and Russian citizen Oleg Lonshakov.  Authorities detained Lonshakov in Brest in late September and told him Russia had requested his extradition for “organizing an extremist organization” and that he had been placed on the countries’ interstate wanted lists.  Authorities released Lonshakov, who had requested political asylum in the country, following the prosecutor’s ruling.  Information as to whether he was granted asylum was unavailable.

The authorities continued to harass individuals, including clergy, who expressed disagreement with the Lukashenka regime or criticized violence by agencies under its control.  After sustained harassment and threat of punishment by the regime, many religious leaders and clergy reportedly chose to refrain from commenting on regime actions.  The authorities stated remarks by religious leaders constituted interference in what they deemed to be political affairs.

According to Christian Vision, an independent Belarus-focused monitoring group, in January, the BOC dismissed Archpriest Siarhei Tsimashenkau, who headed the Synodal Missionary department, due to “alleged workload and other circumstances,” as well as the department’s member priest, Alyaksandr Kukhta.  Father Kukhta spoke against the 2020 presidential election and ensuing postelection violence and provided religious services to hundreds of persons in Minsk detained for participating in the peaceful prodemocracy movement.  Tsimashenkau criticized BOC Metropolitan Veniamin’s engagement with the Lukashenka regime.

In a televised interview on May 20, Metropolitan Veniamin urged clergy “to stay out of politics” and “set an example for other people,” and he also said, “While every person has a right to their own opinion, they also have the right to make a mistake.”  Independent observers interpreted the comments to mean clergy should avoid political activity opposing the Lukashenka regime, as expressing antiregime opinions would be a mistake.  He stated the BOC issued new guidelines to prohibit its clergy from engaging in what it deemed political events and expressing support for political groups.  Speaking at an Easter event on May 2, Lukashenka lauded the BOC for its “courage and endurance,” and he called on the BOC to “continue to stand with the people”; independent political analysts said Lukashenka meant to imply the BOC stands with him.

According to independent media reports in June, the KGB handed the BOC a list of approximately 100 priests who purportedly engaged in political activity surrounding the prodemocracy movement in the country.  The list included religious leaders or clergy who condemned human rights abuses by the authorities and supported fundamental freedoms and who were removed from office, demoted, or forced to retire, according to independent media reports.  For example, on June 9, the Russian Orthodox Holy Synod in Moscow accepted a request from the BOC to retire the 69-year-old Archbishop Artsemi of Hrodna due to what the BOC said was his “health.”  The Archbishop told Radio Free Europe on July 13 that the BOC’s request for his removal was an order from the authorities because “[the authorities] considered it necessary to deal with me.”  In his sermons, Archbishop Artsemi had repeatedly condemned what he said was the falsification of the presidential election and the Lukashenka regime’s violence against protesters.  He also did not take action against priests in his diocese who participated in unauthorized protests or other events not authorized by the regime.

According to Archbishop Artsemi, authorities accused him of “dividing society,” citing as an example a photo of the Archbishop next to a boy holding an Easter egg painted with a symbol associated with the opposition and prodemocracy movement.  The Archbishop dismissed the complaint as “laughable” and said the authorities were “purging” the church of perceived dissenters.  The Archbishop also said authorities had accused him of permitting the singing of Mahutny Bozha (“God Almighty”), a hymn that protesters adopted as a rallying song, in his parish.

According to Forum 18, in April, consistently proregime video bloggers harshly criticized Archbishop Artsemi for commissioning icons depicting 10 Orthodox bishops whom the Russian Orthodox Church had canonized after they were executed by Soviet secret police.  The bloggers criticized the icons as “emanating hatred.”

After Archbishop Artsemi’s retirement and the appointment of his replacement, the Diocese of Hrodna removed or transferred several priests who had participated in protests or had helped protesters injured by police.  One of these priests was Father Heorhi Roy, of Hrodna’s Orthodox Pakrouski Cathedral, who had expressed grief on the internet and from the cathedral’s pulpit regarding the authorities’ violence.  The cathedral had also held regular prayers for an end to violence and for peace in the country.  On July 20, the BOC sent Father Roy to serve in a small locality in the Hrodna region, which religious activists said was a punishment.  On the same day, the BOC removed Archpriest Anatol Nenartovich from his position as Hrodna Diocese secretary.  On July 22, the BOC removed Father Mikalay Haiduk from his post as the priest of Saint Nicholas the Wonderworker Church of the Bishop’s Courtyard in Hrodna and later transferred him to a small town in the Hrodna region.

According to Christian Vision, the administration of the Minsk-based Theological Seminary dismissed teacher of philosophy and priest Father Uladzilau Bahamolnikau on August 30.  Bahamolnikau publicly joined a hunger strike in solidarity with political prisoner Ihar Losik on January 19.  Separately, the BOC dismissed Alena Ziankevich, head of the BOC’s Association of Charity Sisterhoods, on September 7.  Ziankevich was reportedly associated with the prodemocracy movement following the August 2020 elections.

Protestant groups say they remained concerned about the authorities’ ability to prosecute unregistered religious organizations, although there were no reports authorities did so during the year.

Christian groups continued to state the registration requirements for religious groups remained complex and difficult to fulfill, which, they said, restricted their activities, suppressed freedom of religion, and legalized administrative penalties such as fines against individuals for their religious beliefs while the groups were unregistered.  The authorities’ guidelines for evaluating registration applications remained sufficiently broad and their application arbitrary, they said, to give authorities a pretext for denying applications from disfavored groups.

Nontraditional religious groups continued to state the procedure for registering communities and using residential premises for religious gatherings remained cumbersome and arbitrary.  In March and August, authorities in Lida rejected a registration application and an appeal from a local community of Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Some minority religious groups stated that they did not apply for registration because their members feared harassment by authorities and did not want to submit their names, as required by the application process.  Other minority religious groups preferred to negotiate registration and other concerns with local authorities, but few registration attempts were made during the year.  Some communities said they decided to postpone their registrations until the end of the COVID-19 pandemic due to health concerns related to gatherings.

Many unregistered religious groups stated they continued to maintain a low profile because of fear of prosecution and perceived regime hostility.  Some registered religious communities said they were reluctant to report restrictions on their activities because they feared drawing attention to themselves.

From July to November, authorities across the country shut down approximately 300 NGOs, including some faith-based groups and those groups whose activities were widely supported by Protestant and other religious activists and volunteers.  For example, in July, authorities in Orsha shut down the AIDS Care Education Training, an independent educational center supported by local Baptist and Pentecostal communities.  Also in July, Mahilyou authorities shut down a private educational organization associated with the local community of members of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, “Vedanta Veda,” alleging that its leader conducted illegal business activities.

According to Forum 18, in June, OPRRNA sent a letter instructing the BOC, the Roman Catholic Church, and Muslim and Jewish communities to hold an “all-Belarus prayer” in the format of a morning service, with the widest possible attendance, including public servants, and representatives of civil society, culture, and art in the framework of the “2021 Year of National Unity” on July 3, Independence Day.  The opposition used the social media platform Telegram to publish leaked letters from various ministries, including Transport and Communications and Emergency Situations, ahead of the July 3 prayer, calling upon organizations subordinate to ministries and their officials to attend those services “in accordance with their religious affiliations” across the country.  On July 3, the Ministry for Emergency Situations posted a video of approximately 50 uniformed officers attending a service at the BOC’s Assumption Church, in Vitsebsk.  The Roman Catholic Church urged its parishes through a message on its official website on June 16 to “add prayers for unity and peace in our country if the opportunity arises” and “to sing the Mahutny Bozha, in which we ask Almighty God to save us and our land from all evil.”

According to human rights activists, authorities arbitrarily restricted access to prisons by clergy from October 2020 through June 30 to protect against COVID-19 infections.  Former detainees reported, however, that authorities did not implement other basic pandemic protective measures within detention centers.  For example, authorities deliberately placed prisoners with infected individuals as punishment, and withheld medical aid.  Even after restrictions were lifted, prison administrators reportedly selectively denied clergy visits for certain detainees, including political prisoners.  Officials continued to state these denials were related to COVID-19.

Opposition activist Paval Sevyarynets, recognized by human rights groups as a political prisoner, requested a pastoral visit by an Orthodox priest in writing at least five times between June 2020 and April 2021.  His wife also requested a visit three times on his behalf.  The authorities denied all requests while he was in pretrial detention.  After he was sentenced to a seven-year jail term in May, authorities allowed a priest to speak to him only over the phone, separated by a glass panel, which barred him from communion or the privacy needed for a confession.

According to her family, Volha Zalatar, recognized by human rights groups as a political prisoner, repeatedly requested a pastoral visit by a Catholic priest after her detention in March.  Catholic representatives also appealed on her behalf.  The Investigative Committee, a law enforcement agency, refused all requests.  Authorities also prevented Zalatar’s mother from giving her a prayer book.  On June 2, the authorities permitted Vatican Nuncio Archbishop Ante Jozic to visit Zalatar due to his status as a diplomat.

According to Forum 18, prison authorities arbitrarily and forcibly confiscated necklaces with crosses from some detainees upon their arrest.  Christian Vision reported that Vitsebsk resident Dzmitry Karneyenka said that while he was serving several days of detention in January and February for allegedly violating the law on mass events, the prison administration took away his cross.

Many prisons maintained designated Orthodox religious facilities that BOC clergy were allowed to visit through the year, and some prison administrations selectively allowed different Protestant denominations to hold religious meetings for inmates.

The authorities strove to censor the pan-Christian hymn “Mahutny Bozha,” and they harassed and punished religious leaders, clergy, event organizers, and laypeople who sang or allowed or supported the singing of the hymn.  The hymn became linked to the country’s post-Soviet national revival in the early 1990s, when it was proposed (unsuccessfully) as the national anthem, and it had been sung routinely by both religious communities and pro-opposition individuals since then.  After the 2020 presidential election, civil society and the prodemocracy movement adopted it as an unofficial anthem and prayer, including during protests.  According to Roman Catholic activists, believers did not sing the hymn during public masses or the annual pilgrimage to the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary Basilica in Budslau on July 3, because authorities reportedly told organizers they would face reprisals if they did.

On July 7, Roman Catholic Auxiliary Bishop of Minsk-Mahilyou Yuri Kasabutski reported that on July 4, police visited the Blessed Virgin Mary Cathedral in Minsk to notify clergy they had purportedly violated laws by singing “Mahutny Bozha.”  Kasabutski told the press police could not cite any legal statutes prohibiting the hymn and had issued no formal warnings.  He linked the visit, however, with Lukashenka’s July 2 and 3 remarks that the Roman Catholic Church would face reprisals if it allowed the continued singing of “Mahutny Bozha” in churches.  Lukashenka stated the hymn was associated with Nazi collaborators and was used “to destroy the sacred statehood” and “reverse history by justifying [the collaboration of] their grandfathers.”

On August 30, independent media reported that local authorities canceled the biannual Christian music festival called “Mahutny Bozha,” which was scheduled to have been held in August.  While authorities cited the COVID-19 pandemic as the reason, independent media commentators and local observers connected the denial with Lukashenka’s July 2 and 3 remarks.

According to observers, authorities continued surveillance of registered and unregistered religious groups.  The sources stated that “ideology officers” and other representatives of the Lukashenka regime continued to monitor the activities of members of unregistered religious groups, including in their workplaces, although there were no reports of prosecutions.  For example, prosecutors and ideology officers inspected Roman Catholic churches across the country after authorities opened a criminal case against several leaders of the nonregistered Union of Poles on March 25.  Officials reportedly inquired about plans, operations, and activities of parishes and communities.

Authorities, including the security forces, reportedly continued to hold occasional “informal” talks with members of religious groups to learn about their activities.  According to religious leaders, state security officers also continued to attend religious services of registered Protestant communities to conduct surveillance, which group members described as intimidation and harassment.  According to these religious leaders, security officials monitored religious groups for activities or speech perceived as indicating support for the opposition or dissatisfaction with the authorities.

Religious groups, especially Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses, continued to report they remained cautious about proselytizing and distributing religious materials due to their perceptions that they could face intimidation or punishment.

According to media accounts, the BOC was free to proselytize without restrictions on television and in print media as well as in public spaces.

The Mahilyou prison reportedly refused to allow political prisoners to subscribe to the monthly newspaper of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Vitsebsk, among other independent publications, from July to December, according to Christian Vision.  Some families of political prisoners reportedly said that as of September 23, inmates were informed they would no longer be allowed to choose which newspapers and magazines to subscribe to, as internal prison regulations had been changed to give to prison administrators what had been an exclusive right of the inmates.

State radio station Belarus One aired a Sunday Mass at the Catholic Blessed Virgin Mary Cathedral in Minsk on April 11 and resumed broadcasts of the cathedral’s weekly Sunday masses on November 28 after discontinuing them in August 2020.

Authorities continued to deny the Catholic station Radio Mariya permission to broadcast via radio but did not interfere with the station’s internet broadcasts.

According to several local Protestant groups, communities chose not to pursue many new purchases or rentals of properties as places of worship during the year, partially due to the political situation and the COVID-19 pandemic.  Many communities reported, however, that they did not face impediments to purchases or rentals of nonsanctioned places of worship.  Some religious communities with outstanding property cases, such as the Roman Catholic “Red Church” and the evangelical New Life Church in Minsk, continued to engage with the authorities and the legal system to resolve them.  Converting residential property for religious use remained difficult.  Protestant groups stated they continued to be more severely affected than other groups because they were less likely to own religious facilities, and that they could not apply for permission to conduct religious activities in private homes because residences were too small to accommodate their numbers.

The Saint Simon and Helena Roman Catholic parish continued to use its existing church building (the “Red Church”).  The building was expropriated during the Soviet period and the authorities retained title to it despite continued efforts by churchgoers to return ownership of the property to the church.  Given the property’s disputed status, the parish continued to refuse to pay rent, utilities, or land and property taxes or for 2018-19 renovation work for which Minsk city authorities billed it in 2020.  By May, according to authorities, the parish was in arrears exceeding 400,000 rubles ($157,000), and the city continued to bill the parish more than 12,000 rubles ($4,700) monthly.  In June, St. Simon and Helena Church community members collected more than 20,000 signatures on a petition for the authorities to return title to the building to the church.  At year’s end, the authorities had not responded to the petition.

On February 17, police, authorities forced open the doors of the New Life Church (NLC) during prayer services and evicted its congregation from its building.  Authorities allowed the community to remove its property but barred the community from any further access to the church.  Authorities also fined NLC Senior Pastor Vyachaslau Hancharenka for not allowing bailiffs to enter the church on January 5.  Hancharenka said Minsk and national authorities made it clear in a series of meetings that they would not return the church building to NLC, and that alternative rental facilities offered by the city were either too small or too expensive.  Authorities also said they would not approve NLC’s purchase of land on which to build a new church until the community paid land taxes, which totaled approximately 450,000 rubles ($177,000) as of July.  Although religious groups are exempt from land taxes, the building used by the church was owned by district housing authorities, who argued the NLC had to pay the land taxes per a 2009 court ruling that transferred ownership of the building to the city and denied the NLC’s appeal of an earlier eviction order.  The church’s building was the subject of a longstanding property dispute with city authorities.  The NLC bought the building in 2002.  Local authorities, however, had refused to allow the NLC to officially convert the building into a church, starting a series of legal appeals.  In addition, authorities said they would not pay NLC for the costs it incurred in converting the vacated building from a cow barn into a church.

The NLC began holding weekly Sunday services in the parking lot outside its former building immediately following its eviction.  On July 23, however, Minsk police told participants they could be held liable for holding an unauthorized mass event.  The city repeated the warning to Hancharenka on August 5, saying he could be held criminally liable.  At year’s end, the community continued to hold services in the parking lot, and authorities had not pressed charges against Hancharenka or NLC members.

According to media reports, school administrators continued to cooperate only with the BOC among registered religious groups, based on the BOC’s concordat with the regime.  School administrators continued to invite BOC priests to lecture to students, organize tours of Church facilities, and participate in BOC festivities, programs, and humanitarian projects.

On January 11, Lukashenka signed a decree allocating 1.43 million rubles ($562,000) from reserve funds to cover salaries of professors and employees, as well as stipends for students, of the BOC’s seminaries.  As in previous years, Protestant groups and the Roman Catholic Church said their schools did not receive any financial support from the authorities.

On August 23, the Council of Ministers issued an order approving voluntary weekly classes on “Spiritual and Moral Culture and Patriotism” for middle school students.  According to the order, the purpose of the classes was “to shape the spiritual and moral ethics and patriotism of students based on Christian traditions and values of the Belarusian people.”  The material the courses covered focused on Russian Orthodox Church history and traditions and did not mention other religious groups, according to publicly available syllabi of the courses.

BOC dioceses signed several agreements with regime institutions in their respective regions of the country.  For example, on October 21, Polatsk State University and the BOC Diocese of Polatsk signed a cooperation agreement allowing BOC clergy to lead or participate in classes.  The authorities also encouraged student participation in BOC events.  On October 12, Hrodna Medical University and the BOC Diocese of Hrodna signed a similar cooperation agreement covering 2021-2025.

On May 21, the BOC signed a cooperation agreement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs that was intended to prevent drug use and drug trafficking among youth.  At the signing ceremony, BOC Metropolitan Venyamin said the agreement would be implemented jointly by the Healthcare and Education ministries, as well as with state media outlets and public associations.

Unlike other religious groups, the BOC continued to participate in the majority of state-sponsored public events, such as rallies or celebrations, without the need to seek prior approval from authorities.  For example, on July 2, BOC Metropolitan Venyamin participated in the annual Independence Day commemoration, along with Lukashenka, military veterans, public officials, soldiers, civil society representatives, and residents of Brest.  In addition, regional authorities and state-run companies often included BOC representatives in their events.  On March 12, for example, BOC Metropolitan Venyamin held a prayer service and blessed three airplanes owned by national airline Belavia, marking the company’s 25th anniversary.  On August 9, the Metropolitan held a service at a church located at a riot police detachment near Minsk and met with officers.  Human rights organizations and local prodemocracy activists criticized such public engagements with riot police due to what they said were the police forces’ widespread abuses against peaceful demonstrators following the 2020 presidential election.  On September 1, the Metropolitan and Healthcare Minister Dzmitry Pinevich participated in a ceremony launching the academic year at Minsk Medical University.

Authorities continued to permit the BOC to collect charitable donations in public venues as well as on its religious property.  While the law does not restrict other religious groups from raising donations in public, representatives of these groups said authorities continued to limit their fundraising activities to their own places of worship or other properties.  The groups said they faced harassment and possible detention if they tried to raise donations at other locations.

On July 19, the BOC signed a cooperation agreement with the Ministry for Emergency Situations under which the two organizations would streamline activities that would reinforce “spirituality and traditional moral values among officers” and also improve “interethnic communication” and their “quality and efficiency” at work.

On March 25, the BOC and the National Academy of Sciences signed a 2021-2025 plan of joint activities that included plans for scientific conferences, seminars, roundtables, exhibitions, and research work.

In public remarks on July 6, regarding the need to investigate and raise awareness of Nazi war crimes, Lukashenka said the country should follow the example of “the Jews,” who got “the whole world to bow before them” and “to be afraid to point a finger at them.”

On September 7 the state-owned newspaper Minskaya Prauda published a caricature on its front page showing Roman Catholic priests wearing pectoral crosses that progressively changed shape into a swastika and singing “Mahutny Bozha” while holding a flag associated with the opposition.  Senior Roman Catholic Church leaders, including Bishop Yuri Kasabutski and Spokesperson of the Roman Catholic Church Yuri Sanko, condemned the article and said it insulted “millions of Catholics” in the country.  On September 9, Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei met with Apostolic Nuncio Jozic, who said afterwards that the authorities did “not support any actions to incite religious hatred.”  Independent observers viewed Makei’s meeting as an attempt to defuse the situation.  In September, Plenipotentiary Representative for Religious and Nationality Affairs Alyaksandr Rumak wrote to Bishop of Vitsebsk Aleh Butkevich, the head of the Roman Catholic Bishops Conference, that the caricature did not reflect official state policy, but he urged the Church to “follow the law” and cooperate with authorities in order to preserve interfaith peace and harmony in the country.  On October 15, the Minsk regional police department said it had determined Minskaya Prauda had not violated any laws.  The Ministry of Information did not cite the newspaper for hate speech and recommended only that the outlet take “measures to avoid similar publications in the future.”

Religious groups said the regime continued to apply visa regulations inconsistently, which affected the ability of foreign missionaries to live and work in the country.  Authorities maintained a burdensome visa application process but, contrary to past years, did not cancel visas for clergy.  Authorities refused to extend the six-month religious permit of a Full Gospel pastor, which was required to allow him to continue serving in a leadership position of a parish.  The pastor, a Russian citizen, held a permanent residence permit in the country and was allowed to remain in Belarus.  In general, Russian citizens do not need visas to enter Belarus but are required to obtain residence permits to live and work in the country long-term.  In addition, all foreign clergy working in Belarus are required to obtain religious permits to serve in leadership positions at religious institutions and conduct religious duties.

Roman Catholic bishops continued to state that foreign priests faced multiple challenges, including a lengthy approval process before obtaining permission to celebrate Mass; and visas often issued for only three to six months.  In December, however, local bishops reported that contrary to prior years, authorities renewed all requested visa applications that had previously been submitted or were pending review.

According to sources in the Roman Catholic community, authorities continued to refuse Klemens Werth, a Catholic priest from Russia, permission to engage in religious work.  He was allowed to remain in Vitsebsk to continue building a new church, but since he was a foreigner, he was banned from celebrating Mass or otherwise serving in church.

The Jewish community and foreign donors worked with local authorities to erect seven privately funded monuments and five plaques that commemorated victims of the Holocaust at sites of mass killings in the villages of Yasen and Telekhany, the towns of Kletsk, Motal, and Ivanava, and other locations in the country.

Antisemitic comments appeared on social media and in the comment sections of local online news articles, although it was unclear whether the comments were posted by persons in the country.  For example, online communities on the Russian social media platform VKontakte posted images and videos featuring neo-Nazi themes and calling for violence against Jews and others.

Various religious communities reported instances of vandalism.  For example, on March 4, the Homyel Jewish community reported a communal multiuse building on its premises was painted with swastikas and other Nazi symbols.  Police launched an investigation into the vandalism but did not provide further information.

In March, individuals broke into and vandalized the BOC Saint Maria Magdalena Church in Navalukaml.  The next day, police arrested two men who had allegedly also vandalized residential buildings in Navalukaml.  A local court convicted them on charges of hooliganism and gave them suspended sentences of one and a half years as well as a fine of 1,450 rubles ($570) and 80 hours of community service, according to a September report by the General Prosecutor’s office.

In May, unidentified persons vandalized the Roman Catholic Blessed Virgin Mary Cathedral in Minsk, damaging flower beds, streetlamps, a door, and the vehicle of one of the priests.  Police announced an investigation but by year’s end had not announced the results.

Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz, former Archbishop of Minsk-Mahilyou and one of the senior Roman Catholic prelates in the country, retired on January 3 at the age of 75, the standard retirement age for Catholic bishops.  The Lukashenka regime had frequently targeted the Archbishop for criticism and barred his return to the country between August and December 2020.  On September 14, the Vatican announced as his replacement Bishop Iosef Staneuski, general secretary of the Conference of Catholic Bishops in the country.

The BOC continued its annual commemoration in honor of Hauryil Belastoksky (Gabriel of Bialystok), a child allegedly killed by Jews in Bialystok in 1690.  The Russian Orthodox Church considers him one of its saints and martyrs, and the BOC falls under the authority of the Russian Church on traditional practices such as this.  The traditional memorial prayer recited on the anniversary of Belastoksky’s death on May 3 states the “martyred and courageous Hauryil exposed Jewish dishonesty,” although a trial after the boy’s death acquitted the Jew who was charged with the crime.  Some antisemitic references about Belastoksky remained on the BOC’s official website, though in recent years the BOC’s online materials focused more on his role as a regional patron saint of children.  While Jewish community leaders said they prioritized other concerns, prayers for the commemoration reportedly continued to include antisemitic references.

An interreligious working group comprising the BOC, Roman Catholic Church, Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists, Union of Evangelical-Lutheran Churches, and Jewish religious communities organized seminars and educational events, some of which were virtual due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions.  For example, in July, representatives of the working group held a forum marking the 80th anniversary of the establishment of the Minsk ghetto.  The participants highlighted the importance of preserving shared historic memories.

The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials met with representatives of the Lukashenka regime, including the Office of the Plenipotentiary Representative for Religious and Nationality Affairs in February, to discuss religious issues.  The Charge d’Affaires engaged with the authorities on issues related to religious freedom, including the registration of religious communities, the freedom to express and practice religious beliefs, state pressure on clergy for exercising their religious beliefs and participating in political life in their personal capacities, and antisemitism.  The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Makei, denied the Charge d’Affaires’ request to meet with Plenipotentiary Representative for Religious and National Affairs Alyaksandr Rumak in December on the grounds that the previous Charge d’Affaires had already met with the Plenipotentiary in February and the situation with regard to religious freedom in the country had not changed since the previous encounter.

On October 25, the Charge d’Affaires participated in an event commemorating the liquidation of Minsk’s Jewish ghetto in 1943.  The embassy shared on social media photos from the event in memory of the thousands of Jewish victims and those who strove to save Jews.

The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials continued to meet with representatives of the BOC, Roman Catholic Church, Protestants, and minority religious groups, as well as with civil society activists and lawyers for religious groups to learn about religious activities and discuss the regime’s actions that affected religious freedom.  The regime’s political restrictions on public gatherings limited the embassy’s ability to hold events and public engagements with representatives from religious communities.  Embassy officials discussed antisemitism and the preservation of Jewish religious heritage with Jewish religious groups, as well as the regime’s restrictions on registration and operations with Jehovah’s Witnesses and Protestant groups.  Embassy officials continued to hold regular discussions about restrictions on religious freedom with religious freedom activists and religious leaders.  Embassy officials also discussed the status of the Roman Catholic community and the state’s relationship with the Church with diplomatic colleagues at the Apostolic Nunciature.

Following the eviction of New Life Church from its property in February, the Charge d’Affaires visited the church’s new outdoor gathering place and discussed the situation with its leadership.  The embassy expressed concern publicly regarding the eviction and urged authorities to abide by their commitments to uphold religious freedom as a member state of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.  The U.S. Special Envoy for Belarus also expressed support for religious freedom following the investiture of Roman Catholic Archbishop Staneuski as the new Archbishop of Minsk-Mahilyou.  The Special Envoy posted on social media a video message to the Jewish community before Passover and a video message to the Muslim community during Ramadan.  Embassy officials posted the Secretary of State’s speeches and other materials related to religious freedom on social media, including the Secretary of State’s comments on May 16 affirming religious freedom as a fundamental human right.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11.8 million (midyear 2021).  According to the most recent survey in December 2018 by the GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 57.1 percent of residents are Roman Catholic, 2.3 percent Protestant, 2.8 percent other non-Orthodox Christian, 6.8 percent Muslim (mostly Sunni), 0.6 percent Orthodox Christian, 0.3 percent Jewish, 0.3 percent Buddhist, 9.1 percent atheist, 20.2 percent “nonbeliever/agnostic,” and 0.5 percent “other.”  A 2015 study by the Catholic University of Louvain estimated that 42.2 percent of Muslims reside in Flanders, 35.5 percent in Brussels, and 22.3 percent in Wallonia.  According to Catholic University of Louvain sociologist Jan Hertogen, based on 2015 data, 24.2 percent of the Brussels population and 7.5 percent of the Antwerp population is Muslim.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of worship, including its public practice, and freedom of expression, provided no crime is committed in the exercise of these freedoms.  It states no individual may be required to participate in any religious group’s acts or ceremonies or to observe the group’s religious days of rest, and it bars the state from interfering in the appointment of religious clergy or blocking the publication of religious documents.  It obligates the state to pay the salaries and pensions of clergy (according to law, to qualify clergy must work in recognized houses of worship and be certified by those religious groups), as well as those of representatives of organizations recognized by the law as providing moral assistance based on a nonconfessional philosophy.

The law prohibits discrimination based on religious or philosophical (e.g., nonconfessional) orientation.  Federal law prohibits public statements inciting religious hatred, including Holocaust denial.  Discrimination based on Jewish descent is distinguished from discrimination against Jewish religious practices.  The maximum sentence for Holocaust denial is one year in prison.  Courts have interpreted that an antiracism law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, skin color, ancestry, national origin, or ethnicity may be applied to cases of antisemitism.

The government officially recognizes Roman Catholicism, Protestantism (including evangelicals and Pentecostals), Anglicanism (separately from other Protestant groups), Orthodox (Greek and Russian) Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and secular humanism.

The law does not define requirements to obtain official recognition.  The Ministry of Justice specifies the legal basis for official recognition.  A religious group seeking official recognition applies to the Ministry of Justice, which then recommends approval or rejection to parliament, which votes on the application.  The government evaluates whether the group meets organizational and reporting requirements and applies criteria based on administrative and legislative precedents in deciding whether to recommend granting recognition to a religious group.  The religious group must have a structure or hierarchy, a “sufficient number” of members, and a “long period” of existence in the country.  It must offer “social value” to the public, abide by the laws of the state, and respect public order.  The government does not formally define “sufficient number,” “long period of time,” or “social value.”  Final approval is the sole responsibility of the federal parliament; however, parliament generally accepts the ministry’s recommendation.

The law requires each officially recognized religious group to have an official interlocutor, such as an office composed of one or more representatives of the religion plus administrative staff, to support the government in its constitutional duty of providing the material conditions for the free exercise of religion.  The functions performed by the interlocutor include certification of clergy and teachers of the religion, assistance in the development of the religious curriculum in schools, and oversight of the management of houses of worship.

The federal and regional governments provide financial support for officially recognized religious groups.  Federal government subsidies include direct payment of clergy salaries and pensions, while regions subsidize maintenance and equipment costs for facilities and places of worship, as well as clergy housing, and oversee finances and donations when the legal exemption amount is exceeded.  Denominations or divisions within the recognized religious groups (Shia Islam, Reform Judaism, or Lutheranism, for example) do not receive support or recognition separate from their parent religious group.  Parent religious groups distribute subsidies according to their statutes, which may also include salaries to ministers and public funding for renovation or facility maintenance.  Unrecognized religious groups may worship freely and openly but do not receive the subsidies that recognized groups do.  In addition, the law stipulates a separate federal government subsidy for three organizations:  the Belgian Muslim Executive, the Secular Central Council, and the Belgian Buddhist Union.  Although the Buddhist Union receives this separate subsidy, the government has not officially recognized Buddhism as a religious group.

There are procedures for individual houses of worship of recognized religious groups to apply to obtain recognition and federal subsidies.  To do so, a house of worship must meet requirements set by the region in which it is located and receive final approval by the federal Ministry of Justice.  These requirements include transparency and legality of accounting practices, renunciation of foreign sources of income for ministers of religion working in the facility, compliance with building and fire safety codes, and certification of the minister of religion by the relevant interlocutor body.  Recognized houses of worship also receive subsidies from the linguistic communities and municipalities for the upkeep of religious buildings.  Houses of worship or other religious groups that are unable or choose not to meet these requirements may organize as nonprofit associations and benefit from lower taxes but not government subsidies.  Individual houses of worship in this situation (i.e., not completing the recognition process) may still be affiliated with an officially recognized religious group.

The Flemish government has a policy of conducting enhanced security screening for possible radicalization of imams or worshippers and against foreign influence at mosques, including by requiring all religious communities and places of worship to submit to a four-year probation period prior to official recognition.  This policy applies to all places of worship regardless of religion.

There is a federal ban on covering one’s face in public.  Individuals wearing face coverings that cover all or part of the face in public are subject to a maximum fine of 137.50 euros ($160).  In addition, the penal code stipulates violators may be sentenced to a maximum of seven days’ imprisonment.

Outside of the Brussels region, which still allows ritual slaughter without stunning, the law prohibits the slaughter of animals without prior stunning.  The legislation does not prevent halal and kosher meat from being imported from abroad.

By longstanding practice rather than law, the government bans the wearing of religious symbols by employees in public sector jobs requiring interaction with the public.  The ban does not apply to teachers of religion in public schools.

The constitution requires teaching in public schools to be neutral with respect to religious belief.  The public education system requires neutrality in the presentation of religious views outside of religion classes.  All public schools offer religious or “moral” instruction oriented toward citizenship and moral values.  Outside of Flanders, these courses are mandatory; parents in schools in Flanders may have their children opt out of such courses.  Francophone schools offer a mandatory one-hour per week “philosophy and citizenship” course plus an additional one-hour mandatory course on either philosophy and citizenship or one of the recognized religions, based on a constitutional court ruling.

Schools provide teachers, clerical or secular, for each of the recognized religious groups, as well as for secular humanism, according to the student’s preference.  The degree of religious expression varies but must follow a principle of “neutrality.”  Because “neutrality” is not defined explicitly in the constitution in the context of religious expression, most state-funded institutions follow one of two principles: “inclusive neutrality,” where individuals must remain neutral in their behavior but may wear religious symbols, or “exclusive neutrality,” where there is a total ban on religious attire.  In either case, the education provided outside of the religious classes must remain neutral.

Public school religion teachers are nominated by a committee from their religious group and appointed by the linguistic community government’s education minister.  Private, authorized religious schools (limited to schools operated by recognized religious groups), known as “free” schools, follow the same curriculum as public schools but may place greater emphasis on specific religious classes.  Teachers at these religious schools are civil servants, and their salaries, as well as subsidies for the schools’ operating expenses, are paid for by the respective linguistic community, municipality, or province.

Unia is a publicly funded independent agency responsible for reviewing discrimination complaints, including those of a religious nature, and attempting to resolve them through mediation or arbitration.  The agency lacks legal powers to enforce resolution of cases but may refer them to the courts.

The federal justice minister appoints a magistrate in each judicial district to monitor discrimination cases and oversee their prosecution, including those involving religion, as a criminal act.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

During the year, according to Justice Minister Van Quickenborne and reported by media outlet La Libre, mosque applications for government recognition stagnated due to changes in the leadership of the Muslim Executive and an announced internal restructuring of the organization, as well as unfavorable decisions by intelligence services following the review of some mosques’ applications.  Some observers continued to state that a number of mosques opted not to seek official recognition because they received sufficient foreign funding and preferred to operate without government oversight.  Some observers stated the lengthy, bureaucratic process of obtaining recognition also acted as a deterrent.

On June 4, the Flemish government approved a decree to resume accepting and reviewing applications for recognition by religious houses of worship that then regional Interior Minister Liesbeth Homans had suspended in 2017.  In 2020, a senior Flemish government official estimated there were 50-100 local places of worship with pending applications for recognition, some dating back to the 2017 moratorium.  Local media reported in June that in the province of Antwerp alone, 31 mosques were awaiting official recognition.

On June 9, Flemish Minister of Civic Integration Bart Somers withdrew the recognition of a Pakistani mosque in Antwerp due to what he said was its failure to meet the criteria of social value.  Somers stated the mosque disrupted social cohesion and had insufficient support within the community.  According to the civil intelligence service, Surete d’Etat, the mosque had faced internal disputes since 2013, which in some cases required police intervention.  On October 18, Somers withdrew recognition of the De Koepel Mosque in Antwerp for what he said was a failure to meet administrative obligations, such as providing annual accounts, budget, and board meeting records.

According to local media and academics, recognition applications by eight mosques in the Brussels-Capital region remained pending.  Minister of Justice Van Quickenborne denied recognition to the Great Mosque of Brussels in December 2020 after a negative report from Surete d’Etat.  The Surete cited what it described as questionable ties to Moroccan authorities.

At year’s end, there were 87 recognized mosques, the same number as at the end of 2020 – 39 in Wallonia, 27 in Flanders, and 21 in Brussels.  The Belgian Muslim Executive estimated there were a total of 300 mosques in the country, both recognized and unrecognized.

In January, the deputy head of the Muslim Executive, Salah Echallaoui, resigned after Minister of Justice Van Quickenborne accused him of mismanagement; he was subsequently replaced by Noureddine Smaili.  On January 27, the Muslim Executive reported that an internal evaluation found several of its members had ties to extremist movements and networks.  The organization subsequently announced it would undergo internal restructuring.  On October 6, Justice Minister Van Quickenborne requested an investigation to be led by Surete d’Etat into the operations of the Muslim Executive, since, he said, it had failed to make progress restructuring.  On October 19, several media outlets quoted President of the Muslim Executive Mehmet Ustun stating that he was considering renouncing state subsidies due to excessive “political meddling.”  In response, Van Quickenborne threatened to withdraw state funding for the Muslim Executive, which amounts to 500,000 euros ($567,000) per year, if the organization failed to comply with the government’s conditions for maintaining official recognition – greater transparency, reduced concentration of power among a small group of persons within the organization, and elimination of foreign influence.  On December 16, during a plenary session of the House of Representatives, Van Quickenborne stated that the “current circumstances” of foreign influence and mismanagement within the Muslim Executive could justify cutting it off from subsidies in 2022, and he urged the executive to institute reforms.

An application from the Belgian Hindu Forum for the government to recognize Hinduism as a religion, submitted in 2013, remained pending, as did its application to receive a government subsidy.  There were no other pending requests by religious groups.

In March, the Ghent Correctional Court ruled against the Kraainem Jehovah’s Witness congregation, finding it guilty of inciting discrimination and inciting hatred or violence against former members of the congregation and fining it 12,000 euros ($13,600).  The Ghent prosecutor filed a criminal case against the group in 2020 following a five-year investigation based on a complaint by a former member of the congregation, Patrick Haeck, who said he had been shunned after he exposed a case of sexual abuse.

Although the ban on face coverings remained unchanged, police did not enforce the law in the context of COVID-19.

On January 27, media reported that the State Secretary for Asylum and Migration, Sammy Mahdi, said he had ordered a Turkish imam to leave the country within 30 days for making homophobic remarks.  The man, who was the imam of the Green Mosque in the Flemish municipality of Houthalen-Helchteren and a member of the Belgian branch of the Turkish religious authority Diyanet, reportedly posted the comments on the mosque’s and his personal Facebook pages.  Mahdi stated that the imam’s comments could incite hate and “harm public order or national security” and refused to renew his residence permit.  On April 23, Mahdi’s cabinet confirmed via a press release that the imam had left Belgium.  At the same time, Flemish Minister for Civic Integration Somers began procedures to remove the recognition of the mosque due to what he said were discriminatory messages against the LGBTQI+ community on its Facebook page.  At year’s end, the government continued to recognize the mosque.

In January, the city of Charleroi approved a construction project for a mosque in its municipality of Lodelinsart after a second public comment period, which the city opened in 2020 after approving the project in 2019.  However, in June, Walloon Minister for Urbanism Willy Borsus denied a construction permit for the mosque, citing parking and noise concerns.

On March 8, media reported that a mosque in Court-St-Etienne had been completed.  The project was approved in 2018 after four construction permit rejections.

In a newspaper interview, Mayor of Antwerp Bart De Wever stated that the city’s historic community of Orthodox Jews risked bringing a “wave of antisemitism” upon themselves because of noncompliance with COVID-19 social distancing and testing requirements.  De Wever threatened to close one synagogue for violation of COVID-19 restrictions, stating that police had raided the synagogue twice on the Sabbath, evicting 37 persons in one incident and 22 persons in the other.  A spokesperson in Antwerp for the Forum of Jewish Organizations called De Wever’s criticism of the Jewish community “undiplomatic,” but added that the mayor was “a close and good friend of the Jewish community.”

In October, the Constitutional Court rejected the appeals launched by Muslim and Jewish associations against the ban on animal slaughter without stunning in Flanders and Wallonia.  The office of the Central Israelite Consistory of Belgium (the official representative of the Jewish community in dealings with the government) unanimously decided to lodge an appeal with the European Court of Human Rights against the decision rendered by the court.  Representatives of the Islamic faith, the Muslim Executive, and the Coordination Council of Islamic Institutions in Belgium said they were also considering an appeal.

A large slaughterhouse performing kosher and halal slaughter continued to operate in Brussels, where slaughter without prior stunning remained permitted, but it could not accommodate all requests, particularly during religious holidays.  The Brussels government said it had no policy on animal slaughter without prior stunning.  In February, Brussels Minister for Animal Welfare Bernard Clerfayt held discussions on the subject with Muslim and Jewish leaders in Brussels who followed halal and kosher practices, as well as with animal welfare organizations.  Sources stated that Clerfayt had been due to present a draft ordinance to the Brussels Council of Ministers in October that would prohibit the slaughter of animals without prior stunning, including for religious reasons, but he had not done so by year’s end.

On January 9, national media reported that, in a civil case, the Antwerp Court of First Instance ruled that the Antwerp-based NGO Mothers for Mothers, which stated its aim was to assist families and mothers in financial difficulties, was guilty of discrimination for refusing aid to veiled women.  The organization allowed veiled women to access only the entrance hall to its offices, excluding them from the rest of the premises.  The court ruled that the association had to remove the restrictions on veiled women or incur a penalty of 500 euros ($570) for each documented violation.  On January 15, the association closed its building in Antwerp to avoid complying with the court order.  A notice on the building door stated that the association deemed the court ruling “incomprehensible.”

During the year, the government appointed Ihsane Haouch, who wears a hijab, as government commissioner to the Institution for the Equality of Women and Men.

In May, the Brussels Labor Court found the Brussels-based public transportation company STIB/MIVB guilty of gender and religious discrimination after a Muslim woman was denied interviews for jobs at the company for wearing a religious head covering.  The court ordered the company to end its policy of “exclusive neutrality,” which bans all outward display of religious symbols and ruled that it disproportionately affected Muslim women.  In June, following internal discussions, the Brussels government announced it would not appeal this decision.  In a press release, Brussels authorities highlighted the “importance of the principle of neutrality of staff in the organization of public services” and called on parliament to hold a debate on the issue.

In February, the Ghent public prosecutor’s office called for the criminal prosecution of nine members of the youth movement Schild & Vrienden (Shield and Friends), commonly characterized as far right in Flemish and Francophone news media, for violating the antiracism law.  The accused included Dries Van Langenhove, a founder of Schild & Vrienden and a Member of Parliament for the Flemish political party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), commonly characterized as extreme right.  The public prosecutor’s office opened an investigation in 2018 after public broadcaster VRT documented antisemitic, anti-Muslim, xenophobic, racist, and sexist messages exchanged by the members in an online chat room.  Some of the individuals were also accused of Holocaust denial.  On December 28, the media outlet De Morgen reported that procedural issues in the case had arisen following accusations of a lack of impartiality by investigating judge Annemie Serlippens.  Serlippens subsequently resigned, and Van Langenhove’s lawyer requested that the evidence obtained through her investigation be declared null and void.  The Ghent Chamber of Indictments rejected this request.  At year’s end, the case had not been referred to the criminal court.

On September 1, the government ended Operation Vigilan Guardian (OVG), which since 2015 had provided domestic military protection in the face of increased terror threats.  With the change, responsibility for protection of Antwerp’s Jewish quarter shifted from the military to the Antwerp municipal police, although Antwerp Mayor De Wever stated on multiple occasions that his municipality lacked the resources to protect the Jewish quarter.  According to media, the Antwerp police department would need to expand significantly to meet the increased security requirement.  Community members stated publicly that they felt less secure due to the end of OVG.  They said the military had withdrawn the military protection because the government assessed the threat to the Jewish community was a tier lower than it had been several years earlier when the threat had been rated at the highest of four possible tiers.  Community members expressed concern that police might provide less effective security because, unlike the military, the police could be called away.  On Jewish high holy days, the city assigned extra police to protect synagogues and other sites.

Police continued to offer a voluntary, day-long course, “The Holocaust, the Police, and Human Rights,” at the Dossin Barracks in Mechelen, site of a Holocaust museum and memorial.

Media and NGOs, including Amnesty International, the Collective Against Islamophobia in Belgium, the NGO Antisemitism Belgium, and Unia, reported incidents of violence, threats, harassment, discrimination, and hate speech against Muslims and Jews.

In 2020, the most recent period for which data were available, Unia reported 115 antisemitic incidents, a 45 percent increase from 2019.  Unia defined these as incidents against Jewish persons rather than against Jewish practices, which it tracked separately.  Of these, 70 percent were related to hate speech and 49 percent took place on the internet.  Unia reported four cases of destruction of public property and four cases of verbal harassment related to antisemitism.  No cases of physical assault or attacks were recorded.

Unia reported 261 cases of other religious discrimination or harassment in 2020 and noted that the decreased number of in-person social interactions due to COVID-19 might account for the decrease in cases from 2019, when 336 cases were recorded.  Of the 2020 incidents, 37 percent were media related, and 30 percent occurred in the workplace, mostly against Muslims.  Approximately 88 percent of the cases targeted Muslims.  There were 11 incidents against Jewish religious practices, seven against Christians, and 13 in which the religious link was categorized as “other” or “unclear.”

Unia cited 112 cases of religious hate speech in its 2020 annual report. Approximately 90 percent of these were related to “inciting hatred, discrimination or violence.”  A total of 29 religious hate crimes were recorded by Unia, with 93 percent being cases of intimidation or harassment and no cases of physical attacks.

In February, Flemish media outlets De Morgen and Gazet Van Anwerpen reported that Flemish Jews pointed to increasing antisemitic comments on social media following news reports about large gatherings in synagogues and higher infection rates in the Antwerp Jewish community during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Security services also reported an increase in hate messages targeting Jews, including some accusing the Jewish community of spreading COVID-19.

In March, the Flemish television program TelefactsNU reported it had infiltrated and exposed an extreme right online chat group called “Volksverbond” that praised violence and spread racist and anti-Muslim propaganda.  Members of the chat group created fake online Muslim profiles and posted provocative and purportedly Islamist messages, such as calling for adoption of sharia, to “open the eyes of the people.”  Others proposed dressing as Muslims and throwing Molotov cocktails at protestors during a far-right demonstration.  Group members also shared information on how to acquire weapons and arms licenses.  According to the Flemish media outlet Het Laatste Nieuws, the group had 350 followers on Instagram and 26 core members in its private chat.

On June 3, the Court of Mechelen sentenced a man to six months in prison and fined him 800 euros ($910) for performing the Nazi salute in Fort Breendonk, located near the city of Mechelen, which had served as a Nazi prison hub for the transit and deportation of the country’s Jews during World War II.  The man was a member of Right-Wing Resistance Flanders, listed as a right-wing extremist group by the government’s Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis.

In May, press reported that the Royal Belgian Football Association had begun an ethics investigation of a Dutch soccer player for the Brugge soccer club after video appeared of the man singing with club fans that he would “rather die than be a Jew” following a match with Brussels club Anderlecht.  According to local media, other teams commonly referred to Anderlecht players and supporters as “Jews.”  The player said on social media he had not intended to offend, and the Brugge club said he “had no antisemitic undertone.”  Jewish parliamentarian Michael Freilich said the player needed to hear “how offensive his words have been to Belgian Jews.”

The Aalst Carnival, which in previous years was marked by open displays of antisemitism, did not take place due to COVID-19.  In January, press reported that the director of the carnival, Sven de Smet, posted a message on Facebook referencing accusations that Orthodox Jews did not follow COVID-19 restrictions.  The message read, “Hey, Jew, the rules apply to you, too.  Anything!  The chosen people of God.”  Journalist Rudi Roth filed a complaint with Unia about de Smet’s post.

According to Antisemitism Belgium, in early May five men insulted a man, his wife, and children, shouting “Free Palestine”; one of them later punched the man twice in the face.  The victim received medical care at the hospital, and the perpetrator was arrested by local guards and transferred to the police.  There was no further information on the status of the case.

Also in May, two persons threw rocks at a group of Jews in Antwerp.  Police were unable to identify the individuals responsible.

In July, an Antwerp resident assaulted two members of the Antwerp Jewish community near a synagogue.  The police later arrested a suspect.  There was no further information on the status of the case.

Other cases reported by Antisemitism Belgium include online antisemitic hate messages, for example postings comparing Israel and Zionists to Nazis or calling for the killing of Jews or the destruction of Israel; in-person verbal harassment, for example, instances of calling persons “dirty Jews”; and discrimination and vandalism, such as the defacement of posters highlighting the issue of violence against Jews.

In September, the Brussels-based NGO Action and Protection League issued the results of its European antisemitism survey based on data from December 2019-January 2020.  According to the survey, 8 percent of 1,000 respondents ages 18-75 in Belgium said they had negative feelings towards Jews.  Four percent said they would be “totally uncomfortable” or “uncomfortable” with having Jewish neighbors.  The survey cited stereotypical statements about Jews and asked respondents the degree to which they agreed or disagreed.  The proportion who responded “strongly agree” or “tend to agree” with the following statements were:  “The interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population” (23 percent); “There is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world” (23 percent); “Jews have too much influence in this country” (14 percent); “Jews will never be able to fully integrate into this society” (24 percent); “Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals” (16 percent); “Many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later” (9 percent); “Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them” (12 percent); and “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes” (22 percent).

U.S. embassy officials discussed anti-Muslim and antisemitic incidents and sentiment in meetings with representatives from the Office of the Prime Minister; the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Justice; and regional governments.

A U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor met with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for Democracy and Human Rights in November to discuss the government’s efforts to promote religious freedom in the country and combat antisemitism.

Embassy officials regularly met with religious leaders to discuss incidents of religious discrimination and ways to counter public manifestations of anti-Muslim and antisemitic sentiment.  They continued engagement with activists from the Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish communities.  On October 29, embassy representatives met with the Forum of Jewish Organizations in Antwerp to discuss animal slaughter, government regulations, antisemitic incidents, and security concerns following the end of the OVG program.  In December, the Charge d’Affaires met with leaders from the Central Israelite Consistory and the Coordinating Committee of Jewish Organizations in Belgium to discuss interreligious understanding and listen to concerns within the Jewish community.

Embassy officials met with various university professors to discuss the animal slaughter ban outside of Brussels and its effect on the Muslim and Jewish communities, the veil in public schools and institutions, and the process for recognition of mosques and imam training in Belgium.

The embassy engaged with the Antwerp municipal government and police to ensure the continued protection of the Jewish community as responsibility shifted from the military to local police forces.

The embassy continued its grant support to Actions in the Mediterranean (AIM), a Brussels-based NGO, to implement a project to educate elementary-aged students on the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The program brought 40 students from various Brussels schools from a wide variety of socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds together to learn about the history of the conflict and travel to Israel and Palestinian areas for a week to learn to break down stereotypes and combat antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiment alongside young Israelis and Palestinians.  Upon return, they shared their experience with peers and others.  The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials discussed the project with the president of AIM on December 14.

The embassy supported participation by an archivist from Kazerne Dossin Institute, a museum and documentation center on the Holocaust and human rights, in a virtual U.S. government program on preserving Holocaust history in July.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 406,000 (midyear 2021).  According to the 2010 census, the most recent, the Roman Catholic Church is the largest religious group, accounting for 40 percent of the population.  Protestants make up 32 percent, including Pentecostals (8 percent), Seventh-day Adventists (5 percent), Anglicans (5 percent), Mennonites (4 percent), Baptists (4 percent), Methodists (3 percent), the Church of the Nazarene (3 percent), and the Salvation Army.  Jehovah’s Witnesses make up 2 percent of the population, while other religious groups, including The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, Rastafarians, Baha’is, and Soka Gakkai together constitute 11 percent.  Approximately 15 percent of the population does not affiliate with one of these religious organizations.

No religious group is a majority in any of the country’s six districts.  Catholics reside throughout the country.  Mennonites and Pentecostals reside mostly in the rural areas of the Cayo and Orange Walk Districts.

The 2010 census lists 577 Muslims in the country.  This number does not include the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat group, which according to its leaders, numbers fewer than 160 individuals.  Some members of indigenous groups, including the Maya and the Garifuna, practice traditional folk religious rituals.

Legal Framework

The preamble to the constitution acknowledges “the supremacy of God.”  The constitution provides for freedom of religion, freedom to change one’s religion or belief, and freedom to express one’s religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance.  It also provides for freedom, either alone or in community with others, to manifest and propagate one’s religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance.  The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion.  It states that no one may be compelled to take an oath contrary to one’s religion or belief.  The constitution also stipulates religious groups may establish places of education and states that “no such community shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for persons of that community.”  A rarely enforced law limits speech that is deemed “blasphemous or indecent.”

By law, the BCC, a board that includes representatives from several major Christian denominations, and the Belize Association of Evangelical Churches (BAEC) alternate in appointing the church senator to the Senate, with the Governor General’s concurrence.  The BCC includes the Anglican, Catholic, Methodist, and Presbyterian Churches, as well as the Salvation Army, the Chinese Christian Mission, Seventh-day Adventists, and the Young Women’s Christian Association.  The BAEC includes evangelical Protestant groups, the Church of Christ, and the Assembly of God Church, but it excludes the NEAB, which separated in 2015 due to political differences.  The church senator also represents non-Christian groups, which participate in the church senator’s activities but have chosen not to play a role in the senator’s appointment.

By law, the church senator provides advice on public policy affecting the political positions of religious groups.  This senatorial seat places the political interests of religious leaders on par with three other senators, who are appointed to represent labor unions, the business community, and the NGO community, respectively.  The Senate is the upper chamber of the country’s two-part National Assembly; members of the House of Representatives run for election, while senators are appointed.

The law requires all religious groups to register with the official Companies Registry in the Ministry of the Attorney General the same way a business would register.  Registration allows a religious organization to operate legally in the country; receive state recognition; negotiate, sue, and be sued; own property; hire employees; and lend or borrow money.  There is a one-time registration fee of 295 Belize dollars ($150) and a yearly fee of five Belize dollars ($2.50).  Requirements for registration include a memorandum of association with the government delineating the group’s objective and mission, an article of association, and a letter from the Central Bank if the organization has foreign financial contributors.  The government may shut down the facilities of groups that do not register.

The government does not levy property taxes on churches and other places of worship.  Other church-owned buildings occupied on a regular basis, such as clergy residences, are not tax-exempt.  Religious organizations may also partner with the state to operate schools, hospitals, and other charitable organizations and, depending on funding availability, receive financial assistance from the government.

The public school curriculum includes weekly nondenominational “spirituality” classes incorporating morals and values.  Government-supported church-run schools may teach lessons on world religions for students from kindergarten through high school as part of social studies curricula.  These church-run schools also offer separate religious education classes that are specific to their own faith.  While there is no official rule governing a student’s ability to opt out of either of these classes, parents may decide their children will not attend.  The constitution prohibits any educational institution from obligating a child to attend any religious ceremony or observance.

Due to insufficient government funds and pre-independence agreements, Christian churches manage most public elementary schools, high schools, and some colleges.  Churches comanage, along with the government, approximately 60 percent of primary schools, 40 percent of high schools, and 50 percent of colleges.  Churches that comanage educational institutions include the Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Seventh-day Adventist, Baptist, Nazarene, Salvation Army, evangelical Protestant, Presbyterian, Muslim, Pentecostal, and Mennonite Churches.  Schools routinely observe Christian and other religious holidays at the schools’ discretion.  Non-Christian religious groups run a few schools, such as the Muslim Community Primary School in Belize City.  All schools, public and private, must incorporate the national education curriculum and adhere to government regulations under the monitoring of the Ministry of Education.

The law grants respect for inmates’ religious beliefs, and inmates may participate in religious activities in prison.  Religious leaders may request use of the chapel inside the facility and offer religious services to inmates.  The law prohibits prison authorities from requiring unnecessary work by prisoners on Sunday and other major Christian holidays (Christmas and Good Friday) and by prisoners recorded as belonging to other religions on their recognized days of religious observance.  The law allows the provision of religious scriptures and other books of religious observance to prisoners.  Authorities allow inmates to communicate with religious officiants via mail.

To enter the country and proselytize, foreign religious workers require a multi-entry visa, which costs 100 Belize dollars ($50) and is valid for one year.  Applicants must also purchase a religious worker’s permit, costing 50 Belize dollars ($25).  The visas are renewable on an annual basis.  Visa information questions include an applicant’s intended length of stay, location of service, funding availability for activity, and specific purpose.  Members of all religious groups are eligible to obtain visas.  While a group does not need to be locally registered, a recommendation by a locally registered religious group lends more credibility to the visa request, according to local authorities.

The Belize Defense Force retains a nondenominational chaplain and space for religious observance.  With the prior consent of authorities, any religious group may use the space for worship.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In January, the NEAB expressed disappointment about the government’s proposal to legalize marijuana, stating the government had disregarded moral boundaries for “mere economic benefit.”  The NEAB said it found it to be “shockingly offensive that in a national pandemic crisis” the new administration would put forward this proposal in its first 100 days.  The NEAB urged the government to “exercise intelligence and creativity” in finding other beneficial industries for the country.  On July 2, the government introduced a bill to amend the Misuse of Drugs Act, which would authorize the legalization of marijuana.  The bill sought to establish a provision for the licensing and registration of enterprises operating in the cannabis industry that would allow persons to cultivate, process, distribute, and deliver cannabis for adult use.  In October, the NEAB stated it was “deeply concerned” that government involvement in the marijuana business meant the official promotion of marijuana use and development.  NEAB officials said they had been voicing their concerns to the Minister of Home Affairs and New Growth Industries Kareem Musa but were still waiting for a formal meeting.  The BCC also expressed concern that the government did not “seek and consider input on important moral and societal issues.”

The BCC said that legalizing the cultivation and distribution of marijuana would encourage widespread use of the drug, causing effects on the human body, particularly young people, and was “not a path civil society should choose to take.”  In response, Minister Musa said the bill was intended to regulate an already existing industry and, after meeting with the BCC, he said that requirements in the law would prevent the easy accessibility of marijuana to minors.  At year’s end, the bill remained pending before parliament.

In July, the BCC expressed “major concern” that actions of the government “further eroded and undermined the Church’s faith” in the existing church-state relationship.  The BCC pointed to a statement Prime Minister Briceno made in July blaming the leadership of religious schools for a 10 percent reduction in teachers’ salaries that the government had instituted in June as part of its economic recovery measures.  The BCC stated that while it supported the government on salary reduction under the belief that it was for the greater good, assigning blame to the leadership of religious schools was “grossly unfair.”  The arrangement between the government and religious groups called for the government to provide 100 percent of salaries for primary school teachers and 70 percent for high school teachers.  On a monthly basis, the government made disbursements to religious school officials, who in turn made payments to teachers.  In November, the BCC stated that both government and church officials had taken steps to improve the relationship.

Throughout the year, the government held discussions with the BCC, church Senator Benguche, and several other religious leaders on plans regarding new legislation and amendments to existing legislation, as well as COVID-19 pandemic matters.  According to the head of the Council of Churches, non-Christian religious groups had not engaged him on communicating their political perspectives, although by law the church senator represents all religious groups.  In a July statement, the BCC said that government consultations should not be an “information-sharing exercise, but rather an open dialogue reminiscent of their past relationship.”  According to the BCC, the government had not fully taken into account its concerns regarding COVID-19 restrictions on the reopening of churches to in-person worship, and it felt it unsuitable that the government had treated churches in the same manner as businesses.  The BCC leadership said discussions with the government on the safest ways to reopen churches had been underway when the government announced in December public health protocol guidelines including adhering to curfews, wearing a mask, or other face covering and social distancing.  The BCC also raised with the government what it said was the need for more counselors at the primary and secondary school levels, especially in the context of various difficulties introduced by the pandemic.

In October, the government passed a law rescinding the post of director of health services and, in its stead, created two positions of director of hospital services and principal health inspector.  Senator Benguche said church leaders were concerned the government had amended existing legislation to eliminate the position of director of health services and in doing so had bypassed important civil servant protections codified in law.  According to Benguche, this was viewed as a violation of the labor rights of the incumbent, Director of Health Services Dr. Marvin Manzanero.  Benguche said the religious community was supportive of Dr. Manzanero because of his key leadership role during the COVID-19 pandemic and the professional relationship that it had established with him.  While the BCC said it differed from the government’s policies on several issues, it commended the working relationship it had developed with Minister of Education Francis Fonseca and noted that under his leadership, there had been “tremendous improvement” in the comanagement of schools and the composition of church representation on school boards.

Due to COVID-19 restrictive measures, prison authorities suspended religious services and activities for most of the year, but sources stated that corrections officers encouraged private religious observance.  Officials from the Catholic Kolbe Foundation stated the organization trained inmate facilitators to lead small group services and that the prison radio station broadcast religious messages to inmates.  Authorities allowed inmates to communicate with religious officiants via mail.

The interfaith BCS, which includes representatives from the Methodist, Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian, and Pentecostal Churches, the Salvation Army, and the Chinese Christian Mission, as well as Muslim and Baha’i leaders, held limited counseling services for relatives of crime victims, as permitted under health regulations.  COVID-19 pandemic assembly restrictions significantly curtailed BCS services to the central prison and to Karl Heusner Memorial Hospital staff, patients, and relatives, along with BCS weekly Sunday services and Islamic prayers on Fridays at hospital chapels.  During the year, the BCS organized food drives and distributed meals to the needy.

Fifteen registered religious-based radio stations operated in the country.  According to the Belize Broadcasting Authority, evangelical Protestant groups continued to own and operate most of the stations.  Others included Catholic, Mennonite, and Pentecostal radio stations.

The Kolbe Foundation continued to manage the country’s central prison, with a focus on rehabilitating inmates.  It provided support for all religious denominations within the inmate population, subject to the availability of a suitable chaplain.  According to the BCC, the Kolbe Foundation continued to respect dietary restrictions for prisoners of diverse religious backgrounds.  During the year, the Jehovah’s Witnesses sent letters of encouragement to each inmate, along with a copy of Watch Tower magazine.

U.S. embassy officials, including the Charge d’Affaires, continued to reiterate the importance of religious tolerance in meetings with government officials, including the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and opposition representatives.  In March, the Charge d’Affaires met with government officials to emphasize the importance of the government continuing to engage with a wide spectrum of religious groups in the country, including Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, Baha’is, the Garifuna Afro-indigenous religions, and Mayan folk religionists.  The Charge d’Affaires also met with Senator Benguche, Anglican Bishop Wright, and Catholic Bishop Nicasio to discuss the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on churches.

The embassy used social media, including Facebook and Twitter, to highlight the importance of religious freedom and respect for religious diversity.  Messages underscored the protection of human rights, including the freedom to worship safely.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 13.3 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2013 census (the most recent), 48.5 percent of the population is Christian, 27.7 percent is Muslim (mostly Sunni), 11.6 percent practice Voodoo, 2.6 percent are members of indigenous religious groups, 2.6 percent are members of other religious groups, and 5.8 percent declare no religious affiliation.  The largest Christian denominations are Roman Catholicism, with 25.5 percent of the population, and the Celestial Church of Christ, with 6.7 percent.  Other religious groups include Methodists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baha’is, Baptists, Pentecostals, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), the Very Holy Church of Jesus Christ of Baname, and Eckankar followers.

Many individuals who identify as Christian or Muslim also practice Voodoo or other traditional religions.

Most Muslims reside in northern regions.  There are some Shia Muslims, and most are foreign residents.  Residents in the north report the presence of Tablighi Muslim adherents.  Southern regions are predominantly inhabited by Christians.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes a secular state, prohibits religious discrimination, and provides for freedom of religious thought, expression, and practice, consistent with public order as established by law and regulations.  The law bans any expression – including religious sermons – that infringes on the values and symbols of the state.

The Ministry of Interior has the authority to deploy the national police to intervene in conflicts between religious groups to ensure public order and social peace, provided the intervention complies with the principle of state neutrality in religious affairs.  Local department and municipal leaders may also issue orders limiting religious practice to maintain public order.

Persons who wish to form a religious group or establish a religious affiliation must register with the Ministry of Interior.  Registration requirements include submission of administrative materials (including the applicant’s birth certificate, police record, request letter, copy of identification, and the group’s internal rules) and payment of a registration fee of 50,000 CFA francs ($86).  If a group is not registered, the Ministry of Interior may order the closing of its religious facilities until the group registers.

By law, public schools may not provide religious instruction.  Religious groups may establish private schools with authorization from the state and may benefit from state subsidies.

The law bans online or written material, game shows, and other programs made public by journalists, editors, or printers that incite hatred or violence for religious purposes.  The law also imposes fines between 1,000,000 CFA francs ($1,700) and 5,000,000 CFA francs ($8,600) for individuals guilty of defamation for the purpose of inciting hatred against a group of people based on their religion using written press, audiovisual media, or printed materials.

The Digital Code criminalizes use of electronic means to incite discrimination, hatred, or violence against an individual or a group of people based on their religion.  Those found guilty may receive a one-year prison sentence and a fine of up to 1,000,000 CFA francs ($1,700).

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to the Ministry of Interior’s Director of Internal Affairs and Religion, the primary catalyst for government involvement in religious affairs remained “disruption of public order.”  For example, according to an evangelical Christian church leader, police intervened in several disputes between Voodoo and Christian followers over Voodoo practices that included animal sacrifices, initiation ceremonies, and idolatry.

Religious groups remained active in resolving the political discord that resulted from a 2020 electoral crisis.  On January 26, President Patrice Talon met with a delegation from the Episcopal Conference of Benin, representing the Catholic Church, to discuss the April 11, 2021 presidential election.  The delegation encouraged the government and political parties to engage in a peaceful, inclusive, democratic, and transparent dialogue ahead of the election.

Religious leaders from the Orthodox churches, the Cherubim and Seraphim Churches, the Mariavite Church, and the African Methodist Church of Benin, under the umbrella of Benin’s National Council of Ecumenical Churches, published a message on January 29 calling for social peace during the electoral process and an inclusive and fair presidential election.

To limit the spread of COVID-19, the government announced on September 1 restrictions on all cultural, festive, sporting, and religious events.  At a press conference on September 2, government spokesperson Wilfried Houngbedji stated that places of worship were not affected by the restrictions.  Houngbedji encouraged religious leaders, however, to raise awareness of the COVID-19 vaccine among their followers and to maintain COVID-19 prevention measures at places of worship.

Several religious events were cancelled due to COVID-19 limitations on large gatherings.  Speaking on Traditional Religions’ Day on January 10 in Ouidah, Minister of Culture Jean-Michel Abimbola stated that the government was not authorizing the usual large-scale religious celebrations because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Government officials continued to attend inductions, funerals, and other religious ceremonies organized by religious groups while observing COVID-19 prevention measures.  State-owned television often broadcast these events.  Police continued to provide security for religious events upon request.

On September 6, a former priest of the Christian Church of Baname, Jean Claude Assogba, sent a letter to government authorities, diplomatic missions, and trade unions to denounce what he said were abuses committed by Church leadership against its congregants.  He said these abuses included fraud and occult practices such as selling beverages made of animal blood to followers, poor conditions for and ill-treatment of priests, and mysterious disappearances and poisoning of followers.  Reports about his letter circulated widely on social media.  In 2017, four leaders of the same Church were briefly detained on order of the Court of Porto-Novo after five congregants died following practices advised by Church leaders.  As of year’s end, neither the Church nor the government had addressed the latest allegations.

Embassy officials discussed religious tolerance issues with government officials from the Ministries of Justice, Social Affairs and Interior, as well as mayors of several communes.

Embassy representatives met with leaders of religious groups, including Muslim, Christian, Catholic, Voodoo, and others and promoted religious tolerance.  Throughout the year, the embassy engaged with religious leaders in conducting its development activities and as part of its ongoing outreach to civil society organizations.  Embassy representatives also consulted regularly with practitioners and leaders from the Catholic, Celestial Christian, Muslim, Voodoo, and evangelical Christian communities on human rights issues.

Embassy officials invited religious leaders of Christian, Muslim, and traditional groups to a human rights event on July 13 in Cotonou.  Participants shared views on religious tolerance, and embassy officials discussed and encouraged religious tolerance and respect for minority groups’ rights.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 857,000 (midyear 2021).  According to a 2012 report by the Pew Research Center, approximately 75 percent of the population follows Buddhism and 23 percent are Hindu.  Hindus reside mostly in southern areas adjacent to India.  The 2020 report by the World Christian Database estimated that Buddhists comprised 83 percent of the population and Hindus 11 percent in 2019.

The 2012 Pew Research Center report estimates of the size of the Christian community ranges from 0.5 to 3.6 percent of the total population.  The Open Doors report covering 2021 estimates the Christian population at 30,000 (approximately 3.5 percent).  Most Christians are concentrated in towns in the south.  According to scholars, although individuals often combine Bon (an indigenous Tibetan religious tradition) practices with Buddhist practices, very few citizens adhere exclusively to this religious tradition.  The Sharchop ethnic group, which makes up the majority of the population in the east, practices elements of Tibetan Buddhism combined with elements of the Bon tradition and Hinduism, according to scholars.

Most of the country’s foreign workers come from India.  In 2019 (most recent data available), India’s Ministry of External Affairs estimated that 60,000 Indian nationals lived in the country and 8,000 to 10,000 additional temporary workers entered the country daily.  Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, some Indian residents left the country and the government limited entry of most foreign workers.  While there is no data on their religious affiliation, most foreign workers are likely Hindu and, in fewer numbers, Muslim.

Legal Framework

The constitution recognizes Buddhism as the state’s “spiritual heritage” and stipulates it is “the responsibility of all religious institutions and personalities to promote the spiritual heritage of the country.”  The constitution provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and bans discrimination based on faith.  The constitution says the King must be Buddhist and requires the King to be the “protector of all religions.”

The constitution also states, “No person shall be compelled to belong to another faith by means of coercion or inducement.”  The Religious Organizations Act states that “no religious organization shall compel any person to belong to another faith by providing reward or inducement for a person to belong to another faith.”  The penal code criminalizes “coercion or inducement to convert” as a misdemeanor, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment.  Neither “coercion” nor “inducement to convert” is defined in law or regulation.

The law prohibits oral and written communication “promoting enmity among religious groups” and provides for sentences of up to three years’ imprisonment for violations.

The penal code states individuals found guilty of promoting civil unrest by advocating “religious abhorrence,” disturbing public tranquility, or committing an act “prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony” among religious groups shall be subject to punishment of five to nine years’ imprisonment.

The law requires religious groups to register with the CRO.  To register, a religious group must submit an application demonstrating its leaders are citizens of the country and disclosing their educational backgrounds and financial assets.  The law also specifies the organizational structure, bylaws, and procedural rules for registered religious organizations.  It prohibits religious organizations from “violating the spiritual heritage” of the country and requires them to protect and promote it.  The law also states no religious organization shall do anything to impair the sovereignty, security, unity, or territorial integrity of the country.  It mandates that the CRO certify that religious groups applying for registration meet the specified requirements.

Registered religious groups may raise funds for religious activities and are exempt from taxes.  Registered groups require approval from local government authorities to hold public meetings outside of their registered facilities and must seek approval from the Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs to invite foreign speakers or receive foreign funds.

Unregistered religious groups may not organize public religious services, own property, raise funds, conduct outreach activities, or import literature.  Penalties for unregistered organizations performing these activities range from fines to prison terms, depending on the offense.  The law states it is an offense for a religious group to provide false or misleading information in its religious teachings, to misuse investments, or to raise funds illegally.  The CRO has the authority to determine whether the content of a group’s religious teachings is false or misleading and whether it has raised funds illegally.  Sanctions include fines and potential revocation of registration.

The law states that the CRO shall consist of an eight-member board responsible for overseeing the structure of religious institutions, enforcing the constitutional separation between the government and religious organizations, and monitoring religious fundraising activities.  The chairperson of the board is a cabinet minister appointed by the Prime Minister.  A senior official from the Ministry of Finance and one of the King’s appointees to the National Council also sit on the board.  The director of culture in the Ministry of Home Affairs serves ex officio as secretary.  Heads of Buddhist religious organizations and the Hindu Dharma Samudaya, a registered Hindu organization, occupy the remaining seats.  The law requires the CRO to “ensure that religious institutions and personalities promote the spiritual heritage of the country” by developing a society “rooted in Buddhist ethos.”

The constitution states the King shall appoint the chief abbot of the country’s Central Monastic Body, on the advice of the five masters of the Buddhist monastic body.  Those individuals and a civil servant administrative secretary make up the Commission for Monastic Affairs, which manages issues related to Buddhist doctrine.  The constitution says the state will provide funds and “facilities” to the central monastic body.

The law permits the government to “avoid breaches of the peace” by requiring licenses for public assembly, prohibiting assembly in designated areas, and imposing curfews.  The government may apply these measures to groups and organizations of all kinds, including religious groups.

Government approval is required to construct religious buildings.  By law, all buildings, including religious structures, must adhere to traditional architectural standards.  The CRO determines conformity with these standards.

The constitution states that religious institutions and personalities have the responsibility to ensure that “religion remains separate from politics in Bhutan.”  It also states, “Religious institutions and personalities shall remain above politics.”The law also prohibits religious organizations from involvement in political activity.  Ordained members of the clergy of any religion may not engage in political activities, including running for office and voting.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

International NGOs continued to report that the lack of clarity in the law addressing “inducements” to conversion placed the activities of minority religious groups at risk of legal sanction, although the country’s religious minority groups reported no such sanction or pressure during the year.

There were no applications to register religious organizations during the year, compared with 14 in 2020.  There was no information available regarding the composition of the 14 groups.  There were 139 religious organizations registered with the government as of December:  137 Buddhist and two Hindu.  The CRO took no action on any pending church registration requests.  The government did not offer any official explanation to applicants.

Unregistered religious groups, including Christians, reported being able to worship in private, although unregistered groups were not permitted to organize publicly, own property, raise funds, conduct outreach activities, or import literature.

Christian groups said they continued to be unable to acquire burial plots and there was no clear governmental process to do so.  Some groups instead buried their dead in undeveloped areas away from settlements.  One group said there was no official directive requiring cremation of the dead, but that government contacts informally urged cremation.  The group said cremation remained the clear national preference, given the broad influence of Buddhist practice and tradition, and that as a minority religious group, Christians had little influence on this issue.

Some Christian groups said that Christians had fewer officially endorsed public celebrations than the Hindu community.

The Open Doors report covering 2021 said Christians often faced difficulty obtaining “nonobjection certificates” from local authorities; these were required for loan and employment applications, property registration and renewing identification cards.  One local organization said it was not difficult to obtain a certificate, except when the applicant had a criminal record.

The government continued its financial assistance for the construction of Buddhist temples and shrines as well as funding for Buddhist monks and monasteries.  According to the NGO Minority Rights Group International, authorities gave Buddhist temples priority over Hindu temples in the licensing process.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government imposed strict safety protocols and prohibited religious gatherings and associated activities during the nationwide lockdown from January to February 13.

Some courts and other government institutions remained housed within or adjacent to Buddhist monasteries.  Some religious groups stated that government ceremonies continued to involve mandatory Buddhist prayer rituals.

Members of the Hindu Dharmic Samudaya continued to cite strong official support for Hindu religious practice.

Some converts reported continued societal pressure on individuals to participate in Buddhist traditions and practices.  The Open Doors 2021 report said converts to Christianity faced intense pressure to return to their former religion, especially from relatives who viewed the conversions as bringing shame to their entire family.  The NGO characterized persecution of Christians in the country as “very high.”  The NGO report said that anyone who left Buddhism was viewed with suspicion by neighbors and friends, and family members went to great lengths to bring converts back to their original faith.  One local organization said persecution varied in different regions of the country, with pressure to return to Buddhism likely to be higher in rural areas.

The United States does not have formal diplomatic relations with Bhutan; the U.S. embassy in New Delhi oversees unofficial bilateral relations.  During the year, the embassy engaged government officials on religious freedom issues and met virtually with community and religious leaders.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11.8 million (midyear 2021).  According to U.S. government figures, 77 percent of the population identifies as Catholic and 16 percent as Protestant, including evangelical Protestant and Pentecostal groups.  According to the local leader of the Church of Jesus Christ, approximately 300,000 followers reside in the country; the Church of Jesus Christ’s central website estimates more than 200,000 followers.  Approximately 5 percent of the population identifies with smaller religious groups, and 5 percent self-identify as nonbelievers.  There are approximately 1,500 Muslims and 450 Jews, according to leaders of the respective faiths and news reports.  Approximately 60,000 Mennonites live in the lowlands province of Santa Cruz, according to community leaders.  Many indigenous communities, concentrated in rural areas, practice a mix of Catholic and indigenous spiritual traditions.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, the state respects and provides for “freedom of thought, spirituality, religion and worship,” expressed individually or collectively, in public and in private.  The constitution stipulates the state is independent of all religion.

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination, including access to educational institutions, health services, and employment, and protects the right of access to public sport and recreational activities without regard to religion.

The law governing religious freedom and religious and spiritual organizations creates a clear distinction between NGOs and religious organizations.  Under the law, religious organizations are constituted to practice, profess, and teach their specific faith or religion, while NGOs have no such faith-based ties.  The religious freedom law requires all religious or spiritual organizations to inform the government of all financial, legal, social, and religious activities.  The law regulates religious or spiritual organizations’ finances and labor practices by requiring their use of funds exclusively to achieve the organization’s objectives, banning the distribution of money among members, subjecting all employees to national labor laws, requiring the organizations to register with the MFA, and compelling them to pay taxes.  Pursuant to a concordat with the Holy See, the Catholic Church is exempt from registration.

Religious organizations must submit 14 documentary requirements to register with the government.  These include notarized legal documents, including statutes, internal regulations and procedures; rental agreement documents, utility invoices for the place(s) of worship, and a site map; detailed information on board members and legal representatives, including criminal background checks; an INTERPOL certificate for foreigners; proof of fiscal solvency; organization chart, with names, addresses, identification card numbers, and photographs; a full list of members and identifying information; details on activities and services provided by the organization, including the location of the services; and information on their financing source(s), domestic and/or foreign.

The requirements for classification as a spiritual organization or religious organization vary slightly, but the government requires essentially the same type of information from both spiritual and religious entities.  The constitution defines a spiritual organization as a group of natural, national, and/or foreign persons who organize themselves to carry out practices that develop their spirituality according to their ancestral worldview.  Most spiritual organizations are indigenous in their origins.  The constitution defines a religious organization as a group of natural, national, and/or foreign persons who organize themselves with the purpose of carrying out practices of worship and/or belief around a Supreme Being to develop their spirituality and religiosity, and whose purpose does not pursue profit.

The government may revoke a spiritual or religious organization’s operating license for noncompliance with the registration requirements; if the organization does not produce an annual report of activities for more than two consecutive years; does not comply with its stated objectives; carries out activities different from those established in its statutes; or carries out activities contrary to the country’s constitution, laws, morality, or “good customs.”  A religious or spiritual organization may also lose its operating license if it does not comply with the deadline for renewing the license.  The government may not deny legal recognition to any organization based on its articles of faith.

A 2017 regulation requires religious and spiritual groups to reregister their operating licenses to ensure all documents list the official name of the country as “Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.”  Reregistration also requires any amendments to organizations’ bylaws to conform to all new national laws.  Religious and spiritual groups were required to comply with these new registration requirements by the end of 2019.

The fees to obtain an operating license differ between “Religious Organizations” and “Spiritual Organizations,” with costs of 6,780 bolivianos ($990) and 4,068 bolivianos ($600), respectively.

The constitution and other laws provide educational institutions the option to teach religion classes, including indigenous spiritual belief classes, with the stated aim of encouraging mutual respect among religious communities.  While religion classes are optional, schools must teach ethics with curriculum materials that promote religious tolerance.  The government does not restrict religious teaching in public or private schools, and it does not restrict a student from attending private, religiously affiliated schools.  The law also requires all schools to accept students regardless of their religious affiliation.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights.

Government Practices

Religious leaders and sources in the MFA reported the government had not completely implemented or enforced the religious freedom law that was passed in 2019, particularly aspects pertaining to the registration requirement, due to the political fluidity in the country and prolonged restrictions related to COVID-19.

Members of the evangelical Protestant community continued to say several smaller religious communities formed congregations that held services at unofficial worship locations and conducted other activities without registering.  These smaller communities continued to refuse to register their organizations because, according to sources, they preferred not to provide the government with access to internal information.  Sources stated these unregistered groups still could neither own property nor hold bank accounts in their organization’s name; instead, money for a group was generally held in a bank account controlled by the leader’s family.

According to the MFA’s Office of Religion and Nongovernmental Organizations, there were approximately 648 registered groups listed under the requirements of the religious freedom law, compared with 440 groups in 2020, and an additional 75 groups with a registration request in process with the MFA.  According to religious leaders, nearly all known religious or spiritual organizations that wished to register with the government had complied with the requirements.  Religious groups said the registration process generally took four to six months to complete.  In November, MFA officials stated they were working on a system to digitize the registration process to reduce the timeline to one to two months and planned to have the new digital system complete by 2022.

According to press reports in September, evangelical Protestant pastor Luis Aruquipa objected to government efforts to vaccinate the population against COVID-19, stating, “We are against being forced to vaccinate.  You have to leave it to free will.”  He also quoted a passage from Psalm 119:45: “I will walk in freedom, for I have devoted myself to your commandments.”

In September, evangelical Protestant leaders said they were upset with Vice President David Choquehuanca for “corrupting” the evangelical faith.  They said Choquehuanca, who was raised in the faith, used his office to promote a syncretic religion that amalgamates indigenous rituals and evangelical Protestant beliefs.

According to Catholic Church leaders, the government increasingly pressured the Church due to its role in mediating the presidential succession in 2019, when post-electoral unrest led to the resignation of then-president Evo Morales.  Catholic leaders said that the government’s public verbal attacks created a hostile atmosphere that affected the perception that many youths had of the Church.  Catholic leaders also said the government was delaying international clothing donations and increasing the difficulty of obtaining documentation for incoming missionaries.

On March 13, the BEC released a statement hours after authorities detained former interim president Anez.  In their statement, the bishops said that “politics of revenge” and a justice system aligned with the ruling political power “do not create confidence in the people.”  The bishops released their message by video, with conference president Bishop Ricardo Centellas reading from a prepared text:  “We cannot remain passive while citizens who have served Bolivia, [albeit] with their limitations, are persecuted.”

On August 25, the BEC issued a press statement expressing concern “over the deplorable human rights situation” in the country and “the manipulation of the judicial system by those at the top of the state,” and calling for a summit on justice reform.  A Catholic Church representative stated that a few days after the statement was issued, he was summoned by high-ranking government officials who threatened him and ordered him to stop meddling in politics.

On September 23, President Arce delivered a speech at the UN General Assembly, in which he accused the Catholic hierarchy of “participating in the breakdown of [the country’s] constitutional order.”  While avoiding a specific response to the President’s speech, the leader of the BEC made a November 14 public statement that criticized “threats and words that incite violence” and called for an inclusive, peaceful dialogue that seeks justice and peace in the country.

According to media, on October 29, the government’s ombudsman, Nadia Cruz, and other officials led a march to the BEC’s headquarters, where some protestors vandalized the premises with slogans, including, “They are not pro-life, they are pro-rape” and “rapists and perverse priests.”  The protesters were reportedly protesting what they characterized as the meddling of the Catholic Church in convincing an 11-year-old pregnant rape victim not to abort.

Police and media reported the explosion of a crude bomb near the entrance of the La Paz BEC headquarters in the early morning hours of November 24.  The explosion caused material damage to the structure but did not result in any injuries.  While there was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack, many believed the incident was related to the case of the 11-year-old pregnant rape victim.  Minister of Government Eduardo del Castillo reported that police had identified two women allegedly responsible for the attack but did not provide any more information, citing the confidential nature of the ongoing investigation.

According to media, on October 31, groups in favor of abortion interrupted a Mass at the San Francisco Basilica and San Miguel Church in La Paz and at the San Lorenzo the Martyr Cathedral in Santa Cruz, spray painting the latter with red paint.  The activists were demonstrating on behalf of the 11-year-old pregnant rape victim.  “From the point of view of our faith, there’s an absolute conviction to protect life,” Susana Inch, legal counsel for the BEC, said.  “Even when there’s an instance of sexual violence, even when there’s a high-risk pregnancy, even when everything is unfavorable, the conviction is to protect and save that life under any circumstance.”  A representative of the Archdiocese of Santa Cruz condemned the attacks on the Catholic Church and its buildings.

Media reported a November 25 incident in which a group of pro-abortion rights protesters confronted a group attempting to protect the Maria Auxiliadora Church in La Paz.  The protesters threw buckets of paint, feces, and other objects at the group protecting the church.

In November, embassy representatives met with MFA officials to discuss the challenges related to COVID-19 restrictions and their impact on religious freedom and the status of implementation of the new religious freedom law.

Embassy representatives regularly engaged religious leaders to underscore the importance of tolerance and religious freedom.  In October, the Charge d’Affaires met with religious leaders from the evangelical Protestant, Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish communities to discuss religious freedom issues, including the religious freedom law, and to encourage religious leaders to engage in interfaith dialogue.  Throughout the year, embassy officials met individually with leaders of the Church of Jesus Christ, and evangelical Protestant, Catholic, Mennonite, and Muslim groups to discuss the impact of the implementation of the religious freedom law, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their communities, and their relationships with the government under the leadership of President Arce.

The embassy posted traditional greetings for Hannukah and Christmas on its Facebook page.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.8 million (midyear 2021).  According to the most recent census, conducted in 2013, Sunni Muslims constitute approximately 51 percent of the population, Serbian Orthodox Christians 31 percent, Roman Catholics 15 percent, and others, including Protestants and Jews, 3 percent.

There is a strong correlation between ethnicity and religion:  BiH Serbs affiliate primarily with the SOC, and BiH Croats with the Catholic Church.  Bosniaks are predominantly Muslim.  The Jewish Community estimates it has 1,000 members, with the majority living in Sarajevo.  The majority of Serbian Orthodox live in the RS, and most Muslims and Catholics in the Federation.  Protestant and most other small religious communities have their largest memberships in Sarajevo and Banja Luka.

Legal Framework

Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which serves as the country’s constitution, provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.  It stipulates no one shall be deprived of citizenship on the grounds of religion and that all persons shall enjoy the same rights and freedoms without discrimination as to religion.

The entity constitution of the Federation states all individuals shall have freedom of religion, including of public and private worship, and freedom from discrimination based on religion or creed.  It defines religion as a vital national interest of the constituent peoples.

The entity constitution of the RS establishes the SOC as “the Church of the Serb people and other people of Orthodox religion.”  It provides for equal freedoms, rights, and duties for all citizens irrespective of religion and prohibits any incitement to religious hatred or intolerance.  It specifies religious communities shall be equal before the law and free to manage their religious affairs and hold religious services, open religious schools and conduct religious education in all schools, engage in commercial activities, receive gifts, and establish and manage endowments in accordance with the law.

The self-governing Brcko District follows national law on religious freedom.

A national law on religion provides for freedom of conscience and grants legal status to “churches and religious communities.”  To acquire official status as a recognized religious community, religious groups must register.  The constitutions of BiH, the Federation entity, and the RS entity state that registered religious organizations are allowed to operate freely.

Unregistered religious groups may assemble to practice their religion, but they have no legal status and may not represent themselves as a religious community.

Registration affords numerous rights to religious communities that are not available to those that do not register, including the right to conduct collaborative actions such as charity work, fundraising, and constructing and occupying places of worship.  The law states churches and religious communities serve as representative institutions and organizations of believers, founded in accordance with their own regulations, teachings, beliefs, traditions, and practices.  The law recognizes the legal status of four “traditional” religious communities:  the Islamic Community, SOC, Catholic Church, and Jewish Community.  The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) maintains a unified register of all religious communities, and the MHRR is responsible for documenting violations of religious freedom.

According to law, any group of 300 or more adult citizens may apply to register a new religious community or church through a written application to the MOJ.  Requirements for registration include presenting statutes that define the method of religious practice and a petition for establishment with the signatures of at least 30 founders.  The ministry must issue a decision within 30 days of receipt of the application.  The law stipulates the ministry may deny the application for registration if it concludes the content and manner of worship may be “contrary to legal order, public morale, or is damaging to the life and health or other rights and freedoms of believers and citizens.”  A group may appeal a negative decision to the BiH Council of Ministers.  The law allows registered religious communities to establish their own suborganizations, which may operate without restriction.

The law states that no new church or religious community may be founded bearing the same or similar name as an existing church or religious community.  The law also states no one may use the symbols, insignia, or attributes of a church or a religious community without its consent.

In addition to registered churches and religious communities, there are educational, charitable, and other institutions, known as “legal subjects,” that belong to these communities but are registered as separate legal entities in the MOJ registry.  The Islamic Community has 121 legal subjects, the Catholic Church 400, the Orthodox Church 538, Jewish Community eight, and other churches and religious communities and alliances (primarily of Protestant groups) have 50.

Pursuant to a 2015 decision of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, employees of judicial institutions are prohibited from wearing any form of “religious insignia,” including headscarves, or practicing religion, such as by praying or proselytizing, at work.

The state recognizes the Islamic Community as the sole supreme institutional religious authority for all Muslims in the country, including immigrants and refugees, as well as for Bosniaks and other Muslim nationals living outside the country who accept the Islamic Community’s authority.  According to the law, no Islamic group may register with the MOJ or open a mosque without the permission of the Islamic Community.

The law on religion states that churches and religious communities must pay taxes and contributions on earnings of their employees (pension, health, and disability insurance).  In the Federation, two of the 10 cantons – Western Herzegovina Canton and Herzegovina-Neretva Canton – include religious officials in their health insurance system.  Sarajevo Canton does not include religious workers in its health insurance system but offers such insurance to religious officials under more favorable provisions than those available to other citizens.  The RS provides pension benefits and disability insurance to religious workers while they have residence there.

The criminal codes of all three BiH administrative units regulate hate crimes.  The provisions in these codes define hate crimes as any criminal act committed because of religious belief or various other factors.  The criminal codes also stipulate that these motivations be considered aggravating circumstances of a criminal act unless the code itself stipulates harsher punishments.

The laws of the Federation, each of the 10 Federation cantons, and the RS affirm the right of every citizen to religious education.  The laws allow a representative of each of the officially registered religious communities to assume responsibility for teaching religious studies in public and private preschools, primary and secondary schools, and universities if there is sufficient demand.  Religious communities select and train their respective religious education teachers, who are employees of the schools where they teach, although they receive accreditation from their respective religious institutions.

The Islamic Community, SOC, and Catholic Church develop and approve religious curricula across the country.  Public schools offer religious education in the religion of the majority of the school’s students, with some exceptions.

In the Federation’s five Bosniak-majority cantons, primary and secondary schools offer Islamic religious instruction as a twice-weekly course.  Alternatively, students may take a course in ethics.  In cantons with Croat majorities, Croat students in primary and secondary schools may attend an elective Catholic religion course twice a week or take a course in ethics.  In the five primary and 10 secondary Catholic schools spread throughout the Federation and the RS that do not have Croat majorities, parents may choose either an elective Catholic religion course or a course in ethics.  The Sarajevo Canton Ministry of Education offers Orthodox and Protestant religious education in addition to classes offered to the Muslim and Catholic communities.  The RS Ministry of Education offers elective Orthodox religious education in secondary schools, but students have the option to take a course in ethics.  In both the RS and the Federation, as well as Brcko, students belonging to a registered religious community that is a minority in the school may enroll in a course pertaining to that religious community if there are at least 18 interested students.

The BiH constitution provides for representation of the three major ethnic groups – Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks – in the government and armed forces.  The constitution makes no explicit mention of representation for religious groups, although each ethnicity mentioned by the constitution is associated with a particular religious group.

The BiH constitution reserves all positions in the House of Peoples (one of two houses of parliament) and apportions other government offices to members of the three major ethnic groups according to quotas.  Members of religious minorities are constitutionally ineligible to hold a seat in the House of Peoples.  The three-member Presidency must consist of one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb.

A law against discrimination prohibits exclusion, limitation, or preferential treatment of individuals based specifically on religion in employment and the provision of social services in both the government and private sectors.

The country has no law on restitution that would allow for the return of, or compensation for, property, including property owned by religious groups, nationalized or expropriated under communist rule.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to government officials, the MHRR made only partial progress in implementing the national religious freedom law during the year.  The officials said the MHRR made it easier for religious groups to carry out educational and charitable work, but the ministry did nothing to facilitate resolution of pension, disability allowance, and health insurance issues for religious officials, despite pledging to do so in 2019.  The Federation, RS, and Brcko governments did not make provisions for religious officials to fully qualify for pensions and health and disability insurance, although the MHRR asked them in 2019 to work with religious group representatives to do so.  In the absence of systemic solutions, the Islamic Community independently provided health benefits and pensions for its religious workers, while the RS paid those benefits to SOC religious workers.

The MOJ said it generally processed registration applications by religions groups within a week, and no religious group reported delays in registration.  No groups registered during the year, and there were no reports the ministry denied any registration applications by religious communities.

On October 18, the BiH Presidency was scheduled to take up for consideration a 2015 agreement between the state and the Islamic Community that, if approved by the Presidency and parliament, would recognize and regulate Islamic dietary restrictions in public institutions, public and private sector employee accommodations for daily prayer, time off to attend Friday prayers, and time off for one-time travel to Mecca for the Hajj.  Serb member of the Presidency Milorad Dodik, however, requested that the Presidency not take up the agreement, stating publicly that the agreement would grant greater rights to Muslims than to other religious groups.  By year’s end, the Presidency had not taken up consideration of the agreement or consulted with the Islamic Community to resolve concerns over it.

According to the MHRR, the implementation of the agreement with the SOC had likely been stalled for years due to the absence of a similar agreement between the state and the Islamic Community.

The government did not reestablish the joint commission with the Catholic Church to implement the concordat with the Holy See, a requirement after each change in government.  The government and the Catholic Church nominated members for the commission, but the BiH Council of Ministers had not approved the commission by year’s end.  Similarly, the government failed to reestablish a joint commission to implement its agreement with the SOC; by year’s end the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not nominated a candidate to the commission, and therefore it was not submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval.

According to representatives of the Catholic Church, nonformation of the concordat commission and nonimplementation of the agreement affected pastoral care in hospitals, work with police services and prisons, health insurance for Church workers, restitution of confiscated property, compensation for the use of confiscated property, tax policy regarding the nonprofit activities of Church legal entities, financing school and charitable Church institutions, the legal status of in-kind donations to the Church, and other issues.  The Catholic Church reported that government actions recommended by earlier sessions of the concordat commission, such as legislation recognizing religious holidays, had not been implemented.  The commission last met in 2016.

In July, Cardinal Puljic told an Al Jazeera interviewer that he did not understand local politicians who were persistently avoiding constructive agreement on equal rights for all in BiH.  He added that Croats and other Catholics, but also persons of other ethnicities and religious groups, were left on their own, as politicians who were supposed to represent them did not act in their best interest.

On February 23, the Court of BiH rejected a 2020 complaint by a soldier, Emela Mujanovic Kapidzija, who had stated that the Ministry of Defense had discriminated against her and violated her religious freedom by prohibiting her from wearing a headscarf at work.  Kapidzija filed an appeal with the Appellate Chamber of the Court of BiH, which rejected the appeal on April 19.  On May 25, the Commission for Freedom of Religion of the Islamic Community filed an appeal with the Constitutional Court of BiH on her behalf.  At year’s end, the case was pending.  Kapidzija remained a member of the Armed Forces of BiH but could not wear a headscarf at her workplace at the Ministry of Defense pending a ruling by the Constitutional Court.

On December 2, the Constitutional Court decided in favor of a petition from BiH House of Peoples Deputy Speaker Bakir Izetbegovic requesting a review of provisions of the Rules of Service in the Armed Forces of BiH prohibiting beards.  The court determined in a final ruling that the ban violated the right to privacy and the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution of BiH and the European Convention on Human Rights.

On June 5, the government of BiH completed demolition of a Serbian Orthodox church built without permission on the property of Bosniak returned refugee Fata Orlovic, a Muslim.  The government also cleared the property of debris.  The lawyer representing Orlovic confirmed the RS government paid her 5,000 euros ($5,700) and 13 of her relatives 2,000 euros ($2,300) each in compensation.

Leaders of the four traditional religious communities in BiH continued to say the country’s lack of a law on restitution – for both religious communities and private citizens – hindered efforts of religious communities to resolve claims of properties confiscated and nationalized under communist rule from 1946 to 1965.  In the absence of a restitution law, the return of property was at the discretion of local authorities, and, even if these authorities returned properties, the claimants could not receive titles to those properties.  At the end of the meeting of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Banja Luka on July 14, the bishops sent a message to BiH authorities, urging them to return confiscated property to all those who were deprived of it after World War II.  The bishops stated that many private individuals, as well as religious communities, were seeking the return of property.  They cited an estimate from a study conducted by the University of Sarajevo that only 7 percent of restitution claims were of property belonging to religious communities.  Cardinal Puljic, the Archbishop of Vrhbosna, added that there were many “dirty acts” surrounding the return of property.

In December, the Islamic Community protested the city administration of Tuzla’s issuance of a construction permit for business facilities on land the Islamic Community stated was endowed to it by Muslim believers.

In February, Jakob Finci, the president of the country’s Jewish Community, told media that BiH was the only country in the region that had done nothing to resolve the restitution problem and that restitution would not be a financial burden for the country.  He said the lack of resolution posed a burden on religious communities, as disputed properties could be an important and much needed source of revenue for them.  According to Finci, “We don’t need [to be paid] a single mark to carry out restitution.  For example, La Benevolencija has a building where the cantonal Ministry of Interior is currently located …  We only want our ownership to be recognized, instead of the state receiving rental income for our property.”

In January, SOC Metropolitan Hrizostom stated that political disagreement regarding whether the state or the country’s two entities – the Federation and RS – had competency over restitution, as well as the potential cost, continued to be the main barriers to adoption of a law on restitution.  In February, members of the BiH Presidency said they would task the MOJ with preparing a report on the status and legal considerations of religious property restitution.  By year’s end, the ministry had not issued a report on the issue.  All major religious groups in the country continued to say there was an urgent need for a restitution law.  They said the Federation and the RS restituted religious properties unequally, discriminating against religious minorities in their respective areas.

In February, according to press reports, the Zenica city council voted unanimously to return use of the city’s synagogue to the Jewish Community.  Zenica Mayor Fuad Kasumovic stated that, because of the absence of a restitution law, the city would continue to own the property.

The municipality of Stari Grad Sarajevo continued construction of a large building in the center of Sarajevo on a plot of land previously claimed by four Jewish families and the Islamic Community.  The BiH Jewish Community reported that the last living member of the Jewish Community with claims to the property was compensated 110,000 convertible marks (BAM) ($63,800) in September, thus ending the dispute with them.  The Islamic Community was reportedly compensated for its share of the property in 2019.

Online news site Balkan Insight reported in March that Banja Luka prosecutors said in February that they had ended investigations in five cases involving the destruction of five mosques in Banja Luka and Gradiska in 1993 because the statute of limitations had expired.  The Islamic Community stated prosecutors had rejected its request to pursue the cases as war crimes, investigating them instead under a law against demolition of cultural and historical monuments, the most lenient law available in terms of penalties and the statute of limitations.  The Islamic Community had, according to Balkan Insight, taken its case to the state prosecutor’s office and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, requesting that the BiH Prosecutor’s Office take over the cases and that they be treated as war crimes.  At year’s end the BiH Prosecutor’s Office had not taken over the cases.

The parish priest of the Holy Trinity Catholic Church in Novi Grad, Banja Luka Diocese, reported that on November 11, a private local construction company paved an asphalt road directly in front of the church’s entrance, even though the paved land belonged to the church, which had not granted permission for the paving.  He requested action from the local mayor, but authorities had not acted by year’s end.

The 2021 European Commission report on BiH stated authorities failed to meet court ruling requirements to complete or apply the common core curriculum or make progress in eliminating the practice of “two schools under one roof,” where children in the same school were segregated based on ethnicity.  The report also said even online education was implemented via separate platforms, many RS schools did not recognize the Bosnian language, and the availability of teaching in the national groups of subjects remained limited. According to the OSCE and reports by various media outlets, returnee students (those belonging to a minority ethnic group returning to their homes after being displaced by the war in the 1990’s) continued to face barriers in exercising their rights to education in their own language.  The OSCE and media reported that parents of Bosniak children in returnee communities throughout the RS continued to boycott public schools in favor of sending their children to alternative schooling financed and organized by the Federation Ministry of Education with support from the governments of the Sarajevo and the Zenica-Doboj Cantons and the Islamic Community.  According to the OSCE, the RS Ministry of Education and Culture (RS MoEC) again failed to approve a group of “national” subjects (specific courses to which Bosniak, Serb, and Croat students were legally entitled and that were to be taught in their constituent language according to their ethnicity).  The RS MoEC also again failed to comply with an RS Supreme Court ruling from December 2019 that students in a school in Vrbanjci, Kotor Varos receive instruction in the national group of subjects and in the Bosnian language.

According to nongovernmental organizations and media reports, parents of different faiths throughout the country continued to send their children to public school religious education classes to avoid having their children stand out from other children who attended the classes and be exposed to peer pressure.

The government again failed to comply with a 2009 ruling by the ECHR stating the country should amend its constitution to allow members of minority groups, including Jews, to run for the Presidency, the House of Peoples, and other offices reserved for members of constituent peoples.  BiH political leaders were engaged in negotiations during the year on an electoral and limited constitutional reform package that according to international experts would have included implementation of the court’s decision.  At year’s end, however, political leaders had not reached an agreement.  On December 22, the 12th anniversary of the ruling, Dervo Sejdic, one of the appellants, said he felt very sad the discriminatory provision in the BiH constitution had not been eliminated.

According to Bosniak Muslim, Croat Catholic, and Serb Orthodox religious communities, authorities continued to discriminate against them and enforce selectively the rights of religious groups regarding access to education, employment, health care, and other social services in areas where those groups constituted religious minorities.  They said refugees returning to their original communities pursuant to the Dayton Peace Agreement were particularly subject to discrimination.  In November, RS Vice President Ramiz Salkic, a Muslim, wrote a letter to RS Prime Minister Radovan Viskovic calling on the RS to end employment, education, language, and religious holiday discrimination against the predominantly Muslim Bosniak minority returnees in the RS.  In his letter, Salkic stated the RS education system incorporated discriminatory elements, including naming schools after Serbian historic figures or Serbian Orthodox saints, celebrating the day of St. Sava, the Orthodox patron saint of schools, harmonizing curricula with Serbia instead of other parts of BiH, and glorifying convicted war criminals in history textbooks.

Religious leaders also continued to state that police were reluctant to investigate potential hate crimes targeting religious minority communities because law enforcement officials often represented and included only the members of the majority group.

On September 15, the RS National Assembly adopted a law mandating use of the Cyrillic alphabet and Serb language for all institutions that receive funding from the RS budget and at all government-funded events.  The Bosniak and Croat caucuses of the RS Council of Peoples opposed the law and blocked its implementation, pending a judicial review.  On November 23, the RS Constitutional Court ruled that the law violated the vital national interests of Bosniaks and Croats and was invalid.  As a result, the law did not enter into force.

According to the OSCE, in 2020, the most recent year for which data were available, BiH judicial institutions completed five court cases concerning potential religious bias incidents.  Three cases were treated as felonies and two as misdemeanors.  In the first felony case, the Municipal Court in Kiseljak acquitted a suspect charged with causing public danger by arson due to lack of evidence.  Prosecutors charged the defendant with setting on fire a local imam’s car parked inside a garage next to the imam’s home in 2017.  In the second felony case, the Court of BiH sentenced an individual charged with incitement to hatred to one year in prison with mandatory psychiatric treatment as a result of a plea agreement with the BiH Prosecutor’s Office.  The defendant targeted a local imam in Gacko with a series of online death threats and profanities based on religion and ethnicity.  He also defecated in front of the entrance of the local mosque.  In the third felony case, the Court of BiH sentenced an individual to six months of imprisonment suspended for two years for endangering personal security with online threats.

In one of the misdemeanor cases, the Municipal Court in Bosanska Krupa imposed a fine of BAM 500 ($290) on an individual it convicted of violating public peace and order by posting a video of himself in 2020, verbally insulting the SOC and its flag, calling the latter the flag of Republika Srpska, which he said was a “genocidal creation.”  In the other, the Municipal Court in Bihac imposed a fine of BAM 300 ($170) on the parents of a minor girl who sprayed graffiti insulting God and Jesus on the walls of a Catholic Church.  The court convicted them of failure to exercise parental supervision of a minor.

On several occasions, leaders of the IRC – whose membership comprises the four traditional religious communities – again said local authorities throughout the country continued to discriminate in providing police protection and investigating threats of violence, harassment, and vandalism.  While only a few cases were recorded, the IRC said law enforcement officials treated the cases as simple theft or vandalism, without taking into consideration that the acts occurred at religious sites and could be categorized as hate crimes.  According to the IRC, the officials rarely investigated the motives of the acts, which would help distinguish cases of simple theft from hate crimes.  In many instances, IRC leaders said they hesitated to report incidents to the police or media, particularly in areas where their religious group was a minority, fearing that public attention could result in retaliation or raise tensions in the community, with deleterious effects on IRC members.

On January 11, the House of Representatives (lower chamber) of the BiH parliament adopted a nonbinding resolution sponsored by parliamentarian Damir Arnaut of Nasa Stranka (Our Party) to rename streets, squares, parks, schools, and other places that honored World War II Nazi collaborators with the names of persons from the country recognized by the Yad Vashem Holocaust Remembrance Center.  The resolution was nonbinding, as local municipalities, not parliament, would have the authority to implement it.  Shortly after the resolution passed, the Bosniak-majority Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action, or SDA) party, which had voted for it, reversed its position and criticized the initiative for including Bosniaks among the list of Nazi collaborators.  SDA leader Bakir Izetbegovic stated that the choices made by Bosniak Nazi collaborators Husein Dozo, Mustafa Busuladzic, and Hafiz Muhamed Pandza should be evaluated in their “global and historical context.”  SDA-aligned press labeled Arnaut a traitor and defended Bosniaks who worked with the Nazis.  The BiH House of Peoples (upper chamber) had not acted on the resolution by year’s end.

The Federation and RS governments again failed to fulfill their financial commitments to support the IRC.  The commitments stemmed from memorandums of cooperation that the state level government of BiH, as well as the governments of the Federation and RS entities and Brcko District, concluded with the IRC in 2011.  The memorandums stipulated annual contributions to the IRC budget of BAM 100,000 ($58,000) by the state, BAM 50,000 ($29,000) by the entities, and BAM 20,000 ($11,600) from Brcko District.  In practice, however, neither the Federation nor the RS governments honored their financial commitment over the previous eight years.  The BiH Council of Ministers and Brcko District continued to provide the annual grant regularly to the IRC from their respective budgets.

The IRC, which records and tracks cases of religious intolerance and hatred, recorded three incidents against religious officials and 23 cases of vandalism against religious buildings.  Of the 23 incidents of vandalism, eight targeted Catholics, 10 Muslims, three the SOC, and two the Jewish Community.  In 2020, the IRC recorded 17 incidents of vandalism against religious buildings, identifying suspects in only three of those cases.  Because religion and ethnicity often are closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many actions as solely based on religious identity.

The IRC again stated it believed the actual number of religiously motivated incidents against religious persons or buildings was much higher but that members of religious groups feared reporting them.  The IRC also stated it lacked the staff, capacity, or funding to follow up in detail on every case.

In one of the three incidents against persons, on January 18, a man in Livno Canton verbally insulted imams and Muslims gathered in a mosque.  Livno Canton Police identified the individual and arrested him.  Authorities fined him for disturbing public peace and order.

The BiH Jewish Community reported a significant increase in antisemitic speech online, especially after clashes between Israelis and Palestinians in May.  Examples of online hate speech included targeting members of the Jewish Community, sending them death threats, denying the Holocaust, glorifying Hitler, and stating that “all Jews should be sent to Auschwitz gas chambers.”  The IRC condemned this social media post and called on local police to investigate the case and identify the author of the post.

On February 18, an unknown person fired several gunshots at the minaret of the historic Aladza Mosque in Foca, causing minor damage.  Police investigated but had not identified a suspect by year’s end.

In March, a person drew a swastika on an obituary that was hanging on the entrance of the Ashkenazi Synagogue/Jewish Community headquarters in the center of Sarajevo.  The obituary was of a prominent member of the Jewish Community in Sarajevo.  Using surveillance camera footage, Sarajevo Canton Police identified the 17-year-old who drew the swastika and filed a criminal report against him with the Sarajevo Canton Prosecutor’s Office.

On May 9, an unknown person drew graffiti insulting Jesus on the front of the Church of Saint Anthony of Padua in Bihac.  Near the church, there was a swastika drawn on a traffic sign, and the slogan “Knife, Wire, Srebrenica,” referencing the 1995 Srebrenica genocide, written on a billboard nearby.  Bihac Mayor Suhret Fazlic condemned the vandalism and called on police to investigate it vigorously, but there were no developments in the case by year’s end.  The Islamic Community also condemned the incident, saying via social media that desecration of religious objects was an act not only against religion but also against civilization, and that should concern everyone.

On August 5, unidentified persons broke a window in the Orthodox Church of the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin in the village of Vukovsko near Kupres and overturned the headstone of the grave of Simo Popovic, the priest who built the church in 1860.  The attack was the third on the church in recent years.  MHRR Minister Milos Lucic condemned the incident.  There were no developments in the case by year’s end.

Mesud Hrbat, a Sarajevo businessman, provided support to all four main religious groups in Sarajevo in order, he said, to contribute to good neighborly and interreligious relations in Sarajevo.  Hrbat funded the construction of a mosque in the Rjecica settlement of Sarajevo’s Novi Grad Municipality, paid BAM 100,000 ($58,000) for the facade of the Catholic Saint Luke the Evangelist Church in Sarajevo’s Municipality of Novi Grad and BAM 100,000 ($58,000) for restoration of the yard of the Old Orthodox Church in Sarajevo, and pledged BAM 60,000 ($34,800) for a new facade on the Ashkenazi Synagogue /Jewish community building in Sarajevo.

In 2020 (the most recent year for which data were available), the OSCE Mission to BiH observed through its monitoring program 16 potential bias-motivated incidents targeting Muslims and 27 incidents targeting Christians (Catholic, Seventh-day Adventist, and Orthodox).  All 43 incidents, which represented a 39 percent increase over the 31 the OSCE reported in 2019, were reported to the police.  The incidents included threatening religious officials such as Cardinal Puljic, threatening believers, disturbing religious ceremonies, vandalism of religious properties, desecration of cemeteries, and other property offenses.  The OSCE said the data should be interpreted with caution because of an assumed high rate of underrecording and underreporting of bias crimes in the country.

The Council of Muftis of the Islamic Community said it was continuing efforts to persuade unregistered Islamic congregations (known as para-jamaats), which gathered predominantly Salafist followers and operated outside the purview of the Islamic Community, to cease what they described as “unsanctioned” religious practices and officially unite with the Islamic Community.  The Islamic Community reported there were 20 active para-jamaats, compared with 11 in 2020.  According to Islamic Community officials, the difference was not the result of an increase in the number of para-jamaats but of better data collection.  According to the Islamic Community, of these 20 groups, four had memberships consisting of up to 40 families, while other para-jamaats comprised only a handful of believers.

The IRC continued working on different projects through its 15 local chapters across the country, primarily focusing on youth and women.  The projects included publishing a manual to guide religious officials working with wartime sexual abuse survivors and organizing an interreligious camp that brought together youth from all principal religious communities across the country.  The IRC also continued to monitor and condemn attacks on religious leaders and buildings.  In September, the IRC organized a youth conference on combating hate speech, including religiously motivated hate speech, in social media.  The IRC also expanded its interfaith network of women belonging to different religious groups across its 15 chapters.

In meetings with government officials, U.S. embassy representatives emphasized the need to promote respect for religious diversity and enforce equal treatment for religious minorities.  In February, the Ambassador met with the BiH Presidency and urged them to support the adoption of restitution legislation.  Embassy officials continued to stress with BiH government officials, and with the MHRR, the importance of concluding the agreement with the Islamic Community, implementing the agreements with the SOC and Catholic Church, and taking steps to implement the law on religious freedom.

In June, the Ambassador and OSCE Ambassador met with a group of Herzegovina religious leaders, including Bishop of Mostar Duvno Diocese Palic, Mostar Mufti Salem Dedovic, and Orthodox Bishop Dimitrije, to discuss interreligious dialogue, postwar recovery, and reconciliation.  It was the first joint meeting of the leaders of the three religious communities in Herzegovina since the war.

On October 16, the Ambassador attended a reception in Sarajevo hosted by the SOC in honor of Serbian Patriarch Porfirije’s visit.  In his engagement with the Patriarch, the Ambassador stressed the importance of interreligious dialogue and religious communities’ role in promoting reconciliation.

On November 16, the Counselor of the Department of State met with BiH religious leaders from the Islamic Community, Catholic Church, and Jewish Community.  The Counselor discussed with them their perspective on the political crisis in BiH and encouraged them to work together and take a more active role on reconciliation and peacebuilding.

On September 28, the Ambassador and a senior embassy official met with the newly appointed Mufti of Sarajevo, Nedzad Grabus, to discuss the Islamic Community’s views of the political crisis in BiH, the importance of interreligious dialogue, and the religious community’s role in promoting mutual understanding.

Throughout the year, embassy officials continued to hold small in-person meetings and host events with the representatives of the Islamic, Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish communities.  At these events, embassy officials emphasized the importance of interreligious dialogue and respect for religious diversity and urged the religious communities to continue efforts to foster reconciliation, counter violent extremism related to religion, and condemn intolerance and hate speech.

The embassy reinforced the messages it conveyed at these events and meetings on its social media platforms; the postings, particularly on Twitter, included calls for tolerance and the importance of interreligious dialogue and reconciliation.  For example, following the Counselor’s meeting with BiH religious leaders, the embassy shared his statement recognizing the role of religious communities in promoting reconciliation.  The embassy also welcomed an IRC statement that called on local political leaders to deescalate the political crisis and return to citizen-focused reforms.

A total of 80 students from four madrassahs – high schools run by the Islamic Community – throughout the country participated in and successfully completed an embassy-funded two-year intensive Access English language program.  The program brought together students of different backgrounds from underserved communities into one mixed, American-style classroom.  In all participating high schools, Access teachers used an interactive approach to language learning and challenged students to promote peace, cooperation, and tolerance in their communities.

The embassy continued supporting the Interreligious Studies and Peacebuilding master’s program, a long term project in its fifth year of operation, implemented jointly by the Catholic Theological Faculty, Faculty of Islamic Studies (both of the University of Sarajevo), and the Orthodox Theological Faculty (University of East Sarajevo) and accredited by both schools.  During the 2020-2021 academic year, in which there were 12 students enrolled, the embassy financed a Fulbright fellow who was one of the professors teaching the program.  The program’s stated goal was to bring together professionals and students from different ethnic and religious backgrounds to highlight the role of religious institutions as advocates of a more just and peaceful society.

The embassy also provided a grant to the IRC to organize an eight-day interreligious youth camp called “Meet-Pray-Cooperate” in October, which gathered 50 youths from different religious groups from around the country.  The camp included lectures, workshops, sports, and cultural activities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.4 million (midyear 2021).  According to Botswana’s 2011 Population and Housing Census reporting on the population 12 years and over (the most recent data available), 79 percent of citizens are members of Christian groups, 15 percent espouse no religion, 4 percent are adherents of the Badimo traditional indigenous religious group, and all other religious groups together constitute less than 1 percent of the population.

Anglicans, Methodists, and members of the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa make up the majority of Christians.  There are also Lutherans, Roman Catholics, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ), Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, Mennonites, and members of the Dutch Reformed Church and other Christian denominations.  According to the 2011 census, there are approximately 11,000 Muslims, many of whom are of South Asian origin.  There are small numbers of Hindus, Baha’is, Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jews.  Immigrants and foreign workers are more likely to be members of non-Christian religious groups than native-born citizens.

Legal Framework

Under its broader protections of freedom of conscience, the constitution provides for freedom of thought and religion, the right to change religion or belief, and the right to manifest and propagate religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance.  The constitution’s provision of rights also prohibits discrimination based on creed.  The constitution permits the government to restrict these rights in the interest of protecting the rights of other persons, national defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or public health when the restrictions are deemed “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.”  The state of emergency imposed from March 2020 to September 2021 to prevent the spread of COVID-19, which capped the size of regular religious gatherings and meetings, was the first time the government ever exercised this provision.

The constitution permits religious groups to establish places for religious instruction at their expense.  The constitution prohibits requiring religious instruction or participation in religious ceremonies in a religion other than one’s own.  The constitution also prohibits compelling an individual to take an oath contrary to that individual’s religious beliefs.  The penal code criminalizes “hate speech” towards any person or group based on “race, tribe, place of origin, color or creed” and imposes a maximum fine of 500 pula ($43) per violation.

All organizations, including religious groups, must register with the government.  To register, a group must submit its constitution to the Registrar of Societies section of the Ministry of Nationality, Immigration, and Gender Affairs.  Registration enables religious groups to conduct business, sign contracts, and open an account at a local bank.  In order to register, new religious groups must have a minimum of 150 members.  For previously registered religious groups, the membership threshold is 10.  Any person who manages, assists in the management of, or holds an official position in an unregistered group is subject to a fine of up to 1,000 pula ($85) and up to seven years in prison.  Any member of an unregistered group is subject to penalties, including fines up to 500 pula ($43) and up to three years in prison.  According to 2019 data from the Registrar of Societies (the latest available), there are 2,318 registered religious organizations in the country.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Police arrested a pastor from the Bethel Transfiguration Church September 7 when he tried to deliver a petition to President Mokgweetsi Masisi demanding his resignation over what the pastor said was mismanagement of the COVID-19 crisis.  The pastor, Thuso Tiego, also criticized the government for restricting religious gatherings at a time when he said that individuals turned to churches for counseling and support during the pandemic.  Tiego was held overnight at a police station and released without charge.  Media reported that several of his supporters were beaten by police when they gathered outside the station demanding Tiego’s release.  The national police service did not announce any disciplinary action against the officers involved.

The government continued to pursue court cases involving unregistered churches (sometimes called “fire churches”) coming into the country to “take advantage of” local citizens by demanding tithes and donations for routine services or special prayers.  The government required pastors of some of those churches to apply for visas – even those from countries whose nationals were normally allowed visa-free entry.  The government said in June 2019 that it was reviewing the visa policy for these foreign pastors, but by year’s end had not released the results of this review or announced any changes.  Former members of one of the most prominent unregistered churches forced to close in 2019, the Enlightened Christian Gathering, subsequently formed their own smaller, independent churches with local leadership that was ultimately registered by the government.

Under the COVID-19 state of emergency that ended in September, the government limited attendance at religious services to no more than 50 persons at one time and limited services to twice a week.  The government also banned all religious gatherings during “extreme social distancing” periods.  Although the limits on religious gatherings lasted 18 months and prevented some individuals from fully practicing their faith, most religious groups did not say their freedom of religion was being restricted and stated that the extraordinary measures were necessary for public health

Optional religious education remained part of the curriculum in public schools; this curriculum continued to emphasize Christianity, but it also discussed other religions practiced in the country.  Government regulation of private schools did not distinguish among Christian, Muslim, or secular schools.  Since 2020, government policy has allowed students to wear a hijab or religiously based head covering in public schools.

Although it was common for government meetings to begin with a Christian prayer, members of non-Christian groups occasionally led prayers as well.

Representatives of religious organizations, including Christian and Muslim, again said that interfaith relations were strong, which in the past have included partnerships to address issues including HIV/AIDS and gender-based violence.  They continued to say there was a high degree of tolerance for religious diversity in the country.

Embassy officials engaged with Muslim, Buddhist, Christian, and other religious representatives to discuss religious freedom, interreligious relations, and community engagement.  Topics included government tolerance of minority religious groups, the impact of COVID-19 restrictions on religious expression, and interfaith cooperation to address community challenges.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 213.4 million (midyear 2021).  According to a 2019 Datafolha survey, 50 percent of the population identifies as Roman Catholic, the same as the previous survey in 2016 but down from 60 percent in 2014.  Atheists and those with no religion represent 11 percent, and the proportion of evangelical Christians is 31 percent, compared with 24 percent in 2016.  Two percent practice Afro-Brazilian religions, and 3 percent are Spiritists.  According to the 2010 census, the most recently available data from official sources, 65 percent of the population is Catholic, 22 percent Protestant, 8 percent irreligious (including atheists, agnostics, and deists), and 2 percent Spiritist.  Adherents of other Christian groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and Seventh-day Adventists, as well as followers of non-Christian religions, including Buddhists, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Afro-Brazilian and syncretic religious groups, such as Candomble and Umbanda, make up a combined 3 percent of the population.  According to the census, there are approximately 600,000 practitioners of Candomble, Umbanda, and other Afro-Brazilian religions.  Some Christians also practice Candomble and Umbanda; however, some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) believe this is significantly underreported, given the number of terreiros located across the country.  According to recent surveys, many Brazilians consider themselves followers of more than one religion.

According to the 2010 census, approximately 35,200 Muslims live in the country, while the Federation of Muslim Associations of Brazil (FAMBRAS) estimates the number to be 1.2 to 1.5 million.  The largest communities reside in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba, and Foz do Iguacu, as well as in smaller cities in the states of Parana and Rio Grande do Sul.

According to CONIB, there are approximately 120,000 Jews in the country.  The two largest concentrations are 70,000 in Sao Paulo State and 34,000 in Rio de Janeiro State.

Legal Framework

The constitution states freedom of conscience and belief is inviolable, and the free exercise of religious beliefs is guaranteed.  The constitution prohibits federal, state, and local governments from either supporting or hindering any specific religion.  The law provides penalties of up to five years in prison for crimes of religious intolerance, including bullying, employment discrimination, refusal of access to public areas, and displaying, distributing, or broadcasting religiously intolerant material.  By law, courts may fine or imprison for one to three years anyone who engages in religious hate speech.  If the hate speech occurs via publication or social communication, including social media, courts may fine or imprison those held responsible for two to five years.  It is illegal to write, edit, publish, or sell literature that promotes religious intolerance.

Religious groups are not required to register to establish places of worship, train clergy, or proselytize, but groups seeking tax-exempt status must register with the Department of Federal Revenue and the local municipality.  States and municipalities have different requirements and regulations for obtaining tax-exempt status.  Most jurisdictions require groups to document the purpose of their congregation, provide an accounting of finances, and have a fire inspection of any house of worship.  Local zoning laws and noise ordinances may limit where a religious group may build houses of worship or hold ceremonies.

The law protects the right to use animal sacrifice in religious rituals.

Government regulations require public schools to offer religious instruction, but neither the constitution nor legislation defines the parameters.  By law, the instruction must be nondenominational and conducted without proselytizing, and alternative instruction for students who do not want to participate must be available.  Schools are required to teach Afro-Brazilian religion, history, and culture.  The law allows public and private school students, except those in military training, to postpone taking exams or attending classes on their day of worship when their faith prohibits such activities.  The law guarantees the right of students to express their religious beliefs and mandates that schools provide alternatives, including taking replacement exams or makeup classes.

A Rio de Janeiro State law enacted in March permits public and private schools to include subjects in their curricula that address respect for freedom of belief and worship; religious and cultural diversity; combating racism in the country; the important influence of Afro-Brazilian, indigenous, and Jewish faiths in the formation of national society; the relationship between religious freedom and secularity of the state; and the legal consequences of intolerance against expressions of religion.

The law prohibits public subsidies to schools operated by religious organizations.

A constitutional provision provides the right of access to religious services and counsel to individuals of all religions in all civil and military establishments.  The law states that public and private hospitals as well as civil or military prisons must comply with this provision.

A Sao Paulo State law approved in March establishes administrative sanctions for individuals and organizations engaging in religious intolerance.  The new law supplements an existing one from 2019 focused on religious discrimination by broadening the concept of religious intolerance, taking steps to promote religious freedom, and increasing the fines imposed.  Punishments range from a warning letter to fines of up to 87,000 reais ($15,300).

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In January, the federal government created the National Registry of Religious Organizations, a voluntary database of religious leaders and entities eligible to receive federal funds and to carry out actions in partnership with the Ministry of Women, Family, and Human Rights.  Social science professor and leader of the Protestantism and Pentecostalism Study Group at the Pontifical Catholic University, Edin Sued Abumanssur, said the program duplicated preexisting databases of religious organizations, and he suggested creation of the new database was an attempt to garner the support of churches in the lead-up to the 2022 presidential election.

In January, the Rio de Janeiro city council created the Parliamentary Front of Religious Freedom.  The purpose of the group, composed of 38 city council members, was to discuss strategies to combat religious intolerance in the municipality.

Acting on a Rio de Janeiro State civil police report that said the state had registered 6,700 crimes of religious intolerance from 2015 through 2019, state legislator Martha Rocha established in February a parliamentary commission of inquiry in Rio de Janeiro’s Legislative Assembly to investigate this increasing number and to discuss possible strategies to promote religious freedom.

On March 3, Governor of Sao Paulo State Joao Doria approved a state-level religious freedom law regulating the constitutional principle of free exercise of faith, including imposing fines of up to 87,000 reais ($15,300) for verifiable cases of disturbances of religious ceremonies and cults, vandalism of sacred symbols, and discrimination in schools, such as prohibiting the use of religious attire.

In March, media reported that evangelical Christians and Catholics in Pernambuco State protested the state’s imposition of COVID-19 related limitations on public religious gatherings.

In April, the STF found that government decrees to close churches and other religious temples throughout the country due to the COVID-19 pandemic were constitutional.  The decision followed the STF review of Sao Paulo Governor Doria’s decree ordering the closure of religious centers to avoid large crowds.  Following the decision, according to press reports, religious groups protested the government’s COVID-19 restrictions on religious gatherings in Brasilia.  In response to the STF decision, in October, the Sao Paulo legislature overturned Governor Doria’s decree, and it declared religious observances and their respective places of worship were essential activities to be maintained in times of crises, including during pandemics and natural disasters, provided that the activity complied with the recommendations of the Ministry of Health.

In December 2020, the city of Porto Alegre inaugurated a Police Office for Combating Intolerance with a mandate to assist victims of prejudice and investigate discrimination, including religious discrimination.  As of April, the office had registered 169 occurrences, including eight related to religious discrimination.

Beginning in June, individuals could report religious intolerance in Rio State to the military police’s 190 hotline.  The Commission to Combat Religious Intolerance (CCIR), an independent organization comprised of representatives of religious groups, civil society, police, and public prosecutors’ office representatives, was responsible for documenting cases of religious intolerance and assisting victims.  CCTR coordinator Ivanir dos Santos highlighted the importance of this new channel, saying that even though victims were already able to report incidents to civil police, the 190 military police hotline was more easily accessible and familiar.

In June, Bahia’s Court of Justice sentenced Edneide Santos de Jesus, a member of the Casa de Oracao Evangelical Church, to monthly court appearances and community service for repeatedly verbally harassing members of a traditional Candomble temple in Camacari, Bahia.  The court also found de Jesus guilty of spreading rock salt in front of the Candomble temple to “cast out demons.”  The ruling by the Court of Justice was the first ruling of “religious racism” (religious intolerance or prejudice) in the state’s history.

Media reported that in June, during a search for suspected serial killer Lazaro Barbosa, police officers repeatedly entered at least 10 Afro-Brazilian temples in Goias State.  Religious leaders filed a complaint alleging that police used force in their entry, pointed weapons at the heads of those present, and examined mobile phones and computers without a court order.  The Public Security Secretariat of Goias stated that a task force composed of police officers from Goias, the federal district, and the federal highway police was “working with a single purpose:  to guarantee peace to the population of the region and to capture Lazaro Barbosa within the limits of legality.”

In July, a judge on Sao Paulo’s Court of Justice acquitted Juliana Arcanjo Ferreira of charges of domestic violence and bodily harm against her daughter after Ferreira took the 11-year-old to a traditional Candomble rite called a “cure” in October 2020.  The girl’s father filed a police report four months after the ceremony accusing Ferreira of assault, following a weekend visit during which he discovered scars on the girl’s body from the rite, which entailed making small superficial incisions on the skin.  Medical examiners found that the scars from the ritual were mild and did not cause disability; there was no conclusion that they were made under torture or other cruel means.  The judge presiding over the case emphasized that religious freedom was a constitutional right and that the transmission of beliefs to children could not carry criminal consequences if it was done with “respect for life, freedom, and security.”  He continued that there could be no justification, other than religious intolerance, for restricting a Candomble ritual.

In August, the government of Sao Paulo State announced the creation of an Online Diversity Police Station, a tool to enable citizens to report crimes of discrimination and intolerance, including those involving religion, through an online platform.  Per the tool, after reporting, cases were directed for further investigation to the city of Sao Paulo’s newly redesigned 26-person specialized precinct for crimes of discrimination and intolerance.  Alternatively, cases in the interior of Sao Paulo State were directed to the State Criminal Investigation Departments.  Authorities said 20 percent of the state’s police officers in these departments had special training in combating and investigating intolerance.

According to the FAMBRAS, women said they continued to face difficulties in being allowed to wear Islamic head coverings such as the hijab when going through security in airports and other public buildings.

In July, President Jair Bolsonaro met Beatrix von Storch, a German parliamentarian and lawmaker of the Alternative for Germany Party (AfD).  CONIB representatives criticized the welcoming of Storch, saying that the AfD was a party that downplayed Nazi atrocities and the Holocaust.  According to media reports, however, Storch’s official visit did not include any discussion of either Nazism or the Holocaust.

In March, Roberto Jefferson, leader of the Brazilian Labor Party, posted on Instagram, “Baal, Satanic deity, Canaanites and Jews sacrificed children to receive their sympathy.  Today, history repeats itself.”  CONIB said in a statement that Jefferson’s post constituted “a crime of racism, with an increased penalty for having been committed through a social network.”  For an unrelated matter in August, authorities charged Jefferson with belonging to a criminal organization opposing democracy.  He remained in jail, pending trial through the end of year.

In Maranhao State, Afro-Brazilian religious institutions and activists working to counter religious intolerance, together with the public defender, the state prosecutor, and the Order of Attorneys in Maranhao, met in July to discuss strategies to end attacks on terreiros.  According to the State Secretariat for Racial Equality, terreiros, including the Pai Lindomar Temple, had suffered increasingly frequent attacks for several years, despite military police presence in the Anjo da Guarda neighborhood where the temple was located in the state’s capital of Sao Luis.  For example, on average there were five complaints of religious intolerance per year, but in two months of 2021, four complaints of intolerance were filed.

In June, the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Public Ministry of Santa Catarina State (MPSC) shelved an investigation into possible illegal acts by history professor Wandercy Pugliesi.  In 2020, the Liberal Party pressured Pugliesi to step down as a candidate for a local town council election in Pomerode due to his association with neo-Nazi symbols and for not being ideologically aligned with the party.  Pugliesi had a large, tiled swastika symbol in his personal pool and named his son Adolf; police seized Nazi-related materials from him in 1994.  In June, Pugliesi’s lawyers requested that the Public Prosecutor’s Office shelve the case after Pugliesi provided photos showing that the symbol in the swimming pool had been removed.  In September, a member of the Superior Council of the MPSC requested that the Center for Confronting Racial Crimes and Intolerance study the case prior to shelving it.  According to media, while there was no firm timeline for the study, upon completion the MPSC’s Superior Council would consider the results of the study and whether to recommence the investigation.

In August, federal police launched Operation White Rose, a reference to the historical White Rose anti-Nazi movement in World War II Germany, to address crimes of discrimination or prejudice based on race, color, ethnicity, religion, or national origin, as well as the placement of Nazi symbols.  Documents in a database of Safernet Brazil – an NGO that promotes human rights on social networks and monitors radical websites – provided the basis for an operation against a man who made discriminatory comments against categories of individuals that included Jews and Catholics.  According to press reports, the man also displayed Nazi symbols, declared himself to be a Nazi, and disseminated content related to antisemitism and idolatry of Nazism and fascism, with the intention of inciting violence.

During the year, civil police and the Public Ministry initiated Operation Bergon (named after a French nun who helped rescue Jewish children during World War II) to investigate the spread of hatred and threats of violence on social media, including against Jews.  In December, civil police and prosecutors launched a series of actions, serving four arrest warrants and 31 search and seizure warrants across the states of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Norte, Parana, Santa Catarina, and Rio do Sul.

The NGO Center for Articulation of Marginalized Populations reported Afro-Brazilian victims of religious intolerance in the state of Rio de Janeiro continued to view police and the judiciary as being indifferent, in general, to attacks on Afro-Brazilian places of worship.  It cited what it said was a lack of investigations and arrests in these cases and that offenders were rarely held accountable.

In April, the STF declared unconstitutional a 2015 Amazonas State law requiring schools and libraries to keep at least one copy of the Bible in their collections on the grounds that it violated the principles of state secularism.  Following the ruling, some postings on social media stated the STF had banned the Bible from schools and public libraries, allegations that the government said were false.

In September, acting Rio State Governor Claudio Castro declared the Terreiro de Gomeia (Gomeia Temple) in Duque de Caxias an historical and cultural heritage site.  Candomble followers founded the Gomeia Temple in the 1950s.  The declaration emphasized the value of Afro-Brazilian religious practices.

On January 21, municipalities around the country commemorated the National Day to Combat Religious Intolerance.  In Rio Grande do Sul, civil police distributed an educational booklet on religious intolerance, including information on what encompasses crimes of religious intolerance and how to report incidents.

On May 25, the Sao Paulo Secretary of Justice, through the Inter-Religious Forum for a Culture of Peace and Freedom of Faith, promoted a webinar in partnership with UNESCO to discuss freedom of religion as an integral effort to promote peace and tolerance in the country and worldwide.  The event included representatives from a variety of faiths including Afro-Brazilian religions, Islam, and Judaism.

In May, Sao Paulo Legislative Assembly Caucus of Religious Freedom representatives held a Sao Paulo State Religious Freedom Week, a series of 16 webinars to promote freedom of religion and tolerance, with the participation of various civil society groups.  Assembly deputy Damaris Moura, who led the promotion for the week’s events, said, “Defending religious freedom for all is a fundamental right constitutionally guaranteed, but still with practical problems.  Therefore, it is always necessary to alert, raise awareness, and prevent.”  The President of the Legislative Assembly, deputy Carlao Pignatari, defined religious freedom as “freedom to profess any religion [and to] hold services and [practice]  traditions related to beliefs,” and he emphasized that religious beliefs should not have “direct influence on the formulation of public policies.”  Approximately 1,000 persons attended the opening event of the week, held at the Legislative Assembly.

The State Secretariat of Human Rights in Espirito Santo State organized a State Week of Combating Religious Intolerance from January 18 to 21.  Programming included a virtual educational campaign on the secretariat’s website, a roundtable on religious intolerance with inmates from the Linhares Detention and Rehabilitation Center, and two seminars on religious intolerance that included speakers representing Catholicism, Protestantism, and Afro-Brazilian religions as well as the State Council for the Promotion of Racial Equality.

Although only approximately 2 percent of the population were followers of Afro-Brazilian religions, a disproportionate number of cases registered by the human rights hotline involved victims who were practitioners of Afro-Brazilian religions. Media reported multiple incidents in which individuals and groups destroyed terreiros and sacred objects.

In January, an unidentified man broke into an Umbanda temple in Duque de Caxias, Baixada Fluminense, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, and set a fire and destroyed sacred religious objects.  According to the temple’s priest, Maria Antonia dos Santos, the man said his pastor had instructed him to break “all the demons he could find in the temple.”  The suspect was arrested the same day and sent to a psychiatric hospital after police concluded he was suffering a mental health crisis.  The leaders of the temple organized a fundraising campaign and rebuilt the temple, which was rededicated in May.

In February, unidentified men set fire to a food stand of Candomble priestess and street vendor Maria Enoia de Sousa, known as Mae Enoia, in Macae, southern Rio de Janeiro State.  The priestess had reportedly been harassed since November 2020, when she had begun selling acaraje, a regional dish associated with practitioners of Afro-Brazilian faiths.  According to media reports, when she attempted to file a police report, the police precinct said she needed to pay a fee of 700 to 800 reais ($120-$140) to conduct the investigation.  Police investigated the case, with monitoring by the CCIR, through year’s end.

In February, Gleidson Lima, an evangelical Christian pastor and leader of the Tenda dos Milagres Church, destroyed Afro-Brazilian sacred objects and offerings in the neighborhood of Belford Roxo, part of the greater metropolitan area of the city of Rio de Janeiro.  A video posted on the internet following the attack showed the pastor stating he was breaking the objects “in the name of Jesus.”  Police indicted Lima on February 24 on charges of religious intolerance, and a trial date was pending at year’s end.

In March, media reported that an unidentified, apparently intoxicated man destroyed a statue of Our Lady of Sorrows in a Catholic church in Petropolis, Rio de Janeiro State.  According to Father Lucas Thadeu, who witnessed the incident, the man broke the statue after declaring that due to his religion he did not like religious images.   Police were investigating at year’s end.

According to media in May, four individuals entered the Nossa Senhora dos Remedios Parish in Osasco, Sao Paulo, and destroyed seven religious images, plus flower vases, and toilets, saying they did so “in the name of Jesus.”  After reviewing security camera footage in June, the Secretariat of Public Security detained four suspects, including two minors.  Police indicted the two adults for the crimes of religious intolerance and “vilification of images” (the mistreatment or disrespect of objects) and took the minors to the Childhood and Youth Court.  Authorities released all the suspects after their hearings to await the outcome of the investigation, which according to media reports, the Ocasco police investigation continued through year’s end.

According to press reports, on December 3, police arrested and charged a man with aggravated theft and arson for the November 26 arson of the Shia Imam Ali Mosque in Ponta Grossa, in Parana State.  The man broke into and set fire to the husseiniya (Shia congregation hall), dirtied the kitchen walls, destroyed masbahas (prayer beads), and set fire to five volumes of the Quran.  The individual confessed to the crime, which carries a possible sentence of up to 14 years in prison.  In response to the attack, Parana Governor Carlos Massa Ratinho Junior stated his support for the mosque, stating, “We will not tolerate any criminal acts, especially those of religious intolerance, like what happened at the mosque, in Ponta Grossa,” and he pledged civil police would conduct a full investigation.

In December, a group of preschool students visited Xica Manicongo, the urban quilombo (a historical community founded by formerly enslaved persons) in the municipality of Niteroi in Rio de Janeiro State, to watch a cultural performance.  Afterward, individuals virtually attacked the participating school on social media.  Commenters conflated the quilombo with an Afro-Brazilian terreiro in the city, with posts using offensive language and criticizing the school administrators for permitting the visit.  In response, Niteroi’s municipal Secretary of Education defended the children’s participation in the event, explaining that schools have “autonomy to develop activities that defend freedom of expression and the antiracist education agenda.”  The secretary’s statement also reiterated that these activities were supported by laws that promote the culture and history of Afro-Brazilian peoples.  In response to the municipality’s clarification, many persons expressed support for the school’s position and the visit.

In February, followers of Afro-Brazilian religions in Maceio, Alagoas State, paid homage to Tia Marcelina, a temple leader whom security forces beat in 1912.  According to the Municipal Foundation for Cultural Action, the objective of the event, which included singing, instrumental music, and the hanging of a banner, was to remember the power and ancestry of the day in history and to renew what the foundation termed the fight against “religious racism.”

In July, former Mundial Supermarket employee Rafael Oliveira denounced the chain for religious intolerance, stating supermarket management verbally harassed, and ultimately fired him when he wore a protective facemask containing an image of the orixa ogun, an Afro-Brazilian deity.  According to Oliveira, other Mundial employees in the northern Rio de Janeiro State city of Ramos wore facemasks in support of other religions and sports teams without reprimand, while a manager told Oliveira to change his mask.  In the three weeks thereafter, the supermarket transferred Oliveira five times and changed his hours eight times before terminating his employment.  The supermarket chain stated that “it does not condone any act of discrimination or religious intolerance and respects all beliefs,” and said Oliveira’s dismissal was not related to discrimination.

In July, Afro-Brazilian religious leaders met with officials from Bahia State’s Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality to discuss a series of attacks against Terreiro Icimimo, a 104-year-old site recognized by the Bahia State government as a cultural heritage site.  That same month, unidentified men had broken into the temple and destroyed sacred objects and outdoor ceremonial spaces.  According to a representative for the terreiro, authorities had not indicted or arrested any suspects by year’s end.

In August, representatives of Afro-Brazilian religions in Pernambuco State, under the coordination of the Pernambuco Terreiros Walk Network (ACTPE), which unites the state’s terreiros to combat racism and religious prejudice, held a demonstration against acts of religious intolerance.  During the event, the representatives announced they had filed a complaint with the Public Ministry of Pernambuco through the State Secretariat for Social Defense against an evangelical Protestant pastor for having maligned Afro-Brazilian religions.  On social networks, Pastor Aijalon Berto of the Evangelical Church Dunamis (meaning power) objected to artistic graffiti panels installed near the Abolition Museum that depicted Afro-Brazilian cultural and religious symbols, saying these were associated with evil and Satan.  In the video, the pastor stated, “Entities referred to in Candomble are witchcraft.”  Civil police said they were investigating the case.  In November, the ACTPE held a second march in conjunction with the start of the country’s Month of Black Consciousness to mark the fight against racism and religious intolerance.  Local and state political leaders spoke alongside Afro-Brazilian religious leaders, calling for respect on a daily basis.

Media continued to report on cases of Candomble practitioners being expelled from the community and being prohibited from wearing the white clothing that is generally used by adherents of the Candomble faith in the area controlled by a criminal group self-identifying as evangelical.  Alvaro Malaqunas Santa Rosa, known as Peixao, who, according to media in 2020, had joined forces with a militia group to expand influence over a group of five favelas (informal housing settlements) to establish what came to be known as the “Complex of Israel” in northern Rio de Janeiro, continued to avoid arrest despite police operations targeting his drug trafficking operation.  As a child, Peixao followed his mother’s Umbanda practices but later converted to evangelical Christianity.

Media continued to report on cases of evangelical Christian missionaries traveling to isolated and recently contacted indigenous communities to proselytize.  Indigenous organizations said these actions violated indigenous peoples’ constitutional right to maintain their cultural heritage and sacred practices and threatened their safety.  In September, STF Minister Luis Roberto Barroso reaffirmed a 2020 court decision that prevented the entry of third parties, including members of religious groups, into areas in which isolated indigenous peoples were living to curb the spread of the COVID-19 virus.

An August report published by Globo using data obtained through the Access to Information Law showed that in the first five months of the year, federal police investigated 36 cases entailing violations of the country’s laws against the use of symbols to publicize Nazism, a rate Globo estimated was on track to be only slightly fewer than the 110 cases opened in all of 2020.  In 2020, the highest number of cases was opened in the southeast of the country, particularly in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro States, with 27 and 23 cases, respectively.  The data did not include the states of Mato Grosso do Sul, Rondonia, and Tocantins.

FISESP’s annual Antisemitism Report recorded 57 incidents and allegations of antisemitism in the country from January to July, compared with 149 incidents and allegations during the same period in 2020.  FISESP also reported a total of 92 incidents at year’s end.  The report was based on a range of sources, including traditional media, social media, and reports from branch offices of the organization.  The survey reported a variety of activities including sightings of swastikas and other antisemitic graffiti, antisemitic hand gestures, and the sale of Nazi artifacts.  FISESP attributed the drop in recorded cases to difficulties collecting data during COVID-19 pandemic shutdowns, when local FISESP branches were closed.

From the end of 2020 to May, neo-Nazi cells grew from 349 to 530, according to anthropologist Adriana Magalhaes Dias at the Sao Paulo State University of Campinas.  The cells were most prevalent in the south and southeast regions, with 301 and 193 identified, respectively.  Dias also mapped cells in the midwest (18) and northeast (13).  According to Dias, a neo-Nazi cell was a group of at least three persons inspired by the Nazism in Europe in the 20th century.

According to press reports, on March 12, the federal police raided the Pentecostal Generation Jesus Christ Church in the city of Rio de Janeiro to seize literature and antisemitic materials related to a 2020 video broadcast of the church’s leader, evangelical Pastor Tupirani da Hora Lores, praying with congregants for another Holocaust.  He said, “Massacre the Jews, God, hit them with your sword, for they have left God, they have left the nation.”  The police raid supported a cybercrimes police investigation of the pastor for inciting practitioners to discriminate against Jews through his in-person and online sermons.  In August, press reported that despite the police investigation, the pastor continued to make offensive comments.

Neo-Nazi groups maintained an active presence online.  The National Cyber Crime Reporting Center, operated by Safernet Brazil, recorded for the second year in a row an increase in complaints about internet content supporting Nazism.  During the year, Safernet Brazil stated it received 14,476 reports of neo-Nazi content online, a 60.7 percent increase compared with 2020 and the highest number registered since 2010.  The reports included 894 different webpages, of which 318 were removed by TikTok, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter because of content defined as illegal and pro-Nazi.

There continued to be reports of private entities and individuals inciting violence against or engaging in verbal harassment of religious minorities on social media and in the press.  As of August, the Israelite Federation of the State of Rio de Janeiro reported that it had confirmed 10 cases of antisemitism in Rio de Janeiro.  The number of reports of crimes of intolerance – racial, religious, or related to sexual orientation or gender identity – registered by the ombudsman’s office of the Sao Paulo Department of State between January-July represented a 24.5 percent increase compared with the same period in 2020.  During this period, 311 reports were registered, compared with 248 during the same period in 2020.

In June, the Federal Public Ministry indicted a man in the First Federal Criminal Court of Sao Paulo for incitement of Nazism on a Russian online social network in 2015.  Authorities accused the man, who had a history of involvement with neo-Nazi groups, of being responsible for a webpage containing neo-Nazi symbols and photos referencing Adolf Hitler, with faces covered by emojis.  Identified through police cooperation between Brazil and Russia, the man confessed to the authorship of the publications.  The Public Ministry said the man would be prosecuted for inciting discrimination and prejudice based on race, color, religion, or nationality and if found guilty, would be subject to a fine, up to five years in prison, or both.

According to media, on August 7, an unidentified individual or individuals scattered antisemitic pamphlets on the sidewalks and streets of Rio de Janeiro’s Barra de Tijuca neighborhood that stated, “Jews, impulsive accumulators of gold, diamonds, and dollars.”  Rio de Janeiro civil police said they were investigating the incident as a possible hate crime.

According to press reports, on August 23, unidentified men online posted pornographic images and antisemitic messages during a virtual Jewish ceremony organized by the Israelite Religious Association in Rio de Janeiro.  Hackers threatened the participants by posting messages such as, “We will burn all synagogues” and “Death to Jews.”  Organizers suspended the event until a new link could be sent to the participants.  Rio de Janeiro police were investigating the case at year’s end. 

In November, journalist Jose Carlos Bernardi, working for Jovem Pan, one of the country’s largest broadcasters, stated that Brazil could attain economic development enjoyed by Germany “only by attacking Jews.  If we kill a gazillion Jews and appropriate their economic power, then Brazil will get rich.  That’s what happened with Germany after the war.”  The journalist and network later apologized for the remarks, following public complaints.

According to FAMBRAS, anti-Muslim messages on the internet, mostly associating Islam with terrorism and spreading messages of hate against Muslim representatives and their religious symbols, continued.  In March, according to FAMBRAS legal advisor Mohamed Charanek, the Court of Justice in Brasilia ordered the removal from social media of all material associating Islam with terrorism posted by a group self-identifying as the “Conservative Party,” a group seeking recognition as a political party.  The court fined the group 10,000 reais ($1,800).

The Ministry of Women, Family, and Human Rights’ National Secretariat of Human Rights received 581 reports of religious intolerance via the nationwide Dial 100 Human Rights hotline during the year, compared with 566 in 2020.

The Rio de Janeiro Civil Police Office for Racial Crimes and Crimes of Intolerance (DECRADI) reported receiving 78 reports of religious intolerance during the year.  According to the Chief of Police and head of DECRADI, authorities had indicted nine persons on charges of religious intolerance.  The State Secretariat for Human Rights in Rio de Janeiro reported 51 instances of religious intolerance between January and July, compared with 26 instances during the same period in 2020.  Afro-Brazilian religious groups experienced the greatest number of occurrences, with harassment, discrimination, and destruction of religious temples reported regularly.

According to the Bahia State Secretariat of Racial Equality, there were 19 instances of religious intolerance in the state between January and July, compared with eight instances in the comparable period in 2020.

On January 21, in celebration of the Brazilian National Day Against Religious Intolerance, Temple Ile Axe Abassade Ogum organized a tribute to the late Candomble priest Mother Gilda, who experienced verbal abuse involving religious intolerance during her lifetime.  The ceremony took place at Parque do Abaete, in Salvador, Bahia State, the site of a bust of the religious leader.

Bahia State University (UNEB) organized an online event entitled “Religion, (in)Tolerance, and Respect” to celebrate the January 21 National Day to Combat Religious Intolerance.  The UNEB event focused on the growth of religious diversity in the country and how religious intolerance could lead to discrimination and aggression when members of one religious group did not recognize the religious freedom of other religious groups.

During the year, embassy officials assisted the government’s efforts to address the spread of hatred and threats of violence against religious groups, including by providing information leading to the launch of Operation Bergon.

On January 29, the embassy organized a virtual roundtable with government, legal experts, and interfaith and religious leaders on the legal instruments available in the country to promote tolerance and inclusion.  Panelists included a federal prosecutor, a professor from the University of Chicago, Professor Vania Maria da Silva Soares from the Interfaith Forum in Sao Paulo, and Ali El Zoghbi, vice president of the Muslim Federation of Associations in Brazil in Sao Paulo.

On August 8, the Consul General in Sao Paulo met with representatives of Jewish organizations, including CONIB, CONIB-Sao Paulo, Albert Einstein Hospital, and the Harmony Club, a social and cultural club maintained by the Jewish community of Sao Paulo, to discuss further engagement in support of religious freedom.  On October 22, the Consul General in Rio de Janeiro visited the Museum of the Republic to meet with Afro-Brazilian leaders, activists, priests, prosecutors, and lawmakers involved in the religious freedom and tolerance movement for Afro-Brazilian religious communities.  During the visit, the Consul General toured the “Free Our Sacred” exhibit, which included more than 500 artifacts seized from Afro-Brazilian religious communities during police raids between 1890 and 1945.  On December 22, the Consul General in Sao Paulo met with the Archbishop of Sao Paulo, Cardinal Odilo Scherer, to discuss interfaith dialogue, the impact of COVID-19 on religious groups, and human rights in the country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 471,000 (midyear 2021).  According to the 2011 census (the most recent), 78.8 percent of the population is Muslim, 8.7 percent Christian, and 7.8 percent Buddhist, while the remaining 4.7 percent consists of other religions, including indigenous beliefs.

There is significant variation in religious identification among ethnic groups.  According to 2019 official statistics (the most recent), ethnic Malay citizens comprise 66 percent of the population and are defined by law as Muslims from birth.  The ethnic Chinese population, which is approximately 10 percent of the total population and includes both citizens and stateless permanent residents, is 65 percent Buddhist and 20 percent Christian.  Indigenous tribes, such as the Dusun, Bisaya, Murut, and Iban, make up approximately 4 percent of the population and are estimated to be 50 percent Muslim, 15 percent Christian, and the remainder followers of other religious groups, including adherents of traditional practices.  The remaining 18 percent of the population includes foreign-born workers, primarily from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and other South Asian countries.  According to official statistics, approximately half of these temporary and permanent residents are Muslim, more than one-quarter Christian, and 15 percent Buddhist.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the religion of the country shall be the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam but allows all other religions to be practiced “in peace and harmony” by the persons professing them.

The legal system is divided between secular law and sharia, which have parallel systems of both criminal and civil/family law and operate separate courts under a single judiciary department.  The civil courts are based on common law.  The sharia courts follow the Shafi’i school of Islamic jurisprudence, in which there is no concept of legal precedent and judges are not bound by the decisions of a higher court.  Sharia courts have jurisdiction over both criminal law and civil/family matters involving Muslims and hear cases brought under longstanding sharia legislation as well as under the SPC.

The SPC spells out provisions for corporal and capital punishment for murder, theft, adultery, rape, sodomy, apostasy, blasphemy, and other acts deemed crimes under sharia.  Depending on the type and specifics of the offense, these punishments include fines, imprisonment, whipping, caning, amputation of hands or feet, or death (including by stoning).  The SPC identifies murder, adultery, rape, sodomy, apostasy, and blasphemy as capital offenses, although the law requires either a confession or the testimony of multiple pious Muslim male eyewitnesses to support a death sentence.  Apart from caning, however, no capital or corporal punishments have been handed down or enforced since 1957.  A de facto moratorium on the death penalty, announced by Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah in 2019, remained in effect during the year.

Most SPC sections apply to both Muslims and non-Muslims, including foreigners, and they also are applicable to offenses committed outside the country by citizens or permanent residents.  Non-Muslims are exempt from certain sections, such as requirements for men to join Friday prayers and pay zakat (obligatory annual almsgiving).  The SPC states that Muslims will be identified for purposes of the law by “general reputation,” but without further definition.

The SPC incorporates longstanding Sharia-based domestic laws that prohibit drinking alcohol, propagating religions other than Islam, eating in public during the fasting hours of Ramadan, cross-dressing, and close physical proximity between unmarried persons of the opposite sex.  It prohibits “indecent behavior,” including pregnancies out of wedlock, and criminalizes any act that “tends to tarnish the image of Islam, deprave a person, bring bad influence, or cause anger to the person who is likely to have seen the act.”

Punishments included under the SPC have different standards of proof from the common law-based penal code, such as requiring four pious men to witness personally an act of fornication to support a sentence of stoning.  Stoning sentences, however, may be supported by a confession in lieu of witness testimony at the discretion of a sharia judge.  If neither qualifying testimony nor a confession is available, the possible sentences are limited to caning, imprisonment, or fines.

The government describes its official national philosophy as Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB), or Malay Islamic Monarchy, which it defines as “a system that encompasses strong Malay cultural influences, stressing the importance of Islam in daily life and governance, and respect for the monarchy as represented by His Majesty the Sultan.”  The government has said this system is essential to the country’s way of life and is its main defense against “extremism.”  The government-run MIB Supreme Council seeks to spread and strengthen MIB philosophy and ensure MIB is enshrined in the nation’s laws and policies.  MIB is a compulsory subject for students in both public and private schools, including at the university level.

MORA’s Religious Enforcement Division leads investigations of crimes that exist only in the SPC and other sharia legislation, such as male Muslims failing to pray on Fridays.  The RBPF investigates cases involving crimes not covered by sharia legislation, such as human trafficking.  RBPF and Religious Enforcement Division officers cooperate on investigations of crimes covered by both the secular and sharia laws.  In such cases, an “assessment committee” composed of secular and sharia prosecutors and secular and sharia law enforcement officers decides which court system will try the case.  The deliberations of the assessment committee to determine whether specific cases will proceed through secular or sharia court are not public, and the government does not make public the committee’s bases for its decisions.

The government bans religious groups it considers “deviant,” including the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, al-Arqam, Abdul Razak Mohammad, al-Ma’unah, Saihoni Tasipan, Tariqat Mufarridiyyah, Silat Lintau, Qadiyaniah, the Baha’i Faith, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.  The list is based on fatwas proclaimed by the state mufti or the Islamic Religious Council – a government body and the sultan’s highest authority on matters on Islam – and is available on MORA’s website.  The SPC also bans most non-Sunni forms of Islam and any practice or display of “black magic.”

The SPC includes a list of words and expressions, including the word “Allah,” reserved for use by only Muslims or in relation to Islam.  MORA officials state that the use of certain words such as “Allah” by non-Muslims does not constitute an SPC offense when used in a nonreligious context or social activity.

Under the SPC, Muslims are not permitted to renounce or change their religion.  Non-Muslims must be at least 14 years and seven months old to convert or renounce their religion.  If either parent converts to Islam, their children younger than 14 years and seven months automatically become Muslim.

The law requires all organizations, including religious groups, to register and provide the names of their members.  Applicants are subject to background checks of leaders and board members, and proposed organizations are subject to naming requirements.  Registered organizations must furnish information on leadership, election of officers, members, assets, activities, and any other information the registrar requests.  Benefits of registration include the ability to operate, reserve space in public buildings, and apply for permission to raise funds.  The Registrar of Societies, under MOHA, oversees the application process, exercises discretion over applications, and is authorized to refuse approval for any reason.  Organizations are prohibited from affiliation with any organization outside the country without written approval by the registrar.  Unregistered organizations may face charges of unlawful assembly and may be subject to fines.  Individuals who participate in or influence others to join unregistered organizations may be fined, arrested, and imprisoned.  The penalty for violating laws on the registration and activity of organizations is a fine of up to 10,000 Brunei dollars (BND) ($7,400), imprisonment for up to three years, or both.

The law states that any public assembly of five or more persons requires official approval in advance.  Under longstanding emergency powers, this applies to all forms of public assembly, including religious assembly.  In practice, however, places of worship are viewed as private places in which gatherings do not require approval.

The law forbids the teaching or promotion of any religion other than Islam to Muslims or to persons of no faith.  Under the SPC, the penalty for propagating religions other than Islam is up to five years in prison, a fine of up to 20,000 BND ($14,800), or both.  The SPC includes a provision that makes it illegal to criticize Islam as well as the SPC itself.

Laws and regulations limit access to religious literature.  The law states it is an offense for a person to import any publication deemed objectionable, which is defined in part as describing, depicting, or expressing matters of race or religion in a manner likely to cause “feelings of enmity, hatred, ill will, or hostility between different racial or religious groups.”  The law also bans distributing materials relating to religions other than Islam to Muslims or persons of no faith.  All religious texts are listed as restricted items for import and require a government import permit before shipment.

The law establishes two sets of schools:  those offering the national or international curriculum that are administered by the Ministry of Education, and those offering supplemental religious education (ugama) that are administered by MORA.

Ministry of Education schools teach a course on Islamic religious knowledge that is required for all Muslim children between the ages of seven and 15 who reside in the country and who have at least one parent who is a citizen or permanent resident.  Non-Muslims are exempted from all religious study requirements and receive teaching on moral behavior.  Non-Muslim students are still required to take MIB classes.

Ugama instruction in MORA schools is a seven-to-eight-year course that teaches the day-to-day practice of Sunni Islam according to the Shafi’i school.  Under a 2012 government order, ugama instruction is mandatory for Muslim students between the age of seven and 14 who hold citizenship or permanent residency; many students attend ugama schools in the afternoon after Ministry of Education schools have adjourned.  Parents may be fined up to 5,000 BND ($3,700), imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year, or both, for failure to comply with the order.  The law does not make accommodations for Muslims who have non-Shafi’i beliefs.  MORA also administers a set of schools taught in Arabic that offer the national curriculum combined with ugama religious education.

Public and private schools, including private schools run by churches, are prohibited from providing religious instruction on beliefs other than the Shafi’i school of Islam.  Under the SPC, schools may be fined or school officials imprisoned for teaching non-Islamic religious subjects.  The SPC criminalizes exposing Muslim children or the children of parents who have no religious affiliation to the beliefs and practices of any religion other than Islam.  The law requires that any person wishing to teach on matters relating to Islam must obtain official permission.  Churches and religious schools are permitted to offer private religious education in private settings, such as someone’s home.

All parental rights are awarded to the Muslim parent if a child is born to one Muslim and one non-Muslim parent.  The non-Muslim parent is not recognized in any official document, including the child’s birth certificate, unless that parent has converted to Islam.  The law bans any Muslim from surrendering custody of a minor or dependent in his or her guardianship to a non-Muslim.

Under the SPC, non-Muslims may be arrested for zina (fornication or adultery) or khalwat (close physical proximity between two unmarried individuals of opposite sexes), provided that the other accused party is Muslim.  Foreigners are also subject to these laws.

A regulation requires businesses that produce, supply, and serve food and beverages to obtain a halal certificate or apply for an exemption if serving non-Muslims.

MORA has declared circumcision for Muslim girls (sunat) a religious rite obligatory under Islam and describes it as the removal of the hood of the clitoris (Type I per World Health Organization classification).  The government has stated it does not consider this practice to be female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) and has expressed support for the World Health Organization’s call for the elimination of FGM/C.  In his 2017 fatwas, the State Mufti declared that both male and female circumcision are required and specified that female circumcision involves a “small cut above the vagina.”

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In response to a COVID-19 outbreak, the Minister of Religious Affairs announced all mosques and other places of worship would close on August 7 until at least 70 percent of the population was fully vaccinated.  As a result, many religious services moved online.  Unlike for the closures mandated in 2020, MOHA and MORA did not inform members of minority religious groups about the rules for closing and reopening of churches and places of worship, and instead, they had to rely on press conferences and news articles for details.

By year’s end the government still had not ratified the UNCAT, which it signed in 2015 following widespread condemnation of the government’s implementation of the first phase of the SPC order in 2014.  Foreign Minister Dato Erywan stated, however, that the government was in the ratification process.

Legal sources reported that sharia courts continued to prosecute criminal, divorce and probate cases until August 7, when the country locked down to contain a second wave of COVID-19.  Prior to the COVID outbreak, local media outlets reported on cases heard in the sharia and civil courts, but coverage of sharia court hearings ceased during the lockdown while reporting on civil court proceedings continued.

The government did not issue official or public condolences or acknowledge the death in May of the country’s first Catholic cardinal, Cornelius Sim.  Cardinal Sim had led interfaith dialogues and gatherings of interdenominational faith leaders from churches throughout the country and frequently acted as the Christian community’s liaison with the government.

Non-Muslims and members of Muslim minority groups reported no significant changes with respect to the practice of minority religions since the full implementation of the SPC in 2019, but they said the law continued to prohibit the ability of non-Muslims to proselytize Muslims or other non-Muslims.  MORA announced 414 residents had converted to Islam in 2020, 94 of whom belonged to the Iban indigenous community who inhabit rural areas, areas where the sultan had called on MORA to do more to increase the spread of Islam.  One non-Muslim said that some Muslims viewed COVID-19 as a curse from God which led to an increase in efforts to convert Christians to Islam, but also said that members of the Christian community in general believed they were under less scrutiny and pressure compared to when the SPC was introduced in 2019.  The said the SPC’s blasphemy provisions could be used to constrain non-Muslim groups’ activities but expressed more concern about subtle government pressure than about the possibility of harsh punishments under the SPC.

The government continued to periodically warn the population about the preaching of non-Shafi’i versions of Islam, including both “liberal” practices and those associated with jihadism, Wahhabism, or Salafism.

MORA awarded contracts worth more than 13.5million BND ($9.99 million) to local companies to build three new mosques in a virtual signing ceremony in October, adding to more than 99 registered mosques according to 2015 government data.  Under the contracts, construction of the mosques would take two years and were projected to serve more than 6,000 congregants.  The mosque construction fund was partially financed by monthly salary deductions from Muslim government workers, except those who took the necessary steps to opt out of automatic salary deductions.

MORA continued to provide all mosques with approved sermons for Friday services.  The government required that registered imams deliver the sermons and forbade deviance from the approved text.

There was no legal requirement for women to wear head coverings in public; however, religious authorities continued to reinforce social customs to encourage Muslim women to wear a head covering (known locally as a tudong), and many women did so.  When applying for passports, drivers’ licenses, and national identity cards, Muslim females were required to wear a tudong.  Muslim women employed by the government were expected to wear a tudong to work, although some chose not to with no reports of official repercussions.  In government schools and institutions of higher learning, Muslim female students were required to wear a uniform that includes a head covering.  Male students were expected to wear the songkok (a traditional hat), although this was not required in all schools.  Women who were incarcerated, including non-Muslims, were required to wear a uniform that included a tudong.

As in past years, the government limited traditional Lunar New Year lion dance performances to a three-day period and restricted them to the country’s sole Chinese Buddhist temple, Chinese school halls, and private residencies of Chinese Association members (comprised of the members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and several other Chinese business associations).  Members of the royal family publicly attended Lunar New Year celebrations and lion dance performances during the allowed period, with extensive coverage in state-influenced media.

The government continued to enforce strict customs controls on importing non-Islamic religious texts such as Bibles, as well as on Islamic instructional materials or scriptures intended for sale or distribution.  Authorities generally continued to ban the import of non-Islamic religious texts, and the censorship board continued to review Islamic texts to ensure they did not contain text that deviated from the Shafi’i school of Islam.  Customs officials continued to check personal packages entering the country to ensure they did not contain anything of a non-Shafi’i Islamic or perceived sexual nature, such as magazines showing women in swimsuits.

Custom and Excise officers confiscated a Bible mailed to a foreign worker by his wife for personal use in October.  Custom officials reported the worker could reclaim the Bible because it was for personal use, but the process required the claimant to obtain prior written approval from the RBPF, the Internal Security Department, and MORA’s Islamic Learning Center.

Christian leaders continued to state that a longstanding fatwa discouraging Muslims from supporting non-Islamic faiths inhibited the expansion, renovation, or construction of new non-Islamic facilities; in accordance with the fatwa, government officials slowed or did not process building plans and permits for churches.  Christian religious groups said that authorities generally only permitted churches and associated schools to repair and renovate buildings on their sites if required for safety.  The process for obtaining approval to renovate church buildings and associated school buildings remained lengthy and difficult, and there were continuing reports of the government stalling new construction projects for not meeting the complicated requirements.  With only six approved churches in the country, the last built in the 1960s before the country gained independence, facilities were often too small to accommodate their congregations without significant overflow seating outdoors.  Several sources reported that schools associated with Christian churches had to pay government business taxes despite being nonprofit organizations.  They said this measure was not applied to other nonprofit private schools with no religious affiliation.  The Chinese temple was also subject to the same fatwa.  Christian worshippers continued to report difficulty accessing churches on many Sundays because of road closures by the government for official events, with some services being rescheduled.

The government reported that many non-Muslim children elected to take courses on Islam.  Reportedly, those applying for government-funded scholarships believed having such courses on their transcripts could be advantageous.  Most school textbooks were illustrated to portray Islam as the norm, and women and girls were shown wearing the tudong.  There were no depictions of the practices of other religious groups in textbooks.

Authorities continued to prohibit non-Muslims and non-Shafi’i Muslims from receiving non-Shafi’i religious education in schools.  All church-associated schools were recognized by the Ministry of Education and remained open to students of any religion, although they were not permitted to offer religious instruction other than for Shafi’i Islam.

The Minister of Religious Affairs reported the ministry was researching and evaluating school schedules for religious schools in response to public online criticism regarding difficulties Muslim parents faced in sending children to MORA religious schools.  Parents said children were forced to change school uniforms and eat lunch in the car while traveling from nonreligious schools in the morning to attend religious classes in the evening.  Parents also reported they were often late to work after lunch due to religious school schedules.

Throughout the year, the government continued to enforce restrictions requiring all businesses to close for the two hours of Friday prayers.

Religious authorities again allowed nonhalal restaurants and nonhalal sections in supermarkets to operate without interference, but they continued to hold public outreach sessions to encourage restaurants to become halal.

The government continued to offer incentives to prospective converts to Islam and the Shafi’i school, especially those from indigenous communities in rural areas, including help with housing and welfare assistance.  The government allocated travel funding so that those who could not participate in the Hajj due to COVID-19 travel restrictions during the year could do so in the future.  The government gave presentations on the benefits of converting to Islam that received extensive press coverage in state-influenced media.  According to government statistics, 414 individuals converted to Islam during the year, compared with 293 in 2020.  Converts included citizens and permanent residents as well as foreigners.  Government policy supported Islam through the national MIB philosophy as well as through government pledges to make the country a zikir nation (one that remembers and obeys Allah).

In a January roundtable meeting with members of LGBTQ community, participants discussed what they stated were societal pressures stemming from the country’s deep-seated Islamic culture and discussed MORA’s “raid” of a private party during which members of their community were targeted.

Despite the absence of a legal prohibition of Muslims marrying non-Muslims, all Islamic weddings continued to require sharia court approval, and officiants, who were required to be imams approved by the government, also required the non-Muslim party to convert prior to the marriage.

Most government meetings and ceremonies commenced with an Islamic prayer, which the government continued to state was not a legal requirement but a matter of custom.

The government continued to require residents to carry identity cards that stated the bearer’s ethnicity and were used in part to determine whether he or she were Muslim; for example, all ethnic Malays, including those traveling in the country, were assumed to be Muslim.  Malays were required to follow certain Islamic religious practices or potentially face fines, arrest, and imprisonment.  Visitors to the country were asked to identify their religion on their visa applications.

Social media users criticized MORA’s December 22 instructions requiring shops to remove Christmas images and products one month after many stores had already started Christmas promotions.  California-based Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf was among establishments the MORA official visited, prompting some social media users to call for greater religious tolerance.  Although December 25 remained an official holiday on which government offices closed, including MORA, according to the social media accounts MORA officials stated the enforcement measures were needed to “control the act of celebrating Christmas excessively and openly, which could damage the faith of the Muslim community.”  The government allowed Christmas decorations in private residences.

MORA faced online criticism after it punished a local nonhalal restaurant catering to non-Muslim customers for violating laws prohibiting dine-in service during Ramadan fasting hours.  While similar incidents and the ensuing online criticism had occurred in previous years, comments were more numerous and personal during the year in the wake of the MORA Minister’s son receiving a five-year prison sentence for embezzlement and corruption.

Non-Muslims and Muslims face social pressure to conform to Islamic behavioral guidelines.  Some male Muslims reportedly felt pressure from family and friends to attend Friday prayers even though they did not hold strong religious beliefs.  Members of the LGBTQ community expressed fears about openly expressing their sexual or gender identity, saying they believed it would bring shame on their families for violating religious mores.

Following the death of Cardinal Sim in May, individuals from a variety of faith backgrounds made numerous comments in online forums praising the Cardinal for his efforts to serve the people of the country, according to local press.

Legislative council member Khairunnisa binti Haji Ash-ari faced social media backlash when she reintroduced a 2012 proposal for MOHA to open village head positions to women in the March annual parliamentary sessions.  In her speech she pointed out that women held positions of significant leadership in the government and private sector, and there should be no issue in electing a village head regardless of gender.  Many social media users did not agree, using Instagram to state women should be ineligible due to the Islamic responsibilities mixed in with the village head’s otherwise administrative role.  The Minister of Home Affairs said the matter would be taken into consideration but by year’s end had taken no action.  One local online newspaper, The Scoop, turned off comments due to “abusive and derogatory” language and remarks containing misogyny, racism, and prejudice.

Social media users expressed anger after a court acquitted a religious teacher charged with sexual abuse.  Comments on Reddit, Borneo Bulletin’s Instagram, and Media Permata’s Instagram drew comparisons and contrasts with another sexual assault case reported on the same day in which a court handed down a lengthy sentence to the defendant.  Many commentators said the justice system in the country was flawed because it accorded leniency to the rich and powerful, and stated the court gave the acquitted teacher preferential treatment due to his association with MORA.  They also questioned the need for six witnesses in prosecuting the religious teacher’s case, while this was not required in the other case.

There were again reports that some individuals who wished to convert to another religion continued to fear social retribution, such as ostracism by friends, family, and their community.  If parents converted to Islam, there was often family and official pressure for the children to do the same if they were not young enough to have been automatically converted with their parents.  Some non-Muslims said they continued to feel pressured in the workplace or in social groups to convert to Islam.  While the SPC outlined harsh punishments for Muslims converting to another religion, there were no known cases during the year of the government having applied those penalties.  Non-Muslims reported, however, that government officials monitored their religious services and events to ensure that no Muslims attended and that there was no anti-Islamic content.

The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials raised U.S. concerns regarding the effects of the SPC, the importance of ratification of UNCAT, and the protection of minority religious group rights with government officials, including from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Attorney General’s Chambers, and the Chief Justice of Brunei.  The Charge d’Affaires also encouraged MORA to support religious freedom by resuming interfaith dialogues with religious minorities.  U.S. officials continued to coordinate with other governments, including Australia, France, and the United Kingdom, regarding shared concerns about the SPC.

Embassy officials visited places of worship and met with religious leaders to discuss the concerns of religious minorities regarding the implications of the SPC for the non-Muslim community and the limitations placed on the open practice of other religions.  Embassy officials emphasized U.S. support for religious freedom and encouraged religious minority groups to maintain communication with the embassy.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 6.9 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2011 census (the most recent), 76 percent of the population identifies as Eastern Orthodox Christian, primarily affiliated with the BOC.  The census reports Muslims, the second largest religious group, are approximately 10 percent of the population, followed by Protestants, including the Union of Evangelical Congregational Churches, Union of Evangelical Baptist Churches, and Union of Evangelical Pentecostal Churches, at 1.1 percent, and Roman Catholics at 0.8 percent.  Nearly 95 percent of Muslims reported being Sunni; most of the rest are Shia, and there is a small number of Ahmadis concentrated in Blagoevgrad.  Orthodox Christians of the Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church (AAOC), Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of the Church of Jesus Christ, and other groups together make up 0.2 percent of the population.  According to the census, 4.8 percent of respondents have no religion and 7.1 percent did not specify a religion.  According to a 2019 report by the think tank Agency for Social Analyses, 74 percent of individuals identify as Orthodox Christians, 10 percent as Muslims, 13 percent as atheists, and 3 percent with other religious traditions.

Some religious minorities are concentrated geographically.  Many Muslims, including ethnic Turks, Roma, and Pomaks (descendants of Slavic Bulgarians who converted to Islam under Ottoman rule) live in the Rhodope Mountains along the southern border with Greece and Turkey.  Ethnic Turkish and Romani Muslims also live in large numbers in the northeast and along the Black Sea coast.  Some recent Romani converts to Islam live in towns in the central region, such as Plovdiv and Pazardjik.  According to the census, nearly 40 percent of Catholics live in and around Plovdiv.  The majority of the small Jewish and Armenian communities are in Sofia, Plovdiv, and along the Black Sea coast.  Protestants are widely dispersed.  Many Roma are Protestant converts, and Protestants are more numerous in areas with large Romani populations.  Approximately 80 percent of the urban population and 62 percent of the rural population identifies as Orthodox Christian.  Approximately 25 percent of the rural population identify as Muslim, compared with 4 percent of the urban population.

Legal Framework

The constitution states freedom of conscience and choice of religion or no religion are inviolable, prohibits religious discrimination, and stipulates the state shall assist in maintaining tolerance and respect among believers of different denominations, as well as between believers and nonbelievers.  It states the practice of any religion shall be unrestricted except to the extent its practice would be detrimental to national security, public order, health, and morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.  It states no one shall be exempt from obligations established by the constitution or the law on grounds of religious or other convictions.  The constitution also stipulates the separation of religious institutions from the state and prohibits the formation of political parties along religious lines or organizations that incite religious animosity, as well as the use of religious beliefs, institutions, and communities for political ends.  The law does not allow any privilege based on religious identity.

The constitution names Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the country’s “traditional” religion.  The law establishes the BOC as a legal entity, exempting it from the court registration that is mandatory for all other religious groups seeking legal recognition.

The penal code prescribes up to three years’ imprisonment for persons attacking individuals or groups based on their religious affiliation.  Instigators and leaders of an attack may receive prison sentences of up to six years.  Those who obstruct the ability of individuals to profess their faith, carry out their rituals and services, or compel another to participate in religious rituals and services may receive prison sentences of up to one year.  Violating a person’s or group’s freedom to acquire or practice a religious belief is subject to a fine of between 100 and 300 levs ($58-$170).  If a legal entity commits the infraction, the fine may range from 500 to 5,000 levs ($290-$2,900).

To receive national legal recognition, religious groups other than the BOC must register with the Sofia City Court.  Applications must include:  the group’s name and official address; a description of the group’s religious beliefs and service practices, organizational structure and bodies and management procedures, bodies, and mandates; a list of official representatives and the processes for their election; procedures for convening meetings and making decisions; and information on finances, property, and processes for termination and liquidation of the group.  The Directorate for Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers provides expert opinions on registration matters upon the court’s request.  Applicants must notify the Directorate for Religious Affairs within seven days of receiving a court decision on their registration.  Applicants may appeal negative registration decisions to the Sofia Appellate Court and, subsequently, the Supreme Cassation Court, the country’s highest court.  The law does not require the formal registration of local branches of registered groups with the local court, only that branches notify local authorities and local authorities enter them in a register.  The law prohibits registration of different groups with the same name in the same location.  The Directorate for Religious Affairs and any prosecutor may request that a court revoke a religious group’s registration on the grounds of systematic violations of the law.  There are 199 registered religious groups in addition to the BOC.

Registered religious groups must maintain a registry of all their clergy and employees, provide the Directorate for Religious Affairs with access to the registry, and issue a certificate to each clerical member, who must carry it as proof of representing the group.  Foreign members of registered religious groups may obtain long-term residency permits, but for the foreign member to be allowed to conduct religious services during his or her stay, the group must send advance notice to the Directorate for Religious Affairs.

The law requires the government to provide funding for all registered religious groups based on the number of self-identified followers in the latest census, at a rate of 10 levs ($6) per capita to groups that comprise more than 1 percent of the population and varying amounts for the rest.

Registered groups have the right to perform religious services; maintain financial accounts; own property such as houses of worship and cemeteries; provide medical, social, and educational services; receive property tax and other exemptions; and participate in commercial ventures.

The law does not consider unregistered religious groups.  These groups may engage in religious practice, since there is no law prohibiting it, but they lack privileges that the law grants to registered groups, such as access to government funding and the right to own property, establish financial accounts in their names, operate schools and hospitals, receive property tax exemptions, and sell religious merchandise.  Some local regulations also restrict the groups, in breach of the law.  Several municipalities, including Kyustendil and Sliven, prohibit unregistered religious groups from conducting any religious activities.

The law restricts the wearing of face-covering garments in public places, imposing a fine of 200 levs ($120) for a first offense and 1,500 levs ($870) for repeat offenses.

The law allows registered groups to publish, import, and distribute religious media; it does not address the rights of unregistered groups with regard to such media.  The law does not restrict proselytizing by registered or unregistered groups.  Dozens of municipalities, including the regional cities of Kyustendil, Pleven, Shumen, and Sliven, have ordinances prohibiting door-to-door proselytizing and the distribution of religious literature without a permit.  The ordinance in Kyustendil remains in effect despite a 2018 Supreme Administrative Court ruling that it was unconstitutional.  Burgas municipality prohibits the wearing of religious dress and symbols of unregistered religious groups.  Some municipalities prohibit religious activities inside cultural institutes, schools, and establishments for youth and children.

The law states that every child has “the right to protection from involvement” in religious activities and prescribes that parents or guardians shall determine the religious attitudes of children up to 14 years of age.  Between the ages of 14 and 18, children determine their religion by agreement between them and their parents or guardians.  If such agreement is not reached, a child may apply to the relevant regional court to resolve the dispute.

By law, public schools at all levels may, but are not required, to teach the historical, philosophical, and cultural aspects of religion and introduce students to the moral values of different religious groups as part of the core curriculum.  A school may teach any registered religion in a special course as part of the elective curriculum upon request of at least 13 students, subject to the availability of books and teachers.  The Ministry of Education and Science approves the content of and provides books for these special religion courses.  If a public school is unable to pay for a religion teacher, it may accept financial sponsorship from a private donor or a teacher from a registered denomination.  The law also allows registered religious groups to operate schools, provided they meet government standards for secular education, and post-secondary educational institutions that meet the requirements for opening secular higher education institutions.

The Commission for Protection against Discrimination is an independent government body charged with preventing and protecting against discrimination, including religious discrimination, and ensuring equal opportunity.  It functions as a civil litigation court adjudicating discrimination complaints and does not charge for its services.  The commission’s decisions may be appealed to administrative courts.  Upon accepting a case, the commission assigns it to a panel that then reviews it in open session.  If the commission makes a finding of discrimination, it may impose a fine of 250 to 2,000 levs ($150-$1,200).  The commission may double fines for repeat violations.  Regional courts may also try civil cases involving religious discrimination.

The law establishes an independent ombudsman to serve as an advocate for citizens who believe public or municipal administrations or public service providers have violated their rights and freedoms, including those pertaining to religion, through their actions or inaction.  The ombudsman may request information from authorities, act as an intermediary in resolving disputes, make proposals for terminating existing practices, refer information to the prosecution service, and request that the Constitutional Court abolish legal provisions as unconstitutional.

The penal code provides up to three years’ imprisonment for forming “a political organization on religious grounds” or using a church or religion to spread propaganda against the authority of the state or its activities.

The penal code prohibits the propagation or incitement of religious or other discrimination, violence, or hatred “by speech, press, or other media, by electronic information systems or in another manner,” as well as religiously motivated assault or property damage.  Either offense is punishable by imprisonment for one to four years and a fine of 5,000 to 10,000 levs ($2,900-$5,800), as well as “public censure.”  The propagation of “fascism or another antidemocratic ideology” is punishable by imprisonment for up to three years or a fine of up to 5,000 levs ($2,900).  Courts have found that Nazism falls within the purview of “antidemocratic ideology.”  Desecration of religious symbols or sites, including places of worship or graves, is punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 3,000 to 10,000 levs ($1,700-$5,800).

The law provides for restitution of real estate confiscated during the communist era; courts have also applied the law to Holocaust-related claims.

The law allows religious groups to delay until 2029 paying back outstanding revenue obligations owed to governments, for example, for social insurance payments or garbage collection or other municipal services, incurred before December 31, 2018.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On February 19, the Plovdiv Appellate Court confirmed the Pazardjik District Court’s 2019 verdict convicting 12 Romani Muslims on charges of supporting ISIS, assisting foreign fighters, propagating Salafi Islam, characterized by the government as an antidemocratic ideology, and incitement to war.  Two other Romani Muslims who were part of the original case did not appeal their convictions or sentences.  The appellate court also confirmed the lower court’s sentences:  8.5 years in prison for the group’s leader, Islamic preacher Ahmed Mussa, and incarceration ranging from 12 to 42 months for 10 of the other Romani, all men.  The 12th Romani, the only woman in the group, received a two-year suspended sentence.  A final appeal of the case to the Supreme Cassation Court by both defendants and prosecutors was pending at year’s end.

In May, the Samokov Regional Court exonerated Church of God-Bulgaria pastor Nikolay Vasilev, who was charged in 2020 with holding an Easter service in Samokov in breach of the COVID-19-related ban on public gatherings.  A prosecutor appealed the verdict in the Sofia District Court, where the case was pending at year’s end.  Administrative proceedings in the Samokov Regional Court regarding fines imposed on other Church of God-Bulgaria officials relating to the same event were also pending.

In April, Sofia Municipality revoked its ordinance restricting the activity of unregistered religious groups, complying with a 2020 decision of the Sofia Administrative Court.  In May, the Supreme Administrative Court reversed a 2020 decision of the Shumen Administrative Court and determined that a Shumen Municipality ordinance restricting door-to-door proselytizing did not violate the country’s constitution and laws, but it stated the provisions prohibiting religious activities by “non-traditional religious groups” (i.e., groups other than the BOC) inside cultural institutes, schools, and establishments for youth and children were illegal, since they discriminated against those religious groups.  Jehovah’s Witnesses said the decision limited their right to express their beliefs and put followers at risk of being subjected to discrimination and aggression.  On November 2, a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court refused to review an appeal by Jehovah’s Witnesses of the court’s April ruling, stating the group had missed the appeal deadline.

Contrary to years prior to 2020, Jehovah’s Witnesses did not report any incidents against their members by government officials while engaged in proselytizing.  They attributed the change to reduced public proselytizing and increased online activity due to COVID-19 restrictions.

In September, a publication in the online human rights platform Marginalia stated the national census had violated children’s rights for the benefit of religious groups by disregarding the legal right of children aged 14-18 to independent religious self-identification.  According to the publication, the census instructions allowed adults to increase the number of members of a religious group by including their children, which directly affected the size of the government subsidy for that group until the next census.

The Office of the Grand Mufti and regional Muslim leaders again said several municipalities, including Sofia, Stara Zagora, and Gotse Delchev, continued to reject, on what they said were nontransparent grounds, their requests to build new, or rehabilitate existing, religious facilities.  Grand Mufti Mustafa Hadji said he had raised the issue in several meetings with Sofia Mayor Fandakova, including in March and October, but the mayor’s office had not provided by year’s end any information on the reasons for the city’s continued rejections of the construction applications.

The Office of the Grand Mufti said it was continuing to search for ways to litigate its recognition as the successor to all pre-1949 Muslim religious communities for the purpose of reclaiming approximately 30 properties, including eight mosques, two schools, two baths, and a cemetery seized by the former communist government.  Pending a decision on who was the rightful successor to the Muslim religious communities, some courts continued to suspend action on all restitution claims by the Office of the Grand Mufti.  In May, the Targovishte District Court ruled against the Office of the Grand Mufti’s claim regarding a former mosque and Muslim school in Popovo, stating the office was not the proven successor.  In October, the Varna Appellate Court confirmed the lower court’s decision.  In October, the Tutrakan Regional Court ruled against the Office of the Grand Mufti’s claim to a former Muslim school converted to a secular school during communism, refusing to recognize the office as the proven successor.

In March, the Sofia Appellate Court rejected a restitution claim by the International Missionary Society Seventh-day Adventist Reform Movement on a plot of land in Sofia.  According to the court, the group had failed to prove that the three persons who bought the lot in 1934 had acted on behalf of the denomination despite the written declarations to that effect by two of those persons in 1949 and 1951.  At year’s end, an appeal was ongoing at the Supreme Cassation Court, and the next hearing was scheduled for January 2022.

The national public school elective curriculum continued to provide three sets of classes in religious studies at various grade levels:  one for Orthodox Christianity, one for Islam, and one for “good morals” (nonconfessional) developed by the Protestant NGO Bible League.  In September, the Ministry of Education approved official school textbooks for students from sixth to twelfth grade in the program on Islam, grades one through five having been approved in 2020.  Schools began using the full set of books on Orthodox Christianity and Islam from first to twelfth grade in the academic year that began in September.  There were approved textbooks on nonconfessional religious education from first to third grade but there were no trained teachers to put them to use.  The Evangelical Alliance, a group of 14 Protestant Churches and 16 Protestant NGOs, complained that the Ministry of Education delayed the training of teachers until 2022 and provided funding only for 40 percent of the candidates.

The Office of the Grand Mufti and the Evangelical Alliance expressed concern that they lacked the resources to meet the legal requirement for bringing their religious academies up to university standards by the end of the year and would be forced to close them.

In September, High Muslim Council chair Vedat Ahmed criticized schools and universities that invited BOC clerics to perform religious rituals, stating that many students were Muslims, and said it would be appropriate either to invite imams as well or refrain from any religious activity.

On February 13, Sofia mayor Fandakova issued an order canceling the Lukov March after it had begun on the grounds that the municipality had not approved the route proposed by the organizers, after the city was unable to legally ban the event in advance.  Approximately 50 participants turned out for the annual demonstration to honor General Hristo Lukov, the 1940s antisemitic, pro-Nazi Union of Bulgarian National Legions leader.  Police divided the rally into smaller groups and escorted them to Lukov’s house, where the groups held a commemoration ceremony.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the then-ruling GERB Party, the Democratic Bulgaria Alliance, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, NGOs, international organizations, and diplomatic missions denounced the rally.  In February, the Sofia City Court rejected a prosecutor’s claim for deregistration of the rally organizer, Bulgarian National Union-Edelweiss, stating the claim failed to provide evidence of incitement of ethnic, racial, and religious hostility or other unconstitutional activity by the party.  At year’s end, an appeal was proceeding in the Sofia Appellate Court.

In February, Blagovest Asenov, the leader of the National Resistance organization, accused on social media Jews and Jewish NGOs of being “anti-Bulgarian,” as well as of causing the “refugee crises in Europe” and “forcing the COVID pandemic” on authorities.  Police issued Asenov a warning, but a prosecutor dismissed the case, citing lack of evidence of a criminal offense.

Shalom expressed “strong concern” regarding Alternative for Bulgarian Revival Party leader Rumen Petkov’s appearance for a TV interview on September 21 while wearing a yellow badge reading “Unvaccinated” on his lapel.  Shalom said Petkov’s badge was a reference to the yellow stars Jews were forced to wear during World War II and stated he was minimizing the Holocaust.  In a subsequent public statement, Petkov denied the accusations of antisemitism and apologized to “everyone who felt offended.”

In October, the Office of the Grand Mufti expressed concern that municipal authorities had excavated the area around the historic Kursun Mosque in Karlovo and piled up a large amount of dirt in the yard, calling it a desecration.  In a subsequent meeting with Regional Mufti of Plovdiv Taner Veli, Karlovo mayor Emil Kabaivanov explained the piles of dirt were the result of archaeological excavations dating back three years.  At year’s end, the Office of the Grand Mufti’s litigation (which the office initiated in 2012) against Karlovo Municipality regarding ownership of the mosque was pending in the Sofia Appellate Court.

In February, Jewish organizations protested the “scandalous and slanderous content” of a question posed by Orlin Goranov, host of the game show “Last One Wins,” to contestants on Bulgarian National Television.  Goranov asked for the name of the chess player who allegedly denied there were gas chambers in Nazi extermination camps and who claimed that Jews disliked working, especially in the camps, preferring others “to do all the work so that they can collect the profit.” According to press reports, the host was quoting, without naming him, the late world chess champion Bobby Fischer.  The Director General of the station, Emil Koshlukov, apologized on Facebook and fired the scriptwriter for including the question.  The show’s host also publicly apologized on the air.

According to NGOs, souvenirs exhibiting Nazi insignias and imagery continued to be widely available in tourist areas around the country and few local governments responded to complaints about them.  In June and August, Shalom alerted the mayors of Primorsko and Pomorie, respectively, about such souvenirs, calling for their removal from the market.  The Primorsko Municipality did not respond, but Pomorie authorities removed the merchandise.

In February, March, April, and November, the government allocated 11.42 million levs ($6.62 million) to fund repair and maintenance of BOC facilities in Karan Varbovka, Kyustendil, Nevestino, Granitsa, Godech, Pernik, Sugarevo, Zhablyano, Shipka, Veliko Tarnovo, Vidin, Muldava, Sofia, and Rila, as well as 3.34 million levs ($1.94 million) for repair and maintenance of Islamic facilities and for purchasing a building to house the High Islamic Institute.

The national budget allocated 42.65 million levs ($24.74 million) to registered religious groups for current expenses, such as employee and cleric salaries, educational activities, and cemetery maintenance, as well as capital investments, such as construction and maintenance of religious facilities and related expenses, compared with 33.34 million levs ($19.34 million) in 2020.  Of the 42.65 million, 35.75 million levs ($20.74 million) went to the BOC; 6.35 million levs ($3.68 million) to the Muslim community; 220,000 levs ($128,000) to the Catholic Church; 176,000 levs ($102,000) to Protestant denominations; and 77,000 levs ($45,000) each to the AAOC and the Jewish community.  No other registered religious groups received government funding.  Evangelical Alliance representatives again said Protestants did not receive their fair share of government funding, possibly because they were not represented by a single organization, even though their numbers exceeded 1 percent of the population.  The Religious Affairs Directorate held the subsidy allocated for Protestants and said it allocated portions of it (typically only for construction and repairs) to whichever denomination sent a request.

In April, ahead of Ramadan, President Rumen Radev invited Grand Mufti Hadji to meet with him “as a token of respect to the traditions and culture of Bulgarian Muslims.”  The President subsequently issued an Eid al-Fitr greeting addressed to the country’s Muslim population, citing a national culture of tolerance and sharing.

In January, the Armenian Community Association objected in an open letter to the April 4 date the President had set for general elections, which coincided with Armenian Easter, stating it was a “sign of disrespect for Armenian religious customs and culture.”  Pavel Gudjerov, the mayor of Rakovski, home to the largest Catholic community in the country, also addressed the President, urging him to change the date, but the President did not reverse his decree.

After the government’s term expired in May and the new parliament failed to form a government, the two caretaker governments succeeding it did not appoint a new national coordinator on combating antisemitism to replace the outgoing coordinator.  In May, a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) said the ministry would fill the coordinator position when parliament formed a regular government.  In early November, another MFA official said the previous coordinator could not be replaced because he was appointed to the post by name.  The MFA stated in mid-December it was unable to submit the draft decision establishing the position permanently to the Council of Ministers for adoption due to the elections in November and subsequent government formation process, but it expected to have a decree establishing the position permanently at the deputy minister of foreign affairs level in early 2022.  At year’s end, the government had not filled the coordinator position.

According to press reports, the city of Vidin, with the approval of Shalom, was proceeding with a project using the equivalent of $6 million in EU funds to restore the crumbling synagogue in the city and convert it into a community and cultural center.  The center, according to the plan, would include a permanent exhibition on the history of the Jewish community in Vidin, which once numbered approximately 2,000 members, although only approximately a dozen Jews remained.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Antisemitic rhetoric continued to appear regularly in online comments and on social networking sites, for example, calling Jews “lampshades,” as well as in online media articles and in the mainstream press.  Antisemitic graffiti, including swastikas and offensive slurs, appeared regularly in public places.

In June, Shalom reported spotting stickers with Nazi symbols inside public transportation vehicles in Sofia and inside ski lifts in Bansko.  Shalom also reported increased incidents of antisemitic hate speech online in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing election campaigns.  In October, vice presidential candidate Elena Guncheva of the Vazrazhdane Party referred on social media to local politicians of Jewish and Turkish origin, saying they should consider themselves “guests” in the country.  After Shalom complained of “xenophobia and hate speech” to the Central Electoral Commission, which condemned her words but stated it could not interfere in the political campaign, Guncheva addressed Shalom specifically on social media, reiterating that “Bulgaria is the land of Bulgarians.”  In November, the Israeli embassy issued a public letter condemning her comments.

Jewish community leaders expressed concern regarding periodic vandalism of Jewish cemeteries and monuments and what they said was an increasing trend of antisemitic and xenophobic propaganda and graffiti.  In June, Shalom approached the local government in Provadia after discovering that the old local Jewish cemetery had become an illegal landfill, with bones scattered around the site.  Shalom asked the municipality to clean the cemetery and to allow a rabbi to collect the bones.  At year’s end, the municipality had not responded to Shalom.

On January 29, unknown persons defaced with a swastika a memorial plaque in Plovdiv for a Jewish man killed in 1943.  The Plovdiv municipality cleaned the plaque, but police had not identified the perpetrator by year’s end.

On August 22, vandals drew racist and antisemitic symbols, including a swastika, on the fence of the Sofia Synagogue.  Police had not identified any suspects by year’s end.

Shalom condemned remarks by Miroslav Ivanov, a candidate for parliament from the Bulgarian National Union-New Democracy Party during a television interview in July.  The party has no representation in parliament.  According to press reports, among other comments, Ivanov said that Jews were happy under Hitler because they could work freely, Nazi gas chambers were used for deworming, and that a Nazi salute he was shown to be doing in a picture was actually a “Roman salute.”  Shalom called for Ivanov to be prosecuted for Holocaust denial and spreading antisemitic propaganda.

For the second consecutive year, Jehovah’s Witnesses reported no cases of hostility or harassment against their members by nongovernment officials, which they attributed to COVID-19-related restrictions that forced them to switch to online gatherings.

The Church of Jesus Christ reported no instances of harassment of missionaries, compared with three such incidents in 2020.  The Church attributed the change to having moved most of its activity online due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Office of the Grand Mufti said Muslims were targets of periodic hate speech, such as at a protest in November in front of the Embassy of Turkey in Sofia against alleged interference of Turkey in the general elections, where participants chanted “death to Turks.”  According to the office, since most of the Muslim population in the country is ethnic Turkish, Bulgarian society frequently conflates “Muslim” and “Turk.”  The office also cited several instances of offensive graffiti on Muslim properties, such as a swastika on a mosque in Plovdiv in January and obscenities spray-painted on a mosque in Kazanlak.

On February 14, Regional Mufti of Plovdiv Veli again hosted the annual Tolerance Coffee, gathering representatives of the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities, local government officials, foreign diplomats, and representatives of civil society.  According to the press release from the mufti’s office, the event commemorated the 2014 attack on the local Cumaya Mosque and was intended as a sign of respect and tolerance among all people, regardless of their ethnic background or religious beliefs.

The National Council of Religious Communities, whose members include representatives of the BOC, Muslim, evangelical Protestant, Catholic, AAC, and Jewish communities, continued to serve as a platform for the largest religious groups to organize joint events and defend a common position on religious issues, such as legislative proposals, political statements, and actions by others, and religiously motivated vandalism.  The BOC only occasionally participated in the council’s activities, according to reports from members of the council and public reports of council activities.  The council again substantially curtailed activity due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including by canceling the annual Festival of Religions in Sofia for the second year in a row.

In July, Bridges – Eastern European Forum for Dialogue, an NGO, organized its fifth youth camp, gathering 15 youths from different regions in the country and from different faiths in Plovdiv for discussions on history, traditions, tolerance, and dialogue with BOC, Catholic, Muslim, AAOC, and Jewish leaders.

The U.S. Ambassador and other embassy officials held regular discussions with representatives of the MFA’s Directorate for Human Rights, the Council of Ministers’ Directorate for Religious Affairs, Office of the Ombudsman, Commission for Protection against Discrimination, and local government administrations about cases of religious discrimination, harassment of religious minorities, and initiatives to support interfaith dialogue.  Embassy representatives also discussed with the MFA the need to fill the position of national coordinator on combating antisemitism, vacant since May.

Embassy officials continued to meet with representatives of the NCRC, BOC, Office of the Grand Mufti, Church of Jesus Christ, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Evangelical Alliance, and the Catholic, AAOC, Muslim, and Jewish communities throughout the country to discuss religious discrimination with regard to ongoing efforts to restitute religious properties, religious education, and government funding provided to the groups.  Embassy officials also met with civil society and human rights groups, such as the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, to discuss these issues and cases of harassment against religious groups.

In February, the Ambassador visited the new mosque in Kardjali and discussed interfaith dialogue and mutual support with Regional Mufti Beyhan Mehmedov.  In February, the Ambassador discussed with the NCRC joint initiatives to promote interfaith dialogue, such as a proposal to hold an interfaith roundtable, possibly in 2022, when it could potentially be held in person.  The Ambassador also discussed with the council the lack of BOC participation in most council meetings and events, and possible ways to bring in the BOC.  The Ambassador discussed religious tolerance, support for interfaith dialogue, and initiatives with Grand Mufti Hadji in June.  They conferred about joint public events between the embassy and the Office of the Grand Mufti.  In July, the Grand Mufti and the Ambassador jointly commemorated Eid al-Adha by delivering a donation of food and toys to a Center for Children with Disabilities in Sofia

In November, the Ambassador and embassy officials discussed rising antisemitic rhetoric with Shalom, both in the country and beyond.  Subsequently, the embassy posted a message about the meeting on social media that expressed solidarity with the Jewish community in the face of discrimination and denounced hate speech and intolerance.

In December, the Ambassador met separately with BOC Patriarch Neofit and Grand Mufti Hadji.  The Ambassador sought their support in interfaith efforts to promote tolerance.

On December 10, to recognize International Human Rights Day, the Ambassador joined religious groups, the NCRC, like-minded diplomatic missions, and local human rights NGOs within Sofia’s “Triangle of Tolerance” – an area downtown demarcated by the Sveta Petka Orthodox Church, the Banya Bashi Mosque, and the Sofia Synagogue – to record a video message against religious intolerance and hate speech and unveil a banner reading in Bulgarian and English, “United for Human Rights – United Against Hate.”  Participants signed the banner, to be displayed on a rotating basis at their respective organizations.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 21.4 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2006 census, 61 percent of the population is Muslim (predominantly Sunni), 19 percent is Roman Catholic, 4 percent belong to various Protestant groups, and 15 percent maintain exclusively indigenous beliefs.  Less than 1 percent is atheist or belongs to other religious groups.  Statistics on religious affiliation are approximate because Muslims and Christians often adhere simultaneously to some aspects of traditional or animist religious beliefs.

Muslims reside largely in the northern, eastern, and western border regions, while Christians are concentrated in the center of the country.  Traditional and animist religious beliefs are practiced throughout the country, especially in rural communities.  The capital has a mixed Muslim and Christian population.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the country is secular, and both the constitution and other laws provide for the right of individuals to choose and change their religion and to practice the religion of their choice.  The constitution states freedom of belief is subject to respect for law, public order, good morals, and “the human person.”  Political parties based on religion, ethnicity, or regional affiliation are forbidden.

The law provides that all organizations, religious or otherwise, may register with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD), which oversees religious affairs.  Registration confers legal status, and the process usually takes approximately three to four weeks and costs less than 50,000 CFA francs ($86).  Religious organizations are not required to register unless they seek legal recognition by the government, but after registration they must comply with applicable regulations imposed on all registered organizations or be subject to a fine of 50,000 to 150,000 CFA francs ($86-$260).  The ministry, through the Directorate for Customary Affairs and Worship, helps organize religious pilgrimages; promotes and fosters interreligious dialogue and peace; develops and implements measures for the construction of places of worship and the registration of religious organizations and religious congregations; and monitors the implementation of standards for burial, exhumation, and transfer of remains (which may include religious elements).

Religious groups operate under the same regulatory framework for publishing and broadcasting as other entities.  MATD may request copies of proposed publications and broadcasts to verify they are in accordance with the nature of the religious group as stated in its registration.  MATD also reviews permit applications by religious groups.

The government generally does not fund religious schools or require them to pay taxes unless they conduct for-profit activities.  The government, however, provides subsidies to a number of Catholic schools as part of an agreement allowing students from public schools to enroll in Catholic schools when public schools are at full capacity.  The government also provides subsidies to registered Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim (commonly referred to as “Franco-Arabic”) schools for teacher salaries, which were typically less than those of public-school teachers.  The government taxes religious groups only if they engage in commercial activities, such as farming or dairy production.

Religious education is not allowed in public schools.  Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant groups operate private primary and secondary schools and some institutions of higher education.  These schools are permitted to provide religious instruction to their students.  Schools (religious or not) must submit the names of their directors to the government and register their schools with the Ministry of National Education and Literacy.  The government does not appoint or approve these officials, however.  The government periodically reviews the curricula of new religious schools as they open, as well as others, to ensure they offer the full standard academic curriculum.  The majority of Quranic schools are not registered and thus their curricula are not reviewed.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

During the year, security continued to deteriorate in the country, further weakening the government, according to media and experts.  Following the terrorist attack that claimed the lives of 53 gendarmes in Inata (Sahel) on November 14, and a wave of civil society-led protests and demonstrations across the country, some peaceful and others violent, President Kabore appointed a new Prime Minister, and vowed to step up the fight against terrorism.  According to sources, he reshuffled his cabinet and military leaders in an effort to establish a more effective “fighting” government and to satisfy protesters.  During a parliamentary session on November 26, the Ministers of Defense and Security stated that the majority of those attacking security forces were from the country (Burkinabe) and expressed concern that security forces were hampered by the actions of Burkinabe on the ground who cooperated with extremist groups.

From August 9-13, trials involving 10 defendants facing terrorism charges began in Ouagadougou, the country’s first terrorism-related criminal proceedings.  One defendant was acquitted, five other defendants were convicted and sentenced to between 10 and 21 years in prison.  The court had not concluded trial proceedings for the remaining four by year’s end.  One convicted defendant confessed to membership in Ansaroul Islam, considered a terrorist organization by the government and a U.S. government-designated terrorist organization, responsible for prior violent and deadly terrorist attacks.  The defendant said he joined the group to “defend the Muslim religion.”  He stated in the proceeding that he considered it a legitimate act to attack and burn a school and rob staff members because “they don’t pray and they have no religion,” and because the school is a government institution.  More than 900 defendants facing terrorism charges remained in custody pending trial at year’s end.

The government stated that terrorists attacked religious institutions with the aim of dividing the population.  On many occasions, representatives of the government acted with a stated intent to counter this influence and foster peaceful cohabitation between communities and followers of various religions.

President Kabore attended the second annual FAIB congress on August 8, during which FAIB President El Hadj Zoungrana condemned terrorist acts, thanked everyone involved in the fight against terrorism, and stated that “Islam is a religion of peace and respect for human life.”

On May 13, in a celebration during Ramadan, which coincided with the Christian Ascension holiday, Minister of State and Interior Clement Sawadogo commended the religious communities in the country for what he stated were the peaceful coexistence they had demonstrated.  “When I see that Cardinal Philippe Ouedraogo has left his own faith’s celebration of Ascension Day to come here to commune with Muslims, it serves as a powerful symbol, and represents an advantage for our country which we must preserve.  All believers must live in harmony, in peace, in joy so that our country is always a haven for peace.”

On July 21, Minister of National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Zephirin Diabre and Minister of State and Interior Minister Clement Sawadogo attended the Eid al-Fitr (known locally as Tabaski) prayer ceremony in Ouagadougou.  Sawadogo said, “[T]he government, through our presence, intends to commune with all the Muslims of Burkina Faso on this blessed day of Tabaski.  It is an opportunity for us to show the gratitude of the government for all your prayers for us and for our country.”

The government allocated 75 million CFA francs ($129,000) each to the Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, and animist communities, the same level as in previous years.  Sources continued to state that this funding was meant to demonstrate equitable government support to all religious groups in the country.

On August 6, the government issued a decree integrating the traditional animist communities into ONAFAR, providing animist communities with representation in the government agency responsible for promoting interreligious dialogue as well as preventing and managing conflicts of a religious nature.

The government continued to routinely approve applications from religious groups for registration, according to religious group leaders, although the government indicated it had rejected some on “moral” grounds, such as the moral character of the person or group, lawful conduct of activities, and transparency in disclosing sources of income.  Government officials indicated mosques had been closed as a result of application denials on moral grounds, but the central government does not maintain statistics on these closures.

On May 6, the government made a final decision to convey a disputed plot of land in Ouagadougou to FAIB for the construction of a mosque and community center to benefit the Muslim community.  The government also committed to allocate a separate tract of land to the legal owner of the disputed land, a Christian.  The parties had agreed to this arrangement, and according to Clement Sawadogo, Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, the government’s actions were intended to promote social cohesion and resolve tensions between Christian and Muslim communities resulting from the destruction of a mosque on the original plot of land in 2020.  Some within the judiciary as well as some members of the Muslim and Christian communities stated they did not believe the government should involve itself in this legal matter.  The Union of the Judiciary stated the ruling was “… a challenge to the independence and authority of the judiciary.”

In October, senior government officials indicated the government was monitoring preaching that could promote violence or intolerance on social media using ONAFAR.  The MATD also announced the recruitment of a communication specialist to work on social media and strengthen the ONAFAR team.

The Director of Public and Political Freedoms within MATD stated in December that MATD was close to completing review of amendments to the law ensuring religious freedom for groups within the country’s secular government framework.

Domestic and transnational terrorist groups continued to operate throughout the year and increased their killings of individuals based on their religious identity, according to media reports.  These attacks forced more populations to flee their villages, bringing more communes under the groups’ control, and preventing villagers from farming.  The attacks spread to the south and west, the Cascades and the Boucle du Mouhoun Regions.  Security experts stated that in the Est Region, terrorists/jihadis set up their own administrative structure requiring payment by the population of “zakat” or religious taxes.  These groups included U.S.-designated terrorist groups Ansaroul Islam, Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS), Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, and al-Mourabitoun.  Although many attacks in the country went unclaimed, observers again attributed most to three terrorist groups:  Ansaroul Islam, JNIM, and ISIS-GS.  Media reported that terrorist groups regularly targeted Muslim and Christian clergy, religious congregations, houses of worship, teachers, local government employees, and schools.  According to local residents, terrorist groups were also responsible for killing imams whom the groups accused of collaborating with government security forces.

Media reported a number of attacks on places of worship, religious leaders, and religious services.  Militants ambushed a group of villagers gathered for a Muslim naming ceremony on May 18 and during the attack killed 15 Muslim men in the Adjarara area of Oudalan Province.  This attack was initially widely reported in international media as an attack on a Christian baptism, although sources later confirmed that all victims were Muslims, the international media reports being in error.  Local media further suggested that the motive for the attack could have been reprisal for villagers having provided information to the government on the movements of armed militants through the area.

On April 11, militants killed two persons they had kidnapped 10 days earlier in front of the mosque of Babonga, Yagha Province.

On May 30, terrorists linked to the JNIM organization killed the imam of Bouli, in the Centre-Nord Region, along with his son, the village chief, and member of the state-sanctioned armed group the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland.  Two others in a neighboring village were also killed.

On May 30, violent extremists kidnapped three Christian worshippers in Sanipenga during a church service in the Est Region.

On July 21, militants killed a man in front of the mosque of Boudieri; they had kidnapped the man nearly eight months prior on the road between Namagri and Boudieri in the Est Region.  On July 29, suspected Islamic State – Greater Sahel (ISGS) militants kidnapped two persons in Bognori, a village in the Sahel Region.  They took the two hostages to the village of Wouro Djama where they killed one in public in front of village’s inhabitants, who were forced to watch.  Afterwards, attackers threatened the villagers with similar treatment if they did not strictly follow Islam.  All victims in these cases were Muslims.

According to the Ministry of Education, as of November 30, terrorist violence forced nearly 3,000 schools to close, depriving nearly 500,000 children of education.  Minister of Education Stanislas Ouaro expressed concern that school closures had spread to parts of the country formerly free of violent extremist activity, particularly in the Cascades and Sud-Ouest Regions.  In a number of attacks, militants singled out and killed individuals wearing Christian imagery such as crucifixes, according to media reports and church leaders.  Some attacks took place at houses of worship, both Christian and Islamic, during prayers or other services.  According to many observers, attacks also targeted Muslims whom they said the attackers believed were insufficiently rigorous in their practice of Islam.

Attacks against Christians forced some to adopt new practices in their religious observance to avoid violent extremists, according to media, NGOs, and the government.  Members of the Parish Saint Paul of Sandikpenga in the Est Region learned of threats to their church building and rescheduled a planned Mass for Pentecost.  An arson attack destroyed the church later that day.  Local residents indicated the church subsequently closed and church leaders told members to pray in their homes until further notice.

Evangelical Christian pastor Aristar Lankoande, a member of the International Missionaries Society (IMS), reported that as of November 8, 552 evangelical churches had closed in the Est Region, and IMS had sent 422 of its pastors to minister elsewhere.  Church members in the region were also encouraged to instead pray in their homes.

On March 4, militants disrupted the celebration of life ceremony practiced in traditional religion for a deceased villager in Kodjema, in Gnagnan Province.

On March 6, attackers forcibly entered the village of Souloungou, also in the Gnagnan Province, and told the local population they would be forced to adopt Islamic dress and other religious traditions.  This was one of several reported incidents of armed groups forcing local populations to adopt the practice of Islam according to their standards under threat of violence.

On April 29, violent extremists attacked the village of Solmonre in Sanmantinga Province during an iftar celebration, firing shots into the air and setting several houses on fire, including the local chief’s.  Much of the village’s population subsequently fled the area.

On May 3, militants stopped a passenger bus in traveling between Diapaga and Fada, claiming they were searching for security forces.  They then ordered the passengers not to get involved in conflicts between violent extremists and security forces and to adopt and practice Islam according to their standards.

On May 4, ISGS militants attacked the villages of Menzourou and Kaltewoute in the commune of Tin-Akoff, in Oudalan Province, Sahel Region. They killed the son of a marabout (Muslim religious teacher) in Menzourou and burned down several houses before retreating into the countryside.

On May 7, suspected JNIM militants took control of Douma in the commune of Tangaye, 28 miles from Ouahigouya in the Nord Region and forced the closure of schools unable to meet their demand for teaching in Arabic.

On May 20, nearly 160 militants suspected of belonging to the Katiba Macina group (an Ansar al Dine affiliate) invaded the village of Douma in the Nord Region, demanding that the women wear a veil and threatening to kill husbands whose wives did not comply.  They also ordered men to adopt specific dress and grooming standards, including wearing short pants and growing beards.  On May 25, militants forced populations at Tankougounadie-centre in the Sahel Region to do the same and adopt sharia.

On June 1, the populations of several predominantly Muslim villages in Tapoa Province were forced to flee after militants threatened them with violence if they did not follow certain commands.  These included outlawing any religions besides Islam, forcing young people to marry, prohibiting the use of alcohol, banning the breeding of farm animals they considered offensive under Islam, and requiring villagers to join their fight.

On June 4, a video circulated widely online depicted three victims of an attack in Deou, Sahel Region, whose right hands had been amputated, allegedly by ISGS-linked militants.  In the video, the victims were accused of robbery and the amputations were the punishment meted out under sharia, the first such reported incident in the country.

On June 6, suspected ISGS militants forcibly entered Lonadeni, a village in the Est Region, and threatened to kill anyone who engaged in indigenous religious practices.

On Sept. 15, a Catholic priest reported to local media that his local diocese had been forced to close a parish after violent extremists invaded its community and threatened non-Muslims with violence, forcing local clergy to flee mainly to Gaoua in the Sud-Ouest Region.  He also reported that several towns in the region were unable to celebrate the Catholic feast of the Assumption out of fear of an attack by violent extremists.

On October 15, militants allegedly linked to Katiba Macina forced the closure of four schools in the villages of Gosson, Daka, Yankore et Bossoum in Sourou Province when they refused to adhere to their religious demands and teach in Arabic.

On October 25, unknown individuals destroyed an animist religious idol in the city of Orodara, which was meant to bless local families.

On November 4, a widely circulated video depicted the amputation by violent extremists of the hand of a young man accused of theft.

On Christmas Eve, priests, catechists, and some worshippers from the Parish of Titao, in the Lorum province, Nord Region, were forced to flee, helped by security forces, to avoid being attacked by jihadis.  “This is the first time in 50 years that we did not celebrate Christmas at Titao,” stated Father Victor Ouedraogo, the manager of the Research Center for Interfaith and Social Dialogue (CRDIS) at Ouahigouya in the Nord Region.

Human rights organizations and religious groups continued to express concern that religiously targeted violence threatened what they termed the “traditional peaceful coexistence” of religious groups in the country.  Observers continued to report the stigmatization of the predominantly Muslim Fulani ethnic community because of a perceived association with militant Islamist groups.  They said this aggravated social tensions in some regions, since self-defense militias at times exacted vigilante justice on Fulani communities in the northern and central regions of the country because of this perceived connection to militant and terrorist groups.

Members of the Burkinabe Muslim Community Organization, the Catholic Archdiocese of Ouagadougou, and the Federation of Evangelical Churches continued to state that despite an increase in religiously motivated attacks, religious tolerance remained widespread as a common value, and numerous examples existed of families of mixed faiths and religious leaders attending each other’s holidays and celebrations.  Members of the largest religious communities promoted interfaith dialogue and tolerance through public institutions such as FAIB, which conducted awareness campaigns throughout the country.  They also worked through NGOs such as the Dori-based Fraternal Union of Believers, which encouraged various religious communities, specifically in the Sahel Region, to conduct social and economic development activities with the goal of reducing vulnerability to terrorist recruitment and fostering religious tolerance between the communities.

In January, the Catholic Archbishop of Ouagadougou, Cardinal Philippe Ouedraogo, denounced terrorist violence, calling it “an evil for humanity.”  Ouedraogo also said he feared how jihadist and terrorists attacks were challenging social cohesion.  He said, “Fundamentalism is gaining ground, due to the misinterpretation of the holy book.  We already see tensions, as evidenced by fundamentalist signs including within religions…”  He added, however, that Protestants, Muslims, and Catholics had met together with the Mogho Naba, a powerful traditional chief of the predominantly Muslim Mossi ethnic group, who had assisted in addressing and reducing such tensions.  Describing the closure of three of the six parishes of the Diocese of Dori in the Sahel Region, Ouedraogo said, “All priests, sisters, and worshippers have fled” to Kaya (Centre-Nord Region).  The Archbishop discussed his initiative to promote interfaith dialogue through the annual Christian-Islamic and interethnic couples pilgrimage to the Marian shrine of Notre Dame de Yagma near Ouagadougou, taking place in February, the second time for this pilgrimage.

Pastor Henry Ye, the President of the Federation of Evangelical Churches and Missions (FEME), stated that religious dialogue and tolerance was valued among religious leaders in the country, but observed that the broader religious community did not yet embrace this spirit at the same level.  To counter pressures toward radicalization and violent extremism among youth in particular, he noted that the FEME held regular exchanges over social media among youth organizations of religious groups.  Ye also described how acts of terrorism affected churches.  For instance, all FEME-related churches in Yagha Province, Sahel Region were closed.  Pastor Lankoande Isaie of the Assembly of God said that one group of violent extremists agreed not to close churches in Tapoa, Est Region, as long as members did not raise pigs or brew beer, and the men grew beards and wore short trousers.

Religious leaders continued to express their view that the foundation of interfaith dialogue in the country helped them resist and survive various crises over time, including the threat and challenge to interreligious and ethnic cohesion posed by terrorism.  They said the government often called upon them for assistance in resolving socioeconomic tensions including a case involving destruction of a mosque in 2020 on disputed land, and tensions regarding the length of closure of places of worship during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Another case involved a protest and attack at FAIB headquarters regarding the perceived prolonged closure of a mosque, to which the government responded by reopening the mosque.

As in previous years, new Muslim and Protestant congregations continued to form without approval or oversight from existing Muslim and Protestant federations.  Religious leaders stated the messages of tolerance by Muslim and Protestant federations were often undermined by small new religious groups that did not fall under their oversight and that took positions counter to the federations’ views.  They said the lack of oversight made it difficult for official religious groups to monitor and regulate the activities and messages of these new groups.

On February 4, FAIB leaders cited the growing social stigmatization of their wives when they wear a veil.  El Hadj Oumarou Zoungrana, then president of FAIB, also described FAIB’s newly-established National Technical Committee, charged with reviewing sermons for content promoting violence in sermons and speeches by imams, and reprimanding the offenders.

Embassy officials raised the continued increase in religiously motivated attacks, particularly in the Sahel, the Nord, the Ouest, the Sud-Ouest, and Est Regions, with government officials, including those in the MTAD, the Ministries of Defense and Security, and the Office of the President.  Embassy staff regularly discussed events and policies affecting religious freedom with the MATD, and the Director General for Traditional Beliefs, which included discussing the equitable registration process for religious groups, a draft of a pending law on religious freedom, the equitable treatment of religious groups by the government, and the status of the relationship between the government and different religious groups.

The Ambassador and embassy officials met separately with Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant religious leaders to encourage their efforts to promote interfaith dialogue and advocate for religious tolerance and freedom.  During these meetings with religious leaders throughout the year, many discussed with the Ambassador the impact of the current violent extremism on the country’s tradition of peaceful coexistence of religious groups

On January 22, the Ambassador met with Cardinal Ouedraogo to discuss his views on needed support from the international community to end terrorist violence in the country.

On February 17, the Ambassador visited the headquarters of FEME and discussed with FEME leaders their views of the consequences of violent extremism on interreligious and intrareligious tensions, and the spread of ethnic division.

On January 27, the Ambassador hosted a roundtable with representatives of religious associations and NGOs working on interfaith dialogue.  Participants suggested that giving more such opportunities to voices of persons supporting interfaith dialogue would promote increased social cohesion.  One young participant working in the Sahel explained how he used the WhatsApp network to link with youth from 13 regions across the country to promote interfaith dialogue.  “The idea is to train people including imams and other religious leader to be part of social media” in this effort.

Embassy representatives used social media platforms to reinforce messaging that promoted religious freedom and tolerance.  The Ambassador regularly raised the need to counter the threats to the country’s tradition of religious freedom and tolerance.

The embassy continued funding literacy programming in registered Quranic schools in northern parts of the country, the curriculum of which focused on peaceful dialogue, nonviolent conflict resolution, and religious tolerance.

The embassy provided the Association for Religious Tolerance and Interfaith Dialogue a $35,000 grant for activities such as advocacy, awareness campaigns, public messaging, community inclusion efforts, and conflict prevention.

Embassy officials organized or supported several activities to respond to the social divisions between religious groups.  For example, the embassy supported training for religious leaders on building tolerance and stability in their communities, conflict management, and fostering inter- and intrareligious cohesion.

The 2008 constitution, drafted by the military, guarantees every citizen “the right to freely profess and practice religion subject to public order, morality, or health and to the other provisions of this Constitution.”  The law prohibits speech or acts insulting or defaming any religion or religious beliefs.  In December, the OHCHR stated that, since the coup, regime security forces had committed “an alarming escalation of grave human rights abuses.”  As was the case in previous years and following the military coup in February, it was sometimes difficult to categorize incidents based solely on religious identity due to the close linkage between religion and ethnicity.  During the year, there were reports of threats, detentions, and violence targeting minority religious and ethnoreligious groups.  On May 24, media reported military forces bombed the Sacred Heart Church in Kayan Tharyar, Kayah State, killing four persons who had taken refuge there.  According to media, on May 28, military forces fired upon the church of Saint Joseph in Demoso, Kayah State, and killed two men who were collecting food for internally displaced persons (IDPs).  In April, local media reported that residents found the body of a Muslim muezzin, who was wearing a dress and lipstick, hanging in a mosque in Yangon Region.  Residents said regime security forces likely had killed him.  In September, regime soldiers shot and killed a Christian pastor in Chin State while he attempted to extinguish a fire started by artillery fire.  In June, the prodemocracy NUG issued a statement promising to “seek justice and accountability” for crimes committed by military forces against more than 740,000 Rohingya and said if it returned to government, it would repeal a 1982 law denying citizenship to most Rohingya.  In August, the NUG issued a statement in which it held the military regime responsible for having “perpetuated crimes against humanity,” including war crimes committed on the basis of religion.  The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that regime authorities had confined 144,000 predominantly Muslim Rohingya in camps within Rakhine State at year’s end.  The government enforced extensive restrictions on in-country movement of Rohingya.  According to humanitarian aid organizations, regime authorities made no genuine efforts to initiate the return of Rohingya refugees.  In September, regime security forces arrested 30 Rohingya traveling without documentation and sentenced them to two years in prison.  According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a nonprofit human rights organization, as of December 6, the regime had detained 35 Buddhist monks and nine Christian leaders since the military coup.  The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), established by the UN Human Rights Council to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyze evidence of the most serious international crimes and violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011 and to prepare files to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, continued to engage with local actors, including the NUG, to collect evidence of potential crimes but was not able to travel inside the country during the year.  According to leaders of minority religious communities and human rights activists, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the inconsistent enforcement and interpretation of government regulations, in place before the coup and continuing afterward, exacerbated communal disparities during the year, with harsher outcomes reported for minority religious communities.  Religious leaders also expressed concern that the regime might misconstrue religious assembly as part of prodemocracy activities.

According to local media, some armed ethnic organizations operating in the country continued to pose a threat to ethnic and religious minority groups, including the Arakan Army (AA), which continued to force local villagers, including Christian religious leaders, to work without pay and recruited villagers to attend military training camp.  In September, gunmen shot and killed Rohingya Muslim activist and community leader Mohib Ullah in the Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh.  According to press reports, Ullah’s killers were likely associated with the insurgent group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).  Ullah had spoken out against ARSA militancy and abuses in the refugee camps in Bangladesh.

In July, the NUG announced its appointment of a Rohingya activist as an advisor to its “Ministry of Human Rights.”  Members of ethnic minorities said they continued to face discrimination based on their ethnicity and religion.  Rohingya continued to be perceived as foreigners, irrespective of their citizenship status, and as members of a religion commonly viewed with fear and disdain.  There were continued reports of social stigma surrounding any assistance to or sympathy for Rohingya.  Some civil society leaders said that even among otherwise tolerant individuals, anti-Rohingya sentiment remained prevalent.  Some local media reports, however, said the Bamar ethnic majority’s empathy for the decades of persecution suffered by Rohingya and other minorities had grown due to their own post-coup experiences.  A June public opinion poll found that when asked about relations among persons of different faiths in the country, 47 percent of respondents said that strict protection of one’s own religion would provide a stronger foundation for democracy in the future, while 48 percent said that granting more rights to religious minorities would provide a stronger foundation for democracy in the future.

Senior U.S. government officials – including the Secretary of State, the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Ambassador, and senior Department of State officials for East Asia and for human rights – consistently raised ongoing U.S. government concerns about religious freedom with the regime and other internal political actors, as well as with international organizations and also engaged in advocacy on social media calling for an inclusive democracy that respects all ethnicities and religions.  Concerns raised included the plight of Rohingya in Rakhine State, hardships facing minority religious communities in Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Shan, and Chin States amid escalating post-coup violence.  The U.S. government pressed for full accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations, including those concerning religious freedom.  The embassy amplified the Department of State spokesperson’s message on the fourth anniversary of the military’s August 25, 2017, ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State.^[1]  U.S. government officials continued to call for sustainable solutions to address the root causes of discrimination and religiously motivated violence.  While embassy facilities in Yangon and Mandalay suspended most of their public programs following the coup, the embassy continued to prioritize ethnic and religious diversity in its exchange programs, selecting participants from Shan, Wa, Kachin, Kayah, Chin, Rakhine, and Mon ethnic groups, many of whom belong to religious minority groups.  Embassy representatives, including the Ambassador, continued to engage with Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and Hindu leaders, including ethnic minority religious leaders, members of faculties of theology, and other religiously affiliated organizations and NGOs, to advocate for religious freedom and tolerance.

Since 1999, Burma has been designated a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.  On November 15, 2021, the Secretary of State redesignated Burma as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation:  the existing ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) pursuant to section 402(c) (5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 57.1 million (midyear 2021).  According to the most recently available estimates, approximately 88 percent are Theravada Buddhists.  Approximately 6 percent are Christians, primarily Baptists, Roman Catholics, and Anglicans, along with several small Protestant denominations.  Muslims (mostly Sunni) comprise approximately 4 percent of the population.  There are small communities of Hindus and practitioners of Judaism, traditional Chinese religions, and animist religions.  The 2014 census excluded Rohingya from its count, but nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the deposed civilian government estimated the overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim Rohingya population at 1.1 million prior to October 2016.  There are an estimated 600,000 stateless Rohingya in Rakhine State, and according to the United Nations, as of August 31, Bangladesh continues to host approximately 860,000 Rohingya refugees.

There is a significant correlation between ethnicity and religion.  Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion among the majority Bamar ethnic group and among the Shan, Rakhine, Mon, and numerous other ethnic groups.  Various forms of Christianity are dominant among the Kachin, Chin, and Naga ethnic groups.  Christianity also is practiced widely among the Karen and Karenni ethnic groups, although many Karen and Karenni are Buddhist, and some Karen are Muslim.  Individuals of South Asian ancestry, who are concentrated in major cities and in the south-central region, are predominantly Hindu or Muslim, although some are Christian.  Ethnic Rohingya and Kaman in Rakhine State, as well as some Bamar and ethnic Indians in Yangon, Ayeyarwady, Magway, and Mandalay Regions, practice Islam.  Chinese ethnic minority groups generally practice traditional Chinese religions and to a lesser extent Islam and Christianity.  Some smaller ethnic groups in the highland regions are animists, observing traditional indigenous beliefs.

Legal Framework

The 2008 constitution, drafted by the military junta in control at that time, states that every citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess and practice his or her religious beliefs.  The constitution limits those rights if they threaten public order, health, morality, or other provisions of the constitution.  It further provides to all citizens the right to profess and practice their religion if not contrary to laws on security, law and order, community peace, or public order and morality.

The law prohibits deliberate and malicious speech or acts intended to outrage or wound the religious feelings “of any class” by insulting or defaming its religion or religious beliefs.  The law also prohibits injuring, defiling, or trespassing on any place of worship or burial grounds with the intent to insult religion.

All organizations, whether secular or religious, must register with the government to obtain official status.  This official status is required for organizations to gain title to land, obtain construction permits, and conduct religious activities.  The law on registering organizations specifies voluntary registration for local NGOs, whether religious in nature or not, and removes punishments for noncompliance for both local and international NGOs.

The law bars members of religious orders, such as priests, monks, and nuns of any religious group, from running for public office, and the constitution bars members of religious orders from voting.  The government restricts by law the political activities and expression of the Buddhist clergy (sangha).  The constitution forbids “the abuse of religion for political purposes.”  The election law states that a candidate’s parents must be citizens at the time of the candidate’s birth; authorities have denied citizenship to most Rohingya, thus precluding most Rohingya from running for office.

Although there is no official state religion, the constitution notes that the government “recognizes the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union.”  The constitution “also recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Animism as the religions existing in the Union at the day of the coming into operation of this Constitution.”

The law bans any organization of Buddhist monks other than the nine state-recognized monastic orders.  Violations of this ban are punishable by immediate public defrocking and criminal penalties.  The nine recognized orders submit to the authority of the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (SSMNC or Ma Ha Na), whose members are elected by monks.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture’s Department for the Perpetuation and Propagation of the Sasana (Buddhist teaching) oversees the government’s relations with Buddhist monks and schools.  Religious education is not included in public schools; however, some schools with Buddhist-majority student bodies may start the school day with a Buddhist prayer.

Monastic schools, run by monasteries and nunneries in all states and regions of the country, serve approximately 320,000 students.  Those that are officially registered use the official state primary and middle school curricula but also teach about Buddhist culture and ways of life.

Four laws passed in 2015 for the “protection of race and religion” remain in effect.  One of the laws bans polygamy, making it a criminal offense to have more than one spouse, which observers say targets the country’s Muslim population.  A marriage law specifically for Buddhist women stipulates notification and registration requirements for marriages between non-Buddhist men and Buddhist women, obligations that non-Buddhist husbands must observe, and penalties for noncompliance.  A religious conversion law regulates conversion through an extensive application and approval process through a township-level Religious Board for Religious Conversion; however, the law is rarely applied, and many townships do not have conversion boards.  The applicant must be older than 18 and must undergo a waiting period of up to 180 days; if the applicant still wishes to convert, the board issues a certificate of religious conversion.  A population control law allows for the designation of special zones where population control measures may be applied, including authorizing local authorities to implement three-year birth spacing. 

To register a Buddhist marriage, a couple must appear in court with their national identity card (which identifies their religion as Buddhist) and attest that they are married.  Buddhist marriages may be registered at any court with relevant jurisdiction.  Christian marriages are regulated under a Christian marriage act dating from 1872, and to be recognized, must be officiated by a Christian religious figure registered with the Supreme Court.  There are only a handful of ministers or priests registered in the country.  The officiating church must submit details of a marriage from its registry to the Supreme Court within three months of the marriage ceremony solemnization, and only the Supreme Court is permitted to recognize Christian marriages, making it nearly impossible for a Christian marriage to be legally recognized.  Muslim marriages officiated by a mullah are recognized under the law with no court filing requirements.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

As was the case in previous years and following the military coup in February, it was sometimes difficult to categorize incidents based solely on religious identity due to the close linkage between religion and ethnicity.  Both before and following the military coup and the deposition of the civilian government in February, there were reports of threats, detentions, and violence targeting minority religious and ethnoreligious groups, which, according to media reports, increased under the military regime.  According to local and international NGOs, there continued to be almost complete impunity for regime security forces that had committed or continued to commit abuses, including what the NGOs said was genocide and crimes against humanity against Rohingya, most of whom are Muslim.  Local media outlet The Irrawaddy reported in February that one of the military units responsible for the 2017 atrocities and other human rights abuses in Rakhine State against Rohingya was also involved in crackdowns on prodemocracy demonstrators following the military coup.

According to Agence France Presse (AFP) and other news sources, in February, following reports that military forces beat, arrested, and used rubber bullets against protestors in and around Myitkyina, the capital of predominantly Christian Kachin State, a Catholic sister knelt before security forces, begging them not to shoot children.  In March, Pope Francis said, “I, too, kneel on the streets of Myanmar and say, ‘Stop the violence,’” referencing the actions of the Catholic nun from the Sisters of St. Francis Xavier.

In April, local media reported that residents found the body of a Muslim muezzin, who was wearing a dress and lipstick, hanging in a mosque in Yangon Region.  Residents said regime security forces likely killed him.  Also in April, according to local media outlet Myanmar Now, soldiers opened fire inside the Sule Mosque in Mandalay’s Maha Aungmyay Township, killing Ko Htet, who was sleeping inside the mosque when the attack started approximately10 am.  He had spent the night there after fasting, as Muslims around the world began observing Ramadan.  According to the news report, witnesses said soldiers started firing immediately after storming the mosque.  Two others were injured in the shooting.

On May 24, local media reported that military forces bombed Sacred Heart Church in Kayan Tharyar, Kayah State, killing four persons who had taken refuge there, and that on May 28, government forces fired upon the Church of Saint Joseph in Demoso, Kayah State, and killed two men who were collecting food for displaced persons.  Local media also reported military forces killed a volunteer from a Catholic seminary on May 29, in Kayah State.  After the Sacred Heart bombing, Cardinal Charles Bo, Archbishop of Yangon, issued a statement on May 25, asking the junta not to target places of worship.  Violence involving houses of worship and other holy sites continued however, including on June 6, when the military reportedly shelled another church in Kayah State that it stated was being used by “terrorists” to launch offensives against the regime.

In June, the opposition NUG issued a statement promising to “seek justice and accountability” for crimes the military committed against more than 740,000 Rohingya.  In addition, the NUG said that if it returned to government, it would repeal a 1982 law denying citizenship to most Rohingya.  In August, the NUG issued a statement in which it held the military regime responsible for having “perpetuated crimes against humanity,” including war crimes committed based on religion.

In June, Pope Francis lamented the suffering of IDPs in Burma, stating, “Churches, pagodas, monasteries, mosques, temples, just as schools and hospitals, [must] be respected as neutral places of refuge.”

In September, regime soldiers shot and killed Baptist pastor Cung Biak Hum in Chin State while he attempted to extinguish a fire started by artillery fire.  A soldier reportedly cut off his finger post-mortem to remove his wedding ring.  The general secretary of Chin Baptist Convention told local media, “The military should carefully distinguish between their enemies and civilians… If they continue this way, fighting could grow into a larger ethnoreligious conflict.”

In October, The Irrawaddy reported Buddhist Gurkha student Lin Paing Soe, from Kyaukse Technological University, was tortured to death while detained by regime security forces.  According to the report, regime security forces used racial and religious slurs and beat him “inhumanely.”  An October Associated Press report on the military’s use of torture included a story of an unnamed monk who described unsanitary conditions in detention and how the military forced him to defrock and “kicked him in the head, chest, and back.”

In February, regime security forces arrested Myanmar Now reporter Kay Zon Nway for her coverage of peaceful protests in Yangon and placed her in solitary confinement for staging a “hunger strike.”  Her lawyer told local media that she was fasting for Ramadan.  Kay Zon Nway was released from Insein Prison in June after 124 days in detention.

On February 1, Myanmar Now reported that regime security forces arrested and detained three senior influential monks, including vocal critic of the military Ashin Ariya Vansa Bivansa, better known as Myawaddy Sayadaw.  Authorities sentenced him to six months in prison and subsequently released him on August 2, after serving his full sentence for defamation.

In May, the online Buddhistdoor Global journal and multimedia platform reported that the military raided a monastery in Mandalay purported to be associated with prodemocracy activities.  A teacher from the monastery reported that he was beaten repeatedly by three members of the military before being sent to an interrogation center at Mandalay Palace.

In June, The Irrawaddy reported that regime security forces arrested three Christian pastors from Kachin State who organized a prayer for “peace in Myanmar.”  If convicted, the pastors could serve up to three years in prison for incitement.  Regime security forces released all three in October.

In August, Myanmar Now reported the military issued, then rescinded, plans that would have installed Buddhist monks at military checkpoints in Mandalay.  Local monastics objected to the plan, with one Mandalay monk saying that the military was “…trying to exploit the religion for their political gains.”

On September 16, in Mandalay, armed men in plain clothes, accompanied by uniformed military, arrested Reverend Thian Lian Sang, an ethnic Chin pastor.  According to the Baptist World Alliance, following his arrest, regime security forces entered Sang’s home, where they confiscated money and cellphones belonging to the Church and the pastor’s family.

In November, a regime court extended by two years the prison sentence of prominent Buddhist monk Ashin Thawbita, who was charged earlier in the year with violating a section on defamation in the telecommunications law for his comments on social media the military perceived to be defamatory.  His new sentence stemmed from an additional charge of incitement under the penal code.

Religious leaders also expressed concern that religious assembly could be misconstrued by the regime as prodemocracy organizing.  In June, according to multiple local media reports, soldiers in Mandalay beat Buddhist monks for reciting suttas (religious discourses) interpreted as antiregime.

According to media reports, in April, Christian leaders said regime security forces raided and searched several Christian churches across the country, including in Kachin State and Mandalay Region.  Regime security forces reportedly said they were looking for individuals involved in illegal activities and for antiregime activists.

According to the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), Christians in Chin State and Sagaing Region experienced destruction of homes and places of worship and suffered physical violence by the military.  Myanmar Now reported in December that in Thantlang, Chin State, the military had destroyed at least seven churches, in addition to 842 homes, in a series of arson attacks starting in October.  In November, the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) condemned the military’s attacks on civilians, citing as an example the military’s continued shelling of the town of Thantlang and its setting fire to homes and churches.  According to BHRN, the attacks were part of the “Kill all, burn all, and destroy all strategy the military is documented using against other ethnic and religious minorities.” 

In October, media sources reported regime security forces arrested seven workers from the Catholic Church social agency Caritas (Karuna) who were on a mission to provide aid for IDPs in Kayah State.  At year’s end, Church officials were working to secure the release of the aid workers.  Local residents with knowledge of the situation said that it was common for the military to inflict violence against local residents in the area and make arbitrary arrests based on religious affiliation.

According to AAPP, the military regime had detained 35 Buddhist monks for participating in protests, as well as nine Christian leaders, and a Muslim religious leader for unexplained reasons since the military coup as of year’s end

According to the IIMM, it collected and analyzed more than two million pieces of evidence of possible human rights violations or abuses in Burma from 2019-2121, including reports of approximately 1,300 victims and eyewitnesses in Rakhine, Chin, Shan, Kachin, and Karen States.

According to The Union of Catholic Asian News, more than 100,000 persons, many Christians, remained in camps for displaced persons in Kachin and Shan States, while another 100,000, mostly Karen Christians, were in camps across the Thai border.

In August, the regime amended the penal code to include a provision on genocide.  According to legal experts, the decision reflected an attempt to ease international pressure on the regime as it faced a genocide charge at a United Nations court for genocide and crimes against humanity committed by members of the military against Rohingya.  According to The Irrawaddy, the provisions of the law include up to the death sentence for killings committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnic, racial, or religious group.

The regime enforced at least three different laws to limit gatherings, including religious gatherings.  A gathering of five or more persons – including for religious reasons – could result in charges and punishment under a natural disaster management law (three months to three years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both), a communicable diseases prevention and control law (six months’ imprisonment or a fine), or Article 188 of the Penal Code – defiance of a government order (one to six months’ imprisonment or a fine).

On October 7, the UNHCR reported that regime authorities continued to confine approximately 148,000 Rohingya in 21 displacement camps.  Restrictions on in-country movement of Rohingya remained extensive, with authorities requiring them to carry special documents and obtain travel permits even to travel within Rakhine State, where most Rohingya reside.  According to humanitarian aid organizations, regime authorities made no new efforts to initiate the return of Rohingya refugees during the year, most of whom remained in camps in neighboring Bangladesh.  According to these organizations, under the military regime, there was no possibility for the voluntary, dignified, safe, and sustainable repatriation of Rohingya.

The regime’s General Administration Department reinstated legal action against Rohingya traveling without documentation, a reversal of an April 2020 order.  For example, in September, regime security forces arrested 30 Rohingya traveling without documentation and sentenced them to two years in prison.  In November, Myanmar Now reported that regime authorities in Buthidaung, northern Rakhine State, had tightened travel restrictions on local Rohingya, requiring them to obtain a permission slip from an immigration office to leave the township.  According to one Rohingya interviewee, previously Rohingya residents had to obtain a recommendation from their village administrator to travel outside the township but now immigration officials had to grant permission as well.

Rakhine local media reported human smuggling of Rohingya from Rakhine State to Malaysia continued, including eight identified cases in October.  Radio Free Asia reported in December that a court in Maungdaw Township, Rakhine State sentenced 109 Rohingya to five years in prison with hard labor after convicting them on illegal immigration charges.  The refugees had fled Burma during the military’s 2017 crackdown against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State and made their way to camps in Bangladesh; Burma’s navy intercepted them in late November as they attempted to reach Malaysia.

During the year, the regime tightly restricted external access to ethnic majority areas where religious minorities also live, including access by UN, humanitarian, and media organizations.  Fighting between the military and some ethnic armed organizations, such as the Chin National Front, escalated after the coup, though it was difficult to categorize the increase in fighting as primarily religiously motivated.  The United Nations reported that as of December 17, more than 296,000 persons were newly displaced since the coup, particularly in ethnic majority areas, including Kayah, Karen, Chin, and Shan States.  According to UN reports, thousands more were displaced by year’s end, particularly in Kayah and Karen States in the southeastern part of the county.  According to the Karenni Human Rights Group (KnHRG), as of the end of the year, more than 156,900 persons had been displaced since May, of which 95 percent were Karenni Christian, due to the escalation in violence between the military and ethnic armed organizations.  According to The Union of Catholic Asian News, in April, more than 100,000 persons, many Christians, remained in camps for displaced persons in Kachin and Shan States, while another 100,000, mostly Karen Christians, were in camps across the Thai border.

The regime continued to restrict the right to freedom of association, including of religious groups.  In the run-up to the November 2020 general elections, the now deposed NLD-led civilian government reinterpreted the law on registering organizations to require NGOs that received foreign funding to register with the government.  After the coup, the regime required banks to report on all foreign funds received by both local and international NGOs.  According to various religious groups and NGOs, the process to register an NGO remained lengthy and was often unsuccessful.

Religious groups throughout the country, including Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, and especially Muslims, continued to report difficulties and delays that could last for years in getting permits to allow construction of and repairs to religious buildings.  Buddhist leaders said obtaining such permission was more difficult for non-Buddhist groups.  Representatives of religious groups said the need for multiple permissions, unclear authority, and interminable delays in responses to requests for permits led them to construct places of worship without the required permissions.  Others said it was necessary to bribe authorities to obtain permits.

According to local media reports, at least 30 churches and a mosque were damaged or destroyed during fighting between the military and joint ethnic armed organizations and opposition People’s Defense Force.  CHRO reported that as of November, the military had destroyed 36 churches and Christian-affiliated buildings in Chin State.  Similarly, KnHRG reported that as of December, the military had destroyed at least seven Christian churches in Kayah State.

In August, CHRO reported soldiers were camping in church compounds.  They reportedly tore up Bibles, destroyed property, drank alcohol, and slaughtered livestock on church grounds.  KnHRG reported similar incidents in the first week of December in Karenni State’s Demoso Township.

According to a BHRN report entitled Before Our Eyes, which it released in July, on February 28, eyewitnesses saw many military officers gathering around the gate of a mosque compound in Mandalay.  They proceeded to shoot the gate open and advance into the compound.  Eyewitnesses heard gunfire and saw military forces destroying the mosque’s interior.  According to the BHRN report, on 18 March in Thingangyun township, police and military forces destroyed the doors of a Hindu temple.

According to local media and NGOs, there were no reports that the regime held perpetrators accountable for crimes against members of religious minority communities.  NGOs also said that regime authorities prevented them from legally owning land and constructing religious buildings.  In Rakhine State, according to the United Nations and media reports, the situation remained unchanged from 2019, with the movement of members of various ethnic and religious groups, particularly Rohingya, restricted by the regime.  Restrictions varied governing the travel between townships of persons whom the government (before its removal in February) and the regime considered foreigners, including both Muslim and Hindu Rohingya, some other Hindus living in Rakhine State, and others in northern Rakhine State.  Depending on the township, restrictions usually required the submission of an immigration form.  The traveler could obtain this form only from the township of origin’s immigration and national registration department and only if that person provided an original copy of a family list, temporary registration card, and letters from two guarantors.  The form typically authorized travel for two to four weeks but was issued almost exclusively for medical emergencies, according to human rights activists.  Sources stated obtaining travel permits often involved extortion and bribes.  Muslims throughout the country still faced restrictions on travel into and out of Rakhine State and reportedly feared authorities would not allow them to leave Rakhine State if they were to visit.

According to NGOs, such restrictions, which continued under the regime, continued to impede the ability of Rohingya to pursue livelihoods and education, access markets, hospitals, and other services, and engage other communities.  Sources stated that individuals stereotyped by security forces as appearing to be Muslim continued to receive additional scrutiny on their movements in the region, regardless of their actual religion; obtaining these travel permits often involved extortion and bribes.

According to various religious organizations and NGOs, services to process the registration of NGOs, whether religious or not, were unavailable during the year because of regime-imposed COVID-19 protocols.  According to representatives of some civil society groups, NGOs refrained from registering because doing so would require providing extensive information on the staff to the regime, which they preferred not to provide.

According to CHRO, neither the government overthrown in February nor the subsequent military regime issued any permits to Christian groups to register and own land and properties.  All such registration applications remained pending at year’s end, with some pending for more than 16 years.

In areas with few or no mosques, Muslims often conducted prayer services and other religious practices, such as teaching, in private homes.  As the democratically elected government had done before it, the regime Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture continued to restrict non-Buddhist religious teachings to government-approved religious buildings and prohibited prayer services and religious teaching in private homes.

Both prior to and following the military coup in February, COVID-19 restrictions limited access of members of minority religious groups to religious sites.  This led to the suspension of applications by Christian groups to buy land in Chin State and Sagaing Region.

Sources continued to state that authorities of both the deposed democratically elected government and the regime generally did not enforce laws passed in 2015 for the “protection of race and religion.”

In June, the military regime ordered all primary schools to reopen following months of closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but approximately 90 percent of primary and secondary school students refused to enroll, many reportedly to protest against the military regime.  Similarly, hundreds of university students refused to enroll, although it was unclear to what degree COVID-19 also played a role in their decision.  In early July, following a third wave of COVID-19, the regime ordered all primary schools to close again; many schools did not reopen until the end of the year.  Several Christian theological seminaries and Bible schools continued to operate, along with several Islamic madrassahs, in Yangon, Sagaing, and elsewhere.  At year’s end, the regime ordered all institutions of higher learning to reopen on January 6, 2022.

Due to continuing regime-imposed restrictions of movement on Rohingya, many Rohingya could not access education in state-run schools.  Rohingya and Kaman children in central Rakhine State had physical access to only one high school, located in Thet Kae Pyin, Sittwe township, according to international observers.  Authorities generally did not permit Rohingya high school graduates from Rakhine State and others living in IDP camps to travel outside the state to attend college or university, but Rohingya students could take a limited number of online courses.  Authorities continued to bar any university students who did not possess citizenship cards from graduating, which disproportionately affected students from religious minorities, particularly Muslim students.  These students could attend classes and take examinations but could not receive diplomas unless they had a citizenship card, the application for which required some religious minorities to identify as a “foreign” ethnic minority.

On September 24, military regime-appointed Minister for Religious Affairs and Culture U Ko Ko issued an order to monasteries and convent schools not to accept long-term guests and requiring that temporary guests register at the ward administration office.  According to local media outlets, the order explicitly named the CRPH, NUG, and other prodemocracy organizations, making clear it was designed to prevent these institutions from becoming safe havens for prodemocracy supporters.

In February, the regime granted amnesty to several high-profile ethnic Rakhine politicians, including Dr. Aye Maung and writer Wai Hin Aung, sentenced to long jail sentences for high treason under the deposed NLD government.  In September, local media outlets reported that the regime had dropped charges against and released promilitary, ultranationalist Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu, and several other monks.  Media reports indicated that some Buddhist nationalists had joined a promilitary militant group called Phyu Saw Hti to assist the military regime in its counterinsurgency operations.  The prior civilian government had charged Wirathu with sedition based on comments he made during a 2019 promilitary rally, where he criticized Aung San Suu Kyi’s relationships with foreigners and her wearing of high heels.  According to press reports, Wirathu was widely known for his anti-Muslim rhetoric and prejudice against Rohingya.

According to leaders of minority religious communities and human rights activists, during the COVID-19 pandemic, inconsistent enforcement and interpretation of COVID-19 pandemic regulations exacerbated communal disparities, with harsher outcomes for minority religious communities.  In February, the regime-controlled Global New Light of Myanmar and Myawaddy News announced the regime had allowed the reopening of houses of worship.  Some chose to remain closed due to COVID-19.  According to media reports, Yangon authorities requested that Muslims observe Ramadan at home due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  The pandemic led to additional government restrictions on all forms of worship, including Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim, but sources reported punishments for violations were disproportionally applied to religious minorities, restrictions that continued under the regime.  Although Muslims said authorities had granted limited permission to slaughter cows during Eid al-Adha in prior years, COVID-19 restrictions prevented this activity during the year.  Regime-controlled media continued to report frequently on officials and military personnel paying respect to Buddhist monks, offering donations at pagodas, and organizing “people’s donations” of money and food.  Regime-controlled media also highlighted regime COVID-19 vaccination efforts.  In August, The Irrawaddy reported that only citizens were eligible for the military’s nationwide COVID-19 vaccination program, which excluded noncitizens such as Rohingya.

Buddhists continued to make up nearly all senior officials within the military and civil service.  Applications for civil service and military positions continued to require the applicant to list his or her religion.

Authorities continued to require citizens and permanent residents to carry government-issued identification cards that permitted holders to access services and prove citizenship.  These identification cards indicated religious affiliation and ethnicity.  Citizens were also required to indicate their religion on certain official applications for documents such as passports, although passports themselves did not indicate the bearer’s religion.  Members of religious minorities, particularly Muslims, continued to face problems obtaining identification and citizenship cards.  Some Muslims reported they were required to indicate a “foreign” ethnicity if they self-identified as Muslim on their application for a citizenship card.

The regime halted the deposed government’s previous call for Rohingya to participate in the citizenship verification process and to apply for National Verification Cards (NVCs).  Under the civilian government, NGOs reported that authorities coerced or pressured Rohingya to apply for NVCs.  Rohingya generally expressed distrust of any documentation process that did not affirm their citizenship or that would grant naturalized versus full citizenship, which carries fewer rights under law.  NGOs documented past cases where Rohingya were forced to identify as “Bengali” when applying for an NVC, with the implication that Rohingya are viewed as “foreigners” not entitled to full citizenship rights.  The few Rohingya who did receive citizenship through the NVC process said they did not receive significant rights or benefits and that they had to pay bribes at different levels of government to receive the document.  The regime announced a citizenship documentation project in May, which, it stated, was a concerted, nationwide effort to issue household registration lists and national identification cards and a means to prevent the kind of voter fraud the military regime said occurred in the 2020 general election.  According to the director general of the Department of National Registration and Citizenship, as of November 5, the regime had issued 171,149 household lists and 567,371 national registration cards.  Authorities issued no citizenship cards to Rohingya through this program by year’s end.

Statements by some authorities before and after the coup exhibited Buddhist nationalist sentiment.  In August, CINC Min Aung Hlaing said in a speech, “Most of us are primarily Buddhists in our country.  The Buddha devotees were disheartened in their faith in Buddhism during the previous five years.  Since the time we took power, we have emphasized religious affairs under the provisions of the constitution.”

Regime-controlled media continued to report frequently on officials and military personnel paying respect to Buddhist monks, offering donations at pagodas, and organizing “people’s donations” of money and food.

In May, The Irrawaddy reported that the regime released Michael Kyaw Myint, the leader of the Yeomanry Development Party detained by the deposed civilian government.  Kyaw had previously served a year in prison after leading an anti-Muslim mob in Yangon.

According to local media, some ethnic armed organizations operating in the country continued to pose a threat to ethnic and religious minority groups.  The AA continued to force local villagers, including Christian religious leaders, to construct roads without any pay for their labor and recruited villagers to attend military training camp.  According to a local source, the AA also forced Christian religious leaders to attend its administration training, often holding them against their will.

In September, gunmen shot and killed Rohingya Muslim activist and community leader Mohib Ullah in the Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh.  Ullah was known for his detailed compilation of abuses and atrocities committed in 2017 against Rohingya in Burma.  According to press reports, his killers were likely associated with the insurgent group ARSA.  Ullah spoke out against ARSA militancy and abuses in the refugee camps in Bangladesh.

In July, the NUG announced its appointment of a Rohingya activist as an advisor to its “Ministry of Human Rights.”  The NUG’s August 24 statement on the anniversary of atrocities committed against the Rohingya received public support via social media.  Some social media users commented that the coup had united the country against the military regime and had produced more sympathy for the Rohingya, which, they said, may have been responsible for a decline in online hate speech aimed at the Rohingya noted by some observers.

According to Muslim activists, Rohingya continued to be perceived as not truly belonging to the country, irrespective of citizenship status, and as belonging to a religion commonly viewed with fear and disdain.  There were continued reports of social stigma surrounding any assistance to or sympathy for Rohingya.  Some civil society leaders said that even among otherwise tolerant individuals, anti-Rohingya sentiment remained prevalent.  There were continued reports of general anti-Muslim prejudice, including social pressure not to rent housing to Muslims in some areas.  Some local media reports, however, said the Bamar ethnic majority’s empathy for the decades of persecution suffered by Rohingya and other minorities had grown due to their own post-coup experience of the brutal crackdown by regime security forces on innocent persons irrespective of ethnic and religious background.  For example, a schoolteacher told the New York Times, “I saw soldiers and police killing and torturing people […] I started to feel empathy for Rohingya and ethnic people who have been suffering worse than us for many years.”

In June, a public opinion poll found that, when asked about relations among persons of different faiths in the country, 47 percent said that strict protection of one’s own religion would provide a stronger foundation for democracy in the future, while 48 percent said that granting more rights to religious minorities would provide a stronger foundation for democracy in the future.

Despite a continuing order by the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (SSMNC), an independent but government-supported body that oversees Buddhist affairs, that no group or individual operate under the banner of Ma Ba Tha, some branches of the group continued to use the name Ma Ba Tha, while others used the new name, Buddha Dhamma Parahita Foundation.  According to Myanmar Now, in March SSMNC announced in a statement that it would suspend its activities and called on the military to end the violence and arrests.  One of SSMNC’s 47 abbots said of the suspension, “It is similar to the [Civil Disobedience Movement].”  According to local media, some Ma Ba Tha-affiliated monks held a rally in November in support of the military.

In March, protestors waved flags made of women’s sarongs in celebration of International Women’s Day.  Regime-controlled Myawaddy News called the act “inappropriate” and “severely insulting to religion and contempt of [Buddhist] religion…and monks.”

Throughout the year, senior U.S. government officials – including the Secretary of State, the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the USAID Administrator, the Ambassador, and senior Department of State officials for East Asia and for human rights – consistently raised ongoing U.S. concerns about religious freedom, including the plight of the majority Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine State, hardships facing Christian minority religious communities in Kachin, northern Shan, and Chin States amid ongoing violence, and also engaged in advocacy on social media calling for an inclusive democracy that respects all ethnicities and religions and against violence and hate speech against religious minorities.  In July, the Secretary met with civil society representatives from diverse ethnic and religious groups in the country to discuss their calls to restore the country’s democratic transition.

The U.S. government continued to press for full accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations, including those concerning religious freedom.  On February 10, the President issued Executive Order 14014, Blocking Property with Respect to the Situation in Burma, which stated, in part, the military “unjustly arrested and detained government leaders, politicians, human rights defenders, journalists, and religious leaders.”  Pursuant to the Executive Order 14014 of February 10, 2021, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six officers of Burma’s military who played a direct role in the coup.  OFAC also designated four military officials who were appointed to positions in the SAC following the coup and designated three entities operating in Burma’s gem industry that are owned or controlled by the military.  In addition, OFAC designated 46 individuals, including the union ministers, immediate family members of military-related designated individuals, and 14 entities including the SAC between March and July 2021, pursuant to E.O. 14014.

U.S. government officials continued to call for sustainable solutions to the root causes of discrimination and religiously motivated violence.  In July, the United States was among 15 countries from the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance to sign a joint statement that condemned “any attack on places of worship” and commended faith actors for their work in the prodemocracy movement and in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic.  In an October statement about reported attacks in Chin State, the Department of State spokesperson condemned the “brutal actions by the Burmese military regime against people, their homes, and places of worship.”  U.S. government support for the Burma-Bangladesh humanitarian crisis response included more than $124.6 million in 2021, with nearly $49.6 million for programs in Burma and approximately $75 million for programs in Bangladesh.  Since August 2017, the U.S. government has provided more than $820 million in humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh and Burma, including $469 million in 2020, with $78 million for programs in Burma, $314 million for programs in Bangladesh, and $29 million in regional crisis response.

Embassy officials at all levels emphasized the importance of addressing the effects of ethnoreligious violence and hate speech, including anti-Muslim rhetoric.  Embassy officials promoted religious freedom and meaningful inclusion during meetings with the opposition NUG, CRPH, and the National Unity Consultative Council, as well as with ethnic armed organizations and other ethnic and religious leaders.

Although embassy travel to ethnic and religious minority-predominant areas was curtailed in 2020 and 2021 by the COVID-19 pandemic and the February 1 coup, discussions of religious freedom and tolerance with NGOs and members of community-based organizations and religious communities continued.

The embassy emphasized the need for respect for religious freedom, tolerance, and unity in its interactions with all sectors of society, in public engagements, and through its social media accounts.  Embassy representatives, including the Ambassador, continued to engage with Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, and Hindu leaders, including ethnic minority religious leaders, members of faculties of theology, and other religiously affiliated organizations and NGOs, to advocate for religious freedom and tolerance.

The embassy also posted content on Facebook, Facebook Stories, and Twitter to engage local audiences on the importance of religious pluralism, tolerance, and shared identity in democratic societies, including the recognition of minority religious holidays.  The embassy amplified the Department of State spokesperson’s message on the fourth anniversary of the military’s August 25, 2017, ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State, which some NGOs said was part of a larger campaign of genocide and crimes against humanity.  The statement demanded accountability for those responsible and noted the $155 million in assistance announced earlier in May as part of the 2021 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis.  In September, an embassy tweet highlighted the Department of State’s announcement of $180 million in additional assistance for the humanitarian crisis facing Rohingya inside and outside the country.  In addition, in October, the embassy amplified the Secretary of State’s statement on the killing of Rohingya Muslim leader Mohib Ullah, in which he praised Ullah’s advocacy for the human rights of Rohingya Muslims around the world.  That same month, the Ambassador’s Thadingyut video message marking the end of Buddhist Vassa, an annual period of fasting and reflection, called for peace and prosperity for all during a time of hardship.  The video received more than 200,000 views and 20,000 “likes,” with comments acknowledging U.S. efforts in raising awareness about shared values among all faiths.

The embassy regularly published statements highlighting concerns about religiously based tensions and anti-Muslim discrimination, as well as calling for respect for religious diversity, unity, and tolerance.

While embassy facilities in Yangon and Mandalay suspended most of their public programs following the coup, the embassy continued to prioritize ethnic and religious diversity in its exchange programs, selecting participants from Shan, Wa, Kachin, Kayah, Chin, Rakhine, and Mon ethnic groups, many of whom belong to religious minority groups.  As in prior years, the embassy worked with and supported NGOs working on programs promoting religious freedom and tolerance, as well as with former participants of U.S. government exchange programs promoting tolerance and equal access to basic health care, education, and mental health resources, regardless of religious affiliation.

Since 1999, Burma has been designated as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.  On November 15, 2021, the Secretary of State redesignated Burma as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation:  the existing ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) pursuant to section 402(c) (5) of the Act.

[1] On March 21, 2022, the Secretary of State publicly announced his determination that members of the Burmese military committed genocide and crimes against humanity against Rohingya in Burma.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 12.2 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2008 national census (the most recent), 62 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 21.6 percent Protestant, 2.5 percent Muslim, and 2.3 percent Seventh-day Adventist.  Another 6.1 percent have no religious affiliation, and 3.7 percent belong to indigenous religious groups.  The head of the Islamic Community of Burundi, however, estimates Muslims constitute 10-12 percent of the population.  The Muslim population lives mainly in urban areas; most are Sunni, although there are some Shia communities as well as a small number of Ismaili Muslims in Bujumbura.  Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Church of the Rock, Free Methodist, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Orthodox Christians, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Eglise Vivante, Eglise du Bon Berger, Hindus, and Jains.  According to 2018 statistics from the Ministry of Interior, there are approximately 1,000 religious groups in the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes a secular state; prohibits religious discrimination; recognizes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; and provides for equal protection under the law regardless of religion.  These rights may be limited by law in the general interest or to protect the rights of others, and may not be abused to compromise national unity, independence, peace, democracy, or the secular nature of the state, or to violate the constitution.  The constitution prohibits political parties from preaching religious violence, exclusion, or hate.

By law, all religious celebrations and prayer sessions must not cause harm to the natural environment and must respect public order.

The government recognizes and registers religious groups through a 2014 law governing the operational framework of religious groups, which states these organizations must register with the Ministry of Interior.  There is a 20,000 Burundian franc ($10) fee for registration.  Each religious group must provide the denomination or affiliation of the institution, a copy of its bylaws, the address of its headquarters in the country, an address abroad if the local institution is part of a larger group, and the names and addresses of the association’s governing body and legal representative.  Registration also requires identifying any property and bank accounts owned by the religious group.  The ministry usually processes registration requests within two to four weeks.  Leaders, administrators, or adherents of religious groups who continue to practice after denial of their registration application, or after a group has been dissolved or suspended, are subject to six months to five years of imprisonment, a fine, or both.

The law regulating religious groups provides additional specific registration requirements.  Any new, independent religious group based in the country must have a minimum of 300 members to qualify.  Foreign-based religious groups seeking to establish a presence in the country must have at least 500 members to qualify.  The law prohibits foreigners from being part of executive and decision-making committees of religious groups at the national level.

The law on religious groups does not provide broad tax exemptions or other benefits; however, the financial laws exempt from tax goods imported by religious groups if the groups can demonstrate importation of the goods is in the public interest.  Some religious schools have agreements with the government entitling them to tax exemptions when investing in infrastructure or purchasing school equipment and educational materials.

The official school curriculum includes religion and morality classes for all primary and secondary schools.  The program offers religious instruction in Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam, although all classes may not be available if the number of students interested is insufficient in a particular school.  Students are free to choose from one of these three classes or attend morality classes instead.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Authorities released former Seventh-day Adventist Church president Lameck Barishinga from prison in February; he had been arrested and imprisoned since October 2019 without formal charges.  His arrest followed a dispute among leaders within the Burundi Seventh-day Adventist Church, including a disagreement over the disposition of church funds that led to violence among church members.  The East-Central Africa Division of the Seventh-day Adventist Church issued an official statement in February thanking God, the Government of Burundi, and people around the world for Barishinga’s release, characterizing his imprisonment as having been “for his faith.”

Media reported that police arrested approximately 40 followers of Eusebie Ngendakumana, also known as Zebiya, on October 12 and detained them in an Ngozi prison on charges of public disturbance after they attempted to visit a shrine in anticipation of a Marian apparition (appearance of the Virgin Mary).  Ngendakumana, whom her followers described as a Catholic prophet, set up a shrine at her home in Businde, Gahombo commune, in Kayanza Province, stating that she had regular visions of the Virgin Mary on the 12th of each month, and urged followers to join her.  Her followers, who had been deported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Burundi in 2020 after five years spent in South Kivu and North Kivu Provinces in eastern Congo, said they feared for their safety in Burundi and believed that Businde is a holy place where they had to make a pilgrimage and commune with God.  Community residents complained of noise levels and a lack of respect for their property on the part of Ngendakumana’s followers, which led to physical altercations between the groups, causing police to intervene and prohibit the followers from accessing the shrine.  Police had sought to locate and arrest Ngendakumana for six years on charges of “inciting civil disobedience.”  The group had not sought accreditation as a religious denomination because members stated they considered themselves members of the Catholic Church.  Catholic Church representatives in the country stated publicly that Ngendakumana did not represent the Church.

Following disputes over the election of their next leader, representatives of the Islamic Community of Burundi (COMIBU) met with Minister of Interior, Public Security, and Community Development Gervais Ndirakobuca on October 16 to discuss its election plans.  Disagreements on succession within COMIBU arose after the August 2020 resignation of the former mufti and legal representative of COMIBU, Sheikh Sadiki Kajandi, who resigned after being accused of selling COMIBU property and using the proceeds for personal benefit.  The government then appointed Kajandi as ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and Sheikh Jacques Ya’quub Nahayo, deputy mufti, became COMIBU’s interim legal representative for a term of six months.

COMIBU’s electoral commission put forward two candidates for the position of mufti in January, and the Superior Council of Sheikhs put forward its candidate, Sheikh Yusuf Gihete, a former legal representative of COMIBU.  Several days later, the deputy mufti asked the Superior Council of Sheikhs to withdraw Gihete from consideration, indicating only that the decision for withdrawal came from “higher up.”

In February, the COMIBU general assembly elected Sheikh Hassan Nyamweru as mufti, but the Ministry of Interior refused to accept and validate the results, stating that some individuals eligible to vote in the election were excluded from the opportunity to vote.  Following the failed election, Minister of Interior Ndirakobuca agreed to a proposal by the deputy mufti for establishing a temporary management commission directed by the Superior Council of Sheikhs to lead COMIBU for one year on a nonrenewable basis.  In October the minister invited the president of COMIBU’s general assembly and the 11 bodies that make up COMIBU to attend a meeting to find a solution for organizing elections.  Media reported that many in attendance were not legitimate members of the 11 COMIBU bodies, inferring that such attendees were there to support the candidate favored by the government.  The Minister of Interior directed that elections should be held within two weeks of October 16.  Elections finally took place on November 13, resulting in the election of Sheikh Shabani Ali as the new mufti.

In a June meeting with religious leaders, Minister of Interior Ndirakobuca asked Muslim sheikhs to lower the volume of early-morning calls to prayer so as not to disturb the public while sleeping.  At the same meeting, he asked Christian religious leaders to discontinue high-volume night prayer services.  In response, Rashid Ndikumana, an imam at a small mosque on the outskirts of Bujumbura, accused Ndirakobuca of openly attacking Islam and demanded his resignation and an apology.  Some Muslim representatives said his comments were an insult to the minister and called on Ndikumana to withdraw his remarks and apologize.  Authorities arrested Ndikumana the day after his comments, and he reportedly remained in detention at year’s end.

Media reported on weekly visits by government officials to various churches throughout the year, including by President Ndayishimiye, Prime Minister Allain-Guillaume Bunyoni, Speaker of the National Assembly Gelais-Daniel Ndabirabe, and President of the Senate Emmanuel Sinzohagera.  In some instances, church leaders gave officials opportunity to preach about scriptures and moral issues.  Senate President Sinzohagera also served as the legal representative of the Free Methodist Church.

President Ndayishimiye met with the Catholic Bishops Conference of Burundi on August 13 to review the Church’s role as a major collaborator with state institutions for providing services and praised the Church’s contributions to education, national reconciliation, and community development.  He reiterated the willingness of the government to promote socioeconomic equality and to uphold the rule of law.  He said the Catholic Church would be invaluable in mobilizing citizens for the development of their country, resulting in job creation, improvement of living conditions, and poverty reduction.  The bishops committed to encouraging development projects and pointed to an increase in trust between the population and government authorities, despite isolated cases of abuse of power in some local administrations.

The government continued to grant benefits such as tax waivers to religious groups for the acquisition of materials to manage development projects.  According to the Burundi Revenue Authority, the government also granted tax waivers for imported items such as printed religious materials, wine for masses or other religious services, and equipment to produce communion wafers.  The revenue agency organized a meeting with religious leaders to explain the obligation to pay tax on commercial activities of their groups.

The Independent National Human Rights Commission organized a workshop and training session on April 8 for religious leaders on the role of religious organizations in the promotion and protection of human rights.  Representatives from religious communities spoke and emphasized their contributions to establishing respect for human rights and made future commitments.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials regularly met with key religious leaders, including from the Anglican and Catholic Churches and Muslim communities, to discuss ways to improve religious freedom in the country.  The embassy encouraged community leaders, including political leaders and representatives of major faith-based groups, to support the acceptance of all religious groups, as well as to promote interfaith discussion regarding the collaborative role religious groups could play in disseminating a message of peace and religious tolerance to the wider population.

During a series of September and October meetings with some of the country’s prominent religious leaders, including from the Inter-Religious Council of Burundi (CICB), the Ambassador and the leaders discussed the country’s top challenges and how religious groups could help address them.  The Ambassador also met with the secretary general of the National Council of Churches of Burundi as part of the U.S. continued commitment to encourage reconciliation.  In September, the embassy extended for two more years its support of the CIBC.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 589,000 (midyear 2021).  The preliminary 2020 national census showed a total population of 498,000.  According to the 2010 national census, the most recent to report population by religious grouping, 77 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 10 percent Protestant, 2 percent Muslim, and 11 percent does not identify with any religion.  The second largest Christian denomination is the Church of the Nazarene.  Other Christian denominations include Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ), Assemblies of God, Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, Independent Baptists, and other Pentecostal and evangelical Christian groups.  There are small Baha’i and Jewish communities.

Legal Framework

The constitution states freedom of conscience, religion, and worship are inviolable and protects the right of individuals to choose, practice, profess, and change their religion and to interpret their religious beliefs for themselves.  It provides for the separation of religion and state and prohibits the state from imposing religious beliefs and practices on individuals.  It prohibits political parties from adopting names associated with specific religious groups.  The constitution prohibits ridiculing religious symbols or practices.

Violations of religious freedom are crimes subject to penalties of between three months and three years in prison.  These may include discrimination against individuals for their expressed religion or lack thereof, violations of the freedom of and from religious education, denial of religious assistance in hospitals and prisons, denial of free speech to religious organizations, threats against places of worship, and violations of conscientious objection within the bounds of the law.

The law codifies the constitution’s religious freedom provisions by providing for equal rights and guarantees for all religions in accordance with the constitution and international law.  The law separates religion and state but allows the government to sign agreements with religious entities on matters of public interest.  Specific sections of the law guarantee the protection of religious heritage, the right to religious education, freedom of organization of religious groups, and the free exercise of religious functions and worship.

A concordat between the government and the Holy See recognizes the legal status of the Catholic Church and its right to carry out its apostolic mission freely.  The concordat further recognizes Catholic marriages under civil law and the right of Catholics to carry out religious observances on Sundays, and it specifies a number of Catholic holidays as public holidays.  It protects places of worship and other Catholic properties and provides for religious educational institutions, charitable activities, and pastoral work in the military, hospitals, and penal institutions.  The concordat exempts Church revenues and properties used in religious and nonprofit activities from taxes and makes contributions to the Church tax deductible.

The law requires all associations, whether religious or secular, to register with the Ministry of Justice.  To register, a religious group must submit a copy of its charter and statutes signed by its members.  Failure to register can impinge on a religious group’s ability to conduct such activities as importing supplies, purchasing land, and constructing places of worship.  Registration provides additional benefits, including exemptions from national, regional, and local taxes and fees.  Registered religious groups may receive exemptions from taxes and fees in connection with places of worship or other buildings intended for religious purposes, activities with exclusively religious purposes, institutions and seminaries intended for religious education or training of religious leaders, goods purchased for religious purposes, and distribution of publications with information on places of worship.  Legally registered churches and religious groups may use broadcast time on public radio and television at their own expense.  The law requires religious groups to obtain the notarized signatures of 500 members before they may begin any activities related to developing their presence in the country.  Failure to present the required signatures prevents religious groups from completing their formal registration process and obtaining tax-exempt status and protections to property and presence in the country.

The law permits conscientious objection to mandatory military service on religious grounds.

According to the law, recognized churches and religious communities or organizations may apply for and obtain authorization to provide moral and religious education in public schools.  Such education is optional, not required.  By law, the government is to ensure necessary conditions to provide moral and religious education in schools without discrimination.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

All of the country’s prisons suspended activities, including religious assistance such as visits from clergy, during the year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, although some inmates communicated with religious communities through letters.  Prisons gradually resumed some assistance at the end of the year with support from representatives of several religious groups.  The Ministry of Justice reported that it held a four-day National Meeting on Social Reintegration (of former inmates) in October with representatives of all major religious groups, partners in the implementation of the 2022 National Plan for Social Reintegration.

In November, newly inaugurated President Neves met with a visiting delegation from the Church of the Nazarene led by U.S.-based General Superintendent Duarte, originally from Cabo Verde, to discuss the role of the Church in Cabo Verdean society.  In July and August, Minister of the Presidency and Parliamentary Affairs Filomena Goncalves, who was also responsible for relations with religious groups, met with Catholic, Nazarene, and Seventh-day Adventist representatives to underscore the government’s stated interest in maintaining ties and contributing to development of the social projects of these institutions.  In December, Prime Minister Correia e Silva visited social projects, including preschools, supported by the Nazarene Church.  He announced that the government would meet with leaders from other religious groups in the coming months as part of the new government program “MAIS – Mobilization to Accelerate Social Inclusion” to combat poverty and provide assistance to vulnerable communities.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

In meetings with government officials, the Ambassador stressed the importance of religious tolerance.  In December, the Ambassador underscored the significance of religious freedom and tolerance during a gathering he hosted of senior officials and Cabo Verdeans of Jewish descent to celebrate the success of the Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project.  The embassy partnered with civil society groups, including those with close ties to religious organizations, to support programs of mutual interest, such as strengthening laws which prohibit discrimination on a number of bases, including religion.  An embassy series of videos on social media promoting English language reading featured children’s books highlighting a variety of faiths and religious traditions.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 16.5 million (midyear 2021).  According to the MCR, approximately 93 percent of the population is Buddhist, 95 percent of whom practice Theravada Buddhism, with an estimated 4,400 monastic temples throughout the country.  The remaining 7 percent of the population includes Christians, Muslims, animists, Baha’is, Jews, and Cao Dai adherents.  Most ethnic Vietnamese traditionally practice Mahayana Buddhism, although others have adopted Theravada Buddhism and Roman Catholicism, representing most Catholics in the country.  Catholics constitute 0.4 percent of the population.  Nongovernmental estimates of the Protestant population, including evangelical Christians, vary, but are less than 2 percent of the total population.

According to government and NGO estimates, between 2 and 5 percent of the population is Muslim and is predominantly ethnic Cham, although not all Cham are Muslim.  The Cham typically live in towns and rural fishing villages along the banks of Tonle Sap Lake and the Mekong River, as well as in Kampot Province.  Nearly 90 percent of Muslims are adherents of Sunni Islam, subscribing to the Shafi’i school of Islamic law.  The remaining minority practice Salafist, Wahhabist Sunni doctrines; there are also Ahmadi Muslims.  A portion of the Cham community also subscribes to the indigenous Iman-San sect of Islam, combining traditional ancestral practices with Sunni Islam.

According to government estimates, 0.28 percent of the population is ethnic Bunong, the majority of whom follow animistic religious practices.  An additional estimated 0.25 percent of the population includes Baha’is, Jews, and Cao Dai adherents.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of belief and religious worship, as long as such freedom neither interferes with others’ beliefs and religions nor violates public order and security.  The constitution establishes Buddhism as the state religion and provides for government support of Buddhist education; it also prohibits discrimination based on religion.  The law requires that religious groups refrain from openly criticizing other religious groups, but it does not elaborate the legal consequences for these types of violations.  The law also forbids religious organizations from organizing events, rallies, meetings, and training sessions that are politically focused.

The law requires all religious groups, including Buddhist groups, to register with the MCR.  The law mandates that religious organizations inform the government of their goals; describe activities; provide biographical information for all religious leaders; note funding sources; submit annual reports detailing all activities; and refrain from insulting other religious groups, fomenting disputes, or undermining national security.  Registration requires approval from numerous local, provincial, and national government offices, a process that can take up to 90 days.  There are no penalties for failing to register, but unregistered religious groups cannot receive an income tax exemption from the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

The law bans non-Buddhist groups from proselytizing publicly and stipulates that non-Buddhist literature may be distributed only inside religious institutions.  The law also prohibits offers of money or materials to convince persons to convert.  The law prohibits and penalizes acts that constitute “infringement on state religion,” including unauthorized wearing of Buddhist monks’ robes in public, damaging Buddhist religious premises or sacred objects, and “insult” towards a Buddhist monk or a nun.

The law requires separate registration of all places of worship and religious schools.  Authorities may temporarily shut down unregistered places of worship and religious schools until they are registered.  The law also makes a legal distinction between “places of worship” and “offices of prayer.”  The establishment of a place of worship requires that the founders own both the structure and the land on which it is located.  The facility must have a minimum capacity of 200 persons, and the permit application requires the support of at least 100 congregants.  An office of prayer may be located in a rented property and has no minimum capacity requirement.  The permit application for an office of prayer requires the support of at least 25 congregants.  Places of worship must be located at least two kilometers (1.2 miles) from each other and may not be used for political purposes or to house criminals or fugitives.  The distance requirement applies only to the construction of new places of worship and not to offices of religious organizations or offices of prayer.

Schools that focus on religious studies must be registered with the MCR and the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport (MOEYS).  MOEYS advises religious schools to follow the ministry’s core curriculum, which does not include a religious component.  Non-Buddhist religious schools are permitted and may be either public or private.  Secular public schools may choose to have supplemental Buddhist lessons, but they are required to coordinate with MOEYS when doing so.  Not all secular public schools offer supplemental Buddhist lessons, and non-Buddhist students may opt out of such instruction.  The law forbids non-Buddhist supplemental religious instruction in secular public schools.

The law does not provide authorization for a religious entity to own land, compelling some religious leaders to register land in their personal capacity rather than that of their organization.  There is no visa category specifically applicable to religious workers.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In December, the government issued a directive restricting monks from participating in political protests and requiring them to be politically neutral.  The directive came after authorities arrested a monk for being active on social and environmental issues.  The MCR, in consultation with religious leaders of several faiths, prepared a draft law criminalizing “religious people” who participate in political acts, including “organized activity against any political party.”  Experts who reviewed the draft legislation said the term “religious people” is commonly used to refer to monks and is not further defined in the draft law, making it unclear if the proposed rule would apply to non-Buddhists.  Criminal penalties could include up to 15 years in prison.

The government took steps regarding religious practices related to COVID-19 deaths.  Prime Minister Hun Sen met with Muslim groups to discuss their concerns shortly after a March government order that all COVID-19 victims’ remains must be cremated.  Responding to public appeals to allow for religious burial rites, in April, the Prime Minister dedicated land in Kampong Speu Province for the burial of Muslim COVID-19 victims.  The Prime Minister publicly called on followers of non-Islamic religions to support this exemption.  The Highest Council for Islamic Religious Affairs subsequently issued instructions to local Muslim councils to facilitate faith-appropriate burials for COVID-19 victims.

The government required all public hospitals to install Islamic prayer halls and formalized the right of women to wear Muslim headscarves at public schools, responding to concerns raised during an iftar attended by the Prime Minister and Muslim leaders in 2019.  Three medical facilities opened new prayer rooms in 2021:  the Khmer-Soviet Friendship Hospital, the Ang Duong Hospital, and the School of Medical Care.  Wearing head coverings indoors is often considered a sign of disrespect in the country, and schools had previously discouraged them in classrooms.

The ruling Cambodian People’s Party, though the MCR, exercised control over appointments to leadership positions in the country’s primary Buddhist and Muslim groups.  Senior Buddhist leadership positions were approved by the Prime Minister and the King.  In June, the government announced that a top Buddhist leader, Supreme Patriarch Bour Kry, had appointed an online lotion vendor and a fortune teller as personal advisors, a decision which drew strong public criticism on social media, given the advisors’ perceived lack of education and religious training.

In January, government officials and local Muslim leaders serving on the Cambodian Halal Steering Committee formalized a new Department of Halal Affairs under the Ministry of Commerce’s General Department of Consumer Protection, Competition, and Fraud Prevention.  The Department oversaw the production and proper labeling of halal products, a move intended in part to help increase Muslim tourism to the country in the wake of the pandemic.

A Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts official stated that the ministry was actively working to register land for indigenous communities based on the land’s importance to religious worship in response to previous complaints about sluggish land registration and deforestation affecting spiritual practices and economic livelihoods.

The government continued to reject a UNHCR request to accept permanently a group of Christian Montagnards from Vietnam who came to the country to claim refugee status.  Of the original estimated 200 Christian Montagnards who fled Vietnam and were in Cambodia in 2017, 12 remained in the country after two traveled illegally to Thailand and 13 returned to Vietnam voluntarily in 2020.  The government continued to require them to live in a specific area of Phnom Penh.  The adults were not permitted to work, and the children were not permitted to attend school.  These 12 decided to stay in the country until they receive permission to leave for a third country.

The government continued to promote Buddhist holidays by grants of official status and declarations of government holidays.  The government also provided Buddhist training and education to monks and laypersons in pagodas and gave financial support to an institute that performed research and published materials on Khmer culture and Buddhist traditions.  The government did not grant similar treatment to other religious groups, including by declaring government holidays.

In April, a report by the Cambodian Youth Network found that more than 3,200 acres of a 7,400-acre protected forest in Kratie Province had been illegally cleared, while another 1,140 acres were under threat.  The forest is a religious site for the indigenous Bunong people.  A network official accused “wealthy and powerful individuals” of illegally clearing the forests for profit from logging or converting the land to other commercial purposes.  Indigenous community leaders reported that individuals and companies who purchased sacred indigenous land commonly hid their intention to clear the land of forest cover, a fact that, if known, would have caused local residents and religious leaders to object to the sale of the land.  Sources stated that it was difficult for local communities to prevent the clearing of forest after a sale was completed and payments made.

Observers and religious leaders reported improved public acceptance of persons practicing non-Buddhist religions, although some biases and prejudice remained.  Leaders in the minority Muslim Cham community stated that the Cham had equal employment and educational opportunities.

After meeting with Tep Vong, the Supreme Patriarch of Mohanikaya Buddhism, Roman Catholic Bishop Olivier Schmitthaeusler, head of the Apostolic Vicariate of Phnom Penh, reported that there was “reciprocal religious respect” among religious groups in the country and that government policies and social tolerance were instrumental in improving interreligious relationships.

In June, the Roman Catholic Church donated 20,000 masks to the High Council for Islamic Religious Affairs to help prevent the spread of COVID-19.  A Council representative expressed gratitude to the Church for demonstrating solidarity with Cambodian Muslims.

The Ambassador raised the issue of the Christian Montagnards from Vietnam on several occasions with government ministers and other representatives and encouraged the government to allow their permanent resettlement to proceed.  The Ambassador and other officers highlighted to government officials the vulnerabilities that religious minority groups faced due to the COVID-19 pandemic and stressed the importance of actively ensuring these groups are not discriminated against and receive all public services to which they are entitled.  Embassy officials regularly raised with government representatives the importance of fully integrating religious minorities into Cambodian society and highlighted the benefits of supporting religious pluralism.  The Ambassador called for tolerance for differing religious viewpoints on social media and encouraged the government to continue protecting the rights of every person to practice his or her faith without interference.

Embassy officers underscored with leaders of Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim groups the importance of accepting religious diversity, emphasizing the importance of interfaith tolerance in a democratic society.  The Ambassador met with Muslim leaders from the minority Cham community to discuss religious freedom and challenges facing their community during a provincial outreach trip in June.  He also met with minority Cham community members and graduates of a U.S.-funded English education program in a separate provincial outreach trip in September.

Embassy officers met with ethnic Cham and other Muslim community members, indigenous leaders, and representatives of the country’s small Christian community to understand their perspectives on religious tolerance, respect for minority culture, equal economic opportunity, and integration of ethnic minorities into the wider culture, and to express the embassy’s support for religious freedom.  In order to document religious persecution by the Khmer Rouge regime, the embassy also funded transitional justice programs that engaged the Cham Muslim community.

Some embassy programs focused on supporting the preservation of religious cultural sites, such as the Phnom Bakheng Temple in Siem Reap Province.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 28.5 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2005 census, the most recent available, 69.2 percent of the population is Christian, 20.9 percent Muslim, 5.6 percent animist, 1.0 percent belongs to other religions, and 3.2 percent reports no religious affiliation.  Among Christians, 55.5 percent are Catholic, 38 percent Protestant, and 6.5 percent other Christian denominations, including Jehovah’s Witnesses and Orthodox churches.  The 2020 Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project found that 38.3 percent of Christians were Catholic and 31.4 percent of Christians were Protestant.  There is a growing number of Christian revivalist churches.

Christians are concentrated primarily in the southern and western parts of the country.  The Northwest and Southwest Regions are largely Protestant, and the South, Center, East, Littoral, and West Regions are mostly Catholic.  The Mbororo ethnic community is mostly Muslim and located primarily in the North, Far North, Northwest, Adamawa, and East Regions; the Bamoun ethnic group is also predominantly Muslim and located in the West Region.  Many Muslims, Christians, and members of other faiths also adhere to some aspects of traditional beliefs.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes the state as secular, prohibits harassment or discrimination on grounds of religion, and provides for freedom of religion.

The law on freedom of association governs relations between the government and religious groups.  The government must approve religious groups or institutions as a prerequisite for lawful operation.  Although the law prescribes no specific penalties for operating without official registration, the government may suspend the activities of unregistered groups.  The government does not require indigenous religious groups to register, characterizing the practice of traditional religion as a private concern observed by members of a particular ethnic or kinship group or the residents of a particular locality.

To become a registered entity, a religious group must legally qualify as a religious congregation, defined as “any group of natural persons or corporate bodies whose vocation is divine worship” or “any group of persons living in community in accordance with a religious doctrine.”  The entity must submit a request for registration as a religious group and include with it the group’s charter describing planned activities, names and functions of the group’s officials, and a declaration of commitment to comply with the law on freedom of association to the relevant local office.  The relevant local office then forwards the documents to the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT).

MINAT reviews the file and sends it to the presidency with a recommendation to approve or deny.  Registration is granted by presidential decree.  Official registration confers no general tax benefits but allows religious groups to receive real estate as a tax-free gift for the conduct of activities and to gather publicly and worship.  It also permits missionaries to receive visas with longer validity.  Unregistered religious groups may gather publicly and worship under a policy of “administrative tolerance” as long as public security and peace are not disturbed.

MINAT may issue an order to suspend any religious group for “disturbing public order,” although no legislation defines these terms.  The President may dissolve any previously authorized religious organization that “deviates from its initial focus.”

The Ministry of Basic Education and the Ministry of Secondary Education require private religious schools to comply with the same curriculum, infrastructure, and teacher-training standards as state-operated schools.  Unlike public schools, private schools may offer religious education.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Media and religious leaders said most abuses of religious freedom were related to the crisis involving English-speaking separatists in the Northwest and Southwest Regions and the activities of nonstate actors in the Far North Region.  Because religion, ethnicity, and political ideology are closely linked, it was often difficult to determine whether incidents were predominantly motivated by religion.

According to the Presbyterian Church in Cameroon (PCC), gunmen fired on the PCC church building in Natanfoang, Northwest Region during an August 22 service, killing a parishioner, Grace Titalabit, and wounding the officiating pastor, Simon Montoh Voma.  After he recovered, Montoh Voma said that government soldiers had wounded him and killed Titalabit.  According to the media, church parishioners at the time of the incident said that men in military uniforms fired the gunshots.  PCC Moderator Samuel Forba Fonki condemned the shootings in an August 22 press release and called for an independent investigation.  In a press release on August 23, the Ministry of Defense stated that members of the separatist group Buffalo Fighters of Bali detonated an improvised explosive device as soldiers on patrol approached the church and exchanged gunfire with separatist fighters.  The ministry’s statement blamed separatists for killing Titalabit and wounding Montoh Voma.

In October, government forces accompanied by local Muslim Mbororo herders killed at least seven individuals in the mostly Christian town of Wum, Northwest Region, according to multiple sources.  The attackers burned one of the victims alive and burned 13 houses.  The attacks occurred shortly after separatists killed a soldier in Wum.  According to multiple Wum residents, the involvement of Muslim Mbororos in military campaigns against local populations, who are mostly Christian, significantly worsened traditionally tense relations between the two communities.

On June 8, government forces in Vekovi, Northwest Region arrested Father Sylvester Ngarba Nsah, a Catholic priest of the Diocese of Kumbo.  Soldiers took him to a military tribunal in Bamenda, Northwest Region, where they accused him of collaborating with separatists and detained him for several days before releasing him on bail.  The case against Ngarba Nsah remained pending at year’s end.

On October 5, according to media and civil society sources, government forces looking for separatists destroyed part of the Cameroon Baptist Convention (CBC) church building in Luh, Northwest Region.  According to the pastor of the church, the soldiers deliberately shot at the building multiple times, damaging the walls and destroying the windows.  He said there were no casualties, as the church was empty at the time.

According to CBC Pastor Vincent Tawa, on October 6, government forces looking for separatists attacked church buildings in Kikaikum, Northwest Region.  Tawa said the soldiers broke into the CBC church compound, destroyed the church residence, and invaded the Full Gospel church building, destroying church property inside.

According to Charles Mbuntum, a Catholic priest in Kikaikelaki, Northwest Region, on April 25, government soldiers on patrol interrupted a morning worship service and forced 20 civilians out of their church to fill trenches and remove separatist-established roadblocks.  Mbuntum said the soldiers allowed them to rejoin the other worshippers after they cleared the road.  According to the media, on July 5, government forces entered a church in Ngondzen during a worship service, accused the worshipers of supporting separatists, and forced them to exit the building.

According to a priest of the Diocese of Kumbo, on April 26, soldiers fighting separatists fired shots at the Catholic residence in Kikaikelaki, damaging the building.  The priest said that intense gunfire exchanges between separatists and government forces often took place while he officiated morning worship services.  He said the constant fighting frightened parishioners and had discouraged many from attending religious services.

On April 30, Adamawa Region Governor Kildadi Taguieke Boukar suspended night prayers at mosques to preempt a rise in COVID-19 cases due to the expected large number of worshippers during the final 10 days of Ramadan, when most did not follow government COVID-19 safety guidelines.  According to local authorities, the governor consulted Muslim leaders, who relayed his message to their followers.  However, some local residents complained the suspension of night prayers limited their freedom to worship during the most sacred period of the Islamic calendar.

On May 11, Minister of Territorial Administration Paul Atanga Nji banned the Cameroonian Lunar Crescent Council (CLCC) from making public announcements on the duration of Ramadan and said only the National Lunar Crescent Commission (NLCC), another Muslim organization, had that right.  Atanga Nji’s ban followed a dispute between the newly created CLCC and the NLCC regarding the determination of the duration of Ramadan.  The NLCC had played this role in previous years.  Muslim leaders opposed to the CLCC’s creation described the new organization as controversial in a press release.  They said the CLCC lacked credibility and transparency and promoted discord among Muslims.

The government took no action to adjudicate applications for the registration of several religious groups that had been pending for years.  The government approved only one new religious group in the last 18 years and none since 2010.  Although by law groups must register, the government continued to allow hundreds of unregistered small religious groups to operate freely under a policy of “administrative tolerance.”  In June, approximately 50 Pentecostal churches that had been functioning in secret in Yaounde submitted their registration documents to the prefect of Yaounde I subdivision and expressed the desire to be recognized officially, according to a local media outlet.  As of the end of the year, the churches in question remained unregistered.  According to a local religious leader, the government was reluctant to register many faith-based organizations, such as Pentecostal churches, partly because they “lacked the ability to coordinate their actions and activities,” unlike Catholic and mainline Protestant churches.

On October 26, an official of the government-sponsored Cameroon Human Rights Commission (CHRC) said that in many instances, the government could not register faith-based organizations because of their inability to meet the legal criteria and present required documentation.  According to the CHRC official, the government was also reluctant to recognize the existence of faith-based organizations it assessed had ulterior financial motives.  Some religious group members continued to suggest the government used the delay in registrations to curb unregistered churches and to create tension between those with proper credentials and those without.

The government continued to grant broad legal authority to traditional leaders to manage their districts.  As part of this authority, traditional leaders continued to exercise control over local mosques, with the right to appoint or dismiss imams.  Traditional leaders did not have this same authority over the appointment or dismissal of other religious figures.

State-sponsored radio stations and the sole state-sponsored television station continued to broadcast Christian and Islamic religious services and ceremonies regularly on national holidays and during national events.  Government ministers and other officials often attended these ceremonies.

The government provided an annual subsidy to all private primary and secondary education institutions, including religious schools.  The size of the subsidy was proportional to the size of the student body.

Boko Haram and ISIS-WA continued to commit terrorist acts in the Far North Region in what observers said was an attempt to impose their religious and political beliefs.  Boko Haram continued to target Muslims, Christians, and traditionalist believers without apparent distinction, while ISIS-WA tended to target and attack military installations and other government property more than civilians.

According to the annual report from international Christian advocacy organization Open Doors, Christians faced a threat of individual assault or kidnapping from Boko Haram while they cultivated their farms in the Far North Region.  The nongovernmental organization (NGO) stated that Boko Haram also attacked villages during the year, killing people and burning churches.  Some Christians told Open Doors they slept in the forest at night to protect themselves from terrorists.

According to multiple sources, including from local media and civil society, in February, Muslim Mbororo herders killed at least 13 members of the mostly Christian population in Nwa, Northwest Region.  During the attacks, they burned down three churches and the residence of the local CBC pastor.  According to another CBC pastor in the area, the attacks forced thousands of Nwa residents to flee into the forest and cross the border into Nigeria.  The pastor said the attacks only subsided in March after the Mbororo herders withdrew from the area.  In February, a pro-Mbororo NGO, the Justice and Dignity Campaign, said prior to the Nwa attacks, separatists – most of whom were Christian residents of the area – killed and abducted several Mbororos in the area, as well as in other parts of the Northwest Region.  According to the CBC pastor, while Christian residents and Muslim Mbororo herders managed to coexist despite longstanding tensions over land, the crisis in the Northwest and Southwest Regions had exacerbated tensions, especially as Mbororos regularly allied with the military against separatists.

Boko Haram and ISIS-WA abducted numerous civilians, including Christian women and girls who were often sexually abused and forced into marriage with Muslim men, according to local media outlet L’Oeil du Sahel.  In October, two human rights activists in the Far North Region said that Boko Haram and ISIS-WA attacks had worsened in that area when compared with previous years, despite the diminished fighting capacity of Boko Haram.  In a 2021 report on religious freedom in the world, Aid to the Church in Need, an international papal charity of the Catholic Church, described the situation for Christians in the country as one in which persecution was prevalent and created an untenable environment for worship.

According to reports, on June 6, a group presumed to be separatists attacked the Francis Xavier Pastoral Centre in Mamfe, Southwest Region, where several priests had gathered.  According to the media, one person died during the attack while a second died in the hospital, and 11 others were wounded.  According to UNICEF, one of those killed was a 12-year-old child.  Following the attack, Christopher Eboka, a priest of Mamfe Diocese, told the media the frequent attacks indicated the Catholic Church had become the new target of the “belligerents” of the separatist crisis because the perception that the Church was wealthy encouraged some groups to regularly threaten priests and abduct them for ransom.

Suspected separatists had previously abducted Eboka on May 22.  According to a diocese-issued press release, the abductors kidnapped him and his commercial motorbike driver during a pastoral trip to celebrate Pentecost.  After the abductors released Eboka on May 31, they stated in a video message on social media that they had not collected any ransom and had abducted the priest as a warning to the Catholic Church, which they said was allied with the government and opposed to the independence of the Northwest and Southwest Regions.

On June 8, Humphrey Tata Mbui, the communications secretary for the National Episcopal Conference, representing Catholics in the country, stated in a press release that separatists had abducted Catholic priest Sylvester Ngarba Nsah in March prior to the government arresting him in June.  Separatists accused him of collaborating with the military before releasing him.  According to the Diocese of Kumbo, separatists kidnapped and tortured Ngarba Nsah twice because he had defied a separatist-supported school boycott by leading the resumption of classes at a Catholic school in Vekovi.

In July, unidentified individuals kidnapped a pastor and two members of Miracle Valley International Gospel Centre in Limbe, Southwest Region as they were leaving the church after a worship service.  The senior pastor of the church, Derek Temiong, identified the kidnappers as separatists and said they asked for a ransom of 600,000 CFA francs ($1,000) for the release of the three individuals.  He said the separatists targeted his church because of its perceived collaboration with the government and its opposition to the independence of the Northwest and Southwest Regions.  According to Temiong, the three abductees were released days later after negotiations with the separatists, who did not receive a ransom.

According to a press release issued by the chancellor of the Diocese of Mamfe, Sebastine Sinju, on August 29, armed separatists forced their way into the major seminary compound in Mamfe and abducted the vicar general, Julius Agbortoko.  According to the press release, the kidnappers asked for a ransom of 20 million CFA francs ($34,600).  On September 1, Sinju issued a press release that Agbortoko had been released without the payment of a ransom.

According to the PCC, on October 24, five armed individuals on motorbikes abducted the congregational chairperson of the Ntamulung Presbyterian Church, Anastasia Nana, in Bamenda, Northwest Region.  The abduction took place at the church compound at the end of a worship service.  In a press release issued shortly after the incident, the PCC attributed the abduction to separatists.  On October 26, the PCC announced that Nana had been released after spending a night in captivity.  The PCC did not specify if the separatists had received a ransom in exchange for her release.

In July, L’Oeil du Sahel reported that Boko Haram and ISIS-WA had started applying sharia to Muslims and non-Muslims in the areas of the country under their control near Lake Chad.  This included public floggings of smokers and alleged adulterers and cutting off one hand of persons accused of theft.

According to the media, in August, suspected Boko Haram terrorists launched several attacks in Krawa-Mafa, Mayo Tsanaga, Far North Region, where they destroyed one church and many other buildings.

In January, self-proclaimed separatists affiliated with the “Interim Government of Ambazonia,” a group that may hold significant command and control over armed groups on the ground, announced a lockdown of Bamenda, Northwest Region to prevent Catholics from attending a Mass organized during the visit of the Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Pietro Parolin.  In several audio messages on social media, separatists said the Catholic Church was indifferent to the plight of English-speaking Cameroonians and regularly failed to condemn government-perpetrated human rights abuses.  According to media reports, numerous Catholics attended the event.  After Parolin’s visit, Bamenda-based Muslim scholar Abdulkarim Ali said on social media that some separatists threatened to assault him after he attended the service.  The Archbishop of Bamenda, Andrew Nkea Fuanya, and other religious leaders attempted to mediate between the government and separatist fighters throughout the year.

On May 7, separatists fired gunshots during a Mass at Saint Augustine’s College, Kumbo, where parishioners had gathered to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the priesthood of the Bishop of Kumbo, George Nkuo.  Videos of the attack circulating on social media showed hundreds of panic-stricken civilians fleeing or taking cover amid the sounds of gunfire.  On May 8, the pro-separatist media outlet Bareta News said the separatists opposed the presence at the event of the Northwest Region governor, Adolphe Lele Lafrique, and viewed his presence as evidence that the Church was collaborating with the government.  On May 10, a priest from the Diocese of Kumbo said the worship service was suspended for at least 15 minutes while separatists exchanged gunfire with security forces deployed prior to the event.  According to the media, no one was hurt.

On September 4, separatists in Bali announced a ban on PCC activities there because of the PCC moderator’s failure to state unequivocally that government forces were responsible for the August 22 shootings.  The separatists declared the Church’s activities would only resume after the resignation of the moderator and asked PCC Christians to worship at other churches.  Following the separatists’ announcement, the PCC Ntanfoang chapel in Bali closed for several weeks.  On September 5, the PCC moderator instructed all PCC pastors to leave Bali.  On October 10, worship services resumed at PCC Ntanfoang after separatists lifted the ban.

Because religion, ethnicity, and politics are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

In September, tensions escalated between Muslims and Christians in Ngaoundere, Adamawa Region, according to Etienne Patrice Etoundi Essama, leader of the Cameroon Association for Interreligious Dialogue.  Etoundi Essama said the leading imam in the area, Cheikh Mahmoud Ali, accused authorities at the Catholic Mazenod High School of attempting to convert Muslim students to Christianity by compelling them to wear badges bearing a cross.  Ali characterized the practice as a subtle form of evangelization and urged Muslims to withdraw their children from the school.  According to the school authorities, the badge was part of a uniform that identified all students at the school, but the uniform requirement had previously not been required for Muslim students.  Following government-led mediation on September 12, Minister of Territorial Administration Paul Atanga Nji said that both sides agreed that Muslim students at the school would be exempt from wearing badges bearing a cross.  On October 25, the Catholic Church’s Justice and Peace service said many Muslim parents withdrew their children from the school after the incident.

In October, a group of evangelical Christians in Douala, Littoral Region, accused an elderly woman of being possessed by demons and assaulted her in her home after she refused to adhere to their doctrine.  According to the media, the assailants had previously attacked other individuals in the area who did not share their religious beliefs.  Security forces rescued the woman and arrested seven individuals on assault charges and jailed them at the New Bell Prison in Douala.  The trial of the seven was proceeding at the Douala Court of First Instance at year’s end.

In July, Derek Che Choh, Chancellor of the Archdiocese of Bamenda, announced in a public statement that unidentified individuals had desecrated two churches in Njinikom, Northwest Region.  According to Che Choh, on May 14, intruders stole the eucharist from the Perpetual Adoration Chapel in Njinikom Parish.  He said on July 8 that in a separate incident, unidentified individuals removed the tabernacle from the wall of the Christ the King parish church in Fuli Kom.  Che Choh said the acts were sacrilegious and desecrated the most sacred aspects of the Catholic faith.

In its report covering 2021, NGO Open Doors said that Christians who converted from Islam in the country suffered persecution and were at great risk from their immediate family and their wider community if they told anyone about their conversion, or if Bibles are discovered in their possession.

In October, members of an LGBTQI+ organization in the North Region said they regularly faced the discrimination and violence from other members of their religious communities.  They said religious leaders and other worshippers physically assaulted them, often shunned or avoided them during services, and denied them entry into faith-based organizations.

In September, the Cameroon Association for Interreligious Dialogue (ACADIR) organized a roundtable that brought together diverse faith-based organizations to discuss doctrines and practices that the association said hindered peaceful coexistence and exacerbated religious extremism.  Participants at the roundtable discussed the response of Muslim leaders to threats of Boko Haram and ISIS-WA in the Far North Region and addressed perceived religious extremism associated with Pentecostal churches.  The roundtable additionally addressed a conflict between Muslims and Christians in Adamawa Region, and discussed the contribution of diverse groups, including women and youth, to national peace and development.

Some prominent religious leaders played significant roles in promoting COVID-19 vaccinations.  In June, the Cameroon Council of Imams and Muslim Dignitaries (CIDIMUC) launched a campaign to sensitize Muslims to the necessity of the vaccinations.  CIDIMUC members publicly received their vaccines at Djoungolo Hospital in Yaounde, and Muslim leaders urged worshippers to take the vaccine during prayers at mosques.  In June, CIDIMUC produced a commercial promoting COVID-19 vaccination that ran on state-funded CRTV television for several weeks.

In May, ACADIR – in partnership with UNICEF and the Ministry of Public Health – organized a workshop in Yaounde during which participants urged Christians and Muslims to wear masks, observe COVID-19 safeguards, and get vaccinated.

On October 9, CIDIMUC organized an interreligious conference to promote interreligious dialogue and multiculturalism and consolidate peace.  According to the organizers, the conference sought to highlight the virtues of social cohesion and the contribution of religious groups to conflict prevention and resolution.

In February, ACADIR provided training on interreligious dialogue to Christians and Muslims in Ngaoundere, Adamawa Region.  In March and in June, ACADIR provided similar training sessions to Christians and Muslims in Bertoua, East Region, Garoua, North Region and Maroua, Far North Region.

Embassy officials discussed interreligious tensions between Muslims and Christians with government officials.  In January, embassy officials raised the relations between Muslim Mbororo and local Christians with the mayor of Betare-Oya in the East Region.  In October, embassy officials discussed the implications of tensions between Muslims and Christians at a Roman Catholic College in Ngaoundere with the city mayor.  During a meeting with a mayor in Bertoua in March, embassy officials discussed Boko Haram and ISIS-WA attacks and emphasized the role the administration and local leaders could play in the fight against terrorism.

In May, the Charge d’Affaires hosted a religious freedom roundtable in Yaounde to discuss roles religious leaders could play in mitigating the spread of COVID-19, promoting COVID-19 vaccines, and bringing peace in the Northwest and Southwest Regions.  The roundtable included prominent Catholic, evangelical Christian, Muslim, Protestant, and Greek Orthodox religious leaders and scholars.  All the religious leaders present expressed frustration at the lack of substantive engagement from the government on issues related to the pandemic and to peace.

Embassy officials discussed the importance of interreligious dialogue and the response of religious leaders to Boko Haram and ISIS-WA attacks with leaders from Christian and Muslim communities, including the Bishop of Buea, the leader of Caritas-Kumbo, a local branch of the Catholic relief and development agency in the Northwest Region, the PCC moderator, a representative of the Cameroon Baptist Convention, regional ACADIR leaders, and the national coordinator of CIDIMUC.  Embassy officials also discussed with these leaders the violence in the Northwest and Southwest Regions and its negative impact on religious freedom.

On March 3, the embassy issued a press release to express concern regarding communal violence between Muslim Mbororos and Christian communities in Nwa.  It called for an immediate cessation of violence and urged the authorities to conduct a full and impartial investigation and to hold those responsible accountable.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 37.9 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2011 census, which has the most recent data available on religion, approximately 67 percent of the population self-identifies as Christian.  Roman Catholics constitute the largest Christian group (38 percent of the total population), followed by the United Church of Canada (6 percent), Anglicans (5 percent), Baptists (1.9 percent), and Christian Orthodox (1.7 percent).  Presbyterian, Lutheran, and Pentecostal groups each constitute less than 2 percent of the population.  The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints estimates its membership at 199,000.  The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (FLDS Church) estimates its membership at 1,000.  The Hutterites, or Hutterite Brethren, which number approximately 35,000, are an Anabaptist ethnoreligious group living primarily in Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan Provinces.  Approximately 3 percent of the population is Muslim, and 1 percent Jewish.  Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, Scientologists, Baha’is, and adherents of Shintoism, Taoism, and aboriginal spirituality together constitute less than 4 percent of the population.  Approximately 24 percent of the population list no religious affiliation.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, and expression.  Every individual is equal under the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination based on religion.  The law imposes “reasonable limits” on the exercise of these religious rights only where such restrictions can be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”  The law permits individuals to sue the government for violations of religious freedom.  Federal and provincial human rights laws prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion.  Civil remedies include compensation and/or changes to the policy or practice responsible for the discrimination.

The law does not require religious groups to register, but the government grants tax-exempt status to religious groups that register as nonprofit organizations with the Charities Directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency.  Nonprofit status provides such organizations with federal and provincial sales tax reductions, rebates, and exemptions.  To gain and retain tax-exempt status, a group must be nonpolitical and undergo periodic audits.  Charitable status also grants members of the clergy various federal benefits, including a housing deduction under the tax code and expedited processing through the immigration system.  The term “clergy” includes persons whose communities have licensed, ordained, or otherwise formally recognized them for their religious leadership and authority to perform spiritual duties and services within their religious organization.  Individual citizens who donate to tax-exempt religious groups receive a federal tax receipt entitling them to federal income tax deductions.

A 2019 Quebec provincial law on secularism prohibits certain provincial government employees from wearing religious symbols while exercising their official functions.  The law defines a religious symbol as “any object including clothing, a symbol, jewelry, an adornment, an accessory, or headwear; that (1) is worn in connection with a religious conviction or belief; or (2) is reasonably considered as referring to a religious affiliation.”  Classes of individuals and offices covered by the law include the president and vice presidents of the national assembly; administrative justices of the peace; certain municipal court employees; police, sheriffs, and deputy sheriffs; certain prosecutors and criminal lawyers; and certain principals, vice principals, and teachers, among others.  The law also requires anyone seeking certain provincial government services to do so with “face uncovered.”  The law invokes the “notwithstanding clause” of the federal constitution, which permits a province to override specific constitutional protections for a period of five years to prevent citizens from bringing challenges to the law based on the federal constitution.  The law is subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms after the five-year period if the exemption is not renewed.  The law exempts provincial employees working prior to the implementation of the law; however, they lose their right to wear religious symbols upon changing jobs or receiving a promotion.

Government policy and practices regarding education, including regulation of religious schools, fall under the purview of the provincial, rather than federal, governments.  Six of the 10 provinces provide full or partial funding to some religious schools.

Catholic and Protestant schools in Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan retain the federal constitutionally protected right to public funding they gained when those provinces joined the federation.  Other provinces either had no legally recognized denominational schools that qualified for such protection at the time of federation or accession, or they subsequently secured a federal constitutional amendment allowing them to terminate religious education funding rights and introduce an exclusively secular publicly funded education system.  Federal statutory protection for Catholic and Protestant publicly funded minority education exists in the Yukon, Nunavut, and Northwest Territories, which do not have provincial status.  Constitutional or federal statutory protection for public funding of religious education does not extend to schools of other religious groups, although British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Quebec offer partial funding to religious schools of any faith that meet provincial scholastic criteria.  The laws permit parents to homeschool their children or enroll them in private schools for religious reasons.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In May, the Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal of the sentence of a Quebec man who shot and killed six Muslim worshipers in the Grand Mosque in Quebec City in 2017.  The Quebec government appealed a 2019 lower court decision that reduced the man’s 40-year cumulative sentence to the maximum single term of 25 years without eligibility for parole on the grounds that consecutive sentencing constituted harsh and unusual punishment and violated the country’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  The Supreme Court scheduled the appeal hearing for March 24, 2022.

Provinces continued to temporarily ban in-person religious gatherings or imposed restrictions that varied by province and limited the number of persons permitted to gather to stem transmission of COVID-19.  Restrictions fluctuated during the pandemic based on local conditions and governmental decisions.  Some religious communities said provincial orders and additional measures were discriminatory against religious groups.  For example, in June, seven churches in Manitoba filed a class action lawsuit against the province’s COVID-19 health orders that restricted in-person church services to 10 persons or 25 percent of capacity.  The suit stated the public health orders infringed on their religious freedom and caused a “crisis of conscience.”  In October, a Manitoba judge ruled pandemic restrictions put in place by the province were not a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the public health orders were reasonable limitations on the groups’ rights.  Throughout the year, individual clergy across the country were also fined and arrested for not complying with COVID-19 orders.  For example, in June, an Alberta judge found Fortress of Adullam Street Church Pastor Artur Pawlowski and his brother David Pawlowski guilty of contempt of court for deliberately and repeatedly violating COVID-19 health orders, including by organizing in-person church services in violation of provincial capacity limits.  In October, an Alberta court sentenced Pawlowski and his brother to prison time, fines, 18 months’ probation, including community service hours, and required that any time they exercised their right of free speech and spoke against the Alberta Health Services’ orders – whether in person or online – they state they were aware that their views were not held by the majority of medical experts in Alberta.  In May, three Ontario churches challenged the constitutionality of lockdown measures in their province.  The hearing remained pending at year’s end.

In February, authorities arrested GraceLife Pastor James Coates in Alberta for holding in-person church services in violation of the province’s 15 percent capacity limit and for violating a previous warning issued by Alberta health authorities.  Authorities ordered his release in February, but he refused to comply with the bail terms to not hold in-church services and remained in custody for 35 days, until March 29.  In April, Alberta health authorities and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) took custody of the GraceLife Church building, located in the Edmonton area, and barricaded it with temporary fences for continued violations of provincial capacity limits for in-person worship.  In June, an Alberta court ruled Coates’ rights were not violated when he was ticketed and arrested for violating COVID-19 restrictions.  Authorities returned the church building to the congregation on July 1 after Alberta rescinded the health orders.

In January, British Columbia (B.C.) health authorities temporarily prohibited in- person worship services and public gatherings to stem transmission of COVID-19.  The RCMP fined three B.C. churches for holding in-person services.  Church representatives filed a legal challenge to the public health orders on the basis the orders violated their constitutional right to worship in-person.  They also said the government allowed restaurants and other businesses to remain open with fewer restrictions and that Orthodox Jewish synagogues were granted permission to hold indoor services.  The B.C. supreme (trial) court dismissed the case and upheld the restrictions in March.  The churches appealed the trial court ruling, and trial dates for the three pastors were scheduled for January 2022.  Also in March, B.C. authorities revised public health orders and allowed churches and other faith communities to hold outdoor services with a 25 percent capacity if COVID-19 safety plans were in place.  In January, Quebec officials proposed a limit of 10 persons for religious gatherings per place of worship as part of enhanced COVID-19 restrictions.  The Jewish Community Council of Montreal, as well as the Jewish Hasidic Council of Quebec and several other ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups, urged the government to interpret the public health order as accommodating 10 persons per room in a multispace venue if each room had independent access to the street and did not share a common space, allowing a greater number of persons to take part in religious ceremonies.  Municipal guidance changed three times over the course of 48 hours, leading to confusion and the ticketing by police of more than 200 members of the Jewish community for exceeding the 10-person limit.  The Hasidic Jewish Council sought an injunction against the 10-person limit, and a Quebec trial court judge ruled in its favor.  In March, Quebec changed its COVID-19 regulations to allow a maximum of 250 persons inside a house of worship and 500 persons for an outdoor service.  In December, it reduced capacity to 50 percent for places of worship and other venues.

In December, the Western Quebec School Board removed a Chelsea, Quebec elementary school teacher from the classroom for wearing a hijab, citing the provincial law on secularism.  Board interim chair Wayne Daly said the board erred in hiring the teacher without knowing she wore a hijab and withdrew her from the classroom in compliance with the law.  Daly said that all principals at schools within the Western Quebec School Board had received a memo outlining the law and were instructed to “take it into consideration when you’re hiring teachers.”  He said, however, that the law was unethical, and the board was categorically opposed to the law on secularism.  The teacher remained employed with the school board, which transferred her to an administrative position working on “inclusion and diversity literacy.”  The teacher’s case was raised in parliament.  Prime Minister Justin Trudeau reiterated the government’s concerns regarding the law, saying on December 15, “I don’t think that in a free and democratic society, a person should lose their job because of their religion.”  He said on December 17 that the federal government continued to “reflect” on future action, including potentially asking the Supreme Court for an advisory ruling or clarification on how the constitution’s notwithstanding clause should be used.

In April, an Alberta school requested a judge overturn a 2020 decision by the Alberta Human Rights Commission that ordered it to allow two Muslim students to pray and to pay them 18,000 Canadian dollars ($14,100) each plus interest as the remedy for having denied them a space to pray.  The school had accommodated the boys’ request for prayer space briefly after enrollment in 2011 but withdrew permission on the basis that it contravened the school’s secular character.  When the boys continued to pray, the school expelled them.  School officials stated the ruling created a double standard at the school, which they said focused on academic achievement and secular multiculturalism.  The court dismissed the school’s appeal in July.

In October, Quebec Education Minister Jean-Francois Roberge unveiled a new mandatory “Culture and Quebec Citizenship” course to replace the former Ethics and Religious Culture program in the province’s public schools.  The program, scheduled to be implemented in classrooms across Quebec at the start of the 2022 school year, is built upon three main aspects:  culture, Quebec citizenship, and dialogue/critical thinking.  Observers stated the change aligned with the government’s wider vision of a secular Quebec and was consistent with its passage of legislation prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols by certain provincial public employees.

In February, the country’s Supreme Court dismissed an appeal filed by the Public Schools of Saskatchewan – a coalition of school boards in the province’s secular, publicly funded education system – and upheld a March 2020 lower court decision that stated non-Catholic students attending a Catholic school in the province may receive public funding for their schooling.  Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe applauded the decision, stating, “Our government strongly supports parent and student choice in education, including Saskatchewan’s public, separate, and faith-based schools,” and, “…Students have the right to attend public or separate schools, regardless of their religious affiliation.”  According to Tom Fortosky, executive director of the Saskatchewan Catholic School Boards Association, the Supreme Court’s decision was a “welcome relief.”

In July, a federal judge ruled the federal government had denied Redeemer University in Ontario procedural fairness in its application for funding under the Canada Summer Jobs Program because it was a faith-based institution affiliated with the Christian Reformed Church.  The school had taken part in the Canada Summer Jobs program since 2006, but the federal government rejected its application in 2018 on the grounds the school failed to demonstrate measures to provide a workplace free of harassment and discrimination.  LGBTQI+ students and alumni said that Redeemer’s disciplinary policy that restricted sexual behavior on religious grounds to relations within heterosexual marriage discriminated based on sexual orientation.  The judge also ruled the federal government failed to conduct a fair and unbiased assessment of Redeemer’s application because government officials sought no clarification of measures taken by Redeemer to provide an equitable workplace.  The judge stated that there was no evidence the ministry made any overt attempt to consider Redeemer’s rights to freedom of religion, expression, and association.  He ordered the federal government to pay the university’s legal fees.

In February, a student in Ontario said he was dismissed from the Ryerson University student newspaper because he held orthodox Catholic beliefs that included the belief that being homosexual or transgender was sinful.  The student filed a complaint of discrimination based on religious belief with the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal and sought 200,000 Canadian dollars ($157,000) in compensation, plus the development of human rights codes at the school newspaper.  The tribunal found in the student’s favor and the parties reached a settlement in October in which the student newspaper issued a letter of regret, according to press reports.

Also in February, the University of Toronto’s Complaint and Resolution Council for Student Societies found the Graduate Students’ Union Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Committee could not use student fees to promote the anti-Israel boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement.  The case was brought to the council by a Jewish student with the assistance of B’nai B’rith Canada, which said the BDS movement was antisemitic.  According to Michael Mostyn, chief executive officer of B’nai B’rith Canada, the decision was a “…massive victory for Jewish students at the University of Toronto and across Canada.”

In June, a Quebec man said provincial child protection authorities took custody of his three-day-old baby and discriminated against him because he was Muslim and because his wife wore a hijab and did not speak French.  The man said child welfare authorities removed the baby from the family because he and his wife refused certain blood tests for genetic and heredity testing and because hospital staff accused his wife of shaking the baby and not waking up to feed the infant, actions the father denied.  The parents went to court to regain custody of the child.

In October, Prime Minister Trudeau announced the government would make the role of the country’s Special Envoy for Preserving Holocaust Remembrance and Fighting anti-Semitism a permanent position and bolster the position with more resources.  Trudeau said the Special Envoy would be responsible for developing the country’s national plan to combat all forms of hate and antisemitism.

In January, councilors from Montreal, Quebec’s most populous borough, Cote-des-Neiges-Notre-Dame-de-Grace, voted to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism.  Elsewhere, debate on the IHRA continued throughout the year.

In July, Tribute to Liberty, a charity raising funds for a new monument in Ottawa to honor the victims of communist regimes, received donations in honor of known fascists and Nazi collaborators through its “buy-a-brick” campaign called Pathways to Liberty, according to press reports.  The references to these individuals were removed from the Tribute to Liberty website, but it was unclear whether the donations were returned.

In August, the Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center in Canada renewed their calls for removal of two monuments in Edmonton, Alberta that the group said honored Nazi collaborators.

The Tax Court of Canada implemented a policy between October 2020 and May 2021 to ensure no Muslims appeared before Judge David Spiro, according to media reports in September.  At the time, Spiro, who is Jewish, was under investigation for allegations of bias in trying to block the hiring of a law professor at the University of Toronto whose academic work criticized Israel for human rights issues in Palestinian territories.  Spiro was a major donor to the university.  According to Spiro, his opposition to the candidate was because of her affiliation with an organization the government considered terrorist, not because of the candidate’s views on the Israel-Palestinian conflict.  The Tax Court said it screened counsel and litigants to avoid cases brought by Muslims from being adjudicated by the judge for “perception purposes.”  Some members of the legal community, however, opposed the policy, saying it was the equivalent of a “Muslim ban” and was inconsistent with equality in the justice system.  According to Mohammad Fadel, a law professor at the University of Toronto, “The policy made it appear falsely as if the complaints against Judge Spiro pitted Jews and Muslims against one another.”  In May, a review panel for the Canadian Judicial Council determined that Judge Spiro had made a “serious error” in involving himself in the university hiring decision, but the council recommended no action against him.  The Tax Court lifted restrictions on hearings before Spiro in May.

In July, the federal government held separate national summits on antisemitism and Islamophobia.  The summits were held to identify ways in which organizations, communities, individuals, and governments could work together to increase public awareness, enhance community security, combat misinformation and online hate, and identify new measures necessary to combat hatred and discrimination based on religion.  During both summits, the federal government announced six million Canadian dollars ($4.7 million) in funding for 150 projects to support communities at risk of hate-motivated crime.

In June, the government of Ontario announced funding for educational programs to help fight anti-Muslim sentiment.  It gave grants to the Muslim Association of Canada to create digital resources for educators, students, and parents to counter anti-Muslim sentiment.  It also gave grants to the National Council of Canadian Muslims for programs to help Muslim immigrants learn about the country and to prepare Muslim students for school.

In January, the University of Toronto established a working group to create what it termed an inclusive and welcoming environment for Jewish members of the university community and to recommend actions the university could take to improve education about antisemitism.

In July, Mayor Kenny Bell of the Nunavut territorial capital of Iqaluit said he planned to bring forward a motion to the city council to withdraw tax exemptions for churches from municipal property taxes.  The mayor said he decided to take the action after publication of the discovery of unmarked graves believed to be of indigenous children at the sites of church-run former Indian Residential Schools.  Bell said, “Tax exemptions as a whole are supposed to be for groups that do the community good.  It’s very clear that the Catholic Church has not done the community any good.”  The mayor subsequently reversed his decision and did not introduce the motion.

According to media reports, in February, RCMP authorities arrested Nationalist Party Leader Travis Patron for “willfully promoting hatred to an identifiable group” after he posted an antisemitic YouTube video, entitled “Beware the Parasitic Tribe.”  Officially registered in 2019, the Nationalist Party had no members in any legislature.

In July, an article published in the online Jewish newspaper Algemeiner entitled “How Faculty and Teachers Spread anti-Israel Hatred and Anti-Semitism” included a comment from Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Centre executive Michael Levitt, who warned of the “mainstreaming of anti-Semitism in Canada.”  According to the article, professors at both public and private universities were contributing to an increase in antisemitism on university campuses.  For example, the article cited a professor at the University of Victoria who wrote, “Zionist students should not feel welcome in progressive spaces.”  The same article stated a professor at the University of Western Ontario, a university with a large Jewish student population, called for a “boycott against Zionist students on campus.”

In April, Prime Minister Trudeau issued a statement on Yom HaShoah, Holocaust Remembrance Day, in which he urged Canadians to take time to remember the victims of the Holocaust and to honor its survivors.  He said, “Today, and every day, we vow ‘Never again,’ and promise to remain vigilant against antisemitism and all forms of hatred, wherever and whenever they occur.”

In January, then-Minister of Canadian Heritage Steven Guilbeault declared January 29 a National Day of Remembrance of the 2017 Quebec City Mosque Attack and Action Against Islamophobia, to honor the victims and express solidarity with the survivors of the tragedy.

There were reports of physical violence, vandalism, hate speech, and harassment directed at religious groups, particularly against Jews and Muslims.  In July, Statistics Canada released statistics for 2020 that showed a 16 percent decline in the number of police-reported, religiously motivated hate crimes from 613 in 2019 to 515 in 2020.

In 2020, the most recent year for which there were statistics, the B’nai B’rith Canada League for Human Rights reported nine cases of antisemitic violence, compared with 14 in 2019; there were 118 reports of vandalism, including the painting of swastikas and threatening messages on buildings, and 2,483 reports of harassment, compared with 182 and 2,011, respectively, in 2019.  The league received 2,610 reports of antisemitic cases in 2020, compared with 2,207 in 2019 and 2,041 in 2018.  More than 95 percent of the occurrences (2,483) involved harassment.  Seventy-one percent of all incidents reported in 2020 occurred online or had an online component; the physical location and identities of those posting the online messages were unknown.  Occurrences of in-person versus online harassment increased to one in four incidents in 2020.  In 2020, while overall incidents increased across the country, there were significant reductions in all provinces except for Ontario and Atlantic Canada, which include New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island.

Ontario reported more than 1,000 incidents of antisemitism in 2020, a 44 percent increase over the span of a single year and which accounted for 43 percent of all antisemitic incidents in Canada.  Atlantic Canada, which historically was the region with the lowest recorded incidents of antisemitism, recorded a rise of more than 226 percent in antisemitic incidents.  All incidents in Atlantic Canada were either harassment or vandalism.  According to the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, police-reported hate crime data for 2019 indicated that Jews, although only approximately 1 percent of the population, were the targets of 15 percent of all hate crimes in the country and remained the country’s most targeted group.

In June, Nathaniel Veltman struck five members of a Muslim family with his truck, killing four of them, in London, Ontario.  Police stated the driver fitted his truck bumper with a ram bar and targeted the family because they were Muslim.  Authorities arrested Veltman and charged him with one count of terrorism, four counts of first degree murder, and one count of attempted murder.  Prime Minister Trudeau condemned the attack as “brutal, cowardly, and brazen” and said the “killing was no accident.  This was a terrorist attack.”  The Prime Minister said he would redouble the government’s efforts to dismantle “far-right hate groups” and groups that threatened public safety, adding the government would continue to fund programs to help community centers, religious schools, and places of worship protect themselves.

A preliminary hearing was held in January for Guilherme “William” Von Neutegem, who was charged with first degree murder in the 2020 killing of a congregant in the parking lot of the International Muslim Organization Mosque in Rexdale, a suburb of Toronto.  Von Neutegem remained in custody at year’s end.

In June, an unidentified man attacked two Muslim women in Alberta, grabbing one of the women by her hijab, pushing her to the ground, and knocking her unconscious, according to media reports.  The man reportedly knocked the second woman to the ground and threatened her with a knife.  Police opened an investigation and released a sketch of the suspect but made no arrest by year’s end.

In March, a woman verbally harassed two Muslim girls, then physically assaulted one of them in Prince’s Island Park in Calgary, according to media reports.  The assailant reportedly punched one of the victims in the face and kicked her in the stomach.  Calgary police charged the assailant with assault, mischief, and causing a disturbance.  Dr. Mukarram Zaidi of the Canadian Muslim Research Think Tank said Muslim women and young girls told him, “These kinds of incidents occurred on a daily basis.”

According to B’nai B’rith Canada, more antisemitic incidents were reported to the organization in May than in all of 2020, 2019, and 2018 combined.  The increase occurred at the same time protests were taking place across the country in response to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.  B’nai B’rith Canada stated that incidents of antisemitism also “tend to increase during election campaigns in Canada, whether federal or provincial.”  In August, B’nai B’rith Canada reported unidentified persons vandalized the Beth Sholom Synagogue in Toronto, Ontario with swastikas and other graffiti.  A sign drawing attention to antisemitism in Toronto was vandalized with antisemitic rhetoric, and a school in a Jewish neighborhood in Thornhill, Ontario, was painted with swastikas and obscene graffiti.  Police opened investigations.  Also in August, unknown individuals in Montreal defaced the election signs of two Jewish candidates for the federal parliament with swastikas.  Montreal police opened an investigation.  In November, unknown vandals defaced the provincial courthouse and neighboring city hall in Ottawa with swastika graffiti and the letters “SS.”  Ottawa police opened a hate crime investigation but had made no arrests at year’s end.

According to B’nai Brith, in July, a customer assaulted an elderly Jewish liquor store employee in Toronto after another employee had asked to see the customer’s identification and the customer refused to comply.  The customer called the Jewish employee a “dirty [expletive] Jew,” struck him in the back with a wine bottle, and punched him in the face.  The victim required stitches and had to take medical leave from work.  Authorities arrested a suspect three weeks after the incident and charged him with seven criminal counts.  According to B’nai Brith Canada, Toronto police considered it a hate crime.

In May, Jewish and Palestinian groups held parallel demonstrations in central Montreal, and a group of men bearing Palestinian flags attacked a group of Jewish individuals.  The men threw stones at the Jewish demonstrators and physically assaulted some of them, according to media reports.  Police used tear gas to disperse the crowds.

A June, an Angus Reid Institute poll on racism and diversity found 25 percent of Canadians said they felt “cold” towards Muslims, the highest negative sentiment toward any other religious group described in the survey.  A November 2020 submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief reported 52 percent of Canadians said they trusted Muslims “a little” or “not at all.”

According to press reports, in January, police charged Adam Riga with threatening to set fire to a place of worship and possession of incendiary materials after one of Montreal’s largest synagogues, Congregation Shaar Hashomayim, was vandalized with antisemitic symbols.  Large swastikas were painted on the doors of the synagogue and the man brought a canister of gasoline to the site.  In February, the judge hearing Riga’s case determined Riga was mentally unfit and could not be held criminally accountable for his actions and ordered that he be transferred to a psychiatric hospital for treatment.

According to media reports in Vancouver in February, Susan Standfield, characterized as an anti-vaccine conspiracist, promoted a t-shirt online that depicted a yellow Star of David marked with the words “Covid Caust.”  B’nai B’rith’s CEO Michael Mostyn condemned Standfield “in the strongest terms” for what he called “trafficking in Holocaust imagery in order to promote COVID-19 conspiracy theories.”  He stated, “There can be no comparison between masks and vaccines, which are intended to save lives, and the cruel murder of six million Jews and millions of others by the Nazis and their collaborators.”

In June, unidentified individuals burned four Catholic churches in indigenous communities in suspected arson fires in British Columbia, with two fires set on National Indigenous People’s Day.  Police investigated the four incidents.  A Catholic church in Nova Scotia was also set on fire in a First Nations (indigenous) community north of Halifax.  In July, unknown persons vandalized 11 churches, both Catholic and Protestant, in Calgary, Alberta with red and orange paint, according to media reports.  Most of the targeted churches were Catholic, and the vandalism included a smashed window with paint thrown inside, splattered paint over a statue of Jesus Christ, painted handprints on doors, and texts that read “Charge the priest,” “Our lives matter,” and “215.”  The paint colors and the number 215 were symbolically linked to protests over the discovery of unmarked graves believed to be of indigenous children compelled to attend Indian Residential Schools.  One of the vandalized churches was an African Evangelical Church.  According to Alberta Premier Jason Kenney, who condemned the vandalism, many of the church’s congregants had arrived in the country as refugees.  Police in Alberta opened an investigation.

An indigenous Manitoba man was arrested in June for setting fire to a Catholic church on Easter Sunday on the territory of the St. Theresa Point First Nation.  Several days later, St. Francis Xavier Catholic Church in Ontario was set ablaze, and police opened an investigation.  Police said they believed the church fires were likely set as protests after the discovery of 215 unmarked graves believed to be of indigenous children at the sites of former Indian residential schools.  Catholic and Protestant religious groups operated most of the schools between 1831 and 1998, and according to media, the government funded them to force the assimilation of Indigenous children into dominant Canadian culture and away from their own native culture and religion.  Prime Minister Trudeau commented, “The destruction of places of worship is unacceptable and it must stop.  We must work together to right past wrongs.”

In April, an individual shot an air rifle at the Assahaba Islamic Community Centre in Montreal, according to media reports.  Surveillance video showed a hooded individual taking 11 shots at the community center and then running away.  The Montreal police hate crimes unit opened an investigation.

In August, an unknown individual vandalized the Komagata Maru memorial in Vancouver.  The memorial is dedicated to the 376 Sikh, Muslim, and Hindu passengers aboard the ship Komagata Maru that in 1914 was denied entry to Canada under exclusion laws and forced to return to India.  Vancouver Mayor Kennedy Stewart said, “This is disgusting and whoever did this is a coward.  This memorial is about the perseverance of a community that has helped to build and shape our city.”  Vancouver police opened a hate crime investigation that remained pending at year’s end.

Embassy, consulate, and other U.S. government officials emphasized with the national and provincial governments the need for respect for religious freedom and diversity and reaffirmed the U.S. government’s commitment to addressing discrimination and exclusion through the Roadmap for Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership, a strategic document of shared policy priorities.  Embassy and other U.S. government officials met with representatives from Global Affairs Canada’s Office of Diversity and Inclusion to discuss issues of religious freedom in the country, including religious expression, inclusion, and tolerance.  Throughout the year, the embassy and consulates used social media to amplify religious freedom messaging from senior Department of State officials.

In July, a senior embassy official, and in October, the Charge d’Affaires, held roundtables with religious and secular leaders in Quebec City to discuss the relationship between religious freedom and secularism in Quebec.  In September, a senior embassy official gave remarks at an event on U.S. support for international religious freedom to graduate students in a Carleton University program on religion and public life.  In December, the consulate general in Vancouver participated in a virtual discussion and question and answer session with the British Columbia Muslim Students Association in which students shared their personal and professional experiences working on religious freedom, human rights, and social justice issues.  In August, officials from the consulate general in Calgary hosted a virtual panel on the intersection of identity and religion.  The event featured spokespersons from the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic faiths.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.4 million (midyear 2021).  According to the Pew Research Foundation in 2019 (the most recent data available), the population is 61 percent Protestant, 28 percent Catholic, and 9 percent Muslim.  Other religious groups, including traditional religious groups and those having no religious beliefs, make up an estimated 2 percent of the population.  The NGO Oxfam estimates the percentage of Muslims, most of whom are Sunni, at up to 15 percent (2019 data).  Some Christians and Muslims incorporate aspects of indigenous religions in their religious practices.

In the central, western, and southern regions of the country, Catholicism and Protestant Christianity are the dominant religious groups, while Islam is practiced in the far northern border areas near Cameroon, Chad, and Sudan.  In the capital, most residents of the Third District are Muslim, while other neighborhoods are predominantly Christian.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as of August 2021, there were 703,373 refugees from the Central African Republic in bordering countries, including Cameroon (46 percent), Democratic Republic of the Congo (29 percent), Chad (17.1 percent), Sudan (3.9 percent), Republic of Congo (2.9 percent), and South Sudan (0.3 percent).  Most refugees were Muslim.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes the country as a secular state.  This legal framework provides for freedom of religion and equal protection under the law and prohibits all forms of religious intolerance and “fundamentalism,” although it does not define these terms.  The constitution requires the head of state to take an oath of office, including a promise to fulfill the duties of office without religious bias.

Religious groups, except for indigenous ones, are required to register with the Ministries of the Interior, Public Security, and Territorial Administration.  To register, religious groups must prove they have a minimum of 1,000 members and their leaders have adequate religious education.  Indigenous religious groups may receive benefits and exemptions offered to registered groups regardless of their size.

The law permits the government to deny registration to any religious group deemed offensive to public morals or likely to disturb social peace.  It allows the suspension of registered religious groups if their activities are judged subversive by legal entities.  There are no fees for registration as a religious group.  Registration confers official recognition and benefits, such as exemptions from customs tariffs for vehicles or equipment imported into the country.  There are no penalties prescribed for groups that do not register.

The law does not prohibit religious instruction in public or private schools, but religious instruction is not part of the public-school curriculum.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government and UN forces regained control of a large portion of territory from rebels from the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) militia alliance during a counteroffensive launched in January by government forces, bilaterally deployed forces from neighboring countries, and forces from the Russia-backed Wagner Group.  However, instability continued as government forces struggled to maintain military gains, and armed groups continued to prey on civilians.  Amnesty International reported that during these operations, government forces and their allies from the Wagner Group targeted Muslims, engaging in killings, gender and sexual based violence, and physical abuse and threats.

According to CNN and the investigative group The Sentry, 14 persons were killed on February 16 at a mosque in Bambari when progovernment forces recaptured the city from the CPC.  During this assault, Wagner Group forces and soldiers from the national military – the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) – reportedly raped, tortured, and killed Muslim civilians.  Imams in Bangui stated that Muslim IDPs had been victims of torture, rape, extrajudicial killing, disappearance, and theft at the hands of FACA and Wagner Group forces.

Leaders of the Muslim Fulani ethnic minority stated they believed FACA and Wagner Group forces targeted and indiscriminately killed Fulani civilians during military operations against armed groups such as the Return Reclamation and Rehabilitation (3R) and the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC).  The United Nations also reported that government security forces and Wagner Group forces targeted Muslim civilians.

Local media reports stating there was a massacre of 40 Fulani civilians by government forces in the Nana-Mambere region on September 7 became a rallying cry for the Fulani community.  International observers were unable to verify the reports, which they said they believed were misquoted counts of Fulani civilian deaths during the prior weeks.  Local and international observers said they confirmed 12 civilians from two Fulani pastoralist families were killed by government forces in the same area on September 3.

An August human rights report by the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) noted an increase in targeted attacks against the civilian population, especially Muslims, in the central and northwestern parts of the country by government security forces and elements from the Wagner Group (denoted as “other security forces” in the MINUSCA report).  Mankeur Ndiaye, special representative of the UN Secretary-General and head of MINUSCA, said, “All parties to the conflict continue to commit atrocities as the security situation deteriorates, particularly in the provinces.”  The MINUSCA report recorded 526 cases of what it termed “abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law” across the country, which resulted in at least 1,221 casualties between June 2020 and June 2021, with attacks by FACA forces and their Wagner Group allies against Muslim communities increasing between February and June.  In one example, according to the MINUSCA report, “In the town of Kaga Bandoro, Nana Gribizi prefecture, a Muslim shopkeeper was arrested by other security personnel May 6 and taken to their base.  The day after his arrest, May 7, his charred body was found on the outskirts of the town, cut into pieces.”

The MINUSCA Human Rights Division reported that in mid-April, Wagner Group forces and FACA forces targeted the Muslim population in Bria, reportedly arresting and, according to MINUSCA, torturing high-level community chiefs.

In February, the International Criminal Court (ICC) began hearings in the case of anti-Balaka commander and former parliamentarian Alfred “Rambo” Yekatom and senior anti-Balaka leader Edouard Ngaissona.  The case was underway at the end of the year.  (The anti-Balaka are a loose affiliation of predominantly Christian armed groups.)  Both men were accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including killings that targeted Muslim civilians, the deportation and torture of Muslims, and the destruction of mosques, from 2013 to 2014.  Ngaissona was arrested by authorities in France in December 2018 and was transferred to ICC detention in January 2019.  Yekatom was arrested by government authorities in Bangui and surrendered to the ICC in November 2018.  Both arrests followed the government’s May 2014 decision to delegate cases involving conflict-related violence after August 2012 to the ICC.

In May, the Swiss NGO Center for Humanitarian Dialogue supported a community, religious, and victim leaders’ meeting in Bangui to discuss the mechanisms and objectives of the Truth, Justice, Reparations, and Reconciliation Commission, a body created by the government in February 2020 to lead national reconciliation by “establishing truth, pursuing justice, and restoring dignity to victims.”  In September, the country’s hybrid Special Criminal Court began the trial of Eugene Ngaikosset, a former captain of the Presidential Guard.  Ngaikosset was delivered to the court by government authorities for his role in commanding a unit implicated in the massacres of Muslim civilians in the northwest and northeast from 2005 to 2007.

Observers stated that because the electoral code did not permit refugees living outside the country to vote, Muslims were underrepresented in the electorate, and they warned that Muslims – who comprised the majority of the country’s refugees sheltering in neighboring countries – could be disenfranchised in elections scheduled for 2022, just as they had been in December 2020 elections.  In November, a national electoral authority official stated that complications in surveying and counting the country’s refugee population, and difficulties coordinating with refugee host countries, were the main reasons for the lack of a refugee voting provision.  Observers also stated that widely held prejudices calling into question the citizenship of Muslims who resided in the country, including on the part of government officials, complicated procurement of identity documents for Muslim voters.

On May 11, President Touadera attended Eid al-Fitr prayers at the Central Mosque in Bangui’s Third District.  On July 20, he participated in Eid al-Adha prayers at the Gobongo Mosque in Bangui.  During both visits, Touadera called for social cohesion and asked worshipers to continue praying for a return to peace and security.

On March 24, President Touadera convened leaders of major religious groups to discuss measures to block the spread of COVID-19 in places of worship, including by closing places of worship, schools, and the country’s borders for a few months during the year.  Religious leaders, including representatives of the Catholic Church, the Evangelists Association of Central Africa, the Islamic Superior Council of Central Africa, as well as members of the government and the Presidency cabinet, welcomed the initiative.

While international observers noted they believed the government took back significant portions of the territory previously occupied by armed groups during the year, Human Rights Watch and other observers said militias and armed rebel groups continued to foment violence and attack both civilians and government targets, even in the areas retaken by the government.  Government control of the territory remained tenuous, and observers noted clashes between armed groups and government forces continued throughout the country.  Most observers, including the UN Panel of Experts on CAR, described the violence along ethnic lines – which mostly overlapped with religious beliefs – with political and economic power struggles as important root causes.  Members of the CPC rebel coalition included two predominantly Christian, anti-Balaka groups; the predominantly Muslim Central African Patriotic Movement (MPC), the Popular Front for the Rebirth of CAR (FPRC), and the UPC; and the predominantly Fulani, Muslim-led 3R.  The MPC, UPC, and FPRC were formerly part of the “Seleka” alliance of rebel militia groups that claimed power through an armed rebellion and coup in March 2013.  Catholic clergy, including Archbishop of Bangui Cardinal Dieudonne Nzapalainga, stated that rather than religion or the protection of any community, armed group leaders were motivated by the conquest of political power and exploitation of the country’s economic resources.  Cardinal Nzapalainga stated these views during meetings with the UN Sanctions Committee in September.

Muslim community leaders continued to report social discrimination against and the marginalization of their communities, including difficulties acquiring identification documents.  Members of the board of the Coordination of Central African Muslim Organizations (COMUC) expressed similar concerns.  Imams from mosques in the majority-Muslim PK5 community of Bangui’s Third District stated that despite numerous efforts to build social cohesion between Muslims and Christians nationwide, their community continued to experience discrimination and instability.

According to COMUC, the Muslim community was marginalized and suffered inequality and injustice at all levels of society.  Many Muslim children lacked birth certificates, since most administrative documents were destroyed during the 2013-14 conflict.  At times, this allowed civil authorities to question the citizenship of children with Muslim names.  As a result of not having birth documents, many Muslim children could not attend school.  The PK5 community, COMUC reported, faced more water outages than other Bangui neighborhoods; COMUC said it believed this was due to the city’s deliberately spending fewer resources in the area because the population was largely Muslim.

Christian burials continued to take place in Bangui’s Islamic cemetery near M’poko Airport, in contravention of a 2016 agreement between the Christian and Muslim communities that designated the area exclusively for Islamic burials.  One Muslim community leader described the burials as provocations that were indicative of underlying, persistent tensions between the Muslim and Christian communities.

COMUC leaders said that Muslims were stigmatized and largely discriminated against in the existing political system.  They also stated Muslims were deprived of property rights and business ownership.  Although at least five of 32 ministers in President Touadera’s cabinet were Muslim, as well as National Mediator El Hadj Moussa Laurent Ngon Baba, civil society leaders in the Muslim community stated they perceived that Muslims were largely absent from positions of leadership.  Muslim community advocates again said that in their view, Muslims were underrepresented in the civil service and among recruits for state security institutions, despite diversity targets outlined in the National Defense Plan.

Traditional and social media outlets at times continued to portray Muslims negatively, particularly those of Fulani ethnicity.  On September 21, local newspaper Le Citoyen published an article that described Ali Darassa, the leader of the predominantly Muslim UPC armed group, as the “Caliph.”

The Nour al-Yaqin Mosque of the PK5 neighborhood of Bangui’s Third District reopened on February 26 following repairs by the local peace committee in partnership with MINUSCA.  The mosque had been vandalized during intracommunal violence in 2013 and 2014.

In March, the international NGO Conciliation Resources and its partners – the National Council of Central African Youth, Diocesan Commission for the Pastoral Care of Children and Youth, Central African Islamic Youth, African Evangelical Youth, and a taxi-moto association – carried out research on young persons’ views of the crisis in the country, peacebuilding prospects, and their visions for the future.  The research, funded by the United Kingdom, captured the views of 550 young persons in Bangui.  Despite suffering recurrent crises since 2013 and dealing with a legacy of trauma, loss, and disrupted lives and livelihoods, those polled expressed optimistic views in the survey, according to the researchers.  The study’s participants rejected sectarian and ethnic division, blamed bad governance and political manipulation – not each other – for social ills, and professed a deep desire to take the lead in transforming their own futures and their relationship with government.

The Platform for Religious Confessions in Central Africa (PCRC), composed of the senior Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Muslim leaders in the country, continued its efforts to promote interfaith dialogue.  The group remained focused on supporting the return of IDPs and refugees and promoting social cohesion in communities that previously experienced intercommunal violence occurring along ethnoreligious lines, such as the village of Ndangala in Lobaye Prefecture.  In September, local authorities and religious leaders in Ndangala launched a local branch of the PCRC in that village, which in turn organized interfaith discussions chaired by Christian leader Jean-Pierre Soalakpe and brought together 200 participants from the three religious groups of the village:  Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims.

Embassy representatives raised concerns regarding religious freedom and the safe voluntary return of refugees and IDPs to their home communities with officials in the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, and Public Security.  The representatives encouraged the government to implement outreach activities directed at religious communities, and publicly condemn hate speech and attacks on religious structures and against religious groups.  In a press statement, the U.S. Ambassador urged the government to provide security for all citizens, regardless of faith, following allegations of a September massacre of Fulani Muslims in the northwestern part of the country.  The United States and other international actors, including the European Union and the United Nations, advocated for amending the electoral code to allow for voting in future elections by the mostly Muslim refugees living outside the country.

Embassy officials regularly engaged religious leaders, including from the PCRC, on issues related to religious freedom and reconciliation.  Officials explored opportunities to broaden religious leaders’ access and dialogue with elected officials and recognized their peacebuilding efforts.  On May 11, the Ambassador met with Muslim civil society organizations in Bangui’s Third District, delivered symbolic gifts for a virtual iftar, discussed their concerns, and expressed U.S. government support for the community.

Embassy officials monitored religious-based hate speech in local media and expressed concern to local journalists on a regular basis.  Through an embassy-sponsored program, the NGO Internews provided training to journalists on how to counter and avoid hate speech, including hate speech linked to religion.  In August and September, the embassy organized exchange sessions with journalists from various media outlets to discuss ways to mitigate hate speech and fake news.  On October 11, the Ambassador chaired a workshop on mitigating hate speech, organized by local NGOs, including the Association of Youth in Movement for the Development of Central African Republic and the Central African National Youth Council.  The Ambassador urged young persons to be agents of peace and democracy and to refrain from using and disseminating hate speech.

The embassy recognized all of the country’s principal religious holidays on social media.  The Ambassador’s regular outreach to the Muslim community was amplified on embassy social media pages, along with her donation of foodstuffs to female-headed Muslim households in Bangui during Ramadan.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 17.4 million (midyear 2021).  According to a 2014-2015 census estimate, 52.1 percent of the population is Muslim, 23.9 percent Protestant, 20 percent Roman Catholic, 0.3 percent animist, 0.2 percent other Christian, 2.8 percent no religion, and 0.7 percent unspecified.  Most Muslims adhere to the Sufi Tijaniyah tradition.  A small minority hold beliefs associated with Wahhabism, Salafism, or follow the political-religious doctrine espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood.  Most Protestants are evangelical Christians.  There are small numbers of Baha’is and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Most northerners practice Islam, and most southerners practice Christianity or indigenous religions.  There is a significant Muslim presence in the south, but a minimal Christian presence in the north.  Religious distribution is mixed in urban areas, and indigenous religions are often practiced to some degree along with Islam and Christianity.

Legal Framework

Shortly after being declared the winner of the presidential election for what would have been his sixth term, President Idriss Deby died on April 20 from wounds sustained on the battlefield while commanding a Chadian army unit fighting rebels advancing toward the capital.  The CMT, created shortly after Deby’s death, suspended the constitution upon taking power in April.  The CMT chose Deby’s son, army general Mahamat Idriss Deby, to lead it and put in place a Transitional Charter that includes holding a national dialogue, scheduled to begin in May 2022, and enacting a new constitution in 2022.  The Transitional Charter establishes the state as secular and affirms the separation of religion and state.  The Transitional Charter provides for freedom of religion and equality before the law without distinction as to religion.  These rights may be regulated by law and may be limited by law only to ensure mutual respect for the rights of others and for the “imperative” of safeguarding public order and good morals.  It prohibits “any act undermining the republican form and secularism of the state.”  The suspended constitution contained this prohibition as well.

A December 2020 constitutional amendment removed a denominational oath of office that had required government directors and secretaries general and above to take an oath “under God” or “under Allah.”  The Transitional Charter is silent on this point.

Under the law, all associations, religious or otherwise, must register with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralized Territorial Collectivities.  Associations must provide a list of all the founding members and their positions in the organization, founders’ resumes, copies of the founders’ identification cards, minutes of the establishment meetings, a letter to the minister requesting registration, principal source of the organization’s revenue, address of the organization, a copy of its rules and procedures, and statutory documents of the organization.  The ministry conducts background checks on every founding member and establishes a six-month temporary, but renewable, authorization to operate, pending final authorization and approval.  Failure to register with the ministry means that organizations are not considered legal entities and may not open bank accounts or enter into contracts; it may also lead to the banning of a group.  Group founders or board members may be subject to one month to one year in prison and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 CFA francs ($86-$860) for failure to register.  Registration does not confer tax preferences or other benefits.

Burqas, defined by ministerial notice as any garment where one sees only the eyes, are forbidden by ministerial decree.  The ministerial notice also applies to niqabs, although this ban reportedly is not enforced.

The Transitional Charter states public education shall be secular.  The government prohibits religious instruction in public schools but permits religious groups to operate private schools, and there are numerous schools operated by Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant groups.

The High Council for Islamic Affairs (HCIA), an independent government body, oversees Islamic religious activities, including some Arabic-language schools and institutions of higher learning, and represents the country’s Muslim community at international Islamic forums.  The government approves those nominated by members of the HCIA to serve on the council.  Wahhabis are nominated to serve on the council but have not participated due to their stated concerns regarding the council’s role in the government ban on their activities.  Muslim Brotherhood adherents also sat on the council, operating under the umbrella of Sufi groups rather than as overt representatives of Muslim Brotherhood groups.  The Grand Imam of N’Djamena, who is selected by a committee of Muslim elders and approved by the government, is the de jure president of the HCIA and oversees the heads of the HCIA branches and grand imams from each of the country’s 23 regions.  He has the authority to restrict Muslim groups from proselytizing, to regulate the content of mosque sermons, and to control activities of Islamic charities.

The law prohibits media reports that are likely to “incite hatred.”

The Office of the Director of Religious and Traditional Affairs under the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralized Territorial Collectivities oversees religious matters.  The office is responsible for mediating intercommunal conflict, reporting on religious practices, and ensuring religious freedom.  It also reports concerns and suggestions regarding religious activities to the Minister of Territorial Administration, who has the authority to ban or sanction activities.  The position of office director rotates every two years among Muslims, Protestants, and Catholics.  The office contains a special bureau for Hajj and Umrah under the supervision of the Presidency of the Republic, with members chosen annually by presidential decree.  The HCIA deals directly with the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralized Territorial Collectivities or with the civil office of the President of the Republic to address concerns with Wahhabi groups.

The Transitional Charter is silent on the question of military service, but military service was obligatory under the constitution (suspended in April), which prohibited invoking religious belief to “avoid an obligation dictated by the national interest.”  This statute largely applies in case of wartime mobilization, since the country does not have universal military conscription.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government maintained its ban on the leading Wahhabi group, Ansar al-Sunna.  According to civil rights organizations, enforcement was especially difficult due to strained government capacity during the ongoing political transition, and adherents continued to meet and worship in their own mosques.  Local media said one reason Wahhabi groups continued their activities was that a number of government and security officials came from the same region or tribe as the Wahhabi leaders.  Local media reported that the HCIA president reconciled with Wahhabi groups, in contrast with the approach of his predecessor, who was generally perceived to be anti-Wahhabist.  Due to the government ban on their activities, Wahhabis continued to receive financial support from abroad as individuals rather than as a group, according to local media.

According to local observers, the government continued to deploy security forces around both Islamic and Christian places of worship, in particular on Fridays around mosques and on Sundays around churches.

Media reported that on November 3, security forces forcibly entered the Blessed Isidore Bakanja Parish courtyard in N’Djamena on a vaguely defined “mission” (in the words of the security force members involved), verbally harassed a priest inside who tried to film the scene as security force members defaced the premises, and aggressively confiscated his phone.  Following the incident, the government made no arrests or took any other action.  Archbishop of N’Djamena Goetbe Edmond Djitangar said, “We denounce certain attitudes and behaviors of contempt that some compatriots hold towards the religious beliefs of others.  This is a form of intolerance that should have no place in a pluralistic society like ours.”  He said this incident followed other government actions against the Catholic Church, citing a 2018 case where security forces used tear gas inside of a parish “for no apparent reason” while dispersing protesters during a demonstration, and a 2020 case in which a local curate was prohibited from attending Sunday Mass as a result of COVID-19 restrictions on public gatherings.

Although he had the legal authority to do so, the Grand Imam of N’Djamena reportedly did not in practice regulate the content of sermons.

In April, the transitional government was sworn in without using a denominational oath of office.

Media reported religious tensions existed in the form of farmer-herder violence.  The disputes reportedly were caused by land use issues rather than religion, though herders are commonly associated with Islam and farmers with Christianity.  Religious tensions were sometimes raised when the use of Islamic diya – financial compensation paid to victims of violence – was proposed by local authorities as a means of resolving conflicts with Christian groups that refused to pay or accept diya.  On October 22, following criticism from the legal community, the central government annulled an agreement establishing the practice of diya in the Christian majority southern province of Mandoul.  The agreement, signed on October 15, would have defined suggested compensation amounts, including for accidental and intentional deaths.  The agreement and subsequent annulment followed a 2019 interministerial order regulating the practice of diya, with the criminal code taking precedence in any conflict involving diya practices.

Analysts stated the country, which comprises a diverse society with many tribal, ethnic, and religious identities, remained relatively free from significant conflict between religious groups.  Most conflicts took place between farmers and herders over competing uses of land, not religious identity, according to observers.  Analysts stated that lengthy periods of largely southern and Christian rule (1960-1979), followed by largely northern and Muslim rule (1979-2021), against the backdrop of widespread poverty created an association between religion and geographic region that political actors continued to exploit for their purposes.  Media said N’Djamena and other large cities self-segregated according to religious divisions.

Analysts and human rights groups said poverty and a lack of government services and economic opportunity raised the risks that violent extremism, including extremism related to religion, could spread to the country, especially in the Lake Chad region, where Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa launched attacks against government soldiers and unarmed civilians during the year.  A Boko Haram attack occurred in the Lake Chad region in August 2021, killing 26 Chadian soldiers.  The Chadian military remained active in its fight against Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa in the Lake Chad region.

Religious leaders, including imams, continued to raise awareness among adherents of the risks of terrorist attacks, particularly in Lac Province, and to advocate for continued additional security in places of worship.  On a television program broadcast on Evangelical TV (ETV) during Easter, pastors and guests called on the government to address the root causes of religious extremism and recruitment to extremist causes by expanding access to economic opportunity.

In accordance with the legal prohibition against “inciting hatred,” media coverage continued to not mention instances of religious tension or conflict, instead using the term “communalism” – allegiance to a specific group or community rather than to wider society – to refer in general to divisions among various groups or communities, whether based on geographic, ethnic, religious, or other loyalties.

The Regional Forum on Interfaith Dialogue, comprising representatives of evangelical Protestant churches, the Catholic Church, and the Islamic community, did not meet during the year after meeting two or three times in 2020.  The National Prayer Day originally scheduled for November 28 was rescheduled for January 29, 2022.

The embassy amplified messages promoting religious freedom and tolerance throughout the year.  On May 5, the Charge d’Affaires met with the President of the High Council for Islamic Affairs and the Archbishop of N’Djamena to discuss how the United States could best assist the country in maintaining peaceful coexistence and promoting dialogue immediately following the death of President Deby.  On a trip to the south from June 25-30, embassy officers met with interfaith religious leaders in Bongor, Kelo, and Moundou to discuss interfaith dialogue, promote peaceful coexistence, and support efforts to counter extremist messages related to religion.

During a trip to the north in November, the Charge d’Affaires met with local religious leaders in Abeche (Muslims, Protestants, and Catholics) to discuss peaceful coexistence and the upcoming national dialogue.  On November 23 and 24, the Charge d’Affaires met with the Grand Imam and President of the High Council to discuss the transitional period and upcoming national dialogue and exchange good wishes on the occasion of the National Prayer Day for Peaceful Cohabitation.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 18.3 million (midyear 2021).  According to ONAR’s 2021 estimates, 70 percent of the population self-identifies as Roman Catholic and an estimated 18 percent identifies as “evangelical,” a term used in the country to refer to non-Catholic Christian groups, including Episcopalians, but not the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Orthodox Churches (including Armenian, Greek, Persian, Serbian, and Ukrainian communities), and Seventh-day Adventists.  In the most recent census that included religious affiliation, conducted in 2002, Baha’is, Buddhists, Jews, Muslims (Sunni, Shia, and those who identify with Sufism, among others), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, and members of the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), the Church of Jesus Christ, the Orthodox Churches, and other unspecified religious groups together constitute less than 5 percent of the population.  An estimated 4 percent of the population identifies as atheist or agnostic, while 17 percent of the population identifies as nonreligious.  According to ONAR, 9 percent of the population self-identifies as indigenous, of which approximately 30 percent identify as Catholic, 38 percent as evangelical, and 6 percent as other; the remaining 26 percent do not identify with any religion.  ONAR states that many of those individuals also incorporate traditional indigenous faith practices into their worship.  Indigenous Mapuche communities primarily identify as Christian, with the majority being Catholic, while an increasing number identify with evangelical Christian groups; others adhere to traditional Mapuche beliefs and syncretism.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience and the free exercise of worship.  It states these practices must not be “opposed to morals, to good customs, or to the public order.”  Religious groups may establish and maintain places of worship if the locations comply with public hygiene and security regulations established by laws and municipal orders.

According to the constitution, religion and state are officially separate.  The law prohibits discrimination based on religion, provides civil remedies to victims of discrimination based on their religion or belief, and increases criminal penalties for acts of discriminatory violence.  The law prohibits discrimination in the provision of social services, education, ability to practice religious beliefs or gain employment, property rights, and the right to build places of worship.

By law, registration for possible conscription to the military is mandatory for all men between the ages of 17 and 45.  Alternative service, by working for the armed forces in a job related to the selectee’s expertise, is possible only for those studying in certain fields.  The law makes no provision for conscientious objection.  Only ministers or priests from registered religious organizations are exempted on religious grounds.

The law does not require religious groups to register with the government, although there are tax benefits for those that do.  Once registered, a religious group is recognized as a religious nonprofit organization.  Religious organizations have the option of adopting a charter and bylaws suited to a religious entity rather than to a private corporation or a secular nonprofit.  Under the law, religious nonprofit organizations may create affiliates, such as charitable foundations, schools, or additional houses of worship, which retain the tax benefits of the parent religious organization.  According to ONAR, public law recognizes more than 3,200 religious organizations as legal entities, mostly small evangelical Christian or Pentecostal churches.  By law, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) must accept the registration petition of a religious entity, although it may object to petitions within 90 days if legal prerequisites for registration are not satisfied.

Applicants for religious nonprofit status must provide the MOJ with an authorized copy of their charter and corresponding bylaws with charter members’ signatures and their national identification numbers.  The bylaws must include the organization’s mission, creed, and structure.  The charter must specify the signatories, the name of the organization, and its physical address, and it must include confirmation that the religious institution’s charter signatories approved the bylaws.  In the event the MOJ raises objections to the group, the group has 60 days to address the MOJ’s objections or challenge them in court.  Once a religious entity is registered, the state may not dissolve it by decree.  If concerns are raised regarding a religious group’s activities after registration, the semiautonomous Council for the Defense of the State may initiate a judicial review of the matter.  The government has never deregistered a legally registered group.  One registration per religious group is sufficient to extend nonprofit status to affiliates, such as additional places of worship or schools, clubs, or sports organizations, without registering them as separate entities.

ONAR is charged with facilitating communication between faith communities and the government and ensuring the protection of the rights of religious minorities.

By law, all public schools must offer religious education as an elective class for two teaching hours per week through pre-elementary, elementary, middle, and high school.  Local school administrators decide how religious education classes are structured.  Most religious instruction in public schools is Catholic.  The Ministry of Education also has approved instruction curricula designed by 14 other religious groups, including Orthodox and Reform Jews, evangelical Christians, and Seventh-day Adventists.  Schools must provide religious instruction for students according to students’ religious affiliations.  Parents may have their children excused from religious education.  Parents also have the right to homeschool their children for religious reasons or enroll them in private, religiously oriented schools.

The law grants religious groups the right to appoint chaplains to offer religious services in public hospitals and prisons.  Prisoners may request religious accommodations.  Regulations for armed forces and law enforcement agencies allow officially registered religious groups to appoint chaplains to serve in each branch of the armed forces, the national uniformed police, and the national investigative police.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In March, the government announced a mandatory lockdown on Santiago and 20 other cities during the weekends in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  According to media, Bishop of Punta Arenas Bernardo Miguel Bastres, whose Catholic diocese includes the southernmost regions of the country, criticized the measure and called for “civil disobedience,” adding that the local health situation was different from the capital.  Bastres said it was also necessary to consider that the national government restrictions did not contribute to the spiritual needs of the faithful.  In response to COVID-19 restrictions on public gatherings, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference called on the government to engage in a dialogue on freedom of worship and religion.  According to media, on March 14, the government modified its COVID-19 restrictions, announcing that Catholic masses and other religious gatherings would be allowed and that the maximum numbers of attendees would vary based on a region’s level of COVID-19 infection rates.

On September 3, Vice Minister of the Secretariat General of the Presidency Maximo Pavez and ONAR Director Jeremias Medina met with religious leaders and announced changes to visitor capacity that allowed 250 participants at indoor religious gatherings (or 1,000 participants if all had a “mobility pass” with proof of COVID-19 vaccination) and 500 participants in outdoor religious gatherings (5,000 if all had a mobility pass).  Pavez said, “Freedom of worship is a fundamental right.”

On June 2, the Chile-Palestine Inter-Parliamentary Group in the Chamber of Deputies drafted a BDS bill.  Lawmaker Sergio Gahona – one of the bill’s drafters – and other parliamentarians stated that the bill would prevent human rights violations in Israel-occupied territories.  Both the CJCH and the Chilean Community of Israel, the latter organization whose members live in Israel, condemned the bill, stating it “creates a clearly hostile environment against the members of the Jewish community in our country, which is reflected in various forms of aggression and antisemitism, which have increased alarmingly in recent weeks.”

On June 29, the Chamber of Deputies approved a resolution stating its absolute rejection of any types of discrimination and any act of tolerance coming from authorities and candidates for public office.  The resolution also called on mayor of Recoleta Municipality and then presidential candidate Daniel Jadue, who is of Palestinian origin, to “publicly and categorically deny the statements made in the biographical sketch of his high school yearbook, which classifies him as antisemitic.”  According to media, in the yearbook, Jadue wrote that the best gift they could give him was a “Jew to target.”  Jadue did not respond to the resolution.  Jadue previously accused Jews of controlling the country’s media and referred to the Jewish community as the “Zionist community.”  At year’s end, the draft BDS bill remained under consideration in the Constitution and Legislation Committee of the Chamber of Deputies.

In August, ONAR hosted a virtual symposium entitled, “How Does the State Recognize the Spirituality of Our Native Communities?,” which addressed religious freedom of the country’s indigenous communities.  ONAR Director Medina described the symposium as a point of convergence between ancestral spirituality and Chilean society, highlighting ONAR’s efforts to promote religious freedom as a fundamental human right.  Speakers included academics and representatives of the Mapuche and Aymara communities.

On September 28, President Pinera and First Lady Morel, along with several cabinet members, the Director of ONAR, and key members of the Jewish community, participated in a Tefilah prayer service in observance of the country’s national independence month.  During the service, CJCH President Gorodischer called on congress to draft and pass enhanced legislation to improve protections against hate crimes and to strengthen the antidiscrimination law.  He encouraged the government to adopt the IHRA’s working definition of antisemitism.  There was no government decision regarding the request to adopt the IHRA’s definition by year’s end.

On September 18, President Pinera and leaders of the legislative and judicial branches attended an ecumenical Thanksgiving service (Te Deum) celebrated in observance of the country’s Independence Day.  Apostolic Administrator of the Archdiocese of Santiago Monsignor Celestino Aos led the service in the Metropolitan Cathedral.

In September, ONAR and the Social Organizations Division, an agency of the Ministry General Secretariat of Government, jointly conducted in-person training for leaders of religious organizations to provide tools to strengthen engagement between religious institutions and civil society organizations.  In September, ONAR also held a nondenominational symposium commemorating the educational and value-shaping contributions that the Bible has had in society, including the role of translation and interpretation.  In October, ONAR held several symposia on religious freedom to commemorate Religious Freedom Month.  On October 28, it cohosted an event on human dignity and religious freedom with the Argentine Council on Religious Freedom.  ONAR designated October 31 as the National Day of Evangelical Churches.

On October 28-29, ONAR cohosted the First Forum on Human Dignity and Religious Freedom in the Southern Cone, with Brigham Young University and the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile Center for Law and Religion, which was open to members of all religious groups.  The forum included in-person events in Santiago and virtual access for participants in other countries in the region.  The forum’s goals included reaffirming the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reinforcing the principles of religious freedom in the Southern Cone.

ONAR continued to engage with local authorities in the communities affected by attacks on churches in several regions of the country, including the Araucania and Santiago Regions, to rebuild the damaged churches.  ONAR helped the affected churches report threats to police and pressed for increased police monitoring and patrols of religious buildings in the region.

On October 12, unknown individuals burned a Catholic church and the Nuevo Pacto Pentecostal Church in a continuation of violent incidents in the southern region of Araucania.  Following the arson attacks, President Pinera declared a state of emergency for the region.  In April, arsonists burned a church in the municipality of Padre Las Casas on the road to Huichahue.  Media reported that individuals wrote, “Freedom to the prisoners of the Chilean state” on the front of the damaged church.  In February, assailants burned the Boroa Mission Church, located in the municipality of Nueva Imperial in Araucania Region.  This was the sixth year that such burnings occurred, with an increase in numbers of arson attacks reported during the year.

Several priests and churches in the Araucania Region reportedly received arson threats during the year.  ONAR reported that its regional directors were in constant contact with the churches and communities affected by the arson attacks, and it held discussions with governors regarding possible assistance from regional governments.  According to academic and nongovernmental sources, the Mapuche, an ethnonym chosen by the group and referring collectively to the country’s largest indigenous group, consider most of Araucania as ancestral territory and continued to call for the government to return lands confiscated prior to the return to democracy in the late 1980s.  Some factions of the Mapuche continued to use violence, including attacks on facilities and vehicles of industrial producers such as farms and logging companies, as well as churches and private residences, to demand the return of land.

Jewish community leaders again expressed concern regarding what they stated was a rise in antisemitism in the country.  According to the Antisemitism Cyber Monitoring System, an Israeli government monitoring system that tracks antisemitism worldwide, the significant Palestinian presence in the country influenced public discourse, “which is expressed in distinctly antisemitic tone under the guise of anti-Zionist activity.”  On May 19, a group of demonstrators burned Israeli flags outside the Israeli embassy in Santiago.  In May, the Jewish community reported a series of antisemitic comments and threats posted on social media coinciding with the escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas.  On May 12, the Federation of Jewish Students received several antisemitic messages, including, “They are coming, pest murders of Palestinians…. HAIL HITLER.”  The CJCH’s annual report, “Anti-Jewish Incidents in Chile, 2020-2021,” identified several incidents:  on August 17, observers saw a poster hanging outside the National Institute of Human Rights with the slogan “From Colombia to Palestine the peoples resist against fascism and criminal Zionism.”  In September, individuals reported graffiti that featured swastikas and SS symbols in Las Condes Municipality in Santiago Metropolitan Region and near the Hebrew Institute in the city of Santiago.  On September 16th, a truck driver shouted “Heil Hitler” when passing the Aish Hatorah Synagogue in Santiago.

During the year, the Chilean Association of Interreligious Dialogue (ADIR Chile), which includes Catholics, Orthodox, Adventists, Anglicans, Baptists, Evangelicals, Lutherans, Church of Jesus Christ, Jews, Muslims, Baha’is, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, Brahma Kumaris, and indigenous spiritual traditions, held several events, including an interfaith dialogue about the constitutional process on July 28 and a virtual interfaith Gathering to Celebrate the International Day of Peace on September 21.  On October 19, representatives of the Catholic, Orthodox, and Anglican Churches, National Evangelical Union, National Evangelical Platform, Church of Jesus Christ, Islamic Center of Chile, Seventh-day Adventist Church, and of Jewish and Muslim groups delivered a proposal to members of the country’s Constitutional Convention that addressed the importance of religious freedom in a free and democratic country.  On December 13, members of ADIR Chile and other religious leaders visited a Mapuche religious center, Ruca Mapuche, in the municipality of La Cisterna as part of a program to foster respect for spiritual and cultural diversity.

The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy representatives regularly met with government officials, including from ONAR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Interior Ministry, and members of congress, to discuss the status of religious minorities in the country and their security concerns, reports of antisemitism, and institutional cooperation between government and religious organizations.  The embassy engaged members of congress and government officials to underscore U.S. government opposition to the draft BDS bill.

The Charge and other embassy representatives met with civil society and religious leaders to discuss religious diversity and tolerance and to discuss incidents of concern, including perceived threats to the Jewish community.  On September 23, a senior embassy official attended a prayer service with the CJCH and discussed religious freedom issues with other attendees.  The embassy highlighted Ramadan, International Religious Freedom Day, and the UN International Day for Tolerance through social media posts encouraging interfaith understanding and religious tolerance.  On October 29, the Charge d’Affaires attended and discussed the importance of religious freedom at the First Forum on Human Dignity and Religious Freedom in the Southern Cone, sponsored by Brigham Young University’s International Center for Law and Religion Studies, ONAR, and the Center for Law and Religion at Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, with participants from Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the United States.

The embassy continued to use social media to underscore the importance of interfaith understanding and tolerance.

The constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which cites the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), states that citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities,” without defining “normal.”  The government recognizes five official religions:  Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism.  Only religious groups belonging to one of the five state-sanctioned “patriotic religious associations” representing these religions are permitted to register with the government and officially permitted to hold worship services, although other groups reported meeting unofficially.  CCP members and members of the armed forces are required to be atheists and are forbidden from engaging in religious practices.  National law prohibits organizations or individuals from interfering with the state educational system for minors younger than the age of 18, effectively barring them from participating in most religious activities or receiving religious education.  Some provinces have additional laws precluding minors’ participation in religious activities.  The government continued to assert control over religion and to restrict the activities and personal freedom of religious adherents that it perceived as threatening state or CCP interests, according to religious groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international media reports.  NGOs and media continued to report deaths in custody and that the government tortured, physically abused, arrested, disappeared, detained, sentenced to prison, subjected to forced labor and forced indoctrination in CCP ideology, and harassed adherents of both registered and unregistered religious groups for activities related to their religious beliefs and practices.  The NGO Human Rights Without Frontiers estimated the government imprisoned 2,987 individuals for exercising their right to freedom of religion or belief as of December 7.  According to Minghui, a Falun Gong-affiliated publication, 101 Falun Gong practitioners died during the year as a result of persecution of their faith, compared with 107 in 2020, and both Minghui and the Falun Dafa Infocenter reported police arrested more than 5,000 practitioners and harassed more than 9,000 others.  According to the annual report of The Church of Almighty God (CAG), authorities arrested more than 11,156 of its members and subjected them to physical abuse, including beatings, sleep deprivation, and being forced into stress positions, resulting in the death of at least nine individuals.  There were reports the government pressured individuals to renounce their religious beliefs.  The government continued its multiyear campaign of “Sinicization” to bring all religious doctrine and practice in line with CCP doctrine, which included requiring clergy of all faiths to attend political indoctrination sessions and suggesting content for sermons that emphasized loyalty to the CCP and the state.  The State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) issued regulations, effective May 1, entitled “Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy,” requires all clergy to pledge allegiance to the CCP and socialism and created a database of “religious personnel” to track their performance.  Authorities did not issue a “clergy card” to individuals not belonging to one of the five officially recognized patriotic religious associations, including pastors of Protestant house churches, Catholic clergy who rejected the government’s 2018 provisional agreement with the Holy See and refused to join the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), teachers and clergy at independent mosques and Buddhist and Taoist temples, rabbis, and religious personnel of new religious movements.  The SARA issued new regulations on September 1 that require all religious schools to teach Xi Jinping Thought and adhere to the “Sinicization of religion.”  The government prohibited private tutors, including those based abroad, from using textbooks “propagating religious teachings” and closed several informal, religiously affiliated schools.

During the year, officials across the country shut down religious venues, including some that were affiliated with the authorized patriotic religious associations, in some but not all cases citing COVID-19 restrictions.  The government intensified its campaign against religious groups it characterized as “cults,” including the CAG, maintained a ban on other groups, such as Falun Gong, and conducted propaganda campaigns against xie jiao (literally “heterodox teachings”) aimed at school-age children.  Authorities limited online worship.  Authorities continued to restrict the printing and distribution of the Bible, the Quran, and other religious literature, and penalized businesses that copied and published religious materials.  The government removed religious apps from app stores and censored religious content from the popular messaging service WeChat.  Authorities censored online posts referencing Jesus or the Bible and there were continued reports that authorities destroyed public displays of religious symbols throughout the country.  The government continued to remove architectural features that identified some churches and mosques as religious sites and removed crosses from private property.  The SARA’s “Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy” made no provision for the Holy See to have a role in the selection of Catholic bishops, despite the 2018 provisional agreement between the Vatican and the government concerning the appointment of bishops.  At a national conference on religious affairs in December, President and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping called on religious personnel and government officials to “uphold and develop a religious theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

Christians, Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, and Falun Gong practitioners reported severe societal discrimination in employment, housing, and business opportunities.  International media reported growing anti-Muslim sentiment in society as a result of the government’s Sinicization campaign.

The Charge d’Affaires and other U.S. embassy and consulate general officials met with a range of government officials to advocate for greater religious freedom and tolerance, and for the release of individuals imprisoned for religious reasons.  The Charge and other embassy and consulate general officials met with members of registered and unregistered religious groups, family members of religious prisoners, NGOs, and others to reinforce U.S. support for religious freedom.  The embassy continued to amplify Department of State religious freedom initiatives and advocacy directly to Chinese citizens through outreach programs and social media.  The U.S. Secretary of State, Charge, and other State Department and embassy officials issued public statements, including via social media, supporting religious freedom and condemning the PRC’s violations of the rights of religious minorities.  The U.S. Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State, Charge d’Affaires, and other senior State Department officials and embassy and consulate general representatives repeatedly and publicly expressed concerns about abuses of religious freedom in China, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang.  On January 19, the then Secretary of State determined that since at least March 2017, the PRC has committed genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.  On January 13, U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued a Withhold Release Order that prohibited the import of all cotton and tomato products produced in Xinjiang.  On March 22, the U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned two officials under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.  On May 12, the Secretary of State announced visa restrictions against a PRC government official for his involvement in gross violations of human rights against Falun Gong practitioners.  On June 24, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Department of Commerce, and U.S. Department of Labor took action against companies in the polysilicon industry using forced labor of religious and ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.  On July 9, the U.S. Commerce Department added to the Entities List 14 Chinese electronics and technology firms and other businesses for helping enable “Beijing’s campaign of repression, mass detention, and high-technology surveillance” against Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.  On July 13, the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Labor, and the U.S. Trade Representative issued an updated Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory that highlighted for businesses with potential supply chain and investment links to Xinjiang the risk of complicity with forced labor and human rights abuses.  On December 6, the Presidential press secretary announced the United States would not send diplomatic or official representation to the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic or Paralympic Games because of human rights abuses in China.  On December 10, the U.S. Department of State imposed visa restrictions on four current and former PRC officials for complicity with human rights violations in Xinjiang, and the U.S. Department of Treasury also sanctioned two officials and one company.  On December 23, the President signed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.

Since 1999, China has been designated as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.  On November 15, 2021, the Secretary of State redesignated China as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation:  the existing ongoing restriction on exports to China of crime control and detection instruments and equipment, under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246), pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.4 billion (midyear 2021).  According to the State Council Information Office (SCIO) report Seeking Happiness for People:  70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China, published in September 2019, there are more than 200 million religious adherents in the country.  An SCIO April 2018 white paper on religion in the country states there are approximately 5,500 religious groups.

Local and regional figures for the number of religious followers, including those belonging to the five officially recognized religions, are unclear.  Local governments do not release these statistics, and even official religious organizations do not have accurate numbers.  The Pew Research Center and other observers say the numbers of adherents of many religious groups often are underreported.  The U.S. government estimates that Buddhists comprise 18.2 percent of the country’s total population, Christians 5.1 percent, Muslims 1.8 percent, followers of folk religions 21.9 percent, and atheists or unaffiliated persons 52.2 percent, with Hindus, Jews, and Taoists comprising less than 1 percent.  According to a February 2017 estimate by the U.S.-based NGO Freedom House, there are more than 350 million religious adherents in the country, including 185 to 250 million Buddhists, 60 to 80 million Protestants, 21 to 23 million Muslims, seven to 20 million Falun Gong practitioners, 12 million Roman Catholics, six to eight million Tibetan Buddhists, and hundreds of millions who follow various folk traditions.  According to Boston University’s 2020 World Religion Database, there are 499 million folk and ethnic religionists (34 percent), 474 million agnostics (33 percent), 228 million Buddhists (16 percent), 106 million Christians (7.4 percent), 100 million atheists (7 percent), 23.7 million Muslims (1.7 percent), and other religions adherents who together constitute less than 1 percent of the population, including 5.9 million Taoists, 1.8 million Confucians, 20,500 Sikhs, and 2,900 Jews.  According to the Christian advocacy NGO Open Doors USA’s World Watch List 2022 report, there are 96.7 million Christians.  According to 2015 data from the World Jewish Congress, the country’s Jewish population is 2,500, concentrated in Beijing, Shanghai, and Kaifeng.

The SCIO’s April 2018 white paper found the number of Protestants to be 38 million.  Among these, there are 20 million Protestants affiliated with the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), the state-sanctioned umbrella organization for all officially recognized Protestant churches, according to information on TSPM’s website in March 2017.  The SCIO report states there are six million Catholics, although media and international NGO estimates suggest there are 10-12 million, approximately half of whom practice in churches not affiliated with the CCPA.  Accurate estimates on the numbers of Catholics and Protestants, as well as other faiths, are difficult to calculate because many adherents practice exclusively at home or in churches that are not state sanctioned.

According to the 2018 SCIO white paper, there are 10 ethnic minority groups totaling more than 20 million persons for whom Islam is the majority religion.  Other sources indicate almost all Muslims are Sunni.  The two largest Muslim ethnic minorities are Hui and Uyghur, with Hui Muslims concentrated primarily in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and in Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan Provinces.  The SARA, also referred to as the National Religious Affairs Administration, estimates the Muslim Hui population at 10.6 million.  A June report on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) issued by the Department of Population and Employment Statistics of the PRC’s National Bureau of Statistics estimates the total population in Xinjiang is 26 million.  The report states Uyghurs, along with ethnic Kazakh, Hui, Kyrgyz, and members of other predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups, number approximately 15 million residents, or 58 percent of the total population there.

While there is no reliable government breakdown of the Buddhist population by school, the vast majority of Buddhists are adherents of Mahayana Buddhism, according to the Pew Research Center.  Most ethnic Tibetans practice Tibetan Buddhism, although a sizeable minority practices Bon, a pre-Buddhist indigenous religion.

Prior to the government’s 1999 ban on Falun Gong, the government estimated there were 70 million adherents.  Falun Gong sources estimate tens of millions continue to practice privately, and Freedom House estimates there are seven to 20 million practitioners.

Some ethnic minorities follow traditional religions, such as Dongba among the Naxi people in Yunnan Province and Buluotuo among the Zhuang in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.  The central government classifies worship of Mazu, a folk deity with Taoist roots, as an expression of “cultural heritage” rather than a religious practice.

Legal Framework

The constitution, which cites the leadership of the CCP and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping Thought, states citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief,” but it limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities,” without defining normal.  It states religion may not be used to disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system.  The constitution provides for the right to hold or not to hold a religious belief.  It says state organs, public organizations, and individuals may not discriminate against citizens “who believe in or do not believe in any religion.”  The constitution states, “Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.”

The law does not allow individuals or groups to take legal action against the government based on the religious freedom protections afforded by the constitution.  Criminal law allows the state to sentence government officials to up to two years in prison if they violate a citizen’s religious freedom.

The government recognizes five official religions:  Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism.  Regulations require religious organizations to register with the government.  Only religious groups belonging to one of the five state-sanctioned religious associations are permitted to register, and only these organizations may legally hold worship services.  The five associations, which operate under the direction of the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), are the Buddhist Association of China, the Chinese Taoist Association, the Islamic Association of China, the TSPM, and the CCPA.  Other religious groups, such as Protestant groups unaffiliated with the official TSPM or Catholics professing loyalty to the Holy See but not affiliated with the CCPA, are not permitted to register as legal entities.  The law does not provide a mechanism for religious groups independent of the five official patriotic religious associations to obtain legal status.

The CCP is responsible for creating religious regulations and oversees the UFWD, which in turn manages the SARA’s functions and responsibilities.  The SARA is responsible for implementing the CCP’s religious regulations and administers the provincial and local bureaus of religious affairs.

On January 18, the SARA issued new regulations, effective May 1, entitled “Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy.”  The regulations require all clergy to pledge allegiance to the CCP and socialism and to create a database of “religious personnel” to track their performance.  Article 3 of the regulations states religious clergy “should love the motherland, support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, support the socialist system, abide by the constitution, laws, regulations, and rules, practice the core values of socialism, adhere to the principle of independent and self-administered religion in China, adhere to the direction of the Sinicization of religion in China, and operate to maintain national unity, religious harmony, and social stability.”  Article 6 states, in part, clergy should “resist illegal religious activities and religious extremist ideology, and resist infiltration by foreign forces using religion.”  The regulations also provide that “entrance to religious places of worship should be regulated through strict gatekeeping, verification of identity, and registration.”  The regulations also stipulate that authorities will hold religious organizations and institutions responsible for the behavior of individual religious clergy.  Article 7 stipulates religious staff should “focus on improving their own quality, improving their cultural and moral literacy, studying the contents of doctrines and regulations that are conducive to social harmony, progress of the times, and health and civilization, and integrate them into preaching, and play a role in promoting the Sinicization of religion in our country.”

The Counterterrorism Law describes “religious extremism” as the ideological basis of terrorism and states religious extremism uses “distorted religious teachings or other means to incite hatred or discrimination, or advocate violence.”

Authorities require CCP members and members of the armed forces to be atheists and forbid them from engaging in religious practices.  Members found to belong to religious organizations are subject to expulsion, although these rules are not universally enforced.  The vast majority of public office holders are CCP members, and membership is widely considered a prerequisite for success in a government career.  These restrictions on religious belief and practice also apply to retired CCP members.

The law bans certain religious or spiritual groups.  Criminal law defines banned groups as “cult [xie jiao, literally ‘heterodox teachings’] organizations” and provides for criminal prosecution of individuals belonging to such groups and punishment of up to life in prison.  There are no published criteria for determining, or procedures for challenging, such a designation.  A national security law also explicitly bans cult organizations.

The CCP maintains an extralegal, party-run security apparatus to eliminate the Falun Gong movement and other organizations.  The government considers Falun Gong an “illegal organization.”  The government continues to ban the Guanyin Method religious group (Guanyin Famen or the Way of the Goddess of Mercy) and Zhong Gong (a qigong exercise discipline).  The government also characterizes a number of Christian groups as “cult organizations,” including the Shouters, CAG (also known as Eastern Lightning), Society of Disciples (Mentu Hui), Full Scope Church (Quan Fanwei Jiaohui), Spirit Sect, New Testament Church, Three Grades of Servants (San Ban Puren), Association of Disciples, Established King Church, Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), Family of Love, and South China Church.

According to regulations, in order to register, religious organizations must submit information about the organization’s historical background, members, doctrines, key publications, minimum funding requirements, and government sponsor, which must be one of the five state-sanctioned religious associations.  Registration information is required only once, but religious organizations must reregister if changes are made to the required documentation.

Under revisions to the civil code passed by the National People’s Congress in 2020, a religious institution established according to law may apply for the status of a “legal person” (nonprofit entity) under Article 92 of the civil code.  The revisions formalize the ability of organizations to possess property, publish approved materials, train staff, and collect donations, thereby facilitating authorities’ ability to track and regulate religious institutions.

Religious and other regulations permit official patriotic religious associations to engage in activities such as building places of worship, training religious leaders, publishing literature, and providing social services to local communities.  The CCP’s UFWD, including the SARA, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs provide policy guidance and supervision on the implementation of these regulations.

Revisions to the Regulations on Religious Affairs in 2018 increased restrictions on unregistered religious groups.  Individuals who participate in unsanctioned religious activities are subject to criminal and administrative penalties.  The regulations stipulate that any form of income from illegal activities or illegal properties shall be confiscated and a fine imposed of between one to three times the value of the illegal income or properties.  If the illegal income or properties cannot be identified, officials impose a fine of less than 50,000 renminbi (RMB) ($7,800).  Authorities may penalize property owners renting space to unregistered religious groups by confiscating properties and illegal incomes and levying fines between RMB 20,000 and 200,000 ($3,100-$31,400).

Government policy allows religious groups to engage in charitable work, but regulations specifically prohibit faith-based organizations from proselytizing while conducting charitable activities.  Authorities require faith-based charities, like all other charitable groups, to register with the government.  Once they are registered as official charities, authorities allow them to raise funds publicly and to receive tax benefits.  The government does not permit unregistered charitable groups to raise funds openly, hire employees, open bank accounts, or own property.  According to several unregistered religious groups, the government requires faith-based charities to obtain official cosponsorship of their registration application by the local official religious affairs bureau.  Authorities often require these groups to affiliate with one of the five state-sanctioned religious associations.

The Regulations on Religious Affairs require members of religious groups to seek approval to travel abroad for “religious training, conferences, pilgrimages, and other activities.”  Anyone found organizing such activities without approval may be fined between RMB 20,000 and 200,000 ($3,100-$31,400).  Illegally obtained income connected to such travel may be seized and, “if the case constitutes a crime, criminal responsibility shall be investigated according to law.”

The regulations specify that no religious structure, including clerical housing, may be transferred, mortgaged, or utilized as an investment.  SARA regulations place restrictions on religious groups conducting business or making investments by stipulating the property and income of religious groups, schools, and venues must not be distributed and should be used for activities and charities befitting their purposes; any individual or organization that donates funds to build religious venues is prohibited from owning the venues.

The regulations impose a limit on foreign donations to religious groups, stating such donations must be used for activities that authorities deem appropriate for the group and the site.  Regulations state that any donations exceeding RMB 100,000 ($15,700) must be submitted to the local government for review and approval.  Religious groups, religious schools, and “religious activity sites” may not accept donations from foreign sources that have conditions attached.

The regulations require that religious activity “must not harm national security” or support “religious extremism.”  The regulations do not define “extremism.”  Measures to safeguard national unity and respond to “religious extremism” include monitoring groups, individuals, and institutions.  Penalties for “harm to national security” may include suspending groups and canceling the credentials of clergy.

National laws allow each provincial administration to issue its own regulations concerning religious affairs, including penalties for violations.  Many provinces updated their regulations after the national 2018 regulations came into effect.  In addition to the five officially recognized religions, local governments, at their discretion, may permit followers of certain unregistered religions to carry out religious practices.

By law, prison inmates have the right to believe in a religion and maintain their religious faith while in custody, but not a right to exercise their faith, such as by accessing prayer facilities or meeting with clergy.  Muslim prisoners are reportedly allowed to have meals with the “halal” label.

The law does not define what constitutes proselytizing.  The constitution states that no state unit, social organization, or individual may force a citizen to believe or not believe in a religion.  Offenders are subject to administrative and criminal penalties.

An amendment to the criminal law and a judicial interpretation by the national Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Supreme People’s Court published in 2016 criminalize the act of forcing others to wear “extremist” garments or symbols; doing so is punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment, short-term detention, or controlled release, as well as a concurrent fine.  Neither the amendment nor the judicial interpretation defines what garments or symbols the law considers “extremist.”

Publication and distribution of literature containing religious content must follow guidelines determined by the State Publishing Administration.  Publication of religious material must also conform to guidelines determined by the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee.  Online activities (“online religious information services”) of religious groups require prior approval from the provincial religious affairs bureau.  Religious texts published without authorization, including Bibles, Qurans, and Buddhist and Taoist texts, may be confiscated, and unauthorized publishing houses closed.

In December, the government published new regulations to limit online religious content.  The Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services, set to go into effect on March 1, 2022, would prohibit overseas organizations and individuals from operating online religious information services in the country.

The government offers some subsidies for the construction of state-sanctioned places of worship and religious schools.

To establish places of worship, religious organizations must first receive approval from the religious affairs department of the local government when the facility is proposed, and again before services are first held at that location.  Religious organizations must submit dozens of documents to register during these approval processes, including detailed management plans of their religious activities, exhaustive financial records, and personal information on all staff members.  Religious communities not going through the formal registration process may not legally have a set facility or worship meeting space.  Therefore, every time such groups want to reserve a space for worship, such as by renting a hotel room or an apartment, they must seek a separate approval from government authorities for that specific service.  Worshipping in a space without prior approval, gained either through the formal registration process or by seeking an approval for each service, is considered an illegal religious activity and is subject to criminal or administrative penalties.

By regulation, if a religious structure is to be demolished or relocated because of city planning or the construction of “key” projects, the party responsible for demolishing the structure must consult with its local bureau of religious affairs (guided by the SARA) and the religious group using the structure.  If all parties agree to the demolition, the party conducting the demolition must agree to rebuild the structure or to provide compensation equal to its appraised market value.

The Regulations on Religious Affairs include registration requirements for schools that allow only the five state-sanctioned religious associations or their affiliates to form religious schools.  Children younger than the age of 18 are prohibited from participating in religious activities and receiving religious education, even in schools run by religious organizations.  One regulation states that no individual may use religion to hinder the national education system and that no religious activities may be held in schools.  The law mandates the teaching of atheism in schools, and a CCP directive provides guidance to universities on how to prevent foreign proselytizing of university students.  The SARA also issued new regulations on September 1 entitled “Administrative Measures for Religious Schools” that stipulate religious schools should ensure CCP ideological training is included in all religious education, including required classes on Xi Jinping Thought, ideological and political theory, and socialism.

The Regulations on Religious Affairs of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region state, “Minors shall not participate in religious activities.  No organization or individual may organize, induce or force minors to participate in religious activities.”  Minors are also prohibited from entering religious venues.  Multiple provinces send letters instructing parents that “teachers and parents should strictly enforce the principle of separation between education and religion and ensure that minors are not allowed to enter religious places, participate in religious activities, or to attend religious trainings.”  Individuals, including parents, who violate these regulations may be criminally liable.  Implementation of these rules, however, varies greatly across and within regions.

On September 1, the Ministry of Education published the “Administrative Measures for Off-campus Training Materials for Primary and Secondary School Students.”  “Off-campus training” refers to private tutoring services designed to help students prepare for entrance exams.  The regulations prohibit private tutors, including those based abroad, from using textbooks “propagating religious teachings, doctrines, canons, or xie jiao, or feudal superstitions, etc.”

The law states job applicants shall not face discrimination in hiring based on religious belief.

In 2020, the Administrative Measures for Religious Groups went into effect.  These measures comprise six chapters and 41 articles dealing with the organization, function, offices, supervision, projects, and economic administration of communities and groups at the national and local levels.  The measures state that only registered groups may operate legally and stipulate that religious organizations must support the leadership of the CCP, adhere to the direction of Sinicization, and implement the values of socialism.  Article 17 states that religious organizations shall “follow the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, abide by laws, regulations, rules, and policies, correctly handle the relationship between national law and canon, and enhance national awareness, awareness of the rule of law, and citizenship.”

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  With respect to Macau, the central government notified the UN Secretary-General, in part, that residents of Macau shall not be restricted in the rights and freedoms they are entitled to unless otherwise provided for by law, and in case of restrictions, the restrictions shall not contravene the ICCPR.  With respect to Hong Kong, the central government notified the Secretary-General, in part, that the ICCPR would also apply to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Government Practices

Authorities continued to arrest and otherwise detain leaders and members of religious groups, often those connected with groups not registered with the state-sanctioned religious associations.  Authorities reportedly used vague or insubstantial charges, sometimes in connection with religious activity, to convict and sentence leaders and members of religious groups to years in prison.

NGOs, religious groups, and media sources continued to report deaths in custody, enforced disappearances (often through “residential surveillance at a designated location” – a form of black-site detention utilized by authorities against individuals accused of endangering state security), and organ harvesting in prison of individuals whom authorities targeted based on their religious beliefs or affiliation.  NGOs and media reported authorities used violence during arrests and tortured detainees, including by forcing them to maintain stress positions, beating them, and depriving them of food, water, and sleep.  NGOs reported that some previously detained individuals were denied freedom of movement even after their release.

The NGO Human Rights Without Frontiers estimated that the government imprisoned 2,987 individuals for exercising their right to freedom of religion or belief as of December 7.

The Political Prisoner Database of the human rights NGO Dui Hua Foundation counted 3,793 individuals imprisoned as of September 30 for “unorthodox” religious beliefs, including 2,751 Falun Gong practitioners, 578 CAG members, and 147 members of other Protestant groups.

Minghui reported 101 Falun Gong practitioners died as a result of persecution suffered because of their faith, compared with 107 in 2020.  It also reported that authorities arrested 5,045 (8,160 in 2020) and harassed 9,245 (10,973 in 2020) Falun Gong practitioners during the year.  The Falun Dafa Infocenter reported police arrested more than 5,000 practitioners and harassed more than 9,000 others during the year.

Minghui stated police often used violence during arrests of Falun Gong practitioners and that individuals were tortured in custody.  Police in Anyang City, Henan Province, arrested shopkeeper Li Xianxi on May 11 for talking about Falun Gong in a market.  When he performed Falun Gong exercises at the local detention center following his arrest, authorities handcuffed and shackled him.  On June 13, authorities informed his family that Li had died on June 12.  According to those who saw his body, he was emaciated, his head was swollen, and there were injuries to his back and knees.

Bitter Winter, an online publication that tracks religious liberty and human rights abuses in the country, reported that on April 12, authorities informed the family of Colonel Gong Piqi, a Falun Gong practitioner and former deputy chief of staff of the Shandong Provincial Reserve Artillery Division, that Gong had died in prison.  He had been forced to retire when authorities discovered he was a practitioner.  Authorities arrested Gong in 2017 and sentenced him in 2018 to seven and a half years and a fine of RMB 20,000 ($3,100) for being active in a banned religious group.  According to authorities, Gong experienced a “sudden cerebral hemorrhage” and died despite receiving medical treatment.  His family and friends reported seeing signs of torture on his body, causing them to doubt he died of natural causes.

Minghui reported that Hubei Province resident Hu Hanjiao died in prison while serving a four-year sentence for practicing Falun Gong.  Authorities arrested Hu on March 15 for talking to people about Falun Gong and the Xiaochang County Court sentenced her in late June.  During the seven months authorities held her at the Hanchuan City Detention Center, Hu staged a hunger strike in protest and was force fed.  Thirteen days after she was transferred to the Hubei Province Women’s Prison, prison authorities called Hu’s husband to inform him she had died.  They refused to release her body to her family.

In June, Bitter Winter reported that government and police officers confirmed that, in the context of the 100th anniversary of the CCP’s founding, the government ordered increased arrests for members of all dissident groups, particularly CAG members.  One document issued by the Office of State Security in Shanxi Province ordered officials to “put real efforts to strengthen surveillance over key personnel and carry out a severe crackdown on The Church of Almighty God.”  According to Bitter Winter, authorities throughout the country arrested more than 1,000 CAG members in the first half of the year.  From May 19 to 25, Guangdong Province police arrested approximately 160 CAG members in Foshan, Guangzhou, Zhuhai, and other cities.  Authorities also arrested 403 CAG members in Shanxi Province from the beginning of the year through June, and at least 265 CAG members in Henan Province from mid-April to mid-June.  In April, the government in Anhui Province arrested at least 116 CAG members after a long-term surveillance and tracking operation and confiscated at least RMB 750,000 ($118,000) of church and personal assets.

During the year, Bitter Winter reported on several cases of authorities imprisoning CAG members, pressuring them to sign statements renouncing their faith, and subjecting them to psychological and physical abuse, including beatings and stress positions, when they refused.  One CAG member from the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region said during his imprisonment, a guard tightly wrapped a copper wire as thick as a little finger around his body five times, cutting off his circulation.  After authorities forced him to stand for four hours, the man’s legs became swollen, his hands were numb and trembling, and his abdomen became numb to the touch.  One CAG member from Anhui Province said authorities forced her into a stress position eight hours a day for five consecutive days during which she had to squat while keeping her torso upright, her hands raised above her head, and her body unmoving.  Another CAG member reported being deprived of sleep for five nights.  Two CAG members said when they refused to sign a statement renouncing their faith, guards encouraged fellow inmates to beat them, resulting in bruises and broken teeth.  Another CAG member described fellow prisoners, at the guards’ instigation, smearing feces on his body.

In April, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported authorities in Sichuan Province detained members of Christian house churches in unofficial detention facilities where they pressured individuals to renounce their faith.  One Protestant individual said authorities held him in a windowless basement for eight or nine months, during which time they physically and mentally abused him.  He said, “You can’t see the sun, so you lose all concept of time,” and that suicidal thoughts and self-harm among detainees were commonplace.  Secret police attempted to coerce inmates into signing confessions of guilt and held those who refused in solitary confinement for prolonged periods.  Another Christian told RFA that similar facilities were being used to abuse members of the underground Catholic Church and Falun Gong practitioners.

According to the annual report released by the CAG, during the year, at least 68,456 Church members were directly persecuted by authorities, compared with at least 42,807 in 2020.  The report stated that authorities harassed at least 57,300 Church members (at least 35,752 in 2020), arrested 11,156 (7,055 in 2020), detained 3,636 (4,045 in 2020), tortured or subjected to forced indoctrination 6,125 (5,587 in 2020), sentenced 1,452 (1,098 in 2020), and seized at least RMB 250 million ($39.23 million) in Church and personal assets.  At least nine Church members died as a result of being physically abused during detention (at least 21 in 2020).

The NGO ChinaAid reported that on May 23, police in Guiyang, Guizhou Province, arrested Pastor Yang Hua of the Guiyang Living Stone Church for conducting religious activities.  At the station, leaders of the Guiyang Yunyan District Party Committee reportedly struck Yang, causing injuries that required medical attention.

Media reported authorities used measures ostensibly intended to prevent the spread of COVID-19, including facial recognition software and telephone tracking, to identify and arrest members of unregistered or banned religious groups.  The government installed surveillance cameras outside unregistered churches during the pandemic.

Bitter Winter reported that on June 7, the Qinnan District People’s Court in Qinzhou City, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, sentenced 21 members of the Blood and Water of Jesus Christ and Holy Spirit Full Gospel Evangelistic Group to prison for being active in a cult.  They were part of a group of Church members detained by the Qinnan Branch of the Qinzhou Public Security Bureau in August 2020.  Police also seized 113 books, 989 loose “propaganda materials,” 183 CDs, 3 calendars, 2 diaries, and 48 signs, among other items.  The movement was founded in Taiwan and the government declared it a cult in 1995.

According to Minghui, police arrested and harassed Falun Gong practitioners throughout the country.  Harassment spiked in April and May, around the “sensitive dates” of April 25, the anniversary of 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners’ appealing in 1999 outside the central government compound for the right to practice their beliefs, and May 13, the 29th anniversary of Falun Gong’s introduction to the public.  According to Minghui, harassment was also driven by the “stability maintenance” campaign prior to the CCP’s centennial anniversary.  From July to August, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Shandong, Jilin, Sichuan, Shanxi, and Liaoning were the provinces where the highest number of practitioners were targeted.  Those arrested included teachers, restauranteurs, librarians, construction workers, factory workers, academics, nurses, engineers, farmers, shop owners, and many retirees.

On September 12, Minghui reported multiple examples of police harassment and arrests of practitioners of Falun Gong.  On March 10, police in Fushun City, Liaoning Province, arrested Yang Xiaozhi for distributing Falun Gong materials.  She reported that detention officers shocked her with electric batons before releasing her on bail on March 15.  On May 14, police in Jilin City, Jilin Province, arrested 98-year-old Cai Xiufang for talking to people about Falun Gong.  They held her in a metal cage at the police station for several hours and ransacked her home before releasing her on bail.  Authorities arrested Gong Ruiping, a former elementary school teacher in Beijing, on July 20 in connection with practicing Falun Gong.  Guards force fed her when she attempted a hunger strike.  On July 23, authorities arrested Li Lihong, a middle school teacher in Ningxiang City, Hunan Province, for talking to people about Falun Gong.  Minghui reported that Baimaqiao police station head Zhang Jie threatened to shoot and kill her.  On August 15, a plainclothes police officer in Handan City, Hebei Province, beat Wang Shuqin for talking to him about Falun Gong.  Wang suffered two broken ribs and was taken to the hospital.

ChinaAid reported that in January in Hengyang City, Hunan Province, officials detained Chen Wensheng for 25 days for preaching Christian teachings on the streets.  Following his release from detention on January 29, local authorities came to his home to persuade him to stop “street evangelism.”

On June 14, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights published a statement from a group of 11 UN-affiliated independent human rights experts, including UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief Ahmed Shaheed, who were “alarmed by reports of alleged organ harvesting targeting minorities including Falun Gong practitioners, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Muslims, and Christians, in detention in China.”  The independent experts reported receiving credible information from NGOs and activists stating that authorities “may have forcibly subjected… detainees from ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities” to blood tests and organ examinations such as ultrasounds and x-rays without their informed consent, while other prisoners were not required to undergo such examinations.  The results of the examinations were reportedly registered in a database of living organ sources that facilitated organ allocation.  The independent experts stated, “According to the allegations received, the most common organs removed from the prisoners are reportedly hearts, kidneys, livers, corneas and, less commonly, parts of livers.  This form of trafficking with a medical nature allegedly involves health sector professionals, including surgeons, anaesthetists and other medical specialists.”  The experts said that despite the gradual development of a voluntary organ donation system, “[I]nformation continues to emerge regarding serious human rights violations in the procurement of organs for transplants in China,” and concern remained at the lack of independent oversight as to whether consent to donation and organ allocation was effectively given by prisoners or detainees.  The experts noted that authorities reportedly prevented families of deceased detainees and prisoners from claiming their bodies.

On August 9, the government responded to the High Commissioner, asserting the experts’ report was “based on false information and makes groundless accusations against China” and was “filled with malice and prejudice.”  The government said witnesses were “‘actors’ who repeatedly engage in slander and rumour-mongering on the issue of human rights in China[.]”  The government stated that regulations required medical examinations for persons entering detention facilities “for the purpose of determining the detainee’s physical condition at the time of admittance to the facility and providing prompt treatment in the event of illness.”  It stated that, by law, organ donation was “voluntary and nonremunerative” and that organ trading and involuntary organ harvesting had been criminalized.

In July, Minghui reported authorities collected DNA, blood samples, and other biometrics from Falun Gong practitioners against their will.  During the first half of the year, this reportedly occurred in 18 provinces and municipalities – Beijing, Shanghai, Shandong, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Zhejiang, Liaoning, Gansu, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Guizhou, Hebei, Hubei, Henan, Shanxi, Sichuan, Guangdong, and Shaanxi.  Between April 26 and 29, four practitioners in Shanghai reported police broke into their homes and forcibly collected blood samples.  Practitioners reported police also collected handwriting samples, fingerprints, height information, photographs, and phone numbers.  According to Minghui, some practitioners suspected authorities were collecting these biometrics and blood samples to establish a DNA and organ matching database, as well as to enhance the surveillance of practitioners.

According to the CAG annual report, harassment of members included the collection of biological data, such as blood samples and hair.

The Union of Catholic Asian News (UCA News) reported local Catholic sources said authorities abducted Bishop Peter Shao Zhumin of Yongjia (Wenzhou) Diocese in Zhejiang Province on October 25 and held him incommunicado for two weeks before releasing him.  Shao was ordained a bishop in 2011 with Vatican approval, but his appointment was not approved by the two state-sanctioned church bodies – the Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC) and the CCPA – and he was not among the Vatican-approved bishops recognized by the CCPA as a result of the 2018 Sino-Vatican provisional agreement.  According to UCA News, this was the seventh time since 2016 that authorities detained Shao, and his prior arrests stemmed from his refusal to join the CCPA.

Media reported the status of Catholic Bishop Taddeo Ma Daqin, whom authorities placed under house arrest in Shanghai following his resignation from the CCPA in 2012, remained unchanged at as of April.

RFA reported that on April 21, police in Chengdu City, Sichuan Province, raided the Early Rain Covenant Church (ERCC) during a study session and detained 19 Church members, including 12 children.  At the local police station, officers questioned the children without their parents present, in contravention of the law regarding detention of minors.  According to a Church member, police released 16 of the 19 persons after detaining them for 11 hours and continued to hold three individuals without giving a reason to their families.

International Christian Concern reported that on August 22, police in Chengdu City entered the home of an ERCC member during a Sunday worship service and arrested 28 individuals, including 10 children.  During the arrests, police injured Pastor Dai Zhichao on his arm and confiscated his mobile phone.  An ERCC member said police beat many individuals in detention and when the children became unruly, officers threatened to hit them on their heads.  Police held Dai and the homeowner, He Shan, in detention for 14 days and fined He RMB 1,000 ($160) for holding an illegal religious gathering.

Bitter Winter reported that in May the Beijing Municipal Court sentenced Lin Xianzan, a member of the Shouters, to three years in prison for being active in a banned religious group.

There were reports that authorities continued to crack down on qigong movements that it classified as cults or equivalent to cults.  Bitter Winter reported that on April 27, the Zhaouyan City People’s Court in Shandong Province sentenced Sun Xuhui to two years in prison after she confessed to leading a branch of Zhonggong, a qigong movement, and “brainwashing” followers.  According to Bitter Winter, the Ministry of Public Security set up a special task force with anti-Zhonggong divisions in Beijing and Tianjin municipalities, and Yunnan, Hebei, Liaonin, and Shandong Provinces.  In May, police in Luoyang, Henan Province, arrested several followers of the Buddhist master Tian Ruisheng (also known as Shijakai), and accused them of spreading the teachings of the banned movement Xiang Gong, originally known as Buddhist Qigong.

ChinaAid reported that on March 7, authorities in Chengdu City, Sichuan Province, raided the Fountain of Life house church during a Sunday service and took Pastor Zha Changping, his wife, and three other church members to the local police station for questioning.  Authorities released them after several hours.

According to Bitter Winter, authorities arrested 181 Association of Disciples members in a large operation carried out in late 2020 and early 2021 in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.  They charged the members with being active in a cult.  Authorities told local media the arrests were the result of the program implemented in 2018 to grant rewards up to RMB 50,000 ($7,800) to those who denounced their neighbors or acquaintances as cult members; the program included a tip line for doing so.

On May 5, RFA reported that authorities arrested two elders of Zion Church in Beijing, as well as elder Zhang Chunlei of the Renai Reformed Church in Guiyang City, Guizhou Province, on suspicion of fraud.  Zhang’s defense attorney said the fraud accusations were related to his receiving his living allowance from member donations and said, “This [practice] happens in all religions, and it doesn’t constitute fraud.”

Bitter Winter reported that authorities arrested 10 teachers at a Christian school in Wuhu City, Anhui Province, on May 27.  Authorities claimed the school was an illegal operation because it was not affiliated with the TSPM.  According to Bitter Winter, local Christians viewed the raid as part of a larger crackdown on all forms of education not directly controlled by the CCP.

On May 27, a ChinaAid source reported the arrests and imprisonment of numerous Christians affiliated with the Local Assembly, a house church, in Wuxi City, Jiangsu Province, Nanning City, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and Beijing, accusing them of “using a cult to undermine the enforcement of law.”

ChinaAid reported that on November 16, the Xi’an Municipal Intermediate Court in Shaanxi Province upheld a lower court’s sentencing of Chang Yuchun and Li Chenhui to seven years’ imprisonment and a RMB 250,000 ($39,200) fine for an “illegal business operation.”  Chang and Li printed and sold Christian books from 2015 to 2020, when local police shut down their business, confiscated more than 210,000 books, and forcibly disappeared them into “residential surveillance at a designated location.”

On August 7, RFA reported that police in Taiyuan City, Shanxi Province, detained nine Golden Lamppost Church leaders and members who refused to join the TSPM, including Pastor Wang Xiaoguang and preacher Yang Rongli.  According to sources, the group was carrying out a house church baptism when police arrested them.  Shortly afterwards, local authorities used dynamite to demolish a Golden Lamppost church in Taiyuan City.  On September 27, police arrested seven Church members.  On December 27, authorities charged them with fraud.  RFA said the detentions and demolition came amid a series of raids on unofficial Protestant house churches in Linfen County, Shanxi Province.

Bitter Winter reported on that on August 14, a court in Kaili City, Qiandongnan Miao and Dong Autonomous Prefecture, Guizhou Province, convicted four Seventh-day Adventist Church clergy of fraud for collecting offerings outside of the purview of the TSPM.  The court sentenced one member to 12 years in prison, and the others to three to six years.

In November, Minghui reported that on October 14, nine officials came to Yi Shuying’s home and ordered her to sign a letter renouncing Falun Gong.  They threatened officials would deny her granddaughter, a junior high school student, admission to college in the future if Yi did not renounce Falun Gong.  Yi refused to comply.

In June, ChinaAid reported that ERCC Pastor Wang Yi, whom authorities sentenced to nine years in prison in December 2019, was “being treated very badly in prison,” held in solitary confinement in Chengdu Province’s Jintang Prison under constant supervision, and malnourished.  ChinaAid stated prison officials continued to prevent family members and lawyers from visiting him and withheld medical treatment.  According to the NGO International Christian Concern, since his arrest, Wang’s wife and child were living in an unknown location, under surveillance.

On April 20, RFA reported the police department of Yulin City, Shaanxi Province, confirmed to his wife that it was still detaining Gao Zhisheng, a human rights lawyer taken into custody in September 2017.  Previously, Gao’s family had not known his whereabouts or whether he was alive.  Gao had previously defended on-trial members of Christian groups, Falun Gong practitioners, and other minority groups.

On July 20, ChinaAid reported that the Xiamen City religious affairs bureau fined Pastor Yang Xibo of Xingguang Church, an unregistered church in Xiamen City, Fujian Province, and his wife RMB 200,000 ($31,400) for organizing an “illegal religious activity.”  According to RFA, several dozen state security police and officials from the local religious affairs bureau raided worship services at the church in April and May 2020.  Yang told RFA the congregation was targeted for refusing to join the state-sanctioned TSPM.

During the year, authorities continued to detain Hui Muslim poet Cui Haoxin, known by his pen name An Ran, for Twitter posts in which he criticized the government for the imprisonment, surveillance, and persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang and throughout the country.  Authorities took Cui into custody in January 2020 and accused him of “picking quarrels and stirring up trouble.”

On April 9, Bitter Winter published an article in which it described several CAG members being forced to perform labor during their imprisonment.  One CAG member said she had to produce 250 artificial flowers per day, and if she failed to reach her quota, authorities forced her to stand four to six hours per night.  The article stated that the plastic used in the artificial flowers contained chemicals and heavy metal elements harmful to the human body, such as vinyl chloride, formaldehyde, and lead, leading to endocrine disorders, decreased immunity, aplastic anemia, leukemia, and other blood diseases.  The report also stated that exposure to the chemicals disrupted women’s menstrual cycles.  Another female CAG member who was sentenced to three years in a women’s prison described working on 550 dresses per day in a dressmaking shop while standing for 13 hours.  After her release, she was diagnosed with a herniated disc, which caused her pain if she sat for more than 10 minutes.

AsiaNews reported that the new SARA regulations entitled “Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy,” which took effect on May 1, placed additional ideological controls over the training, selection, and monitoring of clergy, including emphasizing allegiance to the CCP and socialism.  The new regulations also stipulated the government would hold religious organizations and institutions responsible for the behavior of clergy and created a new centralized database to record information about clergy, as well as to track their behavior and “misdeeds.”  Local governments were instructed to update the database with information on “rewards and punishments” of clergy.  On February 11, Bitter Winter published an English-language translation and analysis of the new regulations.  According to Bitter Winter, registration in the government database was “complicated.”  Individuals who were not listed in it but claimed to be clergy would be committing a crime.  Individuals unable to obtain a “clergy card” would include anyone not belonging to one of the five officially recognized patriotic religious associations, such as pastors of Protestant house churches, Catholics who rejected the government’s 2018 provisional agreement with the Holy See and refused to join the CCPA, teachers and clergy at independent mosques and Buddhist and Taoist temples, rabbis, and religious personnel of new religious movements.  According to AsiaNews, “living buddhas,” under the regulations, “will not be able to exercise any ministry, nor will they be considered true reincarnations without the permission of the [CCP].”  According to Bitter Winter, individuals had to prove they “support[ed] the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and support[ed] the socialist system.”  Bitter Winter stated the regulations created “an Orwellian system of surveillance, and strengthen[ed] the already strict control on all clergy.”

The SARA continued to maintain publicly available statistics on some, but not all, registered religious groups.  According to the SARA, there were 42,439 Buddhist temples and 8,349 Taoist temples registered in the country as of year’s end.  The SARA did not publish the number of registered Islamic mosques, Catholic churches, and Protestant churches.  According to 2014 SARA statistics (the latest available), more than 5.7 million Catholics worshipped in sites registered to the CCPA.  The SCIO’s April 2018 white paper stated approximately 144,000 places of worship were registered to conduct religious activities in the country, among which were 33,500 Buddhist temples (including 28,000 Han Buddhist temples, 3,800 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, and 1,700 Theravada Buddhist temples), 9,000 Taoist temples, 35,000 mosques, 6,000 CCPA churches and places of assembly spread across 98 dioceses, and 60,000 TSPM churches and places of assembly.  The SCIO white paper also estimated there were more than 384,000 religious personnel in the country:  222,000 Buddhist, 40,000 Taoist, 57,000 Islamic, 57,000 Protestant, and 8,000 Catholic.

The government continued to close down or hinder the activities of religious groups not affiliated with the state-sanctioned religious associations, including unregistered Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, and other groups.  At times, authorities said they shuttered a group because the group or its activities were unregistered; at other times, because the place of worship lacked necessary permits.  Some local governments continued to restrict the growth of unregistered Protestant church networks and cross-congregational affiliations.  Authorities allowed some unregistered groups to operate but did not recognize them legally.  In some cases, authorities required unregistered religious groups to disband, leaving congregants from these groups with the sole option of attending services under a state-sanctioned religious leader.

International media and NGOs reported the government continued to carry out its nationwide campaign to “Sinicize religion” by altering doctrines and practices across all faith traditions to conform to and bolster CCP ideology and emphasize loyalty to the CCP and the state.  The CCP’s Administrative Measures for Religious Groups, promulgated in 2020, further formalized the administrative procedures for Sinicizing all religions.  Commenting on the administrative measures, one Catholic Priest told AsiaNews, “In practice, your religion no longer matters, if you are Buddhist, or Taoist, or Muslim or Christian; the only religion allowed is faith in the Chinese Communist Party.”

The five-year plan to promote the Sinicization of Christianity, issued in 2018, called for “incorporating Chinese elements into church worship services, hymns and songs, clerical attire, and the architectural style of church buildings,” and it proposed to “retranslate the Bible or rewrite biblical commentaries.”  On its website in 2018, the TSPM pledged to “cultivate and practice core socialist values,” “carry out patriotic education,” and incorporate Sinicization into Christian theology, TSPM rules and regulations, theological education, and believers’ faith practice via symposiums, seminars, essay contests, and commemorative activities such as art exhibitions.  During the year, the TSPM celebrated the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP and sponsored activities to “cultivate a Christian charity culture with Chinese characteristics.”  The TSPM website stated that in 2022, it planned to examine experiences of Sinicization in various regions, determine best practices from the 2018-2022 five-year plan, and formulate a 2023-2027 work plan for further promoting the Sinicization of Christianity.

On March 31, the Economist reported that the government targeted all religions for Sinicization and instructed Christian preachers to promote “core socialist values.”  The Economist stated that government policy dictated “[i]nterpretations of the Bible should become more Sinified – meaning, presumably, that they should help to bolster belief in socialism.”  Authorities required state-approved churches to display national flags and portraits of President Xi, a move some TSPM pastors resisted, and encouraged them “to use Chinese architecture and Chinese tunes for hymns, as well as Chinese-style painting, calligraphy and other ‘popular cultural forms.’”  According to the Economist, despite increased pressure on house churches, authorities faced difficulties imposing Sinification on these unofficial, unregulated religious communities.

UCA News reported that according to the state-controlled BCCCC and the CCPA, on September 24, Catholics from two churches in Zibo City, Shandong Province, attended an event organized by the BCCCC called “One Hundred Sermons” that sought to explain President Xi’s instructions on religious activities and the promotion of Sinicization in the Catholic Church and how to adapt Catholicism to the socialist society.  On September 27-29, 18 key members of the CCPA from various provinces and cities met in Xibaipo village, Hebei Province, for an educational program based on the theme, “Take the Red Footprints and Inherit the Red Spirit,” intended to cultivate positive feelings toward the CCP, patriotism, and socialism.

According to Bitter Winter, in some parts of the country, local authorities regularly reviewed sermons of TSPM pastors to ensure they were consistent with CCP ideology and contained praise for government leaders.  Bitter Winter reported that on October 26, authorities in Shangqiu City, Henan Province, held a “Sinicization Seminar and Exchange Conference” for TSPM pastors and teachers.  During the conference, participants raised the national flag and sang patriotic songs.  Authorities told participants Christian social teaching should be Sinicized and that they would establish a “Research Office of Sinicization of Christianity” in Shangqiu.  They said sermons should be preached on socialist themes.

Bitter Winter reported that at the national conference of the TSPM and the China Christian Council on July 8, state-appointed heads of the TSPM and the council ordered pastors to study and preach about President Xi’s July 1 speech on the 100th anniversary of the CCP’s founding.  During the conference, religious authorities told pastors to make President Xi’s speech a principal topic of sermons and Bible study groups.  TSPM chairman Xu Xiaohong offered pastors a model sermon based on nine points in the speech that glorified the nation, the CCP, and President Xi.  He said pastors should instruct Christians to say, “Long live the great, glorious, and correct Chinese Communist Party.  Long live the great, glorious, and heroic Chinese people.”  Wu Wei, chairman of the China Christian Council, said pastors should direct Christians in “thanking God for putting us in this great era” and “continuing to learn the spirit of General Secretary Xi’s speech.”

Bitter Winter reported that on October 29 in Tianjin Municipality, Huasheng Temple authorities required Buddhist monks to watch a film entitled, “The Battle at Lake Changjin.”  On its WeChat account, the temple stated the activity was “to carry out in-depth education on Party history and promote the spirit of patriotism.”  The film depicted the “story of Chinese soldiers defeating American troops, despite great odds” at the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War.  One monk told Bitter Winter, “Party classes are supposed to be an activity that only Communist Party members need to attend.  Compelling monks to take a Party movie class is something incestuous, making the temple look like a branch of the Communist Party.”

According to the UFWD, from May 20-24, the Nanhai Buddhist Academy held a training session for more than 50 Buddhist deacons in Hainan Province.  The training, themed “Love the Party, Love the Country, Love Socialism,” included studying President Xi’s speeches and PRC religious laws and regulations and viewing patriotic documentary films.  Deputy minister of the provincial UFWD Liu Geng praised the Party, urged attendees to learn its history, promoted the Sinicization of religion, and advocated for socialist values in religious settings.  He urged the deacons to be “politically reliable, religiously accomplished, and morally convincing.”

According to the religious affairs bureau of Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province, on August 11, the Guangdong Taoist Association hosted an interfaith conference on the theme “Love the Party, the Country, and Socialism” to study Xi Jinping’s speech commemorating the 100th anniversary of the CCP’s founding, and to view “patriotic” films and exhibits.  The chairmen, vice chairmen, and secretaries general of the Guangdong Buddhist Association, Islamic Association, Catholic Association, and Christian Association attended.  Participants vowed to promote Sinicization in their respective religious teachings.

According to the Haixia Buddhist Network website, on February 26, monks and employees of Guangdong Buddhist Association and Guangxiao Temple in Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province, celebrated the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP by watching a video lecture on CCP history presented by the Central Party School.  According to the network’s website, monks in attendance said the CCP’s history was “a history of seeking happiness for the people” and that “the Chinese people have become prosperous and strong under the leadership of the CCP.”  Master Mingsheng, president of the Guangdong Buddhist Association, called on Buddhists to adhere to the Sinicization of Buddhism and to “guide Buddhism to be compatible with Socialism.”

According to a TSPM news outlet, the Guangdong Provincial Two Christian Councils held a ceremony at the Guangdong Union Theological Seminary on March 5 to launch a series of programs celebrating the CCP’s 100th anniversary.  Pastoral personnel and approximately 200 teachers and students participated.  The programs included lectures on Party history and a knowledge contest on the themes of “knowing the Party’s history, feeling the Party’s favor, listening to the Party, and following the Party.”  There was also a seminar on the Sinicization of Christianity.  Pastor Fan Hongen told participants the Guangdong Provincial Two Christian Councils was actively adapting to socialist society and strengthening the mission of Sinicizing Christianity.

According to ChinaAid, on June 25, the TSPM-affiliated Shandong Theological Seminary in Shandong Province held a theatrical performance with the theme of “Sing a Praise to the Party” to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the CCP’s founding.

According to the UFWD of Guangdong Province, from March 22 to 28, the Guangdong Islamic Association organized imam training classes at the Guangdong Provincial Institute of Socialism.  Thirty-six imams from nine cities in the province attended the one-week training session, at which they studied the history of the CCP, socialism, and how to “adhere to the direction of the Sinicization of Guangdong Islam.”  Imams attending the training said they would “unswervingly” listen to the Party.

According to the CCPA website, the Guangdong Catholic Association celebrated the 100th anniversary of the CCP by organizing a CCP training session in Guangxi Province from April 12 to 16 for 40 priests from 21 different cities.  The participants toured several CCP “red education” sites, learned the “heroic deeds of revolutionary martyrs,” and were encouraged to “love the party.”

In May, the Minnan Buddhist Institute, located in Nanputuo Buddhist Temple, Xiamen City, Fujian Province, held a public speaking contest on the theme of “studying the history of the Party, thanking the Party, and following the Party.”  Approximately 700 faculty members and students attended the contest to praise the Party’s “brilliant history and great accomplishments,” according to the Nanputuo Buddhist Temple’s website.  RFA reported that a Shandong monk criticized the contest, saying that the Buddhist Institute coerced monks into participating.  He stated that the institute would prohibit students who did not participate from studying there.

Media reported that throughout the year, crackdowns on some churches with foreign ties intensified significantly throughout the country.  Many religious groups, including groups connected to the five “patriotic religious associations,” faced comprehensive investigations that included checking their background, organizational setting, membership, online evangelism, and finances.  On April 3, International Christian Concern reported that the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) planned to intensify efforts to shut down social organizations, private nonenterprise units, and foundations that were not registered with relevant authorities.  Organizations that had their registration revoked but nevertheless continued with their activities would also be targeted, the ministry said.  According to RFA, “The MCA’s latest campaign has already begun in some provinces, such as Sichuan.  The Department of Civil Affairs in Sichuan published a list of 84 ‘Illegal Social Organizations’ on March 25 which contain[ed] several Buddhist and Christian groups, including the heavily persecuted house church Early Rain Covenant Church.”

ChinaAid reported that authorities continued to harass members of the Trinity Gospel Harvest Church in Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province, during the year.  On March 1, security officials warned members against gathering to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Church’s founding.  On April 25, police and religious affairs officers raided Church services and detained pastors Mao Zhibin and Cao Yuan and eight members for questioning, without explanation.  On July 11, authorities again raided Sunday worship services.  The government formally banned the Church at the end of April.  According to ChinaAid, in May, authorities closed a beach where baptisms of new members were to take place in order to prevent the baptisms, causing the group to move to another beach.  In September, under instructions from the local police, a Shenzhen hotel refused service to Church members and refunded fees they paid to stay there.

Bitter Winter reported authorities cracked down on religious groups that organized prayer meetings in hotel rooms.  On March 16 in Guiyang City, Guizhou Province, the Renai Reformed Church organized a prayer meeting in the Wenzhou Hotel complex.  Police raided the room and arrested several congregants.  When Church elder Zhang Chunlei went to the station to negotiate the release of the Church members, police arrested him as well and held him in detention for 15 days.  They raided the houses of followers and confiscated computers and religious materials.  Reporting on the same March 16 raid, RFA said officials stated they detained the individuals because gatherings were restricted to family members due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In October, ChinaAid reported that the local government of Jiake village, Yunnan Province, the TSPM, and the Chinese Christian Council banned Kai Yiduo from taking part in religious activities in what ChinaAid said was retribution for his dispute with the local government.  Yiduo said the government had not compensated him after demolishing his home.

In November, the Jerusalem Post reported that authorities again did not permit Jews in Kaifeng City, Henan Province, to celebrate Hanukkah.  Sources reported that on November 28, the Jewish community in Shanghai was able to hold a Hannukah commemoration.

In September, Bitter Winter reported the China Christian Council instructed all churches and congregations to “organize worship activities” to commemorate the 76th anniversary of China’s victory over Japan in World War II and to “further promote the fine tradition of patriotism and love of religion and to demonstrate the good image of peace-loving Christianity in China.”  The directive stated, “Churches are requested to submit evidence of the relevant activities (text, video and photo materials) to the Media Ministry Department of the China Christian Council by September 10.”  A photograph accompanying the Bitter Winter article showed students at Fujian Theological Seminary in Fujian Province praying for Red Army “martyrs.”

Throughout the year, the government closed venues throughout the country, including religious venues, and prohibited mass gatherings due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Media reported authorities tried to stop many religious groups from congregating or holding services online during the COVID-19 lockdown.  According to media, in some localities, government officials used COVID-19 precautions as a pretext to prevent religious organizations from recommencing their activities long after restrictions had been lifted in analogous nonreligious contexts.  According to the National Catholic Reporter, authorities prevented Catholics from celebrating the Feast of Mary on May 24 at the Sheshan Shrine in Shanghai, the country’s most famous Marian shrine and traditionally a pilgrimage site.  Authorities cited the COVID-19 pandemic, but critics noted the government permitted amusement parks and a golf club in the area to remain open during the same period.  There was at least one case, however, where authorities relaxed restrictions:  when monks at the Shenyang Ci’en Buddhist Temple in Shenyang City, Liaoning Province, declared, “Monks and believers love the Party and will continue to follow the party to accomplish Sinicization,” government officials authorized them to resume large-scale services.

One source said the government used COVID-19 prevention as a pretext to close Islamic venues, particularly in Qinghai and Gansu Provinces and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, where Hui Muslims are concentrated, while allowing Buddhist temples to remain open.

RFA reported that on April 30, officials in Yunnan Province shut down the Bulai Protestant Church in Lao Muden village, Fugong County, ostensibly to prevent the spread of COVID-19, despite the church’s having been allowed to meet previously throughout the pandemic.  China Christian Daily reported that on August 1, an unregistered church in Suzhou City, Jiangsu Province, was forced to interrupt its on-site Sunday service when local officials, citing “reducing crowds for epidemic prevention and control,” cut off the electricity and pasted seals on the doors.  Authorities also suspended services at other local churches in Suzhou, China Christian Daily reported.

According to the Economist, many house churches held services online and there were numerous Bible study groups and church forums on WeChat.  Some unauthorized seminaries and missionary training schools moved online.  One pastor said some online congregations were 50 percent larger than in-person meetings.  However, in March, Open Doors USA reported officials monitored online activities and “even officially registered churches were ordered to stop online services.”

In December, Bitter Winter reported that authorities, citing the COVID-19 pandemic, took measures to stop Christians from gathering for Christmas celebrations, although they allowed some musical and cultural events to take place in what Bitter Winter described as “cosmetic” activities designed to give the appearance of religious tolerance.  Bitter Winter reported that authorities in Rong’an County, Liuzhou City, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region ordered elementary and kindergarten teachers and students not to celebrate Christmas at school or at home, calling the holiday a “Western celebration.”  The directive included the name and contact number for a tip line for people to report individuals “doing any event” for Christmas.

Media and human rights organizations reported SARA regulations stating that only the Islamic Association of China was permitted to organize Muslim pilgrimage trips, issued in 2020, remained in effect.  The regulations stated that those who applied to join the Hajj must be “patriotic, law-abiding, and have good conduct,” must have never before participated in the Hajj, and be in sound physical and mental health.  They also had to be able to pay all costs associated with Hajj travel and to oppose religious extremism.  According to a notice issued by the Islamic Association of China on June 15, citing the risk of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government suspended all Hajj activities during the year.

The government continued to label several religious groups, including the CAG, Shouters, Association of Disciples, All-Sphere Church, and many others, as cults or xie jiao organizations.  The government also continued to ban groups, such as Falun Gong, that it classified as illegal organizations.

Bitter Winter reported that on July 26, the Supreme People’s Court published its “Opinion on Providing Judicial Services and Protection for Accelerating the Modernization of Agriculture and Rural Areas.”  The “opinion” included provisions to “intensify the punishment of illegal religious activities and overseas infiltration activities” in rural areas, “crack down on organizing and using xie jiao organizations to commit crimes,” and “stop the use of religion and xie jiao from interfering in rural public affairs.”

Bitter Winter reported that on October 23, approximately 100 children from preschools of the district of Jiaocheng in Ningde City, Fujian Province, underwent a program of “preventive education.”  The children, ages three to six, received picture booklets, viewed a panel exhibition, and watched cartoons warning against “xie jiao and illegal religion.”  One film presented the CAG as a cult, and others admonished against “superstition” and “illegal religion” in general.

Bitter Winter reported provincial governments shut down local branches of the Good News Mission, a Protestant religious group with ties to South Korea.  On March 30, the Civil Affairs Bureau of Shaoxing City, Zhejiang Province, banned the group and raided local communities.  On April 30, the government in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin Province, announced prefecture authorities had banned the Good News Mission and shut down its churches.  According to Bitter Winter, the Good News Mission was “not in the list of xie jiao, but it is now a common strategy to ban a religious movement in one region and province after the other, leading to a de facto national ban.”

Bitter Winter reported authorities continued to link xie jiao to criminal activities and other social ills.  In November, border police and “legal education” officers carried out a surveillance and propaganda operation in Ningming County, Guangxi Province, and Honghe Hani and Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan Province, both on the border with Vietnam, prompted by what Bitter Winter said were fears that illegal religious groups might enter the country via Vietnam.  The campaign against drug smuggling and HIV/AIDS included indoctrinating residents against “illegal religion” and xie jiao.  It targeted 600,000 Hani, who hold predominantly shamanistic beliefs, and 900,000 Yi, who practice both Christianity and shamanistic religions.

Bitter Winter reported that on National Security Education Day on April 15, authorities mounted exhibitions as part of an anti-xie jiao campaign, and students across the country signed pledges to renounce illegal religious activities by groups labeled cults.  Zhou Qiang, president of the Supreme People’s Court, called cults “a cancer” and stated the CCP had three main targets:  Falun Gong, CAG, and the Association of Disciples.  He also said cults colluded with Western anti-China forces, and he accused the Association of Disciples of manipulating some local elections.  The article included a photograph from the social media site Weibo showing students from Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications in Chongqing Province signing a large billboard pledging to renounce xie jiao.

State-run media reported that on September 10, Qiongshan District in Haikou City, Hainan Province, organized a series of anti-illicit drugs and anticult propaganda activities in middle schools.  Government officials distributed brochures, hung propaganda banners, and gave lectures to teachers and students on how to recognize a cult and “consciously resist it.”

Media reported that in June in Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province, volunteers conducted large-scale COVID-19 testing at multiple locations, where they distributed educational literature warning against xie jiao alongside personal protective equipment and hand sanitizer.  The volunteers reportedly posted signs publicizing an “anti-xie jiao” app, and digital billboards warned residents about the harmful influence of xie jiao and advised them to “be wary of cult organizations taking advantage of the epidemic to spread rumors and create chaos.”

According to Bitter Winter, in October, prefecture-level city authorities in Hui’an County and nearby Quanzhou City, Fujian Province, launched an anti-xie jiao program as part of their celebration of the CCP’s centennial anniversary.  Teachers organized lessons in all elementary and middle schools and distributed propaganda material against xie jiao and “illegal religion.”  Individuals played a WeChat game in which they proved they had read the propaganda material by answering questions.  Those who answered the most questions correctly won prizes.  According to Bitter Winter, the names of those who scored low were sent to the local CCP secretaries.  Local CCP officials said the initiative was needed because during the COVID-19 pandemic, “illegal religion” and xie jiao had increased in Fujian.

According to media, authorities maintained a near ubiquitous surveillance system through the development and widespread deployment of advanced technology such as artificial intelligence, CCTVs, and social media applications.  In October, an academic who studies the subject told the Diplomat that domestic police departments in ethnic minority areas in Ningxia, Sichuan, and Yunnan Provinces and elsewhere purchased digital forensics tools to scan mobile phone hard drives for “more than 50,000 markers or patterns of illegal activity.”  More than 500 cities and municipalities across the country developed “smart city systems” that used forms of biometric surveillance that could surveil ethnic and religious minorities.

According to ChinaAid, on March 19, the Siming District Religious Affairs Bureau in Xiamen City, Fujian Province, released a circular that instructed police officers to patrol office buildings and hotels in the district on Saturday evenings and Sundays to prevent a resurgence of house church gatherings that were suppressed in past months and years.  The circular identified several buildings and streets for priority patrol.

CBN News reported in August that the government encouraged citizens to report anyone distributing printed religious material or holding worship gatherings.  Authorities offered informants RMB 1,000 ($160).  One Hui Muslim source said officials instructed children to report on their parents’ and family’s religious and cultural practices.  ChinaAid reported that in early January, authorities in Shijiazhuang, Baoding, Xingtai, and other areas in Hebei Province encouraged the public to report house churches.  Authorities in Xingtai issued a “Notice on Rewards for Reporting Religious Activities during the Epidemic,” promising whistleblowers a reward of more than RMB 500 ($78).  In early August, authorities in Meilisi Daur District, Qiqihar City, Heilongjiang Province, announced a “Reward System for Reporting Illegal Religious Activities and Crimes,” under which individuals could make reports by phone, email, or letter, and receive RMB 1,000 ($160).  According to ChinaAid, reportable violations included “unqualified religious personnel, unauthorized cross-regional activities, preaching and distribution of printed religious works, audiovisual products outside of worship venues, unauthorized donations, and private family gatherings.”

In January, the Christian rights advocacy NGO World Watch Monitor reported authorities in Henan and Jiangxi Provinces placed surveillance cameras in all state-approved religious venues.  Many of the cameras were reportedly installed next to standard CCTV cameras but were linked to the Public Security Bureau, meaning artificial intelligence could instantly connect with other government databases.

The New York Times reported in February that authorities in Sanya City, Hainan Province, continued to take measures against the 10,000-member, predominantly Muslim Utsul ethnic minority, including efforts to ban girls from wearing traditional dress, including hijabs and long skirts, in school.  Signs on shops and homes that read “Allahu akbar” (God is greatest) in Arabic were covered with foot-wide stickers with the words “China Dream,” a nationalistic official slogan.  Restaurants removed the Chinese characters for halal from signs and menus.  Authorities closed two Islamic schools.  Local mosque leaders said authorities told them to remove loudspeakers that broadcast the call to prayer from the tops of minarets, place them on the ground, and turn down the volume.  Authorities halted construction of a new mosque because of its supposedly “Arab” architectural elements.  According to residents, the city barred children younger than 18 from studying Arabic.  The restrictions followed a 2019 government-issued “Working Document Regarding the Strengthening of Overall Governance over Huixin and Huihui,” which referred to the only two predominantly Utsul neighborhoods in the island province.  One academic, commenting on the measures, told the New York Times, “This is about trying to strengthen state control.  It’s purely anti-Islam.”

According to a National Review article published in July, the government continued to require churches to display banners with CCP slogans, perform the national anthem before singing Christian hymns, and “demonstrate their loyalty to the CCP above all, and only secondarily to the church.”  According to the National Review, “Consistent indoctrination and blatant submission to communist standards [was] spreading across all religious groups.”

According to Open Doors USA, in Shanxi, Henan, and Jiangxi Provinces, authorities threatened Christians with the removal of social welfare benefits and pensions if they refused to replace Christian imagery, such as crosses, with pictures of Xi Jinping.  One Christian on welfare assistance reported officials told him that since he believed in God, he should ask God for food instead of living off the CCP.

In April, UCA News reported that authorities in Zhaoxian City, Hebei Province, closed the House of the Dawn orphanage operated by Catholic nuns from the Sisters of the Child Jesus congregation, accusing the nuns of “illegal adoption practices.”  Local sources stated authorities actually closed the orphanage as part of a crackdown on church facilities operated by the unregistered Catholic Church.  The orphanage served more than 100 children, many with special needs.  According to UCA News, authorities accused Christian-run organizations of proselytizing and converting children through their social and charitable work.

According to ChinaAid, on September 4 in Harbin City, Heilongjiang Province, more than 30 CCP officials, including SWAT officers, police, religious affairs bureau officials, and local school district administrators, raided the Maizi Christian Music High School and arrested all staff members and several students.  They seized school assets, including pianos, computers, and documents.  Prior to the raid, police took the school’s principal into custody.  The students were released after 24 hours, but authorities held staff for questioning for several days.  According to AsiaNews, there were reports authorities would charge the school principal with proselytizing.

Authorities continued to restrict the printing and distribution of the Bible, the Quran, and other religious texts.  The government continued to allow some foreign educational institutions to provide religious materials in Chinese, which were used by both registered and unregistered religious groups.  During the year, however, many provinces conducted campaigns cracking down on “illegal religious publications” emanating from unofficial distribution channels.

ChinaAid reported in July that the Bao’an District Court in Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province, found four Christian employees of the Shenzhen Life Tree Technology Development Company guilty of “illegal business” and gave them sentences ranging from fifteen months to up to six years in prison, with fines of up to RMB 200,000 ($31,400).  Authorities arrested the individuals in 2020 for illegally selling audio Bible players and confiscated their electronics and other belongings.

Local authorities throughout the country continued to ban the sale and display of religious couplets (banners with poetry) traditionally displayed during Lunar New Year.  Local authorities threatened to fine or imprison anyone caught selling them.  According to ChinaAid, officials in Pingdingshan, Henan Province, went house to house tearing couplets off the doors of Christian families that displayed faith-related messages.

In October, the BBC reported that Apple, at the request of the government, removed from its store the app Quran Majeed, which allows users to download the Quran.  The media outlet stated, “The BBC understands that the app was removed for hosting illegal religious texts.”  Apple declined to comment to the BBC.

Christian organizations seeking to use social media and smartphone apps to distribute Christian materials reported the government increased censorship of these materials.  According to International Christian Concern, authorities removed Bible-related apps from app stores.  Catholic News Agency reported in October that a digital Bible company removed its app from the Apple app store after Apple stated the company must demonstrate it had authorization from the government to distribute an app with book or magazine content in mainland China.

In May, International Christian Concern reported that according to a tweet by Father Francis Liu from the Chinese Christian Fellowship of Righteousness, the home pages of some Christian WeChat accounts, such as “Gospel League” and “Life Quarterly,” no longer showed any content.  Instead, visitors saw a message reading, “[We] received a report that [this account] violates the ‘Internet User Public Account Information Services Management Provisions’ and its account has been blocked and suspended.”

China Christian Daily reported the government blocked many registered churches’ WeChat accounts during a crackdown on online Christian content.  The banned accounts were managed by TSPM-approved churches in Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Yunnan Provinces.  The Shanghai Pure Heart Church, Huai’an Church of Jiangsu Province, and Nanjing Holy Word Church of Jiangsu Province were among the churches whose official WeChat accounts that authorities blocked.  “Today’s Nanjing Union Life,” the WeChat page of Nanjing Union Theological Seminary, the only national Protestant seminary in the country, was inaccessible from May to the end of the year.  China Christian Daily further reported that WeChat censored the words “Christ,” “gospel,” and “fellowship.”  ChinaAid also reported that authorities blocked key words related to Christianity from search engines.

International Christian Concern stated Bibles in hard copy were not available for sale online and said TSPM-owned bookstores were increasingly selling books promoting Xi Jinping Thought and CCP ideology.  According to International Christian Concern, “Even their WeChat accounts are turning into propaganda channels for CCP.”

ChinaAid reported that at the end of the year, a court upheld the initial verdict in the second trial of Chen Yu (also known as Zhang Xiaomai).  Chen owned and operated the Xiaomai Bookstore in Linhai, Zhejiang Province, which sold Christian books online and in-store.  In September 2019, the government arrested Chen for selling online “illegal religious overseas publications” and sentenced him to seven years in prison and a fine of RMB 200,000 ($31,400).  Authorities also confiscated 12,864 books and investigated more than 10,000 individuals who bought from Chen.  Nationwide, authorities confiscated all copies Chen sold of ERCC Pastor Wang Yi’s Transformation of the Gospel.

ChinaAid reported that the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee censored information related to Christianity in school textbooks.  In one textbook containing a picture of Michelangelo’s “Creation of Adam” on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, authorities changed the word in the description from “God” to “Old Man,” and in the description of a painting of the Virgin Mary and Jesus, they changed “Holy Mother and Holy Son” to “mother and son.”

A Hui Muslim source told international media the government was attempting to remove characteristics of Hui religion and culture to make Hui citizens indistinguishable from Han citizens, with whom they share physical characteristics and language.  Authorities took down minarets and domes and consolidated mosques.  He said authorities trained clergy in Party doctrine and instructed them to pass those teachings on to their religious communities.  The government targeted Hui cultural and business elites to remove Hui texts and art and cut off independent financial support to the community.  The source called this a kind of “cultural genocide.”

On October 24, National Public Radio (NPR) reported that the government had removed domes and minarets from thousands of mosques across the country, saying these were evidence of “foreign religious influence,” and to replace them with more traditionally Chinese architectural features.  Authorities removed the dome and minarets from the Dongguan Mosque in Xining City, Qinghai Province.  According to one local resident, “The government says they want us to ‘Sinicize’ our mosques so that they look more like Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.”  NPR stated the campaign coincided with rising anti-Muslim sentiment in the country and growing religious restrictions.

According to ChinaAid, on February 1, authorities for the second time removed a 100-year-old cross from Shuixin Church in Wenzhou City, Zhejiang Province, against the wishes of the congregation.  They first cut the building’s electricity and then took the church’s night watch staff into custody.  According to one Christian observer, several security guards held one church member in a headlock and confiscated his mobile phone.  They warned him, “Do not fight back.  We are enforcing orders from higher officials.”  Authorities had removed the cross in June 2014, but the church later reinstalled it.

ChinaAid reported that on July 28, authorities in Zhoushan City, Zhejiang Province, forced several fishermen to remove crosses from their privately owned fishing vessels.  Authorities also erased “Emmanuel” slogans painted on boats and threatened that if the fishermen refused to cooperate, authorities would not grant them fishing permits or allow them to purchase gasoline for their boats.  The authorities did not present any legal documents supporting their actions.  The fishermen wrote on social media, “The government is completely unreasonable.  Fishing boats are our personal property.  We have the right to put crosses on our boats.  Religious freedom is written in the constitution.  However, it is just empty talk.  The government never enforces the constitution.”

According to Bitter Winter, in January authorities sentenced Pastor Li Juncai of the Yuan Yang County House Church in Xinxiang City, Henan Province, to five and a half years in prison.  In early 2019, Li had resisted government orders to remove the cross from his building and change the Church motto from “Love God and Love Others” to “Love the Country and Love Religion.”  He also objected to constructing a stand within the church where a national flag would be placed.  Authorities arrested Li in February 2019, and the Yuan Yang County prosecutor’s office charged him with “misappropriation of office, obstruction of official duties, and destruction of accounts.”  He remained in jail until his trial.  The court found him guilty on all three counts.

According to the SARA data, at year’s end, religious groups ran 87 schools in the country, including 37 Buddhist, 10 Taoist, 10 Islamic, nine Catholic, and 21 Protestant.  Authorities barred students younger than 18 from receiving religious instruction, but enforcement and implementation of the prohibition varied widely across and within regions.  According to the SARA, there were six national-level religious colleges.  Although there were two CCPA seminaries in Beijing, civil society sources said one of these institutions was primarily used as CCPA propaganda for international visitors.

In March, Open Doors USA reported authorities using CCTV observed a woman in Shandong Province taking her child to a state-affiliated church.  Officials reprimanded her for violating the ban on children participating in religious activities, such as attending church.

In May, Bitter Winter reported that police came to the home of Zhao Weikai, a worker at Taiyuan Reformed Church in Taiyuan City, Shanxi Province, with an arrest warrant for “religious fraud.”  Police arrested Zhao and confiscated his mobile phone and other items.  They reportedly told Zhao to stop homeschooling minors, which is prohibited by law.  Individuals present questioned the summons’ validity, saying that court officials had neither signed nor stamped it.

In November, ChinaAid reported that during the year, the government shut down several informal Christian schools.  On May 27, authorities raided the Xuan De learning center, affiliated with the Wuhu Jiamishan Christian Church in Anhui Province.  They confiscated books, computers, and mobile phones, and detained the school’s headmaster and teachers.  On May 28, the Wuhu civil affairs bureau labeled the center an “illegal social organization,” and in July, the Wuhu local government deemed the Church an “illegal gathering.”  On October 12, police arrested five educators from the Abeka Academy, a U.S.-based Christian homeschool education program in Zhenjiang City, Jiangsu Province, and detained children, parents, and teachers.

Individuals seeking to enroll at an official seminary or other institution of religious learning continued to be required to obtain the support of the corresponding state-sanctioned religious association.  The government continued to require students to demonstrate “political reliability,” and political issues were included in examinations of graduates from religious schools.  Both registered and unregistered religious groups reported a shortage of trained clergy, due in part to government controls on admission to seminaries.

National regulations required Muslim clerics to meet the following requirements:  “Uphold the leadership of the CCP; love Islam and serve Muslims; possess a degree in or receive formal training in Islamic scriptural education; have graduated from junior high school or above, in addition to attaining competency in Arabic; and be at least 22 years old.”  According to sources, imams had to pass an exam testing their ideological knowledge to renew their license each year.

The government and the Holy See remained without formal diplomatic relations, and the Holy See had no official representative to the country.  Media stated the SARA’s “Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy” made no provision for the Vatican to have a role in the selection of Catholic bishops, despite the 2018 Sino-Vatican provisional agreement reportedly involving both Chinese authorities and the Holy See in the process of appointing bishops.  AsiaNews stated the regulations undermined the Sino-Vatican provisional agreement.  The news outlet said, “Even Catholic bishops, although ‘approved and ordained’ by the Council of Chinese Bishops, can only exercise their ministry after registering with the SARA.  In this way, the state and not the Church retains management of the pastoral ministry of bishops.”  According to AsiaNews, the provisions reenforced the distinction between official and unofficial priests and bishops, “thus endorsing and supporting the division imposed by the regime.”  Some senior Chinese sources, however, told the Catholic news outlet The Pillar that the new rules would not invalidate the agreement.  One Catholic cleric said provisions on financial management were aimed not at Catholic churches but rather at Buddhist temples, while those pertaining to “foreign domination” were aimed primarily at underground Protestant house churches.  He said the government had omitted the Vatican from the regulations because the CCP would not want to publicly identify a foreign power in any way, despite coordinating on the selection of bishops.

Media reported that on May 20, authorities detained seven priests and an unspecified number of seminarians in Xinxiang City, Henan Province, for using an abandoned factory as a seminary to train priests.  On May 21, they arrested Vatican-approved Bishop Joseph Zhang Weizhu.  All were accused of violating the SARA’s May 1 regulation outlawing religious activities, including worship, in places not registered with the state.  The CCPA does not recognize Xinxiang as a diocese, although it was created by the Vatican in 1936.  Zhang was ordained by the Vatican as a bishop in 1991, but his appointment was not approved by the two state-sanctioned church bodies – the BCCCC and CCPA – and he was not among the Vatican-approved bishops recognized as a result of the Sino-Vatican provisional agreement.

Media reported in April that authorities in Cangnan County, Wenzhou City, Zhejiang Province, fined Catholic Huang Ruixun RMB 200,000 ($31,400) for offering his private chapel to Bishop Peter Shao Zhumin and approximately 20 worshippers to conduct services.  They charged that the event was an illegal religious activity.  Shao was ordained by the Vatican as Bishop of Yongjia/Wenzhou Diocese in 2016, but he was not among the Vatican-approved bishops recognized as a result of the Sino-Vatican provisional agreement.

On September 8, Franciscan Father Francis Cui Qingqi was ordained Bishop of Hankou/Wuhan Diocese, with the approval of the state and the Catholic Church, making him the sixth bishop ordained since the Sino-Vatican provisional agreement of 2018, and the fourth since it was extended in 2020.  The Vatican press office director told journalists that Pope Francis appointed Cui on June 23, 2020.  Media stated the state-sanctioned BCCCC had elected him “democratically” on September 27, 2020.

A number of Catholic clergy, including some bishops appointed by the Pope, remained unable or unwilling to register with the CCPA.

The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that during an August 27-28 conference on ethnic affairs attended by CCP leaders, legislators, and the political advisory body, including all seven Politburo Standing Committee members, President Xi told attendees to “continue to eradicate poisonous thoughts of ethnic separatism and religious extremism.”  SCMP reported that Xi’s statements were an apparent attempt to “rebuff international allegations of human rights abuses.”

According to the State Council website, the government convened a national conference on religious affairs on December 3-4, the first since 2016, that called on clergy, the CCP, and government officials to ensure religious doctrine followed the CCP.  At the conference, President Xi said religions in the country had made progress in “enhancing their recognition” of the Chinese nation and culture, along with the CCP and socialism.  Xi emphasized the need to “uphold and develop a religious theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics, work in line with the Party’s basic policy on religious affairs, and uphold the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation.”  Xi urged “full and strict governance of religions.”  He told CCP and government officials to train individuals who were “adept at the Marxist view on religion, familiar with religious affairs, and competent to engage in work related to religious believers.”  According to media reports, Xi further emphasized strengthening “the management of online religious affairs,” which critics said implied that religious practitioners would be disciplined for inappropriate online commentary.

The Associated Press reported that on May 18, the host of a program on CGTN, the overseas channel of state broadcaster CCTV, used antisemitic tropes.  Speaking in English, Zheng Junfeng said, “Some people believe that U.S. pro-Israeli policy is traceable to the influence of wealthy Jews in the U.S. and the Jewish lobby on U.S. foreign policy makers… Jews dominate finance and internet sectors.”  Responding on Twitter, the Israeli embassy in China stated, “We have hoped that the times of the ‘Jews controlling the world’ conspiracy theories were over, unfortunately antisemitism has shown its ugly face again.  We are appalled to see blatant antisemitism expressed in an official Chinese media outlet.”

In a June SCIO white paper entitled, “The Communist Party of China and Human Rights Protection – A 100-Year Quest,” the government stated that it protects “normal religious activities” and “does not interfere in the internal affairs of religions.”

On August 13, the outlet Algemeiner described as antisemitic a caricature of the U.S. Secretary of State that the state-owned Xinhua news agency published alongside Xinhua’s article on the Secretary’s July meeting with World Health Organization head Tendros Ghebreyesus.  The cartoon depicted the Secretary as a devil with red skin, horns, and a large, elongated nose, holding a report entitled “COVID-19 Origins Tracing.”  The American Jewish Committee denounced the cartoon on Twitter, calling it “despicable.”

Because the government and individuals closely link religion, culture, and ethnicity, it was difficult to categorize many incidents of societal discrimination as being solely based on religious identity.

Despite labor law provisions against discrimination in hiring based on religious belief, some employers continued to discriminate against religious believers.  Religious minorities continued to report employers terminated their employment due to their current or prior religious activities.

In 2020, the Economist reported employment discrimination against ethnic minorities was pervasive, citing a study that found that Hui job seekers had to send twice as many applications as Han applicants and that Uyghurs had on average to send nearly four times as many applications just to hear back from potential employers.  The study found the gap was greater for highly educated workers, with Uyghur candidates who were in the top 1 percent academically having to send six times as many applications as their Han counterparts.  According to the Economist, the application gap was “similar in both smaller cities and in the provincial-level regions of Guangdong, Beijing and Shanghai.  State-owned enterprises, which have an official mandate to hire more minority workers, appeared at least as biased as other firms.”

Discrimination against potential or current tenants based on their religious beliefs reportedly continued.  Since 2017 and 2018, when articles in the 2005 Public Security Administration Punishment Law related to “suspicious activity” began to be enforced in earnest, Falun Gong practitioners reported ongoing difficulty in finding landlords who would rent them apartments.  Sources stated government enforcement of this law continued to move the country further away from informal discriminatory practices by individual landlords towards a more formalized enforcement of codified discriminatory legislation.

In June, the Diplomat reported growing anti-Muslim sentiment in society as a result of the government’s Sinicization campaign, which the Diplomat said could lead to violence.  Sources said government propaganda portraying Uyghurs as radicals, extremists, and terrorists had created societal hostility toward that group.  Anti-Muslim speech in social media reportedly remained widespread.

There were reports that Uyghur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, and other religious minorities continued to face difficulties in finding accommodation when they traveled.

In January, media reported messages on social media blamed local Catholics from Shijiazhuang City and “several priests from Europe and the United States” for the spread of COVID-19 in Hebei Province that resulted in a lockdown on January 6.  Local priests denounced the posts, saying there had been no religious activities, masses, or meetings since December 24, 2020.

The U.S. Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State, Charge d’Affaires, and other senior State Department officials and embassy and consulate general representatives repeatedly and publicly expressed concerns about abuses of religious freedom in the country, including in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang.  In July, the Secretary of State met virtually with Uyghur family members, Xinjiang internment camp survivors, and advocates to express the U.S. commitment to calling for the government to end atrocities in Xinjiang.  In July, the Deputy Secretary of State met with State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi and raised concerns about human rights abuses in the country, including in Hong Kong and Tibet, and the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity occurring in Xinjiang.  During the Secretary of State’s October meeting with Foreign Minister Wang, the Secretary’s spokesperson said the Secretary “raised concerns about a range of actions that undermine the international rules-based order and that run counter to our values and interests and those of our allies and partners, including actions related to human rights, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, the East and South China Seas, and Taiwan.”

Embassy and consulate officials regularly sought meetings with a range of government officials managing religious affairs to obtain more information on government policies and to advocate for greater religious freedom and tolerance.  Embassy and consulate officials, including the Charge and Consuls General, urged government officials at the central, provincial, and local levels, including those at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries, to implement stronger protections for religious freedom and to release prisoners of conscience.  The Charge highlighted religious freedom in meetings with senior officials.  The Department of State, embassy, and consulates general regularly called upon the government to release prisoners of conscience and advocated on behalf of individual cases of persons imprisoned for religious reasons.

PRC authorities consistently harassed and intimidated religious leaders to dissuade them from speaking with U.S. officials.  Authorities regularly prevented members of religious communities from attending events at the embassy and consulates general, and security services questioned individuals who did attend.  Authorities routinely declined to approve or postponed U.S. officials’ requests to visit religious sites and meet with religious leaders.

The Charge, Consuls General in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Wuhan, and other embassy and consulate general officials met with religious groups, as well as academics, NGOs, members of registered and unregistered religious groups, and family members of religious prisoners to reinforce U.S. support for religious freedom.  Embassy and consulate general officials hosted events around religious holidays and conducted roundtable discussions with religious leaders to convey the importance of religious pluralism in society and learn about issues facing religious communities.

The embassy continued to amplify Department of State religious freedom initiatives directly to local audiences through postings to the embassy website and to its Weibo, WeChat, and Twitter accounts.  Over the course of the year, the embassy published nearly 50 messages promoting religious freedom, including videos, statements, images, and infographics.  The embassy highlighted the Secretary’s participation in the civil society-led International Religious Freedom Summit in July and his visit to the Vatican in June to emphasize U.S. support for religious freedom.  It posted or retweeted posts concerning the state of religious freedom in Xinjiang and Tibet.  For example, on International Religious Freedom Day on October 27, the embassy reposted the Secretary’s message supporting respect for religious freedom, as well as information describing the Chinese government’s continuing control over religion and restrictions on the activities of religious adherents.  On December 10, the embassy issued a Human Rights Day statement from the Charge on its website and through its international and Chinese social media accounts.  The statement highlighted the breadth of gross violations of human rights occurring in the PRC, including restrictions on religious freedom.  The embassy also shared greetings from the President and Secretary of State on special religious days for Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Tibetan Buddhists; these were viewed by millions of social media users.  In total, embassy posts on social media garnered almost 10 million views and approximately 240,000 engagements.

On January 13, CBP issued a Withhold Release Order that prohibited the import of all cotton and tomato products produced in Xinjiang “based on information that reasonably indicates the use of detainee or prison labor and situations of forced labor.”

On January 19, the then Secretary of State determined that since at least March 2017, the PRC’s repressive actions against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other religious minority groups in Xinjiang constituted genocide and crimes against humanity.

On March 22, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Wang Junzheng, Secretary of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), and Chen Mingguo, Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB), pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, for their connection to serious human rights abuses against ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.  The U.S. coordinated the timing of the sanctions with the European Union, United Kingdom, and Canada, which levied their own sanctions against Chinese individuals and entities on the same day.  In response, on March 27, the Chinese government sanctioned two officials on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), a move the Secretary condemned as “baseless.”

On May 12, the Secretary of State announced visa sanctions against Yu Hui, former office director of the Central Leading Group Preventing and Dealing with Heretical Religions in Chengdu, for his involvement in gross violations of human rights against Falun Gong practitioners.

Also on May 12, the United States cohosted a high-level virtual event on Xinjiang with 17 other countries and six NGOs.  Speaking at the event, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations described Uyghurs’ wish “to practice basic freedoms of religion, belief, expression, and movement…”  In other multilateral action, the United States joined a group of 44 countries on June 22 in issuing a Canada-led joint statement expressing grave concern about the human rights situation in Xinjiang, as well as deep concern about the deterioration of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong and the human rights situation in Tibet.  On October 21, it joined a group of 43 countries delivering a joint statement on the human rights situation in Xinjiang at the UN General Assembly Third Committee.

On May 27, the Secretary condemned the PRC’s sanctioning of a former USCIRF commissioner.  The Secretary stated, “Beijing’s attempts to intimidate and silence those speaking out for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion or belief, only draw additional international attention and scrutiny to its egregious abuses.  This includes the ongoing crimes against humanity and genocide in Xinjiang, as well as its repression of religious and spiritual adherents, including Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and Falun Gong practitioners.”

Addressing the use of forced labor of ethnic and religious minorities in the polysilicon industry in Xinjiang, on June 24, the CBP issued a Withhold Release Order against Hoshine Silicone Industry Co., Ltd, a company headquartered in Xinjiang.  The U.S. Department of Commerce added related Xinjiang-based companies to its list of entities subject to specific license requirements for export, reexport, and/or transfer in-country of specific items (the “Entity List”); the U.S. Department of Labor updated its List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor with related products; and the White House issued a fact sheet on forced labor in Xinjiang.

On July 9, the Bureau of Industry and Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce announced it would add 14 entities to the Entity List for being complicit in China’s campaign of repression, mass detention, and high technology surveillance against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang.  The penalties prohibit U.S. companies from selling equipment or other goods to these firms.

n July 13, the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, Labor, and the U.S. Trade Representative issued an updated Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory that highlighted for businesses with potential supply chain and investment links to Xinjiang the risk of complicity with forced labor and human rights abuses.

On December 6, the Presidential press secretary announced the U.S. would not send diplomatic or official representation to the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic and Paralympics Games “given the PRC’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and other human rights abuses.”

On December 10, the U.S. Department of State imposed visa restrictions on four current and former PRC officials – Shohrat Zakir, Erken Tuniyaz, Hu Lianhe, and Chen Mingguo – for their involvement in gross violations of human rights, specifically arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in Xinjiang.  The U.S. Department of the Treasury also designated Shohrat Zakir and Erken Tuniyaz under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program in connection with serious human rights abuse.  The Department of the Treasury also imposed financial sanctions on the company SenseTime Group Limited for its involvement in developing facial recognition programs aimed at identifying ethnic Uyghurs.  On December 21, in reaction to the December 10 U.S. sanctions, the PRC announced sanctions against four USCIRF officials.

On December 23, the President signed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act “to ensure that goods made with forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the [PRC] do not enter the United States market.”  The legislation banned imports of goods made using forced labor of “Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, and members of other persecuted groups,” including goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part.  The act directed the CBP to presume imports from Xinjiang were produced with forced labor unless the importer proved otherwise to CBP and imposed sanctions on foreign individuals responsible for forced labor in the region.

Since 1999, China has been designated as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.  On November 15, 2021, the Secretary of State redesignated China as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation:  the existing ongoing restriction on exports to China of crime control and detection instruments and equipment, under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246), pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

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Tibet | Xinjiang | Hong Kong | Macau

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 50.4 million (midyear 2021).  According to a 2017 survey by the NGO Latinobarometer, 73 percent of the population is Catholic, 14 percent Protestant, and 11 percent atheist or agnostic.  Groups that together constitute less than 2 percent of the population include nondenominational worshipers, Jews, Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Church of God Ministry of Jesus Christ International, Mennonites, Baha’is, and Buddhists.  There are between 85,000 and 100,000 Muslims, according to a 2018 Pew research study.  According to Baha’i leaders, there are approximately 60,000 followers; a Buddhist representative estimates there are 9,000 adherents in the country.  The CJCC estimates there are approximately 5,500 Jews.  There is also a small population of adherents of animism and various syncretic beliefs.

Some religious groups are concentrated in certain geographical regions.  Most of those who blend Catholicism with elements of African animism are Afro-Colombians and reside on the Pacific coast.  Most Jews reside in major cities (approximately 70 percent in Bogota), most Muslims live on the Caribbean coast, and most adherents of indigenous animistic religions live in remote rural areas.  A small Taoist community is located in a mountainous region of Santander Department.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and the right to profess one’s religious beliefs.  It prohibits discrimination based on religion.  There is no official state church or religion, but the law says the state “is not atheist or agnostic, nor indifferent to Colombians’ religious sentiment.”  The constitution states all religions and churches are equal before the law.  A 1998 Constitutional Court ruling upheld the right of traditional authorities to enforce the observation of, and participation in, traditional religious beliefs and practices on indigenous reserves.  Subsequent rulings refer to the 1998 decision to reaffirm the right of indigenous governors to prohibit the practice of non-indigenous religions on indigenous reserves.  A concordat between the Holy See and the government, recognized and enforced by law, recognizes marriages performed by the Catholic Church, allows the Church to provide chaplaincy services, and exempts members of the Catholic clergy from compulsory public service, including military service.  According to a court ruling, these provisions are constitutional as long as they apply to all religious groups, but the legal framework is not in place to extend them to all religious groups.  The law prohibits any official government reference to a religious affiliation for the country.

The MOI is responsible for formally recognizing churches, religious denominations, religious federations and confederations, and associations of religious ministers, as well as keeping a public registry of religious organizations.  Organizations formally recognized by the MOI may then confer this recognition, called “extended public recognition,” to affiliated groups sharing the same beliefs.  The application process requires submission of a formal request and basic organizational information, including copies of the organization’s constitution and an estimate of the number of members.  The government considers a religious group’s total membership, its “degree of acceptance within society,” and other factors, such as the organization’s statutes and its required behavioral norms, when deciding whether to grant formal recognition.  The MOI provides a free, internet-based registration process for religious and faith-based organizations seeking recognition.  Formally recognized religious organizations may collect funds and receive donations, establish religious education institutions, and perform religious services, excluding marriages.  Unregistered ones may perform religious activities without penalty but may not collect financial funds or receive private donations, which may be nonfinancial.

The government recognizes as legally binding marriages performed by the Catholic Church, the Jewish community, and 13 non-Catholic Christian denominations that are signatories to a 1997 public law agreement:  the Council of the Assemblies of God, Christian Community Spring of Eternal Life, Christian Crusade Church, Quadrangular Christian Church, Church of God in Colombia, House on the Rock Integral Christian Church, United Pentecostal Church of Colombia, Denomination of the Pan-American Mission of Colombia, Pentecostal Church of God International Movement in Colombia, Seventh-day Adventist Church of Colombia, Wesleyan Church, Christian Church of Long Bridge, and the Federation Evangelical Council of Colombia.  The agreement authorizes these religious groups to engage in activities such as marriages, funeral services, and spiritual assistance in prisons, hospitals, military facilities, and educational institutions.  Under this agreement, members of religious groups that are neither signatories to the agreement nor affiliated with signatories must marry in a civil ceremony for the state to recognize the marriage.  Religious groups not signatories to the 1997 public law may not provide chaplaincy services or conduct state-recognized marriages.

The constitution recognizes the right of parents to choose the education of their child, including religious instruction.  The law states religious education shall be offered in accordance with laws protecting religious freedom, and it identifies the Ministry of Education as responsible for establishing guidelines for teaching religion within the public school curriculum.  Religious groups, including those that have not acceded to the public law agreement, may establish their own schools, provided they comply with ministry requirements.  A Constitutional Court ruling obligates schools to implement alternative accommodations for students based on their religion, which could include students at religious institutions opting out of prayers or religious lessons.  The government does not provide subsidies for private schools run by religious organizations.

The penal code prohibits discrimination based on religious beliefs or violations of religious freedom, including physical or moral harm.  It imposes a penalty of one to three years in prison and a fine of 10 to 15 times the monthly minimum wage, approximately 8.3 million to 12.4 million Colombian pesos ($2,100-$3,100).

A Constitutional Court ruling ruled that citizens, including members of indigenous communities, may be exempt from compulsory military service if they can demonstrate a serious and permanent commitment to religious principles that prohibit the use of force.  Conscientious objectors who are exempt from military service may complete alternative, government-selected public service.  The law requires that regional interagency commissions evaluate requests for conscientious objector status; commission members include representatives from the armed forces, the Inspector General’s Office, and medical, psychological, and legal experts.  By law, the National Commission of Conscientious Objection reviews any cases not resolved at the regional level.  The law requires that every battalion or larger military unit designate an officer in charge of processing conscientious objector exemptions.

According to the law, all associations, foundations, and corporations declared as nonprofit organizations, including foundations supported by churches or religious organizations recognized by the MOI, must pay taxes.  Churches and religious organizations recognized by the MOI are tax-exempt, but they must report their income and expenses to the National Tax and Customs Authority.  According to a Constitutional Court ruling, the state may not seize the assets of non-Catholic churches in legal proceedings if the church meets the requirements for formal government recognition.

Foreign missionaries must possess a special visa, valid for up to two years.  The MFA issues visas to foreign missionaries and religious group administrators, who are members of religious organizations officially recognized and registered with the MOI.  When applying for a visa, foreign missionaries must have a certificate from either the MOI or church authorities confirming registration of their religious group with the MFA.  Alternatively, they may produce a certificate issued by a registered religious group confirming the applicant’s membership and mission in the country.  The visa application also requires a letter issued by a legal representative of the religious group stating the organization accepts full financial responsibility for the expenses of the applicant and family, including funds for return to their country of origin or last country of residence.  Applicants must explain the purpose of the proposed sojourn and provide proof of economic means.  A Constitutional Court ruling stipulates that, although missionaries may work in the country, no group may impose forced religious conversion on members of indigenous communities.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On April 7, the Constitutional Court determined that an adolescent member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses had the right to refuse a blood transfusion for medical purposes due to her religious beliefs and instead receive alternate methods of treatment.  The decision was made in relation to a 2020 case in which a hospital and the Administrative Court of the Cundinamarca Region had previously determined that blood transfusions could be required to be administered to patients in cases of “extreme urgency.”

On May 21, the Constitutional Court reiterated that government officials should refrain from actions that could be interpreted as violating the separation of church and state and instructed the Presidential Counsel for Communication to ensure that government authorities use social media appropriately.

On July 22, the Constitutional Court ruled that the right to euthanasia – recognized in 1997 – applies not only to terminal patients, but also to those with “intense physical or mental suffering from bodily injury or serious and incurable disease.”  In response to the ruling, Catholic Church officials described euthanasia as a “serious offense to the dignity of life.”

The MOI reported there were 9,032 formally recognized religious organizations in the country at the end of the year, compared with 8,214 at the end of 2020.  It received 723 applications for formal recognition of religious organizations, compared with 393 in 2020; approved 595, compared with 343 in 2020; and deferred or denied 15, compared with 12 in 2020.  The MOI stated that the reason it deferred and denied petitions was because the applying entity failed to meet the legal requirements and/or because it failed to provide missing information during the year.  The MOI stated it continued to review the remaining applications.  According to the MOI, 99.4 percent of the applications were from evangelical Christian churches and the rest were from Muslim and Jewish entities.  The MOI continued to give applicants who submitted incomplete applications or incorrect supporting documents 30 days to bring their applications into compliance.  If the MOI deemed an application incomplete, it could deny the application; however, the applying organization could resubmit an application at any time, and the MOI indicated there was no waiting period to reapply.

The DRA provided support to the 32 departments to implement the National Public Policy of Religious Freedom and Worship adopted in 2018 to provide guarantees to exercise freedom of religion and worship.  The policy also formally recognized religions and their affiliated organizations as managers of peace, forgiveness, and reconciliation.  It further guaranteed coordination between the regions and the different levels of government to promote peacebuilding, reconciliation, and forgiveness with a view to recognizing victims of conflict in the country.  As part of the initiative to support the policy, the DRA promoted the implementation of 90 public measures on religious freedom during the year.  These included public campaigns to promote religious tolerance and nondiscrimination as well as efforts to strengthen communication between religious groups and government institutions at the national and regional levels.  The DRA also provided technical assistance to officials by creating a Manual for Territorial Religious Liaisons containing guidelines to promote the protection of religious freedom.  The DRA additionally provided guidelines to implement the Comprehensive Public Policy on Religious Freedom and Religious Groups for territorial entities.  Passed in 1994, the policy regulates the right to freedom of religion and worship present in the constitution and addresses church-state relations and the legal status of non-Catholic religions.

During the year, the DRA created religious freedom liaison positions – government representatives to serve as liaisons between religious organizations and local and regional governments.  These religious liaisons were appointed in 29 departments, including in the municipalities of Chinchina, Caldas; Yopal, Casanare; Tierra Alta, Cordoba; Manizales, Caldas; Pasto, Narino; and the Departments of Antioquia, Boyaca, and Meta.

The DRA took steps to implement an international cooperation agreement with the UNDP signed in 2020 to study the religious community and gather relevant information regarding the characteristics, needs, challenges, and contributions of religious groups.  The goal was to implement public policies on religious freedom in a more detailed way and articulate actions between the religious community and the public sector to achieve common objectives.  During the year, the study involved the departments of Bolivar, Norte de Santander, Risaralda, and Valle del Cauca.  The project conducted 1,436 surveys that examined social, cultural, educational, coexistence, and peace and reconciliation elements.  According to the survey data, the religious community assisted vulnerable populations such as victims of conflict, women, the elderly, children, adolescents, and migrants.  The agreement with the UNDP also supported the training of religious community employees and public officials to focus on respect for religious freedom and empowering religious groups in the exercise of their rights.  By year’s end, 2,000 persons had taken the training.

According to the DRA and religious leaders, the MOI continued implementing its public policy goal of raising awareness of the role of religious groups in supporting victims of conflict and other vulnerable populations, as well as strengthening interreligious cooperation and tolerance at the local level through structured interfaith dialogues and technical assistance.  In May, the DRA created a dialogue commission with the Catholic Church to fulfill a legal mandate that a roundtable be created with the Church to adopt public policies concerning the Church’s status.  The DRA also promoted more than 200 interreligious engagements through committees, roundtables, and councils, and it led one training workshop on the legal framework of religious freedom.  On June 25, the DRA held an educational campaign through digital media on religious freedom, tolerance, nondiscrimination, and stigmatization or persecution for religious reasons.  It also supported an interreligious promotional campaign called “As Born Between Us” to support migrants in the country.

President Duque commemorated National Day of Religious Freedom on July 4, when he spoke in support of outreach and initiatives highlighting religious freedom.  By year’s end, 90 municipalities had adopted public policies on religious freedom.  The policies included public campaigns to promote religious tolerance and nondiscrimination as well as efforts to strengthen communication between religious groups and government institutions at the national and regional levels.  Religious freedom and respect for religious groups were included in new territorial development plans for 2020-23 in 16 of the country’s 32 departments and 24 municipalities.  The national outreach programs continued to prioritize integrating the religious community into public policy discussions, including on how to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, the increasing number of Venezuelans residing in the country, and how to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.  During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government supplied hundreds of aid packages to humanitarian and religious programs.

The Ministry of National Education urged preschool, elementary, and middle school educational institutions to foster peaceful resolution to conflicts involving religious belief.

According to religious groups, individuals continued to have difficulty obtaining exemptions from military service on religious grounds.  Religious leaders expressed continued concern regarding a law requiring interagency commissions to evaluate requests for conscientious objector status.  Religious organizations reported mixed enforcement of the conscientious objector law, stating that some objectors were still required to serve in the military, although they were exempt from carrying a weapon.  The Ministry of Defense reported that by year’s end, it had approved 61 of 112 applications seeking conscientious objector status on religious grounds.

The CJCC continued to express concern about antisemitic rhetoric and actions on social media after the CJCC met with a presidential candidate in May as part of a series of meetings with all presidential candidates.  For example, social media included comments stating the Jewish community was “conspiring with communism” and committing “treason against the homeland.”  In November, Colombian National Police (CNP) cadets from the Simon Bolivar Police Academy in Tulua wore Nazi attire and displayed paraphernalia with swastikas at a ceremony the police claimed was to honor Germany.  President Duque condemned the incident, stating that any demonstration that uses or refers to symbols associated with those responsible for the Holocaust was unacceptable.  The Defense Ministry similarly denounced this act, and the police dismissed the head of the academy.  The national police suspended two senior officers at the academy.

The Colombian National Police, through the Protection and Special Services Directorate, continued to provide security for religious sites, and the National Protection Unit of the MOI provided personal security to individuals deemed at risk.

In connection with the observance of National Day of Religious Freedom, the MOI and regional governments held forums and other events to educate the public on the significance of the holiday and the new public policy to build bridges with religious organizations.  On July 7, President Duque met with youth representatives of the country’s main religious communities and organizations.  During the meeting, the youth representatives signed a pact to promote the Integral Public Policy of Religious Freedom that advocates youth supporting the common purpose of religious freedom.  President Duque highlighted the inclusion of religious freedom in the constitution, stating that all religions and belief systems have the same rights, freedoms, and obligations.  The MOI also launched the first knowledge repository of interreligious initiatives, a formal mechanism established to recognize and highlight practices of religious and social entities and to support the social, cultural, and educational work of religions entities and their organizations.

The AGO reported that there were no killings of religious figures, compared with three killings of religious figures in 2020.  NGOs and church representatives, however, reported that illegal armed groups continued to kill, threaten, or displace human rights defenders, including some religious leaders, for promoting human rights, assisting internally displaced persons, assisting with land restitution claims, and discouraging coca cultivation.

During the year, leaders of many religious groups continued to report that illegal armed groups, in particular the National Liberation Army, hindered peace and reconciliation programs, including those led by religious institutions, such as the Catholic Church, in rural areas with a limited state presence.  The AGO reported four cases of threats by members of illegal armed groups against religious leaders and one case of displacement of a religious organization leader, compared with nine threats and 16 attacks the previous year.

The Christian NGO Open Doors’ annual report for 2021, released on January 19, 2022, showed an increase from the previous year in persecution and attacks by criminal and guerilla elements against Christians for denouncing corruption and violence perpetrated by such groups, with greater prevalence in remote areas of the country.

During the year, the AGO investigated two cases of abuses of religious freedom in the municipalities of Soledad, Atlantico and Barrancabermeja, Santander.  In addition, the AGO investigated four cases of vandalism reported in Ayapel, Cordoba; La Plata, Huila; Cucuta, Norte de Santander; and Floridablanca, Santander.  The MOI also stated that several acts of vandalism against churches occurred during the year.

The DRA said acts of vandalism towards two churches occurred in the departments of Tolima in March and Valle del Cauca in May.  In addition, according to the Colombia Episcopal Conference, groups of women in favor of legalizing abortion vandalized the Catholic Cathedral of Ibague and the St. Francis Church of Bogota on March 8, International Women’s Day.  The women also damaged the physical structures and harassed church members.  In both cases, police were present but made no arrests.

According to the Colombian Episcopal Conference representing the Catholic Church, some state and private schools encouraged students to limit visible expressions of faith.  On February 17, Ash Wednesday, the French School in Pereira required three girls to wash the ash cross off their foreheads to enter the school.

According to media, Martha Sepulveda, a self-described devout Catholic, was scheduled to become the first person in the country without a terminal prognosis to die by legally authorized euthanasia on October 10.  On October 8, the private Colombian Institute of Pain (Incodol), which was scheduled to perform the procedure, determined that she was no longer eligible because her condition had improved.  Sepulveda’s family planned to appeal the decision.  A member of the national bishops’ conference urged Sepulveda to “calmly reflect” on her decision and invited all Catholics to pray that God would grant her mercy.  On October 27, a court in Medellin ruled that Sepulveda was entitled to die by euthanasia, with the procedure scheduled for early 2022.

During the year, the Catholic Church, Mennonite Church, and other religious groups continued to conduct programs focused on religious tolerance, land rights, peace, and reconciliation.  Faith-based and interfaith NGOs, including DiPaz and the Inter-Ecclesiastical Commission on Justice and Peace, continued to promote religious freedom and tolerance through their programs and community engagement.

DiPaz, which includes the Presbyterian Church, Lutheran Evangelical Church, Council of the Assemblies of God, and various NGOs, focused on advancing the peace process in the country.  In a July 16 letter to the United Nations Security Council, DiPaz called on the international community to urge the government to resume the full implementation of the 2016 peace accord that ended the conflict between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and strengthen channels of dialogue to resolve societal issues.  The World Council of Churches and Action by Churches Alliance joined DiPaz in supporting the search for sustainable peace in the country.  The letter appealed for continued and further action to promote a genuine and sustainable peace for all the individuals in the country, especially the most marginalized communities and those most affected as victims of violence.  Several regional and global organizations, including the World Communion of Reformed Churches, Presbyterian Church, Alliance of Presbyterian and Reformed Churches of Latin America, Regional Ecumenical Advisory and Service Center, World Student Christian Federation, QONAKUY (a phrase of the aboriginal Quechua people meaning “to join with another is to share the best of oneself”), and the American Lutheran Church, endorsed the letter.

The Catholic Church and other religious organizations distributed food packages during the COVID-19 pandemic to all in need regardless of religion.

Embassy officials discussed conscientious objection to military service and the effect of the actions of guerrilla and illegal armed groups on religious freedom with the Human Rights Directorate of the MFA, the International Affairs Directorate of the AGO, and the DRA.  Embassy officials discussed with the DRA public policies on religious freedom, including support for victims of conflict and other vulnerable populations.

The embassy highlighted on social media U.S. collaboration with the government and civil society to promote respect for religious pluralism and diversity of belief and that condemned antisemitism and highlighted local events advocating for religious freedom and tolerance.  The Ambassador issued a statement denouncing the CNP event involving Nazi paraphernalia and praising the government’s quick action in response.  Embassy officials met virtually with representatives from a wide range of religious groups, including Catholics, evangelical Protestants, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Presbyterians, Mennonites, Baha’is, the CJCC, Greek Orthodox, Bogota’s Muslim community, representatives from a coalition of indigenous religious groups, and from other faith-based NGOs, including Global Ministries, the Colombian Evangelical Council’s Peace Commission, and the Colombian Confederation of Religious Freedom, Conscience and Worship.  Embassy officials discussed the government’s policies on religious freedom, conscientious objection, antisemitism, and the groups’ role in combating religious intolerance and support for the 2016 peace accord.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 864,000 (midyear 2021), of which 98 percent is Sunni Muslim.  Roman Catholics, Shia Muslims, Ahmadi Muslims, and Protestants together make up less than 2 percent of the population.  Non-Muslims are mainly foreign residents and are concentrated in the country’s capital, Moroni, and the capital of Anjouan, Mutsamudu.  Shia and Ahmadi Muslims mostly live on the island of Anjouan.

Legal Framework

The constitution states Islam is the state religion and citizens shall draw principles and rules to regulate worship and social life from the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam.  The preamble “affirms the will of the Comorian people” to cultivate a national identity based on a single religion, Sunni Islam.  It proclaims equality of rights and obligations for all individuals regardless of religion or belief.  A law establishes the Sunni Shafi’i doctrine as the “official religious reference” and provides sanctions of five months’ to one year’s imprisonment, a fine of 100,000 to 500,000 Comorian francs ($230-$1,200), or both, for campaigns, propaganda, or religious practices or customs in public places that could cause social unrest or undermine national cohesion.

The law prohibits anyone from insulting a minister of religion in the exercise of his functions, punishable by a fine of 50,000 to 150,000 francs ($120-$350), and anyone who strikes or assaults a minister of religion in the exercise of his function will be punished with imprisonment of one to five years.

Proselytizing for any religion except Sunni Islam is illegal, and the law provides for the deportation of foreigners who do so.  The penal code states, “Whoever discloses, spreads, and teaches Muslims a religion other than Islam will be punished with imprisonment of three months to one year and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 Comorian francs” ($120-$1,200).  The law also states, “The sale [or] the free distribution to Muslims of books, brochures, magazines, records and cassettes or any other media teaching a religion other that Islam” will be punished with the same penalties.

There is no official registration process for religious groups.  The law allows Sunni religious groups to establish places of worship, train clergy, and assemble for peaceful religious activities.  It does not allow non-Sunni religious groups to assemble for peaceful religious activities in public places, although foreigners are permitted to worship at three Christian churches in Moroni, Mutsamudu, and Moheli, and foreign Shia Muslims are permitted to worship at a Shia mosque in Moroni.

The law prohibits proselytizing or the performance of non-Sunni religious rituals in public places, to avoid “affronting society’s cohesion and endangering national unity.”  Without specifying religion, the penal code provides penalties for the profaning of any spaces designated for worship, for interfering with religious leaders in the performance of their duties, or in cases where the practice of sorcery, magic, or charlatanism interferes with public order.  The new penal code, adopted in February, provides a penalty from one to six months imprisonment and a fine of 150,000 to 750,000 francs ($350-$1,700) for those offenses.

According to the constitution, the Grand Mufti is the highest religious authority in the country.  The President appoints the Grand Mufti, who manages issues concerning religion and religious administration.  The Grand Mufti heads an independent government institution called the Supreme National Institution in Charge of Religious Practices in the Union of the Comoros.  The Grand Mufti counsels the government on matters concerning the practice of Islam and Islamic law.

The law provides that before the month of Ramadan, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the Council of Ulema publish a ministerial decree providing instructions to the population for events that month.

The government uses the Quran in public primary schools for Arabic reading instruction.  There are more than 200 fee-based schools with Quranic instruction that also receive some support from the government.  The tenets of Islam are sometimes taught in conjunction with Arabic in public and private schools at the middle and high school levels.  A new education law adopted in May provides that “pre-elementary education (for ages three to five years) aims at acquiring the first elements of the Muslim religion,” including initiation into reading the Quran.

The country is a signatory but not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

A Shia leader said in July that 2021 had been “generally quiet and peaceful” for Shia Muslims in Moroni and that private Shia commemorations of all Eids, Ramadan, and Ashura were allowed to proceed and did so peacefully on all three islands.  Shia Muslims continued to report government surveillance during religious holidays important to their community.  For the second consecutive year, the President and other political leaders refrained from making public statements against religious minorities.  One religious minority group leader attributed the government’s relative restraint to international engagement related to this issue.

There were no reports of arrests for Comorians engaging in other religious practices, but members of non-Sunni groups reported broad self-censorship and stated they practiced or spoke about their beliefs only in private.  Shia and Ahmadi Muslims stated that they were not able to worship publicly and that government authorities sometimes attended religious gatherings held in private homes to observe their practices but did not interfere.

Ahmadi Muslims stated the tract of land on the island of Anjouan that was the site of an Ahmadi mosque seized and destroyed by local authorities in 2017 had not been returned to them.  Shia Muslims on Anjouan stated that local authorities prevented them from practicing in the Shia mosque that has existed on the island for more than a year.  Instead, they were forced to worship in a Shia community center that only has a rooftop space for prayer, exposing them to the elements.  Ahmadi and Shia Muslims on Anjouan stated they did not live in fear of violence but needed to exercise caution and self-censorship to avoid attracting unwanted attention from local authorities.

Expatriate Christian community members reported they had been waiting for more than four years for a government response to their application for a license to build a new nondenominational church.

There were continued reports that local communities unofficially shunned individuals suspected of converting from Islam to Christianity.  Societal abuse and discrimination against non-Muslim citizens persisted, particularly against Christians or those who were converts from Islam.  Non-Muslim foreigners reported little to no discrimination.

Most non-Sunni Muslim citizens reportedly did not openly practice their faith for fear of societal rejection, and some Shia Muslims reported being harassed by Sunni Muslims.  Societal pressure and intimidation continued to restrict the use of the country’s three churches to noncitizens.  Christians reported they would not eat publicly during Ramadan so as not to draw attention to their faith.

There is no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in the country.  The ambassador and representatives from the U.S. embassy in Madagascar visited the country and engaged with government officials on issues of religious freedom, including with President Assoumani and officials from the Foreign Ministry, Interior Ministry, and Justice Ministry, focusing on the importance of individuals being able to practice their religion freely and ending government statements criticizing religious minorities.

Embassy representatives met with a diverse group of Muslim and Christian religious and civil society leaders, including Sunni, Shia, and Ahmadi Muslims, on issues of religious freedom.  The embassy also used social media posts to highlight the importance of religious freedom and diversity and to engage with civil society and the general populace.

On November 15, 2021, in accordance with the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as amended, the Secretary of State placed Comoros on the Special Watch List for having engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.2 million (midyear 2021).  According to a University of Costa Rica (UCR) study released during the year, Catholics represent approximately 47 percent of the population (compared with 49 percent in 2019); no religious affiliation 27 percent (20 percent in 2019); evangelical Christians 19 percent; other Protestants 1.0 percent (the 2019 study estimated all Protestants combined at 36 percent); no response 6 percent, and others 2.7 percent.

Most Protestants are Pentecostal, with smaller numbers of Lutherans and Baptists.  There are an estimated 32,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses, predominantly on the Caribbean coast.  The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints estimates its membership at 50,000.  The Jewish Zionist Center estimates there are between 3,000 and 3,500 Jews in the country.  Approximately 1,000 Quakers live near the cloud forest reserve of Monteverde, Puntarenas.  Smaller groups include followers of Islam, Taoism, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Scientology, Tenrikyo, and the Baha’i Faith.  Some members of indigenous groups practice animism.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes Catholicism as the state religion and requires the state to contribute to its maintenance.  The constitution prohibits the state from impeding the free exercise of other religions that do not undermine “universal morality or proper behavior.”  Unlike other religious groups, the Catholic Church is not registered as an association and receives special legal recognition.  Its assets and holdings are governed consistent with Catholic canon law.

The constitution recognizes the right to practice the religion of one’s choice.  By law, a person claiming a violation of religious freedom may file suit with the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court and may also file a motion before the Constitutional Chamber to have a statute or regulation declared unconstitutional.  Additionally, a person claiming a violation of religious freedom may appeal to the Administrative Court to sue the government for alleged discriminatory acts.  Legal protections cover discrimination by private persons and entities.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship is responsible for managing the government’s relationship with the Catholic Church and other religious groups.  According to the law, a group with a minimum of 10 persons may incorporate as an association with judicial status by registering with the public registry of the Ministry of Justice.  The government does not require religious groups to register; however, religious groups must register if they choose to engage in any type of fundraising.  Registration also entitles them to obtain legal representation and standing to own property.

The constitution forbids Catholic clergy from serving in the capacity of president, vice president, cabinet member, or Supreme Court justice.  This prohibition does not apply to non-Catholic clergy.

An executive order provides the legal framework for religious organizations to establish places of worship.  Religious organizations must submit applications to the local municipality to establish a place of worship and to comply with safety and noise regulations established by law.

According to the law, public schools must provide nonsectarian Christian religious instruction by a person who is able to promote moral values and tolerance and be respectful of human rights.  If a parent on behalf of a child chooses to opt out of religious courses, the parent must make a written request.  The Ministry of Public Education provides religious education assistance to private schools, both Catholic and non-Catholic, including directly hiring teachers and providing teacher salaries and other funds.

The law allows the government to provide land free of charge to the Catholic Church only, but the government also provides funds to evangelical Christian groups.  Government-to-church land transfers are typically granted through periodic legislation.

Only Catholic priests and public notaries may perform state-recognized marriages.  Wedding ceremonies performed by other religious groups must be legalized through a civil union.

Immigration law requires foreign religious workers to belong to a religious group accredited for migration control purposes by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, and it stipulates religious workers may receive permission to stay at least 90 days, but not more than two years.  The permission is renewable.  To obtain accreditation, a religious group must present documentation about its organization, including its complete name, number of followers, bank information, number of houses of worship, and names of and information on the group’s board of directors.  Immigration regulations require religious workers to apply for temporary residence before arrival.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The time limit to enact a draft 2009 bill that would reform the constitution to make the country a secular state expired in September 2020, and the Legislative Assembly did not advance a new bill on this issue during the year.

In June 17, the Legislative Assembly passed its first vote on a public employment bill that included an article on conscientious objection.  Some legislators, including those belonging to the government-affiliated Citizen Action Party and the National Liberation Party, objected to the inclusion of the article and appealed before the Constitutional Court.  On August 1, the Constitutional Court upheld as constitutional the article on conscientious objection.  Some religious groups had requested this provision to allow public employees to be exempted from participating in government-required LGBTQ+ training courses.  Another first vote, required to pass the bill, was pending at year’s end.

Some non-Catholic leaders continued to state the constitution did not sufficiently address the specific concerns of non-Catholic religious groups, particularly regarding registration processes.  Members of Protestant groups registered as secular associations continued to say they preferred a separate registration process that would specifically cover church construction and operation, permits to organize events, and pastoral access to hospitals and prisons for members of non-Catholic religious groups.  These Protestant groups continued to seek legislative reform to allow these changes through the passage of a religious freedom bill under legislative review since 2018.  In the case of the Catholic Church, the government continued to address such concerns through the special legal recognition afforded the Church under canon law.

During the year, the Constitutional Chamber received 12 claims of denial of the free exercise of religious freedom at educational institutions, Catholic institutions, or public places, compared with 24 claims in 2020.  Of the 12 claims presented in during the year, seven were dismissed, three were accepted, and two were unresolved through year’s end.  Reportedly, the decrease in numbers of claims was partly due to COVID-19 restrictions on in-person learning during the year.  The court dismissed seven claims due to insufficient evidence proving discrimination or because it found no basis for claiming discrimination.  In some of these dismissed cases, the claimants stated they experienced discrimination because of the government’s closure of places of worship during the COVID-19 pandemic and because of a pandemic-related restriction limiting the number of attendees at a religious service to 200 worshippers, regardless of the size of the venue.  For the purposes of limits on gatherings, religious organizations fell under the same category as sports, cultural and academic activities; the 200-person limit applied equally to all groups.  The court dismissed the complaints, stating the pandemic-related restrictions were applied to all places of worship for health reasons.

Two claims pertaining to a requirement that public employees attend a course on equal rights for LGBTQ+ persons remained unresolved through year’s end.  The chamber ruled in favor of three other claims.  In one case, a Jewish municipal employee filed a complaint seeking authorization to observe the Sabbath on Saturday.  In another case, the chamber ruled in favor of a minor claimant who opted out of a religious course, stating the minor could not be obligated to take an unrequired course.  The parents of children attending public schools filed the third claim against the Ministry of Education because the ministry had not replaced the school’s religion teacher several months after his retirement.  In its ruling, the chamber ordered the hiring of a new teacher of religion.

The government again included financial support for the Catholic Church and evangelical Christian groups in its annual budget.  It earmarked approximately 32.6 million colones ($51,100), 23 million colones ($36,000) for the Catholic Church and 9.5 million colones ($14,900) for evangelical Christian groups, for various projects requested by the religious groups, including funds to make improvements at churches and parish buildings in different parts of the country.  This total funding of 32.6 million colones ($51,100) for religious groups was included in supplemental budgets for the year and compared with 55 million colones ($86,200) earmarked in the 2020 budget.  According to a legislative aide, the decrease in allocation for religious groups was because of the overall decrease in the budget due to the impact of COVID-19 on the economy.  A semiautonomous government institution again sold lottery tickets, using the proceeds to support social programs sponsored by religious groups.

In June, Marco A. Fernandez Picado became the new director of religious education in the Ministry of Public Education.  According to Fernandez Picado, because most classes were virtual during the year due to continuing COVID-19 restrictions, there was no implementation of a 2019 Ministry of Education directive stating school directors should make decisions on whether to place religious images in educational institutions based on “mutual respect for the rights and liberties of all, as well as the values and principles under which the education system functions.”

According to political observers and opinion polls, in the lead-up to the 2018 national election, religious issues such as same-sex marriage were polarizing campaign topics that impacted voters’ decisions.  According to press reports, during the February 2022 election campaign, candidates tended to avoid raising these topics, likely to avoid repeating such polarization.

Representatives of political parties that defined themselves as evangelical Christian continued to occupy 14 of the country’s 57 legislative seats, and evangelical Christian parties contested the municipal election in February.  No evangelical Christian mayors were elected, but 38 evangelical Christians were elected as representatives in 82 municipal governments.  The president of the Evangelical Alliance again instructed pastors to refrain from electoral politics, while Catholic leaders continued to defend the right of the Catholic Church to engage in the political process.  At year’s end, 30 political parties had registered for the 2022 general election; seven of these parties stated a Catholic or evangelical Christian religious affiliation.

Religious groups, including the Catholic Church and Evangelical Alliance, continued to state their opposition to same-sex partnerships and to legislation passed and implemented in 2020 that recognizes same-sex marriages, citing moral grounds.  In July, evangelical Christian groups belonging to the Evangelical Alliance, including its president, organized a prayer night broadcast on radio “in favor of families, life, and children.”  Other Christian radio stations joined the program.

Abortion continued to be a frequent topic of public debate involving religious groups.  According to a December 2019 executive order requiring hospitals to develop protocols for doctors to perform an abortion when the life and health of the woman was in danger, abortion was permitted in such cases in accordance with the penal code.  The order also allowed health personnel to refuse to participate in abortion procedures for religious reasons.  Media reported that opposition of the Catholic Church and evangelical Christian groups to abortions continued.  From March 22 to April 4, legislator Nidia Cespedes of evangelical Christian party New Republic (Nueva Republica), protested barefoot in the Legislative Assembly’s plenary room, expressing her opposition to a proposed bill decriminalizing abortion, which was later introduced in August.  The same month, the Catholic Church organized its members to sign a letter requesting the government keep abortion illegal.  By year’s end, the Legislative Assembly did not vote on the bill.

In July, the Ministry of Public Education organized a National Week of Religious Education to present a preview of the ministry’s new religious education programs to be offered as part of basic general education and diversified education levels.  As a result of the July meeting, the ministry drafted an Interreligious Declaration for a Religious Education for A Culture of Peace, which the ministry presented at a Ministry of Education conference on September 22.

According to UCR polling, the demographic shift to fewer adherents of the Catholic Church continued.  Approximately half of those who left the Catholic Church joined evangelical Christian groups, while the other half gave up religious affiliation altogether.  According to Catholic Chancellor Rafael Sandi, however, there were fewer requests to formally disaffiliate with the Catholic Church during the year compared with the number of requests made in 2020, 2019, and 2018.

An increase in instances of anti-Catholic language on social media was noted after media reports detailed the continued high-level investigations of Catholic priests charged with sexual abuse.  In May, the extradition from Mexico of Catholic priest Mauricio Viquez on four charges of sexually abusing minors prompted negative comments on social media against Viquez, his alleged enablers, and the Catholic Church, the latter for attempting to prevent Viquez’ case from going to trial.  At year’s end, Viquez remained in preventive detention.  In 2019, the statute of limitation ended for three of the four accusations.

Jewish community leaders continued to report anti-Israeli comments appearing on social media, some of which, they said, were antisemitic, although not directed at Jews living in the country.  In September, the Israelite Zionist Center of Costa Rica reported antisemitic comments it detected online through its Antidiscrimination Web Observatory, which compiles antisemitic incidents and messages posted on social networks.  Some messages combined negative comments against Jews with actions taken by Israel.  For example, some messages compared former Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu with former Nazi officer Heinrich Himmler.  Another online comment accused Israeli citizens of using their religion and the Holocaust to repeat their experience with Palestinians.  One social media post stated, “Israel does not exist.  Not only do they appropriate a territory that does not belong to them, but also…most of these people are not even Semites, but rather, central European Aryans.”

Interludio, a forum of religious groups established by Pastor Jose Castro in 2017 to encourage interreligious dialogue among the country’s religious groups, continued to promote dialogue among religious leaders, with participation of representatives from the Catholic, evangelical Christian, Protestant, Lutheran, Jewish, Baha’i, and Buddhist faiths.  The group met periodically throughout the year and hosted a variety of events, including talks on spiritual growth and moral values.  

The Museum of Empathy, associated with Interludio, continued to promote a Resilience Academy, which provided psychological and spiritual support to populations especially vulnerable due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with a focus on the elderly and on single mothers. 

Embassy representatives raised with the Director of Religion Cyrus Alpizar of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship the request of some religious groups to register through a church-specific registration process.  On May 26, embassy officials hosted a virtual roundtable with the Director of Religious Issues from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, the Director of Religious Education from the Ministry of Education, leaders of the Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant communities, and other religious groups to discuss how to address the challenges of holding religious gatherings and celebrations during the pandemic.

The embassy again used social media to send congratulatory messages highlighting tolerance and respect for religious diversity to religious groups on special religious occasions.  Examples included messages sent to celebrate Rosh Hashanah, the evangelical Christian celebration of the Month of the Bible, and the celebration of Religious Freedom Day on January 16.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 28.1 million (midyear 2021).  According to the most recent census in 2014, 42.9 percent of the population is Muslim and 33.9 percent Christian.  Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include adherents of indigenous and other religious beliefs.  According to the census, 19.1 percent of the population identifies as following no religion.  The government carried out a new census in November and December; however, as of the end of the year, the results had not been released.  Many individuals who identify as Christian or Muslim also practice some aspects of indigenous religious beliefs.

Christian groups include Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, Harrists (a group that follows the teachings of William Wade Harris, a Liberian who evangelized in Cote d’Ivoire in the early 20th century), The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Southern Baptists, Greek Orthodox, Copts, the Celestial Church of Christ, and Assemblies of God.  According to 2014 census data, 17.2 percent of the population is Catholic, 11.8 percent evangelical Christian, 1.7 percent Methodist, 0.5 percent Harrist, 0.4 percent Celeste, and 2.2 percent belongs to other Christian denominations.  Muslim groups include Sunnis (95 percent of Muslims), many of whom are Sufi; Shia (mostly members of the Lebanese community); and Ahmadis.  Adherents of other religious groups include Buddhists, Baha’is, Rastafarians, followers of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Jews, and Bossonists, who follow traditions of the Akan ethnic group.

Muslims are the majority in the north of the country, and Christians are the majority in the south.  Members of both groups, as well as other religious groups, reside throughout the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates a secular state that respects all beliefs and treats all individuals equally under the law, regardless of religion.  It specifically prohibits religious discrimination in public and private employment and provides for freedom of conscience, religious belief, and worship consistent with the law, the rights of others, national security, and public order.  It prohibits “propaganda” that encourages religious hatred.  It recognizes the right of political asylum in the country for individuals persecuted for religious reasons.

The Department of Faith-Based Organizations (DGC), which is part of the Ministry of Interior and Security, is charged with promoting dialogue among religious groups as well as between the government and religious groups, providing administrative support to religious groups attempting to become established in the country, monitoring religious activities, and managing state-sponsored religious pilgrimages and registration of new religious groups.

The law requires all religious groups to notify the government of their existence.  Foreign religious groups with a presence in the country require authorization from the Minister of Interior and Security, and all religious groups – foreign and local – must register with the DGC.  Whether a religious group is categorized as local or foreign is based on the nationality of its members, the source of its funding, the make-up of its executive board, and the location of its head office.  Groups with 75 percent foreign membership, foreign funding, foreign board members, or a foreign head office are considered foreign.  Local religious groups are allowed to operate two months without official approval after they submit their registration application.  Foreign religious groups are technically not allowed to begin operating until they receive authorization, but this is not enforced.

There are no penalties prescribed for groups that do not register, but registered groups benefit from government support, such as free access to state-run television and radio for religious programming if requested.  Registered religious groups are not charged import duties on devotional items, such as religious books or rosaries.  Registered religious groups are also exempt from property tax on the places of worship they own.  Nonregistered groups are not allowed to sue for damages or receive compensation for injuries suffered.

To register, a group must submit an application to the DGC that includes its bylaws, names of the founding members and board members, date of founding, and general assembly minutes.  The DGC investigates the group to ensure it has no members or purpose deemed politically subversive and that no members have been judicially deprived of their civil and political rights.

There are legal penalties for threatening violence or death via an “information system.”  This definition includes print and electronic media.  When such a threat is of a “racist, xenophobic, religious, or ethnic [nature] or refers to a group characterized by race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin,” the law provides for a prison term of 10 to 20 years and a fine of 20 million to 40 million CFA francs ($34,400-$68,700).  Additionally, defamation, insults, or threats made towards a group of people who belong to a certain race, ethnicity, or religion are punishable by a prison term of five to 10 years and a fine of 500,000 to five million CFA francs ($860-$8,600).

Religious education is not included in the public school curriculum but is often included in private schools affiliated with a particular faith.  Religious groups running those schools normally provide opt-out procedures.  Teachers and supervisory staff in religiously affiliated schools must participate in training offered by the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training before the school receives accreditation from the ministry.  The government provides some funding to both secular and religious primary private schools pursuant to legal conventions between the government and these schools.  Subsidies are paid on a per student basis and the rate per student is the same for secular and religious schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In recent years, al-Qaida affiliate Jamat’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) based in the Sahel region has expanded into the northern part of the country from the Sahel, and JNIM sub-group Katiba Macina, also known as the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), launched several attacks on the country’s security forces during the year, some fatal.  Government and civil society sources expressed concern that these groups and others would continue to increase their presence in the country and recruit from vulnerable populations, such as unemployed youth.  To counter this threat, religious leaders partnered with local law enforcement and subnational government leadership on security matters to prevent violent extremism and protect their communities from what they stated was the growing terrorist threat.

In April, following the unexpected death of COSIM President Mamadou Traore and his replacement by Imam Ousmane Diakite, Minister of the Interior and Security Diomande, representing President Ouattara, said at Diakite’s June 12 investiture that Diakite’s appointment presented an opportunity for the promotion of “an Islam of love and tolerance.”  Diomande also said there was no Quranic basis for ideologies of hatred or death and said the President was counting on imams and preachers throughout the country to advocate the practice of a peaceful form of Islam to help prevent violent extremism.  In his investiture speech, Diakite, like Diomande, denounced violent extremism and stated Islam was a religion of tolerance, balance, and moderation.  On June 18, Prime Minister Patrick Achi visited Diakite and noted that Diakite’s “human qualities, his wisdom, his calm, his discretion, (and) his open-mindedness reassure us that [not only] the country but also the Muslim community is in good hands.”

In March, former president Gbagbo was definitively acquitted by the International Criminal Court of crimes against humanity during the 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis.  The government paid for his return to the country in June.  Gbagbo, a former evangelical Christian, announced his renewed commitment to Catholicism during a public Mass on June 20.  On July 27, in what was widely reported in the media as a step towards peace and gesture of reconciliation, he met with President Ouattara, who was his rival in the 2010 presidential election.  During a Mass on August 1 attended by Prime Minister Achi, Cardinal Kutwa said the Ouattara-Gbagbo meeting was a significant development for peace and political reconciliation between the rival party leaders following the 2010-2011 crisis (which resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths and 500,000 displaced persons) and the contentious and sometimes violent period surrounding the 2020 presidential election.  According to Kutwa, although religion was not a driver of these disputes, many citizens looked to religious leaders to help reduce politically motivated conflict and guard against political manipulation of national identity, ethnicity, and religious differences to foment division in the country.  Regarding the Ouattara-Gbagbo meeting, Kutwa invited all Ivoirians to follow the two leaders’ example and stated “there is a time for war and a time for peace.  The time for peace has arrived.”

Leaders from across the religious spectrum generally supported Gbagbo’s return and the government’s release of persons arrested for crimes allegedly committed around the 2020 presidential election, saying the releases were also necessary for peace and political reconciliation.  Civil society organizations reported that some religious leaders privately petitioned government officials on these issues.

Leaders of one Christian denomination said they had generally positive working relationships with the government, but they also said that some government officials continued to believe that members of certain religions denominations were automatically loyal to specific political figures.  In this case, the leaders said, the stereotype persisted that certain Christian denominations were loyal to opposition parties.  The leaders of this religious group stated that this was not the case, and that the denomination had no political loyalties.

Government officials reported meeting with religious leaders to encourage them to raise awareness about COVID-19 mitigation measures with their followers.  Religious leaders reported collaborating with the government to have mobile units administer COVID-19 vaccinations and offer national identity card registration at some places of worship.  The National Forum of Religious Denominations, which comprises Muslim and Christian members, said that at the request of the government, it carried out awareness-raising activities in December to encourage participation in the national census.  Muslim and Christian community groups in several parts of the country, including Yamoussoukro, Bouake, Beoumi, Daoukro, and Man, participated in community policing programs aimed at fostering interfaith collaboration to increase community safety.

As of early December, the DGC reported the government had funded pilgrimages to Lourdes, France for more than 200 Catholics and to Turkey for more than 450 evangelical Christians.  The government also funded pilgrimages for more than 200 Catholics to certain religiously significant locations within the country, including in Abidjan, Issia, Diabo, Raviart, and Yamoussoukro.  The government did not fund pilgrimages for Muslims to Saudi Arabia because of Saudi COVID-19 travel restrictions.  In December, the director general of the DGC, Messamba Bamba, said in a newspaper interview that the government welcomed proposals for pilgrimages from all religious groups in the country.

The DGC said that when its representatives attended events organized by religious groups (e.g., ceremonies, conferences, and festivals), those representatives used speaking opportunities to exhort audiences to disseminate messages of peace and tolerance through all mediums of communication with the goal of promoting social cohesion.

The DGC stated that many unregistered local religious groups operated in the country, which it said was due to the group leaders’ lack of knowledge or understanding of registration requirements.  The DGC stated that when informed of the registration requirement, some religious leaders were puzzled, because they did not understand the purpose of the government’s involvement in a personal matter like the practice of religion.  The DGC said it had not identified any foreign religious groups operating without authorization.  The DGC registered 186 new religious groups during the year.  The DGC said it was not aware of any religious groups being denied or deferred registration during the year.

High ranking government officials met with religious leaders and attended religious events throughout the year.  In April, shortly after his appointment, Prime Minister Achi visited Cardinal Kutwa, and in a traditional ceremonial gesture, asked for Kutwa’s blessing as he embarked on his new position in the government.  Achi said the government benefited from exchanges with major religious leaders because these leaders could provide insight on the national mood, given their close connection to the population.  Sources stated that Prime Minister Achi’s visit was significant, given Kutwa’s August 2020 criticism of President Ouattara’s decision to run for a third term, which sparked a rebuke from Catholic cabinet ministers.  Some commentators at the time suggested Kutwa’s criticism showed he supported the opposition, although Kutwa denied having any political affiliation.

Leaders of a Christian denomination reported an instance in May in which denomination members were prevented from building a church on land they owned in a majority-Muslim community in the south-central part of the country.  Local Muslims, mainly youths, opposed the project.  According to the Christian leaders, Muslim community members had asked Christian landowners earlier to let them use the land for prayer; in order to maintain good relations with the town’s Muslim community, the landowners agreed to allow this temporarily until they were ready to build their church.  The Christian landowners said they understood that Muslims would pray on the land without constructing a mosque, as Muslims often prayed in locations other than mosques.  The Christian leaders said that after they allowed the Muslims to use the land, the latter began building a mosque on the site and refused to leave when asked to do so.  The landowners contacted the community imam, who said he had not instructed his congregants to build the mosque, but he took no action to remove them from the land.  The landowners then petitioned the mayor (locally elected), the prefect and subprefect (regional representatives of the central government), and the DGC for assistance.  All initially said they could not help.  The mayor ultimately convened the landowners and local Muslim leaders and offered to give the landowners a different parcel of land in a more remote section of the community to build a church.  The Christian leaders said the landowners accepted this offer and ceded their original parcel of land to the Muslim community to maintain positive relations with the community.  The mosque remained on the land.  The Christian leaders said they did not report the issue to the press because they did not want to harm the group’s generally good relations with the Muslim community.

The leaders of the same Christian denomination reported a second incident in the central part of the country with the same basic circumstances – Muslims occupied a parcel of land owned by Christians and constructed a mosque, thus preventing Christians from building a planned church.  The landowners petitioned local government officials for assistance to mediate the dispute; the prefect offered the Christians another parcel of land, but, as of December, the dispute was unresolved.

Religious leaders and civil society representatives again stated that leaders across the religious spectrum were broadly united in their desire to work toward peace and reconciliation following the 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis and the upheaval surrounding the 2020 presidential election.

Imam Djiguiba Cisse, a member of COSIM’s leadership, the chief imam at a major Abidjan mosque, and the director of the nationwide Islamic radio network and television station Al-Bayane, stated that he continued to have strong relationships with Christian leaders.  He noted that COSIM met with Catholic leaders during the year to build support for officially forming and registering a multifaith platform called the Alliance of Religions for Peace, which previously operated informally.  Two weeks prior to the 2020 presidential election, the alliance held a national interfaith prayer for peace and social cohesion in Abidjan.  The country continued to host several other multifaith organizations dedicated to peace and social cohesion, including the National Forum of Religious Denominations.  Between January and November, forum delegations visited several locations across the country to encourage social cohesion, peace, and reconciliation, invoking both Biblical and Quranic verses in support of peaceful coexistence when addressing audiences.

Leaders of the country’s interdenominational evangelical association, the Federation of Evangelical Churches of Côte d’Ivoire, said they had good relations with leaders of the country’s major religions.  A Catholic priest serving as spokesperson for the Archdiocese of Abidjan expressed similar sentiments and noted a July conference organized by Muslim and Catholic journalists’ associations in which leaders of both faiths stressed the importance of communication among different religious groups.  Minister of National Reconciliation Kouadio Konan Bertin attended the conference and, in his remarks, said the journalists should assist the government in its mission to reconcile the country.  Bertin thanked the associations for working together to promote friendship and cooperation among religions.  He also noted the power of language and suggested the journalists, through their reporting, could help maintain peace.  A Methodist leader said the Abidjan Methodist community held an annual prayer session with the Catholic community and noted that Methodist leaders regularly met with other faith leaders, including Muslims and Baptists.  A leader of the country’s small Jewish community said the community had warm relations with other religious groups, including Muslims.  Christian and Muslim leaders in the northern part of the country reported generally good relations.  Some community radio stations reported reserving airtime for different religious groups to conduct prayers on Fridays and Sundays.

According to religious leaders and civil society organizations, numerous individuals regularly celebrated each other’s religious holidays by attending household or neighborhood gatherings and religious ceremonies, regardless of their own faith.  Muslim and Christian leaders in Korhogo, for example, noted that adherents of the two religions sang, danced, and prayed together on certain occasions and invited each other to religious events.

Some Muslim leaders continued to state that their community took steps to prevent the influence of what they called intolerant forms of Islam in the country.  Specifically, they referred to adherents who disparaged any who did not follow their specific interpretation of Islam.  These steps included providing imams with suggested themes for sermons and advising imams to closely vet guest preachers before allowing them to give sermons in their mosques.  Community leaders in the north of the country reported that some communities required traveling Muslim preachers to have their proposed sermons approved by village authorities before giving them in village mosques.  Muslim leaders in the north reported that, in a break from tradition, some imams no longer offered temporary shelter in mosques to male travelers not known to their communities out of fear these travelers might have ties to terrorist or criminal groups.

Government sources and civil society leaders said that religiously based hate speech sometimes was used on social media, but they stated that influential political and religious leaders did not use such language.  A nongovernmental organization that tracks online hate speech in the country said cases of religiously based hate speech were rare.

Embassy officials discussed the state of religious freedom and tolerance in the country with government officials.  Specifically, embassy officials met with the DGC and discussed, among other topics, if the government had recorded interreligious conflicts or threats to, violence against, or harassment of any specific religious groups; whether the government had penalized or denied benefits to any religious groups; and the government’s assessment of the threat of religiously motivated violent extremism in the country.  The Ambassador and other embassy officials met with senior Christian and Muslim religious leaders, including in cities and towns in the country’s center (Bouake) and north (Korhogo and Ferkessedougou).  Embassy representatives convened religious community leaders for roundtable discussions on issues that included religious tolerance and the status of relations between Christian and Muslim groups.  A senior embassy official attended the investiture of the new COSIM president.  Embassy officers also met regularly with the director of media network Al-Bayane, affiliated with COSIM, to discuss the role of religious media in promoting peace, social cohesion, and religious freedom.

In December, the Ambassador met separately with leaders of the Federation of Evangelical Churches of Côte d’Ivoire and Cardinal Kutwa.  In the meetings, the leaders stated that religious freedom and tolerance continued to be the cultural norm in the country.  In June, the Ambassador was the first foreign envoy to meet with the newly elected President of COSIM, who later paid him a return visit.  Throughout the year, embassy officials met with representatives from the Muslim, Evangelical Christian, Methodist, Catholic, and Jewish communities.  Topics included these religious groups’ relations with the government, the role of religious leaders in promoting peace and reconciliation, relations between different religious groups, and the status of religious freedom and tolerance in the country.

In February 2014, armed forces of the Russian Federation seized and occupied Crimea.  In March 2014, Russia claimed that Crimea had become part of the Russian Federation.  The UN General Assembly’s Resolution 68/262 of March 27, 2014, entitled “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” and Resolution 75/192 of December 28, 2020, entitled “Situation of Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine),” declared continued international recognition of Crimea as part of Ukraine.  The U.S. government recognizes Crimea is part of Ukraine; it does not and will not recognize the purported annexation of Crimea.  Russian occupation “authorities” continue to impose the laws of the Russian Federation in the territory of Crimea.

On September 10, the Executive Board of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) published its Follow-up of the Situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, stating that the “Russian occupation of Crimea has changed the perception of Ukraine’s historical and cultural heritage, both by the state and society.”  According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, following Russia’s occupation of Crimea, many religious communities were essentially driven out of the peninsula through registration requirements under newly imposed Russian laws.  Only the UOC-MP continued to be exempt from these registration requirements.  According to the Religion Information Service of Ukraine (RISU), the number of denominations decreased from 43 in 2014 to 20 in 2021.  Various sources reported that Russian “authorities” in occupied Crimea continued to persecute and intimidate minority religious congregations, including Muslim Crimean Tatars, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and OCU members and clergy.  At year’s end, two Jehovah’s Witnesses were serving prison sentences for their faith.  According to the NGO Crimea SOS, as of July, 74 (compared with 69 through October 2020) Crimean residents remained in prison in connection with their alleged involvement with the Muslim religious political organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is banned in Russia but legal in Ukraine.  Russian occupation “authorities” continued to subject Muslim Crimean Tatars to imprisonment and detention in retaliation for their opposition to Russia’s occupation by prosecuting them for purported involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir.  According to the international religious freedom NGO Forum 18, Russia continued to prosecute individuals for some types of worship, including imams leading prayers in their own mosques, as “illegal missionary activity.”  UGCC leaders said they continued to have difficulty staffing their parishes because of the policies of occupation “authorities “and that they must register their congregations in Crimea as parishes of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, removing all reference to Ukraine in their name.  Crimean Tatars reported police continued to be slow to investigate attacks on Islamic religious properties or refused to investigate them at all.  The OCU reported continued seizures of its churches.  According to the OCU, Russian occupation “authorities” continued to pressure the OCU Crimean diocese to force it to leave Crimea.  On August 23, a judge fined Archimandrite Damian, the head of the St. Demetrius of Thessaloniki Men’s Monastery, for holding a church service on the private land on which the monastery stands, stating such worship constituted “unlawful missionary activities.”  Religious and human rights groups continued to report Russian media efforts to create suspicion and fear among certain religious groups, especially targeting Crimean Tatar Muslims, whom media repeatedly accused of having links to Islamist groups designated by Russia as terrorist groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir.  Russian media portrayed Jehovah’s Witnesses as “extremists.”  In January, the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision accepting for consideration Ukraine’s complaint alleging that Russia was responsible for multiple human rights violations in Crimea between February 27, 2014, and August 26, 2015.  The court accepted Ukraine’s allegation of the harassment and intimidation of religious leaders not conforming to the Russian Orthodox faith, arbitrary raids on places of worship, and confiscation of religious property.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, a radio survey in Crimea found 67 percent of those surveyed did not approve of Russia’s ban on Jehovah’s Witnesses.  The Jehovah’s Witnesses said that non-Jehovah’s Witnesses who observed Jehovah’s Witnesses being treated like criminals and accused of terrorism for their faith had increased sympathy for the organization.

The U.S. government condemned the continued intimidation of Christian and Muslim religious groups by Russian occupation “authorities” in Crimea and called international attention to religious rights abuses committed by Russian forces through public statements by the Secretary of State and other senior officials.  In a September 5 press statement, the State Department spokesperson stated, “The United States strongly condemns the September 4 detention of the Deputy Chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis Nariman Dzhelyal and at least 45 other Crimean Tatars by Russian occupation “authorities” in Crimea.  We call on the Russian occupation “authorities” to release them immediately.  This is the latest in a long line of politically-motivated raids, detentions, and punitive measures against the Mejlis and its leadership, which has been targeted for repression for its opposition to Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea.”  U.S. government officials remained unable to visit the peninsula following its occupation by the Russian Federation.  Embassy officials, however, as well as other State Department officials and the Secretary of Energy, participated in the August 23 Crimea Platform Summit, an international gathering of senior officials to discuss the annexing of Crimea, in which human rights was one of five key topics.  The Secretary of Energy, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, and a senior official from the Bureau of Democracy, Rights, and Labor gave remarks at the summit, whose joint declaration condemned the “continued violations and abuses and systematic undue restrictions of human rights and fundamental freedoms that residents of Crimea face,” including the right to religion or belief.  Embassy officials continued to meet with Crimean Muslim, Orthodox, and Protestant leaders to discuss their concerns about actions taken against their congregations by the occupation “authorities” and to demonstrate continued U.S. support for their right to practice freely their religious beliefs.

The Crimean Peninsula consists of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) and the city of Sevastopol.  According to State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2014 estimates (the most recent), the total population of the peninsula is 2,353,000.  There are no recent independent surveys with data on the religious affiliation of the population, but media outlets estimate the number of Crimean Tatars, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, is 300,000, or 13 percent of the population.

According to information provided by the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture in 2014 (the most recent year available), the UOC-MP remains the largest Christian denomination.  Smaller Christian denominations include the OCU, RCC, UGCC, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, along with Protestant groups, including Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Lutherans.  Adherents of the UOC-MP, Protestants, and Muslims are the largest religious groups in Sevastopol.

There are several Jewish congregations, mostly in Sevastopol and Simferopol.  Jewish groups estimate between 10,000 and 15,000 Jewish residents lived in Crimea before the 2014 Russian occupation.  No updates have been available since the occupation began.  The 2001 census, the most recent, records 671 Karaites.

Legal Framework

Pursuant to international recognition of the continued inclusion of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea within Ukraine’s international borders, Crimea continues to be officially subject to the constitution and laws of Ukraine.  In the aftermath of Russia’s occupation, however, Russian occupation “authorities” continue their implementation of the laws of the Russian Federation in the territory.  The Muslim religious-political group Hizb ut-Tahrir is considered a terrorist organization under Russian Federation law but not under Ukrainian law.  According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, Russian occupation “authorities” continue to ban Jehovah’s Witnesses in Crimea under a 2017 ruling by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.

According to occupation “authorities,” fines for individuals conducting illegal missionary activity range from 5,000 to 50,000 rubles ($67-$670); the fine for legal entities is 100,000 to one million rubles ($1,300-$13,300).

Government Practices

According to the Kyiv-based Ukrainian human rights organization Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), the Russian government unlawfully incarcerated or imprisoned 117 individuals pursuant to politically or religiously motivated persecution in Crimea during the year, compared with 111 in 2020.

Human rights groups said occupation “authorities” continued to impede the rights of Crimean Tatars following the 2016 designation of the Mejlis, recognized under Ukrainian law as the democratically elected representative council of Crimean Tatars, as an extremist organization.  Rights groups reported detentions and forced psychiatric examinations of Crimean Tatar Muslim prisoners continued throughout the year.

According to CHRG, as of December, 79 Crimean residents remained in prison for alleged involvement in Muslim religious organizations that are declared terrorist or extremist in Russia, although they are legal in Ukraine.  In most cases, these were individuals accused of belonging to the “illegal” organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, but detainees also included individuals accused of belonging to Tablighi Jamaat and Takfir wal-Hijra.  Observers believed these individuals were largely prosecuted in retaliation for their opposition to Russia’s occupation of Crimea.  Occupation “authorities” placed three additional Crimean residents under supervision and banned them from leaving the occupied territory, and two more remained under house arrest.  As of November, the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group reported Russian occupation authorities had detained 80 Crimean Tatars and other Ukrainian Muslims for supposed involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir, which the human right group described as a peaceful transnational Muslim party.

On August 16, the Southern District Military Court in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don sentenced Crimean Muslims Ruslan Mesutov and Lenur Halilov to 18 years each in prison, Ruslan Nagayev to 13 years, and Eldar Kantimirov to 12 years in prison for their membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir.  “Authorities” arrested the four men in 2019 in Crimea after searching their homes.

According to the CHRG, on December 1, Russia’s Southern Area Military Court (YuOVS) in Rostov-on-Don extended to March 2022 the detention of Crimean Tatars Tofik Abdulgaziyev, Vladlen Abdulkadyrov, Izzet Abdullayev, Medzhit Abdurakhmanov, Imam Bilial Adilov, Servet Gaziyev, Dzhemil Gafarov, Alim Karimov, Seyran Murtaz, Erfan Osmanov, Erver Ametov, Osman Arifmemetov, Yashar Muedinov, Ruslan Suleymanov, and Rustem Sheikhaliyev.

In December, the Military Court of Appeal in Vlasikha, Russia upheld the decision of a lower court to hold in custody Crimean Tatars Ernest Ibragimov and Oleg Fedorov until February 2022.

On December 23 the same court upheld a lower court decision to hold in custody Crimean Tatars Raim Ayvazov, Farkhod Bazarov, Remzi Bekirov, Rizu Izetov, Shaban Umerov until February 16, 2022.

On December 23, YuOVS extended the detention period for Crimean Tatar Ismet Ibragimov until April 24, 2022.

According to press reports, on November 25, the Southern District Military Court in Rostov-on-Don extended until March 15, 2022 the detention of NGO Krymska Solidarnist (Crimean Solidarity) activist Remzi Bekirov.  Crimean Solidarity is a human rights organization that opposes Russia’s occupation of Crimea.  The court also extended until March 15 the detention period of Tatars Rustem Seitkhalilov, Seitveli Seitabdiyev, Asan Yanikov, and Ruslan Suleimanov.

According to Crimean Solidarity, during mass searches of Crimean Tatar homes on August 17, the FSB detained Rustem Murasov, Rustem Tairov, Dzhebbar Bekirov, Zavur Abdullayev, and Raif Fevziyev for their suspected membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir.  Fevziyev was the imam of a mosque in Strohonivka village near Simferopol.  According to the Parliamentary Human Rights Ombudsperson, occupation “authorities” kept the imam in a damp and overcrowded prison cell containing six beds for eight inmates.  One of Fevziyev’s cellmates reportedly suffered from a mental health disorder and posed a threat to the lives of other prisoners.  According to the Radio Free Europe-associated news website Krym.Realii, in November, occupation “authorities” subjected the imam to forced psychiatric examination, keeping him in a hospital ward with four convicted murderers.  During his detention, Fevziyev reportedly began to feel abdominal pain and could only ease it using medicine provided by his family.  In December, Simferopol’s Kyivsky District Court extended his detention until April 11, 2022.

Krym.Realii reported that on December 21, the Leninsky District Court of Simferopol extended the detention of Murasov and Abdullayev until February 10, 2022.  Krym.Realii quoted Murasov’s lawyer as saying that occupation “authorities” kept Murasov in a cell infested with rats, mice, and mold.  In October, the court extended the detention of Rustem Tairov until January 11, 2022.  The news outlet said that for two weeks Tairov suffered tooth pain, but the administration of his pretrial detention center ignored his request for medical assistance.

On July 30, Ukraine’s Consul General in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, described to the Crimea SOS-affiliated QirimInfo news website what he said were the worsening conditions of elderly Tatar prisoners Servet Gaziyev and Dzhemil Gafarov.  The Consul General said Russian “authorities” did not provide adequate medical assistance to Gaziyev, who suffered a ministroke on June 28, until September 2.  On October 29, Crimean Solidarity quoted lawyer Aider Azamatov as saying that during the year, an ambulance had to be called six times to provide urgent medical aid to Servet Gaziyev during his trial, and the judge insisted that Gaziyev speak Russian rather than Crimean Tatar.  According to lawyer Lilya Gemedzhi, prior to his discharge from the hospital on September 25, unspecified individuals threw Gaziyev to the floor, beat him, and shaved his beard.

According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Russian occupation “authorities” continued to ban Jehovah’s Witnesses’ activities in Crimea, ostensibly under a 2017 ruling by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation outlawing the group.  The OHCHR reported that all 22 congregations of Jehovah’s Witnesses registered in Crimea had lost the right to operate since 2017.  As a result, practicing Jehovah’s Witnesses risked retaliation by law enforcement and were subject to detention, house arrest, or travel restrictions.  According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, four Ukrainian Jehovah’s Witnesses were serving sentences of six years or more, with at least 12 others facing such sentences.

The Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group reported that on February 10, “authorities” searched the homes of Jehovah’s Witnesses Andriy Rogutsky and Lyudmila Shevchenko, removing Bibles, notebooks, and electronic devices.  According to the website jw-russia.org, the items seized at Lyudmyla Shevchenko’s home included a book, “The Sacred Nativity Scene,” that did not belong to her and was not published by Jehovah’s Witnesses.  She said security officials had planted and then “found” the book.  During the search, Andriy Rogutskiy’s wife became ill and required an ambulance.  Reportedly, “authorities” did not detain or charge the women.

In March, according to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, “authorities” carried out 11 armed searches and detained four Jehovah’s Witnesses.  “Authorities” charged Taras Kuzio, who was previously charged in 2019, with “financing an extremist organization” and ordered him to remain under house arrest.  They also ordered him to have no contact with others involved in the case and prohibited him from using the internet and sending or receiving mail.  According to the CHRG, on July 29, “authorities” detained Jehovah’s Witness Petro Zhiltsov, whom they previously interrogated as a witness against Kuzio, and charged him with “organization of the activities of an extremist organization” and “financing of extremist activities.”  The charges carry a sentence of up to 10 years.  On July 30, “authorities” placed him under house arrest until his trial.  On July 29, “authorities” opened a case against Daria Kuzio, the wife of Taras Kuzio, for “organizing of the activities of an extremist organization” and issued a travel restriction.  On July 30, “authorities” combined the criminal cases against the Kuzios and Zhiltsov into one case.  On August 10,” authorities” detained Sergei Lyulin, connected to Taras Kuzio, and transported him to Simferopol, a 16-hour journey, taping him to the seat of the luggage compartment of a minibus with his arms handcuffed to the ceiling.  The court in Simferopol ordered his detention until September 4.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, on August 2, FSB investigators filed charges against Oleksandr Lytvyniuk and Oleksandr Dubovenko for “organizing the activities of an extremist organization.”  The charges, which carry a sentence of up to 10 years imprisonment, stemmed from a Zoom conference that “authorities” said was to “attract new members of a banned organization.”  On August 5, “authorities” searched at least eight Jehovah’s Witnesses’ homes for more than nine hours.  According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the FSB officers reportedly tried to force their way into one home by turning off the plumbing.  Authorities removed individuals’ computers, personal notes that mentioned the Bible, and documents confirming ownership of their residences.  They later held Lytvyniuk overnight, placing him under house arrest on August 6.  “Authorities” placed Dubovenko, who was not at home during the searches, under house arrest on August 9.

According to Forum 18, Jehovah’s Witnesses Sergei Filatov and Artyom Gerasimov remained in prison in the town of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky in Rostov Oblast, Russia – each serving six-year sentences since 2020 – and “authorities” did not allow them to receive letters from their families.

According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, on May 24, Jehovah’s Witness Artem Shabliy’s trial for “drawing others into the activities of an extremist organization” began.  The group stated that in May 2020, armed FSB, Russian National Guard, and masked riot police raided four homes of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Kerch, arresting Shabliy.

According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, on October 22, a court in Sevastopol sentenced Jehovah’s Witness Ihor Schmidt to six years in prison for “organizing extremist activities.”  Three other men, Yevhen Zhukov, Volodymyr Maladyka, and Volodymyr Sakada, arrested with Schmidt in 2020 and also charged with “organizing extremist activities,” remained imprisoned at year’s end.

According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, on March 23, a court sentenced Jehovah’s Witness Viktor Stashevsky to six and half years’ imprisonment for “organizing extremist activities” and placed a seven-year restriction on his right to carry out public activities.  Addressing the court before sentencing, Stashevsky said all charges against him would be dismissed if he were to stop being a Jehovah’s Witness, saying, “I do not plan to renounce my faith in God.  I have been and remain a Jehovah’s Witness.”  A judge dismissed his appeal in August.

In a review of the eighth periodic report on Ukraine, released in October, OHCHR cited the significantly limited freedom of religion in territories controlled by armed groups, noting that religious communities there faced selective restrictions.  Valeriia Kolomiiets, the country’s Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration, reported to OHCHR that the Russian Federation continued to violate human rights in the temporarily occupied territories.  Specifically noting the systematic persecution of the OCU, she reported that persecution on national and religious grounds was carried out systematically.  According to the report, there continued to be a pattern of criminalization of affiliation with or sympathy toward Muslim groups banned in the Russian Federation that continued to disproportionately affect Crimean Tatars.  According to the report, these cases raised concerns about the right to a fair trial, because detainees’ hearings often banned cameras, media, and family members from the courtroom.  OHCHR reported that Russian courts in Crimea cited the “need to ensure the safety of the participants in the proceedings,” but defendants’ lawyers and family members said Russian occupation “authorities” excluded the public from court hearings to limit public awareness of trials, restrict public scrutiny, and exert additional pressure on the defendants.

According to Forum 18, Russian “authorities” continued to prosecute and fine individuals in Crimea for conducting missionary activity.  Of the nine known prosecutions brought so far during the year, three were against imams and four against members of Sevastopol’s House of the Potter Protestant Church.  The NGO stated that by law, “Russians conducting missionary activity” could incur a fine of 5,000 to 50,000 rubles ($67-$670), with the fine for organizations (legal entities) being from 100,000 to one million rubles ($1,300-$13,300).  “Foreigners conducting missionary activity” could incur a fine of 30,000 to 50,000 rubles ($400-$670), with the possibility of expulsion from Russia.

On February 11, a judge fined Imam Murtaza Ablyazov the equivalent of approximately two weeks average local wages for conducting missionary activity by leading prayers in a mosque.  On January 25, a judge fined Aleksey Smirnov and Ivan Nemchinov after identifying them as Potter Protestant Church leaders based on a social media post by a Church member.

On August 23, a judge fined OCU Archimandrite Damian, the head of the St. Demetrius of Thessaloniki Men’s Monastery, for holding a church service on the private land on which the monastery stands, stating such worship constituted unlawful missionary activities.  This ruling followed an August 8 raid on the parish.  Archbishop Klyment, Head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in Crimea, called it “an appalling act of lawlessness.  A priest is accused merely of praying to God in his own home.”  According to the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Damian’s lawyer stated he planned to appeal, and said, “Russia is destroying yet another Ukrainian religious and cultural group and is continuing to purge Crimea of all that is Ukrainian.”

Renat Suleimanov, a member of Muslim group Tablighi Jamaat, remained under administrative supervision and on Russia’s Federal Financial Monitoring Service List of Terrorists and Extremists at year’s end.  Russia continued to ban the Tablighi Jamaat Muslim missionary movement in Crimea under a 2009 ruling by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, although the movement remained legal in Ukraine.  In January 2019, a Simferopol court sentenced Suleimanov to four years in prison on extremism-related charges for meeting openly in mosques with three friends to discuss their faith.  The state released him in December 2020 and ordered him to spend one year under administrative supervision.

On January 14, the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision accepting for consideration Ukraine’s complaint alleging that Russia was responsible for multiple human rights violations in Crimea between February 27, 2014, and August 26, 2015.  Among the claims accepted was Ukraine’s allegation that the local “authorities” harassed and intimidated religious leaders not conforming to the Russian Orthodox faith, arbitrary raided places of worship, and confiscated religious property in violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

On February 16, parliament appealed to international organizations and foreign governments to condemn the occupation of Crimea and to call for the release of Ukrainian political prisoners.  It condemned the persecution and harassment of its citizens on ethnic, religious, political, and other grounds in the Russia-occupied area, emphasizing the unacceptability of restricting linguistic, religious, and other rights of minorities and indigenous peoples, in particular, Crimean Tatars.

On February 25, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy released a declaration that stated, “Residents of the peninsula face systematic restrictions of their fundamental freedoms, such as the freedoms of expression, religion or belief and association, and the right to peaceful assembly… The Crimean Tatars continue to be unacceptably persecuted, pressured, and [to] have their rights gravely violated.  Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians, and all ethnic and religious communities in the peninsula must be ensured the possibility to maintain and develop their culture, education, identity, and cultural heritage traditions, which are currently threatened by the illegal annexation… The ban on the activities of the Mejlis, a self-governing body of the Crimean Tatars, must be reversed.”

On November 24, the Religious Information Service of Ukraine reported that the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emine Dzhaparova, told the audience attending the Forum of the International Alliance on Freedom of Religion in Brazil that Russia continued to create artificial obstacles to the activities of any religious community that did not belong to the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.  She said Crimean Tatars had become the most persecuted religious community in occupied Crimea, with more than 120 imprisoned on trumped-up criminal cases.  “In the occupied territories of Ukraine, Russia restricts missionary activities under the pretext of fighting so-called extremism.  The Russian Federation is trying to stop the activities of all pro-Ukrainian organizations in occupied Crimea – in particular, religious communities of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and Crimean Tatar Muslims.”  Dzhaparova said that of the 49 religious communities that operated in Crimea at the beginning of 2014, only five were still operating.

According to Russia’s Ministry of Justice, as of the end of 2020 (the most recent information available), 907 religious organizations were registered in Crimea, compared with 891 in 2019.  The number of religious organizations had dropped by more than 1,000 since the occupation began in 2014, the last year for which Ukrainian government figures were available.  Registered religious organizations included the two largest – the Christian Orthodox UOC-MP and the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea – as well as various Protestant, Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Greek Catholic communities, among other religious groups.

On January 7, Metropolitan Epiphaniy told the Espreso.tv news agency that Russia wanted to eliminate the OCU’s presence in Crimea.  In May, RISU reported Metropolitan Klyment of Simferopol and Crimea of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine said that at the beginning of the occupation, 49 Ukrainian Orthodox religious organizations were operating in Crimea, but only six remained.  In August, RISU reported that Iryna Verihina, a representative of the Commissioner for the Observance of the Rights of Residents of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, said that because of Russian repression, only five of 49 OCU religious organizations remained in Crimea, and only four of 22 clergymen.

Human rights groups reported Russian occupation “authorities” continued to require imams at Crimean Tatar mosques to inform them each time they transferred from one mosque to another.

The RCC continued to operate in the territory as a pastoral district directly under the authority of the Vatican.  “Authorities” permitted some Polish and Ukrainian RCC priests to stay in the territory for only 90 days at a time and required them to leave Crimea for 90 days before returning.

UGCC leaders said they continued to have difficulty staffing their parishes because of the policies of occupation “authorities”.  They said “authorities” continued to require them to register their congregations in Crimea as parishes of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, removing all reference to Ukraine in their name, and to operate as a part of the pastoral district of the RCC.

According to the pro-Ukraine Voice of Crimea news website, on August 8, representatives of the Center for Combating Extremism, led by police major Vladimir Gorevanov, stormed into a church at the OCU Monastery of St. Demetrius of Thessaloniki in Balky Village, Bilohirsk District.  The representatives forced the monastery’s abbot to halt the morning religious service and ordered all its participants to exit to the backyard so “authorities” could document the monastery’s “illegal missionary activity.”  On August 23, the Bilohirsk District Court ordered the abbot, Archimandrite Damian, to pay a fine of 15,000 rubles ($200).

On September 10, the Executive Board of UNESCO published its Follow-up of the Situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Ukraine), pursuant to the decisions and resolutions by the UNESCO Executive Board and the general conferences.  According to the document:  “Over seven years of occupation… systemic political persecution, physical and psychological pressure, annihilation of the independent media, discrimination on the basis of religion, [and] violation of ownership and language rights forced more than 45,000 Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians to leave the occupied peninsula.  The Russian Federation continues to prosecute ethnic and religious communities that refuse to recognize the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and seek to preserve their native language, religious, and cultural identity.  The Russian occupation of Crimea has changed the perception of Ukraine’s historical and cultural heritage, both by the state and society.  Russia has appropriated Ukrainian cultural property on the peninsula, including 4,095 national and local monuments under state protection.  Appropriation of monuments is in itself a violation of international law.  However, it is equally important that Russia uses such appropriation to implement its comprehensive long-term strategy to strengthen its historical, cultural, and religious dominance over the past, present and future of Crimea.”

The OCU continued to call on the Ukrainian parliament to finalize the approval of a 2020 decision by the Cabinet of Ministers to transfer the Saints Volodymyr and Olha Cathedral, the only OCU church building in Simferopol and the location of the OCU diocesan administration, from the ownership of the government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to central government ownership.  OCU sources believed this transfer would enable Ukraine to take Russia to international courts over its refusal to allow OCU members to use the premises.  According to RISU, on June 28, the Russian-controlled Arbitration Court of Crimea ordered the transfer of the cathedral premises to the use of the Russian Ministry of Property of Crimea.  Klyment said he would appeal this decision.

Crimean Tatars reported police continued to be slow to investigate attacks on Islamic religious properties or refused to investigate them at all.

On April 20, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol expressed outrage over the desecration of an old Islamic cemetery in Kamyanske village, Leninsky District.  Construction equipment scattered human remains while digging a trench though the burial area as part of a pipeline project.  Occupation “authorities” had reportedly not taken the cemetery into account when planning the construction.  After complaints from local residents, authorities suspended the work to allow the Muslim community to rebury the remains.

According to Freedom House, the Russian FSB continued to encourage residents to inform on individuals who expressed opposition to the purported annexation, including expressing support for Crimean Tatars, condemning the designation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Hizb ut-Tahrir as extremist groups, or opposing the oppression of the OCU.

Religious and human rights groups continued to report Russian media efforts to create suspicion and fear of certain religious groups, especially targeting Crimean Tatar Muslims, whom media repeatedly accused of having links to Islamist groups that were designated by Russia as terrorist, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir.  Russian media also portrayed Jehovah’s Witnesses as extremists.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, a radio survey in Crimea found 67 percent of those surveyed did not approve of Russia’s ban on Jehovah’s Witnesses.  The Jehovah’s Witnesses reported that respondents, seeing “ordinary citizens” treated like criminals and accused of terrorism for their faith, had increased sympathy for the organization.

On November 2, the Unian.net news website reported “authorities” in Crimea placed under house arrest a suspect who had allegedly painted offensive graffiti on a wall of a Christian church in Leninsky District.

The U.S. government condemned the continued intimidation of Christian and Muslim religious groups by Russian occupation “authorities” in Crimea and called international attention to religious abuses committed by “authorities.”  On February 26, on the seventh anniversary of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the President released a statement saying, “The United States does not and will never recognize Russia’s purported annexation of the peninsula, and we will stand with Ukraine against Russia’s aggressive acts.”

Also on February 26, the Secretary of State released a statement saying, “Russian occupation authorities have sustained a brutal campaign of repression against Crimean Tatars, ethnic Ukrainians, and members of other minority ethnic and religious groups in Crimea.  Russian occupation authorities have raided mosques and homes… Russia’s repression has left Crimean residents in a constant state of fear, unable to live their lives freely.”

In a September 5 press statement, the State Department spokesperson stated, “The United States strongly condemns the September 4 detention of the Deputy Chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis Nariman Dzhelyal and at least 45 other Crimean Tatars by Russian occupation authorities in Crimea.  We call on the Russian occupation authorities to release them immediately.  This is the latest in a long line of politically-motivated raids, detentions, and punitive measures against the Mejlis and its leadership, which has been targeted for repression for its opposition to Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea.”

U.S. government officials remained unable to visit the peninsula due to its occupation by the Russian Federation.  U.S. government and embassy officials, however, participated in the August 23 Crimea Platform Summit, an international gathering of senior officials convened to discuss the situation in Crimea, in which human rights was one of five key topics.  The Secretary of Energy, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, and a senior official of the Bureau of Democracy, Rights, and Labor gave remarks at the summit.  In a joint declaration, Crimean Platform Summit participants condemned the “continued violations and abuses and systematic undue restrictions of human rights and fundamental freedoms that residents of Crimea face,” including the right to religion or belief.  Participants also pledged in the joint statement “to urge the Russian Federation to ensure that all persons belonging to ethnic and religious communities in the peninsula, including ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, are fully able to enjoy their human rights and given the possibility to maintain and develop their culture, education, identity, and cultural heritage traditions, which are currently severely threatened by the temporary occupation.”

Embassy officials also continued to meet with Crimean Muslim, Orthodox, and Protestant leaders to discuss their concerns about actions taken against their congregations by the occupation “authorities” and to demonstrate continued U.S. support for their right to practice freely their religious beliefs.

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Ukraine

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.2 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2011 census (the most recent available), 86.3 percent of the population is Catholic, 4.4 percent Serbian Orthodox, and 1.5 percent Muslim.  Nearly 4 percent identify as nonreligious or atheist.  Other religious groups include Jews, Protestants, and other Christians.  According to the World Jewish Congress, there are approximately 1,700 Jews.

Religious affiliation correlates closely with ethnicity.  Ethnic Serbs are predominantly members of the SOC and live primarily in cities and areas bordering Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Most members of other minority religious groups reside in urban areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for equality of rights regardless of religion, as well as freedom of conscience and religious expression.  It prohibits incitement of religious hatred.  According to the constitution, religious communities shall be equal under the law and separate from the state; they are free to conduct religious services publicly as well as open and manage schools and charitable organizations under the protection and with the assistance of the state.  The Penal Code defines a hate crime as a criminal offense committed on the grounds of race, skin color, religion, national or ethnic origin, disability, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity.  The Penal Code criminalizes public incitement to violence and hate and provides sanctions for such crimes.  Hate crimes are also considered an aggravating circumstance unless a provision already provides for more severe sanctions.

Hate speech is also punishable as a misdemeanour under laws on Public Order and Peace, Act on Public Assembly, Law on Prevention of Violence at Sport Games, and the Anti-Discrimination Act. 

Legislation covering electronic media (amended in 2021) stipulates that in audio and/or audiovisual media services it is forbidden to incite, encourage incitement, and spread hatred or discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin or skin color, gender, language, religion, political or other belief, national or social background, property, union membership, education, social status, marital or family status, age, health, disability, genetic heritage, gender identity and expression or sexual orientation, as well as antisemitism and xenophobia, fascism, nationalism, communism, and support for other totalitarian regimes.  The legislation stipulates that audiovisual and radio programs and contents in electronic publications must publish accurate information and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Roman Catholic Church receives state financial support and other benefits established by four concordats between the government and the Holy See.  One of these agreements provides state financial support for some religious officials.  Another agreement stipulates state funding for religious education in public schools.

The law defines the legal position of religious communities and determines eligibility for government funding and tax benefits.  Registered religious communities are exempt from taxes on the purchase of real estate, the profit/capital gains tax, and taxes on donations.  According to the law, a religious community previously active as a legal entity before enactment of the current law in 2002 (amended in 2013) need only submit its name, the location of its headquarters, information on the office of the person authorized to represent it, and the seal and stamp it uses to register.  To register as a religious community, a religious group without prior legal status as a religious community must have at least 500 members and have been registered as an association, with at least three members, for at least five years.  To register as a religious community, a group must submit a list of its members and documentation outlining the group’s activities and bylaws and describing its mission to the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration.  Nonregistered religious groups may operate freely but do not receive tax benefits.  They may conduct financial transactions as legal entities.  A contractual agreement with the state, which grants a registered religious community eligibility for further funding and benefits, defines the community’s role and activities and provides for collaboration with the government in areas of joint interest, such as education, health, and culture.

There are 55 registered religious communities, including the Roman Catholic Church, SOC, Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Christian Adventist Church, Church of Christ, Church of God, Croatian Old Catholic Church, Catholic Old Church, Evangelical Church, Macedonian Orthodox Church, Pentecostal Church, Reformed Christian Church, Union of Baptist Churches, Seventh-day Adventist Reform Movement, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Union of Pentecostal Churches of Christ, Coordination Committee of Jewish Communities in Croatia (an umbrella group of nine distinct Jewish communities), Jewish Community of Virovitica, Bet Israel (a Jewish group), and the Islamic Community of Croatia.  In addition to the Roman Catholic Church, 19 of the registered religious communities have formal agreements with the state that more clearly define activities and cooperation, such as in the areas of marriage and religious education in public schools.  These groups may access state funds for religious activities.

The state recognizes marriages conducted by registered religious communities that have concluded agreements with the state, eliminating the need for civil registration.  Marriages conducted by registered communities that have not concluded agreements with the state, or by nonregistered religious groups, require civil registration.

Registered religious communities that have not concluded agreements with the state and nonregistered religious groups may not conduct religious education in public schools.  Nonregistered religious groups have no access to state funds in support of religious activities, including charitable work, counseling, and building costs.  Registered religious communities that have not concluded agreements with the state and nonregistered religious groups may engage in worship, proselytize, own property, and import religious literature.  Only registered religious communities, with or without agreements with the state, may provide spiritual counsel in prisons, hospitals, and the military.

Public schools at both the primary and secondary levels must offer religious education, although students may opt out without providing specific grounds.  The Catholic catechism is the predominant religious text used.  Other religious communities that have agreements with the state may also offer religious education classes in schools if there are seven or more students of that faith.  Eligible religious communities provide the instructors, and the state pays their salaries.  Private religious schools are eligible for state assistance and follow a national curriculum.  Registered religious communities may have their own schools.  Unregistered religious groups may not have their own schools.

Education regarding the Holocaust is mandatory in the final year of elementary school (eighth grade) and during the final year of high school.

The law allows foreign citizens whose property was confiscated during and after the Holocaust era to seek compensation or restitution if the applicant’s country has a bilateral restitution treaty with the state; however, no such bilateral treaties currently exist.  Two court cases have held that such treaties are not required; however, the law has not changed.  The law does not allow new property claims because the deadline expired in 2003.

The ombudsperson is a commissioner appointed by parliament responsible for promoting and protecting human rights and freedoms, including religious freedom.  The ombudsperson examines citizens’ complaints pertaining to the work of state bodies, local and regional self-governments, and legal persons vested with public authority.  The ombudsperson may issue recommendations to government agencies regarding human rights and religious freedom practices but does not have authority to enforce compliance with his or her recommendations.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

International media reported in April that an Afghan woman stated that a border police officer on February 15 held her at knifepoint and forced her to strip during a search of a group of migrants on the border with BiH.  The Guardian newspaper later reported the woman told police officers she was a Muslim and said it was haram (forbidden) to strip and he slapped her over the head and responded, “If you are Muslim, why did you come to Croatia – why didn’t you stay in Bosnia with Muslims?”  The European Commission described the incident in the report as a “serious alleged criminal action” and urged the Croatian authorities “to thoroughly investigate all allegations and follow up with relevant actions.”  According to the Danish Refugee Council, the incident occurred on the night of February 15, a few kilometers from the city of Velika Kladusa in BiH.  The Ministry of Interior said the police would investigate the allegations but that based on preliminary checks, there were no recorded dealings with “females from the population of illegal migrants” on the day in question.  It stated, “The persistent portrayal of the Croatian police as a brutal and inhumane group prone to robberies and abuse of illegal migrants has now become commonplace, without a single piece of evidence.”

The government’s measures to limit the spread of COVID-19 applied to all religious groups and representatives of religious groups stated that they did not perceive them as having a discriminatory effect.  Leaders from several religious groups cooperated with the government in respecting COVID-19 related guidelines related to their religious practices, which included modifications as circumstances changed.

Representatives of different minority groups advocated the criminalization of the Ustasha salute, Za Dom Spremni (For the Homeland, Ready).  On August 26, Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic told reporters that the use of salute already was not allowed and no one could question that, but that potential amendments of the Penal Code would be discussed.  Scholars and judges were reported to be divided on the question of whether the use of the salute is a criminal act, misdemeanor, or permissible for the use of commemorative purposes under existing law.

On September 20, Croatian state television (HRT) aired a 12-part documentary entitled “NDH” that featured approximately 30 members of the academic community and historians who discussed the period when Croatia was controlled by the Ustasha.  Media reported that the creator, historian Hrvoje Klasic, said the documentary should have been aired much sooner; HRT rejected claims that it deliberately delayed the broadcast.  Both Klasic and HRT said publicly that this project was long-awaited.

SOC representatives said their community still had outstanding restitution issues with the government, mainly properties and residential buildings the government appropriated during the Yugoslav period.  The government reported that since 1999, the state had resolved 344 property claims related to the Orthodox Church that included the right to compensation in bonds.  The Church stated several outstanding claims remained, especially in the southern and eastern part of the country.  Catholic Church representatives also said there remained a significant number of outstanding claims for Catholic properties appropriated during the Yugoslav period.

According to the 2020 annual report released in March by the Office of Ombudsperson for Children, the largest number of complaints of discrimination with regard to education were related to religion and/or belief.  Parents complained about difficulties for children who did not attend elective religious education classes; complaints involved the timing for such classes and the lack of appropriate facilities to meet during prescribed times.  The report cited these issues as especially problematic in the lower grades of primary school because children whose parents did not want them enrolled in religious education classes would sit in the hallway, walk around the school or, in the absence of a suitable solution, be required to remain in the religious education class.  The report stated that due to the inadequate organization of activities for opt-out students during this “free” hour, some parents would enroll their children in religious education for their protection and safety, even though they did not wish to do so.  In 2020, parents reported that teachers required children who did not attend religious education at school to stay with other students in religious classes due to COVID-related epidemiological measures.

The Office of the Ombudsperson for Children reiterated to the Ministry of Science and Education its recommendations that elective religious instruction should take place at the beginning or end of the daily schedule, and in the case such scheduling was not possible, that schools provide an alternative plan.  The introduction of such an alternative plan was supported by the National Strategy for the Rights of the Child for the period 2014-2020, which emphasized the right to education, its acceptability and that “quality education that should be without discrimination, relevant and culturally appropriate for all students,” and that students “should not be expected to adapt to any religion or ideology.”

Atheist, Jewish, and Serbian Orthodox organizations continued to state that although the law allowed students to opt out of religious education, in practice, most public primary schools did not offer any alternatives to Catholic catechism.

Atheist groups continued to complain that Catholic symbols remained prevalent in government buildings such as courtrooms, prisons, and public hospitals.  They said they believed this practice was inconsistent with the constitution, which states religious communities shall be separate from the state.

During the year, the government did not take action to adopt amendments to legislation providing for restitution of private property from the Holocaust and post-Holocaust-eras for foreign claimants or reopen the deadline for potential new claims.

According to the Office of the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities, the government budgeted 325.9 million kuna ($50.53 million) during the year to the Catholic Church for salaries, pensions, and other purposes, compared with 293.1 million kuna ($45.44 million) in 2020.  The government provided funding to other religious communities that had concluded agreements with the state, a portion of which was based on their size, in addition to funds provided to support religious education in public schools and the operation of private religious schools.  The government budgeted 23.9 million kuna ($3.71 million) to these groups, compared with 22.7 million kuna ($3.52 million) in 2020.  Atheist groups again criticized the government for allocating more to the Catholic Church than to other groups; although the funding was generally proportional to the Catholic share of the population, analysts stated the criticism reflected the atheist groups’ concern about what they perceive as the outsized role of the Church in society.

Some minority religious and secular groups, including atheists, continued to say the Catholic Church enjoyed a special status in relation to other religious communities, in part because of its concordats with the government, which provided the Church with significant financial support, and in part because of its far-reaching cultural, educational, and political influence as the majority religion.

According to the ombudsperson’s annual report released in February, apart from the specific challenges related to the restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020 was marked by a smaller number of complaints of religious discrimination.  The office reported on the positive impact of the amendment to the law governing holidays and time off that entered into force in January 2020.  Specifically, the law stipulates that Muslims who celebrated Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha and Jews who celebrated Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah had the right not to work one day of their choice for each of these holidays with full salary compensation, while Orthodox Christians who celebrated Easter according to the Julian calendar had the right not to work on Easter Monday, also with the right to full salary.  The office had received complaints in previous years about the unequal treatment of members of certain religious communities in the workplace when using days off during religious holidays but said there were no such complaints in 2020.

On January 27, President Zoran Milanovic, Speaker of Parliament Gordan Jandrokovic, Deputy Prime Minister for Social Affairs and Human Rights Boris Milosevic, and Minister of Culture and Media Nina Obuljen-Korzinek marked International Holocaust Remembrance Day by laying a wreath in the Jewish section of Zagreb’s Mirogoj Cemetery.  The government issued a statement on that day strongly opposing any form of discrimination, exclusiveness, or intolerance, and stressing the importance of Holocaust education.  Civil society organizations, including the Croatian Antifascist League and the Serb National Council (SNV), issued a statement on January 27 demanding that the law be changed to ban and criminally prosecute the use of Ustasha insignia, the denial of the existence of World War II concentration camps, and the glorification of pro-Nazi Ustasha war criminals.

On February 5, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Gordan Grlic-Radman attended a ceremony to reinstall a damaged memorial Stolperstein (“stumbling block” that denotes the last location of residency or work before Holocaust victims were apprehended) honoring Holocaust victim Chief Rabbi Miroslav Salom Freiberger, organized by the Centre for the Promotion of Tolerance and Holocaust Remembrance, in partnership with the Bet Israel community and the Spuren (Traces)-Gunter Demnig Foundation.  Grlic-Radman expressed regret that the monument was damaged and spoke on behalf of the government about the importance of preserving the collective memory, declaring that no crime should be minimized and each victim deserved to be remembered and respected.  He said that Croatia would chair the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in 2023.

On April 22, President Milanovic, Prime Minister Plenkovic, Speaker of Parliament Jandrokovic, several ministers, and representatives of victims’ groups (Jews, Roma, Serbs, and antifascists) commemorated the victims of the Jasenovac World War II concentration camp and condemned the World War II Nazi-affiliated Independent State of Croatia (NDH).  Prime Minister Plenkovic called the atrocities committed under the NDH “the most tragic period in Croatian history” and stated that patriotism could not be contrary to the tolerance of others.  President Milanovic told the press, “This was an Ustasha-run camp, and the Ustasha were Croats, and since I am a Croat, I cannot say that it does not concern me.”  For four years, from 2016 to 2019, representatives of the Jewish and Serbian communities, as well as antifascists, boycotted the official commemoration, stating that the government had not taken real measures to stop or even limit revisionist denials of the Holocaust.

Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

SOC representatives reported that following the inauguration of Metropolitan Joanikije II on September 5 in a historic monastery in Cetinje, Montenegro, several negative media articles about the Church appeared.  One article appeared under the headline, “Zagreb Likes Patriarch Porfirije; however, this does not mean that the SOC is not evil.”  Commenting on the situation on September 13, Porfirije said, “The Church is not a political organization and has no political goals.”  He added that he had always spoken “affirmative[ly] of Croatia, even though sometimes there were reasons not to do so.”  He expressed regret for the negative messaging but said he was not surprised by the “fallacy of arguments” coming from Montenegro to Croatia.  He stated, “Croatia, together with its leadership and majority of its citizens, has a democratic capacity that leaves everyone a space to live in individual ethnic freedom and to freely declare feelings, regardless to which God he or she is praying.”

In April, the association In the Name of the Family published a “Report on Intolerance and Attacks on the Catholic Church and Catholic Believers in Croatia” that detailed incidents occurring during 2020.  The report stated there was an increasing number of incidents against the Catholic Church and Church members.  They included expression of hatred and intolerance, false accusations by the media, and dissemination of fake news and claims based on prejudice about priests, religious brothers and sisters, bishops, and the faithful.  The report also noted that individuals disputed the obligation and the right of bishops, priests, and monks to publicly express the views of the Catholic Church on social issues, and they also criticized Catholic teaching.  The report described burglaries of churches and desecration of church buildings and property.  The organization said the aim of the report was to shed light on the difference between constructive criticism and the spread of intolerance and discrimination.

The report of the ombudsperson described generally positive relations with the Muslim community in 2020; there was, however, an incident in which insulting messages appeared at the Zagreb Mosque and the perpetrator(s) was/were not identified.  The Office of the Ombudsperson also investigated an incident related to the alleged dissatisfaction of local citizens with the planned construction of an Islamic Center in the city of Pula but found nothing significant and closed the case.

Following complaints by a minority Christian religious group, the Office of the Ombudsperson issued a recommendation to the HRT to include more content intended for minority religious communities when designing and planning media programs.

As in recent years, some members of Jewish groups expressed concern over the public use of the Ustasha salute, Za Dom Spremni, associated with the World War II-era Independent State of Croatia.

The Charge d’Affaires and embassy staff regularly discussed religious freedom issues, including the status and treatment of religious minorities, antisemitism, and Holocaust revisionism, with representatives of the Ministries of Foreign and European Affairs, Justice and Public Administration, and Culture and Media, the ombudsperson, representatives of parliament, youth representing different religious groups, and other officials.

The Charge d’Affaires held meetings with the Ministers of Justice and Administration, Foreign and European Affairs, Culture and Media, and leaders of Jewish organizations, which covered a wide range of issues, including restitution of private and communal properties from the Holocaust and post Holocaust-era, restitution of art, and Holocaust education and remembrance.  U.S. officials continued to encourage the government to adopt amendments to legislation to provide for restitution of private property, including provisions that would unequivocally allow for foreign claims and reopen the deadline for potential new claims.  Embassy engagement also focused on the restitution of Jewish communal properties, including resorts, land, cultural centers, synagogues, and cemeteries.

During the year, embassy officials attended major events that emphasized the importance of Holocaust remembrance and interreligious dialogue.  On February 5, the Charge d’Affaires and embassy officials, along with city and national government officials, other foreign diplomats, and Jewish group members, attended the reinstalment of the memorial Stolperstein honoring Chief Rabbi Freiberger.  During the event, embassy officials discussed with participants the importance of the Holocaust remembrance activities.  The embassy’s diversity and inclusion program deepened engagement on religious freedom issues through a speaker series with members of different faith groups.

In September, the Charge d’Affaires and embassy staff visited the memorial at the World War II-era Jasenovac concentration camp to pay respects and learn about its history.  Also in September, the embassy partnered with the Jewish Film Festival of Zagreb, the Center for the Promotion of Tolerance and Holocaust Remembrance, and the Jasenovac Memorial Center to commemorate Holocaust remembrance through a youth performance of the opera Brundibar for hundreds of Croatian students at the Jasenovac site.  The event drew substantive media coverage, including from neighboring Serbian outlets.  In November, the Charge d’Affaires and embassy staff visited Zagreb’s mosque to show support for the Islamic community and promote dialogue and tolerance.

Embassy officials discussed religious freedom issues, including freedom of expression and efforts to counter discrimination, with NGOs such as Human Rights House, Documenta, and Protagora, academics and historians, as well as with representatives from Catholic, Serbian Orthodox, Baptist, Jewish, Muslim, and other religious groups.  The embassy provided grants to local NGOs and cultural institutions for the advancement of education on Holocaust issues, with the goal of creating a regional network of teachers to address the topic through conferences, commemorations, and cultural events.  For these programs, the embassy engaged leaders such as Deputy Prime Minister for Social Affairs and Human Rights Boris Milosevic, representatives from the Ministry of Science and Education, the ombudsperson’s office, and the President of the Coordination Committee of Jewish Communities, as well as other government and local officials.

In partnership with an NGO that promotes tolerance, the embassy funded a unique opera for children at a memorial site for Holocaust victims for an audience of Croatian school children.  The embassy used social media platforms to highlight a range of religious freedom issues, including support for Holocaust commemorations and a pluralistic view of faith and religion, particularly among youth in the country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11 million (midyear 2021).  There is no independent, authoritative source on the overall size or composition of religious groups.  The Catholic Church estimates 60 percent of the population identifies as Catholic.  Membership in Protestant churches is estimated at 5 percent.  According to some observers, Pentecostals and Baptists are likely the largest Protestant denominations.  The Assemblies of God reports approximately 150,000 members; the four Baptist conventions estimate their combined membership at more than 100,000.

Jehovah’s Witnesses estimate their members at 95,000; Methodists 50,000; Seventh-day Adventists 36,000; Presbyterians 25,000; Anglicans 22,500; Episcopalians 10,000; Anabaptists 4,387 (mostly Iglesia de Los Hermanos en Cristo, the Brethren of Christ); Quakers 1,000; Moravians 750; and the Church of Jesus Christ 357 members.  There are approximately 4,000 followers of 50 Apostolic churches (an unregistered, loosely affiliated network of Protestant churches, also known as the Apostolic Movement) and a separate New Apostolic Church associated with the New Apostolic Church International.  According to some Christian leaders, evangelical Protestant groups continue to grow in the country.  The Jewish community estimates it has 1,200 members, of whom 1,000 reside in Havana.  According to a representative of the Islamic League, there are approximately 4,000 Muslims in the country, of whom fewer than half are native-born.  The representative also said that the majority of the Muslim population is Sunni.  Immigrants and native-born citizens practice several different Buddhist traditions, with estimates of 6,200 followers.  The largest group of Buddhists is the Japanese Soka Gakkai; its estimated membership is 1,000.  Other religious groups with small numbers of adherents include Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, and Baha’is.

Many individuals, particularly Afro-Cubans, practice religions with roots across Africa, including Yoruba groups often referred to by outsiders as Santeria, but by adherents as the order of Lucumi or Orisha worship.  Bantu-influenced groups refer to themselves as Palo Monte.  These religious practices are commonly intermingled with Catholicism and other forms of Christianity, and some require Catholic baptism for full initiation, making it difficult to estimate accurately their total membership.  Rastafarian adherents also have a presence on the island, although the size of the community is unknown.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, “The state recognizes, respects, and guarantees religious liberty” and, “Distinct beliefs and religions enjoy equal consideration.”  The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religious beliefs.  It declares the country is a secular state and provides for the separation of religious institutions and the state.

The constitution also “recognizes, respects, and guarantees people’s freedom of thought, conscience, and expression.”  It provides for the “right to profess or not profess their religious beliefs, to change them, and to practice the religion of their choice…,” but only “with the required respect for other beliefs and in accordance with the law.”  At the same time, it states, “Conscientious objection may not be invoked with the intention of evading compliance with the law or impeding another from the exercise of their rights.”  Military service is mandatory for all men, and there are no legal provisions exempting conscientious objectors from service.  Similarly, the penal code prohibits anyone from using a religious basis to oppose “educational objectives, the duty to work, the defense of the Homeland…” and other requirements in the constitution.

The government is subordinate to the CCP; the party’s ORA enlists the entire government, especially the MOJ and the security services, to control religious practice in the country.  The ORA regulates religious institutions and the practice of religion.  The Law of Associations requires all religious groups to apply to the MOJ for official registration.  The MOJ registers religious denominations as associations on a basis similar to how it officially registers civil society organizations.  The application process requires religious groups to identify the location of their activities, their proposed leadership, and their funding sources, among other requirements.  Even if the MOJ grants official registration, the religious group must request permission from the ORA each time it wants to conduct activities other than regular services, such as holding meetings in approved locations, publishing major decisions from meetings, receiving foreign visitors, importing religious literature, purchasing and operating motor vehicles, and constructing, repairing, or purchasing places of worship.  Groups failing to register face penalties ranging from fines to closure of their organizations and confiscation of their property.

The penal code states membership in or association with an unregistered group is a crime; penalties range from fines to three months’ imprisonment, and leaders of such groups may be sentenced to up to one year in prison in addition to fines.

The law regulates the registration of “house churches” (private residences used as places of worship).  Two house churches of the same denomination may not exist within 1.2 miles of one another.  House churches must provide detailed information – including the number of worshippers, dates and times of services, and the names and ages of all inhabitants of the house in which services are held – to authorities.  The law states if authorization is granted, authorities will supervise the operation of meetings; they may suspend meetings in the house for a year or more if they find the requirements are not fulfilled.  If an individual registers a complaint against a church, the house church may be closed permanently and members subject to imprisonment.  Foreigners must obtain permission before attending services in a house church; foreigners may not attend house churches in some regions.  Any violation will result in fines and closure of the house church.

The constitution states, “The rights of assembly, demonstration and association are exercised by workers, both manual and intellectual; peasants; women; students; and other sectors of the working people,” but it does not explicitly address religious association.  The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion.

A law in force since July 2019 curtails freedom of expression on the internet to protect against “disseminating information contrary to the common good, morals, decency, and integrity through public data transmission networks.”  The penalty for violating the law is 3,000 Cuban pesos ($120) or two to four years in prison.

Religious education is highly regulated, and homeschooling is illegal, with parents who homeschool their children subject to arrest.

The country signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 2008 but did not ratify it.  The government notes, “With respect to the scope and implementation of some of the provisions of this international instrument, Cuba will make such reservations or interpretative declarations as it may deem appropriate.”

Government Practices

Many religious groups said that despite constitutional provisions providing for freedom of conscience and religion and prohibiting discrimination based on religion, the government continued to use threats, detentions, violence, and other coercive tactics to restrict the activities of some religious groups, leaders, and followers, including the right of prisoners to practice religion freely.  Religious groups also said the government applied the law in an arbitrary and capricious manner to target religious groups and individuals whose views were not in line with the government’s.  Some religious groups continued to express concerns that the constitution, in effect since February 2019, significantly weakened protections for freedom of religion or belief and diluted references to freedom of conscience, separating it from freedom of religion.

In its annual Watch List, Open Doors, a self-described nondenominational, ecumenical Christian organization, reported a continued rise in the persecution of Christians in the country.  It attributed the continued rise to the government’s “highly restrictive measures against churches deemed to be opponents of the regime ­especially non-registered Protestant churches.”  The report noted the government used the COVID-19 crisis “as a pretext to hinder church and community activities, monitor church leaders, make arbitrary arrests, confiscate private property and impose extortion fees.”

CSW reported security forces targeted religious leaders amid unprecedented nationwide public protests that began on July 11 and led to state-directed violence, detention, and harassment against religious figures from multiple faith communities.  According to CSW, security officers arrested Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo, pastor of the unregistered nondenominational Monte de Sion Church, and his teenage son in the town of Palma Soriano during one of several peaceful protests across the country on July 11.  Authorities charged Rosales Fajardo with committing a series of crimes, including “disrespect” and “public disorder.”  He said that while he was in detention, guards subjected him to a brutal beating.  Following his December 20-21 trial, Rosales Fajardo was found guilty of the charges and awaited sentencing at year’s end.  A sentence could entail up to 10 years in prison.  Rosales Fajardo’s son was released following a week in captivity, after his mother paid a fine.  Government authorities had previously targeted Rosales Fajardo, including as far back as in 2012 when they seized his church property.

According to HRW, either a state security agent or a member of rapid response, government-affiliated paramilitary forces beat Catholic priest Jose Castor Alvarez Devesa with a bat while he tried to assist an injured protester during a July 11 demonstration in Camaguey.  Security forces detained him when he sought medical attention for his injuries.  The government later released Alvarez Devesa, but he remained under investigation through year’s end for incitement to commit crimes, and with his movements restricted.

CSW also reported two other pastors detained on July 11 in Matanzas, Yeremi Blanco Ramirez and Yarian Sierra Madrigal, spent two weeks in jail, with no means to communicate with their families, lawyers, or friends before their release to house arrest following international pressure.  Both men received fines for joining the protests and remained under police surveillance through year’s end.  While they were in custody, a landlord evicted the family of Pastor Sierra Madrigal from their home after state security pressured the landlord, according to CSW.  Later, authorities forced both men to sign a document that would justify their imprisonment should they participate in future protests.  Also on July 11, security forces detained, released, and later interrogated and threatened with charges of incitement Pastor Yusniel Perez Montejo of the Eastern Baptist Convention of Cuba.

During a visit to the country on September 9, Cardinal Sean O’Malley, Archbishop of Boston, met with President Miguel Diaz-Canel.  The Associated Press reported that state media published images of the meeting but provided no details on the topics discussed.  On his departure from the country the following day, Cardinal O’Malley wrote in his blog that he had spoken to Diaz-Canel about the July 11 protests “and appealed for clemency for those involved in the demonstrations in a nonviolent way.”

The Global Liberty Alliance reported authorities continued to subject Free Yorubas leaders and members to additional arbitrary detentions, threats, fines, physical violence, and verbal harassment.  According to observers, although Yoruba and other African syncretic religious groups were given latitude to practice their beliefs as individuals, the government selectively recognized groups and leaders based on their favorable view of the government.  The NGO reported that in March, security forces beat and robbed a Free Yorubas youth leader, Dairon Hernandez Perez, outside his home as he returned from attending a religious event.  Hernandez Perez said members of the security forces and members of the government’s Black Berets, commonly described as shock troops and serving as a rapid response brigade, beat him extensively, damaged religious items, confiscated money, and threatened him with imprisonment for “pre-criminal dangerousness.”

In September, the Global Liberty Alliance sought precautionary measures from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on behalf of four members of the Free Yorubas, who faced extended pretrial detention after their arrests following the July 11 protests.  According to the NGO, Donaida Perez Paserio, Loreto Hernandez Garcia, Lisdiani Rodriguez Isaac, and Lisdani Rodriguez Isaac had faced repression from security forces over many years because the government did not recognize the Free Yorubas as a religious organization.  Prosecutors in Santa Clara cited a range of charges against the Free Yorubas detainees, including disobedience, public disorder, and assault or attack, and they sought eight-to-10-year combined prison sentences for the four.  At year’s end, all four were awaiting trial.

The Global Liberty Alliance recorded several other instances of Free Yorubas members being detained and fined for peaceful protests in July.  Police fined Elizabeth Cintron 3,000 pesos ($120) in August, thereby making her ineligible to stand trial.  Prior to paying the fine, Cintron was in pretrial detention.  Also in August, police forced Dayron Dadis Lorrando to pay a 1,000-peso fine ($40), which is approximately half the official minimum monthly wage, at a Santa Clara police station, a decision that denied him his right to due process.

According to media, in May, authorities released Christian human rights activist Mitzael Diaz Paseiro after he completed his three and a half-year sentence.  Diaz Paseiro said he was occasionally placed in solitary confinement, beaten, and deprived of water.  Amnesty International recognized him as a prisoner of conscience.

In May, security forces arrested Pastor Yoel Demetrio, of the Cuban Apostolic Movement in Las Tunas, after eight security agents raided his church.  He was later released with a warning that he could face criminal charges for contempt.  In March, he had reported that unidentified individuals threw stones at his church in Las Tunas while members of his congregation held a prayer vigil inside.  Demetrio told reporters that authorities arbitrarily fined him several times, with no explanation of the reason for the fines.

Media reported police continued to detain members of the Ladies in White.  Throughout the year, Ladies in White leader Berta Soler Fernandez reported she faced repeated arrests and short detentions, although the organization had suspended much of its activities due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  The group’s youngest member, Sissi Abascal Zamora, received a six-year sentence from a municipal court for participating in a July 11 protest.  The court found her guilty of contempt, hitting a police officer, and public disorder.

According to media, the potential for additional widespread protests in November led to increased repression against religious leaders, including the staging of “acts of repudiation” in front of their homes.  CSW condemned the targeting of religious leaders, which it said was a government attempt to block the November peaceful protests.  CSW reported police and state security agents summoned and interrogated many Protestant and Catholic religious leaders to intimidate and dissuade them from participating in the peaceful marches called by civil society groups.  The ORA delivered a direct warning to Catholic Church officials that three priests in Camaguey, Alberto Reyes Pias, Jose Castor Alvarez, and Rolando Montes de Oca, would be arrested if they participated in any protests.  One of the priests, Alberto Reyes, vowed to join the protests saying, “The gospel of Jesus Christ speaks of freedom, it speaks of justice, it speaks of truth… If being arrested is the price of being true to the teachings of the gospel, so be it.”  Multiple media outlets reported that on the morning of the proposed march on November 15, a group of CCP officials and sympathizers orchestrated an act of repudiation at the residence of the Archbishop of Camaguey, where Father Reyes was staying, along with Archbishop Wilfredo Pino Estevez.  According to press reports, the government used acts of repudiation that directed participants to verbally abuse and intimidate government critics so the critics would not leave their homes.  Because of the crowds at the protests and the presence of state security officers, the priests and many other religious leaders remained in their homes on November 15.

The Cuban Observatory of Human Rights registered at least 30 repressive acts against leaders and laypersons associated with various religious groups for showing their support for the proposed November marches.  Government actions included multiple acts of repudiation, police surveillance, internet cuts, and the harassment of the Mother Superior of the Daughters of Charity, Sister Nadieska Almeida, whom government supporters harassed on November 15 while she was walking to visit a friend in Havana.

According to CSW, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the government targeted religious leaders by accusing them of hoarding goods, which many religious leaders provided to needy members of their communities.  CSW reported that in January, police arrested and detained Pastor Karel Parra Rosabal, the leader of an unregistered Apostolic Church in Las Tunas, on what the NGO said was a false charge of hoarding.  The pastor, who operated a small bike repair shop, was reportedly told by authorities he was being arrested “so that you learn that illegal churches in Cuba are not allowed.”  Authorities stated he had too many tools for his business without providing evidence that he had acquired them legally.  After 10 days in detention, authorities released him, and prosecutors dropped the charges against him.  They did not return his confiscated equipment, which he needed to provide for his family.

According to CSW, many religious groups continued to state their lack of legal registration impeded their ability to practice their religion.  Several religious groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Church of Jesus Christ, continued to await decisions from the MOJ on pending applications for official registration, some dating as far back as 1994.  Despite a 2019 letter from Cuban Ambassador to the United States Jose Cabanas to the First Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ in Salt Lake City stating the denomination was “welcome” in the country, the MOJ had not approved the Church’s registration by year’s end.

Representatives of several religious organizations and religious freedom organizations said the government continued to interpret the law on associations as a means for the ORA and the MOJ to deny registration of certain groups.  They also said the MOJ’s determinations of ineligibilities for registration sometimes included the assertion that another group already had identical or similar objectives, which these representatives said was a pretext the government used to control and favor certain factions of a religious denomination or one religious group’s activities over others.

Members of Protestant denominations said some groups were still able to register only a small percentage of house churches in private homes, although some unregistered house churches could operate with little or no government interference.  CSW reported authorities continued to rely on two 2005 government resolutions limiting house churches to impose complicated and repressive restrictions on them.

At year’s end, Soka Gakkai continued to be the only Buddhist group registered with the government, and the Islamic League was the only registered Islamic group.

According to religious leaders and former inmates, authorities continued to deny prisoners, including political prisoners, pastoral visits and the ability to meet with other prisoners for worship, prayer, and study.  Many prisoners also said authorities repeatedly confiscated Bibles, crucifixes, rosary beads, and other religious items, sometimes as punishment and other times for no apparent reason.

CSW and religious leaders reported that the government, through the Ministry of Interior, continued to systematically plant informants in all religious organizations, sometimes by persuading or intimidating members and leaders to act as informants, or by sending informants to infiltrate a church.  The objective was to monitor and intimidate religious leaders and report on the content of sermons and on church attendees.  As a result, CSW said many leaders continued to practice self-censorship, avoiding stating anything that might possibly be construed as anti-Castro or counterrevolutionary in their sermons and teaching.  Catholic and Protestant church leaders, both in and outside the government-recognized Council of Cuban Churches (CCC), continued to report frequent visits from state security agents and CCP officials.  These church leaders said the purpose of the visits was to intimidate and to remind them they were under close surveillance, as well as to influence internal decisions and structures within the groups.

Many house church leaders continued to report frequent visits from state security agents or CCP officials.  Some reported warnings from the agents and officials that the education of their children, or their own employment, could be threatened if the house church leaders continued their activities.

According to news reports, authorities continued to harass Pastor Alain Toledano, a member of the Apostolic Movement and leader of the Emanuel Church in Santiago de Cuba.  Toledano said state security officials arrested him for “propagating the COVID pandemic” in August, when he said he held a socially distanced service.  In the weeks that followed, Toledano reported state security cited or interrogated at least eight members of his church for showing him support.

During the year, the government used internet laws restricting freedom of expression of independent journalists, including those promoting freedom of religion or belief and other human rights.  In addition, CSW continued to report the government used social media to harass and defame religious leaders, including Facebook posts and online editorials publicly targeting religious leaders or groups.  In most instances, accounts posting attacks targeting religious leaders seemed to be linked to state security.  According to the annual report of the U.S.-based human rights NGO Freedom House, the country had one of the most restrictive media environments in the world, including in terms of internet freedom such as restrictions on networks, blocking of social networks and websites, and the repression and arrest of individuals for using social media networks.  For example, according to HRW, on August 17, the government responded to the July 11 protests by issuing Decree Law 35, which further criminalized online content deemed to be critical of the government or that disseminated “content that violates the constitutional, social and economic precepts of the State” or incites acts that affect public order.

In July, the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops released a statement calling for dialogue and imploring the government to respect citizens’ rights to freedom of expression.  In November, the Conference of Cuban Religious and Catholic leaders released statements condemning state intimidation of religious leaders, as well as what they termed the systematic repression of voices who criticize the government.

In May, 34 individuals and organizations signed a letter addressed to Cuba’s Chief of Mission at its embassy in Washington, raising concerns about violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief taking place under two decree laws (349 and 370) that limit freedom of expression either through artistic means or online.  The letter called for the repeal of the two laws and highlighted the case of independent journalist Yoel Suarez, who regularly reported on religious freedom issues.  During the year, state security agents summoned Suarez for multiple interrogations, threatened him with criminal charges, and questioned his wife, reportedly to pressure her to convince him to abandon his work.

According to CSW, Christian leaders from all denominations said a scarcity of Bibles and other religious literature continued, primarily in rural areas.  Some religious leaders continued to report government obstacles, including bureaucratic obstruction and arbitrary restrictions such as inconsistent rules on importing computers and electronic devices, prevented them from importing religious materials and donated goods.  In some cases, the government held up religious materials or blocked them altogether.  According to the U.S.-based Patmos Institute, a civil society organization focusing on religious freedom and interreligious dialogue, the Cuban Association for the Divulgation of Islam was unable to obtain a container of religious literature embargoed since 2014.  Several other groups, however, said they continued to import large quantities of Bibles, books, clothing, and other donated goods.

The Catholic Church and several government-recognized Protestant groups continued to maintain small libraries, print periodicals and other information, and to operate their own websites with little or no formal censorship.  The Catholic Church continued to publish periodicals and hold regular forums at the Varela Center, where participants sometimes criticized official social and economic policies.

According to media, government officials frequently instigated or did not investigate harassment of religious figures and institutions.  Although most cases of what CSW defined as religious persecution were directed toward Christians, CSW also reported that religious minorities were also likely to be victims of religious persecution.  Patmos continued to report that Rastafarians, whose spiritual leader remained imprisoned since 2012, were among the most stigmatized and repressed religious groups.

Muslim community representatives said the country’s small Muslim community was subject to discrimination.  The government denied a Muslim woman permission to travel abroad for urgent medical care, a decision she said she believed was linked to her affiliation with an unregistered religious group.  According to CSW, Yusdevlin Olivera Nunez was prohibited from travelling due to a five-year sentence of restricted liberty she received upon joining the unregistered Cuban Association for the Dissemination of Islam.  At year’s end, Olivera Nunez – known as Mercy Olivera – had not received travel documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  She said the treatment needed for her medical conditions was not available in the country.

Before her detention following the July 11 protests, Free Yorubas President Perez Paseiro and member Yaimara Reyes Soler filed a legal complaint in June in Santa Clara, stating the government had committed dozens of religious freedom violations against members of their group.  The petition stated authorities had erroneously and intentionally determined the Free Yorubas to be a political entity rather than an association of Yoruba believers and that it forbade them from observing traditional practices such as wearing garments or head coverings in accordance with their faith.  Court officials initially refused to even accept the legal filing and by year’s end had not acted upon the complaint.

While some religious leaders reported that access to broadcast media had marginally improved during the year, several religious leaders continued to express concern about the government’s restriction on broadcasting religious services over the radio or on television.

According to CSW, while movement to, from, and within the country was again highly restricted due to the COVID-19 pandemic, religious travelers said they continued to experience higher levels of scrutiny than others and were often denied freedom of movement, including traveling to religious gatherings outside the country.  Patmos reported that immigration officers continued to target religious travelers and their goods and informed airport-based intelligence services of their incoming and outgoing travel.

According to CSW, during the year there were no reported cases of the ORA and immigration officials targeting foreign visitors by denying them religious visas.  CSW attributed the change to the government’s overall closure of borders to tourists as part of its efforts to limit the spread of COVID-19.

Reportedly because of COVID-19-related restrictions on internal movement, government agencies continued to refuse to recognize changes in residence for pastors and other church leaders assigned to new churches or parishes.  These restrictions, not lifted until October, made it difficult or impossible for relocating pastors to obtain government services, including housing.  Legal restrictions on travel within the country also limited itinerant ministry, a central component of some religious groups.

According to media, religious discrimination against students continued to be a common practice in state schools, with multiple reports of teachers and CCP officials encouraging and participating in bullying of students belonging to religious groups perceived as being critical of the government.

According to religious leaders, the government continued to selectively prevent some religious groups from establishing accredited schools.  These leaders said religious groups with connections to the government and willing to participate in government events were allowed to operate seminaries, interfaith training centers, before-and-after-school programs, eldercare programs, weekend retreats, workshops for primary and secondary students, and higher education programs.  The Catholic Church continued to offer coursework, including entrepreneurial training leading to a bachelor’s and master’s degree through foreign partners.  Several Protestant communities continued to offer university-level degrees in theology, the humanities, and related subjects via distance learning; however, the government did not recognize these degrees.

Jehovah’s Witnesses leaders continued to state they found the requirements for university admission and the courses of study incompatible with the group’s beliefs because their religion prohibited them from political involvement.

On January 27, hundreds of Catholics, including bishops, religious, and laypersons, issued a public appeal for citizens to begin to take control of the future of their country.  The appeal stated, “The Cuban people, although slowly, have been overcoming and unlearning helplessness.… This is a very important path to empowerment and recovery of social self-esteem.  It is important that we come to feel stronger, that we convince ourselves that we can act and live without being paralyzed by fear, so that we come to express ourselves freely, to seek the good and justice while preserving peace, and to be critical of our reality, because in fact, it is the duty of everyone to contribute to the building of a new Cuba.”

According to international media, despite increased shortages of food, medicine, and other essential items, authorities greatly restricted many religious organizations’ ability to receive and distribute humanitarian assistance.  While the government allowed Caritas to continue providing food and other goods to the needy, it did not allow many smaller religious groups and charities that were not part of the government-recognized CCC to provide aid.  Other religious leaders also said the government continued to restrict their ability to receive donations from overseas.

Some religious groups continued to report the government allowed them to engage in community service programs and to share their religious beliefs.  Other religious groups reported government restrictions varied and were largely based on the government’s perceptions of the “political pliancy” of each religious group.  Religious leaders continued to report government opposition to and interference in religious groups’ providing pastoral services.

According to media, the Community of Sant’Egidio intensified its activities, despite COVID-19 restrictions.  It continued to hold prayer and meetings in small groups.  “The community has flourished in the pandemic,” said an 80-year-old woman and member of the “Long Live the Elderly” program in Santiago de Cuba.  Sant’Egidio established the program to encourage youth to assist elderly individuals in various neighborhoods of Santiago, including Maceo, Cicharrones, Flores, and Marti.

According to a May National Public Radio article entitled, The Youth of Cuba’s Tiny Jewish Minority, a lack of tourists during the COVID-19 pandemic hit the country’s small Jewish community hard because the community relied on tourism for attendance at religious services, for donations, and for solidarity.

International faith-based charitable operations such as Caritas and Sant’Egidio, both Catholic, and the Salvation Army maintained local offices in Havana.  Caritas continued to gather and distribute relief items, providing humanitarian assistance to all individuals regardless of religious belief.

Embassy officials did not meet with or otherwise engage with the ORA during the year due to lack of responsiveness from the government.  In public statements and through social media postings, U.S. government officials, including the Secretary of State, continued to call upon the government to respect its citizens’ fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of religion and expression.

Embassy officials met with the head of the CCC and discussed obstacles unregistered churches faced to gain official status.

Embassy officials met with leaders of a range of registered and unregistered religious groups, including Catholics, Protestants, and other faith groups.  They discussed the principal issues of religious freedom and tolerance, including freedom of assembly, church expansion, access to state-owned media, and their inability to open private religious schools.

On November 15, 2021, in accordance with the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as amended, the Secretary of State again placed the country on the Special Watch List for having engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious freedom.

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and protects the freedom to worship, teach, and practice one’s religion.  It grants the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus the exclusive right to regulate and administer its internal affairs and recognizes the Vakf, an Islamic institution that manages sites of worship and property Muslims have donated, as a charitable endowment.  Reuters and other press outlets reported that on September 15, the government dropped a disciplinary investigation launched in 2020 against art teacher and headmaster Yiorgos Gavriel after complaints about his work from the Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and other figures.  In a written complaint to the Ministry of Education, the Archbishop said that Gavriel’s depictions of Jesus were “obscene.”  Gavriel painted Jesus as a soccer fan; on a motorcycle; naked; and interned in a refugee camp.  Muslim community leaders stated the government continued to allow the community access for religious services at only six of the 19 mosques designated as cultural heritage sites, as well as to two other mosques not located on such sites.  Of the eight functioning mosques, seven were available for all five daily prayers and six had the necessary bathroom and ablution facilities. Representatives of the Jewish community continued to report authorities performed autopsies on deceased members of the community for deaths that were not suspicious, a practice they said violated Jewish religious beliefs and practice.  They stated that despite their continuing efforts to raise the issue with government authorities during the year, it remained unresolved.  Two of the functioning mosques under the guardianship of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) continued to lack bathroom and ablution facilities.  The Department of Antiquities continued to limit regular access to the Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque to only two of the five daily prayers, although it routinely granted expanded access during Ramadan and at the request of the imam.  The imam said the Department of Antiquities replaced the security guards after his complaint in 2020 that they allowed some non-Muslim tourists to enter the mosque without observing the dress code.  Authorities continued to deny permission to perform animal slaughter for food production according to Jewish law.  Authorities did not respond to a request pending since 2017 from the Chief Rabbinate of Cyprus to have the right to officiate marriage, death, and divorce certificates.

In March, unknown persons sprayed anti-Turkish graffiti, Greek flags, and crosses on the exterior wall of the Episkopi Mosque in Limassol District.  The Orthodox Church of Cyprus called for the withdrawal of the country’s entry into the annual Eurovision contest, a song entitled “El Diablo,” charging the song made an international mockery of the country’s moral foundations by advocating “our surrender to the devil and promoting his worship.”  Some religious minority groups continued to report societal pressure to engage in public Greek Orthodox religious ceremonies, such as weddings and christenings.  Greek Orthodox Christians reported they sometimes faced ostracism from their community if they converted to another religion.  Leaders of the main religious groups continued to meet under the framework of the Religious Track of the Cyprus Peace Process (RTCYPP) and advocated for greater religious freedom for faith communities across the island. The RTCYPP, organized under the auspices of the Swedish embassy, is a peacebuilding initiative to encourage and facilitate religious leaders’ dialogue and efforts for religious freedom, human rights, and bicommunal reconciliation.

U.S. embassy representatives continued to meet with government officials to discuss various issues, including access to religious sites on either side of the “green line” dividing the country.  The Ambassador met with religious leaders to discuss religious freedom restrictions, access to religious sites, and interfaith cooperation.  Embassy staff met with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religious leaders to discuss topics including access to religious sites island-wide and discrimination against minority religious groups.  Embassy officials also visited places of religious significance on both sides of the “green line” and encouraged continued dialogue and cooperation among religious leaders.  Embassy staff interacted on several occasions with religious leaders in the country, focusing on religious freedom and encouraging interfaith dialogue.

The U.S. government estimates the total population of the island at 1.3 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2011 census, the most recent, the population of the government-controlled area is 840,000.  Of that total, 89.1 percent is Orthodox Christian and 2.9 percent is Roman Catholic, known locally as Latin.  Other religious groups include Protestants (2 percent), Muslims (1.8 percent), Buddhists (1 percent), Maronite Catholics (0.5 percent), and Armenian Orthodox (0.3 percent), with small populations of Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Baha’is.  The country’s chief rabbi estimates the number of Jews at 4,500, most of whom are foreign-born residents.  A Jehovah’s Witnesses representative estimates the group has 2,600 members.  Recent immigrants and migrant workers are predominantly Roman Catholic, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and protects the right of individuals to profess their faith and to worship, teach, and practice or observe their religion, individually or collectively, in private or in public, subject to limitations due to considerations of national security or public health, safety, order, and morals or the protection of civil liberties.  The constitution specifies all religions whose doctrines or rites are not secret are free and equal before the law.  It protects the right to change one’s religion and prohibits the use of physical or moral compulsion to make a person change, or prevent a person from changing, his or her religion.

The constitution grants the Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus (Church of Cyprus) the exclusive right to regulate and administer the Church’s internal affairs and property in accordance with its canons and charter.  By law, the Church of Cyprus pays taxes only on commercial activities.

The constitution sets guidelines for the Islamic Vakf, which is tax exempt and has the exclusive right to regulate and administer its internal affairs and property in accordance with its laws and principles.  According to the constitution, no legislative, executive, or other act may contravene or interfere with the Church of Cyprus or the Vakf.  The Vakf, which acts as caretaker of religious properties in the Turkish Cypriot community, operates only in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots.  The government administers and provides financial support for the physical maintenance of mosques in government-controlled areas.

In addition to the Church of Cyprus and Islam, the constitution recognizes three other religious groups:  Maronite Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, and Latins (Latin Rite Roman Catholics).  These groups’ institutions are tax exempt and eligible for government subsidies for cultural and educational matters, including to cover costs to operate their own schools, for school fees of group members attending private schools, and for activities to preserve their cultural identity.

Religious groups not recognized in the constitution must register with the government as nonprofit organizations to engage in financial transactions and maintain bank accounts.  To register, a religious group must submit, through an attorney, an application to the Registrar of Companies under the Ministry of Energy, Commerce, and Industry stating its purpose and providing the names of its directors.  Religious groups registered as nonprofit organizations are treated the same as other nonprofit organizations.  They are tax exempt, must provide annual reports to the government, and are not eligible for government subsidies.

The clergy of the Greek Orthodox, the Muslim, and the three Christian communities recognized by the constitution (Armenian, Maronite, and Latin) serve as automatically authorized marriage officers and may sign marriage certificates.  Members of the clergy of other faiths must apply to the MOI for authorization to perform marriages.  The list of authorized marriage officers is published in the Official Gazette.  Divorce requires a court decision.  A state doctor or pathologist, not a member of the clergy, signs any death certificates.

According to the law, the Armenian, Maronite, and Latin communities each have an elected representative to the parliament who has nonvoting observer status.  Members of these communities also may run for one of the 56 seats that have voting rights in the body.

The government has formal processes by which religious groups may apply to use restored religious heritage sites for religious purposes.

According to a public school regulation, students are not permitted to cover their heads in school.  The regulation explicitly states, however, that it should be implemented without discriminating against a student’s religion, race, color, gender, or any political or other convictions of the student or the parents.

The law criminalizes incitement to hatred and violence based on race, color, religion, genealogical origin, national or ethnic origin, or sexual orientation.  Such acts are punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to 10,000 euros ($11,300), or both.

The law requires stunning animals before slaughter.  No religious exemptions are granted.

The government requires Greek Orthodox religious instruction and attendance at religious services before major Greek Orthodox religious holidays in public primary and secondary schools.  The Ministry of Education (MOE) may excuse primary school students of other religious groups from attending religious services and instruction at the request of their guardians, but Greek Orthodox children in primary school may not opt out.  The MOE may excuse secondary school students from religious instruction on grounds of religion or conscience and may excuse them from attending religious services on any grounds at the request of their guardians or at their own request if over the age of 16.

The Office of the Commissioner for Administration and Protection of Human Rights (ombudsman) is an independent state institution responsible for protecting citizens’ rights and human rights in general.  The ombudsman may investigate complaints made against any public service agency or official for actions that violate human rights, including freedom of religion, or contravene the laws or rules of proper administration.  The ombudsman makes recommendations to correct wrongdoings but is unable to enforce them.

Conscientious objectors on religious grounds are exempt from active military duty and from reservist service in the National Guard but must complete alternative service.  The two options available for conscientious objectors are unarmed military service, which is a maximum of four months longer than the normal 14-month service, or social service, which is a maximum of eight months longer than normal service but requires fewer hours of work per day.  The penalty for refusing military or alternative service is up to three years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to 6,000 euros ($6,800), or both.  Those who refuse both military and alternative service, even if objecting on religious grounds, are considered in violation of an offense involving dishonesty or moral turpitude, and are disqualified from holding elected public office, and ineligible for permits to provide private security services.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Reuters and other press outlets reported that on September 15, the government dropped a disciplinary investigation launched in 2020 against Nicosia public high school art teacher and headmaster Yiorgos Gavriel after complaints about his work from Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Cyprus Chrysostomos II and other religious and government figures.  In a written complaint to the Ministry of Education, the Archbishop said Gavriel’s depictions of Jesus were “offensive” and “obscene.”  Gavriel depicted Jesus in his paintings as a soccer fan; on a motorcycle; naked; and interned in a refugee camp.  The government announced it was ending the investigation after a public outcry and expressions of support for Gavriel from members of parliament.

Although requests for access to churches, mosques, and monasteries declined due to government-imposed COVID-19 mitigation measures, religious leaders on both sides of the island said this issue remained a top priority.  As of year’s end, the MOI had not responded to a letter from Imam Alemdar, the representative of the Mufti of Cyprus, regarding the Department of Antiquities’ August 2019 closure of the Limassol Great Mosque for restoration.  The Department of Antiquities took the action without previously informing the Muslim community of the nature of, or timeline for, the restoration.  The MOI reported in October that the Department of Public Works, in cooperation with the Department of Antiquities, was in the process of finalizing the designs for the restoration of the mosque and said it expected the restoration to be completed by 2024.

Muslim community leaders stated the government continued to allow the community access for religious services at only six of the 19 mosques located on cultural heritage sites as well as at two other mosques not located on such sites.  Of the eight functioning mosques, seven were available for all five daily prayers and six had the necessary facilities for ablutions.  The government again failed to respond to the Muslim community’s longstanding request for permission to make improvements at the functioning mosques, and there was no change from previous years in either the number of open mosques or the number of ablution and bathroom facilities available at those mosques.  The Bayraktar and Dhali Mosques had no ablution facilities and no bathrooms.

According to Alemdar, the functioning mosque in Paphos was too small for the size of the Muslim congregation, holding approximately 100 worshippers, compared with an estimated Muslim population of approximately 5,000 in the area.  He said the Department of Antiquities did not approve his request to allow the use of the recently restored Grand Mosque of Paphos.  In 2019, the MOI said installing facilities at Dhali Mosque was difficult due to limited space near the mosque but that it planned to identify a suitable location and develop new plans.

The MOI reported in December that the only available space for the construction of the facilities at Dhali Mosque was behind the uninhabited house intended for the mosque’s imam.  MOI inspectors reportedly found the house structurally unsafe and decided to not proceed with construction because use of the facilities would require passage through the house.  The MOI was preparing a study for the stabilization of the house at year’s end.

In 2020, the Department of Antiquities and Imam Alemdar agreed on plans for the installation of bathrooms and ablution facilities at the Bayraktar Mosque.  Alemdar reported the Department of Antiquities informed him the plans had been submitted in 2020 to the MOI to initiate the project.  Construction, however, had not begun by year’s end.

Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque, the most historically important Islamic religious site in the country because of its ties to a companion of the Prophet Muhammed, continued to be the only one of the eight functioning mosques not regularly open for all five daily prayers.  The Department of Antiquities classified the mosque as an “ancient monument” and continued to keep it open only for standard museum hours, limiting access to the mosque to two of the five daily prayer times during most of the year.  The imam reported the mosque remained open 24 hours daily only during Ramadan.  Due to COVID-19 restrictions, only a few persons attended communal prayers.  Ramadan services were recorded and uploaded on YouTube.  According to the Department of Antiquities and the mosque’s imam, the imam still had to obtain permission from the MOI and Department of Antiquities to keep the mosque open after 5 p.m. in the autumn and winter months and after 7:30 p.m. in the spring and summer months.  According to local observers, the imam said the authorities routinely granted permission.

The imam of Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque reported to local observers that the Department of Antiquities replaced the security guards stationed at the complex following his complaint that guards sometimes did not require visitors to wear appropriate clothing when entering the mosque.  The new guards enforced the dress code.

In August, the Cyprus Mail reported a group of individuals gathered outside the Nicosia district court in support of Metropolitan of Morphou Neophytos, whom authorities had charged with “prompting people to attend an illegal gathering.”  The bishop was present to defend himself for violating coronavirus decrees and for holding a church service on Epiphany during the government-mandated lockdown.  His lawyer said Neophytos was not allowed into the courtroom, which the lawyer said was in defiance of articles of the constitution specifying the right to be present.  His hearing resumed on September 24. The court did not allow Neophytos to enter the courtroom because he refused to wear a mask, a requirement per government regulations, and he was therefore represented by his lawyer.  On October 4, Neophytos, arguing that his constitutional right to be present had been violated, appealed to the Supreme Court to declare the hearing null and void.  The appeal was pending before the Supreme Court at year’s end.

In previous years, the government waived visa requirements for the movement of non-Turkish Cypriot pilgrims crossing the “green line” into the south to visit the Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque to conduct prayers and services on special occasions.  The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) facilitated these movements.   Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, no such requests were submitted during the year.

Representatives of the Jewish community continued to report that authorities performed autopsies on deceased members of the community for deaths that were not suspicious, a practice they said violated Jewish religious beliefs and practice.  Representatives stated that despite continuing efforts to raise the issue with government authorities during the year, it remained unresolved.  According to the law, the state pathologist determines which deaths require autopsies.

Jewish representatives again reported that Department of Veterinary Services officials denied exemptions from the requirement to stun animals before slaughter following a 2019 department decision to no longer grant exemptions for religious slaughter.  The Jewish community reported it was able to import kosher meat from other European Union (EU) countries at a significantly higher cost than if it were locally available.

In April 2020, the Council of Ministers submitted to the House of Representatives a bill allowing kosher and halal slaughter of animals, i.e., without stunning.  The government withdrew the bill the same month following strong reactions by animal rights activists.  The leadership of the Jewish community reported sending letters on the issue to all members of the House of Representatives, the president of the Agriculture Committee, and the president of the Chamber of Commerce.  In December 2020, the EU Court of Justice ruled EU member states may impose a requirement to stun animals prior to slaughter and that such a requirement did not infringe on the rights of religious groups.

Jewish representatives again said the government continued not to respond to their longstanding request to grant the Chief Rabbinate of Cyprus the right to sign official documents, including marriage, death, and divorce certificates, as an authorized party.

A Jehovah’s Witnesses representative said that some local government authorities still did not allow Jehovah’s Witnesses to bury their adherents in some municipal cemeteries, which were often managed by local Greek Orthodox churches.  The MOI did not respond to a request submitted in 2019 for assistance with the municipalities.

Imam Alemdar said the Larnaca Turkish cemetery was completely full and new land for Islamic burials was required.  In February 2020, he sent a letter to the MOI requesting that a Vakf property near Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque be made available as a cemetery.  According to local observers, the representative of the mufti said an MOI official denied the request that same month, saying there was space for burials in the existing cemetery.

The military continued to require recruits to take part in a common prayer led by Church of Cyprus clergy during swearing-in ceremonies.  Recruits of other faiths, atheists, and those who did not wish to take the oath for reasons of conscience could refrain from raising their hand during the ceremony.  They instead recited a pledge of allegiance at a separate gathering.

Pope Francis made an official visit December 2-4 and President Nicos Anastasiades hosted a reception in his honor that included senior government officials, civil society, and members of the diplomatic corps.  The President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Annita Demetriou, participated in an open-air Mass led by the Pope at a Nicosia sports stadium that was reportedly attended by 10,000 people.

Because religion and ethnicity often overlap, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Media reported a group of Greek Orthodox people staged a protest outside the stadium holding Greek flags and banners saying, “The Pope is persona non grata,” “Pope out of Cyprus,” and “Cyprus is Orthodox.”  At a separate event, Pope Francis led a prayer at the Catholic Church of Holy Cross in Nicosia with dozens of migrants and asylum seekers in attendance.  The entire visit appeared live on national television.  Press coverage was widespread and predominantly positive.

Vandals spray painted Greek nationalist graffiti consisting of Greek flags, crosses, nationalist slogans, and threats on the Episkopi Mosque in Limassol on March 25, the 200th anniversary of the Greek uprising against the Ottoman Empire.  The building, originally a Byzantine church dating to the sixteenth century, later became a mosque during the Ottoman period.  The graffiti included letters and symbols meaning “Jesus Christ Conquers.”  On the same day, government spokesperson Kyriakos Koushos issued a written statement saying the Republic of Cyprus “strongly and unreservedly condemns the actions of some brainless people who under the pretext of so-called patriotism, insult religious sites and the meaning and ideals of patriotism.”  The Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus did not issue a public condemnation or comment.  “TRNC President” Ersin Tatar, the “MFA,” and the “Prime Minister’s” office separately released statements condemning the attack.  Tatar stated, “With only days to go prior to the 5+1 UN informal meeting to be held in Geneva, Switzerland, Greek Cypriot provocations have once again intensified.”  Chairman of the Turkish Cypriot People’s Party (HP) Kudret Ozersay also called the incident a provocation, adding, “If the same place is attacked twice, sometimes three times in a row, it is because the Greek Cypriot political leadership does not identify and punish those responsible.”

The Episkopi community council immediately cleaned the wall and the community chairman publicly condemned the incident.  The police said they examined footage from closed-circuit television and searched the residence and the car of a suspect looking for evidence linking him to attack.  The Supreme Court denied a request by the suspect to invalidate a search warrant.  However, the police investigation did not identify the individuals responsible.  Human rights defenders and representatives of the Muslim community stated on social media they did not believe there would be a serious investigation and named the lack of law enforcement action for previous incidents as the primary reason for repeated acts of mosque vandalization in the country.  Episkopi mayor Lefkios Prodromou told Politis Radio this was the third time that such a “reprehensible” incident had occurred at the mosque.  Speaking to the newspaper Phileleftheros on March 26, Prodromou said he asked the local police chief to provide a visible police presence at the mosque on April 1 to prevent a repeat attack on Greek Cypriot National Day.  Imam Alemdar said the incident marked a “worrying and growing trend” of hate speech in the country.  He added that authorities never fully investigated or prosecuted previous culprits and that security concerns would persist for mosques throughout the country until those responsible for such acts were held accountable.

The Orthodox Church of Cyprus called for the withdrawal of the country’s entry into the annual Eurovision contest, a song entitled “El Diablo,” charging the song made an international mockery of the country’s moral foundations by advocating “our surrender to the devil and promoting his worship.”  The Holy Synod, the Church’s highest decision-making body, said in a statement the song “essentially praises the fatalistic submission of humans to the devil’s authority” and urged the state broadcaster to replace it with one that expressed the country’s history, culture, and traditions.  The Church’s statement came a few days after authorities charged a man with uttering threats and causing a disturbance when he entered the grounds of the public broadcaster and condemned the song as blasphemous and an affront to Christianity.

Representatives of the Jewish community reported an increase in instances of antisemitic verbal harassment in public places, threats on social media and against Jewish students at schools, vandalism of menorahs and Israeli flags, and antisemitic and pro-Nazi graffiti outside schools attended by Jewish students.  They reported a physical attack against a 15-year-old Jewish student in Limassol by a group of Palestinian students.  Individuals who were attacked in public places wore kippahs or tzitzit.  Some of the incidents were reported to the police.  Authorities reported no arrests, according to Jewish community representatives.

The Catholic NGO Caritas reported that discrimination against Muslim children in schools declined compared with previous years and stated increased diversity awareness and language training during the year contributed.

The NGOs Caritas and Action for Equality, Support, Antiracism (KISA) said women wearing the hijab often faced difficulties finding employment.  According to Caritas, in October 2019, a Somali woman filed a complaint with the ombudsman based on a hotel’s refusal to employ her because she was wearing a hijab.  Her case remained under review at year’s end.

Members of minority religious groups continued to report societal pressures to participate in the public religious ceremonies of majority groups.  For example, children of various religious minorities said they faced social pressure to attend Greek Orthodox religious ceremonies at school.  Armenian Orthodox representatives continued to say community members who married Greek Orthodox individuals received pressure from their spouse’s family members to have a Greek Orthodox wedding and follow Greek Orthodox rituals.  Similarly, Armenian Orthodox army recruits reportedly continued to feel peer pressure to take the oath administered by a Greek Orthodox priest.

Some Greek Orthodox adherents who converted to other faiths reportedly continued to hide their conversion from family and friends due to fear of social ostracism.

In June, the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage (TCCH), one of the bicommunal (Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot) technical committees established as part of the UN-facilitated settlement negotiations process, finished the conservation of two Muslim cemeteries in Mandria/Yeşilova and in Kalo Khorio/Vuda.  In March, the TCCH launched tender processes for the restoration of mosques in the villages of Orounda, Maroni, Kalo Khorio/Vuda, Lefkara, Alektora, Avdimou/Evdim, and Tera.  In February, the TCCH launched conservation works at Zouhouri Mosque in Larnaca.

The leaders of the main religious groups on the island continued to meet regularly, in-person and online, within the framework of the RTCYPP.  On June 7, Greek Orthodox, Muslim, Armenian, Maronite, and Roman Catholic leaders met in person for the first time since June 2020 to demonstrate what they said was their commitment to standing together for religious freedom and to advocating for others’ religious rights.

On May 2, the Mufti of Cyprus, on the RTCYPP website and on his Facebook and Twitter accounts, extended Easter greetings to the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and all Christians celebrating Easter.  On May 12, Christian religious leaders similarly issued a joint greeting to the Mufti of Cyprus and all Muslim faithful, wishing them a blessed Eid al-Fitr on the RTCYPP website and social media accounts.  The RTCYPP organizes regular meetings of religious leaders and facilitates interreligious communication and cooperation, and maintains an office in the buffer zone in Nicosia.

The RTCYPP continued its joint project of offering religious leaders Greek and Turkish language classes for priests, imams, nuns, and laypersons in the Greek Orthodox, Muslim, Armenian Orthodox, Maronite, and Roman Catholic communities who worked for faith-based organizations.  Classes continued online when in-person gatherings were not possible due to COVID-19-related restrictions.  In June, the RTCYPP expanded its Greek language classes to include 20 new students from the Muftiate of Cyprus, 10 women and 10 men, including imams and teachers of religious education.

Embassy representatives met with government officials from the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice to discuss religious freedom issues, including encouraging greater access to religious sites on either side of the “green line” and reducing discrimination against minority religious communities.

The Ambassador met with numerous religious leaders, including the Archbishop of the Maronite Church of Cyprus and several Orthodox Church of Cyprus metropolitan bishops.  These discussions included interfaith cooperation, changes to the restrictions on access to religious sites on either side of the island, concerns expressed by members of religious minorities about their ability to exercise their right to religious freedom, and discrimination for religious reasons by state institutions or society.  In February, the Ambassador met with the executive director of the RTCYPP to coordinate action in support of religious freedom.

On July 27, the Ambassador visited Koprulu Mosque in Limassol, which was vandalized in 2020, and discussed religious freedom issues with the mosque’s imam.  In March, following the defacement of the Episkopi Mosque, the Ambassador tweeted, “The U.S. Embassy strongly condemns the vandalism on the Episkopi Mosque.  Freedom of worship is a fundamental value, and we echo the condemnation from religious leaders and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.”

Embassy staff continued to discuss religious freedom issues, including religious-based discrimination, with Caritas, the Cyprus Refugee Council, and KISA.  They used social media to promote religious freedom and to engage representatives of the Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witness, Jewish, Maronite, Muslim, and Roman Catholic communities on their concerns about access to, and the condition of, religious sites and cemeteries, incidents of religious-based harassment and discrimination, societal attitudes toward minority religious groups, and obstacles to religious freedom.

Embassy staff visited Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque and discussed the mosque’s limited hours of operation and the condition of the Larnaca Turkish Cemetery with the resident imam.  Embassy officials supported religious leaders’ continuing dialogue within the RTCYPP and encouraged continuing reciprocal visits of religious leaders to places of worship on both sides of the “green line.”  Embassy staff interacted regularly with religious leaders in country, focusing on religious freedom and encouraging interfaith dialogue.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 10.7 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2021 census, of the 70 percent of citizens who responded to the question about their religious beliefs, approximately 48 percent held none, 10 percent were Roman Catholic, 13 percent listed no specific religion, and 9 percent identified with a variety of religious faiths, including the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, the Czechoslovak Hussite Church, other Christian churches, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism.  Academics estimate there are 10,000 Jews, while the FJC estimates there are 15,000 to 20,000.  Leaders of the Muslim community estimate there are 10,000 Muslims, most of whom are immigrants.  According to a 2018 report by the Pew Research Center based on a 2015 survey of 1,490 adults, 72 percent of persons do not identify with a religious group, 21 percent identify as Catholic, 3 percent as Protestant, 1 percent as Orthodox Christian, and 3 percent as other or did not know or refused to answer.

Legal Framework

The constitution does not explicitly address religious freedom, but the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, a supplementary constitutional document, provides for freedom of religious conviction and the fundamental rights of all, regardless of faith or religion.  It states every individual has the right to change religion or faith; to abstain from religious belief; and to freely practice religion, alone or in community, in private or public, “through worship, teaching, practice, observance.”  The charter defines religious societies, recognizing their freedom to profess their faith publicly or privately and to govern their own affairs, independent of the state.  It stipulates conscientious objectors may not be compelled to perform military service and that conditions for religious instruction at state schools shall be set by law.  The charter states religious freedom may be limited by law in the event of threats to “public safety and order, health and morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.”

The law states the MOC Department of Churches is responsible for religious affairs.  Religious groups are not required by law to register with the government and are free to perform religious activities without registering.  The law establishes a two-tiered system for religious groups which choose to register with the ministry.  The ministry reviews applications for first- and second-tier registration with input from other government bodies such as the Office for Protection of Private Data and from outside experts on religious affairs.  The law does not establish a deadline for the ministry to decide on a registration application.  Applicants denied registration may appeal to the MOC to reconsider its decision and, if denied again, to the courts.

To qualify for the first (lower) tier, a religious group must present at least 300 signatures of adult members permanently residing in the country, a founding document listing the basic tenets of the faith, and a clearly defined structure of fiduciary responsibilities to the Department of Churches.  First-tier registration confers limited tax benefits, including exemptions from taxes on interest earned on current account deposits, donations, and members’ contributions.

For second (higher) tier registration, a group must have been registered with the Department of Churches as a first-tier group for 10 years, have published annual financial reports throughout the time of its registration, and have membership equal to at least 0.1 percent of the population, or approximately 10,700 persons.  The group must provide this number of signatures as proof.  Second-tier registration entitles religious groups to tax benefits granted to first-tier groups and to the exercise of special rights, including conducting weddings, teaching religion at public schools, and conducting chaplaincy in the army and prisons.  Prisoners may receive visits from their own clergy, regardless of registration status.  Second-tier religious groups registered prior to 2002 are entitled to government subsidies.  The law phases out direct state subsidies to second-tier religious groups over a 17-year period ending in 2029.

Religious groups registered prior to 2002 received automatic second-tier status without having to fulfill the requirements for second-tier registration.  These groups must publish an annual report on the execution of special rights, including conducting weddings, teaching religion at public schools, and maintaining chaplaincy in the army and prisons.

There are 42 state-registered religious groups, 21 first- and 21 second-tier.

Unregistered religious groups are free to assemble and worship but may not legally own property.  Unregistered groups may form civic associations to own and manage their property.

The law authorizes the government to return land or other property that was confiscated during the communist era and is still in the government’s possession to 17 religious groups (the largest of which are the Roman Catholic Church, FJC, Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, and Hussite Church).  The government estimates the total value of property in its possession eligible to be returned at 75 billion crowns ($3.5 billion).  The law also sets aside 59 billion crowns ($2.8 billion) in compensation for property – mostly in possession of private persons or entities or local or regional governments – that cannot be returned, payable over a 30-year period ending in 2043.  Based on an agreement among the affected religious groups, the law allocates approximately 79 percent of these funds to the Catholic Church and 21 percent to the other 16 groups.  The law prescribed a one-year deadline ending in 2013 for religious groups to file restitution claims for confiscated property.  The government agency in possession of a property for which a group has filed a restitution claim adjudicates that claim.  If the government agency rejects a property claim, the claimant may appeal the decision in court.

The law permits second-tier religious groups to apply through the MOC to teach religion in state schools if there is a demand for such classes.  Eleven of the 21 second-tier groups have permission to teach religion classes.  The religious groups provide the teachers and the state pays their salaries.  If a state school does not have enough funds to pay for its religious education teachers, religious groups pay for them.  Student attendance at religious classes is optional.  According to law, if seven or more students register for a particular religion class at the beginning of the school year, a school must offer that class to those who registered.

The government does not regulate religious instruction in private schools.

The law prohibits speech that incites hatred based on religion, as well as the denial of Nazi- and communist-era genocides and crimes.  Violators may be sentenced to up to three years in prison.

Religious workers who are not from European Economic Area countries or Switzerland must obtain long-term residence and work permits to remain in the country for more than 90 days.  There is no special visa category for religious workers.  Foreign missionaries and clergy are required to meet the conditions for a standard work permit.

The law designates January 27 as Holocaust Remembrance Day.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In December, the MOC registered the Religious Society of Slavs, which had applied for registration in 2020.  In August, the Municipal Court in Prague denied an appeal, pending since 2017, of the MOC’s 2016 rejection of the registration application from the Lions of the Round Table – Order of the Lands of the Czech Crown.  The Ecclesia Risorum’s (Church of Laughter) 2020 appeal against the MOC’s 2019 and 2020 denials of its application remained pending with the Municipal Court in Prague.  The Essenic Christian Church’s application for registration, submitted to the MOC in January, was pending at year’s end.

In January, the Olomouc Appellate Court upheld the Zlin Regional Court’s 2020 conviction of PGJ leader Jaroslav Dobes and member Barbora Plaskova of the rape of six women and acquitted them of a charge of rape of a seventh woman.  Dobes and Plaskova continued to seek asylum in the Philippines, where they were in immigration detention, and international arrest warrants by Czech authorities for the pair remained outstanding.

In March, according to the PGJ, the Prague Municipal Court ruled that the government’s Office for Personal Data Protection’s investigation of the group’s registration application had been conducted improperly and instructed the office to reexamine the case.  PGJ officials reported that the office declined to further investigate the group’s registration application procedures and returned the fine it had levied on PGJ representative Martin Krajca for what the office had said was negligence in the collection of personal data of PGJ members.  The PGJ had filed a lawsuit with the Prague Municipal Court in 2017 against the Office for Personal Data Protection, alleging abusive investigation of its registration application and arguing against the MOC’s rejection of its registration application.  Also in March, the PGJ said it filed an appeal of the MOC’s denial of its registration application with the Administrative High Court after the Prague Municipal Court rejected the group’s appeal of the MOC’s registration denial.  That appeal, according to the PGJ, remained pending in the Administrative High Court at year’s end.

According to an article published in April by the NGO Center for Studies on New Religion, the Appellate Court in Olomouc ruled that 190,000 euros ($215,000) seized by the Zlin Regional Court in 2010 should be returned to the Poetrie esoteric yoga school, which was tied to the PGJ.  The Zlin court had seized the funds as part of the prosecution against Jaroslav Dobes and Barbara Plaskova.  According to the PGJ, the group was seeking additional compensation for losses due to inflation during the 11 years the funds had been withheld.

The MOI reported that as of June, it had granted subsidiary protection to all the remaining Chinese citizens who applied for asylum in 2016 citing fear of persecution as Christians.  Subsidiary protection prevents forcible return to their country of origin of persons who have been found ineligible for refugee status.  An NGO representing some of the applicants, however, reported that its clients still had pending applications but had stopped communicating with the Czech government out of fear of reprisal from the government of China.

The government provided second-tier religious groups approximately 3.2 billion crowns ($149.41 million):  one billion crowns ($46.69 million) in government subsidies to 17 groups and 2.2 billion crowns ($102.72 million) to 16 groups as compensation for communal property in private and state hands that would not be returned.  Five of the 22 second-tier groups declined the government subsidy and were not eligible for compensation payments for lost property.  The Baptist Union accepted the state subsidy, but while eligible to receive it, opted not to accept compensation for unreturned property.  In addition, the MOC provided 11.9 million crowns ($556,000) in grants for religiously oriented cultural activities in response to applications from various religious groups.

The government paid the annual allotment of 20 million crowns ($934,000) of the total of 100 million crowns ($4.67 million) earmarked for 2019-2023 as contribution to the Endowment Fund for Holocaust Victims for projects focused on Holocaust remembrance and education, welfare for Holocaust victims, and care for Jewish monuments.

In November, the Kolel Damesek Eliezer Foundation (a U.S. charity), the FJC, the U.S. Commission for Preservation of America’s Heritage Abroad, and the Hanacky Jerusalem Association met with the municipal council of Prostejov to continue discussions on the plan to restore a former Jewish cemetery in that city that the MOC had designated a cultural monument.  Later in the month, the Prostejov municipal assembly approved the 2022 municipal budget that earmarked 350,000 crowns ($16,300) to conduct a preparatory study for the restoration project.

The SPD and its leader, Tomio Okamura, continued to criticize Islam and Muslim migrants.  In November, Okamura stated on his Facebook page that “It has been fully confirmed that Islam is not compatible with freedom and democracy.  There will either be democracy here, or Islam.  There is nothing in between.”  In October, Okamura stated on Facebook that the “SPD submitted bills that ban the promotion of hateful Islamic ideology and Islamic veiling in public.”  Also in October, he stated on Facebook that the “SPD does not want us [the Czech Republic] to end up like the Islamized Western Europe where people often fear to go outside as they do not want to be stabbed or killed by the migrants.”  In September, the SPD initiated a petition against accepting migrants from Afghanistan after the departure of allied forces.  The petition, which had no legal force, was part of an action by the Identity and Democracy faction in the European Parliament, of which the SPD is a member, stated that “the new migration wave from Afghanistan can bring various risks, including Islamization and terrorism.”

In June, the government approved the 2020 Report on Extremism and Hate Crime, the 2021-2026 Strategy to Combat Extremism and Hate Crime, and the 2021-2022 Action Plan to Combat Extremism and Hate Crime that defined as one of its three strategic goals improving protection and assistance to victims of crimes, including religiously motivated crimes.  The action plan outlined specific tasks for various ministries, such as the MOI, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, MOC, and Ministry of Finance, in fighting extremism and hate crimes, including those against religious groups.  Steps the document outlined included “raising public awareness about extremist activities, initiatives by state regulatory and security bodies to reduce hate speech on the internet, strategic communication to combat xenophobia and racism, education and prevention programs at schools, specialized training for law enforcement, and assistance to victims.”

On January 27, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Social Equality, organized an online commemoration of International Holocaust Memorial Day entitled “Remembering, Perpetuating and Pursuing Justice.”  Speakers included Czech President Milos Zeman and then Foreign Minister Tomas Petricek, Israeli President Reuven Rivlin, and the U.S. Secretary of State.  Speakers stressed the importance of recalling past tragedies and fighting Holocaust denial.

Also on January 27, the Senate, in cooperation with the FJC, again organized a ceremony to honor victims of the Holocaust.  Speaker of the Senate Milos Vystrcil, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Radek Vondracek, Holocaust survivor Michaela Vidlakova, and FJC Chairman Petr Papousek delivered remarks and called for religious tolerance.  The event was broadcast live on state-owned television.

In April, the 16th annual public reading of Holocaust Victims’ names – Yom Ha-Shoah – took place online.  Public figures who participated in the reading included then Foreign Minister Petricek, Mayor of Prague Zdenek Hrib, and members of the diplomatic community.

In April, organizers cancelled the annual Culture Against Antisemitism Festival and march due to the COVID-19 pandemic and held an online event in the Pinkas Synagogue in Prague in memory of victims of the Shoah entitled “We All Are People 2021.”  Speaker of the Senate Vystrcil and director of the Jewish Museum Oto Pavlat spoke out against hatred and violence based on ethnicity and religion, and Vystrcil cited the importance of the continued fight against antisemitism, stating that any form of hatred, including hatred against Jews, was dangerous to persons all over the world.  The event also included the testimony of a Czech Holocaust survivor and a telecast of the commemoration ceremony from the Yad Vashem Memorial in Jerusalem.

The government provided grants for religiously oriented cultural activities, including the annual Night of Churches held in several cities; the National Commemoration of the 1,100th Anniversary of St. Ludmila’s death; a liturgical festival of St. Cyril and Methodius in Velehrad; the annual Concert in Memory of Holocaust Victims; an exhibition entitled Musical Treasures of the Jerusalem Synagogue; a celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Hussite Church, part of which had been postponed from 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic; and the Litomysl Days of Baroque Tradition (a festival consisting of liturgical music, masses, and readings).

According to the FJC, the MOI continued to provide security to the Jewish community and Jewish sites based on a memorandum of cooperation signed in 2016.

The government-funded Endowment Fund for Holocaust Victims, established by the FJC, contributed four million crowns ($187,000) to 14 institutions providing health and social care to approximately 450 Holocaust survivors.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

The NGO In IUSTITIA stated it received reports of one religiously motivated hate crime during the first half of the year – an incident against Jews – compared with seven such cases – four against Muslims, two against Jews, and one against Christians – in the same period in 2020.  The incident concerned an employee of the Jewish community’s school, who was part of a government on-line hate free campaign.  Someone posted “Juden raus” (“Jews out”, a common antisemitic slur) under his profile in the campaign.

In 2020, the most recent year data were available, the MOI reported 27 criminal offenses with antisemitic motives and nine with anti-Muslim motives, compared with 23 and 11 offenses respectively, in 2019.  The MOI reported only incidents that it investigated.

The FJC, which monitored the internet for instances of antisemitism, reported 874 antisemitic incidents in 2020, an increase of 26 percent over the 694 incidents in 2019 and 252 percent over the 347 incidents in 2018.  The FJC attributed this increase to improved digital monitoring tools, rising political polarization, and a move from the real to the virtual world because of COVID-19-related restrictions.  The 2020 incidents included one of physical assault, one of property damage, and six of harassment.

In one incident, an unidentified person assaulted an Israeli student in a bar in Brno during the Purim holiday in March 2020 after he requested the disk jockey play an Israeli song.  The victim, who received medical treatment, did not report the incident to police.  In May 2020, the front gate of the synagogue in Krnov was doused with a sticky liquid.  The other 866 incidents included graffiti, videos, articles, and online comments.  According to the FJC, the largest increase was in antisemitic hate speech on the internet, which accounted for 98 percent of the incidents.  It stated 84 percent of incidents involved stereotypical statements and conspiracy theories about Jews, such as allegations Jews controlled the economy and government.  In 9 percent of the cases, the writers criticized Israel (the FJC did not classify all criticism of Israel as antisemitic) and wrote in support of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement, while 4 percent denied the Holocaust.  The FJC stated that although the country remained safe for the Jewish community, online antisemitism should not be underestimated, as an analysis of attacks in other countries showed that violent acts were preceded by online radicalization.

In June, police charged four individuals and two companies associated with the publishing firm Guidemedia with Holocaust denial for producing a Czech translation of Germar Rudolf’s book Dissecting the Holocaust, which denies gas chambers were used in Nazi camps.  At year’s end, their trial had not begun.  Police continued to investigate Guidemedia for publishing an antisemitic children’s book, Poisonous Mushroom, first published in Germany in 1938 as part of antisemitic Nazi propaganda.  In January, police charged Emerich Drtina and the Nase Vojsko company with promoting a movement suppressing human rights and freedoms for publishing a 2021 calendar featuring Nazi figures.  As of October, the case was pending review by the District Court in Prague.  In September, police charged the Bodyart Press publisher and another person for publishing and distributing The Myth of the Six Million, a Holocaust denying book authored by a deceased U.S. historian.  In November, the state prosecutor indicted the publisher.  The case was pending at year’s end.

The MOI reported two private “white power” concerts were held during the first half of the year in which participants expressed antisemitic and neo-Nazi views, compared with nine such concerts in 2020.  The ministry estimated approximately 50 to 100 persons attended each concert.

A report published during the year on 2020 hate crimes in the country from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) cited five antisemitic incidents, one of physical violence, two of threats, and two of vandalism.  In one case that ODIHR sourced to the FJC, a television presenter received an anonymous letter containing antisemitic and xenophobic insults and threats of physical violence.  ODIHR also cited the FJC as the source of one report of vandalism against a Jewish synagogue in 2020 and In IUSTITIA as reporting vandalism against a street sign pointing to a Jewish cemetery damaged by gunshots.

The ODIHR report, citing In IUSTITIA, included five incidents against Muslims – one of physical violence, one of a threat, and three of vandalism.  In one incident, five persons subjected a woman wearing a headscarf to anti-Muslim and misogynist insults and death threats on the street.  In another incident, a woman wearing a headscarf was repeatedly subjected to anti-Muslim insults.  The perpetrators ripped the hijab from her head.

In September, the Brussels-based NGO Action and Protection League issued the results of its European antisemitism survey based on data from December 2019-January 2020.  According to the survey, 21 percent of 1,000 respondents ages 18-75 in the Czech Republic said they had negative feelings towards Jews.  Twenty-seven percent said they would be “totally uncomfortable” or “uncomfortable” with having Jewish neighbors.  The survey cited stereotypical statements about Jews and asked respondents the degree to which they agreed or disagreed.  The proportion who responded “strongly agree” or “tend to agree” with the following statements were – “the interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population” (24 percent); “there is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world” (23 percent); “Jews have too much influence in this country” (14 percent); “Jews will never be able to fully integrate into this society” (20 percent); “Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals” (22 percent); “many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later” (14 percent); “Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them” (15 percent); “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes” (20 percent).

In July, the Olomouc Appellate Court issued a two-year suspended sentence to Benedikt Cermak for online comments expressing approval of the deadly attacks on two mosques in New Zealand in 2019.  The court reversed a verdict of the Regional Court in Brno that had sentenced Cermak to six years in prison in May.

The Jewish community said it hoped to complete by 2022 a memorial that would include Jewish gravestone fragments.  The communist government took the fragments from a 19th century Jewish cemetery in the 1980s and cut them into cobblestones to be placed across the capital.  The Prague mayor’s office returned the fragments to the Jewish community in 2020.

Embassy representatives continued to engage government officials from the MOC on issues including religious tolerance and compensation in lieu of property restitution to religious groups, as well as developments on restoration of the Prostejov Jewish cemetery.  Embassy officials also met with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs special envoy for Holocaust issues, Robert Rehak, regarding compensation for confiscated property of religious groups.  Embassy officials expressed support for the restoration of the Jewish cemetery in Prostejov, meeting jointly in November with Mayor Frantisek Jura and the groups involved in the project.

The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials continued to meet with representatives from the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish communities to reaffirm U.S. commitment to religious freedom and tolerance and to hear their views on interfaith relations.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 105 million (midyear 2021).  In 2010, the Pew Research Center estimated 95.8 percent of the population is Christian, 1.5 percent Muslim, and 1.8 percent report no religious affiliation.  Of Christians, an estimated 48.1 percent are Protestant, including evangelical Christians and the Church of Jesus Christ on Earth through the Prophet Simon Kimbangu (Kimbanguist), and 47.3 percent Roman Catholic.  There are approximately 60 Protestant denominations.  Other Christian groups include Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and the Greek Orthodox Church.  There are small communities of Hindus, Jews, Buddhists, Baha’is, and followers of indigenous religions.  Muslim leaders estimate their community makes up approximately 5 percent of the population.

A significant portion of the population combines traditional beliefs and practices with Christianity or other religious beliefs.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and provides for freedom of religion and the right to worship, subject to “compliance with the law, public order, public morality, and the rights of others.”  It stipulates the right to religious freedom may not be abrogated even when the government declares a state of emergency or siege.

The law regulates the establishment and operation of religious groups.  According to law, the government may legally recognize, suspend recognition of, or dissolve religious groups.  The government grants tax-exempt status to recognized religious groups.  Nonprofit organizations, including foreign and domestic religious groups, must register with the government to obtain official recognition by submitting a copy of their bylaws and constitution.  Religious groups are required to register only once for the group as a whole, but nonprofit organizations affiliated with a religious group must register separately.  Upon receiving a submission, the Ministry of Justice issues a provisional approval and, within six months, a permanent approval or rejection.  Unless the ministry specifically rejects the application, the group is considered approved and registered after six months even if the ministry has not issued a final determination.  Applications from international headquarters of religious organizations must be approved by the Presidency after submission through the ministry.  The law requires officially recognized religious groups to operate as nonprofits and respect the general public order.  It also permits religious groups to establish places of worship and train clergy.  The law prescribes penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment, a fine of 200,000 Congolese francs ($100), or both for groups that are not properly registered but receive gifts and donations on behalf of a church or other religious organization.

Under the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) organic law of 2006, the eight religious confessions (the Catholic Church, Protestant groups, the Islamic faith community, the Salvation Army, the Independent Church of Congo, the Kimbanguists, the Revival Church, and the Orthodox Church) meeting certain characteristics with regard to their status and competence in electoral matters (i.e., acting as civil society organizations) are charged with nominating the CENI head.

The constitution permits public schools to work with religious authorities to provide religious education to students in accordance with students’ religious beliefs if parents request it.  Government-funded public schools administered by religious-institutions may provide religious instruction.  Government-owned schools may not mandate religious instruction, but may offer religion as a subject.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Vatican News and the Association for Catholic Information in Africa reported that on August 1, assailants believed to be progovernment and affiliated with the ruling party threw stones at the residence of Cardinal Fridolin Ambongo, the Catholic Archbishop of Kinshasa, in the Archdiocese of Kinshasa’s Lindonge Pastoral Center, and vandalized other property.  The attack was widely believed by Church leaders to be connected to the Church’s criticism of the reorganization of the country’s CENI.  The government made no statement regarding the vandalism nor took responsibility for its supporters’ actions.

In compliance with the CENI organic law of 2006, the eight religious confessions met in October to nominate the new CENI head.  The representatives of organizations representing mainline Protestant and Catholic Churches, the two confessions to which a majority of religious adherents in the country belong, rejected the choice of the other six religious groups – the Islamic faith community, the Salvation Army, the Independent Church of Congo, the Kimbanguists, the Revival Church, and the Orthodox Church.  In the absence of consensus, the six religious groups that agreed submitted their nomination of Denis Kadima as CENI head to the National Assembly.  National Assembly deputies voted in a plenary session to approve the nomination.  Following confirmation by President Felix Tshisekedi, Kadima took the oath of office on October 26.

The government and religious communities continued to maintain close relations, according to the media and religious leaders.  Catholic leaders reported regular dialogue with members of the Presidency and the government on issues of human rights, women’s empowerment, religious freedom, education, and security.  In April, President Tshisekedi spoke at the International Kimbanguist Church Headquarters in Nkamba during the Church’s 100th anniversary celebration.  Local press said his presence reflected the influence of the Kimbanguist movement and its deference to state authorities, in contrast to Roman Catholics, whose leaders the media stated were often found on the front lines of social and political protests.

The Ministry of Justice again did not issue any final registration permits for religious groups and had not done so since 2014.  The government, however, continued its practice of permitting groups to operate that were presumed to have approval, and unregistered domestic religious groups reported they continued to operate unhindered.  Foreign-based religious groups stated they operated without restriction after applying for legal status.  Under existing law, which remained under review, nonprofit organizations could operate as legal entities by default if a government ministry ruled favorably on their application and the government did not object to their application for status.  According to 2015 registration statistics, the latest year for which the Ministry of Justice had statistics, there were 14,568 legally registered nonprofit organizations, 11,119 legal religious nonprofit organizations, and 1,073 foreign nonprofit organizations.

The government continued to rely on religious organizations to provide public services such as education and health care throughout the country.  According to the Ministry of Education, approximately 72 percent of primary school students and 65 percent of secondary school students attended government-funded public schools administered by religious organizations.  The government paid teacher salaries at some schools run by religious groups, depending on the needs of the schools and whether they were registered as schools eligible to receive government funding.  Most schools were run by the Catholic Church.

In October, teachers in schools around the country, including those administered by religious organizations, organized strikes to protest the delay in the payment of their salaries, and, in one eastern city, over working conditions.  Minister of Primary and Technical Education Tony Mwaba accused Catholic Church authorities of being behind the teachers’ strike, and Secretary General of the Catholic Teachers’ Union Jean-Bosco Puna prohibited the teachers from returning to the classroom until the strike was settled.  Teachers returned to work in some schools in Kinshasa on November 8, and in the rest of the country in December, after the government signed a memorandum of understanding with the union agreeing to pay the teachers, including back pay and a one-time bonus, and standardize the distribution of payments.

Muslim community leaders again said the government did not afford them some of the same privileges as larger religious groups.  The government continued to deny Muslims the opportunity to provide chaplains in the military, police force, and hospitals despite a complaint filed in 2015 with the then president and his cabinet.  Catholic, Protestant, and Kimbanguist chaplains continued to serve in the police force and the armed forces.

ISIS-DRC continued to be active in the country.  The group reportedly attacked civilians indiscriminately and regardless of religion, although most victims were Christian, reflecting their status as the majority religious group.  Both local Christian and Muslim leaders, with vocal support from the government, condemned ISIS-DRC’s attacks on civilians.  According to a May report by the nongovernmental organization Kivu Security Tracker, the aim of the ISIS-DRC killings was to discredit and put pressure on government authorities, to divide the government forces pursing them, and to divide society as a whole.  In its report covering the period from January through June, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) reported that ISIS-DRC continued to extend its control beyond the Ruwenzori sector in Beni territory, North Kivu Province, into the territories of Mambasa and Irumu in Ituri.

The BBC reported that an unknown assailant gunned down and killed Sheikh Ali Amini, a local Muslim leader, inside a mosque during evening prayers on May 1 in the eastern city of Beni.  The cleric was a strong critic of Islamic militancy in the region.  On May 18, several local and international media reported that an unknown assailant killed Sheikh Djamali Moussa, a prominent imam in Beni and a leading civil society activist in the Mavivi community, as he returned from evening prayers near Beni.  The imam was known for his regular alerts to the community on ISIS-DRC movements in the region.

News outlet France 24 and other media reported on a series of bombings on June 27 in Beni, after which local authorities closed markets, schools, and churches for 48 hours to prevent further attacks.   The army and the head of a large civil society organization blamed the bombings on ISIS-DRC, and the Kivu Security Tracker said it suspected ISIS-DRC.  One of the bombings targeted a Catholic church and was the first known bombing of a Catholic church in North Kivu Province.  Following the bombings, the army spokesman announced authorities had arrested two suspects and intercepted their communications.  Explaining the closure of schools, markets, and churches in the city, he said that the army did not want more than 10 people to gather at a time in order to prevent them from becoming targets of ISIS-DRC.  The vicar general of the Catholic Diocese of Butembo-Beni said two women were injured in the church blast, which went off shortly before crowds were due to start gathering for a confirmation ceremony.  Several hours after the church bombing, a suicide bomber died in an explosion outside a bar located approximately 100 yards from a mosque.  In its July report covering the period from January through June, the UNJHRO said, “These attacks are clearly aimed at spreading terror among the population.”

Local media outlet Actualite.cd on September 21 reported that armed men wearing police uniforms robbed a parish church in Bukavu, South Kivu Province, despite its proximity to a police sub-station, and assaulted the priests, tying them up, and stuffing a shirt into one priest’s mouth to prevent him from calling for help.

In August, RFI reported multiple instances of vandalism targeting Catholic churches in southwestern Kasai Province and southeastern Haut-Katanga Province.  The Archbishop of Lubumbashi denounced the theft of a statue of the Virgin Mary and other items from Catholic places of worship within his jurisdiction.  RFI reported further vandalism in October in western Kongo Central Province, where gunmen in a Protestant parish destroyed graves of Swedish missionaries.  According to RFI, local civil society members condemned these acts, and some politicians described them as a reaction to these religious institutions’ frequent criticism of those in power.  Some observers on social media explained the vandalism as merely the theft of valuable objects, and others suggested some perpetrators had hoped to gain spiritual power from stolen religious relics.

A representative of the Jehovah’s Witnesses said there have been several attacks on members in the interior provinces, which he described as less tolerant of Jehovah’s Witnesses than Kinshasa.  The representative said the attacks included threats, beatings, and kidnappings, and took place in Kwilu Province in the west and Maniema Province in the east.

The Ambassador and embassy officers discussed with officials from the Ministry of Human Rights, Justice, Defense, and Interior religious freedom issues, including government relations with religious organizations.  Embassy officials also regularly urged the government, security forces leaders, and community and political leaders to refrain from violence and to respect the rights of civil society, including of religious groups, to assemble and express themselves freely.

Throughout the year, embassy and Washington-based officials engaged members of the eight primary religious confessions and human rights organizations, especially in the eastern conflict-affected provinces.  The Ambassador met with religious leaders frequently during visits to cities in the eastern provinces.  In meetings with members and representatives of both the largest denominations and smaller faith communities, U.S. officials discussed religious groups’ ability to operate within the country, their relationship with the government and other religious organizations, and their freedom to practice their religion as they saw fit.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.9 million (midyear 2021).  As of the end of 2021, 73.2 percent of the Danish population were ELC members according to Statistics Denmark.  In 2021, 8,961 members left the ELC, representing the lowest yearly number who departed that church since 2007.  A church historian at the University of Copenhagen attributed this development to the pandemic, which highlighted the importance of religious communities.  The Danish government does not collect data on religious affiliation outside of the ELC.  A professor estimated in April 2020 that there are approximately 250,000 Muslims, accounting for 4.4 percent of the population.  Muslims are concentrated in the largest cities, particularly Copenhagen, Odense, and Aarhus.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates other religious groups, each constituting less than 1 percent of the population, to include, in descending order of size, Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Serbian Orthodox Christians, Jews, Baptists, Buddhists, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Pentecostals, members of the Baha’i Faith, and nondenominational Christians.  According to a 2020 survey released by the Ministry of Immigration and Integration, approximately 11 percent of the population does not identify as belonging to a religious group or identifies as atheist.  The organization Jewish Community in Denmark estimates between 6,000 and 8,000 Jews live in the country, mostly in the Copenhagen area.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares the ELC as the country’s established church, which shall receive state support and to which the reigning monarch must belong.  The constitution also states individuals shall be free to form congregations to worship according to their beliefs, provided that nothing “contrary to good morals or public order shall be taught or done.”  The constitution stipulates no person may be deprived of access to the full enjoyment of civil and political rights because of religious beliefs and that these beliefs shall not be used to evade compliance with any common civic duty.  It prohibits requiring individuals to make personal financial contributions to religious denominations to which they do not adhere.

The law prohibits hate speech, including religious hate speech, and specifies as penalties a fine (amount unspecified) or a maximum of two years’ imprisonment.  The law also prohibits the incitement of terrorism, murder, rape or violence in connection with religious movements or training and specifies penalties, including a fine or a maximum of three years’ imprisonment.

The ELC is the only religious group that receives funding through state grants and voluntary, tax-deductible contributions paid through payroll deduction by its members.  Voluntary payroll deduction contributions account for an estimated 79 percent of the ELC’s operating budget, and government grants contribute another 10 percent; the remaining 11 percent comes from a variety of activities, such as revenue from use of Church property.  Members of other recognized religious communities may not contribute via payroll deduction but may donate to their own community voluntarily and receive a tax deduction.  The ELC and other state-recognized religious communities have the authority to carry out registration of civil unions and name changes.  The ELC also registers births and deaths of its members.

The Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs is responsible for granting official status to religious groups other than the ELC through recognition by royal decree (for groups recognized prior to 1970) or through official registration.  Congregations are not required to register by law, although registration is required to receive tax benefits.  Religious communities must comply with annual reporting requirements to maintain their government recognition.  According to the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, there are 448 religious groups and congregations the government officially recognizes or that are affiliated with recognized groups:  338 Christian, 65 Muslim, 16 Buddhist, seven Hindu, three Jewish, and 19 other groups and congregations, including Baha’is, the Alevi community, and followers of the indigenous Norse belief system Forn Sidr.

Recognized religious groups may perform legal marriage ceremonies, name and baptize children with legal effect, issue legal death certificates, obtain residence permits for foreign clergy, establish cemeteries, and receive various value added tax exemptions.  The law allows only religious communities recognized before 1970 to issue birth, baptismal, and marriage certificates.  In accordance with the 2018 law recognizing religions outside the ELC, this privilege will expire for all religious communities except the ELC in 2023.  Members of other religious communities or individuals unaffiliated with a recognized religious group may have birth and death certificates issued by the health authority.

The state entitles groups not recognized by either royal decree or the registration process, such as the Church of Scientology, to engage in religious practices without public registration.  The state does not grant unrecognized religious groups full tax-exempt status, but members may deduct contributions to these groups from their taxes.

The law codifies the registration process for religious communities other than the ELC and treats equally those recognized by royal decree and those approved through registration.  A religious community must have at least 50 adult members who have resident status and possess Danish citizenship.  For congregations located in sparsely populated regions such as Greenland, the government applies a lower population threshold, which varies according to the total population of the region.

Religious groups seeking registration must submit a document describing the group’s central traditions and most important rituals to the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs.  A group applying for registration must also provide a copy of its rules, regulations, and organizational structure; an audited financial statement (which it must submit annually); information about the group’s leadership; and a statement on the number of adult members permanently residing in the country.  Groups also must have formal procedures for membership and make their teachings available to all members.  The ministry makes the final decision on registration applications after receiving recommendations from a group consisting of a lawyer, religious historian, sociologist of religion, and nonordained theologian.  Religious groups that do not submit the annual financial statement or other required information may lose their registration status.

The law prohibits masks and face coverings, including burqas and niqabs, in public spaces.  Violators face fines ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 Danish kroner ($150-$1,500).  Fines are 1,000 kroner ($150) for the first offense, 2,000 kroner ($310) for the second, 5,000 kroner ($760) for the third, and 10,000 kroner ($1,500) for the fourth and subsequent offenses.

The law bans judges from wearing religious symbols such as headscarves, turbans, skullcaps, and large crucifixes while in court proceedings.

The law requires persons to shake hands during their naturalization ceremonies to obtain Danish citizenship, although authorities suspended the requirement during the COVID-19 pandemic.  In December, the government passed a bill reintroducing the handshake requirement for citizenship ceremonies starting January 1, 2022.

All public and private schools, including religious schools, receive government financial support.  The Ministry of Children and Education oversees private schools, which includes supervising teaching standards, regulating compliance with the country’s regulations on curriculum, and financial screening.  The Board of Education and Quality conducts systematic monitoring and has authority to issue directives to individual institutions, withhold grants, and terminate financial support.  Public schools must teach ELC theology.  The instructors are public school teachers rather than individuals provided by the ELC.  Religion classes are compulsory in grades 1-9, although students may be exempted if a parent presents a request in writing.  No alternative classes are offered.

The ELC course curriculum in grades 1-6 focuses on life philosophies and ethics, biblical stories, and the history of Christianity.  In grades 7-9, the curriculum adds a module on world religions.  The course is optional in grade 10.  If the student is 15 or older, the student and parent must jointly request the student’s exemption.  Private schools must teach religion classes in grades 1-9, including world religions in grades 7-9.  The religion classes taught in grades 1-9 need not include ELC theology.  The law allows collective prayer in schools but each school must regulate prayer in a neutral, nondiscriminatory manner, and students must be allowed to opt out of participating.

The law requires parents in communities with significant non-Western populations to send children from one year of age to government-funded daycare, where they learn what are considered to be Danish values, including Christmas and Easter traditions.  The penalty for noncompliance is the loss of quarterly welfare benefits of up to 4,557 kroner ($700).

Military service, typically for four months, is mandatory for all physically fit men older than 18 years of age.  There is an exemption for conscientious objectors, including on religious grounds, which allows for alternative civilian service.  An individual wishing to perform alternative service as a conscientious objector must apply within eight weeks of receiving notice of military service.  The application is adjudicated by the Conscientious Objector Administration and must demonstrate that military service of any kind is incompatible with the individual’s conscience.  Alternative service may take place in various social and cultural institutions, peace movements, organizations related to the United Nations, churches and ecumenical organizations, and environmental organizations.

The law prohibits ritual slaughter of animals, including kosher and halal slaughter, without prior stunning and limits ritual slaughter with prior stunning to cattle, sheep, goats, and chickens.  All slaughter must take place at a slaughterhouse.  Slaughterhouses practicing ritual slaughter are obliged to register with the Veterinary and Food Administration.  Violations of this law are punishable by a fine or up to four months in prison.  Halal and kosher meat may be imported.

The law requires clergy members with legal authorization to officiate marriages to have an adequate mastery of the Danish language and to complete a two-day course on family law and civil rights administered by the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs.  The law also requires that religious workers “must not behave or act in a way that makes them unworthy to exercise public authority.”  The government may strip the right to perform marriages from religious workers whom it perceives as not complying with these provisions.

By law, the Ministry of Immigration and Integration may prevent entry by foreign religious figures who do not already have a residence permit if it determines their presence poses a threat to public order.  In such cases, the ministry places the individuals on a national sanctions list and bars them from entry for two years, a period which it may extend.  The sanctions list does not apply to European Union nationals and residents.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In January, prior to parliamentary debate on 2020 draft legislation to mandate the translation of sermons into Danish, the Danish Council of Churches sent an open letter to Prime Minister Frederiksen opposing the legislation.  The letter noted, “We welcome the broader political intention of integrating ethnic minorities in an open and pluralistic Danish society – but we see dangers in a law leading to religious harassment.”  The letter stated that the draft legislation was “discriminatory and ill-considered” and would impose “significant burdens” on economically weak minority religious groups.  Similarly, in February the Islamic Faith Society published a press release with concerns over the proposed bill’s potential to increase the alienation of Danish Muslims, referring to it as “an encroachment on religious freedom” and “a clear obstacle to the Danish Muslims’ practice of their religion.”  In July, the government postponed indefinitely plans to introduce the legislation, which had been sponsored by the ruling Social Democratic Party but opposed by ELC, Muslim, Jewish, and Catholic religious leaders.

Representatives of the Muslim and Jewish communities continued to express frustration at the country’s limitations on slaughter of livestock meeting their religious requirements but reported that halal and kosher meat could be imported from within the European Union.

In March, parliament approved a new law that bans foreign countries from funding and financing mosques in the country.  The new law garnered support from all major political parties.  Social Democrat Immigration and Integration Minister Mattias Tesfaye labeled the law an important step to curb what he termed “Islamist extremism.”  The law states, “Anyone who receives one or more donations that individually or together exceed 10,000 kroner ($1,500) within 12 consecutive calendar months from a natural or legal person who is included on the public ban list is punishable by a fine.”

In March, the parliamentary Legal Committee held a hearing focusing on hate crimes committed against Muslim women in the country at the request of Free Greens parliamentarian Sikandar Siddique.  During the hearing, Siddique criticized the government for not doing enough to publicly denounce incidents, such as a confrontation between an elderly couple and a Muslim woman in a suburb of Copenhagen in February.  In that incident, a Muslim woman reported that an elderly woman repeatedly slammed her car door into her car and when the young woman confronted the woman and her husband, they called her a racial slur and spat on her.  Police charged the elderly couple with assault and the husband with threatening violence, as well as vandalism.  In May, the court sentenced the husband to 50 days’ probation, subsequently lowered to 60 days of community service because this was his first offense.  The court acquitted his wife.

Siddique contrasted what he termed the government’s weak reaction to attacks against Muslims to what he said was its stronger response to hate crimes against the Jewish community.  He called for an action plan to combat what he labeled Islamophobia.  In response to Siddique’s comments, Minister of Justice Nick Haekkerup cited improved prosecution efforts for hate crimes and strengthened police training on identifying and handling hate crimes.  In October, Siddique and his parents were targets of hate speech outside of parliament when a man accosted them and shouted at them, “Go home,” and “Your Arabic culture has no place in Denmark, you’re not welcome here.”

In March, parliament amended the law for religion instructors seeking to extend their residency permits, raising the required passing grade for the test in competency in the Danish language and knowledge of Denmark and Danish society to qualify for an extension.

In April, Jakob Naesager, chairman of the Copenhagen municipality resident committee and member of the Conservative People’s Party, stated that municipal legislation should be changed to ban the Islamic call to prayer in that city in the absence of national level legislation to do so.  Legislators took no action on it during the year.

On May 18, parliament failed to pass legislation proposed in 2020 to ban and criminalize ritual circumcision for boys under the age of 18.  The vote followed extensive political and public debate, including opposition from Prime Minister Frederiksen, leader of the largest opposition party Jakob Ellemann-Jensen, and Jewish community leaders.  The Institute for Human Rights (IHR) stated that the proposed ban would have been “a significant encroachment on religious freedom.”  The Society of Anesthesiology and Intensive Care Medicine supported the legislation, which was proposed for the third year in a row in 2020.  Despite the government’s opposition, approximately 74 percent of the public supported the ban according to an April opinion poll conducted by the Danish research firm Epinion.  In a similar poll conducted by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Jewish Community in September, only 38 percent of respondents supported the ban, due to a different phrasing of the question.  Representatives from the Jewish and Muslim communities expressed concern that parliament could take up the bill again after the next parliamentary election, which will take place no later than June 2023.

In May, the Danish People’s Party (DPP) proposed requiring that cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad and discussion of the 2005 controversy surrounding publication of those caricatures be included in school curricula.  In a media interview, DPP parliamentary faction leader Peter Skaarup said the cartoon controversy is “part of Danish history” and reflected the country’s “firm stance” in favor of free speech.  Skaarup said the requirement would be “a protection for teachers who are under threat today because they want to show what the Muhammad cartoons are about, but they cannot be allowed to do so because someone is coming and threatening them.”  At the Socialist People’s Party’s annual meeting in September, Party Chair Pia Olsen Dyhr said there was a need for teachers to be able to use such “tools” in a classroom setting without fearing consequences.  The Chair of the Union of Teachers said the DPP proposal, which was not presented as draft legislation, would still leave the choice of whether to include the cartoons to the teachers.  Representatives from the Muslim community expressed concerns that if the proposal became enacted legislation, it would further fuel anti-Muslim sentiment.

In June, the government reached an agreement with five major political parties to modify the 2018 policy to reduce the number of what are termed “parallel societies” by 2030.  The agreement passed as legislation in November and replaced the term “ghetto” with the term “parallel society,” which the government defined as a neighborhood with more than 1,000 residents where at least two criteria based on employment, income, education, and crime rates were met and where the proportion of non-Western immigrants and their descendants exceeded 50 percent.  The agreement also introduced a new category called “prevention areas,” defined as meeting two of four socioeconomic criteria and where the proportion of non-Western immigrants and their descendants exceeded 30 percent.  The stated goal of the agreement was to prevent the emergence of new parallel societies by reducing the percentage of non-Western residents in such neighborhoods to less than 30 percent within 10 years, according to the Ministry of the Interior and Housing website.  In May, parliament had rejected a civil society petition that received 55,000 signatures calling for the pre-November “ghetto” law to be repealed altogether.

Media continued to widely interpret “non-Western” to mean Muslim-majority communities.  In March, Minister of Housing and the Interior Kaare Dybvad Bek said the government’s goal was to “prevent more vulnerable residential areas” by “creating more mixed residential areas” throughout the country.  He also said, “The term ghetto is misleading….This is about helping the residents and creating equal opportunities for all children, no matter where they grow up in Denmark.”  The November legislation required neighborhoods classified as parallel societies for four years in a row to reduce the amount of public housing in their area by 40 percent through demolition, sale, or privatization.  The government would be responsible for rehousing evicted individuals.  The legislation aimed to integrate Danish residents from these neighborhoods into other neighborhoods to reduce “the risk of an emergence of religious and cultural parallel societies,” according to Bek.  The legislation also mandated that parents living in those areas send their children to daycare to learn Danish values, and doubled penalties and sentences for crimes committed in the neighborhoods, such as vandalism, burglary, arson, drug offenses, and possession of weapons.

One activist from a neighborhood affected by the legislation said, “The ghetto lists and ghetto legislation are an expression of the politicians’ desire to change the composition of the population [in those areas].”  Some NGOs said that the government’s language regarding societal integration stemmed from anti-Muslim sentiment and therefore focused on predominately Muslim immigrant communities.  DIHR advocated for the removal of ethnic origin from the legislation’s criteria to avoid discrimination, and it said the term “parallel society” could be as stigmatizing as the term “ghetto.”  Several NGOs demonstrated against the new legislation on December 1 when the Interior Minister announced additions to the list of areas to be covered by the legislation.

In a report released in September and drawn from data collected in 2019, the Pew Research Center categorized the country as having “moderate government restrictions on religion,” the second level in the report’s four-tiered system (low, moderate, high, and very high government restrictions).

In November, the Immigration Service updated its national sanctions list of religious preachers barred from entering the country to include 21 individuals; five were U.S. citizens.  The Ministry of Immigration and Integration stated the individuals were barred from entering the country for “the “sake of the nation’s public order” but provided no additional details.

In consultation with Jewish Community, the government continued to provide security for sites considered to be at high risk of a terrorist attack, including Copenhagen’s synagogue, community center, and one school.

In a December letter to parliament, DIHR reiterated the need for religious communities to be able to apply for COVID-19 exemptions to permit services, weddings, and funerals to protect their religious freedom in future revisions of the Epidemic Act, which governed the country’s COVID-19 protocols.  Most leaders of faith groups, however, reported that the pandemic did not have a major impact on their religious services, as they were able to adapt by implementing safety protocols such as social distancing.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Police reported 194 religiously motivated crimes in 2020, the most recent year for which statistics were available, 8 percent more than in 2019, in which 180 such crimes were reported.  There were 87 crimes reported against Muslims, compared with 109 in 2019; 79 against Jews, compared with 51 in 2019; 25 against Christians, compared with eight cases in 2019; and three against members of other religions or belief groups, compared with 12 in 2019.  Most incidents involved harassment, hate speech, and vandalism, including desecration of cemeteries, and mainly affected the Muslim and Jewish communities.  The report cited hate speech as the most common type of religiously motivated hate crime.  In 2020, 45 percent of religiously motivated hate crime cases reported were directed at Muslims.  The number of hate crime cases committed against Jews increased significantly since 2018, when there were 26 cases reported.  The police report attributed the 2020 increase in hate crimes against Christians to the 12 cases of parish priests who received threatening text messages in April and May that year.

Police Inspector Claus Birkelyng said it was unclear whether the increase in reports in 2020 reflected an increase in actual crimes or a higher number of reported crimes than in previous years.  He also said there had been an increase in hate crimes committed online compared with previous years, from 128 in 2019 to 164 in 2020.  Of the 164 reported online hate crimes, 99 were identified as religiously motivated, of which 32 were directed at Muslims and 51 at Jews.

In January, witnesses discovered the words “[expletive] the Quran,” accompanied by a drawing of a hand with the middle finger up, painted on the side of the mosque belonging to the Danish-Turkish Islamic Foundation in Aabenraa, in the southern part of the country.  This was the third time vandals damaged the mosque since 2019.  By year’s end, officials had not arrested anyone for the incident.

In April, vandals placed two dolls in nooses near a grave in the Jewish cemetery in Aalborg and poured red paint over the dolls and the wall surrounding the cemetery. The vandals also left antisemitic flyers referring to a website for the right-wing radical organization Nordic Resistance Movement near the dolls.  Police charged a man with vandalism and racism for the crime and in June, and a court sentenced him to one year in prison.  He appealed the verdict and officials released him in November, with the court expected to rule on his appeal in January 2022.

On April 6, a court sentenced a man to nine months in prison for racism, violation of the peace of a graveyard, and gross vandalism against a grave in a Jewish cemetery in Randers in 2019.

In May, a video of a Danish man verbally abusing a Muslim couple and their two small children went viral, prompting several politicians, including Prime Minister Frederiksen, to condemn the act.  Frederiksen said, “We all have a responsibility to speak out – against racism, hate, and discrimination.  It doesn’t belong in Denmark.”

In July, the newspaper Kristeligt Dagblad released the findings of a survey the paper had conducted among 81 Muslim associations in the country.  The survey found that 30 percent of the associations contacted had been vandalized since January 2017.  The incidents ranged from graffiti and stickers promoting hatred on walls to door handles wrapped in bacon.  The survey reported that in two-thirds of the cases, the mosque or organization involved did not report the incident to the police.  In a media report about the survey, Ismail Celik, chairman of the mosque in Odense and spokesman for the Danish-Turkish Islamic Foundation said, “People are worried about the hatred of Muslims.  We want to be part of society and we want to be respected in the community.”  Similarly, a study released by the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs in February showed that 19 percent of all churches had experienced vandalism since 2017.

In its report released in September, the Pew Research Center categorized the country as having “moderate societal hostility to religion.”

In September, a Danish-Somalian family appeared on television after being harassed by their downstairs neighbor in Copenhagen.  The family showed videos, including a clip in which the neighbor yelled “You know what you are? You are dirty Muslim animals.”  Authorities did not file charges in this case.

Also in September, unknown persons physically and verbally assaulted a Muslim woman at a public library in Copenhagen, where an individual called her a “Muslim [expletive]” and told her to “take that [expletive] off,” referring to her hijab.  Authorities charged the perpetrator with assault.  No further information emerged on the case.

The U.S. Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues met with the Special Representative for Freedom of Religion or Belief to encourage the country to include the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s examples in applying the alliance’s definition.  Embassy officials met with parliamentarians and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office of the Special Representative for Freedom of Religion or Belief to emphasize the importance the United States places on religious freedom, and to discuss ways to combat anti-Muslim sentiment and antisemitism.  Embassy officials expressed concerns about legislation proposing to ban circumcision and requiring translation of sermons into Danish, and urged support for the protection of religious expression.

Embassy officials engaged with religious leaders from the Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities throughout the year to discuss issues including the proposed circumcision ban, the ban on ritual slaughter, the proposed bill requiring the translation of sermons into Danish, and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on their faith practices.  Embassy officials met with representatives from the Danish Islamic Center, Muslim World League, and Danish Muslim Aid to discuss interfaith engagement opportunities and challenges for Muslims in the country, including anti-Muslim sentiment.

The embassy funded a project designed by the Jewish Community to survey attitudes and knowledge about male circumcision and to create a website to counter misinformation related to this topic.  Representatives of the organization discussed their concerns about negative societal attitudes, which they attributed to increasing antisemitism in the country and fueled by extremists such as the Nordic Resistance Movement.  Embassy officials also supported the development of a national action plan to combat antisemitism.

Embassy officials also met with Christian groups, including representatives from the ELC and Roman Catholic Church, and discussed the proposed requirement for sermon translation, as well as broader issues of religious freedom and practice.  The embassy engaged with interfaith organizations, including the NGOs Religion and Society, the Islamic Christian Study Center, and DIHR, to discuss efforts to increase interfaith dialogue and understanding.

On May 6, the Charge d’Affaires hosted an iftar with leaders of the Muslim community and discussed issues pertaining to religious freedom and the groups’ concerns, including the ban on ritual slaughter, the proposed circumcision ban, and the proposed bill requiring the translation of sermons into Danish.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 938,000 (midyear 2021), of which 94 percent is Sunni Muslim.  According to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Shia Muslims, Roman Catholics, Protestants, Ethiopian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hindus, Jews, Baha’is, and atheists constitute the remaining 6 percent.  Non-Muslim populations are generally concentrated in Djibouti City and include foreign-born citizens and expatriates.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates the registered refugee population at 34,000, of whom 42 percent are from Somalia, 37 percent from Ethiopia, 18 percent from Yemen, and 3 percent from Eritrea.  Refugees are both Muslim and non-Muslim, but no data exists on their religious breakdown.

Legal Framework

Islam is the religion of the state, according to the constitution.  The constitution mandates the government respect all faiths and guarantees equality before the law, regardless of one’s religion.  The law does not impose sanctions on those who do not observe Islamic teachings or who practice other religious beliefs.  The constitution prohibits religiously based political parties.

The Ministry of Islamic and Cultural Affairs, renamed in May as the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Waqfs, has authority over all Islamic matters and institutions, including mosques, religious events, and private Islamic schools.  Imams are civil service employees of the ministry; the government owns mosque properties and other assets.  The ministry’s High Islamic Council vets all Friday prayer service sermons.

The President swears an Islamic religious oath.

The government requires all foreign and domestic religious groups to register by submitting an application to the Ministry of Interior, which conducts a lengthy background investigation of the group.  The investigation reviews group leadership, religious affiliation, sources of finance, and the group’s objectives within the country.  Ties to religious groups considered extremist, strong political agendas, and relations with unfriendly foreign nations are factors that could cause a group’s application to be rejected.  Domestic and foreign Muslim religious groups must also inform the High Islamic Council at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Waqfs of their existence and intent to operate.  Muslim and non-Muslim foreign religious groups must also gain approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to operate in the country.  Once approved, every foreign religious group signs a one-year agreement detailing the scope of its activities, and its workers must obtain work permits and purchase annual residency cards.  Foreign religious groups must submit quarterly reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and renew their agreements every year.  The quarterly report details activities, origin of funding for activities, and scope of work completed, and it identifies beneficiaries.  Religious groups may not operate in the interim while awaiting registration.

Muslims may bring personal status matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance either to family courts, whose code includes elements of civil and Islamic law, or to civil courts.  Civil courts address the same matters for non-Muslims.  Citizens are officially considered Muslims if they do not specifically identify with another religious group.  Cases in family courts, referred to as sharia courts, have two stages.  The complainant first brings the grievance to the neighborhood council (qadi), which either issues a judgment or transmits the case to the family court.  If the complainant is not satisfied with the decision of the qadi or the family court, he or she may appeal to the court of first instance of the family court or the supreme Sharia Council.

The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Waqfs and the Ministry of Education jointly oversee the curricula and teacher certification of approximately 40 Islamic schools, except for two religious schools run by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the country, which follow the Saudi curriculum.  Other international schools are permitted to offer their own curriculum.  The public school system is secular and offers no courses on specific religions; religion in general is taught, along with other subjects.  Private schools run by religious organizations must offer a civic and moral education course based on Islamic principles to all students, including non-Muslims.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Waqfs continued to oversee all Islamic matters during the year.  The government continued to provide imams with their Friday sermons, and the imams were not permitted to stray from the script.  A ministry representative stated that government control and oversight of mosques was necessary to preclude political activity from mosques and counter foreign “extremist” influence.

The government continued to permit registered non-Islamic groups, comprising Catholic, Protestant, Greek Orthodox, and Ethiopian Orthodox churches, to operate freely, according to Christian leaders.  Muslim citizens were permitted to enter Christian churches, although societal pressure continued to discourage conversion.  There were no limitations on the importation of religious literature for registered non-Islamic groups.  No other Christian or non-Christian groups were legally recognized by the government during the year, although the Church of Scientology maintained its registration as a commercial entity.  The government subsidized the cost of utilities at some church properties of registered non-Islamic groups, since it considered some church properties to be part of the national patrimony.  Religious groups not registered with the government, including the Ethiopian Protestant and non-Sunni Muslim congregations, continued to operate without government sanction.  Observers stated these groups and other religious minorities hosted worship gatherings in private homes due to small numbers and usually at night, in part because of reduced police presence at that time.

In October, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Waqfs published the first-ever translation of the Quran into the regional Afar language, a project that brought together Afar-speaking religious leaders from Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea and was funded by Saudi Arabia.

The government continued to allow non-Islamic religious groups to host events and proselytize on the groups’ private property.  The government continued to permit a limited number of Christian missionaries to sell religious books and pamphlets at a bookstore in Djibouti City.

The government continued to issue visas to foreign Islamic and non-Islamic clergy and missionaries but required them to belong to registered religious groups before they could work in the country or operate nongovernmental organizations.  The number of foreign religious workers was relatively small during the year, estimated at 20-30.  The government continued to require foreign religious leaders to regularize their status by purchasing an annual residency card for 24,000 Djiboutian francs ($140).

Observers continued to say it would be practically impossible for a non-Muslim to achieve a high position in government service.

Local public schools continued to observe only Islamic holidays, but, under the direction of the Ministry of Education, schools in refugee camps continued to permit students of other religious groups to miss class for their respective religious holidays.  The ministry continued work on revising the national curriculum, including reforming civic and moral education courses to promote religious inclusivity.

The government continued to implement a civic and moral education course, based on Islamic principles, in public schools across the country.  According to a Christian religious leader, private schools run by non-Muslim religious groups were required to teach the Islam-focused course.

Societal norms and customs discouraged conversion from Islam, but conversions reportedly occurred, particularly for marriages with non-Muslim partners.  An Islamic leader stated that Muslim women were less likely to marry outside the Islamic faith due to societal pressures.  Both Muslim and Christian leaders stated conversion from Islam was detrimental to a person’s social status; Muslim religious leaders said traditional social networks often ostracized converts from Islam.

One imam noted the possibility that unregistered religious groups could spread a message of extremism or religious intolerance as had happened in the mid-2000s, although he said the Muslim community had actively worked since then to ensure such messages did not become widespread.

A Christian leader noted that although societal religious tolerance is high in the country, with members of different religious groups living side by side without friction, religious leaders rarely came together to discuss issues and potential common responses to social concerns, such as poverty or food insecurity.

Embassy officials met with officials from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Waqfs to discuss continued equitable treatment of religious groups, especially in refugee camps.  Embassy officials also met with religious representatives to discuss their perceptions of government attitudes towards religious practice and to note any changes.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 74,600 (midyear 2021).  According to the U.S. government, Catholics represent 61.4 percent of the population, Protestants 28.6 percent, Rastafarians 1.3 percent, Jehovah’s Witnesses 1.2 percent, and those listing “other” 0.3 percent; 6.1 percent report no religious affiliation, and 1.1 percent are unspecified.  According to the most recent census in 2011, approximately 53 percent of the population is Catholic.  Evangelical Protestants constitute approximately 20 percent of the population.  The largest evangelical Protestant groups are Pentecostals with 6 percent, Baptists with 5 percent, and the Christian Union Mission, with 4 percent.  Seventh-day Adventists constitute 7 percent of the population.  Other smaller religious groups include Anglicans, Methodists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, Rastafarians, and Baha’is.  According to the census, 9 percent of the population professes no religious affiliation.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, including freedom of thought, freedom to practice one’s religion, and freedom from taking oaths contrary to one’s beliefs.  By law, the government may make exceptions to constitutionally required provisions in the interests of public order and morality if the exceptions are for activities “shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.”

The constitution prohibits a minister of a religion from being qualified to run in an election.

Religious groups seeking nonprofit status must register with the Attorney General’s Office.  They must submit a letter signed by five executives of the religious group and provide the official name of the group and an address identifying the place of worship.  The registration fee is 25 Eastern Caribbean dollars ($9).  The Attorney General’s Registry Office reviews and approves applications.  Any organization denied permission to register has the right to apply for judicial review.  By law, religious groups also must register buildings used to publish marriage banns (announcements of marriage) or used as places of worship.

The constitution grants religious groups the right to establish and maintain private schools and to provide religious instruction.  Students of different religions may attend private schools run by religious groups of another affiliation.  Public schools may hold nondenominational prayers, and attendance is optional.  The law requires the vaccination (non-COVID-19) of all children to attend both public and private schools.  The government does not offer a waiver for children without vaccinations.  Parents may homeschool their children.

Dreadlocks are prohibited in all government-funded schools as well as in prisons; however, the law is not enforced.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In addition to establishing a series of COVID-19 prevention measures, the government also encouraged religious leaders to conduct services by electronic or virtual means.  In August, Catholic Bishop of Roseau Gabriel Malzaire broadcast his support for the government’s efforts to combat COVID-19 and urged his followers to get vaccinated as “an act of love.”  During the year, religious leaders met with the government’s COVID-19 task force to address vaccine hesitancy.

The DAEC continued to advocate for the repeal of a law prohibiting licensed clergy from running for public office.

Rastafarians continued to press the government for complete legalization of marijuana use.  In October 2020, parliament decriminalized the possession of up to 28 grams of marijuana to individuals 18 years and above for personal religious use.  Representatives of the Rastafarian community said authorities did not enforce the law against using marijuana when the community used it in its religious rites.

The government continued to subsidize teacher salaries at all private schools run by religious organizations, including those affiliated with the Catholic, Methodist, and Seventh-day Adventist Churches.

At public schools, teachers, principals, and students continued to lead nondenominational prayers during morning assemblies, but students were not required to participate.

In June, the DAEC reported it continued to stand firmly against homosexuality and continued to support the government’s ban on same-sex marriage.  In 2020, the Dominica Christian Council, with the participation of Anglican, Methodist, and Catholic Churches, applied for, and received, the High Court’s permission to intervene in opposition to a 2019 constitutional challenge seeking to overturn the country’s anti-sodomy law.  The case remained pending at year’s end.

Religious groups produced live and recorded televised religious services throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, broadcasting on radio, television, and social media.  Places of worship also provided drive-in services throughout the year.  The DAEC and other religious groups continued to operate counseling hotlines for persons experiencing fear, worry, or emotional stress because of COVID-19.

During the year, the Catholic church-associated Caritas Dominica Youth Emergency Action Committee’s (YEAC) trained individuals regardless of their religious background as first responders in cases of natural or manmade disasters.  YEAC used the opportunity to demonstrate and promote religious tolerance.  Interdenominational organizations continued their efforts to advance respect for religious freedom and diversity.  Interdenominational dialogue between the DAEC and the Christian Council occurred on a regular basis throughout the year.

Embassy officials met twice during the year with the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Governance, Public Service Reform, Citizen Empowerment, Social Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs and discussed the important role of religious groups in encouraging COVID-19 vaccinations and in promoting health care and education.

In January, the embassy promoted religious tolerance through supporting YEAC’s efforts to train first responders.  In June, an embassy official met with the president of the Evangelical Association to discuss religious freedom in the country, the DAEC’s position on homosexual unions, and its current position on constitutional provisions prohibiting a minister of religion from running in an election.  In June and September, embassy officials met with Bishop Malzaire to discuss the same topics, as well as the role of the Catholic Church in helping youth.

Embassy officials and staff maintained social media engagement on religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 10.6 million (midyear 2021).  According to a 2019 Latinobarometer survey, the population is 49 percent Catholic, compared with 55 percent in a 2016 Latinobarometer survey and 68 percent in 2008.  The 2019 survey indicates 26 percent of the population is evangelical Protestant, compared with 12 percent in 2008.  The 2018 Latinobarometer survey found 29.4 percent of the population has no declared religion or identify as atheist or agnostic, compared with 29.1 percent in 2017 and 13 percent in 2015.  Other faiths include Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ), and nonevangelical Protestants.  According to a November 2020 estimate by the Dominican Council of Evangelical Unity, evangelical Protestants make up approximately 30 percent of the population, with the number of Pentecostals growing the fastest.

According to representatives of the Muslim community, there are approximately 3,000-4,000 Muslims throughout the country, a number that is increasing annually, according to news reports.  Jewish leaders state that most of the approximately 350 members of the Jewish community live in Santo Domingo, with a small community in Sosua.  There are also small numbers of Buddhists, Hindus, and Baha’is.

Most Haitian immigrants are Christians, including evangelical Protestants, Catholics, and Seventh-day Adventists.  According to the Dominican National Statistics Office, in 2017, the most recent survey year, there were 498,000 Haitian immigrants in the country.  An unknown number practice Voodou or other Afro-Caribbean beliefs such as Santeria.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of “conscience and worship, subject to public order and respect for social norms.”  A 1954 concordat with the Holy See designates Catholicism as the official state religion and extends special privileges to the Catholic Church not granted to other religious groups.  These include the special protection of the state in the exercise of Catholic ministry, exemption of Catholic clergy from military service, permission to provide Catholic instruction in public orphanages, public funding to underwrite some Catholic Church expenses, and exemption from customs duties.  Nationally recognized holidays also include days that are only observed by Catholics.

To request exemption from customs duties, non-Catholic religious groups must first register as NGOs with the Attorney General’s Office and the Ministry of Finance.  Registration with the Attorney General’s Office is a two-step process.  The organization must provide documentation of a fixed address and the names of seven elected officers, have a minimum of 25 members, and pay a nominal fee.  The organization must also draft and submit statutes and provide copies of government-issued identification documents for the board of directors.  After registering, religious groups request customs duty exemption status from the Ministry of Finance, which is not always granted.

The law stipulates the government recognizes only marriages performed by religious groups registered with the Central Electoral Board.  The law requires churches to have legal status and be present in the country for at least five years, provide a membership list, and train clergy on how to perform marriages.  Churches are responsible for determining the legal qualification of couples as the law prohibits same sex marriages as well as marriages for persons younger than 18, and churches must record all marriages in the civil registry within three working days of the marriage.  According to the law, failure to comply with these regulations may result in a misdemeanor charge, including 100 pesos ($2) for each day beyond the recording deadline, suspension of a marriage license, or up to five years in prison.

The concordat grants the Catholic Church full access to prisons, and only the Catholic Church is legally guaranteed access to prisoners.  Prisoners of all faiths have the right to practice their religion under a new law on the regulation of penitentiary and correctional systems that went into effect on April 23.  The new law establishes freedom of religion for all persons deprived of their liberty, while also allowing the Catholic Church to have a representative in every prison.

The concordat and a subsequent biblical studies law ratified in 2000 require that religious studies based in either Catholic or evangelical Protestant teachings be taught in all elementary and secondary public schools.  Parents, however, may excuse their children from this course.  Private schools are exempt from the biblical studies requirement, although private schools run by religious groups may opt to teach religious studies.

The biblical studies law also mandates public schools read the Bible at the beginning of each day after the national anthem, although this is not enforced.

Foreign missionaries may obtain a one-year, multi-entry business visa through the Ministry of Foreign Relations after submitting proof of their affiliation with the relevant religious institution in the country.  Foreign missionaries may renew their visa before the original one-year visa has expired.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Non-Catholic religious groups continued to state that the government provided the Catholic Church significant financial support and other benefits unavailable to them, including transferring properties to the Catholic Church, providing monetary assistance for the Catholic Church to build new places of worship, and giving subsidies to support salaries of Church officials.  They expressed dissatisfaction with the government’s preference for the Catholic Church, lack of explicit legal protection for religious groups beyond what the constitution provides, and treatment under the law of non-Catholic churches as NGOs rather than as religious organizations.  Protestant leaders, however, said the current government led by President Abinader paid more attention to Protestants than previous administrations.  A Church of Jesus Christ representative said his Church maintained a constructive relationship with the Protestant Liaison to the Executive Power, which he said highlighted how non-Catholic outreach extended beyond the larger and more established Protestant groups, such as Episcopalians, Baptists, and Pentecostals.

On April 23, the government started implementing a law on the regulation of penitentiary and correctional systems that included provisions allowing prisoners of all faiths, not just Catholics, the right to practice their religion and seek counseling from officiants of their faith.  The Catholic Church continued to have a representative in every prison.

Deliberation continued on a draft law that, if passed, would allow other religious organizations to receive the same benefits as the Catholic Church, such as funding from the government and additional tax exemptions.  The draft law was introduced in 2019 but the required period during which the draft needed to pass expired in early 2020 without the Legislative Assembly passing it.  The law was reintroduced in June in the lower chamber and sent for review to the Permanent Commission on Culture, a legislative subcommittee.  The Legislative Assembly had until mid-January 2022 to pass the proposed law.  According to some Protestant leaders, approval of the proposed law would be a step in the right direction, but it would still be difficult to change the “hearts and minds” of both the government and the average citizen because Catholicism was so deeply rooted in the country’s culture and history.  They said it would take a “cultural shift” both within the public and the government to see any significant progress towards fully equal treatment.  Catholic Church representatives said they did not oppose the new law but that they would not advocate for it either, as they did not see it as “their issue.”

Some Protestant leaders said the government should open a department of religious affairs instead of working through liaisons from different Christian denominations, in order to be more responsive to all religious groups.  According to some civil society organizations, they feared some religious groups, mainly Catholics, exerted too much influence in politics and government, thereby limiting the ability of non-Catholic groups to advance their own priorities.

On June 30, the Chamber of Deputies approved a draft penal code that critics alleged would allow discrimination in employment, housing, and health services against LGBTQI+ persons and other marginalized communities based on “religious requirements.”  According to Amnesty International, the draft code also declined to decriminalize abortions in three circumstances.  The draft code was largely supported by Catholic and Protestant churches.  In November, the Senate approved the most recent iteration of the draft code, which included “sexual orientation” as a protected category and changed “religious requirements” to “without detriment to the liberty of conscience and worship.”  The draft code was then sent to the lower chamber for deliberation, where legislators rejected it on December 16.  Several legislators said they expect to reintroduce the bill during the next legislative session in February 2022.

In December 2020, the Ministry of Education presented the National Plan for the Promotion of Books and Reading for the new school cycle, which included the provision of Bibles in public schools.  Although supporters of the implementation of the plan said the use of the Bible in public schools was not mandatory, the minister announced the distribution of thousands of Bibles to public schools starting on September 20.  Many individuals opposed the distribution of the Bibles because they did not identify with any religion.

According to evangelical Protestant leaders, Catholicism, Catholic practices, and Catholic holidays formed a big part of the country’s culture, and Catholic traditions were deeply intertwined with many aspects of life, including government and politics, marriage, family gatherings, and education, among others.

Some non-Catholic religious leaders said non-Catholic religious groups should focus more on the value of cultural change to help the population understand and value religious freedom and the right to freely practice one’s religious beliefs.  Representatives of some non-Catholic religious groups also said they were concerned that both governmental and societal discrimination against non-Catholic groups would continue even if the law that would allow non-Catholic religious groups to receive the same benefits as the Catholic Church were passed, because of the entrenched position of Catholicism in the country.

The Interfaith Dialogue Table, comprising members of all major Protestant church councils, continued to work together and with other religious groups, including the Jewish community, to provide assistance to poor communities, regardless of the religious affiliations of members of those communities.

Embassy officials engaged the Abinader administration and other government officials throughout the year on issues of religious freedom, including equal treatment of Catholic and non-Catholic religious groups under the law and the ability of parents to decide for their children whether they should partake or not in religious activities in school.

In March, the Charge d’Affaires met with Archbishop Ghaleb Bader, the Apostolic Nuncio to the country, to discuss the Church’s relationship with the new administration and any perceived societal or governmental challenges for Catholics to freely exercise their religion.  In August, the Charge d’Affaires met with Father Jose Joaquin Dominguez, the Catholic liaison to the Executive Power, and in September, he met with the Protestant liaison, Pastor Dioris (Dio) Astacio.  These meetings provided an opportunity to strengthen relationships with the two main religious liaisons to the Executive Power.  The Charge d’Affaires discussed the ability to choose whether to associate with a religion or not, and the ability to freely exercise one’s religion.

The embassy continued to support Holocaust remembrance and education initiatives through grants to the Sosua Jewish Museum and to two U.S. institutions to support the museum’s efforts to preserve and digitalize museum archives that told the story of Jewish refugees who immigrated to the country after fleeing Nazi persecution.  In August, the Charge d’Affaires met with the board of the museum and representatives from the adjacent synagogue and toured the exhibitions.  The embassy publicized the visit on its social media pages.

Throughout the year, embassy officials met with leaders representing different religious groups, including representatives from the Interfaith Dialogue Table, the Dominican Christian Alliance, evangelical Protestant groups, and the Church of Jesus Christ, to discuss religious freedom and the challenges non-Catholic groups faced in the country.  Embassy officials also engaged non-Catholic leaders to discuss the draft law in Congress that would remove the requirement that non-Catholic religious entities register as NGOs and provide greater funding for these groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 17.1 million (midyear 2021).  According to a Latinobarometro 2018 public opinion survey, approximately 92 percent of respondents have a specific religious affiliation or belief:  74.8 percent identify as Catholic; 15.2 percent as evangelical Christian; and 1.2 percent as Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Approximately 1.4 percent identify as members of other religious groups, including Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ), Jews, and other evangelical and nonevangelical Protestants.  Other religious groups include Anglicans, Baha’is, Episcopalians, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), Greek Orthodox-affiliated Orthodox Church of Ecuador and Latin America, Hindus, followers of Inti (the traditional Inca sun god), and practitioners of Santeria (primarily resident Cubans).  Estimates of the number of followers of these groups are not available.  Of the remaining respondents, 0.8 percent identify as atheists, while 6.1 percent have no religion.

Some groups, particularly those in the Amazon region, combine indigenous beliefs with Catholicism or evangelical Protestantism.  Pentecostals draw much of their membership from indigenous persons in the highland provinces.  There are Jehovah’s Witnesses throughout the country, with the highest concentrations in coastal areas.  Buddhist, Church of Jesus Christ, Jewish, and Muslim populations are primarily concentrated in large urban areas, particularly Quito, Guayaquil, and Cuenca.

Legal Framework

The constitution grants all individuals the right to practice and profess publicly and freely the religion of their choice and prohibits discrimination based on religion.  It states the government has a responsibility to “protect voluntary religious practice, as well as the expression of those who do not profess any religion and will favor an atmosphere of plurality and tolerance.”  Individuals have the right to change their religion.  The constitution also states secular ethics are the basis for public service and the country’s legal system.  The constitution grants the right of self-determination to indigenous communities, including provisions granting freedom to “develop and strengthen their identity, feeling of belonging, ancestral traditions, and form of social organization.”

A 1937 concordat with the Holy See accords juridical status to the Catholic Church and grants it financial privileges and tax exemptions.  Other religious groups must register as legal entities with the government under a separate 1937 religion law and a 2000 decree on religion.  If a religious group wishes to provide social services, it must register under a 2017 executive decree regulating civil society.  The 2017 decree dictates how civil society organizations (CSOs) must register to obtain and maintain legal status.  A religious group does not need to register as a religious organization to register as a CSO and may conduct the processes separately.

According to a 2019 decree, the Human Rights Secretariat, a government body reporting to the President, oversees religious issues, including the registration process for religious groups and CSOs.  The Human Rights Secretariat maintains national databases of legally recognized religious organizations and legally recognized CSOs, including religious groups registered as CSOs.  Registration provides religious groups with legal and nonprofit status.  An officially registered religious group, whether as a religious organization or as a CSO, is eligible to receive government funding and exemptions from certain taxes, per the tax code.  All religious organizations must be not-for-profit and are not required to disclose their financial accounts to the government.

To register as a religious organization, a group must present a charter signed by all its founding members to the Human Rights Secretariat and provide information on its leadership and physical location.  Registrants may deliver their documentation to the Human Rights Secretariat directly, to one of the secretariat’s eight regional offices, or via email.  The registration process is free of charge.  The Directorate for Registration for Nationalities and Religious Organizations within the Human Rights Secretariat is charged with reviewing and approving the submitted documentation.

To register as a CSO, religious groups submit the same documentation required to register as a religious organization, in addition to approved statutes and a description of the mission statement and objectives of the organization.  A religious group registers as a CSO under the government agency overseeing the issues on which the group wishes to work.

The secretariat may dissolve a religious group if the group does not maintain legal status or does not adhere to the mission, goals, and objectives listed in its bylaws at the time of registration.  Dissolution may include liquidation of physical property and be voluntary – in which case, the religious group could decide to whom to transfer its property – or forced, in which case the Human Rights Secretariat would confiscate the group’s property.  By law, religious organizations are prohibited from participating in political parties or endorsing political candidates.  The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, a separate entity from the Human Rights Secretariat, protects and advocates for human rights, including rights pertaining to religious groups; however, its role in this regard is not clearly defined in the constitution.

The labor law states that in general, all work must be paid and does not distinguish religious workers from other types of workers.  A citizen participation law recognizes volunteerism and states social organizations may establish agreements with government authorities to employ unpaid labor.  The law, however, does not specifically reference religious volunteerism as a category to be utilized to establish such an agreement.

Foreign missionaries and religious volunteers must apply for a temporary residence visa and present a letter of invitation from the sponsoring organization, which may be foreign or domestic but must have legal status in the country, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The letter must include a commitment to cover the applicant’s living expenses and detail the applicant’s proposed activities.  Applicants also must provide a certified copy of the bylaws of the sponsoring organization and the name of its legal representative as approved by the government.

The law prohibits public schools from providing religious instruction.  Private schools may offer religious instruction but must comply with Ministry of Education standards.  There are no legal restrictions specifying which religious groups may establish schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Religious leaders said the Human Rights Secretariat’s registration process implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic remained efficient.  A Human Rights Secretariat official said the secretariat would fully implement an online registration system by year’s end after digitalizing all religious organizations’ documents to make the process more convenient for end-users.  According to a Human Rights Secretariat official, a total 5,131 religious groups were registered during the year, compared with 5,007 groups registered in 2020.  The secretariat official said there were approximately 195 pending registrations and that the registration processing time continued to average 30 days, similar to 2020.

Religious leaders continued to express concerns about the absence of a specific reference to religious volunteerism in the labor code, which they felt exposed religious organizations to potential negative legal consequences.  Religious leaders stated that the government expected religious organizations to define specific working hours for staff and pay them according to those hours, which, they said, presented a problem, since many staff viewed their religious vocation as a way of life requiring them to be always available to meet the needs of their congregation.

Jewish and Muslim leaders said customs regulations, import taxes, and onerous paperwork continued to hinder the ability to import kosher and halal foods, beverages, and plants used for religious ceremonies and holidays.  A Jewish leader said the law treated religious communities the same as companies because all imports, including those for religious purposes, were taxed and treated as commercial items.  Jehovah’s Witnesses leaders said they were exploring legal actions to address their concerns about local authorities’ violating religious organizations’ rights to receive certain tax privileges.  For example, they said, authorities in Quito denied their requests for property tax exemptions, and the municipal government in Duran in the Guayaquil area charged religious organizations permit fees intended for business entities.  A Jehovah’s Witnesses representative said he did not believe his organization was being singled out.

President Lasso invited leaders from Catholic and evangelical Protestant communities to attend his May 24 inauguration to convey what he said was his message of inclusion and reconciliation, stating that religious groups were called to be “witnesses of the reconciliation between the state and churches.”  According to evangelical Protestant leaders, it was the first time in the country’s history that non-Catholic leaders were formally invited to a presidential inauguration.

Religious leaders said they coordinated closely with national authorities to ensure COVID-19 health and safety protocols were followed in the staged reopening of in-person religious practices.  They also said they continued to work with authorities to deliver food kits and other humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities.

Religious leaders said President Lasso’s first state of exception declaration for the national prison system due to violent prison riots, in effect July 22 to September 20, temporarily restricted visitors’ access to inmates, including visits by religious groups.  President Lasso declared a second state of exception for the national prison system from September 29 to November 28 after 118 inmates were killed during violent clashes between rival gangs in Guayaquil on September 28.  Lasso declared a third state of exception for the national prison system from November 29 to December 28 after 68 inmates were killed in a prison riot involving rival gangs on November 12.  Catholic and evangelical Christian volunteers said they were not allowed to visit inmates during the states of exception in Guayaquil-area prisons, where security concerns were greatest.  According to press reports, religious leaders expressed a willingness to participate in a dialogue with President Lasso to find a solution to the prison crisis.  Religious leaders welcomed Lasso’s December 16 announcement to appoint two religious representatives to serve on a newly formed commission with a mandate to develop a strategy to prevent, control, and respond to prison violence.

Religious leaders said the National Assembly that took office on May 14 made no progress on a proposal to reform the 1937 religion law that CONALIR, which includes representatives from Anglican, Baha’i, Buddhist, Catholic, evangelical and nonevangelical Protestants, Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, and Seventh-day Adventist Church faith communities, discussed with the previous National Assembly in 2018.  CONALIR’s proposed reforms aim to create greater equality between the Catholic Church and other religious groups, to update the registration process for religious groups, and to recognize legally the nonprofit status of all religious groups and the practice of utilizing volunteers for certain activities.

On April 28, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling decriminalizing abortion in all cases of rape.  On April 26, the Episcopal Conference of Ecuador, representing Catholic bishops, issued a statement calling on the Constitutional Court to defend life and expressing concerns for decriminalizing abortion.  Then president-elect Lasso published a statement on April 28, saying his government would respect the court’s decision, despite his strong personal religious beliefs.  The statement also said he believed in the separation of powers and the separation between church and state.  In May, evangelical Christian organizations submitted an appeal of the ruling to the Constitutional Court.

On August 11, the Constitutional Court set a precedent involving the rights of religious organizations by ruling in favor of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in a case involving a conflict with indigenous residents in the town of San Juan de Iluman in Imbabura Province.  The ruling concluded the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious freedom and right to equal treatment and nondiscrimination had been violated.  The Constitutional Court also ruled local courts had violated the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ right to due process by repeatedly dismissing their protective action requests and ordered intercultural training sessions for local government officials and judges involved in the case.  Jehovah’s Witnesses said the ruling was the first Constitutional Court case involving discrimination due to religious belief.  The case stems from a 2014 Jehovah’s Witness appeal after a group of protesters broke into and damaged a Kingdom Hall under construction.  According to religious leaders, local government authorities then coerced the Jehovah’s Witnesses leadership to sign a statement requiring the suspension of construction and preventing the group from gathering in town.

In December, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of a Seventh-day Adventist student who filed a lawsuit against the University of Guayaquil to accommodate the student’s request to reschedule an exam to allow the student to observe the Seventh-day Adventist Sabbath.  A provincial court ordered the school to accommodate the student’s request in 2019, but the university appealed the decision.  The Constitutional Court upheld the provincial court’s decision.

Several religious leaders continued to express concern regarding what they considered a rise in secularism and societal discouragement of their participation in important legal and cultural discussions.  According to a Jewish leader, moral and ethical education tended to be relegated to religious leaders, whereas, he said, moral and ethical education should be the responsibility of all members of society.

In May, Jewish leaders said that during the military escalation between Israel and Palestinians in Gaza, two local newspapers ran opinion articles that included comments they considered antisemitic.  A May 29 opinion piece in El Universo newspaper by Julio Cesar Roca De Castro compared contemporary Israeli policies to the Nazis, stating, “The wall is reminiscent of the ghettos where Jews were confined and crowded, subjecting them to hunger and disease, as the Nazis did in Warsaw, whose inhabitants they exterminated when they rebelled.”  Jewish leaders publicly condemned the statements but reported no acts of aggression on their community, unlike in previous years.

Religious leaders said although the COVID-19 pandemic continued to challenge their communities, their congregations were meeting in person for religious services.  Participation, however, remained lower than before the pandemic, mainly due to continued caution about attending large in-person gatherings.

In September and November, embassy and consulate officials discussed the registration process for religious groups with the Human Rights Secretariat, as well as other government efforts to support religious freedom.

Throughout the year, embassy and consulate officials met with leaders of Buddhist, Catholic, evangelical and nonevangelical Protestant, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jewish, Muslim, and Orthodox Church of Ecuador and Latin America communities to discuss religious liberty and societal respect for religious diversity.

The embassy and consulate used social media platforms to highlight International Religious Freedom Day and other efforts to promote social inclusion of religious groups and religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 106.4 million (midyear 2021).  Most experts and media sources estimate that approximately 90 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim and 10 percent is Christian.  Approximately 90 percent of Christians belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church, according to Christian leaders.

Other Christian communities together constitute less than 2 percent of the population.  These include Anglican/Episcopalian, Armenian Apostolic, Catholic (Armenian, Chaldean, Melkite, Maronite, Latin, and Syrian), and Orthodox (Greek and Syrian) Churches.  Most Protestant denominations are members of the umbrella group known as the Protestant Churches of Egypt, also known as the General Evangelical Council.  These include the Apostolic Grace, Apostolic, Assemblies of God, Baptists, Brethren, Christian Model Church (al-Mithaal al-Masihi), Church of Christ, Faith (al-Eyman), Gospel Missionary (al-Kiraaza bil-Ingil), First Grace (al-Ni’ma al-Oula), Second Grace (al-Ni’ma al-Thaneya), Independent Baptist, Message Church of Holland (ar-Risaala), Open Brethren, Pentecostal, Presbyterian, Revival of Holiness (Nahdat al-Qadaasa), and Seventh-day Adventists.  There are an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 Jehovah’s Witnesses and fewer than 100 members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ), the vast majority of whom are expatriates.  Christians reside throughout the country.

Scholars estimate that Shia Muslims comprise approximately 1 percent of the population.  Baha’i representatives estimate the size of their community to be between 1,000 and 2,000 persons.  There are very small numbers of Dawoodi Bohra Muslims and Ahmadi Muslims as well as expatriate members of various other religious groups.

According to a local Jewish NGO, there are six to 10 Jews in the country.

There are no reliable estimates of the number of atheists; in 2020, local media sources quoted a former Minister of Culture and a scholar at al-Azhar University estimating numbers of atheists at “several million” and “four million,” respectively.

Legal Framework

The constitution specifies Islam as the state religion and the principles of sharia as the main source of legislation.  The constitution states that “freedom of belief is absolute” and “the freedom of practicing religious rituals and establishing worship places for the followers of divine [Abrahamic] religions is a right regulated by law.”  The constitution also states citizens “are equal before the law,” prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, and makes “incitement to hatred” based upon “religion, belief, sex, origin, race…or any other reason” a crime.  The constitution prohibits political activity or the formation of political parties based on religion.  The constitution also states, “No political activity may be engaged in, or political parties formed, on the basis of religion, or discrimination [be permitted] based on sex, origin, sect, or geographic location.”

The government officially recognizes Sunni Islam, Christianity, and Judaism and allows only their adherents as defined by the government to publicly practice their religion and build houses of worship.  The constitution defines al-Azhar, the main authority on theology and Islamic affairs, as “an independent scientific Islamic institution with exclusive competence over its own affairs… It is responsible for preaching Islam and disseminating the religious sciences and the Arabic language” worldwide.  Al-Azhar’s Grand Imam is elected by al-Azhar’s Council of Senior Scholars and is officially appointed by the President for a life term.  The President does not have the authority to dismiss him.  The constitution declares al-Azhar to be an independent institution and requires the government to provide “sufficient funding for it to achieve its purposes.”

According to the law, capital sentences must be referred to the Grand Mufti, the country’s highest Islamic legal official, for consultation before they can be carried out.  The Grand Mufti’s decision in these cases is consultative and nonbinding on the court that handed down the sentence.

The constitution stipulates the canonical laws of Jews and Christians form the basis of legislation governing their personal status, religious affairs, and selection of spiritual leaders.  Individuals are subject to different sets of personal status laws (regarding marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.) depending upon their official religious designation.  The Ministry of Interior issues national identity cards that include official religious designations.  Designations are limited to Muslim, Christian, or Jewish citizens.  Although the government designates Jehovah’s Witnesses as “Christian” on identity cards, a presidential decree bans their religious activities.  Since a 2009 court order, Baha’is’ religious affiliation is denoted by a dash (“-”) on national identity cards.  The Minister of Interior has the authority to issue executive regulations determining what data national identity cards must list.

Neither the constitution nor the civil or penal codes prohibit apostasy from Islam, nor efforts to proselytize.  The law states individuals may change their religion.  However, the government recognizes conversion to Islam, but generally not from Islam to any other religion.  The government recognizes conversion from Islam for individuals who were not born Muslim but later converted to Islam, according to a Ministry of Interior decree pursuant to a court order.  Reverting to Christianity requires presentation of a document from the receiving church, an identity card, and fingerprints.  After a determination is made that the intent of the change – which often also entails a name change – is not to evade prosecution for a crime committed under the Muslim name, a new identity document is issued with the Christian name and religious designation.  In cases in which Muslims not born Muslim convert from Islam, their minor children, and in some cases adult children who were minors when their parents converted, remain classified as Muslims.  When these children reach the age of 18, they have the option of converting to Christianity and having that reflected on their identity cards.

The law stipulates Muslim women are not permitted to marry non-Muslim men.  Non-Muslim men who wish to marry Muslim women must convert to Islam.  Christian and Jewish women are not required to convert to Islam in order to marry Muslim men.  A married non-Muslim woman who converts to Islam must divorce her husband if he is not Muslim and is unwilling to convert.  If a married man is discovered to have left Islam, his marriage to a woman whose official religious designation is Muslim is dissolved.

A divorced mother is entitled to custody of her son until the age of 15 and her daughter until she marries.  The children’s father has the right to petition the court to ask the children to choose between staying with their mother or father, unless one parent is Muslim and the other is not, in which case the Muslim parent is awarded custody.

The government recognizes only the marriages of Christian, Jewish, and Muslim citizens, with documentation from a cleric, and does not recognize civil marriage between Egyptian citizens.  Marriages of Shia are recognized as Muslim.  The government recognizes civil marriages of Baha’is, as well as of individuals from other unrecognized religious groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hindus, and members of the Church of Jesus Christ, if one or both are foreigners.  Authorities deny Baha’is the rights of married couples pertaining to inheritance, divorce, and sponsoring a foreign spouse.  In practice, however, Baha’is have reported occasional success in filing individual petitions for recognition of their marriages in civil court.

The law generally follows sharia in matters of inheritance.  In 2017, however, an appellate court ruled applying sharia to non-Muslims violated the section of the constitution stating that personal status matters for Christian and Jewish communities are governed by their respective religious doctrine.

According to the penal code, using religion to promote extremist thought with the aim of inciting strife; demeaning or denigrating Islam, Christianity, or Judaism; or harming national unity carries penalties ranging from six months to five years’ imprisonment.

There are four entities currently authorized to issue fatwas (religious rulings binding on Muslims):  the al-Azhar Council of Senior Scholars, the al-Azhar Islamic Research Academy, the Dar al-Iftaa (House of Religious Edicts), and the Ministry of Awqaf’s (Islamic endowments) General Fatwa Directorate.  While a part of the Ministry of Justice, Dar al-Iftaa has been an independent organization since 2007.

Islamic, Christian, and Jewish denominations may request official recognition from the government, which gives previously unrecognized religious groups the right to be governed by their own canonical laws, practice religious rituals, establish houses of worship, and import religious literature.  To obtain official recognition, a religious group must submit a request to the Ministry of the Interior’s Administrative Affairs Department.  The department then determines whether the group poses a threat to national unity or social peace.  As part of this determination, the department consults leading religious institutions, including the Coptic Orthodox Church and al-Azhar.  The President then reviews and adjudicates the registration application.

The law does not recognize the Baha’i Faith or its religious laws, and it bans Baha’i institutions and community activities.  The law does not stipulate any penalties for banned religious groups or their members who engage in religious practices, but these groups are barred from rights granted to recognized groups, such as having their own houses of worship or other property, holding bank accounts, or importing religious literature.

The government, through the Ministry of Awqaf, appoints, pays the salaries of, and monitors imams who lead prayers in licensed mosques.  According to the law, penalties for preaching or giving religious lessons without a license from the Ministry of Awqaf or al-Azhar include a prison term of up to one year, a fine of up to 50,000 pounds ($3,200), or both.  The penalty doubles for repeat offenders.  Ministry of Awqaf inspectors also have judicial authority to arrest imams violating this law.  A ministry decree prevents unlicensed imams from preaching in any mosque, prohibits holding Friday prayers in mosques smaller than 80 square meters (860 square feet), bans unlicensed mosques from holding Friday prayer services (other prayer services are permitted), and pays bonuses to imams who deliver Friday sermons written and disseminated by the Ministry of Awqaf.  Ministry personnel monitor Friday sermons in major mosques and an imam who fails to follow the guidelines for ministry sermons may lose the bonus and be subject to disciplinary measures, including potentially losing his preaching license.

The Prime Minister has the authority to stop the circulation of books that “denigrate religions.”  Ministries may obtain court orders to ban or confiscate books and works of art.  The cabinet may ban works it deems offensive to public morals, detrimental to religion, or likely to cause a breach of the peace.  The Islamic Research Academy of al-Azhar has the legal authority to censor and confiscate any publications dealing with the Quran and the authoritative Islamic traditions (sunnah) and to confiscate publications, tapes, speeches, and artistic materials deemed inconsistent with Islamic law.

A 2016 law delegates the power to issue legal permits and to authorize church construction or renovation to governors of the country’s 27 governorates.  The governor is to respond within four months of receipt of an application for legalization; any refusal must include a written justification.  The law does not provide for review or appeal of a refusal, nor does it specify recourse if a governor fails to respond within the required timeframe.  The law also includes provisions to legalize existing unlicensed churches.  It stipulates that while a request to license an existing building for use as a church is pending, the use of the building to conduct church services and rites may not be prevented.  Under the law, the size of new churches continues to depend on a government determination of the “number and need” of Christians in the area.  Construction of new churches must meet specific land registration procedures and building codes and is subject to greater government scrutiny than that applied to the construction of new mosques.

Under a separate law governing the construction of mosques, the Ministry of Awqaf reviews and approves building permits.  A 2001 cabinet decree includes a list of 10 provisions requiring that new mosques built after that date must, among other conditions, be a minimum of 500 meters (1,640 feet) from the nearest other mosque, have a ground surface of at least 175 square meters (1,900 square feet), and be built only in areas where “the existing mosques do not accommodate the number of residents in the area.”  The law does not require Ministry of Awqaf approval for mosque renovations.

In public schools, Muslim students are required to take courses on “principles of Islam” and Christian students are required to take courses on “principles of Christianity” in all grades.  Schools determine the religious identity of students, and the religious studies courses they should take is based on official identity card designations, not personal or parental decisions.  Students who are neither Muslim nor Christian must choose one or the other course; they may not opt out or change from one to the other once selected.  A common set of textbooks for these two courses is mandated for both public and private schools, including parochial schools.  Al-Azhar maintains a separate school system that serves an estimated two million students from kindergarten through secondary school using its own curriculum.

The penal code criminalizes discrimination based on religion and defines it as including “any action, or lack of action, that leads to discrimination between people or against a sect due to… religion or belief.”  The law stipulates imprisonment, a fine of no less than 30,000 pounds ($1,900) and no more than 50,000 pounds ($3,200), or both, as penalties for discrimination.  If the perpetrator is a public servant, the law states that the imprisonment should be no less than three months and the fine no less than 50,000 pounds ($3,200) and no more than 100,000 pounds ($6,400).

Customary reconciliation is a form of dispute resolution that predates the country’s modern judicial and legal systems and is recognized in the law in instances that do not involve serious crimes (i.e., homicide, serious injury, or theft).  Customary reconciliation sessions rely on the accumulation of a set of customary rules to address conflicts between individuals, families, households, or workers and employees of certain professions.  Parties to disputes agree upon a resolution that typically contains stipulations to pay an agreed-upon amount of money for breaching the terms of the agreement.

In matters of family law, when spouses are members of the same religious denomination, courts apply that denomination’s canonical laws.  In cases where one spouse is Muslim and the other a member of a different religion, both are Christians but members of different denominations, or the individuals are not clearly a part of a religious group, the courts apply sharia.

Sharia provisions forbidding adoption apply to all citizens.  The Ministry of Social Solidarity, however, manages a program called “Alternative Family” which recognizes permanent legal guardianship if certain conditions are met, including requirements that the guardians share the same religion as the child and have been married to one another for a minimum of five years.

The quasigovernmental National Council for Human Rights, whose members are appointed by parliament under a 2016 law, is charged with strengthening protections, raising awareness, and ensuring the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including religious freedom.  It also is charged with monitoring enforcement and application of international agreements pertaining to human rights.  The council’s mandate includes investigating reports of alleged violations of religious freedom.

The 2014 constitution mandates that the state eliminate all forms of discrimination through an independent commission to be established by parliament, but the parliament has not yet established such a commission.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights but declared in a reservation that it became a party considering that the provisions of the covenant do not conflict with sharia.

Government Practices

Authorities executed Ahmad Saeed Ibrahim al-Sonbati on June 21 for the 2017 killing of Coptic priest Father Samaan Shehata, of the church of Yulius al-Aqfahsi, in the village of Ezbet Girgis in Beni Suef Governorate.  Sonbati’s 2017 death sentence was confirmed by the court of appeals in 2018 and received final approval on November 9, 2020 from the Court of Cassation, the country’s highest court.

In October, the Alexandria Criminal Court sentenced to life in prison brothers Nasser and Ali al-Sambo for the December 2020 killing of Coptic Christian Ramsis Boulos Hermina in Alexandria.  Hermina was attacked in his plastics and household goods shop.  According to press reporting, Nasser and Ali Sambo and their brother Anwar had a reputation in their neighborhood for harassment of Coptic shop owners.

On February 10, the Court of Cassation upheld a 15-year prison sentence for 10 defendants who participated in a 2013 church burning in Kafr Hakim, Giza Governorate.

On October 11, the Court of Cassation dismissed the first appeal submitted by the defendants convicted of the 2013 arson attack on Mar Girgis Church in Sohag city and originally sentenced in 2015 and 2020 by the Criminal Court to 3 to 15 years’ imprisonment.  Authorities charged the defendants with assaulting Christian places of worship, destroying and burning police cars, possession of firearms and ammunition without a license, attempted theft, assaulting public and private property and shops, inciting violence, vandalism, and intimidating citizens.

According to press reporting, the Minya Criminal Court on June 15 sentenced 10 defendants to five-year prison terms on charges of “vandalism, violence, and burning the homes of Coptic citizens” during a 2016 sectarian riot in the village of Karm in Minya Governorate, and acquitted 14 others, citing lack of evidence.  The June 15 court verdicts were linked to a separate attack on Souad Thabet, an elderly Christian woman whom attackers stripped and dragged through the village of Karm during 2016 rioting.  Authorities originally charged four persons with attacking Thabet, and another 25 with attacking Thabet’s home and six other Christian-owned homes in response to rumors that her son had an affair with the wife of a Muslim business partner.  In January 2020, the Minya Criminal Court sentenced three defendants in absentia to ten years’ imprisonment for the attack on Thabet.  After the men surrendered, the Minya court returned the case to the Beni Suef Criminal Court for retrial.  When that court acquitted the three defendants in December 2020, the Prosecutor General subsequently filed an appeal with the Court of Cassation in January.  At year’s end, no session had been called to examine the appeal.

BBC Arabic aired an interview on November 25 with Ahmed Abdou Maher, described as a “lawyer, researcher, and writer,” whom a court sentenced on November 17 to five years in prison with hard labor for defaming Islam in his book, How the Imams’ Jurisprudence Is Leading the Nation Astray.  Maher told the interviewer that his book did not include a word of extremism, blasphemy, or incitement against Islam; rather, it only criticized what he called Islam’s “blood-soaked ideology.”  In a separate interview, Abdou told al-Mayadeen TV that the Islamic “nation” was “static,” and that “enlightenment” required courage.  According to media reports, “liberals” defended him and insisted that his prosecution was “a disgrace” and “an assault on freedom of thought and expressions.”  Activists and NGOs responded to the case by calling for the abolition of the country’s blasphemy law, with some estimating there had been 130 cases of blasphemy during the last 10 years, with penalties ranging from six months to five years in prison.

On June 21, the Economic Misdemeanor Appeals Court in Alexandria rejected an appeal submitted on behalf of atheist activist and blogger Anas Hassan of a February 27 verdict sentencing him to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 300,000 pounds ($19,100) for managing “The Egyptian Atheists” Facebook page.  Authorities originally arrested Hassan in 2019 for publishing atheist ideas and criticizing the “divinely revealed religions.”  According to a local civil society group, Hassan’s next court session was set for February 2022.

The detention of human rights advocate Ramy Kamel Saied Salib (commonly known solely as Ramy Kamel) continued.  Authorities originally arrested Salib in November 2019 following his application for a Swiss visa to speak at a UN forum in Geneva, where he had previously presented issues affecting the Coptic community.  The government charged him with joining a banned group and spreading false news.  On October 10 and again on November 27, a Cairo court renewed his detention for 45 days.  Kamel’s defense team said he was subjected to harsh conditions of imprisonment, including solitary confinement, that may have endangered his health.

On October 12 and again on November 27, authorities renewed Quranist Reda Abdel Rahman’s detention.  During the year, the courts heard several appeals submitted by Abdel Rahman’s defense team to release him.  Quranists (Quraniyyun) believe the Quran is the sole source of Islamic law and reject the authenticity and authority of the hadith (the body of sayings and traditions attributed to the Prophet Mohammed).  The NGO EIPR called for Abdel-Rahman’s release and for dropping the charges against him.

In September, the government released four prominent Salafi preachers who were members of a political group arrested in 2019.  Authorities had charged Mahmoud Shaaban, Ashraf Abdel Moneim, Hisham Mashali, and Saad Fayyad with “inciting violence and joining a terrorist group.”  Shortly after their release, the government rearrested Shaaban and charged him with inciting violence, joining a group seeking to disrupt the country’s constitution and laws, and harming social peace.  His case remained pending at year’s end.

On September 8, social media activists posted videos of the demolition of a 4,300-square-foot unlicensed church building in the village of Bastra, Beheira Governorate.  As reported by the Coptic newspaper Watani, the city council in Beheira’s capital Damanhour implemented the removal order in cooperation with local security forces.  Clashes between parishioners and security forces as the demolition order was carried out resulted in at least four injuries and the arrest of 21 Coptic protestors, who were subsequently released; no interreligious community violence was reported because of the building’s demolition.  Observers, including Coptic Church officials, and administrators blamed local clergy for not having gone through official registration channels to erect the building.

On November 8, al-Azhar Grand Imam Ahmed al-Tayyeb and Coptic Pope Tawadros II hosted a celebration marking the 10th anniversary of the government-sponsored Family House (Beit al-’Aila), a foundation established after the 2011 suicide bombing at Alexandria’s All Saints Church.  Family House’s mission is “preserving the fabric of Muslim-Christian unity within Egyptian society and upholding the principles of coexistence and tolerance,” principally through communal reconciliation efforts.  Former president Adly Mansour attended, as did the Minister of Justice, who delivered a speech on behalf of the Prime Minister.  In remarks at the event, al-Tayyeb said that freedom of religion was “one of the most precious human rights.”  According to press reporting, Tawadros II said at the event, “God did not grant religion to man for the sake of rivalry, but rather for the sake of cooperation.”  Muslim and Christian religious leaders said Family House was very active in some areas, such as Assiut Governorate, while in others, such as Cairo and Alexandria, it was much less engaged.

While the Coptic Orthodox Church did not bar participation in government-sponsored customary reconciliation sessions, a Church spokesperson said reconciliation sessions should not be used in lieu of the application of the law and should be restricted to “clearing the air and making amends” following sectarian disputes or violence.  At least one Coptic Orthodox diocese in Upper Egypt continued to refuse to participate in reconciliation sessions, criticizing them as substitutes for criminal proceedings rather than a means of addressing attacks on Christians and their churches.  Other Christian denominations continued to participate in customary reconciliation sessions.  Human rights groups and some Christian community representatives characterized reconciliation sessions as encroachment on the principles of nondiscrimination and citizenship, and that Christian participants were regularly pressured to retract their statements and deny facts, leading in some cases to the dropping of criminal charges.

Some Christian expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly did not declare Easter, May 2, as an official holiday for state workers.  Instead, he announced it would be a day off from work in order to prevent overcrowding during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Citing the article (No. 53) in the constitution that says that the state shall take all necessary measures to eliminate discrimination, human rights activists said that basic religious holidays should be official ones for all citizens and should be referred to as such.  The government had not previously designated Easter as a holiday.

Efforts to combat atheism received official support.  In 2019, al-Azhar founded a Bayan (Declaration) Unit in its Center for Electronic Fatwa to “counter atheism” and prevent youth from “falling into disbelief.”  As of the end of the year, the unit remained active.  During the year, its activities included posting more than 15,000 social media comments intended to refute atheist opinions.

On October 18, the Supreme Administrative Court postponed hearing an appeal filed by the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) against an administrative court’s 2020 ruling that obligated the NTRA to block Shia websites in general, and the Ibn al-Nafis news website in particular, from the internet, until a November 15 hearing.  The case was pending at year’s end.

In August, a religious leader in the Presbyterian community said police stopped dozens of converts on their way to a church retreat, confiscated IDs, and detained and interrogated some parishioners.  While all detainees were ultimately released, the leader said many continued to be subject to harassment and occasional detention.

EIPR called on September 9 for the release of Coptic Christian Gerges Samih Zaki Ebeid and the dropping of charges against him for having written a post on his personal Facebook account described by villagers, social media commenters, and prosecutors as offensive to Islam.  On September 7 and again on November 24, a court renewed Samih’s detention for 45 days, pending an investigation into allegations he had joined a terrorist group, spread false news with the aim of disturbing the public peace, and used an online account with the intention of committing a crime.  Authorities arrested Samih in Delta Governorate in November 2020 following sectarian violence in the village of al-Barsha, in Mallawy District of southern Minya Governorate that had resulted from the Facebook post.  Following interreligious clashes, the Minya Public Prosecutor detained 35 defendants, including 15 Copts and 20 Muslims, for 15 days pending investigations, releasing them on January 12, pending further questioning.

Members of the country’s Shia community said that they risked accusations of blasphemy for publicly voicing their religious opinions, praying in public, or owning books promoting Shia thought.

The government has designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization (the government in 2013 banned the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party).  On June 14, the Court of Cassation upheld death sentences for 12 senior Muslim Brotherhood leaders including Mohamed al-Beltagy, Safwat Hegazy, and Abdel-Rahman al-Bar, following a mass trial of 739 persons for their participation in large-scale antigovernment sit-ins in Rabaa al-Adawiya Square in July and August 2013.  On July 11, the Cassation Court upheld the 2019 sentencing of 10 Muslim Brotherhood leaders, including the group’s Supreme Guide, Mohammed Badie, to life imprisonment on charges of “killing policemen, organizing mass jail breaks, and undermining national security by conspiring with foreign militant groups, including Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah” during unrest in 2011.  On April 8, a court sentenced Mahmoud Ezzat, former acting Supreme Guide, to life in prison.  Media reported the court convicted Ezzat on terrorism-related charges stemming from 2013 clashes between Brotherhood supporters and their opponents in Cairo.  In an April 8 statement, the Brotherhood denounced the verdict as politicized and based upon fabrications and described Ezzat as a “devoted religious leader.”

On July 12, the parliament passed legislation, signed into law by the President on August 1, that allowed the dismissal of any public employee found to have undermined national security, or whom the government has listed as a member of a terrorist organization.  Press and NGOs said the new law targeted the Muslim Brotherhood.  On July 26, the Supreme Council of Universities directed university presidents in the country to prepare and submit lists of employees covered by the new law, for submission after the law took effect.  In September, press reported the country’s railway authority had removed approximately 190 employees for alleged Muslim Brotherhood ties.

In August, the Ministry of Awqaf issued an order banning books relating to extremism and the Muslim Brotherhood from all mosque libraries.  The director of the religious sector at the ministry alerted its directorates in all governorates to review books, magazines and publications in mosque libraries and remove any items that were found to include “extremist ideology.”  In a statement, Minister of Awqaf Mokhtar Gomaa directed the punishment of any official neglecting these orders.  The ministry’s order also warned imams to not include any books in mosque libraries without permission from the ministry’s office responsible for religious guidance.

In November 2020, the Supreme Administrative Court added Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, leader of the Strong Egypt Party, to a list of designated terrorists, based on a charge that the party was affiliated with an Islamist group.  The court dismissed an appeal submitted by Aboul Fotouh on November 18.

In December, authorities banned Shia activist Haidar Kanil, a reporter for al-Dustour newspaper, from travelling to Moscow where he said he planned to seek employment.  Kandil told the news website The New Arab that police required him to check in on a weekly basis in his hometown, Tanta city.  He said officials accused him of contempt of religion, spreading Shiism and anti-state ideas, and establishing a group in violation of the law.  Minister of Awqaf Gomaa directed the punishment of any official neglecting these orders.  The ministry’s order also warned imams to not include any books in mosque libraries without permission from the ministry’s office responsible for religious guidance.

At year’s end, authorities continued to detain Ahmed Sebaie, who was arrested in 2020 after posting a video on his YouTube channel that discussed the Bible and Christian doctrine.  More than 400,000 subscribers followed Sebaie’s YouTube account, which focuses on religion.  In the past, he produced videos in which he discussed Christian doctrinal issues, commented on social media posts of atheists, and promoted Islam.

On June 28, the Ministry of Awqaf banned Alaa Mohammed Hussein Yaqoub, son of a prominent Salafi imam and preacher, from preaching at mosques, ostensibly for having failed to adhere to sermon length and content guidelines.  The ban came after Alaa Yaqoub’s father, Mohammed Hussein Yaqoub, testified for the government in a terrorism case before a Cairo court, denying that he was a religious scholar and criticizing Salafism.  The press said that Mohammed Yaqoub’s testimony, which appeared to contradict many years of preaching, resulted in “widescale controversy.”  Al Masry al-Youm reported that, as a result of the testimony, a member of parliament introduced legislation to prevent nonspecialists from speaking in religious matters or issuing fatwas.  Alaa Yaqoub said he would comply fully with the government’s order banning him from preaching.

On January 17, the Court of Urgent Matters in Egypt accepted a lawsuit filed by the head of the Judiciary’s Committee for Inventory, Seizure, and Management of Terrorist Funds aimed at seizing assets belonging to 89 members and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood – including family members of the late former president Mohammed Morsi – and transfer them to the state treasury.

On September 18, the Awqaf Minister ordered the dismissal of the undersecretary of the Ministry of Awqaf in Ismailia after a quarrel with worshipers at al-Matafy Mosque.  The undersecretary reportedly angered some of the worshipers by describing them as extremists during a sermon, leading to an altercation with worshipers following his address.

On September 25, local media reported the Supreme Administrative Court issued a final verdict that banned the use of mosques for political purposes and upheld the state’s right to supervise them.  This ruling upheld a previous decision by the Minister of Awqaf to place 42 mosques in Beheira Governorate under the ministry’s supervision.

Local media reported in October that a new prison complex at Wadi al-Natroun included a church, making it the first in the country to include church facilities.  Media reported Christian clergy previously had to conduct prison services in multipurpose rooms.  The government said publicly that clergy were allowed inside prisons to perform services for inmates during Copts’ celebration of Christmas on January 8.  According to the NGO Arab Network for Human Rights Information, on January 1, imprisoned labor activist Khalil Rizk asked a warden of Tora Prison for permission to attend upcoming Coptic Christmas services.  Although authorities told Rizk his request had been approved, they did not allow him to attend Christmas prayers or allow a priest to visit him.

The government largely continued to allow Baha’is, members of the Church of Jesus Christ, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Shia Muslims to worship privately in small numbers, but it continued to deny requests for public religious gatherings by unregistered religious groups.

Baha’is were subject to inconsistent application of administrative court rulings recognizing marriages.  Members of the community reported that members whose marriages the state formally recognized were occasionally subject to government appeals seeking to overturn that recognition.

Shia community sources and religious freedom observers stated that information contained in a 2019 report by Minority Rights Group International (MRGI), an international NGO, on challenges facing the country’s Shia community remained valid in 2021.  The MRGI report stated that there continued to be no Shia congregational halls (husseiniyas) in the country and Shia Muslims remained unable to establish public places of worship.  Members of the Shia community risked accusations of blasphemy for publicly voicing their religious opinions, praying in public, or owning books promoting Shia thought.

Based on 2020 Supreme Administrative Court verdicts banning faculty and teaching staff at Cairo and Ain Shams Universities from wearing the niqab in class, a lawyer filed an October 5 lawsuit before an administrative court to obligate the Minister of Education to issue a decision banning the wearing of the niqab for teachers, students, workers, and administrators in public, private, and international schools.  According to the memo submitted to the court in support of the suit, criminals wearing the niqab had taken advantage of the anonymity it affords to commit crimes, including terrorist attacks.  The case remained pending at year’s end.

According to analysis by the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, an international NGO focused on human rights, the government continued to ban the importation and sale of Baha’i and Jehovah’s Witnesses literature and authorized customs officials to confiscate religious materials from these groups’ adherents.

On July 9, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) reported that a broad array of antisemitic books continued to be exhibited among the materials hosted at the state-run book fair, “including the notorious antisemitic forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.”  The ADL noted that it had raised the Cairo Book Fair’s sale of antisemitic titles with government representatives in previous years.  The NGO said that the 2021 book fair, which began on June 30, continued to sell every problematic book sold at the 2020 fair that the ADL had identified in its earlier communications with the government.

The Mansoura Emergency State Security Misdemeanors Court ordered on December 7 the release of EIPR researcher Patrick George Zaki after 22 months of pretrial detention, pending an investigation on charges of “spreading false news” following a 2019 article Zaki wrote on anti-Coptic discrimination.  The court set February 1, 2022 as the next hearing date in Zaki’s case.

The Coptic Papal Office, local bishoprics, and Coptic media expressed positive views about the pace of church registration and construction five years after passage of the 2016 Church Construction Law.  EIPR, however, listed 25 cases in which churches and worship places had been closed after the passage of the 2016 law, and called for new legislation guaranteeing freedom of religious practice and the building of places of worship for all citizens.

In a November 7 statement, a cabinet committee tasked with registering unlicensed churches approved the legalization of 63 churches and church facilities that had been operating without a permit, bringing the total number of churches and service buildings granted legal status since 2017 to 2,021.  In November, the Prime Minister ordered governorates to accelerate permits and to send him periodic reports on their progress.

In August, the Ministry of Awqaf said that 1,650 mosques had been opened since September 2020, including 1,510 new mosques, while 140 underwent maintenance or restoration.  The construction and renovation work, implemented under the supervision of the regional directorates, brought the number of new or refurbished mosques between September 7, 2020 and August 27 to 1,810.

Local media reported pharaonic inscriptions on the facade of the Ibrahim Abdel Latif Mosque, located in the Youssef al-Siddiq Center in village of Nazla, Fayoum Governorate, sparked controversy in September.  Local media said the community had paid to construct the mosque, but the inscriptions had escaped the notice of the Awqaf Ministry’s engineering department (which limits mosque inscriptions to Islamic themes or text).  An engineer in the engineering department of the Fayoum Awqaf Directorate was being investigated.

On January 5, the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities opened the first stop on the 2,100-mile Holy Family Trail – marking the route believers hold was taken by Mary, Joseph, and Jesus – in Samannoud, Gharbeya Governorate.  Development projects in Samannoud included the conservation and restoration of St. Abba Noub Church and the surrounding area.  The ministry announced the project in 2020, stating the trail would run from Sinai to Assiut, including stops at churches, monasteries, and water wells.

On July 24, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi directed the renovation of the shrines of Ahl al-Bayt (the family of the Prophet Muhammad) across the country, particularly the tombs of Sayyida Nafisa (Muhammad’s great-granddaughter), Sayyida Zeinab (Muhammad’s granddaughter), and Sayyid al-Hussein (Muhammad’s grandson), including the restoration of the interior halls of mosques at these sites and their architectural details.

In November, the Ministry of Awqaf issued a decision that banned the use of collection boxes in mosques.  The boxes often are used for donations for mosque repair and upkeep, provision of social services, and charitable endeavors.  Authorities said the decision was driven by security and transparency concerns.  After the government’s initial announcement, the ministry stated an exception would be made for mosques belonging to Sufi orders, which have “vows” collection boxes, used for donations made if a worshiper believes God has answered a prayer.

On February 14, Deputy Minister of Education Reda Hegazy announced in parliament that the ministry supported a proposal by Member of Parliament Freddy al-Bayadi advancing school curriculum that highlighted the common values shared by Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, and the principles of tolerance, citizenship, and coexistence.  Sources in parliament stated that schools were gradually updating curricula to include messages of interreligious tolerance, although al-Bayadi’s proposal progressed no further in the chamber by year’s end.  According to news websites, Hegazy also said that there were new government instructions to remove Quranic verses from the general curriculum and restrict them to religious courses.  He explained that including religious texts in courses such as Arabic, history, and geography allowed unqualified teachers to provide “an extremist and destructive” interpretation of the texts.  A former senior Ministry of Awqaf official responded that the measure represented “a plan to alter Egypt’s Islamic identity” and that President Sisi “has used all his media outlets to attack al-Azhar, its grand sheikh, and Islam.”  The Salafist al-Nour Party said that the removal of Quranic texts from the general curriculum was “unacceptable.”

In December, parliament debated a bill intended to support the use of Standard Arabic, the Quranic form of the language.  During the debate, a representative of al-Azhar expressed support for the proposed legislation’s requirement that elementary school students memorize Quranic verses.  Yousef al-Husseini, a member of the House of Representatives, said, “There are non-Muslim students like Copts who should not be forced to memorize the Quran.”  In a statement, al-Azhar said, “The call to remove Quranic texts from the Arabic language subject is an explicit call to distance students from their religion and values and to cut them off from their language, culture, and identity, as it opens the door to destructive ideas and interpretations.”

The Ministry of Education and Technical Education continued to develop a new curriculum that included increased coverage of respect for human rights and religious tolerance.  In 2020, third grade students began using revised textbooks, including the book Values and Respect for Others, an ethics text drawn from Islamic and Christian religious traditions.  For the 2021/2022 academic year, use of the text expanded to first and second grade classes.

On March 9, the Jerusalem Post reported the Ministry of Education for the first time approved a measure that allowed Egyptian children to study verses from Jewish scripture.

On January 2, TV anchor and journalist Ibrahim Issa cited a lack of “adequate references” to Christian history in educational curricula, except for material dealing with monasticism, monasteries, and participation in the 1919 Revolution.  In June, Pope Tawadros II called on the Ministry of Education to include information on the route of the Holy Family in its curricula, calling the history of the flight to Egypt a source of “pride for any Egyptian.”  The Minister of Education pledged to study the Pope’s proposal “within the general framework of the new curricula in the ministry.”

In early September, the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) released a statement reinforcing a Dar al-Iftaa fatwa calling on preschools to stop posting verses from the Quran or the Bible over their entrances.  The fatwa and statement followed the viral spread via social media of a photo of a nursery gate that featured a Quranic verse that had been taken out of context and contained grammatical errors.  MOSS’s statement stressed, moreover, “Egypt is a home for everyone,” and said that the inclusion of religious verses could be construed to indicate that specific schools or nurseries only catered to Muslims or Christians, respectively.

Christians reported being underrepresented in the military and security services, and they stated that those admitted at entry levels of government face limited opportunities for promotion to the upper ranks.

No Christians served as presidents of the country’s 27 public universities.  The government barred non-Muslims from employment in public university training programs for Arabic-language teachers, stating as its reason that the curriculum involved study of the Quran.

The Minister of Immigration and Expatriate Affairs was the only Christian in the cabinet, which consists of 32 ministers.  Among the 27 governorates, only Damietta and Ismailia had Christian governors.  The governor of Damietta was the country’s first female Christian governor.  The electoral laws reserve 24 seats for Christian candidates in the House of Representatives.  During the year, the House of Representatives exceeded the quota, with 31 Christians, out of a total of 596 representatives.  There were a total of 24 Christian senators – 17 elected, and seven appointed by President Sisi – out of 300 seats in that chamber, including the Deputy Speaker.  Observers stated that President Sisi also had several senior Christian advisors.

Some Shia stated they were excluded from service in the armed services, and from employment in the security and intelligence services.

The government generally permitted foreign religious workers in the country.  Sources continued to report, however, that some religious workers were denied visas or refused entry upon arrival without explanation.

On March 1, the President issued a decree forming Boards of Directors of endowment bodies for the Catholic Church and Protestant churches of Egypt.  The decree followed passage of a law in parliament intended to give the Catholic and Protestant communities equal status to the Coptic Orthodox Church.

On August 22, local NGOs reported that the Supreme Judicial Council – the highest administrative body for the country’s judiciary and headed by the President of the Court of Cassation – approved a request by the Prosecutor General to transfer 11 female judges, including one Copt, to work in the public prosecutor’s office for the judicial year beginning in September.  On August 5, the Official Gazette published two presidential decisions appointing assistant delegates to the State Council – an independent body that rules on mainly administrative matters involving the country’s judiciary – from among 2016 and 2017 law school graduates.  According to EIPR researchers, the first decision included three Copts out of 204 delegates, or 1.5 percent.  The second decision included three Copts out of 207 delegates, or 1.4 percent.

Grand Imam al-Tayyeb made multiple public references to the Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Coexistence, which he signed with Pope Francis in 2019, as a framework for “a world full of prosperity, tolerance, peace, and love.”  Al-Tayyeb and Pope Francis met in person and discussed the initiatives resulting from the document on October 4 following a Vatican-hosted summit entitled “Faith and Science:  Towards COP26,” alongside other world faith leaders.

Al-Azhar continued tracking and countering online statements by ISIS and other extremist groups through the al-Azhar Observatory for Combating Extremism.  The observatory’s staff of approximately 100 individuals monitored and offered counterarguments to religious statements on jihadi websites.  The center’s website and social media employed numerous languages to reach foreign audiences, including English, Arabic, Urdu, Swahili, Chinese, and Farsi.  Al-Azhar, through the al-Azhar International Academy, also continued to offer courses to imams and preachers in 20 countries on a wide range of subjects related to Islam.  Al-Azhar largely curtailed travel and in-person training during the year due to the COVID-19 pandemic but continued to offer training virtually.

In May, the government announced it would include all civilians who lost their lives to terrorist operations since January 2014 among those eligible for government aid via the 2018 official Fund for Honoring Martyrs, Victims, Missing Persons, and Injured in Terror and Security Operations, and their Families.  The list of those eligible for aid included the families of 1,260 civilians killed and 1,804 civilians injured in terrorist attacks targeting religious minorities.

During an August 3 meeting with participants in a conference organized by Dar al-Iftaa, “Fatwa Institutions in the Digital Age,” President Sisi said that scholars needed to confront electronic platforms spreading false ideas that distorted the essence of Islam and exploited religion to achieve political goals through terrorism.  During an August 24 television interview, the President said, “We are all born Muslim and non-Muslim according to our ID cards, but we realize that we have to reformulate our understanding of the belief that we follow.”  On September 11, during the launch ceremony of the National Human Rights Strategy, President Sisi asked, “Why are you upset to see a church or a synagogue?  The state has moved to face this matter effectively and ensures the respect of all religions through laws.”  He added, “I respect nonbelievers.  If someone tells me [he or she is] neither Muslim nor Christian nor a Jew or that he or she does not believe in religion, I would tell them, you are free to choose.”  Sisi also said, “And it is not because I am not protective of my religion.  I am.  And that is why I respect the will of nonbelievers, which is based on freedom of belief – a God-given right.”  On social media, some users criticized Sisi for normalizing the acceptance of individuals who do not believe in God, saying this attitude was unacceptable to much of the Muslim majority in the country.  On October 17, marking the celebration of Mawlid al-Nabi (the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday), Sisi urged religious institutions and scholars to intensify their efforts to spread values of tolerance, intellectual diversity, and acceptance of others.

The National Strategy for Human Rights contained a section dedicated to “Freedom of Religion and Belief” that noted several steps the government had taken in recent years, including the establishment of a National Council for Combating Terrorism and Extremism and the Supreme Committee for Combating Sectarian Incidents as well as the Ministry of Higher Education’s strategy against extremism and takfiri (declaring someone a nonbeliever) ideology at the country’s universities.  It stated that the Ministry of Awqaf dedicated some Friday sermons to promote tolerance and combat violence and hatred.  The document also noted efforts by al-Azhar, the Dar al-Iftaa, and Christian churches to promote intercommunal understanding.  The strategy stated the government frequently promoted interfaith dialogue.

On January 24, the Grand Mufti issued a fatwa permitting Muslims to work in church construction in exchange for a salary, a ruling that sparked controversy on social media.  Activists recalled previous 2013 fatwas on Salafist websites prohibiting such employment.  Dar al-Iftaa based the more recent decision on an earlier ruling by Imam Abu Hanifa in which he stated that such work was permissible and was an obligation unless it involves the humiliation of a Muslim or required him to consent to anything that contradicted Islamic theology.  Some media interpreted the fatwa as giving Muslims permission to contribute to the ongoing or planned construction/restoration of churches throughout the country.

On October 13, while addressing a workshop that trained religious leaders to raise awareness of women’s issues, Minister of Awqaf Gomaa said a pilot program involving female preachers and nuns set an outstanding model of national action, which, he added, was an approach adopted by the ministry in partnership with churches and the National Council for Women.  Gomaa said that women’s equality was a religious, national, and humanitarian obligation.  According to local press, in September, the number of female preachers was 304, including 251 female volunteers and 53 female mentors appointed by the ministry.

The cabinet’s media center released a documentary that promoted the values of citizenship, loyalty, nondiscrimination, and equality between Muslims and Christians.  The documentary highlighted the importance of strengthening these values in preserving the country’s security and stability, as well as of countering attempts to sow sedition within communities, according to a statement released by the center on January 7.

On January 9, the al-Azhar Observatory for Combating Extremism issued a report in 12 languages under the title Religious Freedom:  An Authentic Islamic Principle.  The observatory stated in the report that religious freedom was one of the most important principles of Islam.  On May 5, the Grand Imam said, “Congratulating non-Muslims on their holidays and their joys and comforting them in their misfortune…[is] the righteousness that Islam command[s].”

On August 11, President Sisi extended the term of Grand Mufti Shawky Allam by a year by presidential decree.  The President issued a separate but related decree the same week that designated the Dar al-Iftaa as a “special entity” not subject to the provisions of the civil service law.  Some observers said that these decrees redistributed power traditionally vested in the Council of Islamic Scholars to the President.  In July, a proposed law sought to make Dar al-Iftaa and the Grand Mufti independent of al-Azhar.  Sources told the press that the main objective of the proposed law was to create a parallel entity to al-Azhar under the direct control of the government.  Under its terms, the President would have had the right to appoint the Grand Mufti.  The State Council ruled the draft law unconstitutional, after which it was withdrawn by the government.

On September 14, after the launch of the National Strategy on Human Rights, the Minister of Awqaf announced his intention to establish a human rights unit to enact provisions of the strategy.  The unit, according to the statement, will work to promote the values of citizenship and religious tolerance, contribute to social protection and community service programs, and fulfill the rights of people with disabilities (for example, incorporating sign language during weekly sermons).

On March 7, EIPR filed a lawsuit on behalf of a Coptic woman with the Supreme Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of requiring Christian citizens to apply the rules of sharia in inheritance matters.  The lawsuit maintained that this requirement violated Article 3 of the constitution, which permits the canonical laws of religious minorities to prevail in civil matters.  Defendants in the lawsuit included the President, Prime Minister, Minister of Justice, and Speaker of Parliament.  On September 12, the court’s board of commissioners examined the case and on November 14, the court referred the case to the Constitutional Court to set a date for further review.  The case remained pending at year’s end.

On December 4, the news website Cairo 24.com reported that that the Ministry of Justice completed drafting the Family Law (Personal Status for Christians) after representatives of Christian denominations agreed on its text during meetings earlier in the year.  On July 4, a representative of the Coptic Orthodox Church announced completion of a review of the draft law in the Ministry of Justice after 16 sessions that brought together ministry officials with representatives of Christian denominations to agree on its articles.  In September, the newspaper Al-Dustour reported the draft law would be introduced in parliament, after other Christian churches expressed support.  In December, the ministry sent the draft law to the cabinet for approval.  At year’s end, the cabinet had not submitted the draft legislation to the House of Representatives.

There was public debate and court challenges on the issue of listing religions on the national ID.  Coptic human rights attorneys filed a lawsuit on August 25 demanding the Civil Status Department of the Ministry of Interior remove the “religion” field from the national ID card.  Referring to what it said was the positive atmosphere of religious unity promoted by the Sisi government, the lawsuit stated that some persons still used the religious designator on ID cards to discriminate against religious minorities.  During a panel discussion in September, journalist Ibrahim Eissa called for religion to be removed from citizens’ ID cards.  Justice Minister Omar Marwan responded that “there must be some form of official documentation of citizens’ religion” to ensure laws and services that were specific to one’s religion were properly provided.

On December 27, the Alexandria Administrative Court dismissed a lawsuit brought in January by EIPR on behalf of a group of Baha’i citizens in Alexandria seeking to have the government designate a cemetery for those whose national ID cards showed a “-” (meaning no selection) under religious affiliation.  The government cited opinions from al-Azhar that, despite earlier rulings and practices, said it was impermissible to allocate a plot of land for individuals who were not Muslims, Christians, or Jews.  Bassatine Cemetery in Cairo, which members of the Baha’i community described as overcrowded and inconveniently distant for Baha’is living outside Cairo, remained the only cemetery in the country where Baha’is could be buried.  EIPR said it planned to appeal the decision.

In June, the ADL reported that it had completed a review of elementary, middle, and high school textbooks as part of an examination of antisemitic content in state-published curricula.  The ADL stated that although the country’s most recent textbooks contained some positive material about the Jewish people, that content was “directly contradicted by other, much more problematic lessons in the curriculum.”  The report cited one fifth grade textbook that teaches taught students that “the treachery of the Jews” was “one of their traits” and that Jews “betrayed God and his Prophet.”

The press reported that on June 29 the al-Azhar International Center for Electronic Fatwas warned against the online video game Fortnite, saying it contained a portrayal of the destruction of the Kaaba, the center of the Great Mosque in Mecca.  The game’s designers posted a statement on Facebook that said they respected all religious faiths and that the problematic content was made by an independent player in “creative mode.”

On June 20, President Sisi met with Sultan Mufadal Saifuddin, head of the Bohra branch of Ismaili Shia Islam.  According to press reporting, the President noted the country’s close ties with Bohra Ismailis and thanked the group for its help in restoring several historic mosques and shrines in the country.

On March 16, Minister of Awqaf Gomaa said that the President and government had always called for the export of moderate Islam to Africa.  Gomaa said that the government had regularly sent imams and preachers to many African countries, stressing that the government placed great importance on countering extremism.  On August 2, al-Azhar announced a training course on countering extremism for 23 imams and preachers from Mali.  On August 10 after a meeting with the ambassador from Senegal, Grand Imam al-Tayyeb, said that al-Azhar was ready to establish a similar institution in Senegal, while confirming that 350 Senegalese students were currently studying at al-Azhar, which had sent 41 teachers to Senegal.  In separate statements in June and August, al-Azhar said it would step up efforts to train imams in Pakistan and Russia.

Terrorist groups, including Islamic State-Sinai Peninsula (or ISIS-SP, formerly known as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis), continued sporadic attacks on government, civilian, and security targets in the North Sinai Governorate.  According to an international NGO, at least 26 civilian deaths, 51 security force deaths, and 31 terrorist deaths occurred in the conflict in Sinai between January and July.  According to an ISIS media affiliate, ISIS-SP claimed 101 attacks resulting in 206 casualties during the year.

In April, ISIS-SP released a video that documented the killing of Nabil Habashi, a local Coptic Christian and cofounder of the only church in the district of Bir al-Abd, one of the focal points of ISIS-SP operations.  ISIS-SP kidnapped Habashi in November 2020, using the justification of “Christian support for the Egyptian military and state” and held him for ransom until killing him in February.  Pope Tawadros II released a statement mourning the “faithful son and servant” Habashi, offering condolences to his family and church, and “saluting the heroes of the Egyptian military and police.”  EIPR characterized the killing as a “murder based on religious identity.”

On July 27, Shenouda Salah Asaad, a Copt, was stabbed to death, allegedly by a Salafist neighbor, in al-Qusiyah, Assiut Governorate.  Salah’s wife was injured and hospitalized.  The investigative police in al-Qusiyah reportedly intensified efforts to arrest the perpetrator.  At year’s end, there had been no official confirmation of his apprehension.

In April, sectarian clashes in al-Mudmar village in Sohag Governorate resulted in at least one death and six injuries that required hospitalization.  Witnesses in al-Mudmar said that the events began with a dispute between two Copts, and later drew in a Muslim would-be mediator.  Following the violence, security forces moved into the village.  Eyewitness residents said the village generally experienced amicable relations between Muslims and Christians.

On October 11, local media reported that a female pharmacist working in Sharqia Governorate accused her coworkers of assaulting, harassing, and persecuting her for her decision not to wear a hijab.  The pharmacist filed a report with the Zagazig District police department against her colleagues, prompting the Governor of Sharqia to offer support, pending investigation by the prosecution.  The pharmacist also appealed to the Pharmacists Syndicate to intervene, and one of her colleagues documented the alleged assault in her workplace with a video that was widely circulated on Facebook.  One week after the pharmacist’s complaint, the Supreme State Security Prosecution ordered her detained for 15 days pending investigation on charges of “joining a terrorist group and spreading false news.”  In November and again on December 21, the State Security Prosecution Office extended the pharmacist’s detention by 15 days.  The pharmacist remained in detention at year’s end.

In September, the press reported that two doctors and another employee at a Cairo hospital had anonymously posted a video to social media of them bullying a nurse and demanding that he kneel and pray to a dog.  The nurse stated that it would be a sin for all of them if he complied.  The press reported that there was a “wave of indignation on social media.”   The Ministry of Health later said that it fired the senior doctor; the country’s Prosecutor General ordered the three men detained, pending an investigation on charges of bullying, abuse of power, and contempt of religion.  The case was referred to a criminal court, which sentenced the three to two years in prison in October.

Religious discrimination in private sector hiring continued, according to human rights groups and religious communities.

A July report by the NGO Coptic Solidarity stated that out of 141 athletes on the national Olympic team that competed in the 2020 Tokyo games (held in 2021), only one was a Copt.  The Olympic teams in 2012 and 2016 had similar breakdowns, which the NGO stated was due to “entrenched, deep-rooted, systematic, and systemic discrimination against the Copts.”

In February, Al-Monitor, a news website, reported that Christian soccer players formed a team, Je Suis Club, in 2016 to provide Christians playing opportunities.  The report stated that the main Egyptian teams, including Zamalek, Ahli, Ismaili, and the Alexandria Union, had only Muslim players on their rosters.

During a nationally broadcast television program, an al-Azhar University professor responded to the beating of a woman by her husband by saying that women tended to exaggerate when complaining, that no man would resort to this degree of violence unless strongly provoked, and that wives were guilty of bringing domestic violence upon themselves.  A local advocacy group for battered spouses posted the video on social media, criticizing the downplaying of spousal abuse by a member of the country’s religious establishment.  One of the professor’s female colleagues at al-Azhar’s Tadwein Center for Gender Studies denounced the professor’s televised statements and said Islam did not justify violence against women under any circumstances.

Reuters reported the country’s first all-female Muslim recitation choir, al-Hour, was challenging “deep-rooted taboos about women singing in public or reciting from the Quran.”  Al-Hour founder Nemaa Fathi said, “Having women in the Muslim religious chanting field not only breaks social stereotypes about female chanters.  It also gives a new, distinctive style to an art that has long been dominated by only men.”

The press reported that a video of a girls’ choir singing Christian hymns on the Cairo Metro was extensively reposted after initially having been posted by Nabila Makram, a Copt and Minister of Emigration and Expatriate Affairs.  One human rights lawyer characterized the singing as courageous, adding, “The reality is that Egyptian society is intolerant of Christians’ public expression of faith.”

In June, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar welcomed a proposal to establish a center in Egypt for Islamic studies, presented to him by a delegation from the Anglican Episcopal Church. The proposal was the first of its kind in the history of relations between al-Azhar and the Church.  Also included in the proposal were the establishment of an Islamic library, in cooperation with al-Azhar University.

In November, Patriarch Theodore II of Alexandria and All Africa inaugurated the Patriarchal Center for Studies and Dialogue in the Holy Monastery of St. Georgios in Cairo as a new center for interfaith and intercultural dialogue.

In October, the Syndicate of Musical Professions in Egypt issued a decision banning its members from dealing with Egyptian rapper Marwan Pablo due to his having “defiled a religious invocation” during a concert in New Cairo.  In a statement, the syndicate said that Marwan “repeated a well-known religious invocation but that he replaced its words with vulgarity and emptied it of its moral content.”

According to a January 8 report on Al-Monitor, following a decision by the Government of Pakistan to ban the release of a British film, The Lady of Heaven, a number of social media activists, Islamic scholars, and Salafist imams called for a ban on screening the film in Egypt.  They urged the issuance of fatwas prohibiting the viewing of the film and sent demands to the United Kingdom to stop the international distribution of the movie.  According to press, the film portrayed the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter Fatima, who also was the wife of Ali, fourth caliph of Sunni Muslims and first imam of Shia Muslims.  Several newspapers reported that the film featured the voice of the Prophet Muhammad as a narrator in the film.

On April 3, 22 royal mummies and 17 sarcophagi were transferred from the Egyptian Museum, in Tahrir Square, Cairo, to the National Museum of Egyptian Civilizations, also in Cairo.  During the transfer, prominent actors and actresses portrayed figures from the history of Egyptian civilizations, including the centuries-long coexistence of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – including prominent scenes within churches and synagogues.

The research and consulting firm PSB took a June poll of youth between the ages of 17 and 24 in 17 Arab states and reported 24 percent of Egyptian respondents said that their religion was the most important factor in their personal identity, which was lower than the regionwide result of 34 percent.  Other choices offered by the poll as possible responses included family/tribe, nationality, Arabic heritage, political beliefs, language, and gender.

U.S. government officials at multiple levels, including the Ambassador, other embassy officials, and other senior Administration officials, regularly raised religious freedom concerns with senior government officials.  The Ambassador and other embassy representatives discussed church legalization and construction, preservation of Jewish cultural heritage and sites, interfaith dialogue, and countering religious extremism with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, members of parliament, regional governors, senior religious leaders, and civil society and minority religious groups.  In these meetings, embassy officers emphasized the U.S. commitment to religious freedom and raised issues including alleged harassment of religious converts; prospective changes to Egypt’s Personal Status Law; recognition of Baha’is, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Church of Jesus Christ; access to Jewish communal archives; and the use of religious designations on national identity cards.

Throughout the year, embassy representatives met with senior officials in the offices of the Grand Imam of al-Azhar; Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawadros II; bishops and senior pastors of Catholic, Protestant, and Anglican Churches; and members of the Jewish community.  In these meetings, embassy staff members discussed cases in which administrative courts applied inconsistent or discriminatory standards to members of unrecognized religious minorities; prosecuted individuals for religious defamation; and enabled religious discrimination via the continued inclusion of religious designations on national identity cards.  They also discussed progress on religious freedom issues such as continued issuance of permits for and new construction of churches, political support for Christian and Jewish communities, and the protection and restoration of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish religious sites.

U.S. officials met with human rights activists and religious and community leaders to discuss contemporary incidents of sectarian conflict and gather information to raise in meetings with government officials.  Embassy officials on several occasions attended court hearings or submitted letters to court officials expressing official interest in cases of Egyptians held in pretrial confinement based on religious statements or writings.

On April 18, following a five-year restoration project implemented through U.S. funding, the Ambassador attended the reopening of the country’s largest mausoleum dome:  the tomb of Imam Abu Abdullah Mohammed bin Idris al-Shafie, the founder of the Shafie school of Islamic jurisprudence.  On August 28, the Ambassador toured Sohag Governorate’s Red and White Monasteries – 3rd Century monastic churches that are among the best preserved of their kind in the country – where he met with church officials, observed more than five million dollars worth of U.S.-funded preservation work, and emphasized the U.S. commitment to preserving the country’s religious and cultural heritage.  On September 15, the Ambassador opened a U.S.-government-supported academic conference on the 12th-century Jewish rabbi and scholar Maimonides, reminding attendees in his remarks of the centrality of religious freedom to the founding principles of the United States and the longstanding history of pluralism in Egypt.  On October 20, the embassy held the public launch of a girls’ empowerment event in Upper Egypt.  The three million dollar program, with a strong emphasis on religious tolerance, was being implemented in the governorates of Qena and Minya, two areas historically characterized by higher levels of interreligious discord between Muslims and Copts.  In the second half of the year, the embassy conducted a six-month virtual interfaith dialogue program with U.S. and Egyptian Muslim and Christian religious influencers focused on conflict resolution and peace building.  The embassy facilitated a 12-week professional development course for more than 70 English language instructors at al-Azhar University, allowing for broader U.S. government engagement with al-Azhar and, according to al-Azhar staff members, allowing the institution to better engage with the outside world.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 6.5 million (midyear 2021).  According to a February survey by the University of Central America’s Institute of Public Opinion, 43.3 percent of the population identifies as Catholic, 33.9 percent as evangelical Protestant, and 18.6 percent with no religious affiliation.  Approximately 3 percent state “other,” which includes Anglicans, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Muslims, Baha’is, Jews, Buddhists, and members of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness.  Approximately 1.2 percent of the population identifies as agnostic or atheist.  A small segment of the population adheres to indigenous religious beliefs, with some mixing of these beliefs with Christianity and Islam.  Muslim leaders estimate there are approximately 500 Muslims.  According to Imam Emerson Bukele, President Nayib Bukele’s half-brother, the 20,000 estimate in 2020 likely represents individuals of Palestinian descent, most of whom are Christian and not Muslim.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the free exercise of religion.  It states all persons are equal before the law and prohibits discrimination based on religion.  The PDDH monitors the state of religious freedom in the country, including issuing special reports and accepting petitions from the public for alleged violations of the free exercise of religion.

The penal code imposes criminal sentences of one to three years on individuals who publicly offend or insult the religious beliefs of others, or damage or destroy religious objects.  The law defines an offense as an action that prevents or disrupts the free exercise of religion, publicly disavows religious traditions, or publicly insults an individual’s beliefs or religious dogma.  Sentences increase to four to eight years when individuals commit such acts to gain media attention.  Repeat offenders may face prison sentences of three to five years.

The constitution states members of the clergy may not occupy the positions of President, cabinet ministers, vice ministers, Supreme Court justices, judges, governors, attorney general, public defender, and other senior government positions.  Members of the clergy may not belong to political parties.  The electoral code requires judges of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and members of municipal councils to be laypersons.

The law restricts support of and interaction with gangs, including by clergy members, and defines gangs as terrorist organizations.  Rehabilitation programs and ministry activities for gang members, however, are legal.

The constitution allows religious groups to apply for official recognition by registering with the government.  It grants automatic official recognition to the Catholic Church and exempts it from registration requirements and from government financial oversight.  Religious groups may operate without registering, but registration provides tax-exempt status and facilitates activities requiring official permits, such as building places of worship.  To register, a religious group must apply through the Office of the Director General for Nonprofit Associations and Foundations (DGFASFL) in the Ministry of Governance.  The group must present its constitution and bylaws describing the type of organization, location of its offices, its goals and principles, requirements for membership, functions of its ruling bodies, and assessments or dues.  The DGFASFL analyzes the group’s constitution and bylaws to ensure both comply with the law.  Upon approval, the government publishes the group’s constitution and bylaws in the official gazette.  The DGFASFL does not maintain records on religious groups once it approves their status, and there are no requirements for renewal of registration.

By law, the Ministry of Governance has authority to register, regulate, and oversee the finances of nongovernmental organizations and all religious groups except the Catholic Church, due to its special legal recognition under the constitution.  Foreign religious groups must obtain special residence visas for religious activities, including proselytizing, and may not proselytize while on visitor or tourist visas.  Religious groups must be registered to be eligible for their members to receive this special residence visa for religious activities.

The penal code imposes criminal sentences of six months to two years for individuals who publicly offend or insult the religious beliefs of others or damage or destroy religious objects.  If these acts are carried out with the purpose of publicity, sentences may increase to one to three years in prison.

Public education, as funded by the government, is secular and there is no religious education component.  The constitution grants the right to establish private schools, including schools run by religious groups, which operate without government support or funding.  Parents choose whether their children receive religious education in private schools.  Public schools may not deny admittance to any student based on religion.  All private schools, religiously affiliated or not, must meet the same academic standards to obtain Ministry of Education approval.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to the Attorney General’s Office, during the year, authorities prosecuted one case under the penal code for publicly offending or insulting the religious beliefs of others; it did not provide details on the case.  At year’s end, the PDDH reported it had not received notice of any cases of alleged violations of religious freedom.

According to the Ministry of Governance, there were 169 requests for registration of religious groups during the year, compared with 122 in 2020.  Of these, the ministry approved 28 and denied 24 because of incomplete documentation; 117 were pending at year’s end.  Government officials said the COVID-19 pandemic continued to impact the registration process because several officials from the ministry teleworked and did not have access to all relevant documents.  The Ministry of Governance reported that although the registration process was available electronically, many religious groups did not present the required documents in a timely manner.  According to the ministry, delays in registration approvals occurred because religious groups were first required to obtain legal entity documentation and the paperwork that they submitted to the ministry was incorrect or incomplete.

Although the Minister of Prisons officially prohibited religious organizations, nonprofit organizations, and the PDDH from visiting prisons due to COVID-19 safety protocols, several religious organizations reported they had sporadic access to prisoners.

Alvaro Rafael Saravia Merino, a former military captain with an outstanding arrest warrant for the killing Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero in 1980 as he celebrated Mass, remained a fugitive.  In March, civil rights attorneys stated that 41 years after the crime, the case still had not advanced.  They accused the Attorney General’s Office of negligence by not appointing a team to investigate the case, which remained pending at year’s end.

In February, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Spain dismissed former Salvadoran army colonel Inocente Orlando Montano’s appeal and ratified his sentence of 133 years and four months in prison.  In September 2020, Spain’s highest criminal court, Audencia Nacional, sentenced Montano for planning and ordering the November 1989 killings of five Spanish Jesuits at the Central American University in San Salvador.

According to press reports, the Attorney General’s Office had not replied to the December 2020 request by human rights advocates to reopen the case against former generals Juan Orlando Zepeda and Francisco Helena Fuentes and former president Alfredo Cristiani, all accused of planning the 1989 Jesuit killings.  Jesuit priest Jose Maria Tojeira said he was pressing the Prosecutor’s Office to reopen the cases and to investigate two magistrates who had ruled to close the cases in September 2020 because he said they seemed to intentionally ignore a 2007 decision by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court.  The 2007 decision annulled the 1993 amnesty law, which had provided amnesty against prosecution to war criminals, including the perpetrators of the 1989 Jesuit killings.

On April 12, gang members assaulted an elderly priest, Father Gregorio Landaverde, in Santa Tecla, La Libertad Municipality, when he unknowingly drove into a gang-controlled neighborhood to find an alternative route around a traffic jam.  When Landaverde, pastor of the Asuncion Pleca Parish in the Delgado Municipality, stopped to ask for directions, gang members immediately surrounded him and searched his truck, where they found a machete that he had used the previous day to clear land for relatives, which gang members said made the priest a potential threat.  The gang members beat him with stones, took his wallet, and damaged his car.  Landaverde was hospitalized, and the parish church cancelled Mass until Landaverde recovered.

In January, Father Manuel Acosta, a professor of theology at the Jose Simeon Canas Central American University, told Catholic press outlet Crux that he was disturbed about the violence against Catholic priests, including the thus far unexplained killings of three priests in fewer than three years ending in 2020.  All were his former students.  “I had no words,” said Acosta recalling his thought the morning he heard of the killing in August 2020 of yet another former student, Father Ricardo Cortez, who was found dead after being shot in the head.

According to law enforcement representatives, gang members continued to extort organizations with known funding streams, including religious groups, demanding payments in exchange for allowing them to operate in some territories.  Reports of criminals targeting churches, stealing religious relics and other valuable cultural items, and violently assaulting parishioners continued.

According to media, on July 28, security guards killed one thief and injured another when they attempted to rob the Los Heraldos del Evangelio Catholic Church in the Santa Elena neighborhood of San Salvador.  A third assailant escaped.  Authorities investigated the incident and charged the injured suspect with trespassing; he remained in detention and awaited trial at year’s end.

Media again reported, and religious leaders also said, former gang members who joined evangelical Protestant churches were allowed to leave their gang to dedicate themselves to their faith only after they gained approval from their gang leaders.  According to the national police, conversion to an evangelical Protestant group was a way out of gang membership from which there was otherwise no exit.  Gangs continued to monitor former members for years after they left the gang to ensure they were routinely attending church services and following strict religious practices.  If the gang discovered the religious conversion was not authentic, the penalty for the deception was death.  For some gangs, even if a member was allowed to leave for religious reasons, the member still could be called to rejoin the gang as needed.  According to law enforcement representatives, the gangs used death threats against these former gang members or their families to force their return to the gang.

According to the Pew Research Center’s 12th annual study of restrictions on religion, issued in September but covering 2019, El Salvador had a moderate decrease in its social hostilities index compared with Pew’s 11th annual report issued in 2018 and covering 2019.  The social hostilities index measured acts of religious hostility by private individuals and societal organizations or groups.

On September 14, embassy officials discussed with the PDDH the importance of government officials carrying out their duties to protect the rights of all individuals, including religious freedom, regardless of the officials’ personal religious affiliation or beliefs.

On May 6, an embassy official attended an iftar at the Hispano-American Islamic Mosque, under the leadership of Imam Bukele.  The official and the imam discussed the challenges the Muslim community faced in a predominantly Christian country and the importance of respecting religious tolerance and diversity.

During the year, embassy officials met with religious leaders from the evangelical Protestant, Anglican, and Catholic Churches, as well as the Baha’i Faith, to discuss religious freedom issues and the difficulties religious groups experienced in attempting to reach followers in gang-controlled territories.  Embassy officials stressed the importance of filing complaints with law enforcement agencies and the PDDH.

On October 27, in support of International Religious Freedom Day, the embassy tweeted, “Religious freedom is a human right,” highlighting the importance of supporting religious freedom in the country and globally.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 857,000 (midyear 2021).  The most recent local census, conducted in 2015, estimates the total population at 1.2 million.  According to the most recent government estimate from 2015, 88 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 5 percent Protestant.  Many Christians reportedly practice some aspects of traditional indigenous religions as well.  Two percent of the population is Muslim, mainly Sunni, according to the 2015 census.  Most of the Muslim population consists of expatriates from West Africa.  The remaining 5 percent adhere to animism, the Baha’i Faith, Judaism, or other beliefs.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and worship and prohibits political parties based on religious affiliation.  The law states there is no national religion and individuals are free to change religions.  By law, Christians converting to Islam are permitted to add Muslim names to their Christian names on their official documents.

Neither the Catholic Church nor the Protestant Reformed Church of Equatorial Guinea, the two largest religious groups in the country, are required to register with the MJRAPI.  The only religious group to receive state funding for operating educational institutions is the Catholic Church.

Some longstanding religious groups, such as Methodists, Muslims, and Baha’is, hold permanent government authorizations and are not required to renew their registrations with the MJRAPI.  Newer groups and denominations may be required to renew their registration annually.  To register, religious groups at the congregational level must submit a written application to the MJRAPI director general of religious affairs.  Groups seeking to register must supply detailed information about the leadership (e.g., curriculum vitae) and membership of the group, construction plans for religious buildings, property ownership documents, accreditations, and a mission statement from the religious organization’s headquarters, and must pay a fee of 500,000 Central African francs (CFA francs) ($860).  The director general of religious affairs adjudicates these applications and may order an inspection by the MJRAPI before processing.  The government may fine or shut down unregistered groups.  The law requires a permit for door-to-door proselytizing.

An MJRAPI decree specifies that any religious activities taking place outside the hours of 6 a.m. to 9 p.m. or outside of registered places of worship require preauthorization from the ministry.  The decree prohibits religious acts or preaching within private residences if those acts involve persons who do not live there.  Foreign religious representatives or authorities must obtain advance permission from the MJRAPI to lead or speak at religious activities, but such permission is not required simply to attend services.  The MJRAPI permission is usually granted for the duration of the foreign religious representative’s visit to the country.  The decree exempts the Catholic Church.

The government recognizes official documents issued by authorized religious groups, such as birth certificates and marriage certificates.

The constitution states individuals are free to study religion in schools and may not be forced to study a faith other than their own.  Catholic religious classes are part of the public school curriculum, but such study may be replaced by non-Catholic religious study or by a recess with a note from a leader of another religious group.

There are several Catholic schools.  Protestant groups, including the Reformed Church, Seventh-day Adventists, Assemblies of God, Methodists, Baptists, and other Christians, operate primary and secondary schools.  These schools must be registered with the government and fulfill standard curriculum requirements.

Most foreigners, including foreign evangelical Christian missionaries, are required to obtain residency permits to remain in the country.  Catholic missionaries are exempt from the residency permit requirement.

By law, the National Day of Prayer, usually celebrated on the first Sunday in April, is an annual event.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.v

Government Practices

In February, the MJRAPI applied a new regulation requiring all evangelical Christian missionaries and leaders, including those previously approved, to submit their theological certificates (i.e., educational credentials or proof of their religious qualifications) as a requirement for their religious groups to continue operating in the country.  This resulted in the dissolution of several unregistered evangelical Christian groups, which, according to sources, at least one evangelical leader believed was the underlying intent of the new rule.  Some evangelical Christian leaders said privately that the new regulation discriminated against them, since it was not applied to all religious groups.  Government officials said the new regulation had been imposed because many evangelical Christian churches had been involved in community scandals or were not respecting the norms for religious practice established by the MJRAPI.  The new regulation did not apply to the Catholic Church or the Reformed Church.

During the year, the government increased the price of registration of religious groups from 100,000 to 500,000 CFA francs ($170 to $860), and some religious groups were granted exceptions by the government and allowed to reregister every two years instead of annually.

While the government continued routinely to grant permission for religious groups to hold activities outside of places of worship, with the exception of private homes, it usually denied permits to hold activities outside of the prescribed hours of 6 a.m. to 9 p.m., according to religious leaders.  Authorities permitted all religious groups, including a small number of Baha’i and Jewish groups, to hold services as long as they finished before 9 p.m. and did not disturb the peace.  Evangelical Christian groups stated they continued to hold activities in places of worship outside the prescribed hours with no repercussions.

Evangelical Christians continued to report that residency permits (which are separate from group registration permits) were prohibitively expensive at 400,000 CFA francs ($690) for a two-year period, leading some missionaries to risk the consequences of not obtaining or renewing their permits.  Local police reportedly enforced the requirement with threats of deportation and requested a small bribe as an alternative.  There were no deportations reported.  While the residency permit fee for foreign missionaries was the same as for all other foreigners, if the missionary coordinated with the MJRAPI and was part of a religious group present in the country since independence, a residency permit could be obtained for free, provided applicants could prove their missionary status, meet the new requirement to submit a theological certificate, and pass the requisite security checks.  Catholic missionaries did not require residency permits to remain in the country.

Catholic masses remained a normal part of all major ceremonial functions and were held, for example, on Independence Day (October 12) and the President’s Birthday holiday (June 5).  Catholic leaders were the only religious leaders to regularly meet publicly with the highest-level government officials.  Catholic and Reformed Church leaders were often seated in preferred locations at official functions.

Some non-Catholics who worked for the government continued to report that their supervisors strongly encouraged participation in religious activities related to their government positions, including attending Catholic masses.  Government officials stated that it was expected that they attend major events such as the President’s Birthday Mass at nearby Catholic churches.

The government again did not allow the Muslim community to celebrate Eid al-Adha in Malabo Stadium due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions.

The National Day of Prayer celebration was again held online due to the pandemic.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The Ambassador met with government officials, including the MJRAPI minister, to discuss the importance of religious freedom, efforts to promote religious tolerance, and respect for human rights

Embassy officials also spoke with the Catholic Archbishop of Malabo, evangelical Christian pastors, Protestant leaders, and representatives of the Muslim and Baha’i communities for their insights, as well as to discuss the need to promote mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect for all religious groups, especially for minority religious groups.

Renovation of the Batete Catholic Church – a project developed in 2019 with funding from the embassy, a U.S. oil company, and the national government – continued to be delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 6.1 million (midyear 2021).  The UN estimates a population of approximately 3.5 million.  Reliable population data in the country is difficult to gather.  There are no reliable figures on religious affiliation.  The Pew Foundation in 2016 estimated the population to be 63 percent Christian and 37 percent Muslim.  Some government, religious, and international sources estimate the population to be 49 percent Christian and 49 percent Sunni Muslim.  The Christian population is predominantly Eritrean Orthodox.  Catholics, Protestants, and other Christian denominations, including Jehovah’s Witnesses and Pentecostals, constitute less than 5 percent of the Christian population.  Some estimates suggest 2 percent of the population is traditionally animist.  The Baha’i community reports approximately 500 members, half of whom reside in the capital, Asmara.  Only one Jew is known to remain in the country and resides in Eritrea only on a part-time basis.

A majority of the population in the southern and central regions is Christian, while the northern areas are majority Muslim.  A majority of the Tigrinya, the largest ethnic group, is Christian.  Seven of the other eight principal ethnic groups, the Tigre, Saho, Afar, Bilen, Hedareb, Nara, and the Rashaida, are predominantly Muslim and reside mainly in the northern regions of the country.  The Kunama are diverse, with Christians, Muslims, and animists.

Legal Framework

The law and unimplemented constitution prohibit religious discrimination and provide for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief and the freedom to practice any religion.

Proclamation 73/1995, which serves as the guiding law on religious issues, calls for separation of religion and state; outlines the parameters to which religious organizations must adhere, including concerning foreign relations and social activities; establishes an Office of Religious Affairs; and requires religious groups to register with the government or cease activities.  Some members of religious groups that are unregistered or otherwise not in compliance with the law reportedly continue to be subject to the former provisional penal code, which sets penalties for failure to register and noncompliance.  A new penal code was promulgated in 2015 that does not directly address penalties for religious groups that fail to register or otherwise comply with the law, but it includes a punishment for “unlawful assembly” of between one and six months’ imprisonment and a fine of 5,001 to 20,000 nakfa ($330-$1,300); however, the new code has not yet been implemented.

The Office of Religious Affairs has authority to regulate religious activities and institutions, including approval of the applications of religious groups seeking official registration.  Each application must include a description of the group’s history in the country; an explanation of the uniqueness or benefit the group offers compared with other registered religious groups; names and personal information of the group’s leaders; detailed information on assets; a description of the group’s conformity to local culture; and a declaration of all foreign sources of funding.

The Office of Religious Affairs has registered four religious groups:  the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahedo Church, Sunni Islam, the Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Eritrea (affiliated with the Lutheran World Federation).  While Baha’is are not one of the four officially recognized religions, they have registered every year since 1959, the year the chapter was established, and have “de facto” recognition from the government.  A synagogue exists in Asmara, but there are not enough adherents for regular services.  A 2002 decree requires all other religious groups to submit registration applications and to cease religious activities and services prior to approval.

Religious groups must obtain government approval to build facilities for worship.

While the law does not specifically address religious education in public schools, Proclamation 73/1995 outlines the parameters to which religious organizations must adhere, and education is not included as an approved activity.

By law, all citizens between ages 18 and 50 must perform 18 months of national service, with limited exceptions, including for health reasons such as physical disability or pregnancy.  In times of emergency, the length of national service may be extended indefinitely, and the country officially has been in a state of emergency since the beginning of the 1998 war with Ethiopia.  There is also a compulsory militia for all men not in the military, including many who had been demobilized from National Service, otherwise exempted from military service in the past, or are elderly.  Failure to participate in the militia or national service may result in detention.  Militia duties mostly involve security-related activities, such as airport or neighborhood patrolling, and agricultural work.  Militia training primarily involves occasional marches and listening to patriotic lectures.  The law does not provide for conscientious objector status for religious reasons, nor are there alternative activities for persons willing to perform national service but unwilling to engage in military or militia activities.

The law prohibits any involvement in politics by religious groups.

The government requires all citizens to obtain an exit visa prior to departing the country.  The application requests the applicant’s religious affiliation, but the law does not require that information.

The law limits foreign financing for religious groups, including registered groups.  The only contributions legally allowed are from local followers, the government, or government-approved foreign sources.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

During the year, the government both arrested and released individuals imprisoned on the basis of religion.  According to CSW, officials released 70 Christian prisoners in the first two months of the year, six on January 27, and 64 on February 1.  On April 5, Release International reported two new sets of arrests, one set of 23 persons in Asmara and the other of 12 persons in Assab.  On April 12, the BBC reported that 36 Christians were released on bail, including 22 from the previous group in Asmara reported by Release International and 14 who had been in prison on the Dahlak Islands for four years.  According to Christian Today’s September reporting, authorities arrested 15 Christians, all of whom had previously been imprisoned for their religion.

NGOs estimated authorities continued to detain from 130 to more than 1,000 people due to their faith.  Determining more precisely the number of persons imprisoned for their religious beliefs was difficult due to lack of government transparency and the reported intimidation of those who might come forward with such information.

Authorities reportedly continued to detain 24 Jehovah’s Witnesses, more than half of whom had been in prison for more than 20 years, for refusing to participate in military service or renounce their faith.  At least 20 Muslim protesters reportedly remained in detention following protests in Asmara in October 2017 and March 2018.

Eritrean Orthodox Church Patriarch Abune Antonios, who last appeared in public in July 2017, has remained under house detention since 2006 for protesting government interference in Church affairs.

The government continued to single out Jehovah’s Witnesses for particularly harsh treatment because of their blanket refusal to vote in the 1993 referendum on the country’s independence and subsequent refusal to participate in mandatory national service, for which the government stripped them of their citizenship in 1994.  The government continued to detain Jehovah’s Witnesses and other religious prisoners for failure to follow the law or for national security reasons and continued to deny them citizenship.  Authorities’ treatment of religious prisoners appeared to have been inconsistent.  In some prisons, religious prisoners reportedly were not allowed to have visitors, but in others, visitors were allowed.  Some former prisoners held for their religious beliefs continued to report harsh detention conditions, including solitary confinement, physical abuse, and inadequate food, water, and shelter.  Other former religious prisoners reported acceptable conditions, adequate food, and no physical abuse.

Government authorization remained necessary for any organization to print and distribute documents; for religious groups, that authorization needed to come from the Office of Religious Affairs, which continued to approve requests only from the four officially registered religious groups.

The government continued to impose restrictions on proselytizing, accepting external funding from international NGOs and international organizations, and groups selecting their own religious leaders.  Unregistered religious groups also faced restrictions in gathering for worship, constructing places of worship, and teaching their religious beliefs to others, although they reported that in many cases the government unofficially allowed them to worship in private homes as long as it was done discreetly.

The government, which has not approved the registration of additional religious groups since 2002, again approved no new religious groups during the year.  Unrecognized religious groups expressed fear that applying would open them to further repression.

Jehovah’s Witnesses were largely unable to obtain official identification documents, which left many of them unable to study in government institutions and barred them from most forms of employment, government benefits, access to bank accounts, and travel.

Arrests and releases often went unreported.  Information from outside the capital was extremely limited.  Independent observers stated many persons remained imprisoned without charge.

The government continued to detain without due process persons associated with unregistered religious groups, occasionally for long periods, and sometimes on the grounds of threatening national security, according to minority religious group members and international NGOs.  Their eventual release from detention was sometimes conditioned on a formal renunciation of their faith.

Religious observers continued to report the government denied many exit visa applications for individuals seeking to travel to international religious conferences.  According to a 2019 report by the European Asylum Support Office, the issuance of exit visas was inconsistent and did not adhere to any consistent policy; members of unrecognized religious communities could be denied exit visas solely on the basis of their religious affiliation.

The government continued to ban all other practices of Islam other than Sunni Islam.

Official attitudes differed toward members of unregistered religious groups worshipping in homes or rented facilities.  Some local authorities reportedly tolerated the presence and activities of unregistered groups, while others attempted to prevent them from meeting.  Local authorities sometimes denied government ration coupons to Jehovah’s Witnesses and members of Pentecostal groups.  Some religious prisoners reported they were allowed to worship together in prison as long as they did so quietly.

Diaspora groups reported authorities controlled directly or indirectly virtually all activities of the four formally recognized groups.  The leaders of the four groups continued to say that their officially registered members did not face impediments to religious practice.  Individuals also reported restrictions on clergy meeting with foreign diplomats.

The government announced plans to continue its confiscation and nationalization of Catholic schools, begun in 2018.  In June, it announced the scheduled closure of the remaining early childhood and intermediate primary schools, prompting the Eritrean Catholic Bishops collective to issue a letter denouncing the action, as “…explicitly detrimental to the most elementary principles of justice….”  As of year’s end, the schools remained open, according to Catholic sources.

Most places of worship unaffiliated with the four officially registered religious groups remained closed to worship, but many of those buildings remained physically intact and undamaged.  Religious structures formerly used by the Jewish and Greek Orthodox communities in Asmara have been preserved.  The government protected the historic synagogue, which was maintained by the last Jew known to be remaining in the country.  The Greek Orthodox Church remained open as a cultural building, and as there is no longer a Greek Orthodox community; members of the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahedo Church sometimes held religious services on the site.  Other structures belonging to unregistered groups, such as the Church of Christ, remained shuttered.  The government allowed the Baha’i center in Asmara to remain open, and the members of the center had unrestricted access to the building.  A Baha’i temple outside of Asmara was allowed to operate.  There were indications other unregistered groups, including Seventh-day Adventists and the Faith Mission Church, operated to some degree.  The Anglican Church building held services, but only under the auspices of the registered Evangelical Lutheran Church.

Some church leaders continued to state that the government’s restriction on foreign financing reduced church income and religious participation by preventing churches from training clergy or building or maintaining facilities.

Government control of all mass media, as well as a fear of imprisonment or other government actions, continued to restrict the ability of unregistered religious group members to bring attention to government actions against them, according to observers.  Restrictions on public assembly and freedom of speech severely limited the ability of unregistered religious groups to assemble and conduct worship in a designated place of worship, according to group members.

Observers noted that the government exerted significant direct and indirect influence over the appointment of heads of recognized religious communities, including the Eritrean Orthodox Church and the Sunni Islamic community; some international NGOs said that authorities directly controlled the appointments.  The government denied this, stating these decisions were made entirely by religious communities.  The sole political party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, led by President Isaias Afwerki, de facto appointed both the head of the Sunni Islamic community and the head of the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahedo Church, as well as some lower-level officials for both communities.  On May 12, the Synod of the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahedo Church elected the fifth patriarch, Abune Qerlos, six years after the death of the fourth patriarch, Abune Dioskoros, (and 15 years after the arrest of third Patriarch Abune Antonios, still seen as the rightful patriarch by many followers).  On July 10, Acting Mufti Sheikh Salim Ibrahim al-Muktar was elected Mufti of Eritrea, a position left vacant since 2017.

While the overwhelming majority of high-level officials, both military and civilian, were Christian, four ministers in the 17-member cabinet, the Asmara mayor, and at least one senior military leader, were Muslims.

The government said its official party doctrine promoted national citizenship above religious sectarianism and stated that it did not officially prefer any religion.  Programs in support of this doctrine included National Service and required attendance for all 12th graders at Warsay Yikealo Secondary School at Sawa (co-located with a defense training center) where students from across the country study and receive military training.

While government control of all media and public discourse limited information available concerning societal actions affecting religious freedom, religious tolerance appeared to international observers to be widespread within society.  Churches and mosques are located in close proximity to each other, and most citizens congratulated members of other religious groups on the occasions of religious holidays and other events.  There were no reports of sectarian violence, and most towns and ethnic groups included members from all of the major religious groups.

Some Christian leaders continued to report Muslim leaders and communities were willing to collaborate on community projects.  Ecumenical and interreligious committees did not exist, although local leaders met informally.  Some shrines were venerated by both Orthodox and Muslim believers.  Some Muslims expressed privately their feelings of stress and scrutiny in professional and educational settings because of their religion.

Embassy representatives met with government officials to raise religious freedom concerns, including seeking ways to accommodate unregistered groups.  They also advocated for the release of Jehovah’s Witnesses, including the remaining 24 still in prison, and for an alternative service option for conscientious objectors refusing to bear arms for religious reasons, and they expressed concern over the continued detention of Patriarch Abune Antonios.  Officials in Washington shared similar concerns with officials at the Eritrean embassy.  Embassy officials raised issues of religious freedom with a wide range of partners, including visiting international delegations, Asmara-based and regionally based diplomats accredited to the government, UN officials, and other international organization representatives.  They used social media to highlight the importance of religious tolerance and employed public diplomacy programs to engage the public and highlight the commitment of the United States to religious freedom and to rebut government statements denying persecution, such as an embassy Facebook post on September 16 highlighting the recent arrest of Christians at the same time the government claimed it supported a “culture of tolerance.”

Since 2004, Eritrea has been designated as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, section 402(b), for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.  On November 15, 2021, the Secretary of State redesignated Eritrea as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation:  the ongoing denial of licenses or other approvals for exports or imports of defense articles and services as referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(n) pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.2 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2011 census (the most recent data available), 29 percent of the population is religiously affiliated, 54 percent do not identify with any religion, and 17 percent do not state an affiliation.  According to Estonian Council of Churches data from December 2020, 13 percent of the population belong to the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church, while 13.9 percent belong to the Estonian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (EOCMP), and 2.3 percent belong to the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church.  The Union of Free Evangelical and Baptist Churches of Estonia and the Roman Catholic Church together comprise 1 percent of the population.  Other Christian groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, Methodists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Russian Old Believers, collectively constitute 1.1 percent of the population.  According to the 2011 census, there are small Jewish and Muslim communities of 2,500 members and 1,500 members, respectively.  Most religious adherents among the Russian-speaking population belong to the EOCMP and reside mainly in the capital or the northeastern part of the country.  According to 2011 census data, most of the country’s community of Russian Old Believers live along the west bank of Lake Peipsi in the eastern part of the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares there is no state church and stipulates freedom for individuals to belong to any religious group and practice any religion, both alone and in community with others, in public or in private, unless doing so is “detrimental to public order, health, or morals.”  The constitution also prohibits incitement of religious hatred, violence, or discrimination.  According to the penal code, an act inciting hatred is a crime if it results in danger to the life, health, or property of a person.  The law also states that violations are punishable by fines or up to three years in prison.  The constitution recognizes the right to refuse military service for religious reasons but requires conscientious objectors to perform alternative service for the same amount of time required for military service as provided by law.

Although gender discrimination and discrimination based on race or ethnicity are prohibited in employment, housing, healthcare, social welfare, education, goods and services, and other forms of discrimination, including that based on religion, are only prohibited for employment.  For these forms of discrimination there is no mechanism for affected individuals to receive state assistance or to claim compensation.

The law criminalizes activities that publicly incite hatred, violence, or discrimination on the basis of religion or other minority status if they result in danger to the life, health, or property of a person.  Violators are subject to a fine or detention.  The law prohibits any activity that knowingly interferes, without legal grounds, with the acknowledgement or declaration of religious beliefs or the absence thereof, or the exercise of religion or religious rites.  Violators are subject to a fine or up to one year’s imprisonment.

The law regulates the activities of religious associations and religious societies.  Religious associations are defined as churches, congregations, unions of congregations, and monasteries.  Churches, congregations, and unions of congregations are required to have a management board.  The management board has the right to invite a minister of religion from outside the country.  The residence of at least half the members of the management board must be in the country, in another member state of the European Economic Area, or in Switzerland.  The elected or appointed superior of a monastery serves as the management board for the monastery.  Religious societies are defined as voluntary organizations whose main activities include religious or ecumenical activities relating to morals, ethics, and culture and social rehabilitation activities outside the traditional forms of religious rites of a church or congregation.  Religious societies do not need to affiliate with a specific church or congregation.

The registration office of the Tartu County Court registers all religious associations and religious societies.  To register, a religious association must have at least 12 members, and its management board must submit a notarized or digitally signed application, the minutes of its constitutive meeting, and a copy of its statutes.  The law treats registered religious associations as nonprofit entities entitled to some tax benefits, such as a value-added tax exemption, if they apply for them.  There are more than 550 religious associations registered with the government.

The law does not prohibit activities by unregistered religious associations.  Unregistered religious associations, however, may not act as legal persons.  Unlike registered religious associations, unregistered associations are not eligible for tax benefits.

Religious societies are registered according to the law governing nonprofit associations and are entitled to the same tax benefits as religious associations.  To register as an NGO, a religious society must have a founding contract and statutes approved by its founders, who may be physical or legal persons.  The minimum number of founders is two.  The society must submit its registration application either electronically or on paper to the Tartu County Court registry office.

The law requires the commanding officer of each military unit to provide its members the opportunity to practice their religion.  Prison directors must also provide the opportunity for inmates to practice their religious beliefs.  The state funds police and border guard, military, and prison chaplains, who may belong to any registered religious denomination, and it must guarantee religious services for individuals of all faiths.

Optional basic religious instruction is available in public and private schools and is funded by the state.  All schools must provide religious studies at the primary and secondary levels if students request these studies.  The courses offer a general introduction to different faiths.  Religious studies instructors may be lay teachers.  There are also private religious schools.  All students, regardless of their religious affiliation or nonaffiliation, may attend religious schools.  Attendance at religious services in religious schools is voluntary.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Authorities arrested Kristo Kivisto for threats and defamation of a foreign symbol after Kivisto had advocated for the formation of a new cell of the violent Nordic Resistance Movement, generally characterized as far right.  Kivisto also made antisemitic comments online.  In February, the Parnu County Court sentenced him to six months’ probation on those charges.

On April 2, individuals threw eggs at the site of the Holocaust Memorial in Rahumae Jewish Cemetery.  Police identified those involved and filed charges under the penal code’s section on desecration of graves.

According to the government NGO register, two religious associations – both Christian congregations – registered with the government during the year.

The government allocated 646,000 euros ($732,000) to the Estonian Council of Churches.  The council, comprised of 10 Christian churches, including the Lutheran Church and both the Estonian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate and the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, continued to serve as an organization encompassing the country’s largest Christian communities.  The government continued to fund ecumenical activities, including ecclesiastical programs broadcast by the Estonian Broadcasting Company, youth work by churches, activities promoting interreligious dialogue, and religious publishing.

The Ministry of the Interior provided 103,179 euros ($117,000) in subsidies for the salaries of religious association employees to compensate for losses caused by COVID-19 restrictions.  All registered religious associations had the opportunity to apply for salary compensation.

in cases of suspected arson in February and again in June, fires broke out at the Orthodox Church of Narva Joesuu, in the northeast of the country.  The police opened a criminal investigation, which was pending at year’s end.  Due to the significant destruction of church property of historical and cultural value, the National Heritage Board allocated 100,000 euros ($113,000) to the restoration of the church.

In March and April, the government provided 65,100 euros ($73,800) to support televised prayer services on the Estonian Broadcasting Company when in-person religious services were restricted due to COVID-19.

In April 2020, the government pledged two million euros ($2.27 million) for support of religious associations struggling as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, both to the members of the Council of Churches and to other independent congregations, including the Estonian Jewish Congregation and the Jewish Community of Estonia.

On January 27, the government held its annual memorial event for Holocaust Remembrance Day at the Rahumae Jewish Cemetery in Tallinn.  Schools again participated in commemorative activities throughout the country.  The Education and Research Ministry, in cooperation with the Estonian Jewish community, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), the Estonian Memory Institute, and the Museum of Occupation, again organized an essay writing competition for schoolchildren on topics related to the lessons of the Holocaust.

The government is a member of IHRA.

In May, the government announced a reorganization and reduction of the military chaplain service due to state budget cuts.

On May 8 and in the last week of July, the Chaplain Service of the Estonian Defense Forces held annual commemorations honoring victims who lost their lives in the Second World War.

In August, unknown persons defaced a poster promoting vaccination with antisemitic graffiti in Tallinn.  City council member Vladimir Svet denounced the incident saying, “The district government takes such situations very seriously and condemns antisemitism and any incitement of hatred against any group.”  Police did not file formal charges due to what they stated was a lack of evidence and suspects.

According to government statistics, in 2020, the most recent year for which data was available, police registered three cases of physical abuse, breach of public order, or threats (as defined by law) that included hatred against persons belonging to religious or other minorities, compared with eight cases in 2019.  According to government sources, at least two of these cases were tied to the victim’s race or national origin.  Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

According to many religious and other civil society leaders, there was societal support for religious freedom and tolerance.

On September 5, the Jewish Community held its annual commemoration for the victims of the Holocaust at the memorial for the victims of Nazism at Kalevi-Liiva, with the participation of foreign diplomats and representatives of the state, municipalities, and public organizations.

Embassy officials raised the importance of combating antisemitism, promoting religious tolerance, and promoting Holocaust education in meetings with government officials from the Ministries of Interior, Culture, Education and Research, and Foreign Affairs.  The Charge regularly met with the leader of the Jewish community and participated in the Jewish community’s Yahad Conference, a forum on Estonian Jewry held in the city of Parnu.

Embassy officials met with members of the Jewish community, leaders of religious associations, including members of the Muslim community, representatives of the Council of Churches, civil society groups, and NGOs to discuss religious tolerance and the state of religious freedom in the country.  The embassy used social media to promote religious freedom, including a Facebook post celebrating International Religious Freedom Day.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.1 million (midyear 2021).  Religious leaders estimate that 90 percent of the population is Christian, approximately 2 percent is Muslim (of whom many are not ethnic Swati, the dominant ethnic group in the country), and the remainder belongs to other religious groups, including those with indigenous African beliefs.  According to anecdotal reports, approximately 40 percent of the population practices Zionism, a blend of Christianity and indigenous ancestral worship (some adherents of which self-identify as evangelical Christians), while another 20 percent is Roman Catholic.  Zionism is widely practiced in rural areas.  Other religious groups represented include Anglicans, Methodists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Jewish and Baha’i communities.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to worship, alone or in community with others, and to change religion or belief.  These rights may be limited by laws that are “reasonably required” in the interest of defense, public safety, order, morality, health, or protecting the rights of others.  The constitution provides religious groups the right to establish and operate private schools and to provide religious instruction for their students without interference from the government.

The law requires religious groups to register with the government.  The Ministry of Home Affairs is the government agency responsible for monitoring religious affairs in the country.  To register as a religious group, Christian groups must apply through one of the country’s three umbrella religious bodies – the League of Churches, Swaziland Conference of Churches, or Council of Swaziland Churches – for a recommendation, which is routinely granted and does not impede registration, according to church leaders.  The application process requires a group to provide its constitution, membership, and physical location, along with the relevant umbrella body’s recommendation, to the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Trade, which then registers the organization.  For indigenous religious groups and non-Christian religious organizations, authorities consider proof of a religious leader, a congregation, and a place of worship as sufficient grounds to grant registration.  Registered religious groups are exempt from taxation, but contributions are not tax deductible.

All prospective builders, including religious groups, must obtain government permission for the construction of new buildings in urban areas, and permission from the appropriate chief and chief’s advisory council for new buildings in rural areas.  In some rural communities, chiefs have designated special committees to allocate land to religious groups for a minimal fee.

Christian religious instruction is mandatory in public primary schools per a 2017 directive from the Prime Minister and is incorporated into the daily morning assembly.  Christian education is also compulsory in public secondary schools.  There are no opt-out procedures.  Religious education is neither prohibited nor mandated in private schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Representatives of various religious groups, including some Christians, said that the government policy declaring Christianity the only religion permitted to be taught in public schools and making Christian education compulsory was harmful to society because it fostered ignorance of other religions.  These groups included the Muslim community, Seventh-day Adventists, the Catholic Church, and representatives from the Jewish Community.  In particular, the Muslim community said the directive increased misperceptions of their faith because children learned about Islam from often erroneous information on social media instead of from materials taught in school.  Efforts launched in 2020 to consider revising the Christian education requirement did not advance during the year since sources stated that the country was preoccupied by the COVID-19 pandemic and widespread civil unrest that began in June after the government limited some political freedoms, precipitating widespread protests, violence, looting, arson, and large-scale destruction of property.  Security forces used deadly force to restore order, resulting in dozens of deaths and hundreds of injuries.  Reports stated that security forces used excessive force responding to the unrest.

According to religious leaders and civil society organizations, school administrations continued to permit only Christian religious youth clubs to operate in public schools.  In October, however, schools throughout the country closed “indefinitely” due to continued violence and protests.  Schools partially reopened in late December and were expected to open fully in 2022.  These school closures, combined with earlier closures due to COVID-19, meant that schools in the country were closed for almost the entire year, severely limiting the possibility for extracurricular activities and Christian clubs.

Seventh-day Adventists complained that many official functions, such as elections and school testing, took place on Saturdays and that they were often unable to receive religious exceptions.  Seventh-day Adventists also chose not to register under one of the three main religious umbrella bodies as required by law, and instead registered as a private entity.  Seventh-day Adventists stated that as a result, they were unable to have tax-exempt status like other registered religious groups.

Non-Christian groups reported the government continued to provide some preferential benefits to Christians, such as free time on state television and radio.  Government-owned television and radio stations broadcast daily morning and evening Christian programming.  The government continued to provide each of the three Christian umbrella religious bodies and their affiliates with free airtime to broadcast daily religious services on the state-run radio station.  Local newspapers provided free space in their announcement sections to Christian groups but not to non-Christian groups.

The monarchy, and by extension the government, continued to align itself with Christian faith-based groups and supported Christian activities such as commemorating Christian holidays.  Official government programs often opened with a Christian prayer, and several government ministers held Christian prayer vigils that civil servants were expected to attend.

In August, following widespread civil unrest in late June and early July, the King ordered the country to pray and fast for three days.  In September, at a government function, the King said he had received a message from God and issued a directive that government and municipality offices, private homes, and businesses throughout the country display signs proclaiming “Hallelujah” for a period of one month.  Authorities did not enforce the directive.  Citizens were frequently urged to attend royal festivals and events that celebrated traditional Swati culture and beliefs, and some reported fear of reprisal for nonattendance.

Muslim leaders continued to report negative and/or suspicious views of Islam in society.  Muslim leaders and business owners said they felt their community was unfairly targeted during civil unrest, as a significant percentage of the businesses that were looted and burned were owned by members of the Muslim community, although sources stated that it was unclear if this was due to religious or racial/ethnic bias.  Other observers attributed the motivation for attacks on Muslim-owned shops during the protests to racism and a widely held perception that the Asian community had close ties to the King.  Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, with Muslims in the country being primarily of South Asian descent, it was difficult to categorize such incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Due to complications from COVID-19 restrictions and ongoing civil unrest, the Baha’i community did not hold the planned interfaith devotional fellowship dialogues during the year, although Baha’i and Muslim faith groups sometimes collaborated on community service or development initiatives.

U.S. embassy officials engaged with government officials on religious freedom and tolerance issues.

The Ambassador and embassy officials also engaged with civil society, the academic community, and religious leaders of different faiths on religious issues such as the King’s directive to display “Hallelujah” signs, the importance of involving religious leaders in political discussions and in COVID-19 vaccination campaigns, and the importance of developing and maintaining interfaith dialogue in the country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 110.9 million (midyear 2021).  According to 2016 U.S. government estimates, 44 percent of the population adheres to the EOTC, 31 percent are Sunni Muslim, and 23 percent belong to evangelical Christian and Pentecostal groups, including the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Ethiopian Kale Heywet Church, and Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus.  Most observers believe the evangelical Christian and Pentecostal proportion of the population has increased since the last national census was conducted in 2007.  The EOTC predominates in the northern regions of Tigray and Amhara, while Islam is most prevalent in Afar, Oromia, and Somali Regions.  Established Protestant churches have the most adherents in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s (SNNP) Region and Gambella Region and parts of Oromia Region.

Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Eastern Rite and Roman Catholics, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, and practitioners of indigenous religions.  The Rastafarian community numbers approximately 1,000 and its members primarily reside in Addis Ababa and the town of Shashemene in Oromia Region.

Legal Framework

The constitution requires the separation of state and religion, establishes freedom of religious choice and practice, prohibits religious discrimination, and stipulates the government shall not interfere in the practice of any religion, nor shall religion interfere in state affairs.  It permits limitations on religious freedom as prescribed by law to protect public safety, education, and morals as well as to guarantee the independence of government from religion.  The law criminalizes religious defamation and incitement of one religious group against another.

The law permits sharia courts to adjudicate personal status cases, provided both parties are Muslim and consent to the court’s jurisdiction.

Registration and licensing of religious groups fall under the mandate of the Directorate of Faith and Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Peace, which requires unregistered religious groups to submit a founding document, the national identity cards of its founders, and the permanent address of the religious institution and planned regional branches.  The registration process also requires an application letter, information on board members, meeting minutes, information on the founders, financial reports, offices, name, and symbols.  Religious group applicants must have at least 50 individuals for registration as a religious entity and 15 for registration as a ministry or association; the rights and privileges are the same for each category.  During the registration process, the government publishes the religious group’s name and logo in a local newspaper.  If there are no objections, registration is granted.  Unlike other religious groups, the EOTC is not registered by the Ministry of Peace but obtains registration through a provision in the civil code passed during the imperial era that is still in force.  Registration with the ministry confers legal status on a religious group, which gives the group the right to congregate and to obtain land to build a place of worship and establish a cemetery.  Unregistered groups do not receive these benefits.  Religious groups must renew their registration at least once every five years; failure to do so may result in a fine.

Registered religious organizations are required to provide annual activity and financial reports.  Activity reports must describe proselytizing activities and list new members, newly ordained clergy, and new houses of worship.

Under the constitution, the government owns all land; religious groups must apply to both the regional and local governments for land allocation, including for land to build places of worship.

Government policy prohibits the holding of religious services inside public institutions, per the constitutionally required separation of religion and state.  The government mandates that public institutions take a two-hour break from work on Fridays to allow Muslim workers to attend Islamic prayers.  Private companies are not required to follow this policy.

The constitution prohibits religious instruction in public and private schools, although both public and private schools may organize clubs based on shared religious values.  The law permits the establishment of a separate category of religious schools under the auspices of churches and mosques.  The Charities and Societies Agency, a government body accountable to the federal attorney general, and the Ministry of Education regulate religious schools, which provide both secular and religious instruction.  The Ministry of Education oversees the secular component of education provided by religious schools.

The law prohibits the formation of political parties based on religion.

The law allows all civil society organizations and religious groups to engage in advocacy and lobbying activities and to collect and obtain funding from any legal source.

Religious groups undertaking development activities are required to register their development arms as charities with the Charities and Societies Agency and to follow legal guidelines originating from the Charities and Societies Proclamation.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The conflict that erupted in northern Ethiopia in November 2020 spread to other regions during the year and victims of violence included religious figures.  According to media, at least 78 priests were reportedly killed in Tigray during the first five months of the year by soldiers from the national army and Eritrean troops.  The Telegraph reported the killings based on a church letter to the Synod of the EOTC that said “priests, deacons, choristers and monks” had been “massacred” over a period of five months.

In April, according to media, Co-Patriarch Mathias, an ethnic Tigrayan, accused the government of genocide in Tigray.  In a video shot the previous month on a mobile phone and taken out of the country, the Co-Patriarch addressed the Church’s millions of followers and the international community, saying his previous attempts to speak out were blocked.  “I am not clear why they want to declare genocide on the people of Tigray,” the Co-Patriarch said, speaking in Amharic.  “They want to destroy the people of Tigray,” he added, listing alleged atrocities including massacres and forced starvation as well as the destruction of churches and looting.

On February 25, the Europe External Programme with Africa reported that one monk was killed during the bombing and looting of Debre Damo Monastery in Tigray in January.  Reportedly, Eritrean troops aligned with the Ethiopian National Defense Forces were responsible for the attack.  The Times reported other buildings had been completely destroyed, including monks’ ancient dwellings.  Many reporters cited ethnic grievance as the basis of the attack and said there was no evidence the attack was religiously motivated.

On May 9, according to the Addis Standard, government security forces dispersed thousands of Muslims from Meskel Square where the Muslim community in Addis Ababa had organized a Grand Iftar event during Ramadan.  In response to videos and photos showing security forces firing teargas at the crowds, Muslim activists and clerics on social media decried the government’s actions as religiously motivated.  Some members of the EOTC said Meskel Square was the EOTC’s traditional property.  City officials, however, said the violent dispersal was due to safety concerns arising from the unexpectedly large number of attendees and ongoing construction in Meskel Square.  City officials consequently canceled the event and rescheduled it for May 11.  According to the Ethiopian News Agency (ENA), the rescheduled event was held peacefully.  ENA also reported that the purposes of the event included demonstrating that Ramadan was a time of compassion, sharing, and supporting one another in line with Islamic teachings and praying for the unity of the country.  Despite the delay, event organizers thanked city administrators for allowing the event to take place.  Mayor of Addis Ababa Adanech Abiebie stated that the square belonged to all citizens – not just Christians – and called for Ethiopians to unite and celebrate religious differences.

In June, police accused a preacher from the Mahibere Kidusan – an EOTC congregation – of supporting the TPLF, which parliament had designated as a terrorist group.  Police reportedly arrested members of the Mahibere Kidusan for taking pictures of police officers during a demonstration outside the home of EOTC Co-Patriarch Mathias.  Demonstrators marched to show solidarity with Mathias after he publicly condemned the ongoing war in Tigray and characterized abuses against Tigrayans as genocide.

According to media, in July, police officers raided a church in Addis Ababa, interrupting prayers and forcing a dozen ethnic Tigrayan priests and monks into a pickup truck; they were released several weeks later.

In August, Minister of Health Lia Tadesse thanked the IRCE for holding a high-level advocacy meeting on reduction of stigma and discrimination against people living with HIV/AIDS and their families.  She tweeted, “Our Creator does not stigmatize and discriminate; let’s not stigmatize and discriminate.”

On January 5, the BBC reported the government agreed to repair the al-Nejashi Mosque that was damaged in 2020 during the conflict in Tigray.  Local Muslims said the mosque was the oldest in Africa.  The government said a nearby church would also be repaired.

During the year, the government provided funding to religious schools, including 250 Catholic schools and 219 Islamic schools.

Human rights groups stated that societal violence was on the rise, especially in the context of the conflict in the northern part of the country.  Because ethnicity and religion are often closely linked and because criminality, politics, access to resources, and historical grievances were also drivers of violence, it was difficult to characterize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

In October, the Amhara Region Islamic Affairs Supreme Council said the TPLF had demolished a historic mosque in Zarema town, North Gondar, Amhara Region.  The secretary general of the council said the attack proved TPLF’s continued antireligious stand.  He said the TPLF had destroyed several other mosques and religious sites in the region and massacred religious students in madrassahs.

On March 5, according to the Addis Standard, members of the OLA killed 29 individuals in Abo Church in Debos Kebele, East Wollega, Oromia Region.  Witnesses said victims were marking the beginning of the EOTC’s two-month period of fasting.  Reports stated members of the OLA stormed into the church, immediately killing the church administrator.  The OLA members took the rest of the victims to a nearby forest and killed them.

In May, the EOTC stated that the government allowing Muslims to hold the Grand Iftar celebration in Meskel Square – of which the EOTC claimed traditional “ownership” – could threaten coexistence between the country’s Christians and Muslims.  The EOTC advised Muslims to hold the event at its usual venue, Abebe Bikila Stadium.  After the government disrupted the celebration on May 9 and despite the EOTC’s protests, the rescheduled celebration took place peacefully on May 11 in Meskel Square.

The Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (EIASC) expressed continued concern about what it said was the influence of foreign Salafist groups within the Muslim community.  The EIASC accused foreign Salafist groups of forcibly taking control of local mosques.  The EIASC said it continued to hold these foreign groups responsible for the exacerbation of tensions between Christians and Muslims and within the Muslim community.

According to the Catholic Near East Welfare Association and the EIASC, the number of Islamic religious schools was growing.  Abdul Geni Kedir, a headmaster at one school, said that the expansion of the schools, which were “significantly contributing to the spread of the faith,” reflected the steady increase of the community’s influence in society.  He said, “Islamic education has been reinforced by the burgeoning Islamic media and related public activities.  Now, we have private newspapers, television stations, educational videos, and there is an increase in the production of multilingual traditional and modern Islamic hymns.”

Observers described a small revival of Waaqeffanna – an indigenous religion in Oromia – especially on university campuses.

The IRCE continued to include representatives from the EOTC, EIASC, Catholic Church, and several evangelical Christian groups, including the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Ethiopian Kale Heywet Church, and Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus.

In May and December, the Ambassador hosted EOTC Co-Patriarch Mathias to discuss the humanitarian crisis in Tigray and Mathias’ public statement that genocide was occurring in Tigray.  In a Facebook post following the May meeting, the embassy reported that the Ambassador discussed the humanitarian situation in Tigray as well as the Co-Patriarch’s video message on the crisis released a week earlier and reported widely in local press.  The Ambassador invited the Co-Patriarch to attend future interfaith community meetings to “further explore and continue their conversation.”

The U.S. government awarded several grants to the IRCE and other faith-based organizations to fund projects that encouraged religious tolerance.  In September, the embassy awarded funding to the Ghion Peace, Reconciliation and Development Association for a program promoting religious tolerance.  The program trained 60 youth and faith-based organizations to facilitate consultative workshops on peacebuilding and conflict mitigation within Amhara and Qimant communities.  Participants then led discussions with over 200 youth from the towns of Gondar and Chilga/Aykel on peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

In October, the embassy provided funding to the IRCE to design a two-day program for religious leaders on conflict prevention and mitigation, to be conducted in 2022.  This program, designed to encourage peacebuilding and religious and ethnic tolerance, would bring together IRCE members across the country to engage on security issues, including the conflicts in Tigray, Amhara, and Afar.  The embassy provided logistical and technical support to the IRCE as it began organizing the meeting and identifying potential conflict mitigation roles for regional and religious leaders at the community level.  The two-day program would establish a six-month engagement plan framework.

In August, the embassy provided funding to the Inter-Religious Council in Dire Dawa to facilitate a program to promote interreligious peacebuilding and tolerance in Harar, Chiro, and Dire Dawa by empowering leaders to work with youth and women in their constituencies to promote interreligious peace.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 940,000 (midyear 2021).  According to the 2007 census (the most recent with a breakdown by religion), 64.5 percent of the population is Christian, 27.9 percent Hindu, and 6.3 percent Muslim.  Protestants make up 45 percent of the population, of which 34.6 percent is Methodist, 5.7 percent Assembly of God, 3.9 percent Seventh-day Adventist, and 0.8 percent Anglican.  Roman Catholics make up 9.1 percent of the population, and other Christian groups 10.4 percent.  There are small communities of Baha’is, Sikhs, and Jews.

Religious affiliation runs largely along ethnic lines.  According to the 2007 census, most indigenous Fijians, who constitute 57 percent of the population, are Christian.  The majority of the country’s traditional chiefs belong to the Methodist Church, which remains influential among indigenous persons, particularly in rural areas, where 44 percent of the population lives, according to the 2017 census.  Most Indian Fijians, who account for 37 percent of the total population, are Hindu, while an estimated 20 percent are Muslim and 6 percent Christian.  Approximately 60 percent of the small Chinese community is Christian.  The small community of mixed European and Fijian ancestry is predominantly Christian.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes a secular state and protects freedom of religion, conscience, and belief.  The government may limit these rights by law to protect the freedoms of others or for reasons of public safety, order, morality, health, or nuisance.  The constitution mandates separation of religion and state.  Citizens have the right, either individually or collectively, in public and private, to manifest their religion or beliefs in worship, observance, practice, or teaching.  The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religious affiliation, and laws make inciting hatred or “disaffection” against religious groups a criminal offense.  The constitution provides that individuals may not assert religious belief as a reason for disobeying the law.  The constitution places limits on proselytizing on government premises and at government functions.  Sacrilege is outlawed and is defined as committing any crime within a place of worship after breaking and entering or before exiting with force, or intentionally committing any act of disrespect in a place of worship.  Penalties may include up to 14 years’ imprisonment.

By law, religious groups must register with the government through trustees, who may then hold land or property for the groups.  To register, religious bodies must submit applications to the registrar of titles office.  Applications must include the names and identification of the trustees signed by the head of the religious body seeking registration, a copy of the constitution of the proposed religious body, title documents for the land used by the religious body, and a registration fee of 2.30 Fiji dollars ($1).  Registered religious bodies receive exemption from taxes after approval from the national tax agency, on the condition they operate in a nonprofit and noncompetitive capacity.  By law, religious bodies that hold land or property must register their houses of worship, including their land, and show proof of title.  The law does not address conditions for religious organizations that do not hold land.

Permits are required for any public meeting on public property organized by religious groups, with the exception of regular religious services in houses of worship.

There is no required religious instruction for children or youth.  Private or religious groups sometimes own or manage school properties, but the Ministry of Education administers and regulates the curriculum.  The law allows religious groups the right to establish, maintain, and manage places of education, whether or not they receive financial assistance from the state, provided the institution maintains educational standards prescribed by law.  The law permits noncompulsory religious instruction in all schools, enabling schools owned and operated by various religious denominations but receiving government support to offer religious instruction.  Schools may incorporate religious elements, such as class prayer, as long as they do not require teachers to participate, and students may be excused if their parents request it.  The government provides funding and education assistance to public schools, including schools owned and operated by religious organizations, on a per-pupil basis.  Some schools maintain their religious and/or ethnic origin but must remain open to all students.  According to the law, the government ensures free tuition for primary and secondary schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In July, the government imposed a national curfew, closed schools and nonessential services, and restricted travel and large gatherings (which included religious gatherings and services) to contain a COVID-19 outbreak that began in April.  In July, the government introduced a range of broad regulations that barred persons from employment and access to state allowances and benefits if they did not receive at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by August 14 and if not fully immunized by November 1.  The regulations also permitted only fully vaccinated people to enter certain public spaces such as workplaces, tertiary institutions, houses of worship, hotels, restaurants, cafes, cinemas, gyms, pools, and tattoo parlors; consequently, many religious bodies cancelled in-person meetings and instead conducted religious services on social media platforms.  In mid-September, approximately 10 ministers of the CMF Church resigned because of the government’s official “no jab, no job” policy.  CMF Church Media Director Jo Kurulo said, “Since the policy came into act, the Church was considered a workplace and, therefore, all Church officeholders need to be vaccinated or else the Church would cop heavy fines.”  The Methodist Church confirmed it advised its unvaccinated pastors and church workers “not to partake in any church services but to stay in their own homes as they were still being paid.”  The government eased some restrictions in October, although regulations stipulated that churches and religious groups could allow only fully vaccinated members onto their premises for religious services, and required that churches verify the vaccination status of their attendees using the government’s online tool.  The government also capped attendance at services at 70 percent of capacity.

Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama, other cabinet ministers, and members of parliament continued to emphasize religious tolerance during public addresses.  The Prime Minister addressed the nation on multiple religious holidays, including Christmas and on October 18 for the Prophet Muhammed’s birthday, when he shared a message of resilience emphasizing that Fijians could look forward entering and “being seated together in houses of worship.”

A decision on an appeal against the 2018 acquittal of three staff members of the Fiji Times on sedition charges remained pending at year’s end.  The three, which included the editor in chief, were charged for the 2016 publication of a letter to the Fiji Times’ indigenous-language newspaper Nai Lalakai that the government characterized as antagonistic toward the country’s Muslim community.

On September 29, police investigated an alleged incident of criminal sacrilege involving Rajesh Goundar, a pastor of the El-Shaddai Assemblies of God Church, who was recorded on video demolishing a statue of a Hindu god at a house in Wairabetia, Lautoka.  Hindus in the country, including politicians and those from religious organizations such as the Sanatam Dharam Pratinibhi Saba who viewed the widely circulated video on social media, condemned the incident as an “act of sacrilege.”  Veena Wati, the owner of the home where the alleged desecration occurred, later explained in local media that she had consented to the removal of the statue from her family’s property.  Wati said that the “issue was blown out of proportion,” stating that parts of the video showing the family conducting what she called a peace mantra before removing the Hindu statue were edited out.  Wati and her family, recent converts to Christianity, stated that they resorted to breaking the idol when they couldn’t remove it from its foundation.  The Fiji Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commission received at least three complaints regarding the incident and said it would investigate the issue and called for religious leaders in the country to promote religious tolerance and respect.  A police investigation remained pending at year’s end.

The Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, and Seventh-day Adventist Churches, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and Hindu and Muslim groups operated numerous schools, including secondary schools, which were eligible for government subsidies based on the size of their student population.

On November 4, the Charge d’Affaires spoke about the importance of faith and protecting religious freedom at a Diwali commemoration and on social media.  The Charge d’Affaires also attended an event on October 18, a public holiday commemorating the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad.

The embassy used social media posts and videos that highlighted diverse religious traditions in the country and religious holidays including Eid al-Adha, Navratri, and Yom Kippur, to promote religious pluralism and tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.6 million (midyear 2021). According to Finnish government statistics from December 2020 that count only registered members of registered congregations, 67.8 percent of the population belongs to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland (ELC) and 1.1 percent to the Finnish Orthodox Church, while 0.3 percent (approximately 17,000) have official membership in Islamic congregations, and 29.4 percent do not identify as belonging to any religious group.  The census combines other minority religious communities, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roman Catholics, Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jews, and members of the Free Church of Finland, that together account for 1.4 percent of the population.

Multiple sources indicate the Muslim population has grown rapidly in recent years because of a significant inflow of immigrants.  Muslim religious leaders estimate the number of Muslims rose to 100,000 in 2018 (most recent data available), of which approximately 80 percent is Sunni and 20 percent Shia.  In 2017, the latest year for which statistics are available, the Pew Research Center estimated 2.7 percent of the population, or approximately 150,000 persons, were Muslim.  According to a survey by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC), the Muslim population numbered approximately 65,000 in 2016.  According to the Islamic Society of Finland, discrepancies among these sources and between them and official government statistics may occur because only a minority of Muslims register with registered Islamic societies.  Apart from Tatars, who immigrated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as well as during the Soviet Union period, most Muslims are immigrants or descendants of immigrants who arrived in recent decades from Somalia, North Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Syria, Turkey, and Iran.  There are 300 registered members of the Ahmadi community, according to leaders of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat Finland.

In a report released in 2020, the Institute of Jewish Policy Research estimated the Jewish population at 1,300.  There are 18,000 members of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the country, according to Church representatives.  According to Catholic Diocese statistics from 2021, there are 15,902 registered Catholics in the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution bars discrimination based on religion “without an acceptable reason.”  It stipulates freedom of religion and conscience, including the right to profess and practice a religion, to express one’s convictions, and to be a member or decline to be a member of a religious community.  It states no one is under the obligation to participate in the practice of a religion.

The law criminalizes blasphemy, or the “breach of the sanctity of religion,” which includes “blaspheming against God,” publicly defaming or desecrating to offend something a religious community holds sacred, and disturbing worship or funeral ceremonies.  Violators are subject to fines or imprisonment of up to six months.  The amount of a fine is dependent both on the severity of the offense and the financial standing of the sentenced offender.  Authorities have occasionally applied the law, most recently in 2019.

The constitution cites the ELC, the only religious group it mentions, stating that “provisions on the organization and administration [of the ELC] are laid down in the Church Act.”

It is considered a crime of ethnic agitation if any person makes available or spreads to the public an expression of opinion or any other message that threatens, defames, or insults a certain group on the basis of race, skin color, birth status, national or ethnic origin, religion, belief, sexual orientation, or disability.  This includes the distribution of hate material intended to incite discrimination in print or in broadcast media, books, or online newspapers and journals.  Punishment includes a fine based on the severity of the defamation or insult or up to two years’ imprisonment.  If the ethnic agitation involves incitement or enticement to serious violence, a person may be charged with aggravated ethnic agitation, which carries a punishment of imprisonment of between four months and four years.  Hate speech is not a separate criminal offense but may constitute grounds for an aggravated sentence for other offenses.  In principle, any act that is considered a crime in legislation may be a hate crime, depending on the underlying motive.  The victim does not need to be a part of a defined group for a crime to be considered a hate crime; it is enough that the perpetrator assumes the victim to be a member of the group.

The law prohibits religious discrimination and establishes the position of a nondiscrimination ombudsman responsible for supervising compliance with the law, investigating individual cases of discrimination, and having the power to issue fines in noncriminal cases.  The ombudsman advocates on behalf of victims, offers counseling, promotes conciliation, and lobbies for legislation, among other duties and authorities.  The ombudsman may also refer cases to the National Non-Discrimination and Equality Tribunal (NDET), which also enforces fines issued by the ombudsman and assists plaintiffs seeking compensation in court.  Individuals alleging discrimination may alternatively pursue legal action through the NDET, which may issue binding decisions that may be appealed to the courts or through the district court system.  Litigants may appeal the decisions of the NDET and the district courts to the higher Administrative Court.  Neither the ombudsman nor the NDET has the authority to investigate individual cases of religious discrimination involving employment.  Such cases fall under the purview of the Occupational Safety and Health Authority.

Individuals and groups may exist, associate, and practice their religion without registering with the government.  To be eligible to apply for government funds, however, religious groups must register with the Patent and Registration Office as a religious community.  To register as a religious community, a group must have at least 20 members, the public practice of religion as its purpose, and a set of rules to guide its activities.  A registered religious community is a legal entity that may employ persons, purchase property, and make legal claims.  A religious group may also acquire legal status by registering as an association with a nonprofit purpose that is not contrary to law or proper behavior.  Registered religious groups and nonprofit associations are generally exempt from taxes.  According to the MEC, as of August, there were approximately 156 registered religious communities, most of which had multiple congregations.

According to the MEC, several additional religious communities are organized under the name the Pentecostal Church of Finland but have registered as associations and not as separate religious communities.  Similarly, other organizations, such as revivalist congregations of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, have independent theological or functional operations but have remained administratively under the Evangelical Lutheran Church and have not registered as independent religious communities.  Persons may belong to more than one religious group.

In March, parliament passed an amendment to the Church Act that governs the practices of the ELC.  The amended Church Act provides greater freedom to the ELC administration for holding meetings in an online setting.  It allows members participating in meetings virtually to be considered as present for the purposes of reaching a quorum.

All citizens who belong to either the ELC or Finnish Orthodox Church pay a church tax, collected together with their income tax payments.  Congregations collectively decide the church tax amount, currently set at between 1 to 2 percent of a member’s income.  Those who do not want to pay the tax must terminate their ELC or Orthodox congregation membership.  Members may terminate their membership by contacting the official congregation or the local government registration office, either electronically or in person.  Local parishes have fiscal autonomy to decide how to use funding received from taxes levied on their members.

Registered religious communities other than the ELC and Finnish Orthodox Church are eligible to apply for state funds in lieu of the church tax.  In addition to receiving the church tax, the ELC and Finnish Orthodox Church may also apply for state funds.  The law states registered religious communities that meet the statutory requirements, including ELC and Orthodox congregations, may apply to receive an annual subsidy from the government budget in proportion to the religious community’s percentage of the population.

The law requires the ELC to maintain public cemeteries using its general allocation from state funds and church taxes and to account for monies used for this purpose.  Other religious communities and nonreligious foundations may maintain their own cemeteries.  All registered religious communities may own and manage property and hire staff, including appointing clergy.  The law authorizes the ELC and Finnish Orthodox Church to register births, marriages, and deaths for their members in collaboration with the government Digital and Population Data Services Agency.  State registrars do this for other persons.

Parents may determine their child’s religious affiliation if the child is younger than 12.  The religious affiliation of children between the ages of 12 and 17 may only be changed by a joint decision of the child and his or her parents or guardian, and the family must pursue specific administrative procedures with their religious community and the local population registration officials to change or terminate the religious affiliation.

All public schools provide religious teaching in accordance with students’ religion.  All students must take courses either in religious studies or ethics, with the choice left up to the student.  Schools must provide religious instruction in religions other than the Lutheran faith if there is a minimum of three pupils representing that faith in the municipal region, the religious community in question is registered, and the students’ families belong to the religious community.  Municipalities may arrange for students from different schools to take a combined course to meet this requirement.  Students who do not belong to a religious group or belong to a religious group for which special instruction is not available may study ethics.  Students aged 18 or older may choose to study either the religious courses pertaining to their religion or the ethics courses.  If a student belongs to more than one religious community, the parents decide in which religious education course the student participates.  The national and municipal governments fund private, including religiously based, schools.  Despite the name, private schools are in fact completely financially dependent on government funding, to ensure equitable education nationwide.  With the exception of international and foreign-language schools, by law private schools may not charge tuition.  They do not practice selective admission based on students’ religion.

Religious education focuses on familiarizing students with their own religion, other religions, and on general instruction in ethics.  Teachers of religion must have state-mandated training for religious instruction.  The state appoints them, and they are not required to belong to any religious community.  The National Board of Education provides a series of textbooks about Orthodox and Lutheran Christianity, Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam, as well as a textbook on secular ethics.

By law, conscientious objectors, including those who object on religious grounds, may choose alternative civilian service instead of compulsory military service.  Conscientious objectors who refuse both military and alternative civilian service may be sentenced to prison terms of up to 173 days, one-half of the 347 days of alternative civilian service.  Regular military service ranges between 165 and 347 days.

The law requires that animals be stunned prior to slaughter or be stunned and killed simultaneously if done pursuant to religious practice.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

YLE, the Finnish English news site, administered a poll revealing that a majority of MPs did not want to change Finland’s law on the sanctity of religion, which includes the possibility of a six-month prison sentence for blasphemy.  The survey, however, also indicated that MPs of the Greens Party, part of the governing coalition, and opposition Finns Party were united in favor of making changes to the law, with their views based on the same issue:  freedom of speech.  The UN Human Rights Committee called on Finland to change the “vague and broadly worded” criminal provision on the sanctity of religion, stating that it restricts freedom of expression.

Religious communities reported a consistently high level of autonomy in how they were allowed to implement COVID-19 protocols and said that inspections by government officials were unobtrusive and generally helpful.  According to the Ministry of Education and Culture, restrictions imposed on public events did not apply to the characteristic activities of religious communities organized in community premises or similar facilities.  According to legal analysts in an interview with the newspaper Iltalehti, the legislation on communicable diseases that provides the legal basis for limiting public gatherings does not apply to religious gatherings because the latter are legally distinct from public events, as defined by the relevant legislation regarding public assembly.  Catholic Church officials said that when more than 100 persons were potentially exposed to COVID-19 after attending a funeral service in Kouvola, which led to a public outcry, the Church worked closely with government officials to develop improved internal protocols to continue offering regular services without additional public backlash.

In August, the Helsinki District Court ruled that men who carried swastika flags in an Independence Day Towards Freedom rally in 2018 were not guilty of ethnic agitation.  According to the court, while flags carried in the demonstration were associated with the Nazi ideology of persecution and genocide of Jews, carrying a swastika flag was not sufficient for an ethnic agitation conviction.  The court found that the defendants had not been shown to have spread a message that threatened and insulted specific ethnic groups.  Prosecutor General Raija Toiviainen stated that he intended to appeal the decision.  Leaders in the Jewish community spoke out against the ruling, saying that displaying a swastika flag represented expressing advocacy of genocide.  According to a survey by the public broadcaster Yle News, most political parties supported criminalizing public use of the swastika flag, either through legislative action or through a Court of Appeal’s decision.  Of the major parties, only the Finns Party, citing concerns for individual freedom, responded that swastika flags should not be banned.

On October 1, Director General of the Finnish National Gallery Kimmo Leva stated the COVID-19 pandemic continued to disrupt plans to prepare a formal study of the state of research on the provenance of Holocaust-era art in museum collections, as recommended by the MEC in June 2019.  At the same time, the Finnish Heritage Agency organized a roundtable discussion for Finnish museums on art provenance (the record of ownership of a work of art) related to both Nazi art and colonialism.  Articles published in 2020 and 2021 through MuseoPro, a publication of the Finnish Association of Museums, showed an increasing consensus regarding the complications of art provenance.  Leva suggested the Finnish Association of Museums might crowdsource the research, following the example of the Finnish National Gallery, which had published a list online of all its art lacking sufficient provenance from the period 1933-1945.

Yle News in May reported that the Ministry of the Interior continued its previously postponed study regarding whether religious symbols, including headscarves, could be worn as part of police uniforms.  In January, the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat reported the story of Fardowsa Mohamud, a Muslim woman who withdrew from voluntary military service due to a similar hijab ban in the Defense Forces.

In November, the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture requested public commentary for proposed changes to animal welfare laws.  Proposals included a section on the stunning of animals before slaughter, and explicitly did not include religious exceptions for ritual slaughter.  These legal changes, which would affect kosher and halal practices in the country, were met by vocal opposition by Muslim and Jewish organizations.  The Central Council of Jewish Communities in Finland in a public statement said the law trampled on religious rights and was in contradiction of rights protected under the European Human Rights Convention. Religious groups also stated that as the proposal did not include measures to rectify what they said were other problematic issues concerning animal rights, including tightening of animal stunning procedures, the effect was a culturally subjective law that exclusively limited the cultural traditions of religious minorities.

Ministry of Social Affairs and Health guidelines discouraged the circumcision of males and continued to withhold public healthcare funding for such procedures.  In its guidelines, which were recommendations rather than requirements per prior Supreme Court rulings, the ministry stated only licensed physicians should perform nonmedical circumcision of boys, a child’s guardians should be informed of the risks and irreversibility of the procedure, and it should not be carried out on boys old enough to understand the procedure without their consent.  The ministry termed nonmedical male circumcision a violation of child bodily integrity and self-determination.  Members of the Muslim and Jewish communities continued to express disagreement with the guidelines and stated that each time the issue came up for public debate, it was accompanied by antisemitic or anti-Muslim rhetoric in the press and more broadly.

Parliament took no action on a proposal submitted by 16 parliamentarians in 2020 that “the government…identify the need for regulation of non-medical circumcision of boys and take the necessary legislative measures to clarify the legal situation and define the legal boundaries of non-medical circumcision.”  In the parliamentary Legal Affairs Committee discussion on the October proposal, however, pro-ban MPs were able to get a mention in the committee report that the matter should be brought under consideration in the future.

According to representatives from Jehovah’s Witnesses, the number of Russia-origin members of Jehovah’s Witnesses applying for asylum based on stated religious persecution continued to decline for the second consecutive year, in part because of COVID-19 travel restrictions.  The Finnish Immigration Service (FIS) rejected most of the claims by members of Jehovah’s Witnesses and continued to state that asylum adjudicators did not consider membership in the Church alone to be sufficient basis for an asylum claim.  Information from representatives for Finnish Jehovah’s Witnesses and the FIS showed 15 cases pending before the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) in the first half of 2021.  At least 47 individuals who received negative decisions from the SAC renewed their asylum applications with the FIS based on changed circumstances and were awaiting new decisions at year’s end.

In its Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Finland submitted in April, the United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed concern “that the Act Repealing the Act on the Exemption of Jehovah’s Witnesses from Military Service in Certain Cases (330/2019) has removed the exemption from military and civilian service accorded to Jehovah’s Witnesses, in contrast to the Committee’s previous recommendations to extend such exemption to other groups of conscientious objectors.”  The Human Rights Committee and the Finnish branch of Amnesty International both noted that alternative nonmilitary service amounted to the longest period of conscripted service, placing a burden on those who exercised their right to conscientious objection, including those who did so on religious grounds.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses representatives, two asylum-seeking families who identified as members of Jehovah’s Witnesses faced deportation to Russia during the year because the families had exhausted all domestic legal remedies in seeking asylum.  The families applied for interim measures to the United Nations Human Rights Committee; both received positive interim decisions that halted their deportation.  While their applications were pending under the domestic immigration system, legal employment was no longer possible.  As a result, the families became dependent on limited government services.

According to representatives of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat Finland, the FIS continued to deny most asylum applications for Ahmadi Muslims from Pakistan.  The representatives said the FIS only considered “prominent persons” in the Ahmadi community to be in danger, while other Ahmadis should be able to move to safer areas of Pakistan instead of seeking asylum.  The representatives said that when deportation orders were appealed, authorities requested proof that the individuals in question were in danger instead of considering the systematic persecution Ahmadis faced in Pakistan.  Ahmadi community leaders said they were never consulted on how to confirm or verify membership or persecution status in seeking asylum.  They said that asylum applications had decreased during the past two years because individuals who faced persecution were unwilling to start the asylum process, knowing that it would ultimately be unsuccessful.  The representatives said the group had met with several government representatives, but that it had not yet been able to secure a meeting with the Ministry of Interior to discuss the challenges the community faced.  In the past, the Ministry of the Interior had formally declined to meet with the community and had directed representatives to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

According to a senior military officer, the military continued to maintain a zero-tolerance policy regarding hate speech and hate crimes, including religiously motivated incidents.  Unit commanders initiated investigations of reported incidents.  If a commander judged the infraction to be minor, he or she administered a formal reprimand or other punishment.  For more serious offenses, the commander reported the investigation up the chain of command, and military authorities might refer the case to civilian courts.  The officer also stated that the military accommodated, per regulation, religious dietary needs and fasting requirements, and granted religious leave and prayer time to all personnel.  The officer said that these procedures were maintained during the COVID-19 pandemic and that recruits still had access to military chaplains while pandemic protocols were in place.

Yle News reported in July and September that the Helsinki Police Department fired two officers, including the chief of staff, for engaging in communications with far-right hate groups that included anti-Muslim and antisemitic messages.  Text messages revealed discussion of an upcoming “civil war,” with language particularly targeting the country’s Muslim, Somali, and Roma populations.  The report indicated that an additional five police officers and one guard with ties to far-right groups were under investigation.

Religious community leaders repeatedly stated that reported hate crime statistics likely significantly undercounted incidences of hate crimes.  A member of the National Forum for Cooperation of Religions (CORE Forum), an interfaith dialogue group, stated that many members of Muslim communities, particularly women who wear hijabs, encountered verbal and physical harassment that had gone unreported because previous reports were unaddressed.  One Muslim woman said that she no longer used public transit, and a Jewish woman stated she was considering leaving the country due to increased harassment, but neither had reported incidents to the police.  In October, the hashtag #miksienluotapoliisiin (“why I do not trust the police”), trending on Twitter, included citizens’ statements of religious harassment and neo-Nazi, racist, and anti-Muslim rhetoric that they said police ignored.  Representatives from the Helsinki police responded that they were taking the discussion seriously.

On January 5, Yle News reported that Jyrki Aland, the chairperson of the Turku local association of the Finns Party, said he wished for increased COVID-19 deaths in the Varissuo district of Turku in light of the area’s ethnic composition.  Sources quoted Aland as saying that the reports of COVID-19 deaths in Sweden in 2020 would be good for Varissuo because “it is a neighborhood where migrants live and possibly a small Corona cleaning job would do a lot of good there.”  Aland later stated that the comments were made in jest and apologized for them.  According to Yle News on January 11, police were investigating the statements.  More than 48 percent of the population and more than 80 percent of school-age children in Varissuo identify as speaking neither Finnish nor Swedish as their first language, and the suburb is home to significant Muslim and Catholic immigrant populations.  Aland resigned as local association chairperson on September 20.

Yle News also reported in January that the Attorney General’s office announced it would not prosecute SDP MP Hussein al-Taee for Facebook posts from 2011-2012, before he was elected to parliament.  At a press conference in September 2019, al-Taee apologized to Jewish and Sunni Muslim communities for the posts, which were directed at those communities, and did not contest police findings that his posts promoted ethnic agitation.  The Attorney General’s office stated in its decision that al-Taee had actively and independently, without the intervention of authorities, sought to apologize and minimize the harm from his previous actions. On his website, al-Taee apologized to Jewish, Egyptian, and Sunni Muslim communities for the posts and stated that his previous writings are incompatible with his current worldview.

On April 30, the Helsinki Times reported that Christian Democrat MP Paivi Rasanen, a former Minister of the Interior, had been charged with ethnic agitation and incitement to hatred on the basis of sexuality in connection with a booklet she published in 2004 and a 2019 tweet.  According to the article, the prosecutor examined statements in Rasanen’s booklet, entitled “Male and Female He Created Them – Homosexual Relationships Challenge the Christian Concept of Humanity,” and a tweet responding to news that the ELC was partnering with the Helsinki Pride Festival that stated, “How can the Church’s doctrinal foundation, the Bible, be compatible with the lifting up of shame and sin as a subject of pride?”  The prosecutor determined that these comments disparaged gays and lesbians, violated their equality rights, and fomented intolerance and hatred.  Incitement to hatred on the basis of sexuality was outlawed in 1995.  Rasanen defended her statements by stating her religious beliefs were an expression of her freedom of speech and religion.  Dr. Juhana Pohjola, Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Mission Diocese of Finland, faced a similar charge related to distribution of the 2004 booklet.

Yle News reported in May that authorities sentenced former chairman of the Finnish People First Party Marco de Wit to six months’ probation for three counts of aggravated defamation and 13 counts of defamation, one of which concerned “violating the peace of religion.”  De Wit had published several articles online threatening and insulting Muslims, Afghans, refugees, and asylum seekers on the basis of their religion, skin color, and ethnic origin.  More than 20 plaintiffs joined the defamation case against de Wit, who had posted social media items linking Finnish Muslims and police officers with child sexual exploitation.  In addition, the court ordered de Wit to delete his social media posts and pay more than 40,000 euros ($45,400) in compensation to the victims.

On October 7, Helsingin Sanomat reported that the Oulu District Court convicted former Oulu city councilor Junes Lokka of ethnic agitation and sentenced him to 70 day-fines with a value of 420 euros ($480).  The severity of a sentencing fine is measured by the number of day-fines while the monetary value of the day-fine is set by one’s income level.  The court had previously convicted Lokka on two counts of ethnic agitation regarding videos Lokka posted online in 2016 depicting Muslim immigrants and other immigrants as being inferior to other human beings.  The prosecution brought the new charge as a result of comments Lokka made at an Oulu city council meeting in February 2020 in which he threatened Muslim immigrants and refugees and promoted the hiring of “death squads” to promote migration of minorities out of the municipality of Oulu.

In October, a court convicted Finns Party MP Sebastian Tynkkynen on charges of ethnic agitation in connection with 2017 Facebook posts that were part of a municipal election campaign.  In the posts, Tynkkynen published several pictures and texts referencing “the criminal behavior of Muslim asylum seekers and immigrants towards women and children.”  Tynkkynen denied all charges, stating that his posts were moderate and in accordance with freedom of expression.  The court fined Tynkkynen 70 day-fines, totaling 4,410 euros ($5,000) and demanded Tynkkynen delete the posts from his Facebook account.

Ministry of the Interior and MEC statistics indicated the government allocated 117 million euros ($132.65 million) to the ELC, compared with 115.6 million euros ($131.07 million) in 2020, and 2.6 million euros ($2.95 million) to the Finnish Orthodox Church, compared with 2.58 million euros ($2.93 million) in 2019.  The MEC allotted a total of 824,000 euros ($934,000) to all other registered religious organizations, equal to the amount allotted in 2020.  This sum includes 524,000 euros ($594,000) distributed across communities in relation to the number of registered members and 300,000 euros ($340,000) to the Helsinki Jewish Congregation to continue its investments in security at facilities and events following antisemitic incidents.  Religious leaders of minority religions indicated concern over the funding allocation.  Several Muslim community leaders noted what they said was that a lack of cultural understanding regarding individual registration hurt funding for Muslim communities, while the Catholic Church lobbied for the ability of its members to designate funds for the Church through their taxes, as ELC and Finnish Orthodox Church members are able to do.

The MEC awarded 80,000 euros ($90,700) to promote interfaith dialogue, consistent with funding in 2020.  Three organizations split the funding:  the CORE Forum, composed of representatives from the largest religious denominations; Fokus, an interfaith and intercultural organization; and Ad Astra, an organization promoting dialogue, interfaith projects, and inclusivity for children in schools, preschools, and daycare facilities.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

In 2020, the latest period for which data were available, police reported 108 hate crimes against members of religious groups, including crimes involving assault, threats and harassment, discrimination, and vandalism, compared with 133 such incidents in 2019.  There were 39 incidents involving Muslims, 28 involving Christians, including two involving Jehovah’s Witnesses, 18 involving Jews, and 21 involving others or unknown religious groups.  Police did not, however, cite any details of the incidents or release information on how many were motivated solely by religion.  Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Despite the ban on the self-described Pan-Nordic neo-Nazi NRM in the country, the group continued to operate a website, make statements promoting discrimination or violence against Jews and Muslims, and participate in demonstrations.  Authorities stated that in 2020, Finnish members of the NRM began operating as part of the Towards Freedom group, considered to be the NRM’s successor by the National Bureau of Investigation.  While Towards Freedom’s website remained active, it had not been updated since December 2020.  Former NRM members continued activities under new websites, including Partisaani, a far-right news aggregation website that spread anti-Muslim and antisemitic conspiracy theories and Finn Aid (Suomalaisapu), an organization that describes itself as a charity organization but also used anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric.  These outlets often featured the traditional NRM logo that includes neo-fascist imagery.

Finnish researchers studying online extremism stated that neo-Nazi activities decreased significantly during the year following the ban of the NRM.  Helsingin Sanomat reported in March, however, that the threat of terrorism posed by far-right groups, particularly as a response to racist and anti-Muslim “replacement theory” (which asserts that immigration and low birth rates among native populations will result in the replacement of native populations by foreigners of different races and religions), increased in the country, corresponding with the findings of a 2020 study by the National Bureau of Investigation.

In August, former Tampere City Council member and far-right party organizer Terhi Kiemunki led a protest organized by the Alliance of Nationalists commemorating the fourth anniversary of a terrorist attack by a self-identified soldier of ISIS in Turku, Finland.  While the Alliance of Nationalists stated that it did not take a position on the activities or opinions of its members or discriminate against other nationalities, religions, and ethnicities, the alliance hosted regular “White Lives Matter” events and promoted news articles describing “replacement theory” ideology on its webpage.  Leaders of the Alliance of Nationalists include former NRM members.  Police estimated attendance at the protest at more than 100 participants, fewer than both previous memorial demonstrations.  Police estimated attendance at a concurrent counterdemonstration by the anti-fascist group Turku Without Nazis as larger than the event sponsored by the Alliance of Nationalists.  Police arrested one person for harassing behavior, but police did not comment on whether the detainee took part in the protest or counterprotest.

Stickers and posters with antisemitic images and messages were placed on the synagogue of Helsinki’s Jewish Congregation, in neighborhoods with significant Jewish populations, and on public property throughout the year.  Sources stated the vandalism was both random and targeted.  Antisemitic graffiti and stickers bearing iconography of the NRM also appeared at LGBTQI+ Pride events.  Representatives of the Jewish community reported that despite available video and photographic evidence of those responsible, police made no arrests.

In September, anti-immigration activists organized a demonstration called Rise Finland (Nuose Suomi) in Helsinki’s Parliament Park to protest the reception of Afghan refugees in the country.  Speakers included former members of the NRM, and organizers advertised the event on the Norwegian branch of the NRM’s website and on Partisaani.  Speeches, broadcast live on YouTube, focused on what the organizers called “the Islamization of Finland” and called on Finns to take a stand for “Finnishness.”

In a Swedish documentary series released in Finland in January, Linda Karlstrom, the coach of the IK Kronan gymnastics club of Kronoby, made several remarks questioning the existence of the Holocaust.  The Swedish-speaking Sports Federation raised Karlstrom’s case, but the Gymnastics Association Disciplinary Committee did not punish her on free-speech grounds.  The disciplinary committee stated that, as a general rule, matters outside sports do not fall with its remit.  As of March, Karlstrom no longer coached at IK Kronan.

Anti-Muslim and antisemitic organizations were active across a variety of social media platforms.  “Replacement theory” references spread on Facebook, Twitter, the Russian social media network VK, and the American social media network Gab.  The European Jewish Congress and leaders of the Helsinki Jewish community reported antisemitic incidents in European social networks, including posts in Finnish, throughout the year.  Telegram, VK, Gab, and Twitter spread Holocaust denials and conspiracy theories of Jewish “world domination.” According to Helsingin Sanomat, the Finnish Football Association announced in May that it would donate Nike sports hijabs to every soccer player who wanted one.  The announcement was met with a backlash on Twitter, where a significant proportion of comments expressed opposition to the hijab.

NGOs working with migrants, including the Finnish Refugee Advice Centre, continued to raise concerns about the ability of religious minorities housed in migrant reception centers to worship without harassment from other migrants housed within the same center.  A representative of the center said converts to Christianity in migrant reception facilities continued to face harassment, including social exclusion, threats, and blackmail but that there were limited security and social services resources to combat these issues.

Leaders of Muslim religious organizations were divided concerning the need for additional houses of worship that could accommodate the growing and diverse Muslim community.  A representative of the CORE Forum said that Muslim groups continued to seek adequate houses of worship, but that they were hindered by insufficient funds from purchasing property, given that most Muslims did not belong to congregations registered with the government and did not choose to register.  Except for a handful of purpose-built mosques, most mosques were located in converted commercial spaces.  Other members of the Muslim community noted that, in sum, the spaces available were sufficient, but that persons from some religious or ethnic backgrounds may not feel comfortable using the currently available spaces.  According to one community leader, while the number of prayer rooms was sufficient, there were not enough spaces providing community services, particularly for women and children, or prayer services in Finnish.  Members of the LGBTQI+ Muslim community noted that there were no “safe spaces” for Muslims who identified as LGBTQI+ and, in particular, for LGBTQI+ Muslims in asylum-seeker reception centers.  Attempts to build a large grand mosque in the south of the country stalled; some Muslim community leaders identified politicization of zoning laws, anti-Muslim and racist attitudes in some local communities, and deep divisions across the diverse Muslim community as contributing factors.

Representatives of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat Finland stated that other Muslim groups continued to block the group’s formal membership in interfaith organizations.  Representatives of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat Finland said the group planned to construct a mosque and cultural center in the future and that although the mosque would be built solely with funds from the Ahmadi community, it would be open to all religious and nonreligious individuals.

The nondiscrimination ombudsman’s office reported receiving 34 complaints of religious discrimination in 2020 – 3 percent of total discrimination complaints – compared with 37 complaints in 2019.

The website Magneettimedia continued to post antisemitic content and in January published an article entitled, “Biden:  Jews in leadership positions in the White House, CIA, NSA, and Ministry of Finance,” and in April a piece entitled “World Power Aspirations of the Jewish Mafia.”  The website also warned of what it said was a coming confrontation among the Christian and Islamic and Jewish worlds that could lead to the destruction of Christianity.  Major companies and consumer brands continued to boycott the department store chain owned by the former owner of Magneettimedia, Juha Karkkainen, due to his antisemitic views.

In June, the Ministry of the Interior published a report by a working group dedicated to improving security at religious sites.  The report found that while nearly all (93 percent) Christian respondents reported feeling safe in or near their religious facilities, only 69 percent of Muslims and 33 percent of Jews reported feeling safe in the vicinity of designated religious spaces.  The report’s recommendations included improving state support for security for all religious communities.  According to the leadership of the Central Council of Jewish Communities, proposed budget cuts to synagogue security funding were a significant concern.  Representatives of the Ahmadi Muslim community said that they were not consulted in the production of the report and expressed additional security concerns, particularly about what they termed extremist groups.

Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, representatives of religious groups participated in virtual events hosted by other religious groups.  Finn Church Aid (FCA), associated with the ELC, again hosted an interfaith iftar, bringing together virtually representatives from the largest religious groups, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and municipal governments.  The theme of the event was “Loving Thy Neighbor in the Time of a Pandemic:  An Inclusive Approach,” and it discussed how interfaith dialogue and community organization might advance religious freedom during difficult times and restrictions, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Throughout the year, embassy staff engaged with officials from the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Foreign Affairs to discuss religious intolerance, the promotion of interfaith dialogue, the provision of religious services for refugees and asylum seekers, and the treatment of Jehovah’s Witnesses in asylum adjudications.

Embassy staff engaged with Christian, Jewish, and Muslim clergy, lay activists from these communities, the Finnish Ecumenical Council, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other minority religious groups to discuss the state of religious freedom in the country.  Embassy staff and members of the Jewish and Muslim communities discussed these communities’ shared concerns about the impact of government guidelines discouraging male circumcision, religiously motivated crimes, and problems establishing or maintaining places of worship that fit the various needs of the diverse Muslim population.  Embassy staff also discussed anti-Muslim discrimination with representatives from different Muslim congregations and met regularly with NGOs such as the CORE Forum.  Embassy staff continued to engage with representatives of Jehovah’s Witnesses concerning the high rate of application denials for Jehovah’s Witnesses from Russia seeking asylum on grounds of religious persecution.  Embassy staff corresponded with representatives of the Ahmadi Muslim community, who expressed concerns over the high rate of denials of asylum applications for Ahmadis from Pakistan and the security situation of the Ahmadi community in Finland.  Embassy staff also engaged with the predominantly Muslim Uyghur community.

The embassy coordinated approaches on anti-Semitism with counterparts in the UK and Canadian diplomatic missions.  Embassy officers used social media messaging to elevate minority religious voices and to promote greater Holocaust awareness.

Embassy staff participated in events hosted by minority religious groups and the CORE Forum.  Embassy staff participated in an online seminar in September that promoted interfaith dialogue to confront persecution of religious minorities.  In October, embassy staff participated in the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the CORE Forum, which included a seminar series on religious literacy and direct engagement with government officials and leaders of religious institutions on issues of religious expression, cooperation, and freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 68.1 million (midyear 2021).  ccording to a January 2020 report released by the government-appointed Observatory for Secularism, based on a poll conducted in cooperation with polling company Viavoice, approximately 47 percent of respondents identify as Catholic, 3 percent Muslim, 3 percent Protestant, 2 percent Buddhist, 1 percent Jewish, 1 percent Christian Orthodox, and 1 percent other religious groups; 34 percent said they have no religious affiliation and 8 percent preferred not to respond.  According to the observatory’s 2019 report, there are 140,000-150,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses and 150,000-300,000 Hindus.  In a poll on secularism released in February and conducted with Viavoice, 35 percent of respondents say they are believers, 30 percent nonbelievers or atheist, 14 percent agnostic, and 13 percent indifferent.  Most observers, including the observatory in its 2019 report, estimate the number of Muslims in the country at three to five million, or between 4 and 7 percent of the population.  According to Church of Scientology leaders, there are approximately 40,000 followers in the country.

A poll by the research firm French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP) conducted August 24-25 found that 51 percent of respondents said they do not believe in God, and 49 percent said they do.  According to the IFOP poll, the highest percentage of believers (58 percent) was found among those 65 years and older and the lowest (45 percent) among those aged 35-49.  Other age groups were close to evenly split, with a slight majority of nonbelievers.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as a secular republic and states it “shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law,” regardless of religion, and shall respect all beliefs.  The law provides for the separation of religion and state and guarantees the free exercise of religious worship except to maintain public order.

The law, as well as international and European covenants to which the country adheres, protects the freedom of individuals to choose, change, and practice their religion.  Interference with freedom of religion is subject to criminal penalties, including a fine of 1,500 euros ($1,700) and imprisonment for one month.  Individuals who are defendants in a trial may challenge the constitutionality of any law they say impedes their freedom of religion.

Laws increase the penalties for acts of violence or defamation when they are committed because of the victim’s actual or perceived membership or nonmembership in a given religious group.  Additional penalties beyond those for the underlying crime for acts of violence that courts determine are religiously motivated are three to five years’ imprisonment and fines of 45,000 to 75,000 euros ($51,000-$85,000), depending on the severity of the victims’ injuries.  For religiously motivated acts of public defamation, defined as an allegation of fact that affects the honor of a person or body, the penalties are one year’s imprisonment and/or a fine of 45,000 euros ($51,000).  The government may expel noncitizens for inciting discrimination, hatred, or violence against a specific person or group of persons based on religion.

The law penalizes hate crimes and hate speech.  Provisions in the criminal code cover hate crimes.  They criminalize racist, antisemitic, or xenophobic acts, considering them as aggravating circumstances when an offense is committed on the basis of a victim’s membership or nonmembership, true or supposed, in a given ethnic group, nation, race, or religion.  When made in public, such as on the internet, hate speech is covered by a special law related to the rights of the press that criminalizes the publication or dissemination of racist remarks, including those directed against persons because of their membership in religious groups.  The law covers all means of public expression (speeches, exclamations, threats, writings, printed matter, drawings, engravings, paintings, symbols, images, etc.), and any media permitting wide dissemination to the public.  When not made in public, hate speech is covered by the criminal code and punishable by a 1,500 euro ($1,700) fine.

There is no national-level law prohibiting blasphemy, but Alsace-Moselle continues to retain part of an old German code, a remnant from past German annexation of the area, that declares “blasphemy” against Catholics a crime.  However, a Ministry of Justice decree states that the antiblasphemy provision may not be applied anywhere in the country.

Although the law does not require it, religious groups may apply for official recognition and tax-exempt status.  Religious groups may register under two categories:  associations of worship, which are exempt from taxes; and cultural associations, which normally are not exempt.  Associations in either category are subject to fiscal oversight by the state.  An association of worship may organize only religious activities.  Although not tax-exempt, a cultural association may engage in for-profit as well as nonprofit activity and receive government subsidies for its cultural and educational operations.  Religious groups normally register under both categories.  For example, Catholics perform religious activities through their associations of worship and operate schools through their cultural associations.

Religious groups must apply at the local prefecture (the administrative body, headed by a prefect, that represents the central government in each department) for recognition as an association of worship and tax-exempt status.  To qualify as an association of worship, the group’s sole purpose must be the practice of religion, which may include liturgical services and practices, religious training, and the construction of buildings serving the religious group.  The association must also engage in public worship and respect public order.  Among excluded activities are those that are purely cultural, social, or humanitarian in nature.  To apply for tax-exempt status, the association must provide to the prefecture its estimated budget for the year, annual accounts for the previous three years or since the association’s creation, whichever is shorter, a written justification of eligibility for the status, and the number of members of the association.  In Paris, the association must have a minimum of 25 members.  Once granted, the association may use the tax-exempt status nationwide.  The government does not tax associations of worship on donations they receive.  If the prefecture determines an association is not in conformity with its tax-exempt status, however, the government may change that status and require the association to pay taxes at a rate of 60 percent on past, as well as future, donations until it regains tax-exempt status.  The Ministry of Interior has not provided recent information on the number of associations with tax-exempt status.  According to ministry data more than a decade old, there are 109 Protestant, 100 Catholic, 50 Jehovah’s Witness, 30 Muslim, and 15 Jewish associations with tax-exempt status.

The number of cultural associations, many of which are not associated with religious groups, is in the thousands and changes frequently.  Cultural associations may be declared using an online form through the government’s public administration website.  Cultural associations, even if associated with religious groups, may operate without applying for government recognition, but receiving government recognition exempts them from taxes.  The Church of Scientology has the status of a secular and not a religious association.

The law states, “Detained persons have the right to freedom of opinion, conscience, and religion.  They may practice the religion of their choice…without other limits than those imposed by the security needs and good order of the institution.”

Counterterrorism legislation grants prefects in each department the authority to close a place of worship for a maximum of six months if they find that comments, writings, or activities in the place of worship “provoke violence, hatred, or discrimination or the commission of acts of terrorism or praise such acts of terrorism.”  The management of the place of worship has 48 hours to appeal the closure decision to an administrative court.  A place of worship that has been closed may remain closed beyond the six-month maximum if it does not replace its chief cleric and/or management.  Noncompliance with a closure decision carries a six-month prison sentence and a fine of 7,500 euros ($8,500).  A counterterrorism and intelligence law that parliament enacted on July 22 makes permanent some provisions of a 2017 law on internal security and counterterrorism that had been set to expire July 31.  The new law allows authorities to close facilities belonging to places of worship linked to acts of terrorism, rather than only the places of worship themselves, as was previously the case.

The law prohibits covering one’s face, including for religious reasons, in public places, including public transportation, government buildings, and other public spaces, such as restaurants and movie theaters.  If police encounter a person in a public space wearing a face covering such as a niqab or burqa, they are legally required to ask the individual to remove it to verify the individual’s identity.  According to the law, police officials may not remove it themselves.  If an individual refuses to remove the garment, police may take the person to the local police station to verify his or her identity.  Police may not question or hold an individual for more than four hours.  Refusing a police instruction to remove a face-covering garment carries a maximum fine of 150 euros ($170) or attendance at a citizenship course.  Individuals who coerce other persons to cover their face on account of gender by threat, violence, force, or abuse of power or authority are subject to a fine of up to 30,000 euros ($34,000) and may receive a sentence of up to one year in prison.  The fine and sentence are doubled if the person coerced is a minor.  The law exempts use of face coverings mandated by the authorities, such as masks worn for COVID-19 prevention.

The law prohibits agents of the administration, public services, and companies or associations carrying out public services from demonstrating their religion through visible signs of religious affiliation, such as an Islamic headscarf, Jewish skullcap, Sikh turban, or Christian cross.  The prohibition applies during working hours even if the agents are not in their place of employment and at any time at the place of employment.

By law, the government may not directly finance religious groups to build new places of worship, except, as noted below, in Alsace-Lorraine and overseas departments and territories.  The government may, however, provide loan guarantees or lease property to groups at advantageous rates.  The law also exempts places of worship from property taxes.  The state owns and is responsible for the upkeep of most places of worship, primarily Catholic, built before 1905.  The government may fund cultural associations with a religious connection.

The Upholding Republican Values law – passed by parliament on July 23, ruled constitutional on August 13 by the Constitutional Court, and signed by President Macron on August 24 – includes measures expanding requirements of neutrality in expression and attire for public servants and private contractors of public services, methods to combat online hate speech, stricter restrictions on homeschooling, increased control of public associations, transparency of religious associations, and enhanced measures against polygamy, forced marriages, and “virginity certificates.”  The law requires audits of associations, including those that are religious in nature, that receive foreign funding of more than 153,000 euros ($173,500) per year.  The law imposes additional reporting requirements on local religious-based organizations.  It modifies a law on policing of religions to include punishing the incitement to discrimination, hatred, or violence with up to five years in prison.  The law also increases the punishment for holding political meetings in places of worship and prohibits the organization of campaigning operations for political elections in places of worship.  In addition, a judge may forbid anyone convicted of provoking terrorism, discrimination, hate, or violence from entering places of worship.  The government may temporarily close places of worship if it finds any activities that incite hatred or violence.  The new law expanded the requirements for neutrality, impartiality, and principles of secularism, which previously applied only to government employees, to apply to private contractors for public services.  The law also implements a commemorative “secularism day,” to be recognized annually on December 9.  In addition, it requires municipalities and departments to inform local prefects three months before concluding a long-term lease with, or providing loans to, places of worship.

The Upholding Republican Values law includes provisions to combat hate speech, including the criminalization of disseminating personal information which could endanger the life of others.  Violators may be punished with up to five years in prison and a fine of 75,000 euros ($85,000) if the victim is a public official, a journalist, or a minor.  An expedited procedure allows authorities to remove content on mirror sites.

The law separating religion and state does not apply in three classes of territories.  Because Alsace-Lorraine (currently comprising the departments of Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, and la Moselle and known as Alsace-Moselle) was part of Germany when the law was enacted, Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jews there may choose to allocate a portion of their income tax to their religious group.  Pastors, priests, and rabbis of these four recognized faiths in Alsace-Moselle receive a salary from the Interior Ministry, and the country’s President, with the agreement of the Holy See, appoints the Catholic bishops of Metz and Strasbourg.  The Prime Minister appoints the Chief Rabbi and the presidents of the Jewish and Protestant consistories (the administrative governance bodies of these groups) in Alsace-Moselle, and the Interior Minister appoints ministers of three Christian Churches (Catholic, Lutheran, and Protestant Reformed Church of Alsace and Lorraine) in the region.  Local governments in the region may also provide financial support for constructing religious buildings.  The Overseas Department of French Guiana, which is governed under 19th century colonial laws, may provide subsidies to the Catholic Church.  Other overseas departments and overseas territories, which include island territories in the Caribbean and the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, and several sub-Antarctic islands, may also provide funding for religious groups.  This provision also applies to the portion of Antarctica the government claims as an overseas territory.

Public schools are secular.  The law prohibits public school employees from wearing visible signs of religious affiliation and students from wearing “conspicuous religious symbols,” including the Islamic headscarf, Jewish skullcap, Sikh turban, and large Christian crosses.  Public schools do not provide religious instruction except in Alsace-Moselle and overseas departments and territories.  In Alsace-Moselle, religious education regarding one of the four recognized faiths (Catholicism, Lutheranism, Protestant Reformed Church of Alsace and Lorraine, and Judaism) is compulsory in public primary and secondary schools, although students may, with a written request from their parents, opt for a secular equivalent.  Religious education classes are taught by laypersons who are trained and nominated by the respective religious groups but are paid by the state.  Elsewhere in the country, public schools teach information about religious groups as part of the history curriculum.  Parents who wish their children to wear conspicuous religious symbols or to receive religious instruction may homeschool their children or send them to a private school.  Homeschooling and private schools must conform to the educational standards established for public schools; however, private schools may permit the wearing of religious symbols on their premises.  Under the Upholding Republican Values law, beginning in September 2022, homeschooling will be allowed only for strictly defined reasons, including sickness, disability, intensive sport or artistic training, transient families, or those with geographic constraints.  Parents who wish to take their children out of school will be required to get an annual authorization from the local education authority.

By law, the government subsidizes private schools, including those affiliated with religious organizations.  In 98 percent of private schools, in accordance with the law, the government pays the teachers’ salaries, provided the school accepts all children regardless of their religious affiliation.  The law does not address the issue of religious instruction in government-subsidized private schools.  According to the education code, religious instruction is allowed but optional in government-subsidized private schools.  Students are not required to attend religion classes, and other activities are available for students who opt out.

Missionaries from countries not exempt from visa requirements must obtain a three-month tourist visa before traveling to the country.  All missionaries from nonexempt countries wishing to remain longer than 90 days must obtain long-duration visas before entering the country.  Upon arrival, missionaries must provide a letter from their sponsoring religious group to apply to the local prefecture for a temporary residence card.

The country adheres to the nonbinding Terezin Declaration of 2009 – an agreement to remedy the economic wrongs experienced by Jews and other victims of Nazi persecution – and its guidelines and best practices of 2010.  The government has laws and mechanisms in place for property restitution and reparation, including for all three types of immovable property:  private, communal, and heirless.

The government’s Commission for the Compensation for Victims of Spoliation (CIVS or the “Drai Commission”) is a sovereign and independent administrative body under the authority of the Prime Minister.  CIVS recommends and examines reparations to individual victims of the Holocaust or their heirs not previously compensated for damages resulting from antisemitic legislation passed either by the Vichy government or by the occupying Germans.  On June 17, the CIVS announced that on its recommendation, Prime Minister Jean Castex had ordered the return to the descendants of Jewish lawyer Armand Dorville 12 works of art acquired by the French State in 1942.  At year’s end, the government was working on a draft law to effectively implement this decision.

The law criminalizes the Boycott, Divestment and Sanction (BDS) movement against Israel, treating it as “a provocation to discrimination or hatred or violence towards a person or a group of persons because of their origin or belonging to an ethnic group, a nation, a race, or a determined religion.”

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On April 14, the Court of Cassation upheld the Paris Court of Appeals’ decision that Kobili Traore, the killer of Sarah Halimi, a 65-year-old Jewish woman, was unfit to stand trial because his cannabis consumption prior to the killing rendered him psychotic, despite the judges’ opinion that the attack was antisemitic in character.  The Court of Cassation’s decision closed the case.  According to media reports, Traore continued under psychiatric care where he had been assigned since killing Halimi in 2017 and would remain hospitalized until psychiatrists concluded he no longer represented a danger to himself or others.  Lawyers for Halimi’s relatives announced their intention to take the case to the European Court of Human Rights.  On April 21, lawyers representing Halimi’s sister announced that she intended to file a criminal complaint against Traore in Israel.

On April 25, media reported that more than 20,000 persons demonstrated at Trocadero Square in Paris to “proclaim determination to continue the fight for Sarah’s memory.”  Similar protests were held in several other cities across the country.  French political leaders, including President Macron, criticized the court ruling and what he called the loopholes in law exposed by the case.  Macron also told daily newspaper Le Figaro that “Deciding to take narcotics and then ‘going mad’ should not, in my view, remove your criminal responsibility,” and said he wanted Justice Minister Eric Dupond-Moretti to introduce a change in the law “as soon as possible.”  On July 22, the National Assembly established a parliamentary commission of inquiry into the affair, which was continuing its investigation at year’s end.

On March 15, following the resignation of M’hammed Henniche, the rector (administrator) of a mosque in Pantin, a Paris suburb, and the nomination of a new board of directors, Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin called for the reopening of the mosque, made effective on April 9.  In October 2020, Darmanin had ordered a six-month closure of the mosque, following the beheading of teacher Samuel Paty, who had shown his class cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad as part of a lesson on freedom of expression.  The mosque’s imam Ibrahim Doucoure had posted on social media calls to retaliate against Paty for showing the cartoons.  The Montreuil Administrative Court had validated the government’s decision to close the mosque.

On October 26, Junior Minister for Citizenship Marlene Schiappa reported that, since the end of 2019, as part of a nationwide program to counter “Islamism and communitarianism,” the Ministry of Interior had conducted 23,996 assessments and closed 672 establishments of various kinds, including 22 mosques.  According to Schiappa, those establishments, which the government did not specifically identify, “were gathering places to organize Islamist separatism,” which President Macron had previously described as a “methodical organization” to create a “countersociety” in which Islamists impose their own rules and laws on isolated communities.

On October 13, Interior Minister Darmanin announced he had ordered authorities to close a mosque in Allonnes, in the Loire Region, following what he said was evidence the mosque preached radical Islamism.  According to the local prefecture, some of its 300 members were linked to radical Islamist movements that “legitimized the use of armed jihad” as well as “hate and discrimination.”  In early October, authorities froze the accounts of the two associations running the mosque.

On October 26, Interior Minister Darmanin reported that, following inspections of mosques conducted starting in November 2020, the government suspected 92 of the 2,500 mosques in the country of being radical and had closed 21 of them.  On December 12, Darmanin said 36 mosques were removed from the list of those suspected of Islamist separatism after complying with government requests, including dismissing “dangerous” imams and rejecting foreign funding.  Darmanin reiterated the mosques suspected of practicing radical Islam represented a very small minority.

In a December 27 decree, Darmanin announced the government administratively closed the mosque of Beauvais, north of Paris, for six months because of the anti-republican sermons of one of its imams.  Darmanin accused Imam Islem, born Eddy Lecocq, of dividing society by justifying jihad and using discriminatory language against LGBTQ+ persons and women in his sermons.  The mosque’s representative argued that Islem’s comments were taken out of context, calling the closure “unjustified” and the accusations against the imam false.  Some members of the Beauvais Muslim community expressed frustration to the press, saying that while the law should apply to this imam, it was unfair that “the whole community was being punished” for his actions.

Contrary to the previous year, Jehovah’s Witness officials did not report any cases in which authorities interfered with proselytizing during the year.

After President Macron’s announcement that a COVID-19 health pass would be required to enter public spaces beginning in August, some protesters wore the yellow Star of David or held signs comparing treatment of nonvaccinated persons to that of Jews during the Holocaust; others protested with antisemitic signs.

With the stated intent to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, the government continued to impose measures limiting the distance between worshippers during religious services.  It required places of worship to ensure that there were at least two empty seats between persons unless they were members of the same household and that only one row of seats out of two was occupied.  Unlike with other gatherings, the government did not require a COVID-19 health pass to attend religious ceremonies.  The Prime Minister’s office told Le Figaro newspaper July 13 that places of worship enjoyed constitutional protections beyond those of other groups because of the fundamental value of the freedom of religion.

On August 24, President Macron signed into law the Upholding Republican Values bill, which the government used to continue closing organizations accused of separatism, including some places of worship.  On March 10, leaders of the Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox Churches in the country issued a public statement expressing their concern about the then draft bill.  Catholic Archbishop Eric de Moulins-Beaufort, President of the Bishops Conference of France (CEF), Pastor Francois Clavairoly, President of the Protestant Federation of France, and Metropolitan Emmanuel Adamakis, Metropolitan of the Greek Orthodox Metropolis of France, signed the statement.  The statement said that “by its internal logic … this bill risks undermining fundamental freedoms such as freedom of worship, association, teaching and even freedom of opinion.”  The three leaders added that “turning its back on the separation [of church and state], the state interferes in the qualification of what is religious” and that the law allowed the state to apply more constraints and controls on religious organizations when the Christian churches believed the procedures necessary to maintain public order already existed.  Muslim leaders, also speaking about the bill while in draft, said that, although it did not specifically mention the word Islam, many of its provisions clearly singled out Islam, targeting and stigmatizing Muslims.  They also pointed out that President Macron had initially proposed the law as a means to combat “Islamist separatism.”  NGOs expressed concern about the increased power of unelected prefects to close associations.  Mohammed Moussaoui, president of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM), said the then draft would increase restrictions on French religious associations, “but in the end it will be beneficial and there will be less suspicion towards donations.”  France’s Chief Rabbi Haim Korsia said the then draft law “reminds us of the importance of carrying the values of the republic everywhere, in all spaces, including religious spaces” and gives “legal tools to do what we could not do before.”

In a January 18 meeting with representatives of the CFCM, which until December was the government’s main dialogue partner among groups representing the Muslim community, President Macron praised the CFCM’s adoption of the “Charter of Principles for the Islam of France,” the Elysee (Office of the Presidency) reported.  “This is a clear, decisive and precise commitment in favor of the republic,” Macron said, hailing “a truly foundational text for relations between the state and Islam in France.”  According to the CFCM, the agreement was reached during a January 16 meeting of the CFCM with Interior Minister Darmanin after weeks of resistance from some CFCM members, who objected to a “restructuring” of Islam to make it compatible with French law and values.  Signatories to the charter included the CFCM, the Union of Mosques of France, Gathering of Muslims of France, Great Mosque of Paris (GMP), and the French Federation of Islamic Associations of Africa, Comoros, and the West Indies.  Signatories to the charter, composed of 10 articles, vowed to reject attempts to use Islam for political ends, refrain from distributing messages of violence, hate, terrorism, or racism, and educate youth against those who spread such messages; affirmed gender equality and the need to educate believers that certain cultural practices presumed to be Muslim are not part of Islam; and agreed to combat “superstitions and archaic practices” that endanger the lives of victims, recognize Muslims have the right to renounce Islam, and reject racism, antisemitism, and misogynistic acts.

Online news site Middle East Eye published an opinion piece in February that called the charter “the worst violation of the separation of Church and state in the history of the Fifth Republic,” and stating it was crafted by the government, particularly President Macron and Interior Minister Darmanin, and not by Muslims.  On January 17, Tareq Oubrou, the Great Imam of Bordeaux, said he deplored that the CFCM produced the charter “under political pressure.”

On November 21, the GMP along with three Muslim federations announced they had set up a National Council of Imams (CNI) aimed at establishing a new certification system for imams in France.  The CFCM, which President Macron had instructed in 2020 to establish a new imam certification system to ensure Muslim clerics’ compliance with French republican values, denounced the initiative.  The CFCM president, Mohammed Moussaoui, accused the GMP, the Gathering of Muslims of France; the French Federation of Islamic Associations of Africa, Comoros, and the West Indies; and the Muslims of France (former Union of Islamic Organizations in France) of having “taken the organization of Muslim worship hostage.”

On July 23, the Ministry of the Interior and the Loire regional prefecture officially suspended Mmadi Ahamada, the imam of the Attakwa Mosque in Saint-Chamond, for discriminating against women.  In Eid al-Adha remarks, the imam said women should “stay home, not show off … and not be too complacent in your language,” nor give in to “corruption and vice.”  Interior Minister Darmanin tweeted that he would relentlessly counter those who violated the values of the republic, and said that at his instruction, the Saint-Chamond imam and another imam were fired for “unacceptable sermons.”  Darmanin also ordered the Loire prefect to evaluate the Saint-Chamond imam’s renewal of his residency permit.  According to media reports, the imam, a citizen of Comoros, could be deported if the permit were not renewed.

On July 15, the government announced the creation of a new Interministerial Committee on Secularism to replace the Observatory for Secularism – an independent public watchdog entity established in 2013 whose members were appointed by the government – that critics from the political right and left said did not crack down hard enough on radical Islam.  According to Minister for Citizenship Schiappa, who announced the new committee, it would function under the authority of the Prime Minister’s office and be responsible, as the observatory had been, for coordinating government efforts to protect state secularism, for instance by ensuring no public funding was allocated to nonsecular programs.  She stated the committee would also assume responsibility for secularism training for public employees, with the goal of providing such training to all five million employees by 2025.  Twelve ministers on the new committee were tasked with coordinating state secularism and tracking the implementation of the Upholding Republican Values law.  The committee was also tasked with placing a secularism specialist in each public administration by the end of the year to provide information and mediate on issues relating to religion.  It would oversee new powers given to prefects to take legal action against local governments if they implement policies that seem to contradict secularism, for example by allowing women-only sessions in public pools.  In her announcement, Minister Schiappa also said that, during the December 9 “Secularism Day,” the Ministry of the Interior would award a “Legality Prize” of 50,000 euros ($56,700) for promoting secularism.

According to media, on October 12, at the request of President Macron, Interior Minister Darmanin summoned CEF President Archbishop de Moulins-Beaufort, after the Archbishop publicly stated that the secrecy of confession was “above the laws of the republic,” sparking outrage among groups of victims of sexual abuse by priests.  De Moulins-Beaufort made the comment after a Church-commissioned independent report revealed more than 200,000 cases of sexual abuse by priests over the previous seven decades.  After the meeting, Archbishop de Moulins-Beaufort cited “the determination of all bishops, and all Catholics, to make the protection of children an absolute priority, in close cooperation with the French authorities.”

According to the Ministry of Justice, as of 2018, the penitentiary system employed 720 Catholic, 361 Protestant, 231 Muslim, 191 Jehovah’s Witness, 74 Jewish, 54 Orthodox Christian, and 18 Buddhist chaplains.  In detainee visiting areas, visitors could bring religious objects to an inmate or speak with the prisoner about religious issues but could not pray.  Prisoners could pray in their cells individually, with a chaplain in designated prayer rooms, or, in some institutions, in special apartments where they could receive family for up to 48 hours.

In September, 55 foreign imams and two murshidates (Muslim religious female guides) began year-long assignments at mosques in the country.  On September 14, Chemsedine Hafiz, Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris, announced on social media that his mosque held a welcoming seminar before sending the imams and murshidates to their respective places of assignment.  In accordance with a bilateral agreement with Algeria, the government hosted training sessions on secularism and French values for these imams and murshidates.

On September 29, as part of the government’s stated efforts to combat radicalization, Interior Minister Darmanin announced in a tweet the dissolution of the Nawa Center for Oriental Studies and Translation in the southwestern town of Pamiers for reportedly producing Islamist propaganda and legitimizing violence.  In its decree, the government cited Nawa publications that called for the “extermination of the Jews,” legitimized violence against LGBTQ+ individuals, and encouraged the punishment of “adulterous women.”  In a September 28 interview with Le Figaro, Darmanin said the government was in the process of closing six religious sites and banning another 10 local associations for ties to radical Islam.

In a September 24 ruling, the Council of State, the country’s highest court for public administration issues, approved the authorities’ December 2020 dissolution of the Collective Against Islamophobia in France, an NGO with the stated aim of combating discrimination towards Muslims in the country and providing legal support to victims of discrimination.  The government had moved to close the collective in late 2020, following the killing of teacher Samuel Paty by an Islamist.

In a tweet published on October 20, Interior Minister Darmanin announced that, at his request based on the instructions of President Macron, the Council of Ministers had dissolved the Coordination against Racism and Islamophobia, an association created in 2008 and based near Lyon.  On its website, the association presented itself as “an initiative aiming at fighting against a continuously growing scourge:  Islamophobia.”  Darmanin said the association called for “hatred, violence, and discrimination,” and government spokesman Gabriel Attal added it also expressed antisemitism.

In May, President Macron’s ruling La Republique en Marche! (The Republic on the Move!) Party threatened to withdraw its support for a Muslim candidate running in June local elections after she wore a headscarf in a photograph on a campaign flyer.  Party chief Stanislas Guerini said wearing “ostentatious religious symbols” in photographs appearing in campaign materials was against the party’s values.

On November 2, the Council of Europe retracted visuals that said, “freedom is in [a] hijab,” from a campaign combating discrimination and anti-Muslim sentiment after the French government rejected the messaging.  One advertisement, published the previous week, showed a split image of two women, one wearing a hijab and the other not, alongside the slogan: “Beauty is in diversity as freedom is in hijab.”  The split image “deeply shocked me,” Secretary of State for Youth Sarah El Hairy said in a November 2 television interview.  “It is the opposite of the values France is standing up for … which is why it was pulled today.”  The council suspended the entire promotional campaign on November 3.

On December 21, the Paris Administrative Court upheld the 2020 ruling by the Court of Montreuil overturning a 2019 municipal decree that had refused a permit for the Church of Scientology to renovate a building it had purchased in the municipality of Saint-Denis for the purpose of converting it into its headquarters and a training center.  The court ruled that the refusal was a “misuse of power” and ordered the city of Saint-Denis to reexamine the permit request within three months.

According to statistics released by the Ministry of the Armed Forces in March, the government regularly deployed 3,000 military personnel – a number that could rise to 10,000 at times of high threat – throughout the country to patrol vulnerable sites, including Catholic, Jewish, and Islamic sites and other places of worship.  Some Jewish leaders requested the government also station armed guards at Jewish places of worship; the government did not do so.

Interior Minister Darmanin called for strengthening security at places of worship ahead of major religious holidays because of the “persistent terrorist threat,” AFP reported on March 17.  Darmanin reportedly instructed prefects to pay particular attention to religious “gatherings and services that traditionally bring together large groups of people … and consequently constitute targets with strong symbolism.”  Darmanin also called for increasing counterterrorism patrols under the Ministry of the Armed Forces’ Operation Sentinel around vulnerable and symbolic religious sites.

In a September 1 memo to prefects during the Jewish month of Tishrei (September 7-October 6), which includes Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, and several other Jewish holidays, Interior Minister Darmanin asked them to strengthen the security of Jewish places of worship and to ensure maximum police presence due to the “very high level of the terrorist threat.”  Counterterrorism patrols under Operation Sentinel could also be deployed around particularly vulnerable sites, according to the memo.  The MOI executed similar countermeasures at all Christian churches throughout the country on August 15 for the Day of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

On January 4, according to judicial sources, two of 14 defendants that the Special Criminal Court found guilty in 2020 of supporting terrorists who conducted attacks against satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and a kosher supermarket in 2015 appealed their sentences.  The appeal was scheduled to be heard in September-October 2022.

On March 22, the city of Strasbourg approved 2.56 million euros ($2.90 million) in city funding for the construction of the Milli Gorus Islamic Confederation-sponsored Eyyup Sultan Mosque.  In a March 23 Business FM television interview, Minister Darmanin stated that the city’s decision supported foreign interference in the country.  He criticized the Milli Gorus Islamic Confederation for what he said was its affiliation with Turkey and for engaging in political Islam and refusing to sign the “Charter of Principles for the Islam of France,” a part of the government’s effort to fight Islamist separatism.  Darmanin asked the local prefect to contest the city’s decision before an administrative judge.  Mayor Jeanne Barseghian wrote in a letter to President Macron that she had set as conditions for final approval of the funding that mosque project leaders ensure transparency in their financing and subscribe to the values of the republic.  The prefect disputed that conditions were set and announced on April 7 that the city’s decision would be contested in administrative court.  Further information on the status of the project was unavailable at year’s end.

On January 27, the Paris Court of Appeals ruled that 67-year-old Hassan Diab, the main suspect in the 1980 deadly bombing of the rue Copernic Synagogue in Paris, would have to stand trial, and on May 19, the Court of Cassation upheld that decision.  Diab, a dual Lebanese-Canadian citizen, is suspected of having prepared and placed the bomb, which killed three Frenchmen and an Israeli journalist and injured 46 persons.  Diab returned to Canada in 2018 after three years in detention in France when judges determined the evidence was insufficient to warrant prosecution.  On December 22, Le Figaro reported that Diab’s trial would open in Paris in April 2023, but by year’s end, authorities had not issued an arrest warrant and Diab remained in Canada.

On April 14, the Paris Appeals Court validated the grounds for an investigation of a 1982 terrorist attack against an Israeli restaurant in Paris that left six dead and wounded 22 others.  The decision left open the possibility of a trial, judicial sources reported.  The court dismissed two challenges relating to a missing signature on a judicial detention document and an attempt to nullify a December 2020 decision to place the suspect under investigation.  In December 2020, Norwegian authorities extradited to France a suspect in the case, naturalized Norwegian Walid Abdulrahman Abou Zayed.  On December 23, judges decided to keep the suspect in pretrial detention.

On April 16, the Ministry of Education reported 547 infringements of the secularism law in schools between December 2020 and March 2021.  Middle schools accounted for 45 percent of incidents, while primary schools accounted for 33 percent and high schools for 22 percent; 32 percent of violations were in the form of religiously motivated insults or other verbal aggression, while 10 percent involved proselytism.  According to a report released on December 9 by the ministry, 614 infractions of secularism in schools were reported between September and mid-November in the country’s 60,000 schools, an increase of 12 percent compared to December 2020-March 2021.  Incidents cited included insults or other verbal abuse of a religious nature, the wearing of religious symbols, and refusal to take part in school activities.

In February, Education Minister Jean-Michel Blanquer commissioned a report from former school inspector Jean-Pierre Obin on how teachers and headteachers might be better equipped to handle the issue of secularism in schools.  The report, published on June 14, described some confusion among pupils and teachers about the meaning of secularism, exacerbated by the case of teacher Samuel Paty, beheaded in 2020.  The report also highlighted how the historical roots of the country’s current laws were not always understood.  Following the report’s publication, according to Radio France International, Blanquer introduced training programs for teachers and principals on the place of religion in schools so that there would be a common understanding of what secularism entailed and what was and was not allowed.  On October 19, 1,000 teachers started the 120- to 150-hour training.

On October 15-16, schools commemorated the first anniversary of the killing of Samuel Paty with a series of ceremonies and screenings of documentaries on freedom of speech.  On October 16, Prime Minister Castex unveiled a memorial plaque honoring Paty at the entrance of the Education Ministry.  Macron also received Paty’s family at the Elysee Palace.

On February 20, 800 academics signed an open letter in Le Monde calling for Higher Education Minister Frederique Vidal’s resignation for threatening “intellectual repression” by ordering, earlier that month, a “scientific investigation” of “Islamo-leftism” at universities.  In a February 21 response, Vidal stated the investigation would be carried out in a “scientific” and “rational” manner.  Several officials within the Macron administration, including President Macron, distanced themselves from Vidal’s proposal, affirming their commitment to academic independence.  Academics said it was a failed attempt to distract from the more important problem of growing student discontent and poverty caused by COVID-19.  Information on the status of the investigation was unavailable at year’s end.

On April 14, the Mayor of Albertville, Frederic Burnier-Framboret, announced he would appeal an April 6 Grenoble Administrative Tribunal decision obliging him to grant a building permit for the Islamic school supported by the Milli Gorus Islamic Confederation, linked to Turkey.  According to media reports, Burnier-Framboret’s appeal would rest on an amendment to the Upholding Republican Values law that allows prefects to oppose the opening of out-of-contract schools supported by a foreign state “hostile” to the republic.  On December 16, the Lyon Appeals Court approved the mayor’s decision not to grant a building permit for the Muslim school.

On October 5, the Senate passed a nonbinding draft resolution to adopt the IHRA nonlegally binding working definition of antisemitism.  The motion, which was sponsored by the Senate’s majority party, the Republicans, with the government’s support, was adopted by a show of hands by all political groups, with one exception, the Communist, Republican, and Citizen and Ecologist Group.  Recalling the National Assembly had passed a similar resolution in 2019, Minister Schiappa said she was “happy that the Senate is taking the same approach.”  Although the resolution was not legally binding, it would allow for better identification and characterization of antisemitism, she added.  In February, the Paris city council adopted the IHRA working definition, while in March, the Strasbourg city council rejected it.  Pierre Jakubowicz, a council member who supported the IHRA working definition, said he was dismayed by the latter decision, adding that Strasbourg had been “plagued” by antisemitic outrages during the year.

In March, following a final judgment in 2020 by the European Court of Human Rights that the country had violated Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights when it convicted a group of 12 pro-Palestinian activists for incitement to discrimination for distributing leaflets calling for a boycott of Israeli goods, the government paid a fine of 380 euros ($430) of pecuniary damage and 7,000 euros ($7,900) in nonpecuniary damage to each activist.

On May 19, Normandy’s public prosecutor opened a formal investigation of what the prosecutor said were racist and anti-Islamic social media posts by the then far-right National Rally candidate for President of the Regional Council, Nicolas Bay.  On May 5, Bay – a member of both the Normandy Regional Council and the European Union (EU) Parliament – posted a video calling the Evreux Mosque a hub of “delinquency and terrorism” and saying it was linked to the killing of Samuel Paty.  Evreux elected officials denounced the video as a call to violence against Muslims, and the Great Mosque of Paris called for charges against Bay for inciting “racial hatred.”  On Facebook, Bay responded that “identity politics and Islamism” were threats to the nation and that the Evreux minaret was not welcome in Normandy.

Various groups initiated multiple petitions seeking action against the government for failing, according to the petitions, to follow the rule of law in dealing with the country’s Muslim population.  For example, in January, a coalition of 36 civil society and religious organizations from 13 countries, including the Strasbourg-based European Initiative for Social Cohesion, wrote to the United Nations Human Rights Committee to request that it open formal infringement procedures against the government for “entrenching Islamophobia and structural discrimination against Muslims.”  The 28-page document stated that the country’s actions and policies in relation to Muslim communities violated international and European laws.

On March 8, 25 NGOs from 11 different countries signed a letter urging the EU to investigate the French government for “state-sponsored Islamophobia” and imposing what the letter described as the discriminatory Charter of Principles for the Islam of France.  According to the signatories, the letter responded to what they said were the government’s efforts to isolate Islamist extremists through the Upholding Republican Values law, which was then under consideration in the Senate.  The letter to the European Commission stated that the legislation was inherently discriminatory and that the charter censored free speech in violation of European law.

On May 6, the National Council of Evangelicals of France sent an official report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, criticizing the Upholding Republican Values law and stating it would restrict freedom of worship.

In an April 20 statement, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s General Rapporteur on combating racism and intolerance, Momodou Malcolm Jallow, expressed deep concern that the Upholding Republican Values law stigmatized Muslims and “will serve to further legitimize the marginalization of Muslim women and will contribute to establishing a climate of hate, intolerance, and ultimately violence against Muslims.”

In an October 4 meeting with prefects, Interior Minister Darmanin said the country had deported 72 radicalized foreign Islamists since October 2020 and 636 since 2018.  The 72 were part of a list of foreigners on the FSPRT (fichier des signalements pour la prevention de la radicalisation a caractere terroriste) – a list of individuals suspected of radicalization – under orders of deportation.  On September 28, Interior Minister Darmanin said he had called on regional prefects to refuse any residence permits for imams sent by a foreign government.  According to the Ministry of Interior, approximately 300 imams, or 70 percent of all imams in the country, were trained in foreign countries such as Turkey, Morocco, and Algeria.  In 2020, President Macron announced he would gradually end the foreign imam program by 2024, creating instead a program for imams to be trained in France.

On January 27, on International Holocaust Remembrance Day and the 76th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, the Education Ministry invited teachers to take part in special activities and reflect on the Holocaust with students.

On January 10, Interior Minister Darmanin, Justice Minister Dupond-Moretti, Education Minister Blanquer, Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly, government spokesperson Gabriel Attal, and Junior Minister for Gender Equality, Diversity and Equal Opportunities Elisabeth Moreno attended a Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions (CRIF)-organized memorial ceremony outside a Paris kosher supermarket, where six years earlier a gunman had killed four Jews and held 15 other persons hostage.

On July 16, Prime Minister Castex, Junior Minister for Gender Equality, Diversity, an Equal Opportunities Moreno, and Secretary of State for the Armed Forces Genevieve Darrieussecq attended a ceremony at the Izieu Memorial Museum, the site where 44 Jewish children and their six educators were deported to Nazi extermination camps and later killed.  Prime Minister Castex issued a call to “fight everywhere and always against the unfulfilled temptations of barbarism.”

President Macron and government ministers continued to condemn antisemitism and declare support for Holocaust education on several occasions, including a February 19 visit to the Shoah Memorial; the March 19 commemoration of the ninth anniversary of the killings of three Jewish children and their teacher by Mohammed Merah in Toulouse; and the April 30 Holocaust Remembrance Day commemoration.  On April 25, Secretary of State for the Armed Forces Darrieussecq laid a wreath at the Shoah Memorial and the Memorial of the Martyrs of the Deportation in central Paris.

On April 26, the country held private or virtual ceremonies (because of COVID-19 restrictions) commemorating the thousands of persons deported to Nazi death camps during World War II.  On July18, Secretary of State for the Armed Forces Darrieussecq held a ceremony in Paris honoring the victims of the 1942 Velodrome d’Hiver roundup in which 13,000 Jews, including 4,000 children, were deported to extermination camps.  At the ceremony, 94-year-old Holocaust survivor Joseph Schwartz expressed anger in a speech at seeing anti-COVID-19 vaccine activists comparing the government’s COVID-19 health pass with the yellow Star of David Jews were forced to wear during World War II.

On July 26, Interior Minister Darmanin participated in a tribute for Father Jacques Hamel, the Catholic priest killed in an attack at his church in Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray in 2016, for which ISIS claimed responsibility.  In his remarks, Darmanin said, “The government of the republic commemorates its martyrs, and there is no doubt that Jacques Hamel is one of them,” adding that “Islamist barbarism [touched] all the symbols that make the West and France.”  President Macron and Prime Minister Castex also paid tribute to Father Hamel on social media on the same date, the anniversary of his death.

On October 18, Prime Minister Castex met with Pope Francis at the Vatican for celebrations to mark the centenary of the restoration of diplomatic relations between France and the Holy See.  At a press conference after the meeting, Castex, in a reference to a report on the sexual abuse of French children by Catholic clergy, said the Church “will not revisit the dogma of the secrecy of the confession,” and emphasized the need to find “ways and means to reconcile this with criminal law, the rights of victims,” adding that “the separation of Church and state is in no way the separation of Church and law.”

On October 26, President Macron and Interior Minister Darmanin participated in the first Economy and Protestantism dinner organized by the Protestant Federation and the Charles Gide Circle, a Protestant association which advocates a “responsible economy.”  In his remarks, President Macron stated that the Upholding Republican Values law was important “because we cannot deny [that] … in the name of religions, strategies have been set up that want to separate the republic.”  Macron added that he did not mean that the republic and society must separate itself from religion but that every person must be free to believe or not believe.  He said he did not accept any speech separating an individual from these rules “on the basis of a religion, a philosophy or anything else.  That is the basis of this law.”

On October 26, President Macron, accompanied by Chief Rabbi of France Korsia inaugurated in the village of Medan the first museum dedicated to the “Dreyfus Affair,” which recalls the 1894-1906 period when antisemitism led to the wrongful conviction of Jewish army captain Alfred Dreyfus.

On October 28, Interior Minister Darmanin attended a ceremony marking the repair of the Jewish cemetery of Sarre-Union, where vandals desecrated 269 graves in 2015.  “There is no greater duty for the republic than the protection of our Jewish compatriots who have suffered so much,” Darmanin stated.

In June, declared presidential candidate Jean-Luc Melenchon of the France Unbowed Party said that the killing by Mohammed Merah of Jewish schoolchildren and a rabbi in Toulouse in 2012 was “planned in advance” to place blame on Muslims before elections.  CRIF President Francis Kalifat condemned Melenchon’s remarks, tweeting they were an obscene attack on the memory of the victims and that Melenchon was pandering to Islamo-leftist voters and conspiracy theories.

On July 16, President Macron became the first president to visit the sanctuary of Lourdes on the same day when, according to believers, in 1858 the 18th and last apparition of the Virgin Mary to Bernadette Soubirous, also known as Saint Bernadette of Lourdes, took place in the cave of Massabielle, a Catholic holy place.

The country is a member of the IHRA.

The Ministry of Interior reported registering 1,659 antireligious acts during the year, compared with the same period in 2019, when 1,893 acts were reported.  (According to the ministry, statistics from 2020, when it recorded 1,386 antireligious acts, were not comparable because of the COVID-19 lockdown.)  While the total number of acts reported decreased from 2019, the number of anti-Muslim acts increased by 38 percent to 213, from 154 in 2019 (234 in 2020).  Anti-Christian acts decreased 19 percent, to 857, from 1,052 in 2019 (813 in 2020), and antisemitic acts fell 14 percent to 589, from 687 in 2019 (339 in 2020).

On August 9, Emmanuel Abayisenga, a Rwandan asylum seeker, killed Father Olivier Maire, a Catholic priest in Saint-Laurent-sur-Sevre in the Loire Region.  Abayisenga was under judicial supervision while awaiting trial for allegedly setting fire to the Nantes Cathedral in 2020.  Since the end of his pretrial detention, following an assessment he was mentally unfit to remain in the judicial system, Abayisenga had been staying with the victim.  In an August 9 press conference, the regional deputy prosecutor said there was no initial indication of any terrorist motive.  Media reported the killing had prompted a strong public outcry; President Macron and Prime Minister Castex both tweeted their condolences, and Minister of Interior Darmanin offered his support to the country’s Catholics.  At year’s end, remained in a psychiatric hospital.

On May 29, a group of approximately 10 men jeered, whistled at, and physically attacked Catholics taking part in a procession in Paris commemorating Catholics killed during the 1871 Commune.  The perpetrators tore down flags and threw projectiles at the marchers, injuring two of them.  Interior Minister Darmanin condemned the attack on social media.  Authorities charged one suspect with “aggravated violence” and “violation of religious freedom”.  His trial was scheduled for 2022.

In September, press reported that five men beat a Jewish man wearing a kippah on a street in Lyon, after the man confronted them when the group called him “a dirty Jew.”  The man sustained minor injuries.  Police arrested one suspect, a teenager.  There was no further information on the case at year’s end.

On March 29, a Pakistani national in the country illegally attempted to attack with a knife three young Jewish men wearing kippahs as they were leaving a synagogue in Paris during Passover.  According to press reports, authorities indicted the man for making a “threat with a weapon” but not for an antisemitic hate crime, reportedly because of insufficient evidence, and then released him.  Authorities subsequently deported the man to Pakistan on April 16.  The president of the local Jewish community expressed relief at the man’s deportation.

In March, according to press reports, guards at a Jewish school in Marseille overpowered a man with a knife whom they suspected of planning to stab customers at a nearby kosher store and bakery.  The guards disarmed the man and police took him into custody.  There was no further information on the case at year’s end.

According to media reports, in November, police arrested a teenager who brandished a machete, hurled marbles, and shouted “dirty Jews” in front of a Jewish high school outside Lyon.  Police were investigating whether the teenager or his family had ties to terrorism.

On December 1, legal authorities announced the trial of a man known as Aurelien C., whom security forces arrested in 2020 in Limoges because they suspected him of planning an attack on the Jewish community, would begin in Paris in January 2022.  Aurelien C, a former member of both the military and the Yellow Vest protest movement, had posted on social media white supremacist conspiracy theories and both antisemitic and anti-Islamic comments, while glorifying terrorists such as the 2019 Christchurch and 2011 Oslo attackers.  Investigators reportedly found incendiary tools in his home that could be used as mortars and found evidence he had researched when Jewish religious sites would reopen in his town.  Aurelien C. remained in detention at year’s end.

On May 26, a priest at the Toulon Cathedral received a voicemail warning that someone would come to “kill people in the church” and “make the building jump [i.e., explode].”  Police secured the cathedral and arrested a minor in Annecy later that afternoon for what they said may have been a prank.  The priest and police admonished the public that such jokes were unacceptable, particularly in light of recent attacks on places of worship.

On April 17, authorities deported to Algeria an Algerian food delivery driver whom the Strasbourg Criminal Court had convicted on January 14 of antisemitic discrimination for refusing to transport orders of kosher food to Jewish customers.  Interior Minister Darmanin said the courier, who was in the country illegally, was deported after serving his four-month prison sentence.

Jehovah’s Witnesses officials reported 14 incidents during the year.  On December 31, a physical attack took place against a Jehovah’s Witness in a parking lot in Pierrefitte-sur-Seine.  The individual filed a lawsuit.

According to the Israeli government’s Aliyah and Integration Ministry figures released in October, 2,819 French Jews emigrated to Israel in the first half of the year, compared with 2,227 in all of 2019.  According to the same source, approximately 2,220 Jews left France for Israel during the first 11 months of 2020.

On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the kidnapping, torture, and killing of Ilan Halimi, a young Jewish man, the CRIF commissioned a survey from research firm Ipsos on the perception of antisemitism in France.  The survey was conducted between February 5 and 8 with a sample of 1,000 persons over the age of 18.  The poll showed at least 74 percent of respondents believed that antisemitism was a widespread phenomenon in the country.  The poll also found 56 percent believed antisemitism was more severe than 10 years previously and 88 percent believed that the fight against antisemitism should be a priority for public authorities.  According to the poll, 69 percent of respondents were aware of the Ilan Halimi case; 53 percent believed that antisemitism had the same roots as other forms of racist hatred, and 38 percent did not fully understand the meaning of “anti-Zionism” rhetoric.

The annual report of the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, an advisory body to the Prime Minister, released on July 22, included the results of an Ipsos poll conducted in November 2020 and involving face-to-face interviews with a representative sample of 1,323 residents above the age of 18.  The results were similar to a poll Ipsos conducted a year earlier.  According to the more recent poll, 47.6 percent (compared with 34.2 percent in 2019) of respondents believed Jews “have a particular relationship with money,” and 21.9 percent (18.6 percent in 2019) thought Jews had too much power in the country.  The poll found 46.1 percent (35.5 percent in 2019) of respondents had a negative image of Islam, and 58.9 percent (44.7 percent in 2019) considered it a threat to national identity.  The commission’s report again cited what it said was persistent societal rejection of Islamic religious practices, finding, for example, that 68.8 percent of respondents (45.5 percent in 2019) opposed women wearing a veil.

In September, the Brussels-Based NGO Action and Protection League issued the results of its European antisemitism survey based on data that in France was collected between February and June 2020.  According to the survey, 7 percent of 1,000 respondents ages 18-75 in France said they had negative feelings towards Jews.  Twelve percent said they would be “totally uncomfortable” or “uncomfortable” with having Jewish neighbors.  The survey cited stereotypical statements about Jews and asked respondents the degree to which they agreed or disagreed.  The proportion who responded “strongly agree” or “tend to agree” with the following statements were – “the interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population” (21 percent); “there is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world” (28 percent); “Jews have too much influence in this country” (21 percent); “Jews will never be able to fully integrate into this society” (13 percent); “Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals” (15 percent); “many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later” (12 percent); “Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them” (28 percent); “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes” (24 percent).

In a July 25 interview with weekly Le Journal du Dimanche, CRIF President Kalifat condemned the anti-COVID-19 vaccine movement’s use of references to the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis.  Kalifat said he was angry at those who “compare the implementation of the COVID-19 health pass, a tool intended to save lives, with the yellow star, which was itself the symbol of discrimination and the death of six million Jews [who] went up in smoke in Nazi crematoria.”  Kalifat said the pandemic was a pretext for online conspiracy theories accusing Jews and Israel of introducing the virus to profit from the vaccine.

According to a study by the London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue, French antisemitic content in online media platforms Twitter, Facebook, and Telegram increased seven-fold in the first two months of the year, compared with the same period in 2020.  In addition to frequent antisemitic content related to COVID-19, the study found 55 percent of the content had to do with conspiracy theories about Jews controlling international, financial, political, and media institutions.

On February 1, on the occasion of an official visit to a CEF session by Chief Rabbi of France Korsia, CRIF President Kalifat, and Joel Mergui, then president of the Israelite Central Consistory of France (the main Jewish administrative governance body), the CEF expressed its strong opposition to antisemitism and concern for growing intolerance against Jews in the country.  In a statement released to mark the visit, the bishops said their warning of the dangers of rising antisemitism in the country was “all the more urgent” given a “trivialization of violence” raised through hate speech, especially on social media.  The bishops also urged “not only Catholics, but also all our fellow citizens to fight vigorously against all forms of political and religious antisemitism in and around them.”

A report covering 2019-20 and issued in December by NGO The Observatory on Intolerance and Discrimination Against Christians in Europe stated that society in the country seemed to be increasingly divided between Christians, secularists, and Muslims, adding that the government’s secularism had resulted in strong pressures on Christians on moral issues in which Christians and secular society have different views, such as marriage, family, education, bioethics, and identity politics.  It also said media helped to perpetuate certain stereotypes about Christianity, leading to further division.  The NGO expressed concern about what it called a lack of respect for Christianity and a high number of attacks on Christians, churches, and Christian symbols, as well as reports by Christians of feeling Islamic oppression.  The report also stated authorities had noticed “the high number of serious attacks against churches, Christian buildings and symbols as well as against some citizens.”

In a report issued in March, NGO European Center for Law and Justice (ECLJ) stated that the overwhelming majority of converts to Christianity from Islam in the country experienced family and community contempt and persecution, most commonly in the form of verbal or physical aggression, threats, harassment, or rejection by members of the Muslim community.  ECLJ added that persecution was greater for women and girls who converted from Islam, a significant proportion of whom it said were threatened with being forcibly married, sent to their parents’ country of origin, or sequestered if they did not return to Islam.  The report stated that every year, 300 persons of Muslim origin were baptized into the Catholic Church and estimated that twice that number joined Protestant churches, concluding that there were at least 4,000 converts to Christianity from Islam in the country.

In September, religious leaders and other commentators criticized presidential candidate for 2022 Eric Zemmour’s statement that the Nazi-aligned Vichy regime “protected French Jews” during the Second World War.  In an October TV interview, Chief Rabbi Korsia called Zemmour, who is of Jewish heritage, an antisemite for his comments doubting the innocence of Alfred Dreyfus, famously exonerated of treason charges in 1906.  Zemmour was convicted in 2018 of incitement to religious hatred for making anti-Islamic comments.

On August 27, a fire, suspected to be arson, damaged a Protestant church in Behren-les-Forbach, in the eastern part of the country.  On Twitter, Interior Minister Darmanin strongly condemned the arson and expressed his “support to France’s Protestants.”  A gendarmerie investigation was ongoing at year’s end.

On April 12, students found a spray-painted crossed-out Star of David with the inscriptions “Death to Israel” and “Kouffar” (“nonbelievers” in Arabic and a pejorative term commonly used to describe Christians and Jews) on the facade of the Institute of Political Sciences, an institute of higher learning, in Paris.  The Union of Jewish Students of France called for the institute to take action “to fight the scourge of racist and antisemitic hatred within its walls.”  Higher Education Minister Vidal condemned the vandalism “in the strongest possible terms” on social media.  At year’s end, authorities had not identified any suspects.

According to media reports, on August 28, neighbors discovered antisemitic slogans, such as “Death to the Jews,” painted on the wall of the cemetery and an adjoining barn in Rouffach, located in Upper Rhine Department.  President of the Grand East Region Jean Rottner immediately condemned the incident on Twitter and called for an inquiry.

On August 11, local media in Brittany reported that a monument to French Holocaust survivor and European Parliament president Simone Veil in Perros-Guirec had been defaced three times with excrement and swastikas.  On August 24, following a joint investigation conducted by gendarmes and the Central Office for the Fight against Crimes Against Humanity, two men were arrested.  The local prosecutor announced on August 26 that the men were formally charged with aggravated degradation, aggravated public insult, and incitement to hatred charges, and were released on bail, with conditions.  A trial had not been scheduled by year’s end.

On August 7, antipolice graffiti was discovered on the walls of the Nour El Mohamadi Mosque in central Bordeaux, which was vandalized twice in 2020.  A police investigation was ongoing at year’s end.

On April 11, unidentified individuals defaced the Avicenne Muslim Cultural Center in Rennes with anti-Muslim graffiti, prompting a same-day visit by Interior Minister Darmanin and CFCM President Moussaoui.  The Rennes prosecutor opened an investigation for vandalism of a religious nature.  On April 29, vandals again defaced the Avicenne Muslim Cultural Center and a nearby halal butcher shop with anti-Muslim graffiti referencing a recent Islamist terror attack in Rambouillet, presidential candidate Melenchon, and right-wing monarchist group Action Francaise.  Action Francaise denied responsibility for the vandalism.  Elected officials and the regional prefect issued statements condemning the vandalism and affirming support for the Muslim community.  The CFCM also condemned the incident as “a new and cowardly” provocation.

On December 10, unknown persons vandalized dozens of tombs in the Muslim cemetery in the town of Mulhouse, knocking flowers and ornaments off the graves, according to press reports.  Mulhouse Mayor Michele Lutz condemned the vandalism.

On January 4, press reported local officials discovered swastikas and antisemitic graffiti spray painted on the walls of churches in Echouboulains and Ecrennes and the town hall of Vaux-le-Penil.  Vandals had painted near-identical graffiti a week earlier on graves at a local cemetery and at a nativity scene in the nearby towns of Fontainebleau and Melun.  The prefect of Seine-et-Marne Department and the mayor of Echouboulains condemned the vandalism, and Seine-et-Marne authorities opened an investigation.

On April 17, “The Return of Satan,” “Traitors,” and antisemitic graffiti were scrawled in red paint on the Saint-Sernin Basilica and in surrounding areas in Toulouse.  Mayor Jean-Luc Moudenc condemned the vandalism.  Local press said they believed far-right agitators could be behind the vandalism to create the impression of a Muslim attack on both Catholics and Jews.

The investigation of the 2020 killing of three Catholic worshippers in the Basilica of Notre Dame in the southern city of Nice continued at year’s end.  The suspect in the killings, identified as Brahim Aouissaoui, an asylum seeker from Tunisia who entered the country shortly before the attack, remained in prison.  The national counterterrorism prosecutor’s office said it was treating the attack as a terrorist incident.

On November 9, a Paris prosecutor requested a 32-year prison sentence for Yacine Mihoub, convicted of killing Holocaust survivor Mireille Knoll in 2018 and 18 years in prison for his accomplice, Alex Carrimbacus.  On November 10, the Paris Criminal Court sentenced Mihoub to life imprisonment, with no possibility of parole before 22 years.  Carrimbacus was acquitted of murder but found guilty of theft and sentenced to 15 years in prison.  The court ruled the killing was fueled by “a broader context of antisemitism” and “prejudices” about the purported wealth of Jewish people.  The victim’s family said the verdict was “just.”  On November 15, Mihoub’s lawyer announced his client had appealed the ruling, paving the way for a second trial.

On August 27, the Paris Criminal Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to hear a case involving two men who in 2020 shouted antisemitic insults and assaulted a Jewish man, stole his watch, and beat him unconscious.  The criminal court transferred the case to the Court of Assizes – which hears the most serious criminal cases – because the two men could face more than 15 years in prison on a charge of violent theft motivated by religious reasons.  At year’s end, a trial had not been scheduled, and the two men remained in detention.

On July 2, the Seine-Saint-Denis Criminal Court sentenced nine individuals to prison, with sentences ranging from four to 12 years for the violent September 2017 robbery of a Jewish family in Livry-Gargan, a northern Paris suburb.  The individuals were convicted of breaking into the home of Roger Pinto, the president of Siona, a group that represents Sephardic Jews, and beating Pinto’s son and wife.  The court confirmed the antisemitic nature of the robbery.  The Pinto family’s lawyer called the ruling “a victory for the law.”  The convicted individuals’ lawyer announced her clients would not appeal the ruling.

On July 8, the Colmar Court of Appeals declared a man accused of attempted murder after crashing his car into a mosque in Colmar in 2019 criminally not responsible for his actions and ordered he be sent to a psychiatric hospital instead.

On July 7, the Paris Criminal Court handed down suspended prison sentences ranging from four to six months to 11 of 13 defendants after they were found guilty of harassing and threatening a 16-year-old student, Mila, online in Lyon in 2020.  The 13 defendants represented a variety of backgrounds and religions; one had charges dismissed for procedural reasons, and another was acquitted.  The court considered the case a “real business of harassment.”  The student’s lawyer told the court Mila had received approximately 100,000 threatening messages, including death threats, rape threats, misogynist messages, and hateful messages about her homosexuality after she posted a vulgar anti-Islam video online.  The student said she posted the video in response to a vulgar attack on her sexuality by a Muslim.  Mila was also forced to change schools and continued to live under police protection through year’s end.  In July, the student met with Chemsedine Hafiz, Rector of the Great Mosque of Paris.

On September 22, four men and four women appeared before the Paris Criminal Court for posting antisemitic tweets against April Benayoum, the runner-up in the 2021 Miss France competition.  The eight were tried for “public insults committed because of origin, ethnicity, race, or religion.”  Benayoum received numerous antisemitic comments on social media after revealing that her father was Israeli during the televised competition in 2020.  Prosecutors requested suspended sentences of two months’ imprisonment.  On November 3, a Paris court ordered seven of the eight defendants to each pay fines ranging from 300 to 800 euros ($340-$910).  Each of the seven was also ordered to pay one euro ($1.13) in damages to the contestant and to each of several associations involved in combating racism and antisemitism which had joined the plaintiff in the lawsuit.  Four of the defendants were also ordered to attend a two-day civic class.  The court acquitted the eighth suspect, finding that his tweet did not target Benayoum directly.

On July 2, a Paris court sentenced French comedian Dieudonne M’Bala to four months in prison for “public insult of an antisemitic nature” and “contestation of a crime against humanity” for two 2020 videos regarding the Holocaust.  M’Bala appealed the decision.

On May 19, the Paris Court of Appeals condemned writer Alain Soral, commonly described in the press as a right-wing extremist, to four months in prison, with work release during the day, for incitement to religious hatred for blaming the 2019 fire in Notre Dame Cathedral on Jews from Paris.  In a separate case, the Court of Cassation on October 26 rejected Soral’s appeal of a 2020 ruling by the Paris Court of Appeals that convicted him for contesting crimes against humanity for his remarks regarding the Holocaust and ordered Soral to pay a fine of 5,000 euros ($5,700) or face imprisonment.

On October 19, a court in Metz sentenced teacher and former National Rally political candidate Cassandre Fristot to a suspended prison sentence of six months for “inciting racial hatred.”  Fristot held a placard with antisemitic slogans at an antivaccine protest in August, sparking wide condemnation and prompting Interior Minister Darmanin to ask the Prefect of Moselle to take legal action.  The court also ordered Fristot to pay fines of between one and 300 euros ($1.13-$340) to eight out of 13 groups, including CRIF and various NGOs, that joined the case as plaintiffs.  Education authorities also suspended Fristot from her teaching position on August 9, pending disciplinary action.

On May 18, the Lyon Criminal Court dropped charges against French-Palestinian activist Olivia Zemor, stating lack of evidence.  An Israeli pharmaceutical company had sued Zemor for defamation and incitement to economic discrimination after she posted an article on Europalestine, a pro-Palestinian website, accusing the company of being complicit in “apartheid and occupation.”

According to media, on October 26, a court in Val d’Oise, a region north of Paris, gave an optician a one-year suspended prison sentence for having a harassed a Jewish family returning from synagogue on August 21.  The woman repeatedly gave the Nazi salute, shouted “Heil Hitler,” and told the family, “Dirty Jews, you are the shame of France.”

On October 29, the Paris Criminal Court declared Jean-Marie Le Pen, the 93-year-old founder of the National Front party, now known as National Rally, not guilty of charges of inciting racial hatred for comments targeting a Jewish pop singer.  Asked in June 2014 about the French singer and actor Patrick Bruel, Le Pen referred to Bruel’s Jewish origins with a pun evoking the Holocaust, stating, “I’m not surprised.  Listen, next time we’ll do a whole oven batch!”  The court said Le Pen had clearly targeted Jews with his comment but that the statement did not amount to “inciting discrimination and violence.”

According to press reports, in September, the Correctional Tribunal of Toulouse acquitted Mohamed Tatai, the Rector of the Great Mosque of Toulouse, for a sermon he gave in Arabic in 2017 that prosecutors stated was antisemitic.  In the sermon, posted on a U.S. website, Tatai said, “The Prophet Muhammad told us about the final and decisive battle:  the last judgment will not come until Muslims battle Jews.”  The court ruled that Tatai, who said he was mistranslated, had no desire to incite hatred in his sermon.  Jewish leaders criticized the ruling.  Franck Teboul, the president of the Toulouse chapter of the CRIF, likened the decision to the Court of Cassation’s ruling not to convict the killer of Sarah Halimi, and commented, “…so you tell thousands at a mosque to kill Jews and hide beyond a centuries-old text.”  Abdallah Zakri, President of the Observatory for the Fight Against Islamophobia, called Tatai a moderate Muslim who had maintained good relations with Jews and Catholics and said his acquittal would undercut radical fundamentalists.

On January 5, the Correctional Court of Saint-Nazaire ordered a man to pay a 400-euro ($450) fine and complete an internship on citizenship for posting in 2020 on social media, “You want to honor [Samuel Paty]?  Go burn down the mosque in [the southern town of] Beziers to send the message that we are sick of it.”

On May 5, the Rhone Mosque Council published a request asking women not to attend mosques for the planned May 13 Eid al-Fitr prayer.  Kamel Kabtane, the Rector of the Lyon Great Mosque, said this decision was due to the COVID-19 crisis, and added that the elderly and weak were also advised to stay home.  He denied accusations of discrimination that were posted on social media stating individuals were trying to be malicious toward Muslims.  Kabtane also said mosques did not have sufficient capacity to hold all worshippers and cited a note from the Ministry of the Interior prohibiting prefects and mayors from renting them larger spaces.

On October 5, the Catholic Church’s Independent Commission on Sexual Abuse in the Church released its report on child abuse committed by Catholic priests, concluding that, not counting deceased victims, priests had abused 216,000 minors in the country between 1950 and 2020.  Adding claims against lay members of the Church, such as teachers at Catholic schools, the report said the number of victims might total 330,000.  Commission President Jean-Marc Sauve said the abuse was systemic and the Church had shown “deep, total, and even cruel indifference for years.”  CEF President Archbishop de Moulins-Beaufort, who had requested the report along with Sister Veronique Margron, President of the Conference of Monks and Nuns of France, expressed “shame and horror” at the findings.  The CEF said it would financially compensate victims by selling its own assets or taking on loans if needed and that an independent national commission would be set up to evaluate the claims.  In a November 8 statement, CEF leadership recognized formally for the first time that the Church bore “an institutional responsibility” for the abuse and, in what they said was a gesture of penance, prayed on their knees at the sanctuary of Lourdes.

The Charge d’Affaires and other staff from the embassy, consulates general, and APPs engaged relevant government officials, including at the religious affairs offices of the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs and DILCRAH, on ways to combat antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred and strengthen religious freedom.  Topics discussed included religious tolerance, antisemitic and anti-Muslim acts, the role of religious freedom in lessening violent extremism, the BDS movement, Holocaust-related compensation, and bilateral cooperation on these issues.  Embassy officials closely monitored official government positions on antisemitic, anti-Muslim, and anti-Christian incidents.

Staff from the embassy, consulates general, and APPs met regularly in person and virtually with religious community leaders, activists, and private citizens throughout the country to discuss issues of discrimination and to advocate tolerance for diversity.  Embassy officials discussed religious freedom, antisemitism, anti-Muslim sentiment, and interfaith dialogue and tolerance with senior Christian, Muslim, and Jewish representatives, and NGOs such as Coexister, an organization that promotes interfaith dialogue, and the American Jewish Committee (AJC) Europe.  They also hosted meetings with representatives from CRIF, the Israelite Central Consistory of France, the CFCM, the Paris Great Mosque, and Catholic and Protestant representatives working on interfaith dialogue.

The embassy supported for a second year an interfaith program, “Kol Yoom,” with local NGO Institut Hozes.  The program conducted interfaith “boot camps” gathering Jewish and Muslim teenagers from different social backgrounds to create shared experiences to foster tolerance and mutual understanding.  The groups participated in workshops and community service activities and acted as a force of positive change in their communities.  The embassy facilitated an Escape Zoom, an online cooperative game to foster ties between Jewish and Muslim students aged 12-17.  In April, the Interfaith Tour documentary, Le Temps des Olives (the Olive Season), was screened online for the group, followed by a discussion of ways to build societal cohesion and fight against hate speech.  The documentary portrayed four youths of different faiths from Coexister who conducted an eight-month world tour in 18 countries, funded in part by the embassy, to interview activists, academics, politicians, and interfaith leaders and to research projects to build diverse, inclusive, and sustainable societies.

On May 18, the Charge d’Affaires and the Consul General in Marseille took part in a conference at the Camp des Milles Holocaust Memorial and educational site.  They discussed with other participants opportunities to raise Holocaust awareness and increase societal tolerance.

In September, embassy representatives met with Chemsedine Hafiz, Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris, to discuss religious freedom, anti-Muslim sentiment, societal tolerance, and interfaith dialogue.

In September, the Consul General in Strasbourg hosted an interfaith roundtable with the Council of Europe, the Holy See’s Ambassador to the council, and religious leaders from across the region, including Catholic, Protestant, Anglican, Jewish, and Muslim representatives from Alsace.  Participants discussed current challenges presented by social media platforms regarding intolerance and radicalization, and ideas on how to bring interfaith discussion to the international identity of Strasbourg, in partnership with the Council of Europe.

During the year, the Consul General in Marseille held a series of meetings with religious leaders to discuss religious freedom issues.  The Consul General met with the Regional Council of the Muslim Faith (CRCM) in the Midi Pyrenees Region and the CRCM spokesperson in Toulouse on February 18, where they discussed preventing violent extremism, the Upholding Republican Values law, and tolerance and acceptance towards Muslims in French and American society.  On March 2, she met with the CRIF Marseille president and discussed tolerance and acceptance towards Jews, and Jewish and Muslim cooperation and understanding in Marseille’s northern neighborhoods.  In April, she held a virtual iftar with the Muslim community of the Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur Region, with attendees from Marseille, Avignon, Nice, and Carpentras at which they discussed the Ramadan traditions of the North African diaspora in Southern France, countering violent extremism in prisons, the Upholding Republican Values law, and the importance of interfaith dialogue in increasing societal tolerance.  On May 25, she met with the Vaucluse Jewish community and the CRCM representative for Vaucluse, and visited the Carpentras Synagogue and the Carpentras Mosque.  At the synagogue, she and Jewish community representatives discussed how community members were working to preserve their Jewish traditions within their congregation.  In the mosque, she and Muslim community representatives discussed how Muslim leaders were helping newcomers integrate into the country, especially with material support for young families and with literacy education.

On October 2-4, an official from the consulate general in Marseille and representatives of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum visited the Camp de Rivesaltes Memorial site in the Pyrenees Orientales Region and met with the memorial’s staff to explore opportunities for cooperation on Holocaust remembrance.  The camp was a transit point for deportees who were later sent to Nazi extermination camps.

APP Rennes officials met with Marc Brzustowski and Philippe Strol, respectively Vice President and President of the Rennes synagogue, on September 22 to discuss religious freedom, antisemitism, and opportunities for interfaith dialogue.  In October, APP Rennes officials discussed opportunities for interfaith dialogue with local government officials.

APP Lyon officials attended the investiture of the new Grand Rabbi of Lyon and the Auvergne-Rhone-Alpes Region, Daniel Dahan, in October.  The Consul spoke with the Grand Rabbi and other Jewish leaders regarding their concerns about the growth of antisemitism in the region.

On November 11, the Second Gentleman of the United States visited the Shoah Memorial in Paris to pay homage to victims of the Holocaust while marking Franco-American resolve to combat contemporary antisemitism.  He lit a memorial candle in honor of the 76,000 Jews deported from the country under Vichy rule at the Wall of Names that lists the victims.

The embassy regularly amplified messages from the Secretary of State and Department of State on religious freedom on embassy social media platforms in French and in English.  For example, in May and July, it posted remarks by the Secretary on religious freedom as a human right.  The Charge d’Affaires also published messages related to religious holidays on his Twitter accounts to highlight the diversity of religions and high-level engagement on religious freedom issues.  These included posts on Yom Kippur, Easter, Ramadan, Naw Ruz, and Holi, among others.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.3 million (midyear 2021).  Demographic studies do not track religious affiliation, and estimates from religious leaders and government agencies vary widely.  The Episcopal Conference of Gabon estimates approximately 80 percent of the population is Christian.  Of the Christian population, approximately two-thirds is Roman Catholic and one-third Protestant, which includes evangelical churches.  The High Council of Islamic Affairs estimates approximately 12 percent of the population is Muslim, including many noncitizen residents with origins in West Africa.  There are no published estimates of the Sunni/Shia percentages, although the Sunni are predominant.  The remaining 8 percent of the population practices animism or does not identify with any religious group.  Many individuals practice a syncretic faith such as Bwiti that combines elements of Christianity with traditional indigenous faiths, Voodoo, or animism.  Other traditional faiths in the country are Mwiri and Ndiobi.  Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Jews and a growing Baha’i community that was established in the 1960s.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the state as secular and establishes separation of religion and state.  It prohibits religious discrimination and holds all citizens equal before the law, regardless of religion.  The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, the free practice of religion, and the right to form religious communities that may govern and manage their affairs independently, consistent with public order.  The constitution stipulates religious communities whose activities are contrary to laws of the country or promote conflict among ethnic groups may be banned.

The law requires all associations, including religious groups, to register with the MOI.  Registered groups are eligible for exemptions from fees for land use and fees for construction permits.  To register, a group must present to the MOI copies of its founding statutes and internal rules, a letter attesting to publication of these documents in the applicable local administrative bulletin, a formal letter of request for registration addressed to the MOI, a property lease, the police records of the group’s leaders, and the group’s bank statements.  The registration fee is 10,000 CFA francs ($17).  Registered religious groups must also provide the MOI with proof of nonprofit status to receive exemptions from local taxes and customs duties on imports.  The MOI maintains an official registry of religious groups.

The constitution states parents have the right to choose their children’s religious education.  The state provides for public education based on “religious neutrality.”  Public schools are secular and do not provide religious instruction.  Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim groups operate primary and secondary schools, in which representatives of religious groups provide religious instruction.  These schools must register with the Ministry of Education, which ensures they meet the same standards as public schools.  The government does not fund private schools, religious or secular, although in some schools it may subsidize a portion of the teachers’ salaries.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to the MOI, the difficulty of new religious groups registering with the ministry usually involved gathering the appropriate documents.  Ministry officials described the religious groups it did not register as often being “one-man operations” practicing a mixture of Christianity and traditional animist beliefs, and “lacking authenticity.”  Unregistered groups charged with fraud or other illegal activity were those most likely to be sanctioned.  MOI officials said they continued to update the regulations governing associations and religious groups, which were treated identically in those regulations.

Because of the continued COVID-19 pandemic, government health safety requirements remained in place.  These included that no place of worship could reopen without permission, attendance at services was limited to 30 persons, only one service could be held a day, and services could not offer communion.  Religious leaders said they were concerned that the size limitations continued to be excessive, as some churches and mosques were built for congregations of 1,000 or more persons.  Although the restrictions were not widely observed, religious leaders said they wanted the government to officially lift them.

In February, Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim leaders met to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic and official social distancing restrictions.

Embassy staff met with senior MOI officials, nongovernmental organizations, and local religious leaders during the year to encourage continued respect for religious freedom and discuss the government’s response to the pandemic as it related to religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.2 million (midyear 2021).  Approximately 95 percent of the population is Muslim, most of whom are Sunni; the Ahmadiyya Muslim community states it has approximately 50,000 members.  Christians make up approximately 4.2 percent of the population, the majority of whom are Roman Catholics.  Religious groups that constitute less than 1 percent of the population include Baha’is, Hindus, and Eckankar members.  Individuals tend to mix indigenous (animist) beliefs with Islam and Christianity.

Legal Framework

The constitution states, “Every person shall have the freedom to practice any religion and to manifest such practice” subject to laws that may impose such “reasonable restrictions” as necessary for national security, public order, decency, or morality.  The constitution also states that such freedom must “not impinge on the rights and freedoms of others or on the national interest, especially unity.”  The constitution prohibits religious discrimination, the establishment of a state religion, and religiously based political parties.  It provides for the establishment of qadi courts, with judges trained in the Islamic legal tradition.  The courts are located in each of the country’s seven regions, and their jurisdiction applies only to marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance where all the involved parties are Muslims.  Citizens may choose to use either the civil or qadi courts.

There are no formal guidelines for the registration of religious groups.  Religious groups that do not provide social services are not legally required to register.  The criminal code outlaws “insult to religion,” “disturbing religious assemblies,” and “uttering words with the intent to wound religious feelings.”  Faith-based groups that provide the same social services as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must meet the same eligibility criteria as other NGOs.  By law, all NGOs are required to register with the NGO Affairs Agency and register as charities at the attorney general’s chambers under the Companies Act.  They are required to have governing boards of directors composed of at least seven members responsible for policy and major administrative decisions, including internal control.  This law also requires that all NGOs submit to the NGO Affairs Agency a detailed annual work program and budget, a detailed annual report highlighting progress on activities undertaken during the year, work plans for the following year, and financial statements audited by NGO Affairs Agency-approved auditors.  The government has stated the submissions help the NGO Affairs Agency monitor NGO activities.

The law does not require public or private schools to include religious instruction in their curricula.  The government, through the Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education, provides religious education teachers to public schools to teach an academic course on major world religions.  Most public schools offer this course, and most students take the class.  Some private schools also offer classes in religious education and tolerance and provide an overview of major world religions.

The constitution bans political parties organized on the basis of religion.

The Ministry of Lands and Regional Affairs oversees the portfolio of religious affairs.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

No efforts were made to resurrect the constitutional reform process following the September 2020 rejection by the National Assembly of a draft of a proposed new constitution, for which consultation and drafting began in 2018.  During legislative debate over the draft as well as public consultations held by the Constitutional Reform Commission, inclusion of the word “secular” to describe the state was the subject of broad debate; the draft constitution did not include the phrase, although it maintained religious freedom protections, as does the constitution in force since 1997 (known locally as the “1997 Constitution”).  However, President Barrow pledged to make constitutional reform “the legacy” of his second term in office.

Prior to Ramadan, the government passed a bill that cut the daytime working hours of female civil servants, stating the decision was made in order to allow women to return home and prepare meals for their families to break the fast.  According to media reporting, some Christians stated the action was discriminatory and questioned why they were not afforded a similar accommodation during Lent.

According to local media reports, during the 2021 election campaign, the founder of the Gambia Action Party, Musa Yali Batchilly, inaccurately labeled independent presidential candidate Essa Faal an Ahmadi and declared him an enemy of the Prophet Muhammad.   In response, Faal expressed disappointment over the attack on his faith and dismissed allegations that he was an Ahmadi, which he described as a lie, saying he is “simply a Muslim” who did not embrace any of the branches of Islam.  Faal finished fifth out of six presidential candidates in the December election, with approximately 2 percent of the vote.

President Barrow read televised statements during major Islamic and Christian religious holidays in which he stressed his administration’s commitment to promoting religious tolerance.

SIC leaders continued to state that all religious organizations in the country were entitled to freedom of expression and assembly.  The SIC continued to state that Ahmadi Muslims did not belong to Islam, and it therefore did not include Ahmadi members in SIC events.  The Ahmadiyya community had deep links to the educational and medical sectors in the country; they operated one of the largest affordable sharia-compliant schools in the country.  The group proactively sought new adherents, predominantly by distributing printed material and preaching at health-care facilities.  Ahmadi Muslims said they believed themselves free to practice their religion without interference but expressed frustration with the SIC’s refusal to integrate them into the broader Muslim community.

Intermarriage between Muslims and Christians continued to be common.  However, due to cultural and gender norms, women were generally required to convert to their husband’s religion and raise all children in the husband’s religion.  It was not uncommon for persons of different faiths to live in the same dwelling, and observers said religious differences were widely accepted among family members and neighbors, with each jointly celebrating the religious events and holidays of the other.

Embassy representatives held meetings and events with government officials as well as with religious leaders of different faith groups, including Muslim (both Sunni and Ahmadi) and Christian, to emphasize the importance of continued religious tolerance.  The Ambassador hosted Ramadan iftars and Christmas receptions with a variety of religious, government, human rights, and other civil society and community leaders to bring together persons of different faiths.  As is traditional at most public gatherings, both Muslim and Christian prayers were offered at embassy-hosted religious freedom events.  Participants at these events commented on the productive and friendly relationship maintained among leaders representing different faiths.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.9 million (midyear 2021).  According to a 2021 Georgian National Statistics Service estimate, the population is 3.7 million.  According to the 2014 census, GOC members constitute 83.4 percent of the population, followed by Muslims at 10.7 percent and members of the Armenian Apostolic Church at 2.9 percent.  The remaining 3 percent includes Roman Catholics, Yezidis, Greek Orthodox, Jews, growing numbers of religious groups defined by the law as “nontraditional” such as Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, and individuals who profess no religious affiliation.

Ethnicity, religious affiliation, and region of residence are strongly connected.  Most ethnic Georgians affiliate with the GOC.  A small number of mostly ethnic Russians are members of several Orthodox groups not affiliated with the GOC, including the ROC, Molokani, Starovery (Old Believers), and Dukhobory (Spirit Wrestlers).  Ethnic Azeris are predominantly Shia Muslims and form the majority population in the southeastern region of Kvemo-Kartli.  Other Muslim groups include ethnic Georgian Muslims in Adjara region and Chechen Kists in the northeast; both groups are predominantly Sunni.  Ethnic Georgian Sunni Muslims are also present in the south-central region of Samtskhe-Javakheti.  Ethnic Armenians belong primarily to the Armenian Apostolic Church and constitute the majority population in Samtskhe-Javakheti Region.

Reliable information from the Russia-occupied regions of Georgia continued to be difficult to obtain.  According to the 2016 census conducted by de facto Abkhaz authorities (the most recent), there were 243,000 residents of Russia-occupied Abkhazia.  A survey conducted in 2003 by the de facto authorities listed 60 percent of respondents as Christian, 16 percent as Muslim, 8 percent as atheists or nonbelievers, 8 percent as followers of the pre-Christian Abkhazian religion, and 1 percent as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, or adherents of other religions.  The remaining 7 percent listed no preference.

According to a 2015 census conducted by de facto South Ossetian authorities, there were 53,000 residents of Russia-occupied South Ossetia, of whom the majority were Orthodox Christians.  Minority groups included Muslims and the Right Faith, a pre-Christian ethnic Ossetian religion.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of belief and religion, subject to considerations of public safety and the health and rights of others, and equality for all regardless of religion.  It prohibits persecution based on religion and prohibits compelling anyone to express his or her opinion about religion.  It also prohibits political parties that incite religious strife.  The law provides for freedom of religious belief, denomination, and conscience, including the right to choose and change religious affiliation.

The constitution recognizes the GOC’s special role in the country’s history but stipulates the Church shall be independent from the state and that relations between the GOC and the state shall be governed by a constitutional agreement (concordat).  The concordat grants the GOC rights not given to other religious groups, including legal immunity for its patriarch and a consultative role in government, especially in state education policies, and reiterates an exemption of Church clergy from military service (although by law, clergy from all religious groups are exempted).  The concordat states that some of its provisions require additional legislation before they may be implemented, including the GOC’s right to a consultative role in state education policies.  There is currently no implementing legislation for the concordat.  Changes to or cancellation of the concordat require a three-fifths majority of parliament and the consent of the GOC.

A religious group may register with the National Agency of the Public Registry (NAPR) as a legal entity under public law or as a noncommercial entity.  Both statuses offer equivalent benefits, including legal recognition, tax exemptions for donations and other “religious activities,” (a term not clearly defined by law), and the right to own property and open bank accounts.  The civil code defines the activities and rights of denominations registered for legal entity under public law status.  Unregistered religious groups may conduct religious activities but do not receive the legal status or benefits conferred on registered groups.  Unregistered religious groups may have a charter and ownership of property may be based on that charter.  The property should be registered with the National Registrar.  They may maintain a bank account with a commercial bank, based on national bank regulations.  Unregistered groups may also invite clergy to the country.

To register as a legal entity under public law, the law specifies a religious group must have a historic link with the country or be recognized as a religion “by the legislation of the member states of the Council of Europe.”  A religious group must also submit to the NAPR information regarding its objectives and procedures and a list of its founders and members of its governing body.  Religious groups registering as noncommercial entities do not have to demonstrate historic ties to the country or recognition by Council of Europe members but must submit to the NAPR similar information on their objectives, governing procedures, and names of founders and members of their governing body.  There is no appeal mechanism for groups that are denied registration as a legal entity under public law, but they may reapply to NAPR.

The state recognizes only civil marriages; it does not recognize marriages conducted by the GOC or other religious groups, regardless of their registration status.

The law grants the GOC exceptions from several requirements applicable to other religious groups, including payment of taxes on the construction, restoration, and maintenance of religious buildings and the payment of taxes on property.  It exempts the GOC, but not other religious groups, from taxes on “profit from the sale of crosses, candles, icons, books, and calendars used…for religious purposes.”  In addition, the law states only the GOC may acquire nonagricultural state property through a direct sale by the government.  Should other religious groups wish to acquire this type of property, they must participate in public tenders.  Only the GOC has the right to acquire agricultural state property free of charge; all others must pay a fee.  The law grants the Church ownership over state forests located near or adjacent to GOC churches and monasteries.

The criminal code prohibits interference with worship services, persecution of a person based on religious faith or belief, and interference with the establishment of a religious organization; the code does not define “establishment.”  Interference with the establishment of a religious organization is punishable by a fine, “corrective labor” (community service) for up to one year, house arrest for six months to two years, or imprisonment for up to two years.  Violations committed by public officials are considered abuses of power and are punishable by larger fines or longer terms of imprisonment if committed by force of arms or by insulting the dignity of a victim, although the law does not define “insult” and does not specify an amount or time limit for punishment under those circumstances.  In cases of religious persecution, the perpetrator may face imprisonment for up to three years, depending on the use or threat of violence, his or her official position, and the damages caused.  In cases of unlawful interference with the right to perform religious rituals involving the use or threat of violence, offenders may face imprisonment for up to two years; in cases where the offender holds an official position, the offender may face up to five years in prison.

According to a Ministry of Justice decree, accused and convicted individuals may meet only with spiritual representatives of the GOC and registered religious organizations.  Prison regulations state prisoners have the right to possess and use religious literature and objects of worship.

The law prohibits restitution to religious organizations of religious buildings and their ruins previously owned by these groups and currently under state ownership, including historical religious buildings confiscated by the Soviet regime.  The prohibition, however, does not apply to the GOC, which, per the terms of its concordat with the government, is entitled to receive all previously confiscated property.  For other religious groups, the government, through NAPR, lends the property on a for-use-only basis to the groups as legal entities under public law; this is not considered a transfer of state property.

The law stipulates that five religious groups are eligible to receive government payments in compensation for damages they experienced during the totalitarian Soviet regime:  the GOC, the Muslim community, represented by AMAG, the Roman Catholic Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, and the Jewish community.  According to the law, the government may not pay such compensation to any other religious group.

Although the law states that public schools may not be used for religious indoctrination, proselytizing, or forcible assimilation, the concordat accords the GOC the right to teach religious studies in public educational institutions; however, there is no implementing legislation allowing the GOC to do so.  The concordat also authorizes the state to pay for Georgian Orthodox religious schools, although the government does not do so.  The law states that students may pursue religious study and practice religious rituals on school grounds “of their own accord,” but only after school hours.  Outside instructors, including clergy of any faith tradition, may only attend or direct students’ religious education or activities if students invite them to do so; school administration and teachers may not be involved in this process.  The law includes no specific regulations for private religious schools.  Private schools must follow the national curriculum, although they are free to add subjects, including religious studies, if they wish.

The MOIA’s Department of Human Rights is responsible for assessing whether crimes are motivated by religious hatred and for monitoring the quality of investigations into hate crimes.

By law, the Prosecutor General’s Office, which is separate from the MOIA, prosecutes human rights violations involving religious intolerance, while the Public Defender’s Office serves as the country’s human rights ombudsman and monitors complaints of restrictions on religious freedom.  The Public Defender’s Office (Human Rights Ombudsperson) is a watchdog rather than an investigatory body; it and makes recommendations to the MOIA and the State Inspector Service.  The Public Defender’s Office’s Tolerance Center (composed of leaders from minority religious groups) carries out educational activities and monitors and analyzes cases of religious and ethnic discrimination.  It also coordinates the Council of Religions and Council of Ethnic Minorities, which are affiliated with the Public Defender’s Office.  The Council of Religions has a civic mandate to protect religious freedom; facilitate a constructive multilateral dialogue among various religious groups; promote a tolerant, fair, and peaceful environment for religious groups; and engage religious minorities in the process of civic integration.  It produces an annual report on the status of religious freedom in the country that includes policy recommendations.

The State Inspector Service, a separate investigative body from the Prosecutor General’s Office, investigates crimes such as torture, degrading treatment, and abuse of power or office perpetrated by law enforcement and public officials if committed with the use of force or in violation of human dignity and involving discriminatory elements, including religious motives.  Following an investigation, the service may refer these cases to the Prosecutor General’s Office for prosecution.  The service has never received any information on a religiously motivated crime since its creation in 2019.

The mandate of SARI, which is part of the Office of the Prime Minister, is to promote and ensure peaceful coexistence based on principles of equality and tolerance.  Its responsibilities include researching the existing religious situation and reporting to the government, preparing recommendations and drafting legal acts pertaining to religion for government consideration, and serving as a consultative body and intermediary for the government in disputes arising between religious associations.  SARI may issue nonbinding recommendations to relevant state institutions regarding approval of applications for the construction of religious buildings, determination of their locations, and transfer of such properties to religious organizations.  By law, SARI distributes government compensation to the GOC and to Islamic, Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Armenian Apostolic religious organizations registered as legal entities under public law for “the material and moral damages inflicted upon them during the Soviet period.”

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On June 30, the government ended a curfew that it had instituted in November 2020 in response to COVID-19, but some restrictions on large social gatherings remained in place.  Prior to the end of the curfew, minority religious leaders and religious freedom NGOs stated curfew rules were not applied equally, as the government granted blanket exceptions for the GOC to organize gatherings on GOC holidays, including Orthodox Christmas Eve on January 6 and Orthodox Easter Eve on May 1, while other minority religious groups had to apply on each occasion for one-time exceptions for their holidays and to submit to SARI full lists of expected attendees.  Critics said this created a barrier to freedom of assembly for religious purposes and caused concern that the State Security Service was tracking minority religious groups’ members.  According to a TDI report on religious freedom, the government stated in response to criticism that any religious group could submit a list of clergy and parishioners to SARI, and it would issue one-time curfew passes for those on the list.  TDI, the Union of Georgian Muslims, the Supreme Theological Division of the Muslims of Georgia, the Evangelical Church, the Evangelical Baptist Church, the Church of the Gospel Faith, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, the Word of Life Evangelical Church, the Friends Society – Quakers, the Svedenburg Religious Society, the Church of the Anointed Christians, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Salvation Army called this process discriminatory and an unjustified collection of personal data and did not apply for permits.

From June 30 to the end of the year, permits for public gatherings, including religious gatherings, were no longer required, although the government issued recommendations to mitigate the spread of COVID-19.  At year’s end, however, restrictions remained on “large-scale” social gatherings that applied to wedding receptions.

On August 1, Nika Gvaramia, director general of the pro-opposition television channel Mtavari Arkhi TV, reported the State Security Service was spying on clergy, including GOC clergy, among other groups.  In September, transcripts of telephone conversations were published on the internet and widely covered in the media.  These appeared to document widespread surveillance by the State Security Service of religious leaders, including their interactions with political leaders, journalists, and foreign diplomats.  The government and ruling Georgian Dream Party denied the legitimacy of these documents, while NGOs, journalists, and religious leaders stated many of the documents were accurate.  Numerous political and civil society leaders expressed concern that the State Security Service monitored private conversations with their personal religious or spiritual leaders and said such activity had a chilling effect on religious freedom, as it confirmed their suspicion the State Security Service was monitoring religious groups.

In September, the NAPR registered the Jehovah’s Witnesses Christian Organization in Georgia as a legal entity under public law.  Previously, the group was registered as a noncommercial entity.  The group stated it sought the change to bring the Jehovah’s Witnesses Christian Organization in Georgia to an equal legal status as other recognized religious groups.  Because noncommercial entities and legal entities under public law receive the same benefits, the group did not gain additional benefits.  The NAPR denied the registration applications of six organizations due to “non-existence of legal grounds envisioned by legislation”:  the Evangelical Church – Source of Life; Protestant Confession – Presbyterianism; the Georgian Christian Evangelical Protestant Church – Biblical Friends (Quakers); the Caucasus Orthodox Catacomb Church; the Evangelical Church; and the Georgian Christian Protestant Church – Eternal Freedom.

Most prisons continued to have Georgian Orthodox chapels and areas for prayer.  Authorities allowed Muslims to pray in their cells or prayer areas and to possess Qurans and prayer rugs.  According to SARI and Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Baptist, Muslim, and Jewish groups, prisoners had access to counseling and services appropriate to their religious group upon request.  The government provided accommodation for the dietary restrictions of Muslim and Jewish prisoners.  During religious holidays, prisoners were exempt from fulfilling their regular duties.

According to NGOs and minority religious groups, many religious issues, such as tax exemptions and restitution issues, continued to lack a clear legislative framework.  SARI and some religious groups’ representatives, including members of the Jewish community and the Armenian Apostolic Church, said they remained in favor of drafting a new, broader “law on religion” to define which groups would be eligible for these and other benefits and to address issues pertaining to the registration and legal status of religious groups and the teaching of religion in public schools.  Many civil society representatives and members of other religious groups, including some individuals from the Muslim community, the Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Baptist Church, however, remained opposed, arguing such legislation would create a hierarchy of religious groups and allow the government to discriminate against smaller religious communities and increase its leverage over them.  Critics of such a law also stated it might include new criteria for registration that would be difficult for nontraditional religious groups to meet.  They expressed concern that it would also expand the role of SARI, which some smaller groups said they viewed as an entity that promoted government control of religious organizations rather than a protector of religious freedom.  They advocated instead for making benefits available to all religious groups or to none.

Parliament again failed to amend the law granting the GOC tax and property privileges not available to other religious groups, despite the Constitutional Court ruling in 2018 that the law was unconstitutional and instructing parliament to make legislative changes to either abolish the privileges or grant them to all religious organizations no later than December 31, 2018.  Although the Constitutional Court’s ruling was legally binding, the court had no means to enforce parliament’s compliance.

On November 16, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled against the government, finding police had abused and discriminated against four Muslim Georgians during their arrest while at a protest in Mokhe village in 2014.  The four were protesting the government’s efforts to forcibly remove a mosque’s minaret in the village of Chela in Samtskhe-Javakheti Region after the municipal government stated it had been constructed without a proper permit.  The ECHR awarded three claimants 1,800 euros ($2,000) each and one claimant 3,900 euros ($4,400) compensation.

In July, TDI filed a case with the Constitutional Court, disputing the constitutionality of provisions in the law prohibiting restitution to religious organizations other than the GOC of religious buildings and ruins they previously owned that were currently under state ownership.  TDI stated the disparate treatment constituted discrimination toward minority religious communities.  On August 6, the Constitutional Court registered the lawsuit, but at year’s end, it had not yet decided whether it would hear the case.

Many religious property cases pending before the courts and with SARI failed to make progress during the year.  Religious groups said this was partly due to institutional inefficiencies and partly due to disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

On April 30, the Constitutional Court agreed to hear a case brought by nine religious groups alleging that the GOC’s exclusive property tax exemption on land used for noneconomic purposes violated constitutional guarantees of equality before the law.  The court ruled in 2020 the plaintiffs’ case had merit and that it would accept it for substantive consideration.  On December 28, the Constitutional Court combined this case with two other cases submitted by TDI during the year.  TDI’s first case, submitted to the Constitutional Court in April on behalf of nine religious associations, disputed the constitutionality of import tax regulations that allowed the GOC to import religious items free of duty while requiring all other religious groups to pay tax on them.  On June 23, the court partially accepted the constitutional claim of the nine religious associations for consideration on the merits.  In the second case, submitted in July, TDI challenged the constitutionality of the law prohibiting religious organizations, other than the GOC, from regaining full legal ownership of property that was seized by the Soviet regime and currently under state ownership.

At year’s end, the Constitutional Court had not ruled on whether it would hear another case brought by nine religious organizations, Christian and Muslim, challenging restrictions on the rights of religious organizations other than the GOC to purchase or exchange state-owned property.  The court heard arguments on the case in early 2020.

NGOs and some Muslim community leaders again stated the government continued to favor and influence the state-funded AMAG religious group, including by selectively transferring land to AMAG and influencing the selection of AMAG’s religious leader.  The groups again said AMAG was a “Soviet-style” organization that served as a tool of the state to monitor and control religious groups.  Several Muslim groups remained critical of AMAG for insisting it represented all Muslim communities in the country within one organization.

The Armenian Apostolic Church continued to petition SARI for restitution of five churches in Tbilisi and one in Akhaltsikhe, all of which the GOC also claimed and which authorities registered as state property.  As of year’s end, SARI had still not responded to any of the Church’s 57 petitions, 20 of which it filed in 2015 and 37 in 2018, for ownership or right-of-usage status.  The Church reported it operated all 57 churches in the country but did not own any of them.  The Church also stated it had not petitioned NAPR during the year to register them as Church-owned property.  According to the Armenian Apostolic Church, SARI said in 2020 that the Church had not provided sufficient evidence of ownership but that it was in communication with the Church and expressed willingness to cooperate in the future.  According to Armenian Apostolic Church representatives, they did not engage SARI or petition NAPR on this issue during the year, as they did not see such efforts as productive.

Muslim community members continued to state there was a lack of transparency in government decisions regarding construction of mosques.  The Muslim community continued to dispute the government’s ownership, as a legacy of the Soviet era, of mosques in Kvemo Kartli, Adigeni, and Adjara.  The government also said that, in some cases, the existing mosques were former Georgian Orthodox houses of worship converted during the Ottoman and Persian empires or were constructed during those periods on land where Georgian Orthodox houses of worship had once stood.  AMAG reported that when the government transferred state-owned mosques, it only did so for AMAG to use for a 49-year or unlimited period; the government did not transfer full ownership of the property or land.

On September 13, the Kutaisi Court of Appeal upheld a 2019 decision by the Batumi City Court that the Batumi city government had discriminated against the New Mosque Construction Fund (an entity representing members of the Batumi Muslim community seeking to establish a new mosque) by denying, in 2017, the permits necessary to build a new mosque on land the fund owned.  The NGO Social Justice Center (formerly Human Right Education Monitoring Center) reported the Batumi city government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.  The New Mosque Construction Fund filed its own cassation appeal, which was pending at year’s end, requesting that the appeal by the Batumi city government be partially annulled.  If the cassation appeal were to be granted, the Batumi city government would be ordered to issue written consent to start the first stage of construction permitting for the new mosque, according to the Social Justice Center.

The government continued to pay subsidies for the restoration of religious properties it considered national cultural heritage sites.  The National Agency for Cultural Heritage, housed within the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture, and Sport, allocated 2.25 million lari ($732,000) during the year for the restoration of religious monuments, all belonging to the GOC, compared with 1.91 million lari ($621,000) in 2020.

On April 12, the Supreme Court upheld a 2018 lower court decision that the Kobuleti city government must connect an Islamic boarding school in Kobuleti, near Batumi, to utility services.  The court ordered the Kobuleti city government and a company contracted for the work to connect water and sewage systems to the school, but at year’s end neither the municipality nor the company had taken action, and the school was unable to enforce the court decision.  The boarding school, which remained incomplete, was the subject of anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim protests in 2014.

The GOC did not offer any formal religious studies classes in public institutions.  Although the GOC had the right to have direct involvement in public institutions, such as schools, under the concordat, the government did not define clear legal structures for it to do so.  The Social Justice Center said that, unlike in previous years, it had not received any reports of visits to classes in public schools by GOC clergy during regular school hours, a practice prohibited by law.

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, most schools continued to rely on online instruction from January until September.  TDI stated the Ministry of Education did not report to it any complaints of religious discrimination, but TDI remained concerned that students were hesitant to report such cases for fear of reprisal from fellow students, teachers, or school officials.

As in previous years, TDI stated that the MOIA generally correctly applied the appropriate articles of the criminal code in most cases and the quality of investigations of crimes motivated by religious hatred continued to improve.  The institute stated, however, that the Prosecutor General’s Office continued to fail to determine whether an individual was a “victim” of a crime under law (defined as a person who has incurred moral, physical, or material damage as a result of a crime) or to indict individuals for religiously motivated crimes.

Following a 2020 ruling by the Tbilisi City Court that the government was obliged to accommodate students’ religious beliefs when scheduling national examinations, TDI reported that during the year all national exams were scheduled on weekdays.  In 2020, TDI had represented two Seventh-day Adventist university applicants who were contesting the scheduling of an entrance exam on a Saturday, in the Tbilisi City Court case.  TDI had also asked the court to find that the Ministry of Education had discriminated against the applicants because of their religion and to award “symbolic compensation” of one lari ($0.33) for “moral damages,” but at year’s end, the court had not yet issued a ruling on the matter.

During the year, the government directly allocated from the state budget 25 million lari ($8.13 million) to the GOC and SARI reported it allocated 3.5 million lari ($1.14 million) to the four other eligible religious communities to provide partial compensation for damage caused during the Soviet regime.  The 3.5 million lari ($1.14 million) was distributed as follows:  2.2 million lari ($715,000) to the Muslim community, represented by AMAG; 400,000 lari ($130,000) to the Roman Catholic Church; 600,000 lari ($195,000) to the Armenian Apostolic Church; and 300,000 lari ($97,600) to the Jewish community.  These were the same as the 2020 amounts.  SARI again said the remaining one million lari ($325,000) would be distributed among the religious communities “later.”  SARI’s position was that the payments were of “partial and of symbolic character,” and that the government continued to take into account levels of damage and “present day negative conditions” of religious groups in determining compensation.  NGOs and religious groups continued to criticize the exclusion of other religious groups, including the Evangelical Lutheran Church, from the legislation designating the five groups eligible to receive compensation, and they questioned the criteria the government used to select which groups received compensation.

At year’s end, the MOIA Department of Human Rights conducted seven in-person training sessions for a total of 274 employees in Tbilisi and Batumi, as well as three online sessions.  At these events, it trained MOIA employees on aspects of religious discrimination and hate crimes.  Fifteen employees completed the ministry’s remote learning course on hate crimes investigations.  In June, in partnership with a program by the Council of Europe on fighting discrimination, hate crimes, and hate speech, 20 staff members of the MOIA’s territorial and structural units received training on issues pertaining to crimes motivated by intolerance.  Also in June, 40 managers participated in a four-day training course organized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to increase awareness of issues of discrimination (including religious discrimination) and related crimes.

During the year, the media outlet Alt-info, widely described as far right, repeatedly aired criticism of Turkey and Islam.  On March 29, it broadcast a statement by Georgian Idea Party (also widely considered to be far right) leader Guram Palavandishvili, who said, in part, “Why do we want Turkey, is it not an occupier?  Today we do not want Islam either… We are unequivocally against their [Turkish] politics, which is our occupier, and against their religion, which is confronting our religion.”

The Public Defender’s Office and NGOs reported that in January, a ruling Georgian Dream Party member of parliament, commenting on violence between ethnic Georgian Christians and ethnic Georgian Muslims in the village of Buknari over the construction of a mosque, described the violence as between “Georgians and Muslims.”  The Public Defender’s Office, in its Special Report on Combating and Preventing Discrimination and the State of Equality, called the statement “problematic.”

Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained occupied by Russia and outside the administrative control of the central government.  Reliable information from those regions continued to be difficult to obtain.  According to the “constitution” adopted in Abkhazia, all persons in the region are equal before the law regardless of religious beliefs and everyone has the right to freedom of religion, conscience, and belief.  It forbids the formation of associations or parties or activities that incite religious discord.  The “constitution” of South Ossetia guarantees freedom of conscience and faith but states, “Orthodox Christianity and traditional South Ossetian beliefs represent one of the foundations of the national self-awareness of the Ossetian people.”

The ROC and the GOC both formally recognized the Orthodox churches in Abkhazia as well as in South Ossetia as belonging to the GOC, but GOC representatives said de facto authorities in South Ossetia continued to pressure Orthodox churches to merge with the ROC.  Sources stated that the ROC tacitly and unofficially supported breakaway churches that did not have official autocephaly from the GOC.  De facto authorities continued to restrict GOC clergy’s accessing these areas.  Some religious figures in Abkhazia continued to support turning the region’s Orthodox churches into an autocephalous Abkhaz Orthodox Church, while others wished to subordinate them to the ROC, and still others wished to subordinate them to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, according to GOC and other religious officials.  Orthodox priest and self-declared head of the Abkhaz Orthodox Church Vissarion Aplia continued to call for independence from the GOC.  On October 12, the GOC Patriarchate invited Aplia to a dialogue in Tbilisi.  Aplia told an Abkhaz TV network on October 21 that the “issue is not decided in Tbilisi, but rather in Moscow, so let us return there and talk.”

Representatives of the GOC remained unable to travel to or conduct services in Russia-occupied Abkhazia, including in the majority-ethnic-Georgian Gali District.  According to GOC representatives, the district’s ethnic Georgian population continued to have to travel to Tbilisi-administered territory to celebrate religious holidays.  GOC worshipers in Abkhazia were unable to travel to Tbilisi-administered territory to celebrate Orthodox Christmas (January 7) or Orthodox Easter (May 2) due to the closure of the Enguri crossing point from February 2020 to July 2021 because of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Following the lifting of coronavirus restrictions, de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia continued to restrict movement across the division line with the rest of Georgia and to detain and fine residents for “illegal border crossings,” according to multiple reports by international and domestic observers.

According to the report Freedom of Religion in Abkhazia and South Ossetia issued in July by the think tank DRI, the GOC was unable to exercise de facto jurisdiction in Abkhazia and GOC clergy could not conduct church services there.  The report stated ethnic Georgian worshipers who identified with the GOC experienced discrimination, while ethnic Abkhaz Muslims did not.  It stated that Eid al-Adha was an official holiday, and that during Orthodox services, “clergy mention all the Orthodox Patriarchs, except the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia.”

De facto authorities in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia continued to ban Jehovah’s Witnesses.  According to DRI’s report, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Pentecostals in Akhalgori, South Ossetia could assemble freely, although the “KGB” (the de facto security services) often summoned them for interrogation in previous years.

The June SARI report Occupation Heritage stated that only five GOC clergy and one church remained operational in Russia-occupied South Ossetia.  According to the report, de facto authorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia sold Orthodox artifacts and painted over or damaged uniquely Georgian religious symbols.

According to GOC representatives, de facto authorities allowed the GOC to conduct services in South Ossetia, despite a de jure ban.  DRI’s report Freedom of Religion in Abkhazia and South Ossetia stated the number of GOC clergy in South Ossetia was “extremely low.”  According to the report, one GOC church remained open in Akhalgori, South Ossetia, with one priest, and there were two nuns remaining in the Ikoti Monastery and one monk at the Trinity Monastery, also in South Ossetia.  The report stated there was also one Ossetian church in Akhalgori, subordinated to the Diocese of Alania, which held services occasionally, conducted in the Ossetian language.

During the year, the Human Rights Department of the MOIA investigated 13 cases involving crimes reported as religiously motivated, compared with 22 cases in 2020 and 44 cases in 2019.  These included three cases of violence (zero in 2020); one case of domestic violence (zero in 2020); one case with multiple criminal code violations, including violence, a threat, and liability for a domestic crime; two cases of criminal threats (zero in 2020); one case of persecution (four in 2020); and five cases of damage or destruction of property (five in 2020).  In one case, a man abused his wife physically and psychologically because he was irritated by her praying.  Religious organizations and NGOs, which also tracked cases, said COVID-19 pandemic restrictions made gathering sufficient data on exact figures for the current or previous year difficult, but that due to government- and self-imposed COVID-19 pandemic restrictions on public activity, crimes committed against religious groups declined, compared with prepandemic years.

According to the Social Justice Center, on January 12, in Buknari Village, Chokhatauri District, Guria Region, a group of Christians assaulted two teenage Muslim boys, injuring the teens, who required medical treatment.  The incident reportedly occurred while the boys were going to or from a local prayer room established in a private home.  The center said authorities arrested, tried, and convicted one of the Christians and sentenced him to prison, but further details of the case were unavailable.  Following the assault, Muslims from the area and neighboring regions held demonstrations in the village, resulting in clashes between Muslim demonstrators and Christians.  Police intervened and SARI Chair Zaza Vashakmadze said that the Muslim community’s rights had been protected, a statement that many NGOs and members of the Muslim community disputed.

The Public Defender’s Office reported it received six complaints of discrimination or hate crimes based on religion during the year, compared with seven in 2020.  Three cases involved potential hate crimes.  One of these involved the religious conflict in Buknari and another stating that the investigation into events surrounding the dismantling of the mosque in Mokhe in 2014 was insufficient and was carried out only in response to a case at the European Court of Human Rights.  In the third case, on March 25, a person threw a Molotov cocktail in a Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Hall in Mtskheta.  The attack destroyed several items, but the hall was unoccupied at the time and there were no injuries.  According to the Public Defender’s Office, authorities officially recognized the Jehovah’s Witnesses as targets of a religiously motivated crime in the incident.  At year’s end, the investigation of the attack was ongoing.  The other three complaints the Public Defender’s Office received involved discrimination cases, one pertaining to speech that incited discrimination because of religion; and two others alleging the Penitentiary Service did not post the list of food allowed for Muslims on religious holidays.  The Public Defender’s Office stated that cases from previous years remained largely unresolved, partly because of what it described as a lack of urgency and resources from the government.

According to media, in May, in Dmanisi City in Kvemo Kartli District, ethnic Georgians and ethnic Svan (an ethnic subgroup of Georgians) Christians clashed with ethnic Azeri Muslims when an ethnic Azeri shopkeeper refused to sell alcohol on credit to a group of ethnic Svans, who then attacked the shopkeeper and vandalized the store.  Fellow Azeris came to the shopkeeper’s defense, causing ethnic Georgians to enter the violence en masse on the side of the Svans.  Participants spoke of the violence, which had both ethnic and religious dimensions, in terms of “Muslims versus Christians.”  The media report stated that on May 18, the mufti of eastern Georgia, Etibar Eminov, and the head of the communications office of the patriarchate of Georgia, Andrija Dzhagmaidze, went to the district with Georgian Dream Member of Parliament Sozar Subari and persuaded the communities to cease hostilities.

During the year, the Prosecutor General’s Office prosecuted five individuals for crimes motivated by religious intolerance.  One was charged with persecution, one with domestic violence, one with rape and “disclosure of secrets of personal life,” and two with exceeding official powers.  On April 10, the Tbilisi City Court convicted an ethnic Azerbaijani Muslim man of “regular violence” and sentenced him to a two-year suspended sentence.  The appellate court upheld the conviction and sentence on November 29; the Prosecutor General’s Office appealed the decision to the Court of Cassation, arguing for a heavier sentence.  The Prosecutor General’s Office cited both religious and gender discrimination, stating the man had systematically assaulted his wife and threatened to kill her on several occasions from 2017 until April 2021 because she attended a Christian church and wore a cross.  The prosecutor’s appeal was pending at year’s end.

On September 16, the Tbilisi City Court convicted a man of rape and “unlawful obtaining, storage, use, dissemination of or otherwise making available secrets of personal life” and sentenced him to seven years in prison.  The Prosecutor General’s Office stated the man raped a female Jehovah’s Witness on two occasions and took sexually explicit photographs of her in 2020.  According to the prosecutor, the crime was motivated by religious and gender discrimination, and the defendant told the victim she deserved to be raped because she was a Jehovah’s Witness.

Jehovah’s Witnesses again said there were fewer attacks against members compared to prepandemic years because the group, in response to COVID-19 restrictions, shifted to online activities and ceased conducting public outreach, including door-to-door proselytizing.  At year’s end, Jehovah’s Witnesses had reported six religiously motivated incidents to the government, compared with eight in 2020.  Of the reported incidents, one involved attempted arson (the Molotov cocktail incident of March 25 in Mtskheta), two instances of vandalism against Kingdom Halls in Martkopi and Mtskheta, and three break-ins and/or thefts.  Jehovah’s Witnesses said at year’s end, the six cases remained under investigation, along with five of eight cases from 2020.  Of the other three 2020 cases, Jehovah’s Witnesses stated one investigation was ongoing; in another, the court found the attacker guilty of persecution; and in the third, charges were dropped after the vandal paid compensation for damages.

On December 24, 2020, the Tbilisi City Court upheld its earlier conviction in the case of an individual who verbally insulted, then physically attacked, a Jehovah’s Witness who had just left a religious service at a Kingdom Hall in Tbilisi.  The victim required medical treatment for injuries to his eye and lip, and the attacker was found guilty of “purposeful, less grave damage to health.”

During the year, some religious leaders stated SARI pressured AMAG as well as the Tbilisi Synagogue to publish statements against the LBGTQI+ advocacy organization Tbilisi Pride’s planned July 5 Tbilisi “March for Dignity.”  Tbilisi Pride subsequently cancelled the march on the day the march was to take place when approximately 3,000 violent individuals described as far-right actors, including some GOC priests, attacked journalists, destroyed Tbilisi Pride’s office, and attacked offices of sympathetic NGOs.

Representatives of the Public Defender’s Office’s Tolerance Center and minority religious groups continued to report what they termed a widespread societal belief that minority religious groups posed a threat to the GOC and to the country’s cultural values.  On January 14, the Public Defender’s Council of Religions issued a statement expressing concerns over discrimination and hatred of people based on religious grounds.  The statement cited violence against Islamic places of worship, the violence in Buknari, and a “wave of antisemitic speeches of the clergy.”  The statement said, “Insults and discrimination on religious grounds against people or religious communities, as well as manifestations of persecution, are disturbing.”

Minority religious communities, including Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Catholics, and Protestants, continued to report resistance from local communities to their establishment of places of worship and religious schools.  A Social Justice Center report on the January violence in Buknari said that since 2012, the Chokhatauri municipality had denied requests to build a mosque in Buknari after public opposition by the Orthodox community.  As a result, the Muslim community purchased a private house to use as a prayer room in 2020.

During the year, the Media Development Foundation (MDF) documented 117 instances of religiously intolerant statements on television, online, and in print by media representatives, political parties, clergy, public organizations, and others, compared with 30 such incidents in 2020.  Of these statements, it classified 89 as being directed against Muslims, while 28 were directed against various other religious groups.  Ten statements were made by politicians from the Alliance of Patriots (three against Catholics and one praising the GOC), Georgian Dream (one against Muslims), and Georgian Idea (two against Baptists and three against Muslims) Parties, 73 by media representatives, 10 by various other organizations, two by religious representatives (including GOC Deacon Davit Isakadze, who criticized environmental activist Maka Suladze for choosing not to wear a cross), and 22 by members of the public.  MDF attributed the increase in incidents in part to intolerant statements by television station Alt-Info, which began broadcasting during the year, and to reporting on the violence in Buknari.

In August, in an anti-COVID-19 vaccine video posted on Facebook, GOC Deacon Archil Mindiashvili stated the vaccines had not been tested on animals “because you, Judaists and Jews, are in a hurry to bring your Antichrist to the realm and conduct experiments on people.”  TDI characterized the February 8 sermon of GOC Bishop Saba Gigiberia as antisemitic.  In the sermon, Gigiberia linked COVID-19 vaccines to a conspiracy theory about Israel reconstructing the Second Temple in Jerusalem.

TDI reported that on January 4, GOC Archpriest Ilia Karkadze made antisemitic remarks in a sermon defending a 2020 sermon by Bishop Ioane Gamrekeli that was also antisemitic.  In his sermon, Karkadze repeated common antisemitic tropes about Jewish control of banks and the media.  He also cited 19th-century Russian monk Vasiliy Vasilyev, known as Monk Abel, who said Jews had “poisoned Russia.”  On January 1, Bishop Ioane stated that TDI was seeking to damage Georgian-Jewish relations.  On January 8, the GOC published a statement acknowledging that Archpriest Karkadze’s January 4 sermon was antisemitic, saying that it “represents completely groundless accusations against the Jewish people [and] individual representatives.  It is not based on the teachings of the Church and is inspired by antisemitic pathos [i.e., sentiment].”

On January 13, Alt-Info anchor Shota Martineko said in a broadcast, “… if within your influence sphere you give space to the religion contrary to yours, then you give it the means to defeat you.”

The Ambassador and other embassy officials met with officials from the government, including the Prime Minister’s advisor on human rights, and members of parliament to encourage government efforts to increase tolerance of minority religions and to hold individuals accountable for discriminatory actions, particularly regarding the violence between Muslims and Christians in Buknari Village and antisemitic statements.  They also continued to meet with the Public Defender’s Office and officials in its Tolerance Center to discuss discrimination against minority religious groups, hear members’ concerns about potential legislation, and stress the importance of interfaith dialogue.  An embassy officer met with the head of the parliamentary Human Rights Committee to discuss concerns over religious freedom and potential legislation that could affect it.

Embassy staff continued to meet with NGOs, including the Center for Development and Democracy, the Social Justice Center, TDI, and the Council of Jewish Women of Georgia, to discuss interfaith relations, the integration of religious minorities into society, and the promotion of religious freedom for all.

Embassy representatives met with senior officials from the GOC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the wake of a number of antisemitic statements made by GOC clergy to raise concerns over the GOC’s inaction on curbing antisemitic comments and sermons.  The Ambassador met with GOC Patriarch Ilia II and other senior GOC members on multiple occasions.  In her meetings, she stressed the importance of religious diversity and tolerance.

The embassy continued to support Tolerance Center, Council of Ethnic Minorities, and Council of Religions programs that brought together leaders from different faith communities to monitor and advocate for religious freedom and raise public awareness about discrimination faced by religious and ethnic minorities.  With embassy funding, the Council of Religions’ and the Council of Ethnic Minorities’ member organizations regularly met with regional and national government authorities to advocate for solutions to key issues, enhance the ability of government institutions to implement civil integration policies, and improve monitoring and management of ethnic and religious minority issues.  The embassy funded the Council of Religions to study challenges facing religious minorities and formulate recommendations to protect religious freedom in the country.  The embassy funded the Social Justice Center’s “Improving Human Rights Conditions for Marginalized Groups through Strategic Litigation” project, which files court cases to protect the rights of minority religious groups and engages in field work, advocacy, and awareness-raising with regard to problems such as religious and ethnic discrimination by the state and private persons, including hate crimes and unequal treatment in the recognition of property and construction rights.

The embassy promoted International Religious Freedom Day by holding a virtual event on social media on October 27, with the Ambassador, head of the Tolerance Center Beka Mindiashvili, and other embassy officials, who gave remarks and answered questions from high school and university students about religious freedom concepts and cases.  The embassy’s American Corner cultural centers supported interfaith dialogues with students through a number of roundtable discussions on religious tolerance and diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 79.9 million (midyear 2021).  Unofficial estimates based on the census and figures provided by religious groups indicate approximately 27 percent of the population is Catholic and 25 percent belongs to the Evangangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) – a confederation of Lutheran, Reformed (Calvinist), and United (Prussian Union) Protestant regional churches.  Other Protestant denominations, including the New Apostolic Church, Baptist communities, and nondenominational Christians, account for approximately 2 percent of the population.  Orthodox Christians represent 1.9 percent of the population.

According to government estimates published in April, approximately 6.6 percent of the population is Muslim, of which 74 percent is Sunni, 8 percent Alevi, 4 percent Shia, 1 percent Ahmadi, and 1 percent other affiliations such as Alawites and Sufis.  The remaining 12 percent of Muslims in the country say they are not affiliated with any of the above groups or are unwilling to disclose an affiliation.  Intelligence officials estimate there are approximately 12,150 Salafi Muslims in the country.  Estimates of the Jewish population vary widely; the Federal Ministry of the Interior estimates it at 95,000, while other estimates place the number at approximately 190,000 when including Jews who do not belong to a specific Jewish community.  According to the secular NGO Religious Studies Media and Information Service (REMID), Buddhists (270,000); Jehovah’s Witnesses (167,000); Hindus (100,000); Yezidis (100,000); members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ) (40,000); Sikhs (10,000-15,000); and members of the COS (3,400) together constitute less than 1 percent of the population.  All of REMID’s estimates are based on members who have registered with a religious group.  According to the nonprofit Research Group Worldviews Germany, approximately 39 percent of the population either has no religious affiliation or belongs to religious groups not counted in government statistics.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religious opinion and provides for freedom of faith and conscience, freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed, and freedom to practice one’s religion.  It also prohibits an official state church.  It stipulates no one shall be required to disclose his or her religious convictions nor be compelled to participate in religious acts.  The constitution states religious instruction shall be part of the curriculum in public schools, and parents have the right to decide whether their children receive religious instruction.  It recognizes the right to establish private denominational schools.  The constitution guarantees the freedom to form religious societies and permits groups to organize themselves for private religious purposes without constraint.  It allows registered religious groups with Public Law Corporation (PLC) status to receive public subsidies from the states and to provide religious services in the military, hospitals, and prisons.

A federal law prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin, gender, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation.

The federal criminal code prohibits calling for violence, inciting hatred, or taking arbitrary measures against religious groups or their members.  Violations are punishable by up to five years in prison.  It also prohibits “assaulting the human dignity of religious groups or their members by insulting, maliciously maligning, or defaming them,” specifying a maximum penalty of five years in prison, although prison sentences are rare.  The prohibition and penalties apply equally to online speech.  In addition, the federal criminal code prohibits insulting a domestic religious organization, its institutions or practices, or the religious beliefs or world views of another person, if doing so could disturb the public peace.  Violations are punishable by a fine or up to three years in prison but are rarely prosecuted.  The federal criminal code prohibits disturbing religious services or acts of worship, with violators subject to a fine or imprisonment for up to three years.  The law bans Nazi propaganda, Holocaust denial, and fomenting racial hatred, specifying a penalty of up to five years’ imprisonment.

By law, social media companies with more than two million registered users in the country must implement procedures to review complaints and remove or block access to illegal speech within seven days of receiving a complaint and within 24 hours for cases considered “manifestly unlawful.”  Noncompliance may result in fines of up to 50 million euros ($56.69 million).  Unlawful content includes actions illegal under the criminal code, such as defamation of religions and denial of historic atrocities.

The law permits the federal government to characterize “nontraditional” religious groups – such as the COS – as “sects,” “youth religions,” and “youth sects” and allows the government to provide “accurate information” or warnings about them to the public.  The law does not permit the government to use terms such as “destructive,” “pseudo-religious,” or “manipulative” when referring to these groups.  Several past court decisions ruled that the government must remain neutral toward a religion and may provide a warning to the public only if an “offer” by a religious group would endanger the basic rights of an individual or place the individual in a state of physical or financial dependence.

Religious groups wishing to qualify as nonprofit associations with tax-exempt status must register.  State-level authorities review registration submissions and routinely grant tax-exempt status; if challenged, their decisions are subject to judicial review.  Those applying for tax-exempt status must provide evidence they are a religious group through their statutes, history, and activities.

A special partnership exists between the states and religious groups with PLC status, as outlined in the constitution.  Any religious group may request PLC status, which, if granted, entitles the group to levy tithes (8 percent of income tax in Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg, 9 percent in the other states) on members, who must register their religious affiliation with federal tax authorities.  Each state collects the tithes on behalf of the religious community through the state’s tax collection process, separately from and in addition to income taxes.  PLCs pay fees to the government for the tithing service, but not all groups with PLC status utilize the service.  PLC status also allows for benefits, including tax exemptions (larger than those given to groups with nonprofit status), representation on supervisory boards of public television and radio stations, and the right to special labor regulations.  State governments subsidize institutions with PLC status that provide public services, such as religious schools and hospitals.  In addition, due to historic “state-church contracts” dating back to before 1919, all state governments except for Bremen and Hamburg subsidize the Catholic Church and the EKD with different yearly amounts.

According to the constitution, the decision to grant PLC status is made at the state level.  Individual states base PLC status decisions on a number of varying qualifications, including an assurance of the group’s permanence, size, and respect for the constitutional order and fundamental rights of individuals.  An estimated 180 religious groups have PLC status, including Catholics, the EKD, Baha’is, Baptists, Christian Scientists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Mennonites, Methodists, the Church of Jesus Christ, the Salvation Army, and Seventh-day Adventists.  The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community has PLC status in the states of Hesse and Hamburg; no other Muslim communities have PLC status.  The COS does not have PLC or nonprofit status in any state.

Federal animal protection laws prohibit the killing of animals without anesthesia, including as part of halal and kosher slaughter practices.  Pursuant to a Federal Administrative Court decision, however, trained personnel may kill animals without anesthesia in a registered slaughterhouse under observation of the local veterinary inspection office if the meat is for consumption only by members of religious communities whose beliefs require slaughtering animals without anesthesia.

On July 6, a federal law took effect that enables authorities to restrict the tattoos, clothing, jewelry, and hair or beard styles of civil servants if this is necessary to ensure the functionality of public administration or fulfill the obligation for respectful and trustworthy conduct.  The law specifies that if these symbols are of a religious nature, they may only be restricted if they are “objectively suited to adversely affecting trust in a civil servant’s neutral performance of his official duties.”

According to a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court, general headscarf bans for teachers at public schools are a violation of religious freedom, but implementation is left to the states, which may determine if special circumstances apply.  The states of Bavaria, North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW), and Saarland render decisions on a case-by-case basis.  Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lower Saxony do not prohibit headscarves for teachers.  Hesse permits teachers to wear headscarves as long as doing so does not impair “school peace” or threaten perceptions of state neutrality.  Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Wuerttemberg prohibit teachers from wearing full-face veils (i.e., niqabs or burqas).  Berlin bans visible signs of religious affiliation for police, lawyers, judges, and law enforcement staff but not for primary and secondary school teachers.  In Lower Saxony and Bavaria, judges and prosecutors may not wear religious symbols or clothing in the courtroom.  Other states have laws that restrict religious attire in certain circumstances.

Citing safety reasons and the need for traffic law enforcement, federal law prohibits the concealment of faces while driving, including by a niqab.  Infractions are punishable by a 60 euro ($68) fine.

State law in Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Wuerttemberg forbids students in primary and secondary schools from full-face veiling at school (i.e., wearing a niqab or burqa).  This state ban on full-face covering does not apply in higher education.

According to federal law, religious groups may appoint individuals with special training to carry out circumcision of males younger than six months.  After six months, the law states circumcisions must be performed in a “medically professional manner” and without unnecessary pain.

All states offer religious instruction and ethics courses in public schools.  Religious communities with PLC status (or those without such status that have concluded a special agreement with the state granting them this right) appoint religion teachers and work with the states to ensure the curriculum is in line with the constitution; the states pay the teachers’ salaries.  Most public schools offer the option of Protestant and Catholic religious instruction in cooperation with those Churches, as well as instruction in Judaism if enough students (usually 12, although regulations vary by state) express an interest.  Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Berlin, Hesse, Lower Saxony, NRW, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein also offer some religious instruction in Islam.  In most federal states, Muslim communities or associations provide this instruction, while in Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein, the state does.  In Hamburg and Bremen, nondenominational religious instruction is offered for all students by the EKD and the state, respectively.

Students who do not wish to participate in religious instruction may opt out; in some states, those who opt out may substitute ethics courses.  State authorities generally permit religious groups to establish private schools as long as they meet basic curriculum requirements.  Schooling is constitutionally mandated, and homeschooling, including for religious reasons, is prohibited in all states.

The government provides annual payments to Holocaust victims and their descendants, and regularly expands the scope of these programs to broaden the eligibility requirements.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In May, then federal Interior Minister Horst Seehofer banned the Duesseldorf-based Muslim association Ansaar International and related suborganizations for financing terrorism and opposing the country’s constitutional order.  The NRW Office for the Protection of the Constitution (OPC, the state’s intelligence service) had been observing these organizations since 2013.  More than 1,000 officers were deployed in 10 states (Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein) to enforce the ban.

In July, Hamburg’s domestic intelligence service announced that, based on new evidence, it would officially classify the IZH as an organization that is not independent, but rather one that “receives and depends on direct orders from Tehran.”  The IZH challenged this and previous claims in court; a verdict was pending at year’s end.  Hamburg opposition parties and civil society actors continued to advocate an end to Hamburg’s formal relationship with the IZH, which they said was an important Iranian regime asset.

Federal and state OPCs continued to monitor numerous Muslim groups, including the U.S.-designated terrorist groups ISIS, Hizballah, and Hamas, as well as groups such as Turkish Hizballah, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jama’at, Millatu Ibrahim, the IZH, the Muslim Brotherhood, Milli Gorus, and various Salafist movements.

The OPC in Saxony continued to monitor two mosques it said were dominated by Salafists.

According to reports from the federal OPC and COS members, the federal OPC and the OPCs of six states – Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, NRW, and Saxony-Anhalt – continued to monitor the activities of the COS, reportedly by evaluating COS publications and members’ public activities to determine whether they violated the constitution.  At least four major political parties – the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU), Social Democratic Party (SPD), and Free Democratic Party (FDP) – continued to exclude Scientologists from party membership.  “Sect filters,” signed statements by potential employees to confirm they had no contact with the COS, remained in use in the public and private sectors.

Groups under OPC observation continued to say that OPC scrutiny implied they were extremist and that this constrained their ability to apply for publicly funded projects.

In speeches in September and October, then Chancellor Merkel expressed regret that expressions of public antisemitism had increased in the country and said the country would expend great strength to resist it.  At the presentation of a prize for tolerance in September, she stated that support for Jewish life was a special obligation of the government and that the country would not tolerate racism, antisemitism, or hate directed at a group of persons.  She also acknowledged a strong increase in antisemitic acts in 2020 and expressed concern that antisemitism was becoming bolder and more open than before.

In August, the federal government announced it would spend an additional 12 million euros ($13.61 million) on research networks focusing on antisemitism between 2021 and 2024, complementing the one billion euros ($1.13 billion) in spending already planned for 89 measures against right-wing extremism, antisemitism, and racism during that period.  Then Education and Research Minister Anja Karliczek said the government wanted to invest millions in researching the causes of anti-Semitism in order “to efficiently fight” it, adding that there was reason to worry that the 2,351 cases of antisemitism reported in 2020 were “only the tip of the iceberg and that the unreported number of daily attacks on Jews is substantially higher.”

In July, the Duisburg public prosecutor’s office charged six law enforcement officers with sedition and spreading symbols of unconstitutional organizations by participating in right-wing extremist chat groups with names such as “Alphateam” and “Kunte Kinte.”  According to the NRW Interior Ministry, officers exchanged anti-Muslim content in the groups, including praise for the 2019 anti-Muslim attacks at mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand.  The groups had been found entered into an officer’s phone in September 2020.  Investigations against seven other accused members of the chat groups were dropped due to statutes of limitation or lack of sufficient evidence.  Investigations continued in 13 other cases, all involving law enforcement officers.  In September, the NRW Interior Ministry’s unit examining police right-wing extremism published its report of conclusions, in which it recommended 18 separate measures to fight right-wing extremism within the police.

In June, Frankfurt prosecutors launched investigations of 20 members of the city’s elite police special forces (SEK) for exchanging right-wing extremist material in a chat group, including material venerating Nazi organizations and expressing hate against minority groups.  On August 26, Hesse Interior Minister Peter Beuth dissolved the Frankfurt SEK and announced a statewide reorganization of SEK units.  Investigations against a majority of the officers continued at year’s end, but investigations of two superior officers for failing to report the activity were closed.  Frankfurt Police president Gerhard Bereswill said in September that parts of the city’s police force would be reformed to address antisemitic tendencies and other discriminatory attitudes within it.

In July, the chair of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, Ayman Mazyek, and other representatives of the Muslim community said that military chaplains were not available to the estimated 3,000 Muslim soldiers who “put their heads on the line for Germany.”  The Ministry of Defense said that the lack of an umbrella organization for Muslims with which the ministry could negotiate made it difficult to appoint imams as chaplains.

In June, the Bundeswehr (military) appointed its first military rabbi, the first of up to 10 rabbis scheduled to serve the 150-300 Jews in the armed forces.  The Central Council of Jews in Germany and leading politicians of all major parties welcomed the move.

According to the Rhineland-Palatinate Ministry of Justice, the state employed four Muslim prison chaplains, all of whom are state employees and had to pass a multistep recruitment process.  The states of Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Bavaria also employed Muslim chaplains, according to media reports, and in Lower Saxony, 11 Muslim chaplains worked for the prison system on a freelance basis.

In May, the Stuttgart Administrative Court decided in favor of the Wuerttemberg EKD, ruling that the federal government’s COVID-19 restrictions for areas with high infection rates did not apply to church funerals.  The EKD had argued in April that church funerals were religious services, not private events, and should therefore be exempt from the 30-person attendance limit mandated by the COVID-19 regulations.  The court also found that the federal regulation constituted an infringement on religious freedom.

Religious groups, including the Coordination Council of Muslims, whose members included the country’s largest Muslim organizations, expressed concern that authorities might restrict civil servants from wearing headscarves or other religious symbols after the law allowing such restrictions in some circumstances came into effect in July.

On March 22-23, then Chancellor Merkel and the minister-presidents (governors) of the 16 states decided the government would ask churches to cancel in-person Easter services on April 4 as part of heightened COVID-19 restrictions during a five-day “quiet period” of no in-person gatherings.  According to media reports, the Chancellor and minister-presidents did not consult with church leaders or government advisors on religious affairs before announcing the decision.  On March 24, following strong protests by the Catholic Church, the EKD, and business leaders, the federal government withdrew the plan for the quiet period.  The government, however, still encouraged churches to avoid in-person Easter services.

In April, NRW Interior Minister Herbert Reul suggested that religious congregations suspend in-person services due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  The suggestion followed a COVID-19 outbreak at a church in Euskirchen.  Religious groups followed strict social distancing rules for in-person worship but also offered virtual and drive-in services.

Also in April, local officials and mayors across NRW encouraged Muslims to celebrate Ramadan virtually, as large gatherings were prohibited due to COVID-19 regulations.  To comply with social distancing regulations, many mosques offered in-person services for smaller numbers of participants, as well as online prayers.

In August, the NRW state government established a reporting office for antisemitic incidents that do not rise to the level of criminal charges.  The North Rhein State Association of Jewish Communities temporarily administered the office until the government could establish a new organization.

In March, the city of Cologne established a reporting and documentation office for antisemitic incidents at its National Socialist Documentation Center that it said would coordinate its efforts with similar institutions at the state and national level.

In April, the Hamburg government appointed Stefan Hensel, the local chair of the German Israeli Society (DIG), as the city-state’s first independent antisemitism commissioner.  Hensel’s three-year term began on July 1.  Hamburg’s largest Jewish congregation, led by Chief Rabbi Shlomo Bistritzky, as well as the smaller Liberal Jewish Community, endorsed the appointment.  Hensel stated that he was committed to fighting both antisemitism and anti-Zionism, adding that the city should appreciate Hamburg Jews as modern citizens.

Bremen remained the only state in the country without an antisemitism commissioner.  In previous years, the deputy chair of the Jewish community in Bremen said the community preferred to address antisemitism and other issues of concern in an existing forum that included the mayor and president of the legislature.

In August, the government of Baden-Wuerttemberg announced that the annual budget of the state’s antisemitism commissioner would be doubled to more than 2.2 million euros ($2.49 million).

In January, the Baden-Wuerttemberg State Criminal Police Office and the state Interior Ministry announced a new prevention program called “Safe in Religious Communities” aimed at improving communication between law enforcement agencies and religious communities, while giving community representatives tools to safely organize events and identify extremism.  Police officers at regional headquarters were trained to act as liaisons to the Jewish and Muslim communities.  According to a press release by the Baden-Wuerttemberg government, more religious communities might be added at a later date.

On August 23, Baden-Wuerttemberg Interior Minister Thomas Strobl officially inaugurated the country’s first two police rabbis, Moshe Flomenmann from Loerrach and Shneur Trebnik from Ulm.  According to Strobl, the police rabbis would serve as counselors and points of contact for prospective and current police officers, as well as for community members.

In September, the Central Archive for the History of Jews in Germany reopened at a new location in Heidelberg.  The federal Ministry of the Interior funded the archive with 900,000 euros ($1.02 million) annually.

On October 7, the Berlin Administrative Court dismissed a lawsuit filed by two supporters of the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement in which they said the Bundestag had infringed upon their fundamental rights when it passed a resolution criticizing the BDS as antisemitic in 2019.

In May, the Moenchengladbach District Court of Appeals overturned a man’s eight-month suspended sentence imposed by a lower court for distributing the antisemitic manifesto of the 2019 Halle synagogue attacker online, and instead fined him 900 euros ($1,000).  The court stated it found the defendant’s claims that he had shared the manifesto only to mock its contents to be credible.

In May, the NRW Higher Administrative Court in Muenster rejected an exemption for a woman from Duesseldorf who wanted to drive a car while wearing a niqab.  The court cited the law prohibiting drivers from fully covering their face except for the eyes.  The decision could not be appealed.

According to a 2020 survey of state-level education ministries, the most recent available, more than 900 schools in the country offered Islamic religious instruction.  Almost 60,000 students took part in Islamic religious instruction in the school year 2019-20, an increase of 4,000 from the previous year.  Since 2017-18, approximately 35 schools had added Islamic religious instruction.

In May, the NRW Ministry of Education created a new commission to cooperate on Islamic religious instruction in public schools.

In July, the Wiesbaden Administrative Court ruled the Hesse state government had unlawfully ended cooperation with the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB) on Islamic religious education in public schools in April 2020.  The state government appealed the decision in August; the appeal was pending at the end of the year.

In the 2021-22 school year, 364 schools in Bavaria began offering Islamic religion courses, similar to existing religion courses on Christianity and Judaism.  All pupils in Bavaria must receive instruction in one of these religions, or an ethics course if courses in their religion are not available.  Approximately 100 Muslim instructors were expected to teach approximately 17,000 Muslim pupils, although demand for Islamic religion courses was much higher than 17,000, according to parents, schools, and education ministry officials.  Muslim communities complained that the state government, not the religious community, set the curriculum of the course.

In October, Saxony-Anhalt also began offering pupils Judaism instruction for the first time as a pilot project at an elementary school in Magdeburg.  Fourteen pupils enrolled in the course.

In April, the Mainz Administrative Court ruled that the 2019 closure of Rhineland-Palatinate’s only Islamic daycare center, the al-Nur center in Mainz, was lawful.  State authorities had closed the center, saying it was linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist organizations.

In May, the Sunni School Council Foundation, which oversees Islamic religious education in Baden-Wuerttemberg public schools, rejected the teaching license of Abdel-Hakim Ourghi, head of the Islamic Theology department at the University of Education in Freiburg.  While the foundation cited missing credentials as a reason for its decision, critics, including members of the Muslim community, academics, and politicians, accused it of trying to silence a prominent voice of a liberal interpretation of Islam.  The Baden-Wuerttemberg Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs defended the decision, which could be appealed.

The government continued to subsidize some Jewish groups.  Based on an agreement between the federal government and the Central Council of Jews in Germany, the federal government contributed 13 million euros ($14.74 million) to help maintain Jewish cultural heritage and support integration and social work.  In addition, the federal government provided financial support to the Institute for Jewish Studies in Heidelberg, the Rabbi Seminar at the University of Potsdam, and the Leo Baeck Institute, an international group researching the history and culture of German Jewry.

State governments continued to provide funds to Jewish communities and organizations in various amounts for such purposes as the renovation and construction of synagogues.  The federal government continued to cover 50 percent of maintenance costs for Jewish cemeteries.  State and local police units continued to provide security for synagogues and other Jewish institutions.

In March, the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany (also known as the Jewish Claims Conference) and the government announced an agreement to provide transitional payments to surviving spouses of Jewish victims of the Nazis who had been receiving a pension from the government.

In January, the Baden-Wuerttemberg state government signed a contract with the state’s Jewish communities to protect Jewish institutions and combat antisemitism.  The contract stipulated the state government would provide funds to protect Jewish facilities totaling one million euros ($1.13 million) in 2021 and 1.17 million euros ($1.33 million) in each of the ensuing three years, as well as 200,000 euros ($227,000) yearly for three years for the construction of a Jewish academy.

On April 22, the Dresden city council voted to establish a museum on the history of Jewish life in the states of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia and in Poland and the Czech Republic.

After many years of renovation, the Goerlitz synagogue reopened on July 12.  Consecrated 110 years earlier, it had survived the Nazi pogrom of November 1938 (also referred to as Kristallnacht) and been neglected during the German Democratic Republic period.  The federal government supported the construction with 2.8 million euros ($3.17 million).

Construction of Frankfurt’s Jewish Academy began in September.  The academy, due to open in 2024, would function, according to sponsors, as an intellectual center of Jewish life, philosophy, and culture.  The costs of construction, estimated at 34.5 million euros ($39.12 million), was to be shared by the federal government, the state of Hesse, the city of Frankfurt, and the Central Council of Jews in Germany.

In September, the city of Frankfurt and its Jewish community signed an extension to the contract that governs cooperation between them.  The contract stipulated the city would provide an additional one million euros ($1.13 million) for the protection and security of the Jewish community, starting with the 2022 fiscal year.

According to media reports and the Humanistic Union, an organization that describes its mission as working to protect and enforce civil rights, including the right to free development of the personality, total state government contributions during the year to the Catholic Church and the EKD totaled approximately 581 million euros ($658.73 million).  The union said it calculated its estimate based on budgets of the 16 states.  The Humanistic Union advocates the abolition of state church privileges such as faith-based religious education as a regular school subject, collection of church taxes, and other financial aid to religious groups.

On June 16, the country’s first publicly funded Islamic seminary opened in Osnabrueck with a class of 50 students.  Five Muslim federations, including the Central Council of Muslims in Germany and the Muslim Community of Lower Saxony, founded the seminary.  A commission of their representatives sets the curriculum, which is taught in German.  The federal and Lower Saxony governments committed to provide 5.5 million euros ($6.24 million) in funding to the school over five years.

The government continued the German Islam Conference dialogue with Muslims in the country.  The dialogue’s stated aim was to improve the religious and social participation of the Muslim population, give greater recognition to Muslims’ contributions to society, and – in the absence of a central organization representing all Muslims in the country – further develop partnerships between the government and Muslim organizations.  Among the specific outcomes of the dialogue were the April publication of a large study on Muslim life in the country that included new official estimates of the size of the Muslim population, the first in years; a May conference on young Muslims’ perspectives on issues affecting Islam in the country; the establishment of an Islamic seminary in Osnabrueck in June, including government funding for it; and support for efforts to inform the Muslim community about the COVID-19 pandemic throughout the year.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and held the organization’s chairmanship for the year ending March 31.

There were numerous reports of antisemitic, anti-Muslim, and anti-Christian incidents across the country, including assaults, verbal harassment, threats, discrimination, and vandalism.  According to figures collected by the Federal Criminal Police Office, as of November 5, there had been 1,850 antisemitic crimes reported, including 35 involving physical violence leading to 17 persons injured.

In August, a group insulted and severely beat a young Jewish man wearing a kippah while he was sitting in a Cologne park.  The victim was hospitalized with broken bones in his face.  The two attackers were arrested and released; police investigations into the crime continued at year’s end.  Cologne Mayor Henriette Reker, Catholic Archbishop of Cologne Cardinal Rainer Maria Woelki, and President of the Jewish Community in Munich and Upper Bavaria Charlotte Knobloch condemned the attack, which police said they suspected was motived by antisemitism.

In Hamburg on September 18, a man and his companion shouted antisemitic slogans before attacking a 60-year-old Jewish man, leaving him hospitalized with potentially lifelong injuries, according to media reports.  Hamburg Anti-Semitism Commissioner Stefan Hensel said the attacker and his companions were shouting antisemitic and anti-Israel insults at a pro-Israel vigil in central Hamburg and, when vigil participants asked them to stop, the attacker punched the Jewish man in the face, breaking his nose and cheek bone.  Hamburg Deputy Mayor (equivalent to deputy governor) Katharina Fegebank condemned the attack.  Police arrested a 16-year-old suspect, Aram A., in Berlin in late September.

In May, during clashes in Gaza and Israel, there was an outbreak of antisemitic demonstrations, some of them violent, as well as vandalism and assaults across the country.  On May 10, unknown individuals burned a memorial plaque at the site of the former Duesseldorf synagogue, and on May 11, demonstrators burned Israeli flags in front of synagogues in Bonn and Muenster.  Demonstrators also threw stones at the Bonn synagogue.  Approximately 180 persons attended an anti-Israel demonstration in Gelsenkirchen May 12, chanting antisemitic insults describing Jews as subhuman.  Some made the hand signal of the Grey Wolves, a Turkish right-wing extremist group.

The NRW Interior Ministry reported a total of 77 incidents with antisemitic or anti-Israeli connections (the ministry did not separately categorize antisemitic from anti-Israeli incidents) at pro-Palestinian demonstrations in May, for which it believed at least 125 individuals were responsible; it identified 45 persons by name.

On May 15, 3,500 persons participated in a pro-Palestinian demonstration in the Neukoelln district of Berlin that turned antisemitic.  Demonstrators chanted antisemitic slogans and displayed signs equating Israel with the Nazis.  According to media reports, participants included members of the Grey Wolves and left-wing extremist groups.  After police tried to end the demonstration due to noncompliance with COVID-19 requirements, participants became violent, throwing bottles, stones, and burning objects at police and journalists covering the event.  Ninety-three police officers were injured, and 59 persons were arrested for battery, assaulting police, and other charges; police restored order after several hours.  Police investigations were underway at year’s end.  The then mayor of Berlin, Michael Mueller, condemned the demonstration as “unacceptable.”

In a statement delivered by the federal government spokesman, then Chancellor Merkel condemned the demonstrations and attacks on Jewish institutions as antisemitic abuses of the right to free assembly.  They had shown that those involved were not protesting a state or government but expressing hate against a religion and those that belong to it, she said.  Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier also condemned the demonstrations and attacks, saying that that country “will not tolerate hate against Jews, no matter who it comes from … Nothing justifies threatening Jews or attacking synagogues in our cities.”  Then Bundestag President Wolfgang Schaeuble issued a statement that there was “no justification for antisemitism, hate, and violence at the protests,” while acknowledging the existence of antisemitism in the country.  Then Interior Minister Seehofer said that attacks on synagogues and spreading antisemitism would be met with the full force of the law.  President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany Josef Schuster and Chairman of the Central Council of Muslims Mazyek also condemned the incidents.  The president of the Central Council of Jews and the German Conference of Bishops issued a joint press statement warning of growing antisemitism and a “combination of political conflict and religious fanaticism.”  Several state-level religious leaders and government officials, including DITIB Hesse Managing Director Onur Akdeniz, Bishop of Limburg Georg Baetzing, and Hesse Antisemitism Commissioner Uwe Becker, spoke out against antisemitic propaganda at the pro-Palestinian demonstrations.

In May, the Hessian State Criminal Police Office arrested a Berlin-based man, identified only as Alexander M., for sending more than 85 threatening letters with right-wing extremist content, sometimes including antisemitic content, to politicians, journalists, and other prominent figures from late 2018 through 2020.  Many of the most visible targets were Muslim women.  Among the recipients were the heads of the Central Council of Jews in Germany and the Central Council of Muslims in Germany.

In June in Moenchengladbach, two men assaulted a Jewish man, speaking to him in Arabic.  Police were investigating but had not identified any suspects at year’s end.

During a September 30 soccer match in Berlin’s Olympic Stadium between 1.FC Union Berlin and Haifa Maccabi – the first time an Israeli team had played in the stadium opened by the Nazis for the 1936 Olympic games – Maccabi supporters reported that some Union supporters threatened them, used antisemitic insults, and threw objects at them.  According to press reports, one Union fan also attempted to burn an Israeli flag.  1.FC Union apologized for the flag burning, insults, and physical attacks, all of which it termed antisemitic, and banned one person from attending games in the future.  Police were investigating at year’s end.

In April, on Easter Sunday, three unidentified men entered a church in Nidda, Hesse, shouted slogans such as “There is only one God, and that is Allah,” and “Allah is greatest,” and insulted a worshipper attending the church service.  The political crimes unit of the Hesse state police investigated the incident as a possible infringement of the free exercise of religion.

In September, a Halle police officer was suspended for repeatedly corresponding with Stephan Balliet, who had attacked the Halle synagogue on Yom Kippur in 2019.  The officer wrote Balliet at least 10 letters using a pseudonym and false address and reportedly expressed sympathy for the attacker, while minimizing his crimes, in conversations with colleagues.  The police officer had left the force as of October 31, according to newspaper Mitteldeutsche Zeitung.

On June 15, the Erfurt newspaper Thueringer Allgemeine reported that local construction companies had repeatedly declined orders for the construction of a mosque in Erfurt because they feared their involvement would precipitate attacks on their vehicles by opponents of the mosque.  Another newspaper reported in 2020 that construction companies had also declined to participate in the mosque construction at that time.  Suleman Malik, the spokesman for the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in Erfurt, said the reaction of the construction companies had delayed the construction of the mosque by two years.

In July, according to press reports, the Duesseldorf Hyatt Hotel cancelled the reservation of the Baba Sheikh, the spiritual leader of the Yezidis, and his two companions.  The hotel said the cancellation was due to technical issues, apologized for the misunderstanding, and upheld the reservation.

In October, Jewish singer Gil Ofarim reported that hotel staff told him to remove his Star of David necklace during check-in at the front desk of Leipzig’s Westin Hotel.  Hotel employees denied doing so and filed a defamation suit against the singer.  In response, Ofarim accused employees of filing a false report.  Ofarim’s discrimination lawsuit against the hotel was pending at the end of the year.  According to the hotel, it conducted its own investigation that exonerated its employees.

Media again reported that women who wore a hijab faced employment discrimination and that discrimination was made easier by the customary practice of requiring photographs as part of job applications.  According to one March report, a job seeker who wore a headscarf said that she had to submit 450 applications before she got an interview, while hearing about others who did not wear headscarves and received interviews after four applications.

In June, a man attempted to set fire to the Ulm synagogue, resulting in limited damage to the building.  The suspect was a German-born Turkish national who fled to Turkey after the attack.  According to Baden-Wuerttemberg authorities, the Turkish government refused to extradite the suspect.  Following the incident, nearly 500 persons, including various city and state politicians, attended two separate support vigils, and the Baden-Wuerttemberg state parliament passed a resolution denouncing antisemitism.

In April, an unknown perpetrator shot at the Bochum synagogue and a nearby planetarium.  According to police, the attack destroyed windows in both buildings.  Police did not rule out an antisemitic motive for the crime.  In May, police announced they had surveillance camera footage and issued an appeal to the public to help identify the suspect.  The Bochum prosecutor’s office closed the investigation in December, citing insufficient evidence.

On July 24, unknown persons set on fire a banner announcing the construction of a new synagogue in Magdeburg.  Police were investigating the case.  The state of Saxony-Anhalt earmarked 2.8 million euros ($3.17 million) for the construction of the synagogue, out of a total construction cost of approximately 3.4 million euros ($3.85 million).

In June, a swastika was found painted on the Torah ark in a Jewish prayer room at Frankfurt International Airport.  The country’s Orthodox Rabbinical Conference denounced the act of vandalism, saying, “This hatred of Jews must finally stop.”

According to Ministry of Interior federal crime statistics, there were 2,351 antisemitic crimes committed during 2020 (the most recent year for which complete statistics were available), including 57 crimes involving violence.  This represented a 15.7 percent increase from the 2,032 antisemitic crimes reported in 2019, of which 73 were violent; federal crime statistics classified 2,224 crimes (94.6 percent) as motivated by far-right ideology.  RIAS attributed the increase in antisemitic crimes and incidents to the large number of demonstrations against measures to contain COVID-19 or to other COVID-related issues, and it reported 489 antisemitic incidents connected to the pandemic.

The federal OPC annual report stated that, of the 57 violent antisemitic crimes committed in 2020, 48 were motivated by right-wing extremism, a 14 percent drop compared to 2019, when it reported 56 such crimes.  According to the report, membership in right-wing extremist parties such as the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party dropped slightly, from approximately 13,330 persons in 2019 to 13,250 in 2020.

In May, the NRW commissioner for antisemitism published the second NRW antisemitism report, which cited 276 antisemitic crimes (down from 310 in 2019) registered in the state in 2020, of which 254 (down from 291) were motivated by right-wing ideologies.  The crimes ranged from verbal abuse to physical injury; all cases resulted in criminal investigations.  The NRW commissioner stated that 500 antisemitic incidents were reported to her office, including incidents that did not rise to the level of criminal complaints.

A July study by RIAS based on Jewish residents in the state and other sources found that antisemitism was an everyday experience of Jews in Baden-Wuerttemberg, ranging from mundane to virulent forms.  A leading Jewish community representative described antisemitism as “background noise of Jewish life.”  The study analyzed 671 antisemitic crimes that occurred in the state between 2014 and 2018.  A spokesperson of the state’s youth foundation pointed to an increasing online dimension to antisemitism, stating there were 200 such incidents reported in 2020, and 300 in the first half of 2021 alone.

RIAS, to which victims may report antisemitic incidents regardless of whether they file charges with police, reported 1,437 such incidents in the states of Berlin, Brandenburg, Bavaria, and Schleswig-Holstein in 2020, compared with 1,253 in 2019, an increase of 14.6 percent.

Lower Saxony’s government recorded 189 antisemitic crimes in 2020, down from 212 in 2019.  The Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania government counted 73 such crimes in 2020, up from 52 in 2019.

In 2020, the Ministry of Interior registered 929 crimes targeting Muslims and Muslim institutions, including 77 against places of worship and 51 incidents of battery.  The ministry classified most of these incidents as having been carried out by right-wing extremists.  Other recorded incidents included online hate speech against Muslims, hate mail, and aggressive public behavior against persons who appeared to be Muslim.

The Ministry of Interior counted 141 anti-Christian crimes in 2020, including seven cases involving violence, up from 128 in 2019, an increase of 10 percent.  The ministry classified 30 percent of these crimes as motivated by right-wing ideology and 12 percent as motivated by left-wing ideology.

In May, the Ministry of Interior presented its annual report on politically motivated crime, according to which police registered 1,026 crimes motivated by antireligious sentiment.

In January, an unknown person threw stones and paint at St. Luke’s, a confessional Lutheran church in Leipzig, breaking windows and damaging a newly restored mosaic.  An anonymous letter claiming responsibility for the attack was posted online; the writer accused Martin Luther of sexism and tyranny and called churches “one of the best targets” for attacks against western morals.  At year’s end, police had not identified a suspect.

In April, an unknown man broke the windows of the prayer room of a Hildesheim mosque and entered its courtyard before fleeing.  Police arrested and charged a suspect.  A trial was scheduled for 2022.

In August, a man assaulted a woman wearing a headscarf at a subway station in Berlin.  The unknown assailant beat her severely and tore off her headscarf while shouting xenophobic insults.  As she attempted to flee, he knocked her to the ground with his bicycle and left the scene.  The woman required hospitalization; the police unit responsible for hate crimes and political violence was investigating the incident at year’s end.

In September, unknown persons threw stones through six windows of what police called “a Muslim institution” in Zwickau, shattering them; media reports called the building a mosque, which had been the target of vandalism in the past.  Police had not arrested a suspect at year’s end.

In February, the Hamburg District Court found a man who had assaulted a Jewish student with a shovel in October 2020 guilty of attempted murder and aggravated battery.  The court, however, ruled the man was mentally ill and therefore not criminally liable, sentencing him to psychiatric institutionalization.  The man, who was wearing a military-style uniform, assaulted the student at a Sukkot celebration at the Hohe Weide Synagogue in Hamburg, leaving him with a serious head injury.

In January, the Hildesheim District Court in Lower Saxony ruled that a Hildesheim resident arrested in 2020 upon suspicion of planning attacks against Muslims and mosques was suffering from a severe mental illness and could not be held responsible for his behavior.  It ordered him placed in temporary psychiatric care.  Police had found weapons in his apartment, and the suspect had said in an online chat that he wanted to carry out an attack similar to the 2019 mosque attacks in New Zealand and “kill Muslims.”

On June 16, the Bavarian Court of Administrative Appeals ruled in favor of a COS member whose 2018 application for a 500 euro ($570) electric bicycle subsidy was rejected by the city of Munich because she refused to sign a written statement pledging not to employ COS methods or spread COS ideas.  The state of Bavaria and some other states and many cities require persons to sign such a declaration before they can accept public employment or government grants.  The court ruled that, as a citizen, the plaintiff had a right to the subsidy from the city, just like anyone else.

In July, the Court of Justice of the European Union, addressing appeals in two cases, one from Hamburg and one from Bavaria, ruled that employers could ban employees from wearing headscarves under certain circumstances.  Both cases were brought by employees who did not wear headscarves when they started their jobs but decided to do so after returning to work from maternity leave.  Their employers refused to allow them to do so, saying that the employees had to project a neutral image to clients.  The court agreed with the employers.  Muslim organizations and NGOs criticized the verdict, saying it made it difficult for Muslim women to choose a profession.

In September, a trial of two individuals arrested for the vandalism of a Jewish cemetery in Geilenkirchen began.  According to police, the pair knocked over more than 40 gravestones in the cemetery and defaced gravestones with blue paint and Nazi symbols in 2019.  They were charged with property damage and disturbing the peace of the dead.  Prosecutors said both were members of a Neo-Nazi group.  The trial started in September and continued at year’s end.

In September, the Moenchengladbach District Court convicted a man of placing a bloody pig’s head, plastic bags filled with blood, right-wing extremist slogans, and swastikas in front of the al-Rahman Mosque in Moenchengladbach in 2019 and sentenced him to four months’ probation.

In October, a man claiming that Christianity is a false religion forcibly removed sacred religious objects from a church in Nordhausen, Thuringia, including its crucifix and a medieval wooden altarpiece, damaging both.  Police stated they intended to press charges against the man, whose asylum claim had been denied.

The Catholic Church and the EKD continued to oppose the COS publicly.  “Sect commissioners” or “departments on sects and worldview matters” of the EKD and the Catholic Church continued to investigate “sects and cults” and publicize what they considered to be the dangers of those groups.  On its website, the EKD Center for Questions of World Views continued to warn the public about what it said were the dangers posed by multiple religious groups, including the COS, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), Bhagwan-Osho, Transcendental Meditation, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Universal Life, and continued to produce literature criticizing the groups.

In September, the Brussels-based NGO Action and Protection League issued the results of its European antisemitism survey based on data from December 2019-January 2020.  According to the survey, 10 percent of 1,000 respondents ages 18-75 in Germany said they had negative feelings towards Jews.  Fifteen percent said they would be “totally uncomfortable” or “uncomfortable” with having Jewish neighbors.  The survey cited stereotypical statements about Jews and asked respondents the degree to which they agreed or disagreed.  The proportion who responded “strongly agree” or “tend to agree” with the following statements were – “the interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population” (23percent); “there is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world” (15 percent); “Jews have too much influence in this country” (12 percent); “Jews will never be able to fully integrate into this society” (20 percent); “Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals” (15 percent); “many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later” (8 percent); “Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them” (7 percent); “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes” (23 percent).

In a nationwide, representative survey conducted for the Alice Schwarzer Foundation, Giordano Bruno Foundation, and WZB Berlin Social Science Center published on June 11, 65 percent of respondents said it was “right” that freedom of religion applied to Muslims as well as Christians, whereas 18 percent said it was “not right” and 17 percent were unsure.  When asked whether “Islam is part of Germany,” 44 percent said “yes, but only peaceful, non-radical groups” and 44 percent answered “absolutely not,” excluding all Muslim groups.  Only 5 percent said they would completely agree that Islam was part of the country.  The survey also showed support for a ban on burqas among the general population had grown to 73 percent, from 56 percent in 2016.  Another 17 percent supported a ban in certain situations (32 percent in 2016), and 5 percent were generally opposed to such a ban (8 percent in 2016).  Majorities also supported banning headscarves for certain groups:  61 percent supported headscarf bans for public school teachers, 58 percent for public-sector employees, 56 percent for child-care workers, and 53 percent for girls younger than 14 years of age.

In February, Bundestag member Norbert Roettgen removed a social media post and image of a discussion he had held with Muslim students after the post was flooded with anti-Muslim insults.  Roettgen said he removed the image to protect the identities of the participants and decried what he described as the anti-Muslim hate the post had exposed.

In September, authorities initially did not allow a woman in Bergheim, Hesse, to cast her vote at a local polling station because she was wearing a headscarf and a medical mask.  Poll workers insisted she remove her headscarf to identify herself, stating that the law required that a person’s face not be covered when voting.  According to the electoral committee, the scarf only covered the woman’s hair and neck, not her face.  The woman protested to city election authorities and was later allowed to vote while wearing the headscarf.  The city apologized for the incident.

The far-right group Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident (PEGIDA) continued to organize weekly demonstrations in Dresden, although media reports indicated significantly fewer demonstrators than in years prior to 2020.  Approximately 300 to 400 supporters continued to join PEGIDA rallies, even after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Participants regularly expressed anti-Muslim sentiments during the rallies, including by carrying posters expressing opposition to women who wore religious head coverings.  Authorities approved the demonstrations contingent upon participants adhering to masking and social distancing requirements.

Protesters at demonstrations against COVID-19 restrictions in Berlin, Kassel, Munich and other cities continued to use antisemitic rhetoric, including equating vaccines or the anti-COVID lockdown to Nazi-era persecution of Jews, or asserting that Jews were responsible for unleashing the corona virus.  For the year ending on March 17, RIAS registered antisemitic incidents, none of them violent, at 324 separate demonstrations against restrictions to prevent the spread of COVID-19.  For example, in March, numerous antisemitic acts, including ones trivializing the Nazi regime and the Holocaust, were reported at a large demonstration against COVID-19 measures in Kassel.

In May, President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany Schuster remarked on the connection between COVID-19 conspiracy theories and antisemitism, saying, “The old antisemitic narrative of the Jewish world conspiracy has been adapted to the current situation.”  Federal Commissioner for Jewish Life in Germany and the Fight Against Anti-Semitism Felix Klein also cited the role of the internet, saying, “In times of crisis, people are more open to irrational explanations, including antisemitic stereotypes…. What is new, however, is that…groups that previously had little or nothing to do with each other are now making common cause at demonstrations against the corona measures or on the [inter]net.”

In June, the U.S.-based newspaper The Algemeiner cited a study by the London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue that found German-language antisemitic posts in major online platforms in January and February had increased 13-fold over the same period a year earlier.  According to the report, antisemitic narratives related to COVID-19 were frequent, and the most common narratives, 89 percent of the content, pertained to conspiracy theories about Jews controlling financial, political, and media institutions.

In May, NRW Antisemitism Commissioner Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger and the University of Bielefeld published a study on the influence of rap on antisemitic attitudes in young people.  The study found listeners of rap were more likely to have antisemitic and misogynistic views and were more prone to believe in conspiracy theories.

In July, a woman from Cologne was fined 700 euros ($790) for incitement for sharing an antisemitic Facebook post.  The woman said she had not read the full text of the post.

Approximately 20 churches continued to use bells bearing Nazi symbols and inscriptions.  A church in Berlin removed such a bell, and some churches in other part of the country said they had plans to do so.  In June, the Association of Protestant Churches in Central Germany held a conference on the issue; the association also offered financial support to churches under its jurisdiction to cover the cost of new bells.

In October, Cologne Lord Mayor Henriette Reker announced a two-year test phase for Muslim communities to issue calls to Friday prayer using outdoor speakers, if they applied to do so.  The call to prayer may only be made between noon and 3 p.m. and is limited to a maximum of five minutes.  The volume is to be based on the location of the mosque.  Of approximately 35 mosque congregations, two had requested permits by early December.

In June, the U.S. Secretary of State and then Foreign Minister Maas launched the U.S.-Germany Dialogue on Holocaust Issues to promote accurate Holocaust education and information and to combat Holocaust denial and distortion and anti-Semitism.  As part of the dialogue, embassy officials met on a monthly basis with representatives of the country’s foreign ministry, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and the foundation Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe to develop programs and initiatives.

The U.S. embassy and the five consulates general continued to engage closely with authorities at all levels of government regarding responses to incidents of religious intolerance.  Embassy officials met with Federal Commissioner for Jewish Life in Germany and the Fight Against Antisemitism Klein and Ambassador Michaela Kuehler, the country’s Special Representative for Relations with Jewish Organizations, Issues Relating to Antisemitism, International Sinti and Roma Affairs, and Holocaust Remembrance on multiple occasions to discuss antisemitism, the growth in antisemitic incidents and violence, antisemitic conspiracy theories, and Holocaust denial.  Consulate officials also met with the commissioners for antisemitism in their districts.  Embassy and consulate officials engaged with other local, state, and federal officials to discuss religious freedom issues.  These included meetings with state interior ministers, state parliamentarians from the SPD, CDU, and Green party, and mayors.  At a meeting in November, the Cologne Consul General and Lord Mayor Henriette Reker discussed Cologne’s pilot program to allow mosques to issue calls to prayer, among other issues.

Embassy and consulate representatives met with members and leaders of numerous local and national religious and civil society groups regarding their concerns related to tolerance and freedom of religion.  Among the meetings were ones with President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany Schuster; Abdassamad El-Yazidi, speaker of the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany; Burhan Kesici of the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany; Remko Leemhuis, director of the AJC Berlin Lawrence and Lee Ramer Institute for German-Jewish Relations; representatives of the Catholic, Evangelical, and other Protestant Churches; the Central Council of Muslims; the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers; the World Uyghur Congress; Alevi Muslims, and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat.

Topics of discussion with Jewish groups included concerns regarding what they characterized as the growing acceptability of antisemitism throughout the country, concern that right-wing conspiracy groups had exacerbated antisemitism, and growing antisemitism on the intellectual left.

Topics discussed with Muslim groups and representatives included stereotypes and discrimination against Muslims, socioeconomic and cultural challenges that Muslim residents and immigrants faced in the country, and the training of imams.

In June, the Frankfurt Consul General visited Ulm’s Jewish community following an arson attack on the Ulm synagogue and met Ulm Rabbi Schneur Trebnik, as well as Israelite Religious Community of Wuerttemberg representatives.  The visit included a tour of the synagogue and the community center and a discussion on the situation of Ulm’s and Baden-Wuerttemberg’s Jewish community, various forms of antisemitism, and Trebnik’s work as one of the country’s first police rabbis.

Also in June, the Charge d’Affaires and the Leipzig Consul General met with members of the Jewish community in Halle, the site of a fatal 2019 attack on a synagogue, to discuss antisemitism, religious tolerance, and Jewish life in Eastern Germany.  The Leipzig Consul General visited the synagogue and laid a wreath at the site of the attack in October.

The embassy and consulates worked closely with Jewish communities, especially in the east of the country, to provide small grants in support of programs promoting religious tolerance to leading NGOs countering violent extremism related to religion and antisemitism.  For example, the consulate in Leipzig funded an appearance by a Jewish-American speaker in Halle on Holocaust Remembrance Day as well as a small grant for Jewish Remembrance Week in Goerlitz in November.

The embassy utilized virtual programs in which presenters spoke on ways of preserving and promoting accurate Holocaust narratives in the fight against antisemitism.  Four German participants joined a program that showed archivists and museum professionals how to maximize outreach within their fields to counter Holocaust distortions and denial.  Participants included 12 staff members from the Arolsen Archives, a center that documents, archives, and researches Nazi persecution, forced labor, and the Holocaust.  The consulate in Leipzig also supported October and November presentations in Jena and Weimar by the archives’ exhibit #Stolen Memory, featuring items the Nazi regime stole from Jews.

As a follow-up to a 2020 teacher academy that focused on engaging with teachers about Jewish life in the United States, the embassy expanded its discussion of religious freedom by raising awareness of hidden bias and stereotypes.  A workshop on hidden bias as part of a March teacher seminar reached 300 teachers and generated a lively discussion with the presenter, a senior lecturer on North American studies at Leuphana University.  In May, the embassy followed up with a film presentation and discussion of the documentary “Bias” with the filmmaker (including additional sessions with the local state police academies) and, in June, a discussion with a U.S historian and American Academy in Berlin fellow.

In August, the consulate general in Leipzig provided financial support to the 21st Yiddish Summer Weimar in Thuringia, one of the world’s leading summer programs for the study and presentation of traditional and contemporary Yiddish culture.  Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, many concerts and workshops again took place outdoors in public spaces in Weimar, Erfurt, and Eisenach, and other smaller towns in Thuringia.  The consulate also provided funding for several Jewish cultural events in Halle as part of a series of such events focusing on Jewish culture across the state of Saxony-Anhalt.

The consulate general in Leipzig provided seed money for the establishment of the Fachstelle Globaler Antisemitismus (Global Antisemitism Office) in Dessau-Rosslau, Saxony-Anhalt.  This NGO works to educate the public about online right-wing extremism and radicalization.

In October, the embassy and the consulate general in Leipzig cooperated to bring a senior American Jewish Congress official to the country, where he met with Berlin police and NGOs working against antisemitism and spoke on countering antisemitism in Cottbus, Jena, and Leipzig.

The embassy and consulates actively promoted religious freedom and tolerance through their social media channels, utilizing Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram to highlight the engagement of senior embassy officials on the issue.  Examples included visits of the Charge d’Affaires to Goerlitz for Jewish Remembrance Week; the meeting in Halle in June of the Charge d’Affaires and the Leipzig Consul General with representatives of NGOs working on tolerance and openness; and meetings with religious community leaders.  The embassy and consulates also amplified social media messaging by the President, Secretary of State, and Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues in support of religious freedom on many occasions throughout the year, often with German translations, to highlight U.S. religious pluralism and support for religious freedom.

The embassy and consulates general also created their own content, including greetings from the Charge d’Affaires on Jewish and Muslim holidays, social media posts on the right to freedom of religion, and a statement by the Charge d’Affaires condemning antisemitic vandalism at a memorial site to the Nazi concentration camp in Auschwitz.  Public meetings with officials and religious community and public engagements by embassy and consular officials were also accompanied by social media messaging.  Religious freedom and tolerance were topics of frequent focus of the embassy’s and consulates’ digital platforms.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 32.4 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2010 government census (the most recent available with this data), approximately 71 percent of the population is Christian, 18 percent is Muslim, 5 percent adheres to indigenous or animistic religious beliefs, and 6 percent belongs to other religious groups or has no religious beliefs.  Smaller religious groups include Baha’is, Buddhists, Jews, Hindus, and followers of Shintoism, Eckankar, and Rastafarianism.

Christian denominations include Roman Catholic, Methodist, Anglican, Mennonite, Presbyterian, Evangelical Presbyterian Church, African Methodist Episcopal Zion, Christian Methodist Episcopal, Evangelical Lutheran, Eden Revival Church International, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Seventh-day Adventist, Pentecostal, Baptist, Eastern Orthodox, African independent churches, the Society of Friends, and numerous nondenominational Christian groups, including charismatic churches.

Muslim communities include Sunnis, Ahmadiyya, Shia, and Sufis (Tijaniyyah and Qadiriyya orders).

Many individuals who identify as Christian or Muslim also practice some aspects of indigenous beliefs.  There are syncretic groups that combine elements of Christianity or Islam with traditional beliefs.  Zetahil, a belief system unique to the country, combines elements of Christianity and Islam.

There is no significant link between ethnicity and religion, but geography is often associated with religious identity.  Christians reside throughout the country; the majority of Muslims reside in the northern regions and in the urban centers of Accra, Kumasi, and Sekondi-Takoradi.  Most followers of traditional religious beliefs reside in rural areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination, provides for individuals’ freedom to profess and practice any religion, and does not designate a state religion.  These rights may be limited for stipulated reasons including defense, public safety, public health, or the management of essential services.

Religious groups must register with the Office of the Registrar General in the Ministry of Justice to receive formal government recognition and status as a legal entity, but there is no penalty for not registering.  The registration requirement for religious groups is the same as for nongovernmental organizations.   Most indigenous religious groups do not register.

According to law, registered religious groups are exempt from paying taxes on nonprofit religious, charitable, and educational activities.  Religious groups are required to pay taxes, on a pay-as-earned basis, on for-profit business activities, such as church-operated private schools and universities.

The Ministry of Education includes compulsory religious and moral education in the national public education curriculum.  There is no provision to opt out of these courses, which incorporate perspectives from Christianity and Islam.  There is also an Islamic education unit within the Ministry of Education responsible for coordinating all public education activities for Muslim communities.  The ministry permits private religious schools, but these must follow the prescribed curriculum set by the ministry.  International schools, including those that do not follow the government curriculum, are exempt from these requirements.  Faith-based schools that accept funds from the government are obliged to comply with the directive that states students’ religious practices must be respected.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Debate among religious groups and lawmakers regarding how best to regulate religious practices continued during the year.  As of December, key stakeholders, including the Ghana Education Service, the Christian Council of Ghana, the Ghana Pentecostal and Charismatic Council, Muslim leaders and the Office of the Chief Imam, the Catholic Bishops Conference, as well as leaders of smaller faith communities and traditional religious authorities, continued to work on a proposed regulatory framework that would ensure religious rights and deconflict policies, particularly policies that regard elementary and secondary education.  The issue of regulating “self-styled” pastors, those working outside of established ecumenical bodies, continued to be debated between legislators and the Christian Council of Ghana, an umbrella group of mainly traditional Protestant denominations.

There were reports of uneven enforcement and implementation in schools across the country of the government directive requiring schools to respect students’ religious practices.  In March, Achimota School admitted two Rastafarian students on the condition they shave their dreadlocks.  The students challenged the directive and the Human Rights High Court ruled in their favor, but the decision was appealed by the school, with a final decision pending at year’s end.

During Ramadan, Wesley Girls’ School and other schools barred Muslim students from fasting.  Wesley Girls’ School said it was preventing doing so for health reasons.  The issue divided segments of the Christian and Muslim population.  It was widely covered in traditional and social media and discussed in parliament.  On May 1, the Ghana Education Service, the division of the Ministry of Education responsible for ensuring that all school-age children are provided with quality formal education, ordered all schools to permit Muslim students to fast during Ramadan, a decision hailed as a victory for religious tolerance.  President Akufo-Addo made a public show to break the Ramadan fast on Eid al-Fitr with members of the Muslim community served by the school during the debate.

Support for and opposition to the President’s proposal to build an interdenominational national Christian cathedral continued.  Although President Akufo-Addo stated that public funds would not be used for the project, to be constructed on state-owned lands, critics continued to question whether the $100 million cathedral complex should be a priority for a country with urgent development needs and argued that the project inappropriately linked the state with a particular faith.  In September, President Akufo Addo traveled to Texas to attend a fundraising event for the cathedral, following his attendance at the UN General Assembly meeting in New York.  At a midyear budget review presentation to Parliament, Minister of Finance Ken Ofori-Atta urged each citizen to contribute 100 Ghana cedis ($17) per month voluntarily towards the construction of the National Christian Cathedral.

The government continued to issue and revise directives for COVID-19 protocols affecting public events.  As of year’s end, all public gatherings, including worship activities, could not exceed two hours and were required to be held in open spaces.  Religious leaders generally expressed appreciation that the government consulted with religious institutions on COVID-19 protection measures.  While most Christian and Muslim leaders advised their communities to follow the directive, some small, independent churches continued to complain that the ban on large gatherings and the two-hour time limit on church and mosque religious activities infringed upon religious liberties.

Government officials leading official events generally offered Christian and Islamic prayers and, occasionally, traditional invocations.  President Akufo-Addo, a Christian, and Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia, a Muslim, continued to emphasize the importance of peaceful religious coexistence in public remarks.

According to NGO International Christian Concern, a U.S.-based Christian advocacy organization, three members of the Action Prayer Ministry in Kumasi were wounded when armed assailants attacked their all-night prayer service on February 6.  According to police and congregation members, gunmen fired into the congregation at 2:00 am, slightly injuring three individuals.  Police responded and found church members restraining one of the attackers.  The perpetrators were later found to be members of armed gangs who sought to extort money from church members.

Muslim and Christian leaders continued informal dialogue between their respective governing bodies and the National Peace Council.  Faith leaders said they regularly communicated among themselves on religious matters and ways to address issues of concern or sensitivity.  Religious institutions played a key role in providing vulnerable citizens a social safety net during the COVID-19 pandemic.

There were Muslim-Christian and intra-Muslim tensions in the country, with the latter being found largely in northern areas.  Researchers described the main cause of intra-Muslim tensions as doctrinal differences, with different groups interpreting the Quran and hadith differently.  They stated the Ahlus-Sunnah wal Jamaa viewed the Tijaniyya as heretics and innovators, while the latter viewed the former as ignorant and resistant to change.  According to sources, chieftaincy, land tenure, and politics played an important role in exacerbating intra-Muslim tensions between the two major chieftaincies in the Dagbon region.

Embassy representatives discussed with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration and other government officials the importance of mutual understanding, religious tolerance, and respect for all religious groups.  Embassy officials also discussed these subjects with a broad range of religious groups and civil society organizations, including Christian groups such as the Christian Council and the Ghana Catholic Bishops Conference, as well as Muslim civil society organizations such as the Office of the National Chief Imam.  They also engaged with the National Peace Council and Regional Peace Councils, whose governing councils included prominent religious leaders.  In addition, the Ambassador underscored in meetings with key religious leaders that the United States supported an individual’s right to his or her faith as well as the right of individuals not to practice any religion.

In May, the Ambassador encouraged religious freedom and interfaith harmony in a social media post marking Eid al-Fitr.  Embassy officers discussed religious freedom and tolerance with religious leaders and engaged them on the need to maintain broadmindedness.  The embassy supported the Islamic Education Unit of the national education service by donating iftar food packages to Muslim families in selected impoverished communities of Accra, while engaging Muslim organizations and educators on the need to advance religious freedom and prevent violent extremism related to religion.

In July, the Ambassador made an Eid al-Adha food donation to the National Chief Imam.  During their meeting, the Ambassador underscored the importance of avoiding religious extremism.

The embassy continued its support for the efforts of the West Africa Centre for Counter Extremism, a local organization that brings together traditional leaders, interfaith religious leaders, political party leaders, and local government authorities to emphasize messages of peace, tolerance, and nonviolence to vulnerable youth.  During the year, the center organized community workshops and forums aimed at improving inter- and intrareligious (Muslim) relations in the Upper East, Upper West, and Northern Regions, as well as capacity building workshops in Accra focusing on preventing violent extremism and promoting leadership, security, stability, and good governance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 10.6 million (midyear 2021).  According to research polls, 81 to 90 percent of the population identifies as Greek Orthodox, 4 to 15 percent atheist, and 2 percent Muslim.

Approximately 140,000 Muslims live in Thrace, according to government sources using 2011 data; they are largely descendants of the officially recognized Muslim minority according to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.  According to a Pew Research Center study released in November 2017, an additional 520,000 Muslims – mostly asylum seekers, refugees, and other migrants from Southeastern Europe, South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa – reside throughout the country, many clustered in communities by their countries of origin or in reception facilities.  Government sources estimate half reside in Athens.

Members of other religious communities that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Old Calendarist Orthodox, Catholics (mostly Roman Catholics and smaller numbers of Eastern Rite Catholics), Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, members of polytheistic Hellenic religions, Scientologists, Baha’is, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Sikhs, Seventh-day Adventists, Buddhists, and members of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON).  Independent and media sources estimate Ethiopian Orthodox number 2,500 and Assyrians less than 1,000.  According to the Armenian Orthodox Archbishop, interviewed in 2018, approximately 100,000 Armenian Orthodox live in the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution recognizes Greek Orthodoxy as the “prevailing religion.”  It states freedom of religious conscience is inviolable and provides for freedom of worship under the protection of the law, with some restrictions.  The constitution prohibits “proselytizing,” defined by law as “any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion with the aim of undermining those beliefs through inducement, fraudulent means, or taking advantage of the other person’s inexperience, trust, need, low intellect, or naivete.”  The prohibition of proselytism is rarely enforced, entailing brief questioning or detentions, with no new cases reported since 2020.  The constitution prohibits worship that “disturbs public order or offends moral principles.”  It allows prosecutors to seize publications that “offend Christianity” or other “known religions,” which are defined as groups with at least one valid permit to operate a place of prayer or worship.  There is no publicly available list of “known religions,” but the Ministry for Education and Religious Affairs keeps a registry.

The law provides penalties of up to two years in prison for individuals who maliciously attempt to prevent or who intentionally disrupt a religious gathering for worship or a religious service, and for individuals engaging in “insulting action” inside a church or place of worship.  A 2019 amendment to the penal code abolishes articles criminalizing malicious blasphemy and religious insults.  The constitution enumerates the goals of public education, including “the development of religious conscience among citizens.”  Greek Orthodox priests and government-appointed muftis and imams in Thrace receive their salaries from the government.

The constitution states that ministers of all known religions are subject to the same state supervision and obligations to the state as clergy of the Greek Orthodox Church.  It states individuals are not exempt from their obligations to the state or from compliance with the law because of their religious convictions.

The Greek Orthodox Church, Jewish community, and Muslim minority of Thrace have long-held status as official, religious, public-law, legal entities.  The Catholic Church, Anglican Church, two evangelical Christian groups, and the Ethiopian, Coptic, Armenian Apostolic, and Assyrian Orthodox Churches acquired the status of religious legal entities under a 2014 law.  The same law also allows groups seeking recognition to become “religious legal entities” under civil law.

The recognition process requires filing a request with the civil courts, providing documents proving the group has “open rituals and no secret doctrines,” supplying a list of 300 signatory members who do not adhere to other religious groups, demonstrating there is a leader who is legally in the country and is otherwise qualified, and showing their practices do not pose a threat to public order.  Once a civil court recognizes a group, it sends a notification to the Secretariat General for Religions.  Under the law, all religious officials of known religions and official religious legal entities, including the Greek Orthodox Church, the muftiates of Thrace, and the Jewish communities, must register in the electronic database maintained by the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs.

The law also provides a second method for groups to obtain government recognition:  any religious group that has obtained at least one valid permit to operate a place of prayer or worship is considered a “known religion” and acquires legal protection, including a tax exemption for property used for religious purposes.  The terms houses or places of prayer or worship are used interchangeably; it is at the discretion of a religious group to determine its term of preference.  Membership requirements for house of prayer permits differ from the requirements for religious legal entities.  Local urban planning departments in charge of monitoring and enforcing public health and safety regulations certify that facilities designated to operate as places of worship fulfill the necessary standards.  Once a house of worship receives the required approvals, the religious group must submit a description of its basic principles and rituals and a biography of the religious minister or leader to the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs for final approval.  The application for a house of prayer or worship permit requires at least five signatory group members.  The leaders of a religious group applying for a house of prayer permit must be Greek citizens, EU nationals, or legal residents of the country and must possess other professional qualifications, including relevant education and experience.  A separate permit is required for each physical location.

A religious group qualifying as a religious legal entity may transfer property and administer houses of prayer or worship, private schools, charitable institutions, and other nonprofit entities.  Some religious groups have opted to retain their status as civil society nonprofit associations acquired through court recognition prior to the 2014 law.  Under this status, religious groups may operate houses of prayer and benefit from real estate property tax exemptions, but they may face administrative and fiscal difficulties in transferring property and in operating private schools, charitable institutions, and other nonprofit entities.

All recognized religious groups are subject to taxation on property used for nonreligious purposes.  Property used solely for religious purposes is exempt from taxation, as well as from municipal fees.

The law allows religious communities without status as legal entities to appear before administrative and civil courts as plaintiffs or defendants.

The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne accords the recognized Muslim minority of Thrace the right to administer and maintain mosques and social and charitable organizations.  A 1991 law authorizes the government, in consultation with a committee of Muslim leaders, to appoint three muftis in Thrace to 10-year terms of office, which may be extended.  The law also allows a regional official to appoint temporary acting muftis until this committee convenes.  The law mandates that official muftis in Thrace must request notarized consent from all parties wishing to adjudicate a family matter (marriage, divorce, child custody, alimony, or inheritance) based on sharia, or Islamic law.  Decisions issued by the muftis are subject to ratification by first instance courts.  Absent notarized consent from all parties, family matters fall under the jurisdiction of civil courts.  The law also provides for the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs to assume all operating expenses for the muftiates in Thrace, under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance Directorate General for Fiscal Monitoring.

The law establishes an individual’s right to choose his or her burial or cremation location and mandates that death certificates detail this information.  In the presence of a notary, individuals may designate the location and method of funeral service under conditions that adhere to public order, hygiene, or moral ethics, as well as designate a person responsible for carrying out funeral preferences.

Home schooling of children is generally not permitted.  The law requires all children to attend 11 years of compulsory education in state or private schools, including two years of preschool education (ages four to six), in accordance with the official school curriculum.  Religious instruction, mainly Greek Orthodox teaching, is included in the curricula for primary and secondary schools.  Primary schools cover grades one to six, while secondary schools include three years of middle school and three years of high school.  Non-Orthodox students may be exempted from religious instruction with a parent’s or guardian’s submission of a document citing religious consciousness grounds, according to regulations issued by decree during the year.  Exempted students may attend classes with different subject matter during that time.  Under legislation passed in 2020, secondary schools no longer list their students’ religion and nationality on transcripts.

The law provides for optional Islamic religious instruction in public schools in Thrace for the recognized Muslim minority and optional Catholic religious instruction in public schools on the islands of Tinos and Syros.  The law also includes provisions to make it easier for schools to hire and retain religious instructors for those optional courses.

By law, any educational facility with fewer than nine students must temporarily suspend operations, with students referred to neighboring schools.

The law allows Muslim students in primary and secondary schools throughout the country to be absent for two days each for Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha.

According to the law, parents may send their children to private religious schools.  Private Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish schools operate in the country.  As per the Lausanne Treaty, the government operates bilingual secular schools in Thrace.  Bilingual schools operate in Greek and Turkish, and their number may vary according to the number of registered students, with a minimum of nine per school.  There are two Islamic religious schools in Thrace for grades seven to 12.  In addition, Muslim students in Thrace wishing to study the Quran may attend after-hours religious classes in mosques with teachers paid by the Turkish Consulate in Komotini.  Bilingual schools in Thrace, in addition to other official holidays, also observe Islamic holidays.

The law establishes an annual 0.5 percent quota for admission of students from the recognized Muslim minority in Thrace to universities, technical institutes, and civil service positions.  Parliament approved legislation on January 15 designed to modernize the public-sector hiring system.  The law requires that 0.5 percent of job openings with an unspecified contract length be allocated to members of the Muslim minority in Thrace.  Similarly, 2 percent of students entering the national fire brigade school and academy are required to be from the Muslim minority in Thrace.

The law provides for alternative forms of mandatory service for religious conscientious objectors in lieu of the 12-month mandatory minimum military service for men.  Conscientious objectors must serve 15 months of alternative service in state hospitals or municipal and public services.  The law, among other provisions, requires the state to cover expenses for the transportation of conscientious objectors; provides an additional five-day parental leave per child for conscientious objectors who are fathers; protects the return of conscientious objectors to their previous employment after civilian service; and defines 33 as the age after which a conscientious objector may buy off the greatest part of civilian service.

According to what is commonly referred to as the “antiracist” law, individuals or legal entities convicted of incitement to violence, discrimination, or hatred based on religion, among other factors, may be sentenced to prison terms of between three months and three years and fined 5,000 to 20,000 euros ($5,700-$22,700).  Violators convicted of other crimes motivated by religion may be sentenced to an additional six months to three years, with fines doubled.  The law criminalizes approval, trivialization, or malicious denial of the Holocaust and “crimes of Nazism” if that behavior leads to incitement of violence or hatred or has a threatening or abusive nature toward groups of individuals.  A law, passed by parliament in June, prohibits individuals convicted of several specific felony crimes – including but not explicitly referencing those committed by imprisoned leaders from the Golden Dawn Party – from holding important party positions, such as president, secretary general, legal representative, or member of the administrative committee of a party or a coalition of parties during their sentence.  The law prevents any parties led by convicted felons from purchasing advertisements on radio and television during an election campaign.

The law requires all civil servants, including cabinet and parliament members, to take an oath before entering office; individuals are free to take a religious or secular oath in accordance with their beliefs.  Parliament approved legislation on June 5 banning religious leaders of known religions, in addition to judges and other public officials, from running for mayor or city counselor.  The same law also bans the use of religious symbols as emblems of candidate mayors and city counselors.  Through a separate provision in the same law, elected members of city and district councils are required to take a religious oath, in accordance with their faith, in the presence of religious leaders who are officially registered with the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs.  A civil declaration remains an option for those who do not wish to take a religious oath.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On July 1, in Athens, national police arrested and jailed Christos Pappas, the fugitive former deputy leader of the Golden Dawn Party, which a court ruled a criminal organization and found responsible for orchestrated attacks against perceived outsiders, including Muslims and Jews, in 2020.  Pappas had been a fugitive since October 2020, when he was sentenced to 13 years in prison in a landmark trial that resulted in lengthy sentences for more than 50 Golden Dawn-associated defendants.  He was convicted of running a criminal organization, murder, assault, and possession of illegal weapons.

On October 7, Domokos Prison’s judicial council banned Ilias Kasidiaris, a former leader of Golden Dawn and former member of parliament, from making telephone calls from prison to outsiders.  The council ruled that Kasidiaris used the prison’s telephone to record speeches designed to incite his supporters to hatred.  The council decided Kasidiaris could maintain telephone communication only with individuals formally permitted to visit him in prison, including relatives and lawyers.

On February 19, an appeals court in Thessaloniki reduced the sentence of a medical doctor who in 2014 hung a sign in his office, stating “Jews not wanted” in German.  The court had initially sentenced him to a 14-month suspended term but reduced it to nine months based on his behavior afterward.

On October 18, a judicial council decided that Giorgos Patelis, a leading member of Golden Dawn, should be released, pending appeal, after serving just one year of his 10-year sentence because his son was facing mental health problems.  Patelis, who was the leader of Golden Dawn’s chapter in the Piraeus suburb of Nikaia, was convicted of taking part in a criminal organization and complicity in the killing of antifascist rapper Pavlos Fyssas in 2013.  Patelis was sentenced in October 2020.  Prosecutors and human rights groups condemned the decision.  On November 3, a Supreme Court vice prosecutor revoked the decision, and as of year’s end, Patelis remained in prison.

During the year, a civil court approved the registration of an Old Calendarist Christian group as a religious legal entity under the name “Holy Diocese of Talantio and Lokrida.”

On April 17, parliament approved legislation extending the term of all managing boards of Jewish communities until June 30.  Many terms had expired or were due to expire during the COVID-19 pandemic winter and spring lockdown periods.  Jewish community leaders said they appreciated the legislation because it helped the boards continue to operate and conduct transactions.

Groups lacking religious-entity status and without a house of prayer permit that had not applied for a house of worship permit, including Scientologists and ISKCON, continued to function as registered, nonprofit, civil law organizations.  The government did not legally recognize weddings conducted by members of these groups, who, if they wished to be officially recognized as couples, could pursue a civil wedding or civil partnership union.

On May 7, media reported on a local court that ruled, for the first time, that atheism should be listed among the vulnerability criteria when asylum seekers seek international protection.  The court ruling came in the case of a Pakistani man who faced a death sentence in his homeland due to his atheism.

Five prayer sessions marking Eid al-Fitr took place on May 13 in Athens at the newly opened, first government-funded mosque in Europe.  Commemoration of the event took place outside due to social distancing requirements.  The imam, Mohammed Sissi Zaki, led the sessions.  Secretary General for Religious Affairs George Kalantzis attended a session, as did representatives of al-Azhar University in Egypt.  Because of the COVID-29 pandemic, the government said it could not yet officially inaugurate the mosque; however, the mosque held regular prayer sessions in accordance with social distancing and other measures for the countering of the pandemic, similar to other religious sites.  Parliament approved legislation on February 17 that increased the number of members of the Athens Mosque Managing Committee from seven to nine, adding two representatives from the Muslim communities in Athens.

Turkish-speaking members of the Muslim minority in Thrace continued to object to the government’s practice of appointing muftis, pressing instead for direct election of muftis by Muslims in Thrace.  The government continued to state that the appointments were appropriate because the constitution does not permit the election of judges and that the muftis retain judicial powers on family and inheritance matters as long as all parties sign a notarized consent stating they wish to follow sharia law instead of the civil courts.  During the year, government-appointed acting muftis continued to lead all three muftiates in Thrace.  Muslim minority members objected to the muftis’ appointment, stating that the limited and optional judicial powers of muftis were used by the government as an excuse for ignoring their call for direct election.

In parallel with the three official acting muftis, two unofficial muftis also continued to operate in Thrace, providing religious services to members of the Muslim minority; however, the government did not recognize services conducted by the unofficial muftis.  In letters to international organizations, unofficial muftis said they had faced charges for the unauthorized assumption of an official position on several occasions throughout the last decade.  While several such cases never reached the courts and others remained pending and were postponed further due to COVID-19, unofficial muftis reported a climate of longstanding harassment and persecution by the Greek authorities.  Government officials stated that even in the few cases in which unofficial muftis were convicted in court, they were only handed suspended prison sentences, with no prison time.

On February 2, according to media, the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs rejected a petition filed in 2019 by the Cultural Association of Muslims of Macedonia and Thrace to establish a licensed Muslim house of prayer in Thessaloniki.  The ministry cited unmet technical requirements as the reason for the denial.  Applicants stated authorities did not allow them to use Ottoman-era mosques in Thessaloniki as alternative prayer sites.

Another group, the Educational, Cultural, Philanthropic and Philathletic Association of Greek Muslims in the Prefecture of Imathia, appealed to the Council of State regarding the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs’ rejection of the group’s petition to establish an authorized Muslim house of prayer.  Ministerial services rejected the association’s petition, contending that the applicants had requested the licensing of a space far exceeding what would be used for prayer and worship.  The ministry responded that it had no authority to license facilities for uses other than prayer and worship.  The hearing of the appeal at the Council of State took place on April 13, but no ruling was issued by year’s end.

On March 23, the same authorities rejected a petition to establish an authorized Muslim house of prayer filed by a Muslim group in Athens on the grounds that it did not provide certified copies of the passports of the applicants, including the individual who would perform the religious services.  The group also failed to submit documentation on the safety of the building, including fire safety and sound insulation.

Government authorities revoked a total of seven house-of-prayer permits; two, involving a Buddhist center and an evangelical Christian house of prayer in Rethymno, Crete, were revoked on June 29 and July 19 respectively, at the request of the groups operating the facilities.  According to government authorities, in the other cases, they revoked the permit because the religious groups in charge of the houses of prayer (all Pentecostal Christian) did not respond to government communications, had insufficient space for worship, or lacked a religious leader.

During the year, the government approved seven house-of-prayer permits, four of which were submitted by Muslim religious groups.  On February 17 and on July 5, Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs authorities granted house-of-prayer permits to two separate Sunni Muslim religious groups, in central Athens and the district of Marousi, respectively.  On March 19, a religious group of Bektashi (Sufi) Muslims in Evros, Thrace, was granted its first house-of-prayer permit.  A Muslim religious group based in the district of Peristeri, western Athens, was authorized on April 16 to operate a house of prayer.  The remaining permits were granted to a group of evangelical Christians in Glyfada, Athens, on February 10, a group of Pentecostals in Komotini on March 5, and to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church of Athens on March 17.  On March 23, the government also approved plans for the construction of a new church for evangelical Christians in Porotsani.

On June 16, authorities certified the lawful operation of an Old Calendarist Christian church operating in the district of Nea Smyrni in southern Athens.  The church was constructed before 1955, at a time when building permits were not required.  The certification allowed the church to overcome bureaucratic obstacles, such as not having a building permit, which for years had prevented it from filing petitions for building restoration, repairs, or expansion.  Authorities issued another 25 similar certifications involving 13 synagogues throughout the country and 12 Catholic churches.

Turkish-speaking members of the Muslim minority in Thrace continued to object to the government’s appointment of members entrusted to oversee endowments, real estate, and charitable funds of the Islamic Community Trust (waqf), an Islamic endowment, stating the Muslim minority in Thrace should elect the members in accordance with the Lausanne and other treaties.

Muslim leaders continued to state that a lack of Islamic cemeteries outside Thrace obliged Muslims to transport their dead to Thrace for Islamic burials.  Leaders cited cases in which local government bodies refused to establish burial sites designated for Muslims only.  Government officials said that by law, local authorities administered cemeteries and that cemeteries could not be established or privately managed by faith-based groups, except for some Islamic cemeteries in Thrace that dated back to the Ottoman era.  Muslim leaders outside Thrace also continued to state that municipal cemetery regulations requiring the exhumation of bodies after three years due to a shortage of space contravened Islamic law.  At least three sites – on Lesvos Island, in Schisto (in the Athens metropolitan area), and near the land border with Turkey, in Evros – served unofficially as burial grounds for Muslim migrants and asylum seekers.

On October 26, the Council of State ruled that a ministerial decree issued in 2017 allowing the ritual killing of animals during Muslim and Jewish ceremonies without anesthesia was unlawful and contrary to the constitution and European and domestic legislation.  According to the ruling, which came in response to an appeal filed by the Panhellenic Animal Welfare and Environmental Federation, the issuing authority, the Ministry of Development and Foods, “did not try to strike a balance between its obligation to protect the animals… and the religious freedom of practicing Muslims and Jews living in Greece.”  The council annulled the decree on grounds that it violated laws regarding the welfare of animals and called on the Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food “to regulate slaughtering in a way that safeguards the protection of animals from hardship but safeguards religious freedoms for practicing Muslims and Jews living in Greece.”  The government did not issue a new decree by year’s end.  Jewish and Muslim community leaders reported that once the government issued a new decree, they would decide on a legal strategy to challenge it.  According to Abdulhalim Dede, founder of the Greek branch of the European Halal Certification Center and member of the World Halal Council, the decision to outlaw ritual slaughter eroded religious freedom, hurt local halal-related businesses, and increased the risk of unauthorized private, in-house animal slaughtering.

In accordance with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the government reported that it operated a total of 115 bilingual secular primary schools in 2020-21 in Thrace, compared with 123 in 2019-20.  Some minority representatives reported lower numbers of 115 (for the period 2019-20) and 103 (for the period 2020-21).  Although the government operation of bilingual secondary schools, grades seven to 12, is not required under the treaty, the government operated two.  Turkish-speaking representatives of the Muslim minority continued to state that the two bilingual middle schools – grades seven to nine – were insufficient to meet their needs and that the government continued to repeatedly ignore their formally submitted request to privately establish an additional minority secondary school and a private bilingual preschool, the latter covering children ages four to six.  The same representatives said the number of primary minority schools – grades one to six – continued to decrease, which the government attributed to the decreasing number of students, particularly in rural areas.  As per government statistics, there were 4,103 Muslim students attending primary education schools, 1,531 attending secondary-level minority schools, and 192 students enrolled in the two Islamic religious schools.  Government officials also noted that in 2017, both minority secondary schools, in Xanthi and in Komotini (both in the region of East Macedonia and Thrace), expanded with additional classrooms.

The government continued to fund a Chair of Jewish Studies at the Aristotle University in Thessaloniki and Holocaust education training for teachers, but government-funded educational trips for students, including to the Auschwitz concentration camp, remained suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs continued to promote Holocaust education in schools, based on IHRA recommendations, as well as in cooperation with other countries, such as the United States, Israel, and North Macedonia.  The ministry, in cooperation with the Olga Lengyel Institute and the Jewish Museum of Greece, continued providing scholarships to 10 schools annually for implementing Holocaust-related educational projects.  Through these scholarships, beneficiary schools covered material needs, including for purchasing laptop computers and video recording equipment.

On April 25, in the context of Greece’s chairmanship of IHRA, the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, in cooperation with the United States Holocaust Museum and Memorial and Yad Vashem, coorganized a webinar for 100 teachers from Greece, the United States, and Israel on the subject of IHRA recommendations for teaching and learning about the Holocaust.  The Secretariat General for Religious Affairs, under the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, distributed a free version in Greek of the book Five Chimneys from the Olga Lengyel Institute to schoolteachers attending Holocaust-related educational seminars.

On various occasions, on social and other media, some individuals objected to what they said was the government’s allowing or tolerating some religious gatherings, including a processional on October 18 by Pakistani Muslim immigrants in Athens to celebrate the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, while banning processionals by Orthodox Christians, citing COVID-19 restrictions.  Individuals made similar comments online on August 19, when authorities permitted Shia Muslims to proceed with an Ashura processional in the port city of Piraeus.

Some religious groups and human rights organizations continued to advocate for an equal length of required mandatory alternative service for conscientious objectors and required military service, stating any discrepancy was discriminatory.  In June 2020, the Council of State heard an appeal filed by five conscientious objectors challenging a decree by the Ministry of Defense establishing alternative service requirements longer than the military service requirement.  A decision remained pending at year’s end.  During the year, the government increased from nine to 12 months the basic military service requirement without altering the duration of the alternative service, which remained at 15 months.

Just after his August 31 appointment as Minister of Health, Thanos Plevris apologized for antisemitic comments he made in 2009.  This came after several groups, including KIS, called on him to apologize for pro-Nazi views expressed in the past and to condemn Holocaust deniers.  Plevris said he made the comments in his capacity as defense counsel for his father, Konstantinos Plevris, a Holocaust denier and leader of neo-Nazism in the country but stated he did not personally believe them.  In his apology, Plevris said, “My respect for the victims of the Holocaust of the Jews is absolute.  I am sure that my actions as health minister will alleviate even the slightest doubt about my beliefs, and my critics will realize that I harbor no antisemitic feelings.”

In early January, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece Ieronymos said during an interview on OPEN TV that Islam was not a religion, but a political movement.  Later in the same month, Ieronymos clarified that he was referring to the “perversion of the Muslim religion itself by extreme fundamentalists, who sow terror and death throughout the Universe,” and not to Islam overall.

According to Jewish leaders, the government continued to help the Jewish community of Thessaloniki in its efforts to recover archives found by Soviet troops in a castle in Lower Silesia, formerly part of Germany, following Germany’s defeat at the end of World War II.  On several occasions throughout the year, Alternate Foreign Minister Varvitsiotis publicly urged the return of these archives, now held in Moscow.  In his December 8 meeting with Prime Minister Mitsotakis, President Putin announced that Russia would initiate the process for returning these archives to KIS.

The government announced in a September 10 decree that it would distribute a total of 4.5 million euros ($5.1 million) to the Orthodox Church of Greece; KIS; waqf administrations overseeing licensed mosques in Thrace, Rhodes, and Kos; and to religious groups with the status of a known religion or religious legal entity.  The funds would be distributed in lump sums, offered as nontaxable assistance for addressing the pandemic’s negative impact, including reduced income and monetary contributions offered by the faithful to religious leaders and places of worship.  The funds, exceeding 1,000 euros ($1,100) in all cases, would be allocated in proportion to the number of places of worship operated by each group, with a minimum contribution of 1,000 euros per religious group.

The government continued to provide direct support to the Greek Orthodox Church, including funding clergy salaries, estimated at 200 million euros ($226.76 million) annually, the religious and vocational training of clergy, and religious instruction in schools.  The government provided the support in accordance with a series of legal agreements with past governments and as compensation for religious property expropriated by the state, according to Greek Orthodox and government officials.  The government also provided direct support to the three muftiates in Thrace, including salaries for the three official muftis and for teachers contracted to teach an optional class on Islam in local public schools.  The government also paid the salary of the imam of the new Athens public mosque and the salaries of Catholic teachers at the state schools of Tinos and Syros islands.

Government officials publicly denounced the vandalism of Jewish sites, including a mural in Thessaloniki commemorating the Holocaust vandalized in March.  In a statement issued on March 18, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the damage while expressing its “abhorrence of any actions that insult the memory of the victims of Nazi barbarity” and underscoring “the importance of rejecting racism, hatred and fanaticism, and the need to defend moral values.”

On May 24, parliament approved legislation allowing for an exchange of land between the Railway Organization and the Municipality of Thessaloniki to pave the way for the construction of a Holocaust Memorial Museum.  The board of the city of Thessaloniki approved the exchange on June 4.

On June 23, through a joint initiative by KIS and the Ministries of Defense and Culture, a commemorative plaque was placed at “Block 15” of the Haidari concentration camp in western Attica, where Jews, in addition to prisoners of war and communists, were incarcerated and tortured during the Nazi occupation of Greece.  The plaque reads, “Thousands of Greek Jews from Athens, Arta, Thessaloniki, Corfu, Kos, Leros, Patras, Preveza, and Rhodes were imprisoned and tortured here until their deportation to Auschwitz and the other Nazi extermination camps in 1944.  Some of them took their dying breath here.”

On October 14, Minister of Infrastructure and Transport Costas Karamanlis unveiled a reconstructed monument to the Jews whom the Nazis sent to slave labor on the railway network of the Lianokladi-Karya area in the central region of the country.  The new monument, rebuilt by the Hellenic Railways Organization in cooperation with KIS, was located at a prominent place at the Lianokladi station dock.  The original monument – erected in 1988 – was probably destroyed during the renovation of the Lianokladi railway station, according to KIS.  In his remarks, Karamanlis stated, “It is our duty to honor the memory of our Jewish compatriots.  And of course, in our daily lives, it is our duty not to allow any national, religious, racial or other identity to divide us.  Everyone proudly bears their identity, but we always respect each other.  And all together, we create for the present and the future of our country.”

On January 27, Minister for Education and Religious Affairs Niki Kerameus issued a statement to mark Holocaust Remembrance Day.  Referring to the importance of remembering the Holocaust, including through education, she said, “Armed with our knowledge, we ensure the historical memory and the thorough study and teaching of these events, so that no crack is ever left open again, which will [would] allow the revival of fascism, Nazism, antisemitism, intolerance.”

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted a tweet on the Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Day (Yom Hashoah): “We join everyone marking Yom HaShoah to remember the millions of lives lost in the Holocaust.  We honor the victims by keeping the memory of the Holocaust alive and by continuing to learn and educate younger generations so that humanity never again experiences such atrocities,”

Greece assumed the IHRA chairmanship on April 1.  In a November interview with Greek diaspora newspaper The National Herald, IHRA Chair Ambassador Chris Lazaris said the central theme of the country’s chairmanship was “teaching and learning about the Holocaust:  education for a world without genocide ever again,” supplemented by the theme of “Combating Holocaust Denial and Distortion on the Internet.”

According to statistics issued by the Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) on acts of discrimination and violence in 2020, the most recent available, 74 of the 107 incidents recorded targeted migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers on the grounds of ethnicity, religion, or skin color, compared with 51 cases of the 100 incidents recorded in 2019.  Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as solely or primarily based on religious identity.

In the same report, RVRN reported that police received 31 reports of accusations of violence sparked by religion, compared with 36 in 2019.

In September, the Brussels-Based NGO Action and Protection League issued the results of its European antisemitism survey based on data from December 2019-January 2020.  According to the survey, 25 percent of 1,000 respondents ages 18-25 in Greece said they had negative feeling toward Jews.  Thirty-six percent said they would be “totally uncomfortable” or “uncomfortable” with having Jewish neighbors.  The survey cited stereotypical statements regarding Jews and asked respondents the degree to which they agreed or disagreed.  The proportion who responded “strongly agree” or “tend to agree” with the following statements were:  “the interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population” (45 percent); “there is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world” (58 percent); “Jews have too much influence in this country” (40 percent); “Jews will never be able to fully integrate into this society” (36 percent); “Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals” (44 percent); “many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later” (33 percent); “Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them” (37 percent); “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes” (46 percent).

In October, the Piraeus First Instance Court sentenced a man to five years in prison for attacking a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Aspropyrgos, Attica.  The court ruled that the crime was motivated by hate.  The man was convicted of issuing threats and insults and committing bodily harm.

On January 15, police in the northern city of Drama arrested the perpetrator of an act of vandalism carried out in December 2020 at a local Jewish monument.

At least three instances of antisemitic graffiti and vandalism were widely reported.  In addition to damage to a portion of a 115-foot mural at the Thessaloniki New Train Station honoring Holocaust victims a few days after the mural was created, vandals on August 5 opened a grave and destroyed its headstone in the Jewish cemetery of Ioannina in Epirus.  KIS issued a statement condemning this “shameful act.”  In a March 18 statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its “abhorrence of any actions that insult the memory of the victims of Nazi barbarity.”  “We once again underscore the importance of rejecting racism, hatred and fanaticism, and the need to defend our moral values,” the statement concluded.  According to media reports, local artists and social activists worked together to restore the mural.  On September 10, a different grave was vandalized at the same cemetery.  Similar incidents at the same cemetery occurred in previous years.

On January 10, unidentified vandals sprayed red paint on the facade of the Orthodox Christian cathedral in Heraklion, Crete, according to media reports.  Police launched investigations in all cases but made no arrests.

On April 1, KIS addressed a letter to the mayor of Xanthi, writing that unknown individuals had removed a commemorative plaque, placed in 2001 outside a tobacco warehouse to mark the location where local Jews began their transfer to concentration camps in World War II.  KIS underscored the importance of collective memory in a city that lost 99 percent of its Jewish population.

KIS continued to express concern regarding political cartoons and images in which political controversies were illustrated with Jewish sacred symbols or comparisons to the Holocaust.  On January 18, KIS issued a statement protesting a sketch that showed the entrance to the Auschwitz concentration camp in a political cartoon opposing an education bill on universities.  KIS called the cartoon, which appeared in the newspaper Efimerida ton Syntakton on January 16, “a hideous and vulgar instrumentalization of the Holocaust for political purposes.”

On March 9, KIS issued a statement denouncing columnist Elena Akrita for comparing life in an Auschwitz concentration camp during World War II to life in contemporary Greece, drawing parallels between attacks against protesters opposed to pandemic restrictions and the Holocaust.  KIS, in a statement, noted that “Greek Jews … will never stop denouncing any attempt to denigrate and instrumentalize the Holocaust, which leads to the oblivion and distortion of history.”

According to a report published on January 13 by the Ministry of Education and Religion, there were 404 cases of vandalism/theft/desecrations against religious sites in the country in 2020, with most (374) targeting the Orthodox Church, seven the Catholic Church, four the True Orthodox Christians (Old Calendarists), 10 categorized as antisemitic, and nine targeting Islamic sites.  This number represented a decrease from 524 incidents reported in 2019.

The Ambassador and embassy and consulate general representatives discussed the country’s chairmanship of the IHRA and religious freedom issues with Deputy Prime Minister Pikrammenos, as well as with officials and representatives of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias and Deputy Minister Andreas Katsaniotis, Civil Governor for Mount Athos Athanasios Martinos, and Secretary General for Religious Affairs George Kalantzis.  The U.S. officials discussed the ability of minority religious communities to exercise their rights to religious freedom, government initiatives affecting the Muslim minority in Thrace and Muslim immigrants, the operation of the first public mosque in Athens, government action regarding the planned Holocaust Memorial Museum and Educational Center of Greece on Human Rights in Thessaloniki, initiatives promoting interreligious dialogue, and possible joint action, including in the context of the country’s IHRA chairmanship.  Embassy officials also worked with the Prime Minister’s Office and with the Minister of Culture on a project involving the retrieval of personal items belonging to Jewish refugees from the 1946 Athina shipwreck off Astypalea Island that were to be displayed in the museum’s permanent exhibition.

In outreach and meetings with government officials, U.S. government officials raised concerns regarding antisemitic and anti-Muslim acts and rhetoric in the country.  U.S. officials also denounced vandalism of religious sites, including the desecration of graves in the Jewish cemetery of Ioannina.

On February 3, the Ambassador discussed with Deputy Prime Minister Pikrammenos developments regarding construction of the Holocaust Museum in Thessaloniki.

In outreach and meetings with leaders of religious groups, including the Greek Orthodox Church, U.S. government officials expressed concerns regarding antisemitic and anti-Muslim acts and rhetoric in the country.

Senior embassy officials and the Consul General in Thessaloniki met with religious leaders, including metropolitans from the Greek Orthodox Church, official muftis in Thrace, representatives from a religious group of Bektashi (Sufi) Muslims in Evros, and members of the Catholic, Baha’i, and Jehovah’s Witnesses communities to promote interfaith dialogue, religious tolerance, and respect for diversity.  The embassy monitored the ability of minority religious groups to freely practice their religion and the extent of societal discrimination, including physical violence and verbal harassment against both members of indigenous minority religious groups and members of newly arrived minority religious groups.

Three individuals working on religious issues in the country took part in digital U.S. government exchange programs on interfaith dialogue and religious freedom and on countering Holocaust distortion and denial.

The embassy and consulate promoted religious tolerance and the right of religious freedom on social media, emphasizing regularly that religious freedom is a U.S. government priority.  In November, following his meeting with a metropolitan, the Ambassador tweeted the U.S. government’s commitment to protecting religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 113,000 (midyear 2021).  According to the latest government estimate (2011 estimate), 49.2 percent of the population identifies as Protestant (Pentecostal 17.2 percent; Seventh-day Adventist 13.2 percent; Anglican 8.5 percent; Baptist 3.2 percent; Church of God 2.4 percent; evangelical Protestant 1.9 percent; Methodist 1.6 percent; and other 1.2 percent).  Approximately 36 percent identifies as Roman Catholic; 1.2 percent as Jehovah’s Witnesses; 1.2 percent as Rastafarian; 5.5 percent as other; 5.7 percent as having no religious affiliation; and 1.3 percent as unspecified.  Smaller groups include Brethren, Baha’is, Hindus, Moravians, Muslims, Mennonites, Church of Jesus Christ, and the Salvation Army.  There is a small Jewish community.  All these groups have fewer than 1,000 members.

Legal Framework

The constitution protects freedom of conscience, including freedom of thought and religion.  It guarantees the right to change one’s religion and to manifest and propagate it.  The constitution prohibits forced participation in any religious ceremony or instruction.

The criminal code prohibits the publication and sale of materials containing language deemed blasphemous; however, the government does not enforce the law.

The Office of Religious Affairs, also known as the Religious Affairs Unit, functions within the Ministry of Education, Human Resources Development, Religious Affairs, and Information.

To qualify for customs and tax exemptions, a religious group must obtain recognition from the government as a nongovernmental organization (NGO).  The group must also register with the Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office (CAIPO) and with the Inland Revenue Office in the Ministry of Finance, and it must provide a letter of request to the ministry.  The Attorney General grants final approval, and the ministry grants applications for tax exemptions; these are routinely approved.  To be recognized as an NGO, the group must submit details to CAIPO regarding the organization, including information about its directors, as well as a description of the group’s general activities and the location of these activities.  According to 2011 statistics, the most recent available, there are more than 18 religious groups registered in the country.

By law, the government allows religious head coverings of certain types, including the hijab and the Rastafarian head wrap, in photographs for national identity documents, provided the face is clearly visible.

The government, by law, subsidizes all public denominational schools managed by a headmistress/master and staffed by the associated faith-based organization, including those of Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Seventh-day Adventist, and Mennonite communities.  Students at such schools may attend religion classes and may use credits from those classes towards completion of the Caribbean Secondary Education Certificate.  Students from religious groups other than the one associated with a school may also attend these schools and are not obligated to attend religion classes.  There are no non-Christian denominational schools.

As part of the visa process, foreign missionaries must apply to the Ministry of Labor for a work permit costing 500 East Caribbean Dollars (ECD) ($190) along with an application fee of 100 ECD ($37); the permit must be renewed annually.  To be approved, foreign missionaries must demonstrate prior experience and a registered religious group must sponsor them.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to review its religious affairs program to determine appropriate resource allocation through year’s end.  As a result, it postponed projects such as church repairs, updating the government directory with a current list of religions and churches, and hiring a religious affairs coordinator until 2022.

The government inaugurated a faith-based skills training program in September, which will continue through 2022.  Community churches organized the program with financial assistance from the government, and it was available to anyone, regardless of religion, interested in acquiring lifelong occupational skills.

Government officials consulted and collaborated with religious groups during the pandemic on emergency protocols and implemented the recommendations the religious groups proposed.  These included the suspension of in-person services and arrangements for funerals to only be held at a cemetery with no more than 20 persons present.  Both sides agreed to the changes made to the joint protocol agreements between the religious community and government.  Religious communities said they understood the importance of COVID-19-related restrictions and looked forward to the day when in-person gatherings could be resumed safely.  The unreliability of technology and not being able to carry out more community outreach and evangelism were some of the major challenges religious leaders stated they faced in shifting to online activities.  Churches, however, were among the first institutions to restrict in-person gatherings during the COVID-19 outbreak in August.

On September 16, government officials met with members of the religious community, including the Islamic Foundation, to discuss the burial of individuals who died of COVID-19-related causes in accordance with religious rites.  The meeting followed a COVID-19 outbreak in mid-August and a rapid increase in COVID-19-related deaths.  Government officials held discussions with the religious community to ensure all religious rites were observed in accordance with laws stipulating the handling of remains of infectious individuals.  Representatives from the government, religious community, and funeral homes developed a joint statement that was released during a press briefing on September 20.  It reflected an agreement to bury or cremate remains within 72 hours of death, rather than 24 hours, which is stipulated by law.

The government held two national days of spiritual reflection and prayer on September 25 and 26 under the theme, “A Call to Return to God.”  Minister of Education, Human Resources Development, Religious Affairs, and Information Emmalin Pierre stated, “The national days of spiritual reflection and prayer should be a catalyst for continued prayer and worship, and not a one-time personal engagement between individuals and God.”

As in previous years, the government’s official declarations, speeches, and activities attended by the Governor General, Prime Minister, and other officials often included religious references.  Examples included Christian prayers, scripture readings, and exhortations from members of the religious community, such as the head of the Conference of Churches.  Denominational and ecumenical Christian worship services were part of official festivities on national holidays such as Independence and Thanksgiving Day.

As in previous years, on October 25, the Minister of Education, Human Resources Development, Religious Affairs, and Information, along with other cabinet ministers, gave remarks at a virtual ecumenical church service organized by the National Celebrations Committee in collaboration with the CCG to commemorate the country’s Thanksgiving Day, marking the anniversary of the 1983 U.S. military intervention.  The public service featured prayers, scripture readings, and sermons from various Christian denominations.

The CCG, an ecumenical Christian body that includes Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Baptist, and Presbyterian members, continued to serve as a forum to promote mutual understanding, unity, and tolerance among religious organizations despite restrictions on all gatherings, including religious services, during the COVID-19 pandemic that were in place from September through October.  These organizations continued to encourage discussions with different faith-based Christian and non-Christian organizations.  The CCG and the Alliance of Evangelical Churches met with religious organizations and government representatives to agree on COVID-19-related restrictions involving religious groups during the outbreak of COVID-19 cases in August.

In September, the Alliance of Evangelical Churches held a National Day of Prayer under the theme “Heal our Land” that was broadcast live on all social media platforms.

Embassy representatives engaged government officials, including the Minister of Education, Human Resources Development, Religious Affairs, and Information, virtually and in person, regarding some of the programs suspended as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and on the importance of religious freedom during restrictions stemming from the pandemic.

Embassy officials engaged religious groups by holding virtual meetings with representatives from the CCG, the Alliance of Evangelical Churches, the Muslim, Jewish, Rastafarian, Church of Jesus Christ, and Baha’i Faith communities.  During these discussions, the Principal Officer discussed the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and how religious communities were adapting to virtual engagements.  The Principal Officer also reinforced the U.S. government’s mandate to promote religious freedom and ensure all individuals may practice their religion in private and in public.

Through social media, the embassy recognized different religious holidays, such as Whit Monday (also known as Pentecost Monday), Corpus Christi, Ramadan, the Chinese Lunar New Year, Holi, and the country’s National Religious Freedom Day.  The embassy made frequent use of social media to promote an array of religious freedom issues, to include freedom of conscience, belief, and thought.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 17.4 million (midyear 2021).  According to a 2016 survey by ProDatos, approximately 45 percent of the population is Catholic and 42 percent Protestant.  Approximately 11 percent of the population professes no religious affiliation.  Groups together constituting approximately 2 percent of the population include Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, Jews, adherents of Mayan and Xinca spiritual practices, and followers of Afro-Indigenous Garifuna cosmovision.

Non-Catholic Christian groups include the Full Gospel Church, Assemblies of God, Central American Church, Prince of Peace Church, independent evangelical Protestant groups, Baptists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ), Episcopalians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Russian Orthodox, and Seventh-day Adventists.

Catholics and Protestants are present throughout the country, with adherents among all major ethnic groups.  According to leaders of Mayan spiritual organizations, as well as Catholic and Protestant clergy, many indigenous Catholics and some indigenous Protestants practice some form of syncretism with indigenous spiritual rituals, mainly in the eastern city of Livingston and in the southern region of the country.  In the Western Highlands, this syncretism is also prevalent, although there are Mayans whose belief systems are mainly based on Mayan spirituality.

According to Buddhist community representatives, there are between 8,000 and 11,000 Buddhists, composed principally of individuals from the Chinese immigrant community.  Muslim leaders state there are approximately 2,000 Muslims of mostly Palestinian origin, who reside primarily in Guatemala City.  According to local Ahmadi Muslims, there is a small Ahmadiyya Muslim community of approximately 70 members.  According to Jewish community leadership, approximately 1,000 Jews live in the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of expression and freedom of religion, stating, “Every person has the right to practice their religion or belief in public within the limits of public order and the respect due to the beliefs of other creeds.”  The constitution recognizes the distinct legal personality of the Catholic Church through a concordat with the Holy See.

The constitution does not require religious groups to register for the purpose of worship, but groups seeking to obtain tax-exempt status or enter into contracts must register.  The Catholic Church receives these benefits without the requirement to register.  To register, a religious group must file with the Ministry of Interior a copy of its bylaws, evidence that it is a newly established legal entity that intends to pursue religious objectives, and a list of its initial membership with at least 25 members.  The ministry may reject a registration application if it believes the group does not appear to be devoted to a religious objective, appears intent on undertaking illegal activities, or engages in activities that could threaten public order.  Most applications are approved after a lengthy process.  All religious groups must obtain the permission of the respective municipal authorities for construction and repair of properties and for holding public events, consistent with requirements for nonreligious endeavors.

The constitution protects the rights of indigenous groups to practice their traditions and forms of cultural expression, including spiritual practices.  The law permits Mayan spiritual groups to conduct ceremonies at Mayan historical sites on government-owned property free of charge, with written permission from the Ministry of Culture.

The criminal code penalizes with one-month to one-year sentences the interruption of religious celebrations, “offending” a religion, which the law leaves vague, and the desecration of burial sites or human remains; however, charges are seldom filed under these laws.

According to the constitution, no member of the clergy of any religion may serve as President, Vice President, government minister, tax superintendent or part of the Tax Authority Directory, judge, or magistrate.

The law guarantees at least one “religious space, according to [the prison’s] capacity,” in each prison.  Chaplain services are limited to Catholic chaplains and nondenominational (usually evangelical) Protestant chaplains.  Prisoners of minority religious groups do not have guaranteed access to spiritual counselors from their faith.

The constitution permits, but does not require, religious instruction in public schools.  There is no national framework for determining the nature or content of religious instruction.  In general, public schools have no religious component in the curriculum.  Private religious schools are permitted and are found in all areas of the country.  Religious instruction is allowed, but attendance is optional in private religious schools.

The government requires foreign missionaries to obtain tourist visas to enter the country; the visas are renewable every three months.  After renewing their tourist visas once, foreign missionaries may apply for temporary residence for up to two years; the residential permit is renewable.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On June 24, the San Benito, Peten Sentencing Court sentenced Domingo Choc’s three attackers, Edin Arnoldo Pop Caal, Romelia Caal Chub, and Candelaria Magaly Pop Caal, to 20 years in prison for killing Choc in 2020, but according to a family associate, his family was disappointed by the court’s decision not to recognize the killing as motivated by anti-Mayan spiritual hate but rather as a homicide without premeditation.  Mayan spiritual leaders said they widely believed the killing was motivated by anti-Mayan sentiment, but they said the court’s decision to try the case as homicide and not murder reflected the view of some, including the Evangelical Alliance and the Catholic Church, that the killing was a result of personal issues between families.  According to a statement from the Catholic church in Peten published in 2020 shortly after the killing, while expressing shock and horror at the killing of Domingo Choc, church officials said the killing was a result of a disagreement between two families and not a rejection of Mayan spiritual culture.  Family members said they continued to fear for their safety and remained in exile in the nearby town of Poptun.  The lawyer for Choc’s family, Juan Castro, said the case had both cultural and religious dimensions, but according to Castro, the judge had treated the case according to law as a simple murder (intentional homicide with a maximum sentence of 20 years) and not as an assassination (homicide of a targeted person based on religion, ethnicity, race, or political affiliation with premeditation, with a maximum sentence of 50 years).  Castro also said the judge did not consider as an aggravating circumstance that the killing was motivated by an accusation of witchcraft against Domingo, who was a Mayan scholar and researcher of ancient medicinal plants.  In addition, the judge did not impose economic compensation for Domingo´s family, only a 13,600 quetzal ($1,800) fine for funeral expenses.  In November, Castro challenged the ruling, and the court scheduled his appeal to be heard in February 2022.

During the year, the government applied more restrictive measures on churches and temples than other public venues, including restaurants and bars.  Representatives of Protestant and Catholic groups said the government’s COVID-19 pandemic restrictions limited the free exercise of religion, even if that had not been the government’s intent.  The government applied a traffic light color-coded system depending on the number of active COVID-19 cases to determine the severity of restrictions.  For example, under mild restrictions (Yellow Alert), religious services were limited to 30 minutes, with a mandatory one-hour break in between services and a minimum area requirement of 27 square feet per person.  Open-air dining restaurants, for example, were allowed a minimum of 16 square feet per person and could open continuously within curfew hours.  As a result of the restrictions, many religious groups used social media platforms to continue live religious services.

According to evangelical Protestant groups, non-Catholic religious groups must follow a vaguely defined registration process involving several steps that may take up to two years and cost approximately 10,000 quetzals ($1,300) to register with the Ministry of Interior to enter into contracts or receive tax-exempt status.

In May, three of the four Mayan spiritual groups associated with COLUSAG withdrew, leaving only one organization, the Consultants and Organizations of Ajq’ijab’, in the umbrella organization.  According to a former coordinator of COLUSAG, the departures of these groups continued a trend of decreasing relevancy for the committee.  The passage of a law on sacred sites, which COLUSAG submitted to Congress in 2009, remained pending.  According to a Mayan spiritual leader involved in drafting the bill, if passed, the resulting law would provide legally protected status for Mayan spiritual sites, making it a crime to damage them or remove spiritual objects from them.  The law would also establish a national council with legal authority to name holy sites and credential Mayan spiritual practitioners for the purposes of granting them access to protected sites.

According to the Ombudsman, the Congressional Commission on Human Rights approved PDH’s full annual funding of 120 million quetzals ($15.58 million) on November 24.  The Ombudsman said the 11-month delay hampered the PDH’s official functions of enforcing and monitoring the free expression of religion throughout the country.  According to the Ombudsman, the PDH’s delayed funding impeded its operations due to mounting debt and lack of funding to purchase fuel and supplies for its work throughout the country.

Some Mayan leaders said the government continued to limit their access to several religious sites on government-owned property and to require them to pay to access the sites, even though the Ministry of Culture offered free access to credentialed Mayan spiritual practitioners.  Those same leaders said these credentials were not given in a timely manner to all practitioners who wished to access the sites.  The government continued to state there were no limitations on access; however, anyone seeking access to the sites located in national parks or other protected areas had to pay processing or entrance fees.  In Tikal, a complex of Mayan pyramids dating from 200 A.D. and one of the most sacred sites for Mayan spirituality, the access fee was approximately 20 to 30 quetzals ($3 to $4), which, according to members of COLUSAG, was prohibitive for many indigenous populations.

The Mayan community of Chicoyoguito continued to petition for access to its sacred sites and the return of land in Alta Verapaz, located in the north-central part of the country, including its sacred ceremonial center and a spiritual site on a former military base from which the government removed them in 1978.  On June 9, National Civil Police arrested 21 Chicoyoguito community members who were peacefully protesting on the land.  On June 18, the First Court of Coban, Alta Verapaz, ordered the Public Ministry to investigate 18 protesters for aggravated criminal trespassing because the protesters refused to leave after police ordered them to do so; the remaining three were investigated for attempted trespassing.

During the year, the La Ruta initiative engaged approximately 12 spiritual leaders, providing them the opportunity to raise concerns with central government leaders regarding future private sector investment on sacred sites in the Western Highlands.  The spiritual leaders expressed their dissatisfaction concerning continued lack of access to some Maya spiritual sites, especially those considered private property.

According to the Guatemalan Interreligious Dialogue, an interfaith group with representatives of the Catholic Church, evangelical Protestant Churches, the Church of Jesus Christ, Mayan spiritual groups, and Muslim, Buddhist, and Jewish groups, some municipal authorities in rural areas continued to discriminate against non-Catholic groups in processing building permit approvals and in local tax collection.

Missionaries, including some affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ, continued to report that complicated government procedures required to apply for temporary residence were made even more cumbersome by COVID-19 social distancing measures, especially in-person requirements such as presenting photographs and signing documents.  According to Church of Jesus Christ representatives, at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, many foreign missionaries voluntarily exited the country.  Due to the continued prevalence of COVID-19, many missionaries did not return during the year.

On June 2, more than 83 members of Congress presented a bill partially drafted and sponsored by the Association of the Importance of Family and the Council of Catholic Bishops, among other religious groups, entitled “The Initiative on the Law of Freedom of Religion and Consciousness,” to the Congressional Commission on Governance.  If passed, it would create a department in the Ministry of Interior to register new religious organizations, establish tax-exempt status for all religious organizations, and no longer require religious organizations to provide information on their finances, including an article that would allow churches to keep private the sources of their donations.  Although leaders of the Catholic Church, evangelical Protestant groups, and interfaith organizations helped draft the bill, some religious groups, including the Council of Catholic Bishops, objected to an article allowing churches to potentially hide the sources of their funding.  This article was added after the bill’s first draft before it was submitted to the congressional committee.  According to civil society groups that helped draft the original bill, anticorruption groups also widely criticized the article as a method to enable and protect money laundering.  At year’s end, the bill remained pending in committee.

According to reports from nongovernmental organizations, on January 4, unidentified assailants brutally killed Mayan spiritual guide Jesus Choc Yat in Quiche, located northwest of Guatemala City – shackling him to a pickup truck for hours and then dousing him with gasoline and setting him ablaze.  Choc Yat had arrived in Quiche to perform Mayan rituals in the community.  Sources close to Mayan spiritual leaders reported that community leaders in Quiche and Choc Yat’s family were afraid to denounce the killing and make it more public because sentiments against Mayan spiritual practice were prevalent in the area.  Reportedly, some of the killers may have been associated with a local evangelical Protestant group.  The same sources stated the killing and lack of arrests or prosecution demonstrated that the 2020 case of Domingo Choc had not raised more awareness, tolerance, or protection of Mayan spiritual practitioners.

Mayan spiritual leaders reported continued societal discrimination.  According to an anthropologist, evangelical Protestant missionaries in Chichicastenango, located northwest of Guatemala City, distributed fliers asking for donations to build new churches to fight against “satanic” practices, referring to Mayan spiritual practices.  A Catholic parish priest in Izabal reported that this kind of practice was widespread; he mentioned similar efforts by small unorganized evangelical Protestant churches denouncing Mayan spiritual practices in their local publications and announcements online.

Some Catholic clergy continued to report receiving electronic threats and harassment targeting them because of their association with environmental protection and human rights work.  For example, the director of the Office of Human Rights of the Catholic Church reported that during the year, his office received anonymous social media threats.  Some Catholic clergy reported they continued to receive anonymous threats, mostly on social media, because of the Church’s support of transitional justice cases stemming from civil war-era military abuses of indigenous populations.

According to law enforcement professionals working in the penal system, gang members often converted to evangelical Protestant religious groups in prison as an alternative to gangs and as an option to safely leave gangs; unless a gang leader converted before leaving a gang, the gang would likely kill him or her.  Community evangelical leaders who visited prisons to provide aid or incarcerated religious community leaders who guided spiritual practices in prison conducted the conversions.

According to Mayan spiritual groups, some landowners continued to deny them access to locations on their private property that Mayans considered sacred to them, including caves, lagoons, mountains, and forests.  According to one Mayan source, there was no recourse available through the government for Mayans to obtain access to these private lands.

According to Religions for Peace, whose membership comprises representatives from the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Alliance, individual evangelical Protestant churches, the Muslim and Jewish faiths, and Mayan spirituality groups, it continued to seek to resolve misunderstandings among religious groups and to promote a culture of respect.  Some political organizations, including the Municipal Indigenous Council in Solola, rotated leadership between Catholic and Protestant representatives.  Guardians of the Dignity of the State, an interfaith group with members from the Tibetan Buddhist, Protestant, and secular communities, continued to promote social activism and change, including working with Mayan spiritual leaders.

According to representatives from the Catholic Church and the Church of Jesus Christ, evangelical Christianity was growing, and while there was no central leadership, the Evangelical Alliance comprised approximately 67 percent of the country’s evangelical Protestant congregations.  According to alliance leadership, the alliance was unable to meet more than one or two times during the year because of COVID-19 restrictions.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials continued to engage regularly with the human rights Ombudsman, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Commission Against Discrimination and Racism, and members of Congress to discuss religious freedom issues, including threats against Catholic clergy and access for Mayans to their spiritual sites.  The embassy continued to promote increased engagement between the government and indigenous communities, especially through support for increased dialogue and government investment in indigenous communities.

Embassy officials continued to engage government officials as well as Catholic Church officials and other religious leaders on the need to denounce violence against Mayan spiritual practitioners and members of all faiths.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials regularly met with leaders of major religious groups and representatives of faith-based organizations to discuss the importance of tolerance and respect for religious minorities.  During the year, the Ambassador met multiple times with religious leaders, including Catholic Archbishop Gonzalo de Villa and Cardinal Alvaro Ramazzini, to reiterate the U.S. government’s dedication to freedom of religion and discuss cooperation in supporting broader human rights in the country.  In September, embassy officials met with the president of the Evangelical Alliance at the launch of a civil society job creation initiative and with representatives of Catholic organizations.  Embassy officials also worked with the Evangelical Alliance and the Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist communities to strengthen understanding of religious freedom issues and promote religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 12.9 million (midyear 2021).  According to the SRA, approximately 85 percent of the population is Muslim, 8 percent is Christian, and 7 percent adheres to indigenous religious beliefs.  Much of the Muslim and Christian populations incorporate indigenous rituals into their religious practices.  Muslims are generally Maliki Sunni; Sufism is also present.  Christian groups include Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, and several evangelical groups.  There is also a small Baha’i community, in addition to small numbers of Hindus, Buddhists, and adherents of traditional Chinese religious beliefs among foreign residents.

Muslims constitute a majority in all four regions of the country.  Christians are concentrated in large cities, including Conakry, in the south, and in the eastern Forest Region.  Adherents of indigenous religious beliefs are most prevalent in the Forest Region.

Legal Framework

The Transition Charter, published on September 27, states that the country is a secular state and that any act undermining the secular nature of the state or an individual’s religious freedom is to be considered a “high crime” punishable by fines and imprisonment.  The Charter guarantees the freedom of worship “under the conditions and in the forms provided for by law.”  The Charter states that any individual who through assault or threats prevents one or more persons from practicing their religion is punishable by one to three months’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to one million Guinean Francs ($54-$110).  The Charter also states that preventing, delaying, or interrupting religious practices in a place of worship by public disturbance is punishable by two to six months’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to one million francs ($54-$110).  In addition, the Charter states that any person who in any way desecrates a place of worship and/or objects of worship within the place of worship may be punished by six months to one year’s imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to one million Francs ($54-$110).  Anyone who insults a religious leader in the function of his or her duties is may be punished by six months to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to one million francs ($54-$110).  If the individual also threatens, assaults, or injures the religious leader, the punishment is increased to two to five years’ imprisonment, with the same fine.

In addition, the Transition Charter stipulates two religious community members serve as representatives on the 81-member National Transition Council (CNT).  As of year’s end, the CNT had not yet formed.

The 2020 constitution, which was suspended on September 5, stated that the country was a secular state, prohibited religious discrimination, and provided individuals the right to choose and profess their religious faith.  It recognized the right of religious institutions and groups to establish and manage themselves freely.  It barred political parties that identify with a particular religious group.  These rights were subject only to “those limits that are indispensable to maintain the public order and democracy.”

The Transition Charter did not change the laws and processes applicable to the registration of religious groups or the overall authorities of the SRA.  The SRA must approve all religious groups.  Groups must provide a written constitution and application to the SRA along with their address and a fee of 250,000 francs ($27).  The SRA then sends the documents to the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization for final approval and signature.  Once approved, the group becomes officially recognized.  Every six months, each registered religious group must present a report of its activities to the government.  Registering with the government entitles religious groups to an exemption from the value-added tax (VAT) on imported shipments and makes them eligible for select energy subsidies.

Unregistered religious groups are not entitled to VAT exemptions and other benefits.  By law, the government may shut down unregistered groups and expel their leaders.  There is limited opportunity for legal appeal of these penalties.

Religious groups may not own radio or television stations.  This prohibition did not change after the September 5 coup.

The compulsory primary school curriculum does not include religious studies.  Many parents send their children to Quranic schools (madrassahs), either in addition to primary school or as their primary form of education.

The imams and administrative staff of the principal mosque in Conakry and the principal mosques in the main cities of the four regions are government employees.  These mosques are directly under the administration of the government.  Other mosques and some Christian groups receive government subsidies for pilgrimages.

The SRA appoints national directors to lead the Offices of Christian Affairs, Islamic Affairs, Pilgrimages, Places of Worship, Economic Affairs and the Endowment, and Inspector General, which all fall under the SRA.  The SRA is charged with promoting good relations among religious groups and coordinates with other members of the informal Interreligious Council, which is composed of representatives from the Islamic faith and the Catholic, Anglican, and other Protestant churches, as well as the SRA.

Prior to the September 5 coup d’etat, a February 18 decree moved the General Secretariat of Religious Affairs directly under the supervision the presidency.  On November 6, the transition government returned the General Secretariat of Religious Affairs to a cabinet-level position.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On May 13, security forces arrested Imam Nanfo Diaby at his home, under penal code provisions that bar sermons “containing words likely to disturb the public order.”  At the time, he was leading Eid al-Fitr prayer in Malinke rather than Arabic, which violated SRA guidelines that mandate Islamic prayers be offered only in Arabic.  On May 26, Diaby was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, with six months suspended, and a fine of 500,000 francs ($54) by the Kankan Court of First Instance.  He completed his sentence and was released on October 12.  According to Diaby’s lawyers, his appeal was granted on October 5 and his case was pending at year’s end.  Diaby was similarly charged with disturbing public order and violating a ban on praying in the local language and suspended from conducting religious activities by the SRA in 2019.  In July 2020, he was detained briefly by local SRA authorities for leading prayers in Malinke.

In May, the Regional Secretariat of Religious Affairs in Faranah, Upper Guinea, removed Imam Mohamed Bayo from the list of approved imams in Faranah and forbade him from conducting any religious activity in the region.  According to the decision, Bayo was sanctioned due to statements he made during a local radio interview suggesting that it is possible to pray in any language, “since God understands all languages [and not just Arabic].”

The SRA continued to issue guidance outlining themes for discussion during Friday sermons at mosques and Sunday sermons in churches.  The stated purpose of the weekly guidance was to harmonize religious views to prevent radical or political messages in sermons.  Although the SRA did not monitor sermons at every mosque and church, its inspectors were present in every region and were responsible for ensuring that mosque and church sermons were consistent with SRA directives.  Clerics whom the SRA judged to be noncompliant were subject to disciplinary action.  Deviations from approved guidance were often reported in various sermons at mosques and other Islamic events, but the SRA said it had difficulty imposing disciplinary sanctions due to a lack of funding and resources.

The government forbade gatherings for evening prayers during the last 10 days of Ramadan in May because of rising COVID-19 cases.  The press reported numerous protests against the decision across the country, with multiple arrests and one person shot and killed by security forces in Kerouane, Upper Guinea.  On May 6, following protests related to the prayer ban, religious authorities suspended seven imams and barred one, Elhadj Moussa Doumbouya, from preaching within the Kankan urban commune.  All seven were sanctioned for inciting violence, leading protests, and violating the prayer ban.  According to local press sources, one imam was arrested and released, and all the other previously suspended imams were reinstated in August except for Moussa Doumbouya, who remained barred from preaching at the end of the year.  This followed the government opening all places of worship in September 2020 after religious leaders publicly called for a lifting of COVID-19 restrictions.

On September 17, media reported that security forces prevented local Wahhabi Islam followers from attending Friday prayers in Misside Hinde near Labe, Middle Guinea.  Authorities closed the mosque after a complaint was filed by the predominantly Tijaniyah Sufist prefecture’s Islamic League, a civil society organization that closely follows SRA guidance.  According to the decision, the mosque was closed for failing to conform with guidance governing places of worship, since it had not received the necessary authorizations for its construction.  Press reported that although the mosque had existed for more than 20 years, Labe religious authorities remained reluctant to permit Friday prayers there due to concerns regarding what they termed historic tensions between the more fundamentalist Wahhabis and the more moderate Tijaniyah Sufi worshipers in the town.

Neither Jehovah’s Witnesses nor the Baha’i community requested official recognition during the year.  The Baha’is stated they preferred not to have a formal relationship with the SRA, since their lack of recognition and not being subject to government regulation, such as the SRA control over sermon content, allowed them more freedom.

Islamic schools continued to be prevalent throughout the country and remained the traditional forum for religious education.  Some Islamic schools were wholly private, while others received local government support.  Islamic schools, particularly common in the Fouta Djallon Region, taught the compulsory government curriculum, along with additional Quranic studies.  Private Christian schools in Conakry and other large cities accepted students of all religious groups.  They taught the compulsory curriculum but did not receive government support, and they held voluntary Christian prayers before school.

Many Muslim students not enrolled in private Islamic schools continued to receive religious education at madrassahs, some of which were associated with mosques and others supported by local communities.  Unlike Islamic schools, the madrassahs did not teach the compulsory primary school curriculum.  The government did not recognize the madrassahs nor require them to register, allowing them to operate freely.  They focused on Quranic studies, and instruction was in Arabic rather than French.  Funds from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states supported some madrassahs.  Most students in madrassahs also attended part-time public or private schools that taught the compulsory curriculum.

The government continued to allocate free broadcast time on state-owned national television for Islamic and Christian programming, including Islamic religious instruction, Friday prayers from the central mosque, and church services.  The government permitted religious broadcasting on privately owned commercial radio and encouraged equal time for Christian and Muslim groups.

According to media and Catholic Church sources, a series of long-running property disputes between the Catholic Saint-Jean Monastery in Kendoumaya, Lower Guinea, and local Muslim Susu villagers continued during the year.  Villagers continued to claim parcels of land near the monastery, which they began selling to third parties in 2020.  In addition, according to media sources, villagers said they believed that the Church had not honored its commitments from earlier negotiations to pave the main road from Coyah to Kendoumaya, provide electricity to the village, and build a local school.  The Church stated that it made no such commitments.

On September 22, local Muslim Susu residents attacked Saint-Jean Monastery, seeking to occupy more of the disputed land.  After a monk fired warning shots from a shotgun to disperse the crowd, villagers assaulted and dragged him to the home of a local neighborhood elder, then returned him to the monastery.  Security forces later arrived to disperse the crowd.  No charges were filed and there were no arrests.  The monk suffered only minor injuries.  By year’s end, several lawsuits over the land dispute continued in the courts.  On June 15, the Coyah Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the Catholic Church regarding one of the disputed parcels of land.  The court also awarded 150 million francs ($16,200) to the Church as compensation for damages suffered due to local citizens’ occupying and dividing some of the property since the dispute began in 2016.  On October 22, the Church held a press conference at which it publicly requested the transitional government uphold and implement the June 15 court ruling, but the transition government took no action on the issue by year’s end.  A 2020 appeal by the Church against a separate lower court ruling in favor of the villagers was pending with the Supreme Court at year’s end.

In parts of the country, including the middle and upper regions, particularly strong familial, communal, cultural, social, or economic pressure continued to discourage conversion from Islam, according to observers.

The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials met on multiple occasions with the Secretary General of Religious Affairs and religious leaders before and after the coup d’etat to discuss religious tolerance, reconciliation, and social cohesion among religious group.

Embassy officials also met with representatives of the country’s religious groups, including the Grand Imams of Conakry, Kankan, Siguiri, and Labe, Catholic and Anglican bishops; and other Muslim and Christian clergy to discuss the same issues and the historic role religious leaders have played in mediating local conflict.

The Charge d’Affaires and previous participants in a U.S.-funded Young African Leaders Initiative helped clean the Fadiga Mosque in the Nongo neighborhood of Conakry during Ramadan.  The Charge d’Affaires used this opportunity to speak of the importance of religious tolerance and building links between various faith communities, particularly during Ramadan.

In February, as part of the response to an Ebola outbreak, an embassy-funded communication and engagement program brought together more than 120 Muslim and Christian leaders to encourage dialogue among local government authorities, public health officials, and religious leaders to accommodate religiously appropriate burials for Ebola victims.  The program also encouraged vaccination, countering Ebola disinformation, and community acceptance of survivors.

The embassy posted messages through its social media platforms during the month of Ramadan encouraging religious tolerance.

The embassy also promoted tolerance indirectly through its democracy and governance activities.  The Charge d’Affaires gave remarks during the closing ceremony for an embassy-funded program that sought to build religious tolerance and social cohesion through engaging local civil society, government, media, and religious groups.  Additional embassy activities included engagement with influential local figures, including religious leaders, to amplify peace-building messages in communities afflicted by interethnic and religious tensions.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.0 million (midyear 2021).  Estimates of the religious composition of the population vary widely, but according to the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project (2020), approximately 46 percent are Muslim, 31 percent follow indigenous religious practices, and 19 percent are Christian.  Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and those unaffiliated with any religious group.

The Fula (Peuhl or Fulani) and Mandinka (Malinke) ethnic groups are the most numerous followers of Islam.  Muslims generally live in the north and northeast, and most Muslims are Sunni; Shia communities exist as well.  Adherents of indigenous religious beliefs generally live in all but the northern parts of the country.  The Christian population, including Roman Catholics and Protestants, is primarily drawn from the Pepel, Manjaco, and Balanta ethnic groups and is concentrated in Bissau and along the coast.  Catholics represent more than half of the Christian population, while Brazilian Protestant and other Protestant denominations maintain a significant number of congregations and missions throughout the country.  Large numbers of Muslims and Christians hold indigenous beliefs as well.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates the state shall be separate from religious institutions and shall respect and protect legally recognized religious groups, whose activities shall be subject to the law.  It holds freedom of conscience and religion as inviolable, even if the state declares a state of siege, and provides for freedom of worship so long as it does not violate the fundamental principles cited in the constitution.  It establishes that all citizens are equal under the law, with the same rights and obligations, irrespective of their religion.  Political parties and labor unions are barred from affiliating with a particular religious group.  The constitution recognizes the freedom of religious groups to teach their faith.

The government requires religious groups to obtain licenses.  The formal process, which is not often followed, entails providing the name, location, type, and size of the organization to the Ministry of Justice.  Under the law, religious groups are recognized as associations and benefit from tax exemptions.

In accordance with the constitution, religious instruction is not permitted in public schools.  The Ministry of Education enforces this prohibition.  There are some private schools operated by religious groups.  Private schools must meet government-approved curriculum standards and receive Ministry of Education validation in order to grant nationally recognized diplomas or completion certificates.  The government-approved curriculum standards require a broader base of conventional subjects, such as science and the Portuguese language, rather than a more limited curriculum of Arabic and Quranic studies, as offered in some Islamic schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Speaking at the inauguration ceremony of Special Adviser Luis Olivera Sanca on April 12, President Embalo said the government would no longer support the Muslim community with its traditional offering of rice and sugar during Ramadan.  He indicated that Ramadan fasting was not included in the secular state’s budget.  Multiple religious leaders said that the President’s position was unexpected and not popular within the Muslim community.

A religious leader reported that the Governor of Bafata declared a specific date in May following Ramadan to be a prayer day.  All villages within the region reportedly complied except for the village of Contuboel, whose religious leaders selected a different date to conduct prayers.  Local police forces intervened and clashed with youth from Contuboel, who disagreed with the date decreed by the governor.  The religious leader reported that police injured multiple persons.  Referring to the same incident, a news outlet reported that local police physically abused some inhabitants of a Bafata village when they tried to pray prior to the date proscribed by authorities.  A few religious leaders said this was an isolated incident that was unlikely to occur again.

On July 13, the Ministry of Public Administration set the recitation of Eid al-Adha prayers for July 21 and declared that date a national holiday.  A government spokesperson said the date was set after consultations with several Muslim religious organizations, including the National Union of the Imams of Guinea-Bissau.  However, some religious leaders said they regarded the action as government interference in Islamic affairs.  One religious leader said it was acceptable for the government to set the holiday but not to tell persons when to pray.

In October, some religious leaders said the government had not done enough to combat the threat of extremism.  One Muslim leader said that a small but growing percentage of fundamentalist mosques and schools led by Quranic teachers financed by Islamists operating outside the country were potential incubators of radicalism that promoted ideas conflicting with the more moderate beliefs and traditions commonly found in most mosques in the country.  Another Muslim leader said the government had failed to implement its declaration to transform Arabic-only schools into conventional schools of mixed education that would also include the teaching of Portuguese and secular subjects and provide students with a broader knowledge base to allow them to integrate into society.

Multiple Muslim and Catholic leaders said in October that an independent Pentecostal church, Igreja Assembleia de Deus, promoted division, intolerance, and disrespect toward other religions.  One Muslim leader said he reported his concerns about the church to national authorities but that the government took no action.  Religious leaders said this particular church attempted to provoke youth and destabilize peaceful relationships through broadcasts on Radio Luz, which is affiliated with Igreja Assembleia de Deus.  Radio Luz accused other churches, for example, of being satanic or not adhering to the Bible.  To maintain harmony in the religious community, the former Catholic bishop of Bissau encouraged the church to cease its behavior and its radio broadcasts.  Religious leaders said the church continued to foment discord and discontent even after the bishop’s intervention.

The NGO Human Rights League Guinea-Bissau (HRL) highlighted 50 reported instances of persons being accused of witchcraft since 2019.  Of those, 20 resulted in deaths, with six killings reported in 2021, according to HRL.  An HRL representative said that the trend during the past three years represented a substantial increase in cases and that there was a significant overlap between witchcraft and indigenous religious beliefs.  HRL conducted research to determine why persons were being accused of witchcraft, and it promoted a campaign with religious leaders and village chiefs focused on training and capacity building.  HRL also indicated that it was trying to raise awareness within the government, which had not introduced legislation related to witchcraft.

HRL indicated that its three main objectives included training qualified individuals who can train others to resist various forms of religious radicalization, gathering information to identify signs of religious extremism, and promoting a large conference in Bissau on the issue.  HRL further indicated that its local office was partnering on these initiatives with Chatham House in England and the Timbuktu Institute (African Center for Peace Studies) in Senegal.

Other religious leaders said that different ethnic and religious groups were still mostly respectful and tolerant of one another throughout the country.  Some religious leaders, however, expressed concern regarding the spread of religious extremism.  They identified education as the key mitigating factor to combat the spread of religious extremism, which they believed was a particular risk when young students traveled abroad and were exposed to what they said was a more radical practice of Islam.  One leader stated that children must be taught at a young age to build a strong base of traditional beliefs before being tempted to go abroad, where their beliefs may be easily manipulated.  This leader also emphasized the need to educate youth in modern schools, with a focus on teaching values that promote social and religious peace.  Another individual assessed that Islamic schools offered only Arabic and Quranic studies, many of them connected to newly constructed mosques, and left students isolated from the rest of society.  In response, he noted that his organization built a network of 12 conventional schools offering a government-approved curriculum.

One Muslim leader noted instances which, he said, highlighted religious tolerance, including examples of Muslim families who sent their sons to live with Christian families, in some cases for multiple years.  In these instances, the Muslim sons continued to practice Islam while learning about a different culture and religion.  The Muslim leader also said there were examples of children who attended conventional schools of different faiths while continuing to practice their own religion.  The interim Bishop of Bissau indicated that Catholic schools accepted all students who met the basic criterion of having moral values.  He said the Catholic Church wanted to provide an opportunity for all children to gain an education and to respect the values of different faiths.

There is no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in the country.  The United States directs its engagement there from the U.S. embassy in Dakar, Senegal.  In October, a member of the Guinea-Bissau Liaison Office of the embassy in Dakar met with multiple Islamic and Catholic religious leaders in Bissau to discuss issues of tolerance and coexistence and their concern regarding the spread of religious extremism.  Locally employed staff based in Bissau and three American diplomats based at the embassy in Dakar maintained contact with multiple religious leaders, staff, and adherents throughout the year.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 788,000 (midyear 2021).  According to the 2012 national census, the most recent, 64 percent of the population is Christian, 25 percent Hindu, and 7 percent Muslim (mainly Sunni).  Less than 1 percent belongs to other religious groups, which include Rastafarians, Baha’is, Afro-descendent Faithists, and Areruya, an indigenous faith system.  An estimated 3 percent of the population does not profess a religious affiliation.  Among Christians, Pentecostals comprise 23 percent of the population; Roman Catholics, 7 percent; Anglicans, 5 percent; Seventh-day Adventists, 5 percent; Methodists, 1 percent; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, less than 1 percent, and other Christians, 21 percent, which includes those belonging to the Assembly of God Church, Church of Christ, and African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, among others.

The membership of most religious groups includes a cross section of ethnic groups, although nearly all Hindus are of South Asian descent, and most Rastafarians are of African descent.  Most Muslims are of South Asian descent, but there is also a significant Afro-Muslim population.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and worship, including the right to choose and change one’s religion.  The constitution protects the right of religious groups to provide religious instructions to their adherents.  No citizen is compelled to take part in any religious education, ceremony, or observance of a religion not his or her own without consent.  The constitution forbids taking an oath contrary to one’s religion or belief.  An unenforced law prescribes a prison term of one year for a blasphemous libel conviction; however, the law exempts religious expression made in “good faith and decent language.”

The constitution mandates the establishment of the ERC, with the purpose of promoting ethnic harmony and eliminating ethnic discrimination.  The ERC includes representatives of the country’s main religious traditions, including Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism.

There is no official system for formal registration of a religious group, but to receive government recognition, all places of worship must register through the Deeds Registry.  The Deeds Registry requires an organization to submit a proposed name and address for the place of worship, as well as the names of executive group members or congregation leaders.  Once formally recognized, a place of worship falls under legislation governing nonprofit organizations, allowing the organization to conduct financial operations, buy property, and receive tax benefits in its name.

Foreign religious workers require a visa from the Ministry of Home Affairs.  Religious groups seeking to enter an indigenous village for the purpose of proselytizing must apply for and obtain permission from the village council.  Application to a village council must include the name of the group, the names of its members who will be going to the village, their purpose, and the estimated date of arrival.

There is no religious education in public schools, regardless of whether the school is religiously affiliated.  Most public schools’ religious affiliations are Anglican or Methodist.  There are both public and private religiously affiliated schools.  Private schools are operated entirely by private groups and are not funded by the state.  All students attending private religious schools must participate in religious education, regardless of a student’s religious beliefs.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to media, representatives of the Rastafarian community continued to state a law criminalizing the possession of 15 grams or more of marijuana infringed on their religious practices.  “To deny me the holy herb for my sacrament is to deny me my human rights,” said Ras Simeon, an elder from the Rastafarian community.  In January, the government introduced into the National Assembly a draft bill to remove prison time for possession of up to 30 grams of marijuana and to remove the fine for smoking or otherwise using cannabis.  After the bill’s introduction, it was sent it to a select parliamentary committee for further deliberation on January 28.  At year’s end, the bill remained pending in committee.  The Guyana Rastafari Council continued to petition the government to legalize the use of small amounts of marijuana for religious purposes, holding regular protests in front of the office of the Attorney General.  In October, the general secretary of the council told media that authorities had conducted raids on their places of worship to seize marijuana.  He said the Rastafarian community would not stop planting or consuming marijuana and that authorities used drug laws as an excuse to publicly harass Rastafarians.  In July, the IROG, composed of representatives of all religious groups, including Rastafarians, released a statement to support “comprehensive law reform to recognize and respect the religious rights of the Rastafari community.”  A Rastafarian member of the IROG said he did not believe that the measures taken by the government to introduce but not pass legislation were sufficient and asked for international support to lobby the government.

The government continued to maintain regulations limiting the number of visas for foreign representatives of religious groups based on historical trends, the relative size of the group, and the President’s discretion; however, the government and religious groups, whose membership included foreign missionaries, continued to state the government did not apply the visa limitation rule.  Religious groups also said the visa quotas the government allotted to them were sufficient and did not adversely affect their activities.

In February, one of the ERC’s Muslim commissioners called the organization “dysfunctional and wasteful” and said it was not fulfilling its mandate.  According to the commissioner, the ERC, established in 2000 and reconstituted in 2018, continued to provide public messaging during local holidays, but its other public activities were limited, as the commissioners’ three-year term expired in April and the government did not name new members during the year.

The government continued to promote interfaith harmony and respect for diversity through its public messaging.  On all major Christian, Hindu, and Islamic holidays, President Mohammed Irfaan Ali delivered national messages.  During Ramadan, Ali stated, “Ramadan teaches us to have love for all and hatred for none.”  In his Easter message, Ali stated, “Christ’s selfless action and sacrifice must be the lesson [to] sacrifice for the greater good of humanity,” and in his Diwali message, Ali stated, “May the sacred festival of Diwali ignite in all of us the flame of love and concern for others, and may it bless us with the spirit of generosity.”

In January, the Ministry of Human Services and Social Services formalized its SAHN initiative, a partnership among the ministry and nearly 30 leaders from religious communities with the stated goal of increasing tolerance and strengthening interfaith cooperation, as well as developing recommendations and strategies to address social inequities and the marginalization of communities.  The government initiated the partnership as a response to the August 2020 killing of two Afro-Guyanese minors that many in the country viewed as ethnically motivated.  During the year, faith leaders belonging to SAHN reached out to communities affected by violence and offered financial support and counseling for family members.  The organization was fully government run, and its membership could not speak on its behalf without ministry clearance.

While many prominent religious leaders asked their congregations to receive the COVID-19 vaccination, according to press reporting in July, Minister of Health Frank Anthony expressed concern that several religious leaders in rural communities were discouraging congregants from being vaccinated on religious grounds.  “We’re confronted in some communities where people who have influence in those communities; some of the faith-based leaders have been telling their church members not [to] take vaccine,” the minister said.  According to press, the ministry aimed to increase rural outreach to religious leaders to increase vaccination rates.

Several individuals active in religious circles said that the government favored certain Christian, Muslim, and Hindu groups over others due to the personal affiliations of government ministers.  They said, however, that this favoritism did not affect freedom of religious expression or practice in the country.

In October, a Hindu citizen criticized the Ministry of Education in an editorial for allowing a prayer that he characterized as Christian to be recited at a ceremony announcing the results of the Caribbean Examinations Council (the regional organization overseeing curriculum and examinations processes), citing it as discriminatory.  The ministry replied that the prayer was universal, stating it was the same prayer routinely recited during parliamentary sessions.  In a statement, the ministry reiterated the government position that “no one religion, ethnicity, gender, etc. is or should be made to be seen as dominant over the other, and [it] has noted that there have been some events where the intention of the ministry and its policy was not followed and had re-issued a memo, with the universal prayer attached, reminding of said policy.”

Government representatives continued to meet with leaders of various religious groups with the expressed aim of promoting social cohesion and discussing the tolerance of diversity, including of Muslim, Hindu, and Christian groups.  Government officials also participated regularly in the observance of Christian, Hindu, and Islamic religious holidays throughout the year.  The government continued to declare some holy days of the country’s three major religious groups, including Eid al-Adha, Holi, Easter, and Diwali, as national holidays.

The IROG, whose membership includes approximately 40 religious bodies and organizations, continued its stated purposed of promoting social cohesion and respecting religious diversity through its programs and initiatives.  IROG hosted a series of events during UN World Interfaith Harmony Week in February, including a panel discussion at the University of Guyana and an interfaith program of prayers and reflection.  In March, IROG launched the Women of Faith Network to promote the participation of women from different faith traditions in peace building.  In August, during a roundtable discussion, IROG participants, including representatives of Baha’i, Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and Rastafarian groups, stated their religious groups did not discriminate against members of the LGBTQI+ community but did not condone the open practice of their lifestyle.

Because religion, ethnicity, and politics are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize issues as being solely based on religious identity.  According to religious leaders, there was a high degree of religious tolerance, but politics inflamed ethnic tensions, especially around national elections.  They said faith could be a vehicle for healing ethnic tensions, but they were wary of proceeding too deeply into the political sphere, explaining it could lead to claims of bias and therefore diminish their stature and ability to impartially carry out their work.

In November, the Ambassador met with the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs and Governance, who is the government focal point for religious affairs, regarding the government’s stated commitment to support religious freedom and interfaith tolerance.  The Ambassador recognized the importance of tolerance and respect for its multiple faiths and stated that the reconstitution of the ERC following the April expiration of its board would be viewed as a further avenue for promoting interfaith harmony.

In April, the Ambassador hosted an iftar for leaders of Muslim, Christian, Baha’i, and Rastafarian communities.  The group discussed how promoting religious tolerance could help heal ethnic divisions.  In August, embassy officials organized a roundtable that included representatives of Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and Rastafarian groups, in which they discussed issues related to religious tolerance, fostering cohesion and respect for religious differences, and the challenges for worship during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Embassy officials amplified messages of respect for religious diversity with regular social media postings on Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and Jewish religious holidays

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11.2 million (midyear 2021).  According to the government’s 2017 Survey on Mortality, Morbidity, and Use of Services, the most recent study available, Christians who self-identified as either Protestant, Episcopalian, Methodist, Seventh-day Adventist, or Jehovah’s Witness together comprise 52 percent of the population, Catholics 35 percent, Vodouists 2 percent, and 11 percent do not state a religious preference.  An estimated 60 percent of Protestants in the country belong to the Protestant Federation.  These include Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Pentecostals, the Salvation Army, Seventh-day Adventists, and some Baptists.  The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints states it has 24,000 adherents, mostly in Port-au-Prince.  The president of the National Council for Haitian Muslims states there are approximately 6,000 adherents across three branches of Islam – Sunni, Shia, and Ahmadiyya; only members of the Sunni and Shia communities belong to the council.  The Jewish community has approximately 20 individuals.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the free exercise of all religions.  Under the law, the BOW’s primary responsibilities are to register religious and missionary organizations and certify the credentials of clergy of all denominations, authorizing these operations in the country.  The law also tasks the BOW to encourage tolerance and arbitrate conflicts within and between religious groups.

Registering religious organizations and clergy offers certain benefits, but there are no penalties for noncompliance.  Benefits for registered religious organizations may include tax-exempt status, exemption from import duties on church-related items, standing in legal disputes, and eligibility to receive public land to build schools.  To obtain this status, a religious group must submit information on its leaders’ qualifications, a membership directory, a list of the group’s social projects, and annual activity reports to the BOW.  Completion of the separate clergy registration process also confers certain benefits, namely the legal authority to conduct civil ceremonies such as marriages and baptisms following an oath-taking ceremony organized by the Ministry of Justice.  To obtain registered clergy status, the individual sponsored by a registered religious entity must submit approximately 10 documents.  The required documentation package includes proof of completion for both secondary school and university or seminary-level religious studies as well as a police certificate confirming no criminal record and no outstanding warrants.

A concordat between the government and the Holy See signed in 1860 formalizes the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church.  The concordat affords privileges to the Catholic Church, including state protection and monthly stipends for some priests.  It also provides the President the right of consent over the appointment of Catholic archbishops and bishops to their positions.

Foreign missionaries operating in the country are subject to the same legal and administrative requirements as their domestic counterparts.

The country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to media, on April 15, police fired tear gas at dozens of individuals participating in a nationwide event called “Mass for the Freedom of Haiti.”  On this date, the Catholic Church held hundreds of masses simultaneously across the country to protest the deepening political crisis and rising insecurity during the government of then President Moise.  At the time, the 400 Mawozo gang had been holding 10 Catholic clergy for a period of four days.  As a focal point for the event, 11 Catholic bishops led by Archbishop of Port-au-Prince Max Leroy Mesidor held Mass at the Church of St. Peter in Petion-Ville, a neighborhood in Port-au-Prince.  Authorities said they used tear gas after the conclusion of Mass to prevent the escalation of violence because nearby demonstrators had begun to burn cars.  In the aftermath, Father Loudeger Mazile, spokesman for the Catholic Episcopal Conference of Haiti, asked everyone “to remain calm so that we can return to the route of democracy and development.”

Media also reported that on April 21, outside the National Palace, approximately 20 protesters, using a Vodou ritual, demonstrated against Moise-era overall insecurity and kidnappings of Catholic clergy.  While protesters were conducting the ritual, police used tear gas in an attempt to disperse them.

Religious leaders publicly called for the cessation of violence during the year.  In March, the Haitian Conference of Religious wrote an open letter calling on then President Moise to step down, citing what they said was rampant insecurity and injustice in the country, and it stated his administration represented a “descent into hell.”  The letter said of the then Moise government, “The country is dying, the population is under a yoke, insecurity is rampant, the poorest are no longer able to sustain themselves, the population is in disarray and on the verge of desperation… [President Moise] has the duty to give quick and concrete answers to the requests of the people, starting with respect for the laws of the country.”  The calls for government accountability expanded into major protests throughout the country during the entire month of March.  A wide-reaching coalition of Protestant churches joined the growing protests after the Protestant Commission Against Dictatorship in Haiti and the Episcopal Conference of Haiti issued statements calling upon the population to “defend the life, future, and dignity of the Haitian people.”  In April, Catholic leaders continued to publish statements and organize protests, but the focus was increasingly on the lack of government response to kidnappings and gang violence.

The 1860 concordat was a major subject of debate among religious leaders during the year.  A Catholic leader said the Church continued to adhere to the concordat because it was legally bound to do so under the country’s legal system.  One Protestant leader said the concordat was a contract between two sovereign states that must be respected until it was reassessed.  He added that his denomination valued its independence and had no interest in submitting its choices in religious leadership for government approval.  Conversely, several other non-Catholic religious leaders raised concern about the concordat.  One Protestant leader said the concordat afforded the Catholic Church powerful influence over the government.  Vodou leaders cited it as an example of “historical institutionalized predisposition” against them.

Vodou leaders said that while the state of religious freedom made them optimistic for the future, prejudice against them still lingered and often made Vodouists fearful to practice openly.  They did not, however, accuse the government of directly discriminating against them.  Vodou leaders said the government could do more to combat ongoing societal discrimination by encouraging acceptance of Vodouists.  One leader said, “The government should provide us financial support like they do for the Protestants, Catholics, and Episcopalians.”

Some Protestant religious leaders advocated for increased government regulation of religious groups.  One leader stated, “There may be too much religious freedom,” and she said some religious leaders had long called for more stringent government standards for clergy registration.  She said her concern was that self-described pastors with little religious training or accountability could prey on naive churchgoers.  Another Protestant leader also commented on the need for stringent standards for clergy, citing COVID-19 misinformation.  He said, “Hiding behind religious freedom, questionable leaders have preached against COVID-19 vaccination or even promoted unscientific cures.  The government should do something.”

The BOW said that it continued to work with less established religious groups to facilitate their registrations, while defending what it said was the importance of a rigorous registration process.  In May, the BOW granted an operating license to the Ahmadiyya Muslim community, the smallest of the three Muslim communities in the country and the first to receive official status.  According to the BOW, the Ahmadiyya community followed the same registration procedure that applied to all religious groups.  The license allowed the MOE to register schools operated by the Ahmadiyya Muslim community so their students could take national exams.  BOW Director General Souffrant said the transparency of the Ahmadiyya leadership during the registration process assisted the government in its decision to grant it a license.  Sunni and Shia Muslim groups had not completed the procedures for registration and remained unregistered at year’s end.  Sunni and Shia leaders cited what they called “the complex political environment” as a factor delaying their registration, with one leader stating, “The current de facto government is not likely to take it upon itself to recognize a religion that is nascent in the country.”  BOW Director General Souffrant disagreed with this characterization, citing the successful example of the Ahmadiyya community.  At year’s end, representatives from the Sunni and Shia communities did not cite specific procedural barriers that distinguished their experience from other groups.

Despite the benefits of registering, many religious groups and leaders chose to remain unregistered.  According to the BOW, many religious groups and leaders preferred to remain unregistered to avoid government oversight.  Religious minorities said they generally disagreed with this assessment or suggested it was an oversimplification.  According to a Vodou leader, in contrast to its Catholic and Protestant counterparts, the decentralized Vodou community did not easily fit into the government’s criteria for institutional registration.  The Vodou leader also said Vodou clergy faced structural barriers to BOW registration because no degree-granting institution existed for Vodouists, and to create one would be contrary to their initiation rituals.  Two Vodouists had earlier received government recognition, but these were the religion’s highest-level officials, and they obtained the formal credentials required for BOW registration through their appointment to leadership positions within the National Confederation of Haitian Vodou.

According to the BOW, there were 9,195 certified Protestant pastors, 704 certified Catholic priests, and two certified Vodou clergy at year’s end, representing no change from 2020.  By year’s end, the government had not certified any Muslim clergy, including from the newly registered Ahmadiyya community.

According to a Catholic leader, the Catholic Church felt “penalized” whenever a Protestant or Vodouist headed the MFA, of which the BOW is part.  He stated that whenever the Catholic Church criticized government actions, the MFA retaliated by creating long delays for certification of clergy and other routine requests.  Representatives of the Episcopal Church said the registration process was “reasonable and fair.”

According to the World Bank, approximately 75 percent of total primary school enrollment and 82 percent of total secondary school enrollment in the country was in private, usually religious, schools.  The MOE stated that Catholic schools accounted for 15 percent (16 percent of total enrollment) of all schools in the education system, and public schools accounted for 12 percent.  The remaining 73 percent of schools were private institutions either run by Protestant churches (of a wide variety of denominations), secular for-profit, or secular nonprofit organizations.  Although there were no available official statistics, the majority of these were private Protestant institutions, according to the BOW.  The significant expansion of private Protestant institutions was initiated and facilitated in large part by the Jean-Claude Duvalier administration’s national education campaign during the 1970s and 1980s, which required missionaries to build an affiliated school with the construction of any church.

During the 2020-2021 school year, the MOE disbursed a total of 100 million gourdes ($1 million) to religious schools through the National Education Fund:  50 million ($501,000) to Catholic schools; 40 million to Protestant schools ($401,000); and 10 million ($100,000) to Episcopalian schools, which the ministry counted separately from Protestant schools.  The MOE distributed funds roughly in proportion to each religious group’s percent share of the student population.  The Director General of the Office of the National Education Fund stated on November 22 that the same amounts would be disbursed for the 2021-2022 school year.  In 2020, the government signed a three-year agreement with the Catholic Church calling for annual public financial support for Catholic schools, especially those in vulnerable areas, as identified jointly by political and civil society leaders.  By year’s end, there was no announcement regarding funding under this agreement.

The MOE continued to schedule national exams on weekdays instead of Saturdays, which allowed the full participation of Seventh-day Adventist students.

In September, Prime Minister Ariel Henry dismissed the incumbent members of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), seeking to replace them with what he called a “more credible” body of representatives.  Upon dismissing the incumbent members, he invited representatives from civil society to nominate new ones.  Among religious groups that received his request, the Catholic Church and Protestant Federation initially refused to participate in the process to join the CEP on the grounds that the representational institution had become too politicized.  Government officials said they expected Catholic, Protestant, and Vodou communities to nominate members from their respective associations by year’s end; however, at year’s end, none of these communities had nominated new members.  Government officials involved in the procedures for CEP formation stated that the nomination process for the Protestant representative to the CEP was particularly contentious because multiple Protestant coordinating bodies each saw themselves as the rightful representative of the country’s Protestants.

Religious leaders said that rising general insecurity was the issue with the most impact on religious freedom and that armed criminal gangs consistently targeted religious leaders and congregants during the year.  Media reported gangs targeted and killed several religious leaders during the year.  Gang members killed Catholic priest Andre Sylvestre on September 8, after he completed a transaction at a bank in Cap Haitian.  400 Mawozo gang members killed prominent sculptor and houngan (male Vodou priest) Anderson Belony on October 12 during an attack on the artisanal village of Noailles in Croix-des-Bouquets.  The gang also vandalized artists’ studios, as well as Vodou shrines and sacred works.  On September 26, unknown gunmen killed Baptist deacon Sylner Lafaille while he was entering his church in Morne A Tuff for Sunday morning services.  They kidnapped his wife Marie Marthe Laurent Lafaille during the incident and subsequently released her on October 1, after receiving a ransom for an undisclosed amount.  On November 11, unknown bandits in Croix-des-Bouquets believed to be 400 Mawozo gang members attempted to kill Baptist Pastor Stanis Stifinson in an attack that killed his young daughter.  Pastor Stifinson and his young son escaped the attack and survived bullet wounds.

Religious leaders stated that the rising level of violence against them and their communities was a new phenomenon, resulting in numerous victims and significant challenges for the continuation of religious services.  Religious leaders said religious communities were targeted not because of their religion, but rather because gangs believed religious organizations had access to money.  Despite saying that they lived in constant fear, religious leaders stated that the cause was general insecurity, not any particular animosity towards them as religious leaders.  One Vodou leader stated that Vodouists were less likely to be kidnapped due to the perception that Vodouists were poor, while many believed Protestant churches had rich foreign donors.

Media also reported kidnappings for ransom of numerous religious leaders and their congregants during the year.  By year’s end, police had not opened cases or made arrests in any of the crimes.  According to media reports, on each occasion, gangs demanded ransoms in the order of millions of dollars and sometimes received payments for undisclosed amounts.  On January 8, unknown gunmen kidnapped Sister Dachoune Severe, a nun from the Catholic congregation the Little Sisters of Saint Therese of the Child Jesus, in front of her convent in Carrefour and held her until January 10.  Media reports did not mention whether a ransom was paid.  On April 1, unknown gang members kidnapped Seventh-day Adventist clergyman Audalus Estime and three congregants while they were performing music streamed live on Facebook, YouTube, and local radio from a stage in the Gilead Adventist Church in Diquini 63.  They were held until April 5, when unknown individuals paid a ransom for an undisclosed amount.  On April 11, 400 Mawozo gang members kidnapped 10 Catholic clergy, including a French priest and nun, in Croix-des-Bouquets.  Gang members released three of the hostages on April 23 and the others on April 30.  Media reports did not mention whether ransoms were paid.  The Catholic Church postponed numerous church services during the week following the kidnapping (April 11-20) and, after 10 days without progress on the release of the clergy, the Church expanded its protest to a three-day cessation of all activities in all Catholic institutions (April 21-23).  The three-day cessation of activity included the full closure of churches, schools, universities, nonprofit organizations, and Catholic-owned businesses; essential workers at Catholic hospitals and clinics were exempt from the stoppage.  On October 3, 400 Mawozo gang members kidnapped a Haitian-American pastor and two congregants of the Jesus Center Protestant church in Delmas 29 and held them until October 26, when unknown individuals paid a ransom for an unconfirmed amount.  On October 9, unknown gang members kidnapped Pastor Eliodor Devariste of the Free Methodist Church of Parc Chretien in Delmas 28 and held him until October 11, when unknown individuals paid a ransom on his behalf.  The Protestant community led protests as five more persons, some confirmed to be Protestant congregants from local churches, were kidnapped the same week from the same Delmas neighborhood.  It was unclear how long these individuals were held or if ransoms were paid on their behalf.

On October 16, 400 Mawozo gang members kidnapped 16 U.S. citizens and one Canadian (including five children) from the Amish Mennonite missionary group Christian Aid Ministries (CAM) in Croix-des-Bouquets.  The gang released two missionaries on November 21 for medical reasons and another three missionaries on December 5 after, according to the Haitian National Police, individuals unaffiliated with CAM paid a ransom.  The remaining 12 missionaries escaped on December 16; conflicting reports later emerged in the media as to whether individuals unaffiliated to CAM had also paid ransoms on behalf of these victims prior to their escape.

Vodou leaders cited historical injustices and stated that there was still stigmatization against their religion.  They said that some individuals in the Protestant community constituted a considerable concern to them and possibly a threat to their religious freedom.  One Vodou leader said, “Some Protestant pastors preach that Vodou is an evil superstition, and they could ask their followers to attack us if we decide to organize marches.  Our students who attend Protestant schools are forced to deny their identity.”  Another Vodou leader said, “In the past, stigmatization was mostly from the Catholics, who led campaigns against us, but now it mostly comes from Protestant pastors.”

In October, National Council for Haitian Muslims President Landy Mathurin stated, “All Haitians are at risk of violence, not Muslims in particular.”  He continued to say that Muslims did not face any stigmatization and were generally well respected in the country, with Muslim women feeling comfortable wearing the hijab in public.  He said that many young persons tolerated and respected Islam because of some famous Haitian singers and musicians who converted to the faith.

Religions for Peace (RFP), an interfaith organization that included leaders from the Catholic, evangelical Protestant, Episcopalian, and Vodouist communities on its coordinating committee, led many efforts to pursue collaborative religious advocacy.  Throughout the year, RFP issued several open letters calling for peace, solidarity, and respect for human dignity, notably in response to rising violence and kidnappings, the July 7 assassination of President Moise, and an earthquake on August 14.  RFP also acted from September 2019 until April 2021 as the chief facilitator of a peace dialogue that aimed to broker a solution to the Moise-era political and insecurity crisis.  RFP stated in October that it was exploring how a representative from the Muslim community could join the organization as a full council member.  Although formal talks with the Muslim community had not begun by year’s end, Imam Abou Jahman of the Allahou Akbar Spiritual Center in Carrefour-Feuilles often cosigned RFP’s open letters.  Unaffiliated with RFP, Pastor Jean Bilda, President of the Council of Evangelical Churches of Haiti, said his group enjoyed and promoted “harmonious” cooperation with the government, leaders of other religions, and other Protestants.

Embassy officials held regular conversations with government officials and religious leaders to discuss the state of religious freedom and challenges faced by religious groups.  Engagement included focused and interfaith group discussions on promoting religious tolerance, combating stigma, and understanding the rise in targeted attacks against religious leaders, congregations, and missionaries.  The embassy engaged BOW Director General Souffrant on issues of religious freedom, including respect for religious diversity and the varied experiences of different faith communities with the BOW and clergy registration processes.

Senior U. S. government officials visited Port-au-Prince in August, September, and October and met with leaders from a wide variety of religious communities to hear their perspectives on the impact of the political and security crises on religious freedom in the country.  The Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs visited the country on September 30 and participated in an embassy-hosted roundtable with seven major leaders from the Catholic, Episcopalian, Mainstream Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, and Vodou communities to discuss the wide reaching effects of political and security crises in the country.  The Assistant Secretary raised the importance of religious freedom within the context of discussions on widespread gang violence and kidnapping.  During this and other high level visits, religious leaders across every community discussed how gangs impeded their ability to congregate and practice their religions freely but clarified that gangs did not target any specific religious group.

The embassy discussed with religious leaders the challenges of operating in a COVID-19 environment and their views on how to best serve their congregants.  The embassy hosted a roundtable on May 7 with Islamic leaders to discuss their experiences as a relatively new religious minority in the country.  In October, embassy representatives met with leaders of the Vodou community to discuss their status in society and incidents of stigmatization.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 9.3 million (midyear 2021).  According to a CID Gallup poll released in 2020, 48 percent of the population identifies as evangelical Protestant and 34 percent as Roman Catholic.  Other religious groups, each representing less than 5 percent of the population, include The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ), Episcopalians, Lutherans, the Antiochian Orthodox Apostolic Catholic Church, Muslims, Jews, Baha’is, the Moravian Church, and several Anabaptist and Mennonite groups.  Evangelical Protestant churches include the Church of God, Assemblies of God, Abundant Life Church, Living Love Church, International Christian Center, and various Great Commission churches.  Several evangelical Protestant churches have no denominational affiliation.  The Moravian Church has a broad presence in the La Mosquitia Region in the eastern part of the country.  Some indigenous and Afro-descendent groups practice African and Amerindian faiths or incorporate elements of Christianity, African, and Amerindian religions into syncretistic religious practices and beliefs.

According to a representative of the Seventh-day Adventist Association, there are 79,518 members.  The Jehovah’s Witnesses community states it has 23,016 members.  The Muslim community states it has 2,695 members, mostly Sunni; approximately 90 percent are converts.  The Antioquia Orthodox Apostolic Catholic community has approximately 5,000 members.  The Baha’i Faith community counts 1,031 members.  The Jewish community estimates it has 275 members.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the free exercise of all religions as long as that exercise does not contravene other laws or public order.  The constitution prohibits religious leaders from holding public office or making political statements.

Religious organizations may register as legal entities classified as religious associations.  Organizations seeking status as a legal entity must apply to the Ministry of Governance, Justice, and Decentralization and provide information on their internal organization, bylaws, and goals.  Approved organizations must submit annual financial and activity reports to the government to remain registered.  They may apply to the Ministry of Finance to receive benefits, such as tax exemptions and customs duty waivers.  Unregistered religious organizations do not receive tax-exempt status.  The official NGO and religious organization registry office – the Directorate of Regulation, Registration, and Monitoring of Civil Associations (DIRRSAC) – is located within the Ministry of Governance, Justice, and Decentralization.

The law criminalizes discrimination based on religion and includes crimes committed against individuals because of their religion as aggravating circumstances that may increase penalties for criminal offenses.

The constitution states public education is secular and allows for the establishment of private schools, including schools run by religious organizations.  Public schools do not teach religion; however, private schools may include religion as part of the curriculum.  Various religious organizations, including the Roman Catholic Church, Seventh-day Adventist Church, and evangelical Protestant churches, operate schools.  Parents have the right to choose the kind of education their children receive, including religious education.  The government dictates a minimum standardized curriculum for all schools.  Some private religiously affiliated schools require participation of all students, regardless of religious affiliation, in religious studies classes or events to graduate.

The government is a party to the Ibero-American Convention on Young People’s Rights, which recognizes the right to conscientious objection to obligatory military service, including for religious reasons.

The government requires foreign missionaries to obtain entry and residence permits and mandates that a local institution or individual must sponsor a missionary’s application for residency and submit it to immigration authorities.  The government has agreements with the CEH, the Church of Jesus Christ, and Seventh-day Adventists, among others, to facilitate entry and residence permits for their missionaries.  Groups with which the government does not have written agreement are required to provide proof of employment and income for their missionaries.

Foreign religious workers may request residency for up to five years.  To renew their residence permits, religious workers must submit proof of continued employment with the sponsoring religious group at least 30 days before their residency expires.  According to immigration law, individuals who “fraudulently exercise their religious profession or office or commit fraud against the health or religious beliefs of citizens of the country, or the national patrimony” may be fined or face other legal consequences.

The criminal code protects clergy authorized to operate in the country from being required by the court or the Attorney General’s Office to testify regarding privileged information obtained in confidence during a religious confession.  The law does not require vicars, bishops, and archbishops of the Roman Catholic Church and comparably ranked individuals from other legally recognized religious groups to appear in court if subpoenaed.  They are required, however, to make a statement at a location of their choosing.

The official regulations for the penal system state that penitentiaries must guarantee the free exercise of religion without preference for one specific religion, as long as the kind of worship is not against the law or public order.  Prisoners have access to religious counseling from leaders of their faith.

While the government authorizes clergy from all religious groups to conduct marriage ceremonies, by law it recognizes only civil marriages conducted with a lawyer authorized to perform marriage ceremonies.

The official work week is Monday to Saturday, with no exceptions for religious groups that celebrate Friday or Saturday as their Sabbath.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In advance of the November 28 general elections, some religious groups issued public statements encouraging their followers to peacefully participate in the electoral process.  In addition, some religious organizations, such as the Catholic humanitarian organization Caritas and the Association for a More Just Society (a Christian nongovernmental organization [NGO]), participated as civil society election observers during the voting and vote count process.

During the year, the DIRRSAC registered 151 religious associations of a total of 208 applications, compared with a total of 86 applications and 66 registered associations in 2020.  According to the DIRRSAC, it did not deny any registration requests by religious associations during the year, and 57 applications continued to be under review through year’s end.

Representatives of the Seventh-day Adventist Church continued to express concerns that some schools and other public and private institutions did not grant them leave to observe their Sabbath on Saturday because Saturdays were part of the official work week.  They cited specifically the public Francisco Morazan National Pedagogical University and the Catholic University of Honduras in La Ceiba.  They said the Supreme Court had ruled favorably in 2019 on a constitutional challenge that Seventh-day Adventist students filed in 2015 seeking alternatives to taking classes or exams on Saturdays, but these two universities did not uphold that ruling, nor did the government enforce it.  Reportedly, students at both universities requested the institutions comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling.  Other students said they decided not to pursue further recourse due to fear of additional discrimination and retaliation from their professors, or they opted to withdraw from the university.

Some religious organizations, including the evangelical Protestant umbrella organization FIH, which states that 40 religious groups are members and does not have a formalized agreement with the government, said the government continued to give preference to religious groups belonging to the evangelical Protestant umbrella organization CEH, which states its membership includes 360 religious groups.  On September 30, the FIH said the government discriminated against its members in the application of residency permits and a request for tax exemption.  The FIH said the government did not approve or respond to an application for tax exemption for the construction of a religious building or applications for residence permits for its foreign missionaries, while approving similar applications from the CEH, which has an agreement with the government.

At year’s end, CONADEH reported it had not received any complaints of religious discrimination or restrictions on religious freedom.

Muslim community representatives said they continued to receive derogatory messages on social media from members of the evangelical Protestant community, such as “stop infesting our country with false doctrines.”

The FIH reported one of its member churches received negative messages on social media after a pastor died in September of COVID-19.  The messages stated the pastor’s death was a punishment from God because the pastor had made public statements discouraging individuals from getting vaccinated.

Seventh-day Adventists reported the continued refusal of certain private institutions, including places of employment and schools, to permit them to observe Saturday as their Sabbath.  They cited several factories in the department of Cortes and the Catholic University of Honduras in La Ceiba.

The Charge d’Affaires raised with the Minister of Human Rights the importance of religious freedom as a fundamental right and equal treatment under the law for religious groups.  Embassy officials met with officials of the Ministry of Human Rights, the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and CONADEH to discuss issues of religious freedom, including the importance of respect for minority religious groups and for equal treatment under the law for all religious groups.

Embassy officials continued discussions with religious leaders and members of religious communities, including Roman Catholics, CEH, FIH, Orthodox Christians, Seventh-day Adventists, and Muslims, regarding societal violence, poverty, and the COVID-19 pandemic.  The Seventh-day Adventist representative also raised the issue of school and work commitments interfering with their observation of the Sabbath on Saturdays.  On May 18 and October 15, the Charge d’Affaires met with Cardinal Rodriguez Maradiaga to discuss religious freedom, tolerance, and social challenges including violence, migration, and corruption, and the role of the Catholic Church in helping the population address these challenges.

On September 17, the Charge d’Affaires hosted an interfaith roundtable with religious leaders from the evangelical Protestant, Seventh-day Adventist, Muslim, and Baha’i Faith communities to discuss religious freedom and tolerance.  Participants also discussed the Adventists’ continuing difficulties with schools and other private and public institutions that did not grant leave to Seventh-day Adventist students or employees to observe Saturday as their Sabbath and bureaucratic challenges other groups faced, such as updating missionary visa agreements.  In addition, participants exchanged ideas on how religious groups addressed societal inequality, corruption, the role of religious groups in the November presidential and legislative elections, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The embassy amplified local engagement and U.S. State Department leadership messaging on religious freedom topics through the embassy’s social media platforms.  This included a tweet on the embassy’s interfaith roundtable that highlighted the U.S. government’s commitment to supporting international religious freedom and other human rights.

The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), as well as other laws and policies, state that residents have freedom of conscience, freedom of religious belief, and freedom to preach, conduct, and participate in religious activities in public.  The Bill of Rights Ordinance incorporates the religious freedom protections of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  In 2020, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) imposed a broad National Security Law (NSL) for the SAR with the stated aim of combating secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign powers.  The Falun Dafa Association and some churches active in the prodemocracy movement said the government had grown less tolerant since passage of the NSL.  Other religious leaders and advocates stated the NSL did not impair their ability to conduct or attend worship services in conformity with their religious norms; however, they continued to express concern regarding self-censorship and potential PRC targeting of civil society organizations affiliated with religious groups active in the 2019 prodemocracy movement.  An unknown assailant physically attacked the head of the Hong Kong Falun Dafa Association, and unknown assailants vandalized and destroyed printing presses at the contracted printer’s facility of the Falun Gong-affiliated publication Epoch Times.  On April 2 and April 3, masked individuals wielding knives and spray paint destroyed eight Falun Gong public information displays in what the group said appeared to be coordinated attacks across several locations.  In April, Lo Hing-choi, president of the Baptist Convention and a critic of the NSL, resigned and moved abroad, saying he feared government retaliation if he remained in Hong Kong.  In May, the Good Neighbor North District Church, which had supported the prodemocracy movement, ceased operations.  There were reports of emigration of other religious leaders.  Media reported that on October 31, bishops and religious leaders from mainland China briefed Hong Kong Catholic clergymen on the PRC central government’s policy of “Sinicizing” Christianity.  Authorities curtailed activities of Falun Gong practitioners during the year, banning their street kiosks under what practitioners said was a pretext of violating COVID-19 protocols.  In July, several members of the SAR Legislative Council urged the SAR government to outlaw the Falun Dafa Association under the NSL.  In September, an editorial in the PRC-owned media outlet Wen Wei Po called on SAR authorities to ban “cult organizations,” a term the PRC government has historically used to refer to Falun Gong, among other groups.  In April, Wen Wei Po reported that national security police blocked access to the website of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church for internet users in Hong Kong due to “national security” concerns.

In June, an unknown group hung banners defaming Cardinal Joseph Zen, an outspoken critic of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Catholic Church policy on China, around each of the seven Catholic churches that were planning to hold a memorial Mass for the victims of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing.  On May 17, Pope Francis named Reverend Stephen Chow Sau-Yan Bishop of Hong Kong.  The Vatican-affiliated outlet AsiaNews stated Chow was a “balanced” choice between prodemocracy and pro-Beijing camps.  Observers reported Christian churches in Hong Kong continued to provide spiritual and monetary support to underground churches in mainland China.

The U.S. Consul General and staff repeatedly raised concerns regarding the shrinking space for civil society, including religious groups, during meetings with a range of official counterparts in which they also affirmed U.S. government support for protecting freedom of religion and belief.  U.S. officials delivered similar messages to religious leaders, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and community representatives, as well as in public messages.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 7.3 million (midyear 2021).  According to SAR government statistics, there are more than one million followers of Taoism and approximately one million followers of Buddhism; 800,000 Protestants; 404,000 Catholics; 300,000 Muslims; 100,000 Hindus; and 12,000 Sikhs.  The Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, which recognizes the Pope and maintains links to the Vatican, reported approximately 621,000 followers (404,000 local residents and 217,000 residents with other nationalities).  The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints reported it has approximately 25,100 members.  According to the World Jewish Congress, there are approximately 2,500 Jews, primarily expatriates.  Small communities of Baha’is and Zoroastrians also reside in the SAR.  Confucianism is widespread, and in some cases, elements of Confucianism are practiced in conjunction with other belief systems.  The Falun Dafa Association estimates there are approximately 500 Falun Gong practitioners.

There are numerous Protestant denominations, including Baptist, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Lutheran, Methodist, Anglican, the Church of Christ in China, Seventh-day Adventist, and Pentecostal.

Legal Framework

The Basic Law states residents have freedom of conscience, freedom of religious belief, and freedom to preach, conduct, and participate in religious activities in public.  The Basic Law also states the government may not interfere in the internal affairs of religious organizations or restrict religious activities that do not contravene other laws.  The Basic Law calls for ties between the region’s religious groups and their counterparts in mainland China based on “nonsubordination, noninterference, and mutual respect.”  The Basic Law states that religious organizations “may maintain and develop their relations with religious organizations and believers elsewhere.”

The Bill of Rights Ordinance incorporates the religious freedom protections of the ICCPR, which include the right to manifest religious belief individually or in community with others, in public or private, and through worship, observance, practice, and teaching.  The Bill of Rights Ordinance states persons belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their own religion, and use their own language.  The ordinance also protects the right of parents or legal guardians to “ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.”  These rights may be limited when an emergency is proclaimed and the “manifestation” of religious beliefs may be limited by law when necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights of others.  If a state of emergency is proclaimed, the rights may not be limited based solely on religion.

In 2020, the PRC National People’s Congress (NPC) imposed the NSL for Hong Kong.  The law prohibits secession, subversion, terrorism, and “collusion with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security.”  The law states that it shall override local laws if there are inconsistencies.  The NSL states power to interpret the law lies with the NPC Standing Committee, not local courts.

PRC State Administration for Religious Affairs regulations entitled “Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy,” which came into force in mainland China on May 1, which require clergy to pledge allegiance to the CCP and promote the “Sinicization of religion,” do not apply to Hong Kong.

Religious groups are not legally required to register with the government.  They must, however, register to receive government benefits such as tax-exempt status, rent subsidies, government or other professional development training, use of government facilities, or a grant to provide social services.  To qualify for such benefits, a group must prove to the satisfaction of the government that it is established solely for religious, charitable, social, or recreational reasons.  Registrants must provide the name and purpose of the organization, identify its office holders, and confirm the address of the principal place of business and any other premises owned or occupied by the organization.  If a religious group registers with the government, it enters the registry of all NGOs, but the government makes no adjudication on the validity of any registered groups.  Religious groups may register as a society, a tax-exempt organization, or both, provided they have at least three members who hold valid SAR identity documents; the registration process normally takes approximately 12 working days.  The Falun Dafa Association is registered as a society rather than a religious group; as a society, it may establish offices, collect dues from members, and have legal status.

The Basic Law allows private schools to provide religious education.  The government offers subsidies to schools that are built and run by religious groups.  Government-subsidized schools must adhere to government curriculum standards and may not bar students based on religion, but they may provide nonmandatory religious instruction as part of their curriculum.  Teachers may not discriminate against students because of their religious beliefs.  The government curriculum mandates coursework on ethics and religious studies, with a focus on religious tolerance; it also includes elective modules on different world religions.

The NSL stipulates the SAR “shall take necessary measures to strengthen public communication, guidance, supervision and regulation over matters concerning national security, including those relating to schools, universities, social organizations, the media, and the internet.”  Pursuant to the NSL, the Education Bureau issued new guidelines on February 4 to incorporate lessons on “national security” into the government curriculum, beginning at the kindergarten level.  All schools following the Education Bureau curriculum, including those run by religious groups, must incorporate this material.  Private and international schools that do not receive funding from SAR authorities, including those run by religious groups, are not required to follow the new guidelines, but the guidelines state that these schools have the “responsibility to help their students… acquire a correct and objective understanding and apprehension of the concept of national security and the National Security Law.”

Religious groups may apply to the government to lease land on concessional terms through Home Affairs Bureau sponsorship.  Religious groups may apply to develop or use facilities in accordance with local legislation.

The Chinese Temples Committee, led by the Secretary for Home Affairs, has a direct role in managing the affairs of some temples.  The SAR chief executive appoints its members.  The committee oversees the management and logistical operations of 24 of the region’s 600 temples and gives grants to other charitable organizations.  The committee provides grants to the Home Affairs Bureau for disbursement in the form of financial assistance to needy ethnic Chinese citizens.  A colonial-era law does not require new temples to register to be eligible for Temples Committee assistance.

In March, the PRC NPC Standing Committee imposed new measures to amend Hong Kong’s electoral system.  Hong Kong’s majority pro-Beijing legislature passed a bill in May incorporating these measures into local legislation.  The new electoral system creates a nomination and vetting system for all candidates for political office that Beijing and Hong Kong authorities described as designed to ensure that only “patriots” govern Hong Kong.  Hong Kong voters directly elect 20 of the Legislative Council’s newly expanded 90 seats.  Forty of the seats are elected by the Chief Executive Election Committee (CEEC) directly, while 30 are selected as representatives of “functional constituencies” from various economic and social sectors.  The CEEC comprises 1,500 members from five sectors.  The religious subsector, under the third sector (“Grassroots, labor, religious, and other”), is composed of the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, Chinese Muslim Cultural and Fraternal Association, Hong Kong Christian Council, Hong Kong Taoist Association, Confucian Academy, and Hong Kong Buddhist Association.  These six bodies are each entitled to 10 of the 60 seats for the religious subsector on the CEEC.  The religious subsector is not required to hold elections under the Chief Executive Election Ordinance.  Instead, each religious organization selects its electors in its own fashion.  Each of the six designated religious groups is also a member of the Hong Kong Colloquium of Religious Leaders.

Government Practices

The Falun Dafa Association and some churches active in the prodemocracy movement stated the government had grown less tolerant since passage of the NSL.  For example, Falun Gong practitioners reported that SAR authorities shut down their public information kiosks on May 27 and 28 on what practitioners said was the pretext of violating COVID-19 prevention rules under Food and Environmental Hygiene ordinances.  Other religious leaders and advocates stated the NSL did not impair freedom to conduct or attend worship services, although they continued to express concerns regarding self-censorship and potential PRC targeting of civil society organizations affiliated with religious groups active in the 2019 prodemocracy movement.  Archbishop Andrew Chan, the head of the Hong Kong Anglican Church, stated that all religious activities continued to be organized and carried out “as normal” but said preachers were “very cautious to use sensitive terminologies in their homilies.”

Some religious leaders and activists said they were concerned SAR and PRC authorities could target religiously affiliated groups using tactics they repeatedly applied to associations or groups affiliated with the prodemocracy movement.  SAR authorities began investigations into and cut existing government ties with civil society groups, pressuring these groups into disbanding.  Even after threatened groups disbanded, SAR authorities publicly stated that individuals associated with these groups could face further investigations or arrests.  Observers stated these government actions had set numerous legal precedents that undermined fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Basic Law, including freedom of religion.

During the year, Falun Gong practitioners reported that unknown individuals for months surveilled Sarah Liang, head of the Hong Kong Falun Dafa Association, and a journalist with the Falun Gong-affiliated publication Epoch Times.  On May 11, an unidentified man struck Liang more than 10 times with a baseball bat, bruising her legs.  June Guo, director of the Hong Kong edition of the Epoch Times, said the CCP was behind the assault on Liang.

The Epoch Times reported that on April 12, unknown assailants vandalized and destroyed printing presses at its contracted printer, forcing the facility to suspend operations for several days.  Guo stated the safety of the staff at the outlet’s printing plant was a continuing concern.  Falun Gong practitioners reported that no one had been prosecuted for the attacks as of year’s end.

The Falun Dafa Infocenter reported that on April 2 and April 3, masked individuals wielding knives and spray paint destroyed eight Falun Gong public information displays in what the group said appeared to be coordinated attacks across several locations.  At one location, an assailant pushed a volunteer to the ground.  Practitioners said they believed the attacks were instigated by pro-CCP groups.  The Falun Dafa Infocenter spokesperson said, “These violent acts against a religious minority that unfolded in broad daylight on Hong Kong’s streets are a clear indication that basic freedoms, and even the rule of law, are indeed in jeopardy in Hong Kong.”

In August, an unknown group falsely claiming to represent the Falun Dafa Association posted on social media that the group would leave Hong Kong.  The Falun Dafa Association stated it had no plans to leave the city.

Media reported that Baptist pastor Lo Hing-choi, president of the Baptist Convention since May 2018, resigned and moved abroad in April.  According to media, Lo led the Baptist Convention to publicly campaign against the Hong Kong government’s extradition law, and Lo also personally criticized the NSL in June 2020.  In 2019, he openly supported prodemocracy protests, writing articles comparing protesters to Jews facing persecution in the Old Testament.  In July and September 2020, pro-Beijing newspapers such as Ta Kung Pao publicly criticized Lo, reportedly causing him to fear repercussions under the NSL if he remained in Hong Kong.

In May, the Good Neighbor North District Church ceased operations.  Hong Kong police had launched an investigation into the church in December 2020 for alleged money laundering and fraud, arrested two individuals affiliated with the church, and ordered a freeze of the church’s bank accounts.  The church’s former pastor, Roy Chan, who relocated in 2020 to the United Kingdom, continued to state the investigation was an act of political retaliation because some church members had formed a group called “Safeguard Our Generation” in 2019 in an attempt to deescalate violent clashes between police and prodemocracy protesters.  In October, the former pastor said accusations against religious leaders for “inciting subversion” had resulted in self-censorship within local churches and had caused some religious leaders to emigrate.

Reuters reported that on October 31, bishops and religious leaders from mainland China briefed Hong Kong Catholic clergymen on the government’s policy of “Sinicizing” Christianity to bring religious doctrine and practice in line with CCP doctrine.  Clerics who attended or had knowledge of the meeting said that while individual meetings with counterparts in mainland China had occurred in the past, this was the first formal meeting, and that PRC central government officials had arranged and monitored it.

In June, SAR authorities denied permission for gatherings to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing, including the annual vigil in Hong Kong’s Victoria Park, but they did not interfere with memorial masses held at seven Catholic churches around the city honoring the victims of the massacre.  A spokesperson for the Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Diocese, which organized the masses, said that police for the first time questioned the commission about arrangements for the masses and the number of attendees, citing COVID-19 concerns.

Falun Gong practitioners stated they still operated openly and engaged in behavior that remained prohibited in mainland China, including distributing literature, sharing information about the group on social media, and accessing and downloading online materials.  No Falun Gong rallies were permitted during the year due to COVID-19 health restrictions, but practitioners continued to publicly gather in small groups, adhering to COVID-19 restrictions.  Falun Gong practitioners reported the group gathered in front of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government on July 20 to commemorate the 22nd anniversary of the mass arrest of practitioners in mainland China.  Practitioners reported the Hong Kong police instructed them to remove three of their four banners during the event.

Methodist-run Wa Ying College reported difficulties obtaining SAR authorization or funding to renovate school buildings.  The South China Morning Post reported in May that these difficulties may have stemmed from concerns several legislators had regarding the positions many Methodists and the school allegedly took during the prodemocracy protest movement.

In July, several members of the SAR Legislative Council – including Elizabeth Quat, Wong Kwok-kin, and Holden Chow Ho-ding – urged the SAR government to outlaw the Falun Dafa Association under the NSL.  Quat stated the group “aims to subvert state power and should be immediately outlawed,” while Wong called for SAR authorities to freeze the group’s assets.  The SAR Security Secretary promised to investigate the group.

On October 7, pro-PRC Hong Kong media HK01 reported that according to a Hong Kong Public Opinion Exchange Association survey conducted between September 1 and October 5 among 8,855 respondents, 72 percent believed Falun Gong was an “anti-China and Hong Kong” organization that violated the NSL and should be banned.  At a press conference announcing the survey’s findings, Legislative Council member Eunice Yung stated Falun Gong should be banned in Hong Kong “as soon as possible.”  Yung said that Falun Gong had established an “anti-CCP platform” in Hong Kong and called for authorities to investigate the group’s funding sources.

On September 14, an editorial in the PRC-owned media outlet Wen Wei Po identified the Buddhist movement called the True Buddha School as a “cult” and a national security risk.  The editorial requested SAR authorities create legislation banning “cult organizations,” a term that the PRC government has historically used to refer to Falun Gong and the True Buddha School, among other groups, “to prevent Hong Kong from becoming a haven for filth.”

In April, Wen Wei Po reported that national security police blocked access to the website of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church for internet users in Hong Kong due to “national security” concerns.  A pastor of the Church told Radio Free Asia the interference was done in retaliation for the Church’s support of the 2019 prodemocracy movement in Hong Kong and said, “Blocking the site like this is a warning sign that Beijing is extending more mainland China-style restrictions to Hong Kong.”

In the Legislative Council election in December, Peter Koon, the then secretary general of the Province of the Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui (the Anglican Church in Hong Kong), won one of the 40 seats in the Legislative Council elected by the CEEC.

In June, an unknown group hung banners around each of the seven Catholic churches that were planning to hold a memorial Mass for the victims of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing.  The banners contained photographs of Cardinal Joseph Zen, an outspoken critic of the CCP, with the word “devil,” as well as slogans, including “A Cult Has Invaded the Faith” and “Incitement in the Name of Worship.”

Media reported that on May 17, Pope Francis named Reverend Stephen Chow Sau-Yan as the new Bishop of Hong Kong.  Chow, head of Hong Kong’s Jesuit order, replaced Cardinal John Tong, who had served as interim bishop since 2019.  According to one senior cleric, “The security law has made the job a lot more tricky and the pressure is intense.”  The Holy See and the PRC do not have formal diplomatic relations, but the 2018 Sino-Vatican agreement reportedly gives both Chinese authorities and the Holy See a role in the process of appointing bishops in mainland China.  According to Reuters, Vatican officials said the agreement did not apply to Hong Kong; however, some senior clergy stated the PRC was seeking to extend its control over the Diocese of Hong Kong.  The Vatican-affiliated outlet AsiaNews stated Chow was a “balanced” choice between prodemocracy and pro-Beijing camps.  On May 18, Chow told media, “Religious freedom is our basic right.  We want to really talk to the government not to forget that.  It is important to allow religious freedom, matters of faith – not just Catholic – but any religion should be free.”

Observers reported Christian churches in Hong Kong continued to provide underground churches in mainland China with spiritual and monetary support, including Bibles and Christian literature and visits from church members.  Some Hong Kong churches reported that they were able to conduct cross-border online services, while others, including the Catholic Church, reported PRC authorities prohibited individuals in mainland China from attending their online services.

The Consul General and staff repeatedly raised concerns about the shrinking space for civil society, including religious groups, during meetings with a range of official counterparts, although there is no specific Hong Kong government office that regulates religious behavior.  Consulate General Hong Kong officials, including the Consul General, stressed the importance of religious freedom and interfaith dialogue in these meetings with public officials.

Consulate general officials, including the Consul General, also continued to meet with a wide range of religious organizations, including Buddhist, Catholic, Taoist, Jewish, Muslim, Falun Dafa, Sikh, and Protestant religious leaders and adherents, to emphasize the importance of religious freedom and tolerance and to receive reports regarding the status of religious freedom both in Hong Kong and in mainland China.  They also met with NGOs and community representatives regarding the same topics.

Throughout the year, consulate general officials promoted respect for religious traditions by marking traditional religious holidays and visiting local Taoist, Confucian, and Buddhist temples and other religious sites.  At all these events, consulate general officials stressed in public and private remarks the importance of religious freedom, tolerance, and diversity.  Consulate social media posts celebrating International Religious Freedom Day on October 27 and highlighting the Consul General’s visits to religiously affiliated civil society organizations also reflected U.S. government support for the value placed on religious freedom in Hong Kong.

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CHINA | Tibet | Xinjiang | Macau

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 9.7 million (midyear 2021). According to the 2011 national census (the 2021 census was postponed because of COVID-19), which included an optional question on religious affiliation, of the 73 percent of the population that responded, 51 percent identified as Roman Catholic, 16 percent as Hungarian Reformed Church (Calvinist), 3 percent as Lutheran, 2 percent as Greek Catholic, and less than 1 percent as Jewish; 23 percent reported no religious affiliation; and 2 percent said they were atheists.  Other religious groups together constituting less than 5 percent of the population include Greek Orthodox, the Faith Congregation (a Pentecostal group), the COS, Russian and other Orthodox Christian groups, other Christian denominations, Buddhists, Muslims, and the Hungarian Society for Krishna Consciousness.  The Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (MET or the Hungarian Evangelical Brotherhood) has approximately 8,500 members, according to a 2013 news report, and the Hungarian Pentecostal Church approximately 9,300 members, according to the 2011 census.  Local Jewish organizations estimate approximately 100,000 citizens with Jewish heritage live in the country, primarily in Budapest.  Other religious groups are distributed throughout the country.

Legal Framework

The Fundamental Law, the country’s constitution, provides for freedom of conscience and religion, including freedom to choose or change religion or belief, and freedom – alone or in community with others and in public or in private – to manifest religion or belief through religious acts or ceremonies, or in any other way, in worship, practice, and observance.  It prohibits religious discrimination, as well as speech “aimed at violating the dignity” of any religious community.

The constitution’s preamble states, “We recognize the role of Christianity” in preserving the nation and “value the various religious traditions” in the country.  The constitution stipulates separation between religious communities and the state, as well as the autonomy of religious communities.  According to the constitution, the state may, at the request of religious communities, cooperate with them on community goals.  A 2020 constitutional amendment states that children must be guaranteed an “upbringing based on values stemming from our country’s constitutional identity and Christian culture.”

Per a 2019 amendment to the 2011 law on religion, the law establishes a four-tier system of, in descending order, “established (or incorporated) churches,” “registered churches” (also called “registered II”), “listed churches” (also called “registered I”), and “religious associations.”  The term “church” in the law refers to any religious community, not just Christian ones, and religious groups in any category may use “church” in their official names.  All previously incorporated religious groups retained their status in the first tier of the system as established churches.  Parliament must approve recognition of churches as established.  The Budapest-Capital Regional Court has jurisdiction to rule on applications for registration within the other three categories.  Religious groups in all four tiers have legal personality, which grants them legal rights, such as the right to own property.

Religious entities that do not apply for legal status in one of the four tiers are still able to function and conduct worship but are not eligible to receive state funding or income tax contributions from taxpayers.  The law states constitutional protection of freedom of religion also applies to unregistered groups.

To qualify for established church status, a religious group must first have registered status and then conclude a comprehensive cooperation agreement with the state for the purpose of accomplishing community goals.  The government submits the comprehensive agreement to parliament, which must approve it by a two-thirds majority vote.  A registered church becomes an established church from the day parliament approves the comprehensive agreement.  Established churches are eligible to benefit from significant state subsidies for the performance of public service activities.

To qualify for registered church status, a religious group must have received tax allocations from an average of 4,000 persons per year in the five-year period prior to the application.  This status also requires that the group either have operated as a religious association for at least 20 years in the country, or at least 100 years internationally, or have operated as a listed church for at least 15 years in the country or at least 100 years internationally.

To qualify for listed church status, a religious group must receive tax allocations from an average of 1,000 persons per year in the three-year period prior to the application for status and have operated as a religious association for at least five years in the country or for at least 100 years internationally.

To qualify for religious association status, a religious group must have at least 10 members.

The law allows the government to negotiate individual cooperation agreements with all four tiers of religious groups for the performance of public service activities and support of faith-based activities.  The agreements’ duration depends on the status of the religious community, ranging from a five-year maximum for religious associations to 10 and 15 years for listed and registered churches, respectively, and unlimited duration for established churches.  These agreements may be prolonged.

Religious groups that agree not to seek state (including personal income tax allocations) or European Union (EU) funding for their religious activities may qualify as registered or listed churches without fulfilling the requirement regarding the number of personal income tax allocations.  The applicant religious community must perform primarily religious activities and may not be a criminal defendant or have been convicted of a crime during the previous five years, under sanction for “repeated violation of accounting and management rules,” or considered a national security threat.  The court decides whether to grant status as a registered or listed church based on an examination of the criteria above.  In reviewing these applications, the court may consult church law, church history, or ecclesiastical or academic experts, and may also seek the opinion of the national security services.

Religious groups that agree not to seek government or EU funding but accept financial support at a later stage must report it to the court within 15 days of the disbursement of the aid.  To avoid losing its status or a reclassification to the lower association tier, the religious group has eight days to declare to the court that it has returned the funds, requested cancellation of its religious registration status, or complied with the individual tax allocation requirement to become a registered or listed organization.  The religious group or prosecutor’s office may appeal the court’s decision on the status of the group to the Budapest-Capital Court of Appeal.

The law stipulates the minister responsible for church issues, based on information received from the court, shall manage an electronic database of religious groups with legal status, accessible to the public free of charge.  The database is publicly accessible at the government’s central webpage, kormany.hu.

The law allows taxpayers to allocate 1 percent of their income taxes to any religious community in any of the four tiers, starting with the 2020 tax year. Religious groups may use these funds as they wish.  Only established and registered churches (the two highest tiers) are eligible to receive a state subsidy supplementing the 1 percent tax allocations.

According to the law, the Budapest-Capital Regional Court may dissolve a religious community with legal status – with the exception of established churches – if its activities conflict with the constitution or law or if the court rules its registration should have been denied.  Parliament may dissolve an incorporated church if the Constitutional Court finds it is operating in violation of the constitution.  If a religious community is dissolved without a legal successor, its assets, after satisfying creditors, become the property of the state and shall be used for public interest activities.

Thirty-two churches have established (previously known as “incorporated”) status.  These include the Roman Catholic church; a range of Protestant denominations; a range of Orthodox Christian groups; other Christian denominations such as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Seventh-day Adventists, and the Salvation Army; three Jewish groups, the Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities, Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation (EMIH), and the Hungarian Autonomous Orthodox Jewish Community; two Muslim organizations; a Buddhist umbrella organization; and the Hungarian Society for Krishna Consciousness, the sole Hindu group registered as a church.

By law, the state may neither operate nor establish any institution for controlling or monitoring religious groups.  Their doctrines, internal regulations, and statutes are not subject to state review, modification, or enforcement.  Copyright law protects their names, symbols, and rites, while criminal law protects buildings and cemeteries.

The constitution establishes a unified system for the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (ombudsperson).  The ombudsperson investigates cases related to violations of fundamental rights – including religious freedom – and initiates general or specific measures for their remedy.  These measures do not have the force of law.

Treaties with the Holy See regulate relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, including financing of public services and religious activities and settling claims for property seized by the state during the Communist era.  These treaties serve as a model for regulating state relations with other religious groups, although there are some differences in the rights and privileges the state accords to each of the religious groups with which it has agreements.  The state has also concluded formal agreements with the Hungarian Reformed Church, Hungarian Lutheran Church, Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities (Mazsihisz), and four Orthodox churches.

According to the law, established, registered, and listed churches may perform pastoral services in prisons and hospitals.  Other laws indicate religious associations may also have the right to provide services at these facilities.

Military and law enforcement personnel may freely practice their religion in private and also at their workplaces if their religious practice does not violate their mandatory service duties.  The Roman Catholic, Reformed, and Lutheran Churches, and Jewish congregations (which the government generally calls “historical churches”) may provide chaplain services to the military without seeking permission.  Other religious groups must seek permission to offer such services.

Penitentiaries generally allow inmates free practice of religion and provide them with special diets, such as kosher, vegetarian, and pork-free meals.  Historical churches may provide pastoral services in prisons without special permission, but other religious groups may do so only within official visiting hours as outlined in individual agreements and with permission from the penitentiary.  Similarly, historical churches receive automatic access to patients in hospitals to provide pastoral services, while other groups may do so only under certain conditions, such as providing services only during visiting hours.

One hour per week of education in faith and ethics or general ethics is mandatory through the first eight grades of public school.  Parents and students choose between the faith and ethics class offered by an established church of their choosing or a secular ethics course taught by public school teachers.  Other religious groups are not entitled to provide religious education as part of the mandatory curricula in public schools but may offer extracurricular, optional religious education in public schools at the request of parents or students.  Private schools are not required to offer faith and ethics or general ethics classes.

All religious groups registered in one of the four categories have the right to open their own schools.  The state provides a subsidy, based on the number of students enrolled, for employee salaries at all such schools.  Only established churches automatically receive a supplementary subsidy for the schools’ operating expenses.  Other religious groups may apply for a supplementary operational subsidy, and the Ministry of Human Capacities (MHC) may sign an individualized contract with them to cover these costs.

The law also affords all religious groups with legal status the right to assume operation of public schools if more than 50 percent of the parents and adult students enrolled at the school sign a petition to do so and the MHC approves the change.  In these cases, the state may continue to fund the schools.  Whether newly established or converted from public status, religious schools are free to conduct their own religious teaching without government input and to make faith education mandatory and not substitutable with an ethics class.  The state inspects both religious and public schools every two years to ensure they conform to legal standards.

The constitution prohibits speech that violates the dignity of any religious community.  The law prohibits both incitement to violence and incitement to hatred against a religious community or its members, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment.  The law provides a maximum punishment of three years in prison for impeding others through violence or threats from freely exercising their religion or abusing individuals because of their religious affiliation.

Assault motivated by the victim’s actual or presumed religious affiliation is a felony punishable by one to five years in prison.  Violence against a member of the clergy is classified as violence against an “individual providing public service” and is also punishable with a prison sentence of one to five years.  Any person who engages in preparation for the use of force against any member of a religious community is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two years.

The law prohibits public denial, expression of doubt, or minimization of the Holocaust, genocide, and other crimes against humanity committed by the National Socialist or Communist regimes, punishing such offenses with a maximum sentence of three years in prison.  The criminal code makes wearing, exhibiting, or promoting in public the swastika, the logo of the Nazi SS, or the symbol of the Arrow Cross – a fascist, antisemitic party that allied with Nazi Germany – in a way that harms the human dignity or the memory of Holocaust victims a misdemeanor, punishable by five to 90 days’ detention.

The law provides for the lifting of official immunity of an MP who incites hatred against religious groups or publicly denies crimes of the Communist or National Socialist regimes.  No MP has been the subject of such a proceeding.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

During the year, the government provided 134 billion forints ($410.64 million) to established churches (compared with 216.4 billion forints – $663.15 million – during 2020), of which 91 percent – 122.3 billion forints ($374.79 million) – went to the four historical churches.  The Roman Catholic Church received 80 billion forints ($245.16 million), the Reformed Church 34.1 billion forints ($104.50 million), the Evangelical Church 5.2 billion forints ($15.94 million), Mazsihisz 2.2 billion forints ($6.74 million), EMIH 524 million forints ($1.61 million), and the Jewish Orthodox community 260 million forints ($797,000).  The religious groups that received the bulk of the government’s financial support used the funds for such activities as building maintenance; public educational and social services; religious instruction and cultural activities; community programs and investments; employee wages, and faith-based activities for citizens living abroad.

According to statistics the tax authority published on September 13, 136 churches and religious groups received 1 percent personal income tax allocations during the year.  As in previous years, the churches receiving the most allocations were the Roman Catholic Church, with 740,326 persons contributing 4.3 billion forints ($13.18 million); Hungarian Reformed Church, with 309,825 persons contributing 1.8 billion forints ($5.52 million); and Lutheran Church, with 82,701 persons contributing 508 million forints ($1.56 million).  The Hungarian Society for Krishna Consciousness ranked fourth, with 73,890 persons contributing 472 million forints ($1.45 million).  MET, which collected 1 percent personal income tax allocations for the first time since the 2011 modification of the religion law, ranked fifth, with 39,815 persons contributing 315 million forints ($965,000). Among Jewish groups, Mazsihisz received the largest allocation.

According to the PMO, during the 2021-2022 school year, churches or church-run higher educational institutions operated 19.6 percent of elementary and secondary schools (compared with 17.1 percent in 2019-20), and religious associations operated 0.4 percent.  Churches or church-run higher educational institutions operated 9.2 percent of preschools (with students aged three to seven), compared with 10 percent run by incorporated churches in the previous year, and religious associations operated 0.2 percent.  There were 217,169 students – 52.6 percent of whom were in Catholic schools – studying at preschools and elementary and secondary schools operated by churches and religious organizations, compared with 222,944 in the previous year.

Independent media reported in August that the government provided 10 billion forints ($30.64 million) to the preschool development program of the Roman Catholic Church during the year.  The government also allotted an additional 3.5 billion forints ($10.73 million) for educational development projects of the Reformed Church and the Catholic Churches.

For the school year beginning in September, the MHC withdrew complementary funding from MET’s educational institutions, attended by approximately 2,200 mostly Roma children.

Works of writers widely viewed as antisemitic, including member of the Arrow Cross Party Jozsef Nyiro and convicted war criminal Albert Wass, remained mandatory reading material in elementary and secondary public schools.

In a program broadcasted by public Kossuth Radio in March, a historian discussed the Numerus Clausus Law of 1920 and stated the law was not about the deprivation of rights, but only the limitation of rights.  The law, enacted under Regent Miklos Horthy, capped the number of Jews allowed to attend universities and is regarded by the Jewish community as the first antisemitic law in the country’s interwar period.  (Horthy was the leader of the World War II-era Hungarian state.  He allied the country with Nazi Germany and deported more than 400,000 Jews to Nazi death camps.)

In January, the first instance Budapest-Capital Regional Court rejected a complaint filed by MP and deputy faction leader of the Christian Democratic People’s Party Imre Vejkey regarding a cartoon by Gabor Papai published by the daily independent Nepszava in 2020.  The cartoon showed the chief medical officer, who oversaw the government’s COVID-19 pandemic response, looking at Jesus on the cross and saying, “his underlying conditions caused” his death.  According to media commenters, the cartoon satirized what critics viewed as the chief medical officer’s attempt to minimize the number of deaths in the country that were attributable to COVID-19.  The appeals court stated on June 3 that the cartoon infringed the plaintiff’s right to human dignity as a member of the Christian community.  The ruling also ordered the newspaper to pay 400,000 forints ($1,200) plus court costs to Vejkey and to publish an apology on the front page. The newspaper published the apology on June 25, but it announced on July 2 that it had requested the Supreme Court (Curia) to review the lower court’s decision.  At year’s end, there was no information on whether the Supreme Court had agreed to review the case.

On February 5, the Constitutional Court ruled in a seven-year-long case involving the cover page of independent weekly newspaper HVG, entitled “Nagy Haracsony” (a play on words with the terms “Great Christmas” and “great grab-all”).  The Constitutional Court ruled that the cover was protected by freedom of speech and was not intended to offend the Christian community.

In February, media reported a local municipality in Budapest did not extend a property use agreement with the town’s only Jewish broadcaster, Heti TV (Weekly TV).  The municipality said that due to financial difficulties, it intended to make the space available to bidders.  Station founder Peter Breuer criticized the move and the station continued to operate at a new location.

In March, Deputy PM Zsolt Semjen signed a cooperation agreement with the Hungarian Jewish Prayer Association (Zsima), a Jewish organization established in October 2020.  The agreement entailed state funding in the amount of 51 million forints ($156,000) annually until 2025.

The COS reported that on April 28, the DPA raided the storage facility of its Budapest mission and seized one-third of its religious files on its members.  The DPA confiscated the remaining folders on May 26.  These raids were the continuation of the DPA’s 2017 investigation into the COS’s alleged criminal abuse of personal data, in which the DPA seized COS documents at the group’s offices in in Budapest and Nyiregyhaza and fined the COS 40 million forints ($123,000).  The Constitutional Court rejected the appeals petition of the Nyiregyhaza COS mission of the DPA’s 2017 seizure of its documents, while a similar appeals petition of the Budapest COS mission remained pending at year’s end.

On May 27, the NAV raided the homes of dozens of COS members in a criminal case involving alleged tax fraud.  The NAV took four persons to its headquarters in handcuffs.  The COS also reported that the NAV put a lien on the building of the Central Church.  According to the COS, its appeals of government decisions to revoke the residence permit of a Russian Ukrainian missionary couple in 2019 and expel a Kazakh missionary in 2020 were unsuccessful and the decisions became final.

The list of religious associations and listed churches was available at a dedicated webpage maintained by the PMO.  Court decisions regarding the registration process for registered churches, listed churches, and religious associations were available at the central website of the courts, birosag.hu.

The PMO reported that some religious groups were eligible for a simplified registration procedure.  Under the simplified procedure, religious groups did not need to establish the number of persons making income tax allocations to them in prior years or allocations from before 2012, the year when the religion law entered into force.  A total of 15 groups reapplied under the simplified procedure.  At year’s end, there were 234 groups registered as religious associations and 12 listed as churches, including 10 groups which had had applications pending before the amendment to the religion law entered into force in 2019.  According to the PMO, the Budapest-Capital Regional Court rejected two applications, and one remained pending.  The two rejected religious groups were registered as religious associations.  The number of established churches remained unchanged at 32.

The PMO also stated no religious groups qualified for registered church status during the year because they could not meet the requirement of receiving income tax allocations from an average of at least 4,000 persons per year in the previous five years, a period which could only begin in 2019 or later.  The number of registered churches therefore remained zero.  MET appealed the Budapest-Capital Regional Court’s decision to register it as a listed church and requested classification as a registered church.  That appeals process was ongoing at year’s end.

The Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU) – or TASZ in Hungarian – an NGO that represented some religious groups deregistered following the 2011 adoption of the religion law that established a new reregistration process and a tiered system for churches, reported it would not continue domestic or international legal challenges after the Constitutional Court in 2020 rejected its petition that the amended religion law was discriminatory and did not sufficiently address concerns related to its 2011 version.

The HCLU continued the monitoring of, and international advocacy for, the enforcement of the 2014 European Court of Human Rights ruling that the religion law violated freedom of religion and caused monetary damages to the deregistered churches.  The 2014 judgment required the government to reach an agreement with the applicant churches on the restoration of their status and on just compensation for any damages.  The HCLU said it was also assessing whether state financing for certain churches led to their overrepresentation in educational and social institutions, thereby compromising the state’s neutrality in religion.

In February, the NAV debited MET’s bank account for what it said were tax and social security arrears in the amount of approximately 250 million forints ($766,000).  MET’s leader, Pastor Gabor Ivanyi, stated MET would be able to pay its outstanding bills if the state would compensate it for damages sustained in 2016-2019 stemming from the group’s loss of church status.  The pastor added that losing its established church status had also made MET ineligible to receive a government supplement matching the 1 percent personal income tax allocations from Church members.  Separately, in September 2020, MET concluded an agreement with the state-owned utility company to delay payment of outstanding bills until April.  The company had threatened to disconnect MET’s institutions from the gas network in 2020 due to nonpayment.  MET stated that its deregistration as a state-recognized church in 2011 and state administrative measures against the Church in 2020 and 2021 were a retaliation for MET’s leader and Pastor Ivanyi’s public criticism and questioning of PM Orban’s claims that he governed by Christian principles.

The government concluded a research project it had been conducting for several years regarding the value of Jewish heirless and unclaimed property, but in January, in a letter addressed to the WJRO, the government stated for the first time that its 2007 settlement with the WJRO represented “definitive satisfaction of compensation claims” and that under the constitution adopted by the government in 2011, it was “no longer possible to pay restitution for any abandoned Jewish property, whether in or outside Hungary.”  The WJRO disagreed with the government position and sought further negotiations.  Discussions between the government and the WJRO on the compensation issue resumed in October, but by year’s end, the government had not proposed a negotiation roadmap or target date.

In April, Mazsihisz announced that two Orthodox Jewish groups, EMIH and the Hungarian Orthodox Jewish Community, had requested the revision of the government-paid restitution annuity for confiscated Jewish properties, and sued Mazsihisz at the Jerusalem Supreme Rabbinical Court.  In June, the court (which holds no legal jurisdiction in Hungary), in a nonbinding injunction, called on the government to freeze the payments until new criteria for the division of the annuity were defined.  At year’s end, the government had not changed the distribution of the restitution annuity.

According to the COS, the Csongrad County Government Office again failed to act on a certificate of occupancy application by the COS for its headquarters in Budapest.  The application had remained pending since 2017, despite a 2017 Budapest Administrative and Labor Court ruling that the county office process the COS’s application by March 2018.  The COS said it had received no explanation for the continued delay.  An extant court order allowed the COS to continue to use the building.

The Organization of Muslims in Hungary (OMH) reported that the municipality-owned Budapest Funeral Institute provided cemetery space for Muslims, but that Islamic burials required a permit issued by the Hungarian Islamic Community (HIC), the other Muslim organization, for which the HIC charged a fee of approximately 50,000 forints ($150).  OMH members expressed concerns about this practice.  Other than in the capital, OMH reported there was a limited amount of cemetery space in the city of Pecs.  The restoration of the state-owned Yakovali Hasan Mosque in Pecs, ongoing since 2019, remained pending, which prevented the local Muslim community from using the mosque as a place of worship.

On June 10, the renovated Rumbach Synagogue in Budapest – which served as a Jewish deportation point in 1941 – reopened as a place of worship and culture for the first time since the 1950s.  The government supported the renovation with 3.2 billion forints ($9.81 million).  Senior officials of the World Jewish Congress attended the opening ceremony.

On August 29, a ceremony marked the completion of the renovation of a Mazsihisz-operated Jewish hospital in Budapest.  Minister of Human Capacities Miklos Kasler stated at the opening ceremony that the government provided five billion forints ($15.32 million) for the reconstruction of the hospital as part of its efforts to ensure that hospitals run by faith-based groups played a significant role in the national healthcare system.  The facility was the only Jewish hospital in the country and served both Jewish and non-Jewish patients, some of whom were Holocaust survivors.

According to the OMH, Muslims serving prison sentences continued to receive meals containing pork meat or pork fat regularly, despite complaints that it violated their religious dietary practices.

On May 1, Fidesz cofounder and media personality Zsolt Bayer wrote in the government-aligned newspaper Magyar Nemzet that the U.S. Secretary of State, who has Hungarian ancestry, was a “rootless Hungarian” and a “rootless American,” which many interpreted as a classic antisemitic trope.  Bayer has a long history of antisemitic writings and statements.  He has high profile platforms on government-aligned media outlets and received a prestigious government award in 2016.

In June, Laszlo Toroczkai, president of the Mi Hazank (Our Homeland) Party, which is widely described as extreme right and has seats in parliament and in local municipalities, wrote that European nations should stand on their own feet and needed “neither Jews nor Palestinians.”  In August, he commemorated the members of Ragged Guard, a paramilitary unit active in the interwar period, whose leader Ivan Hejjas was responsible for killing and robbing hundreds of Jews.  On his social media channel, he said in October that certain influential businessmen and politicians with Jewish roots were using the COVID-19 pandemic to create a new world order.  In February, the deputy president of the Mi Hazank Party, Elod Novak, gave a speech at an event commemorating Regent Horthy.

In September, the Hungarian Baptist Church signed a cooperation agreement with the government to carry out religious, educational, social, and cultural activities.

On September 12, Prime Minister Orban met with Pope Francis, who celebrated the closing Mass of the International Eucharistic Congress, a week-long gathering of the Roman Catholic Church held in Budapest.  Following their meeting, PM Orban wrote on his Facebook page, “I asked Pope Francis not to let Christian Hungary perish.”

At an international conference on antisemitism and Holocaust remembrance on October 13 in Sweden, Minister for Family Affairs Katalin Novak said that [Holocaust] remembrance was “extremely important” for the government.  She called for a continuous fight against manifestations of antisemitism.

Government officials continued to make statements in defense of a “Christian Europe” and against Muslim immigration.  On September 1, PM Orban stated at the Bled Strategic Forum in Slovenia that present-day migrants were “all Muslims” who changed the cultural identity of Europe.  On September 9, he said at the opening of the academic year at the Mathias Corvinus Collegium, a private educational institution, that during the “Muslim flood [of immigrants],” the West was unable to confront its own historical mission.  On September 27, Orban stated at a church consecration, “Hungarians can only survive as Christians, and each new church is a bastion in the nation’s struggle for freedom and greatness.” He added that since 2010, there had been 150 new churches built and more than 3,000 churches renovated in the country and in the Carpathian basin (former Hungarian territories currently inhabited by ethnic Hungarians).

On October 14, head of the PMO Gergely Gulyas stated at a government-sponsored conference organized in the framework of the country’s Council of Europe presidency, “In Western Europe, we can no longer speak of Christian democracy in its original and Central European sense.”

In October, Peter Barnabas Farkas, deputy mayor in the town of Ozd and member of the Jobbik Party, resigned from his position after two photos of him from 2018 emerged in which he appeared to be giving a Nazi salute in front of the Holocaust Museum in Poland.  Farkas later apologized and visited the Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest.

On October 23, the anniversary of the 1956 revolution, PM Orban accused the opposition of competing to represent the interests of a certain Jewish-American financier and the EU, who were aiming to “take Hungary from the hands of Mary and place it at the feet of Brussels.”

In November, the Chief Rabbi of EMIH, Slomo Koves, told press that the House of Fates, a proposed new Holocaust museum and education center in Budapest owned by EMIH, would likely be ready to open by 2024.  Leading Jewish groups and Holocaust scholars have criticized the museum concept as an attempt to obscure the role of the World War II-era Hungarian state and its leader, Miklos Horthy, in the Holocaust.

In a report on the instrumentalization of antisemitism in European politics issued in February, the Anti-Defamation League, an international NGO, stated the government used coded antisemitism in campaigns – beginning at the end of 2015 – against EU migration policies, following the arrival of more than a million migrants from the Middle East.  The report cited what it described as the government’s demonization of a well-known Jewish-American financier of Hungarian origin.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

In January, the independent online news outlet 444.hu published a documentary about the crimes committed by a group of Hungarian Arrow Cross Party members against Jewish inhabitants of Budapest’s twelfth district during World War II, and about the controversial turul statue erected in the district in 2005.  While the statue officially commemorates civilian victims of the Allied bombing and the Soviet siege of Budapest in 1944-45, experts have stated that the turul bird (a large, mythical bird of prey) was a well-known symbol of right-wing extremist groups during the interwar period and that the statue continued to serve as a gathering place for such groups.  Historians said in 2019 that the names carved into the statue contain at least 22 Arrow Cross gang members who massacred Jews in Budapest, including current Fidesz district mayor Zoltan Pokorni’s grandfather.  In a press conference on February 1, Pokorni, who in 2020 had ordered that his grandfather’s name be removed from the statue, rejected historians’ suggestion that the memorial be turned into one for fallen World War I soldiers.  He proposed that the statue remain but that it should include “a very detailed guide” to the turul symbol.

In September, the Brussels-Based NGO Action and Protection League issued the results of its European antisemitism survey based on data from December 2019-January 2020.  According to the survey, 25 percent of 1,000 respondents ages 18-25 in Hungary said they had negative feeling toward Jews.  Thirty-six percent said they would be “totally uncomfortable” or “uncomfortable” with having Jewish neighbors.  The survey cited stereotypical statements regarding Jews and asked respondents the degree to which they agreed or disagreed.  The proportion who responded “strongly agree” or “tend to agree” with the following statements were:  “the interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population” (34 percent); “there is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world” (39 percent); “Jews have too much influence in this country” (28 percent); “Jews will never be able to fully integrate into this society” (30 percent); “Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals” (27 percent); “many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later” (16 percent); “Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them” (31 percent); “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes” (39 percent).

The Foundation reported 30 antisemitic incidents in 2020, the most recent data available, compared with 35 in the previous year.  These were six cases of vandalism, one threat, one case of discrimination, and 22 cases of hate speech.

In July, Mazsihisz president Andras Heisler presented the results of a 2019-2020 survey prepared by Median independent public opinion pollster and commissioned by Mazsihisz.  Heisler stated that while the number of physical attacks and vandalism cases was low compared with Western Europe, hate speech, conspiracy theories, and antisemitism in public life increased between 2019 and 2020, and the Mi Hazank Party, widely described as extreme right, was among the most common perpetrators of antisemitic incidents and hate speech.  According to the survey, there were 70 antisemitic incidents in 2020, up from 53 in the previous year.  Citing 2019 data, head of the Median public opinion pollster Endre Hann said that 36 percent of Hungary’s adult population could be characterized by some degree of antisemitism, including antisemitic prejudice and attitudes toward Jews.

Muslim organizations stated they did not collect statistical data because, according to one member, they lacked the capacity to do so.  However, OMH reported that while physical assaults were rare, verbal insults and hateful emails and phone calls were frequent, in particular against persons wearing headscarves or who had darker skin and spoke a foreign language.  For instance, according to OMH, individuals often referred to Muslims as “terrorists” and told them to “get out of here.”

OMH also reported a higher number of online insults on social media during the 20th anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks.  According to OMH, the majority of the population regarded Muslims with suspicion.

As in previous years, domestic and international extreme-right and neo-Nazi groups marked the anniversary of the breakout attempt by Hungarian and German troops on February 11, 1945, during the Soviet Red Army’s siege of Budapest.  Despite COVID-19 pandemic restrictions on public gatherings, approximately 100 persons took part in an organized reenactment hike along the route of the attempted siege-breakers in Budapest.  The Hungarian chapter of the international neo-Nazi group Blood and Honor organized the event.  Ahead of the event, one of its organizers published an opinion piece in the government-aligned media outlet Magyar Nemzet entitled “Glory to the Heroes.”  In the article, the author compared Hungarian and German soldiers who attempted the breakout to the great heroes of Hungarian history.

In June, a soccer fan affiliated with Kispest, a Budapest Honved football club, posted a photo on social media with a text that ended, “Heil Hitler.”  In September, independent media reported that Kispest Youth, also called Militant Jugend Kispest, painted swastikas and 88 (a common symbol for “Heil Hitler,” as H is the eighth letter of the alphabet) onto buildings in the Kispest district and wore red-white-black shirts with swastikas on photos that were posted on social media.

In July, TEV reported that swastikas were painted on a company’s building in Szeged and on the pavement in Szolnok.  Also in July, a private property in Leanyfalu displayed a picture of Hitler with the text “Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuhrer.”  Police initiated an investigation.  In 2020, an SS flag was hung from the facade of the same house.  Police first dismissed that case, but the prosecutor’s office reopened it as involving public use of a totalitarian symbol.  In June, a passerby told two Jewish teenagers in Budapest to “go to Auschwitz,” and in May, a guard at a drugstore in Budapest was fired for calling a customer a “filthy Jew.”

According to press reports, a team of international volunteers was working to restore the neglected Kozma Street Cemetery in Budapest, one of the largest Jewish cemeteries in the world, with an area of 77 hectares (190 acres) and containing approximately 300,000 graves.  At midyear, the volunteers had reportedly cleaned up 20 percent of the cemetery.

In October, the Christian-Jewish Council, an informal platform for discussion among Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed, and Baptist Churches and Jewish groups, held a conference on the role of families in religion, with the participation of members of Christian and Jewish groups.

During a visit to the country in September, Pope Francis met with representatives of Christian churches and Jewish communities and said that antisemitism is a “fuse which must not be allowed to burn.”

In meetings and discussions with the government, including officials from the PMO in charge of church and Jewish issues, the Charge d’Affaires and embassy representatives advocated restitution of heirless Jewish property seized during the Holocaust and discussed provisions of the religion law, including the registration process for religious groups.

The Charge d’Affaires and embassy officials also discussed heirless property restitution with the WJRO.

In June, the Charge d’Affaires dedicated a room in the embassy building to the memory of Carl Lutz, credited with saving the lives of more than 62,000 Hungarian Jews.  As a Swiss vice consul, Lutz operated out of the building, likely from the room where the ceremony was held, while Switzerland looked after U.S. property and interests between 1942 and 1945.  Members of the Jewish community attended the event, which the embassy also highlighted on its social media accounts.

In August, the Charge d’Affaires delivered a speech at an event commemorating the birth of Swedish diplomat and honorary citizen of the United States Raoul Wallenberg, who saved thousands of Hungarian Jews while serving in Budapest between 1944 and 1945.  His speech emphasized the importance of education about the Holocaust and the rejection of antisemitism, and the embassy highlighted it on its social media accounts.  In November, the Charge d’Affaires joined the global initiative of the International March of the Living, an international educational program on the history of the Holocaust, to call attention to the anniversary of Kristallnacht, or the Night of Broken Glass, the 1938 Nazi pogrom.  In his remarks delivered in front of the Dohany Street Synagogue in Budapest, he highlighted the U.S. commitment to Holocaust remembrance and combating antisemitism, racism, and intolerance.

Embassy officials also facilitated cooperation between U.S. and Hungarian authorities regarding proper handling of Jewish historic artifacts stolen from Jewish communities in the country during World War II, including from Hungary, that were set to be auctioned in the United States.

The embassy maintained regular contact with leaders of various religious communities, including the four historical groups, as well as Muslims, the COS, and religious groups that lost incorporated church status in 2011, such as MET, Bet Orim, and Sim Shalom, to understand their concerns.  During these discussions, embassy officials discussed the effects of the religion law, antisemitism, and anti-Muslim rhetoric.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 354,000 (midyear 2021).  According to January figures from Statistics Iceland, members of the ELC make up 62.3 percent of the population; persons not belonging to any religious group, 7.6 percent; Roman Catholic Church, 4.0 percent; Free Lutheran Church in Reykjavik, 2.7 percent; Free Lutheran Church in Hafnarfjordur, 2.0 percent; Asatruarfelagid (Icelandic paganism), 1.4 percent; Icelandic Ethical Humanist (Sidmennt) 1.1 percent; and other Christian, non-Christian, and “life-stance” groups, 15.0 percent.  The Association of Muslims in Iceland estimates there are approximately 3,000 resident Muslims, primarily of immigrant origin.  The Jewish community reports there are approximately 300 resident Jews.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes the ELC as the national church and stipulates the government shall support and protect it.  The constitution states all individuals have the right to form religious associations and practice religion in accordance with their personal beliefs, as long as nothing is “preached or practiced which is prejudicial to good morals or public order.”  It stipulates everyone has the right to remain outside religious associations and no one shall be required to pay personal dues to any religious association of which he or she is not a member.  The constitution also specifies individuals may not lose their civil or national rights and may not refuse to perform civic duties on religious grounds.  The constitution bans only religious teachings or practices harmful to good morals or public order.  The law further specifies the right of individuals to choose or change their religion.

The law grants the ELC official legal status, and the government directly funds it from the state budget.  Under the 2019 subsidiary agreement between the government and the ELC, which entered into force on January 1, 2020, the ELC Bishop, Vice Bishop, and other ELC ministers and general staff no longer have civil service status and are no longer paid directly by the government.  The Church pays salaries, benefits, and operating costs out of its own budget, which comes from an annual government lump-sum payment.  The ELC also receives funding from government-levied church taxes, as do other registered religious and life-stance groups.

The government passed in June a new law formally codifying outstanding issues from the 2019 subsidiary agreement between the ELC and the state.  The act designates the ELC as the chief authority on the allocation of its finances and internal structure and designates the ELC Assembly as its governing body.  The act builds upon amendments passed by parliament in June 2020 that replaced multiple ELC funding streams with a lump-sum contribution and ended government subsidies for funeral services provided by religious and secular groups, including the ELC.

The penal code establishes fines of no specified amount and up to two years’ imprisonment for hate speech, including mocking, defaming, denigrating, or threatening a person or group based on religion by comments, pictures, or symbols, or disseminating materials that do so.

Religious groups other than the ELC and life-stance organizations may apply for recognition and registration.  Only registered groups are eligible for state funding and entitled to legal recognition of religious ceremonies, such as marriages, that they perform.  Groups apply for recognition to the district commissioner’s office that covers the administration of religion on a national level (currently the district commissioner of Northeast Iceland), which forwards the application to a four-member panel that by law the Minister of Justice appoints to review applications.  The University of Iceland faculty of law nominates the chairman of the panel, and the university’s Departments of Social and Human Sciences, Theology and Religious Studies, and History and Philosophy, respectively, nominate the other three members.  The district commissioner then approves or rejects the application in accordance with the panel’s decision.  Applicants may appeal rejections to the MOJ, resubmitting their application to the district commissioner with additional information.  The same four-member panel reviews appeals.

To register, a religious group must “practice a creed or religion,” and a life-stance organization must operate in accordance with certain ethical values and “deal with ethics or epistemology in a prescribed manner.”  The law does not define “certain ethical values” or the prescribed manner in which groups must deal with ethics or epistemology.  Religious groups and life-stance organizations must also “be well established,” “be active and stable,” “not have a purpose that violates the law or is prejudicial to good morals or public order,” and have “a core group of members who participate in its operations, support the values of the organization in compliance with the teachings it was founded on, and pay church taxes in accordance with the law on church taxes.”  The law does not define “well established” or “active and stable.”

According to the district commissioner’s Office of Northeast Iceland, which covers the administration of religion on a national level, any unregistered religious group or organization may work in the same way as any company or association, provided it has, as the other organizations do, a social security number.  Unregistered religious groups may, for example, open bank accounts and own real estate.  Members are free to worship and practice their beliefs without restriction as long as their activities do not cause a public disturbance, incite discrimination, or otherwise conflict with the law.

The law specifies the leader of a registered religious group or a life-stance organization must be at least 25 years of age and fulfill the general requirements for holding a public position.  These include being physically and mentally healthy and financially independent, not having been sentenced for a criminal offense as a civil servant, and possessing the general and specialized education legally required for the position.  Unlike the requirements for most public positions, a religious or life-stance group leader need not be a citizen but must have legal domicile in the country.  All registered religious groups and life-stance organizations must submit an annual report to a district commissioner’s office (currently the district commissioner’s Office of Northeast Iceland) describing the group’s operations during the previous year.  Registered religious groups and life-stance organizations are required to perform state-sanctioned functions, such as marriages and the official naming of children, and preside over other ceremonies, such as funerals.

The law provides state subsidies to registered religious groups and life-stance organizations.  For each individual 16 years of age or older who belongs to any of the officially registered and recognized religious groups or life-stance organizations, the government allocates an annual payment from income taxes, called the “church tax,” to the individual’s respective registered organization.  The per capita payment amount varies every year according to the annual budget bill.  The government allocates the payment regardless of whether the individual pays any income tax.  The government registrar’s office (“Registers Iceland”), which describes itself on its website as the government office that maintains records of basic information on everyone who is or has been domiciled in the country as well as citizens residing abroad, maintains a tally of the number of members of each registered group, records the religious affiliation or nonaffiliation of each citizen at birth, and adjusts the information if individuals report a change.

Persons who are not members of a registered organization are still required to pay the church tax, but the government retains their contributions as general revenue rather than allocating them to religious or life-stance organizations.

By law, a child’s affiliation or nonaffiliation with a registered religious or life-stance group is determined as follows:  (1) if the parents are married or in registered cohabitation and both belong to either the same registered organization or no organization, then the child’s affiliation shall be the same as its parents; (2) if the parents are married or in registered cohabitation, but have different affiliations or if one parent is nonaffiliated, then the parents shall make a joint decision on which organization, if any, the child should be affiliated with, and until the parents make this decision, the child shall remain nonaffiliated; (3) if the parents are not married or in registered cohabitation when the child is born, the child shall be affiliated with the same registered organization, if any, as the parent who has custody over the child.  A change in affiliation of children younger than 16 requires the consent of both parents if both have custody; if only one parent has custody, the consent of the noncustodial parent is not required.  The law requires parents to consult their children regarding any changes in the child’s affiliation between the ages of 12 and 16.  After turning 16, children may choose affiliation on their own.

In January, amendments to the Gender Autonomy Act entered into force concerning permanent changes to the gender characteristics (defined in the act as “biological factors related to gender, such as sex chromosomes, hormonal functions, gonads, and genitalia”) of children under the age of 16.  Consistent with standard legislative practice, parliament published supporting justification and elaboration of the amendments that stated, in part, “Foreskin procedures in instances where the foreskin is typical and where such procedures may be performed or planned for religious or cultural reasons fall outside the scope of the bill and therefore the provisions in the bill have no effect on whether such procedures are performed or permitted.”

By law, schools must operate in such a manner as to prevent discrimination on the basis of religion.  Grades one through 10 (ages six to 15) in public and private schools must provide instruction, by regular teaching staff, in social studies, which includes Christianity, ethics, and theology as well as some content on other world religions.  The law specifies the curriculum for these classes must adopt a multicultural approach to religious education, encompassing a variety of beliefs.  The law also mandates that “the Christian heritage of Icelandic culture, equality, responsibility, concern, tolerance, and respect for human value” shape general teaching practices.

Parents wishing to exempt pupils from compulsory instruction in Christianity, ethics, and theology must submit a written application to the school principal.  The principal may request additional information.  The principal then registers the application as a “special case” and writes an official response to the parents, accepting or denying the request.  School authorities are not required to offer other religious or secular instruction in place of these classes.

Of the 12 largest municipalities in the country, eight have adopted guidelines or rules governing the interaction between public schools and religious and life-stance groups.  The Reykjavik City Council prohibits religious and life-stance groups from conducting any activities, including the distribution of proselytizing material, in municipal preschools and compulsory schools (grades one through 10) during school hours or during afterschool programs.  Reykjavik school administrators, may, however, invite the representatives of religious and life-stance groups to visit compulsory classes on Christianity, ethics, theology, and life skills.  These visits must be under the guidance of a teacher and in accordance with the curriculum.  Any student visits to the gathering places of religious and life-stance groups during school hours must be under the guidance of a teacher as part of a class on religion and life-stance views.  During such classes or visits, students may only observe rituals, not participate in them.  The municipality of Hafnarfjordur has similar rules governing the interaction between schools and religious or life-stance organizations.  The municipalities of Kopavogur, Gardabaer, Mosfellsbaer, Arborg, Fjardarbyggd, and Seltjarnarnes have either adopted or adapted guidelines on these interactions that the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture has set.  The ministry’s guidelines are broadly similar to those of Reykjavik and Hafnarfjordur.

Private schools must follow the same curriculum as public schools, including the Christianity, ethics, and theology curriculum taught in social studies classes.  Private schools are free, however, to offer additional classes not in the public-school curriculum, including classes in specific religious faiths.

The law prohibits all forms of discrimination in all fields of society, including those based on religious beliefs.  The Equality Complaints Committee reviews complaints and issues fines in cases of violations unless other applicable statutes specify more severe penalties.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government approved the registration of the Chabad Jewish Community and Wat Phra Buddhism during the year, bringing the number of registered groups to 54.

Officials from the Interfaith Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation had previously noted some issues in the dealings between registered religious organizations and the government registrar’s office.  In 2019, the registrar had restricted religious organizations’ access to membership lists, citing the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation as the reason, but later overturned that decision.  Officials from the government registrar’s office confirmed that religious groups would have access to the government’s membership tallies upon filing appropriate forms and paying required processing fees.  Some religious groups complained about having to pay the fee and that individual member registrations were only electronic.  Officials from Registers Iceland confirmed, however, that paper applications would be accepted and processed.

The Atheist organization Sidmennt criticized the government for a lack of consultation in developing government policy on religious matters.  The organization described the government’s policy as principally focused on creating a legal framework for the ELC, and other religious groups being afterthoughts.

The government church tax payment to registered religious and life-stance groups was 11,820 kronur ($91) for each member, age 16 or older, compared with 11,700 kronur ($90) in 2020.

According to the official state budget bill, in 2020, the latest year for which data were available, the government allocated approximately 7.6 billion kronur ($58.47 million) to religious affairs, of which 3.7 billion kronur ($28.47 million) was in direct subsidies to the ELC and an additional 2.7 billion kronur ($20.77 million) was distributed through the church tax.  The other 50 religious and life-stance groups recognized in 2020 received a total of 549 million kronur ($4.22 million) in church tax distributions.  In 2019, the government allocated approximately 7.3 billion kronur ($56.16 million) to religious affairs, of which 4.8 billion kronur ($36.93 million) was in direct subsidies to the ELC and an additional 2 billion kronur ($15.39 million) was in church tax distributions.  The other recognized religious and life-stance groups received a total of 468 million kronur ($3.6 million) in church tax distributions.

The ELC continued to operate all cemeteries, and all religious and life-stance groups had equal access to them.  Gufunes Cemetery in Reykjavik had a special area designated for burials of Muslims and persons of other non-ELC faiths.

The ELC and the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the public University of Iceland continued to train theology students for positions within the ELC.

State radio continued to broadcast Lutheran worship services every Sunday morning as well as a Lutheran daily morning devotion.  According to the station’s chief of programming, other religious groups could also broadcast their religious services, but none had sought to do so.

The government continued to require persons applying for a passport to present proof of religion from a religious organization if they wished to receive a religious exemption allowing them to wear a head covering for their passport photographs.

Jewish community leaders noted a slight increase in antisemitic rhetoric on social media during violence between Israel and Gaza-based Hamas in May.  One incident involving a verbal confrontation, in which a man yelled at a person wearing a Star of David, occurred in the same time period.

Muslim community leaders voiced concerns about the ability to access physician-performed circumcisions.  They said they had received reports of doctors being reluctant to perform circumcisions except for medical reasons.  The Icelandic Medical Association Code of Ethics states, “A physician is free to follow his conscience and conviction” and may refuse to perform a medical act “which he considers unreasonable or unnecessary.”

Religious groups reported generally good relations with the government and society at large.  Some religious leaders expressed frustration with increased secularism and low levels of religiosity in society.

A Gallup Iceland poll conducted in February and released on February 20 found 32 percent of the public expressed trust in the ELC, compared with 31 percent in 2020, 34 percent in 2019, 33 percent in 2018, 41 percent in 2009, and 61 percent in 1999.

The Forum for Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation, whose membership consists of registered religious and life-stance groups – including the ELC as well as other Christian, Muslim, and Buddhist groups – met virtually three times.  Public health concerns stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic prevented in-person forum meetings for most of the year.  Although the interfaith forum allowed unregistered groups to apply to join it, none had done so by year’s end.

The Islamic Foundation of Iceland organized community information and integration programs for Muslim migrants with representatives from local government and legal offices on such issues as voting and women’s rights.  The foundation also provided translation assistance to asylum seekers.

Embassy officials met with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOJ, the government’s registrar’s office, and the district commissioner’s Office of Northeast Iceland to discuss the roles of religious equality and religious tolerance in the country.  Specific topics included the status and rights of religious groups, religious group relations with government and interfaith relations, and the impact of the subsidiary agreement between the ELC and the government.

Embassy officials continued to meet with representatives of the ELC, Roman Catholic Church, the Islamic Foundation of Iceland, the Chabad Jewish Community, Sidmennt, and various minority religious and life-stance groups to discuss such issues as their relations with the government, religious tolerance, the extent of their involvement in interfaith dialogue, access to physician-performed circumcision, and the role of religious groups in education and refugee resettlement.

In January, the Ambassador hosted religious leaders from the ELC, Catholic Church, Chabad Jewish Community, and Islamic Foundation of Iceland for a roundtable discussion on religious freedom.  In April, the Charge delivered remarks on Holocaust Remembrance Day in conjunction with representatives from the Chabad Jewish Community, the German embassy, and the Polish embassy.

The embassy posted messages to social media marking Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and Icelandic pagan holidays throughout the year, as well as National Religious Freedom Day and Holocaust Remembrance Day.  The Ambassador posted messages on Facebook highlighting the embassy’s engagement with diverse religious leaders and stressing the importance of religious freedom, including the visit of religious leaders to the embassy in January

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.3 billion (midyear 2021).  According to the 2011 national census, the most recent year for which disaggregated figures are available, Hindus constitute 79.8 percent of the population, Muslims 14.2 percent, Christians 2.3 percent, and Sikhs 1.7 percent.  Groups that together constitute fewer than 2 percent of the population include Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians (Parsis), Jews, and Baha’is.  In government statistics, the Ministry of Tribal Affairs officially identifies as Hindus more than 104 million members of Scheduled Tribes – indigenous groups historically outside the caste system who often practice indigenous religious beliefs – although an estimated 10 million of those listed as Scheduled Tribe members are Christians according to the 2011 census.

According to government estimates, there are large Muslim populations in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Telangana, Karnataka, Kerala, and the Union Territories of Lakshadweep and Jammu and Kashmir.  In Lakshadweep and Jammu and Kashmir, Muslims account for 95 percent and 68.3 percent of the population, respectively.  Slightly more than 85 percent of Muslims are Sunni, with the remainder mostly Shia.  According to media reports during the year, there are an estimated 150,000 Ahmadi Muslims in the country.  According to government estimates, Christian populations are distributed throughout the country but in greater concentrations in the northeast as well as in the states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Goa.  Three northeastern states have majority Christian populations:  Nagaland (90 percent), Mizoram (87 percent), and Meghalaya (70 percent).  Sikhs constitute 54 percent of the population of Punjab.  The Dalai Lama’s office states there are significant resettled Tibetan Buddhist communities in Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, and Uttarakhand States, and Delhi.  According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and media reports, there are approximately 100,000 Tibetan Buddhists in the country.  According to media reports, approximately 40,000 Muslim Rohingya refugees from Burma live in the country.  UNHCR estimated it received 1,800 requests for refugee registration since August 2021 and projects it will receive 3,500-5,000 refugee registration requests by the end of 2022.

Legal Framework

The constitution mandates a secular state and provides for freedom of conscience and the right of all individuals to profess, practice, and propagate religion freely, subject to considerations of public order, morality, and health.  It prohibits government discrimination based on religion, including for employment, as well as religiously based restrictions on access to public or private establishments.  The constitution states that religious groups have the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, manage their own affairs in religious matters, and own, acquire, and administer property.  It prohibits the use of public funds to support any religion.  National and state laws make freedom of religion “subject to public order, morality, and health.”  The constitution stipulates that the state shall endeavor to create a uniform civil code applicable to members of all religions across the country.

Federal law empowers the government to ban religious organizations that provoke intercommunal tensions, are involved in terrorism or sedition, or violate laws governing foreign contributions.

Ten of the 28 states have laws restricting religious conversion:  Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand.  Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh States prohibit religious conversion by “force,” “allurement,” or “fraudulent means” including marriage “with the intention of conversion” and require district authorities to be informed of any intended conversions one month in advance.  Himachal Pradesh and Odisha States maintain similar prohibitions against conversion through “force,” “inducement,” or “fraud,” which would include the provision of any gifts, promises of a better life, free education, and other standard charitable activities, and bar individuals from abetting such conversions.  Odisha State requires individuals wishing to convert to another religion and clergy intending to officiate at a conversion ceremony to submit formal notification to the government.  The notification procedures state that police must ascertain if there are objections to the conversion.  Any person may object.  Four state governments have laws imposing penalties against “forced” religious conversions for the purpose of marriage (Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Madhya Pradesh), although some state high courts have dismissed cases charged under this law.  By year’s end, four other state governments announced plans to enact similar legislative measures:  Haryana, Karnataka, Gujarat, and Assam.  Since March, Madhya Pradesh has required prior permission from a district official to convert to a spouse’s faith in case of interfaith marriage, has permitted the annulment of a fraudulent marriage, and set the penalties for violators at a prison term of up to 10 years without bail and fines up to 100,000 rupees ($1,300).

Violators, including missionaries, are subject to fines and other penalties, such as prison sentences of up to three years in Chhattisgarh and up to four years in Madhya Pradesh if converts are minors, women, or members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes.  on freedom of religion in April, Gujarat also imposes sentences of between three and 10 years in prison and fines of up to 50,000 rupees ($670) for forcible or fraudulent religious conversions through marriage.  In Himachal Pradesh, penalties include up to two years’ imprisonment, fines of 25,000 rupees ($340), or both.

The federal penal code criminalizes “promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion” and “acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony,” including acts causing injury or harm to religious groups and their members.  The penal code also prohibits “deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.”  Violations of any of these provisions are punishable by imprisonment for up to three years, a fine, or both.  If the offense is committed at a place of worship, imprisonment may be for up to five years.

There are no requirements for registration of religious groups unless they receive foreign funding, in which case they must register under the FCRA.  Federal law requires NGOs, including religious organizations, registered under the FCRA to maintain audit reports on their accounts and a schedule of their activities and to provide these to state government officials upon request.

Organizations conducting “cultural, economic, educational, religious, or social programs” that receive foreign funding are required to obtain a license under the FCRA.  The central government may also require that licensed organizations obtain prior permission before accepting or transferring foreign funds.  The central government may reject a license application or a request to transfer funds if it judges the recipient to be acting against “harmony between religious, racial, social, linguistic, regional groups, castes, or communities.”

NGOs, including religious organizations, may use 20 percent of their funding for administrative purposes and are prohibited from transferring foreign funds to any other organization or individual.

The constitution states that any legal reference to Hindus is to be construed to include followers of Sikhism, Jainism, and Buddhism, meaning they are subject to laws regarding Hindus, such as the Hindu Marriage Act.  Subsequent legislation continues to use the word Hindu as a category that includes Sikhs, Buddhists, Baha’is, and Jains, but it identifies the groups as separate religions whose followers are included under the legislation.

Federal law provides official minority status to six religious groups:  Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis, Jains, and Buddhists.  State governments may grant minority status under state law to religious groups that are minorities in a particular region.  Members of recognized minority groups are eligible for government assistance programs.  The constitution states that the government is responsible for protecting religious minorities and enabling them to preserve their culture and religious interests.

Personal status laws establish civil codes for members of certain religious communities in matters of marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance based on religion, faith, and culture.  Hindu, Christian, Parsi, Jewish, and Islamic personal status laws are legally recognized and judicially enforceable.  Personal status issues that are not defined for a community in a separate law are covered under Hindu personal status laws.  These laws, however, do not supersede national and state legislation or constitutional provisions.  The government grants autonomy to the All India Muslim Personal Law Board and the Parsi community to define their customary practices.  If law boards or community leaders are not able to resolve disputes, cases are referred to the civil courts.

Interfaith couples and all couples marrying in a civil ceremony are generally required to provide public notice 30 days in advance – including addresses, photographs, and religious affiliation – for public comment, although this requirement varies across states.  Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains who marry outside their religions face the possibility of losing their property inheritance rights under those communities’ personal status laws.

The law recognizes the registration of Sikh marriages but does not include divorce provisions for Sikhs.  Other Sikh personal status matters fall under Hindu codes.  Under the law, any person, irrespective of religion, may seek a divorce in civil court.

The constitution prohibits religious instruction in government schools; the law permits private religious schools.  The law permits some Muslim, Christian, Sindhi (Hindu refugees), Parsi, and Sikh educational institutions that receive government support to set quotas for students belonging to the religious minority in question.  For example, Aligarh Muslim University must admit at least 50 percent Muslims.  St. Stephen’s College in Delhi and St. Xavier’s in Mumbai must admit at least 50 percent Christians.

Twenty-five of the 28 states apply partial to full restrictions on bovine slaughter.  Penalties vary among states and may vary based on whether the animal is a cow, calf, bull, or ox.  The ban mostly affects Muslims and members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes that traditionally consume beef.  In most of the states where bovine slaughter is banned, penalties include imprisonment for six months to two years and a fine of 1,000 to 10,000 rupees ($13-$130).  Since August, when the Assam state government enacted new legislation, penalties have included minimum imprisonment of three years or a fine between 300,000 and 500,000 rupees ($4,000-$6,700) or both, without being eligible for bail prior to trial, for slaughtering, consuming, or transporting cattle.  Since February, the slaughter of all cattle, except for buffalo older than age 13, has been illegal in Karnataka, with violators subject to imprisonment of between three and seven years and penalties between 500,000 and 1,000,000 rupees ($6,700-$13,500).  Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir penalize cow slaughter with imprisonment of two to 10 years.  Gujarat state law mandates a minimum 10-year sentence and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for killing cows, selling beef, and illegally transporting cows or beef.

One state, Madhya Pradesh, imposes fines of 25,000 to 50,000 rupees ($340-$670) and prison sentences of six months to three years for “cow vigilantism,” i.e., committing violence in the name of protecting cows.  This is the only law of its kind in the country.

The National Commission for Minorities, which includes representatives from the six designated religious minorities and the National Human Rights Commission, investigates allegations of religious discrimination.  The Ministry of Minority Affairs may also conduct investigations.  These agencies have no enforcement powers but conduct investigations based on written complaints of criminal or civil violations and submit findings to law enforcement agencies.  Eighteen of the country’s 28 states and the National Capital Territory of Delhi have state minorities commissions, which also investigate allegations of religious discrimination.

The constitution establishes the legal basis for preferential public benefit programs for Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe communities and members of the “Other Backward Classes,” a category for groups deemed to be socially and educationally disadvantaged.  The constitution specifies only Hindus, Sikhs, or Buddhists are eligible to be deemed members of a Scheduled Caste.  As a result, Christians and Muslims qualify for benefits if deemed to be members of “backward” classes due to their social and economic status.

The government requires foreign missionaries to obtain a missionary visa.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On September 26, a 14-year-old Christian boy in the Gaya District of Bihar died at a hospital in Patna after perpetrators threw acid on him, according to media reports.  The family members said police did not register a complaint despite threats to the family by Hindu groups and local individuals.  The boy’s father, Vakil Ravidas, had adopted Christianity with his family five years earlier and, according to family members, local community members threatened and warned them against attending church.  Police told media the boy died by self-immolation due to a familial dispute, a claim the victim’s family denied.  Media reported the family signed a consent letter declaring they did not want to pursue the matter with police or the courts.

According to media reports, two Muslim men from Jamshedpur in Jharkhand stated that during an interrogation on August 26 police used anti-Muslim slurs, forced them to strip naked at a city police station, and pressured them to have sexual intercourse with each other.  When they refused, they said they were “beaten and threatened to be sent to Afghanistan.”  Police released them the same day.  The men said they were called to the police station for questioning in connection with an alleged kidnapping case involving a Muslim man and a Hindu woman who had eloped.  They said seven police personnel, including the station officer in charge, sexually abused them.  The officer in charge denied the allegation.  On August 27, the two men — Mohammad Arzoo and Mohammad Aurangzeb — filed a complaint with Jamshedpur police that they were tortured by seven police personnel.  According to a media report, no action was taken against the accused police officers by year’s end.

The government did not release data on communal violence during the year.  Government data from 2020 reported a large increase in communal violence compared to 2019, largely due to the February 2020 violence and protests following passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA).  The CAA provides an expedited path to citizenship for Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, and Christian migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh who had entered the country on or before December 31, 2014.  Similarly situated Muslims, Jews, members of other faiths, and atheists from these three countries were not included.  The government argued the law was necessary to provide protections for religious minorities from those countries.

The National Crimes Record Bureau reported 857 instances of communal violence in 2020 compared to 438 in 2019.  According to both media and the Crime in India for 2020 report, released in September, police arrested 1818 individuals throughout 2020 for the protests in Northeast Delhi.  The report said that 53 persons including two security personnel were killed in the protests, and 581 individuals, including 108 police personnel, were injured.  Of those killed, 35 were Muslim and 18 Hindu.  Of those arrested, 956 were Muslim and 868 Hindu.  By the end of the year, 1204 individuals remained in jail, 544 individuals had been released on bail, various courts in Delhi were processing 250 outstanding criminal complaints, and Delhi police were investigating an additional 350 criminal complaints related to the riots.  Those numbers continued to fluctuate due to the ongoing hearings.  The first conviction was a Hindu male in December for setting a Muslim resident’s house on fire as part of a mob.

The Crime in India for 2020 report said the riots resulted from the Muslim community’s “feeling of discrimination” due to the NRC and the CAA, and certain groups with “vested interests capitalized on this feeling and further aroused the sentiments of this community against the central government.”  The Assam State government published its NRC in 2018 to define citizenship, and any Assamese resident who did not appear on the list would need to go before the Foreigners’ Tribunal, a quasi-judicial body, which would declare them a foreigner or citizen.  An estimated one-third of Assam’s 33 million residents are Muslim.  The Muslim community and media expressed concern that the NRC, a proposed list of all citizens being implemented only in the state of Assam, coupled with the national CAA, could result in Muslims being determined to be “illegal immigrants” and detained or deported.  None had been deported by the end of the year.

Opposition parties and civil society members continued to criticize the probe into the riot cases and accused Delhi police of targeting minorities, a charge Delhi police and the national Home Ministry (responsible for police oversight) denied.  In a press conference on September 13, several prominent civil society members and activists said Delhi police were responsible for “derailing” the probe and demanded release of individuals arrested for the rioting or protesting against the CAA.  Various courts also criticized the Delhi police for inadequate investigation of the riots, which Muslim academics, human rights activists, former police officers, and journalists said reflected police anti-Muslim bias, while deflecting the investigation away from those responsible.  A lower court in Delhi imposed a fine of 25,000 rupees ($340) on the Delhi police for “callous” investigation into the case of one man who said police shot him in the eye during the riots.  The judge said the police had “miserably failed” their duty in that case.  The Delhi High Court stayed the fine but upheld the lower court judge’s criticism of the riot investigation.  Critical court rulings led to the Delhi police setting up a Special Investigation Cell to monitor progress of the Delhi riots investigation.

During the year, Delhi courts released some of those arrested during the 2020 riots.  In July, for example, a court dropped charges against a Hindu man who was held for over a year in pretrial custody after being accused of joining a mob that burned and looted a shop the mob thought was Muslim-owned, according to media reports.

The case against activist and former Jawaharlal Nehru University student Umar Khalid, a Muslim, who told a court in 2020 he had spent time in solitary confinement after being arrested during the riots, remained ongoing at year’s end and he remained in custody.  Media reported that during a bail hearing, Khalid’s lawyer argued the police officer who originally filed charges against his client had been influenced by the communal tension during the riots and the charges were fabricated.  In September, prominent civil society groups demanded Khalid’s release, describing him a “defender of human rights” and a “peace activist.”

By year’s end, the government had not enacted rules to implement the CAA, and the Supreme Court had not heard any of the more than 100 legal challenges to the act.

Christians and Muslims were charged during the year under laws restricting conversions, and some state governments announced plans to strengthen existing legislation or develop new legislation.

Media reported Madhya Pradesh police filed 21 cases against 47 individuals and arrested 15 Muslims and six Christians between March and June for violations of the state’s law restricting conversions.  In 15 of the 21 cases, rape and molestation charges were added.

On March 8, a law went into effect in Madhya Pradesh that increased the penalties for forced religious conversion through marriage or any other fraudulent means.  The law requires prior notice to a district official, to which any person may object, to convert to the spouse’s faith.  The law also permits the annulment of a fraudulent marriage and increases the penalty for violators from a two-year prison term with bail possible to a term of up to 10 years without bail and fines that can exceed 100,000 rupees ($1,300).  Legal expert Sanjay Hegde said the state laws against conversion let the mobs have the final say.  “If you are born in a religion, you can’t change your religion, without the State’s consent,” said Hegde.  “These laws try to control women, rather than marriage, and assume that the women don’t have any agency of their own,” Hegde added.

According to the Christian NGO International Christian Concern (ICC), on January 11, Azad Prem Singh, a leader of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad Hindu nationalist group, sent a memorandum to the Jhabua District administrative head in Madhya Pradesh demanding a ban of all churches in tribal areas.  Singh said Christians were fraudulently mass converting individuals to Christianity.  “In the past 70 years, Christian missionaries have converted gullible indigenous people to Christianity and built churches specifically on protected tribal land,” Singh said.  “All the illegally built churches should be shut down immediately and action should be taken against all priests and pastors involved in the process.”  In the memorandum, Singh gave the local government 30 days to meet his demands and threatened to use violence if they were not met.  The state government did not agree to Singh’s demand to ban all churches in tribal areas.  The police continued to arrest Christians on charges of forced or induced conversion in the region, according to Christian community members.  On December 25, police arrested three persons, including a Catholic priest and a Protestant pastor, at Bicholi village in Jhabua District for allegedly luring tribal villagers into Christianity by offering free education and treatment in missionary-run schools and the hospital, media reported.  In September, the Christian community in Jhabua wrote to the district authorities and President Ram Nath Kovind complaining of attacks and false accusations by the various Hindu nationalist affiliates of the BJP and the Hindu nationalist organization RSS.

In Uttar Pradesh, between November 2020 and November 2021, police filed 148 cases against 359 persons for violating laws restricting conversion.  According to state police records, the police completed investigations in 113 cases and filed charges in 90, but media reported that no case had been decided by the courts in Uttar Pradesh by year’s end.  Media reported that 72 of the 359 had charges dropped against them for lack of evidence.  According to a faith-based NGO, between June and September, at least 71 Christian leaders were arrested in Uttar Pradesh after Hindu nationalists accused them of carrying out illegal conversions.

In June, the Uttar Pradesh Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) arrested Muslim clerics Mohammad Umar Gautam and Mufti Qazi Jahagir Alam Qasmi for performing illegal conversions.  Police told media the two had been running a “huge conversion racket.”  The ATS later arrested eight more individuals whom police said were performing conversions at the Islamic Dawah Centre by offering “education, marriage, and jobs” to poor people.  According to media reports, eight of those arrested, including the two clerics, were charged in September with “illegal conversions” and “waging war against India.”

On October 7, the Uttar Pradesh ATS arrested a Muslim man in connection with his activities as a member of a WhatsApp group that encouraged individuals to convert to Islam.  ATS told media that the man had been involved in illegal conversion activities since 2016 and that he and others “spread religious hatred” by inducing people to convert to Islam.

On October 10, seven Protestant pastors in Mau District in Uttar Pradesh were taken into judicial custody pending a police investigation after being arrested on charges of unlawful religious conversions.

In March, Uttar Pradesh police detained two nuns and two postulants from the Sacred Heart convent of the Syro-Malabar Church in Kerala after Hindu activists riding with them on a passenger train said the nuns were forcibly converting the postulants to Christianity, according to media reports.  According to the Evangelical Fellowship of India’s (EFI) report covering January-June, police immediately arrested the four and took them to the local police station followed by a crowd of 150 “religious radicals.”  The police released the four after five hours of questioning and did not press charges.  In a statement, the Church said the four continued their journey with police protection.

In January, according to the EFI report, police in Malkangiri District of Odisha arrested Raja Kartami for violating the state’s conversion restriction laws following a complaint from his Hindu in-laws that he was forcing his wife to become a Christian.  As of year’s end, Kartami was in jail awaiting trial.

In August, Haryana Chief Minister Manohar Khattar announced that the state would consider drafting legislation to stop forced religious conversions in response to incidents of “love jihad” (a derogatory term referring to Muslim men seeking to marry women from other faiths to convert them to Islam).  Such legislation had not been introduced by year’s end.

On September 21, Karnataka Home Minister Araga Jnanendra announced that his government would propose legislation to prevent forced religious conversions in the state.  Following this announcement, a delegation of Karnataka-based Catholic bishops, led by Archbishop of Bengaluru Peter Machado, met with state Chief Minister Basavaraj Bommai to discuss the proposed legislation.  The delegation expressed concern, should the legislation become law, about the potential misuse of the law to falsely accuse the Christian community of engaging in forced conversions.  On December 23, the Karnataka State Legislative Assembly passed the “anti-unlawful conversion bill,” which would prohibit forced religious conversion in the state.  At year’s end, the bill was pending approval by the State Legislative Council.

In October, the Uttarakhand government stated it intended to amend existing law and empower police to register cases based on allegations of forced religious conversion.  The existing state law requires such allegations to be handled directly by the courts.  Madan Kaushik, the BJP’s president in Uttarakhand, told media in October that “Our party’s line is clear that no conversion will be tolerated.”  A civil rights attorney in the state expressed concern that such a change in the law could lead to abuse.  She said, “A citizen is somewhat protected if the court hears the complaint and proceeds with the matter.  However, if the state police are given the power to register FIRs [in forced conversion cases], there is no protection from misuse.”

In February, the Supreme Court declined to hear petitions from NGOs and activists challenging the constitutionality of the conversion restriction laws in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, deferring the challenges first to the respective state high courts.

On June 21, Gujarat police arrested a Muslim man for forcibly marrying a Hindu woman.  Police said the man was in violation of the state’s freedom of religion law, which had been amended in April to increase penalties for forced marriages.  According to media reports, after the victim’s mother filed a missing person complaint, Gujarat police opened an investigation and determined that the man, who was already married, kidnapped the woman and forced her to marry him.  Media also reported that the woman said the man raped her and threatened to harm her family if she did not marry.  The Muslim man was charged with kidnapping, rape, and criminal intimidation.  Investigation on the case continued at the end of the year.

On April 1, Gujarat government amended legislation enacted in 2003 on freedom of religion to explicitly prohibit the use of fraudulent marriage to convert partners of different religions.  The law’s preamble stated the amendment aimed to reduce the “emerging trend” of coerced religious conversion of women.  On August 19, the Gujarat High Court suspended seven provisions of the state’s amended freedom of religion law, stating an interfaith marriage by itself cannot be treated as a forceful or “unlawful conversion by deceit or allurement.”  On August 26, the state government asked that the suspension of those provisions be annulled; the High Court rejected the request.  On December 14, the Gujarat government challenged the stay in the Supreme Court; there was no ruling by the end of the year.

On October 13, the Gujarat High Court granted bail to all seven individuals arrested in the state’s first case under the amended freedom of religion law.  The case involved a Hindu woman who filed forced conversion charges against her Muslim husband, five of his Muslim family members, and the officiant at their wedding; all of whom were arrested on June 18.  On August 5, the woman filed a petition in the Gujarat High Court to retract her complaint, stating the police had “twisted” her complaint into a case of forced religious conversion, rape, and other charges.  According to the police report, her Muslim husband had claimed to be Christian before their wedding and, once they were married, the family pressured the wife to convert to Islam.  Police dropped the case after the woman retracted her complaint.

In September, media reported the MHA had suspended the FCRA licenses of six NGOs, including two Christian evangelical groups and one Islamic charity in Kerala, citing FCRA violations.  In December, the MHA stated that FCRA licenses of 5,789 NGOs had lapsed because they did not apply for renewal in time.  Media reported that hundreds of these NGOs were faith-based.  The MHA also stated that it had denied FCRA renewal to 179 NGOs during the year, including Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity.  The MHA reversed the denial several weeks later.  The original MHA announcement of the action cited unnamed “adverse inputs” against the NGO.  Some media reports noted that the government decision came days after police filed a complaint against the director of a children’s home run by the Missionaries of Charity in Gujarat state for attempting to convert young girls to Christianity although the Ministry of Home Affairs did not attribute a linkage between the two events.

NGOs, including faith-based organizations, continued to criticize the requirements of the FCRA as constraining civil society and religious organizations.  Opponents of the FCRA amendments called the requirements onerous and a barrier to organizations continuing to work in the country.  The government continued to say the FCRA law strengthened oversight and accountability of foreign NGO funding in the country.

In a July virtual session hosted by the U.S.-based nonprofit Indian American Muslim Council on Religious Freedom in India, Amnesty International USA said the organization was forced to halt all operations in the country in 2020 because of the FCRA requirements.  The Amnesty representative said the FCRA requirements were one example of “the Indian government activating their overall governmental framework” to crush opportunities for upholding religious freedom.

In March, the MHA stated 22,678 NGOs had been granted registration under the FCRA during the last five years.  The government also reported the registrations of 2,742 NGOs had been revoked from 2018 to 2020 for noncompliance, the most recent data available.

In its annual report, international NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) said the government adopted laws and policies that discriminated against religious minorities, especially Muslims.  HRW also said some BJP leaders vilified Muslims and police failed to act against some BJP supporters who committed violence, a combination that emboldened some Hindu nationalist groups to attack Muslims and government critics with impunity.

On January 4, police officials in Karnataka’s Hassan District banned a Christian prayer service, according to media reports.  A senior police officer asked the worshippers, who included 50 individuals from 15 families, to show proof they were Christians; he later accused them of having been converted to Christianity and misrepresenting their religion by claiming they had been Christian from birth.  Police did not charge the families and warned the worshippers against conducting prayer gatherings without permission.

According to ICC, police shut down a house church in Dharmapuri, Telangana on February 28 following a complaint from a local Hindu group, which had also disrupted the church service there.  The NGO stated that the police invoked a 2007 Andhra Pradesh state law, later adopted by the state of Telangana, to close down the church because Dharmapuri is designated by the law as a “temple town.”  The pastor told ICC he had been leading worship in his home for five years without problems.  While the town of approximately 78,000 persons is overwhelmingly Hindu, there are more than 300 Christians and more than 2,000 Muslims living there.

On July 24, Tamil Nadu police arrested Father George Ponnaiah, a Catholic priest based in Nagercoil, south Tamil Nadu, for alleged hate speech against Hindu gods, the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, and the state government in Tamil Nadu.  Ponnaiah was in custody for 16 days.  At year’s end, Ponnaiah was released on bail, awaiting trial.  If convicted, he could face a prison term up to five years.  Archbishop of Madurai Antony Pappusamy publicly criticized Ponnaiah for his statements.

On January 1, police in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, arrested stand-up comedian Munawar Faruqi and five associates after Eklavya Gaur, the son of state Member of Legislative Assembly Malini Gaur and the head of a local Hindu nationalist group, filed a police complaint stating he overheard the comedian and his associates using religiously offensive language during rehearsal.  On February 6, Indore prison authorities released Faruqi after the Supreme Court granted him bail.  The Madhya Pradesh High Court later granted bail to Faruqui’s five associates.

On January 14, Andhra Pradesh police arrested nondenominational Christian pastor Praveen Chakravarthi for “disturbing communal harmony” after one of his videos from 2013 circulated on social media.  In the video, in a conversation with the head of a U.S.-based NGO, Chakravarthi discussed his evangelism in the country.  After his arrest, Chakravarthi’s bank accounts were frozen.  He was later released on bail, and no further action was reported by the end of the year.

On August 19, Hyderabad police arrested Pastor Honey Johnson from Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh on the charge of making derogatory remarks against Hinduism and Hindu deities on his YouTube channel.  Members of his church held protests in Visakhapatnam demanding his release, and he was subsequently released on bail.

On July 20, the Supreme Court expressed concern about the Kerala government’s relaxation of COVID-19 restrictions during Eid al-Adha celebrations July 18-20.  In a ruling, the court said it could not block the state government’s actions after the fact, but it said, “The Kerala government failed to protect the fundamental rights of life and health of the people.”  The court said it would take action against the Kerala government if the loosened restrictions led to additional spread of COVID-19, but it took no further action on this issue by year’s end.  Earlier in July, the Supreme Court had cancelled the annual Hindu Kanwar Yatra festival in Uttar Pradesh due to a surge in COVID-19 cases there.  In April, activists had asked the government to cancel the Hindu Kumbh Mela festival for COVID-19 reasons, but the government declined to do so.  Also in April, the Supreme Court approved the petition of Muslim leaders to open the Nizzamuddin Mosque in New Delhi for Ramadan services.  Advocates for the mosque cited the Kumbh Mela celebrations in Haridwar, Uttarakhand, which were permitted, as well as at the Hindu temple dedicated to Hanuman in Karol Bagh, Delhi, which remained open despite COVID-19 restrictions, to support their request to reopen.

In June and July, residents of the predominantly Muslim Union Territory of Lakshadweep protested reforms proposed by Administrator Praful Khoda Patel in December 2020.  The reforms included banning cow slaughter and beef sales on the islands, removing beef and meat (except fish and eggs) from meals in schools, closing government-run dairy farms, permitting liquor sales, imposing a law allowing preventive detention, and disqualifying residents with more than two children from running in local elections.  Media reported the local residents considered the proposed reforms as anti-Muslim, and primarily affected Muslim families.  Protesters said Patel had been trying to transform the island culturally and demographically.  The Lakshadweep administration said the reforms were necessary to develop Lakshadweep as a global tourist destination like the Maldives.

NGOs, including faith-based organizations, continued to criticize the requirements of the FCRA as constraining civil society and religious organizations.  According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 5,789 NGOs lost their FCRA licenses because they did not file for their renewal.  Some opposition political parties and faith-based NGOs described the regulations as “onerous” and difficult to comply with, making registration and renewal difficult.  The government continued to say the FCRA law strengthened oversight and accountability of foreign NGO funding in the country.

In October, media reported Hindu protesters in Haryana said Muslims had been using public property to conduct daily prayers for four weeks without authorization from local authorities.  The Muslim worshippers, who numbered 200 according to the media, had been praying outside in an area not designated for prayer.  The protestors said they would continue to “protest peacefully” until the police took action.  Haryana Chief Minister Khattar stated prayer in public spaces would be prohibited.  Muslim groups representing the worshippers stated they were offering prayers at places designated by Haryana government officials.  On December 16, Muslim former MP Mohammed Adeeb filed a petition in the Supreme Court seeking action against Haryana government officials for not following directions to allow Muslims to offer prayers at designated public spaces.  The Supreme Court had not ruled on the matter at year’s end.

The government closed the 600-year-old Jamia Mosque, which serves the largest Muslim congregation in Jammu and Kashmir, for 45 of the 52 Fridays during the year.  According to media reports, the chief imam of Jamia Mosque remained in home detention during closure of the mosque.  Some other mosques in the region closed by the government in August 2019 when it abrogated Article 370 (state status) in Jammu and Kashmir were allowed to reopen during the year.  Since 2019, the government has continued to close mosques in the area periodically, sometimes for long intervals.

In May, authorities in Uttar Pradesh bulldozed a 100-year-old mosque in Barabanki on the grounds that it was an illegal structure.  The destruction followed a March 15 order from the state government to cease worship in the mosque so it could be demolished.  The government also said it blocked traffic.  Muslim leaders said the destruction violated a court order suspending destruction of all “illegal” structures until the end of May and said they would take the case to the Supreme Court.  The government then tried to block access to the mosque by building a wall, which according to media led to public protests in which activist Syed Farooq Ahmad stated at least 30 persons were arrested and others were beaten.  Two days after authorities demolished the mosque, the Sunni Waqf Board of Uttar Pradesh filed a petition in the Allahabad High Court demanding the government reconstruct the mosque.  The court had not ruled on the matter at the end of the year.

On September 6, opposition legislative assembly members from the BJP in Jharkhand protested the state government decision to offer a room in the state assembly building for Muslims to pray.  Media reported that BJP legislators loudly disrupted the assembly session that day with Hindu chants and instruments, calling for the prayer room decision to be rescinded or a separate Hindu prayer room also be designated in the building.  In a media interview, BJP national vice-president Raghubar Das said that the [Muslim] members of the state assembly from the Jharkhand government “openly support the Taliban.  A separate Namaz Hallim [Muslim prayer room] in the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly is a result of this ideology.  Otherwise, any person who believes in Indian democracy would not do such an act.”

In January, two residents of Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, filed a petition in the Allahabad High Court challenging the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) court’s September 2020 acquittal of all 32 persons, including BJP politicians, charged in the 1992 demolition of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya.

In May, the Assam government implemented the 2020 Assam Repealing Bill, which abolished the 1995 Assam Madrassa Education (Provincialization) Act and 2018 Assam Madrassa Education (Provincialization of Services of Employees and Re-Organization of Madrassa Educational Institutions) Act.  Implementation of the act resulted in removal of the theological content from the curriculum at 700 state-run madrassahs and converted them into regular public schools.  Theological content was also removed from the state-run Sanskrit schools, but analysts indicated that madrassahs were impacted in greater numbers.  Privately-run madrassahs and Sanskrit schools were not impacted by the state government measure.

On October 19, 2020, the Allahabad High Court in Uttar Pradesh ruled that the state’s Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act “was being misused against innocent persons” and granted bail to a Muslim arrested under the act.  Uttar Pradesh police had filed charges in 1,716 cases of cow slaughter and made more than 4,000 arrests under the act as of August.  According to Uttar Pradesh State government data, the National Security Act (NSA) was also invoked in some cow slaughter cases; observers said this was to make the charges more serious.  Persons detained under the NSA could be held up to 12 months without formal charges.  A media investigation revealed that between January 2018 and December 2020, the Allahabad High Court had annulled detention orders and freed those arrested under the NSA in 94 of 120 cases it heard under the Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act in Uttar Pradesh.

Assam (in August) and Karnataka (in February) enacted legislation imposing strict penalties for killing cattle, bringing the total states with similar restrictions to 25 (of 28).  Opposition members of the Assam legislative assembly, including from Muslim parties, protested that state’s new legislation.  Faith-based organizations said the law could negatively affect the large Christian and tribal populations in the state that consumed beef.  Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma stated the law would promote harmony between Hindus and Muslims in the state, while some opposition party members said that it could stoke religious tensions, adversely affect livelihoods, and be detrimental to trade and food habits in the region.  Media reported that the new law in Karnataka would give police in the state the power to search and seize property based only on suspicion of violation of the law.

In September, the Gau Sewa Commission, a Punjabi organization dedicated to the preservation and welfare of cows, submitted a petition to the Governor of Punjab demanding the death penalty be instituted for cow slaughter.

In October, the Madras High Court ruled that displays of a Christian cross and other religious symbols and practices could not be cited as reasons to revoke Scheduled Caste (SC) community certificates, which are used by members of designated lower castes in the Hindu hierarchy to obtain government benefits.  The ruling was in response to an appeal by a Hindu medical doctor whose SC community certificate was revoked in 2013 because she married a Christian and the couple raised their children in the Christian faith.  The court ordered the restoration of her SC community certificate in October.

In February, Pratap Simha, a BJP MP, called for denying benefits of government affirmative action programs to individuals who converted to Christianity.  The MP made the remarks while attending a District Development Coordination and Monitoring Committee meeting on February 24.  The Bengaluru-based Christian Political Leaders Forum protested the remarks.

On April 6, the Gujarat High Court blocked the arrest of a Parsi man accused by a Hindu neighbor of selling land to a Muslim in 2020 in violation of the Gujarat Disturbed Areas Act, which mandates that buyers and sellers of different religions obtain permission for property transactions in specific neighborhoods.  The Hindu neighbor also said that the buyer concealed his religion and forged documents to evade provisions of the act.  There was no update by the end of the year.

In September, the government of the Muslim-majority Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir launched a program to address the grievances of migrants from the region, a majority of whom were Hindu.  Under this program, migrants who were forcibly displaced from the Kashmir Valley in the 1990s could reclaim their properties in Kashmir.  According to civil society reports, members of the Hindu Pandit caste may have sold land under duress and the central government measure was a means to address the displacement in the 1990s.  In March, the national government informed the parliament that 44,167 Kashmiri migrant families, including 39,782 Hindu families, had registered with a government-appointed Relief Office, and 3,800 Kashmiri migrants had returned to the Kashmir Valley in the last six years to take up government jobs under a special program announced by the Prime Minister in 2015 for infrastructure development and economic prosperity in Jammu and Kashmir.  According to media reports, mostly Hindus applied for those jobs.  Since the state status of Jammu and Kashmir was revoked in August 2019, 520 migrants had returned and another 2000 migrant candidates were likely to return during the year and in 2022, the government stated.

On August 10, thousands of Dalit Christians and Muslims observed the 71st anniversary of a 1950 petition still pending before the Supreme Court to maintain Scheduled Caste benefits such as quotas in government jobs and education.  The petition seeks to reverse a government order which limited such benefits to Hindu Dalits.  A Dalit Christian lawyer, Franklin Caesar Thomas, who has been arguing the case in the Supreme Court for 16 years, told media that Dalit Christians and Muslims continued to face caste discrimination because of their adopted faiths since they were not formally recognized as Scheduled Castes.  According to the National Council of Churches in India, approximately 70 percent of Christians in India belonged to Scheduled Castes before they converted.  A seven-member panel of Supreme Court judges formed in 2020 to hear the petition had not ruled on the matter by the end of the year.

In April, West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee (All India Trinamool Congress Party) made a public appeal to Muslims to vote for her party in West Bengal elections.  Such a direct appeal from a sitting government official to voters from a particular religious group is prohibited in the constitution.  The national Election Commission reprimanded her for violating the election code of conduct.

On December 24, Asaduddin Owaisi, an MP and president of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), a predominantly Muslim political party, implied in remarks to parliament that Hindus would face consequences when Prime Minister Modi and Uttar Pradesh Yogi Adityanath, both BJP, left office.  Police filed a FIR against Owaisi for communal hate speech.  The leader later clarified that he was speaking in the context of past police “atrocities against innocent Muslims” in Uttar Pradesh and was not making a threat.

In February, ahead of elections in Assam, state Health, Education, and Finance Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma (BJP) told media that his party did not need or want the votes of Bengali-origin Muslims because they were “openly challenging Assamese culture and language and the composite Indian culture.”

While addressing Church members on September 9, Catholic Bishop Mar Joseph Kalarangatt of the Syro-Malabar Church in Kerala said Muslims were using the practices of “love jihad and narcotics jihad” to “destroy” non-Muslims.  Kalarangatt said, “In a democratic country like ours, jihadis have realized that they cannot destroy other communities by using arms.  The jihadis are using other weapons which cannot be identified easily by others.  In the perspective of jihadis, non-Muslims have to be annihilated.  When the agenda is spreading religion and eradication of non-Muslims, the ways for attaining that agenda get manifested in different manners.  The love jihad and narcotic jihad are two such ways.”  According to media reports, Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan said his government would not take action against the bishop.

In February, the Maharashtra state government petitioned the Supreme Court to dismiss pleas seeking a national-level CBI inquiry into the April 2020 killing of three Hindu monks by a crowd in Palghar.  The state government said it had already disciplined 18 police officials for their failure to control the crowd in that incident.  On January 16, a local court granted bail to 89 of the 201 arrested in the case.  The Supreme Court asked the Maharashtra government to submit a second charge sheet filed in the case by Maharashtra police but did not rule on the petition seeking a CBI investigation before year’s end.  In the 2020 incident, a mob pulled the three monks from a police vehicle and killed them, alleging that they were child kidnappers.

Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath on September 12 publicly stated that earlier governments in Uttar Pradesh had favored Muslim constituents in benefits distribution.

In July, Mohan Bhagwat, the chief of the RSS, which is commonly considered to be the ideological parent to India’s ruling party BJP, publicly stated that Hindus and Muslims in India had the same DNA and should not be differentiated by religion.  “There can never be any dominance of either Hindus or Muslims (in the country); there can only be the dominance of Indians,” Bhagwat said, adding that members of the Muslim community should not be afraid that Islam is in danger in India.  He also said that killing non-Hindus for cow slaughter was an act against Hinduism.

On May 17, a Hindu group in the Mewat region of Haryana stopped the car in which Muslim Asif Khan was riding, verbally abused Khan and the other passengers, yelled “kill Muslims,” forced Khan to chant Hindu prayers and killed him when he tried to escape, according to media reporting.  Police opened an investigation but made no arrests by the year’s end.

On June 20, media reported that a Hindu mob killed four Muslim men in the Khowai District of Tripura on suspicion of being cattle thieves.  According to media, the men were killed when they were intercepted at Maharanijur transporting five cows in a truck.  Police arrested three persons in connection with the killing and two others for spreading communal hatred on social media.  There were no further developments in this case reported by year’s end.

On June 21, Muslim Aijaz Dar was beaten to death in Rajouri District of Jammu and Kashmir.  He was returning home after buying a buffalo when suspected cow vigilantes attacked him with stones and sticks, according to media reports.  Police arrested five suspects, but there were no further developments reported by year’s end.

According to media reports, on September 28, Muslim Arbaaz Aftab Mullah was decapitated in Khanapur village in the Belgavi District of Karnataka due to his relationship with a Hindu woman.  Police arrested 10 individuals, including members of the Hindu organization Sri Rama Sene, described as radical, the woman’s parents, and the man hired to kill Mullah.  There were no further developments by year’s end.

On April 3, police in Mangaluru, Karnataka arrested four Hindu activists and members of the Hindu nationalist group Bajrang Dal who were accused of stabbing to death a Muslim man traveling with a Hindu woman.  The woman who filed the police complaint against the assailants stated the victim was her friend for many years and was accompanying her on a bus to a job interview when he was killed.  She said the assailants stopped the bus, then attacked her and the other victim.  After police made the arrests, local Bajrang Dal members reportedly defended the attack claiming that they wanted to save the woman from “falling prey to love jihad.”  One local Bajrang Dal leader told media, “Our responsibility is to rescue girls from our community.”

According to EFI, a group of Hindus killed Pastor Alok Rajhans in the Balangir District of Odisha on May 20.  Police opened a case and arrested two suspects, but they were released shortly thereafter, according to Irish NGO Church in Chains.

On May 20, according to ICC, a group of Hindu nationalists attacked the family of Pastor Ramesh Bumbariya at his home in the Bansawra District in Rajasthan, killing the pastor’s father and beating the pastor and other family members when they refused to renounce their Christian faith.  The police arrested seven persons for the killing and the investigation continued at year’s end, according to Church in Chains.

Terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiyaaba and Hizbul Mujahideen killed several civilians and migrant laborers belonging to the minority Hindu and Sikh communities in the Muslim-majority Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir during the year.  In October, 11 civilians including two schoolteachers – Supinder Kour and Deepak Chand – were killed in targeted attacks.  Kour, a Sikh, and Chand, a Hindu, were killed on October 7 after terrorists forcefully entered their school in Srinagar and identified them as belonging to minority communities.  On October 5, local businessman Makhan Lal Bindroo, a member of the Hindu Pandit caste, was fatally shot at his pharmaceutical shop.  According to media reports, the killings caused widespread fear among Hindus and Sikhs in the Kashmir valley, leading hundreds to depart Jammu and Kashmir.

On October 15, Sikh farm laborer Lakhbir Singh was killed, and his mutilated body tied to a barricade.  In several videos released on social media, Nihang Sikhs claimed responsibility for the killing, saying Singh insulted the Guru Granth Sahib, the Sikh holy book.  Police arrested four members of the Nihang Sikh community and charged them with murder.

On December 19, an unidentified man was reportedly beaten to death by a group of Sikhs at a gurudwara (temple) in Kapurthala, Punjab, on suspicion that he had insulted the Nishan Sahib, the Sikh flag.  Police and Punjab Chief Minister Charanjit Singh Channi stated that there was no evidence that the victim had committed sacrilege.  Police arrested gurudwara caretaker Amarjit Singh on charges of murder.

On September 23, two Muslim men in Mathura, Uttar Pradesh, were beaten for carrying meat in their vehicle.  According to media reports, members of a cow-vigilante group attacked the two and posted video of the assault on social media.  The attackers claimed the Muslim men were carrying beef in violation of the state’s anti-cow slaughter law and the state government’s order banning the sale and transport of any meat in Mathura.  Police arrested the victims under the anti-cow slaughter law and violation of the meat ban order.  None of the attackers were arrested.  A Mathura council member said the two lacked the permit and refrigerator required to transport perishable goods such as meat.  He also said the two men had been jailed.  There was no further information available on the case by year’s end.

In September, the BBC reported views from freelance journalists and political opposition members that the number of attacks against the country’s Muslim community had increased in recent years as well as their views that the government often declined to condemn such attacks.

According to UCF, the number of violent attacks against Christians in the country rose to 486 during the year, from 279 in 2020.  According to UCF, most of the incidents were reported in states ruled by the BJP and included attacks on pastors, disruptions of Christmas celebrations, and vandalism.  A joint report entitled Christians under Attack in India, drafted by NGOs United Against Hate, the Association for Protection of Civil Rights, and the UCF, noted that more than 500 incidents of violence against Christians were reported to the UCF hotline during the year.  The report stated that 333 of 486 incidents were recorded in Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, and Karnataka States.  The report stated that only 34 FIRs were filed against the perpetrators through the year.  At the end of the year, 19 cases were pending against Christians in nine states under the conversion restriction laws, although no Christian had been convicted in the country for illegal religious conversion during the year, according to the report.

In a December New York Times article, Hindu nationalist Dilip Chouhan, who was recorded on video breaking into a church in Madhya Pradesh with a gun strapped to his back, said that senior police officials told him authorities would not pursue charges against him.  Instead, several local pastors were arrested on charges of illegal conversions.  Chouhan said his organization has more than 5000 members.  BJP youth leader Gaurave Tiwari said opposing forced conversion was an important issue for the party.  In Chhattisgarh State, BJP youth conducted several anti-Christian marches.  In September, a group of young BJP workers from the same chapter entered a Chhattisgarh police station, hurled shoes at two pastors and beat them up, reportedly in front of police officers.  Rahul Rao, an office holder in the BJP youth cell, was charged with assault by police and released on bail.  The article also quoted a leaked letter from a top police official in Chhattisgarh ordering police to “keep a constant vigil on the activities of Christian missionaries.”  Media reported the Chhattisgarh government transferred the senior police official from the station hours after the incident.  The investigation continued at the end of the year.

On September 18, media reported police arrested Christian pastor Ravi Gupta from Bihar’s Supaul District was arrested for converting 30 Hindu families to Christianity in his native village.  Members of Vishna Hindu Parishad (VHP), a Hindu nationalist organization affiliated with the RSS, detained Gupta and handed him over to police.  There were no further developments on this case reported by year’s end.

On September 21, according to media reports, a village council in Mangapat Sirsai in the West Singhbhum District of Jharkhand ostracized three tribal families who converted to Christianity.  In the presence of local police officials, the council reportedly asked the families to convert back to the local tribal Sarna religion and subsequently barred them from free movement inside the village when they refused to do so.  According to the district president, the council took the action to counter the influence of Christian missionaries, whom he said had been quite active in the area, luring tribe members with land and money to convert them.

On June 30, approximately 20 members of the Hindu organization Bajrang Dal allegedly attacked Pastor Hemant Meher in the Jajpur District of Odisha, according to a July 10 report from ICC.  The report said the group filmed the incident and beat the pastor before handing him over to the police and saying he had been forcibly converting people to Christianity.  According to ICC, police released Meher without charge, urging him to file a complaint against his assailants.  ICC said Bajarang Dal members attacked Meher again on July 1, forcing him to flee the area.

In April, media reported that a Muslim man posed as a Hindu to marry a Hindu woman in the Fatehabad District of Haryana.  The man allegedly revealed his religious identity seven years into the marriage and attempted to forcibly convert her to Islam.  When his wife refused, he forced her and their child out of their home.  She pressed the local police to take action.  Initially they took no action, but later, according to media reports, police opened an investigation and promised to take action against the police personnel who refused to register her original complaint.  There was no further action reported on this case by year’s end.

The Union of Catholic Asian News service and major international media reported that on January 26, approximately 100 Hindu activists attacked a prayer service at the Satprakashan Sanchar Kendra, a Catholic media center in Indore in Madhya Pradesh, accusing the center of conducting religious conversions.  The pastor told media the assailants beat worshippers and yelled at them.  He said when police arrived, they only jailed the pastors and other church elders for violating Madhya Pradesh’s new law outlawing conversions.  The pastor said he and eight other church leaders were jailed for two months before being released, and still faced charges.  According to national media, police pressed trespassing charges against 15 persons and opened investigations into the incident.  Their cases were pending in court at year’s end.

On January 5, according to media sources, members of the Hindu nationalist group Bajrang Dal disrupted a Christian prayer meeting in Uttar Pradesh.  The pastor told media the group beat them and forced them to chant Hindu prayers, threatening to kill them if they did not.  The Hindus turned the pastor and four others over to police, who charged them with forced conversion, based on the comments of one of the Hindus.  Police also seized copies of the Bible and musical equipment, according to media reports.  On January 6, the pastor and eight others filed a police report.  There were no further developments reported on the case during the year.

On January 6, a Christian group in Uttar Pradesh filed a complaint against members of VHP for disrupting a prayer meeting.  The Christians said 20 VHP members, including one police officer, entered their meeting uninvited, beat some worshippers, and damaged the facility.  Police charged five of the Christians with illegal conversion, according to media reports, but there were no further developments on this case reported by year’s end.

Media reported that on August 29 a group of more than 100 individuals targeted a Christian pastor for alleged religious conversion in Polmi village in Kabirdham District of Chhattisgarh.  The reports stated that the group physically abused the pastor and vandalized his residence during a prayer service.  Police opened an investigation into the incident.

On October 3, according to Catholic news agency Agenzia Fides, there were 13 instances of violence and threats committed by Hindus against Christian communities in Uttarakhand, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Madhya Pradesh states, and in New Delhi.  Drawing on reporting from EFI, Agenzia Fides said these incidents included disrupting worship services and prayer meetings and beating worshippers; police arresting pastors for forced conversion, based on complaints filed by Hindus; and Hindu groups vandalizing Christian places of worship.

In October, Giani Harpreet Singh, leader of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, a Sikh religious organization, and head priest of the Sikh community, said that Christian missionaries were “running a campaign for forced conversions in border areas of Punjab.”

NGO Sabrang reported that in Uttarakhand on October 3, 200 local members of Hindu organizations Bajarang Dal, VHP, and the youth wing of the BJP disrupted a worship service in Roorkee, shouting Hindu slogans, beating worshippers, and ransacking their meeting room.  According to media, police charged the assailants with rioting, vandalism, trespassing, and deliberately injuring others.

In September, Vellappally Natesan, a prominent Hindu Ezhava leader and patron of the Bharat Dharma Jana Sena political organization in Kerala, stated it was not the Muslim community but Christians who were at the forefront of conversions and “love jihad” in the country.

According to media, Hindu nationalist groups disrupted nine Christmas prayer meetings, six in Uttar Pradesh, two in Haryana, and one in Assam, vandalizing church property in some of the incidents.  In Agra, Uttar Pradesh, the regional general secretary of Bajrang Dal told the media that Christian missionaries used the season to “allure children by making Santa Claus distribute gifts to them and attract them towards Christianity.”

The investigation continued into the September 2020 killing of Hindu woman Priya Soni.  Soni was beheaded reportedly for refusing to convert to Islam after marrying Muslim Ajaz Ahmed in a civil ceremony, in Sonbhadra, Uttar Pradesh.  Police arrested Ahmed and Shoaib Akhtar, also a Muslim, for the crime and they remained in custody at year’s end.

In June, the Sikh minority community in Jammu and Kashmir protested over allegations of the forced conversion of two Sikh women, who subsequently married Muslim men.  A Sikh delegation met national Home Minister Amit Shah and requested passage of a conversion restriction law “similar to the one in Uttar Pradesh” in Jammu and Kashmir.

On August 6, according to The Christian Post, a Sikh family in Punjab attacked a Christian woman, her sister, and mother for their beliefs.  The report said that the attackers choked one victim unconscious.  Police opened an investigation, but there were no further developments by the end of the year.

On October 6, Sikh leaders in Punjab started a campaign in rural areas to counter the potential conversion of lower income Sikhs to Christianity.  The head priest of the Punjab Sikh community said, “Christian missionaries have been running a campaign in the border belt for forced conversions over the past few years.  Innocent people are being cheated or lured to convert.  We have received many such reports.”  He also called forced conversions [to Christianity] “a dangerous attack on the Sikh religion.”

In its Freedom in the World 2021 report, Freedom House downgraded the country from free to partly free due to “rising violence and discriminatory policies affecting the Muslim population” and crackdowns on dissent.

A Pew Research study “Religion in India:  Tolerance and Segregation,” released in July and based on interviews conducted in 2019 and 2020, found that 84 percent of those surveyed across different faiths said that “respecting all religions was very important to truly being Indian”; 80 percent said that “respecting other religions was very important to their religious identity”; and 91 percent said they were “very free to practice their own religion.”  These numbers ranged from highs of 93 percent of Buddhists and 91 percent of Hindus, and lows of 82 percent of Sikhs and 85 percent of Jains saying they are very free to practice their religion, with Christians and Muslims at 89 percent.  The survey also showed, however, that 83 percent of all respondents believed communal violence between religious groups was “a problem” for the country.  The study’s overview stated that Indians’ commitment to tolerance was accompanied by a strong preference for keeping religious communities segregated, which was true even for religious minority communities.  Large majorities of those surveyed said they did not have much in common with members of other religious groups, and large majorities in the six major religious groups said their close friends came mainly or entirely from their own religious community.  Nearly two-thirds of Hindus (64 percent) said it was very important to be Hindu to be truly Indian.  According to the report, Hindus who strongly link Hindu and Indian identities were more likely to also support religious segregation.

In its report covering the year, Christian NGO Open Doors said that overall violence against Christians and pressure against Christians “in all spheres of life” remained “very high.”  The NGO said the persecution of Christians had intensified as Hindu nationalists “aim to cleanse the country of their presence and influence.”  This led to the targeting of Christians and other religious minorities, including the use of social media to spread disinformation and stir up hatred.

On December 17-19, during a gathering in Haridwar, Uttarakhand, several Hindu leaders and activists called publicly for violence against religious minorities.  Yati Narasinghanand, characterized as a Hindu extremist, announced a reward of 10 million rupees ($135,000) for any Hindu leader who would lead a militant movement against Islam and Christianity.  Narasinghanand also called upon Hindus to “take up weapons” against Muslims and wage a war against “Islamic jihad” for the protection of Hindus.  Another Hindu religious leader, Sadhvi Annapurna, called for creation of a nation exclusively for Hindus and for raising an army against Muslims.  Uttarakhand police subsequently booked seven persons including Narasinghanand and Annapurna, on multiple charges under the criminal code, including promoting enmity between religious groups, deliberately intending to outrage religious feeling by insulting religious groups, and acting prejudicial to social harmony.  The spokesperson for the Uttarakhand government and director general of police condemned the statements and said that police would “take required action” against those responsible.  On December 26, a group of attorneys, including a former judge on the Patna High Court, wrote the Supreme Court urging action in the case, and stating that the speeches made at the event in Haridwar were not merely hate speeches but “an open call for the murder of an entire community” which not only posed “a grave threat to the unity of the country, but also endangered the lives of millions of Muslim citizens.”

According to media reports, on October 1, Hindu nationalists held a rally in the Surguja District of Chhattisgarh to protest a perceived spike in forced conversion of Hindus to Christianity in the area.  Media reported that World Hindu Congress leader Swami Parmatmanand attended the protest and called for those who engage in forced conversions to be beheaded.  Police took no action against him, according to the Chhattisgarh-based Christian community.

On August 8, a video was widely circulated on social media of a group shouting threats to kill Muslims and demanding that Muslims convert to Hinduism to remain in the country.  The incident took place during a demonstration near parliament in New Delhi in which the crowd was protesting colonial-era laws still in force, according to media reports.  MP Asaduddin Owaisi, a Muslim, stated in parliament that “genocidal slogans” were used against Muslims during the incident.  Media reported that several prominent Hindu activists took part.  Police officials told the media they were viewing video to identify suspects and had filed an FIR against “unknown persons” for shouting the threats.

On June 29, Hindu religious leader Mahamandaleshwar Yatindra Nath Giri in New Delhi stated that parliament should adopt a new constitution banning madrassahs, declaring religious conversion a crime, and punishing couples that have more than two children.

On October 15, Muslim cleric Abbas Siddiqui said persons who insulted the Quran should be “beheaded.”  Siddiqui’s comments were aired in a video shown by media.

Media and one NGO reported that on October 20, Hindu groups affiliated with the RSS, Hindu Jagran Manch, and the VHP attacked and vandalized at least six mosques and more than a dozen shops and houses belonging to Muslim communities across Tripura State, reportedly in retaliation for attacks on minority Hindus in Bangladesh during the Durga Puja festival there.  The NGO Centre for Study of Society and Secularism reported that attackers damaged 11 mosques, six shops, and two homes.  The NGO also said that the authorities took stronger action against the journalists and activists who were reporting the violations than on the rioters themselves.  The government rejected this claim and stated that action was taken against journalists for their “inflammatory social media posts” about the event.  Tripura police registered a case against Ranu Das, a leader from the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha (the youth wing of the BJP) who allegedly threw stones at a mosque and burned Muslim properties, for provocation to cause riot, intent to hurt religious feelings, and causing public enmity.  The suspect fled and had not been arrested by year’s end.

According to media reports, on October 2, unidentified individuals vandalized a Hindu temple in the Anantnag District of Jammu and Kashmir.  Police opened an investigation into the incident.

EFI said that on January 20, members of the Bajrang Dal demolished the boundary wall of a church in the Mahabubabad District of Telangana, saying the church building was too close to a Hindu temple.

According to Pastor Upajukta Singh, in June Hindu villagers destroyed the homes of eight Christian families, expelling them from Ratagaya village.  The victims filed a police complaint.

In May, Hindu Jatav Dalit community villagers of the Muslim-majority Noorpur village in Aligarh District of Uttar Pradesh stated to media that Muslims were harassing them and discriminating against them.  The villagers also said Muslims stopped a marriage procession from passing in front of a mosque in the village.

During the year, embassy and consulate officials met with government officials to discuss religious freedom and emphasize the importance of interfaith dialogue.  Embassy officials, including the Chargés d’Affaires, also engaged with members of parliament and politicians across diverse political ideologies on the importance of religious freedom and the responsibility of democracies to ensure the rights of religious minorities.

Embassy and consulate officials met with leaders from religious minorities, NGOs, civil society members, academics, and interfaith leaders to discuss the perspectives about the status and experiences of religious minorities.

On October 1, the Consul General in Chennai joined Kerala Governor Arif Mohammed Khan at the Sri Vishnu Mohan Foundation’s annual Peace and Reconciliation Conference.  Speaking to a gathering of religious and civil social leaders, government officials and academics, the Consul General emphasized the importance of respecting religious freedom and interfaith dialogue.

On May 7, the consulate general in Hyderabad hosted a virtual panel discussion during Ramadan that highlighted interfaith and cross-cultural experiences during the holiday period.

Throughout the year, the Chargés d’Affaires engaged with members of religious communities, including representatives of the Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh faiths.  In May, the Chargés d’Affaires organized a virtual interfaith dialogue during Ramadan in which he emphasized the importance of religious freedom.  Members of academia, media commentators on interfaith issues, NGO interfaith activists, and representatives of multiple faiths participated.

In July, the Secretary of State met with several leaders from the Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, Christian, Baha’i, and other faiths.  He highlighted the value of the country’s diversity and religious pluralism and the importance of protecting it.  The Secretary addressed the importance of freedom of religion and belief in his public opening remarks and listened to the views and concerns of the religious minority and civil society leaders.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 275.1 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2010 census, 87.2 percent of the population is Muslim, 7 percent Protestant, 2.9 percent Roman Catholic, and 1.7 percent Hindu.  Those identifying with other religious groups, including Buddhism, traditional indigenous religions, Confucianism, Gafatar, other Christian denominations, and those who did not respond to the census question, comprise 1.3 percent of the population.

The Muslim population is overwhelmingly Sunni.  An estimated one to five million Muslims are Shia.  Many smaller Muslim groups exist; estimates put the total number of Ahmadi Muslims at 200,000 to 500,000.

Many religious groups incorporate elements of Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, making it difficult to disaggregate the exact number of followers.  An estimated 20 million persons, primarily in Java, Kalimantan, and Papua, practice various traditional belief systems, often referred to collectively as aliran kepercayaan.  There are approximately 400 different aliran kepercayaan communities throughout the archipelago.

The Sikh population is estimated between 10,000 and 15,000, with approximately 5,000 in Medan and the rest in Jakarta.  There are very small Jewish communities in Jakarta, Manado, Jayapura, and elsewhere, with the total number of Jews estimated at 200.  The Baha’i Faith and Falun Dafa (or Falun Gong) communities report thousands of members, but independent estimates are not available.  The number of atheists is also unknown, but the group Indonesian Atheists states it has more than 1,700 members.

The province of Bali is predominantly Hindu, and the provinces of Papua, West Papua, East Nusa Tenggara, and North Sulawesi are predominantly Christian.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees the right to practice the religion of one’s choice and specifies that freedom of religion is a human right that may not be limited.  The constitution states, “The nation is based upon belief in one supreme God,” but it guarantees all persons the right to worship according to their own religion or belief, saying the right to have a religion is a human right that shall not be discriminated against.

The constitution states citizens must accept restrictions established by law to protect the rights of others and to satisfy, as noted in the constitution, “just demands based upon considerations of morality, religious values, security, and public order in a democratic society.”  The law restricts citizens from exercising these rights in a way that impinges on the rights of others, oversteps common moral standards and religious values, or jeopardizes security or public order.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) extends official recognition and support to six religious groups:  Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism.  The government maintains a longstanding practice of recognizing Sunni Islam as the official version of Islam of local Muslims, although the constitution has no such stipulation.

Blasphemy articles in the criminal code prohibit deliberate public statements or activities that insult or defame any of the six officially recognized religions or have the intent of preventing an individual from adhering to an official religion.  These articles also stipulate that in any case of defamation of the six officially recognized religions, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), the MORA, and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) must first warn the individual in question before bringing a defamation charge.  The articles also forbid the dissemination of information designed to spread hatred or dissension among individuals and/or certain community groups based on ethnicity, religion, or race.  Individuals may be subject to prosecution for blasphemous, atheistic, or heretical statements under either of these provisions or under the laws against defamation and may face a maximum prison sentence of five years.  The Electronic Information and Transaction (ITE) law forbids the electronic dissemination of the same types of information, with violations carrying a maximum six-year sentence.

The government defines a religion as having a prophet, holy book, and deity, as well as international recognition.  The government deems the six officially recognized religions meet these requirements.  Organizations representing one of the six recognized religions listed in the blasphemy law are not required to obtain a legal charter if they are established under a notary act and obtain approval from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights.  Religious organizations other than the six recognized religions listed in the blasphemy law must obtain a legal charter as a civil society organization (CSO) from the MOHA.  Both ministries consult with the MORA before granting legal status to religious organizations.  The law requires all CSOs to uphold the national ideology of Pancasila, which encompasses the principles of belief in one God, justice, unity, democracy, and social justice, and they are prohibited from committing blasphemous acts or spreading religious hatred.  By law, all religious groups must officially register with the government.  Registration requirements for religious organizations include the following conditions:  organizations may not contradict Pancasila and the constitution; they must be voluntary, social, independent, nonprofit, and democratic; and they must have notarized articles of association (bylaws) and a specifically defined purpose.  The organization then registers with the MORA.  After MORA approval, the organization is announced publicly through the state gazette.  Violations of the law may result in a loss of legal status, dissolution of the organization, and arrest of members under the blasphemy articles of the criminal code or other applicable laws.  Indigenous religious groups must register with the Ministry of Education and Culture as aliran kepercayaan to obtain official, legal status.

A joint ministerial decree by the MORA, MOHA, and AGO bans both proselytizing by the Ahmadi Muslim community and vigilantism against the group.  Violations of the Ahmadi proselytizing ban carry a maximum five-year prison sentence on charges of blasphemy.  According to the criminal code, vigilantism carries a maximum four-and-one-half-year prison sentence.

Another joint ministerial decree by the MORA, MOHA, and AGO bans the Fajar Nusantara Movement, known as Gafatar, from proselytizing, spreading its teachings publicly, or any other activities deemed to spread deviant interpretations of Islam.  Violators of the ban may be charged with blasphemy and may receive a maximum five-year prison sentence on charges of blasphemy.

There is no joint ministerial decree that bans proselytizing by other groups.  The MUI, however, has issued fatwas that ban proselytizing by what it calls deviant groups such as Inkar al-Sunnah, Ahmadiyya, Islam Jama’ah, the Lia Eden Community, and al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah.  While the MUI has not labelled Shia Islam as deviant, it has issued fatwas and guidance cautioning against the spread of Shia teachings.

The government requires all officially registered religious groups to comply with directives from the MORA and other ministries on issues such as the construction of houses of worship, foreign aid to domestic religious institutions, and propagation of religion.

A 2006 joint ministerial decree issued by the MORA and the MOHA states that religious groups may not hold services in private residences, and those seeking to build a house of worship are required to obtain the signatures of at least 90 members of the group and 60 persons of other religious groups in the community stating they support the construction.  Local governments are responsible for implementing the decree, and local regulations, implementation, and enforcement vary widely.  The decree also requires approval from the local interfaith council, the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB).  Government-established FKUBs exist at the provincial and district/city level and comprise religious leaders from the six official groups.  They are responsible for mediating interreligious conflicts.

The law requires religious instruction in public schools.  Students have the right to request religious instruction in any one of the six official religions, but teachers are not always available to teach the requested religion classes.  Under the law, students may not opt out of religious education requirements.

Under the terms of a 2005 peace agreement that ended a separatist conflict, Aceh Province has unique authority to implement sharia regulations.  The law allows for provincial implementation and regulation of sharia and extends the jurisdiction of religious courts to economic transactions and criminal cases.  The Aceh government states sharia in Aceh only applies to Muslim residents of the province, although nonresident Muslims and adherents to other faiths may accept sharia in lieu of punishment under the criminal code.

Aceh’s provincial sharia regulations criminalize consensual same-sex sexual conduct, adultery, gambling, consumption of alcohol, and proximity to members of the opposite sex outside of marriage for Muslim residents of the province.  An Aceh governor’s decree forbids women from working in or visiting restaurants unaccompanied by their spouse or a male relative after 9 p.m.  A Banda Aceh mayoral decree forbids women from working in coffee shops, internet cafes, or sports venues after 1 p.m.  Sharia regulations prohibit female Muslim residents of Aceh from wearing tight clothes in public, and officials often recommended wearing headscarves.  The regulation allows local officials to “remind” female Muslims of these regulations but does not allow women’s detention for violating them.  One district in Aceh prohibits women from sitting astride motorcycles when riding as passengers.  The maximum penalties for violations of sharia regulations include imprisonment and caning.  There are regulations intended to limit the amount of force that authorities may exert during a caning.

Many local governments outside of Aceh have enacted regulations based on religious considerations; most of these are in majority-Muslim areas.  Many of these regulations relate to matters such as religious education and only apply to a specific religious group.  Some religiously inspired local regulations in effect apply to all citizens.  For instance, some local regulations require restaurants to close during Ramadan fasting hours, ban alcohol, or mandate the collection of zakat (Islamic alms).  At least 30 local regulations, including in the Sintang Regency, forbid or limit the religious activities of religious minorities, especially Shia and Ahmadi Muslims.

The law contains vague provisions regarding interfaith marriage, which are sometimes interpreted to forbid certain interfaith marriages, despite a 1986 Supreme Court decision specifically allowing interfaith marriages.  The law requires that parties must perform the marriage ceremony according to the rituals and teachings of the religion(s) of both the bride and groom.  Since some religious teachings forbid interfaith marriage, some groups and government officials have held that there cannot be interfaith marriages if one of the religions specifically forbids interfaith marriages.  Religious leaders, human rights activists, and journalists state that interreligious marriage is difficult unless the groom or bride is willing to marry according to the religious rituals of only one of the two religions.

The law requires the leader of an aliran kepercayaan group to demonstrate group members live in at least three regencies, which are administrative designations one level below a province, before the leader may officiate legally at a wedding.  This constraint effectively bars members of some smaller groups without such geographic presence from receiving official marriage services from a member of their faith, although groups may aid each other and facilitate marriages by a group with similar faith traditions and rituals.

A joint ministerial decree by the MORA and the MOHA requires domestic religious organizations to obtain approval from the MORA to receive funding from overseas donors and forbids dissemination of religious literature and pamphlets to members of other religious groups, as well as door-to-door proselytizing.  Religious groups, except for Ahmadi Muslims and Gafatar, are not forbidden from spreading their interpretations and teachings to other members of their religion in their own places of worship.

Foreign religious workers must obtain religious worker visas, and foreign religious organizations must obtain permission from the MORA to provide any type of assistance (in-kind, personnel, or financial) to local religious groups.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On August 16, former leaders of FPI announced the creation of The Islamic Brotherhood Front, which has the same acronym as the now outlawed organization.  FPI’s organization, symbols, and activities were officially banned in December 2020 after the government issued a proclamation declaring the FPI a “nonregistered” mass organization.  Civil society and religious organizations long accused the FPI of being a hard-line Muslim group that engages in acts of violence, extortion, intimidation, and intolerance against other Muslims and religious and ethnic minority communities, and they said the renaming of the organization was an attempt to circumvent the government’s ban.

On January 8, the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) released its report on the December 2020 police shootings of six FPI members on the Jakarta-Cikampek toll road in West Java Province.  The commission found that police had lawfully killed two of the FPI members but had unlawfully killed four others while they were in police custody.  Komnas HAM labelled these four killings a human rights violation.  In April, a police spokesperson reported that three police officials from the Mobile Reserve unit of the Greater Jakarta Metropolitan Regional Police had been named as suspects and were being investigated, noting that one of the three had died in an accident in January.  On October 18, media reported that the trial of the two living suspects, Yusmin Ohorella and Fikri Ramadhan, had started in the South Jakarta District Court.

On June 24, the East Jakarta District Court sentenced Rizieq Shihab, a Muslim cleric and FPI leader, to four years in prison for spreading false information regarding the results of his COVID-19 diagnosis that “purposely caused confusion for the public.”  In late November 2020, Shihab posted a video on social media that was widely rebroadcast by local media claiming he tested negative for COVID-19 despite being in a hospital outside of Jakarta undergoing treatment for the virus.  Prior to his social media announcement, Shihab and his supporters held several large gatherings, including his daughter’s wedding, attended by thousands, which the government said resulted in a surge of COVID-19 cases.  On May 27, the same court sentenced Shihab and five other FPI leaders to eight months in prison for violating health protocols during those gatherings.  The government released the five other FPI leaders on October 6 for time served against their eight-month sentence, while Shihab remained in prison.  Former FPI members and some CSOs criticized the cases against Shihab as being largely political in nature due to his outspoken criticism of the government.

In Aceh, authorities continued to carry out public canings for sharia violations such as selling alcohol, gambling, and extramarital affairs.  Canings continued to occur in public spaces despite the Aceh governor’s 2018 order that they should be executed only in prison facilities.  Media outlets broadcast recordings of the punishments, and observers of the punishment frequently photographed or recorded the proceedings.  Government and sharia officials stated non-Muslim residents of Aceh could choose punishment under either sharia or civil court procedures, but Muslim residents of Aceh must receive punishment under sharia.  According to media reports and human rights activists, several non-Muslim residents of Aceh chose punishment under sharia, reportedly due to its expediency and to avoid the risks of prolonged and expensive trials and possible lengthy prison sentences.

On February 8, three non-Muslims convicted of illegal possession of alcohol in Banda Aceh requested punishment under sharia and each received 40 lashes.  One of those punished publicly stated he did so to avoid a lengthy prison sentence.  On January 28, two men were caned 77 times each in Banda Aceh after being convicted of having sex with each other, violating restrictions on homosexual activities in the province.  On August 25, a couple was caned 100 times each for sexual relations outside of marriage in Sabang.  On August 20, a man was sentenced to four years in prison and 100 lashes for sexually abusing a child.  On October 6, a 19-year-old woman fainted after being caned 100 times for sexual relations outside of marriage in Southwest Aceh Regency.

A September 9 Human Rights Watch report stated that more than 150 individuals, mostly from the nation’s religious minorities, had been convicted under the blasphemy law since its enactment in 2004, and that the law was most commonly used against people deemed to have criticized Islam, including Muslims who criticize their own religion.  The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation reported 67 blasphemy cases in 2020, the most recent year available, with 43 of the cases related to statements made on social media.  International Christian Concern, an international NGO that advocates for Christian communities it believes are persecuted, stated in a January press release that laws on blasphemy were applied disproportionately, with Christians frequently being prosecuted for “insulting Islam.”

In late 2020, the Bandung District Court sentenced Apollinaris Darmawan, a 68-year-old retired civil servant, to five years in prison for blasphemy under the ITE law for a series of tweets and videos posted on Twitter and Instagram that, among other things, stated Islam was not a religion and should be expelled from the country.  Authorities previously sentenced him to prison for four years in 2017 but released him early in 2020.

On April 20, police named Joseph Paul Zhang as a blasphemy suspect for statements on his YouTube channel that he was the 26th prophet of Islam.  On the same day, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies removed 20 videos uploaded by Zhang deemed to be potential blasphemy.  According to media reports, Zhang, a Protestant pastor, had renounced his citizenship and had been living in Germany since 2018, prompting police to send a red notice request to Interpol, which would notify legal authorities worldwide that a person is wanted for extradition.  As of the end of the year, Interpol had not publicly responded to the red notice request.

On May 31, police summoned Desak Made Darmawati, a professor at a college in Jakarta, for questioning as a blasphemy suspect under the ITE law.  A coalition of Hindu organizations in Bali told police that Darmawati made statements in a widely shared online video that Hinduism had many deities and Hindu cremation rituals were strange.  Although Darmawati, a convert to Islam from Hinduism, publicly apologized for her statements on April 17, media reported in September that police investigators called in five individuals for questioning related to the allegations.

On July 19, the Singaraja District Court in Bali sentenced Lars Christensen, a Danish citizen, to two years in prison for blasphemy for a 2019 incident in which he destroyed a Hindu shrine that was located in a house he had bought and was renovating.  The incident was filmed by an ex-girlfriend, and the video was spread widely online.  On September 21, the Denpasar High Court granted Christensen’s appeal and reduced his sentence to seven months.

On August 25, police arrested Muhammad Kece in Bali for blasphemy under the ITE law related to statements made in a YouTube video critical of the Islamic religious curriculum used in the country and insulting the Prophet Muhammad.  Among the charges, the authorities said Kace had changed the word “Allah” in the Islamic profession of faith (the shahadah) to “Jesus.”  Leaders of MUI, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and Muhammadiyah, as well as Minister of Religious Affairs Qoumas, publicly stated their support for prosecuting Kece for blasphemy.  Kece converted to Christianity from Islam in 2014.  After his arrest, he was brought to a detention facility in Jakarta pending trial.  On August 26, Kace filed a report stating that he had been beaten and covered with human excrement by fellow inmates in the Jakarta jail.  Five individuals were named as suspects for this assault, including former police general Napoleon Bonaparte, who was serving a prison sentence for aiding the escape of a corruption suspect.  In December, Kece’s trial for blasphemy began and was underway at year’s end.

On August 28, police arrested preacher Yahya Waloni in East Jakarta for blasphemy and hate speech under the ITE law for a sermon stating that the Bible was fiction and for statements made on social media that Jesus was a failed prophet and the Prophet Muhmmad did not instruct people to pray.  A group named the Community for Society that Loves Pluralism originally reported him to police in April.  Waloni converted to Islam from Christianity in 2006.  On September 27, during a pretrial hearing at the South Jakarta District Court, Yahya apologized to the Christian community for his statements.  During his December trial, Waloni admitted guilt to the charges of blasphemy and the prosecutor recommended a sentence of seven months.  As of year’s end, Waloni had not been sentenced.

In December, Jakarta police arrested Joseph Suryadi, an employee of a property company, as a suspect for blasphemy and hate speech under the ITE law and criminal code.  Suryadi had sent a message in a WhatsApp group reportedly insulting the Prophet Muhammad.

On August 22, Minister of Religious Affairs Qoumas released a statement emphasizing that blasphemy remained a crime and that religious speech should focus on being educational and building national unity and religious tolerance.  On August 26, Qoumas released a statement encouraging police to apply blasphemy laws equally and fairly against all offending parties regardless of their religion.

The MORA maintained its authority at the national and local levels to conduct the “development” of religious groups and believers, including efforts to convert minority religious groups to Sunni Islam.  Beginning in 2014, Ahmadiyya communities in several West Java regencies reported that local governments were forcing or encouraging the conversion of Ahmadi Muslims, using a requirement that Ahmadis sign forms renouncing their beliefs in order to register their marriages or participate in the Hajj.

In November 2020, 274 Shia Muslims and their leader Tajul Muluk converted to Sunni Islam.  Prior to the conversion, Muluk publicly stated that no one was forcing him and his followers to convert.  Muluk’s community was displaced to the outskirts of Surabaya, East Java, in 2012 after anti-Shia groups used violence to force them from their homes in Sampang Regency, Madura.  In January, after a member of Muluk’s community, Hatimah (one name only), died, the surrounding local Sunni communities refused to allow her burial in an Islamic cemetery due to their concerns that the former Shia Muslims had not fully converted.  Local government officials mediated the dispute, leading to an agreement allowing for the burial of Hatimah in the local cemetery as long as the former Shia Muslims were mentored by Sunni clerics and attended religion classes.

On February 3, East Java Provincial Governor Khofifah Indar Parawansa appeared at a ceremony to give 230 land certificates to the former Shia Muslims who had converted with Muluk so they could gain permanent ownership of the land they had been living on since being driven out of Sampang Regency.  In February, senior officials from the East Java Nahdlatul Ulama chapter visited the former Shia Muslim community to provide assistance packages including basic necessities, as well as to build the relationship with the community.

On July 30, nine Shia Muslims from the same displaced community, including their leader Mohammad Zaini, converted to Sunni Islam.  Zaini publicly stated that the group had not been pressured to convert.  On September 15, Presidential Chief of Staff Moeldoko (one name only) visited Sampang to convey his appreciation to the Sampang Regent Slamet Junaedi for resolving the religious-social conflict with Shia Muslims that had occurred in Sampang, including mention of the conversion of Muluk and his followers to Sunni Islam.  On November 30, during a focus group discussion among community members on the resolution of the conflict, Junaedi stated that he was ready to work with the community so that they could return and live in Sampang.

The government responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by implementing policies to prevent the spread of the virus through limiting public events, including religious gatherings.  At the national level, government and religious leaders cooperated closely in developing these restrictions.  On February 23, thousands of interfaith leaders came together at the National Istiqlal Mosque, the largest mosque in Southeast Asia, to receive COVID-19 vaccinations to demonstrate interfaith support to the country’s public health efforts to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.

On July 30, the Indonesian Hinduism Society (PHDI) publicly revoked its recognition of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) as a form of Hinduism.  This national declaration by PHDI followed the August 2020 declaration by its Bali chapter renouncing ISKCON.  In April, the Customary Village Council in Denpasar, Bali, closed the Ashram Krishna Balaram, an ISKCON temple.  The Bali Regional Assembly and the Bali Customary Village Assembly supported the decision, and the Indonesian chapter of ISKCON then filed a complaint with Komnas HAM against the Bali governor, Bali PHDI, Bali Customary Village Assembly, and several other local officials for violating ISKCON followers’ freedom of religion.  On August 27, Komnas HAM sent a letter to Governor of Bali Wayan Koster, other local government officials, and the police recommending they guarantee the freedom of religion for ISKCON followers and their ability to practice their faith in peace.  On September 6, the Bali Customary Village Assembly rejected the KOMNAS HAM recommendation, stating that ISKCON tenets were very different from Hindu tenets and that ISKCON was trying to replace Bali’s Hindu traditions.

According to religious groups and NGOs, government officials and police sometimes failed to prevent religious and religiously affiliated groups commonly labeled as “intolerant groups” from infringing on others’ religious freedom and committing other acts of intimidation, such as damaging or destroying houses of worship and homes.  Groups often identified as intolerant included the Islamic Community Forum, Islamic Jihad Front, Indonesian Mujahideen Council, and the now banned FPI.

In February, the MORA and Komnas HAM announced the creation of a joint help desk to respond expeditiously to reports of religious intolerance.  Beka Ulung Hapsara, one of the Komnas HAM commissioners, said the desk would handle complaints from all religious groups, including those from aliran kepercayaan and Ahmadi Muslims.

In March, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission released regulations that required all preachers appearing on television programs during the month of Ramadan to be “appropriate,” meaning conforming with standards established by MUI, including them being competent, credible, and not linked to organizations prohibited by the government.

In September, the legislature added the revision of the penal code to its Priority Legislation List, indicating the government’s desire to pass a bill revising the code during the year.  The legislature shelved a previous version of this bill in 2019 following mass public protests.  CSOs expressed concerns that the legislation might expand the blasphemy laws and other criminal sections that could be used to restrict religious freedom in the updated version of this bill.  The legislature continued drafting the proposed legislation at year’s end.

In February, the Setara Institute, an NGO that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom, and human rights, released the City Tolerance Index for 2020, which measures religious tolerance in 94 cities across the country.  The index measures local government policies and actions, social regulations, and local religious demographics.  The top five cities were Salatiga, Singkawang, Manado, Tomohon, and Kupang, while the bottom five cities were Pangkal Pinang, Makassar, Depok, Padang, and Banda Aceh.  The index found an overall increase in tolerance across the country compared with the 2018 index.

In May, the Setara Institute released its annual report on the condition of freedom of religion in the country.  According to the report, there were 424 actions infringing on freedom of religion in 2020, compared with 327 actions in 2019.  State actors were responsible for 239 of these actions, including 71 cases of discrimination, 21 cases of arrest, and 16 cases of outlawing religious activities, with the remaining cases mostly related to use of blasphemy laws.

Across the country, minority religious groups, including Muslim groups in non-Muslim majority areas, continued to uphold the official requirement for 90 members of the religious community and 60 members of other religious communities in the area to support the building or renovating a house of worship was a barrier to construction.  Members of the Jewish community stated that since their numbers nationwide were so few, it was impossible for them to build new synagogues.

NGOs reported that local governments did not issue permits for the construction of new places of worship even when congregations had the required number of members, since opponents of the construction sometimes pressured neighbors from other religious communities not to support the construction.  In many cases, a few vocal opponents from the local majority religious affiliation were reportedly sufficient to stop construction approvals, giving majority religions a de facto veto over construction of houses of worship in some areas.  State-recognized religious leaders in government-supported interfaith forums reportedly found ways to block aliran kepercayaan believers from constructing places of worship, largely through stringent permit requirements.  Aliran kepercayaan adherents said they feared accusations of atheism if they contested such treatment in court.  Christian leaders reported that local officials indefinitely delayed the approval of requests to build new churches because the officials feared construction would lead to protests.  Ahmadi and Shia Muslims and Christians said they also faced problems when seeking approval to relocate to temporary facilities while a primary place of worship underwent renovation.

Local governments, police, and religious organizations reportedly tried to close religious minority groups’ houses of worship on the grounds of permit violations, often after protests from “intolerant groups,” even if the minority groups had been issued a proper permit.

Many congregations could not obtain the requisite number of nonmember signatures supporting construction of houses of worship and often faced protests from “intolerant groups” during the application process, making permits nearly impossible to obtain.  Even when authorities issued permits, they halted construction on some houses of worship after facing legal challenges and public protests.  Protestant and Catholic churches also reported that “intolerant groups” forced them to pay protection money if they continued operating without a permit.  Some houses of worship established before the joint ministerial decree on house-of-worship construction came into effect in 2006 reportedly were still obligated to meet the requirements or face closure.  Many houses of worship operated without permits in office buildings, malls, private homes, and shops.

Ahmadiyya congregations faced pressure from local officials to stop reconstruction and renovations on their houses of worship.  On May 6, Garut Regent Rudy Guanwan issued a circular order forbidding Ahmadiyya activities in accordance with the Joint Ministerial on Ahmadiyya and halting the construction of an Ahmadi mosque in the West Java Regency.  On May 8, a coalition of 42 CSOs sent an open letter to the regent criticizing the order as a violation of freedom of religion.

On September 3, a mob of more than 100 people vandalized the Ahmadi Muslim Miftahul Huda mosque in Sintang Regency, West Kalimantan, and burned down a building adjacent to it.  Media reported that police stood by as the attack happened.  The mosque had been in operation since 2004.  Following the attack, Minister of Religious Affairs Qoumas condemned the attack as unjustifiable and illegal.  Prior to the attack, the local government issued a decree in April banning Ahmadiyya activities in the region.  In August, government officials had sealed the Ahmadi mosque temporarily, following reported threats from a local anti-Ahmadi group, the Muslim Umma Alliance.  On August 27, the local government issued a letter permanently closing the mosque.  Police arrested 22 individuals in connection to the case, naming three of those arrested as potential masterminds of the attack.  As of the end of the year, government officials were investigating the incident and the involvement of hard-line groups and the local government.

Following the attack on the mosque, the Nahdlatul Ulama Central Board Chairman Said Aqil Siradj told press that he strongly condemned any violence used against the Ahmadiyya.  Additionally, MORA officials told the press they would begin reviewing the 2008 joint ministerial decree that had criminalized Ahmadi activities.  As of September 8, police had arrested 26 suspects related to the incident and an investigation was underway.  A September 13 editorial in the Jakarta Post newspaper called for the revocation of the joint decree, saying that it “only works to legitimize violent acts against the Ahmadiyah.”

In February, lawyers for Puji Hartono, the head of a musala (a small prayer hall) in South Halmahera Regency, North Maluku Province, sent legal challenges to the local government requesting he be allowed to resume religious services and the construction at the musala.  According to his lawyers, religious study had been held at the musala since 1982, but in February 2020, local government officials stopped him from hosting religious study classes there and halted renovations.  Additionally, media reported that the local officials drove Hartono out of the village, leaving behind his wife and 11 children.  Hartono’s lawyers stated that the closing of the musala and the expulsion of Hartono from the village were done illegally.

In April, a media account regarding a Batak Christian Protestant church in Jombang Regency, East Java, attracted national attention during the year.  In March 2020, the church officially opened, but soon after the government closed it due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions.  However, when the church attempted to reopen in August 2020, the village government denied its request to reopen.  Press reported that hostility from members of other faiths in the local community were the reason behind the government’s decision to refuse the church’s request to reopen.  In November 2020, the village government officially issued an order closing the church for disturbing neighboring residents.  During the church’s closure, members of the church rented another location in a nearby city for their religious activities and ceremonies.

On May 23, the Indonesian Baptist Church in the Tlogosari Kulon area of Semarang, Central Java, was officially opened.  The city government initially granted permission to build the church in 1998, but construction of the church experienced a series of delays caused by local community protests against the construction, government actions to suspend construction, and the congregation’s lack of finances.

On June 13, Mayor Bima Arya of Bogor, West Java, provided a land grant to representatives of the Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) Pengadilan for construction of a new church building by its affiliate church, GKI Yasmin.  Arya stated that this action resolved a longstanding dispute related to the construction of a new church that GKI Yasmin had begun in 2006 but that was halted a year later, after the city withdrew the original building permit due to what the media described as pressure from local Muslim groups.  Following the withdrawal of the permit, the GKI Yasmin congregation filed a lawsuit against the city, resulting in a 2020 Supreme Court decision ordering the Bogor government to reinstate the building permit for the original location.  GKI Yasmin also disputed Arya’s June statement, saying the issue remained unsettled and that its congregation had not been involved in any plans for a proposed relocation, with the government instead negotiating with GKI Pengadilan, an affiliated church, and not directly with GKI Yasmin.  GKI Yasmin members boycotted an August 8 event hosted by Mayor Arya to present the building permit for the new church.  On September 10, Presidential Chief of Staff Moeldoko publicly congratulated Arya for successfully resolving the dispute while deputy chair of the Setara Institute Bonar Tigor Naipospos told press the case reflected a dominant trend in the country where “minority groups [are] forced to relent to satisfy the majority groups,” rather than the government ensuring legal protection for those minority groups.

On August 27, Vice President Ma’ruf Amin, after attending Friday prayers at the National Istiqlal Mosque, walked through the newly constructed “Tunnel of Brotherhood” that connected the mosque with the nearby Jakarta Catholic Cathedral.  Amin stated that the tunnel was “not just a symbol, but it can create the inspiration to unite religious communities.”  President Widodo had initially approved construction of the tunnel in February 2020.

In December 2020, the National Islamic Institute in Manado, North Sulawesi, a state-run Islamic college, built a “religious moderation house” on its campus as a place for discussion of religious tolerance and pluralistic society.  Interfaith leaders from the local Muslim, Hindu, Catholic, Christian, Confucian, and Buddhist communities attended the inauguration of the building.

In July, the Paramadina Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy released a report finding that between 2015 and 2020 there were at least 122 cases of local communities resisting the construction of houses of worship by appealing to local governments under the auspices of the 2006 joint ministerial decree on houses of worship, with approximately 60 percent of cases involving churches, 28 percent involving mosques, and the remaining 12 percent involving Buddhist, Hindu, and Confucian temples.

Aliran kepercayaan followers continued to say teachers pressured them to send their children to religious education classes conducted by one of the six officially recognized religions.  Minority religious groups not among the six recognized religions said that schools often allowed their children to spend religious education time in study hall, but that school officials required parents to sign documents stating their children received religious education.  Ahmadi Muslim students reported religion classes on Islam focused only on Sunni teachings.

On February 3, the Ministers of Education and Culture, Home Affairs, and Religious Affairs issued a joint ministerial decree on the use of uniforms in schools, prohibiting most state-run schools from compelling female students to wear hijabs.  The decree came after two non-Muslim students in West Sumatra refused to wear school-mandated hijabs.  Parents of one of the students filmed their meeting with school officials who stated the student had to wear a hijab and posted the video on social media, prompting the national news media to report on the story.  The school principal subsequently apologized, acknowledging that 23 non-Muslim students in the school had been required to wear the hijab.  The decree ordered local governments and school principals to abandon regulations requiring the hijab but did not prohibit Muslim female students and teachers from choosing to wear the hijab at school.

In February, press reported that the National Commission on Violence Against Women identified 32 provinces and regencies in the country that required girls and women to wear hijabs in public schools, government buildings, and other public spaces.  In some cases, young women had their hair cut, were expelled from schools, were penalized, or were fired from their jobs.  In February, a Human Rights Watch researcher told the press that schools in more than 20 provinces made religious attire mandatory in their dress code.

On May 3, the Supreme Court annulled the joint ministerial decree on hijabs, declaring that the decree violated four laws, including the National Education System Law and Child Protection Law, and said that children under 18 had no right to choose their own clothes.  Religious Affairs Minister Qoumas said he was disappointed with the ruling and would consult with his cabinet colleagues on what to do next.

In March, Human Rights Watch released a report on dress codes for women and girls, finding that “over the past two decades, women and girls in the country had faced unprecedented legal and social demands to wear clothing deemed Islamic as part of broader efforts to impose the rules of sharia in many parts of the country.”  The report found that women and girls across the country were subject to local regulations, social pressure, bullying, and harassment to compel them to wear hijabs at schools, government offices, and in public spaces, causing psychological distress and violating their freedom of religion.

On March 1, Reverend Gomar Gultom, the chairman of the Communion of Churches in Indonesia, the largest Protestant Christian umbrella organization in the country, released a statement that said that the group had written to the Minister of Religious Affairs to work with the Ministry of Education and Culture and with book publishers to revise or drop Islamic textbooks that refer to the Bible.  Gultom said that religious lessons “should be carried out in a private space, such as among families and in houses of worship – not in schools.”  The letter cited criticisms of the Gospels in the Islamic textbooks.

On April 5, Minister Qoumas directed all MORA employees to give opportunities for prayers from religions other than Islam at all MORA events and activities.

According to media reports, in April, the Ahmadi Muslim community displaced from their village of Gereneng by communal violence in 2018 had moved near Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara.  The local government of West Nusa Tenggara told press that it was exploring plans to build the infrastructure in this new location and cautioned against the return of the community to Gereneng village due to social hostility there.  Local CSOs and academics criticized the government approach as giving in to local religious majority pressure rather than protecting religious minorities.

In Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara, approximately 120 Ahmadi Muslims remained internally displaced in cramped apartments after a mob expelled them from their East Lombok village in 2006.  According to media reports in May, the community continued to lack permanent residences.  Media also reported in May that 16 other Ahmadi Muslims displaced by the same conflict were living in a former hospital in Praya, Central Lombok.

Although the government generally allowed citizens to leave the religion column blank on their identity cards (KTPs) and a 2017 Constitutional Court ruling allowed citizens to select indigenous faiths on their KTPs, individuals continued to report difficulties accessing government services if they chose either option.  Faced with this problem, many religious minority members, including those following indigenous beliefs, reportedly chose to identify as a member of an officially recognized religion close to their beliefs or reflecting the locally dominant religion.  According to researchers, this practice obscured the real numbers of adherents to religious groups in government statistics.

In June, the local government of Banyuwangi Regency, East Java, provided identity cards to close to 300 aliran kepercayaan adherents listing their correct religion.  Previously adherents either did not have identity documents or had the documents with a blank in the column for religion.  On June 2, Banyuwangi regent Ipuk Fietsiandani told press that the government would provide services to all community members without discrimination.

NGOs and religious advocacy groups continued to urge the government to remove the religion field from KTPs.  Religious minorities reported they sometimes faced discrimination after others saw their religious affiliation on their KTPs.  Members of the Jewish community said they felt uncomfortable stating their religion in public and often chose to state they were Christians or Muslims depending on the dominant religion where they lived, due to concern that local communities did not understand their religion.

Men and women of different religions who sought to marry reportedly had difficulties finding a religious official willing to perform a wedding ceremony.  Some couples of different religions selected the same religion on their KTPs in order to marry legally.  Many individuals reportedly preferred to go abroad for interreligious marriage, although this option was severely limited due to COVID-19 pandemic-related travel restrictions.

Minority Muslim groups, including Ahmadis, Shia, and Gafatar, continued to report resistance when they applied for KTPs as Muslims, effectively denying them access to public services if they could not secure KTPs.

Both the central and local governments included elected and appointed officials from minority religious groups.  For example, Andrei Angouw won the December 2020 election for mayor of Manado, becoming the country’s first Confucian mayor.  President Widodo’s 34-member cabinet included six members of minority faiths (four Protestants, one Catholic, and one Hindu), the same total number as during his previous administration.

Many individuals in the government, media, civil society, and general population were vocal and active in protecting and promoting tolerance and pluralism.  On April 7, during the opening ceremony for the ninth National Conference for the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, President Widodo stated that exclusive religious practices had to be avoided and that religious groups had to respect each other’s beliefs in order to avoid creating divisions in society.

On September 13, Minister of Religious Affairs Qoumas delivered a speech to the G20 Interfaith Conference highlighting what he stated was Indonesia’s commitment to religious pluralism and tolerance and the role of religion in fostering international peace.

On March 26, Minister Qoumas wished happy new year (Naw-Ruz) to followers of the Baha’i Faith in a video uploaded to YouTube where he discussed the importance of unity and religious moderation.  The video began to be spread widely online in July, and hard-line groups began to criticize the Minister’s new year’s message.  In response, Qoumas told press that while the government officially supports and protects the six official religions of Indonesia, that did not mean other religions such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, or Taoism were illegal in the country or not protected by the constitution.  Following Qouma’s statement, MUI chair Cholil Nafis publicly cautioned the MORA against providing support or recognition to the Baha’i religion.

In January, President Widodo nominated and the lower house of parliament unanimously approved General Listyo Sigit Prabowo, a Protestant, as the head of the Indonesian National Police.  Prabowo was the first Christian to hold the position since the 1970s.  He received the support of the NU and Muhammadiyah as well as leading Muslim organizations and clerics in Banten, the province bordering the capital known for what observers said was its religious conservatism, where he previously led the local police.  However, the head of the MUI, expressing concern regarding Prabowo’s nomination, said that “even though Indonesia is a secular country, it would not be appropriate if the leader of the police had a non-Muslim background.  It was natural for leaders of any country to have the same religion as that of the majority of the population.”

Foreign religious workers from numerous religious groups continued to state they found it relatively easy to obtain visas, and some groups reported little government interference with their religious activities.  COVID-19 pandemic-related restrictions that severely restricted incoming travel for foreigners to Indonesia also impacted the ability of foreign religious workers entering the country.

Police provided special protection to some Catholic churches in major cities during Sunday services and Christian holidays.  Police also provided special protection to Buddhist and Hindu temples during religious celebrations.

On September 27, religious leaders from different faiths attended the Dialogue of Religious Council Leaders in Jakarta, hosted by the Ministry of Religion, issuing the joint “Declaration of Religions for a Just and Peaceful Indonesia.”  Representatives from the ministry, MUI, the Indonesian Association of Churches (PGI), the Indonesian [Catholic] Bishops’ Conference, Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia (PHDI), Representatives of Indonesian Buddhists (Walubi), and the Indonesian Confucian High Council (Matakin) all signed the document.  The statement said all forms of discrimination, violence, hatred, and destruction of places of worship were contrary to religious teaching and reiterated the leaders’ support for the unity of the state and Pancasila.

According to press reporting, the government proposed the promotion of the ninth-century Mahayana Buddhist temple Borobudur, one of the world’s largest Buddhist structures, as a global tourism destination.  The reports stated that the project would be aimed at attracting domestic and international visitors, with the goal of promoting a more moderate face for religion in the country.  Minister for Religious Affairs Qoumas stated the government was studying how to promote Buddhist ceremonies at Borobudur “which can be attended by Buddhists [from] all over the world,” as part of efforts by the authorities to improve religious moderation in the country.  Sudhamek Agoeng Waspodo Soenjoto, chairman of the Indonesian Buddhayana Council supervisory board, expressed his desire that Borobudur not be described as a “global Buddhist worship center,” since it could lead to “misunderstanding and misinterpretation,” and the term “Universal Center for Culture and Spirituality Study for Various Religions” be used instead.

On May 11, four Christian farmers in Poso Regency, Central Sulawesi, were killed by the East Indonesia Mujahedeen, designated by the Indonesian government as a terrorist group.  The same group was accused of killing four residents of Sigi Regency, Central Sulawesi, in November 2020.  According to the Voice of America, local police said the attackers were motivated by “terrorism and robbery.”  A spokesperson for President Widodo condemned the incident, promising that the terrorists responsible for the attack would be caught.  On September 18, security forces killed the group’s leader Ali Kalora in a firefight.  At year’s end, security forces continued operations seeking to apprehend the remaining members of the group.

On March 28, two suicide bombers, later identified as a married couple, attacked the Catholic Sacred Heart of Jesus Cathedral in Makassar, South Sulawesi Province, killing both assailants and injuring 20 bystanders.  Police said the wounded included four guards and several churchgoers.  The attack occurred during a Palm Sunday Mass.  Police identified the two bombers as members of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), an organization designed by the Indonesian government as terrorist, that was previously responsible for the 2018 bombings of three churches in Surabaya, East Java.  In a televised address, President Widodo called for calm and said “the state guarantees the safety of religious people to worship without fear.”  Religious Affairs Minister Qoumas publicly called on police to improve security at houses of worship.  In May, press reported that police had arrested 53 individuals in connection with the bombing.

On May 28, police arrested 11 suspected JAD members in Merauke, Papua, for an alleged plot to kill Catholic Archbishop of Merauke Petrus Canisius Mandagi and planning attacks at several Christian churches in easternmost Papua Province.  Police told press that the suspected members were affiliated with those responsible for the March bombing in Makassar.

Shia and Ahmadi Muslims reported feeling under constant threat from “intolerant groups.”  Anti-Shia and anti-Ahmadi rhetoric was common in online media outlets and on social media.

Individuals affiliated at the local level with the MUI used rhetoric considered intolerant by religious minorities, including fatwas declaring Shia and Ahmadis as deviant sects.  The national MUI did not address or repudiate local MUI officials who called for such fatwas.  In August, the National MUI Conference released a recommendation that the MORA should always consult with MUI prior to making decisions related to Ahmadi, Shia, and Baha’i issues.  In March, the local MUI for Pandeglang Regency, Banten Province, declared the Hakekok Balatasutak, a local religious group, as deviant and stated that its members needed counseling to be brought back to the correct religious path.  Following the destruction of an Ahmadi mosque in Sintang Regency, West Kalimantan, in September, the local MUI signed an agreement with the local FKUB to “embrace” the local Ahmadi community to ensure they returned to the correct teachings of Islam.

On August 12, Muhammad Roin, chair of the Wast Java chapter of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, stated that “Shi’ism” was not part of Islam and was a deviant sect.  He called on the local government and police in West Java to stop any Shia plans to commemorate Ashura.

According to the Setara Institute’s annual report on freedom of religion in the country, nonstate actors conducted 185 actions infringing on freedom of religion in 2020, up from 168 actions in 2019.  These actions included 62 cases of intolerance, 32 cases of reporting blasphemy, 17 cases of refusing the creation of a house of worship, and eight cases of forbidding worship.

On June 3, hundreds of Nahdlatul Ulama members in Banyuwangi Regency, East Java, demonstrated against the construction of a Muhammadiyah-affiliated mosque in their community.  Soon afterwards, the local heads of Nahdlatual Ulama and Muhammadiyah met and publicly stated they were able to resolve the dispute.  Several points from the Nahdlatul Ulama-Muhammadiyah meeting included agreement that Muhammadiyah complete administrative requirements for mosque construction and that both parties encourage communication between their followers at the local level.

On September 20, the Nahdlatul Ulama Central Board issued a letter to all institutions affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama to cease collaborative programs and projects with the two international organizations, the American Jewish Committee and the Institute for Global Engagement, as well as the Leimena Institute, a Christian think tank based in the country.  No reasons were given in the letter for the decision.  Activists reported their view that the letter undermined religious freedom and was spearheaded by certain factions in NU that viewed the actions of these minority religious organizations as “disruptive” to the country’s social fabric.  As of the end of the year, the Nahdlatul Ulama Central Board had not publicly provided a reason for why it issued the letter.

A conspiracy theory blaming Jews for the COVID-19 pandemic spread widely online, leading Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Mahfud MD to state that the COVID-19 pandemic was not the result of a Jewish conspiracy.  Mahfud stated that even some academics and professors had reiterated this conspiracy theory and that he wanted to stop its spread since it distracted from efforts to combat the pandemic.

Christian news sites reported that approximately 12 elementary school children, ages nine to 12, vandalized a Christian cemetery in Solo (Surakarta), Central Java Province, on June 21.  According to local authorities, the children attended a school near the cemetery.

On June 10, residents of Ponorogo Regency, East Java, rejected a plan to convert a house into a church in their neighborhood.  Media reported that one of the local leaders had rejected the plan because the house owner had not asked for permission from majority Muslim local community before pursuing the plan.  Yohanes Kasmin, who led the congregation asking for the conversion, said the dispute was a result of a misunderstanding and that since its creation the congregation had never had a permanent place of worship.

In April, Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists joined with local Muslims in Blitar Regency, East Java, to help build a mosque.  Members of the community told the press that the Hindu-majority community had a long history of interfaith cooperation.

According to a May survey by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, a public opinion pollster, 88 percent of Indonesians were aware of the conflict between Israel and Palestinians, and of those respondents, 65 percent agreed that the conflict was between Judaism and Islam, 14 percent disagreed, and 22 percent said they did not know.

Many of the largest and most influential religious groups and NGOs, including Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, officially endorsed and advocated for tolerance, pluralism, and the protection of minority groups on numerous occasions.  In July, the secretary general for the Supreme Council of Nahdlatul Ulama and the World Evangelical Alliance signed a statement of cooperation establishing a working relationship to promote intercultural solidarity and respect.

According to the “Who Cares about Free Speech” report by the Future of Free Speech, a collaborative project of NGOs and academic organizations, only 26 percent of citizens surveyed in February supported the freedom to express opinions offensive to religion, while the other 74 percent agreed that the government should be able to prevent people from saying things offensive to religion.

According to a September survey by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, 16 percent of respondents indicated their support of a government that operated based on the teachings of Islam, while 77 percent stated the government should not be based on any single religion.

The MORA’s Religious Harmony Index for 2020 found a decrease in religious harmony from 2019 to 2020.  The index used a survey of 1,220 respondents in 34 provinces to measure harmony across three dimensions:  tolerance, equality, and solidarity.  The index was scored from 0 to 100, with 100 being the most harmonious.  The national score for 2020 was 67.46, down from 73.83 in 2019.  A MORA policy paper stated four likely reasons for this decrease:  increased prejudice directed at different groups, especially against adherents of aliran kepercayaan, Ahmadi and Shia Muslims, and atheists; a decrease in the tolerance subindex, with 38 percent of respondents saying they would be bothered if a house of worship belonging to another faith was built near them; a decrease in the equality subindex, with 36 percent of respondents stating they would not support someone from a different faith becoming president; and a decrease in the solidarity index, with 36 percent of respondents saying they would not support other faiths in hosting religious events or celebrations.  According to the survey, more than 50 percent of respondents reported never having direct contact with people from a different faith.

On December 20, the MORA announced results from the 2021 Religious Harmony Index, finding that overall religious harmony score had increased to 72.39.

The Ambassador, Charge d’Affaires, embassy officers, and officers from the Consulate General in Surabaya and the Consulate in Medan regularly engaged with all levels of government on religious freedom issues.  Issues discussed included actions against religious minorities, closures of places of worship, access for foreign religious organizations, convictions for blasphemy, and defamation of religion.  They also discussed the undue influence of “intolerant groups,” the importance of the rule of law, the application of sharia to non-Muslims, the importance of education and interfaith dialogue in promoting tolerance, the equal protection of all citizens regardless of their religion or belief, and promotion of tolerance in international forums.

On February 22, the Charge d’Affaires delivered remarks highlighting religious freedom and tolerance at an event for the 43rd anniversary of the National Istiqlal Mosque, which included participation from the Vice President, ministers, and senior government officials.

On April 9, an official from the Department of State Office of International Religious Freedom provided remarks focused on religious freedom and pluralism at an MUI seminar entitled “Reading the Direction of U.S. President Joe Biden’s Policy regarding Muslims and the Islamic World,” appearing along senior Muslim scholars.

On December 15, the Ambassador delivered remarks on the importance of religious freedom and tolerance, as well as calling for the cessation of violence against Ahmadi and Shia Muslims, during an MUI event entitled “International Webinar on Human Rights in Various Perspectives and the Launching of MUI Human Rights School.”  Other speakers at the event included Minister of Religious Affairs Qoumas, Speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) Bambang Soesatyo, and Deputy Minister of Law and Human Rights Edward Hiariej.

In February, the embassy began working with the National Istiqlal Mosque’s Voice of Istiqlal initiative, which seeks to encourage tolerance and diversity, interfaith dialogue, and gender equality in Indonesia and internationally.  The embassy provided language and technical training to Voice of Istiqlal’s staff.  Soon after this training began, Voice of Istiqlal hosted and broadcast online an interfaith dialogue with Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucianist leaders in September to discuss the importance of interfaith cooperation in helping deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.  The event included speeches by Vice President Amin, Cardinal Ignatius Suharyo Hardjoatmodjo, chairman of the Council of Churches in Indonesia Gomar Gultom, and Grand Imam Nasaruddin Umar.

In March, the embassy completed a project with the Yogyakarta-based Srikandi Lintas Iman to promote religious pluralism through early childhood education and utilizing social media among women.  The project provided training to 57 teachers from Yogyakarta schools and 59 women religious leaders.  Content promoting religious freedom and tolerance created as part of the social media component of the project reached more than 130,000 persons.

On September 30, the embassy completed its $11.5 million project with the Asia Foundation engaging legal aid organizations to defend human rights and religious freedom in six provinces, including all provinces in Java except Banten and Papua.  The embassy supported these partners in developing advocacy papers for outreach on regulations that discriminate against religious minorities, improving their capacity to represent minority religious groups in legal cases, undertaking strategic public campaigns to build wider civil society engagement in challenging intolerance, and publishing periodic reports on abuses of religious freedom.  The project was estimated to have helped provide legal assistance to 240,000 persons from marginalized communities.

The embassy continued a $24.33 million project aimed at developing more effective tools and systems to bolster religious tolerance.  The project partnered with national and local-level government officials, CSOs, universities, research institutions, and grassroots movements that focus on promoting religious freedom and tolerance.

The embassy continued a $3.3 million activity to promote religious tolerance and pluralism among high school students.  Through partnerships with the Ministries of Religious Affairs and Education and Culture, the project aimed to design and implement innovative arts and cultural curricula in select districts to advance community resilience to religious intolerance.

During Ramadan, the embassy and consulates conducted extensive outreach campaigns in print and electronic media and in social media to highlight religious tolerance, reaching an estimated 100 million Indonesians.  The Charge d’Affaires appeared on Amanah Wali 5, one of the highest-rated serialized dramas in the country, where she visited a fictional market to learn about Indonesian customs and discuss tolerance and diversity.  Embassy officials appeared on television, radio, and online shows, as well as in press interviews, to share their experiences of celebrating Ramadan in the country and the U.S. approach to religious pluralism and freedom.  The embassy hosted a series of online events and assisted in press placements, showcasing Indonesians who had lived in the United States and could discuss their experiences of religious freedom and pluralism there.

The Ambassador and Charge d’Affaires met periodically with leaders of the country’s two largest Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, to discuss religious tolerance and pluralism and to further develop areas of cooperation.

Embassy officials met regularly with counterparts from other embassies to discuss support for freedom of religion and belief and to exchange information on areas of concern, programs being implemented, and possible areas of cooperation.

The embassy sponsored four Indonesians to join a virtual program on religious freedom and pluralism.  During the five-week program, participants met U.S. religious leaders of different faiths to discuss the role religious officials play in their own societies and develop ideas for how they can work with leaders of similar or different faiths on shared goals for their societies.

On May 7, the embassy hosted a discussion on “Community Building in Islam,” which featured speakers from Indonesia and the United States, including Grand Imam of the National Istiqlal Mosque Nasaruddin Umar, discussing how religious leaders could help build communities across religious divides.

On August 25, the embassy hosted a virtual talk show entitled “Fostering Diversity and Tolerance among Youth” that showcased alumni of U.S. exchange programs.  Discussion at the event focused on how young Indonesians perceived pluralism and how they had experienced discrimination based on religious, ethnic, and racial groupings, as well as ways they had sought to overcome these divides.

The embassy posted translated speeches and commentary on religious freedom by the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and other high-level government officials on its website.  The embassy also developed graphics for social media and sent information to local journalists to encourage them to cover these issues.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 85.9 million (midyear 2021).  According to Iranian government estimates, Muslims constitute 99.4 percent of the population, of whom 90-95 percent are Shia, and 5-10 percent are Sunni, mostly Turkmen, Arabs, Baluchis, and Kurds, living in the northeast, southwest, southeast, and northwest provinces, respectively.  Afghan refugees, economic migrants, and displaced persons also make up a significant Sunni population, but accurate statistics on the breakdown of the Afghan refugee population between Sunni and Shia are unavailable.  There are no official statistics available on the number of Muslims who practice Sufism, although unofficial reports estimate several million.

According to U.S. government estimates, groups constituting the remaining less than 1 percent of the population include Baha’is, Christians, Yarsanis, Jews, Sabean-Mandaeans, and Zoroastrians.  The three largest non-Muslim minorities are Baha’is, Christians, and Yarsanis.

According to Human Rights Watch data, Baha’is number at least 300,000.

The government Statistical Center of Iran reports there are 117,700 Christians in the country.  Some estimates, however, suggest there may be many more than actually reported.  According to Boston University’s 2020 World Religion Database, there are approximately 579,000 Christians.  NGO Open Doors USA estimates the number is 800,000, and Elam Ministries, a Christian organization, estimates there could be between 300,000 and one million.

Estimates by the Assyrian Church of the total Assyrian and Chaldean Christian population put their combined number at 7,000.  There are also Protestant denominations, including evangelical groups, but there is no authoritative data on their numbers.  Christian groups outside the country disagree on the size of the Protestant community, with some estimates citing figures lower than 10,000.  Many Protestants and converts to Christianity from Islam reportedly practice in secret.

There is no official count of Yarsanis, but HRANA and the NGO Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI) estimate there are up to two million.  Yarsanis are mainly located in Loristan and the Kurdish regions.

According to recent estimates from Armenian Christians who maintain contact with the Christian community in the country, their current numbers are approximately 40,000 to 50,000, significantly lower than the peak of 300,000 estimated prior to 1979.  The number of Roman Catholics in the country is estimated to be 21,000.

According to Zoroastrian groups and the government-run Statistical Center of Iran, the population includes approximately 25,000 Zoroastrians, although the World Religion Database estimates this number to be 64,000.

According to the Tehran Jewish Committee, the population includes approximately 9,000 Jews, while representatives of the Jewish community in the country estimated their number at 15,000 during a 2018 PBS News Hour interview.

The population, according to government media, includes 14,000 Sabean-Mandaeans.

According to the 2011 census, the number of individuals who are nonreligious rose by 20 percent between 2006 and 2011, which supports observations by academics and others that the number of atheists, agnostics, nonbelievers, and religiously unaffiliated living in the country is growing.  The 2020 World Religion Database estimates their number to be 239,000.  Often, however, these groups do not publicly identify, as documented by Amnesty International’s report on the country, because those who profess atheism are at risk of arbitrary detention, torture, and the death penalty for apostasy.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as an Islamic republic and designates Twelver Ja’afari Shia Islam as the official state religion.  The constitution stipulates all laws and regulations must be based on “Islamic criteria” and an official interpretation of sharia.  The constitution states citizens shall enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights “in conformity with Islamic criteria.”

The constitution prohibits the investigation of an individual’s ideas and states no one may be “subjected to questioning and aggression for merely holding an opinion.”  The law prohibits Muslims from changing or renouncing their religious beliefs.  The only recognized conversions are from other religions to Islam.  Sharia as interpreted by the government considers conversion from Islam apostasy, a crime punishable by death.  Under the law, a child born to a Muslim father is Muslim.

By law, non-Muslims may not engage in public persuasion or attempt to convert a Muslim to another faith or belief.  The law considers these activities to be proselytizing and punishable by death.  In addition, citizens who are not recognized as Christians, Zoroastrians, or Jews may not engage in public religious expression, such as worshiping in a church or wearing religious symbols such as a cross.  The government makes some exceptions for foreigners belonging to unrecognized religious groups.

The penal code specifies the death sentence for moharebeh (“enmity against God,” which according to the Oxford Dictionary of Islam means in Quranic usage “corrupt conditions caused by unbelievers or unjust people that threaten social and political wellbeing”), fisad fil-arz (“corruption on earth,” which includes apostasy or heresy), and sabb al-nabi (“insulting the Prophet” or “insulting the sanctities [Islam]”).  According to the penal code, the application of the death penalty varies depending on the religion of both the perpetrator and the victim.

On January 13, parliament passed amendments that added two provisions to the penal code criminalizing “insulting legally recognized religions and Iranian ethnicities.”  The Guardian Council approved the amendments on February 3, and then president Hassan Rouhani signed them into law on February 18.  Under the amendment to Article 499 of the code (which criminalizes membership in any group that “disturbs the security of the country”), authorities may impose a sentence of between two to five years in prison and/or a monetary fine where violence is involved, and between six months and two years and/or a monetary fine if no violence is involved, on anyone who “insults Iranian ethnicities or divine religions or Islamic schools of thought recognized under the constitution.”  Under the amendment to Article 500, authorities may impose prison sentences of two to five years and/or a fine on anyone who commits “any deviant educational or proselytizing activity that contradicts or interferes with the sacred law of Islam.”

The constitution states the four Sunni schools (Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, and Hanbali) and the Shia Zaydi school of Islam are “deserving of total respect,” and their followers are free to perform religious practices.  It states these schools may follow their own jurisprudence in matters of religious education and certain personal affairs, including marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

The constitution states Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians are the only recognized religious minorities.  “Within the limits of the law” they have permission to perform religious rites and ceremonies and to form religious societies.  They are also free to address personal affairs and religious education according to their own religious canon.  The government considers any citizen who is not a registered member of one of these three groups or who cannot prove his or her family was Christian prior to 1979 to be Muslim.

Since the law prohibits citizens from converting from Islam to another religion, the government only recognizes the Christianity of citizens who are Armenian or Assyrian Christians, because the presence of these groups in the country predates Islam, or of citizens who can prove they or their families were Christian prior to the 1979 revolution.  The government also recognizes Sabean-Mandaeans as Christian, even though they state they do not consider themselves as such.  The government often considers Yarsanis as Shia Muslims practicing Sufism, but Yarsanis identify Yarsan as a distinct faith (also known as Ahl-e-Haq or Kakai).  Yarsanis may also self-register as Shia to obtain government services.  The government does not recognize evangelical Protestants as Christian.

Citizens who are members of one of the recognized religious minorities must register with authorities.  Registration conveys certain rights, including the use of alcohol for religious purposes.  Authorities may close a church and arrest its leaders if churchgoers do not register or if unregistered individuals attend services.  The law does not recognize as Christian individuals who convert to Christianity.  They may not register and are not entitled to the same rights as recognized members of Christian communities.

The Supreme Leader (the Velayat-e Faqih, the Guardian of the Islamic Jurist), the country’s head of state, oversees extrajudicial special clerical courts, which are not provided for by the constitution.  The courts, each headed by a Shia Islamic legal scholar, operate outside the judiciary’s purview and investigate offenses committed by clerics, including political statements inconsistent with government policy and nonreligious activities.  The courts also issue rulings based on independent interpretations of Islamic legal sources.  The constitution provides that the judiciary be “an independent power” that is “free from every kind of unhealthy relation and connection.”  The government appoints judges “in accordance with religious criteria.”

The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) monitor religious activity.  The IRGC also monitors churches.

The constitution provides for freedom of the press, except when it is “harmful to the principles of Islam or the rights of the public.”

The Ministry of Education determines the religious curricula of public schools.  All school curricula, public and private, must include a course on Shia Islamic teachings, and all pupils must pass this course to advance to the next educational level, through university.  Sunni students and students from recognized minority religious groups must take and pass the courses on Shia Islam, although they may also take separate courses on their own religious beliefs.  Applicants to university must pass an exam on Islamic, Christian, or Jewish theology, based on their official religious affiliation.

Recognized minority religious groups, except for Sunni Muslims, may operate private schools.  The Ministry of Education supervises private schools operated by recognized minority religious groups and imposes certain curriculum requirements.  The ministry must approve all textbooks used in coursework, including religious texts.  These schools may provide their own religious instruction and in languages other than Farsi, but authorities must approve those texts as well.  Minority communities must bear the cost of translating the texts into Farsi for official review.  Directors of such private schools must demonstrate loyalty to the official state religion.  This requirement, known as gozinesh review, is an evaluation to determine adherence to the government ideology and system as well as knowledge of the official interpretation of Shia Islam.

The law bars Baha’is from founding or operating their own educational institutions.  A Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology order requires universities to exclude Baha’is from access to higher education, or to expel them if their religious affiliation becomes known.  Government regulations state Baha’is are only permitted to enroll in universities if they do not identify themselves as Baha’is.  To register for the university entrance examination, Baha’i students must answer a basic multiple-choice question and identify themselves as followers of one of the four officially recognized religions (i.e., Islam, Christianity, Judaism, or Zoroastrianism).

According to the constitution, Islamic scholars in the Assembly of Experts, a group of 86 popularly elected and Supreme Leader-approved clerics whose qualifications include piety and religious scholarship, elect the Supreme Leader.  To “safeguard” Islamic ordinances and to ensure legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (i.e., the parliament or Majles) is compatible with Islam, a Guardian Council, composed of six Shia clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader and six Shia legal scholars nominated by the judiciary, must review and approve all legislation.  The Guardian Council also vets all candidates for the Assembly of Experts, President, and parliament, and supervises elections for those bodies.  Individuals who are not Shia Muslims are barred from serving as Supreme Leader or President, as well as from being a member in the Assembly of Experts, Guardian Council, or Expediency Council (the country’s highest arbiter of disputes between the parliament and the Guardian Council over legislation).

The constitution bans parliament from passing laws contrary to Islam and states there may be no amendment to its provisions related to the “Islamic character” of the political or legal system, or to the specification that Twelver Ja’afari Shia Islam is the official religion.

Non-Muslims may not be elected to a representative body or hold senior government, intelligence, or military positions, with the exception of five of the 290 parliamentary seats reserved by the constitution for members of recognized religious minority groups.  There are two seats reserved for Armenian Christians, one for Assyrian and Chaldean Christians together, one for Jews, and one for Zoroastrians.

The constitution states that in regions where followers of one of the recognized schools of Sunni Islam constitute the majority, local regulations are to be in accordance with that school, within the bounds of the jurisdiction of local councils and without infringing upon the rights of the followers of other schools.

According to the constitution, a judge should rule on a case on the basis of codified law, but in a situation where such law is absent, he should deliver his judgment on the basis of “authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwas.”

The constitution specifies the government must “treat non-Muslims in conformity with the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and respect their human rights, as long as those non-Muslims have not conspired or acted against Islam and the Islamic Republic.”

The law authorizes collection of “blood money,” or diyyah, as restitution to families for Muslims and members of recognized religious minorities who are victims of murder, bodily harm, or property damage.  Baha’i families, however, are not entitled to receive blood money.  This law also reduces the blood money for recognized religious minorities and women to half that of a Muslim man.  Women are entitled to equal blood money as men, but only for insurance claims where loss of life occurred in automobile accidents and not for other categories of death, such as murder.  In cases of bodily harm, according to the law, certain male organs (for example, the testicles) are worth more than the entire body of a woman.

The criminal code provides for hudud punishments (those mandated by sharia) for theft, including amputation of the fingers of the right hand, amputation of the left foot, life imprisonment, and death, as well as flogging of up to 99 lashes or stoning for other crimes.  As part of hudud, the code allows for qisas (retribution in kind).  The code also allows for ta’zir, which allows judges to use their personal discretion to determine punishment.

By law, non-Muslims may not serve in the judiciary, the security services (which are separate from the regular armed forces), or as public school principals.  Officials screen candidates for elected offices and applicants for public sector employment based on their adherence to and knowledge of Islam and loyalty to the Islamic Republic (gozinesh review requirements), although members of recognized religious minorities may serve in the lower ranks of government if they meet these loyalty requirements.  Government workers who do not observe Islamic principles and rules are subject to penalties and may be fired or barred from work in a particular sector.

The government bars Baha’is from all government employment and forbids Baha’i participation in the governmental social pension system.  Baha’is may not receive compensation for injury or crimes committed against them and may not inherit property.  A religious fatwa from the Supreme Leader encourages citizens to avoid all dealings with Baha’is.

Recognized religious groups issue marriage contracts in accordance with their religious laws.  The government does not recognize Baha’i marriages or divorces but allows a civil attestation of marriage.  The attestation serves as a marriage certificate and allows for basic recognition of the union but does not offer legal protections in marital disputes.

The constitution permits the formation of political parties based on Islam or on one of the recognized religious minorities, provided the parties do not violate the “criteria of Islam,” among other stipulations.

The constitution states the military must be Islamic, must be committed to Islamic ideals, and must recruit individuals who are committed to the objectives of the Islamic revolution.  In addition to the regular military, the IRGC is charged with upholding the Islamic nature of the revolution at home and abroad.  The law does not provide for exemptions from military service based on religious affiliation.  The law forbids non-Muslims from holding positions of authority over Muslims in the armed forces.  Members of recognized religious minorities with a college education may serve as officers during their mandatory military service, but they may not continue to serve beyond the mandatory service period to become career military officers.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but at ratification, it entered a general reservation “not to apply any provisions or articles of the Convention that are incompatible with Islamic Laws and the international legislation in effect.”

Government Practices

According to numerous international human rights NGOs and media reports, the government convicted and executed dissidents, political reformers, and peaceful protesters on charges of “enmity against God” and producing anti-Islamic propaganda.  In February, Amnesty International reported an “alarming rise” in the execution of ethnic minority prisoners since mid-December 2020.  Officials arrested Kurdish individuals, including civil society activists, labor rights activists, environmentalists, writers, university students and political activists.  Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

According to January reports by the NGOs IHR and Iran International, authorities executed three Sunni prisoners – Hamid Rastbala, Kabi Saadat-Jahani and Mohammad Ali Arayesh – on December 31, 2020, at Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad.  Ministry of Intelligence officers arrested the three men in 2015 for suspected membership in Hizb al-Forghan, a militant Sunni group, and in the National Solidarity Front of Iranian Sunnis.  Branch One of the Revolutionary Court of Mashhad sentenced them to death for “armed rebellion against the Islamic Republic.”  The men denied being members of Hizb al-Forghan, which was active in the country from 1992 to 1997, when the three men were boys between ages 10 and 12.  According to HRANA, prior to their execution, authorities deprived the prisoners of contact with their families for months, including a final meeting, and denied the men legal representation during the trial.  In an August 2020 letter, Rastbala said that following their arrest, interrogators tortured all three and threated to arrest or rape family members to convince them to make televised confessions of their “crimes.”

According to Iran International and United for Iran, on January 30, the Justice Department of Sistan and Baluchistan Province announced that authorities executed Javid Dehghan-Khold in Zahedan Central Prison.  He had been sentenced to death on charges of “enmity against God/moharebeh” and “armed rebellion against the Islamic Republic” for alleged membership in banned Sunni separatist groups Jaish ul-Adl and Jaish al-Nasr of Iran.  A court also convicted Dehghan-Khold of taking part in an attack that killed two Revolutionary Guard officers in 2015 and the kidnapping of five border guards in the city of Saravan in 2017.  According to his lawyer, Dehghan-Khold denied membership in these groups or participation in the attacks.  The Office of the High Commission on Human Rights (OHCHR) in a January 29 post on Twitter condemned Dehghan-Khold’s execution as part of “the series of executions – at least 28 [Iranians] – since mid-December, including of people from minority groups.”  According to Amnesty International, the court had “relied on torture-tainted ‘confessions’ and ignored the serious due process abuses committed by Revolutionary Guard agents and prosecution authorities during the investigation process.”

CHRI and HRANA reported that on February 28, authorities executed four Sunni Ahwazi Arabs – Jasem Heidary, Hossein Silawi, Ali Khasraji, and Nasser Khafajian (Khafaji) – in Sepidar Prison in Ahwaz City, Khuzestan Province, without any advance notice to their families.  Ministry of Intelligence agents arrested Heidary in December 2017 and allegedly tortured him into falsely confessing to being a member of an armed group.  Security forces detained the other three men in June 2017 as suspects in an armed attack on a military outpost and police station near Ahvaz in May 2017.  Officials charged all of the men with “armed rebellion against Islamic rule” (baghi).  According to Amnesty International, family members who visited the men in prison observed bruises on their bodies, indicating prison authorities had physically abused them.  Following the executions, Ministry of Intelligence agents told the four families they were not permitted to hold public memorials or invite family to their homes to mourn.  Amnesty International said the families were told the men “would be buried in la’nat abad [damned land].”

In March, IHR reported that a woman, Maryam (Masoumeh) Karimi, was executed in Rasht Central Prison at the hands of her own daughter.  Authorities had sentenced Karimi more than 13 years earlier for having killed her husband, who was reportedly abusive and had refused to separate from her.  In accordance with the rules of qisas, Karimi’s estranged daughter, as the victim’s next-of-kin, carried out her execution by hanging on March 15.  IHR stated that for unknown reasons, Karimi’s father, her co-accused in the killing, was not executed on the same day, but prison officers brought him to the gallows to see her corpse.

On October 10, World Day Against the Death Penalty, IHR released its findings on the country’s use of capital punishment.  According to IHR, as of October, government executions continued at an “alarmingly high” rate, with at least 226 individuals – one juvenile offender, nine women, and 216 adult men – put to death.  One hundred and twenty-five executions were qisas executions for murder, compared with 164 for the same period in 2020.  The qisas executions included the juvenile offender, five adult women, and 119 adult men.  Among the men, officials executed eight in Zahedan Prison, including Sunni Baluch prisoners Elias Qalandarzehi and Hassan Dehvari, on charges of armed rebellion against Islamic rule/baghi for alleged involvement with Jaish al-Adl, and Sunni Ahwazi Arab Ali Motayyeri [Motiri] on charges of moharebeh, afsad-i fil arz (“spreading corruption on Earth”) and killing two individuals from the Basij paramilitary militia forces.  According to United for Iran, authorities held Motayyeri in solitary confinement for more than one year and subjected him to physical and psychological abuse to force a false confession.  According to Dehvari’s attorney, authorities escalated his original prison sentence to execution after he peacefully protested inside Zahedan Central Prison, including by signing statements condemning the executions of Sunni prisoners.  Dehvari’s attorney said his execution was carried out despite a retrial request pending with the Supreme Court.

In April, IHR released its annual report on the government’s use of the death penalty, covering the 2020 calendar year.  According to the report, murder was the most common charge brought against those executed, and 211 of the 267 individuals executed had been sentenced under the qisas code.  IHR said that between 2010 and 2020, the government carried out at least 1,678 qisas executions.

In October, UNPO, the Kurdistan Human Rights Association Geneva, the Baluchistan Human Rights Group, and the Ahwaz Human Rights Organization submitted a joint report to the UNSR in which they stated executions of the predominantly Sunni Baluch minority and of Kurdish citizens increased between June and October, with at least 39 Baluchi citizens and 56 Kurds executed during that time period.  According to IHR’s report entitled Women and the Death Penalty:  A 12-Year Analysis, between January 1, 2010, and October 10, 2021, three of the at least 164 women who were executed were convicted on security charges.  One of these was Shirin Alamhooli, who was executed in 2010 on charges of moharebeh/enmity against God and membership in PEJAK, a Kurdish opposition group.  According to IHR, Alamhooli did not speak Farsi at the time of her interrogations and legal proceedings.  In her letters from prison, she described experiencing three months of physical and mental abuse.

Residents of provinces containing large Sunni populations, including Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and Sistan and Baluchistan, reported judicial authorities and members of the security services continued to repress them, including through extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and torture in detention.  They also reported discrimination (including suppression of religious rights), denial of basic government services, and inadequate funding for infrastructure projects.  The UN Secretary General’s August report compiled by OHCHR, IHR, and other human rights activists continued to report a disproportionately large number of executions of Sunni prisoners, particularly Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs.  The Secretary General’s August report also stated the Supreme Court upheld death sentences for 10 Kurdish political prisoners on charges involving “acting against national security,” afsad-i fil arz/spreading corruption on earth, moharebeh, and membership in Salafi groups.

According to the UNSR Rehman’s July report, on February 22, IRGC officers killed 10 Sunni Baluchi fuel smugglers (sookhtbars) in Sistan and Baluchistan Province at its border with Pakistan.  The shootings triggered demonstrations, during which security forces fired lethal ammunition at protesters and bystanders, killing at least two persons and seriously injuring others.  The death toll was difficult to verify, following the disruption of local mobile data networks from the 24th to the 27th of February.  Reuters reported the death toll in Saravan and other parts of Sistan and Baluchistan Province as “possibly up to 23.”

According to Amnesty International, authorities held Ahwazi Arab Falah Heidari incommunicado following his arrest on May 20.  A source told Amnesty International that security and intelligence agents interrogated Heidari and his son, Safa Heidari, for information about the political activities of Falah’s brother, Abdorrahman Heidari, who was based abroad and was the spokesperson for the political group Patriotic Arab Democratic Movement in Ahwaz.  According to Amnesty International, Ministry of Intelligence interrogators also questioned Falah Heidari about the religious beliefs and practices of his other son, Alaa Heidari, who had left Iran several years earlier, sought asylum abroad after converting from Shia to Sunni Islam and had since engaged in online proselytizing activities.  Authorities aimed to have Falah Heidari pressure his relatives to stop their activities or to relay authorities’ threats to kill or abduct and forcibly return Abdorrahman and Alaa to the country.  On May 30, an IRGC officer interrogated Falah Heidari’s 15-year-old daughter about her family’s contact with her paternal uncle and brother abroad, as well as her family’s political opinions and religious beliefs.

According to UNSR Rehman’s July report, the UN Secretary General’s August report, and Human Rights Watch (HRW), in January, authorities arrested and arbitrarily detained more than 100 Kurdish civil society activists and forcibly disappeared some of these individuals.  Observers stated that there was credible evidence to believe some of these activists were expressing their Sunni religious identity while standing up for Kurdish rights.  According to HRW, of the 89 individuals who remained detained at year’s end, authorities subjected at least 40 to enforced disappearance and refused to reveal any information about their whereabouts to their families.  While authorities did not provide information about the reasons for these arrests, according to IHR and HRW, the arrests were “due to the individuals’ peaceful exercise of their rights to freedom of opinion, expression and association, including through involvement in peaceful civil society activism and/or perceived support for the political visions espoused by Kurdish opposition parties seeking respect for the human rights of Iran’s Kurdish minority.”

Human rights NGOs reported poor conditions and the mistreatment of religious minorities held in government prisons.  BIC reported Baha’is and other prisoners also faced a higher risk of exposure to COVID-19 due to overcrowding.

In February, IranWire and CHRI reported that Behnam Mahjoubi, a Gonabadi dervish, died after suffering seizures in Tehran’s Evin Prison.  Authorities had originally arrested Mahjoubi and several other Gonabadi dervishes for participating in street protests in 2018 following the death under police interrogation of a Gonabadi Sufi dervish.  Mahjoubi had been serving a two-year prison sentence since June 2020, despite the state medical examiner’s concluding he was not in sufficiently good health to withstand incarceration.  Amnesty International stated that during his incarceration, authorities injected Mahjoubi with unknown substances and subjected him to electric shocks on multiple occasions.

CHRI reported that in a letter from Rajaee-Shahr Prison in Karaj to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, dated February 3, former political prisoner Arash Sadeghi said authorities denied several fellow prisoners medical treatment, including Raheleh Ahmadi, who was serving a 31-month sentence in Evin Prison for opposing the country’s mandatory hijab law.  According to CHRI, Ahmadi suffered from mobility issues and her lawyer and medical specialists said there was a possibility she could become paralyzed.  In his letter, Sadeghi also wrote that Monireh Arabshahi, who was serving 5.5 years in Kachuei Prison in Karaj for peacefully protesting the mandatory hijab law, had developed a speech impairment due to an untreated inflamed thyroid gland.

On September 28, IranWire reported authorities continued to reserve the harshest treatment for prisoners who were religious minorities.  This mistreatment included beatings, harassment of family members, and forbidding visits and phone calls.  A former Yarsani inmate told IranWire that authorities shaved Yarsani prisoners’ traditional mustaches as a means of humiliating and degrading them.  In Dieselabad Prison in Kermanshah Province, to harass Sunni prisoners, the guards would play “music and eulogies that insulted the caliphs and their beliefs.”  One source told IranWire that authorities routinely tortured Sunnis in detention to obtain confessions.  “If you’re both a Sunni and a Kurd, these two characteristics are enough for you to be guilty.”

The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran stated that from January 1 to September 24, the government sentenced at least 77 individuals to flogging, based on its interpretation of sharia, and carried out these sentences in at least eight cases.

In October, media reported the government continued to practice qisas, including hand or finger amputations for theft.  According to these reports, in October, authorities sentenced one man to be blinded as punishment for having blinded his neighbor in one eye during a fight in 2018.

According to IranWire, on June 15, authorities transferred Amir Hossein Moradi to the Tehran Police Investigation Center, which, according to IranWire, suggested a new case was being prepared against him.  Authorities arrested Moradi following the November 2019 protests, charging him and two other defendants with “participating in vandalism and arson with the intent to confront and engage in war with the Islamic Republic of Iran” and “enmity against God.”  Later in the month, the Twitter account 1,500 Images, run by activists in contact with the family members of individuals killed and arrested during the November 2019 protests, which initially began over a fuel price increase but quickly turned into antigovernment demonstrations, warned about Moradi’s deteriorating health, reporting, “He is sick whenever he eats and has been taken to the hospital several times on a stretcher” and that he “is in a critical condition.”

On September 23, HRW reported the judiciary had confirmed the September 21 death of Shahin Nasseri, a prisoner who said he had witnessed the torture and forced confession of fellow inmate Navid Afkari when they were both detained in Shiraz Prison.  The government arrested Afkari and his brothers Habib and Vahid in 2018 on charges that included “enmity against God.”  Authorities executed Afkari in 2020.  His brothers remained in solitary confinement at year’s end.  Nasseri’s former lawyer posted on Twitter that Nasseri had called him several times on September 20, the day before his death, to report that his interrogators had threatened him with physical violence.

The government continued to incarcerate numerous prisoners on various charges related to religion.  The Iran Prison Atlas, a database compiled by the U.S.-based NGO United for Iran, stated at least 67 members of minority religious groups remained imprisoned as of November for “religious practice.”  Of the prisoners in the Atlas database, the government sentenced at least 62 to long-term imprisonment or executed them on charges of “enmity against God” or armed rebellion against Islamic rule/baghi, which officials sometimes used in recent years instead of “enmity against God.”  Authorities sentenced at least 20 persons to prison for “insulting Islamic sanctities” and for “insulting the Prophet or Islam.”  According to the NGO Human Rights Without Frontiers, there were 82 persons serving prison terms for exercising their right to freedom of religion or belief as of November 1.

In the July report, UNSR Rehman again expressed concern at the reportedly high number of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience from the Azeri, Kurdish, and Ahwazi Arab communities, many of whom were from religious minorities.

According to the Kurdistan Human Rights Network, in March, authorities sentenced Kurdish Sunni imam Mamoutsa Rasoul Hamzehpour to three years in prison for “propaganda against the state” and “activities on the internet.”  According to the Kurdistan Press Agency and a Kurdish NGO, security forces arrested Hamzehpour in the city of Piranshahr in 2020 at his home, which they searched.  The news report stated Hamzehpour was regarded as a prominent cleric in West Azerbaijan Province and had been arrested several times in the past.

According to IranWire, security forces conducted multiple arrests of Baha’is in the last week of September without providing reasons or charges.  Authorities held four Baha’is from Shiraz City – Negar Ghaderi Sadi, Moin Misaghi, Hayedeh Forootan, and his son, Mehran Mosalanejad – in solitary confinement in Shiraz Police Detention Center 201 for at least one month following their arrests on September 22.  Sources said officers ransacked Misaghi’s house, spilling a bowl of soup on his one-and-a-half-year-old baby, causing the child to suffer burns.  At Negar Ghaderi’s house, officers confiscated mobile telephones, tablets, satellite dishes, and several prayer books.  Authorities previously raided these four individuals’ homes in April and confiscated personal items, including religious books and pictures.  IranWire reported that on September 23 in Ghaem Shahr, Mazandaran Province, Intelligence Ministry agents entered the home of Baha’i Sheida Taeed, confiscated her mobile phone, passport, computer, family photographs, and other personal items, and arrested her without a warrant.  BIC’s representative to the UN posted on Twitter that authorities appeared to be targeting young parents, and their children in particular, with arbitrary arrests.

IranWire reported that on September 23, Ministry of Intelligence agents arrested Baha’i Sheida Taeed in Mazandaran Province.  A source told IranWire that eight agents of the Mazandaran Intelligence Bureau entered Taeed’s home, which they searched for two hours.  After confiscating personal items, including her mobile phone, laptop, computer, letters, family pictures, and passport, they arrested her without a warrant.  According to IranWire, this was the third time authorities had detained or arrested Taeed since 1989.

According to HRANA, Yarsani Kurdish activist and documentary filmmaker Mozhgan Kavousi continued at year’s end to serve her sentence at Evin Prison, along with 19 other female prisoners of conscience.  Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court of Noshahr convicted her of “spreading propaganda against the system” and “inciting people to disrupt the country’s order and security” in connection with two posts on her Instagram account about the November 2019 antigovernment protests and sentenced her to five years and nine months in prison.

According to widespread media reports and Amnesty International, security forces reacted violently to protests that began in Khuzestan Province in mid-July over water shortages.  As protests spread across the country, government forces fired on crowds with live ammunition, birdshot, and tear gas, killing at least nine protestors, including a 17-year-old boy.  Security and intelligence forces swept up dozens of protesters and activists, including many from the Sunni Ahwazi Arab minority, in mass arrests.

Authorities transferred Arab minority rights activist Mohammad Ali Amourinejad and several other inmates, including prisoners of conscience serving life sentences for “enmity against God” due to having promoted educational and cultural rights for Ahwazi Arabs, out of Sheiban Prison following the unrest.  At year’s end, the government continued to hold these prisoners incommunicado in an unknown location.

UNPO’s October joint report to the UNSR stated that in June, officials summoned at least 10 Baluchi citizens to court following a rally in the village of Ramin to prevent the destruction of the Eidgah (land reserved for Eid prayers for Sunnis).  The report also stated that since June, authorities had arrested or detained three Sunni clerics and religious activists without disclosing the charges, including Baluchi Sunni cleric Jafar Hanzarani from Iranshahr County, Sistan and Baluchestan Province, whom police arrested on August 21 without charge.  According to the same report, IRGC intelligence officers arrested Baluchi religious activist Khalilullah Zaeem on September 28, also without an official charge.

According to Article 19, a London-based international human rights organization, the new amendments to the penal code passed in January that criminalized insulting Iranian ethnicities or “divine religions or Islamic schools of thought” (Article 499) and committing “any deviant educational or proselytizing activity that contradicts or interferes with the sacred law of Islam” (Article 500) put religious minorities such as Baha’is, Yarsanis, Mandaeans, Sufi dervishes, Christian converts, atheists, and followers of Erfan-e Halgheh (Inter-Universalism) at a higher risk of persecution.  In July, human rights advocate Ewelina Ochab wrote in Forbes magazine, “Such provisions are destined to be abused against religious minorities.”  In his July report, UNSR Rehman stated these two amendments would “further suppress freedom of religion and belief as well as freedom of expression, especially for religious minorities, and in particular, non-recognized minorities such as Baha’is, atheists, converts to Christianity and Gonabadi dervishes.”

In his July report, UNSR Rehman also noted other official policies targeting religious minorities, including documents published in March that indicated that the suppression of Baha’is and Gonabadi dervishes was “official policy in Sari, Mazandaran Province.”  The report stated the documents contained plans by local authorities to “rigorously control the movements” of Baha’i and Gonabadi dervish residents and to impose restrictions on Baha’is in education and commerce.  According to the UNSR’s report, authorities harassed, arrested, and forcibly disappeared dozens of Baha’is in April and June in incidents in Shiraz and Isfahan.

Non-Armenian Christians, particularly evangelicals and other converts from Islam, continued to experience disproportionate levels of arrests and detentions and high levels of harassment and surveillance, according to Christian NGOs.  Human rights organizations and Christian NGOs continued to report authorities arrested Christians, including members of unrecognized churches, for their religious affiliation or activities, and charged them with operating illegally in private homes or supporting and accepting assistance from “enemy” countries.  Many arrests reportedly took place during police raids on religious gatherings and included confiscation of religious property.  News reports stated authorities subjected arrested Christians to severe physical and psychological mistreatment, which at times included beatings and solitary confinement.  According to human rights NGOs, the government also continued to enforce the prohibition against proselytizing.

According to human rights activists, the government continued to subject Christians who converted from Islam to arbitrary arrest, physical abuse, and other forms of harsh treatment.  The NGO Article 18 reported that on April 19, intelligence agents in Dezful, Khuzestan Province, arrested four Christian converts – Hojjat Lotfi Khalaf, Esmail Narimanpour, Alireza Varak-Shah, and Mohammad Ali (Davoud) Torabi – and in August charged them with “propaganda against the Islamic Republic” due to their membership in a house church.  Authorities arrested and interrogated four additional male Christian converts at the same time and ordered them to sign commitments to refrain from further Christian activities.  Authorities reportedly beat some of the Christians during their interrogations, including Narimanpour.

Article 18 reported that on January 18, the morality police rearrested Christian convert Fatemeh (Mary) Mohammadi, saying her trousers were too tight, her headscarf was not correctly adjusted, and she should not be wearing an unbuttoned coat.  Mohammadi, who was released from prison in February 2020 after being incarcerated for participating in January 2020 prodemocracy protests, stated she had been unable to return to work as a gymnastics instructor because intelligence agents pressured her former employer not to rehire her.

According to Article 18 and HRANA, on August 22, the Albroz Court of Appeals sentenced three Christian converts – Milad Goodarzi, Amin Khaki, and Alireza Nourmohammadi – to three years each in prison.  In November 2020, authorities raided the men’s homes and confiscated personal items, including laptop computers, mobile phones and religious books.  At their first trial in June, the Revolutionary Court of Karaj sentenced the three men to five years’ imprisonment each and a 400 million rial ($9,500) fine for “spreading propaganda against the state” and “engaging in propaganda that educates in a deviant way contrary to the holy religion of Islam.”  The latter charge stemmed from an amendment to Article 500 penalizing “any deviant educational or proselytizing activity that contradicts or interferes with the sacred law of Islam” that went into effect on February 18.

Media reported that on 27 January, the 4th Branch of Bushehr Court of Appeal upheld the one-year prison sentences of three Christian converts – Sam Khosravi, Sasan Khosravi, and Habib Heydari – agreeing with the lower court that they were guilty of the “organization of house churches and promotion of Christianity, which are clear examples of propaganda against the state.”  Ministry of Intelligence agents arrested Sam and Sasan Khosravi, their wives Maryam Falahi and Marjan Falahi, Heydari, and Pooriya Peyma and his wife Fatemeh Talebi at their homes in Bushehr Province in July 2019.  In June 2020, authorities fined the women and gave the men prison terms of one year for Habib, Sam, and Sasan, and 91 days for Pooriya.  The court also sentenced Sam and Sasan Khosravi to two years of internal exile and a ban on working in their profession, the hospitality sector, while exiled.

According to IranWire, on March 14, authorities informed Christian converts Homayoun Zhaveh and Sara Ahmadi their case “had advanced” and they could receive a summons to prison at any moment.  Intelligence agents arrested the couple in June 2019 during a trip they took with several other Christian families to Amol in Mazandaran Province.  Authorities first held the couple in Amol before taking them to Evin Prison.  Authorities released Zhaveh after one month, but Ahmadi spent 67 days in detention, half of them in solitary confinement in the Ministry of Intelligence’s Ward 209.  On November 14, 2020, Branch 26 of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran sentenced Zhaveh and Ahmadi to two years and 11 years in prison, respectively, for “membership and leadership of [a] church.”  On appeal Ahmadi’s sentence was reduced to eight years in December 2020.

According to Article 18, on September 5, authorities arrested three Christian converts – Ahmad Sarparast, Morteza Mashoodkari, and Ayoob Poor-Rezazadeh – during raids on a house church and a private home in Rasht.  The officials held the three converts incommunicado at an unknown location, possibly an IRGC detention center, for nearly two weeks.  On September 18, authorities transferred Mashoodkari and Sarparast to Lakan Prison and released them on bail on September 21.  Authorities released Poor-Rezazadeh on bail on October 3.  Authorities did not file official charges, but during interrogations, they accused the men of “acting against national security.”

Article 18 reported that on April 21, authorities arrested four Christian converts – Hojjat Lotfi Khalaf, Esmaeil Narimanpour, Alireza Varak-Shah, and one other person – and detained them for two days.  Authorities released the four individuals on the condition they refrain from further Christian activities.  Government representatives subsequently summoned them to the 4th branch of the prosecutor’s office of the Civil and Revolutionary Court of Dezful, Khuzestan Province, to answer charges of “propaganda against the Islamic Republic.”

According to human rights activists, Baluchis continued to face government discrimination both as Sunni religious practitioners and as an ethnic minority.  Baluchi rights activists reported continued arbitrary arrests, physical abuse, and unfair trials of journalists and human rights activists.  They stated authorities often pressured family members of those in prison to remain silent.  According to the UN Secretary General’s August report, between January 1 and June 18, authorities executed at least 26 Baluchi individuals, the majority on narcotics charges.  The same report stated there were “a large number of executions of members of minorities” during the first half of the year, including from the Kurdish and Arab minorities.  The report also noted that from January 1 to June 15, at least 24 border couriers (kolbar) and fuel smugglers (sookhtbar), predominantly from the Kurdish and Baluch minorities, “were killed as a result of the government’s excessive use of force.”

Human rights NGOs, including CHRI, HRANA, and the official website of Gonabadi Sufi dervishes (Majzooban Noor), reported throughout the year on extremely poor conditions continuing inside Qarchak Women’s Prison, as well as reports of Shia guards requiring all inmates, regardless of their faith, to use a chador as their head-to-toe covering.

On June 16, HRANA reported that Hossein Sepanta continued to face medical neglect of long-term injuries in his eighth year inside Adelabad Prison in Shiraz, Kerman Province.  Sepanta, a convert from Islam to Zoroastrianism, began serving a 14-year sentence in 2013 on charges of “propaganda against the state” and “assembly and collusion against national security.”  Authorities beat him during his incarceration, causing a spinal cord disorder.  United for Iran posted on Twitter on July 25 that authorities moved Sepanta to a Ministry of Intelligence cell inside the prison after he reportedly started a hunger strike, making it impossible for the NGO to obtain new information on his condition.

According to a January report by IranWire, in December 2020, Ayatollah Mahmoud Amjad, who criticized the government many times in the past, released a video protesting the government’s execution of a dissident journalist and blaming Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for the bloodshed in the country since 2009.  He also called on fellow clerics and religious scholars not to remain silent about the violence.  According to his Instagram page, he continued to post messages in support of opposition figures like Mehdi Karroubi as of October.

According to the human rights NGO Hengaw, in late February, government security services arrested five Kurdish religious activists – Musa Brusan, Taha Karimi, and Saber Mohtadi from Brukan; Abdul Latif Mahmoudi Deli from Oshnaviyeh; and Naseh Sorkhabi from Piranshahar – in West Azerbaijan Province.  The government transferred the men to Urmia Central Prison on February 27.  According to the NGO, authorities accused the five individuals of “collaborating with and joining Salafist groups.”  NGOs reported that the Kurds were denied access to a lawyer.

There continued to be reports that authorities harassed and arrested Sunni clerics and congregants.  According to a December report by Iran International, the Supreme Leader’s representative in Golestan Province, Kazem Nour-Mofidi, dismissed Mowlavi Hossein Gorgij, the Friday prayer imam in Azadshahr City and an outspoken and popular Sunni cleric, as punishment for his Friday prayer remarks that allegedly insulted Shia “sanctities.”  Nour-Mofidi appointed a new Sunni imam.  Gorgij’s followers protested in Azadshahr, and Gorgij issued a statement saying his remarks were misunderstood and that he meant no disrespect toward Shia.

HRANA reported in July that nine Sunni prisoners held in Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan Province, since at least 2016 wrote a letter to UNSR Rehman requesting an investigation into their cases.  The prisoners – Eisa Eid-Mohammadi, Farhad Shakeri, Eid al-Hakim Azim Gargij, Abdolrahman Gargij, Habib Pir-Mohammadi, Abdolbaset Orsan, Mohammad Reza Sheikh Ahmadi, Morteza Fakuri, and Abdullah Hosseini – said authorities beat and tortured them into providing false confessions and threatened their family members.  HRANA said they received death sentences and long prison terms based on false charges of being members of dissident groups and groups the government labeled as “terrorist,” for example, Hizb al-Forghan, and of committing acts of “propaganda against the regime.”

BIC reported authorities arrested 64 Baha’is between January and December.  Prison officials kept many in solitary confinement for long periods and detained individuals for weeks or months before releasing them on bail.  BIC stated that authorities set bail at exorbitantly high levels, requiring families to hand over deeds to properties or business licenses.  In nearly all cases, authorities searched their homes and/or workplaces and confiscated personal belongings, particularly books, photographs, computers, copying machines, and other supplies, as well as items related to the Baha’i Faith.  Some victims reported officers beat them when taking them into custody.  According to BIC, during the year, authorities required 18 Baha’is to begin serving prison sentences or resume sentences following temporary release.

According to BIC, on June 8, Branch 26 of the Revolutionary Court of Tehran sentenced Baha’i Shahrzad Nazifi, a women’s cross-country motorcycle racing trainer, to eight years in prison for “managing unlawful groups for the purpose of disturbing national security.”  On January 21, Branch 28 of the Revolutionary Court of Tehran sentenced Baha’is Sofia Mobini and Negin Tadrisi to five years each in prison on national security charges.  Subsequently, Judge Mohammad Moghiseh, from the same court, without arraignment, adjusted their sentences to 10 and five years’ imprisonment, respectively, for “membership in the illegal Baha’i organization with intent to disturb national security,” under Article 499 of the penal code.  The Court of Appeals later restored their original five-year prison sentences.  Intelligence agents arrested Mobini and Tadrisi in 2017 in connection with celebrations of a Baha’i holy day.

In March, HRW reported that Baha’i historian and writer Touraj Amini had begun serving a six-year prison sentence in January.  Authorities first searched Amini’s house in 2019, confiscating numerous books and his laptop.  HRANA later reported that a court in Karaj sentenced Amini to one year’s imprisonment and two years in domestic exile in 2020.  An Alborz Province appeals court later reduced the sentence to six months in prison and rescinded the exile.  According to HRW, Amini is a historian specializing in the history of Iranian religious minorities prior to the 1979 revolution.

The Kurdistan Human Rights Network reported that in early October, the Revolutionary Court of Orumiyeh sentenced Sunni Kurds Anvar Chaleshi and Kamel Jabarvand (also known as Saydan Maskan) to seven years in prison for “acting against national security” through “membership in the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.”  IRGC officers arrested the men in December 2020 and transferred them in a MOIS detention center in the al-Mahdi base in Orumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province in January, following their interrogation.

Activists and NGOs reported that the government continued to detain or disappear Yarsani activists and community leaders for engaging in awareness-raising regarding government practices or discrimination against the Yarsani community.  According to NGO reports, on June 28, a district court in Kermanshah arrested Kheyrollah Haghjouyan of the Yarsan Civil Rights’ Activists Advisory Council for his remarks criticizing the government’s discriminatory practices against the Yarsani community and for commemorating the eight-year anniversary of the deaths of three Yarsani activists who self-immolated to protest the forced shaving of mustaches – considered an insult in the Yarsani religion – of Yarsani prisoners in Hamadan Prison.  The court accused Haghjouyan of “insulting the sanctities and officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

According to a March report by CHRI, judges continued to use internal exile as a form of punishment for political prisoners, including peaceful activists, religious minorities, and dissidents.  Exile could be ordered as the primary punishment, for example for those found guilty of moharebeh or “armed rebellion,” or as a supplemental punishment for various crimes, to be carried out after the completion of a prison sentence.  Judges chose exile locations from a list prepared by the Ministry of Interior; these were usually remote towns in regions with extreme poverty.  CHRI reported that during the year, judges also sent individuals into “prison exile” by transferring them in the middle of their prison terms to severely under-resourced prisons far from their families and friends.  According to CHRI, the concept of exile or banishment is rooted in Shia theology and is referred to as “denial of country” (nafiye balad).  CHRI stated that prison exile also harmed the detainee’s family by putting the individual in a location family members could not easily visit.

CHRI reported that on January 24, Golrokh Iraee Ebrahimi, a civil rights activist who protested against the practice of stoning women accused of adultery, was transferred from Gharchak Women’s Prison in Tehran to the central prison in Amol, Mazandaran Province, far from her parents.  Authorities originally arrested and charged Ebrahimi in 2014 with “insulting Islamic sanctities” and “spreading propaganda.”  According to her husband, prison officials held Ebrahimi in an unsanitary ward with approximately 50 other inmates, where the risks of infection from COVID-19 and other diseases were high.  Contrary to law, prisoners were not being separated by type of offense or duration of sentence, and many of the other inmates in Ebrahimi’s ward were serving narcotics-related sentences.  According to the NGO Humanists International, in April, Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court sentenced Iraee in absentia to an additional one year in prison, banned her from membership in political organizations, and imposed a two-year travel ban on charges of “propaganda against the state.”  Iraee was denied legal representation during the trial.  She remained in Amol Prison at year’s end, unable to make telephone calls or contact her family.

Human rights NGOs reported that in February, authorities summoned Ebrahim Firouzi, a Christian convert, to respond to allegations of “propaganda against the Islamic Republic in favor of hostile groups.”  He appeared in court on February 8.  Authorities arrested him and detained him in Chabahar Prison in Sistan and Baluchestan Province for 19 days, and then released him on bail.  Firouzi had been in internal exile as part of his 2015 sentence for “collusion against national security” for converting to and practicing Christianity and related missionary activities.  After first serving six years in Rajai Shahr Prison, he was released in November 2019 and reported to the city of Sarbaz for the two years of internal exile included in his sentence.  Authorities later extended his exile by 11 months, saying that Firouzi did not have proper permission for a brief trip home to attend to some family business involving the death of his mother.  The government informed him in November that he would not be required to serve the 11-month extension of his internal exile.

In the July report, UNSR Rehman stated there continued to be reports of forced evictions of the Sunni Baluch minority in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Citing a report by HRANA, HRW said a court in Borazjan, Bushehr Province, sentenced six Baha’is to lengthy prison terms on vaguely defined national security charges, including propaganda against the state “by spreading the beliefs of the Baha’i Faith.”  The six convicted Baha’is were Maryam Bashir, Mino Bashir, Hayedeh Ram, Frank Sheikhi, Borhan Ismaili, and Derna Ismaili.  Authorities charged Borhan Ismaili with “spreading” the beliefs of the Baha’i Faith and acting against national security interests and sentenced him to 11 years in prison.  The court sentenced the other individuals to 12 and a half years in prison for “assisting” in this propaganda, the evidence of which included social media posts on Facebook.  At year’s end, the case remained subject to appeal.

The government continued to permit Armenian Christians to exercise what sources stated was perhaps the greatest degree of religious freedom among religious minorities in the country.  It extended preservation efforts to Armenian holy sites and allowed nationals of Armenian descent and Armenian visitors to observe religious and cultural traditions within their churches and dedicated clubs.

In November, Humanists International stated in its Freedom of Thought Report 2021 that although “‘enmity against God’ is framed as a religious offense and may be used against humanists and other religious dissenters, it [was] most often used as a punishment for political acts that challenge[d] the regime (on the basis that to oppose the theocratic regime is to oppose Allah).”

According to the U.S. Institute of Peace, the government continued to monitor statements and views of senior Shia religious leaders who did not support government policies or Supreme Leader Khamenei’s views.  According to international media, authorities continued to target these Shia clerics with arrest, detention, funding cuts, loss of clerical credentials, and confiscation of property.

Critics stated the government continued to use extrajudicial special clerical courts to control non-Shia Muslim clerics as well as to prosecute Shia clerics who expressed controversial ideas or participated in activities outside the sphere of religion, such as journalism or reformist political activities.

Sources said that even when arrested, perpetrators of crimes against Baha’is faced reduced punishment if they stated that their acts were based on the religious identity of the victim.

The government continued to require all women to adhere to “Islamic dress” standards in public, including covering their hair and fully covering their bodies in loose clothing – an overcoat and a hijab or, alternatively, a chador (full body-length semicircle of fabric worn over both the head and clothes).  Although the government at times eased enforcement of rules for such dress, it also punished “un-Islamic dress” with arrests, lashings, fines, and dismissal from employment.  The government continued to crack down on public protests against the compulsory hijab and Islamic dress requirements for women.

According to media reports, on August 9, authorities in Orumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province arrested a man for running over two women with his vehicle for “bad hijab” and not heeding the Islamic dress code.  The two women, one of whom was reportedly seriously injured, were taken to the hospital.  Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei ordered an investigation into the attack.  Meeting with officials on August 9, he stressed the judicial duty of “supporting those who enjoin good and forbid wrong and defend Islamic values.”

The NGO Frontline Defenders reported that on March 9, the Tehran Appeals Court reduced Saba Kord-Afshari’s prison sentence, which she received in 2019 on a set of charges relating to her protesting the compulsory hijab, from 24 years to seven years and six months in prison.  According to the NGO, on January 26, guards physically assaulted Kord-Afshari and forcibly transferred her from one ward of Qarchak Women’s Prison to another.  Kord-Afshari undertook a hunger strike from May 8 to 18 to protest the continued incarceration of her mother, women’s rights defender Raheleh Ahmadi, in Evin Prison, despite Ahmadi’s deteriorating physical and mental health.

On June 21, UN human rights experts condemned the continued imprisonment of Nasrin Sotoudeh, a prominent female human rights lawyer and 2012 winner of the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for what Amnesty International described as her “peaceful human rights work, including her defense of women protesting against Iran’s forced-hijab laws.”  On July 21, authorities released her from Qarchak Women’s Prison on temporary leave to receive treatment after she contract COVID-19 there.  Her husband told media that conditions in Qarchak Women’s Prison were “catastrophic.”  Authorities summoned Sotoudeh back to prison one month after her release.  The government arrested Sotoudeh multiple times since 2009 because of her work as a rights defender.  A court sentenced her to 33 years in prison and 148 lashes in 2019.  According to HRW, in 2020, authorities arrested and then gave conditional release to Sotoudeh’s attorney, Payam Derafshan, whom the NGO described as “a respected human rights attorney.”  According to the HRW report, the IRGC committed “revolting abuse and medical negligence” on Derafshan during his detention in Evin Prison, including injecting him with a substance that resulted in physical and psychological damage.

The government continued to suppress public behavior it deemed counter to Islamic law, such as dancing and men and women appearing together in public.

The government continued to hold many Baha’i properties it had seized following the 1979 revolution, including cemeteries, holy places, historical sites, and administrative centers.  It also continued to prevent Baha’is from performing burials in accordance with their religious tradition.  According to the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC), authorities routinely prevented the burial of deceased Baha’is from Tabriz at the local Vadi-i-Rahmat Cemetery.  Instead, they often sent the remains for burial in Miandoab, 100 miles away, where authorities did not permit the families to wash the bodies and perform Baha’i burial rites.  IHRDC noted that Baha’i religious practice requires that the deceased be buried at a location within an hour’s travel time from the place of death; however, the travel time between Tabriz and Miandoab is approximately 2.5 hours.  According to the report, authorities at the cemetery, the Tabriz City Council, and the Eastern Azerbaijan provincial government said they were executing orders prohibiting the burial of Baha’is in Tabriz, but none of those offices claimed responsibility for issuing the order.

Citing a report by the Baha’i National Center, in April, HRW reported that authorities instituted a prohibition on the Tehran Baha’i community from burying their dead in a section of a cemetery, Golestan Javid, near Tehran that previously was allocated for their use.  In an April 23 statement, the Baha’i National Center said the office overseeing the cemetery threatened Baha’is trying to use the designated part of the cemetery.  HRW stated that the new policy was part of “a broader, decades-long government repression” of the Baha’i community.  The NGO reported that the Baha’i representative to the UN in Geneva stated that the prohibition was intended to coerce the Baha’i community into burying the dead in areas of the nearby Khavaran cemetery, believed to be the site of a mass grave for political prisoners killed by the government in 1988.  NGOs and the media identified Ebrahim Raisi, the country’s newly elected President, as being heavily involved in those killings.  In April, Amnesty International stated that the mass grave was bulldozed multiple times and had become a symbol of the struggle for truth and justice.  The Amnesty report said, “As well as causing further pain and anguish to the already persecuted Baha’i minority by depriving them of their rights to give their loved ones a dignified burial in line with their religious beliefs, Iran’s authorities are willfully destroying a crime scene.”

In his July report, UNSR Rehman expressed “alarm” at the government’s order denying the Baha’i community access to that part of the Khavaran cemetery assigned for their use, saying, “This order violates the Baha’i community’s right to freedom of religion and belief.”  He said that the order was “one of the many occasions where Baha’i cemeteries have been desecrated or where burial rituals have been restricted.”

According to members of the Sabean-Mandaean and Yarsani religious communities, authorities continued to deny them permission to perform religious ceremonies in public and to deny them building permits for places of worship.

MOIS and law enforcement officials reportedly continued to harass Sufis and Sufi leaders.  Media and human rights organizations reported continued censorship of the Gonabadi order’s Mazar Soltani websites, which contained speeches by the order’s late leader, Noor Ali Tabandeh, and articles on mysticism.

According to Christian NGOs, government restrictions on published religious material continued, including confiscations of previously available books about Christianity, although government-sanctioned translations of the Bible reportedly remained available.  Government officials frequently confiscated Bibles and related non-Shia religious literature and pressured publishing houses printing unsanctioned non-Muslim religious materials to cease operations.  Books about the Yarsani religion remained banned.  Unrecognized religious minorities, such as Yarsanis and Baha’is, continued to report they were unable to legally produce or distribute religious literature.  Books published by religious minorities, regardless of topic, were required to carry labels on the cover denoting their non-Shia Muslim authorship.

There were continued reports of authorities placing restrictions on Baha’i businesses or forcing them to shut down after they temporarily closed in observance of Baha’i holidays, or of authorities threatening shop owners with potential closure, even though by law, businesses may close without providing a reason for up to 15 days a year.  NGOs also reported the government continued to raid Baha’i homes and businesses and confiscate private and commercial property, as well as religious materials.

UNSR Rehman’s July report stated authorities continued to confiscate Baha’i properties they characterized as “illegitimate wealth.”

BIC reported that in August, judicial authorities issued court orders informing six Baha’i property owners of the imminent seizure of their properties in Semnan Province.  These court orders followed raids security forces carried out on hundreds of Baha’i-owned properties in November 2020, including these properties in Semnan, during which they confiscated ownership deeds.  According to BIC, the judiciary ruled these properties belonged to Baha’i institutions rather than to the individuals.  However, the institutions in question were banned by the government in 1979 and formally dissolved in 1983, with the government confiscating all connected properties.  According to BIC and other NGOs, the confiscations were part of an ongoing state-led campaign of economic persecution against Baha’is.  In a 2020 decision upholding the government’s 2019 confiscations of Baha’i property in the village of Ivel, Mazandaran Province, a court ruled that Baha’is had “a perverse ideology,” which was “heretical and ritually unclean,” and therefore had no “legitimacy in their ownership” of any property.

In February, HRANA reported tax authorities in Bandar Lengeh city, Hormozgan Province, acting on a court order, confiscated the business, homes, and bank accounts of two Baha’is – Mohabatullah Thaabet and Erfaan Noahnezhaad.  According to HRANA, they had operated a workshop making composite beams, paid taxes, and kept accounts as required for five years prior to authorities forcing them to close in 2019 “because of their Baha’i beliefs.”

Members of the Sunni community continued to dispute statistics published in 2015 on the website of the Mosques Affairs Regulating Authority that stated there were nine Sunni mosques operating in Tehran and 15,000 across the country.  Community members said the vast majority of these were simply prayer rooms or rented prayer spaces.  International media and the Sunni community continued to report authorities prevented construction of any new Sunni mosques in Tehran.  Sunnis said there were not enough mosques in the country to meet the needs of the population.  Three news sources opposed to the government previously stated that Sunnis were not allowed to have a mosque in Tehran.

Because the government barred them from building or worshiping in their own mosques, Sunni leaders said they continued to rely on ad hoc, underground prayer halls, or namaz khane, the same term used by Christian converts for informal chapels or prayers rooms in underground churches, to practice their religion.  Security officials continued to raid these unauthorized sites.

According to human rights organizations, Christian advocacy groups, and NGOs, the government continued to regulate Christian religious practices.  Official reports and media continued to characterize private Christian churches in homes as “illegal networks” and “Zionist propaganda institutions.”  Christian community leaders stated that when authorities learned Assyrian church leaders were baptizing new converts or preaching in Farsi, they closed the churches.  NGOs reported that virtually all Farsi-language churches in Iran were closed between 2009 and 2012.  Authorities also reportedly barred unregistered or unrecognized Christians from entering church premises and closed churches that allowed the latter to enter.

Christian advocacy groups continued to state the government, through pressure and church closures, eliminated all but a handful of Farsi-language church services, thus restricting services almost entirely to the Armenian and Assyrian languages.  Security officials monitored registered congregation centers to perform identity checks on worshippers to confirm non-Christians or converts did not participate in services.  In response, many Christian converts reportedly practiced in secret.  Other unrecognized religious minorities, such as Baha’is and Yarsanis, were also forced to assemble in private homes to practice their faith in secret.

According to the Tehran Jewish Committee, five Jewish schools and two preschools continued to operate in Tehran, but authorities required their principals to be Muslim.  The government reportedly continued to allow Hebrew language instruction but limited the distribution of Hebrew texts, particularly nonreligious texts, making it difficult to teach the language, according to the Jewish community.

In February, the ADL published a report entitled, Incitement:  Antisemitism and Violence in Iran’s Current State Textbooks.  The report stated that “incitement to hatred against Jews and Israel are extensively interspersed throughout multiple fields of the curriculum such as history, religion, and social studies” at all grade levels in the academic year 2020-2021.  According to the report, school textbooks “overwhelmingly teach hateful messages about Jewish people across both ancient and modern history” in furtherance of a narrative pitting Islamic leaders against the enemies of Islam.  Children were also taught that Jews were untrustworthy, Zionism was “racist,” and the state of Israel must be destroyed.

The ADL report stated a 10th grade textbook on “defense preparation” claimed Zionism and global arrogance had used “religious tools with new definitions of Islam and sect and the creation of takfiri [extremist] groups” to undermine Islam, including ISIS.  An 11th grade sociology textbook asserted, “The gathering of media power in the hand of wealth owners and Zionist associations…makes the cultural identity of non-Western societies vulnerable[.]”

The ADL report stated that state school textbooks depicted Baha’is as “a conspiratorial creation of the West rather than adherents to a legitimate faith” who, along with Buddhists and Wahhabi Muslims, were “physically unclean.”  An 11th grade history textbook stated the Baha’i “sect” was “deviant” and a “trick of colonialism to destroy the religious and cultural foundations of Islamic countries.”

Sunni leaders continued to report authorities banned Sunni religious literature and teachings from religion courses in some public schools, even in predominantly Sunni areas.  Other schools, notably in the Kurdish regions, included specialized Sunni religious courses.  Assyrian Christians reported the government continued to permit their community to use its own religious textbooks in schools, but only after the government authorized their content.  Armenian Christians were also permitted to teach their practices to Armenian students as an elective at select schools.

Authorities reportedly continued to deny the Baha’i, Sabean-Mandaean, and Yarsani religious communities, as well as other unrecognized religious minorities, access to education and government employment unless they declared themselves as belonging to one of the country’s recognized religions on their application forms.

Public and private universities continued to deny Baha’is admittance and to expel Baha’i students once their religion became known.  According to HRW, Iranian authorities systematically refuse to allow Baha’is to register at public universities because of their faith.  As in previous years, the government organization responsible for holding university entrance exams and for placing students, the Sazeman-e Sanjesh, used pretexts such as “incomplete information” and “further investigation required” to reject Baha’i applicants.  IranWire said that the banning of Baha’is from entering higher education began in 1980.

The July UNSR report stated documents published in March indicated it was official policy to impose restrictions on Baha’i education and commerce in Sari, Mazandaran Province.  In 2020, UNSR Rehman reported to the UN Human Rights Council that he remained “highly concerned about the denials of the right to education for religious minorities, with continuing reports of Baha’i students being rejected from entering university despite passing the required examinations.”

According to BIC, on March 17, authorities expelled two Baha’i students – Hananeh Afshar and Sana Fakhri Tazangi – mid-semester from the University of Applied Science and Technology in Shiraz, Fars Province.  The Baha’i women learned via a text message that the university had changed their student status to “registration cancelled” and had voided their credits from prior semesters.  The president of the university showed them a letter from a Ministry of Education official that requested the expulsion of nine Baha’i students from the Universities of Applied Science and Technology across the country.  Authorities expelled three other Baha’i students – Sina Shakib, Shima Fattahi Mirshekarlu, and Mahsa Forouhari – from their universities mid-semester under similar circumstances.

In January 2020, the state-issued national identity card required for almost all government and other transactions changed to allow only citizens to register as belonging to one of the country’s recognized religions.  The Atlantic Council stated in September 2021, “Baha’i families, Yarsanis, Sabean-Mandaeans, and other religious minorities or atheists must either lie to receive a national identification card or be denied access to services, such as insurance, education, banking, and, most recently, public transportation.”  Previously, application forms for an ID card had an option for “other religions.”

The Atlantic Council reported in September that Sabean-Mandaeans experienced hate speech and discrimination.  One member of the community told a researcher, that “we cannot even choose and officially register a Mandaean name for our children because the state has always instilled a great fear of being interrogated in us.”  According to the individual, Sabean-Mandaeans were often called “infidels and impure Muslims in the mosques.”  They did not have the right to work in governmental agencies.  Authorities denied self-employment permits “under various pretexts” and, in some cases, shut down their businesses.

According to an October 29 report by CHRI, the state-run Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice announced plans to launch university-level religion courses dedicated to the “promotion of virtue and prevention of vice” that conformed to the government’s interpretation of Islam.

According to BIC, the government continued to ban Baha’is from participating in more than 25 types of work, many related to food industries, because the government deemed Baha’is “unclean.”

Yarsanis reported continued discrimination and harassment in the military and in school systems.  They also continued to report that the birth registration system prevented them from giving their children Yarsani names.  According to a 2020 article in the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Iran Primer, “The regime has discriminated against the group by cracking down on Yarsani places of worship, religious monuments, religious speech, publications, education and communication in Kurdish.  Yarsanis have also had difficulty finding employment and faced arrest and interrogation by Iranian intelligence.”

In January, IranWire reported that the Yarsani Consultative Assembly of Civil Activists issued a statement calling on the government to stop discriminating against Yarsanis, including depriving of them of government employment, the right to hold public office, the right to post-graduate education, and the right to serve as directors of companies.  The assembly protested the compulsory teaching of Islamic sharia to Yarsani children.  The assembly also called for amending the constitution to include the Yarsan religion as a recognized minority religion.

According to the U.S.-based think-tank Middle East Institute, under the Ebrahim Raisi administration, which assumed power in August, not a single mid-ranking position was held by a Sunni Muslim or a woman during the year.

Sunnis reported continued underrepresentation in government-appointed positions in provinces where they formed a majority, such as Kurdistan and Khuzestan, as well as an inability to obtain senior government positions.  Sunni activists continued to report that throughout the year, and especially during the month of Muharram (the first month of the Islamic year), the government sent hundreds of Shia missionaries to areas with large Sunni Baluch populations to try to convert the local population.

According to media reports from 2018, the most recent reporting available, there were 13 synagogues in Tehran and approximately 35 throughout the country.  Jewish community representatives said they were free to travel in and out of the country, and the government generally did not enforce a prohibition against travel to Israel by Jews, although it enforced the prohibition on such travel for other citizens.  In March, a local Jewish community source told the Times of Israel the government permitted the Jewish community to maintain youth organizations, kosher facilities, and four Jewish schools.  In November, Voice of America reported the law barred Jews, in addition to other recognized minorities, from serving in the judiciary and security services, and it further prohibited Jews from holding authority over Muslims in the armed forces.  Media reported local sources were careful to avoid publicly discussing politics or the State of Israel.

According to BIC, during the year, the government campaign of hate speech and propaganda against Baha’is “reached new levels, increasing in both sophistication and scale.”  BIC stated there was a growing and coordinated network of hundreds of websites, Instagram accounts, Telegram channels, and Clubhouse chat rooms containing content such as “Baha’is are unclean and enemies of your religion,” “Associating with Baha’is is banned,” and “Purchasing any goods from a Baha’i store is forbidden.”  BIC stated discriminatory online material existed alongside videos, print newspaper articles, books, seminars, exhibitions, graffiti, and fatwas “from both official outlets and others sponsored by the government but purporting to be independent.”

International media and NGOs reported continued government-sponsored propaganda aimed at deterring the practice of or conversion to Christianity.  According to Mohabat News, the government routinely propagated anti-Christian publications and online materials, such as the 2017 book Christian Zionism in the Geography of Christianity.  In December, Article 18 stated that although government officials issued Christmas greetings on social media as a propaganda tool, government persecution of Christians increased around the holiday.  One academic told Article 18 the regime feared that an interest in Christmas and other elements of Western culture would lead Muslims, especially youth, to convert to Christianity.  The academic said the government was “more afraid of the religious significance and consequences of these behaviors than of fearing a celebration that belongs to other countries.  Negative reactions to the celebration of Christmas, or open repression of Christian converts, are signs of this fear.”

In its annual report on the year 2020 published in April, Amnesty International stated, “Freedom of religion and belief was systematically violated in law and practice.  The authorities continued to impose on people of all faiths, as well as atheists, codes of public conduct rooted in a strict interpretation of Shia Islam.  The authorities refused to recognize the right of those born to Muslim parents to convert to other religions or become atheists, with individuals seeking to exercise this right risking arbitrary detention, torture and the death penalty for ‘apostasy.’  Only Shia Muslims were allowed to hold key political positions.  Members of religious minorities, including Baha’is, Christians, Gonabadi Dervishes, Yarsan (Ahl-e Haq), and converts from Shia Islam to Sunni Islam or Christianity faced discrimination, including in education and employment, as well as arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, torture and other ill-treatment for practicing their faith.”  The report added, “The authorities continued to commit widespread and systematic human rights violations against members of the Baha’i minority, including forcible closure of businesses, confiscation of property, bans on employment in the public sector, denial of access to higher education and hate speech campaigns on state media.  Raids on house churches persisted.  Sunni Muslims continued to face restrictions on establishing their own mosques.”

In its annual report on the year 2021, HRW noted the country’s “law denies freedom of religion to Baha’is and discriminates against them.  Authorities continue to arrest and prosecute members of the Baha’i faith on vague national security charges and to close businesses owned by them.  The government also discriminates against other religious minorities, including Sunni Muslims….  Minority activists are regularly arrested and prosecuted on vaguely defined national security charges in trials that grossly fall short of international standards.”

In July, Article 18 reported that in a video published by Roshangar Media, senior Armenian and Assyrian representatives distanced themselves from the house church movement of evangelical Christian converts.  Iranian-Armenian Catholic archbishop Sarkis Davidian reportedly said in the video, “We do not encourage people to change their religion.  People must remain in their religion.”  Iranian-Assyrian parliamentary representative Shaarli Anouyeh Tekyeh, in the same video, said evangelical churches were “repugnant to us.”  In an August 2020 Article 18 report, an Armenian journalist said despite harassment of minorities being “institutionalized in the very fabric of the Islamic Republic… representatives of religious minorities find themselves almost forced to defend the interests and discourse of a government that has deprived them of many of their rights, in an attempt perhaps to regain those lost rights or to prevent their further deterioration.”

Government officials continued to employ antisemitic rhetoric in official statements and to sanction it in media outlets, publications, and books.  On February 22, Supreme Leader Khamenei posted a message on Twitter saying, “That international Zionist clown [the UN] has said they won’t allow Iran to produce nuclear weapons.  First of all, if we had any such intention, even those more powerful than him [sic] wouldn’t be able to stop us.”  On June 27, ADL CEO and national director Jonathan Greenblatt wrote in Newsweek, “that [President] Raisi was responsible for systematically propagating The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, one of the most dangerous tracts in history, provides an unsettling reminder of just how engaged Iran’s government and leaders have been in inciting antisemitism.”  According to the ADL, another central theme of the government’s propaganda regarding the global health crisis was the conspiracy theory that Jews are all-powerful or seek world domination.

In May, the government-controlled arts promotion organization Hozeh Honari hosted an exhibition of submissions to its third Holocaust-denial cartoon contest and offered cash awards to several of the participating artists.  The state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Corporation reportedly broadcast the exhibition’s closing ceremony live.  Many of the cartoons at the exhibition, also published in a book produced by Hozeh Honari, featured antisemitic imagery and stereotypical caricatures of Jews.  The contest had financial sponsorship from the partly state-owned Telecommunication Company of Iran through its subsidiary and the largest mobile operator in Iran, Hamrahe Aval.  In an interview on state-run Channel 4 on September 9, Masud Shojaei-Tabatabai, the visual arts director of Hozeh Honari and director of IranCartoon.com, who also organized these exhibitions 2020, 2016, and 2006, said the Holocaust was the “Achilles heel” of the Zionists, that Israelis had “benefited” from the Holocaust, and that the figure of six million Jewish victims was “very exaggerated.”

The government continued to allow recognized minority religious groups to establish community centers and some self-financed cultural, social, athletic, and charitable associations.

Endowed religious charitable foundations, or bonyads, accounted for one-quarter to one-third of the country’s economy, according to some experts.  According to NGOs, government insiders, including members of the military and clergy, ran these tax-exempt organizations, which the law defines as charities.  Members of the political opposition and international corruption watchdog organizations frequently accused bonyads of corruption.  Bonyads received benefits from the government, but there was no requirement for a government agency to approve their budgets publicly.

On December 16, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  The General Assembly passed the measure by a vote of 78 states in favor, 31 against, and 69 abstentions.  The resolution, introduced by Canada with 47 cosponsors, expressed concern about “ongoing severe limitations and increasing restrictions on the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, restrictions on the establishment of places of worship, undue restrictions on burials carried out in accordance with religious tenets, attacks against places of worship and burial, and other human rights violations….”  These violations included “harassment, intimidation, persecution, arbitrary arrests and detention, and incitement to hatred that leads to violence against persons belonging to recognized and unrecognized religious minorities, including Christians, Gonabadi dervishes, Jews, Sufi Muslims, Sunni Muslims, Yarsanis, Zoroastrians and members of the Baha’i Faith, who have faced increasing restrictions from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on account of their faith and have been reportedly subjected to mass arrests and lengthy prison sentences during the COVID-19 pandemic….”  The resolution called upon the government “to cease monitoring individuals on account of their religious identity, to release all religious practitioners imprisoned for their membership in or activities on behalf of a recognized or unrecognized minority religious group, and to ensure that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief, including the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of their choice, in accordance with its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights….”  The resolution also called upon the government “to eliminate, in law and in practice, all forms of discrimination on the basis of thought, conscience, religion or belief, including restrictions contained in newly enacted provisions Article 499bis and Article 500bis of the Islamic Penal Code, as well as economic restrictions, such as the closure, destruction or confiscation of businesses and properties, the cancellation of licenses and the denial of employment in certain public and private sectors, including government or military positions and elected office, the denial of and restrictions on access to education, including for members of the Baha’i Faith, and other human rights violations against persons belonging to recognized and unrecognized religious minorities….”  The resolution condemned “without any reservation any denial of the Holocaust,” and called upon the government “to end impunity for those who commit crimes against persons belonging to recognized and unrecognized religious minorities.”

Yarsanis outside the country reported that widespread discrimination against Yarsanis continued.  They stated Yarsani children were socially ostracized in school and in shared community facilities.  Yarsani men continued to face employment discrimination.  According to reports, Shia preachers continued to encourage social discrimination against Yarsanis.

According to a media reporting, Yarsani graves were neither safe from attacks nor from disrespect, and Yarsani cemeteries and mausoleums were repeatedly damaged and destroyed in the city of Kermanshah and elsewhere in the country.

Violence and social stigma continued to target Baha’i individuals, according to Baha’is and those who advocated for their rights, and perpetrators reportedly continued to act with impunity.  There continued to be reports of non-Baha’is dismissing or refusing employment to Baha’is, sometimes in response to government pressure, according to BIC and other organizations monitoring the situation of Baha’is.  BIC continued to report instances of physical violence committed against Baha’is based on their faith.

Baha’is reported there were continued incidents of destruction or vandalism of their cemeteries.  IranWire reported that in September, HRANA released a video showing the partial destruction of a Baha’i cemetery in the village of Kata, Dena County, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province.  According to HRANA, the attack occurred on September 8.  In a manner that would have been difficult without machinery, much of the cemetery’s exterior wall and bathroom had been knocked to the ground and stone shrines were smashed.

In July, IranWire reported an Assyrian Christian nicknamed “Farough” suffered employment discrimination following a workplace injury at an industrial factory in 2016 in which he lost three fingers on his right hand.  Farough said that when he returned to the factory after his recovery, “They were supposed to do an expert examination and pay me blood money, but when I was paid, I realized that the amount I received was much lower based on the fact that I was a religious minority.”  Farough said a Muslim colleague with similar academic credentials was promoted and given a raise.  “I meanwhile have all the right conditions for employment and career advancement but, just because I am a Christian, I am deprived of any promotion.”

According to human rights NGOs, including CSW, Open Doors USA, and others, converts from Islam to Christianity faced ongoing societal pressure and rejection by family or community members.

Shia clerics and prayer leaders reportedly continued to denounce Sufism and the activities of Sufis in both sermons and public statements.

Sunni students reported that professors continued to routinely insult Sunni religious figures in class.

IranWire reported that according to a survey released by Iran Open Data in October, 48 percent of 2,000 adult respondents said they drank alcohol.  When asked about drinking frequency, 24 percent of respondents reported that they “sometimes” drank, while 9 percent said they drank “weekly,” and 6 percent said they drank “daily.”  Fifty-two percent of participants said they did not drink alcohol.

The United States does not have diplomatic relations with Iran and did not have opportunities during the year to raise concerns in a bilateral setting with the government about its religious freedom abuses and restrictions.

The U.S. government continued to call publicly and in multilateral forums for the government to respect religious freedom and continued to condemn and promote accountability for its abuses of members of religious minority groups in a variety of ways and in different international forums.  These included public statements by senior U.S. government officials, use of social media, reports issued by U.S. government agencies, support for relevant UN and NGO efforts, diplomatic initiatives, and sanctions.  Senior U.S. government officials publicly reiterated calls for the release of prisoners held on grounds related to their religious beliefs.

On June 13, the Special Envoy for Iran posted to Twitter, “It’s been 3 years since human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh was sentenced to 38 and a half years in prison and 148 lashes for defending women’s rights in Iran.  From prison she cont[tinue]s to advocate for the humane treatment of political prisoners.  She should not have spent a single day in prison.”

On July 28, the Department of State released a statement on the protests that started over water shortages in Khuzestan Province, home to the predominantly Sunni Muslim Ahwazi Arab minority.  It condemned the use of violence against peaceful protestors and supported their rights “to peacefully assemble and express themselves, without fear of violence and detention by security forces.”

On March 9, the United States designated IRGC interrogators Ali Hemmatian and Masoud Safdari pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2021 for their involvement in gross violations of human rights.  According to NGOs, Hemmatian and Safdari operated in Ward 2A of Evin Prison and tortured political prisoners, including activists advocating for religious freedom and protestors, during their interrogations.  On the same day, the U.S. representative to the Human Rights Council’s Interactive Dialogue together with the Special Rapporteur on Iran called for Iran to “end its systematic use of an arbitrary and unfair justice system to detain and impose sentence against human rights defenders, including Nasrin Sotoudeh, journalists, members of minority groups, such as the Baha’i, and others who dissent from the government.”

On December 7, the U. S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, sanctioned the Special Units of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and Iran’s Counter-Terror Special Forces (NOPO) for violently suppressing prodemocracy protests in November 2019.  OFAC sanctioned two LEF commanders – Hassan Karami and Seyed Mousavi Azami – as well a Basij commander Gholamreza Soleimani and the Governor of Qods City, Leila Vaseghi, for their roles in carrying out crackdowns against peaceful protesters.  OFAC also sanctioned two prisons, Zahedan Central Prison and Isfahan Central Prison, as well as the warden of Qarchak Women’s Prison, Soghra Khodadadi, and IRGC commander and brigadier general Mohammad Karami for their roles in the “flagrant denial” of the rights prisoners and other citizens, including religious minorities.  The Treasury Department statement announcing the sanctions said that “Zahedan Prison holds several political prisoners who belong to the Baluch ethnic minority group.  According to public reports, on January 3, 2021, Baluch prisoner Hassan Dehvari was executed in Zahedan Prison.  Dehvari was sentenced to death for ‘armed rebellion against the Islamic Rule.’  His sentence was escalated to execution after he engaged in several acts of peaceful protests, such as signing statements condemning executions of Sunni prisoners and condemning the mistreatment of fellow prisoners.”

Since 1999, Iran has been designated as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.  On November 15, 2021, the Secretary of State redesignated Iran as a CPC and identified the existing sanctions as ongoing travel restrictions based on serious human rights abuses under section 221(c) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA), for individuals identified under Section 221(a)(1)(C) of the TRA in connection with the commission of serious human rights abuses, pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 39.7 million (mid-year 2021).  According to 2010 government statistics – the most recent available – 97 percent of the population is Muslim.  Shia Muslims, predominantly Arabs but also including Turkoman, Faili Kurds, and others, constitute 55 to 60 percent of the population.  Sunni Muslims are approximately 40 percent of the Muslim population, of which Arabs constitute 24 percent, Kurds 15 percent, and Turkomans the remaining 1 percent.  Shia, although predominantly located in the south and east, are the majority in Baghdad and have communities in most parts of the country.  Sunnis form the majority in the west, center, and north of the country.

According to Christian leaders as well as NGO and media reports, fewer than 250,000 Christians remain in the country, down from a pre-2003 population estimate of between 800,000 and 1.4 million persons.  Approximately 67 percent of Christians are Chaldean Catholics (an eastern rite of the Roman Catholic Church), and nearly 20 percent are members of the Assyrian Church of the East.  The remainder are Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, and Anglican and other Protestants.  There are approximately 2,000 members of evangelical Christian churches in the IKR, while an unknown number, mostly converts from Islam, practice secretly.

According to Yezidi leaders, most of the 400,000 to 500,000 Yezidis in the country are located in the north, with approximately 150,000 remaining internally displaced as of August, compared with 200,000 to 230,000 remaining displaced as of October 2020.  The Shabak number between 350,000 and 400,000, three-fourths of whom are Shia.  Most Sunni Shabak and some Shia Shabak reside in Ninewa.  According to Kaka’i (also known as Yarsani) activists, their community has approximately 120,000 to 150,000 members located in the Ninewa Plain and in villages southeast of Kirkuk as well as in Diyala and Erbil; the KRG estimates there are 225,000 to 250,000 Kaka’i in the IKR.

Estimates of the size of the Sabean-Mandean community vary, but according to Sabean-Mandean leaders, 10,000 to 15,000 members remain in the country, mainly in the south, with between 450 and 1,000 living in the IKR and Baghdad.  Armenian leaders report a population of approximately 12,000 Armenian Christians, both Armenian Apostolic Church (Armenian Orthodox) and Armenian Catholic in the country, including in the IKR.  Baha’i leaders report fewer than 2,000 members, spread throughout the country in small groups, including approximately 100 families in the IKR.  Leaders of the Kavkaz (the unified name for the Circassians, Chechnya, and Dagestan) community report a population of approximately 50,000 members, located in Baghdad, Ninewa, Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, Kirkuk, and Diyala Provinces.  Most identify as Sunni Muslims who migrated from the Caucasus to Iraq during the wars between the Ottoman and Russian empires following forced displacement.

According to media organizations, following the death by stroke of a Jewish doctor, Dhafer Eliyahu, in March, only four Jewish citizens remain in federal Iraq.  According to unofficial statistics from the KRG Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs (MERA), there are possibly as few as 100 to as many as 250 Jewish families in the IKR; Jewish leaders report that most do not openly acknowledge their religion for fear of persecution or violence by extremist actors.  According to the KRG MERA, there are approximately 15,000 to 20,000 Zoroastrians in the IKR.  A Zoroastrian religious leader said there are approximately 30,000 Zoroastrians throughout the country.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), approximately 1.2 million persons remain displaced within the country, predominantly in Ninewa, Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Kirkuk Provinces, compared with 1.5 million persons at the end of 2020.  According to the KRG’s Joint Crisis Coordination Center (JCC), there are approximately 664,909 IDPs in the IKR as of December 2021, compared with 700,000 in 2020.  According to the JCC, there are 247,422 Syrian, 8,746 Turkish, 9,700 Iranian, and 752 Palestinian refugees, and 507 individuals of other nationalities in the IKR.  Forty percent of the IDPs throughout the IKR are Sunni Arabs, 30 percent Yezidis, 13 percent Kurds (of several religious affiliations), and 7 percent Christians.  Other minority religious groups comprise the remaining 10 percent.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes Islam as the official religion of the state and a “foundational source” of legislation.  It states no law may be enacted contradicting the “established provisions of Islam.”  It also states no law may contradict the principles of democracy or the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in the constitution.

The constitution protects the “Islamic identity” of the Iraqi people, although it makes no specific mention of Sunni or Shia Islam.  The constitution also provides for freedom of religious belief and practice for all individuals, specifying Christians, Yezidis, and Sabean-Mandeans; it does not explicitly mention followers of other religions or atheists.  Federal law prohibits the practice of the Baha’i Faith and prescribes 10 years’ imprisonment for anyone practicing it, although the law is not enforced.  The KRG does not enforce the federal ban as a matter of policy and recognizes the Baha’i Faith as a religion.

The law prohibits takfiri organizations including terrorist organizations al-Qa’ida and ISIS, which declare Muslims who practice a less austere form of Islam apostates.  A 2001 resolution prohibits the practice of the Wahhabi branch of Sunni Islam.

The constitution states each individual has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and belief.  Followers of all religions are free to practice religious rites and manage religious endowment affairs and religious institutions.  The constitution guarantees freedom from religious coercion and states all citizens are equal before the law without regard to religion, sect, or belief.

The constitution guarantees the reinstatement of citizenship to individuals who gave up their citizenship for political or sectarian reasons; however, this does not apply to Jews who emigrated to Israel and were forced to renounce their Iraqi citizenship under a 1950 Iraqi law.

Civil laws provide a simple process for a non-Muslim to convert to Islam.  Personal status laws and regulations prohibit the conversion of Muslims to other religions, and they require the administrative designation of minor children as Muslims if either parent converts to Islam or if one parent is considered Muslim, even if the child is a product of rape.  Civil status law allows all women who are identified in their official documents as non-Muslims to marry Muslim men, but it prohibits Muslim women from marrying non-Muslims.  Muslim men may only marry women of the Christian, Jewish, or Sabean Mandean faith.

An article of the penal code punishes with up to three years’ imprisonment or a 300 Iraqi dinar fine ($.20) any person who “attacks the creed of a religious minority or pours scorn on its religious practices; willfully disrupts, prevents, or obstructs a religious ceremony, festival, or meeting of a religious minority; wrecks, destroys, defaces, or desecrates a building or sacred symbol set aside for the ceremonies of a religious minority; deliberately misspells texts to alter or make light of the meaning, tenets, or teachings of a book sacred to a religious minority; publicly insults a symbol or a person who constitutes an object of sanctification, worship, or reverence to a religious minority; or publicly imitates a religious ceremony or celebration with intent to deceive.”

IKR law forbids “religious or political media speech, individually or collectively, directly or indirectly, that brings hate and violence, terror, exclusion, and marginalization based on national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic claims.”

The law characterizes crimes committed by ISIS against Yezidis, Christians, Turkomans, and Shabak as crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity.  A law passed on March 3 by the national Council of Representatives (COR) grants rights to Yezidis and other survivors of ISIS.  These rights include restitution for damages and access to social and medical services, including services that provide for the rehabilitation and integration of victims into society.  Those eligible for these benefits include Yezidi, Christian, Shabak, and Turkoman female survivors who were kidnapped by ISIS; Yezidis, Christians, Shabak, and Turkomans who survived mass killing operations carried out by ISIS; and Yezidi children who were kidnapped by ISIS.

The following religious groups are recognized by the personal status law and are registered with the government:  Muslims, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Assyrian Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Armenian Apostolic, Armenian Catholics, Roman Catholics, National Protestants, Anglicans, Evangelical Protestant Assyrians, Seventh-day Adventists, Coptic Orthodox, Yezidis, Sabean-Mandeans, and Jews.  Recognition allows groups to appoint legal representatives and perform legal transactions, such as buying and selling property.  All recognized religious groups in the country, except for Yezidis, have their own personal status courts responsible for handling marriage, divorce, and inheritance issues.

There are three diwans (offices) responsible for administering matters for the recognized religious groups within the country:  the Sunni Endowment Diwan, the Shia Endowment Diwan, and the Endowment of the Christian, Yezidi, and Sabean-Mandean Religions Diwan.  The three endowments operate under the authority of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) to disburse government funds to maintain and protect religious facilities.

Neither national nor IKR law specifies penalties for the practices of unrecognized religious groups, including Wahhabi Islam, Zoroastrianism, and Yarsanism, other than Baha’is; however, contracts signed by institutions of unrecognized religious groups are not considered legal or admissible as evidence in court.

In areas other than the IKR, the law does not provide a mechanism for a new religious group to obtain legal recognition.  In the IKR, religious groups obtain recognition by registering with the KRG MERA.  To register, a group must have a minimum of 150 adherents, provide documentation on the sources of its financial support, and demonstrate it is not “anti-Islam.”

Eight faiths are recognized and registered with the KRG MERA:  Islam, Christianity, Yezidism, Judaism, Sabean-Mandaeism, Zoroastrianism, Yarsanism, and the Baha’i Faith.  According to KRG MERA, individuals from 14 different Christian government-recognized denominations reside in the IKR, including denominations associated with the Chaldean Church, Assyrian Old Eastern Church, Syriac Orthodox Church, Syriac Catholic Church, Armenian Orthodox Church, Greek Orthodox Church, Roman Catholic Church, Latin Church, Presbyterian Church, Assyrian Protestant Church, Coptic Orthodox Church, and Seventh-day Adventist Church.

According to the KRG MERA’s Directorate of Christian Affairs, there are 12 registered Protestant and evangelical Christian groups in the IKR, several with multiple branches:  Nahda al-Qadassa, Nasari Evangelical, Kurd-Zman, Ashti Evangelical, Evangelical Free, Baptist Church of the Good Shepherd, St. Mary’s Episcopal Church, al-Tasbih International Evangelical, Rasolia, United Evangelical, Assemblies of God, and Seventh-day Adventist.

The law reserves nine of the Council of Representatives’ (COR) 329 seats for members of religious and ethnic minority communities:  five for Christian candidates from Baghdad, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Dohuk; one for a Yezidi, from Ninewa; one for a Sabean-Mandean, from Baghdad; one for an ethnic Shabak, from Ninewa; and one for a Faili Kurd, from Wasit.  Usually one of the COR rapporteur (administrative) positions is designated for a Christian parliamentarian and the other for a Turkoman.  The Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP) reserves 11 of its 111 seats for ethnic and religious minorities:  five for Chaldeans, Syriacs, and Assyrians; five for Turkomans; and one for an Armenian, most of whom also belong to minority religious groups.

The constitution provides for a Federal Supreme Court made up of judges, experts in Islamic jurisprudence, and legal scholars.  The constitution leaves the method of regulating the number and selection of judges to legislation that requires a two-thirds majority in the COR for passage, but such legislation has never been passed.

The constitution provides citizens the right to choose which court (civil or religious) will adjudicate matters of personal status, including marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and charitable donations.  Islam takes precedence when one of the parties to the dispute is from an unrecognized faith.  The law states civil courts must consult the religious authority of a non-Muslim party for its opinion under the applicable religious law and must apply the religious authority’s opinion in court.  In the IKR, the Personal Status Court adjudicates personal disputes between members of the same religion, while the Civil Status Court handles all other cases.  Minority religious groups may request a non-Muslim judge to adjudicate their cases.

The KRG MERA operates endowments that pay salaries of clergy and fund construction and maintenance of religious sites for Muslims, Christians, and Yezidis but not for the other five registered religions.

The law requires the government to maintain the sanctity of holy shrines and religious sites and guarantee the free practice of rituals for recognized religious groups.

By law, the government provides support for Muslims outside the IKR desiring to perform the Hajj or Umrah, organizing travel routes and immunization documents for entry into Saudi Arabia.

The constitution provides minority groups the right to educate children in their own languages.  While it establishes Arabic and Kurdish as official state languages, it makes Syriac – typically spoken by Christians – and Turkoman official languages only in the administrative units in which those groups “constitute density populations.”

Government regulations require Islamic instruction in public schools outside the IKR, but non-Muslim students are not required to participate.  In most areas of the country, primary and secondary school curricula include three classes per week of Islamic education, including study of the Quran, as a graduation requirement for Muslim students.  The government provides Christian religious education in public schools in some areas where there are concentrations of Christians, and there is a Syriac curriculum directorate within the Ministry of Education.

In the IKR, to register with the KRG MERA, private schools need to provide information on the school’s bylaws, number of students, size, location, facility and safety conditions, financial backing, and tax compliance, and to undergo an inspection.

National identity cards issued since 2016 do not denote the bearer’s religion, although the online application still requests this information, and a data chip on the card still contains data on religion.  The only religions that may be listed on the national identity card application are Christian, Sabean-Mandean, Yezidi, Jewish, and Muslim.  There is no distinction between Shia and Sunni Muslims, or a designation of Christian denominations.  Individuals practicing other faiths may only receive identity cards if they self-identify as Muslim, Yezidi, Sabean-Mandean, Jewish, or Christian.  Without an official identity card, one may not register a marriage, enroll children in public school, acquire passports, or obtain some government services.  Passports do not specify religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights (IHCHR) reported that during the year it had received hundreds of complaints from relatives of persons detained on terrorism charges, citing claims of arrests based on malicious prosecutions, torture, and forced disappearance.  Sunni leaders said these abuses frequently targeted Sunnis held on terrorism charges.  IHCHR Vice President Ali Mizer al-Jarba said there were allegations that “detainees, most of whom were being prosecuted for terrorism cases, were tortured during pre-trial interrogation.”  He added that detainees’ families had demanded medical examinations to document this torture so that medical records could be used to challenge their indictments in the Court of Cessation.

International and local NGOs said the government continued to use the antiterrorism law as a pretext for detaining individuals, mostly Sunnis, without due process.  Observers again said the antiterrorism law did not afford due process or fair trial protections.  Sunni leaders said authorities referenced the law in their detentions of young Sunni men on suspicion of having ISIS links.  According to international human rights organizations, some Shia militias, including some operating under the PMF umbrella, continued to commit physical abuses and were implicated in several attacks on Sunni civilians, allegedly to avenge ISIS crimes against Shia.  The PMF is a state-sponsored organization composed of more than 50 mostly Shia militias originally formed to combat ISIS.  Human rights activists also said PMF forces operated secret prisons in which they held Sunni individuals on false accusations of ISIS affiliation.  PMF forces reportedly extorted families of the detainees.

Predominantly Sunni provinces, such as Anbar, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, and Ninewa, reported fewer security incidents compared with 2019 and 2020.

Yezidis, Christians, and local and international NGOs reported members of the PMF continued to verbally harass and physically abuse members of religious minority communities.  According to media, from December 2020 through February, Iran-aligned militias operating under the PMF carried out a series of attacks on religious minority-owned businesses in Baghdad, including against Christian and Yezidi-owned alcohol establishments.  Minority community leaders said the attacks were designed to harass vulnerable minority entrepreneurs to pay illicit bribes and protection money to the militias.  In some cases, Muslim business competitors drove minority religious entrepreneurs out of business.

During the year, there was almost no reported progress in locating or rescuing missing Yezidis.  On August 2, authorities in the KRG’s Yezidi Rescue Coordinating Office reported 2,763 Yezidis, mainly women and children, were still missing both inside and outside the country, compared with up to 2,874 reported missing in 2020.  According to the Yezidi Rescue Coordinating Office, during the period 2014-2021, approximately 100,000 Yezidis left the country, with most moving to Germany and others to Turkey, Greece, Georgia, Armenia, France, the Netherlands, Croatia, the United States, Australia, Hungary, and Bulgaria.  Approximately 62 Christians also remained missing at the end of the year.  According to the KRG MERA, as of August 2, more than 3,550 Yezidis had escaped, been rescued, or released from ISIS captivity since 2014, compared with 3,543 through 2020.  According to Shabak parliamentarian Mohammed Ibrahim (a Shia of Ninewa), 233 Shabak individuals kidnapped by ISIS in 2014 were still missing.  According to Ninewa Governorate’s Advisor for Women’s Affairs Sukina Ali (a Shia Turkoman of Ninewa), 900 Shia and Sunni Turkomans kidnapped by ISIS were still missing at year’s end.

Sources said some government officials continued to facilitate arbitrary demographic change by providing land and housing for Shia and Sunni Muslims to move into traditionally Christian areas in the Ninewa Plain, such as Bartella Subdistrict, and Sunni areas in Diyala and Babil Provinces, including Jurf al-Sakhar District in Babil Province.  On August 11, Father Behnam Banoka, a Syriac Catholic Church leader in Bartella District, a Christian majority district in Ninewa Province, reported that member of parliament (MP) Qusay Abas, elected under the Shabak quota, had pressured the Ninewa municipality director to redistribute residential lands in Christian majority Bartella City to Shabak families.  According to Banoka, these ongoing demographic changes and the presence of the 30th PMF (Shabak) in the area were among the main reasons Christian IDPs were not returning to Bartella.  Members of Bartella’s Christian community said the brigade’s efforts to alter demographics negatively impacted their way of life.

According to press, in May, parliamentarian Raad al-Dahlaki, a Sunni from Diyala Province, warned that PMF forces and associated Iranian-backed militias continued to forcibly displace Sunnis in Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Ninewa Provinces.  Dahlaki stated, “Armed factions backed by Iran are constantly practicing demographic change operations with the government’s knowledge, but no one can dare to stop these operations.”  He added, “There are secret prisons for armed factions in Samarra and Jurf al-Sakhr Districts and in Diyala Province that contain Sunni detainees.”  Deputy speaker of parliament Hassan al-Kaabi dismissed these allegations as “inaccuracies” and called for the resignation of Sunni parliamentarian Dhafer al-Ani from Baghdad Province for having presented “inaccuracies” regarding the situation.  In May, al-Ani stated the PMF had carried out demographic changes in Salah al-Din, Ninewa, and Diyala Provinces.  Al-Ani called on the government to investigate and warned against “the continuation of these schemes that lead to the killing of civilians and the looting of the assets of people who have suffered from the crimes of ISIS,” referring to what he said were secret prisons armed PMF factions used in Samarra and Jurf al-Sakhr Districts.

Christian leaders reported that interest in the community in emigrating remained high, though COVID-19 travel restrictions prohibited many from leaving.  On August 6, Chaldean Patriarch in Iraq and the World Raphael Louis Sako released a statement warning of what he said were suspicious efforts to alter demographics in the areas inhabited by Christians in Ninewa Province.  He recommended the government implement a strategy to prevent these changes, warning that more Christians would emigrate if the situation continued.

On November 24, in a speech during Christmas Eve Mass at Saint Joseph Church in Baghdad, Prime Minister Kadhimi encouraged Christians to remain in the country and those who had left to return, stating, “We cannot imagine the Iraqi identity without Christians and other components.”  President Barham Salih wished the Christian community a Merry Christmas via Twitter, affirming his support for Christians who have suffered from the impact of extremism and terrorism.  Salih said the country needed to take a serious stand to establish “a capable state and good governance that upholds the principles of citizenship and protects rights and peaceful coexistence.”  COR Speaker Mohammed al-Halbusi sent his best wishes to Christians and hoped for peace and prosperity for the country.

In October, the head of the Iraqi Turkoman Front, Hasan Toran, said the PMF had not allowed Sunni Turkomans to return to their villages in Tuz-Khurmato District, Salah al-Din Province, but the PMF had allowed Shia Turkomans to return.  He stated that in Telafar, Ninewa Province, the PMF continued to verbally harass Sunni Turkomans at checkpoints and required them to obtain the approval of the PMF’s intelligence apparatus to obtain government documentation.  The KRG reported that Christians and other religious and ethnic minorities were victims of demographic changes emanating from the south of Tuz-Khurmato into Kirkuk Province, including in the villages of Matiq and Arab Koye.  These minorities included Kaka’i in Daquq and Mekhas in Khanaqin.

Throughout the year, Hamdaniya District Mayor Essam Behnam, a Christian, said he continued to resist both federal and provincial-level political pressure to issue land grants in Christian-majority Hamdaniya, Ninewa Province, to the mostly Shia families of PMF fighters who fought ISIS.

Shirko Toufiq, a media official of the 15th Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) headquarters in Diyala, told the Shafaq News Agency on December 7 that “the Iraqi government facilitated the Arabization of Kurdish territories in Diyala by ostracizing and marginalizing the Kurds in security and administrative government positions in the disputed territories in Diyala.”  Toufiq said the actions of ISIS and support of some “Sunni Arab locals” for that group contributed to the defacing and obscuring the cultural identity of 72 Kurdish villages in Diyala and forcing 4,200 Kurdish families to move to the Kurdistan Region or other governorates.  Kaka’i leaders said many of the residents of those villages were also members of their religious minority.

NGOs continued to state that constitutional provisions on freedom of religion should override laws banning the Baha’i Faith and the Wahhabi branch of Sunni Islam.  During the year, however, there were again no court challenges filed to invalidate the laws, and no legislation proposed to repeal them.

Representatives of minority religious groups, including Christians and Yezidis, continued to state that while the central government did not generally interfere with religious observances and even provided security for religious sites, including churches, mosques, shrines, and religious pilgrimage sites and routes, local authorities in some regions continued to verbally harass and impose restrictions on their activities.

Christian religious leaders continued to publicly accuse the 30th Brigade of verbal harassment of Christians in Bartella and elsewhere in Hamdaniya District of Ninewa.  Local residents continued to say militias posted pictures of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and former Quds Force Commander Qassim Suleimani, as well as of Iraqi militia leaders such as Secretary General of the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Qais al-Khazali and former Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC) Chief of Staff Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis on shops in Bartella.  They also stated the 30th Brigade continued to disregard 2019 government orders to withdraw from checkpoints in the Ninewa Plain.

On January 2, the leader of the Shia Sadrist movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, directed his deputies, including MPs, religious advisors, PMF leaders, and Deputy COR Speaker Hassan al-Kabi, to form a special committee to receive complaints from Christians inside and outside the country regarding their stolen properties and real estate, and he promised in a statement strict legal measures to punish perpetrators; however, although al-Sadr requested tangible results by May, the committee continued working through the end of year.  On October 5, former parliamentarian and current COR Speaker and Advisor for Components (Minority Groups) Affairs Emad Youkhana said Sadr’s committee had managed to return more than 90 properties, but that the committee sometimes used illegal approaches including threats of violence to return these properties.  Youkhana told the press that while the committee set up to address the return of properties was functioning, it was inefficient and weak, and its procedures were too slow and complicated to be effective.

The committee of security officials and Christian religious leaders created in 2019 by the OPM to return all Christian properties in Ninewa Province to their Christian owners continued to operate.

On September 24, Cardinal Sako told media that armed groups had stolen approximately 3,000-4,000 properties or projects that belonged to Christians in Baghdad and other provinces.   On October 6, head of the Christian, Yezidi, and Sabean Mandaean Endowment Raad Kajaji said that starting in 2017, to prevent others from taking over Christian properties illegally, the government had instructed that no property ownership transactions would be made without the endowment’s approval and needed to be “issued at the request of the owner.”  According to Kajaji, however, the regulation had not been fully successful in stopping illegal property transfers.  Christians of many denominations and residing throughout many parts of the country said the perpetrators sometimes falsified documents certifying themselves as Christians to obtain properties.

According to a high level committee established in 2020 by the KRG Council of Ministers to resolve outstanding land disputes affecting Christian communities, as of November, there were 55 confiscations of properties owned by Christians, as well as reports of individuals forcibly relocated from properties that had belonged to Christians but that had been confiscated by the former Baathist regime.  Of these, 38 cases were adjudicated, or the original owners dropped the charges.  The committee, which includes representatives from the IKP, IKR Presidency, IKR Judicial Council, KRG Ministries of Justice, Agriculture, Municipalities, and Finance, and the head of IKR’s Independent Human Rights Commission, requested immediate compensation for Christians whose lands had been confiscated, for a total of 3.2 trillion dinars ($2.19 billion).  The committee also instructed the Duhok Governorate Council to issue a decree centralizing the purchase and sale of lands and properties located in villages inhabited predominately by Christians.  In October, following pressure from the committee, the Duhok Court of Appeals amended several previous decisions in favor of Assyrian Christian residents of Kashkawa village regarding the ownership of disputed lands.  While Assyrian Christian leaders welcomed the decision, as of October, implementation was still pending with the relevant KRG departments.

Sources reported that Shia militias and the Shia Endowment continued to confiscate properties owned by the Sunni Endowments in Diyala and Ninewa Provinces, leading to sectarian tensions in those provinces.  According to Sunni Endowment representatives, the Shia Endowment confiscated a shrine and cemetery in Baquba District in Diyala, while Shia militias, including AAH, Badr, and Khurasani, turned some Sunni mosques in the province into PMF headquarters.  In Ninewa, the Sunni Endowment stated that the Shia Endowment worked secretly to confiscate properties owned by the Sunni Endowment in Mosul by using false documents or claiming Shia Endowment jurisdiction over the properties based on some of the shrines and mosques bearing Shia religious names.

Kaka’i community members again said the central government’s Shia Endowment continued to occupy places of Kaka’i worship in Diyala and Baghdad, converting them into Shia mosques.  According to Kaka’i representatives, the government had still not responded to their request for the return of the Baba Mahmud House of Worship, taken by the Shia Endowment in 2019.  Kaka’i representatives also reported that the Sunni Endowment continued to occupy Kaka’i houses of worship in Kirkuk.

In October, Christian sources reported the ISF continued to occupy Christians’ houses in Talkayf District, Ninewa Province, and to repurpose them as military barracks.  The sources also reported that the ISF continued to use a youth center as a detention center for ISIS prisoners in Talkayf, intimidating Christians in the district.  In October, Mayor of Talkayf District Bassim Balo said civilians were concerned about the possibility that ISIS forces might attempt to break into the facility and free the ISIS detainees.  He said some Christians had decided to leave the area to avoid ISF searches and restrictions of movement on residents in the area.  According to Balo, the ISF used many houses belonging to Christians without compensating the residents.

According to the KRG MERA, a Zoroastrian temple opened in Erbil in December 2020 with the support of the KRG Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs was forced to close during the year because of lack of financial support from the Zoroastrian community to pay the monthly rent on the building.

The KRG Ministry of Education continued to fund religious instruction in schools for Muslim and Christian students.  The ministry also continued to fund Syriac-language public elementary and secondary schools, which were intended to accommodate Christian students.  The curriculum in these schools did not contain religious or Quranic studies.  In the IKR, there were 49 Syriac- and 18 Turkoman-language schools.

Christian religious education continued to be included in the curricula of at least 255 public schools in the country, including 55 in the KRG, according to the Ministry of Education.  Christian and Yezidi leaders outside the IKR reported continued discrimination in education and the lack of religious minority input on school curricula and language of instruction.  One Kaka’i leader reported an incident in December of a student in Erbil being pressured by her teacher in front of her classmates to convert to Islam.

During the year, minority NGOs together with the NGO Minority Alliance Network continued to hold seminars and workshops to discuss curriculum reform in IKR schools, again recommending amendments to the current curriculum to emphasize religious minority rights.  KRG State Minister for Component (Minority) Affairs Ayden Maroof reported the KRG Education Ministry was working to implement a pilot project with NGOs, including the Minority Alliance Network, to convey to students a thorough understanding of important social values that were complementary to Islamic studies in primary and intermediate schools.  Maroof said the project would later extend to high schools.

Private Islamic religious schools continued to operate in the country.  They had to obtain a license from the director general of private and public schools and pay annual fees.

The Catholic University in Erbil continued to operate with full accreditation from the KRG Ministry of Higher Education and remained open to students of all faiths.  During the year, the university was in the process of opening a medical school affiliated with the American University of Beirut and seeking required permission from the IKR.

According to a representative of the Yezidi NGO Yazda, national government and KRG authorities continued to discriminate against minorities, including Turkomans, Arabs, Yezidis, Shabak, and Christians, in territories claimed by both the KRG and the central government in the northern part of the country.  In October, Yazda representative Jameel Shumar said Yezidis still faced difficulties if they self-identified as Yezidis rather than as Kurdish Yezidis, especially at IKR checkpoints.  He said IKR authorities denied entry to the IKR of Yezidi politicians known for considering Yezidis a separate group from the Kurds and that only those Yezidis who identified publicly as Kurdish could obtain senior positions in the IKR leadership.  Kaka’i leaders also criticized a lack of representation in local KRG positions.

On June 22, former member of the Ninewa Provincial Council and member of the Yezidi Movement for Progress and Reform Khudaida Khalaf said KDP Peshmerga forces insulted Yezidi tribal leader Khalaf Omar Hamzi and his son while they were passing through checkpoints in Dohuk Province.  According to Khalaf, Peshmerga members asked Hamzi if he was Kurdish or Yezidi.  When he told them he was Yezidi, they shoved him and insulted his use of traditional dress.  Khalaf said these kinds of incidents happened frequently to Yezidis passing through Peshmerga checkpoints, especially to known Yezidi activists.

While there remained no legal bar to ministerial appointments for members of religious minority groups, in practice there were still few non-Muslims in the central government Council of Ministers or the KRG Council of Ministers, a situation unchanged from the previous three years.  Members of minority religious communities, including Christians, Yezidis, Kaka’i, and Sabean-Mandeans, continued to hold senior positions in the national parliament and central government – among them Minister of Displacement and Migration Evan Faiq Jabro, a Christian, and KRG Minister of Transportation Communication Ano Abdoka, a Syriac Orthodox Christian.  Several KRG district and subdistrict mayoral positions continued to be reserved for members of religious minority groups, in particular for Yezidis and Christians, and in May, the KRG elected Christian lawyer Muna Yukhna Yaqu to lead the Independent Human Rights Commission of the Kurdistan Region.  Minority leaders, however, said they were still underrepresented in government appointments, in elected positions outside the COR, and in public sector jobs, and that this overall underrepresentation limited members of minority groups’ access to government-provided economic opportunities.  On October 4, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani announced the KRG had elevated Ankawa, a predominantly Christian suburb of Erbil, to an “autonomous district” of Erbil Province to allow local leaders more administrative control, including the ability to nominate civic leaders, appoint officials, and manage security.

Although the IKP continued to reserve 11 seats for religious and ethnic minority candidates and the national COR reserved nine seats for religious and ethnic minority candidates, the law did not restrict who could vote in quota seat races.  Citing reports of Kurds voting for minority parties that aligned with major Kurdish parties, some members of the IKR’s minority populations said these votes undermined the intended purpose of the minority quota seats and diluted the voice of members of minority groups in government, while others opposed restricting who could vote in quota seat races.  Religious minority leaders, including Christians and Yezidis, also expressed their dissatisfaction with the election arrangements and their wish to restrict quota seats only to minority voters.  According to religious and ethnic minority leaders, particularly Christians and, to a lesser degree, Sabean-Mandeans, Shabak, and Faili Kurds, national-level politicians and parties and the IKR’s powerful political parties instructed non-Christian voters to vote for religious minority quota candidates loyal to the parties they wanted to win the October 10 parliamentary election, outvoting “legitimate” minority quota candidates.  Christian parliamentarians Rehan Hana and Yonadam Kanna and other minority representatives and religious leaders supported restricting quota seat races to voters of the same ethnicity and/or religion, while Christian parliamentarians affiliated with Shia political coalition parties drawing votes from Shia-majority provinces opposed imposing restrictions.

The COR was once again unable to pass a new law regulating the number and selection of judges following unexpected vacancies on the Federal Supreme Court bench beginning in late 2020.  In March, the COR amended existing legislation to replace the entire bench.  As a result, the only Christian judge on the court was removed, and a new position of Secretary General was created, which was filled by a different Christian judge.  Efforts to add Islamic jurists to the bench faced resistance from multiple parties in the COR, especially religious minorities, while some political analysts contended that every Iraqi judge was an Islamic jurist by virtue of his or her training in Islamic law.

On December 9, Cardinal Sako said the main obstacle to the consolidation of the democratic process in the country was the sectarian approach of political parties and the quota system, which designates seats in parliament along ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines, and which also applies to the distribution of positions in government institutions.  Sako said sectarianism fueled corruption, poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy, pointing out that the number of Christians in the country had fallen to fewer than 500,000, while it was more than 1.5 million before 2003.

Christians said they continued to face discrimination that limited their economic opportunities, such as PMF “taxation” on goods transported from Erbil or Mosul into the Ninewa Plain.  Sabean-Mandeans, Yezidis, and Christians continued to report fear of importing and distributing alcohol and spirits, despite receiving permits.  Christian, Yezidi, and Sabean-Mandean store owners, especially those operating with alcohol sales licenses, reported PMF militias blackmailed and attacked them.  The ban on alcohol consumption by Muslims, according to local sources, prevented Muslim store owners from applying for permits allowing them to carry and sell alcohol.  Community sources reported the continuing practice of Muslim businessmen using Christians as front men to apply for these permits and operate the stores.

Yezidi community leaders reported that the government continued to require Yezidi female captives of ISIS, who were repeatedly raped and bore children, to register those children as Muslims and convert to Islam themselves to obtain identification cards, passports, and other governmental services – in part because the Yezidi community did not consider these children to be Yezidi.  The Yezidi religion traditionally requires a child to have two Yezidi parents to be considered a member of the community.  According to political party Patriotic Union of Kurdistan COR parliamentarian Rezan Sheikh Dier, efforts to pass a law entitled “My name is my mother’s name” continued during the year.  If passed, the bill would allow a mother’s religion to be passed down to her child.  In August, IKR NGOs and artists launched a campaign to support the draft law, but they said media and some members of the community, especially more traditional Muslims, objected to the bill.

During the year, the NGOs Christian Aid Program Nohadra for Humanitarian Aid in Iraq (CAPNI) and the Hammurabi Human Rights Organization continued to seek amendments to the national identification card law requiring minor children to be listed as Muslim on the identification application form if one parent had converted to Islam.  The NGOs said the law was a “flagrant violation” of the rights on non-Muslims in the country.

In an October report on civil documentation, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that different patterns of rights violations emerged.  The report stated, “Sometimes, the right of IDPs and returnees to obtain documentation is deliberately denied by security actors, especially for persons with perceived affiliation to extremist groups, who are usually subjected to multiple requirements related to security clearance and to family denunciation processes.  In most cases, authorities are unable to effectively provide documentation due to limited operational resources dedicated to the Civil Affairs Directorates and to administrative regulations not being adapted to the specific situation of IDPs and returnees.”  This lack of access to documentation affected many IDPs, including those who were members of religious minorities, such as Yezidis and Christians.

On September 22, Muna Yako, head of the Independent Human Rights Commission in the IKR, called on the KRG, Christian churches, and human rights organizations to help a divorced Christian woman.  Yako reported that the woman’s husband had converted to Islam following their divorce, thereby automatically legally converting their 10-year-old son to Islam and giving the father custody.  Yako said IKR political parties did not consider these cases important and had not updated the relevant laws.  Former Christian MP, COR Speaker, and Advisor for Components Affairs Emad Youkhana said Christian politicians and churches often asked the IKP to amend the national identification card law, but he said politicians and leaders lacked the will to change laws.

According to Christian leaders, authorities continued to force Christian families formally registered as Muslim but privately practicing Christianity or another non-Islamic faith to either register their children as Muslims, or to have the children remain undocumented by federal authorities, thereby denying them the ability to legally convert from Islam.  They said that remaining undocumented affected the family’s eligibility for government benefits, such as school enrollment and ration card allocation for basic food items, which are determined by family size.  Larger families with legally registered children received higher allotments than those with undocumented children.  In November, media reported that a Christian woman said she had converted to Islam to obtain a divorce because it was difficult as a Christian to obtain church permission to divorce.  At the time of her conversion, her sons and daughters were minors.  When she tried to renew their official papers, she discovered that her children had also been converted to Islam by law.

Zoroastrian, Kaka’i, and Baha’i leaders again reported that their religion was listed as “Islam” on their federal identification cards, a common problem reported by members of unrecognized religious minority groups due to the country’s constitution and its personal status law.

Based on local media reports during the year, social recognition of the genocide that ISIS committed against the Yezidis continued to grow.  Cross-sectarian genocide commemoration events took place on August 3 for the fourth consecutive year.  On August 3, KRG Prime Minister Barzani issued a statement on the seventh anniversary of the genocide that said, “On this painful anniversary, the KRG will continue its efforts to return displaced Yezidi to their areas with dignity, and we are also working with the federal government and the international community on the reconstruction of Sinjar and the rest of the Yezidi areas.”  On August 3, Prime Minister Kadhimi said, “The Iraqi people are commemorating the seventh anniversary of the heinous crime of ISIS against our Yezidi people at the hands of ISIS.  The Yezidi portfolio is one of the government’s priorities.  The government will not spare any effort in supporting the Yezidi survivors and in preparing a government program for their rehabilitation, in addition to the government’s effort to return the IDPs to their areas and to provide all forms of assistance for the stability and reconstruction of their areas.”

On July 15, Yezidi MP Khaleda Khalil (KDP) stated that a group of political parties had worked to stop progress on a proposed law to help Yezidi survivors of ISIS in the COR for political reasons.  She said this delay was “on the pretext that they [the group of political parties] had mentioned the genocide in an article in the Yezidi Survivors’ Law as if the genocide of our people, the Yezidis, deserves nothing more than a mention in a few words that do not entail any legal action.”  In October 2020, Khalil submitted a bill to the Iraqi COR presidency to recognize the 2014 Yezidi killings as genocide, stating that the law would compel the government to take responsibility for the victims, strengthen accountability for those who committed crimes against humanity, and provide psychological and medical care as well as reparations to the victims and survivors of ISIS crimes.

During an August 16 visit to Ninewa Province as part of an initiative to encourage members of minority religious groups to remain in the country, Prime Minister Kadhimi renewed his calls to Iraqi Christians and other minorities abroad to return to the country and take part in rebuilding it.  Kadhimi also said Sinjar would shine in the country’s history as witness to the strength of Yezidis in the face of the brutality of ISIS terrorists.  According to Kadhimi, the government was working on implementing the Sinjar Agreement of October 2020, which, he promised, would facilitate reconstruction in the area and restore social cohesion in its communities.  He also stated the government was sparing no efforts to end the displacement of Yezidis and locate those still missing.

On January 25, Ammar al-Hakim, the head of the Hikma Trend political party, called for the voluntary return of all members of minorities to their respective areas of origin.  On July 2, al-Hakim stressed the importance of the ethnic and religious diversity in minority areas and the importance of imposing government control to ensure their safety.  After a January 25 meeting in Baghdad with the religious leader of the Sabean-Mandaean community, Sheikh Sattar Jabbar Helou, President Salih stated that Sabean-Mandeans were an essential part of the national social fabric.

Followers of recognized religious groups, including Baha’is (recognized only in the KRG) and Yezidis (recognized by both the central government and the KRG), reported the KRG allowed them to observe their religious holidays and festivals without interference or intimidation.  Provincial governments also continued to designate festivals as religious holidays in their localities.

Some militias in Ninewa continued to draw their members from local Yezidi and Christian communities but remained subordinate to larger organizations – the PKK in the case of the YBS (Sinjar Resistance Units), for example, and larger Iran-aligned militias in the cases of the 30th (Shabak) and 50th (Christian) PMF Brigades.  According to Yezidi and Christian officials, some militias continued to receive support from the central government in Baghdad through the PMC, which oversees PMF forces, while others received assistance from the KRG.  Representatives of religious minority groups, such as Yezidi and Sabean-Mandean parliamentarians, continued to state they sought a role in their own security and had requested government support to create armed groups from their own communities.  Others asked to join regular law enforcement units, but by year’s end, none had done so because the government had not implemented a recruitment process.

In October 2020, the central government and KRG reached an agreement on cooperation with the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq on a framework for the security and political administration of Sinjar District, as well as forming a joint committee from the central government and KRG to reconstruct Sinjar with the local administration of Ninewa Province.  Yezidi leaders and community members criticized the agreement, saying they did not have enough involvement in the negotiations and remained apprehensive about the progress of implementation.  On July 18, former Ninewa Provincial Council Speaker Sedo Jato and a Yezidi MP representing the KDP in Sinjar said, “Ten months after signing the Sinjar Agreement between the Iraqi government and IKR government under UN supervision, only one aspect of the agreement has been implemented:  recruiting new Yezidi and Arab residents into the Sinjar police.”  Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert characterized the implementation as “slow” in an August 30 statement and called on the central government, KRG, and concerned parties in Sinjar to be more serious in implementing the agreement because it was in the best interest of the residents of Sinjar District, Ninewa Province, and of all Iraqis.  On August 30, National Security Adviser Qassem al-Araji announced that the government had formed a security force for Sinjar District in northern Ninewa Province composed of 2,500 local citizens, as required by the Sinjar Agreement.  According to the head of the Sinjar Council, Falah Hassan, however, the force had not yet deployed as of year’s end.  Yezidi leaders and activists cited the lack of progress in implementing the plan or improving the security situation in Sinjar as major impediments to the ability of internally displaced Yezidis to return to their homes.

In March, during the first papal visit to the country, Pope Francis met with Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and conducted Christian and interfaith ceremonies in Baghdad, Mosul, and the IKR.  Christian and other religious and ethnic minority leaders stated the visit helped raise the profile of Christian issues in the country and the importance of its religious diversity.  Prime Minister Kadhimi applauded Pope Francis’ visit as a great success and called on the Iraqi people and others to form a dialogue of understanding and tolerance.  “The Pope’s message reached all over the world as he travelled with a heart full of hope in the beloved cities of Iraq.  Our people’s message reached all the peoples of the earth,” Kadhimi said.

The Sunni and Shia endowments continued to accept Hajj applications from the public and submit them to the Supreme Council for the Hajj.  The council, attached to the OPM, organized a lottery to select pilgrims for official Hajj visas.  Lottery winners paid differing amounts to the government depending on their mode of travel for the Hajj, 3.7 million dinars ($2,500) by land and 4.8 million dinars ($3,300) by air.  In the IKR, the KRG MERA organized Hajj and Umrah travel, administering a lottery to choose the pilgrims for official Hajj visas allotted to the IKR and coordinating flights and visas with outside authorities.

According to Colonel Muhammad Khalil al-Baziin, the Salah al-Din Province police commander, on July 30, ISIS gunmen attacked a Sunni funeral gathering in the village of al-Boujili, in the town of Yathrib, in Salah al-Din Province, killing 10 civilians and three policemen, and wounding more than 40 others.  According to family members of the victims, the PMF’s Shia-dominant AAH-associated 42nd Brigade was responsible for the attack, not ISIS.

On May 9, Yonan Youkhana, the school principal of Chelak village and a member of the Assyrian Democratic Movement, said dozens of families in majority-Christian Chelak village in Dohuk Province had fled their homes due to Turkish airstrikes on PKK units near the village.  An international NGO, Christian Peacemaker Teams, reported in June that airstrikes injured civilians living in the border regions with Turkey, and more than 1,500 persons from 22 villages evacuated their villages.

According to Yezidi activists and officials, Yezidis continued to be afraid to return to Sinjar because of continuing Turkish airstrikes targeting the PKK that occurred in August, September, and December.  In August, Turkish airstrikes targeted a public medical facility in Sinjar District used by Yezidi fighters affiliated with the PKK, a group also known as the People’s Protection Units or YBS, reportedly killing and wounding many Yezidi civilians.  Another Turkish airstrike the same month targeted a vehicle reportedly belonging to the PKK inside the city of Sinjar (west of Ninewa Province), killing YBS leader Saeed Husain Saeed and two of his companions and injuring two others.  On September 3, security sources said a Turkish airstrike targeted a YBS checkpoint near Sinjar Mountain in Sinjar District, wounding a YBS member.  Yezidis there protested the presence of the PKK and called for its expulsion as a means of ending Turkish military operations in their district.  On December 7, a Turkish airstrike in Khanasor killed a YBS commander, Marwan Badal.  On December 11, a Turkish airstrike struck a YBS-linked building in Khanasor, with no casualties reported.

In January and May, the Yezidi community in Sinjar District reported that the PKK had kidnapped hundreds of Yezidi children from Sinjar and the al-Hol camp in Syria and subject then to ideological “brainwashing” since the group had assumed control of parts of the area in 2015, with the aim of recruiting them.  It was unclear how many of the kidnappings occurred during the year, although the KRG reported more than 400 persons had been kidnapped since the PKK took control of Sinjar in 2015.

On June 7, the head of the Yezidi Council in Sinjar, Falah Hasan, said two Yezidi Peshmerga fighters from Sinjar (deployed in Dohuk), Fero Merza Osman and Badal Amen Osman, went missing on June 6 while they were visiting their families in the Khanasor housing complex in Sinjar District.  Hasan said that according to their families, the PKK captured both of them.  Haidar Shasho, commander of the Yezidkhan Protection Forces (Yezidi Peshmerga), said he assumed that the PKK had taken the men for political reasons, as part of the PKK’s conflict with the KDP.

In October, head of the Iraqi Turkoman Front Hasan Toran reported that the PKK continued to recruit Turkomans from Telafar.  He said that although these newly recruited PKK members were not very active, they received $300-$500 in salary monthly.  According to Turkoman sources, PKK Shia Turkoman members had shared interests with Iran-backed Shia PMF militias in Telefa, and the PKK and PMF worked together in Sinjar District, using these areas as a road to link Iran and Syria and to alter the demographics in favor of Shia Turkomans.

In a July 4 statement, Sinjar Mayor Mahma Khalil, a Yezidi affiliated with the KDP, accused the PKK of stealing from Yezidi farmers and business owners in Sinjar, in addition to conducting kidnappings.

The AAH militia built an office in Bartella.  Reportedly, the 50th “Babylon” Brigade in Batnaya and Tal Kayf continued to control the local real estate market, selling land to non-Christians from outside the district, granting questionable security approvals, and taking bribes, as well as continuing to control trade routes in the Ninewa Plain through checkpoints, forcing Christian merchants to pay bribes to gain access.

During the year, officials found at least 10 mass graves containing victims of al-Qa’ida, ISIS, and the Baathist regime, with more than 210 discovered since 2003.  On June 2, the Director General of the Department of Victims of Terrorism and Military Operations in the GOI’s Martyrs Foundation, Tariq al-Mandalawi, announced that the Department of Mass Graves had opened more than 203 of these graves since 2003, many of them in Salah al-Din, Najaf, Karbala, Samawah, and Ninewa, and on the outskirts of Baghdad.  He added that work was underway in cooperation with international teams to document the bodies and examine them in the Ministry of Health to compare DNA results of the remains with families.  According to UNITAD, work with international teams to exhume and identify the remains would likely take years.

KRG MERA’s Office of Yezidi Affairs and the government’s Martyrs’ Foundation in Baghdad reported that as of November, authorities had found a total of 90 mass graves, in addition to dozens of individual grave sites containing the bodies of more than 2,500 Yezidis, in Sinjar District and other predominantly Yezidi areas of Ninewa Province since 2014.  Of these, they had exhumed 17, each containing the remains of three to 25 individuals.  On January 13, the official spokesman for the Council of Notables of Iraq and Salah al-Din Province, Tami al-Majma’i, said a mass grave was found in Ishaqi District, south of Salah al-Din, containing more than 50 bodies.  Al-Majma’i accused AAH-affiliated militias that controlled the area after its liberation from ISIS of being behind the disappearances of residents.  On May 29, the director of the Mass Graves Affairs and Protection Department in the central government’s Martyrs Foundation, Diaa al-Saadi, said his department had begun excavating a mass grave containing the remains of 600 victims of ISIS in Mosul.  On June 6, the GOI’s Martyrs Foundation announced the discovery of a new mass grave in the eastern province of Diyala containing mostly Shia victims of the Baath regime.  On September 10, security forces discovered a mass grave of Sunni ISIS victims in Heet District of Anbar Province, in the west of the country.  The Kocho community of Sinjar, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Nadia Murad’s hometown, reburied 41 Yezidi victims (26 men and 15 women) of the ISIS massacre of their town identified from mass grave exhumations on December 9.  The reburial was the second in Kocho, the first being in February for 104 victims.

There were continued reports of societal violence by sectarian armed groups across the country except in the IKR.  Although media and human rights organizations said security conditions in many parts of the country continued to improve, reports of societal violence, mainly by pro-Iran Shia militias, continued.  Members of non-Muslim minority groups reported abductions, threats, pressure, and harassment to force them to observe Islamic customs.  Many Shia religious and government leaders continued to urge PMF volunteers not to commit these abuses.  Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

The KRG reported that ISIS forces killed one Kaka’i during the year and that there were several attacks and raids of villages in the territories whose control is disputed by the national government and the KRG.  Although Kaka’i human rights activists did not report any serious attacks by ISIS during the year, they said fear of future attacks and a feeling of general insecurity caused Kaka’i members to evacuate several towns in Diyala and Kirkuk Provinces.

Sources in the Yezidi community estimated the number of children born of Yezidi mothers and ISIS fathers ranged from several dozen to several hundred.  Yezidi leaders said societal stigma made it difficult to obtain accurate numbers.  According to Yezidi sources, Yezidi leaders had excommunicated some Yezidi women who had children born of sexual violence by Muslim men when the women were captives of ISIS.  Due to the position of Yezidi leaders and many in the community that children born of rape were neither welcomed nor recognized as Yezidis, also the case under Iraqi law, many female Yezidi survivors of ISIS said they were compelled to leave their children in orphanages in Syria or Iraq so they could rejoin their community.  According to Yezidi sources, these children were also under threat of honor and retribution killings.  Many Yezidis feared that the children would grow up radicalized due to the possibility of their exposure to radicalization in IDP camps or informal settlement areas and because they had experienced rejection.  Some of the women said they preferred to stay in the camps’ harsh environment with their children rather than leave them behind

On June 8, a delegation of primarily Sunni faculty from the University of Ninewa College of Law visited Yezidi IDPs living in the Shariya camp in Dohuk Province to observe conditions and provide moral support as a gesture of Sunni solidarity with the Yezidis after 400 tents burned down.  On June 14, the General Secretariat of the Imam Hussein Holy Shrine announced the dispatch of relief materials to Yezidi IDP families in Shariya camp, at the direction of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Sheikh Abdul-Mahdi al-Karbalai.

Christians in the south and in PMF-controlled towns on the Ninewa Plain, as well as Sabean-Mandeans in Basrah, Dhi Qar, and Maysan Provinces, reported they continued to avoid celebrating their religious festivals when these observances coincided with Shia Islamic periods of mourning, such as Ashura.  There were continued reports that members of non-Muslim minority groups felt pressured by the Muslim majority to adhere to certain Islamic practices, such as wearing the hijab or fasting during Ramadan.  Non-Shia Muslims and non-Muslim women said they continued to feel societal pressure to wear hijabs and all-black clothing during Muharram, particularly during Ashura, to avoid harassment.  According to representatives of Christian NGOs, some Muslims continued to threaten women and girls, regardless of their religious affiliation, for refusing to wear the hijab, for dressing in Western-style clothing, or for not adhering to strict interpretations of Islamic norms governing public behavior.  Outside the IKR, numerous women, including Christians and Sabean-Mandeans, said they opted to wear the hijab after experiencing continual harassment.

On November 28, Maysan police reported an individual threw an improvised explosive device at a Christian family house in Maysan Province, Amara City, causing material losses but no casualties.  According to press reports, the family had a liquor license and sold alcohol from their house.  Maysan Province police issued a statement saying the reason for the attack was not to affect demographic change or based on ethnic grounds, but rather due to commercial rivalry.  On November 29, Namer Slewa the Christian owner of the house, told media that unlicensed but influential Muslim alcohol sellers planned the attack to run Slewa out of business.  According to Slewa, this was the third time the same business rivals had attacked him, adding that on one occasion, they injured his employees.

On October 19, Basher Shemoon, a Christian member of the Ninewa Plain elders’ council, reported that Shabak Shia had raised religious banners and pictures throughout the city of Bartella, including on the ancient Christian Church of the 40 Martyrs, blocking all the streets inside the city.  He said the actions were part of an effort to intimidate Christian residents during a Shia ceremony.

In October, head of the interreligious Masarat Foundation for Cultural and Media Development Saad Salloum said institutes training religious leaders and journalists had begun using a curriculum focused on understanding the country’s different religions as part of a three-year pilot program prior to the curriculum’s adoption for use in public schools.  Salloum said the Masarat Foundation was also establishing a news agency dedicated to diversity publications and that the foundation’s research on hate speech had revealed an overall reduction of such speech against minorities.  The foundation was created in 2020 with the goal of developing a special curriculum for understanding different religions in the country, to be taught through the Iraqi Institute for Religious Diversity.  Founded by religious leaders, academics, and civil society activists in 2019, the Iraqi Institute for Religious Diversity continued to develop curricula on Christianity, Yazidism, Sabean-Mandeanism, Judaism, the Baha’i Faith, Zoroastrianism, and Kaka’ism.

In a lecture posted on YouTube on April 10, Shia scholar Sheikh Saad al-Mudaris said, “Jews are pleased with Charles Darwin’s theory that mankind is descended from apes, since this removes their shame of being descendants of those whom Allah had turned into apes and pigs.”  He said Jews spread Darwinism around the world and that they used their money to force universities and institutes to spread the theory.

The embassy addressed at the highest levels a full range of religious freedom concerns in the country through frequent meetings with senior government officials, including with Prime Minister Kadhimi.  Issues raised included the presence of undisciplined armed groups in minority areas and creating conditions for the safe and voluntary return of displaced populations.  Messages of promoting religious freedom and tolerance were reinforced through public speeches, and embassy interagency coordination groups promoted religious and ethnic minority community stabilization and humanitarian assistance.  The Ambassador and other embassy and consulate officials continued to meet regularly with national and regional ministries of education, justice, labor, and social affairs, and the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights.  They also met with members of parliament, parliamentary committees, and minority group representatives serving in government positions to emphasize the need for full inclusion of members of religious minority groups and the protection of their rights.

The embassy and consulate used social media platforms to highlight meetings with civil society, including religious and interfaith community leaders, and promote messages of respect for religious diversity and U.S. support for religious and ethnic minority communities.  The bilateral Strategic Dialogue held in Washington, D.C. in July provided additional opportunities to advance religious freedom and highlight the need for outreach to the country’s vulnerable religious and ethnic minority communities.  In October, the Department of State signed a statement authored by the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance expressing support for missing Yezidi women and children.

Embassy efforts continued to center on identifying the most pressing concerns of members of religious minority groups – insecurity, lack of civil documentation, lack of employment, harassment by Iran-aligned militias, and road closures – and obtaining government and KRG commitments to assist in addressing these concerns.  Efforts included promoting the recruitment of members of minority groups into security forces operating on the Ninewa Plain.  UNITAD and the embassy also engaged with Yezidis, the KRG, the central government, and other organizations and groups to coordinate efforts to ensure that exhumations of Yezidi mass graves were performed to international standards and to coordinate U.S.-funded mental health and psychosocial support programs for survivors.

The U.S. government continued to develop, finance, and manage projects to support all religious communities, with special emphasis on assistance to IDPs and returnees.  U.S. government humanitarian assistance efforts, including in areas with religious minority populations, provided critical shelter, essential healthcare, emergency food assistance, protection services such as gender-based violence response, and water, sanitation, and hygiene services.  It also promoted access to civil documentation and legal services, improved the capacity of health care facilities, and increased access to education and livelihood opportunities.

The Ambassador, the Consul General in Erbil, and other senior embassy officials made regular visits to minority areas to meet with community leaders, religious leaders, and local and provincial authorities to underscore U.S. support for their communities, hear their concerns, particularly regarding security and protection, and to assess the needs and challenges they continued to face.  Embassy officials also met with Yezidi, Christian, Shabak, Turkoman, Jewish, Sabean-Mandean, Kaka’i, Baha’i, Zoroastrian, and other religious and minority leaders to encourage reconciliation within their communities.  The U.S. government made efforts through implementing partners, including faith-based partners, to increase awareness throughout the country of religious and ethnic minority issues, as well as to engage the diaspora.  For example, the embassy and consulate general supported a virtual reality exhibition in Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, Dohuk, and Baghdad, and at the COR to raise awareness of ISIS crimes against religious and ethnic minority communities in Sinjar.

In the Ninewa Plain and Sinjar, U.S. government officials and staff worked with an additional 47 local organizations, including many faith-based organizations, to provide assistance for recovery, including economic, health, legal, and social cohesion services to minority religious communities in the northern part of the country.  The U.S. government continued to rebuild critical infrastructure to restore essential services, while also rebuilding heavily damaged and destroyed shelters in religious and ethnic minority communities.

During the year, the U.S. government awarded $1 million to support three local faith-based organizations in their efforts to preserve their communities’ cultural heritage, including digitization of ancient religious manuscripts and texts, and documentation of oral histories.  The embassy funded efforts to help Yezidi survivors of the Kocho massacre in Sinjar to rebuild their lives, including through the establishment of “New Kocho” village and memorials in Kocho and Solagh, the latter a mass grave site commonly known as the “mothers’ cemetery.”  The U.S. government also expanded programs in the Ninewa Plain that focused on building mutual tolerance, trust, and understanding among youth of diverse religious backgrounds while increasing income generation.

U.S. officials in Baghdad and Erbil continued to have regular discussions with government officials, endowment leaders, UN officials, and other nations’ embassies about coordinating international assistance to IDPs and recent returnees to address problems identified by members of religious groups.

In September, the U.S. government returned to the Republic of Iraq a rare cuneiform tablet bearing a portion of the Epic of Gilgamesh, a Sumerian poem with religious themes considered one of the world’s oldest works of literature.  On September 23, the Smithsonian Institution’s Museum of the American Indian in Washington, D.C held a repatriation ceremony for the tablet, with Department of State officials in attendance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.2 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2016 census, the most recent, the population is approximately 78 percent Roman Catholic, 3 percent Church of Ireland (Anglican), 1 percent Muslim, 1 percent Orthodox Christian (including Greek, Russian, and Coptic Orthodox), 1 percent unspecified Christian, and 2 percent other religious groups, while 10 percent stated no religious affiliation, and 3 percent did not specify their religion.  There are small numbers of Presbyterians, Hindus, Apostolic Pentecostals, Pentecostals, and Jews.  The census estimates the Jewish population at 2,500.  The number of Christians and Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa, Muslims from North Africa and the Middle East, Muslims and Hindus from South Asia, and Orthodox Christians from Eastern Europe continues to grow, especially in larger urban areas.  NGOs such as Atheist Ireland and the Humanists Association of Ireland said the census overestimates religious affiliation by asking “What is your religion?” which they said was a leading question.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the free profession and practice of religion, subject to public order and morality.  The constitution references “the Most Holy Trinity” and “our divine Lord, Jesus Christ,” and stipulates the state shall hold the name of God in reverence and honor and respect religion.  The constitution requires the President, judges, and members of the Council of State to swear a religious oath, which begins with a reference to “Almighty God.”  It prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief and states, “The State guarantees not to endow any religion.”

The constitution stipulates every religious denomination has the right to manage its own affairs, own and acquire property, and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes.  It prohibits the diversion of property of any religious denomination except for necessary works of public utility and upon payment of compensation.  The constitution states legislation providing for government aid to schools shall not discriminate among schools under the management of different religious denominations nor affect the right of a child to attend any school receiving public money without attending religious instruction at that school.

A “statement of truth” may be used in civil proceedings in place of affidavits and statutory declarations sworn on a religious oath.  The document must contain a statement that the person making the statement of truth has an honest belief that the stated facts are true.  Religious oaths and affirmations are still required when a witness is giving oral evidence in court.  The statement of truth may not be used in criminal proceedings.

The law forbids incitement of others to hatred based on religion, among other categories, and carries a maximum penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of 25,400 euros ($28,800).  The law does not address or define hate crimes other than incitement of others, although a hate motive is an aggravating factor that judges may take into account on a discretionary basis at sentencing for any criminal offense.

There is no legal requirement for religious groups to register with the government, nor is there any formal mechanism for government recognition of a religious group.  Religious groups may apply to the Office of the Revenue Commissioners (the tax authority) as a charity to receive tax exemptions, and the groups must operate exclusively for charitable purposes, which under the law may include “the advancement of religion.”  The law requires all charitable organizations carrying out activities in the country to register with and provide certain information relating to their organization to the Charities Regulator, a government-appointed independent authority.  The regulator maintains a public register of charitable organizations and ensures their compliance with the law.  Organizations must apply their income and property solely toward the promotion of their main charitable object, as set out in their governing instruments (such as a constitution, memorandum and articles of association, deed of trust, or rules).

Under the law, individual medical professionals may opt out of participating in certain legal procedures, such as abortion, on conscience grounds; however, institutions may not refuse to perform such procedures.

Under the constitution, the Department of Education provides funding to privately owned and managed primary schools – most of which are affiliated with religious groups, particularly the Catholic Church – referred to as “national schools” or simply as primary schools.  Most children receive their elementary-level education at these privately owned schools.  The government pays most of the building and administrative costs, teachers’ salaries, and a set amount per pupil.

Denominational schools are under the patronage of a single religious community.  They provide religious education according to traditions, practices, and beliefs of the specified religious community.  Interdenominational schools are under the patronage or trusteeship of more than one faith community.  Such schools provide for a variety of religious education opportunities.  There are also two types of multidenominational schools at the primary school level:  schools that do not provide religious education as formation during the school day, but do provide education about religions and beliefs (parents/guardians may arrange for denominational religious education outside school hours in such schools); and schools that provide education about religions and also provide some faith formation for different denominations, depending on parental requests, during the school day.

Ninety percent of all national schools are Catholic, 6 percent Church of Ireland, 2 percent multidenominational, 1 percent other religious groups, and 1 percent not religiously affiliated.  Patrons, who are usually members of the religious groups and affiliated with religious organizations with which the school is associated, manage the schools themselves or appoint a board of management to do so.  Patrons often provide land for schools and contribute to building and administrative costs.

By law, Catholic national schools are not allowed to discriminate on religious grounds when making admissions decisions.  According to the law, national schools under the patronage of other religious groups may discriminate in admissions on religious grounds to preserve their distinct religious identities, but only in schools that are oversubscribed.  The law prohibits discrimination in admissions based on religious beliefs in secondary schools.

In funding schools, the constitution stipulates the state shall have due regard “for the rights of parents, especially in the matter of religious and moral formation.”  The government permits but does not require religious instruction, faith-based classes, or general religion classes in national schools.  Although religious instruction is part of the curriculum of most schools, parents may exempt their children from such instruction.  Religious schools teach about their religion while multidenominational schools generally teach about religion in a broader context.  Students may opt out and sit in a classroom where religious instruction is not being conducted.  The Catholic Church certifies teachers of religion classes in Catholic schools.

Approximately half of secondary schools are religiously affiliated.  The government funds religiously affiliated secondary schools.

Vocational schools are state run and nondenominational.

The WRC hears cases of reported workplace discrimination, including claims based on religion.  The WRC may refer cases for mediation, investigate these cases, or decide the case itself.  If the adjudicating officer finds there has been discrimination, he or she can order compensation for the effects of discrimination and/or corrective action.  Litigants may appeal WRC decisions in the courts.

The Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC) is an independent public body accountable to parliament whose stated purpose is to protect and promote human rights and equality and to build a culture of respect for human rights, including religious freedom.  The commission works at the policy level to review the effectiveness of human rights and equality law, as well as public policy and practice.  It also works with communities, including religious and other civil society groups, to monitor and report on the public’s experience of human rights, religious freedom, and equality.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

From January until May, the government suspended all in-person religious services as part of COVID-19 mitigation measures that also applied to nonreligious venues, although churches remained open for private prayer, and up to 25 attendees were allowed for weddings and funerals.  Church representatives generally supported the ban, although some said it was inconsistent to ban religious services but keep certain businesses open.  Media reported that on March 17 (St. Patrick’s Day), Archbishop of Dublin Dermot Farrell in a homily called on authorities “to give assurance that the legitimate desire of people to gather responsibly and within reasonable guidelines to exercise their constitutional right to worship will be prioritized in the easing of restrictions.”  In March, police fined a priest 500 euros ($570) for holding a public Mass in violation of restrictions on public gatherings.

Media reported that on April 15, Taoiseach Micheal Martin met Catholic bishops to discuss COVID-19 mitigation measures, which retired Archbishop of Dublin Diarmuid Martin described as “draconian.”  As of May 10, up to 50 persons could attend religious events, and as of September 6, religious ceremonies could take place with 50 percent of normal capacity.  On September 10, the Irish Times reported Archbishop of Armagh Eamon Martin, head of the Catholic Church of Ireland, expressed “deep frustration” with the “dismissive manner” in which the government announced restrictions during the summer.  On October 22, the government lifted all restrictions on attendance.

School patrons, generally affiliated with religious denominations, continued to define the ethos of schools and to determine the development and implementation of the religious education curriculum in primary schools.  Curricula varied by school and could include teaching about the patron’s religion, the religious history of the country, or an overview of world religions.  Atheist Ireland continued to criticize the government for primarily delivering moral formation through religion and not offering students moral education outside of religion classes.

Atheist Ireland and the media continued to report incidents of school authorities giving preferential treatment, such as homework exemptions, to students in national Catholic schools that engaged in activities such as singing in religious choirs or performing altar services in church.  There were continued reports that some school authorities told parents that, contrary to law, their children could not opt out of religion classes.

The government facilitated patrons’ efforts to open more schools with multidenominational patronage.  Thirteen new multidenominational national schools opened during the year as part of the government’s plan, announced in 2018, to facilitate the establishment of 42 schools – 26 primary and 16 secondary – from 2019-2022.  The Department of Education said it considered parental preferences and projected demand when deciding which patrons would be allowed to sponsor the new schools.  A separate process, the “Schools Reconfiguration for Diversity,” continued, with the aim of accelerating the creation of multidenominational and nondenominational schools in the country, in line with parental preference and the government’s stated commitment to having a total of 400 multidenominational or nondenominational schools by 2030, out of approximately 3,300 public schools in the country.

In accordance with a 2011 government initiative to create more diversity and inclusiveness in the primary school system through a combination of divestment and construction of new schools, eight transfers of patronage took place during the 2019/2020 school year – three schools from Catholic patronage, two from Church of Ireland patronage, and three multidenominational Steiner (aka Waldorf) schools.  All were transferred to the Education and Training Board (ETB).  The ETB manages and operates coeducational, multidenominational national schools, post-primary schools, and further education colleges.

In rural areas, parents continued to report finding non-Catholic national schools was difficult.

Catholic religious orders remained affiliated with 20 of the country’s 45 hospitals.

Several state agencies, including IHREC, WRC, and the police’s National Diversity and Integration Unit (GNDIU), continued to enforce equality legislation and work on behalf of minority religious groups.  According to GNDIU representatives, GNDIU’s liaison officers continued to engage regularly with immigrant minority religious groups to inform them of police services and to educate them on their rights.  These groups included the Cavan Cross Cultural Community, Dublin City Interfaith Forum, Federation for Victim Assistance, Garda Traveller advisory group, and Immigrant Council of Ireland.

Police continued to implement the 2019-21 Diversity and Integration Strategy, with the stated aim of protecting all minorities and diverse groups (including religious groups) in society, although sources said progress was hampered by COVID-19 restrictions.  The strategy focused on improving the identification, reporting, investigation, and prosecution of hate crimes.  It introduced a working definition of hate crime for the police; emphasized human rights as a foundation for providing policing services; and initiated diversity, integration, and hate crime training within the police.  The strategy defined a hate crime as “any criminal offense which is perceived by the victim or any other person to, in whole or in part, be motivated by hostility or prejudice, based on actual or perceived age, disability, race, color, nationality, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation or gender.”  The police’s official website further clarified, “Religion includes ‘non-believers’.”

NGOs, including the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, Immigrant Council of Ireland, Anti-Racism Network Ireland, National Steering Group Against Hate Crime, and European Network Against Racism Ireland, as well as IHREC, again advocated better monitoring of hate crimes, including religiously motivated incidents, legislation against hate crimes, more stringent laws against hate speech, and action to ensure authorities took prejudice into account as an aggravating factor in sentencing criminals.

In April, the government introduced hate crime legislation, which was pending before parliament at year’s end, to establish a category of hate crimes and impose a heavier penalty on an offender whose commission of a relevant offense was accompanied by a hate motive against an individual based on numerous factors, including religion.  There was broad support for the legislation among NGOs.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

In November, parliamentarian Boyd Barrett from the People Before Profit Party representing Dun Laoghaire, referring to the IHRA’s non-legally binding Working Definition of Antisemitism, said on the floor of the Dail that while “we must absolutely commemorate the Holocaust and insist that it never ever happens again,” Ireland should not sign up to a definition of antisemitism that was not allowed to question Israel’s right to exist, when it was a “racist apartheid state.”  He added it was unacceptable that those who “question the right of… an apartheid state to exist” were labeled antisemites.  Thomas Byrne, Minister of State for European Affairs, afterwards urged parliamentarians to avoid injecting the Israel-Palestinian conflict into discussions of antisemitism.

On January 24, Taoiseach Martin and other senior government officials participated in the national Holocaust Day Memorial commemoration.  In his remarks, Martin affirmed “unequivocally and publicly, Ireland’s absolute commitment to Holocaust remembrance and to fighting the ugly scourge of antisemitism and racism.”  Hazel Chu, Lord Mayor of Dublin, said people in the city “feel privileged to be among survivors of the Holocaust and descendants of survivors who have made Dublin and Ireland their home.”  The NGO Holocaust Education Trust Ireland, in association with the Department of Justice, Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration, and Dublin City Council, organized the virtual event, which included readings, survivors’ remembrances, and music, as well as the lighting of six candles symbolizing the six million Jews killed in the Holocaust.

The NGO Irish Network Against Racism recorded 334 incidents of hate speech involving race and religion in 2020, of which 69 targeted Muslims and 23 targeted Jews.  In one case, housemates subjected one Muslim man to theft, abuse, and harassment over a period of months.  The principal at one community college used explicitly anti-Muslim slurs against Muslim students.  The NGO recorded nine incidents of discrimination against Muslims in access to goods and services but did not give details.  It stated that most victims of religious discrimination and racist incidents did not report them to the police.

In October, researcher David Collier published a report on antisemitism in the country that documented antisemitic content posted online by members of the Dail and members of the public.  The author stated that most of this content occurred in the context of criticizing Israeli policies, but it also contained Holocaust denial and antisemitic tropes about Jews controlling world finance.  The report included numerous examples of politicians and members of the public sharing social media posts from other sources that contained Holocaust denial, “Zionist” conspiracy theories, and antisemitic tropes.  In his report, Collier stated, “It seems accurate to suggest that antisemitism is driving their [politicians’ and anti-Israel activists’] obsessive anti-Israel activity.”  Collier recommended that Ireland, which is a member of the IHRA, adopt IHRA’s non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism.

The WRC reported it received 30 complaints of employment discrimination based on religion or belief in 2020, compared with 36 in 2019.

On July 20, approximately 500 Muslims performed prayers to mark Eid al-Adha in Dublin’s Croke Park.  Shaykh Umar al-Qadri, chair of the Irish Muslim Peace and Integration Council, organized the event, which, as in 2020, was held outdoors due to COVID-19 restrictions, in cooperation with the Gaelic Athletic Association.  Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish community leaders, as well as members of government, attended.

U.S. embassy officials discussed issues of discrimination and the integration of religious minorities into the community with the government.  Embassy officials also met with representatives of religious groups, secularist advocates, and NGOs to discuss their concerns regarding religious tolerance, secularism, and religion in the national school system.

The country’s laws and Supreme Court rulings protect the freedoms of conscience, faith, religion, and worship, regardless of an individual’s religious affiliation.  The 1992 Basic Law:  Human Dignity and Liberty describes the country as a “Jewish and democratic state.”  The 2018 Basic Law:  Israel – The Nation State of the Jewish People determines, according to the government, that “the Land of Israel is the historical homeland of the Jewish people; the State of Israel is the nation state of the Jewish People, in which it realizes its natural, cultural, religious and historical right to self-determination; and exercising the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish People.”  In September, the Lod District Court sentenced Zion Cohen to three years in prison for carrying out a series of 2020 arson bombings of religious courts.  On June 9, according to press reports, police arrested 12 protesters who threw heavy objects towards them in a protest by a small ultra-Orthodox sect near Bar-Ilan Street in Jerusalem against the construction of part of the city’s light rail through an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood.  Clashes broke out in April and May with “Day of Rage” demonstrations throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem against Israeli actions in Sheikh Jarrah, the Damascus Gate, and the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem.  On April 13, on the evening of the first day of Ramadan, media and officials from the Jordanian Waqf in Jerusalem, which administers the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, reported that the Israeli National Police entered the site and disconnected loudspeakers used for the call to prayer after the Waqf’s call to prayer disrupted an official Memorial Day service for fallen soldiers attended by Israeli President Reuven Rivlin in the adjacent Western Wall Plaza.  During the last Friday of Ramadan on May 7 and again on May 10, Israeli police entered the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount using teargas, stun grenades, and rubber tipped bullets to disperse Palestinians they said were throwing rocks.  While the government stated it was rare for any individual to be barred entry to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, human rights and civil society organizations said Israeli authorities periodically banned individual Palestinian residents of the occupied territories, and Arab/Palestinian and Jewish citizens of Israel from the site.  The government reiterated that non-Islamic prayer was not allowed on the grounds of the site, but non-Muslim visitors were allowed.  Some religious minority groups said the police were not interested in investigating attacks on members of their communities.  The Chief Rabbinate continued not to recognize as Jewish some citizens who self-identified as Jewish, including Reform and Conservative converts to Judaism and others who could not prove Jewish matrilineage to the satisfaction of the Chief Rabbinate.  As a result, the government prohibited those individuals from accessing official Jewish marriage, divorce, and burial services in the country.  Some Jewish individuals and groups performed religious acts such as prayers and prostration on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount despite the longstanding historical norms against overt non-Islamic prayer there.  On July 8, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 10-to-one, rejected 15 petitions challenging the Basic Law of Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (Nation State law).  The government maintained its policy of not accepting new applications for official recognition from religious groups but stated that members of unrecognized religious groups remained free to practice their religion.  Members of some religious minorities said that the government did not provide the same service and benefits to them as to the country’s majority Jewish population.

During a one-week period in May, amid tensions in Jerusalem and violence in Gaza, ethnic-based violence and civil unrest broke out in a number of mixed Jewish-Arab cities in the country, leading to multiple deaths and injuries.  The violence during the unrest included gunfire, stone throwing by protesters (both Jewish and Arab/Palestinian citizens), arson attacks on synagogues, desecration of Muslim gravestones, and vandalism of automobiles.  The Israel National Police (INP) made approximately 1,550 arrests during and after the unrest with the overwhelming majority of the arrestees being Arab/Palestinian citizens.  On May 12 in the mixed Jewish-Arab town of Lod, Jews shot and killed Moussa Hassouna in clashes between residents.  Later on May 12, Arab/Palestinian citizens in Lod stoned the car of Jewish resident Yigal Yehoshua who died on May 17 after being hit in the head with a thrown brick.  In the northern city of Acre on May 11, Arab/Palestinian citizens set fire to a hotel leading to the death of 84 year-old retiree Aby Har-Even on June 6.  On May 19, teenager Mohammed Mahamid Kiwan died after he was shot on May 18 at the Mei Ami junction on Route 65.  His family said police were responsible.  In April, during the period leading up to the unrest, Palestinian youths in Jerusalem physically attacked ultra-Orthodox individuals and posted videos of the attacks on the social media app TikTok.  On July 1, police arrested Palestinian Jerusalemites for defiling graves in the Har Hamenuchot Cemetery while filming themselves on TikTok.  Jewish individuals and groups continued to engage in nationalist violent hate crimes against Palestinians and their property in the West Bank and Arab/Palestinians in the country, (which the attackers called “price tag” attacks to exact a “price” for actions taken by the government against the attackers’ interests).  Tension continued between the ultra-Orthodox community and other citizens, including concerns related to service in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), housing, public transportation, participation in the workforce, and adherence to COVID-19 regulations.  In its annual Israel Religion and State Index poll of 800 adult Jews published in September, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Hiddush reported that 65 percent of respondents identified as either secular (48 percent) or traditional not religious (17 percent), the same result as in the 2020 poll.

In meetings with Israeli government officials, the Ambassador, Charge d’Affaires, and other U.S. embassy officials stressed the importance of religious pluralism and respect for all religious groups.  Numerous high-level U.S. officials made formal stops at Yad Vashem, the Holocaust remembrance site, to keep a public spotlight on antisemitism and highlight religious tolerance.  Senior U.S. officials spoke publicly about the importance of maintaining the historic status quo at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and conveyed this message in meetings with government officials.  Throughout the year, embassy officials used social media platforms to express U.S. support for tolerance and the importance of openness to members of other religious groups.  Embassy-supported initiatives focused on interreligious dialogue and community development and advocated a shared society for Arab and Jewish populations.  The embassy also promoted the reduction of tensions between religious communities and an increase in interreligious communication and partnerships by bringing together representatives of many faith communities to advance shared goals and exchange knowledge and experience, and through engagements aimed at greater integration of the Arab minority into the broader national economy, especially the high-tech sector.

This section of the report covers Israel within the 1949 Armistice Agreement line as well as Golan Heights and East Jerusalem territories that Israel occupied during the June 1967 war and where it later extended its domestic law, jurisdiction, and administration.  The United States recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017 and Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights in 2019.  Language in this report is not meant to convey a position on any final status issues to be negotiated between the parties to the conflict, including the specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem or the borders between Israel and any future Palestinian state.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 8.8 million (midyear 2021).  According to the country’s Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) classification system (2020 data), approximately 73 percent of the population is Jewish, 18 percent Muslim, 2 percent Christian, and 1.6 percent Druze.  The remaining 5 percent consists of those the CBS classifies as “other.”  This includes those who identify as Jewish but do not satisfy the Orthodox Jewish definition of “Jewish” that the government uses for civil procedures, such as many immigrants from the former Soviet Union.  There are also relatively small communities of Samaritans, Karaite Jews, Messianic Jews, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and members of the Baha’i Faith.  The majority of non-Jewish citizens are of Arab/Palestinian origin.  This includes approximately 77 percent of the country’s 182,000 Christians, according to the CBS as of December.  Non-Arab/Palestinian Christians are mainly those who emigrated from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s as descendants of Jews or alongside Jewish family members and their descendants.

According to the annual religion and state poll conducted by religious freedom NGO Hiddush, 57 percent of Jewish citizens do not affiliate with any religious group, 19 percent are “Zionist Orthodox,” 11 percent “ultra-Orthodox,” 6 percent “Reform,” 5 percent “Conservative,” and 2 percent “National Orthodox.”

The Arab/Palestinian Muslim, Druze, and Christian communities are located throughout the country.  In the Galilee region, some communities are homogenous, while others feature a mix of these groups.  There are dozens of Muslim-majority communities in the Negev.  In addition to an Alawite community in Ghajar, there are several Druze communities in the Golan Heights.

In 2019, the most recent year for which results are available, the CBS and the Jerusalem Institute estimated 563,200 Jews, 345,800 Muslims, and 16,150 Christians lived in the current municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, accounting for approximately 99 percent of the city’s total population of 936,400 as of 2019.

According to government and NGO data, there are approximately 330,000 foreign workers in the country, including 97,000 documented Palestinian workers; 31,000 undocumented Palestinian workers; 98,000 migrant workers with permits, 77,000 non-Palestinian undocumented workers (either migrant workers without a permit or tourists who overstayed their visa); and 31,000 asylum seekers, of whom an unknown number work.  Foreign workers and asylum seekers include Protestants, Roman Catholics, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Seventh-day Adventists, Orthodox Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and Muslims.  According to the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, Catholics among the foreign worker population include 19,000 Filipinos, 15,000 Indians, 5,655 Sri Lankans, 2,500 Colombians, and 1,100 individuals from other South American countries.

Legal Framework

Although the country has no constitution, a series of “Basic Laws” enumerate fundamental rights, which serve as the country’s constitutional foundation.  The 1992 Basic Law:  Human Dignity and Liberty describes the country as a “Jewish and democratic state” and references the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, which protects freedom to practice or not practice religious beliefs, including freedom of conscience, faith, religion, and worship, regardless of an individual’s religion.  The law incorporates religious freedom provisions of international human rights covenants into the country’s body of domestic law, which applies to citizens and Palestinian residents.

The Basic Law:  Israel – The Nation State of the Jewish People (Nation State Law)” recognizes “the exercise of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel” as “unique to the Jewish People” and calls for promotion of “Jewish settlement” as a national value.  The law recommends – but does not require – that judges use Jewish jurisprudence and heritage as a source of legal principles in cases in which there is no relevant legislation or judicial precedent.

The Chief Rabbinate of Israel is the supreme religious authority in the country and the law provides its council with authorities to handle Jewish religious services and rule on matters involving halacha (Jewish religious law).  The Council of the Chief Rabbinate consists of Orthodox rabbis chosen by an assembly of rabbis, local government leaders, government ministers, and laypersons appointed by the government.

Until March 1, the Chief Rabbinate retained the sole authority to issue certificates of conversion to Judaism within the country under Orthodox interpretations of Jewish law, although the government provided funding for both Orthodox and non-Orthodox conversion programs.  Relatives of Jewish converts could not receive residency rights, except for the children of converts born after the parent’s conversion was complete.  On March 1, the Supreme Court ruled that the government must recognize Conservative and Reform conversions performed in the country for the purpose of immigration, citizenship, and registration.

The Population and Immigration Authority of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) recognizes Conservative and Reform conversions in the country for the purpose of being registered as Jewish in the population registry.  However, those who convert through a non-Orthodox denomination, whether inside or outside the country, are not able to obtain such religious services as marriage, divorce, or burial in a Jewish cemetery.  Descendants of Jews qualify for immigration under this law regardless of the religious beliefs under which they were raised.  The law considers those who were eligible for immigration and converted as adults to another religious tradition, including Messianic Judaism, as no longer eligible for benefits under the Law of Return.

The Law of Return provides the right for any Jew, including those who converted to Judaism, or any child or grandchild of a Jew, to immigrate from a foreign country with his or her spouse and children.  Under the law, the minor children of a grandchild of a Jew receive humanitarian status but are not automatically granted citizenship.  Non-Jews who are not descendants of Jews do not have this route to immigration.  Under this law, those who completed an Orthodox Jewish conversion inside or outside the country are entitled to immigration, citizenship, and registration as Jews in the civil population registry.  Those who completed conversion to Judaism in a recognized community outside the country, regardless of affiliation, are eligible for these benefits even if they are not recognized as Jewish by the Chief Rabbinate; this would include Reform, Conservative, and other affiliations of Judaism.

The law recognizes only Judaism, Christianity, Islam, the Druze faith, and the Baha’i Faith.  Christian religious communities recognized according to the adopted Ottoman millet (court) system include Eastern Orthodox, Latin (Roman Catholic), Gregorian-Armenian, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Chaldean (Chaldean Uniate Catholic), Greek Catholic Melkite, Maronite, Syrian Orthodox, and Evangelical Episcopal.  The Anglican and Baha’i communities are recognized through a British Mandate-era law adopted by the government.  The government does not recognize other religious communities, including major Protestant denominations with a presence in the country, as distinct religious communities.  The two legal pathways to formal recognition, according to laws adopted from the British Mandate period, include petitioning either the Prime Minister’s Office or the MOI.  Groups may appeal rejected applications to the Supreme Court.

Recognized religious communities are exempt from taxation of places of worship and may have separate courts to apply their religion’s personal status laws.  Municipalities may levy property taxes on religious properties not used for prayer, such as schools, monasteries, pilgrim hostels, and soup kitchens.

Legislation establishes religious councils for Jewish communities and for the Druze.  The Ministry of Religious Services (MRS) has jurisdiction over the country’s 133 Jewish religious councils that oversee the provision of religious services for Jewish communities.  The government finances approximately 40 percent of the religious councils’ budgets, and local municipalities fund the remainder.  The MOI Department of Non-Jewish Affairs has jurisdiction over religious matters concerning non-Jewish groups and oversees the religious council for the Druze.  The Department of Non-Jewish Affairs annually convenes an interreligious council of all recognized religions, including Judaism, which serves as a discussion forum for recognized religious communities.  The council did not meet in 2021 and 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic; the last meeting took place in 2019, and it is planned to convene again in 2022.

The law criminalizes the damage, destruction, or desecration of religious sites (subject to seven years’ imprisonment) and actions that “harm the freedom of access” of worshippers to religious sites (subject to five years’ imprisonment).  Certain religious sites considered antiquities receive further protection under the antiquities law.  The Ministry of Tourism is responsible for the protection and upkeep of selected non-Jewish religious sites, while the MRS protects and maintains selected Jewish religious sites.  The law also provides for up to five years’ imprisonment for actions “likely to violate the feelings of the members of the different religions” regarding their religious sites.  The law grants the government, not the courts, the authority to decide the scope of the right to worship at certain religious sites.

The law criminalizes willfully and unjustly disturbing any meeting of persons lawfully assembled for religious worship or assaulting someone at such a meeting.  It also criminalizes intentionally destroying, damaging, or desecrating any object held sacred by any group of persons, with punishment of up to three years’ imprisonment for violations.  Government regulations recognize 16 sites as holy places for Jews, while various other budgetary and governmental authorities recognize an additional 160 places as holy for Jews.

The law criminalizes calling for, praising, supporting, or encouraging acts of violence or terrorism where such actions are likely to lead to violence, including calls for violence against religious groups.  The law criminalizes statements demeaning, degrading, or showing violence toward someone based on race, but provides an exception for statements citing a religious source, unless there is proof of intent to incite racism.  The infliction of “injury to religious sentiments” constitutes a criminal offense and is punishable by one year’s imprisonment.  Such injury includes publishing or saying something that is liable to offend the religious sentiment or faith of others.

The law states that acts of enmity towards a person or a group due to religious affiliation with or membership in a religious group are considered offenses under aggravating circumstances, and penalties are set at double the penalty for the original offense or 10 years imprisonment, whichever is the lesser penalty.

The Jordanian Waqf in Jerusalem administers the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, while the Jordanian Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Holy Places supports maintenance and salary of the Waqf staff in Jerusalem.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled since 1993 that Jews have the right to pray on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, but police may restrict this right in the name of public order and safety.  The court reiterated in 2019 that its precedent on this issue is nonintervention in government decisions, “except in highly unusual cases when the decision constitutes a major distortion of justice or is extremely unreasonable.”  The court upheld this position again in a decision in 2020.

The law prohibits institutions that receive government funding from engaging in commemoration of the Nakba, or “catastrophe,” the term used by Palestinians to refer to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians during the country’s 1948 War of Independence.  Activities forbidden by the law include rejection of the existence of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state” or commemorating “Israel’s Independence Day or the day on which the State was established as a day of mourning.”

The law requires citizens to obtain a permit from the MOI or the Prime Minister for travel to countries with no diplomatic relations with Israel, including Hajj travel to Saudi Arabia; the government issues these permits in the vast majority of cases.  Illegal travel is punishable by a prison sentence or fine if the traveler does not request prior approval.

It is illegal to proselytize to a person younger than 18 without the consent of both parents.  The law prohibits offering a material benefit to potential converts while proselytizing.

The government provides separate public schools for Jewish and Arab/Palestinian children, with instruction conducted in Hebrew and Arabic, respectively.  For Jewish children there are separate public schools available for religious and secular families.  Individual families may choose any public school for their children regardless of ethnicity or religious observance.  Minor children have the right to choose a public secular school instead of a religious school regardless of parental preference.  By law, the state provides the equivalent of public school funding to two systems of “recognized but not official” (a form of semiprivate) ultra-Orthodox religious schools affiliated with ultra-Orthodox political parties, the United Torah Judaism-affiliated Independent Education System and the Shas-affiliated Fountain of Torah Education System.

Churches receive partial government funding to operate “recognized but not official” schools.  Palestinian residents in Jerusalem may send their children to one of these church schools or a private school operated by the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf; both include religious instruction.  Some Israeli-funded public schools in Jerusalem use the Palestinian Authority (PA) curriculum.  Religious education is part of the PA curriculum for students in grades one through six in these schools, with separate courses on religion for Muslims and Christians.  Students in these schools may choose which class to take but may not opt out of religion courses.

The Chief Rabbinate determines who may be buried in Jewish state cemeteries, limiting this right to individuals considered Jewish by Orthodox Jewish standards.  The law provides for the right of any individual to burial in a civil ceremony and requires the government to establish civil cemeteries in various areas around the country.  The law criminalizes the intentional desecration of, or trespass on, places of burial, which is punishable by three years’ imprisonment.

Laws inherited from the Ottoman Empire and British Mandate periods establish the legal authority of religious courts operated by officially recognized religious communities over their members in matters of marriage, divorce, and burial.  The law allows for civil registration of two persons as a married couple outside of the religious court system only if they married outside the country or if the partners are of different religions and their respective religious courts do not object to a civil registration, or if both partners are listed as “lacking religion” in the population registry.  A law mandating women’s equality contains language that explicitly exempts matters of marriage, divorce, and appointments to religious positions.

The only domestic marriages with legal standing and that may be registered are those performed according to the religious statutes of recognized religious communities.  Marriages performed outside of the country may be registered with the MOI.  Members of some unrecognized groups may process their personal status documents, including marriage licenses, only through the authorities of one of the recognized religious communities, if those authorities agree.

The law imposes a two-year prison sentence for persons who conduct a marriage or are married in a Jewish wedding or divorce outside the Chief Rabbinate’s authority in the country.

Religious courts have exclusive jurisdiction over divorce cases when the husband and wife are registered with the same recognized religion.  Members of religious groups not permitting divorce, such as Catholics, may not obtain a divorce.  Paternity cases among Muslim citizens are the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.  Civil courts have jurisdiction over personal status cases when religious courts lack jurisdiction, as in cases of interfaith and same-sex couples.

Matters stemming from divorce proceedings, including alimony, child support, child custody, guardianship, and property division, are under the parallel jurisdiction of religious and civil courts.  The first court to receive a case acquires exclusive jurisdiction over it.  The Jordanian Waqf administers Islamic courts in Jerusalem for Muslim residents, with the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs in Jordan having appellate authority.

In accordance with halacha, a Jewish woman whose husband refuses to give her a get (Jewish legal writ of divorce) may not legally remarry in the country.  While a rabbinical court may order a husband to give a get, it does not have the power to terminate the marriage if he refuses.  In such cases, rabbinical courts may impose community-based punishments on the husband, including avoiding financial dealings with a get-refuser, excluding him from community activities, and advertising these decisions to the public.  The law permits rabbinical courts to hear cases of get refusals in which the spouses are not Israeli citizens, if certain other conditions are met (for example, if the couple lives abroad in a location where there is no rabbinical court).

Secular courts have primary jurisdiction over questions of inheritance, but parties may file such cases in religious courts by mutual agreement.  Decisions by these bodies are subject to Supreme Court review.  The rabbinical courts, when exercising their power in civil matters, apply religious law, which differs from civil law, including in matters relating to the property rights of widows and daughters.  A child born to a woman still married to another man is considered a mamzer (child of an unpermitted relationship) under Jewish law, which restricts the child’s future marriage prospects in the observant Jewish community.

Military service is compulsory for Jewish citizens, male Druze citizens, and male Circassian citizens (Muslims originally from the northwestern Caucasus region who migrated in the late nineteenth century).  The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) do not consider conscientious objection on the basis of religious belief as a reason for exemption from military service.

Religious Jewish women and ultra-Orthodox men may request an exemption from military service.  For most ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Druze religious students, military service is postponed for several years, after which they receive an exemption.  A petition on the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men was pending at the Supreme Court as of the year’s end.  Arab Muslims and Christians as well as Druze and Circassian women receive a de-facto exemption by not being called for military service.  Those exempt from military service may volunteer for it or for national civil service.  Members of Jehovah’s Witnesses are not eligible for the national civil service program.

Membership in a recognized religion is recorded in the National Registry and generally passed from parents to children unless a person changes it through a formal conversion to another recognized religion.  Religious identification is listed in the National Registry but not on official identity cards.

All citizens who meet the Chief Rabbinate’s criteria as “Jewish” under Jewish religious law are recorded as Jewish, whether Orthodox or not (unless they convert to another religion).  Approximately 450,000 citizens who identify as Jewish but do not meet the Chief Rabbinate’s criteria as “Jewish” as well as members of religious groups that are not recognized are recorded as “lacking religion.”  The vast majority are immigrants from the former Soviet Union and their children, who gained citizenship under the Law of Return but are not recognized as Jewish by the Chief Rabbinate because they cannot prove they meet the Orthodox definition of Jewish through matrilineal descent.

The Law of Citizenship and Entry, first passed in 2003 and renewed annually, explicitly prohibited residence status for non-Jewish Iranians, Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, including those who are spouses of Israeli residents or citizens, unless the MOI makes a special determination, usually on humanitarian grounds.

The law declares in the context of labor rights that Shabbat and Jewish holidays are national days of rest, while permitting non-Jewish workers alternate days of rest.  The law criminalizes (up to one month imprisonment) employers who open their businesses and employ Jews on Shabbat, except those who are self-employed.  There are exceptions for essential infrastructure and the hospitality, culture, and recreation industries.  The law instructs the Minister of Labor and Welfare to take into account “Israel’s traditions,” among other factors, when considering whether to approve permits to work on Shabbat.  The law prohibits discrimination against workers who refuse to work on their day of rest based on their religion and regardless of whether they are religiously observant.

The law prohibits discrimination in employment and occupation, including against employees, contractors, or persons seeking employment based on age, race, religion, national origin, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, and disability.

The law states that public transportation operated and funded by the national government may not operate on Shabbat, with exceptions for vehicles bringing passengers to hospitals, remote localities, and non-Jewish localities and for vehicles essential to public security or maintaining public transportation services.

The Chief Rabbinate has sole legal authority to issue certificates of kashrut (i.e., complying with Jewish dietary laws), which certify a restaurant or factory’s adherence to Jewish dietary laws.  Businesses are allowed to display a declaration regarding the kashrut standards they observe and the organization that supervises those standards but may not use the words “kosher” or “certificate” without a kashrut license from the rabbinate.  The Chief Rabbinate has the authority to indicate businesses that violate this law.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with a reservation stating that matters of personal status are governed by the religious law of the parties concerned and the country reserves the right to apply that religious law when inconsistent with its obligations under the covenant.

Government Practices

Because religious and national identities were often closely linked, it was often difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

In September, the Lod District Court sentenced Zion Cohen to three years in prison for carrying out a series of bomb attacks on rabbinical courts; it also ordered him to pay a 10,000-shekel ($3,200) fine.  Authorities arrested Cohen in 2020 in connection with the attacks.  Cohen confessed and said his aim was to prevent the courts providing religious services to the secular public to further his goal of separating religion and state.

On June 9, according to press reports, police arrested 12 demonstrators who threw heavy objects towards them in a protest by a small ultra-Orthodox sect near Bar-Ilan Street in Jerusalem; the group was protesting the construction of part of the city’s light rail system through an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood.  On August 24, approximately 300 ultra-Orthodox demonstrators gathered at the Bar-Ilan junction intersection, blocking the road, to protest the light rail line’s construction.  Police used water cannons to disperse the crowd.  Authorities said that they arrested four individuals for disturbing the peace and that one police officer was injured by pepper spray.  According to press, the protesters said the construction of the rail line was a “decree of expulsion and annihilation” aimed at Jerusalem’s ultra-Orthodox community.

Clashes broke out in April and May with “Day of Rage” demonstrations throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem against Israeli actions in Sheikh Jarrah, Damascus Gate, and the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem.  The Palestinian National and Islamic Factions in the West Bank called on Palestinians across West Bank cities, villages, and refugee camps to participate in a “Day of Rage” on May 11 to protest actions by Israeli security forces and Israelis living in East Jerusalem against Palestinians at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount compound and in Sheikh Jarrah.

According to press and NGO monitors, multiple events related to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount contributed, along with other factors, to escalations resulting in unrest and conflict across Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza.  On April 13, on the evening of the first day of Ramadan, media and Waqf officials reported that the Israeli National Police entered the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and disconnected loudspeakers used for the call to prayer after the Waqf’s call to prayer disrupted an official Memorial Day service for fallen soldiers attended by Israeli President Reuven Rivlin in the adjacent Western Wall Plaza.

On June 17, the government charged a police officer, whose name was not released, with reckless homicide in the 2020 killing of Iyad Halak, an autistic Palestinian man, in Jerusalem’s Old City.  Following an investigation, the Ministry of Justice said that Halak had not posed any danger to police.  At Halak’s funeral, the press reported that mourners chanted, “Khaybar, Khaybar, oh Jews, the army of [the Prophet] Mohammed will return,” a taunt referring to the seventh century Muslim massacre and expulsion of the Jews of Khaybar.

During the last Friday of Ramadan on May 7, Israeli police entered the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount using teargas, stun grenades, and rubber tipped bullets to disperse Palestinians they said were throwing rocks.  Media reported that in the aftermath, Palestinians stockpiled stones on the compound for use against the police and far-right Israeli nationalists planning to march through the Old City.  On May 10, Israeli police entered the compound again and used stun grenades, teargas, and rubber tipped bullets to disperse Palestinians.  The Palestinian Red Crescent said that more than 300 individuals suffered injuries.  In an attempt to ease tensions and reduce potential for clashes, Israeli police temporarily barred non-Muslims from visiting the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.

On December 13, authorities released Raed Salah, the head of the outlawed northern branch of the Islamic Movement, from Megiddo Prison, where he served 17 months of a 28-month sentence for incitement to terrorism in 2019 when he preached at the funeral for three terrorists who were involved in the killing of police officers at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.  A crowd of approximately 1,000 supporters greeted Salah upon his return to his home in Umm al-Fahm.  On December 20, Knesset member (MK) Mazen Ghnaim, a member of the Ra’am Party and the ruling coalition, met with Salah, which caused opposition politicians to state that Ghnaim was “supporting terrorism.”

On February 2, former Yitzhar settlement Yeshiva Rabbi Yosef Elitzur was convicted of incitement to violence for publishing articles in 2013 calling on Jews to rise up against Palestinian violence and calling on authorities not to arrest those who committed violent hate-filled attacks against Palestinians in what the attackers called “price tag” attacks (attacks with the stated purpose of exacting a “price” for actions by the government contrary to the attackers’ interests).  According to the prosecution, Elitzur was also one of the authors of a book stating the killing of non-Jews is permitted according to halacha.  On March 18, Elitzur was sentenced to four months’ probation and a fine.  On May 5, the prosecution appealed the sentence, and demanded a sentence of nine months’ imprisonment.  The appeal was pending as of the year’s end.

The government continued to allow controlled access to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.  The government expressed continued support for the post-1967 status quo pertaining to the site to allow non-Muslim visitors but prohibit non-Islamic worship there, while stating that Israel respected Jordan’s “special role” at the site, as reflected in the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty.  The Waqf said that Israeli authorities continued to interfere in the Waqf’s administration of the site, including delaying longstanding maintenance and restoration work.  Israeli officials and activists again stated the Waqf sometimes attempted to conduct repairs without coordinating with Israeli authorities.  In addition to the police banning individual Waqf staff members from the site, the Waqf said that it had a reduced capacity to administer the site because Israeli authorities refused to grant permits to new staff hired to work there, leaving the Waqf seriously understaffed.

On October 5, the Jerusalem Magistrate Court ruled that “silent Jewish prayer” on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount did not violate existing police rules on the site.  The ruling was in response to a case involving a 15-day administrative restraining order against a man whom police had removed from the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount on September 29 on grounds that he disturbed public order by engaging in Jewish prayer.  The judge ruled that silent prayer “does not in itself violate police instructions,” which prohibit “external and overt” non-Islamic prayer on the site.  Al-Monitor said the Magistrate’s Court’s ruling was “unprecedented” and “seem[ed] to question the status quo that has prevailed over the site.”  The Jerusalem District Court overturned the lower court’s ruling on October 8, ruling that the INP had acted “within reason,” and “the fact that there was someone who observed [him] pray is evidence that his prayer was overt.”  Minister of Public Security Omer Bar-Lev supported the appeal, saying “a change in the status quo will endanger public security and could cause a flare-up.”  The Waqf said the lower court’s ruling was “a flagrant violation” of the complex’s sanctity and a “clear provocation” for Muslims.

In April during the beginning of Ramadan, Israeli authorities restricted the number of Palestinians allowed to enter Jerusalem from the West Bank for the purpose of traveling to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount to 10,000 vaccinated persons because of “high morbidity rates” from coronavirus in the West Bank.  Israeli military authorities said the measures were to allow freedom of worship and religion, while also preventing the spread of COVID-19 in the area.

In December, the press reported that a religious extremist group had invoked halachic law in calling for the killing of Religious Affairs Minister Matan Kahana.  Haaretz said the exact identity of the group was unknown, but other sources stated it was “a religious extremist fringe group.”  According to the newspaper, sources tied the threats to Kahana to several religious reforms he promoted, including regarding conversions, kashrut certification, a compromise with non-Orthodox Jewish movements on an egalitarian (mixed gender) prayer space at the Western Wall, and his participation in a government that excluded ultra-Orthodox parties.  The country’s security service, Shin Bet, stated it viewed the threat as an immediate danger to Kahana and ordered bodyguards and security for the Minister as soon as the threat was discovered.

On June 22, Channel 13 News reported that Minister of Public Security Omer Bar Lev (Labor) and Chair of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Ram Ben Barak (Yesh Atid) requested assistance from the Attorney General and the Minister of Defense in defining as a terror organization Lehava (an acronym for “prevention of assimilation in the Holy Land,” which also translates as “flame”), described by press as a radical right-wing Jewish supremacist group.  These officials further asked the Minister of Defense and the Attorney General to outlaw Lehava as well as the registered NGO that funds it, The Fund for Saving the People of Israel.  According to the Anti-Terrorism Law, the Minister of Defense, with the approval of the Attorney General, has the authority to designate an organization as a terrorist group.  On September 12, a group of prominent rabbis, described in the press as religious Zionist and ultra-Orthodox, signed a petition protesting this initiative, stating that Lehava was within its rights to protest intermarriage, acted in accordance with the law and the Torah, and was not involved in violence or illegal activity.  Following the petition, NGO Tag Meir, an umbrella of Jewish groups working to monitor and counter hate crimes and religion-based racism in the country, urged the government to declare Lehava a terrorist organization.

Due to elections in March and the change in government in June, the Supreme Court postponed until January 6, 2022, the implementation of a 2017 verdict that struck down the exemption of ultra-Orthodox men from military service.  This was the 10th time the court postponed the implementation.  On August 22, the Ministerial Committee for Legislation approved a draft bill calling for the gradual increase in the number of ultra-Orthodox men serving in the IDF.  The bill includes yearly benchmarks for ultra-Orthodox serving in the military and a deduction in government support for yeshivas if those benchmarks are not achieved.

While some ultra-Orthodox communities stated that mandatory conscription was a violation of the right to conscientious objection on the basis of religious beliefs, the Ministry of Defense rejected this argument.  The IDF reported increasing numbers of ultra-Orthodox recruits since at least 2011, mainly into dedicated ultra-Orthodox units such as the Netzah Yehuda Battalion.

Authorities continued to allow use of a temporary platform south of the Mughrabi Bridge and adjacent to the Western Wall, but not visible from the main Western Wall Plaza, for non-Orthodox “egalitarian” (mixed gender) Jewish prayers.  Authorities designated the platform for members of the Conservative and Reform movements of Judaism, including for religious ceremonies such as bar and bat mitzvahs.  On November 4, the Supreme Court criticized the government for its lack of progress upgrading the area to a more permanent egalitarian prayer space.  On December 7, the government told the Supreme Court it intended to continue to upgrade the egalitarian plaza but did not mention steps it would take towards further equality and recognition included in the 2016 Western Wall Agreement.  The 2016 agreement was a compromise between Orthodox and non-Orthodox communities, which the government “froze” in 2017, that included the construction of a permanent plaza for mixed gender prayer managed by non-Orthodox groups, and a merged entry to all prayer spaces adjacent to the Western Wall.  The government requested to update the court on developments within six months.

The Supreme Court case was a combination of lawsuits against the government, some dating back to 2013, that would allow prayer for all religious streams of Judaism at the Western Wall.  It resulted in the 2016 Western Wall Agreement.  In 2018, a special government committee approved expansion of the temporary platform for members of the Conservative and Reform movements.  The non-Orthodox Jewish movements stated that upgrading the prayer space alone would not fulfill their 2016 agreement with the government.  In addition, observers stated that scaffolding prevented visitors from touching the sacred wall in the egalitarian prayer space since a rock fell there in 2018.  Over the same period, the Western Wall Heritage Foundation managed large construction projects in the main plaza, making routine inspections for loose rocks at the main plaza without blocking access to the wall.

On September 2, the Supreme Court rejected a petition by female rabbis demanding structural improvements to prevent collapse of the Mughrabi Bridge (the only entrance for non-Muslims to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, that crosses over the women’s section of the main Western Wall Plaza); the court accepted the state’s argument that it was taking action to restore the wooden beams on metal bases which support the bridge.  The court added, “in a place like the Temple Mount, where any change could lead to political or security turbulence, the decision of state institutions to not change the existing situation on the ground is a practical and reasonable decision in which there is no room to intervene.”

In November and December, the press reported that despite the government’s declared intention to create an egalitarian prayer space at the Western Wall, the proposal appeared to be losing support within the ruling coalition.  Minister of Religious Affairs Kahana said the vast majority of Jews in Israel were Orthodox and that it would not be right to give control of parts of the space to the Conservative and Reform streams.  Kahana said the issue “must be studied, to see how we resolve the [religious] wars.”  Other members of the cabinet continued to publicly support the plan.  According to Haaretz, the two key components of the proposal were creating a new and enhanced space on the southern side of the Western Wall for egalitarian prayer and providing official recognition to the Conservative and Reform movements at the site.  The newspaper reported that “the disagreements [were] about that second component.”  Under the government’s original plan, a new authority would have been created to govern the egalitarian space and representatives of the Reform and Conservative movements would sit on its board.  However, Haaretz reported that two Orthodox members of the cabinet, Kahana and Housing Minister Ze’ev Elkin, found this unacceptable and suggested that the egalitarian prayer space continue to operate under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Office or, alternatively, be handed over for supervision to the Jewish Agency.  Leaders of the non-Orthodox movements rejected that plan.  At year’s end, the government had taken no action to move the proposed changes forward.

Israeli authorities in some instances barred specific individuals from the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount site, including Jewish activists believed to have violated the status quo understanding prohibiting non-Islamic prayer, Muslims believed to have verbally harassed or acted violently against non-Muslim visitors to the site or incited others to violence, and public figures whose presence authorities feared would inflame tensions.  Banned individuals included Waqf guards and administrative and maintenance staff and imams delivering sermons at the site, as well as prominent activists.  The Israeli government said that some individuals – including both Muslims and Jews – were prevented access to the site during the year because they could have caused disturbances and riots.  The government said Israeli security prevented access to the site for 389 Muslims and 99 Jews during 2021 due to previous incidents of public disorder at the site, including assaulting or interfering with police, or based on intelligence information.  The Wadi Hilweh Information Center reported that Israeli authorities banned 357 individuals from the site during the year.

While the government stated it was rare for any individual to be barred entry to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, human rights and civil society organizations said Israeli authorities banned some Palestinian residents in the occupied territories, and Arab/Palestinian and Jewish citizens of Israel from the site.  Palestinian civil society organizations said that, in a practice that began in 2020, police continued to check the identify cards of individuals entering the Old City to visit the site for Friday prayers and would bar from entry those with West Bank identity cards and return them to the West Bank.  In May, media reported that Israeli police blocked several buses of Arab/Palestinian citizens of Israel outside of Jerusalem from visiting the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.  Police said they stopped the buses because they had intelligence indicating some of the passengers were planning to riot at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.

At the main Western Wall Plaza, the place of Jewish worship nearest the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and Judaism’s holiest site, the government continued to prohibit the performance of any “religious ceremony that is not in accordance with the customs of the place, [or] which harms the feelings of the public towards the place.”  Authorities interpreted this prohibition to include mixed-gender Jewish prayer services, over the objections of the Jewish Conservative and Reform movements.  The organization Women of the Wall, whose membership is composed of mostly Reform and Conservative Jewish women and whose goal is to secure the official right for women to pray at the Western Wall, stated that their monthly presence at the wall for more than 30 years had established them as part of the “customs of the place.”

Authorities continued to prohibit visitors from bringing private Torah scrolls to the main Western Wall Plaza and women from accessing the public Torah scrolls or giving priestly blessings at the site.  Authorities, however, permitted women to pray with tefillin and prayer shawls pursuant to a 2013 Jerusalem District Court ruling stating it was illegal to arrest or fine them for such actions.  On several occasions, MK Gilad Kariv (Labor) used his parliamentary immunity to bring Torah scrolls for the use of Women of the Wall and referred to the prohibition as illegal.

Within COVID-19 limitations, authorities allowed Women of the Wall to hold its monthly service in a barricaded portion of the women’s area of the main Western Wall Plaza.  Ultra-Orthodox protesters harassed and attacked Women of the Wall members repeatedly during their monthly services by throwing coffee or bottles at them, screaming, cursing, blowing whistles, or pushing them.

Representatives of Women of the Wall said police or ushers from the Western Wall Heritage Foundation, which administers the main Western Wall Plaza and which is ultra-Orthodox-run, were reluctant to intervene when ultra-Orthodox women and men disrupted the women’s monthly prayer service with screaming, whistling, and pushing.  Ahead of a November 5 service held by Women of the Wall, tension rose when former Shas MK Aryeh Deri called MKs and the public to attend the service and prevent MK Kariv from bringing Torah scrolls to the women’s section, which Deri said would be a “desecration of the Western Wall.”  The Western Wall Heritage Fund announced it would not take responsibility for maintaining public order at the plaza, leading to increased INP presence the day of the service.  With President Isaac Herzog’s intervention, and his promise to hold a meeting on non-Orthodox prayer at the Western Wall, most MKs refrained from attending the service at the Western Wall on November 5.  MK Ben Gvir of the Religious Zionist Party still attended to protest against the Women of the Wall, expressing outrage that police confronted protesters who attempted to reach the women who were conducting services at the site.  According to the NGO Israel Religion Action Center (IRAC), INP and the Western Wall Heritage Fund guards confronted Women of the Wall during the service.  The President held a meeting on pluralistic prayer at the Western Wall on December 1.

A 2017 petition to the Supreme Court by Women of the Wall asking that ushers and police prevent disruption of their services was pending at year’s end.

In May, the Jerusalem Municipality opened a parking lot on property it had leased from the Armenian Church in 2020.  In July, the Church signed a new contract with the Jerusalem Municipality extending the lease for 99 years, and the municipality announced that a Jewish-Australian developer would construct a new hotel on the property.  Palestinians widely criticized the Church for leasing the property to the municipality, including public statements by PA figures.  PA Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates Riyad Malki raised the transaction with his Armenian counterpart and asked for Armenian Foreign Ministry assistance in pressuring the Church to cancel the lease.  Malki characterized the deal as opening the door for “the gradual encroachment of Israel’s settler-colonialism into the Armenian Quarter in Jerusalem,” and said it “risks accelerating the obliteration of the Palestinian, Muslim, and Christian character of Jerusalem.”

On February 24, the Supreme Court ordered the government to answer a series of questions by April 22 regarding its plan to build an aerial cable car over a Karaite (a Jewish religious movement) cemetery in Jerusalem.  This order was in response to petitions filed by the Karaite community, the NGO Emek Shaveh, and the NGO Israel Union for Environmental Defense from 2019 and 2020.  According to the Karaite community, the cable car would desecrate the cemetery, thus preventing its further use.  The government stated the cable car was meant to solve accessibility problems to holy sites such as the Western Wall, but some NGOs said the project was meant to specifically promote Jewish touristic sites in East Jerusalem and to reinforce the country’s claims of sovereignty over the area.  Despite respective statements by Transportation Minister Merav Michaeli and Environmental Protection Minister Tamar Zandberg on November 26 and December 13 opposing the project, the government told the Supreme Court on December 28 that it supported the construction of the cable car.  The petition was pending at year’s end.

In October, Palestinian demonstrators sporadically clashed with the INP after the Israeli Nature and Parks Authority began landscaping work on public land adjacent to the Islamic al-Yusufiya Cemetery and unearthed human remains in a shallow grave.  The cemetery, which is hundreds of years old, is affiliated with the Islamic Waqf.  Multiple graves and headstones are located in the disputed area adjacent to the cemetery, some dating from Jordanian control of Jerusalem and others allegedly from recent burials conducted without authorization.  According to an October 11 report in Haaretz, the Israel Nature and Parks Authority said, “This territory is a national park and open public space, outside the Muslim cemetery.  The Muslim Waqf, unlawfully and in violation of court orders, placed several graves there.  During works with the Jerusalem Development Authority to develop the open public space, a shallow dig was uncovered with several bones in it.  The matter is being investigated.  The works at the site are ongoing under court orders.”  On October 17, the Jerusalem Magistrate’s Court rejected requests submitted by the Committee for the Care of Islamic Cemeteries in Jerusalem to suspend bulldozing and exhuming graves on the site.  However, the court restricted construction activity to only light work, such as covering ground, placing grids, and gardening, and prohibited demolition, excavation, casting, or drilling.  Authorities did not allow construction that would impact any graves at the site.  On October 28, Israeli authorities fenced the walls surrounding the area and installed surveillance cameras.  On October 29, police deployed stun grenades and tear gas to disperse demonstrators who threw rocks at the site.  The PA President’s advisor for religious and Islamic affairs described the bulldozing as an ongoing crime against the cemetery, while the Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem stated that “no tomb was damaged during the works, and there is no intention to displace any grave, even if built illegally.”

Some former mosques and Islamic cemeteries remained sealed and inaccessible, including to Muslims.  These sites belonged to the defunct pre-state Waqf (distinct from the current Jordanian-administered Waqf in Jerusalem) until confiscated by the state after the 1948 War of Independence.  Other former mosques continued to be used for secular purposes.

Government restrictions on gathering for prayer varied due to the COVID-19 pandemic and included limitations on the number of worshippers at the Western Wall as well as requiring a “Green Pass,” which indicated a person’s vaccination status, to enter synagogues.

In June, before taking office as Minister of Finance, Avigdor Lieberman said that raising the number of ultra-Orthodox Jews in the workforce would be one of his main goals.  In particular, he said bringing ultra-Orthodox men into the labor force would be a major challenge.  According to the Jerusalem Post, at the beginning of 2020, approximately 53 percent of ultra-Orthodox men were employed, compared with more than 85 percent of non-ultra-Orthodox men.  According to Reuters, those ultra-Orthodox men who did not work in paid employment were devoted full-time to religious studies and relied on government allowances and handouts from donors.  Lieberman said, “We will do everything to provide them [the ultra-Orthodox] an education and enable them to learn a profession and stand on their own two feet, as opposed to [depending on] charity and all the stipends.”

On July 7, in office as Finance Minister, Lieberman revoked the eligibility of fathers studying full-time in yeshivas for childcare subsidies, a move which, according to press coverage, enraged ultra-Orthodox political leaders.  According to the decision, to be eligible for such subsidies, fathers would need to work or study in a nonreligious educational institute for at least 24 hours a week, which would preclude full-time yeshiva study.  Lieberman said the changes were designed to prioritize “those who work and pay taxes.”  United Torah Judaism party leader Moshe Gafni called Lieberman “an evil man” for the policy change, while Shas party chairman Deri described the decision as “destructive and wicked.”  In response, Lieberman said, “Those who are harming the Haredi [ultra-Orthodox] community are the MKs of Shas and United Torah Judaism.  They want to leave the entire Haredi public without a living, so that they will remain dependent on handouts and financial assistance all their lives.”  After the new policy was formally announced in August, lawyers and ultra-Orthodox organizations filed court petitions against the policy shift as discriminatory against the ultra-Orthodox.  The implementation of the plan was initially delayed until November and then until the new year.  On November 10, a Supreme Court panel rejected the ultra-Orthodox organizations’ request for an interim order on the policy itself but issued an interim order that required the government to explain the basis for its authority to change the rules regarding subsidies for ultra-Orthodox childcare after the school year had already started in September.  The case remained pending at year’s end.

The security barrier that divided the majority of the West Bank from the rest of the country also divided some communities in Jerusalem, affecting residents’ access to places of worship.  The government stated that the barrier was needed for security reasons.

Several groups, including religious minorities and human rights NGOs, continued to criticize the Nation State Law.  On July 8, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 10-to-one, rejected 15 petitions challenging the Nation State Law.  According to the court’s opinion, the law should be interpreted in a way that does not detract from individual or cultural rights at the subnational level and the provisions of the Nation State Law do not diminish “the components of the state’s democratic identity that are anchored in other Basic Laws.”  The ruling further stated that, although some of the provisions of the law raise “difficulties,” it should be interpreted in light of the country’s other basic laws, in particular the basic laws on the Knesset, on human dignity and liberty, and on freedom of occupation, which specifically address the dual character of the country as a Jewish and democratic state.  Haaretz reported that the law had been “lambasted for the absence of the words ‘equality’ and ‘democracy’ in the text.”  Justice Minister Gideon Saar said that the court recognized “the essence and character of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.”  The Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights said the decision “enshrined Jewish supremacy and racial segregation as founding principles of the Israeli regime.”

On November 4, the Knesset approved the state budget, which included 40 million shekels ($12.91 million) for Conservative and Reform Judaism for 2022, to be managed through a new department for Progressive Judaism at the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs.  While Progressive Judaism organizations welcomed the funding, the NGO Jewish Pluralism Watch of the Conservative Judaism movement stated the department managing the funds should have been placed in the Ministry of Religious Services, stating that the latter should stop serving Orthodox Judaism only.

In March, NGOs Emek Shaveh and the Arab Culture Association filed a petition with the Supreme Court against the Ministry of Jerusalem and Heritage, demanding that criteria for funding heritage sites by the ministry not exclude non-Jewish sites.  In response, on August 9, the ministry stated it was only responsible for the conservation of Jewish-related heritage while other offices were funding heritage sites of minority populations.  The petition was pending at the year’s end.

In a November 29 meeting with Communications Minister Yoaz Hendel, a delegation of representatives of the ultra-Orthodox community asked to discuss “kosher phones,” a special phone service widely used by their community, despite its announced boycott of the government, which does not include ultra-Orthodox members.  The “kosher cellphones” are configured only for calls and text messages, with no Internet access or apps.  Unlike other users, owners of kosher phones are not able to change their provider while keeping their number.  A story in Haaretz said, “But this is not just about numbers.  It’s about the rabbis controlling the free flow of information into their communities.  Without that control, their power over their followers is greatly diminished.”  The Jerusalem Post reported that Hendel had pointed out that “kosher phones” were a sort of fiefdom within Israeli telecommunications; unlike other phone numbers, since “kosher” numbers could not be moved from one company to another, severely limiting competition.

Following the March elections, Gilad Kariv, former head of the national Reform movement, became the first Reform rabbi member of Knesset.  In his first speech in the Knesset on May 5, Kariv said that the “Jewish pluralist renewal,” including his election, elevated the principles of “tolerance, equity, and most importantly, the recognition that there is more than one way to be a Jew.”  He stated that “heavy obstacles” had been put in the way of this renewal, especially “the monopoly over Israeli Judaism that had been given to one particular stream and institution,” a reference to Orthodoxy and the Chief Rabbinate.

On June 28, MK Meir Porush (United Torah Judaism) responded to the appointment of Kariv as the Chair of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, by comparing him as a Reform Jew to a pig pretending to be kosher.  MK Itamar Ben Gvir (Religious Zionism) responded by saying Kariv is the number one enemy of halacha.

On May 4, Rabbi David Yosef of the Har Nof neighborhood of Jerusalem announced he was retiring following a 2020 Women of the Wall and IRAC petition demanding a disciplinary hearing against him, after his repeated alleged incitement against Women of the Wall.  Yosef served as rabbi in a public servant position in which the office holder is required to act in accordance with the civil service regulations.

In 2019, six Orthodox women halacha students and NGOs petitioned the Supreme Court to permit women to take the halacha examinations used to ordain rabbis.  While Orthodox women cannot become rabbis, passing the examinations is equal to receiving a bachelor’s degree and grants an advantage when applying for certain public sector positions.  On October 21, in its response to the petition, the state offered a compromise whereby the Religious Services Ministry would establish “an alternative, independent examination framework” for women and men.  The petitioners opposed the compromise, arguing it further strengthened the existing discrimination against women and constituted a waste of resources.  The petition was pending at the year’s end.  On June 30, Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef threatened that the rabbinate would not conduct any exams to ordain state-authorized rabbis, including for men, if the court ruled that women could be ordained in contradiction to halacha.

The government employed an “appropriate representation” policy for non-Jewish minorities in the civil service.  The percentage of Arab/Palestinian employees in the public sector was 13.2 percent (61.5 percent of them entry-level), according to the Civil Service Commission.  The percentage of Arab/Palestinian employees in the 62 government-owned companies was approximately 2.5 percent; however, during the year Arab/Palestinian citizens held 12 percent of director positions in government-owned companies, up from 1 percent in 2000, and Arab/Palestinain workers held 13.2 percent of government positions, up from 5 percent in 2000, according to Sikkuy-Aufoq, an NGO that supports full equality between Jewish and Arab/Palestinian citizens.  Of the 13.2 percent, 68 percent were employed in government health services.

Women’s rights and religious freedom NGOs filed a petition with the Supreme Court on May 12 against the Ministry of Religious Services, demanding appropriate representation for women on religious councils.  According to the petitioners, only eight women served on religious councils nationwide, despite an Attorney General directive from 2016 and a 2017 Ministry of Religious Service directive requiring a minimum representation of 20-33 percent.  According to the petitioners, 80 percent of the councils had no women members.  In August, the government responded to the court, stating the Minister of Religious Affairs was working to promote appropriate representation for women in religious councils. The petition was pending at year’s end.

According to the Jerusalem Post, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yair Lapid, in remarks on July 14 to the Global Forum on Combatting Antisemitism, said that antisemitism was part of a broad family of hatreds and that antisemites start by attacking Jews but “always” move on to focus their hate and violence on other groups as well.  After pointing to the slave trade, the massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda, the deaths of Muslims at the hands of Muslim extremists, and fatal attacks on members of the LGBTQI+ community, Lapid said, “The antisemites are all those who persecute people not for what they’ve done, but for what they are, for how they were born… Antisemitism isn’t the first name of hatred, it’s the family name; it’s all those consumed by hatred to the point that they want to murder and destroy and persecute and banish people just because they’re different.”  According to the Times of Israel, Lapid’s comments “ignited a firestorm of criticism and a fierce left-right dustup in the Hebrew-language media.”  The website reported that “right-wingers, led by opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu,” said that Lapid’s comments were “scandalous and irresponsible, warping history and emptying the concept of antisemitism of all content.”  In a July 26 article in Haaretz defending his statement, Lapid wrote, “The State of Israel is in need of a dramatic and fundamental change in direction in its fight against antisemitism, and it must acknowledge that in recent years, it has abjectly failed in that battle.”

The MOI continued to rely on the sole discretion and approval of the Jewish Agency, a parastatal organization, to determine who qualified to immigrate as a Jew or as a descendant of a Jew.  The government continued to deny applications from individuals, including those holding Messianic or other Christian beliefs, whom the government said became ineligible when they converted to another religion.

A group of Orthodox rabbis continued to operate a private conversion court for children of families whom the state or rabbinical courts did not recognize as Jews.  The Chief Rabbinate and MOI continued not to recognize non-Orthodox converts to Judaism as Jews, although they remained eligible for immigration under the Law of Return if they converted outside the country.

After the Supreme Court’s March 1 decision that the government must recognize Conservative and Reform conversions performed in the country, the Jerusalem Post reported that Chief Sephardic Rabbi Yizhak Yosef said, “What Reform and Conservative call ‘conversion’ is nothing but a forgery of Judaism.”  The Times of Israel reported that Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi David Lau said that those who undergo Reform or Conservative conversions “are not Jews.”  Saying the decision “was mainly symbolic,” the New York Times cited a report by the Israel Religious Action Center that only 30 or 40 foreigners convert each year.  In a December 6 article, Haaretz stated that of the approximately 80 non-Orthodox converts who applied for citizenship since the ruling, only three had been approved by the Ministry of Interior.  Rabbi Andrew Sacks, the director of the Rabbinical Assembly for the Conservative-Masorti movement, said that the ministry was “slow-walking the implementation of the conversion process.”

The court’s decision became an issue in the campaign for the March 23 election.  Then Prime Minister Netanyahu reposted a tweet that said, the decision [about recognizing conversions] should be left to “the people and the Knesset.”  Then Interior Minister Deri, leader of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party, promised to introduce legislation to ensure only Orthodox conversions would be recognized in the country.  Leaders of both Shas and the ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism party said they would not join a government coalition that was not committed to overturning the court’s decision.  During the campaign, United Torah Judaism posted a video showing pictures of dogs wearing prayer shawls and kippahs, with a voiceover, “The Supreme Court says they’re Jewish.”  Finance Minister Lieberman, then a candidate to replace Netanyahu, said he and his party would “continue to fight against religious coercion and preserve the character of Israel as a Jewish, liberal, Zionist state.”  Yair Lapid, then head of the Knesset opposition said, “Israel must have complete equality of rights for all streams of Judaism – Orthodox, Reform, or Conservative.”

In July, Kan News reported that Minister of Religious Services Kahana planned to introduce legislation to liberalize conversions to Judaism.  In December, Kahana outlined the framework for his proposed changes, which he said he planned to introduce in Knesset legislation.  As part of Kahana’s proposed framework, municipal rabbis would be able to establish conversion courts to allow them to convert citizens of Jewish descent who were not considered Jewish according to religious law.  According to the Jerusalem Post, Kahana’s legislation would grant the chief rabbis and the Council of the Chief Rabbinate the power, under certain circumstances, to revoke the appointment of a rabbinical judge on the new conversion courts.  On December 29, the government postponed a vote on the legislation after determining it lacked sufficient support to advance the bill.  On the same day, Chief Rabbi David Lau, whose authorization is required for all conversions in the country, wrote the Prime Minister saying if the bill moved forward, “I will be forced to declare myself no longer responsible for anything to do with conversions.”  He added that the reforms had the potential to cause an “irreparable” split among the Jewish people: “two states for two peoples, divided Judaism instead of united Judaism.”  Finance Minister Lieberman said that Lau’s threat to freeze conversions “is not appropriate to the status of the chief rabbi and may lead to proceedings being taken to end his term.”  Minister of Communications Yoaz Hendel said, “A public servant should fulfill the government’s decisions, and if he does not do so, he should not be in office.”

On October 6, Minister Kahana said that although he believed marriage is a religious construct, he believed there should be legal alternatives for those unable to marry in the country’s religious institutions.  He said, “I believe that every citizen needs to be able to actualize their partnership in a legal manner.  I think that marriage is a religious term which should remain ‘according to the religion of Moses and Israel.’  There are enough rabbis, much wiser than me in Judaism and Jewish law, who have outlines for [legal, nonreligious partnerships].”  A member of the opposition Shas party responded by saying, “Kahana is not the minister of religious services, he is the minister of destroying religion and the destruction of Jerusalem.”  In a November interview with the Times of Israel, while declining to offer specific proposals, Kahana said, “I am opposed to civil marriage.  I believe that the concept of marriage, the sacred connection between a man and a woman, in the State of Israel, must remain in the province of halachic Judaism.”

On July 20, the Supreme Court approved an agreement to halt the practice of the Chief Rabbinate using information collected during Jewish status investigations (used to verify individuals’ Jewish status) to question the validity of third parties claiming Jewish ancestry.  The agreement was a result of a 2017 petition by NGOs and individuals affected by the practice.

In February, KAN News reported that the Ashkelon Rabbinical Court conducted Jewish status investigations during two cases of divorce involving Jewish Ethiopian-Israelis and refused to give a writ of divorce prior to the confirmation of the couples’ Jewish status, even though they married in the country in accordance with the rules of the Chief Rabbinate.

In November, the Rabbinate granted ultra-Orthodox music and film entertainer Shuli Rand permission to marry TV personality Zufit Grant despite his wife’s refusal to accept a get from him, thus denying him a divorce.  After his first wife refused to agree to a divorce, Rand reportedly received an exemption signed by 100 rabbis that allowed him to remarry.  NGOs including Mavoi Satum, an organization that aids women who have been refused a Jewish divorce by their husbands, and The Center For Women’s Justice continued to criticize the inequality facing women who cannot remarry because they are unable to obtain a get from their ex-husbands and who consequently are denied similar permission to marry again.

In August, a Tel Aviv rabbinical court “canceled” the 18-year marriage of a couple, following claims of abuse, after the husband refused a get.  In November, the same court overturned its decision, following pressure from ultra-Orthodox public figures, according to Haaretz.

On October 6, Alon Tal, a Conservative Jewish member of Israel’s governing coalition, criticized the then-pending bill opening the kashrut-certification market, saying he was “hugely disappointed” to discover that the reform plans were “intent on excluding anybody that is not Orthodox.”  On October 28, before passage of the bill, the two chief rabbis of the country issued a joint declaration that stated, “The decision on the new kashrut outline is the destruction of kashrut and reflects a trend towards the displacement of Judaism of Israel, another step in making Israel a state of all its citizens.”  The statement also said that changing the kashrut system could lead to “conversion and marriage outside the framework of the Chief Rabbinate, which will inevitably lead to the separation of communities in Israel.”   They also said Israeli rabbis should refuse to cooperate with the reform efforts and refrain from granting certification to any establishment without the authorization of the Chief Rabbinate Council.

On November 4, the Knesset passed a law opening the kashrut-certification market to competition.  According to the law, beginning on January 1, 2022, religious councils would be able to award kashrut certification anywhere in the country, not only in the cities to which they belong.  Then, from January 1, 2023, both private organizations and religious councils would be able to award kashrut certificates, while the Rabbinate would go from certifying food as kosher to performing a regulatory function, certifying others to certify food as kosher.  The new law does not allow for non-Orthodox kashrut certificates.

According to Haaretz, after the kashrut-certification bill was passed, Sephardic Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef organized a conference of rabbinical judges opposing the reforms regarding kashrut certification and conversion.  After the conference, Yosef issued a statement saying that he “utterly rejects the … dangerous initiatives to destroy Kashrut and Judaism in Israel.”  After reviewing the statement, the judicial ombudsman, retired Supreme Court Justice Uri Shoham, asked the Minister of Religious Affairs to consider dismissing Yosef from his position on the Grand Rabbinical Court.

At a December 6 meeting of ultra-Orthodox religious parties, MKs discussed a range of options, including boycotts and mass protests, to oppose various reforms impacting the ultra-Orthodox that were under consideration by the government.  One Shas MK said that the government was seeking to establish “a nation of all its citizens in place of a Jewish and democratic state.”  Another participant said the government was waging a “culture war against the ultra-Orthodox” and that the country was engaged in “a real war” over the future of the Jewish people.

In August, NGOs Hiddush and Secular Forum, in a letter to the IDF Chief of Staff, protested Military Rabbinate orders published during the year that restricted the use of kitchenette facilities during Shabbat, or for preparing nonkosher foods, following complaints from soldiers.  According to the NGOs, the Military Rabbinate was not authorized to order restrictions on food not served by the IDF, and its actions constituted “religious coercion.”

During a June 8 press conference, MK Yaakov Litzman of United Torah Judaism called on soon-to-be Prime Minister Naftali Bennett to “take off his yarmulke, for he disgraces it.”

Yitzhak Pindrus of United Torah Judaism said in the Knesset on June 28 that the Minister of Religious Services should follow the path of a biblical character who killed people who intermarried, referring to such marriages as “miscegenation.”

On October 13, MK Bezalel Smotrich (Religious Zionism) directed his comments from the Knesset plenary’s podium towards Arab MKs, referring to them as “anti-Zionists,” “terror supporters,” and “enemies.”  He also said: “You’re here by mistake, it’s a mistake that Ben-Gurion didn’t finish the job and didn’t throw you out in 1948.”

The website Al-Monitor reported that there were varied opinions within the country about the Muslim political party Ra’am becoming the first Arab party to join a government.  Members of then Prime Minister Netanyahu’s party protested in front of the homes belonging to members of Prime Minister Bennett’s Yamina party to pressure Yamina from joining a coalition that included Ra’am.  A member of the Ra’am party told Al-Monitor that the “responses [in the street] to the move are positive and give us credit,” adding that joining the government was the first step in “a long journey.”

Members of some religious minorities said that the government did not provide the same service and benefits to them as to the country’s majority Jewish population and in many jurisdictions made it difficult for members of minority groups to obtain permits needed for new construction.  In January, the Druze and Circassian mayors’ forum chairman demanded that the problem of urban planning be addressed in those local council districts facing high fines for illegal construction.

The MRS listed 21 dedicated cemeteries in Israel and West Bank settlements for burial of persons the government defined as “lacking religion,” and 33 cemeteries for civil burial, but only three were available for use by the general public regardless of residence, and one had been full for several years.  The state permitted other cemeteries located in agricultural localities to bury only “residents of the area.”  This, according to Hiddush, left the majority of the country’s population deprived of the ability to exercise its right, as mandated by law, to be buried in accordance with secular or non-Orthodox religious views.  The two MRS-administered cemeteries in West Bank settlements were available only for the burial of Israeli citizens.  On September 12, the Supreme Court rejected a 2019 petition by Hiddush that demanded civil burial in agricultural localities for individuals who were not local residents and who did not have another alternative.  According to the government, the existing issues regarding civil burial could not justify burial outside of place of residence, as the law mandates.  The court invited Hiddush to submit a new petition regarding a specific locality, rather than a principled petition.

According to Hiddush, an absolute majority of the MRS licenses for civil burial are held by Jewish Orthodox NGOs and religious councils and some of these organizations conducted a “less religious burial” rather than a secular one, did not allow burial in a coffin, and stated on their websites that their services were only for non-Jews.

Those exempt from compulsory military service continued to have the option to join the National Service, a civilian alternative in which volunteers work for two years to promote social welfare in schools, hospitals, or NGOs.  According to government officials and NGOs, this alternative was more popular among women from Jewish Orthodox backgrounds than other exempt groups.

According to representatives of the ultra-Orthodox Eda Haredit community, some of their members did not receive an exemption from military service because its yeshivas were not recognized by the state and young men studying in those yeshivas did not submit draft exemption applications.  As a result, dozens of them were arrested every month, community members said.

According to the Karaite community’s NGO, during the year the IDF requested religious Karaite women who sought to be exempted from military service to declare their status as religious women at a rabbinical court; the Karaite community said this would be contrary to its beliefs.  Up until 2020, Karaite women were able to submit a letter from a Jewish Karaite court to the IDF to prove their status.  On March 21, three Karaite women petitioned the Supreme Court concerning this matter and as a result, the IDF announced on June 6 that it exempted them from military service.  Due to the IDF’s action, the women’s petition was “deleted” on June 10.

According to the website of Brigham Young University’s Jerusalem Center, the government maintained an agreement with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints that no member of the Church “will engage in proselytizing of any kind” within Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza as a condition to lease land for its campus on the Mount of Olives.  Some other unrecognized Christian communities reported that the MOI Department of Non-Jewish Affairs discouraged them from proselytizing or holding large public gatherings outside their houses of worship.

The Center of Scientology Israel reported that it was targeted by the NGO Israeli Center for Victims of Cults using derogatory labels on their website and categorizing it as a cult.  The NGO Yad L’Achim paid for a campaign to target Scientology online.

The government maintained its policy of not accepting applications for official recognition from unrecognized religious groups, including evangelical Christian churches and Jehovah’s Witnesses, but stated that no religious community applied for recognition during the year.  The government stated some leaders of unrecognized religions were invited to and participated in official events and ceremonies, along with the leaders of recognized religions.

After the Supreme Court ordered the government on April 29 to explain why it would not discuss a 2017 application by the Jehovah’s Witnesses for recognition, the government told the court on December 29 that it had tasked the Ministerial Committee on Internal Affairs to review the request.  The government asked the committee to submit an update to the court within 90 days.

On June 15, the Supreme Court ruled that the Knesset Finance Committee had no authority to reject the application for tax-deductible status submitted by the Messianic Jews’ NGO Yachad Ramat HaSharon, and ordered that the NGO be granted tax-deductible status.  A similar petition by the Jehovah’s Witnesses NGO Watchtower Association was pending at the year’s end.  In 2020, the Finance Committee rejected applications for tax-deductible status by the two NGOs despite objections from legal advisors in the Ministry of Justice and the Tax Authority.  On December 8 and 13, the Knesset Finance Committee discussed the Watchtower Association’s application and decided on a Tax Authority audit of the group to take place in 2022 due to concerns raised by Shas MK of alleged missionary activity directed at minors.

Separate public and semipublic school systems varied widely in educational quality around the country, according to NGOs and international organizations.  During the year, Arab/Palestinians including Christians, Muslims and Druze, as well as ultra-Orthodox students, passed the matriculation exam at lower rates than their non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish counterparts.  The government continued educational and scholarship programs to benefit Arab/Palestinian students.  Between the academic years of 2009-10 and 2020-21, the percentage of Arab/Palestinian students enrolled increased significantly:  in undergraduate programs from 13 percent to 19 percent, in master’s degree programs from 7 percent to 15 percent, and in doctoral programs from 5 percent to 7 percent, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics.

According to the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), the gap in funding for Jewish students and Arab/Palestinian students in elementary and middles schools continued to narrow, but the largest gap in funding was found in high schools.  According to IDI, the gap was not solely a result of differences in the Ministry of Education budget, but was also influenced by local government funding and parental contributions.

According to the Secular Forum, growing “religionization” (hadata) of the education system continued, including in textbooks and through programs in schools taught by Orthodox NGOs.  On April 7 the Supreme Court ruled that government funding previously granted to pluralistic Jewish organizations’ activities in secular schools must be “reexamined” after the government cancelled this funding in 2019.  Prior to the ruling, the state only granted such funding to Orthodox organizations, some of which promoted a pro-settler agenda, according to the NGO Molad – The Center for the Renewal of Israeli Democracy.  According to Haaretz, in November, the Ministry of Education reissued its previous policy on funding Jewish organizations’ activities in secular schools and did not comply with the court’s ruling.   The Israel Religious Action Center said the ministry’s actions ignored the court’s ruling and sought to continue a policy that was rejected by the High Court.  The ministry told Haaretz it has begun acting to fulfill the court’s ruling.

Public Hebrew-language state schools taught Jewish history, culture, and some basic religious texts.  Many ultra-Orthodox religious schools in the “recognized but not official” category continued not to offer a basic humanities, mathematics, and science curriculum.  The government, however, included a basic curriculum for public ultra-Orthodox schools.  Public Arabic-speaking schools continued to teach religion classes on the Quran and the Bible to both Muslim and Christian Arab students.  A few independent mixed Jewish-Arab schools also offered religion classes.  For example, the curriculum at the nonprofit school Hand-in-Hand:  Center for Jewish-Arab Education, which received a third of its funding from the government, emphasized commonalities in the holy writings of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

The government funded approximately 34 percent of the budget of Christian school systems in the “recognized but not official” category, in which schools had autonomy over hiring teachers, admitting students, and the use of school property, according to church officials.  The government repeated its offer made in previous years to fully fund Christian schools if they became part of the public school system, but churches rejected this option, stating that, unlike in Orthodox schools, they would lose autonomy over hiring, admitting students, and use of property.  Church leaders criticized the disparity between government funding for their schools and those affiliated with the ultra-Orthodox political parties United Torah Judaism and Shas, which were also categorized as “recognized but not official” but received full government funding.

On August 28, the Jerusalem Post said that, according to a report by the Shoresh Institute, 50 percent of children from the country’s fastest growing sectors (including 43 percent from the ultra-Orthodox and Arab communities) “are getting a third-world education that will not be able to support a first world economy.”  The author of the Shoresh report, Dan Ben-David, said that these and broader challenges facing the country’s school system “turn the national education picture into a ticking time bomb.”

Seventh-day Adventists and others who worshipped on Saturday stated they faced difficulty traveling to their houses of worship in cities in which public transportation was unavailable on Shabbat, including Jerusalem.

Some unrecognized religious groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses and Seventh-day Adventists, received a property tax exemption on their houses of worship, although others, such as Buddhists and the Church of Scientology, did not.

In an October 26 meeting, Interior Minister Ayelet Shaked announced that the northern Druze town of Mughar would receive city status, making it the country’s first majority-Druze city.  Shaked noted that her decision was proof of the “courageous and strong ties between the Druze and Jewish people.” According to the press, the elevation to status as a city would make various planning, economic, and organizational processes easier and would provide greater authority to local officials.  According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, 57.5 percent of the residents of Mughar were Druze while 21.4 percent were Muslims and 21.1 percent Christians.

Christian leaders reported little difficulty obtaining visas for clergy to serve in the country, except for Christian clergy from Arab countries, some of whom reported long delays for, and periodic denials of their visa applications.  The government stated Christian clergy from Arab countries were subject to the same entry laws and similar security procedures as clergy from other parts of the world and that any visa delays or denials were due to security reviews.  The government also said there were some “unavoidable delays” in cases of applicants from countries that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel.  Church officials noted that the clergy visas did not allow the bearer access to basic social benefits such as disability insurance or national health insurance, even for those who had served in the country for more than 30 years.

The MOI appointed and funded approximately half of the Druze and Muslim clerics in the country and continued to train Druze and Muslim clerical employees of the state on how to work with government ministries.  Muslim leaders criticized the MOI for appointing non-Muslims – mostly Druze former military officers – to head the Muslim Affairs Department at the ministry.  Muslim leaders again said the MOI routinely monitored and summoned for “talks” those whom the ministry suspected of opposing government policies.  The government said it did not monitor clerics, but government employees of all faiths were “expected not to incite against the state in their official capacities.”  The government stated the remaining Druze and Muslim clerics were not state employees due to either the preference of the local community or lack of MOI budgetary resources.  Muslim leaders stated sharia court judges, who were Ministry of Justice employees, were their preferred religious representatives.

No Islamic seminaries remained in the country, and students of Islam traveled elsewhere, primarily to Jordan or the West Bank, to study.  The government stated there were “Islamic colleges” in Umm al-Fahm, Baqa’a al-Gharbia, and Kfar Baraa.  Muslim leaders continued to reject this assertion and stated that none of those institutes was an Islamic seminary.

The government continued to promote measures to encourage increased Jewish-Israeli residence and economic development in the thinly populated Negev Desert in the south of the country, including development plans for military industries, railways, the expansion of Road 6, and a phosphate mine.  Civil society organizations criticized government plans, stating they could lead to the displacement of 36,000 Bedouins.  The government made more funding available for government-approved Bedouin cities and towns to relocate Bedouins displaced by economic expansion.

On October 21, Minister of Interior Shaked announced that the government planned to establish 11 new localities in the Negev, including removing planning obstacles regarding the Jewish town of Hiran.

In reports on its website, the NGO Adalah:  The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel continued to state that the government discriminated against the Bedouin residents of the Negev in several ways, including charging those in unrecognized villages the highest water prices in the country; refusing to classify camels as “farm animals”; preventing Bedouin herders from using the grazing land in the region; not addressing overcrowded and unsanitary conditions in local schools; and displacing residents to allow for the expansion of primarily Jewish towns and the relocation or expansion of government military facilities.

In a June 3rd report to the UN Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the Right Adequate Housing, Adalah stated that the government pursued two main policies discriminating against Bedouin citizens living in the Negev:  “denying their historical land rights and instead labelling them as trespassers” and forcibly displacing and …urbanizing them by concentrating them into a limited number of urban/semi-urban townships and recognized villages.”

On October 20, the Supreme Court rejected a petition against the State Attorney’s decision asking that the government reopen an investigation against police officers involved in the 2017 shooting of teacher Yaqub Musa Abu al-Qian.  Police shot Abu al-Qian during an operation to demolish homes in the unrecognized village of Umm al-Hiran, which was scheduled to be replaced by the Orthodox-only Jewish town of Hiran.  In 2020, Adalah and the NGO Public Committee Against Torture in Israel filed the petition with the Supreme Court on behalf of Abu al-Qian’s family.  The court ruled that the State Attorney’s decision and the preliminary investigation procedure conducted by the Department for Investigation of Police Officers indicated that they made their decision after an in-depth examination and extensive collection of evidence, and that there was no need for the court to intervene in the decision.  The NGOs’ petition disputed the details of the government’s account of the incident.

Bedouin residents in Umm al-Hiran continued to not fulfill their obligations, under the 2018 Development and Settlement of Bedouin in the Negev Agreement with the government, to demolish their structures and relocate to vacant plots in the Bedouin town of Hura.  Jewish families sponsored to move into Hiran by the OR Movement, an organization dedicated to expanding the Jewish Israeli population of the Negev and Galilee regions, remained in the forest outside Umm al-Hiran, living in mobile homes donated by the Jewish National Fund, while waiting for village land vacated by Bedouins to become available for them.

In November, the cabinet approved a draft resolution to legalize three unrecognized Bedouin villages in the southern Negev:  Rakhma, Hashm al-Zena, and Abda.  The NGO Negev Coexistence Forum said approximately 4,000 Bedouin lived in the villages.  NGOs subsequently wrote the Labor Ministry asking that it change the text of the government’s resolution, because it included problematic conditions that would “doom it to failure.”  On November 3, the government also said it would establish a new planned Bedouin community in the south.  On December 6, the Knesset completed the first reading of a bill to enable thousands of homes constructed without permits in Arab communities in the Negev and elsewhere to be connected to the country’s electrical grid.

An August 4 report by the State Comptroller said that the Arab/Palestinian Bedouins of the Negev were the most impoverished community in the country, lagging far behind all the others.  The report also noted that, despite the planned investment of billions of shekels over the years, gaps between Bedouin settlements and their neighbors in the Negev continued to grow.  State Comptroller Matanyahu Engelman stated that basic municipal and regional infrastructure for Bedouin communities such as sanitation, water, and electricity as well as sidewalks and roads lagged far behind and that the government “is responsible for increasing governance in the Negev.”  He also said that blame did not lie with local and state authorities alone, but that the Bedouin community shared responsibility for compounding these problems.  The Arab/Palestinian Muslim Ra’am Party demanded greater investment in Bedouin communities.

On May 26, Haaretz reported that the Tel Aviv-Jaffa planning and building committee gave its approval to a plan to legalize the Tasso Muslim cemetery in Jaffa, the only Islamic cemetery in the city.  According to the report, the zoning plan required the approval of the district planning and building committee before it could take effect.

The IDF continued to have only Orthodox Jewish chaplains.  The government employed civilian clergy of different faiths, including Muslim imams, as chaplains at military burials when non-Jewish soldiers died in service.

In some ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods, private organizations posted “modesty signs” demanding women obscure themselves from public view to avoid distracting devout men.  The Beit Shemesh municipality received several extensions from the Supreme Court, which ordered it to remove such signs in 2018.  On July 1, because Beit Shemesh had not removed the signs, the Supreme Court ordered the Attorney General to develop a national enforcement policy within 90 days that would allow the implementation of the court’s verdict, due to the failure at the local level to remove such “modesty signs.”  The court ruled that 30 days after the new policy was in place, fines would be imposed on municipalities for lack of enforcement.

Women’s photos were regularly vandalized in cities with large ultra-Orthodox populations.  The AP reported in October that vandals “widely believed to be ultra-Orthodox extremists” defaced the photograph of a 94-year-old female Holocaust survivor five times since the April start of the outdoor exhibit that included the photo.  According to media reports, due to failed local law enforcement, companies did not include women in their advertisements, to prevent them from being vandalized.  In a December 2020 Knesset hearing, the police stated it had opened 21 investigations following the vandalizing of women’s photos in public spaces between 2018-2020; police closed 19 of these investigation files without charges and transferred one for prosecution.

On January 10, the Supreme Court denied the Chief Rabbinate’s request to hold an additional hearing on a petition by NGOs Adalah and the Secular Forum against a ban on bringing foods forbidden to Jews during Passover (foods with grains or leavening agents, known as hametz) into public hospitals during the holiday.  The court ruled in 2020 that hospitals must allow nonkosher food for those that wanted it during Passover.  On March 10, Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef asked the Attorney General to postpone the ruling’s implementation due to “insufficient preparation time” and to handle the matter by means of legislation.  According to the Secular Forum, most hospitals adhered to the Supreme Court ruling and made nonkosher food available during Passover for staff and patients who wanted it.  However, during March, the Secular Forum wrote two hospitals in Jerusalem and Netanya threatening them with contempt of court charges because they continued to ban hametz in their facilities during Passover, despite the court’s ruling.  In December, the Secular Forum submitted another petition to the Supreme Court demanding to stop a similar ban on allowing external food into military bases during Passover.  The petition was pending at year’s end.

On July 6, the coalition government failed to renew the Law on Citizenship and Entry, resulting in its expiration and paving the way for family reunification of some 3,000 Palestinians and their Israeli citizen spouses.  Under the law, non-Jewish spouses of Israelis from certain countries and the West Bank and Gaza had been denied residency without a special determination from the MOI.  Although the law lapsed, Interior Minister Shaked ordered the ministry to continue functioning as though the law were in place.  On September 14, three NGOs, including HaMoked, petitioned the Court for Administrative Affairs demanding that the MOI respect the consequences brought about by the expiration of the law.  On November 11, the government responded, supporting Shaked’s continued handling of Palestinians’ requests in accordance with the now-expired regulations, stating that Shaked could implement “interim procedures and regulations” until a new law was passed.  No new procedures were published by year’s end, however.  On November 15, the court rejected the three NGOs’ request for an injunction prohibiting the handling of requests based on the expired law.  As a result, the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court on November 17.  At year’s end, both the petition and new legislation remained pending.

According to the NGO HaMoked, there were approximately 10,000 Palestinians living in the country, including in Jerusalem, on temporary stay permits because of the citizenship and entry law, with no legal guarantee they could continue living with their families.  When the previous citizenship and entry law was not renewed and expired in July, HaMoked petitioned the Supreme Court to direct the Ministry of Interior to adjudicate reunification applications.  HaMoked and Israeli media reported that the Ministry of Interior refused to deal with these applications, and as of December, there were 1,680 such applications waiting to be reviewed.  There were also cases of Palestinian spouses of Palestinian residents living in East Jerusalem without legal status.  Some Palestinian residents moved to Jerusalem neighborhoods outside the security barrier to live with their nonresident spouse and children while maintaining Jerusalem residency.  According to Christian religious leaders, this situation remained an especially acute problem for Christians because of their small population and consequent tendency to marry Christians from the West Bank or elsewhere (Christians who hold neither citizenship nor residency).  A Christian religious leader expressed concern that this was a significant element in the continuing decline of the Christian population, including in Jerusalem, which negatively affected the long-term viability of their communities.

According to NGOs, community members, and media commentators, several factors contributed to Christian emigration.  These included political instability, the inability to obtain residency permits for spouses due to the (now expired) 2003 Law of Citizenship and Entry, the limited ability of Christian communities in the Jerusalem area to expand due to building restrictions, the difficulties Christian clergy experienced in obtaining Israeli visas and residency permits, the loss of confidence in the peace process, and economic hardships created by the construction of the security barrier and the imposition of travel restrictions.  The government stated such difficulties stemmed from the “complex political and security reality” and not from any restrictions on the Christian community itself.

The law continued to prevent the Israel Land Authority (ILA), which administered the 93 percent of the country in the public domain, to lease land to foreigners.  In practice, however, foreigners were allowed to lease if they could show they would qualify as Jewish under the Law of Return.  This public land included approximately 12.5 percent owned by the Jewish National Fund (JNF), whose statutes strictly prohibit sale or lease of land to non-Jews.  The application of ILA restrictions continued to limit the ability of Muslim and Christian residents of Jerusalem who were not citizens to purchase property built on state land, including in parts of Jerusalem.  In recent years, however, an increasing number of Palestinian citizens in Jerusalem have acquired property built on ILA-owned land.  During the year, Arab/Palestinian citizens were allowed to place bids on JNF land, but sources stated that the ILA granted the JNF another parcel of land whenever an Arab/ Palestinian citizen of the country won a bid.  Despite a 2018 Supreme Court ruling that the ILA Executive Council must include an Arab/ Palestinian citizen, Druze, or Circassian member to prevent discrimination against non-Jews, there were no members from these groups on the council at year’s end.

The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate continued its legal efforts to block the transfer of properties in Jerusalem’s Old City to Ateret Cohanim, a Jewish organization that signed a 99-year lease for the properties in 2004.  Courts previously ruled in favor of Ateret Cohanim, and in 2020 the district court ruled against reopening the case to hear new evidence brought forward by the Church.  A Supreme Court hearing is set for 2022 to determine if the case should be reopened based upon the new evidence.

On December 12, 13 heads of Christian communities in Jerusalem issued a joint statement entitled, “The Current Threat to the Christian Presence in the Holy Land,” that said, “Christians have become the target of frequent and sustained attacks by fringe radical groups.  Since 2012 there have been countless incidents of physical and verbal assaults against priests and other clergy, attacks on Christian churches, with holy sites regularly vandalized and desecrated, and ongoing intimidation of local Christians who simply seek to worship freely and go about their daily lives.  These tactics are being used by such radical groups in a systematic attempt to drive the Christian community out of Jerusalem and other parts of the Holy Land.”  The statement acknowledged “the declared commitment of the Israeli government to uphold a safe and secure home for Christians in the Holy Land” but said, “It is therefore a matter of grave concern when this national commitment is betrayed by the failure of local politicians, officials and law enforcement agencies to curb the activities of radical groups who regularly intimidate local Christians, assault priests and clergy, and desecrate Holy Sites and church properties.”  The appeal continued, “The principle that the spiritual and cultural character of Jerusalem’s distinct and historic quarters should be protected is already recognized in Israeli law with respect to the Jewish Quarter.  Yet radical groups continue to acquire strategic property in the Christian Quarter, with the aim of diminishing the Christian presence, often using underhanded dealings and intimidation tactics to evict residents from their homes, dramatically decreasing the Christian presence, and further disrupting the historic pilgrim routes between Bethlehem and Jerusalem.”

Haaretz reported that the statement marked the beginning of a campaign that included a dedicated website and articles in the media.  In a statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the allegations made by the Christian leaders were “baseless and distort the reality of the Christian community in Israel” and that the Christians’ joint statement “could lead to violence and bring harm to innocent people.”  In an editorial, Haaretz stated, “The Christian leadership in Jerusalem may be exaggerating the sense of threat against them, to draft support from communities throughout the world… However, this does not justify the government’s irresponsible behavior toward the Christian public.  The government must recognize that the Christian congregations have an important place in Jerusalem’s human mosaic.  The government must pay attention to the needs and problems of Christian communities.”

On December 29, at an annual New Year’s reception for the spiritual and lay leaders of Christian churches and communities, President Herzog affirmed his commitment to freedom of worship and religion in the country.  Herzog said that each of the Christian groups was “a blessing and an integral part” of the country’s mosaic.  He explicitly rejected all forms of racism, discrimination, and extremism as well as any threat to Christian communities in the country.  Interior Minister Shaked also made remarks, saying that the new year offered an opportunity to build new bonds of friendship and cooperation among all religions.

In December, an interministerial team approved a proposal by Minister of Interior Shaked to exempt tourist groups that fell into the category of “Jewish tourism” from entry restrictions associated with the omicron variant of COVID-19.  According to the press, Christian organizations said the decision was unfair especially given the impending Christmas holidays.  According to a lead editorial in Haaretz, “this is a discriminatory exception, not to say a bigoted one.”  In a statement, the Foreign Ministry said, “These unfounded allegations of discriminatory conduct are outrageous, false, and dangerous.”

In April, the news website Al-Monitor reported that then Minister of Tourism Orit Farkash-Hacohen said that after the signing of the Abraham Accords normalizing relations between Israel and four Arab states, “Israel’s tourist branch began preparing for Muslim tourism.”  Senior ministry officials said the ministry was expecting tens of thousands of Muslim tourists in the upcoming months and that the ministry was mapping religious Islamic sites throughout the country.

In a December Hebrew-language press interview, Arab Muslim MK and member of the governing coalition Mansour Abbas told journalist Mohammad Magadli, “The State of Israel was born as a Jewish state, and the question is how we integrate Arab society into it.”  Responding to Magadli’s comment that no Arab MK ever said such a thing before, Abbas replied: “I was at a demonstration against the Nation State Law, and I don’t want to mislead anyone.  The question is: ‘What is the status of an Arab citizen in the Jewish state of Israel?’  That’s the question.  So the challenge now is not just for Mansour Abbas, but for the Jewish public and the Jewish citizen.”  According to Haaretz, Abbas’s remarks resulted in an immediate backlash.  Masoud Ghanim, former head of the United Arab List (UAL), the bloc of parties that traditionally represented Arab constituencies in the Knesset, said “We in the movement and the party do not recognize the state as Jewish.  Of course, we do not deny the reality in which the State of Israel defines itself as Jewish, but we do not accept or recognize this reality.”  Ayman Odeh, the chairman of the Joint List, which served as an umbrella group for four Arab parties until the UAL left the group in January, said, “This is our homeland, citizens by right, and we will work for the state to be egalitarian and democratic.”

Under the Israeli Antiquities Law, excavations within a sacred site require the approval of a ministerial committee, which includes the Ministers of Culture, Justice, and Religious Affairs.  The government stated that Israel Antiquities Authority (IAA) researchers “have greatly intensified their research on ‘non-Jewish’ periods in the history of the land of Israel, [including] the Prehistoric, Early Bronze, Byzantine, Muslim, Mamluk, and Ottoman periods.”  Palestinian residents of Jerusalem and Muslim leaders continued to protest archaeological excavations and construction work done at the City of David National Park in the Silwan neighborhood outside the Old City, and in the Old City near the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, including an elevator for persons with disabilities being installed at the rear of the Western Wall Plaza.  Some NGOs monitoring archaeological practices in Jerusalem continued to state the IAA emphasized archaeological finds that bolstered Jewish claims while minimizing historically significant archaeological finds of other religions.  Archeologists from Emek Shaveh continued to dispute the government’s representation of the “Pilgrimage Road,” a tunnel dug by the IAA and inaugurated in Silwan in 2019 as being historically part of the pilgrimage route to the Jewish Second Temple.  Emek Shaveh said the excavation method did not establish with certainty the date and purpose of the road.  NGOs such as the City of David Foundation (EL-AD) and the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies continued to concur with the government’s position.

According to Haaretz, an interagency meeting in the spring organized by the Justice Ministry’s director general found that the government was not adequately enforcing a ban on polygamy among the Bedouin population.  A presentation at the meeting said that hundreds of polygamous men were detected in recent years, without consequences.  The director of the country’s sharia courts, Iyad Zahalka, said all polygamous marriages must be registered in a sharia court.

At year’s end, the 120-member Knesset had 13 members from religious minorities (nine Muslims, three Druze, and one Christian), compared with 18 religious minority members (11 Muslims, five Druze, and two Christians) in the previous Knesset.  There was one Muslim member of the cabinet, but no Druze or Christians.  In June, then Jewish Agency Chairman Herzog appointed Gadeer Kamal-Mreeh, a Druze woman and former MK, to be the senior representative for the Jewish Agency in Washington, D.C.

President Herzog hosted Muslim, Jewish, Christian, Druze, and Baha’i leaders to issue a joint call for worldwide vaccination against COVID-19.  In a joint statement, the leaders said that “saving the life of any human being – all created in the image of God – is the greatest religious obligation of all” and, “it is manifestly clear that the mass vaccination of entire populations is our primary tool for defeating this terrible pandemic.”

Because religious and national identities were often closely linked, it was often difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

In September, authorities charged Muad Hib with murder for killing his mother and hiding her body in August, after she converted from Islam to Orthodox Christianity.  Prosecutors stated that her conversion was the motive for the killing.

Amid tensions in Jerusalem and violence in Gaza, ethnic-based violence and civil unrest broke out during a one-week period in May in a number of mixed Jewish-Arab cities in the country, including Lod, Acre, Jaffa, Haifa, and Ramle.  Incidents of violence included automobile vandalism; gunshots fired at a group of Jewish individuals, stone throwing by both Jewish and Arab protestors; arson attacks on synagogues; and desecration of Muslim gravestones.  Armed Jewish Israelis clashed with Palestinians in East Jerusalem neighborhoods.  Responding to the violence, the government reassigned additional security personnel, including border police from the West Bank, to augment INP personnel.  The INP reported it made approximately 1,550 arrests, with the overwhelming majority of the arrestees being Arab/Palestinian citizens.  Security officials said the arrested Jewish citizens were predominately “middle-aged nationalist extremists.”

On May 12 in the mixed Jewish-Arab town of Lod, Jews shot and killed Moussa Hassouna in clashes between residents.  Later on May 12, Arab/Palestinian citizens in Lod stoned the car of Jewish resident Yigal Yehoshua who died on May 17 after being hit in the head with a thrown brick.  In the northern city of Acre on May 11, Arab/Palestinian citizens set fire to a hotel leading to the death of 84 year-old retiree Aby Har-Even on June 6.  On May 19, teenager Mohammed Mahamid Kiwan died after he was shot on May 18 at the Mei Ami junction on Route 65.  His family said police were responsible.

According to the Lod Municipality, Arab/Palestinian citizens perpetrated five arson attacks against four synagogues in the city, and shattered windows of two additional synagogues.  Media reported that Jewish individuals threw stones at worshippers at the Lod Dahmash Mosque on May 12 during prayer time and shattered the windows of the mosque.  On May 13, unknown individuals desecrated an Islamic Cemetery in Lod, tried to set it on fire, and broke 10 of its gravestones.

In the aftermath of the civil unrest, the state filed indictments against 150 persons.  Some NGOs said most were against Arab/Palestinian citizens and expressed concern that the INP disproportionately targeted Arab/Palestinian citizens.  A significant number of demonstrations calling for calm and coexistence were held in multiple cities after the civil unrest.

On September 9, three minors attacked a worshipper and caused damage to a synagogue in Acre.  The police later arrested and released the suspects to house arrest.

In April, during the period leading up to the civil unrest, Palestinian youth in Jerusalem physically attacked ultra-Orthodox individuals and posted the attacks on the social media app TikTok.  The first video of a young Palestinian Jerusalemite slapping a Yeshiva student on the Jerusalem Light Rail was posted on the social network on April 15.  According to the government, the police opened 14 investigations and arrested 31 suspects for being involved in such attacks.  Four of the cases led to indictments, and one suspect was convicted and sentenced to 10 months imprisonment, six months probation and a fine of 2,500 shekels ($810).  On July 1, police arrested Palestinian Jerusalemites for defiling graves in the Har Hamenuchot Cemetery while filming themselves on TikTok.

Racial and religiously motivated attacks by Jewish individuals and groups continued to take place during the year against individuals – particularly Arab/Palestinian citizens of the country and Palestinians of the West Bank and their property – with the stated purpose of exacting a “price” for actions taken by the government against the attackers’ interests.  The attacks occurred against both Christian and Muslim targets.  The NGO Tag Meir continued to organize visits to areas where these attacks occurred and sponsored activities promoting tolerance in response to the attacks.  On March 12, Jewish individuals set cars on fire and sprayed graffiti with a Star of David and the writing: “enough with intermarriage” in the village of Ein Naqquba in the central part of the country.

According to Tag Meir, the assailants also poured gasoline on the home of two families, including on the window of the room of a six-year-old and a seven-year-old, and tried to set it on fire.  Tag Meir stated that “only a miracle” prevented a disaster similar to that of the 2015 Duma arson attack in the West Bank, which resulted in the death of a Palestinian couple and their infant child.  The INP opened an investigation on March 12.

On March 25, unknown individuals spray-painted the words “deport or kill” on a car in the predominantly Arab town of Kfar Qasim.  They also punctured the tires of dozens of cars and spray-painted Stars of David on them.  Police opened an investigation into the case.

On March 1, unknown assailants set fire to the entrance of the monastery of the Romanian Church in Jerusalem near the ultra-Orthodox Jewish neighborhood of Mea Shearim.  The local priest put out the fire quickly.  According to Church officials, this was the fourth act of vandalism in 2021 that targeted the same monastery.  Christian representatives said they believed religious Orthodox Jews were the probable assailants.  The Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem said the arson was “a sign of hatred for the Christian religion” among some Israelis.

On April 5, arson attacks took place against two synagogues in Bnei Brak and Ramat Gan.  On May 8, according to media reports, police arrested an individual from Rosh HaAyn for committing the attacks.

Swastikas were painted on synagogues several times during the year.  On July 31, unknown individuals painted swastikas on the structures of two synagogues in Bnei Brak.  The individuals also left photos of Shira Banki, a 16-year-old who was stabbed to death at the Jerusalem Pride Parade in 2015, at the sites.  On August 26, individuals painted swastikas on the door of a Tel Aviv synagogue.

On November 6, ultra-Orthodox Rabbi Meir Mazuz said that Jews from the former Soviet Union and Reform Jews were nonbelievers who were destroying Judaism in the country.

Christian clergy and pilgrims continued to report instances of ultra-Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem harassing or spitting on them.

During the year, ultra-Orthodox women attacked members of Women of the Wall during their monthly prayers at the Western Wall.  For example, on June 11, ultra-Orthodox protesters shredded and desecrated dozens of prayer books belonging to Women of the Wall.

On July 17, during the Jewish holiday of Tisha B’Av, a day of fasting when Jews commemorate the destruction of the temples, activists of Liba Yehudit, a national-ultra-Orthodox NGO described by Haaretz as “ultra-extreme,” put up a makeshift partition in the middle of the egalitarian prayer area of the Western Wall Plaza, intended to divide those praying by gender, and yelled and cursed to disrupt those praying there for the holiday.  According to Haaretz, “hundreds of right-wing, Orthodox Jews, mostly teenagers” disrupted the reading of the Book of Lamentations by a female member of the Conservative movement, which organized the annual event.  Haaretz described Liba as “an extreme right-wing group, which has been trying to prevent the non-Orthodox from having access to a new and revamped prayer plaza at the southern end of the site.”

On July 18, on Tisha B’Av, Prime Minister Bennett tweeted thanks to the Public Security Minister and the Israel Police Inspector General for “maintaining freedom of worship for Jews on the Mount.”  On November 19, the Prime Minister’s Office said that the government’s policy regarding the status quo at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, which prohibits non-Islamic worship, had not changed and what Bennett actually meant was that both Jews and Muslims had “freedom of visitation rights.”

In March, during Passover, an unknown individual spread hametz outside of synagogues in Bnei Brak and Ramat Gan.

According to missionary organizations, societal attitudes toward missionary activities and conversion to other religions continued to be negative.  Some Jews continued to oppose missionary activity directed at Jews, saying it amounted to religious harassment, and reacted with hostility toward Jewish converts to Christianity, such as Messianic Jews.

On June 2, according to Jehovah’s Witnesses, police closed an investigation of a 2019 complaint regarding an attack on two Jehovah’s Witnesses members during door-to-door activity in Bat Yam.  The police stated there were no grounds for a further criminal investigation.  After the initial complaint was filed, police summoned one of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and told her that the individual who had attacked her later submitted a complaint against her for making threats and trespassing in her efforts to convert him to Christianity.

According to media reports, members of the NGO Lehava used violence and incited violence against Palestinians and Arab/Palestinian citizens of the country during the period of civil unrest in May.

Lehava continued to criticize or assault Arab men who were in relationships with Jewish women and to harass “mixed” couples.  On June 9, the police interrogated Lehava Director Ben-Zion Gopstein on suspicion of incitement to violence following posts in social media regarding intermarriage.  A trial against Gopstein for offenses of incitement to terrorism, violence, and racism, which began in 2020, was ongoing at year’s end.

The NGO Yad L’Achim continued to disrupt instances of cohabitation between Jewish women and Arab men and viewed itself as a “Jewish rescue corps” which recovers Jewish women from “hostile” Arab villages, according to Yad L’Achim’s website.

In October, the Jerusalem Post reported that police arrested several members of La Familia, often described in the press as an ultranationalist fan club for the Beitar Jerusalem soccer team, following the group’s violent attack on a fan who was cheering the team’s Muslim player.  In May, a court agreed to a request by the team, which disavowed La Familia, to ban three of the group’s leaders from attending the team’s games.

There continued to be reports of ultra-Orthodox Jews in public areas of their neighborhoods harassing individuals who did not conform to Jewish Orthodox traditions, such as driving on Shabbat or wearing clothing that they perceived as immodest.  The harassment included verbal abuse, spitting, and throwing stones, and kicking cars driving on Shabbat.

Tension continued between the ultra-Orthodox community and other citizens, including concerns related to service in the IDF, housing, public transportation, participation in the workforce, and adherence to COVID-19 regulations.

On April 30, a deadly stampede occurred at Mt. Meron during the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai on the Jewish holiday of Lag BaOmer, with an estimated 100,000 persons in attendance.  Press reports stated that 45 men and boys were killed, and approximately 150 were injured in the deadliest civil disaster in the country’s history.  Many commentators suggested the ultra-Orthodox community’s extensive autonomy in the country was a major contributing factor to the catastrophe, with ultra-Orthodox MK Moshe Gafni (United Torah Judaism) calling for greater government control over the pilgrimage site.  On June 20, the government approved the establishment of a state commission of inquiry into the event.

Although the Chief Rabbinate and rabbis of many ultra-Orthodox denominations continued to discourage Jewish visits to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount site due to the ongoing halakhic (Jewish legal) debate about whether it is permissible or forbidden for Jews to enter the Temple Mount, some Orthodox rabbis continued to say entering the site was permissible.  Many among the self-identified “national religious” Zionist community stated they found meaning in visiting the site.  Groups such as the Temple Institute and Yaraeh continued to call for increased Jewish access and prayer there as well as the construction of the third Jewish temple on the site.  In some cases, Israeli police prevented individuals from praying and removed them; in other cases, reported by the Waqf, on social media, and by NGOs, police appeared not to notice the activity.

According to local media, some Jewish groups escorted by Israeli police performed religious acts such as prayers and prostration.  Some Jewish visitors publicly noted that the INP was more permissive to them in permitting silent prayer.

NGOs reported that some LGBTQI+ minors who revealed their sexual orientation in religious communities faced expulsion from their homes and stigmatization by rabbis.  NGOs noted reports of mental illness among the LGBTQI+ minor community because of this treatment, leading some to attempt suicide.  Other NGOs noted that an increasing number of rabbis, educators, and community leaders in Orthodox Jewish communities were adopting a more inclusive approach to LGBTQI+ minors.

Several religious NGOs, Orthodox and non-Orthodox, conducted private, unrecognized religious services such as marriages and conversions, and issued unrecognized Kashrut certificates to provide an alternative to the Chief Rabbinate for Jews who could not or did not want to use the Rabbinate’s services.  According to the NGO Panim, 2,486 weddings took place outside of the rabbinate’s authority in 2019, compared with 2,610 in 2018.  These included unofficial Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and secular ceremonies.

According to Bar Ilan University’s Rackman Center for the Advancement of the Status of Women, thousands of Jewish women were trapped in various stages of informal or formal get refusals, especially in the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox communities.  The Rackman Center stated that in some instances a woman’s husband made granting a get contingent on his wife conceding to extortionate demands, such as those relating to property ownership or child custody.  According to the Center for Women’s Justice, one in three Jewish women who divorced faced such demands.

NGOs, including Mavoi Satum and Itim, promoted the use of prenuptial agreements to prevent cases of aginut (in which a woman whose husband is unwilling or unable to grant her a get).  Such agreements provide financial incentives paid by a refusing spouse until the termination of the marriage.

Analysis by Natanel Fisher at the Sha’arei Mishpat Academic College of Law and Science based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics found that approximately 85,000 married couples in Israel, constituting 7 percent of all married couples in the country, involved a Jewish and a non-Jewish partner.  In 90 percent of the cases, the non-Jewish partner was “without religious classification,” in most cases from the former Soviet Union, and while many of them consider themselves Jewish, the rabbinate did not recognize them as such.  The article stated that nearly 60 percent, or 52,000 out of 87,000 such couples involve a woman who is not Jewish, which means that their children would not be considered Jewish either.

A variety of NGOs continued to try to build understanding and create dialogue among religious groups and between religious and secular Jewish communities, including Neve Shalom-Wahat al-Salam, the Abraham Fund Initiative, Givat Haviva, the Hagar and Hand-in-Hand integrated Jewish-Arab bilingual schools, Hiddush, Israeli Religious Action Center, Mosaica, Tag Meir, and Interfaith Encounter Association.  For example, the number of children studying at integrated Yad BeYad Jewish-Arab schools in the school year beginning in September was 2,000, up from 1,800 in the previous year.

Despite the labor law, some foreign domestic workers stated that some employers did not allow their domestic workers to take off their weekly day of worship.

In April, the news website Al-Monitor reported that approximately 20 families from the Gur Hasidic community had bought apartments in the southern city of Dimona.  In response, one resident wrote on social media, “It’s not suitable… An extreme group like this can only ruin it.”  Dimona’s mayor, in a radio interview, suggested that the Gur Hasidim should go elsewhere.

In its annual Israel Religion and State Index poll of 800 adult Jews conducted in July and published in September, the NGO Hiddush reported that 65 percent of respondents, the same result as the 2020 poll, identified as either “secular” (48 percent) or “traditional-not-religious” (17 percent), with positions regarding public policy on religion and state close to the positions of secular Israelis.  Of those surveyed, 81 percent supported freedom of religion and conscience, and 59 percent supported the separation of religion and state.  Sixty-one percent supported equal status for the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform traditions.  A large majority did not see the need for religious conversion approved by the Chief Rabbinate as a condition for the state to recognize the Judaism of new immigrants, with 35 percent considering conversion via the Chief Rabbinate necessary, compared with 34 percent in the previous year.  Thirty-five percent stated immigrants should be recognized as Jewish if they identify as such, and 35 percent stated immigrants should be recognized as Jewish if they undergo either an Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform conversion.  Of those surveyed, 23 percent accepted the position of the ultra-Orthodox parties that yeshiva students should be exempted from military or civic service.

According to the Hiddush poll, 63 percent of the country’s adult Jewish population supported recognition by the state of freedom of choice in marriage, doing away with the rabbinate’s monopoly, and equally recognizing civil and non-Orthodox religious marriages.  According to the same survey, 51 percent of the public stated that had they been allowed a choice, they would not have married in an Orthodox ceremony, compared with 35 percent who expressed the same sentiment in 2009, 39 percent in 2013, and 47 percent in 2016.  Eighty-one percent supported freedom of religion and conscience while 59 percent supported separation of religion and state.  According to the poll, the majority (73 percent) did not observe Shabbat according to religious law.

In a report released December 22, the government’s Central Bureau of Statistics stated that 84 percent of the country’s Christian community said that they were satisfied with life in the country.  Also, according to the study, Arab Christian women had some of the highest education rates in the country.

In meetings with Israeli government officials, the Ambassador, Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials stressed the importance of religious pluralism and respect for all religious groups.  Numerous high-level U.S. officials made formal stops at Yad Vashem, the Holocaust remembrance site, to keep a public spotlight on antisemitism and highlight religious tolerance.  The U.S. Secretary of Defense visited Yad Vashem in April and the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations visited the site in November.  The U.S. Ambassador’s first official event was to Yad Vashem on December 2, shortly after his arrival in Israel, and he publicly condemned antisemitism on social media.

In November, the Charge d’Affaires hosted an interfaith reception for representatives of the country’s diverse religious groups.

Senior U.S. officials spoke publicly about the importance of maintaining the status quo at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and conveyed this message in meetings with government officials.  Throughout the year, embassy officials used social media platforms to express U.S. support for tolerance and the importance of openness to members of other religious groups.  Embassy officials advocated for the right of persons from all faiths to practice their religion peacefully while also respecting the beliefs and customs of their neighbors.  The embassy also issued public statements condemning attacks on places of worship.

Embassy-supported initiatives focused on interreligious dialogue and community development and advocated a shared society for Arab and Jewish populations.  One project was the Jerusalem Intercultural Center for an interreligious community economic development program in the Old City.  Another project brought together three interfaith groups in Jerusalem’s Jewish and Palestinian neighborhoods to meet with U.S. experts, coordinators, and fellow interfaith groups to transform attitudes through constructive conversations on each religion’s similarities and differences.

The embassy also promoted the reduction of tensions between religious communities and an increase in interreligious communication and partnerships by bringing together representatives of many faith communities to advance shared goals and exchange knowledge and experience.  Embassy programs supported mixed Jewish-Arab educational and community initiatives to reduce societal tensions and violence through sports, the arts, environmental projects, and entrepreneurship.

Continuing embassy initiatives included a project by the Citizens Accord Forum that brought together Bedouins and Jews of Ethiopian descent to address violence and build strong relationships between their communities.  Both Ethiopian and Bedouin religious leaders were interviewed about the principles of their Shmagloch and Sulha methods (traditional conflict resolution methods of the respective communities), with the interviews recorded and broadcast at an online convention in August.  Embassy support to the Tag Meir Forum continued to provide joint training sessions for Muslim and Jewish teachers to promote interreligious tolerance in classrooms.

The embassy worked to mitigate interreligious and intercommunal tensions between the country’s non-Jewish and Jewish citizens through the greater integration of the Arab minority into the broader national economy, especially the high-tech sector.

Throughout the year, the embassy highlighted events, programs, religious holidays and observances, and news related to interfaith dialogue and religious freedom across embassy social media platforms and in conversations with reporters.

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West Bank and Gaza

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 62.4 million (midyear 2021).  A 2020 study by the independent research center The Center for Studies of New Religions (CESNUR) estimates 67 percent of the population is Catholic, 24 percent atheist or agnostic, 5 percent non-Catholic Christian, 4 percent Muslim, and 1 percent followers of other religions.  Non-Catholic Christian groups include Eastern Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Assemblies of God, the Methodist and Waldensian Churches, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ), the Union of Pentecostal Churches, and several other smaller Protestant groups, including other evangelical Christian groups.  According to the national branch of the Church of Jesus Christ, there are approximately 26,000 adherents in the country.  CESNUR also estimates that non-Christian religious groups that together account for less than 10 percent of the population include Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Baha’is, Buddhists, Sikhs, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, and Ananda Marga Pracaraka Samgha, an Indian spiritual movement.  According to a 2020 study conducted by SWG, an independent research center, 50 percent of the population identifies as Catholic, 25 percent identifies as atheist or agnostic, 17 percent other religious groups and 8 percent unaffiliated.

The UCEI estimates that the Jewish population numbers 28,000.  According to the legal counsel of the Italian Federation of Progressive Judaism, the organization has between 500 and 600 members.

According to CESNUR, approximately 1.76 million foreign Muslims and 500,000 Italian Muslims – almost 4 percent of the population – live in the country.  According to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the National Agency for Statistics (ISTAT), most growth in the Muslim population comes from large numbers of immigrants from Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, the majority of whom live in the north.  Muslims with Moroccan and Albanian roots make up the largest established groups, while Tunisia and Bangladesh are increasingly prominent sources of Muslims arriving as seaborne migrants.  The MOI reports Muslims in the country are overwhelmingly Sunni.

Legal Framework

The constitution states all citizens are equal before the law regardless of religion and are free to profess their beliefs in any form, individually or with others, and to promote and celebrate rites in public or in private, provided they are not offensive to public morality.  According to the constitution, each religious community has the right to establish its own institutions according to its own statutes if these do not conflict with the law.  The constitution stipulates the state may not impose special limitations or taxes on the establishment or activities of groups because of their religious nature or aims.  The constitution specifies the state and the Catholic Church are independent of each other, and treaties, including a concordat between the government and the Holy See, govern their relations.

The country’s penal code contains an unenforced article on blasphemy, classifying public insults against religions or against religious followers as administrative offenses punishable by a fine ranging from 51 to 309 euros ($58-$350).  The penal code punishes other public offenses to religion, such as offenses against objects used for religious rites or offenses expressed during religious ceremonies, with a fine of up to 5,000 euros ($5,700) or a prison sentence of up to two years.  Those who destroy or violate objects used for religious ceremonies may be punished with up to two years in prison.

The constitution states all religious groups are equally free, and relations between the state and non-Catholic groups, including state support, are governed by agreements (“accords”) between them.  Relations between the state and the Catholic Church are governed by a concordat between the government and the Holy See.  Representatives of a non-Catholic faith requesting an accord must first submit their request to the Office of the Prime Minister.  The government and the group’s representatives then negotiate a draft agreement, which the Council of Ministers must approve.  The Prime Minister then signs and submits the agreement to parliament for final approval.  Twelve groups have an accord:  The Confederation of Methodist and Waldensian Churches, Seventh-day Adventists, Assemblies of God, Jews, Baptists, Lutherans, Church of Jesus Christ, Orthodox Church of the Constantinople Patriarchate, Italian Apostolic Church, Buddhist Union, Soka Gakkai Buddhists, and Hindus.

The law provides religious groups with tax-exempt status and the right to recognition as legal entities once they have completed the registration process with the MOI.  Legal registration is a prerequisite for any group seeking an accord with the government.  A religious group may apply for registration by submitting to a prefect (the local representative of the MOI) an official request that includes the group’s statutes; a report on its goals and activities; information on its administrative offices; a three-year budget; certification of its credit status by a bank; and certification of the Italian citizenship or legal residency of its head.  To be approved, a group’s statutes must not conflict with the law.  Once approved, the group must submit to MOI administrative monitoring, including oversight of its budget and internal organization.  The MOI may appoint a commissioner to administer the group if it identifies irregularities in its activities.  Religious groups that are not registered may still operate legally as cultural associations and obtain tax-exempt status, legal recognition of marriages, access to hospitals and prisons, and other benefits, but those benefits are more easily obtained if a group has an accord with the government.  The Catholic Church is the only legally recognized group exempted from MOI monitoring in accordance with the concordat between the government and the Holy See.

An accord grants clergy automatic access to state hospitals, prisons, and military barracks, allows for civil registry of religious marriages, facilitates special religious practices regarding funerals, and exempts students from school attendance on religious holidays.  Any religious group without an accord may request these benefits from the MOI on a case-by-case basis.  An accord also allows a religious group to receive funds collected by the state through a voluntary 0.8 percent of personal income tax set-aside on taxpayer returns.  Taxpayers may specify to which eligible religious group they would like to direct these funds.

National law does not restrict religious face coverings, but some local authorities impose restrictions.  Regional laws in Liguria, Veneto, and Lombardy prohibit the wearing of burqas and niqabs in public buildings and institutions, including hospitals.

The concordat with the Holy See provides for the Catholic Church to select teachers, paid by the state, to provide instruction in weekly “hour of religion” courses taught in public schools.  The courses are optional, and students who do not wish to attend may study other subjects, or in certain cases, leave school early with parental consent.  Church-selected instructors are lay or religious, and the instruction includes material determined by the state and relevant to both Catholics and non-Catholic religious groups.  Government funding is available for only these Catholic Church-approved teachers.  If a student requests a religion class from a non-Catholic religious group, that group must provide the teacher and cover the cost of instruction; it is not required to seek government approval for the content of the class.  Some local laws provide scholarship funding for students to attend private, religiously affiliated schools, usually but not always Catholic, that meet government educational standards.

Schools are categorized as state-owned, state-equivalent, or private.  The “state-equivalent” category includes public (municipal, provincial, regional, or owned by another public entity) and some private schools, which may be religiously affiliated.  All state-equivalent schools receive government funding if they meet criteria and standards published every year by the Ministry of Education.  The funding is released through the ministry’s regional offices.  Religious entities operate most private schools, and private schools may not issue certificates or diplomas.  Private school students must take final annual exams in state-owned or state-equivalent schools.

A 2019 Lombardy regional law prohibits local authorities from dividing burial plots by religious belief, although local authorities have at times made exceptions.

According to law, hate speech, including instances motivated by religious hatred, is punishable by up to four years in prison.  This law also applies to denial of genocide or crimes against humanity.

All missionaries and other foreign religious workers from countries that are not European Union members or signatories of the Schengen Agreement must apply for special religious activity visas before arriving in the country.  An applicant must attach an invitation letter from his or her religious group to the application.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to the MOI, during the year, it expelled at least 46 persons, reportedly mostly because of what the ministry stated was their violent extremist opinions and their efforts to radicalize Muslims.  On August 30, press reported that the MOI expelled a Tunisian preacher, Mohammed Bezaraa, for expressing extremist views during his sermons in several Islamic cultural centers in Vicenza.  A member of the local Muslim community said he agreed with Bezaraa’s expulsion, stating that some of the Islamic cultural centers in the country had “provided platforms for false imams to spout nonsense without meaning and without any theological basis.”

According to leaders of the Islamic Cultural Center of Italy, the government once again did not make significant progress on reaching an accord with the Muslim community, despite dialogue underway with various Islamic religious entities.  The MOI continued to recognize only the Islamic Cultural Center of Italy, which administers the Great Mosque of Rome, as a legal religious entity, making it the only Islamic entity eligible to sign an accord with the government.  The government continued to recognize other Muslim groups as nonprofit organizations.

On May 29, the Senate Extraordinary Committee to Fight Intolerance, Antisemitism, and Hate Crimes launched an investigation into the nature and the root causes of hate speech.  The committee said it would recommend legal measures and policies to prevent hate crimes against religious minorities.  During a parliamentary hearing, Amnesty International presented the results of a 2020 study of 36,269 tweets, showing that 55 tweets contained hate speech and 2,117 had offensive or discriminatory content against religious minorities.

Regional governments and Muslim religious authorities continued to recognize five mosques, one each in Colle Val d’Elsa (in Tuscany), Milan, and Rome, and two in the Emilia-Romagna Region, in Ravenna and Forli, respectively.  In addition, local governments continued to recognize many sites as Islamic places of worship, although Muslim authorities stated these were not considered full-fledged mosques because they lacked minarets or other key architectural features such as domes.

According to weekly magazine Panorama, there were also an estimated 800 to 1,200 unofficial, informal places of worship for Muslims in 2019 (the most recent figure), known colloquially as “garage” mosques.  According to press reports, authorities allowed most to operate, but they did not officially recognize them as places of worship.

According to media reports, Muslim leaders stated they continued to experience difficulty obtaining permission from local governments to construct mosques.  Local officials continued to cite lack of zoning plans allowing for the establishment of places of worship on specific sites as a reason for denying construction permits, rather than anti-Muslim sentiment.  Some Muslim leaders, however, stated they believed some local authorities were using all possible legal means to block the construction of new mosques in their regions.

According to media reports, informal mosques, including in warehouses, continued to operate in Milan, and worshippers did not adhere to government mandated COVID-19 restrictions limiting public gatherings.  In 2020, the European Court for Human Rights had ruled as admissible the appeal of Abu Hanif Patwery, president of the Bangladesh Cultural and Welfare Association, against the city of Milan for the association’s having contracted a company to convert a storage site into a place of worship.

Media reported that on April 15, the city of Pisa authorized the construction of a mosque.  The decision followed the July 2020 ruling of the Tuscany Regional Administrative Court to annul city council plans in 2019 that prevented the Pisa Islamic Association from building a mosque on land it had purchased.  Pisa city officials had stated at the time that the lot was not large enough for the planned building, while a local imam said the city council had always been hostile to the mosque’s construction.  In July, the Pisa Islamic Association launched a crowdfunding campaign to build the facility.

On April 20, the city of Fermignano modified its zoning plan to officially recognize the headquarters of the local Islamic Cultural Association as a place of worship.  On May 6, Fermignano mayor Emanuele Feduzi stated that the decision “was a sign of civilization; we couldn’t disregard the request of the Muslim community.  Local authorities were also the first in the province [of Pesaro e Urbino] to grant cemetery spaces to religious minorities during the pandemic, a decision that has been a source of inspiration for several other cities.”

On May 6, the city of Florence signed an agreement with the local Muslim community providing two venues to be used as temporary places of worship for five years.  Local authorities also requested the religious community specify the location where it intended to build a permanent mosque, after which the city would review the application.

On July 20, the Council of State (the highest administrative court) ruled that a warehouse bought by the Islamic Association Assalam in Cantu in 2014 could not be used as a place of worship because of zoning restrictions that did not allow religious services.  The ruling was final, and no further appeal was possible.  On June 8, local authorities in Sesto San Giovanni, a municipality in Milan, approved a provision of the zoning plan banning the construction of a mosque proposed by the local Muslim community.

In September, local press reported that the Italian Islamic Confederation had purchased a facility from the city of Turin.  According to a confederation representative, the facility would be restructured to host a mosque, to provide community services open to all regardless of religious affiliation, and to include classrooms to be made available to two local universities.

According to media, on September 1, the Council of State overruled a 2020 ruling by the Veneto Regional Administrative Court that had invalidated the Monfalcone Municipality’s decision to block the conversion of a supermarket into a mosque.  The municipality had concluded that the building was inappropriate for religious services because the building, located in a seismically vulnerable area, was structurally unsound, and the Council of State agreed with the regional court.  A local Muslim association had purchased the facility in 2017 and requested authorization to convert it into a mosque in 2019; however, the city stated that the property had been condemned and the requirements for construction had not been met.

Local governments continued to rent out public land at discounted rates to non-Muslim religious groups, usually Catholic, for constructing places of worship.  Government funding also helped preserve and maintain historic places of worship, which were almost all Catholic.  In September, Vicenza municipal authorities transferred a municipal facility to a Catholic parish for its use for nine years, with an annual rent of 120 euros ($140).

Approximately 60 local governments maintained dedicated burial spaces for Muslims.  Muslim associations reported there were insufficient spaces to meet the needs of Muslim communities in Lombardy, Lazio, and other regions.  The associations said that during the COVID-19 lockdown in place from March through May of 2020, the bodies of several Muslims could not be moved to their countries of origin, placing additional stress on the limited dedicated Islamic burial spaces in Italian cemeteries.

In March, despite a regional provision in Lombardy forbidding the separation of burial plots according to religious belief, municipal authorities dedicated burial plots to the local Muslim community in Desio.

On May 18, the president of the Madni Dar Ul-Islam Muslim cultural association requested local authorities in Brescia to authorize the construction of an Islamic burial space.

In September, the Lombardy Regional Administrative Court overturned a decision by the city of Magenta that denied a Muslim association’s request for space to establish an Islamic cemetery.  Despite the ruling, local authorities did not provide dedicated spaces to the local Muslim community by year’s end.  On September 12, a group of Islamic cultural associations urgently requested additional dedicated burial areas for Muslims in Monza.

On September 9, the Court of Cassation ruled that the constitution neither prohibits nor requires the hanging of a crucifix in classrooms.  The court had censured a school principal in Terni who had ordered the hanging of a crucifix in a public school classroom in 2008 and 2009 as requested by the assembly of students.  The court ruled, “The school community should evaluate and autonomously decide to hang [a crucifix], respecting the beliefs of all, hanging other religious symbols [when requested] and pursuing reasonable arrangements to promote the coexistence of diversities.”

Politicians from several parties, including the League and Brothers of Italy, and from representatives of Casa Pound, a political association widely considered to be far-right, again made statements critical of Islam.  During a rally in the town of Pinerolo on August 28, League Party leader Salvini stated, “The literal implementation of the Quran is incompatible with our democratic society.  Also the Bible?  No, we, as Christians and Catholics, we ended with stakes and the Inquisition some centuries ago.”  He concluded, “The Quran and Islam are incompatible with our civil and democratic rights.”

On February 18, a Turin prosecutor opened an investigation of municipal councilor Monica Amore of the Five Star Movement for possible defamation motivated by racial hatred.  Amore had published a cartoon depicting a collage of newspapers of the Gedi media conglomerate and the drawings of two Jews with caricatured noses, kippahs, and the Star of David on social media.  On March 30, the Jewish community withdrew the complaint after receiving a letter of apology from Amore and other parliamentarians of the Five Star Movement.

On January 27, Holocaust Remembrance Day, President Sergio Mattarella hosted a ceremony to commemorate the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp and stressed “the need to remember as a duty of civilization and as a foundation of the constitution.”

In a January 27 Facebook post, Milan mayor Beppe Sala wrote, “Being a community means remaining vigilant against a common enemy that threatens our society.  We will never turn our back in front of hate.”

On September 30, Prime Minister Mario Draghi and Senator-for-Life and Holocaust survivor Liliana Segre visited the Holocaust Memorial in Milan.  Draghi thanked Segre “in the name of the Italian government and all Italians for her commitment in defense of truth and humanity.”  He stated, “Remembering isn’t a passive act,” but rather “a commitment for the present.  We must act on the deep roots of racism and antisemitism and fight their violent manifestation and stem every form of Holocaust denial.”  Segre remarked, “Indifference leads to violence because indifference is already violence.”

The city of Rome continued its support of collaboration and understanding among the Jewish community, the Waldensian Evangelical Church, Eastern Orthodox communities, the Islamic Cultural Center of Italy, the Italian Hindu Union, and the Italian Buddhist Maitreya Foundation through the Tavolo Interreligioso (interreligious table) interfaith network.  In-person cultural events and presentations in public schools to increase awareness of religious diversity significantly dropped compared with previous years due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  On March 22, the Tavolo Interreligioso, promoted by municipal authorities, organized an online event dedicated to funeral ceremonies during the pandemic.  On February 1, the Tavolo celebrated World Interfaith Harmony Week, which the UN General Assembly designated as an annual event in 2010.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

During the year, the CDEC recorded 200 incidents of antisemitism, compared with 224 incidents in 2020 and 251 in 2019.  Of these, at least 117 involved hate speech on social media or the internet.  Reports of antisemitic incidents published on CDEC’s website included discrimination, verbal harassment, particularly at soccer matches and other sporting events, online hate speech, and derogatory graffiti.  Internet and social media hate speech and bullying were the most common forms of antisemitic incidents according to the CDEC, which continued to operate an antisemitism hotline for victims of, and witnesses to, antisemitic incidents.  According to Milena Santerini, the National Coordinator for the Fight Against Anti-Semitism, the number of antisemitic incidents was vastly underreported.  Santerini also reported that Facebook had removed only a small percentage of posts containing antisemitic material.

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe reported that 158 cases of grave desecration and 47 attacks on places of worship occurred in the country in 2020, compared with 152 and 42 cases, respectively, in 2019.  The national police’s Observatory on Security against Acts of Discrimination (OSCAD) reported 448 crimes of discrimination in 2019, the most recent available data, of which 92 were based on religious affiliation and 216 on ethnicity, compared with 360 crimes of discrimination in 2018.  OSCAD defined crimes of discrimination as crimes motivated by ideological, cultural, religious, or ethnic prejudices.

In September, the Brussels-based NGO Action and Protection League issued the results of its European antisemitism survey based on data from December 2019-January 2020.  According to the survey, 11 percent of 1,000 respondents ages 18-75 in Italy said they had negative feelings towards Jews.  Thirteen percent said they would be “totally uncomfortable” or “uncomfortable” with having Jewish neighbors.  The survey cited stereotypical statements about Jews and asked respondents the degree to which they agreed or disagreed.  The proportion who responded “strongly agree” or “tend to agree” with the following statements were:  “the interests of Jews in this country are very different from the interests of the rest of the population” (20 percent); “there is a secret Jewish network that influences political and economic affairs in the world” (16 percent); “Jews have too much influence in this country” (13 percent); “Jews will never be able to fully integrate into this society” (15 percent); “Jews are more inclined than most to use shady practices to achieve their goals” (9 percent); “many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later” (7 percent); “Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them” (9 percent); “Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes” (12 percent).

The private research center STATISTA reported that an estimated 15.6 percent of the population believed the Holocaust never happened.  In its Italy 2020 Report, the private Eurispes Institute of Political, Economic, and Social Studies reported nearly 16 percent of respondents believed the Holocaust was a myth, while 16 percent of respondents said the number of Holocaust victims had been “exaggerated.”  Of those sampled, 47.5 percent considered recent acts of antisemitism in the country to be a “dangerous resurgence of the phenomenon,” while 37.2 percent viewed the recent acts as “bravado carried out for provocation” or as a “joke.”

Press reported that on March 21 in Rome, a food delivery person stabbed a Jewish colleague several times after screaming, “Damn Jews, I [expletive] hate you.”  The victim, whose wounds required hospitalization, was the son of a Holocaust concentration camp survivor.  On April 7, authorities arrested the suspected assailant and recovered the knife used in the attack.

On August 31, a Bangladeshi migrant attacked an Israeli tourist in Pisa, beating him in the face with a souvenir statue, yelling “Jews are assassins!”  Media widely covered the case, and at year’s end according to the MOI, the assailant remained in the country.

In its periodic review of social media posts, Vox Diritti reported 5.2 percent of all monitored tweets (797,326) contained antisemitic messages during the year, compared with 8 percent of all tweets monitored in 2020 (104,347).  Many antisemitic tweets came from accounts based in Rome, Milan, and Florence.  The NGO said spikes in tweet traffic correlated with the national celebration of the Liberation from the Fascist regime and a series of attacks against synagogues in Germany.

Press later reported that on June 7, police announced an investigation of the Roman Aryan Order, which investigators and the judge presiding over the case considered to be a far-right criminal association using Nazi symbols.  Twelve members of the association in Cagliari, Cosenza, Frosinone, Latina, L’Aquila, Milan, Rome, and Sassari were accused of ethnically and religiously motivated hate crimes, based on their publication of numerous racist and discriminatory posts on social media.

According to media, on July 2, police arrested four self-characterized neo-Nazis in Milan on suspicion of having established a criminal association to commit hate crimes and violence based on the ethnicities and religions of the victims.  They had reportedly been planning an attack on a Muslim activist.

On September 16, police in Turin announced an operation to dismantle an association of four persons under investigation for incitement to commit crimes and discriminate on the grounds of race, ethnicity, and religion.  Investigators had found posts on social media containing antisemitic insults and promoting hate against foreigners.

On January 27, UCEI President Noemi Di Segni said, “Fascism is a poison orchard for the whole Italian society of which the bitterness and latency have not yet been understood.  We still do not have any knowledge of truth and extent.”  She added, “Knowing the roots of this Italian evil is necessary to understand those who today repeat mottos and wear its symbols.  Crimes and offenses against Italy, not only to its Jews then and today, constitute threats too often underestimated and dismissed.”

According to the most recent Pew Research Center study published in October 2019, 55 percent of Italians had negative opinions of Muslims and 15 percent had negative opinions of Jews.  Negative opinions of Muslims were prevalent among the least educated (57 percent) and elderly (66 percent).

Vox Diritti reported that during the year, 65 percent of all tweets mentioning Islam (165,297) contained negative messages against Muslims, compared with 59 percent (67,889) in 2020.  Most anti-Muslim tweets originated in northern regions.

According to press reports, on January 10, a highly organized group of individuals interrupted the online Zoom launch of a book about the Holocaust, shouting antisemitic epithets, including “Jews, we’ll burn you in ovens, the Nazis are back, we will burn you all, you must all die.”  The virtual action, which also included portraits of Hitler and swastikas, occurred during the presentation of a book entitled, “The Generation of the Desert” by Lia Tagliacozzo, a Jewish author born to Holocaust survivors.

In February, press reported that following Holocaust survivor Liliana Segre’s attempts to encourage other older adults to receive the COVID-19 vaccine, several antisemitic comments appeared in social media.  On October 15, during an anti-COVID-19 vaccination rally in Bologna, a self-described far-left organizer, Gian Marco Capitani, took the stage and stated that Segre “brings shame to her history …She should disappear.”  National press widely interpreted the words as antisemitic.  Numerous “no-vax” rallies featured demonstrators wearing Stars of David, equating the “persecution” they faced from the government to the persecution the Jews suffered under the Nazis.  Capitani later said he regretted his use of the word “disappear,” given Segre’s history.  Capitani said his comment that Segre brought shame to her history was in reference to Segre’s personal story as a Holocaust survivor and his view that she had a special responsibility to fight persecution because of her background.

On October 26, police announced an investigation into incidents in eight cities and the identification of an adult and seven minors suspected of having interrupted three online commemorations of Holocaust Remembrance Day, livestreamed on Zoom.  Authorities accused the individuals of cybercrimes, violence, and hate crimes for having disrupted the occasion, insulted Jews, and lauded Benito Mussolini.

As in previous years, press reported examples of antisemitic and anti-Christian vandalism, including depictions on walls of swastikas, antisemitic stereotypes, and praise for neo-Nazi groups.  These appeared in Rome, Milan, Busto Arsizio, and other cities.  On September 12, local press reported the presence of graffiti equating the Star of David with swastikas on multiple buildings in Pisa.  In May, members of the Lazio soccer club displayed an antisemitic banner in response to news that rival soccer club Roma had hired a Jewish Brazilian as its new team manager.  On June 24, authorities found graffiti stating “Lazio football supporter Stolperstein” in Rome.  A Stolperstein, or stumbling stone, is a concrete cube bearing a brass plate inscribed with the name and date of birth and death of each victim of Nazi extermination or persecution.

On December 19, in a church in the town of Fiumicino, unidentified individuals vandalized a Nativity scene.  They threw statues of a shepherd and a donkey on the ground and mutilated them, cutting off the shepherd’s hands and one of the donkey’s ears.  Local media reported that it was not the first time the church had been targeted; previously vandals stole a statue of the baby Jesus.  On December 28, authorities in the town of Montemurlo called police after unknown persons hung 10 Christmas tree ornaments with Hitler’s face on them on a Christmas decoration outside the town council’s office.  The mayor of Montemurlo called the incident “an extremely serious episode that offends the values on which the Italian Republic was born, as well as our democracy.”

In January, the Catholic Church marked the 32nd annual Day of Jewish and Christian Dialogue with a focus on the first verse of the Old Testament Book of Ecclesiastes.

Officials from the embassy and consulates general met with representatives of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the MOI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the national coordinator for the fight against antisemitism, and local government officials in Rome, Naples, Milan, Florence, and Venice.  Discussions centered on the establishment of new places of worship requested by religious groups, relations between the government and Muslim religious communities, the prospect for an accord between the government and Muslim communities, and antisemitic incidents.  During these meetings, embassy officials and government counterparts also discussed the integration of asylum seekers and migrants, many of whom were Muslim, Orthodox (including Romanian, Russian, and Bulgarian Orthodox), or Hindu.

Officials from the embassy and consulates general, as well as visiting Department of State officials, met with members of the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities to stress the importance of interfaith dialogue and to share U.S. best practices regarding education, the integration of second-generation Muslims, and social media networking to promote respect for religious diversity.

On May 4, during a livestreamed embassy virtual program that drew more than 2,500 viewers, U.S. speakers discussed the connection between blues and jazz and traditional Islamic music.  Additionally, the Charge d’Affaires gave opening remarks about the importance of respecting religious beliefs, highlighting values of diversity and cultural exchange and stating how Muslim Americans have enriched the United States since its founding.

On June 22, the Charge d’Affaires hosted an informal discussion with representatives of Catholic, Muslim, Jewish, and Protestant communities on the challenges faced by each community, including societal discrimination, antisemitism, anti-Muslim sentiment, government restrictions on religious practices, and forms of collaboration to advance religious freedom and interfaith dialogue.  In November, the Charge d’Affaires hosted representatives of Jewish and Muslim organizations to promote interfaith dialogue and engagement, activities that had stalled in recent years due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Embassy and consulate general officials continued to meet with representatives of civil society groups, including Catholic Church-affiliated Caritas and Sant’Egidio, as well as with Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish leaders in cities throughout the country.  U.S. officials urged the social inclusion of immigrants, many of whom are Muslim, as well as dialogue among various religious groups, and monitored the ability of groups to practice their religion freely.

The embassy and consulates continued to utilize social media platforms to acknowledge major Christian, Muslim, and Jewish holidays, as well as to amplify initiatives that promote religious freedom and interfaith dialogue at the local level.  They also retweeted Department of State statements and tweets on the International Religious Freedom Act and related topics.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.8 million (midyear 2021).  According to the most recent available data (2011 census), 26 percent of the population belongs to various branches of the Church of God; 12 percent Seventh-day Adventist; 11 percent Pentecostal; 7 percent Baptist; 3 percent Anglican; 2 percent Roman Catholic; 2 percent United Church of Christ; 2 percent Jehovah’s Witnesses; 2 percent Methodist; 1 percent Revivalist; and 1 percent Rastafarian.  Two percent maintain some other form of spiritual practice.  Other religious groups constitute 8 percent of the population, including approximately 23,000 members of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ, 18,000 Moravians, 6,500 members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1,500 Muslims (Islamic groups estimate their numbers at 6,500), 1,800 Hindus, 500 Jews, and 270 Baha’is.  The census reports 21 percent have no religious affiliation.  There is no census data on adherents of Yahweh, Sikhism, Jainism, or Obeah and Myalism, religious practices with West African influences, although these practices are reportedly more common in rural villages.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of thought and religion, including the freedom to change one’s religion or belief either alone or in community with others, both in public and in private, and to manifest and propagate one’s religion or belief in worship.  It prohibits discrimination based on belief.  The constitution provides that rights and freedoms are protected to the extent they do not “prejudice the rights and freedoms of others.”

A colonial era law criminalizing Obeah and Myalism remains in effect.  Potential punishment for practicing Obeah and Myalism includes imprisonment of up to 12 months.  The government, however, does not enforce this law.

Registration with the government is not mandatory for religious groups, but groups, including churches or congregations, need to incorporate to gain benefits, including the ability to hold land, enter into legal disputes as an organization, and allow their clergy to visit prisoners.  Groups seeking incorporated status apply to the Companies Office of Jamaica, an executive agency.  The application comprises a standard form and a fee of 24,500 Jamaican dollars ($1,600).  NGOs register through the same form and fee structure.  Groups incorporated through this process must subsequently submit annual reports and financial statements to the Companies Office.

Alternatively, religious groups may petition parliament to be incorporated by parliamentary act.  Such groups receive similar benefits to those incorporating through the Companies Office, but parliament does not require annual reports or regulate the organizations it incorporates.

Regardless of incorporation status, religious groups seeking tax-exempt status must register as charities.  To be considered a charity, an organization must apply either to the Department of Co-operatives and Friendly Societies, located in the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Agriculture, and Fisheries, or to the Companies Office.  Once registered, groups also submit their registration to the Jamaica Customs Agency in the Ministry of Finance and the Public Service and apply to Tax Administration Jamaica to be considered for tax-free status.

The constitution states religious groups have the right to provide religious instruction to members of their communities.

By law, immunizations are mandatory for all children attending both public and private schools; however, exceptions for medical reasons may be granted.

The law requires school administrators to adhere to several practices regarding the teaching of religion.  No individual may be required to participate in religious observances contrary to his or her beliefs.  The public school curriculum includes nondenominational religious education, which focuses on the historical role of religion in society and philosophical thought and includes group visits to Christian, Jewish, Islamic, and Hindu houses of worship.  Students may not opt out of religious education, but religious devotion or practice during school hours is optional.  The law permits homeschooling.

Churches operate several private schools.  Churches also operate several public schools, for which they receive funding from the government and must abide by Ministry of Education, Youth, and Information rules.  Regulations mandate that religious schools receiving public funding must admit students of all faiths and adhere to ministry standards.  Religious schools are not subject to any special restrictions; they do not receive special treatment from the government based on their religious or denominational affiliation.  Most religious schools are affiliated with Catholic or Protestant churches.  The Islamic Council of Jamaica operates several schools.

Foreign religious workers, regardless of affiliation, who visit the country to work with a religious organization must obtain a visa and a work permit from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

National and international media reported that a police officer forcibly cut a Rastafarian young adult woman’s locs while she was in custody in July.  The individual, Nzinga King, stated the officer cut her hair as part of the jail’s intake process for hygiene purposes while she was serving a 10-day sentence for failing to pay a fine in connection with a disorderly conduct charge.  Authorities released her after payment of the required fine.  According to media, the incident created significant public controversy, with politicians from the ruling Jamaica Labour Party and the opposition People’s National Party speaking out against anti-Rastafarian discrimination.  Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Security Horace Chang said in an August 10 press statement, “There is no place and absolutely no acceptance of discriminatory actions towards Rastafarians.  Everyone must be treated with dignity by the members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force.”  Police Commissioner Antony Anderson ordered an investigation into the incident, telling media that, “it must be stated categorically that the cutting of people’s hair – particularly that of Rastafarians – has no place in the modern Jamaican Constabulary Force.”  In September, INDECOM took over the investigation.  According to media, in September, People’s National Party senator Donna Scott-Mottley called on the government to report the status of the investigation.  On December 8, INDECOM released a media statement saying that it had submitted its findings to the Office of the Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP) on November 11.   On December 21, DPP official Paula Llewellyn told Radio Jamaica News that the DPP was requesting further information from INDECOM before issuing a final ruling.  By year’s end, DPP had not issued a final ruling.

Advocacy and religious groups noted the case’s symbolic representation and potential impact on cultural identity and religious expression.  Rastafarian religious groups, in particular, said the case underscored misconceptions about the health and cleanliness of people who wear their hair in locs.

Rastafarians continued to report discrimination against their children at schools, mostly in rural areas, and at some workplaces.  In October, a couple appealed a 2020 Supreme Court ruling that a primary school was justified in barring their child from attendance unless she cut her locs.  While the court stated that it based its decision on the fact that neither the child nor her parents self-declared as Rastafarians when the child was first barred, national media reported the couple and their lawyer said that such policies breached their right to freedom of expression.

The JDF generally continued to refuse acceptance of Rastafarians into its ranks.  The JDF previously noted it did not discriminate based on religion or denomination, but it stated that the force’s strict codes of conduct regarding hair length and the prohibition of marijuana use among its members were the obstacles to Rastafarian participation in the force.

According to an October Humanists International Freedom of Thought Report, a group of legislators was working on a draft amendment to the law that criminalizes abortion, making it legal, but no vote had been held by year’s end.  Most religious leaders remained opposed to abortion.  One leader also accused supporters of the legalization of abortion as “blaspheming the Word of God.”

Seventh-day Adventists continued to report that their observance of the Sabbath on Saturdays caused them difficulties.  According to media reports, some Adventists said the selection of Wednesday and Saturday as the only shopping days during government-imposed COVID-19 lockdowns conflicted with their ability to observe the Sabbath on Saturdays.  Seventh-day Adventists continued to report facing difficulties with employment due to their inability to work on Saturday.

Over the course of the year, curfew dates, including for Sundays, fluctuated in response to COVID-19.  Media reported the Jamaica Umbrella Group of Churches in August negotiated an agreement with the Office of the Prime Minister to allow a maximum of 20 attendees in places of worship on Sundays, with streaming services for those unable to attend.

Some religious groups, primarily nonmembers of the umbrella group, opposed the agreement negotiated by the umbrella group and the government’s imposition of movement restrictions and other barriers to free assembly to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.  In April, the Tarrant Baptist Church brought a constitutional challenge before the courts stating that the restrictions impaired religious freedom and were applied unequally to religious and secular gatherings.

In April, the Broadcasting Commission launched an investigation into one church-affiliated radio station after it broadcast a sermon urging listeners to refrain from receiving COVID-19 vaccinations.

National Heritage Week, observed from October 10-18, included a religious service at Waltham Park New Testament Church.  The service, one of the main events marking the country’s Heritage Week, was streamed live on national television as well as social media.

According to media, during the year the government continued to compensate individuals from a trust fund it established in 2017 for victims of the 1963 Coral Gardens incident, in which eight persons were killed and hundreds injured in clashes between a Rastafarian farming community outside Montego Bay and security forces.

According to media, three members of Montego Bay’s Pathways International Kingdom Restoration Ministries were killed and one injured as part of a ritual human sacrifice at the church’s compound in October.  When JCF officers responded, an exchange of gunfire resulted in the death of an additional congregant.  Media also reported Pathways’ leader Kevin Smith later died on October 25, along with a JCF officer, in a car crash while being transported in a police convoy following his arrest for multiple counts of murder.  The incident led several prominent religious leaders and government officials to call for increased scrutiny of churches.  “It seems to me that the major church umbrella groups need to sit down and have a conversation among themselves, and then make recommendations to the government, so that not every person who wants to set up a church can so freely do,” said Mark Dawes, a pastor within the Missionary Church Association in Jamaica.  Catholic Archbishop of Kingston Kenneth Richards stated, “[I]t’s very difficult; this is where some of the complexity resides, because there’s the constitutional right to freedom of religion that has to be respected.”  Jamaica Council of Churches president Reverend Newton Dixon proposed the establishment of an “ethical charter” between and among churches and the government to protect people in religious spaces and prevent further violent incidents.  Deputy Prime Minister Chang told media that it would have been difficult to take action against Smith’s church beforehand, given constitutional protections, although he raised the possibility of increased regulations.  By year’s end, the government had not introduced any new regulation of church activities resulting from the incident.

Rastafarians continued to report wider societal acceptance, despite continued negative stereotyping and stigma associated with their wearing locs and smoking marijuana.  In April, Minister for Culture, Gender, Entertainment, and Sport Olivia Grange attended celebrations of Groundation Day, a major holiday for Rastafarians.

Christian, Jewish, and Islamic groups continued to state that society was tolerant of religious diversity, cited their continued involvement, along with other faiths, in the Jamaica Council for Interfaith Fellowship.  The interfaith council included representatives from the Rastafari Innity Council, Sanatan Dharma Mandir United Church, Unification Church, National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is, United Congregation of Israelites, Islamic Council, and Soka Gakkai International.  Other organizations sometimes participated in council events.  The council continued to coordinate public education events, such as offering virtual programming for Interfaith Awareness Day in April, and to publicize World Interfaith Harmony Week, celebrated annually during the first week of February.

LGBTQI+ individuals continued to report negative attitudes and discrimination from some religious groups, although media reports and surveys suggested an overall trend toward increasing acceptance.  Sex between men continued to be criminalized, with the support of some religious groups.  Media reports quoted one leader of a group of churches opposed to decriminalizing sex between men as saying, “We definitely don’t support the established organizations of support to homosexuality, and we are against all their proposals and their recommendations for legalization [and] anything that has to do with the advances of the practice of homosexuality in Jamaica.”

Local media outlets continued to provide a forum for extensive coverage and open dialogue on religious matters through radio and television shows, as well as in opinion pages and letters to the editor in newspapers, such as The Gleaner and The Jamaica Observer.  Topics included the intersection of LGBTQI+ rights with religion, the status of regulation of churches, and religion’s role in society.  The Gleaner also published a series of academic discussions on religion and culture that explored the history and practices of Yahweh, Sikhism, and Jainism, among others.

U.S. embassy officials regularly engaged with officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Culture, Gender, Entertainment and Sport, the Ministry of National Security, JCF, and the JDF to discuss the state of religious freedom in the country, including the rights and treatment of vulnerable individuals by religious groups as well as the status of church oversight and regulation by civil authorities.

Embassy officials also met virtually with and encouraged dialogue among leaders of religious groups, including Christians, Jews, Muslims, and Rastafarians, on the importance of religious tolerance, social inclusion, and freedom of expression and assembly in relation to religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 124.7 million (midyear 2021).  A report by the Agency for Cultural Affairs (ACA) indicates that membership in religious groups totaled 183 million as of December 31, 2019.  This number, substantially more than the country’s population, reflects many citizens’ affiliation with multiple religions.  For example, it is common for followers of Buddhism to participate in religious ceremonies and events of other religions, such as Shinto, and vice versa.  According to the ACA, the definition of follower and the method of counting followers vary with each religious organization.  Religious affiliation includes 88.9 million Shinto followers (48.6 percent), 84.8 million Buddhists (46.3 percent), 1.9 million Christians (1 percent), and 7.4 million adherents of other religious groups (4 percent).  The category of “other” and nonregistered religious groups includes Islam, the Baha’i Faith, Hinduism, and Judaism.

Most immigrants and foreign workers practice religions other than Buddhism or Shinto, according to an NGO in close contact with foreign workers.  A scholar estimates that at the end of 2019, there were approximately 230,000 Muslims in the country, including up to 50,000 Japanese converts.  Most of the approximately 350 Rohingya Muslims in the country live in Gunma Prefecture, north of Tokyo, with some residing in Saitama, Chiba, and Tokyo, according to Burmese Rohingya Association in Japan (BRAJ) President Zaw Min Htut.  Ilham Mahmut, the JUA honorary chairman and World Uyghur Congress Representative for East Asia and the Pacific, said most of the nearly 2,000 Uyghur Muslims in the country reside in Tokyo or its surrounding prefectures of Chiba, Saitama, and Kanagawa.  He states that of the nearly 2,000 Uyghur Muslims, approximately 700 are naturalized Japanese citizens.  The Jewish population is approximately 3,000 to 4,000, according to a long-term member of the Jewish community.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of religion and requires the state to refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.  It prohibits religious organizations from exercising any political authority or receiving privileges from the state.  It states that the people shall not abuse their rights and shall be responsible to use their rights for the public welfare.

The government does not require religious groups to register or apply for certification, but certified religious groups with corporate status do not have to pay income tax on donations and religious offerings used as part of their operational and maintenance expenses akin to nonprofit organizations.  The government requires religious groups applying for corporate status to prove they have a physical space for worship and that their primary purpose is disseminating religious teachings, conducting religious ceremonies, and educating and nurturing believers.  An applicant must present, in writing, a three-year record of activities as a religious organization, a list of members and religious teachers, the rules of the organization, information about the method of making decisions on managing assets, statements of income and expenses for the past three years, and a list of assets.  The law stipulates prefectural governors have jurisdiction over groups seeking corporate status in their respective prefecture, and that groups must apply for registration with prefectural governments.  Exceptions are granted for groups with offices in multiple prefectures, which they may register with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT).  After the MEXT Minister or a prefectural governor confirms an applicant meets the legal definition of a certified religious group with corporate status, the law requires the applicant to formulate administrative rules pertaining to its purpose, core personnel, and financial affairs.  Applicants become religious corporations only after the MEXT Minister or governor approves their application and the applicants subsequently register.

The law requires certified religious corporations to disclose their assets, income, and expenditures to the government.  The law also authorizes the government to investigate possible violations of regulations governing for-profit activities.  Authorities have the right to suspend a religious corporation’s for-profit activities for up to one year if the group violates the regulations.

The law stipulates that worship and religious rituals performed by inmates in penal institutions, alone or in a group, shall not be prohibited.  To support the law and the constitutional right to religious freedom, the MOJ offers inmates access to volunteer chaplains from various faiths in prisons.

The law states that schools established by the national and local governments must refrain from religious education or other activities in support of a specific religion.  Private schools are permitted to teach specific religions.  The law also states that an attitude of religious tolerance and general knowledge regarding religion and its position in social life should be valued in education.  Both public and private schools must develop curricula in line with MEXT standards.  These standards are based on the law, which states that schools should give careful consideration when teaching religion in general to junior high and high school students.

Labor law states a person may not be disqualified from union membership on the basis of religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Tokyo Regional Immigration Services Bureau deported a male Rohingya Muslim in March for illegal overstay.  He had previously applied for refugee status in Japan based on religious persecution in Burma, according to a copy of a document submitted to the Tokyo District Court in June and provided to the MOJ, the umbrella ministry of the Immigration Services Bureau.  According to the document, the man voluntarily abided by the deportation order by waiving his right to request reexamination.  He departed the country via commercial air at his own expense.  The deportee’s attorney requested in June that the immigration services bureau confirm the man’s safety in Burma, but the immigration services bureau did not respond to the inquiry, according to his attorney.  According to an associate of the deported individual, after being deported to Burma, he was detained by the Burmese military regime at an airport but was later released.  His attorney learned from a contact that as of October, he lived in Burma under the surveillance of the regime.  His attorney condemned the deportation, saying it posed a life-threatening risk to the deportee due to the changed civil society landscape precipitated by the February 1 Burmese military coup.

According to the JUA honorary chairman, the PRC continued its practice of using police officials in the PRC to intimidate JUA members residing in Japan.  He stated that PRC police officials contacted JUA members in Japan, implying risks to the safety of their families in the PRC and offering monetary assistance in exchange for providing information about the JUA’s activities and other cooperation.  He also said the PRC embassy in Tokyo restricted Uyghur Muslims in the country from renewing their passports by requiring renewal applicants to disclose their ethnicity.  According to the JUA honorary chairman, the Japanese government generally showed willingness to protect Uyghur Muslims in the country.  He said the government did not deport any Uyghur Muslims to the PRC during the year.  While he expressed continued concern regarding potential bias against Uyghur Muslims applying for refugee status at some government immigration centers, he said the government took measures to rectify past concerns.

According to the president of the Japanese Falun Dafa Association, the PRC embassy in Tokyo displayed propaganda on its website that disparaged the Falun Gong.  The president said a person of unidentified nationality vandalized an association signboard near the Tokyo Regional Immigration Services Bureau.  According to the president, the MOJ in April for the first time granted refugee status to a female Falun Gong practitioner residing in the country based on the PRC’s religious repression of Falun Gong practitioners.

In February, the Supreme Court ruled that the Naha city government violated the constitutional separation of religion and state by allowing a Confucian temple to use public land at no cost.  The city government exempted the temple from paying an annual rent of 5.75 million yen ($50,000) on the grounds that the temple served as a tourist attraction.  The court, however, ruled the public could conclude the municipal government was supporting a specific religion, which is a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of religion, and it ordered the city to charge the organization the full rent.

In July, an immigration facility in Nagoya apologized for giving a foreign male detainee a meal containing ingredients forbidden by his religion.  The facility stated it had issued an apology to the man and would make efforts to treat each detainee appropriately.

Citing religious freedom, the government refrained from issuing COVID-19 regulations specific to places of worship, which were requested to comply with the government’s general nonbinding infection-prevention measures, which were constitutionally prohibited from being enforced.

The JAORO said that the national government did not allow religious groups with corporate status to access some of the government’s welfare payment and subsidy for those businesses and individuals financially impacted by COVID-19.  The JAORO stated that the government interpreted the constitution’s provision on separation of religion and state in an excessively rigorous manner, saying the government’s denial of access for religious groups with corporate status was discriminatory.  The government stated, however, that the denial was due to the groups’ corporate status.

According to the JAORO, some local municipalities, including Minato and Suginami wards (cities) in Tokyo Prefecture, collaborated with religious groups with corporate status to prevent the spread of COVID-19, such as using facilities of religious groups with corporate status as sites for mass vaccination organized by the municipalities.  In January, the ACA officially expressed a view that activities by religious groups with corporate status that contribute to society, including activities for countering disaster and assisting communities, could be interpreted as religious activities.  This was a change from the previous interpretation of such activities conducted by religious groups with corporate status as enterprises for public welfare by law.  The JAORO said the new interpretation helped expand the role of religious groups in society.

The MOJ’s Human Rights Bureau continued to operate its hotline for human rights inquiries available in six different foreign languages – English, Chinese, Korean, Tagalog, Portuguese, and Vietnamese.  In May, the MOJ reported that in 2020 (latest statistics available), its human rights division received 116 inquiries of cases of potential violations of religious freedom out of 10,668 suspected human rights violations overall, compared with 224 inquiries related to religious freedom violations in 2019.  It confirmed four cases (compared with seven in 2019) as highly likely to be religious freedom violations.  The MOJ assisted the potential victims in all four cases by mediating between the parties, calling on alleged human rights violators to rectify their behavior, or referring the complainants to competent authorities for legal advice.  These MOJ measures, however, were not legally binding.

According to the ACA, central and prefectural governments had certified 180,828 groups as religious groups with corporate status as of the end of 2019, the most recent statistics available.  The large number reflected local units of religious groups registering separately.  The government generally certified corporate status for religious groups when they met the requirements.

NGOs and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees continued to express concern regarding the government’s interpretation of the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its protocol, which resulted in a low rate of approval of refugee applications.  Civil society and legal groups also expressed concern regarding what they stated were restrictive screening procedures that led applicants to voluntarily withdraw their applications and accept deportation, citing 3,936 individuals who applied for refugee status in 2020, down 62 percent from 10,375 applicants in 2019.  They specifically stated that the government’s interpretation of “well-founded fear of persecution” used when adjudicating refugee claims was overly restrictive.  The government granted refugee status to 47 applicants in 2020 (latest statistics available).  According to available information, the ministry granted refugee status to two applicants based on a well-founded fear of persecution for religious reasons in 2020.  In one case, the MOJ determined the applicant had a well-founded fear of being persecuted by his or her government for converting from one religion to another religion.

The government maintained its practice of granting special permits to stay in country on humanitarian grounds, or temporary stay permits, to most of the Rohingya Muslims who had entered the country on the basis of ethnic and religious persecution in Burma.  The majority of those individuals had resided in the country for more than 10 years – some for more than 20 years – and were allowed to be employed and required regular renewal of their status by regional immigration offices.  Of the approximately 350 Rohingya Muslims in the country, the government granted refugee status to five individuals in September in addition to the 18 Rohingya Muslims who already had refugee status, according to BRAJ President Zaw Min Htut.  The BRAJ president also said approximately 20 Rohingya Muslims had a pending application for refugee status and were not associated with any formal resettlement program, were prohibited from obtaining employment, and faced hardships, including lack of health care.  These applicants’ children were born in the country and therefore remained effectively stateless.

According to the JUA, the government has granted citizenship through naturalization to approximately 700 Uyghur Muslims, in addition to permits to remain in the country for the remaining 1300 Uyghur Muslims, most of whom came to the country from the PRC initially to study or work.  The government did not deport any Uyghur Muslims during the year.

Civil society groups also reported that it takes an average of three years for an applicant to be recognized as a refugee, and some cases involving multiple appeals have lasted 10 years.

Muslim communities continued to report societal religious tolerance of their faith.  Several media outlets, however, stated that local communities, particularly in the western part of the country, continued to be reluctant to have Islamic cemeteries in their neighborhoods, citing local residents’ concerns that the Muslim tradition of burying a body could contaminate soil and water (cremation is a widespread practice in the country).  Due to this concern, the Beppu Muslim Association faced opposition from some residents to its plan submitted to local authorities in 2019 for a permit to build an Islamic cemetery on land that it owns in Hiji Town, Oita Prefecture.  The association reportedly petitioned the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare to establish at least one public burial site in each prefecture or designate one section of existing public cemeteries for Islamic burials to remedy a shortage of burial sites for Muslims.  The ministry reportedly acknowledged in June that it recognized the issue and would seek advice from concerned municipalities.  According to press reports, the Hiji Town government organized talks between the residents and the Beppu Muslim Association on November 5 to find a solution.  In the talks, residents reportedly proposed another site owned by the town government as an alternative.  They reportedly assessed the alternative site would be unlikely to contaminate water because of its topography and the lack of contamination from a nearby monastery that also buries deceased individuals in the soil.  Hiji Mayor Honda Hirofumi publicly stated that making progress on the issue would be possible should residents and the Beppu Muslim Association agree on the alternative site.  A representative of the Beppu Muslim Association publicly said the alternative site would be acceptable as long as the residents concurred with the association’s use of the site.

The Tokyo Organizing Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games fired the director of the opening ceremonies, Kobayashi Kentaro, one day before the event when a video showing Kobayashi making a joke about the Holocaust in 1998 surfaced.  The committee called the conduct “unacceptable,” and Kobayashi issued an apology shortly thereafter.

In meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with lawmakers, embassy officials encouraged the government to continue to work with the United States to protect Muslims originating from the PRC and from other countries that otherwise restrict religious freedoms.

The embassy continued to use its social media platforms in both Japanese and English to highlight the importance of religious freedom, including amplifying messages of the importance of religious freedom as a human right.

In conversations and meetings with the JAORO, as well as with leaders of religious groups and organizations representing religious minorities, including Rohingya and Uyghur Muslims and the Jewish and Falun Gong communities, embassy officials underscored the priority the United States places on respect for religious freedom, discussed issues faced by these communities, and advised some of them on their outreach efforts with the national government and local municipalities.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 10.9 million (midyear 2021).  According to U.S. government estimates, Muslims, virtually all of whom are Sunni, make up 97.1 percent of the population while Christians make up 2.1 percent.  Church leaders’ estimates of the size of the Christian community range from approximately 1.8 percent to as high as 3 percent of the country’s population.  Groups constituting less than 1 percent of the population include Buddhists, Baha’is, Hindus, and Druze (who are considered Muslims by the government).  According to the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies (RIIFS), there is also a small community (consisting of a few migrant families) of Zoroastrians and Yezidis.  Most of the more than one million migrant workers are from Egypt, South and Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.  Migrant workers from sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia are often Christian or Hindu.  There are an estimated 760,000 refugees and other displaced persons registered with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees from 57 countries of origin, including more than 670,000 Syrians, 67,000 Iraqis, and 13,000 Yemenis.  The government states there are 1.3 million Syrians present in the country.  The Syrian and Iraqi refugee populations are mostly Sunni Muslim.  Shia Muslims and Christians account for less than one-third of the Iraqi refugee population.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam “the religion of the state” but safeguards “the free exercise of all forms of worship and religious rites,” as long as these are consistent with public order and morality.  It stipulates there shall be no discrimination in the rights and duties of citizens on grounds of religion and states the King must be a Muslim.  The constitution allows for religious courts, including sharia courts for Muslims and ecclesiastical courts for Christian denominations recognized by the government.  According to the General Iftaa Department, the office charged with issuing religious guidance in the form of fatwas, in adjudicating personal status cases, sharia courts follow the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence.

The constitution does not address the right to convert to another faith, nor are there penalties under civil law for doing so.  The constitution and the law, however, allow sharia courts to determine civil status affairs for Muslims; these courts do not recognize converts from Islam to other religions.  Under sharia, converts from Islam and their children are still considered Muslims and are subject to sharia but are regarded as apostates.  Neither the penal code nor the criminal code specifies a penalty for apostasy.  Sharia courts, however, have jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, and inheritance, and individuals declared to be apostates may have their marriages annulled or be disinherited, except in the case of a will that states otherwise.  Any member of society may file an apostasy complaint against such individuals before the Sharia Public Prosecution.  The Sharia Public Prosecution consults with the Council of Church Leaders (CCL), a government advisory body comprising the heads of the country’s 11 officially recognized Christian denominations, before converting a Christian to Islam to make sure the conversion is based on religious conviction and not for purposes of marriage and/or divorce.  The penal code contains articles criminalizing acts such as incitement of hatred, blasphemy against Abrahamic faiths, undermining the regime, or portraying citizens in a manner that violates their dignity.  The penal code criminalizes insulting the Prophet Muhammad, punishable by one to three years’ imprisonment.  Written works, speeches, and actions intended to cause or resulting in sectarian strife, including conflicts between religious groups, are punishable by one to three years’ imprisonment and a fine not exceeding 200 Jordanian dinars ($280).  The law also provides a term of imprisonment not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding 20 dinars ($28) for anyone who publishes anything that offends religious feelings or beliefs and for anyone who speaks within earshot of another person in a public space and offends that individual’s beliefs.

Authorities may prosecute individuals who proselytize Muslims under the penal code’s provisions against “inciting sectarian conflict” or “harming the national unity.”  Both of these offenses are punishable by imprisonment of up to three years or a fine of up to 200 dinars ($280).

Islamic religious groups are granted recognition through the constitution and do not need to register with the government.  Non-Islamic religious groups must obtain official recognition through registration.  If registered as “denominations,” they may administer rites such as marriage.  Recognized religious groups may also own land, open bank accounts, and enter into contracts.  Religious groups may alternatively be registered as “associations.”  If so, they must work through a recognized denomination on matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, but they may own property and open bank accounts.  They must obtain government approval to accept foreign funding.  Recognized non-Islamic religious groups are tax-exempt but do not receive the government subsidies granted to Islamic religious groups.

Religious groups not recognized as denominations or associations lack legal status and may not undertake basic administrative tasks such as opening bank accounts, purchasing real estate, or hiring staff.  Individuals may exercise such activities on behalf of the unrecognized group, however.  To register as a recognized religious denomination, the group must submit its bylaws, a list of its members, its budget, and information regarding its religious doctrine to the Ministry of Interior and Prime Ministry.  In determining whether to register or recognize Christian groups, the Prime Minister confers with the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the CCL.  Although the practice is not explicitly mandated by law or the constitution, church and government leaders have stated that the CCL must endorse recognition for new Christian groups prior to the Prime Minister’s approval.  To achieve official recognition as denominations, Christian groups must be recommended by the MOI and approved by the cabinet.  The government also refers to the following criteria when considering recognition of Christian groups:  the group’s teachings must not contradict the nature of the constitution, public ethics, customs, or traditions; the Middle East Council of Churches, a regional body comprising four families of churches (Catholic, Orthodox, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant/Evangelical), must recognize it; its religious doctrine must not be antagonistic to Islam as the state religion; and the group’s membership must meet a minimum number of citizens, although a precise figure is not specified.

An annex to the 2014 Law for Councils of Christian Denominations lists 11 officially recognized Christian religious groups:  Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Melkite Catholic, Anglican, Maronite Catholic, Lutheran, Syrian Orthodox, Seventh-day Adventist, United Pentecostal, and Coptic.  In 2018, five additional evangelical Christian denominations, formerly registered under the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), were recognized by the MOI as associations but not as religious denominations and, as a result, none have been permitted to establish an ecclesiastical court:  the Free Evangelical Church, Church of the Nazarene, Assemblies of God, Christian and Missionary Alliance, and Baptist Church.  Religious groups such as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the Jehovah’s Witnesses are not registered and gather in unofficial meetings places.  The government granted legal status as an association to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in 2018.

The CCL serves as an administrative body to facilitate tax and customs exemptions, as well as to issue civil documents related to marriage or inheritance.  In other matters, such as issuing work permits or purchasing land, the denominations interact directly with the relevant ministries.  Religious groups that do not have representatives on the CCL handle administrative tasks through the ministry relevant to the task.  Unrecognized Christian groups do not have representatives on the CCL, have no legal status as entities, and must have individual members of their groups conduct business with the government on their behalf.

According to the constitution, a special provision of the law regulates the activities and administration of finances of the Islamic awqaf (religious endowments).  Per this provision of the law, the Ministry of Awqaf manages mosques, appoints imams, pays mosque staff salaries, manages Islamic clergy training centers, and subsidizes certain mosque-sponsored activities, such as holiday celebrations and religious observances.  Other Islamic institutions are the Supreme (Sharia) Justice Department, headed by the Office of the Supreme (Sharia) Justice (OSJ) and in charge of the sharia courts, and the General Iftaa Department, which issues fatwas.

The government requires imams to adhere to officially prescribed themes for Friday sermons.  Muslim clergy who do not follow government policy may be suspended, issued a written warning, banned from delivering Friday sermons for a certain period, or dismissed from the Ministry of Awqaf.  In addition to these administrative measures, a preacher who violates the law may be imprisoned for a period of one week to one month or given a fine not to exceed 20 dinars ($28).

The law forbids any Islamic cleric from issuing a fatwa unless authorized by an official committee headed by the Grand Mufti in the General Iftaa Department.  This department is independent from the Ministry of Awqaf, with the rank of Grand Mufti being equal to that of a government minister.

The law prohibits the publication of media items that slander or insult “founders of religion or prophets” or that are deemed contemptuous of “any of the religions whose freedom is protected by the constitution,” and it imposes a fine on violators of up to 20,000 dinars ($28,200).  The government’s Media Commission regulates the publishing and distribution of all books and media.  If the Media Commission deems that passages “violate public norms and values, are religiously offensive, or are insulting to the King,” it can request a court order to prohibit the distribution of the book.

By law, public schools provide Islamic religious instruction as part of the basic national curriculum; non-Muslim students are allowed to opt out.  Private schools may offer alternative religious instruction.  The constitution provides “congregations” (a term not defined in the constitution, but which, according to the legal code, includes religious groups recognized as denominations and associations) the right to establish their own schools, provided “they comply with the general provisions of the law and are subject to the control of government in matters relating to their curricula and orientation.”  To operate a school, religious institutions must receive permission from the Ministry of Education, which ensures the curriculum meets national standards.  The ministry does not oversee religious courses if religious groups offer them at their places of worship.  In several cities, Christian groups, including Baptists, Orthodox, Anglicans, and Roman Catholics, operate private schools and are able to conduct religious instruction.  Private schools, both nonreligious and religious, are open to adherents of all religions.

Knowledge of the Quran is required by law for Muslim students in both public and private schools but is optional for non-Muslims.  Every student, however, must pass an Arabic language exam in their final year of high school that includes linguistic mastery of some verses of the Quran.  Islamic themes appear in lesson examples of other subjects’ curriculums.  The Islamic religion is an optional subject for secondary education certificate exams for non-Muslim students following the standard curriculum, or for Muslim students following international curricula.

The constitution specifies the judiciary shall be divided into civil courts, religious courts, and special courts, with religious courts divided into sharia courts and tribunals of other religious communities.  According to the constitution, matters concerning personal status, which include religious affiliation, marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance, are under the jurisdiction of religious courts.  Matters of personal status in which the parties are Muslim fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.  A personal or family status case in which one party is Muslim and the other is non-Muslim is heard by a civil court unless both parties agree to use a sharia court.  According to the constitution, matters of the personal status of non-Muslims whose religion the government officially recognizes are under the jurisdiction of denomination-specific courts of religious communities, except for matters of inheritance, when sharia is applied to all persons, regardless of religious affiliation.  Such ecclesiastical courts exist for the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Melkite Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Coptic, Syrian Orthodox, and Anglican communities.  According to the law, members of recognized religious groups lacking their own courts may take their cases to civil courts, which, in principle, follow the rules and beliefs of the litigants’ denomination in deciding cases, unless both parties to a case agree to use a specific religious court.  There are no tribunals for atheists or adherents of unrecognized religious groups.  Such individuals must request a civil court to hear their case.

The OSJ appoints sharia judges, while each recognized non-Islamic religious community selects the structure and members of its own tribunal.  The law stipulates the cabinet must ratify the procedures of each non-Islamic religious (ecclesiastical) court.  All judicial nominations must be approved by a royal decree.

According to the constitution, sharia courts also exercise jurisdiction with respect to cases concerning “blood money” (diya) in which the two parties are Muslims or one of the parties is not a Muslim and the two parties consent to the jurisdiction of the sharia courts.  Sharia courts also exercise jurisdiction regarding matters pertaining to Islamic awqaf.  Muslims are also subject to the jurisdiction of sharia courts on civil matters not addressed by civil status legislation.

Sharia courts do not recognize converts from Islam as falling under the jurisdiction of their new religious community’s laws in matters of personal status.  Sharia court judges may annul the marriages of converts and transfer child custody to a Muslim nonparent family member or declare the children “wards of the state” and convey an individual’s property rights to Muslim family members.

According to the PSL, in accordance with its interpretation of sharia, marriages between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man are not permitted; the man must convert to Islam for the marriage to be considered legal.  If a Christian woman converts to Islam while married to a Christian man, her husband must also convert to Islam for their marriage to remain legal.  If a Christian man converts to Islam while married to a Christian woman, the wife does not need to convert to Islam for the marriage to remain legal.  There is no legal provision for civil marriage or divorce for members of unrecognized religious groups.  Members of nonregistered Christian groups, as well as members of groups registered as associations, must obtain marriage certificates from any recognized Christian denomination with an ecclesiastical court, such as the Anglican or Orthodox Churches, which they then may take to the Civil Status Bureau to receive their government marriage certificates.

Sharia governs all matters relating to family law involving Muslims or the children of a Muslim father.  The PSL stipulates that mothers, regardless of religious background, may retain custody of their children until age 18.  Minor children of male citizens who convert to Islam are considered Muslims and are not legally allowed to reconvert to their father’s prior religion or convert to any other religion.  Like citizenship, religion is transmitted only via the father.  Female children of a Muslim father who converts to Christianity remain registered as Muslims and thus are ineligible to marry a non-Muslim.

In accordance with sharia, adult children of a man who has converted to Islam become ineligible to inherit from their father if they do not also convert to Islam, unless the father’s will states otherwise.  All citizens, including non-Muslims, are subject to the PSL, which mostly follows Islamic legal provisions regarding inheritance if no equivalent inheritance guidelines are codified in their religion or if the state does not recognize their religion.  In practice, Christian ecclesiastical courts use sharia-based rules to adjudicate inheritance.

National identification cards issued since May 2016 do not list religion, but religious affiliation is contained in records embedded in the card’s electronic chip and remains on file in other government records.  National identification cards are renewed every 10 years.  Passports issued since May 2016 do not list religion.  Passports are renewed every five years.  Atheists and agnostics must list the religious affiliation of their fathers as their own.  Per the ban on conversion from Islam under sharia, converts from Islam are not allowed to change their religion on electronic records.  Converts to Islam must change their religion on their civil documents, such as family books (a national registration record issued to every head of family), and on electronic records.

According to the electoral law, Christians are allocated nine of 130 parliamentary seats.  Christians may not run for office in electorates not designated as Christian seats.  No seats are reserved for adherents of other minority religious groups.  The law stipulates that Muslims must hold all parliamentary seats not specifically reserved for Christians.  There are no reserved seats for the Druze population.  The government classifies Druze as Muslims and permits them to hold office as Muslims.

Although the constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion, labor law does not explicitly prohibit it.

The National Center for Human Rights, a quasi-independent institution established by law, receives both government and international funding.  The Prime Minister nominates its board of trustees, and the King ratifies their appointment by royal decree.  The board appointed in 2019 includes Islamists, former cabinet ministers, former judges, members of parliament, religious leaders, and civil society representatives.

The law prohibits parties formed on the basis of religion or sect, as well as membership in unlicensed parties.

In 2020, the Court of Cassation, the country’s highest court, dissolved the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s (JMB) legal identity, saying the organization had failed to resolve its legal status.  Authorities shut down the Brotherhood’s headquarters and several offices in 2016 and transferred ownership of the property to a government-authorized offshoot, which said it severed ties with the broader movement.  The Ministry of Social Development’s committee in charge of the JMB’s legal dissolution announced on December 21, 2020, that the Court of Cassation’s final decision declaring the JMB officially dissolved had been implemented and directed any creditors to address financial or legal claims on the JMB to the ministry.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Converts to Islam from Christianity continued to report security officials questioning them regarding their religious beliefs and practices, as well as some instances of surveillance, as part of the government’s effort to prevent nominal conversions of convenience for the purpose of receiving advantageous divorce or inheritance benefits.  Likewise, some converts to Christianity from Islam reported instances of harassment by security officials, in-person and electronic surveillance, and bureaucratic delays or rejections of document requests, including passport applications.  Others reported security forces pressured converts to denounce their conversions and to recite Quranic verses in their offices.  Christian converts belonging to unregistered denominations described personal accounts of being summoned to security forces offices on several consecutive days, putting their jobs at risk.  Christians converts from larger Jordanian tribes with more supportive families tended to avoid some of the more extreme examples of scrutiny.  Some converts to Christianity from Islam reported they continued to worship in secret to avoid scrutiny by security officials.  Because of the sharia ban on conversion, government officials generally refused to change the religion listed on official documents from Islam to any other religion.  Accordingly, the converts’ religious practice did not match their official religion, opening them up to claims of apostasy and personal status issues involving marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

During the year, the government Media Commission banned distribution of 15 books for insulting Islam, five for insulting Christianity, and 19 for “unethical” content, including books that contained sexual content without caveating for age and “promoting homosexuality.”  The commission banned 20 books in 2020.

Members of religious groups unable to obtain religious divorces converted to another Christian denomination or to Islam to divorce legally, according to reports from religious leaders and the MOJ.  The chief of the OSJ continued to ensure that Christians wanting to convert to Islam did not have a pending divorce case at one of the Christian religious courts to prevent them from converting for the sole purpose of obtaining a legal divorce.  The OSJ continued to enforce the interview requirement for converts to Islam, introduced in 2017, to determine whether their conversion reflected a genuine religious belief.

Youth Sub-Committee Member Wafa al-Khadra resigned from the Royal Committee for the Modernization of the Political System in July after she critiqued Eid al-Adha sacrifice practices, saying theses rituals “lacked mercy.”  Social media users called for her resignation, calling her a “heretic” and stating her comments insulted Islam.  Al-Khadra said her statement had been taken out of context and clarified that some individuals sacrificed sheep in an inhumane way.  A public prosecutor declined to proceed with an apostasy complaint lodged against al-Khadra.

As part of its COVID-19 pandemic response, the government instituted defense orders and ordered periodic comprehensive lockdowns, including places of worship, on Fridays, and daily curfews from October 2020 to April 2021.  The government intermittently allowed Muslim worshippers to walk to their local mosques for Friday prayers when driving was prohibited.  Protesters throughout the year demanded the government ease restrictions on congregational prayers at mosques.  Muslim religious leaders wrote a letter in March to the King requesting permission to perform group prayers in mosques, while others expressed support for the government’s efforts to combat the pandemic.  In March, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Awqaf said the ministry’s decision to suspend Friday prayers aimed to preserve human life and complied with Islamic laws.  Greek Orthodox Bishop Christophoros Atallah, in his capacity as CCL President, also affirmed during a March press conference that worshippers should remain committed to the government’s efforts to combat the pandemic.  After the government decided to reopen all sectors in September, mosques partially opened, on the conditions that adherents comply with crowd-size mandates.  Worshippers accused the government of having double standards when applying defense orders, since it allowed large gatherings of individuals for concerts, while preventing in-person worship.  Churches reported they continued to meet online and in person except during periods of general lockdown.  According to RIIFS, 58 percent of respondents supported the government’s decision to close places of worship for health and safety purposes during the pandemic, 27 percent opposed the closures, and 15 percent were neutral.

The same RIIFS survey found 24 percent of respondents believed government closures affected Muslim women’s freedom of worship, since they were not allowed to participate in Friday prayers at mosques, while 49 percent did not believe the closures affected women’s ability to worship.  When polled by RIIFS, 43 percent of the country’s religious experts viewed the decision to prevent women from attending Friday prayers as discriminatory, while 39 percent said the decision did not discriminate between men and women, on the grounds that Friday prayers were only obligatory for men under the experts’ interpretation of sharia.  At year’s end, women were still not allowed to attend Friday prayers.

Muslim and Christian leaders worked with the government to raise awareness regarding the pandemic during Friday and Sunday sermons, according to RIIFS.  The Ministry of Awqaf used social media to publish statements on the significance of helping others, donating to relief funds, and following government measures.  Religious charitable societies distributed health supplies and food to citizens around the country.  Religious leaders also preached about the importance of vaccines during the government’s rollout.

The Ministry of Awqaf continued to monitor sermons at mosques and required that preachers refrain from political commentary not approved by the government.  Authorities continued to disseminate themes and required imams to choose from a list of recommended texts for sermons.  Imams violating these rules risked being fined or banned from preaching.

Unofficial mosques continued to operate outside Ministry of Awqaf control in many cities, and imams outside of government employment preached without ministry supervision.  Ministry of Awqaf investigations uncovered some unregistered imams leading prayers in mosques during the year.  In these cases, the government ordered all attendees and imams to cease their activities and gather in a designated mosque in their area for the Friday sermons led by a registered imam.  Friday prayers in major cities were consolidated into central mosques, over which the Ministry of Awqaf had more oversight, continuing a process that began in 2018.  The ministry allowed smaller mosques to continue Friday sermons along with their areas’ central mosque.

On January 26, Greek Orthodox Bishop Christophoros Atallah, in his capacity as CCL President, sent a letter to the Judicial Council and Royal Court requesting they refer all Christian PSL cases to the CCL instead of to civil courts.  Atallah’s letter said adherents of unrecognized Christian denominations used the civil courts to enter into “illegal marriages” and “gain legitimization” by bypassing the CCL.  Judicial Council Chief Justice Mohammad al-Ghazo subsequently issued a memorandum on February 5 requiring Christians to use the CCL for PSL cases.  Evangelical Christian church leaders expressed concern regarding their ability to function as churches, and in early March, after lobbying by the evangelical churches, the Judicial Council retracted its order and convoked a meeting with Christian leaders to resolve the dispute.  Evangelicals said they had been specifically targeted because the CCL and government officials viewed them negatively, associating their religious groups with proselytization and U.S.-based, pro-Israel evangelical denominations.

Authorities continued to deny a license to an unrecognized Christian church to operate a publishing house and approval for a private Baptist school in the city of Zarqa.

During the year, expatriate religious volunteers from the evangelical Christian community continued to report bureaucratic delays in the renewal of residency permits and what they termed occasionally arbitrary rejections of paperwork.  In 2018, the government began enforcing a new residency policy to limit the ability of churches to sponsor religious volunteers for residency.  Observers suggested that the volunteers were illegally proselytizing Muslims.  Authorities previously allowed the churches to obtain residency status for religious volunteers with the approval of the MOI and a letter of sponsorship from the church.  Volunteers were required to obtain additional approvals, including from the Ministry of Labor, lengthening the average renewal process by several months, according to church officials.  Some expatriate religious volunteers reported the government refused to grant residency permission, forcing them to depart the country.

The government policy of not recognizing the Baha’i Faith continued, but the government continued to allow Baha’is to privately practice their religion and included them in officially sponsored interfaith events.  Sharia courts and the courts of other recognized religions continued not to issue Baha’is the marriage certificates required to transfer citizenship to a foreign spouse or to register for government health insurance and social security.  The Department of Civil Status and Passports also continued not to recognize marriages conducted by Baha’i assemblies, but it issued family books to Baha’is, allowing them to register their children, except in cases of marriages between a Baha’i man and a Baha’i woman when the marriage was erroneously registered as Muslim.  In those cases, the children were considered illegitimate and were not issued birth certificates or included in family books and subsequently were unable to obtain citizenship or register for school.  The Baha’is were able to obtain some documents such as marriage certificates through the civil courts, although they reportedly were required to pay fees that sometimes amounted to more than 500 dinars ($710) for documents normally available for five dinars ($7) through religious courts.  Some Baha’is traveled to other countries to obtain officially recognized marriages and others sought marriages from sympathetic Muslim clergy, a process that Baha’is deemed unsustainable and unacceptable.  Members of the Baha’i community stated that they continued to lobby the government unsuccessfully for recognition.

In an article that detailed the problems facing the foreign-born wives in Baha’i families, the news website Middle East Monitor stated that these women seeking to become naturalized citizens, as allowed by the country’s laws, were unable to do so because of the government did not recognize the Baha’i Faith and the government did not issue marriage certificates to Baha’i couples.  As a result, the women faced limited options in employment, career, education, and travel outside the country.

There continued to be two recognized cemeteries registered in the name of the Baha’i Faith through a special arrangement previously agreed between the group and the government.  Baha’i leaders reported they continued to be unable to register other properties under the name of the Baha’i Faith but remained able to register property under the names of individual Baha’is.  In doing so, the Baha’i leaders said they continued to have to pay new registration fees whenever they transferred property from one person to another at the death of the registered owner, a process that created a large financial burden.  Baha’i leaders said they were using the civil courts to challenge their group’s property registration restrictions, stating they were unable to legally protect Baha’i assets if individuals who registered Baha’i property under their names decided to misappropriate funds or property.  The Baha’i community’s request for religious exemptions for property registration fees remained pending.

The government continued to deny official recognition to other religious groups, including the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Some unrecognized religious groups reported they continued to operate schools and hospitals and were able to hold services and meetings if they maintained a low profile.  Some unregistered Christian denominations said that although all religious groups were equal in the eyes of the constitution, the government practiced favoritism toward specific Christian groups that had more political power, which increased tensions among these religious groups.

In early December, the Director of the Public Security Directorate, Major General Hussein al-Hawatmeh, announced an increase in security force presence in Christian areas and public areas decorated for the holidays throughout the month.  Christian leaders expressed their appreciation to the authorities for protecting churches and Christian spaces during the holidays.

The government authorized Christian civil servants leave for Sunday worship and religious holidays.

Religious minorities, including Christians and Druze, continued to serve in parliament and as cabinet ministers.  Members of religious minorities served as deputy prime ministers, senators, members of parliament (MPs), and ambassadors.  The cabinet appointed in October included one Druze member and two Christian members, unchanged from the previous cabinet.  A Christian MP served as House Second Deputy Speaker for parliament’s 2020-21 and 2021-22 terms.

The government continued to record Druze as Muslims on civil documents identifying the bearer’s religious affiliation, without public objection from the Druze.  Druze continued to report discrimination, and the way constituencies were geographically distributed hindered their coreligionists from reaching high positions in government civil service and official departments.  The government did not include members of the Druze community in the Political Modernization Committee, established by the King in June to reform the political system, despite the committee’s assurances that it would consider the country’s demographics and to include representation from all facets of society.

Christians and Druze achieved general officer rank in the military, but Muslims continued to hold most of the senior positions across the security and intelligence services.

The national school curriculum, including materials on tolerance education, did not mention the Holocaust, but some private schools included it in their curricula.  An Anti-Defamation League study found examples of antisemitic tropes in public school textbooks, including a passage that says, “Treason and the breaking of pacts are among the characteristics of the Jews.”  Another textbook, used for 12th grade history, described the Zionist movement as “a racist, settler political movement aimed at establishing a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine, founded on historical claims without basis in truth,” and said that Jewish links to Jerusalem are “founded on historical and religious claims without any actual grounds on which to base them.”

Christian leaders reported many Jordanians believed Christianity arrived in the country during the Crusades due in part, said the leaders, to the national secondary school curriculum’s practice of not teaching Jordan’s pre-Islamic history nor acknowledging that there was a Christian presence in the region prior to the rise of Islam.

Members of non-Muslim religious groups, especially unregistered groups, continued to report occasional threats by the government to arrest them for disrupting public order if they proselytized Muslims.  Security officials continued to refuse to renew residency permits for some foreign religious leaders and religious volunteers after raising concerns their activities could incite extremist attacks, according to multiple nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  Others were denied residency permits on the basis of proselytization accusations.

Christian groups that maintained a lower profile noted examples of security forces monitoring them only when other Christian denominations submitted official complaints against them.

The government deemed some children, including children of unmarried women or interfaith marriages involving a Muslim woman and converts from Islam to another religion, “illegitimate” and denied them standard registration.  The government issued these children, as well as orphans, special national identification numbers, which made it difficult for these children to attend school, access health services, or receive other documentation.

In June, the Bible Society of Jordan posted a verse from the Book of Psalms, Psalms 37:11 – “The meek shall inherit the earth” – on city entrances and bridges in Amman, an annual practice to honor Jordan’s Independence Day.  The banners sparked widespread controversy; several social media users posted antisemitic commentary equating the Book of Psalms only with Judaism and the promotion of Zionism.  MP Hasan Riyati sent a request to the House Speaker to investigate the “authorities that licensed a Torah verse to be hung around the city in a country whose religion is Islam and whose main enemy is the Zionists.”  The Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) subsequently removed the banners and issued a statement saying it would not allow anyone to post statements that violate public morals.  Christians and some Muslims criticized the GAM’s statement, arguing the verse was in line with public morals.  Others saw the controversy as an opportunity to educate the public, explaining the verse was found in the holy books of both Christians and Jews and that the Quran contained a similar verse.  GAM Mayor Yousef Shawarbeh met with Christian leaders to offer an apology; he removed the GAM statement from official media but did not reinstall the banners.  Christian youth groups held a protest outside the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate offices, saying the government’s apology was insufficient.  Many citizens asked the government to take concrete actions against hate speech and against those who did not respect the religious freedom of Christians in the country.

In December, MP Suleiman Abu Yahya stated the Jews attempted to “poison” the Prophet Muhammad and “would not hesitate to poison Jordanians” during a parliamentary hearing on Project Prosperity, a planned energy-for-water project involving Jordan, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates.

In September, parliament approved legislation to develop public lands adjacent to the Jordanian side of the Jordan River identified by some scholars as Jesus’s baptism site, which some MPs said would promote religious tourism, support local communities, and provide job opportunities.  The law would also establish a nonprofit charitable foundation supervised by a Board of Trustees, appointed by the Royal Hashemite Court, and would grant fee and tax exemptions.  Christian leaders largely supported the law, noting it would deepen church connections around the world as pilgrims travelled to the country, and it would supplement the national economy.

Throughout the year, RIIFS, established under the patronage of Prince Hassan bin Talal, organized periodic discussions and sponsored initiatives with religious leaders and social activists to promote political pluralism, cultural diversity, religious tolerance, and civic responsibility in the country and throughout the region.  It also held comparative religion seminars on Muslim and Christian doctrinal teachings.

Converts from Islam to Christianity reported continued social ostracism, threats, and physical and verbal abuse, including beatings, insults, and intimidation, from family members, neighbors, and community or tribal members.  Some reported they worshipped in secret because of the social stigma they faced as converts, while others reported persistent threats of violence from family members protecting traditional honor.  According to international NGOs, female converts from Islam were particularly vulnerable to harassment and pressure to renounce their conversions.  Church leaders continued to report incidents of violence, pressure, and discrimination against religious converts and persons in interfaith romantic relationships; the latter continued to report ostracism and, in some cases, feuds among family members and violence toward those involved.  Some converts from Islam expressed interest in resettlement abroad due to discrimination and threats of violence.  Converts from Christianity to Islam also reported social stigma from their families and Christian society.  Christian women married to Muslim men were more often stigmatized.  Nonbelievers reported societal intolerance and discrimination.  Although an individual’s religion was no longer written on identification cards, one’s religion could often be surmised based on personal and family names.

Religious leaders reported continuing online hate speech, frequently through social media, directed towards religious minorities and those who advocated religious moderation.  One NGO reported increased online hate speech towards the Christian community in direct response to radio and internet broadcasts of local services to the local Christian community.  This NGO turned off comments on websites and blocked repeat offenders on its social media accounts in an effort to avoid hate speech.  Religious broadcasts were an alternative to regular in-person services, which were not allowed when the country was under periodic comprehensive lockdowns due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  NGO sources said the negative responses were the reactions of Muslims to their first real exposure to Christianity.  NGOs disagreed on the prevalence of hate speech in local society.  One NGO worried about calls from the local community to criminalize hate speech in new laws or amendments, believing it would lead to selective application of the law.

Some religious leaders privately associated hate speech, intolerance, and extremism with poverty and lack of educational opportunities in the country.

Criticism online and in social media continued to target converts from Islam to other religions.  Religious minorities expressed concerns that some Muslim leaders preached intolerance.  Christians reported they self-segregated into Christian enclaves in Amman and its outskirts to escape social pressure and threats.  Although Christians clustered in specific neighborhoods and sought life abroad for safety and community support, Christian leaders stated it was difficult to categorize the desire to relocate solely based on religious identity; Christians relocated to the cities and moved abroad seeking economic opportunities as well.

Observers reported friction between Christian denominations on the CCL and evangelical churches not recognized by the government.  Leaders from some CCL-affiliated churches said there were “recruitment efforts” and “hidden agendas” against their members and Jordanian society writ large by evangelical churches, and that evangelical churches were disrupting interfaith harmony, creating rifts in local society and undermining the CCL’s relationship with the government and security services.  CCL leaders stated they worried that outsiders “causing trouble” would bring unwanted attention on the Christian community.  Members of the evangelical community said that some CCL leaders applied pressure on the government to not recognize evangelical churches in the country.

In an April Yarmouk TV broadcast, a University of Jordan professor, Ahmad Nofal, accused Jews of “ruling the world” and stated there was no differentiation between “Zionists” and “Jews.”  He also accused Zionists of purposefully harvesting organs and infecting Palestinians with diseases.  In November, Nofal asked on Yarmouk TV, “Do the Europeans love the Jews that much?…They want to dump them on us….Instead of doing what Hitler did – massacring and burning and whatever – they dump them on the Middle East.”

In April, Jordanian analyst Mohammed Faraj, on Lebanon’s Mayadeen TV, denounced a Holocaust memorial ceremony held in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), saying that commemorating the Holocaust was a UAE attempt to cover up the real massacres perpetrated by Israel against the Palestinians.  He said it was a “Zionist strategic policy” to focus on only six million of the 42 million who were killed in World War II.

In May, former MP Saud Abu Mahfouz, in a video posted to YouTube, said that Jews are “bastards [who have] all the money of [Irving] Moskowitz, of Rothschild, and of Sheldon Adelson.”  With their “deeds [and] filth…[Jews] are provoking the Islamic identity.”

When criticizing Israeli government policies in November, Roya TV, a privately owned, Amman-based satellite channel, published a cartoon on social media that appeared to show Lord Balfour and a Jewish man wearing a kippah and holding the map of Israel and Palestinian territories in a police lineup.  Also in November, Roya posted a video with an exaggerated reenactment of an Orthodox Jew when discussing an energy-for-water deal between Jordan, the UAE, and Israel.  In December, the German broadcaster DW suspended a 10-year-old partnership with Roya over “the discovery of anti-Israeli and antisemitic comments and caricatures in social media disseminated” by Roya.  A senior DW executive apologized for overlooking “these disgusting images.”  In response, Roya’s CEO said that “criticism of illegal, inhuman, or racist actions by Israel as a state” should be distinguished from antisemitism.

A Christian boxer’s death sparked criticism online in April after some individuals sent their condolences to his family using the phrase, “May God have mercy on him.”  Some individuals criticized those offering condolences, claiming mercy should be reserved only for Muslims.

In July, the Religion News Service reported on a debate in the country over the possibility of opening up to Shia pilgrims, long discouraged from visiting the tombs of the relatives of the Prophet Muhammad, most prominently Jafar, Muhammad’s cousin and the brother of Ali, the first leader of Shia Islam.  Zaid Nabulsi, a lawyer and prodemocracy advocate, first made the suggestion in a Facebook post, noting that most of the sites of interest to Shia pilgrims are in the impoverished southern part of the country.  Government officials said no change in policy was being considered.

The Catholic Center for Studies and the international Muslim Council of Elders, based in Abu Dhabi, organized a conference in Amman in September, “Media Against Hate.”  More than 100 Arab media professionals attended the meeting, which was sponsored by Prince Ghazi bin Mohammed.  Attendees discussed the use of legacy and social media in spreading and countering hate speech.  Religious leaders expressed skepticism regarding officially and unofficially organized interfaith conferences in the country, saying such conferences did not increase intercommunal harmony and were often a facade for the West.

In a poll published by RIIFS that included 400 Muslims, 83 Christians, and nine individuals identified as “other,” 83 percent of respondents agreed all worshippers should have equal rights to practice their religion regardless of cultural, social, and religious backgrounds, and any discrimination in this regard should be considered a human rights violation; 7 percent disagreed; and 10 percent were neutral.  In the same study, 74 percent said that religious rites were practiced freely in the country and that it had appropriate legislation allowing freedom of worship.

In a poll conducted by a Dubai-based public relations firm in June and involving a team of international experts, 57 percent of the country’s citizens between the ages of 18 and 24 agreed that religion was “the most important” factor to their personal identity, compared with 34 percent overall for youth polled in the 17 Arab states included in the survey.  Only one other state included in the survey had a larger percentage of respondents agreeing with this response.  Other choices offered by the poll as possible responses included family/tribe, nationality, Arabic heritage, political beliefs, language, and gender.

Embassy officers, including the Ambassador, continued to engage with government officials at all levels, including the Minister of Awqaf, Grand Mufti, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, and senior officials at the Royal Hashemite Court, to advocate for the rights of religious minorities, the protection of cultural resources, and interfaith tolerance.

Embassy officers continued to meet frequently with representatives of religious communities, including unrecognized groups, religious converts, expatriate religious volunteers, and interfaith institutions such as RIIFS and the Jordanian Interfaith Coexistence Research Center, to discuss issues related to religious freedom.

The embassy continued to advise the government’s Baptism Site Commission on its efforts to increase revenue from religiously based tourism, create jobs, preserve the country’s religious heritage, and highlight religious pluralism.  The embassy used social media to promote religious tolerance and mark religious holidays, including through posting video messages, which generally received positive responses from social media audiences.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 19.2 million (midyear 2021).  The most recent national census in 2009 reported 96.7 percent of the population identified with a religious faith.  A 2019 CRA study shows that 92.8 percent of the population self-identifies as religious.  According to 2009 census data, approximately 70 percent of the population identifying as religious is Muslim, most of whom adhere to the Sunni Hanafi school.  Other Muslim groups include Shafi’i Sunni, Shia, Sufi, and Ahmadi.

According the 2009 census data, Christians constitute 26 percent of the population identifying as religious, the great majority of whom are Russian Orthodox.  Other groups include Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, Mennonites, Pentecostals, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and members of the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church).  Ethnic Kazakhs and other Central Asian ethnic groups primarily identify as Muslim, and ethnic Russians and Ukrainians primarily identify as Christian.

Other religious groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population identifying as religious include Jews, Buddhists, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Baha’is, and Scientologists.

Nonbelievers or atheists constitute 18.8 percent of the population, according to a 2019 study by a government-affiliated think tank.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as a secular state and provides for freedom of religion and belief as well as the freedom to decline religious affiliation.  These rights may be limited only by laws and only to the extent necessary for protection of the constitutional system, public order, human rights and freedoms, and the health and morality of the population.  Under the constitution, all persons have the right to follow their religious or other convictions, take part in religious activities, and disseminate their beliefs.  These rights, however, are in practice limited to registered or “traditional” religious groups.  “Traditional” is not defined by law, but typically refers to Hanafi Sunni Islam, the Russian Orthodox Church, Greek and Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Judaism.

The MISD and the CRA regulate the practice of religion in the country.  By law, the MISD is responsible for the formulation and implementation of state policy on religion, as well as for facilitating government and civil society engagement.  It also considers potential violations of the laws on religious activity and extremism.  The MISD drafts legislation and regulations, conducts analysis of religious materials, and makes decisions on censorship.  Religious groups are required to submit religious materials for approval before dissemination; however, amendments to the Law on Religion signed into effect by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on December 29 exempt registered religious groups from this requirement.  The MISD cooperates with law enforcement bodies to ban religious groups and sanction individuals who violate the religion law, coordinates actions of local government to regulate religious practices, and provides the official interpretation of the religion law.

The counterterrorism law requires religious organizations to secure their buildings of worship against potential terrorist attacks; the government may act against religious organizations for failure to do so.  The law states the government shall not interfere with the choice of religious beliefs or affiliation of citizens or residents unless those beliefs are directed against the country’s constitutional framework, sovereignty, or territorial integrity.

The criminal and administrative codes include penalties for unauthorized religious activity, which includes the arrangement of, and participation in, activities of unregistered religious groups, participation in religious activities outside permitted areas, unlicensed distribution of religious materials or training of clergy, sale of religious literature without government approval or in places not approved by the government, and discussion of religion for the purpose of proselytization without the required missionary registration.  Criminal penalties for this activity include imprisonment up to seven years and fines of up to 20,419,000 tenge ($46,700).  For less serious violations, a local prosecutor and judge may impose administrative penalties without further court action.  Administrative penalties include detention of up to 30 days and fines of up to 583,400 tenge ($1,300) for individuals, 875,100 tenge ($2,000) for officials, and 1,458,500 tenge ($3,300) for organizations.  The amendments to the Law on Religion signed by President Tokayev on December 29 introduce a notification system in place of a previously required authorization system for religious organizations participating in activities outside houses of worship.

The criminal code prohibits the “incitement of interreligious discord,” which includes “propaganda of exclusivity, superiority, or inferiority of citizens according to their relation to religion [and other] origin.”  It also criminalizes the creation and leadership of social institutions that proclaim religious intolerance or exclusivity, punishable by imprisonment from three to seven years.

The extremism law, which applies to religious groups and other organizations, accords the government discretion to identify and designate a group as an “extremist organization,” ban a designated group’s activities, and criminalize membership in a banned organization.  The law defines “extremism” as an organization or commission of acts in pursuit of violent change of the constitutional system; violation of the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the country; undermining of national security; violent seizure or retention of power; armed rebellion; incitement of ethnic, religious, or other forms of social discord accompanied by calls to violence; or the use of any religious practice that causes a security or health risk.  An extremist organization is a “legal entity, association of individuals, and (or) legal entities engaged in extremism and recognized by a court as extremist.”  The law provides streamlined court procedures for identifying a group as “terrorist or extremist,” permitting a court to render judgement and act on a decision in as few as 72 hours.  After a legal finding of a violation, the law authorizes officials to immediately revoke the organization’s registration, thus ending its legal existence, and to seize its property.  Prosecutors have the right to annually inspect all groups registered with state bodies for compliance with all applicable laws.

There are 22 religious-affiliated organizations in the country formally banned under the extremism law.  Most of the banned organizations follow a form of Islam other than the officially recognized Hanafi school of Sunni Islam.  Banned organizations include Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Taliban, the Kurdish People’s Congress, the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Society for Social Reforms, as well as terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

Under the counterterrorism law, the Ministry of Finance may freeze the financial accounts of persons convicted of terrorism or extremism crimes.

The administrative code prohibits “spreading the creed of religious groups [that are] unregistered” in the country, an offense punishable by a fine of 252,500 tenge ($580).  A foreigner or stateless person found guilty may also be deported.

A religious organization may be designated “national,” “regional,” or “local.”  To register at the local level, an organization must submit an application to the Ministry of Justice that lists the names and addresses of at least 50 founding members.  Religious organizations may be active only within the geographic limits of the locality in which they register unless they have enough members to register at the regional or national level.  Regional registration requires at least two local organizations, each located within a different province, and a combined membership of at least 500 persons.  National registration requires at least 5,000 total members and at least 300 members in each of the country’s 14 regions and the cities of Nur-Sultan, Almaty, and Shymkent.  Only groups registered at the national or regional level have the right to open educational institutions for training clergy.

The law allows the government to deny registration to a religious group based on an insufficient number of adherents or on inconsistencies between the religious group’s charter and any national law, as determined by an analysis conducted by the CRA.  According to the administrative code, individuals participating in leading or financing an unregistered, suspended, or banned religious group may be fined between 126,250 tenge and 505,000 tenge ($290-$1,200).

The administrative code mandates a 505,000-tenge ($1,200) fine and a three-month suspension from conducting any religious activities for registered groups holding religious gatherings in buildings not approved for that purpose; importing, producing, or disseminating religious materials not approved by the CRA; systematically pursuing activities that contradict the charter and bylaws of the group as registered; constructing religious facilities without a permit; holding gatherings or conducting charity events in violation of the law; or otherwise defying the constitution or laws.  Private persons engaged in these activities are subject to a fine of 126,250 tenge ($290).  Police may impose these fines without first going to court.  Those fined may appeal their penalties to a court.

If an organization, its leaders, or members engage in activities not specified in its charter, it is subject to a warning, a fine of 252,500 tenge ($580), or both.  Under the administrative code, if the organization commits the same violation within a year, the legal entity is subject to a fine of 378,750 tenge ($870) and a three- to six-month suspension of activities.

According to the administrative code, if a religious organization engages in a prohibited activity or does not rectify violations resulting in a suspension, an official or the organization’s leader is subject to a fine of 505,000 tenge ($1,200), the entity is also subject to a fine of 1,262,500 tenge ($2,900), and its activities are banned indefinitely.

The law authorizes local authorities to “coordinate” the location of premises for religious events held outside religious buildings.  By law, religious activities may be held in residences, provided that organizers take into account the “rights and interests of neighbors.”  Authorities sometimes interpret this as a requirement to receive permission from the neighbors.

The government prohibits individuals who do not pay their fines, including those who do not pay their fines for violating religious laws, from traveling outside the country.

The law prohibits efforts to force a person to convert to any religion or to force a person’s participation in a religious group’s activities or in religious rites.  The law further bans activities of religious organizations that involve violence against citizens or otherwise harm the health or morality of citizens and residents, force them to end marriages or family relations, or violate human rights and freedoms.  The law also bans activities which force citizens to evade the performance of “duties specified in the constitution and legislation,” but the definition of these duties is subject to broad interpretation by the government.  The law prohibits methods of proselytizing that exploit a potential convert’s dependence on charity.  The law also prohibits blackmail, violence or the threat of violence, or the use of material threats to coerce participation in religious activities.

The law states that in cases when a prisoner requests a clergy member to perform a religious rite, he or she may invite a clergy member of a formally registered religious group to a detention facility, as long as this access complies with the prison’s internal regulations.  The law bans construction of places of worship within prison territory.  Pursuant to the law, registered religious organizations may participate in monitoring prisons, including creating and implementing programs to improve the correctional system and developing and publicly discussing draft laws and regulations as they relate to the prison system.  Religious groups may identify, provide, distribute, and monitor the use of humanitarian, social, legal, and charitable assistance to prisoners.  They may provide other forms of assistance to penitentiary system bodies, as long as they do not contradict the law.  According to the law, prisoners may possess religious literature, but only if it is approved following an analysis conducted by a CRA religious “expert.”  The law does not define the qualifications needed to be a religious expert.

The law defines “religious tourism” as a “type of tourism where persons travel for performance of religious rites in a country (place) of temporary residence” and requires the MISD to regulate it.  Together with the Sunni Hanafi Spiritual Administration of Muslims (SAMK), a government-organized religious NGO headed by the Grand Mufti of Almaty and including CRA officials, the MISD oversees the process by which individuals participate in the Hajj or in other travel for the performance of religious rites.  The government requires that specially selected guides and imams accompany each group and states the rules are designed to ensure pilgrims are not recruited by extremist religious groups.

The law prohibits religious ceremonies in government buildings, including those belonging to the military or law enforcement.

All production, publication, and dissemination of religious literature and information materials of religious content are allowed only after receiving a positive expert opinion from the CRA.  The law allows one copy of published religious materials to be imported for personal use without CRA review.

The law states the government shall not interfere with the rights of parents to raise their children consistent with their religious convictions, unless a court or relevant government official determines that such an upbringing harms the child’s health or infringes upon the child’s rights.

The law requires organizations to “take steps to prevent involvement or participation of anyone under the age of 18 in the activities of a religious association” if a parent or other legal guardian objects.  The law bans religious activities, including proselytizing, in children’s vacation, sport, creative, or other leisure organizations, camps, or sanatoria.  The extent to which organizations must prevent underage persons’ involvement in religious activity is not specifically outlined and has not been further defined by authorities.

The law prohibits religious instruction in public schools, colleges, or universities.  Homeschooling for religious reasons is also prohibited.  The law allows afterschool and other supplemental religious instruction only if a registered religious group provides it.  A decree mandates that schoolchildren wear school uniforms that comply with the secular nature of education and prohibits inclusion of any elements that could indicate religious affiliation, such as head coverings.

The election law prohibits political parties based on religious affiliation.

The criminal code prohibits creating, leading, or actively participating in a religious or public association whose activities involve committing acts of “violence against citizens or the causing of other harm to their health or the incitement of citizens to refuse to carry out their civil obligations as well as the creation or leadership of parties on a religious basis.”  The code punishes such acts with a fine of up to 15.2 million tenge ($34,800) or up to six years’ imprisonment.

To perform missionary or other religious activity in the country, a foreigner must obtain a missionary or religious visa.  These visas allow a person to stay for a maximum of six months, with the possibility to apply to extend the stay for another six months.  To obtain missionary visas, applicants must be invited by a religious group formally registered in the country.  The CRA must approve the letter of invitation.  Applicants must obtain consent from the CRA each time they apply.  The CRA may reject missionary visa applications based on a negative assessment from CRA religious experts, or if it deems the missionaries represent a danger to the country’s constitutional framework, citizens’ rights and freedoms, or any person’s health or morals.  The constitution requires foreign religious groups to conduct their activities, including appointing the heads of local congregations, “in coordination with appropriate state institutions,” notably the CRA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Foreigners may not register religious groups.

Local and foreign missionaries are required to register annually with the local executive body of a region or of the cities of Nur-Sultan, Almaty, and Shymkent and provide information on their religious affiliation, intended territory of missionary work, and intended timeframe for conducting that work.  Missionaries must submit all literature and other materials intended to support their missionary work, together with their registration application.  Use of materials not vetted during the registration process is illegal.  A missionary must produce registration documents and a power of attorney from the sponsoring religious organization to work on its behalf.  The local executive body of a region or the cities of Nur-Sultan, Almaty, and Shymkent may refuse to register missionaries if those executive bodies deem the missionaries’ work to “constitute a threat to the constitutional order, social order, the rights and freedoms of individuals, or the health and morals of the population.”

The law does not provide for conscientious objection to mandatory military service on religious grounds, but clergy from recognized religious organizations, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, may be exempted from service.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to the international religious freedom NGO Forum 18, 24 Sunni Muslims were serving sentences connected to their religious activities or beliefs at the end of the year, the same number as in 2020.  Eight other individuals were serving “restricted freedom” sentences that consisted of probation plus compulsory community service, and in some cases, court-imposed restrictions on their freedom of movement.  Sixteen individuals who had completed their prison terms remained banned from religious activities.

Civil society representatives reported that some of the individuals who had completed their prison terms or restricted freedom sentences continued to experience restrictions on access to their bank accounts.  According to Forum 18, the government typically added persons who had been convicted on terrorism or extremism charges to the Ministry of Finance’s list of individuals “connected with the financing of terrorism or extremism,” freezing their bank accounts.  Families often discovered accounts were blocked only after going to the bank.  Forum 18 reported that relatives were allowed to withdraw small amounts if they did not have other sources of income.

On May 11, police arrested eight persons who protested for 93 days in front of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) consulate in Almaty, where they had been advocating for Muslim ethnic Kazakh relatives detained in Xinjiang.  On September 23, authorities arrested and subsequently fined 10 members of the group as demonstrators peacefully held signs outside the PRC embassy in Nur-Sultan.  The same 10 individuals were also detained and again fined as they left their rented apartment in Nur-Sultan on October 1, the PRC’s national day.  The daily protests continued in Almaty through year’s end.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported that some of their members who were conscientious objectors encountered difficulties in obtaining exemption from military service, although all cases were eventually resolved through dialogue with authorities.  Jehovah’s Witnesses representatives said that in some cases, local enlistment officers initially considered the certificates issued by the recruits’ local religious communities to be insufficient evidence to exempt the young men from service.  The communities then provided clarification of the applicants’ eligibility for exemption as members of the religious group’s clergy, as well as letters from the conscientious objectors formally asking to be released from military service.

According to CRA statistics covering the first nine months of the year, there were 3,824 registered religious organizations or branches in the country, compared with 3,818 registered in the same period in 2020.  The government did not provide information on the specific religious organizations registered during the year.

The government did not approve the registration of Muslim groups apart from those observing the Sunni Hanafi school, which the SAMK oversaw.  All other schools of Islam remained unregistered and were officially unable to practice in the country, although religious leaders reported some non-Hanafi Muslim communities continued to worship informally without government interference.

The MISD and the SAMK maintained an official agreement on cooperation, and NGOs continued to state this agreement led to the government effectively exercising control over the nominally independent SAMK.  By joining the SAMK, Muslim communities relinquished the right to appoint their own imams, subjected themselves to SAMK approval regarding any property actions (such as sales, transfers, or improvements), and were required to pay 30 percent of their mosque’s income to the SAMK.  The SAMK also set the curriculum for religious education across the country and provided guidelines and sample texts for sermons during Friday prayers.

The SAMK continued to oversee the opening of new and restored mosques.  According to the CRA, there were 2,683 mosques in the country, one fewer than reported in 2020, but the government and news media continued to report varying and occasionally inconsistent statistics on the number of mosques nationwide.

The SAMK continued to control the activities of all formally registered Muslim groups affiliated with the Sunni Hanafi school and had authority over appointment of imams as well as over the administration of qualification examinations and background checks for aspiring imams.  The MISD continued to work closely with the SAMK on the training of imams, upgrading madrassahs to the status of degree-granting colleges, and controlling Hajj pilgrimages.  The SAMK permitted imams to enroll in baccalaureate, masters, or doctoral programs offered at Nur Mubarak University’s Islamic Studies and Religious Studies departments based on their prior education levels.  In addition, there were 11 schools for religious training of Sunni Hanafi imams, and one each for Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox clergy.

The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community remained unregistered during the year; the group had attempted to register with authorities six times since 2011 and was last rejected in 2016.  Government experts had previously concluded the community’s teachings were not Islamic and that it must remove the word “Muslim” from its registration materials.  Some community members reported that since they were not registered, they did not engage in any religious activity.

According to local and international observers, authorities continued to impose restrictions on and conduct additional scrutiny of what the government considered “nontraditional” religious groups, including Muslims who practice a version of Islam other than the officially recognized Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, and some non-Lutheran Protestant Christian groups.

The Council of Baptist Churches reported it continued to refuse on principle to register under the law, in keeping with its policy of maintaining a distance from the government.  Community representatives reported authorities continued to closely monitor their meetings and travels and police followed and surveilled them, as in prior years.

The Church of Scientology continued to function as a registered public association rather than as a religious organization.  The government allowed the Church, as a public association, to maintain resource centers/libraries where members could read or borrow books and host discussions or meetings, but it did not allow the Church to engage in public activity the government considered religious in nature, such as conducting services.

According to the CRA, as of the third quarter of 2021, there were 367 missionaries officially registered in the country.  Of those, 293 were foreign nationals and 74 citizens.  Of the officially registered missionaries, 95 percent were members of Christian religious organizations; the other 5 percent included members of the Krishina Consciousness Society, and Jewish and Buddhist religious organizations.

The amendments to the religion law in effect as of December 29 followed a June decree by President Tokayev on human rights that included instructions to improve religious organizations’ ability to register.  According to Forum 18 and some religious groups, the regulations in the amended law continued to impose onerous requirements on holding gatherings outside registered places of worship.

Religious freedom observers consistently reported that authorities continued to use the religion law to harass and restrict minority religious groups with fines and limitations on their activities.  Violations included attending worship meetings not approved by the state; offering, importing, or selling religious literature and pictures, including on the internet; sharing or teaching faith; and violating procedures for praying in mosques.  The CRA reported 134 administrative prosecutions for violations of the religion law in 2020, the most recent government data available, and a significant decrease from 2019, when 552 such prosecutions were reported.  According to Forum 18, as of September, (latest information available) there were 90 known administrative cases against members of religious organizations for exercising their religion or belief during the year, of which 20 were for holding meetings or rituals or maintaining prayer rooms without state permission.

On January 8, police and officials of the West Kazakhstan Region Religious Affairs Department raided the Christmas service of a Baptist congregation in Oral (Uralsk in Russian).  The congregation, as was the case with all other Baptist congregations in the country, was unregistered.  After the service, police detained church members and fined two, Dmitry Isayev and Vladimir Nelepin one month’s wage (approximately 140,546 tenge, $320).  Church members told Forum 18 that the local authorities routinely observed the church’s services.

Forum 18 reported that on April 8, authorities charged Society of Krishna Consciousness follower Timur Seitov with performing religious rituals without state permission for chanting a mantra at an intersection in central Almaty.  On May 27, the Almaty Interdistrict Specialized Administrative Court found Seitov guilty, fined him one month’s wages (approximately 140,546 tenge, $320), and banned him from unauthorized activity, including singing in public, for three months, while he was on parole.

On January 28, a court in Aktobe found Muslim Mukhammed Toleu guilty of violating religious laws and conducting an unapproved business after Toleu led Friday prayers in the basement of his home in December 2020.  The court fined Toleu (65,000 tenge, $150) and banned him from maintaining a prayer room for three months.  On March 25, the same court found Toleu guilty of a second offense after he held Friday prayers in his home on February 12, and it fined him an additional four month’s average wages.  The Aktobe Regional Court rejected his appeal of the lower court’s decisions on April 12.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, in 2020 (most recent information), authorities detained 63 members of the community on charges of illegal missionary activity between January and October.  Authorities issued oral warnings to 38 members, written warnings to 14, and took 11 to court for allegedly violating the religion law.  Of those 11, nine were acquitted and two were found guilty under the country’s administrative code and fined 277,800 tenge each ($640).

As part of COVID-19-related public health restrictions, local officials in regions with high incidences of COVID-19 transmission prohibited large gatherings, including religious ceremonies.  All religious organizations had to comply with region-specific public health-related restrictions that changed frequently as authorities sought to limit the spread of the virus.  In September, the government announced new regulations permitting large gatherings, including weddings, funerals, and activities in houses of worship, with restrictions on the number of participants based on the level of COVID-19 transmission in the region.  According to religious leaders, COVID restrictions were often applied in practice at a local level more strictly to nontraditional groups than to traditional or registered groups.  Religious leaders reported some clergy were arrested under the regulations for attempting to conduct services.  Some observers stated authorities used COVID-19 pandemic restrictions to discriminate against them.

The government maintained its policy of banning religious attire in schools.  In September, a group of 1,640 parents wrote an open letter to President Tokayev requesting legislative changes to allow girls to wear the kimeshek, a traditional Kazakh head covering, in school and to allow prayer rooms in schools.  In response, CRA Chairman Erzhan Nukezhanov told media on September 7 that the 2016 Ministry of Education decree on mandatory school uniforms for both public and private educational facilities remained in force, in accordance with the country’s secular form of government.  The decree does not permit students to wear traditional clothing.

According to Forum 18, in the first eight months of the year, authorities fined 26 persons for offering religious literature or other religious objects for sale without state permission.  Authorities fined 11 individuals and warned two others for selling religious literature and objects on the shopping website OLX.kz.

The Kordai District Court fined three ethnic Dungan (ethnic Chinese) Muslims, Sherba Yuburov, Kharsan Yasyrov, and Kelir Nusyrov, 291,700 tenge ($671) each in February, March, and July, respectively, for illegal religious teaching after finding them guilty of instructing children about the Quran at unsanctioned gatherings in Kordai District of Zhambyl Region.  Religious freedom observers noted that Kordai District, on the country’s southeastern border with Kyrgyzstan, experienced a disproportionate number of religious freedom prosecutions, with Forum 18 stating that half of all illegal religious instruction cases in the country from 2018 to 2021 were from the district.

The international Christian NGO Open Doors continued to cite the country on its World Watch List for the government’s control over religious expression, including surveillance, raids on church meetings, and arrests.  The NGO said reports of violence against Christians decreased in 2021 compared with 2020.  The NGO said Christians from a Muslim background bore the worst persecution, much of it from the community rather than from authorities.

Some religious minority groups faced attempts by local governments to seize their property.  On January 21, the Supreme Court overturned a 2020 lower court decision to seize buildings of the New Life Church in Almaty and stopped the seizure of two buildings used by the Church to support the needy.  Church representatives welcomed the ruling after previously expressing fears that some who lived in the buildings would have no place to go if the local government confiscated the buildings.  Authorities were still seeking to sell a former residence of one of three New Life pastors convicted in 2019 for using hypnotism and psychological manipulation to defraud parishioners in order to pay the 26 million tenge ($59,500) in damages awarded in the earlier court decision.

In February, representatives of the Presbyterian Grace Church and the Pentecostal Agape Church of Nur-Sultan agreed to financial and land compensation from Nur-Sultan city and complied with a court order to vacate their existing property and leases in that city after all appeals were exhausted.  This ended a legal dispute begun in 2020 when the mayor of Nur-Sultan attempted to confiscate the Churches’ property.

On September 30 and October 14, government authorities administratively extended without delay for an additional year (the maximum time allowed by law) the asylum status of four Muslim ethnic Kazakh Chinese citizens who fled persecution in Xinjiang.  The four individuals first received asylum status in Kazakhstan in October 2020 on the grounds of credible fear of persecution if they returned to China.  On January 21, however, unidentified persons attacked two of these individuals nearly simultaneously in the cities of Nur-Sultan and Almaty.  The victims stated publicly that local authorities and PRC contacts had warned them repeatedly not to speak about the situation in Xinjiang.  Kaster Muskan and Murager Alimuly, two other Muslim ethnic Kazakh refugees from China, also said living in Kazakhstan had had become more difficult.  They said “Our main goal was to stay in Kazakhstan.  At first, the authorities told us, ‘We will give you citizenship, just keep a low profile.’  We got used to it and kept quiet.  But eventually, we were told that we would never be granted citizenship.  Now the only option is to go to a third country.  If they would give us citizenship, we would be glad to live in Kazakhstan.”

The Church of Scientology reported that during the year, authorities continued to harass and intimidate its members s, including through frivolous lawsuits and extrajudicial searches, destructive raids of their premises, and seizure of literature.

Media reported that on October 2, the Taraz City Court awarded two million tenge ($4,600) to a married couple who sued Jehovah’s Witnesses for causing mental harm.  According to the expert testimony of two psychiatrists and a psychologist introduced at the trial, the couple’s membership in Jehovah’s Witnesses and study of the religious group’s literature resulted in their mental illness, characterized as an obsessive-compulsive disorder with the formation of mental dependence on being members of Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Forum 18 and other observers stated the court’s decision was flawed, particularly because much of the expert testimony was plagiarized from a 2008 analysis used in a case against Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia.  Observers also noted that the government had previously approved much of the literature that was cited as harmful.

According to the Penitentiary Committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, all prisons continued to have dedicated specialists charged with creating programs to counter religious extremism, in accordance with a 2017 order issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs as part of a national counterterrorism program.  Lawyers familiar with the program said most of the specialists lacked education or specialized training.

In August, the MISD, CRA, Association of Religious Organizations of Kazakhstan, and the U.S.-based interfaith NGOs Love Your Neighbor Community and Multi-Faith Neighbor Network cosponsored a workshop to promote greater religious tolerance in the country.  The workshop equipped local faith leaders and city government officials with best practices to help build relationships across faiths.  Muslim, Orthodox and Protestant faith leaders from nine major cities around the country participated.

President Tokayev in his September 1 state of the nation address said the harmonious development of interethnic relations had always been and would remain a primary government policy.  Tokayev called on all citizens to realize the importance of harmonious interethnic and interfaith relations as an invaluable facet of the country’s identity.

In September, CRA Chairman Nukezhanov announced to media that the government would propose legislative amendments to protect the right of nonbelief for atheists.  The government took no further action before year’s end.

Observers and members of minority Christian religious communities continued to express concerns regarding negative articles and broadcasts about minority religious groups that private and government-run media described as “nontraditional.”

Jehovah’s Witnesses continued to report the appearance of defamatory articles in private and government-run media outlets during the year.  The Church of Scientology also received negative media coverage.  In an August interview on antivaccine movements, editor-in-chief Pavel Bannikov of the news website Factcheck.kz said the Church was not very active in spreading antivaccine propaganda, but he equated Scientology with foreign disinformation campaigns because of the group’s campaign against elements of the country’s health code and, in particular, its opposition to psychiatric care.

NGOs continued to report individuals were wary of “nontraditional” religious groups, particularly those that proselytized or whose dress or grooming, including the use of Islamic headscarves and beards, suggested “nontraditional” beliefs.

According to the NGO Open Doors, Christians who converted from Islam continued to be persecuted by family, friends and their community.

The Association of Religious Organizations of Kazakhstan, which includes many of the Protestant groups deemed “nontraditional” by the government, represented those minority religious groups’ concerns to the government and provided a forum for consultations among those groups.

The Ambassador, other embassy officers, and senior U.S. government officials met with senior government officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MISD, and CRA to urge respect for religious freedom, both in general and regarding specific cases.  They discussed government-proposed changes to the country’s law regulating religious practice and raised concerns, before the law was amended, about its restrictive effects on religious freedom, especially concerning criminal penalties for peaceful religious speech, praying without registration, and censorship of religious literature.  U.S. officials made recommendations to improve the amendments, but the government did not accept many of them.  U.S. officials also raised concerns about the government’s inconsistent application of the religion law and the criminal and administrative codes, depending on whether the government considered a religious group to be nontraditional or traditional.

In bilateral meetings, including during the virtual meeting of the U.S-Kazakhstan International Religious Freedom Working Group in June and the U.S.-Kazakhstan Enhanced Strategic Partnership Dialogue in December, U.S. officials continued to encourage the government to respect individuals’ rights to peaceful expression of religious belief and free practice of religion.  U.S. officials continued to express concern about vaguely written laws related to religious freedom that were broad in scope and lacked specific definition of legal terms that enabled authorities, particularly at the local level, to apply them in an arbitrary manner.  They encouraged the government to eliminate burdensome registration requirements for religious communities and to take other steps to further amend the religion law to increase the ability of believers to practice their faith.  U.S. officials encouraged fair and equal treatment for faith organizations in land disputes with the government.  An embassy officer took part in an August multifaith workshop cosponsored by MISD, CRA, U.S.-based interfaith NGOs, and the Associations of Religious Organizations of Kazakhstan, at the request of the organizers, to show U.S. interest in, and support for, religious tolerance efforts.  On social media, the embassy engaged in outreach to urge respect for religious freedom.

Embassy officials continued outreach to, and maintained contact with, a wide range of religious communities, their leaders, and religious freedom advocates.  They underscored the importance freedom of religion plays in countering violent extremism, expressed concern about further government restrictions on religious freedom, and encouraged reform of relevant laws and guidelines so all citizens could conduct peaceful religious activities freely, whether or not they were part of a registered religious group.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 54.7 million (midyear 2021).  The government estimates that as of 2019, approximately 85.5 percent of the total population is Christian and 11 percent Muslim.  Groups constituting less than 2 percent of the population include Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is, and those adhering to various traditional religious beliefs.  Nonevangelical Protestants account for 33 percent of the population, Roman Catholics 21 percent, and other Christian denominations, including evangelical Protestants, African Instituted Churches (churches started in Africa independently by Africans rather than chiefly by missionaries from another continent), and Orthodox churches, 32 percent.

Most of the Muslim population lives in the northeast and coastal regions, with significant Muslim communities in several areas of Nairobi.  Religion and ethnicity are often linked, with most members of many ethnic groups adhering to the same religious beliefs.  For example, ethnic Somalis and Swahilis living in the coastal region account for the majority of the Muslim population.  The five largest ethnic groups (the Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo, and Kamba) are predominately Christian.  There are more than 230,000 refugees and asylum seekers in the Dadaab refugee camps near the Somali border, mostly ethnic Somali Muslims.  The Kakuma refugee camp in the northwestern part of the country has more than 177,000 refugees, including Somalis, South Sudanese, and Ethiopians, who practice a variety of religions.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates there shall be no state religion and prohibits religious discrimination.  The constitution provides for freedom of religion and belief individually or in communities, including the freedom to manifest any religion through worship, practice, teaching, or observance, and to debate religious questions.  The constitution also states individuals shall not be compelled to act or engage in any act contrary to their belief or religion.  These rights shall not be limited except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society.”

The constitution requires parliament to enact legislation recognizing a system of personal and family law adhered to by persons professing a particular religion.  The constitution also specifically provides for qadi courts to adjudicate certain types of civil cases based on Islamic law, including questions relating to personal status, marriage, divorce, or inheritance in cases in which “all the parties profess the Muslim religion.”  The secular High Court has jurisdiction over civil and criminal proceedings, including those in the qadi courts, and accepts appeals of any qadi court decision.

Although there is no penal law referring to blasphemy, a section of the penal code states that destroying, damaging, or defiling any place of worship or object held sacred with the intention of insulting the religion of any class of persons is a misdemeanor.  This offense carries a penalty of a fine or up to two years in prison but is reportedly rarely prosecuted under this law.  Crimes against the property of religious groups or places of worship are more likely to be treated as malicious destruction of property, which is also a misdemeanor.

According to the law, new religious groups, institutions or places of worship, and faith-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must register with the Registrar of Societies, which in turn reports to the Attorney General’s Office.  Indigenous and traditional religious groups are not required to register, and many do not.  To register, applicants must have valid national identification documents, pay a fee, and undergo security screening.  Registered religious institutions and places of worship may apply for tax-exempt status, including exemption from duty on imported goods.  The law also requires that organizations dedicated to advocacy, public benefit, the promotion of charity, or research register with the NGO Coordination Board.

All public schools have religious education classes taught by government-funded teachers.  These classes focus on either Christian, Muslim, or Hindu teachings and on the basic content of the religious texts of the religion being taught, as well as ethics.  The Ministry of Education allows local communities and schools to decide which course to offer.  The course selected usually depends on the dominant local religion and the sponsor of the school, which is often a religious group.  The national curriculum mandates religious classes for primary school students, and students may not opt out.  Some public schools offer religious education options, usually Christian or Islamic studies, but are not required to offer more than one.

The law establishes fees for multiple steps in the marriage process that apply to all marriages, religious or secular.  All officiants are required to purchase an annual license, and all public marriage venues must be registered.  Officiants must be appointed by a registered religious group to conduct marriages and to purchase the license.

The Ministry of Information, Communications, and Technology must approve regional radio and television broadcast licenses, including for religious organizations.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Human rights groups and prominent Muslim leaders and religious organizations continued to state the government’s antiterrorism activities disproportionately affected Muslims, especially ethnic Somalis and particularly in areas along the border with Somalia.  The government continued to deny directing such actions, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, and detention.

In November, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims called for weekly protests to demand government accountability regarding alleged enforced abductions.  According to the council, security forces had killed or disappeared 133 individuals during the year.  The governmental Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA), established to provide civilian oversight of the work of police, and human rights organizations reported numerous complaints from predominantly Muslim communities, particularly in the Eastleigh neighborhood of Nairobi and coastal regions, regarding intimidation, arbitrary arrest, and extortion by police.  Some complainants stated police accused them of being members of al-Shabaab.

In October, Muslim leaders from various religious and human rights organizations issued a joint statement criticizing the government for not protecting the rights of Muslim citizens.  The leaders stated security forces abducted more than 40 Muslims through October, only 10 of whom had returned to their homes.  They highlighted the case of a Muslim employee of Lamu County whom they stated was abducted in June by individuals in a government vehicle and whose whereabouts remained unknown at year’s end.

In October, unknown persons allegedly abducted a Muslim male after he left a mosque in Mombasa.  Activists accused police of targeting Muslim youths and accusing them of having ties to terrorism without providing evidence.  Police denied involvement and were reportedly investigating the matter.

In February, the government evicted approximately 3,500 members of the Muslim Nubian community in Kisumu County, whose homes were allegedly built on land belonging to the state-owned Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC).  In August, the Environment and Land Court ruled the KRC violated the Nubians’ rights by conducting an illegal eviction.  Activists said that homes and other structures belonging to non-Muslims were even closer to the railway line than the Nubians’ homes but were left alone.  They described this incident as a case of religious discrimination.  This ruling laid the groundwork for an additional lawsuit against KRC to claim damages, but it was unclear at year’s end whether residents had done so.

The government continued to take steps, described by human rights organizations as limited and uneven, to address cases of alleged abuses by security force members.  IPOA continued to refer cases of police misconduct to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for prosecution.  Public prosecutors, however, experienced lengthy delays in moving cases to trial and conviction.  IPOA investigations led to five convictions of police officers during the year.

The Registrar of Societies, which has not registered any religious organizations since 2014, continued not to register any new religious organizations pending completion of revised Religious Societies Rules.  Religious leaders criticized the government’s inaction, which had led to a backlog of thousands of unapproved religious group applications.  Some religious leaders called on the government to resume registrations, stating the suspension interfered with freedom of worship, including by making it more difficult to purchase property and conduct operations.

At the start of the pandemic, the government appointed an Inter-faith Council on the National Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic to develop guidelines for the phased reopening of places of worship, which closed in late March 2020 to stem the spread of COVID-19, and the holding of religious ceremonies.  The council continued to advise the government and adjust its guidelines based on evolving COVID-19 conditions.

In October, the council raised its recommended limit on attendance of in-person worship services to two-thirds of a house of worship’s seating capacity, if religious leaders implemented masking and social distancing guidelines.  Council members and religious leaders familiar with the council’s work said government officials largely adopted the council’s recommendations.  Religious leaders reported local officials at times attempted to harass religious groups for failing to follow COVID-19 guidelines but said national government officials intervened to help resolve these issues.

Many religious leaders criticized politicians for holding political gatherings that did not adhere to the government’s restrictions on public gatherings and for politicizing funerals and other religious gatherings.

Some predominately Muslim ethnic groups, including Kenyan Somalis and Nubians, reported difficulties obtaining government identification cards.  These communities stated government officials at times requested supporting documents not required by law and implemented vetting processes in a biased manner.  In June, the NGO Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) said it helped nearly 200 young individuals obtain national identification cards, which are required to obtain government services or register to vote.  These individuals, the majority of whom were Muslim, lived in Lamu County near the border with Somalia.  The government reportedly halted issuance of identification cards in this region due to concern that al-Shabaab terrorists from Somalia could pose as Kenyan nationals to fraudulently obtain government-issued identification cards.  MUHURI and other human rights organizations stated the government was unfairly profiling Muslims.

There were reports that, in general, non-Muslims continued to harass or treat with suspicion persons of Somali ethnicity, who are predominantly Muslim.  Police officers typically do not serve in their home regions, and therefore officers in some Muslim-majority areas are largely non-Muslim.  NGOs stated this often led to misunderstandings between police officers and the communities they are assigned to serve.

Religious leaders representing interfaith groups, including the Anglican, Catholic, evangelical Protestant, Muslim, and Hindu communities, continued to engage with political parties and government bodies in the national reconciliation process initiated after violent 2017 presidential elections.  The interfaith Dialogue Reference Group, composed of prominent Christian, Muslim, and Hindu groups, continued to hold national and county forums to promote national reconciliation.  The Dialogue Reference Group also regularly issued statements calling for national unity and urging the government to take necessary steps to conduct a peaceful and credible general election in August 2022.

The Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab again carried out attacks in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Lamu Counties in the northeastern part of the country, sometimes targeting non-Muslims because of their faith.  In January, the international Christian advocacy organization Open Doors noted what it described as a rise in violence against Christians, especially in the northeast where al-Shabaab was responsible for many threats and attacks.  In June, al-Shabaab terrorists attacked two buses traveling through Mandera County near the Kenyan border with Somalia, killing three individuals.  Media outlets reported the attackers were targeting non-Muslims.

According to NGO sources, some Muslims and their families believed they were threatened with violence or death, especially individuals who had converted from Islam to Christianity and those of Somali ethnic origin.

Some interreligious NGOs and faith leaders, citing extensive interfaith efforts to build peace between communities, promote peaceful elections, and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, said relations between religious groups continued to improve.  For example, the national interfaith umbrella group the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK) partnered with the governmental National Cohesion and Integration Commission to call on politicians to avoid inciting violence by adhering to an elections code of conduct in advance of the country’s general election in August 2022.  It also encouraged members of its religious communities to register to vote and educate themselves about the electoral process.  The interfaith Dialogue Reference Group, composed of prominent Christian, Muslim, and Hindu groups, continued to hold national and county forums to promote national reconciliation.  The Dialogue Reference Group also regularly issued statements calling for national unity and urging the government to take necessary steps to conduct peaceful and credible elections.

IRCK also partnered with other NGOs such as the Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE) to increase religious tolerance and reduce opportunities for radicalization related to religion, particularly in Nairobi and the coastal region.  KECOSCE and IRCK hosted interfaith dialogues and joint community activities to encourage peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding.  IRCK and religious leaders reported that close collaboration among different faiths continued to inform and improve the country’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Leaders collaborated on several initiatives at the national and county level to disseminate accurate information, protect public health, and address the socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19.

Embassy officials emphasized the importance of respecting religious freedom in meetings with government officials, including senior police officials and local governments in the coastal region, where they especially stressed the role of interfaith dialogue in stemming religious intolerance, countering religiously based violent extremism, and addressing the grievances of marginalized religious and ethnic groups.  Embassy staff continued to engage senior officials to underscore the importance of addressing human rights abuses by security forces, including abuses limiting the ability of minority religious groups to function freely in society, and supported several programs to improve police accountability.

The Charge d’Affaires and embassy staff met frequently with religious leaders and groups, including the IRCK, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics, Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, Hindu Council of Kenya, National Muslim Leaders Forum, Alliance of Registered Churches & Ministries Founders, Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, and National Council of Churches of Kenya.  Topics of discussion continued to include the importance of religious groups in countering religiously based extremism, promoting peaceful elections, and responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the value of sharing guidance from religious leaders on human rights issues.

The Charge d’Affaires hosted or participated in several interfaith roundtables during the year to discuss issues and problems facing various faith communities.  Participants, including representatives of Christian, Muslim, and Hindu groups, discussed building tolerance between and among faiths, encouraging the critical role religious leaders play in peacebuilding efforts, promoting government accountability, and combating corruption.  For example, the Charge d’Affaires hosted a meeting of the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics in Mombasa to discuss relations between ethnic and religious groups as the nation prepares for the August 2022 general election.  Throughout the year, the Charge d’Affaires participated in similar meetings hosted by foreign diplomatic missions in the country that featured leaders from various religious communities.

Embassy officials met individually with religious and civic leaders to urge them to continue to work across sectarian lines to reaffirm the importance of religious freedom, tolerance, and diversity.  The embassy highlighted these engagements, where appropriate, on its website and social media accounts.  During official visits to various parts of the country, including regions heavily populated by Muslims and other minority groups, the Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officials encouraged faith communities and other societal figures to regard religious diversity as a national strength.  They accomplished this through media interviews and other public and private engagements with religious leaders and NGOs that work to advance religious freedom.

The embassy supported civil society organizations that protect the legal and human rights of marginalized groups, including religious minorities, through direct grants, and by nominating community leaders to participate in U.S. government-sponsored programs.  The embassy also supported efforts to strengthen understanding, respect, and acceptance among religious groups, including within multifaith communities in Nairobi and Mombasa Counties and the IRCK’s “Building Interfaith Bridges” initiative.  The embassy partnered with interfaith groups to improve accountable governance and strengthen communities’ relationships with law enforcement by sponsoring a visiting speaker series.  It also advocated for the inclusion of marginalized groups and building resilience against conflict and violent extremism related to religion through assistance programs.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 113,000 (midyear 2021).  According to the 2015 census, approximately 57 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 31 percent belongs to the Kiribati Uniting Church (until 2016 known as the Kiribati Protestant Church).  Members who did not accept the name change continue as the KPC.  The KPC estimates a membership of 10,000, or approximately 8 percent of the population.  According to the census, 5 percent of the population belongs to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ), but the Church states its membership exceeds 12 percent.  Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include the Baha’i Faith (2 percent), Seventh-day Adventist Church (2 percent), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Assemblies of God, and Muslims.  Persons with no religious affiliation account for less than 1 percent of the population.  Members of the Catholic Church are concentrated in the northern islands, while Protestants constitute the majority in the southern islands.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience (including religion), expression, assembly, and association.  These rights may be limited by law “which is reasonably required” in the interests of public defense, safety, order, morality, or health, or to protect the rights of others.

By law, any religious group with a membership equal to or greater than 2 percent of the total population (according to the most recent census) must register with the government, although there are no legal consequences for not registering.  To register, the religious organization submits a request to the Ministry of Women, Youth, and Social Affairs, signed by the head of the group and supported by five other members of the organization.  Also required in the request is information regarding proof of the number of adherents and the religious denomination and name under which the group wishes to be registered.

There is no mandated religious education in public schools.  Public schools in the country allow a variety of religious groups, including Catholics, Protestants, Seventh-day Adventists, and members of the Church of Jesus Christ, to provide religious education in schools.  Students who opt out of religious education must participate in a supervised study period.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to administer a small grants program for development projects administered by nongovernmental organizations and religious organizations, of which the KPC was a recipient.  Missionaries were active in the country and operated freely.  Missionary visits to islands with a “one church” tradition were allowed as long as they followed the traditional practice of requesting permission from local leaders.  Sources stated that minority religious groups did not seek to send any missionaries to these islands during the year.

The government allowed the KPC to operate, but the Church was not able to register during the year due to a court case and opposition to its registration from the Kiribati Uniting Church, according to KPC leadership.  The Church’s registration application was submitted when it separated from the Kiribati Uniting Church in 2016, and Church officials said they were optimistic the government would grant registration due to the government’s grant support for its activities.

Most governmental meetings and events began and ended with an ordained minister or other church official delivering a Christian prayer.

With approximately 1,000 inhabitants each, the population of two islands – Arorae and Tamana – continued their “one-church-only” tradition, which they stated was in deference to Protestant missionaries who came to the islands in the 1800s, according to government reports.  Residents of the two islands were largely Protestants, who represented 98 percent and 96 percent, respectively, according to the 2015 census.  While most residents of Arorae accepted the name change to Kiribati Uniting Church, most residents of Tamana joined the KPC.  A small number of Catholic, Seventh-day Adventist, Church of Jesus Christ, and Baha’i adherents were also present.  On these islands, residents of other religious groups worshipped only in their own homes.  Sources stated that villagers on Arorae discouraged religious groups outside the Kiribati Uniting Church from proselytizing or holding public meetings but permitted missionaries to visit members in their homes if they requested permission from local leaders first.

Embassy officials held a teleconference with the leader of the KPC to discuss religious tolerance and registration.  The U.S. embassy in Fiji, which covers Kiribati, utilized its social media platforms to promote religious pluralism and tolerance, posting messages on major Jewish, Hindu, and Muslim celebrations on Yom Kippur, Rosh Hashanah, Ganush Chaturthi, Navrati, and Eid al-Fitr.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.9 million (midyear 2021).  According to the 2011 census (the most recent), 95.6 percent of the population is Muslim, 2.2 percent Roman Catholic, and 1.4 percent Serbian Orthodox, with Protestants, Jews, and persons not answering or responding “other” or “none” together constituting less than 1 percent.  Boston University’s 2020 World Religion Database estimates the population is 93 percent Muslim and 6 percent Christian, while 1 percent are atheist or agnostic, or belong to other religions.  Local estimates of the total number of Jews range from 50 to 150.  According to the SOC and international observers, lack of financial support for the census and a boycott of it by most ethnic Serbs resulted in a significant undercounting of ethnic minorities of all religious backgrounds, including SOC members, Tarikat Muslims, and Protestants.  Other religious communities, including Tarikat Muslims and Protestants, also contested the registration data, stating they distrusted the census methodology and believed it resulted in undercounts of their communities’ members.

The majority of Kosovo Albanians are Muslim, although some are Christian (Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant).  Almost all Kosovo Serbs belong to the SOC.  The majority of ethnic Ashkali, Bosniaks, Egyptians, Gorani, Roma, and Turks are also Muslim, while most ethnic Montenegrins and some Roma are Christian Orthodox.  Nearly all ethnic Croats are Catholic.

According to the BIK, most Muslims belong to the Hanafi Sunni School, although some are part of the Sufi Tarikat community.  There is also a Sufi Bektashi religious community; no official estimate exists for the number of its adherents.  Kosovo Albanians represent the majority in 28 of the country’s 38 municipalities, and Kosovo Serbs make up the majority in the remaining 10.  Most SOC members reside in the 10 Serb-majority municipalities.  The largest Catholic communities are in Gjakove (Albanian-language name)/Djakovica (Serbian-language name), Janjeve/Janjevo, Kline/Klina, Pristina, and Prizren.  Evangelical Protestant populations, representing multiple traditions including Baptists, Pentecostals, Reformed, nondenominational, and others, are located throughout the country, concentrated in Pristina and Gjakove/Djakovica.  There are small Jewish communities in Prizren and Pristina, although exact numbers are unavailable.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience and religion for all residents, including the right to change, express, or not express religious belief; practice or abstain from practicing religion; and join or refuse to join a religious community.  These rights are subject to limitations for reasons of public safety and order or for the protection of the health or rights of others.  The constitution provides for the separation of religious communities from public institutions, including the right of religious groups to regulate independently their own organizations, activities, and ceremonies.  It provides for equal rights for all religious communities, stipulates the country is secular and neutral regarding religion, declares the state shall ensure the protection and preservation of the country’s religious heritage, and prohibits discrimination based on religion.  The constitution states the law may limit freedom of expression to prevent violent and hostile provocations on racial, national, ethnic, or religious grounds.  It allows courts to ban organizations or activities that encourage racial, national, ethnic, or religious hatred.

The law on religious freedom stipulates there is no state religion and provides for freedom of nonreligious belief.  It states, “All religions and their communes in Kosovo, including the Kosovo Islamic Community, Serbian Orthodox Church, Catholic Church, Hebrew Belief Community, and Evangelical Church shall be offered any kind of protection and opportunity in order to have rights and freedom foreseen by this law.”  The law does not prescribe any additional rights or benefits to these five named communities as compared with other religious groups.  Authorities interpret the term “Evangelical Church” as encompassing all Protestant groups, regardless of denomination.

The constitution provides for rights and protection for all citizens, including maintaining, developing, and preserving their religion using their own language.  The constitution also states religious communities have the right to establish religious schools and charitable institutions, with the possibility of being funded with government financial assistance “in accordance with the law and international standards.”  It guarantees all ethnic communities access to public media.  The law on religious freedom provides the right for religious groups to establish and use their own media, maintain unhindered peaceful contacts with persons outside the country with whom they share a religious identity, and have equitable access to public employment.

The constitution guarantees 20 of 120 seats in parliament to representatives from ethnic minority communities, a majority of whose members are often associated with a single religious group, such as Muslims or Orthodox Christians.  It also stipulates the adoption, amendment, or repeal of all laws pertaining to religious freedom or cultural heritage requires approval by a majority of the parliamentarians representing minority communities, as well as by a majority of all parliamentarians.

The constitution provides for the Ombudsperson’s Institution, which is responsible for monitoring religious freedom, among other human rights, and recommending actions to correct violations.  It stipulates the state shall take all necessary measures to protect individuals who may be subject to threats, hostility, discrimination, or violence because of their religious identity.  The law criminalizes hate crime, which includes inciting discord and intolerance between religious groups, as well as crimes where religion is a motivating factor or aggravating circumstance.

The law does not require registration of religious groups, but it also does not provide a legal mechanism or specific guidance for religious groups – including the five communities named in the law on religious freedom – to obtain legal status through registration or other means.  Without legal status, religious communities may not own property, open bank accounts, employ staff, or access the courts as a collective entity.  Individual congregations or individuals, however, may do so and perform other administrative tasks in their own name.  Local communities often recognize religious groups’ possession of buildings; however, the law generally does not protect these buildings as property of a religious community, but rather as the private property of citizens or NGOs.  SOC property is an exception; the law on SPZs acknowledges and protects the integrity of SOC property ownership and stewardship over designated areas within the SPZs.

The law stipulates the rights to establish humanitarian/charity organizations, accept voluntary financial contributions from individuals and institutions, and engage in national and international communication for religious purposes.  The law on registering NGOs, however, does not apply to “religious communities, religious centers, or temples,” which prevents religious groups from registering as NGOs and also prohibits NGOs from conducting religious activity in the country.

The law provides safeguards for sites of religious and cultural significance and prohibits or restricts nearby activities that could damage the surrounding historical, cultural, or natural environment.  According to the law, the Implementation and Monitoring Council (IMC) is responsible for arbitrating disputes between the government and the SOC concerning SPZs and other matters related to protecting the SOC’s religious and cultural heritage.  The IMC is a special body originating from the 2007 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (also known as the Ahtisaari Plan) and established by law.  IMC members include the Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning, and Infrastructure (cochair); Special Representative of the European Union (cochair); Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sport; SOC; and the OSCE.

Municipalities, not the central government, are legally responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of all public cemeteries, including those designated for specific religious communities.

According to the law, “Public educational institutions shall refrain from teaching religion or other activities that propagate a specific religion.”  This law is unenforceable in schools operated under Serbian government-run parallel structures, over which the Kosovo government has no control.

An MES administrative circular on the code of conduct and disciplinary measures for elementary and high school students, which carries the force of law, prohibits students from wearing religious attire on elementary and secondary school premises.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government again did not enact amendments to the law on religious freedom that would permit religious groups to acquire legal status, conduct business and acquire real and personal property in their name, open bank accounts, and gain import tax benefits.  The cabinet approved the amendments and sent them to parliament in September 2020, but in February, extraordinary general elections reset Kosovo’s legislative amendment process, reverting the amendments back to the newly elected government, which had not resubmitted them to parliament by year’s end.  Absent enactment of the legislation, all religious communities said they continued to operate bank accounts registered to individuals instead of communities.  The KPEC continued to state that Protestant churches were taxed as for-profit businesses.

The BIK and several media outlets reported police arrested author Gjin Morena in August after he published a book entitled Thunder in the Soul that, according to BIK and media reports, contained poems inciting discord and intolerance towards Muslims.  On August 16, the KPEC wrote on Facebook that Morena is Protestant and that authorities had not followed proper legal procedures when taking him into custody.  Morena pleaded guilty to hate speech in the Basic Court of Gjakova and was fined 1,640 euros ($1,900) in lieu of six months’ imprisonment, following deductions and credit for time served in pretrial detention.

According to the BIK, some elementary schools denied access to individual female Muslim students who attempted to attend school wearing a hijab as a result of the enforcement of the MES administrative circular prohibiting religious attire on school property.  Imam Labinot Maliqi, head of the NGO Kosovo Center for Peace, reported multiple cases in several municipalities in which female elementary school students were denied entrance to school for wearing a hijab.  According to Maliqi, some school officials reversed their decision after the Kosovo Center for Peace inquired into the situation.  In September, Maliqi publicly called on parents to report cases in which female students wearing religious attire were denied access to schools.  At year’s end, the ban remained in place.

Muslim community representatives said there were cases of discrimination against Muslim women who wore religious attire while working in public institutions, including one incident in September of a public school director threatening to fire a teacher if she wore religious attire to work.  The teacher asked the Kosovo Center for Peace to mediate, and the school director subsequently reversed the decision and allowed the teacher to wear a hijab to work.

In October, online news site Balkan Insight reported the MES and police were investigating a global Christian humanitarian NGO after the municipality of Lipjan/Lipljan terminated a 2018 agreement with the NGO in January.  Balkan Insight reported parents had complained that the organization published photos of children along with religious content without parental permission, and that international sponsors sent children in Kosovo letters containing religious content.  Balkan Insight reported the NGO denied any allegations of misconduct and was cooperating with local authorities.  Officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is responsible for registering NGOs, said the law prohibited any NGO from conducting religious activity in the country.  Officials said they worked with NGOs to ensure compliance, including requiring NGOs to change articles of association and remove content indicating an organization’s religious affiliation.

The KPEC again stated the Kosovo Immigration Office continued to deny recognition of foreign missionaries engaged by its member churches.  The KPEC said the Customs Service continued to require its members to pay taxes on humanitarian aid they received from abroad during the year, while exempting some other religious communities, such as the BIK, from the taxation.  In addition, according to the KPEC, some businesses did not respect the value-added tax exemption for goods purchased by its member churches due to what it stated was religious prejudice.

Decan/Decani municipal officials and the central government continued to refuse to implement a 2016 Constitutional Court decision upholding the Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling that recognized the SOC’s Visoki Decani Monastery’s ownership of approximately 24 hectares (59 acres) of land in the monastery’s vicinity.  There was no progress during the year, despite repeated appeals by the SOC and international community to the Kosovo Cadastral Agency and, more broadly, the government, to register the SOC’s ownership of the land.  In September, the Constitutional Court stated all government institutions were obligated to enforce its decisions and referred the issue to the state prosecutor.  At year’s end, the prosecutor had not initiated criminal proceedings against the officials responsible for refusing to implement the decision.  In September, Decan/Decani mayor Bashkim Ramosaj publicly reaffirmed he did not intend to execute the court’s decision.  NATO troops in the country continued to provide security at the Visoki Decani Monastery.  In October, Viola von Cramon, European Parliament rapporteur on Kosovo, posted to Twitter, “Tolerance and mutual respect are the essence of multiethnic society.  The Serbian Orthodox Church heritage in Kosovo must be protected and enjoy full rights.  I thus urge Kosovo govt to implement the long overdue C[onstitutional] C[ourt] judgment as the rule of law means equal treatment of all.”

In May, the SOC halted official communication with the government, citing the government’s nonimplementation of both the Visoki Decani Monastery Constitutional Court decision and a November 2020 Italian-brokered arrangement between the IMC and Decan/Decani municipal authorities on the Decani SPZ roads.  The SOC released a statement saying it was “facing a deliberate legal obstruction by Kosovo institutions both on central and local levels, under the strong influence of formal and informal Kosovo Albanian centers of power which apparently remain determined that the Constitutional Court decision will never be implemented … the institutions are firmly in hands of those who make justice on their own regardless of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts’ decisions as well as laws.”  As a result of breaking off discussions, the IMC did not meet during the year.  The arrangement included development of both a bypass road external to the SPZ boundaries, which would connect Decan/Decani to Montenegro, and a separate local road within the SPZ.  Liburn Aliu, the Minister of Environment, Spatial Planning, and Infrastructure (and cochair of the IMC), publicly opposed the agreed arrangement, saying the construction of a bypass road was a “dangerous precedent.”  Local authorities continued additional road construction works outside the SPZ, which, the SOC said, was an attempt to create a situation in which local authorities could subsequently strengthen their justification for construction within the SPZ.

The Ministry of Local Government Administration (MLGA) reported most municipalities covered funeral expenses for all religious groups and were responsible for costs associated with cemetery administration.  Several municipalities, including Klokot/Kllokot, Gjilan/Gnjilane, Mitrovice/a North, Mamushe/Mamusa, and Gracanica/e, stated a need to expand capacity at existing cemeteries.  The MLGA stated the COVID-19 pandemic continued to have an impact on funeral ceremonies, as the government’s health restrictions limited participation across the country.

The KPEC said a lack of institutional support for dedicated burial sites prevented members from conducting burial services in accordance with their beliefs.  The KPEC said many municipalities contracted cemetery maintenance to the BIK and that the BIK often denied KPEC members the ability to conduct burial services, as the BIK required Islamic burial rites.  The KPEC said the cemetery management officer in Prizren told the local pastor in March that he could bury his deceased father in the cemetery only if the deceased were a Muslim or Catholic, but not a Protestant.  In 2020 (the most recent year for which it provided data), the MLGA reported 23 out of 38 municipal government sites had service contracts with the BIK to provide landscaping, maintenance, and burial services at public cemeteries.  Pristina’s Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Jewish communities continued to use separate public cemeteries that these groups independently maintained and operated.

The SOC and Kosovo-Serb communities continued to state that in many Kosovo-Albanian majority municipalities, local governments did not provide adequate maintenance for their cemeteries and police did not provide sufficient security, allowing for occasional acts of vandalism.  According to Serbian-language media reports and the SOC, some tombstones and crosses in the Orthodox cemetery in Rahovec/Orahovac were vandalized in June and October.  In July, media reported on the lack of care, vandalism, and desecration of some SOC churches and graveyards.

At year’s end, Jewish groups had not yet decided on a suitable location for a synagogue for which the Pristina Municipality had issued a construction permit in 2016.  The municipality stated it was ready to allocate land once the question was resolved.

The Jewish community in Prizren said it received approval from the government in August to start renovation of a building dedicated to the Jewish Cultural Center/Synagogue in Prizren.  The Jewish community said renovation work depended on funds yet to be raised, adding the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sport allocated 80,000 euros ($90,700) during the year for the project.

In August, the Basic Court of Pristina ruled the Pristina Municipality could not be a party to a 2017 lawsuit brought by the University of Pristina against the municipality and the SOC.  The suit seeks annulment of a 1991 grant of land on the university campus to the SOC by the former Yugoslav government and demolition of the uncompleted, but consecrated, SOC Church of Christ the Savior built on that land parcel.  The university’s lawsuit against the SOC remained under consideration in the Basic Court at year’s end.  Both the Pristina Municipality and the university disputed the SOC’s land ownership.

The KPEC said municipalities, which are responsible for allocating land to religious communities, refused to provide it land for church buildings.  The KPEC said it requested land from 38 municipalities during the year but received an allocation from only two, in Gjilan/Gnjilane and Vushtrri/Vucitrn Municipalities.  The KPEC reported it had not received a response from the remaining municipalities.

The SOC said that on June 19, police stopped a bus with Serbian pilgrims and returned the group to Serbia after border police had allowed the bus to enter the country.  The SOC said authorities had ordered the pilgrims, who had planned to visit SOC sites and attend religious services, to leave without offering any valid explanation, and that such action violated the pilgrims’ rights to freedom of movement and religion.

According to the BIK, the central government continued to provide some funding for Islamic education in the BIK madrassah in Pristina and its branches in Prizren and Gjilan/Gnjilane.  Some University of Pristina law faculty members again said this funding was discriminatory because the government did not provide funding for religious education to any other religious group.

Most ethnic Serbs and some Bosniaks, Gorani, Croats, and Roma continued to attend Serbian-language public schools operated and funded by Serbian government parallel structures.  The schools offered Christian Orthodox classes, and the Serbian government paid for the instructors, who were members of the SOC.  Students were allowed to opt out of these classes.

The KPEC said government officials’ public recognition or celebration of Islamic holidays such as Eid al-Adha was discriminatory against religious minorities because government officials did not make similar statements to celebrate non-Islamic holidays.  The KPEC also said the government’s official calendar of holidays referred to “Catholic” or “Orthodox” holidays, but not “Christian” or “Protestant” holidays.  The KPEC stated the government’s lack of vocal advocacy for religious minorities contributed to a perceived climate of discrimination.  The KPEC also said the presence of Islamic imagery in some public buildings contributed to a perception of Muslim influence over government institutions.

In November, the Associated Press reported government health authorities were working with the Muslim community to encourage persons to get COVID-19 vaccinations.  According to the report, imams were encouraging worshippers at Friday prayers to get inoculated, while medical personnel waited in the mosques’ yards, ready to administer the vaccines.  It cited Imam Burhan Hashani of the Sultan Mehmed 2 Mosque in Pristina as saying his pro-vaccine message was well received.  A man attending prayers at the mosque stated, “It’s the first time I have heard the imam calling for vaccination.  Everybody should get vaccinated ….”

The OSCE continued to monitor implementation of legislation on protecting SPZs around Serbian Orthodox religious and heritage sites.  The Police Unit for the Security of Religious and Cultural Heritage Buildings continued to provide 24-hour security to 24 SPZs countrywide.

On May 10, the SOC issued a press release stating it was concerned about incidents of theft and vandalism targeting several of its sites across the country, citing a recent incident in which stones were thrown at the Church of St. Petka in Vitina and other examples.  The SOC said most incidents had ethnic and religious motives and criticized what it labeled as aggressive rhetoric against the SOC coming from some senior Kosovo-Albanian institutional and political leaders, including Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Minister of Environment, Spatial Planning, and Infrastructure Liburn Aliu, that might have contributed to these incidents.  A representative of the SOC told media outlet Kossev, “Complaints to Kosovo institutions are pointless because this violence is the product of aggressive rhetoric that comes from the very top of Kosovo institutions, which instead of solving the problems of the population, economy, and facing the covid pandemic, attack Serbia with the harshest words and collectively accuse the Serb people and even our Church.”  In response, the spokesperson for the Kosovo Police in Gjilan/Gnjilane told Kossev that nothing was damaged in the St. Petka incident and that, although there was no criminal case, police were monitoring the situation.  The SOC also publicly raised concerns regarding break-ins and thefts at six SOC sites (churches and auxiliary buildings) over 10 days in March.  The incidents occurred in Klokot/Kllokot, Partes/Partesh, Gracanica/Gracanice, Peja/Pec, and Strpce/Shterpce municipalities.

In April, the nongovernmental pan-European federation of cultural heritage civil society organizations, Europa Nostra, included the SOC Visoki Decani Monastery on its list of the seven most endangered heritage sites in Europe, citing risks to the monastery from local development efforts.  Senior government officials, including President Vjosa Osmani and Prime Minister Kurti, rejected statements that the monastery was endangered as “biased” and “incorrect” and urged the organization remove the monastery from the list.  In a letter to Europa Nostra, Osmani and Kurti stated, “We are fully committed to the protection of all monuments of our country, and in particular of Orthodox churches and monasteries … the Municipality of Decan[/Decani], as part of its [spatial and development] plan, has committed to treat the special area of the Monastery of Decan[i] with special priority and a high level of seriousness…  The Monastery of Decan[i] is in good condition, it enjoys full constitutional and legal guarantees, as well as complete security, without any danger that threatens it.”  In June, Europa Nostra published a response to “some misguided and inaccurate information” put out on social media and provided additional clarification regarding its decision to include the Decani Monastery on its list.  Europa Nostra stated the monastery had been on the UNESCO List of World Heritage in Danger since 2006 and that the monastery “has a special significance for the cultural and spiritual identity and heritage of Serbian people and it is also important for all citizens in Kosovo, as an invaluable element of the multicultural and multireligious heritage in Kosovo.”  The SOC publicly expressed support for the Europa Nostra decision and rejected the Kosovo officials’ statements, saying the monastery was the only religious site under military protection in the country.  In December, Europa Nostra excluded the Decani Monastery from a shortlist of 12 European heritage sites from which the organization planned to select its list of the seven most endangered heritage sites in Europe for 2022.

The OSCE reported relations between religious communities and municipalities improved – citing improved maintenance of cemeteries by some municipal governments – as a result of OSCE advocacy, for example, of interfaith dialogue with government institutions and its facilitation of joint outreach by government and religious officials to local communities.  The OSCE said the Pristina Municipality removed graffiti from the Jewish cemetery, and religious communities partnered with local government to clean cemeteries in Mitrovica/e North and South.  The OSCE continued to advocate inclusion of representatives of all major religious communities in municipal community safety councils, which meet to discuss security issues.

The Water Services Regulatory Authority stated it once again waived water utility fees during the year for religious buildings belonging to all religious communities.

In July, the Basic Court in Pristina sentenced Montenegrin national Risto Jovanovic to six months in prison for inciting intolerance by chanting nationalist slogans such as “Kill the Albanians!” during the June 28 observance of Vivovdan, which commemorates the 1389 Battle of Kosovo between Serbs and Ottomans at Gazimestan, Pristina.  The court fined Jovanovic 6,700 euros ($7,600) in lieu of imprisonment and banned him from entering the country for five years.