The U.S. government estimates the total population at 33.3 million (July 2016 estimate). There are no reliable statistics available concerning the percentages of Shia and Sunni Muslims in the country; the government’s Central Statistics Office does not collect data disaggregated in this way. Shia leaders claim Shia make up approximately 20-25 percent of the population, while Sunni leaders claim the Shia comprise only 10 percent.

The Shia population includes Ismailis and a majority of ethnic Hazaras. Other religious groups, mainly Hindus, Sikhs, Bahais, and Christians, comprise less than 0.3 percent of the population. The number of Sikhs and Hindus is declining due to emigration. Sikh and Hindu leaders estimate there are 180 Sikh and Hindu families totaling 900 individuals, which is a decline from 343 families totaling 2,000 individuals in 2015. Reliable estimates of the Bahai and Christian communities are not available. There are small numbers of practitioners of other religions, including one Jew.

The Hazaras live predominantly in the central and western provinces, while the Ismailis live mainly in Kabul and in the central and northern provinces. Followers of the Bahai Faith are based predominantly in Kabul, with a small community in Kandahar.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam the official state religion and says no law may contravene the beliefs and provisions of the “sacred religion of Islam.” It further states there shall be no amendment to the constitution’s provisions with respect to adherence to the fundamentals of Islam. According to the constitution, followers of religions other than Islam are “free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of the law.”

There is no definition of apostasy in the criminal code. Apostasy falls under the seven offenses making up the hudud as defined by sharia. According to Sunni Hanafi jurisprudence, which the constitution states shall apply “if there is no provision in the constitution or other laws about a case,” beheading is appropriate for male apostates, while life imprisonment is appropriate for female apostates, unless they repent. A judge may also impose a lesser penalty, such as short-term imprisonment or lashes, if doubt about the apostasy exists. Under Hanafi jurisprudence, the government may also confiscate the property of apostates or prevent apostates from inheriting property. This guidance applies to individuals who are of sound mind and have reached the age of maturity. Civil law states the age of majority for citizens is 18, except it is 16 for females with regard to marriage. Islamic law defines it as the point at which one shows signs of puberty.

Conversion from Islam to another religion is apostasy according to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence applicable in the courts. If someone converts to another religion from Islam, he or she shall have three days to recant the conversion. If the person does not recant, then he or she shall be subject to the punishment for apostasy. Proselytizing to try to convert individuals from Islam to another religion is also illegal according to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence applicable in the courts and subject to the same punishment.

Blasphemy, which may include anti-Islamic writings or speech, is a capital crime according to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence applicable in the courts. Similar to apostates, blasphemers have three days to recant or face death, although there is no clear process for recanting under sharia. Some hadiths (sayings or traditions of the Prophet Muhammad that serve as a source of religious law or guidance) address the issue, suggesting discussion and negotiation with an apostate to encourage the apostate to recant.

According to a 2007 ruling from the General Directorate of Fatwas and Accounts under the Supreme Court, the Bahai Faith is distinct from Islam and is a form of blasphemy. All Muslims who convert to it are considered apostates; Bahai practitioners are labeled infidels.

The law prohibits the production, reproduction, printing, and publishing of works and materials contrary to the principles of Islam or offensive to other religions and denominations. It also prohibits publicizing and promoting religions other than Islam and bans articles on any topic the government deems might harm the physical, spiritual, and moral well-being of persons, especially children and adolescents. The law instructs National Radio and Television Afghanistan (RTA), a government agency, to provide broadcasting content reflecting the religious beliefs of all ethnic groups in the country. The law also obligates RTA to adjust its programs in light of Islamic principles as well as national and spiritual values.

Licensing and registration of religious groups are not required. Registration as a group (which gives the group the status of a shura or council) or an association conveys official recognition and the benefit of government provision of facilities for seminars and conferences. By law, anyone who is 18 years of age or older may establish a social or political organization. Such an entity must have a charter consistent with domestic laws as well as a central office. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) may dissolve such organizations through a judicial order. Groups recognized as shuras or councils may cooperate with one another on religious issues. Associations may conduct business with the government or the society as a whole. Both groups and associations may register with the MOJ. According to the MOJ database, 2,215 Sunni and Shia organizations are registered, while the Sikh and Hindu National Shura is registered with the Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs.

The criminal code punishes “crimes against religions,” which include verbal and physical assaults on a follower of any religion. It specifies a person who attacks a follower of any religion shall receive a prison sentence of not less than three months but no more than a year, and a fine of between 3,000 and 12,000 afghanis ($44 to $177).

The criminal code states persons who forcibly stop the conduct of rituals of any religion, those who destroy or damage “permitted places of worship” (a term not defined by the code) where religious rituals are conducted, or those who destroy or damage any sign or symbol of any religion are subject to a medium-term punishment. The criminal code defines medium-term as confinement in jail for a minimum of one year and a maximum of five years and/or a fine of between 12,000 and 60,000 afghanis ($177 to $884).

According to the constitution, the “state shall devise and implement a unified educational curriculum based on the provisions of the sacred religion of Islam” and develop courses on religion on the basis of the “Islamic sects” in the country. The national curriculum includes materials designed separately for Sunni-majority schools and Shia-majority schools, as well as textbooks which emphasize nonviolent Islamic terms and principles. The curriculum includes courses on Islam, but not on other religions. Non-Muslims are not required to study Islam in public schools.

According to the law, all funds contributed to madrassas by private or international sources must be channeled through the Ministry of Education (MOE).

The civil and penal codes derive their authority from the constitution. The constitution stipulates the courts shall apply constitutional provisions as well as the law in ruling on cases. For instances in which neither the constitution nor the penal or civil code address a specific case, the constitution declares the courts may apply Hanafi Sunni jurisprudence within the limits set by the constitution to attain justice. The constitution also allows courts to apply Shia law in cases involving Shia followers. Non-Muslims may not provide testimony in matters requiring sharia jurisprudence. The constitution makes no mention of separate laws applying to non-Muslims.

A Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim woman, but the woman must first convert if she is not an adherent of one of the other two Abrahamic faiths – Christianity or Judaism. It is illegal for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man.

The government’s national identity cards indicate an individual’s religion. Individuals are not required to declare belief in Islam to receive citizenship.

The constitution requires the president and vice presidents to be Muslim. Other senior officials (ministers, members of parliament, judges) must swear allegiance and obedience to the principles of Islam as part of their oath of office.

The constitution allows the formation of political parties, provided the program and charter of a party are “not contrary to the principles of the sacred religion of Islam.” The constitution states political parties may not be based on sectarianism.

In September parliament passed electoral reform legislation mandating an additional seat in parliament’s lower house be reserved for a member of the Hindu/Sikh community.

According to the MOJ’s database, the country has signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), but the parliament has not yet ratified the country’s signature.

Government Practices

The supreme court upheld the appellate court’s reversal of a death sentence handed down to four individuals convicted of the 2015 mob killing of a woman who allegedly had burned a Quran. The court ordered a review of one-year prison sentences given to seven police officers in the case, which resulted in the appellate court increasing their punishments. As in the past two years, there were no reported prosecutions for apostasy or blasphemy, but individuals who converted from Islam continued to state they feared government punishment as well as reprisals from family and society. Members of the Hindu and Sikh communities reported they continued to avoid settling disputes in the courts for fear of retaliation. They preferred to settle disputes through community councils. Representatives of minority religions continued to report the courts denied non-Muslims the same rights as Muslims. A small number of Sikhs and Hindus continued to serve in government positions. Although some Shia held senior positions in the government, Shia leaders said the number of official positions held by Shia did not reflect the country’s demographics.

In March the supreme court upheld an appellate court’s 2015 decision to reduce four death sentences handed down in the case of a woman killed by a mob in March 2015 for allegedly burning a Quran to 20 years imprisonment. The supreme court upheld the 16-year prison sentences given to eight other civilian suspects in the case, but rejected the sentences of seven police officers who had received suspended one-year prison terms. The court ruled the suspended sentences were too lenient. The court also called on the attorney general’s office to investigate the acquittals of 11 more officers who had been indicted in the case. The supreme court did not release the reasoning for its ruling or provide guidance to the appellate court. On August 7, the appellate court changed the one-year suspended sentences for the seven police officers to two-year suspended sentences, stipulating the police officers would not serve any prison time as long as they maintained clean records and committed no further crimes. The appellate court also sentenced a civilian who had not been sentenced in the initial decision to 16 years in prison.

Individuals who converted from Islam continued to report they risked annulment of their marriages, rejection by their families and communities, loss of employment, and possibly the death penalty.

As in the previous two years, there were no reports of prosecutions for blasphemy or apostasy during the year, including of Bahais who, although labeled infidels, were not considered to be converts and as such not charged with either crime. One individual convicted of blasphemy in 2013 remained in prison serving a 20-year sentence.

The Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs (MOHRA) continued to be responsible for managing pilgrimages (Hajj and Umrah), revenue collection for religious activities, acquisition of property for religious purposes, issuance of fatwas, educational testing of imams, sermon preparation and distribution for government-supported mosques, and raising public awareness of religious issues. The government continued to permit both Sunnis and Shia to go on pilgrimages, with no quota on either group. MOHRA also facilitated pilgrimages for Hindus and Sikhs to India, but did not collect any revenue for or from non-Muslims.

MOHRA estimated between 4,800 and 5,000 mullahs were registered with and worked directly for MOHRA out of a total of approximately 300,000 mullahs in the country as of the end of 2015, the last year for which data was available. The mullahs continued to receive an average monthly salary of 4,700 afghanis ($69) from the government. MOHRA continued to require mullahs who applied to be prayer leaders in MOHRA-registered mosques to hold at least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent, verified by the Ministry of Higher Education According to MOHRA, approximately 50,000 of the approximately 150,000 to 160,000 mosques in the country were registered, including the registration of an additional 700 mosques during the year. MOHRA said the ministry continued to lack the financial resources to create a comprehensive registry of mullahs and mosques in the country.

MOHRA continued to allocate a portion of its budget for the construction of new mosques. Local groups continued to pay the largest portion of the costs for new mosques and continued not to be required to inform the ministry about the new construction unless they wished to request financial or other assistance.

According to Hindus and Sikhs, the government continued not to restrict them from training other Hindus and Sikhs to become clergy, but per the law punishing conversion, they could not proselytize. The government continued not to hinder their communities from building places of worship.

According to Sikh and Hindu community members, they continued not to pursue land disputes through the courts for fear of retaliation, particularly when powerful local leaders occupied their property.

MOHRA reported there were 5,000 registered madrassas and “Quran learning centers” throughout the country. While the government did register some madrassas during the year, it did not report how many. More than 340,000 students were enrolled in the madrassas, mostly in Kabul, Balkh, Nangarhar, and Herat provinces, according to the latest available estimate from 2015.

The registration process continued to require a school to demonstrate it had suitable buildings, classrooms, accredited teachers, and dorms if students lived on campus. MOHRA registered madrassas collocated with mosques, while MOE registered madrassas not associated with mosques. In MOHRA-run madrassas, students received individual instruction, with one imam teaching approximately 50 to 70 children studying at various levels. Registration did not mean the government controlled a madrassa, but qualified the madrassa’s diplomas and certificates for government recognition. Only certificates issued by registered madrassas allowed students to pursue higher education at government universities.

MOHRA did not offer data on the number of unregistered madrassas, but estimated registered madrassas “far outnumbered” unregistered madrassas following the registration effort. The MOE had the authority to close unregistered madrassas, but ministry officials said in practice it was almost impossible to close any due to local sensitivities. The ministry officials reported the government did not close any madrassas during the year due to the potential for negative societal repercussions. They said the government was attempting to raise awareness within the madrassa community of the benefits of registering madrassas, including recognition of graduation certificates and financial and material assistance, such as furniture or stationery.

MOHRA did not operate primary level madrassas; mosques provided primary-level religious studies instead. While MOHRA operated no madrassas offering standard two-year degree programs, there were 80 madrassas registered with the MOE offering two-year degree programs. There were 1,200 public and 200 private madrassas registered with the MOE.

According to government authorities, the legal requirement for registered madrassas to route private or international donations through the MOE allowed the government to monitor financial assistance to institutes of learning, but the MOE seldom imposed a ban for failing to comply with this requirement. The tendency to make cash donations directly to the madrassas made it difficult, they said, for the government to track funds coming from private sources or abroad. Despite this, the government continued its efforts to solicit donations from other Muslim countries and from private individuals to support the madrassas. The MOE also continued to require independent madrassas to be accredited and disclose their funding sources.

Registered madrassas continued to follow the standardized curriculum provided by the MOE’s Department of Islamic Education. This curriculum specified 60 percent of the subjects taught in madrassas had to be religious in nature, while the other 40 percent consisted of mathematics, history, geography, and Dari literature.

There remained one government-sponsored school for Sikh children, located in Kabul. The government continued to provide the same proportionate funding to cover staff salaries, books, and maintenance as it did for other schools. The MOE also continued to provide the curriculum for the Sikh school, except for religious studies. The community appointed a teacher for religious studies, and the MOE paid the teacher’s salary.

The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, a Swedish NGO, continued to support a privately-funded Sikh school in Jalalabad. A few Sikh children continued to attend private international schools. Hindus did not have separate schools but sometimes sent their children to Sikh schools. There continued to be no Christian schools.

According to observers, the courts relied primarily on statutory law in both civil and criminal cases. In some instances, however, members of minority religious groups reported the courts used Hanafi jurisprudence, even where such law conflicted with the country’s international commitments to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Disabled Persons.

The Ulema Council, a group of senior Sunni and Shia scholars, imams, and Muslim jurists, continued to advise the president on Islamic legal issues. It met with the president every two months, discussing topics such as support for the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and peace negotiations with insurgent groups. The Ulema Council also continued to advise the parliament and ministries on the formulation of new legislation and the implementation of existing law. In November the council voiced its support for the peace agreement between the government and the insurgent group Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Although the Ulema Council remained officially independent from the government, its members continued to receive financial support from the state. The council also continued to advise some provincial governments, although in villages and rural areas scholars, NGO representatives and government officials said decisions continued to be based mostly on local interpretations of Islamic law and tradition.

Representatives of minority religions continued to report the courts did not apply protections provided to them by the law and denied non-Muslims the same rights as Muslims, even when the non-Muslims were legally entitled to those same rights. Members of minority religious communities said the state, including the courts, continued to treat all citizens as if they were Muslims, and some basic citizenship rights of non-Muslims were not codified. As a result, they said, non-Muslims continued to risk being tried according to Hanafi jurisprudence.

Sikhs and Hindus stated their community members continued not to take civil cases to court because they continued to feel unprotected by dispute resolution mechanisms such as the Special Land and Property Court. Instead, their members continued to prefer to settle disputes within their communities.

Leaders of both Hindu and Sikh communities stated they continued to face discrimination, including long delays to resolve cases in the judicial system. The most common judicial issues concerned illegal appropriation of Sikh properties. In one case reported by a Sikh community leader, a high-ranking Ministry of Interior official reportedly occupied a piece of land owned by a member of the Sikh community who was still a resident of the country. In another instance, according to the Sikh community leader, a National Directorate of Security (NDS) official reportedly stole the land of a Sikh who had emigrated to Germany and threatened the owner’s proxy at gunpoint when the proxy went to claim the land. Court proceedings continued in both cases, albeit very slowly according to the plaintiffs.

A small number of Sikhs and Hindus continued to serve in government positions, including one at the municipal level, one at the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries, and one as a presidentially appointed member of the upper house of parliament. Although Shia Muslims held senior positions in government, they said appointments to government administrative bodies continued not to reflect the country’s demographics based on their estimate of the percentage of Shia in the country’s population. Sunni members of the Ulema Council stated Shia were overrepresented in government based on Sunni estimates of the percentage of Shia in the population.

Shia leaders stated the law placed no restrictions on their participation in public life, but the government continued to neglect security in majority-Shia areas.

Although four Ismailis continued to serve as members of parliament, members of the Ismaili community continued to raise concerns about what they called the exclusion of Ismailis from other positions of political authority.

Judicial, constitutional, and human rights commissions composed of members of different Islamic religious groups (Sunni and Shia) and supported by the government continued to meet to work towards Muslim intrafaith reconciliation. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs and MOHRA continued to work together toward the stated goal of allowing women to attend mosques. The government funded Moderation Center of Afghanistan continued to promote what the government viewed as a moderate interpretation of Islam. The center continued educational exchanges to send Shia and Sunni clerics to Kuwait for training, and then appointed them as teachers in various provinces to train other clerics. Other organizations continued to work on intrafaith reconciliation as well, including the Ulema Council, the Islamic Brotherhood Council, and the MOHRA.

The ONSC continued to work on addressing religiously-motivated violent extremism as part of its effort to develop an overall strategy to counter violent extremism (CVE). Beginning in September, the ONSC sponsored a series of provincial-level conferences on religiously-motivated violent extremism to collect data to use in this effort. Concurrently, the ONSC established an inter-ministerial working group to coordinate the efforts of relevant government institutions and NGOs to implement the strategy.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

The media continued to report attacks by the Taliban, the ISKP, and other insurgent groups targeted at specific religious and ethno-religious groups, such as the Hazara Shias, as well as at individual religious leaders because of their reported links to the government or their interpretations of Islam.

In July suicide bombers attacked a protest demonstration in Kabul organized by the Enlightenment Movement, an NGO composed primarily of Hazara Shias. At least 97 people were killed and more than 260 injured. Shortly after the attack, the ISKP claimed responsibility for the bombing in a statement on the group’s Amaq News Agency, calling it a “martyrdom attack” against the Shia community.

In November a suicide bomber struck a gathering of Shiite Muslims commemorating Arbaeen, a Shiite observance of loss and grief, in the Baqir ul-Uloom mosque in western Kabul, killing at least 30. ISIS subsequently claimed responsibility.

In October a group of gunmen entered the Karte-Sakhi mosque in Kabul and opened fire on worshippers gathered to mark Ashura. According to an organization monitoring extremist websites, the attackers killed 17 worshippers and wounded 58, including women and children. The Amaq News Agency published an article stating the ISKP was involved in planning the attack and an ISKP fighter was among the gunmen. ISKP later claimed full responsibility for the assault. A day later, a suicide bomber killed 14 civilians and wounded 17 in a bomb blast outside a Shia mosque in Balkh province. There were no official claims of responsibility for the second day’s attack. Shia community leaders condemned the attacks, and said many Shia believed the attacks were attempts by radical elements to foment sectarian tensions in the country. Shia leaders urged the Shia community to avoid any violent reaction that might escalate tensions between Sunnis and Shias, and asked the government to investigate the incident and take necessary steps to protect Shias.

In June unknown militants kidnapped 17 Shia Hazaras from a bus in the northern province of Sar-i-Pul. A provincial council member said the Taliban likely had abducted the passengers to exchange them for a local commander who had been detained by Afghan forces during clashes the day before. The incident came two days after the Taliban killed 13 people and took several others hostage after ambushing a bus convoy in Kunduz province. Local tribal elders were reportedly able to mediate the release of the kidnap victims.

In September eight Hazaras traveling from Bamiyan to Kabul were reportedly kidnapped in Wardak province, just 150 meters away from a police checkpoint. In another incident, a group of militants stopped two passenger vans in Ghor province. The militants singled out five passengers they identified as Hazaras, and took them away at gunpoint. According to government contacts, the Hazaras were kidnapped by the Taliban, who were hoping to exchange them for one of their commanders. One student was killed when government forces attempted to secure their release, while the rest were later freed when tribal elders intervened to mediate. In Ghazni, a student was killed during a clash between the Taliban and government security forces following a Taliban attempt to abduct six Hazara students. In October the Taliban abducted 25 Hazaras traveling on the Kabul-Bamiyan Highway. They were reportedly released through the mediation of local tribal elders.

In December media reported a Kunduz Sikh community leader, Lala Del Souza, was shot dead by unknown gunmen in Kunduz city. Police reported three suspects were arrested in connection with his death. There was media speculation the Taliban were behind the killing, although there was no claim of responsibility from the Taliban.

The Taliban and other insurgents continued to threaten religious leaders with death for preaching messages contrary to the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam or its political agenda. The Taliban also continued to warn mullahs not to perform funeral prayers for government security officials. Between June and September in the Rodat and Momand Dara districts of Nangarhar, the Taliban reportedly killed a number of clerics, including two imams. As a result, according to the director of madrassas at the MOHRA, imams stated they feared performing funeral rites for Afghan National Security Forces and other government employees. The Taliban also continued to monitor the social habits of local populations in areas under their control and imposed punishments on residents according to their interpretation of Islamic law. Insurgents claiming affiliation with ISKP continued to engage in similar activities. The provincial director of MOHRA reported the ISKP seized control of 10 madrassas and removed the government curriculum, replacing it with their own, which included paramilitary training.

Government officials reported in August the Taliban replaced cultural, tourism, and sports curricula in parts of Baghlan and Logar provinces under their control with Islamic teachings administered by imams handpicked by the group. In October Kunduz provincial council members reported the Taliban had taken over more than half the schools in the province. One official estimated the Taliban controlled as many as 80 percent of schools. While the government continued to pay the salaries of the teachers, he said, the Taliban established the school curriculum and selected the teachers as well as school administrators. The government continued to pay salaries to staff selected by the group.

Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, and other non-Muslim minorities stated they continued to face harassment and, in some cases, violence, although Hindus and Sikhs continued to be able to practice their religions publicly. Members of the Hindu community said they continued to face fewer incidents of harassment than Sikhs, ascribing the difference to their lack of a distinctive male headdress. Despite the differences between the groups, many Afghans reportedly continued to use the terms Sikh and Hindu interchangeably. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was often difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

According to the leader of the Sikh community, in September a man with a sword reportedly pounded on the gate of a Sikh temple in Kabul, shouting “convert to Islam.” A week after the incident, the leader of the Hindu/Sikh community reported he found a cow’s head in front of its temple compound in Kabul. Some Sikhs reported instances in which residents and high-ranking government officials told them they were “not from Afghanistan,” that they were “Indians,” and “did not belong here.”

Christians continued to report hostile public opinion toward converts to Christianity and to the idea of Christian proselytizing. Members of the Christian community, who often had converted to Christianity while in other countries, said they continued to worship alone or in small congregations in private homes out of fear of societal discrimination and persecution.

Women of several different religions reported local Muslim religious leaders continued to confront them over their attire. As a result, they said, many women continued to wear burqas in public in rural areas and in some urban areas. In urban areas, where most women no longer wore the burqa, almost all women said they continued to wear some form of head covering, either by personal choice or due to societal pressure. Many said they chose to cover to increase their security in public. The Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs and the National Ulema Council both stated there was no official pressure on women regarding their attire.

Minority religious leaders stated few places of worship remained for the decreasing numbers of Sikhs, Hindus and other religious minorities. According to the Sikh and Hindu Council, there had been 64 gurdwaras (Sikh temples) and mandus (Hindu temples) across the country, but residents of Kandahar, Ghazni, Paktya, and other provinces had seized approximately 30 sites in previous years. Fourteen of those remaining continued to be active, including two sites belonging to the Hindu community. The Hindu community reported it presented the list of its places of worship to the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs in an effort to stop further illegal seizures and to reclaim the land and buildings previously lost. Kabul’s lone synagogue remained inactive, and there were no public Christian churches. Worship facilities for noncitizens of various faiths were located at coalition military facilities and at embassies in Kabul. Buddhist foreigners were free to worship in Hindu temples.

Hindus and Sikhs continued to report interference in their efforts to cremate the remains of their dead in accordance with their customs from individuals who lived near cremation sites. A leader of the Hindu/Sikh community reported an incident in which unknown individuals threw stones and bricks at the community’s cremation site on the day following a fellow Sikh’s cremation. Although the government provided land to use as cremation sites, the distance from any major urban area and the lack of security in the region rendered the land unusable, according to Sikh leaders. The government continued to provide police support to protect the Sikh and Hindu communities while they performed their cremation rituals.

Members of the Sikh and Hindu communities reported they continued not to send their children to public schools due to harassment from other students. In the past, Hindus and Sikhs said they had sent their children to private Hindu and Sikh schools, but many of those schools had closed due to the decreasing sizes of the two communities as well as their members’ declining economic circumstances. Per the Sikh and Hindu Council, there was one school in Nangarhar and two schools in Kabul which remained operational.

According to Sikh leaders, a lack of employment opportunities remained the main cause of Hindu and Sikh emigration. They reported emigration continued to increase as economic conditions worsened and security concerns increased for the two communities. Hindus and Sikhs remained largely illiterate, they said, which continued to limit their employment opportunities.

Observers stated societal discrimination against the Shia minority by the Sunni majority continued to decline. They cited as an example the response to the suicide attack on the Enlightenment Movement when hundreds of Sunnis went to hospitals to donate blood for injured Shias. The observers said there continued to be reports of discrimination in different localities, however.

According to observers, suspicion of development assistance projects continued to exist among Muslim residents, some of whom reportedly suspected such assistance projects were surreptitious efforts to advance Christianity or engage in proselytizing.

Observers reported local Muslim religious leaders continued their efforts to limit social activities inconsistent with Islamic doctrine, such as female participation in sports.

U.S. embassy officers continued to meet with government officials to promote religious tolerance and enhance the government’s capacity to counter violent extremism. Senior embassy officers and other embassy staff continued to discuss the protection of religious minorities with government officials.

Embassy representatives met with high-level government and religious officials to discuss ways to better ensure the curriculum offered by madrassas did not encourage religiously-motivated violent extremism. The embassy coordinated with the ONSC as well as other governmental and non-governmental stakeholders to assist the ONSC in creating a national strategy to combat violent extremism.

Embassy officials met with leaders of major religious groups, scholars, and NGOs to discuss ways to enhance religious tolerance and introduce the public to a broader range of religious perspectives.

During Ramadan, embassy staff hosted iftars with government, civil society, and religious leaders to promote religious dialogue and tolerance.

The embassy sponsored visits by several prominent religious leaders to the United States and third countries to broaden religious dialogue. Embassy officials facilitated several meetings of different research bodies to coordinate research efforts on violent extremism. The embassy also hosted roundtables with leading researchers and religious scholars from organizations such as the Moderation Center and MOHRA to discuss the primary sources of violent extremism and the mechanisms to counter it.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, Sunni Muslims constitute nearly 57 percent of the population, Roman Catholics 10 percent, members of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania nearly 7 percent, and members of the Bektashi Order (a form of Shia Sufism) 2 percent. Other groups include Protestant denominations, Bahais, Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and a small Jewish community. Nearly 20 percent of respondents declined to answer the optional question about religious affiliation.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates there is no official religion, all religions are equal, and the state has the duty to respect and protect religious coexistence. It declares the state is neutral in questions of belief and recognizes the independence of religious groups. According to the constitution, relations between the state and religious groups are regulated by agreements between these groups and the Council of Ministers and ratified by the parliament.

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and guarantees freedom of conscience, religion, and free expression. It states everyone is free to choose or change their religion or beliefs and to express them individually, collectively, in public, or in private. The constitution also states individuals may not be compelled to participate or excluded from participating in a religious community or its practices, nor may they be compelled to make their beliefs or faith public or be prohibited from doing so. It prohibits political parties or other groups from inciting religious hatred.

By law, the Office of the Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination receives and processes discrimination complaints, including those concerning religious practice. The law specifies the State Committee on Cults, under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Prime Minister, regulates relations between the government and religious groups, protects freedom of religion, and promotes interfaith cooperation and understanding. The law also directs the committee to maintain records and statistics on foreign religious groups that solicit assistance, and support foreign employees of religious groups in obtaining residence permits.

The government does not require registration or licensing of religious groups, but to qualify for certain benefits, including opening a bank account, owning property, and obtaining some degree of tax-exempt status, a religious group must register with the district court as a nonprofit association. The registration process entails submission of information on the form and scope of the organization, its activities, the identities of its founders and legal representatives, the nature of its interactions with other stakeholders (e.g. government ministries and civil society organizations) in a particular field, the address of the organization, and payment of a 1,000 lek ($8) fee to the district court. A judge is randomly assigned within 3 to 4 days of the submission of an application, and the process usually concludes within one session.

The government has agreements with the Sunni Muslim and Bektashi communities, the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, and the VUSH. The bilateral agreements serve to codify arrangements pertaining to official recognition, property restitution, tax exemptions on income, donations and religious property, and exemption from submitting accounting records for religious activities. A provision of law enacted in 2009 specifies the government will provide financial support to the four religious communities with which it has agreements dating from the same time. This provision of the law does not include the VUSH, whose agreement with the government dates from 2011. There is no provision of the law stipulating the VUSH should receive financial support from the government.

The law requires the ATP – previously the Agency for the Restitution and Compensation of Property – to address claims by religious groups for properties confiscated during the communist era.

The law allows religious communities to run educational institutions as well as build and manage religious cemeteries on land the communities own.

Public schools are secular, and the law prohibits religious instruction in them. Private schools may offer religious instruction. According to official figures, religious groups, organizations, and foundations have 125 affiliated associations and foundations managing 116 educational institutions, including universities, primary and secondary schools, kindergartens, vocational schools, and orphanages. By law, the Ministry of Education and Sport must license these institutions, and nonreligious curricula must comply with national education standards. Catholic, Muslim, and Orthodox groups operate numerous state-licensed kindergartens, schools, and universities. Most of these do not have mandatory religion classes, but offer them as an elective. The Muslim community runs seven madrassahs that teach religion in addition to the state-sponsored curriculum.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to representatives of the Catholic, Sunni Muslim, Orthodox, and Bektashi communities, the total government financial support for these four groups remained at 109 million lek ($850,000), the same as in 2015, with the Muslim community receiving a 28 percent share and the remaining three each receiving a 24 percent share. This support covered partial salaries for administrative and educational staff. For the Bektashi community, which had fewer staff, part of the support it received was used for new places of worship as well as for global outreach activities of its Tirana-based Bektashi World Headquarters.

Despite requests from the VUSH, the government continued not to provide it financial support. It did not amend the agreement with the VUSH to add the provision of financial support nor did it amend the law to include such financial support.

The government accelerated the process of legalizing unofficial mosques and issued 137 property certificates, compared to six in the previous year. The majority of these unregistered mosques had been built without permission during the 1990s. The government required endorsement from the Albanian Islamic Community (AIC) to legalize unofficial mosques.

Religious groups stated the government had made some progress addressing their claims for restitution or the return of property seized during the communist era. The government did not return any properties but approved partial compensation for 31 properties that had belonged to the Catholic Church, the AIC, and the Bektashi community. The government also stated some communities had not yet gone through the required step of requesting the funds.

Out of the many hundreds of claims submitted by the religious communities to the ATP since the fall of the communist regime in 1990, the vast majority remained unresolved. Religious groups continued to blame the slow progress with regard to the claims on government corruption, legal complexities stemming from the country’s communist past, and competing claims for the same property from individuals or private organizations. The ATP acknowledged there was a problem with the restitution process, saying the competing property claims and the constant restructuring and proliferation of government agencies involved in property disputes since the 1990s had left no agreement between the government and the religious communities on the number of valid property claims submitted over the past 25 years. The ATP met with the communities in March to begin reconciling lists of property claims and established a task force specifically to follow up on these claims.

The ATP reported it continued to budget funds for previous government decisions recognizing the rights of religious communities to numerous properties.

Although the government had promised to clear debris from a site in Dhermi where the local Inspectorate for the Protection of Territory had demolished an Orthodox church in August 2015, as of the end of the year the site remained untouched. A promise to find an alternate location for a new church had also gone unfulfilled. Authorities continued to state the Orthodox church had been built illegally on the site where a culturally significant 17th century church had stood. The Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania continued to protest the demolition.

VUSH members said they continued to rent existing buildings to use as places of worship, and reported continued difficulties in acquiring land on which to construct their own buildings due to local government tax assessments and regulations. They stated these difficulties impeded their ability to hold religious services and to run youth and social activities.

Construction continued on Bektashi places of worship in Korca, Permet, Gjirokaster, and Elbasan. Although the central government provided financial support to help build the properties in Permet and Gjirokaster, Bektashi representatives reported property disputes with some local government offices in these cities delayed progress.

In April Prime Minister Edi Rama announced a pilot project in 10 of the country’s secondary schools to introduce a new curriculum aimed at promoting religious tolerance. The prime minister and minister of education stated the initiative would not affect the country’s secular education system, and would serve as a way to counter violent extremism. Some religious communities expressed disappointment over what they saw as the limited consultation with them prior to the announcement. Religious leaders also expressed concern regarding the capacity of teachers to teach the new religious curriculum, as well as their own capacity to contribute to this initiative. While the government did not present a full version of the new curriculum by year’s end, it introduced elements of the new curriculum into the normal civics courses of several secondary schools.

VUSH leaders stated their churches continued to face problems early in the year concerning local tax requirements, particularly with regard to property taxes. In May VUSH reached an agreement with the Tirana municipality confirming VUSH’s exemption from these taxes. Some local governments continued to assess fines for nonpayment of other taxes, such as sales taxes, however, and VUSH administrators frequently had to appeal these fines, with varying degrees of success.

Representatives from the Catholic, Orthodox, and Bektashi communities all continued to state their numbers were underrepresented in the 2011 official census, leading to an inaccurate picture of the religious demographics of the country.

Although an Interreligious Council existed for leaders of the country’s religious communities to discuss common concerns, religious communities reported it had organized no meetings through the end of the year and did not function as a forum for discussion or for the issuance of joint statements, in contrast to previous years.

Some politicians continued to criticize the Archbishop of Tirana, Durres, and all Albania of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania over ties they perceived him to have with the Greek government.

Pope Francis held an audience on May 11 in Rome with Haji Dede Edmond Brahimaj, head of the global Bektashi community headquartered in Tirana. The audience was a first for any religious leader from the country with the pope.

On November 12, Grand Mufti Skender Brucaj, the leader of the Muslim community, welcomed the Israeli soccer team to the country for a World Cup qualifying game, citing the country’s religious tolerance and harmony.

Embassy officers continued to meet with the state commissioner on cults and with the ATP to urge the government to accelerate its handling of religious property claims and to return to religious groups the buildings, land, and other property confiscated during the communist era.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers continued to engage religious leaders and members of the Sunni Muslim, Bektashi, Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant communities, and to visit churches, mosques, and religious sites to promote religious tolerance. The Ambassador hosted an iftar for members of these different communities where he stressed the value of religious dialogue and tolerance.

The embassy continued to work with religious communities, along with nongovernmental actors, to decrease the potential appeal of violent extremism connected with religion to the country’s youth. The embassy continued its civic education program in which embassy officers spoke to students at Islamic, Catholic, and Orthodox religious schools, public high schools, and other educational institutions to promote tolerance. As part of the program, students of several religious educational institutions planned and carried out projects celebrating religious diversity. Additionally, seminars with key religious figures and discussions with leaders in government, law enforcement, and academia stressed the compatibility between democracy and religious faith.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 40 million (July 2016 estimate), more than 99 percent of whom are Sunni Muslim. Groups together constituting less than 1 percent of the population include Christians, Jews, Ahmadi Muslims, Shia Muslims, and a community of Ibadi Muslims residing principally in the province of Ghardaia. Some religious leaders estimate there are fewer than 200 Jews.

The Christian community includes Roman Catholics, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, members of the Protestant Church of Algeria, Lutherans, members of the Reformed Church, Anglicans, and an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 Egyptian Coptic Christians. Religious leaders’ unofficial estimates of the total number of Christians in the country range from 20,000 to 200,000. Although numbers cannot be confirmed, some church leaders say foreign residents make up the majority of the Christian population. One Christian leader estimates his church has between 20,000 and 40,000 foreign members, compared to fewer than 100 citizen members. The proportion of students and immigrants without legal status from sub-Saharan Africa among the Christian population is also increasing. Christian leaders say citizens who are Christians predominantly belong to Protestant groups. Christians reside mostly in the cities of Algiers, Annaba, and Oran. The Protestant community has an evangelical wing, most of whose members live in the Kabylie region.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam to be the state religion and prohibits state institutions from engaging in behavior incompatible with Islamic values. On February 7, parliament enacted amendments to the constitution, which included adding specific language providing for freedom of worship in accordance with the law. The new constitutional language reflected preexisting provisions in the law pertaining to freedom of worship. Prior to the amendments, the constitution only stated that freedom of conscience and freedom of opinion were inviolable. That language remains in the revised text.

While the law does not prohibit conversions from Islam, proselytizing of Muslims by non-Muslims is a criminal offense. The law prescribes a maximum punishment of one million dinars ($9,174) and five years’ imprisonment for anyone who “incites, constrains, or utilizes means of seduction tending to convert a Muslim to another religion; or by using to this end establishments of teaching, education, health, social, culture, training…or any financial means.” Making, storing, or distributing printed documents or audiovisual materials with the intent of “shaking the faith” of a Muslim is also illegal and subject to the same penalties.

The law criminalizes “offending the Prophet Muhammad” or any other prophets. The penal code provides a punishment of three to five years in prison and/or a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 dinars ($458 to $916) for denigrating the creed or prophets of Islam through writing, drawing, declaration, or any other means. The law also criminalizes insults to any other religion, with the same penalties.

The law grants all individuals the right to practice their religion as long as they respect public order and regulations.

The constitution establishes a High Islamic Council and states it shall encourage and promote ijtihad (the use of independent reasoning as a source of Islamic law for issues not precisely addressed in the Quran) and express opinions on religious questions presented for its review. The president appoints the members of the council and oversees its work. The constitution requires the council to submit regular reports to the president on its activities. A presidential decree further defines the council’s mission as taking responsibility for all questions related to Islam, for correcting mistaken perceptions, and for promoting the true fundamentals of the religion and a correct understanding of it. The council may issue fatwas at the request of the president.

The law requires any group, religious or otherwise, to register with the government as an association prior to conducting any activities. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) grants association status to religious groups; only registered associations are officially recognized. MOI’s registration requirements for national-level associations stipulate the founding members must furnish documents proving their identities, addresses, and other biographic details; furnish police and judicial records to prove their good standing in society; show they have founding members residing in at least one quarter of the country’s provinces to prove the association merits national standing; submit the association’s constitution signed by its president; and submit documents indicating the location of its headquarters. The law requires the ministry to provide a receipt for the application once it has received all the required documentation and to give a response to the application within 60 days of submission of the completed application. The law states applicants are de facto approved if the ministry fails to make a decision within the 60-day limit. The law grants the government full discretion in making registration decisions, but provides applicants an opportunity to appeal a denial to an administrative tribunal.

Registration applications of religious associations must be approved by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA). The law, however, does not specify additional requirements for religious associations or further specify the MRA’s role in the process. Religious groups may appeal an MRA denial to an administrative tribunal. For associations seeking to register at the local or provincial level, application requirements are similar, but the association’s membership and sphere of activity is strictly limited to the area in which it registers. An association registered at the wilaya (provincial) level is confined to a specific wilaya.

The National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups, a government entity, is responsible by law for facilitating the registration process for all non-Muslim groups. The MRA presides over the commission, composed of senior representatives of the Ministries of National Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, the presidency, the national police, the national gendarmerie, and the governmental National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (CNCPPDH).

The CNCPPDH monitors and evaluates human rights issues, including matters related to religious freedom. The law authorizes the agency to issue opinions and recommendations, to conduct awareness campaigns, and to work with other government authorities to address human rights issues. The agency may address concerns of individuals and groups who believe they are not being treated fairly by the MRA. The CNCPPDH does not have the authority to enforce its decisions. It submits an annual report to the president, who appoints the agency’s members.

The law specifies the manner and conditions under which religious services, Muslim or otherwise, may take place. The law states religious demonstrations are subject to regulation and the government may shut down any religious service taking place in private homes or in outdoor settings without official approval. With the exception of daily prayers, which are permissible anywhere, Islamic services may take place only in state-sanctioned mosques. Friday prayers are further limited to certain specified mosques. Non-Muslim religious services must only take place in buildings registered with the state for the exclusive purpose of religious practice, run by a registered religious association, open to the public, and marked as such on the exterior. A request for permission to observe special non-Muslim religious events must be submitted to the relevant wali (governor) at least five days before the event, and the event must occur in buildings accessible to the public. Requests must include information on three principal organizers of the event, its purpose, the number of attendees anticipated, a schedule of events, and its planned location. The organizers also must obtain a permit from the wali. The wali may request the organizers move the location of an event or deny permission for it to take place if he deems it would be a danger to public order or harm “national constants,” “good mores,” or symbols of the revolution. If unauthorized meetings go forward without approval, participants are subject to dispersal by the police. Failure to disperse at the behest of the police may result in arrest and a prison term of two to twelve months under the penal code.

The penal code states only government-authorized imams, whom the state hires and trains, may lead prayer in mosques and penalizes anyone other than a government-authorized imam who preaches in a mosque with fines of up to 100,000 dinars ($916) and prison sentences of one to three years. Fines as high as 200,000 dinars ($1,834) and prison sentences of three to five years are stipulated for any person, including government-authorized imams, who acts “against the noble nature of the mosque” or in a manner “likely to offend public cohesion.” The law states such acts include exploiting the mosque to achieve purely material or personal objectives or with a view to harming people or groups.

By law, the MRA provides financial support to mosques and pays the salaries of imams and religious personnel, as well as health care and retirement benefits. The law also provides for the payment of salaries and benefits to non-Muslim religious leaders who are citizens. The Ministry of Labor regulates the amount of an individual imam’s or mosque personnel’s pay, and likewise sets the salaries of citizen non-Muslim religious leaders based on their position within their individual churches.

The Ministries of Religious Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Commerce must approve the importation of non-Islamic religious writings, except those intended for personal use.

The law states the government must approve any modification of structures intended for non-Muslim collective worship.

Under the law, children born to a Muslim father are considered Muslim regardless of the mother’s religion.

The Ministries of National Education and Religious Affairs require, regulate, and fund the study of Islam in public schools. Religious education focuses on Islamic studies but includes information on Christianity and Judaism and is mandatory at the primary and secondary school levels. The Ministry of National Education requires private schools to adhere to curricula in line with national standards, particularly regarding the teaching of Islam and the use of Arabic as the primary language of instruction, or risk being closed.

The law states that discrimination on the basis of religion is prohibited and guarantees state protection for non-Muslims and for the “toleration and respect of different religions.” It does not prescribe penalties for religious discrimination.

The constitution prohibits non-Muslims from running for the presidency. Non-Muslims may hold other public offices and work within the government.

The family code prohibits Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim men unless the man converts to Islam. The code does not prohibit Muslim men from marrying Christian or Jewish women.

By law, individuals who have converted from Islam to another religion are ineligible to receive an inheritance via succession.

The law prohibits religious associations from receiving funding from political parties or foreign entities. The constitution prohibits the establishment of political parties based on religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Police arrested at least 83 Ahmadi Muslims in connection with the practice of their religion. A court sentenced a Christian convert arrested for insulting the Prophet Muhammad on Facebook to a three-year prison sentence. An appeals court ordered the release of a journalist previously sentenced to prison for insulting the Prophet Muhammad. Some Christian groups continued to report facing a range of administrative difficulties in the absence of a written government response to their requests for recognition as associations. In October the MRA issued two permits to import Bibles and other Christian religious materials. The government issued the import authorization in four months, compared with an 18-month wait for the previous request made in 2014. MRA officials, including the minister, continued to state publicly the government’s willingness to accommodate minority faiths who wished to practice in the country by opening places of worship. Christian leaders stated the lack of government responsiveness to visa applications continued to pose complications for religious workers.

On June 13, police arrested nine Ahmadi Muslims in Blida and charged them with operating an unauthorized religious organization, illegally collecting contributions, and printing books. On October 2, police arrested 18 members of the Ahmadi Muslim community in the wilaya of Skikda for conducting Friday prayers outside of an authorized place of worship. In November the media reported that 17 Ahmadi Muslims in Skikda were given suspended sentences of between one and six months in prison, while three others were acquitted. The media reported the arrest and subsequent release on provisional liberty of six Ahmadis in the wilaya of Ain Temouchent in November. The press also reported the arrest of six Ahmadis in the wilaya of M’sila on November 26 on charges of “harming national security” and holding unauthorized prayer services. At year’s end, it was unknown whether they were released. Press reports stated four Ahmadi Muslims were arrested for the unauthorized practice of religion and proselytization on December 19 in the wilaya of Relizane. Authorities continued to detain them at year’s end. On December 12, press outlets reported the arrest and subsequent release on provisional liberty of 40 Ahmadis in the wilaya of Setif. The status of charges against them was unknown at year’s end. In December Minister of Religious Affairs Mohamed Aissa stated the Ahmadi Islamic “sect” no longer existed in the country and that an effort must be made to bring youth who had been influenced by Ahmadi doctrine back to “our national religious beliefs.” Ministry officials said the Ahmadi community, along with other religious groups they described as “sects” such as the Bahai Faith, were not considered legitimate religious groups and would likely not receive permission to operate legally.

On July 31, police in Setif arrested Slimane Bouhafs, a Christian convert, for posting statements deemed offensive to the Prophet Muhammad on his Facebook page. A court sentenced him on August 7 to five years in prison and a fine of 100,000 dinars ($916). On September 6 his sentence was reduced to three years in prison. Bouhafs had reportedly posted altered verses from the Quran that satirized the Prophet Muhammad’s life. In July a court sentenced Christian convert Samir Chamek, to five years in prison for Facebook posts he made in 2015that the court found were offensive to the Prophet Muhammad. Christian media reported the Facebook post compared the Prophet Muhammad to Hitler and accused him of terrorism.

On June 14, the national gendarmerie published a press release saying it had “dismantled an international criminal network of blasphemers and anti-Muslim proselytizers on the internet.” News reports referenced the press release when they reported the arrests of Rachid Fodil and Daif Hichem in M’Sila Province for content on their Facebook page that the government said attacked the precepts of Islam and denigrated the Prophet Muhammad. Media reported in December Fodil was sentenced to five years in prison and a 20,000 dinar ($183) fine and Hichem to three years in prison and a 20,000 dinar ($183) fine.

Christian leaders reported two Protestants were arrested in Bejaia for transporting unauthorized religious literature. Additional details were unavailable.

In April an appeals court overturned the conviction of journalist Mohamed Chergui, who had been sentenced in 2015 to three years imprisonment and a fine of 200,000 dinars ($1,834) for insulting the Prophet Muhammad following charges filed by the newspaper which had employed him. Authorities promptly released Chergui, who had authored an article in mid-2014 about European research on “Quranic expressions,” which had prompted the newspaper to fire him and pursue a legal complaint.

Some appeals of criminal convictions remained unresolved for several years after the defendant’s conviction. An appeal hearing continued to be delayed for Abdelkrim Siaghi, a Christian convert sentenced to five years in prison in 2011 for offending the Prophet Muhammad.

While the government continued to maintain the right to prescreen and approve sermons before imams delivered them during Friday prayers, MRA officials said they rarely did so. The MRA said it sometimes provided preapproved sermon topics for Friday prayers to address the public’s concerns following major events, such as after a highly publicized child kidnapping, or when trying to raise awareness, such as on World AIDS Day.

According to information provided by MRA officials, if a ministry inspector suspected an imam’s sermon was inappropriate, the inspector had the authority to summon the imam to a “scientific council” composed of Islamic law scholars and other imams who assessed the sermon’s correctness. The government could decide to relieve an imam of duty if he was summoned multiple times. The government also monitored activities in mosques for possible security-related offenses and prohibited the use of mosques as public meeting places outside of regular prayer hours.

The government continued to enforce the ban on proselytizing by non-Muslim groups. Several Christian representatives stated continued government observance of the ordinance against proselytizing by non-Muslims prompted churches to restrict some activities not related to proselytizing, such as the distribution of religious literature and holding of events in the local community that Muslims might attend.

Christian leaders said authorities in March threatened two house churches in the Kabylie region with closure. The churches remained open as of the end of the year. There were no reported cases of government prosecution of Christian citizens belonging to unregistered religious groups, who continued to meet in unofficial “house churches,” which were often homes or businesses of church members. Christian leaders said the authorities generally did not prosecute practitioners as long as house churches respected public order. Some of these groups met openly, while others held worship services more discreetly. These groups were most frequently reported in the Kabylie region. MRA officials said they privately urged such groups to come forward and operate in the open, saying the country tolerated religious minorities.

Christian leaders reported being able to visit Christians, most of whom were migrants, in prison.

Several religious groups that had been registered under the previous associations law prior to 2012 continued to try to reregister with the government. In November the MOI told the Protestant Church of Algeria, which had submitted a registration application in 2013, it considered that application incomplete. The Church submitted supplemental documentation in December. It was awaiting an MOI response at year’s end.

The Seventh-day Adventist and Reformed Churches were uncertain as to the status of registration applications they had pending with the government at year’s end.

According to the MOI, although religious associations were de facto registered if the ministry did not reject their application within 60 days of its submission, the 60-day clock did not begin until the ministry considered the application complete and had issued a receipt to that effect. NGOs and religious leaders said the MOI routinely failed to provide them with a receipt proving they had submitted a completed registration application.

Some religious groups viewed themselves as de facto registered after 60 days. Religious groups stated that even if they considered themselves de facto registered under the 60-day rule, service providers, such as utilities and banks, insisted on proof of registration. As a result, without official papers affirming their status, these groups still faced the same administrative constraints as unregistered associations.

MRA officials stated the delay in approvals had arisen because the government had hoped to issue a refinement of the law, specifically to address religious associations. The MRA stated it had never rejected a registration application for a religious group.

Members of Christian religious groups waiting for a ministry response to their applications reported there continued to be no government interference with their holding religious services, but said they continued to face administrative and bureaucratic difficulties because of their lack of documented registered status. They reported problems including a lack of standing to pursue legal complaints, an inability to open bank accounts or establish related charitable activities, and difficulty managing church billing accounts without documented standing as an association. Most Christian leaders stated they had had no contact with the National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups, despite its legal mandate to work with them on registration, since its establishment in 2006. Christian leaders stated some Protestant groups continued to avoid applying for recognition and instead operated discreetly because they lacked confidence in the registration process.

MRA officials said Muslim associations remained equally burdened under the registration process because the opening of every new mosque required the formation of an association under the law. Government officials stated the law was designed to apply the same constraints on non-Muslims as on Muslims, including ensuring the compliance of religious rites with the law and respect for public order, morality, and the rights and basic freedoms of others.

According to some Christian leaders, individuals and groups who believed the MRA was not treating them fairly rarely addressed their concerns to the CNCPPDH, which was viewed as having limited authority. The MRA said it instructed employees of the agencies making up the National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups to fairly enforce the ordinance which prohibited religious discrimination, and it prohibited its employees from manipulating application of the law based on the employees’ own beliefs.

According to the MRA, the government continued to allow government employees to wear religious clothing including the hijab, crosses, and the niqab. Authorities continued to instruct some female government employees, such as security forces, not to wear head and face coverings that could complicate the performance of their official duties.

In October the government granted two permits, after a four month delay, for the importation of Christian religious texts to one authorized organization, which had sole standing to import Bibles on behalf of all Christian entities in the country. Christian leaders said they viewed the waiting period as an improvement over the 18-month delay in approving the previous request made in 2014. Non-Islamic religious texts, music, and video media continued to be available on the informal market, and stores and vendors in the capital sold Bibles in several languages, including Arabic, French, and Tamazight. The government enforced its prohibition on dissemination of any literature portraying violence as a legitimate precept of Islam.

The government, along with private contributions from local Muslims, continued to fund mosque construction. The government and public and private companies also funded the preservation of some churches, particularly those of historical importance. The province of Oran, for example, continued to work in partnership with local donors on an extensive renovation of Notre-Dame de Santa Cruz as part of its cultural patrimony.

MRA officials restated the government’s willingness to respond to a request to open a synagogue, while saying Jewish religious authorities did not believe there was a large enough Jewish community to require a synagogue. A ministry official said the ministry would be equally willing to open any other religious place of worship at the request of a minority population, but had received no such requests.

Christian leaders said when Christian converts died family members sometimes buried them according to Muslim rites, and the church had no standing to intervene on their behalf. Christian groups reported some villages continued not to permit Christians to be buried alongside Muslims. The government stated people whose lifestyle gave the impression they were non-Muslims were buried in Muslim cemeteries on the basis of their family’s testimonies. A ministry official stated that, where burial grounds were private, the cases were outside of the government’s domain.

Christians reported they continued to encounter refusals or delays when seeking government authorization to give Biblical names to their children, but said a second request following a refusal typically led to approval. The MRA stated similar delays sometimes occurred with other names which were uncommon locally, and attributed delays in approving Biblical names to overzealous local officials, who were unfamiliar with the proposed names and required additional time to seek higher-level approval.

The government did not always enforce the family code prohibition against Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men.

Government owned radio stations continued to broadcast Christmas and Easter services in French, although many Christians said they would prefer services to be broadcast in Arabic or Tamazight.

In May a member of parliament affiliated with the Green Alliance, a coalition of three Islamist political parties that represented a segment of the parliamentary opposition, criticized the government for granting a visa to an Israeli journalist accompanying the French prime minister on an April visit to Algeria. An Arabic language newspaper stated that, in the member of parliament’s view, the government was normalizing relations with “Zionists who make France a door to infiltrate” the country.

Government officials continued to invite leading Christian citizens to events celebrating national occasions, such as the November 1 commemoration of the revolution, according them the same status as Muslim, cultural, and national figures.

MRA representatives, in particular the minister, continued to make public statements warning against the spread of “extremist” Salafism, Wahhabism, Shia Islam, Ahmadi Islam, and the Bahai Faith. For example, in a radio interview in October, Minister Aissa stated, “We are living through a [religious] sectarian invasion.” In June he said “Neither Ahmadism, Shiism, Wahhabism, nor other sects are the products of Algerians.”

Senior government officials publicly condemned acts of violence committed in the name of Islam by nonstate actors, and urged all members of society to reject extremist behavior. At an April 19 seminar, Minister Aissa called on imams to “indefatigably fight” extremist doctrines, which he characterized as “contrary to the values and principles of Algeria.” In response to terrorist attacks in other countries during the year, including in the United States, Mali, France, Libya, and Turkey, the government issued statements calling the attacks “criminal acts” for taking innocent human lives in contradiction to the tenets of Islam.

Government officials regularly made statements about the need for tolerance of non-Islamic religious groups. In remarks at an international conference on Sufism on May 18, the Inspector General of the Ministry of Religious Affairs praised Sufism for providing “a radiant image of the Muslim religion based on tolerance, open-mindedness, and the illumination and acceptance of the other.” On December 28, Minister of Religious Affairs Aissa said, “We do not criticize Christians who celebrate the birth of Jesus Christ, may God’s peace be upon him. It is their culture.” In November, a member of the Council of the Nation, the upper house of parliament, spoke at a conference on tolerance in Beirut on behalf of the Council, saying, “Integrated into the society and solidified at the legal, political, cultural, and religious levels, [Algeria’s Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation] seeks to eliminate all forms of conflict, fanaticism, and discrimination and to establish peace, security, stability, and coexistence.” During Ramadan, the government continued to dedicate numerous media programs to promoting interfaith tolerance, a message the government instructed imams to amplify in their sermons.

Church groups continued to report government delays in responding to the visa applications of religious workers; they said the government often provided no response rather than a documented refusal. Both Catholic and Protestant groups continued to identify the delays as a significant hindrance to religious practice. One religious leader identified lack of visa issuances as a major impediment to maintaining contact with the church’s international organization. The government typically continued to grant short-stay tourist visas and some cultural work visas, rather than the requested long-term work visas; religious leaders reported recipients of these visas were concerned about their legal status when working with churches while on tourist visas. Higher-level intervention with the officials responsible for visa issuance by senior MRA and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials at the request of religious groups often resulted in the issuance of long-term visas, according to religious groups.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, a U.S. government-designated terrorist organization, continued to operate in the country, stating the government was an “apostate regime.” The group claimed credit for a March 18 attack on a gas plant in Krechba. The Jund al-Khilafa group, which has sworn allegiance to ISIS and also is a U.S. government-designated terrorist organization, claimed responsibility for killing a police officer in the city of Constantine in October and continued to call for violence against those who disagreed with its interpretation of Islam.

Several Christian leaders reported instances where citizens who converted, or who expressed interest in learning more about Christianity, were assaulted by family members, or otherwise pressured to recant their conversion.

Some Muslim citizens who converted to Christianity reported they and others in their communities continued to keep a low profile due to their concern for their personal safety and the potential for legal, familial, career, and social problems. Other Muslim citizens who converted to Christianity continued to practice their new religion openly, however, according to members of the Christian community.

Christian leaders continued to report cases in which Muslim parents successfully pressured their Muslim children to divorce their Christian spouses.

Some Christian parents reported their children were reprimanded in school for openness about their religion.

The media criticized religious communities it portrayed as “sects” or “deviations” from Islam or as “foreign,” such as Ahmadis, Shia, Ismailis, and Bahais. In October a privately owned TV channel with national coverage aired a program asserting the Ahmadiyya “sect” was more dangerous than criminal gangs. Among those who openly practiced any religion other than Sunni Islam, many reported that family, neighbors, or members of the general population criticized their choice to practice such a religion, harassed them to convert, and occasionally, insinuated they could be in danger because of their choice.

There were reports that some non-Muslims concealed their religious affiliation in the workplace for fear of losing their jobs.

In January following media reports that foreign embassies were under investigation for spreading Shia Islam, youth in Biskra organized a public awareness campaign warning against the spread of the Shia faith. They reportedly distributed leaflets which described Shia Islam as “invading” the country.

Both private and state run media produced reports throughout the year examining the supposed foreign ties and dangers of religious groups such as Shia, Ahmadis, and Salafists. For example, following the arrests of Ahmadi Muslims in Skikda in October, the private Ennahar television channel aired a program that featured interviews with a professor, an imam, and a scholar of Islam about what they described as the dangers of the Ahmadi faith. The program did not feature opposing viewpoints defending the Ahmadis.

Jewish citizens said they continued to try to keep their religious identity private, while otherwise engaging with society. After an Israeli journalist was granted a visa to visit Algeria in May, an Arabic-language newspaper wrote that the journalist had a “strong, Jewish-sounding name,” and an online news outlet referred to the journalist as an “Israeli Jew,” adding that the government-issued visa allowed him to “strut in the streets of Algiers to meet whoever he wants.”

Some Muslims continued to show an interest in Catholic places of worship, including visiting them for prayer; Catholics reported the interest was because Catholic religious figures, such as the Virgin Mary, were mentioned in the Quran. In some areas of major cities, observers reported shops sold Christmas trees and decorations.

One church reported local youths attempted to trespass onto its grounds to commit vandalism; the church said local security forces were supportive and subsequently boosted security around the site. Other Christian leaders said they had good relations with Muslims in the country, but reported that residents in the churches’ neighborhoods, including children, sometimes threw objects or shouted insults at church staff on days when services were held.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy officers met with government officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Religious Affairs to discuss the difficulties Christian and other religious minority groups faced in registering as associations, in importing religious materials, and in obtaining visas. Embassy officers also addressed the government’s stance toward minority Muslim communities.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers met throughout the year with government-affiliated and independent religious leaders, and representatives of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities to discuss interreligious dialogue and tolerance, and in the case of religious minorities, their rights and status.

The embassy sponsored the visit of a U.S. citizen Muslim writer and scholar to Algiers and Oran to engage youth in discussions of religious freedom and tolerance.

The embassy discussed the practice of religion, its intersection with politics, and the religious and political roles of women with Islamist political parties and Islamic political figures, as well as with the Muslim Scholars Association. The embassy sponsored visits of several Muslim scholars, a representative of a Sufi order, and members of Islamist political parties to the United States and to U.S. government-funded international conferences on countering violent extremism and promoting religious moderation and tolerance. During a September visit, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor met with several officials from the Ministry of Religious Affairs to stress the importance of religious tolerance and freedom of worship.

During Ramadan, the Ambassador and embassy staff filmed messages in support of religious pluralism in the country and shared examples of pluralism and religious tolerance on social media. The Ambassador and other embassy staff hosted several iftars, which featured discussions emphasizing the theme of religious tolerance. Embassy staff and embassy-sponsored U.S. speakers also addressed these themes in discussions with youth.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 86,000 (July 2016 estimate). There are no statistics on the size of religious groups or census data on religious group membership. The majority of the population is Roman Catholic. Smaller religious groups include Muslims, Hindus, Jews, Anglicans, Seventh-day Adventists, Bahais, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), the New Apostolic Church, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Muslim community, of which the large majority is immigrant, has grown in recent years. Muslim leaders estimate the community has 800-2,000 members. The Jewish community reports it has approximately 100 members.

Legal Framework

The constitution “guarantees freedom of ideas, religion, and cult.” It prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion and stipulates no one shall be required to disclose his or her religion or beliefs. The constitution states such freedoms may be limited only to protect public safety, order, health, or morals as prescribed by law or to protect the rights of others. The constitution acknowledges a special relationship with the Catholic Church “in accordance with Andorran tradition” and recognizes the “full legal capacity” of the bodies of the Catholic Church, granting them legal status “in accordance with their own rules.” One of two constitutionally designated princes of the country (who serves equally as joint head of state with the other prince, the President of France) is the Catholic Bishop of Urgell, Joan Enric Vives i Sicilia, whose diocese in Spain includes Andorra.

Faiths other than Catholicism do not have legal status as religious groups. The government registers religious communities as cultural organizations under the law of associations, which does not specifically mention religious groups. To build a place of worship or seek government financial support for community activities, a religious group must register as a nonprofit cultural organization and acquire legal status. To register, a group must provide its statutes and foundational agreement, a statement certifying the names of persons appointed to the board or other official positions in the organization, and a patrimony declaration that identifies the inheritance or endowment of the organization. A consolidated register of associations records all types of associations, including religious groups. The law governing the issuance of official documents such as residence permits, passports, and driver’s licenses, requires individuals to appear and be photographed with their heads uncovered.

According to the law, municipalities are responsible for the construction, preservation, and administration of cemeteries and funerary services.

In August the government approved a regulation on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing. Halal slaughter is permitted so long as it takes place under the supervision of the veterinary services of the country’s slaughterhouse.

Instruction in the Catholic faith is optional in public schools. The Catholic Church provides teachers for religion classes, and the government pays their salaries. The Ministry of Education also provides space in the public schools where the religion classes are taught.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Catholic Church continued to receive special privileges not available to other religious groups. The government paid the salaries of the eight Catholic priests serving in local churches and granted all foreign Catholic priests citizenship for as long as they exercised their functions in the country.

In September the government held initial meetings with the Jewish and Muslim communities to discuss the possible construction of a cemetery where they could conduct burials in accordance with their religious beliefs and customs. Although these communities could bury their dead in existing cemeteries, municipalities did not allocate separate burial areas in those cemeteries, or land for separate cemeteries, for use by the Jewish and Muslim communities. As a result, these communities generally buried their dead outside the country. The Jewish community, for example, used cemeteries in Toulouse, France, and Barcelona, Spain. The Muslim community tended to use cemeteries in Toulouse, France, or repatriate its dead and bury them in their countries of origin.

According to the prosecutor’s office, a 2014 assault by two individuals of a Jew outside of a discotheque in the city of La Massana remained under investigation.

The government continued to fund three Catholic schools at the primary and secondary level.

Foreigners performing religious functions for religious groups other than the Catholic Church could not obtain religious working permits because the law did not define what constituted a “religious worker.” These workers had to enter the country under a different status. Foreign religious workers could enter the country with permits for other positions such as schoolteachers or business workers and were able to carry out religious work without hindrance.

Members of the Muslim community again raised concerns that individuals wearing head coverings for religious reasons could not remain covered in photographs for official documents.

There continued to be no mosque in the country, but there were two Muslim prayer rooms. The Catholic Church of Santa Maria del Fener in Andorra la Vella lent its sanctuary twice a month to the Anglican community so that visiting Anglican clergy could conduct services for the English-speaking community.

The Muslim community processed halal products locally throughout the year. The Jewish community continued to import kosher products, as it was too small to produce them locally.

During periodic visits, the U.S. Ambassador to Spain, who is accredited to the country, and the Consul General and other officials from the U.S. Consulate General in Barcelona discussed concerns about the lack of cemeteries for the Jewish and Muslim communities with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior and Justice officials. The officials stated they were exploring the possibility of building cemeteries for those communities.

Embassy officials met with representatives of the Jewish and Muslim communities to discuss issues such as the lack of legal status as religious groups for faiths other than Catholicism, the implications of regulations requiring individuals to remove head coverings for official identity documents, and the lack of cemeteries for the Jewish and Muslim communities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 25.7 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2014 national census, approximately 41 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 38 percent Protestant. Individuals not associated with any religion constitute 12 percent of the population. The remaining 10 percent is composed of animists, Muslims, Jews, and other religious groups. According to the government, most Muslims are immigrants from North, West, and East Africa. There are approximately 350 Jews, primarily foreign residents.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the state as secular and prohibits religious discrimination. The constitution requires the state to protect churches and religious groups as long as they comply with the law. The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, religious belief, and worship and recognizes the right of religious groups to organize and carry out their activities as long as they adhere to the law. The constitution permits conscientious objections, prohibits questioning individuals about their religious beliefs for reasons other than anonymous statistical purposes, and specifies that religious rights may not be suspended even if the state declares a state of war, siege, or emergency. It recognizes the right of prisoners to receive visits from, and correspond with, religious counselors.

The religious freedom law requires religious groups to register for legal recognition from the state. Legal recognition gives religious groups the ability to purchase property collectively, use their property to hold religious events, exempt them from paying certain property taxes, and authorize the group to be treated as an incorporated entity in the court system. To apply for government recognition, a religious group must collect 100,000 member signatures from 12 of the 18 provinces and submit them to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. The law also requires religious groups to submit documents defining their doctrine, organizational structure, methods of worship, and leadership, and the amount of time the group has operated in the country. While the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights is responsible for registration and recognition of religious groups, oversight of religious organizations is the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture through its National Institute for Religious Affairs.

Religious instruction is not a component of the public educational system. Private schools are allowed to teach religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On April 5, the Huambo provincial court convicted Jose Kalupeteka, the leader of the Light of the World Church, and nine of his followers for killing nine police officers in a clash between police and members of the sect in April 2015. Kalupeteka was sentenced to 28 years in prison. According to official figures, 13 civilians were also killed in the clash. Opposition parties reported the clash resulted in a much higher casualty rate, but figures vary widely and remain unconfirmed.

On August 9, new clashes between police and Light of the World followers in Kwanza Sul Province reportedly resulted in the deaths of five sect members and three police officers. The media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported security forces confronted followers in the same area on August 13, resulting in an unknown number of casualties. The government stated the attorney general’s office was investigating the case, but could not confirm if there were any casualties from the August 13 incident.

In August the government reported several other incidents involving the Light of the World Church and continued to state that some of the group’s practices were destabilizing to social order, such as prohibiting schooling and vaccination of its children.

In July in Mbanza Congo in Zaire Province, religious leader Manuel Nvika was sentenced to three months in jail for disobedience and contempt of court after failing to remove a head covering during a judicial hearing after his group had split from the Christian Union of the Holy Spirit Church. Fifteen other followers were arrested during the trial for contempt of court after the judge ordered Nvika to uncover his head during the proceedings, an act the group stated it considered blasphemous.

In April the press reported that Jorge Mpata, a religious leader from the Evangelic Community for the Prosperity of the Souls, was arrested and charged with harboring illegal immigrants in the northern province of Cabinda. Mpata said his arrest was a result of his refusal to support the ruling party. Authorities subsequently banned his church. Civil society organizations reported the government has been pressuring churches to support the government in the lead-up to planned elections in August 2017.

The government stated publicly it was concerned about the proliferation of religious “sects,” some of which it said used methods that exploited vulnerable populations, especially the poor, and threatened domestic stability.

The government did not make progress on the issue of recognizing new religious groups. The government has officially recognized 81 religious groups, all Christian, but has not recognized a new religious group since 2004, when the current application system was created. A large number of groups continue to await recognition despite having submitted several applications for registration. In 2015, the government estimated that approximately 1300 religious groups were operating without government recognition, often providing education and medical care to their members despite no legal authority to do so.

In some instances, the government disbanded religious organizations and organizations operating without government recognition, and some religious leaders stated they had been the victims of politically motivated prosecution for various criminal charges both tied to, and sometimes unrelated to, the practice of their religion. The government, however, said it routinely worked with religious groups to bring them into compliance with local laws.

During the year the government led an effort to bring unrecognized Christian groups together in associations that could receive government recognition en masse, requesting those groups actively support government requests, such as calls to register for elections, and not to engage in illegal practices. The government approved the operation of three coalitions of Christian churches – counting numerous smaller churches among their members – as a way to allow those churches to operate legally. Members of the religious community in partnership with the government created two organizations – the evangelical Union of Churches of the Holy Spirit in Angola and the Protestant Christian Church Coalition of Angola –to legitimize smaller, unrecognized churches as affiliates of the umbrella group. Some religious leaders, civil society members, and media outlets accused the government of trying to coerce religious groups to align themselves with the ruling party in exchange for authorization to operate freely. Many groups also stated they remained unrecognized and the rigorous requirements imposed by the 2004 law discouraged them from applying for legal authority to operate.

The government continued not to recognize any Muslim groups officially, although the government did not force mosques to close, particularly in Luanda. Some members of the Muslim community stated the high threshold for obtaining legal status, combined with the fact the majority of recognized religious organizations were Christian, indicated the government opposed recognizing non-Christian religious groups. The Bahai Faith and the Global Messianic Church remained the only two non-Christian organizations legally registered. In the past, government officials had stated that some practices allowed by Islam, such as polygamy, contradicted the constitution.

The government was accused of demolishing religious places of worship in the Zango municipality of Luanda. NGO sources stated that, during a planned demolition of an illegally established housing cluster in Zango in August, government soldiers demolished three Catholic churches and threatened a priest who attempted to stop them. In addition, in Curoca municipality in Cunene Province, Church leaders and media stated the government destroyed places of worship as well as cemeteries. Local human rights organizations also stated the government destroyed some places of worship under eminent domain authorities while clearing large swathes of residential communities to make way for private development. According to media sources, much of the land forcibly taken by the government belonged to indigenous pastoralists in the southern part of the country. Church leaders publicly denounced the forced evictions by developers and businesspersons.

On July 20, Vice President Manuel Vicente reportedly called for closer collaboration and cooperation between the Catholic Church and the government to promote moral values, human rights, mutual respect, democracy, and good governance. The vice president stated this during his remarks at the opening ceremony of the 17th Plenary Assembly of the Symposium of Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar in Luanda.

Some leaders of legally recognized religious organizations continued to criticize publicly the proliferation of smaller, unrecognized religious groups. Governmental organizations as well as some religious associations called for all new religious groups to rejoin their “mother churches” or cease operations.

Embassy representatives engaged with government officials on religious freedom issues and encouraged them to develop regulations to expand the rights of citizens to exercise their religion freely. The embassy maintained regular contact with many religious groups, including some not legally recognized by the government, as well as faith-based NGOs.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 94,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, 17.6 percent of the population is Anglican, 12.4 percent Seventh-day Adventist, 12.2 percent Pentecostal, 8.3 percent Moravian, 8.2 percent Roman Catholic, and 5.6 percent Methodist. Those having unspecified or no religious beliefs account for 5.5 percent and 5.9 percent of the population, respectively. Members of the Baptist Church, the Church of God, and the Wesleyan Holiness Consortium each account for less than 5 percent. The census categorizes an additional 12.2 percent of the population as belonging to other religious groups, including Rastafarians, Muslims, Hindus, and Bahais.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of worship as well as the right to change and practice the religion of one’s choosing. The constitution protects individuals from taking oaths contradictory to their beliefs or participating in events and activities of religions not their own, including participating in or receiving unwanted religious education. These freedoms may be limited in the interests of defense or public safety, order, morality or health, or to protect the rights of others, unless actions under such limitations can be shown “not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.” The constitution prohibits members of the clergy from running for elected office. No law may be adopted that contradicts these constitutional provisions. The law that outlaws blasphemous language is not enforced.

In order to receive tax and duty-free concessions and to own, build, or renovate property, religious groups must register with the government. To register, religious groups must fill out an online tax form which determines the group’s activities and the corresponding taxes. The completed form is submitted to the Inland Revenue Department for review and approval. Registration and tax statuses are routinely granted.

Public schools do not allow religious instruction. Private religious schools may provide religious instruction.

The law prohibits the use of marijuana, including for religious purposes.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Caribbean Rastafari Organization (CRO) said the government’s prohibition of marijuana restricted the practice of their religious rights because marijuana was integral to their religious rituals. The CRO said Rastafarians disagreed with the public school requirement that children be vaccinated, which it stated was against the religious beliefs of Rastafarians. The organizations also said the requirement to remove head coverings for passport photos and at security checkpoints was an infringement of Rastafarians’ religious rights. Members of religious groups were permitted to wear their head coverings for passport photos if they provided a letter from their religious organization verifying membership.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy officers engaged various government officials on religious freedom. Embassy officers also met with members of nongovernmental organizations, religious leaders, including leaders of minority religious groups, and the head of the Christian Council to discuss religious freedom issues.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 43.9 million (July 2016 estimate). National census data does not track religious affiliation. Religious demographic and statistical data from NGOs, research centers, and religious leaders vary. According to the Pew Research Center, Roman Catholics constitute 71 percent of the population. Protestants are 15 percent, and atheists, agnostics, and those with no religious affiliation constitute 11 percent. Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Lutherans, Methodists, and members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) together total 3 percent of the population. The Jewish population is approximately 250,000-300,000 and the Muslim population is estimated to be between 450,000 and one million. Evangelical Protestant communities, particularly Pentecostals, are growing in size.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the right to profess, teach, and practice one’s faith freely. It attests the support of the federal government for “the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith,” but the Supreme Court has ruled that it is not an official or state religion.

Non-Catholic groups may register with the Secretariat of Worship in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship. Registration is not compulsory but provides for tax-exempt status for religious groups, visas for religious officials, the ability to hold public activities, as well as other benefits. Non-Catholic religious groups may register and receive the same status and fiscal benefits as Catholic groups. To register, religious groups must have a place of worship, an organizational charter, and an ordained clergy, among other requirements. Registration is not required for private religious services, such as those in homes, but is sometimes necessary to conduct activities in public spaces pursuant to local regulations. For example, city authorities may require groups to obtain permits to use public parks for public activities, and they may require religious groups to be registered with the secretariat to receive the permit. Once an organization is registered, it must report to the secretariat any significant changes or decisions made regarding its leadership, governing structure, size of membership, address of headquarters, or other relevant information. The government has recognized more than 5,300 non-Catholic religious groups.

The mandatory curriculum in public schools is secular by law. Students may request elective courses of instruction in the religion of their choice in some public schools, which may be conducted in the school or at a religious institution. Many Christian, Jewish, and Muslim religious groups operate private schools, which receive financial support contingent on registration with the government.

The government provides the Catholic Church with tax-exempt subsidies, institutional privileges such as school subsidies, significant autonomy for parochial schools, and licensing preferences for radio frequencies.

Foreign religious officials of registered religious groups may apply for a separate category of visa to enter the country. The length of the visa can vary depending on the purpose of the travel. Foreign missionaries of registered religious groups must apply to the Secretariat of Worship, which in turn notifies immigration authorities to request the issuance of the appropriate documents.

The board of the National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Racism (INADI), a government agency under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, includes representatives of the major religious groups. INADI investigates suspected and reported incidents of discrimination based on religion. INADI does not have the authority to enforce recommendations or findings, but its reports may be used as evidence in civil court. The agency also supports victims of religious discrimination and promotes proactive measures to prevent discrimination. INADI produces and distributes publications to promote religious tolerance.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The investigation into the death of Special Prosecutor Alberto Nisman continued through the year. In January 2015 Nisman, the lead federal prosecutor responsible for the investigation of the 1994 bombing of the AMIA community center in Buenos Aires, was discovered dead in his apartment from a gunshot to the head. In March President Macri told leaders attending the Plenary Assembly of the World Jewish Congress that his government was “fully committed to… mak[ing] headway” with the investigation of the unsolved death of Special Prosecutor Nisman. The government also continued its investigation into the 1994 bombing of the Argentina Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) community center. In March President Macri told leaders attending the Plenary Assembly of the World Jewish Congress that his government was “fully committed to… mak[ing] headway” in the investigations of the AMIA attack, the 1992 terrorist bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, and the unsolved death of AMIA Special Prosecutor Alberto Nisman.

The government continued to protect Pastor Marcelo Nieva and his Baptist Evangelical church in Rio Tercero, Cordoba Province, following violence directed towards his church in October 2014. Nieva stated that on April 24, an assailant in an automobile threatened him and his spouse, and that criminal groups continued to harass him and his church because of his social work, particularly with victims of sex trafficking and gender-based violence.

In August the institutional relations director for the city of Chacabuco, Buenos Aires Province provoked widespread criticism on traditional and social media after he published an anti-Islamic statement on his Facebook account. The official resigned his position with the local legislature as a result of the controversy.

In September the government announced that INADI would conduct an education campaign at public and private schools to facilitate a better understanding of Islamic culture, religion, and tradition among young people. The educational campaign was designed to counter a rise in reported complaints of discrimination against Muslims that media reports attributed to public reaction to news of terrorist attacks in Europe credited to ISIS, and to the government’s decision to accept 3,000 Syrian refugees.

Jewish groups reported that relations with the government had improved since the change of administration in December 2015. The groups said the environment between the government and the Jewish community transformed from one of hostility to one of close collaboration.

The secretary of worship, the Buenos Aires director general for religious affairs, and other government representatives hosted and attended religious freedom conferences, interreligious dialogues, rabbinical ordinations, and Rosh Hashanah, Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr celebrations, as well as other religious activities, including those held by Protestant and Orthodox churches throughout the year.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

On August 25, students from the Lanus Oeste German School of Buenos Aires engaged in a fistfight at a nightclub in Bariloche with Jewish students from the Society for Trades and Agricultural Labor (ORT) School of Buenos Aires. Some of the students from the German school wore swastika armbands and false Hitler mustaches, and deliberately provoked a brawl with the Jewish students; no one was seriously injured in the fight. The German school students were disciplined and compelled by the school headmaster to visit the Buenos Aires Holocaust Museum in the company of the Jewish students.

On July 5, an unknown assailant threw a plastic bottle filled with cement through the window of the Maccabi Jewish community center in Santa Fe Province. A note was attached to the bottle, which read “This is a warning, the next one will explode.” The note contained the ISIS logo and the Arabic expression “Allahu Akbar (God is great).”

DAIA documented 478 reported complaints of anti-Semitism in 2015, an increase of 55 percent over the previous year. Less than 10 percent of incidents involved violence and more than half occurred on the internet, including through social media. DAIA attributed the increase in complaints to modified procedures for accounting for incidents of anti-Semitism on social media, and to expansive media attention of the investigation into the death of Special Prosecutor Nisman in 2015.

In regular meetings with the Secretariat of Worship, religious leaders, and civil society organizations, U.S. embassy officials discussed religious freedom, interfaith dialogue, refugees, the status of the AMIA case, and ways to counter anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment. On July 18 the U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism met with the secretary of worship and the minister for human rights at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss religious tolerance and anti-Semitism. The parties discussed challenges associated with the country’s pledge to accept 3,000 Syrian refugees, and how religious institutions of all faiths could partner with the government to assist in the reception and integration of refugees.

In meetings with senior Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim leaders from the national government and the city government of Buenos Aires, the Ambassador discussed religious tolerance, diversity, the interfaith movement, refugees and the poor, and measures to counteract religious discrimination.

The U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism was a panelist at the first Latin American Global Forum Against Anti-Semitism in Buenos Aires on July 16. The forum sought to advance a regional approach to combatting religious discrimination and anti-Semitism, and to promote greater interfaith dialogue. The Special Envoy and the Ambassador met with national religious and civic leaders and civil society organizations such as DAIA, AMIA, B’nai B’rith International, the World Jewish Congress, and the Islamic Center of Argentina.

Embassy officials regularly attended conferences, observances, and commemorations organized by religious groups and NGOs including DAIA, AMIA, the Islamic Center of Argentina, the Islamic Center for Peace, the Evangelical Church of Argentina, and the United Religious Initiative. The events advocated interfaith cooperation and universal tolerance in respecting the freedom of religion. The embassy also participated in the Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue World Congress.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.1 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, approximately 92 percent of the population identifies with the AAC. Other religious groups, none supported by more than 1 percent of the population, include Roman Catholics, Armenian Uniate (Mekhitarist) Catholics, Orthodox Christians, evangelical Christians, Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, charismatic Christians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, the Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian Church of the East, pagans, Molokan Christians, Yezidis, Jews, Shia Muslims, and Sunni Muslims.

Yezidis are concentrated primarily in agricultural areas northwest of Yerevan around Mount Aragats, and Armenian Uniate Catholics live primarily in the north. Most Jews, Mormons, and Orthodox Christians reside in Yerevan, along with a small community of Muslims, most of whom are Shia, including Iranians and temporary residents from the Middle East.

Legal Framework

The constitution states everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right includes the freedom to change one’s religion or beliefs and the freedom to manifest religion or belief in rituals of worship, such as preaching or church ceremonies, either alone or in community with others, in public or in private. The constitution allows restrictions on this right only in order to protect state security, public order, health and morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. The constitution establishes separation of “religious organizations” and the state. It recognizes “the exclusive mission of the Armenian Apostolic Church as a national church in the spiritual life, development of the national culture, and preservation of the national identity of the people of Armenia.” The constitution prohibits the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms for the purpose of inciting religious hatred. It allows conscientious objectors to military service to perform alternative civilian service.

The law prohibits, but does not define, “soul hunting,” a term describing both proselytism and forced conversion.

According to the law, a registered religious group may exercise the following rights: to minister to the religious and spiritual needs of their faithful; to perform religious liturgies, rites, and ceremonies; to establish groups for religious instruction; to engage in theological, religious, and historical and cultural studies; to train members for clergy or for scientific and pedagogical purposes; to obtain and utilize objects and materials of religious significance; to use communications media; to establish ties with religious organizations in other countries; and to engage in charity. The law does not require religious groups to register, but in order for a religious group to conduct business in its own name (e.g., own property, rent property, establish bank accounts), it must register. The law does not stipulate the rights accorded to unregistered groups.

In order to register as a legal entity, a religious community has to present to the Office of the State Registrar an assessment from the Division of Religious Affairs and National Minorities stating its expert opinion whether the community complies with the requirements of the law that it be based on “historically recognized holy scripture;” be “free from materialism and is of a spiritual nature;” have at least 200 adult members; and its doctrine be espoused by a member of the “international modern system” of religious communities. The law does not define “free from materialism” or state which religious communities are considered to be part of the “international modern system.” The law specifies this list of registration requirements, to which the Division of Religious Affairs must attest, does not apply to a religious organization based on the faith of one of the groups recognized as national minorities. A decision by the Office of the State Registrar may be appealed through the courts.

The criminal code prohibits “obstruction of the right to exercise freedom of religion” and prescribes punishment ranging from fines of up to 200,000 drams ($420) or detention of up to two months.

The Human Rights Defender’s office (Ombudsman’s office) has a mandate to address violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of religion, committed by officials of the state and local governments.

The law prohibits an employee of the police, the National Security Service, the service for mandatory enforcement of court rulings, the penitentiary service, the rescue service, or the military from being a member of a religious organization. The law does not define the meaning of “membership” in a religious organization. The law prohibits the members of the police, the military, and the national security service, as well as prosecutors and other state and civil servants from using their official position for the benefit of “religious associations” or from preaching in support of them. The law also prohibits the police, prosecutors, and other state and civil servants from carrying out other religious activities while performing official duties. The law also prohibits members of the military from organizing “religious associations.” While the law defines a “religious organization” as an association of citizens established for professing a common faith as well as for fulfilling other religious needs, there is no definition for “religious associations.”

The law allows the AAC free access to, and the right to station representatives in, hospitals, orphanages, boarding schools, military units, and places of detention, while other religious groups may have representatives in these locations only upon receipt of permission from the head of the institution.

The law mandates public education be secular, and states “religious activity and preaching in public educational institutions is prohibited, with the exception of cases provided by law.” Courses on the history of the AAC are a mandatory part of the national curriculum in public and private schools in grades five through 11.

The AAC has the right to participate in the development of the syllabus and textbooks for these courses and to define the qualifications of their teachers. The Church may nominate candidates to teach the courses, although the teachers are state employees. All students are required to enroll in these classes; there is no opt-out provision. The law grants the AAC the right to organize voluntary extracurricular religious instruction classes in state educational institutions. Other religious groups may provide religious instruction to their members in their own facilities, but not within the premises of state educational institutions.

The labor code prohibits employers from collecting and analyzing data on religious views of employees.

The law provides for two types of service for conscientious objectors as an alternative to compulsory, two-year military service: alternative (noncombat) military service for a duration of 30 months or alternative labor service for a duration of 36 months. Evasion of alternative service remains a criminal offense. Penalties range from two months’ detention to eight years’ imprisonment depending on the circumstances of the case.

The law does not recognize groups organized on the basis of religion as political parties.

The criminal code prohibits incitement of religious hatred through violence, public statements, or the mass media and prescribes punishments ranging from fines of 200,000 to 500,000 drams ($420 to $1,000) or prison terms between two and six years.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On October 4, media reported a member of the Vanadzor City Council, Arkadi Peleshyan, entered the Vanadzor Evangelical Church with a group of his supporters on October 2 and severely beat the church’s pastor and President of the Union of Churches of Evangelical Faith of Armenia, Rafael Grigoryan. The Investigative Committee, an independent body responsible for conducting pretrial investigations, launched an investigation into whether Peleshyan should be formally charged with battery. According to public statements by Grigoryan, the assault was related to his refusal to allow the distribution of promotional materials for Pelehsyan’s political party during Sunday services. The website Protestant.am, a media initiative of Evangelical Christians, issued a statement on October 5 condemning the attack and stating it was caused by “the air of impunity, hate speech and intolerance spread by media toward Christians of evangelical faith.” On November 8, the Investigative Committee suspended the case following a reconciliation between Grigoryan and Peleshyan after the latter made a public apology for the attack.

Some minority Christian groups reported they had the freedom to worship provided they did so discreetly and limited their activities to their own premises and community. They said attempting to expand beyond those premises or attempting to expand their existing membership through proselytizing could potentially create problems. For this reason, the groups said, they kept their activities low profile and exercised self-censorship.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses said they continued to pursue legal avenues for the protection of their rights and tried to maintain a dialogue with the government. They reported they received more police protection while engaging in their public ministry and discerned an improved attitude on the part of government authorities toward their members. Most religious groups, however, said they preferred to solve their issues off the record to avoid the possibility of further problems.

Evangelical Christian groups reported they had given up requesting permission for their pastors to visit prisoners, despite requests by prison inmates, because prison administrators had repeatedly denied them permission for such visits in the last several years.

According to several religious groups, representatives from local governments continued to obstruct their attempts to obtain approval of the required architectural planning studies and building and occupancy permits for houses of worship on land religious groups owned. Representatives of several minority faiths continued to report local authorities granted building permits for places of worship only after receiving informal approval from the leadership of the AAC. Some religious groups said they were more successful in obtaining building permits if they did so using the name of a private individual, or if the stated purpose in applying for the permit was to use the building for a purpose other than as a place of worship. Other groups reported rather than try to build new places of worship, they obtained existing buildings and renovated them for this purpose.

A Yezidi group reported local authorities in the village of Jrashen refused its request to build a monument to a Yezidi leader in the town square. According to the Yezidi group, while no written rejection was provided, the reason for the refusal was the possibility of constructing an AAC church in the same square at some time in the future and the AAC’s desire not to have a Yezidi monument with religious symbolism near an AAC church.

Human rights activists continued to express concern over the government’s integration of the AAC into the public education system and its granting of permission to the AAC to disseminate materials in schools with rhetoric equating AAC affiliation with the national identity.

According to a report on religious freedom in the country issued in March by the Collaboration for Democracy, a local NGO, the public educational system curriculum promoted the identification of the Armenian ethnic identity with the AAC, for example in the 10th grade textbook for the course on the History of the Armenian Church, which stated the AAC turned faith into one of the most important features of the national identity. According to the NGO, other classes, such as those on the Armenian language, history and literature, also contained elements equating national identity to affiliation with the AAC. According to the report, there were other problems with the course on the History of the Armenian Church, including hate speech towards religious organizations other than the AAC, the performance of AAC religious rituals during classes, and the lack of opportunities to take an alternative course.

Yezidi community representatives continued to report their dissatisfaction with the mandatory AAC history course, which they said was religious indoctrination. NGOs, religious organizations, atheists, and non-practicing members of the AAC publicly voiced similar concerns. There were reports of some AAC clergy teaching this course, and making visits to AAC churches part of the course, without providing opportunities for discussion of other faiths or for students to visit non-AAC religious sites. According to media reports, AAC clergy also visited state-funded kindergartens, including during celebrations of AAC holidays, and organized visits of kindergarten classes to AAC churches.

Following public criticism and international attention focused on the AAC’s role in education, observers reported the AAC had instructed the teachers of the ACC history course to be more respectful of the religious views of students. Observers stated teachers appeared to follow this guidance and made fewer negative comments about other religions, although conducting prayers during the AAC history course remained common. Most minority religious groups did not report complaints from their members about discriminatory treatment of students by teachers of the AAC history course. Some groups reported a few cases in which teachers made negative comments about the religious views of students. When this did occur, the groups reported the parents usually were able to resolve the issue by speaking with the teacher or the principal of the school. Such cases were more likely to occur in rural areas than in Yerevan, the groups said.

According to a February 1 article posted on Medialab.am, an academic expert on religious matters stated the required course on the History of the Armenian Church contravened the freedom of religion and forced students and their parents to hide their religious affiliations to avoid ridicule. In response, the site reported, then Minister of Education and Science Armen Ashotyan stated the basis for the required course was the provision of the constitution recognizing the AAC as the national church and the preserver of national identity. In a February 19 interview with the Irates newspaper about the required course, Deputy Minister of Education Manouk Mkrtchyan stated patriotism involved “preserving and especially protecting the characteristics specific to the homeland,” which he said included the Armenian Apostolic faith as a part of the motherland – “the essence of our nation.”

Based on a pilot program launched in 2012 by the Ministry of Education, school administrations had the option to include a different course, entitled History of the AAC/Christian Education, in their curriculum for grades two through four. Once a school chose this option, the course became mandatory for the students in those grades. During the year 83 schools throughout the country followed this option.

According to media reports, on August 26, the new Minister of Education and Science, Levon Mkrtchyan, visited the Lori region to hold consultations with the teachers and principals of public schools. At the suggestion of the Primate of the Diocese of Gougark, Archbishop Sepouh Chuljian, the meeting began with a prayer from the AAC liturgy.

According to various religious groups and NGOs that advocated for religious tolerance, government rhetoric equating national identity to affiliation with the AAC continued to fuel discrimination against religious organizations other than the AAC.

Religious groups affiliated with ethnic minorities, such as Apostolic Assyrians, continued to report better relations with government institutions than did other minority religious groups whose members included ethnic Armenians.

In its March 9 report, the Collaboration for Democracy stated it had found discrimination and dismissals in government, public educational institutions and the military due to religious affiliation. According to the NGO, the government used provisions of the law prohibiting membership of law-enforcement employees and other public service employees in religious organizations, to limit the rights of those employees. The NGO reported the government interpreted the provisions prohibiting membership in religious organizations to mean affiliation with any religious group other than the AAC was prohibited. According to several minority religious groups, public employees and members of law enforcement agencies either chose not to attend religious services or kept their attendance hidden, fearing they might lose their jobs. Another group, however, reported it had government employee members who did not hide their religious membership and had suffered no repercussions. According to a Yezidi group, Yezidis faced discrimination during military service such as being prohibited from serving in the intelligence forces due to their religious and ethnic identity. According to the group, AAC chaplains forced Yezidi servicemen to pray during AAC religious services.

Several minority religious groups reported their members preferred not to publicize their religious affiliation while in military service, although conscripts continued to be required to declare their religion when beginning their service. The government continued to allow only AAC clergy to serve in the army’s chaplaincy program.

The Word of Life evangelical church reported the appeal by a member of the church to rejoin the army was denied by the military in September. The church member had been forced to resign from the army due to her religious beliefs in November 2015. In denying her appeal, the Chief of the Department of the Administrative Apparatus of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Major Aris Brutyan, stated in a letter “according to the requirements of the Law on Starting Military Service…a military serviceperson is prohibited from becoming a member of any political party, religious or trade union.” The letter further stated “according to the position of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Word of Life is a charismatic movement, which has typical totalitarian and destructive attributes, and as a destructive religious movement, it represents a public and national threat.” As of year’s end, the Word of Life church was working with the Office of the Human Rights Defender to try to help the individual regain her military position.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported 17 of their members completed alternative civilian service for conscientious objection by the end of the year. As of November, the most recent date for which data was available, 207 members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses had participated in the alternative civilian service program since the legal reform of the program in 2013, according to leaders of the community. They said the state committee responsible for coordinating and reviewing the applications for alternative service continued to be cooperative, and the program worked well. The group also stated society as a whole responded positively to their members carrying out alterative civilian service.

The Collaboration for Democracy also reported the government tolerated the spreading of hate speech, and the dissemination of defamatory and inaccurate information about minority religious groups, through public and private TV broadcasts without taking any steps to curb or punish it. The NGO additionally reported the government hindered the charitable activities of minority religious groups, although without providing specifics.

On September 23, the private ATV television channel broadcast a story about the alleged sexual assault of a minor whose family belonged to the Mormon Church. During the program, a purported guest expert, known for his rhetoric against religious minorities, presented additional material that he claimed substantiated a link between the Mormon Church and the assault.

According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, during the year there were 17 incidents of physical and verbal harassment of their members while they were engaging in their public ministry, a decline from 33 such incidents in the previous year. In one case, literature carts used by the Jehovah’s Witnesses were overturned with minor damage. Following a prompt response from police officers on duty in the area, the group reported, the offenders did not interfere with the group’s activity again.

According to minority Christian groups and NGOs, the media in general were less critical of minority religious groups than in previous years, although some media outlets continued to label minority religious groups as “sects” and broadcast what the groups said was unverified and biased information about religious minorities. At the same time, the groups said it was possible to find articles, especially in online media, covering religious issues in an unbiased manner and presenting different perspectives. The Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example, stated they welcomed what they perceived to be an increased atmosphere of religious tolerance on the part of officials and the public.

According to one minority Christian group, some journalists, especially on television media outlets, avoided positive coverage of minorities due to fear of reprimand from the station ownership.

On November 9, the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), a local NGO, held its second Annual Media Award Ceremony for the best coverage of issues related to the freedom of religion or belief. The ceremony was a part of EPF’s program to promote religious tolerance and non-discrimination and was implemented with the support of the Dutch government. Fourteen printed articles, 12 caricatures and 3 videos were nominated for the award. According to human rights NGOs, the EPF initiative had a positive impact on media coverage of religious issues.

During his June visit to the country, Pope Francis met with the supreme head of the AAC, Catholicos Garegin II, and other AAC leaders and praised the AAC for the maintenance of Christian identity within the country.

Construction continued on what the media called the world’s largest Yezidi temple on a site in the small village of Aknalich, with the intention of establishing it as the “spiritual center” for the country’s Yezidis.

The Ambassador and embassy officers continued to promote religious tolerance and interfaith dialogue during meetings with government officials. Embassy officers met with a representative of the Ministry of Defense to discuss religious tolerance in the army and the legal restrictions against members of religious groups joining the military. The Ambassador regularly brought together representatives of the government, the office of the Human Rights Defender, and religious minorities to discuss problems of discrimination faced by religious minorities, to foster a dialogue between the government and the religious groups, and to explore cooperative solutions to those problems.

The Ambassador met with leaders of the AAC to engage them in supporting the rights of religious minorities to practice their faiths without restrictions. On April 1, the Ambassador and embassy officers attended the New Year’s celebrations of Apostolic Assyrians in the village of Verin Dvin in the Ararat region to promote religious diversity and tolerance.

Embassy officers continued to meet with representatives of religious and ethnic/religious minorities, including Catholics, evangelicals and other Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Yezidis, Apostolic Assyrians, and Jews, to discuss restrictions on their ability to practice their respective faiths and difficulties they faced obtaining permits to construct houses of worship. On October 20, embassy officers met with pastor Grigoryan and issued a statement condemning the violence against him. Embassy officers also continued to meet with civil society groups to discuss their concerns over the AAC history courses taught in the country’s schools and discrimination against religious minorities in society. Embassy officers participated in the EPF Annual Media Award jury and the ceremony to support religious tolerance in the media.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 22.9 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, 61 percent of residents are Christian, including 25 percent Roman Catholic and 17 percent Anglican. Buddhists constitute 2.5 percent of the population; Muslims 2.2 percent; Hindus 1.3 percent, and Jews 0.5 percent. Eight percent either did not state a religious affiliation or stated other religious affiliations such as “new age,” “not defined,” or “theism,” while 22.3 percent report having no religious affiliation.

The census indicated indigenous persons constitute 2.5 percent of the population, and that 1 percent of indigenous respondents practice traditional indigenous religions. Among this group, affiliation with a traditional indigenous religion is higher in very remote areas (6 percent) than in all other areas (less than 1 percent). Approximately 60 percent of indigenous respondents identify themselves as Christian and an estimated 20 percent report having no religious affiliation. The remainder either did not state a religious affiliation or stated other religious affiliations.

Legal Framework

The constitution bars the federal government from making any law that imposes a state religion or religious observance, prohibits the free exercise of religion, or establishes a religious test for a federal public office.

There are certain legal limitations on the right to religious freedom, including the necessity of protecting public safety, order, and health, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Individuals who suffer religious discrimination have recourse under federal discrimination laws or through the court system and bodies such as the Australian Human Rights Commission.

The state of Tasmania is the only state or territory whose constitution specifically provides citizens with the right to profess and practice their religion; however, seven of the eight states and territories have laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of a person’s religion or ethnoreligious background. South Australia is the only state or territory that does not explicitly prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion. All other states and territories have independent agencies to mediate allegations of religious discrimination. In August the parliament of the Australian Capital Territory passed legislation making it a crime to vilify someone based on his or her religion.

Religious groups are not required to register. To receive tax-exempt status for income or other benefits and an exemption from the goods and services tax (sales tax), however, nonprofit religious groups must apply to the Australia Tax Office (ATO). Registration with the ATO has no effect on how religious groups are treated, apart from standard ATO checks. To receive tax-exempt status, an organization must be a nonprofit entity. An organization’s activities, size, and permanence are some of the factors taken into account when determining its tax-exempt status.

The government permits religious education in public schools, generally taught by volunteers using approved curricula; parents may decide whether their children will attend or not. There is no national standard for approving religious curricula, which happens at state and local levels. Public schools in New South Wales provide secular ethics classes as an alternative for students who do not attend optional scripture classes.

In January the Victoria state government removed religious instruction from the public school curriculum. Students in Victoria can attend religious classes on school grounds for a maximum of 30 minutes per week, but only during lunchtime or in the hours before or after school.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Four senators from the One Nation Party were elected during the July federal elections on a platform which included ceasing Muslim immigration, holding a royal commission on Islam, halting construction of mosques, installing surveillance cameras in mosques, banning wearing of the burqa and niqab in public places, and prohibiting members of parliament from being sworn in under the Quran. In her first senate speech, One Nation Party Leader Pauline Hanson said the country was “in danger of being swamped by Muslims.” Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull disagreed with her views and said “my commitment is to an inclusive multicultural society which is based on mutual respect. The more we respect each other the more secure we become.”

In August an anti-Muslim rally was held in the Melbourne suburb of Melton. Approximately 150 members of nationalist groups attended the rally to oppose the construction of a 75-lot housing development that protestors said was a “Muslim housing estate.” Fifty police officers were present to maintain order and warn against illegal hate speech. The rally was criticized by Federal Opposition Leader Bill Shorten who stated such actions were taking the country “down the wrong path and the wrong direction.”

The government continued to begin each session of parliament with a recitation of a short prayer and then the Lord’s Prayer, as has been the practice since 1901. Participation in the prayers remained optional. The Green Party and other groups called for the practice to end.

In June the federal High Court rejected a request to hear an appeal against the construction of a mosque in Bendigo. The Australian Muslims of Bendigo issued the statement: “we believe the decision is in line with every Australian’s constitutional right to practice their faith.” Premier of Victoria Daniel Andrews welcomed the High Court’s decision. In 2015, local residents opposed decisions providing for the construction of the mosque, reportedly for zoning reasons. Others reportedly opposed the construction of mosques in general.

In April the local council blocked approval for the building of a mosque in southeast Melbourne amid opposition from nationalist groups and local residents. The local government said the mosque should not be built due to its size and because it would not fit in with the local landscape, but critics said the decision represented community and nationalist backlash against Muslims.

In November Orthodox Jews in the northern Sydney suburb of St. Ives won approval to retain an eruv, “a wire cable attached to power poles which extends the private dwelling [in terms of religious practice] to an area encompassing a few blocks or more, giving Orthodox Jews freedom to participate in community activities on the Sabbath.” Several Christians spoke up in defense of the eruv, stating “there is no place for exclusion, discrimination, or anti-Semitism.”

In June the state government of Queensland conducted a review of religious education in state public schools after suspending the long standing Connect curriculum at Windsor State School. The three-year religious education program was said to “solicit” students to become Christians. State Education Minister Kate Jones said the lesson materials “go beyond imparting knowledge of Biblical references, and extend to soliciting children to develop a personal faith in God and Jesus to become a Christian.”

Public and private schools in New South Wales worked to implement the state government’s A$47 million ($34 million) School Communities Working Together program, released in 2015, to help at-risk schools counter “antisocial and extremist behavior.” It included training to assist school staff identify vulnerable young people; specialist support teams; and a telephone hotline for teachers to report such incidents.

The government continued to provide funding for security installations – such as lighting, fencing, and closed-circuit television cameras – and for the cost of employing security guards, in order to protect schools and preschools facing a risk of attack, harassment, or violence stemming from racial or religious intolerance. This funding was available at both government and nongovernment schools, including religious schools.

In Victoria, the parliament was considering an amendment to equal opportunity legislation that would bar faith-based schools and organizations from discriminating against someone because of religious beliefs or activities, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, or gender identity. Some religious organizations stated they feared the amendment would prevent them from considering adherence to the organization’s religious beliefs when selecting employees.

In May the University of Sydney student union withdrew its threat to deregister a religious organization after Christian, Buddhist, and Muslim groups joined together to advocate for amending the union’s regulations to allow declarations based on faith as a condition of membership and leadership of faith-based groups on campus.

In June Prime Minister Turnbull became the first sitting prime minister to host an iftar and stated “the Australian Muslim community is valued and respected – and it is not confined to a narrow security prism – you are an integral part of an Australian family that rests on the essential foundation of mutual respect and understanding.”

The Australian Multicultural Council continued to provide guidance to the government on multicultural affairs policy and programs. The government’s national multicultural policy, The People of Australia, was based on a government-wide approach to maintaining social cohesion and included religious tolerance as a component. The government provided a range of youth-focused early intervention, outreach, and education programs to promote religious tolerance as well as “deradicalization” programs for prison inmates convicted of terrorism-related offenses.

In March approximately 10 youths assaulted three Muslim schoolgirls at a local city park in Geelong, Victoria. The attack included both verbal and physical abuse and forcibly pulling off the hijabs of two of the schoolgirls. By the end of the year, no arrests were made.

Religious tolerance advocates and those who opposed the spread of Islam held competing demonstrations in Melbourne during the year. Police made arrests following violence between the groups during protests in May and July.

Arsonists destroyed two places of worship in the state of Victoria, a Presbyterian church in western Geelong on April 15 and the main mosque in Geelong on May 18. The mosque was a refurbished Christian church and police believe the mosque may have been mistakenly targeted as a church. Police said the arson attacks may have been linked to three other church burnings in Geelong since October 2015. Some observers said the royal commission into child sexual abuse may have inspired the attacks against churches (or what were thought to be churches).

The Executive Council of Australian Jewry reported 210 anti-Semitic incidents of threats or abuse during the year, up from 190 the previous year. In September leaflets containing Holocaust-denial material were distributed in several Australian university campuses in Melbourne, Sydney, and Canberra. The leaflets asserted the Holocaust never happened and it was “the greatest swindle of all time.”

Over 300 incidents were reported in the first 12 months of the Islamophobia Register Australia, which was founded in September 2014 as an online resource for victims and witnesses of anti-Muslim attacks. The register was designed to provide a means to report and record incidents of anti-Muslim sentiment to inform the media and public. The figures represented an average of 5.4 incidents per week. A spokesman for the Melbourne Islamic Community stated the register showed an increase in the frequency of anti-Muslim attacks.

An increase in online harassment of Muslims was reported in South Australia, with families and individuals facing a greater frequency of anti-Muslim abuse, particularly following terrorist attacks abroad.

In June vandals burned a car and painted anti-Muslim graffiti outside a Perth mosque during prayer. In the same month, vandals defaced another Perth mosque with graffiti and left a pig’s head outside its main entrance. In July an Adelaide mosque was vandalized with anti-Muslim and Nazi symbols. In April swastikas were painted on a synagogue and on bus stops in a Sydney suburb. Authorities made no arrests in connection with these incidents.

Several nongovernmental organizations continued to promote tolerance and better understanding among religious groups. These included the Columban Centre for Christian-Muslim Relations, the National Council of Churches in Australia, the Australian Council of Christians and Jews, and the Jewish Christian Muslim Association of Australia.

On October 29, the Lebanese Muslim Association in Australia, supported by the Australian Department of Social Services, sponsored the third annual National Mosque Open Day. The goal was to facilitate a greater understanding of Islam and Muslims in the country by opening mosques to the wider public. Thousands of individuals from different faiths visited mosques around the country.

The U.S. embassy and consulates in Melbourne, Perth, and Sydney met with government officials from the federal and state-level departments of social services and multicultural affairs to promote religious freedom and tolerance programs.

They also engaged a wide range of religious leaders, faith communities, and groups including the Islamic Council of Victoria and the Australia Arab Association of Perth. The embassy and consulates general used social media platforms to increase awareness of U.S. policy and activities supportive of religious freedom through posting and sharing of articles and events.

In June the Consul General in Melbourne hosted a youth iftar. Interfaith attendees included youth and community leaders from throughout the state of Victoria. The event focused on building tolerance through the inclusion of people from other religious groups.

The Consul General in Perth gave an address at the Australia Arab Association’s Multicultural Eid al-Adha events to celebrate diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 8.7 million (July 2016 estimate). Religious groups and the University of Vienna estimate Roman Catholics constitute 61 percent of the population and Muslims 7 percent, while between 14 and 23 percent are unaffiliated with any religion. Religious groups constituting less than 5 percent each include the Lutheran Church; the Swiss Reformed Church (Evangelical Church-Augsburg and Helvetic confessions); Eastern Orthodox Churches (Russian, Greek, Serbian, Romanian, and Bulgarian); Jehovah’s Witnesses; other Christian churches; and Jews and other non-Christian religious groups.

Legal Framework

A combination of historical and modern constitutional documents guarantees freedom of “conscience and creed.” The law provides for the freedom of religious belief and the rights of all residents to join, participate in, leave, or abstain from any religious community. It stipulates that “duties incumbent on nationals may not be impeded by religious affiliation.”

Several constitutional provisions protect religious freedom. The main pillars are historical laws on fundamental rights and freedoms, including religious freedom, and treaties and conventions such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which form part of the constitution. Antidiscrimination legislation prohibits discrimination on religious grounds. Citizens have the right to sue the government for constitutional violations of religious freedom.

The law prohibits public incitement to hostile acts against a church group, religious society, or other religious group if the incitement is perceivable by “many people,” which an official government commentary on the law and the courts interpret as 30 or more people, and also specifically in case of incitement in print or electronic or other media available to a broad public. The law also prohibits incitement, insult, or contempt against religious groups if such action violates human dignity.

By law, registered religious groups are divided into three officially recognized legal categories (listed in descending order of rights and privileges): religious societies, religious confessional communities, and associations. Each category possesses specific rights, privileges, and legal responsibilities. Members of religious groups not legally recognized may practice their religion at home “insofar as this practice is neither unlawful nor offends common decency.”

There are 16 officially recognized religious societies: the Catholic Church, the Protestant churches (specifically Lutheran and Presbyterian, called “Augsburg” and “Helvetic” confessions), the Islamic Faith Community, the Old Catholic Church, the Jewish Faith Community, the Eastern Orthodox Church (Russian, Greek, Serbian, Romanian, and Bulgarian), The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the New Apostolic Church, the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Coptic Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Methodist Church of Austria, the Buddhist Community, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Islamic-Alevi Community, and the Free Christian Churches.

The law grants registered religious societies the right to public practice and independent administration of their internal affairs, to participate in the program requiring mandatory church contributions by church members, and to bring religious workers into the country to act as ministers, missionaries, or teachers. Under the law, religious societies have “public corporation” status, permitting them to engage in a number of public or quasi-public activities, such as government-funded religious instruction in both public and private schools, which are denied to confessional communities and associations. Recognized religious societies are granted tax relief in two main ways: donations are not taxable and they receive exemption from property tax for all buildings dedicated to active practice of the religion or administration of such. Additionally, religious societies are exempt from the surveillance charge, payable for instances where state security is required, and the administrative fee levied on local communities. These benefits do not extend to confessional communities. Responsibilities of religious societies include a commitment to sponsor social and cultural activities that serve the common well-being and to ensure their teachings do not violate the law or ethical standards.

Religious groups seeking to achieve religious society status for the first time must apply for recognition with the Office for Religious Affairs in the Federal Chancellery. Religious groups recognized as societies prior to 1998 retain their status. Fourteen of the 16 recognized religious societies have been grandfathered under this provision of the law. To be recognized as a religious society, religious groups not recognized prior to 1998 must have membership equaling 0.2 percent of the country’s population (approximately 17,400 people) and have been in existence for 20 years, at least 10 of which must have been as an organized group and five as a confessional community. The Jehovah’s Witnesses and Alevi Muslims were recognized as religious societies under these post-1998 criteria. Groups that do not meet these criteria may still apply for religious society status under an exception for groups that have been active internationally for at least 100 years and active in an organized form in the country for 10 years. Groups sharing a broad faith with an existing society or confessional community, for example Christianity, may register separately as long as they can demonstrate that their group has a different theology.

The law allows religious groups not recognized as societies to seek official status as confessional communities with the Office for Religious Affairs in the Federal Chancellery. The government recognizes eight groups as confessional communities: the Bahai Faith, the Movement for Religious Renewal-Community of Christians, the Pentecostal Community of God, Seventh-day Adventists, the Hindu Community, the Islamic-Shia Community, the Old-Faith Alevis, and the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church).

A confessional community recognized by the government has the juridical standing needed to engage in such activities as purchasing real estate in its own name and contracting for goods and services, but is not eligible for the financial and educational benefits available to recognized religious societies. Contributions to their charitable activities are deductible for those who make them.

In order to be recognized as a confessional community, a group must have at least 300 members and submit its statutes describing the goals, rights, and obligations of members, as well as membership regulations, a list of officials, and financing information. A group must also submit a written description of its religious doctrine, which must differ from that of any previously recognized religious society or religious confessional community. The Office for Religious Affairs determines whether the group’s basic beliefs are consistent with public security, order, health, and morals, and the rights and freedoms of citizens. A religious group seeking to obtain confessional community status is subject to a six-month waiting period from the time of application to the ministry. After this period, groups that have applied automatically receive the status unless the government issues a decree rejecting the application.

Religious groups not qualifying for either religious society or confessional community status may apply to become legal associations, a status applicable to a broad range of civil groups. Some groups organize as associations while waiting to be recognized as confessional communities.

The Church of Scientology and a number of smaller religious groups, such as Sahaja Yoga or the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, are organized as associations.

Religious groups registered as associations have the right to function in public, but may not provide religious instruction in schools or pastoral care in hospitals or prisons.

According to the law, any group of more than two people pursuing a nonprofit goal qualifies to organize as an association. Groups apply to the Ministry of Interior. In order to become an association, groups have to submit a written statement citing their common, nonprofit goal and commitment to function as a nonprofit organization. Associations have juridical standing and many of the same rights as confessional communities, such as the right to own real estate and contract for goods and services. Unlike confessional communities, associations may not apply to become a religious society after 10 years.

The law governing relations between the government and Islamic institutions stipulates that funding for the day-to-day operations of mosques must be derived from domestic sources, Islamic teachings and practices must not violate federal law, and Islamic institutions should “take a positive stance” toward the state and society. The law provides an explicit legal definition of, and legal protection for, Islamic practices, such as circumcision and preparation of food in conformity with religious rules, and states Muslims can raise children and youth in accordance with Islamic traditions. Muslim groups with at least 300 members and a theology that is not distinct from a pre-existing Islamic religious society or confessional community are organized as cultural communities and fall under the umbrella of the pre-existing, legally recognized Islamic religious society or confessional communities. The law allows for Islamic theological university studies, beginning at the University of Vienna in the fall of 2017.

Separate laws govern relations between the government and each of the other 15 state-recognized religious societies. The laws have similar intent but vary in specifics, given that they were enacted at different times over a span of approximately 140 years.

The government funds religious instruction for children on a proportional basis in public schools, government-accredited private schools, and places of worship for any of the 16 officially recognized religious societies. The government does not offer such funding to other religious groups. A minimum of three children is required to form a class. Attendance in religious classes is mandatory for all students unless they formally withdraw at the beginning of the school year; students under the age of 14 require parental permission to withdraw from religious classes. Instructors are provided by religious groups and funded by the government. Religious instruction takes place either in the school or at sites organized by religious groups. Some schools offer ethics classes for students not attending religious instruction. Religious education and ethics classes include the tenets of different religious groups as comparative religious education.

The curriculum for both public and private schools includes compulsory antibias and tolerance education, including religious tolerance, as part of civics education across various subjects, including history and German-language instruction.

Holocaust education is part of history instruction and appears in other subjects such as civics.

The Equal Rights Agency, an independent agency falling under the jurisdiction of the women’s ministry, oversees discrimination cases on various grounds, including religion. The agency provides legal counseling and mediation services, and assists with bringing cases before the Equal Treatment Commission, another independent government agency. In cases where it finds discrimination, the commission makes a recommendation for corrective action. In case of noncompliance with the recommendation, the case is brought to court. Only a court may order corrective action and compensation.

The law bans neo-Nazi activity and prohibits public denial, belittlement, approval, or justification of the Nazi genocide or other Nazi crimes against humanity in print, broadcast, or other media.

Foreign religious workers for groups recognized as confessional communities or associations must apply for a general immigrant visa that is not employment- or family-based, and is subject to a quota. The government requires a visa for visitors from non-visa-waiver countries or individuals who would stay beyond 90 days, including religious workers of confessional communities or associations. Foreign religious workers belonging to religious societies do not require visas for either shorter visits or stays beyond 90 days.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Many religious minority groups complained the three-tier system of categorizing legally recognized religious groups impeded their legitimate claims for recognition and demoted them to second- or third-class status, according to a report by Freedom House, an international NGO.

The government continued to apply a policy of banning headwear in official identification documents with an exception for religious purposes as long as the face was sufficiently visible to allow for identification of the wearer.

The federal Office of Sect Issues continued to offer advice to persons with questions about groups it considered to be “sects” and “cults.” While the office was independent, it was government funded, and its head was appointed and supervised by the Minister for Family and Youth. Some Scientologists continued to state on social media the Office of Sect Issues and other government-associated entities fostered societal discrimination against religious groups not registered as religious societies or confessional communities.

A counseling center in Vienna managed by the Society against Sect and Cult Dangers, an NGO working actively against groups it deemed to be “sects and cults,” such as Scientology, continued to distribute information to schools and the general public, and provided counseling for former members of such groups. The center received some funding from the provincial governments of Vienna and Lower Austria. Several other provinces funded counseling offices providing information on “sects and cults.”

The police continued to provide extra protection to the Vienna Jewish community’s offices and other Jewish community institutions such as schools and museums. Law enforcement authorities stated the protection was provided due to general concerns over the potential for anti-Semitic acts against Jewish institutions, given the country’s history of anti-Semitism.

In February an Austrian prosecutor in Linz ruled that 29-year-old Ibrahim B.’s (the court withheld his last name) anti-Semitic Facebook posts were a legitimate way to criticize Israel. The postings showed Adolf Hitler with a statement: “I could have annihilated all the Jews in the world, but I left some of them alive so you will know why I was killing them…” Ibrahim B. posted this “as a criticism of Israel’s Operation Protective Edge war against Hamas,” and “called on Allah to annihilate the Jewish state.” The prosecutor described his statements as merely expressing “displeasure toward Israel,” and not glorifying Hitler. The Austrian-Israel Society protested the prosecutor’s decision, saying it “legitimizes anti-Semitic agitation through Austria’s judiciary.”

In a July ruling in a case involving the dismissal of a Muslim assistant to a notary for wearing a full-face veil instead of a headscarf, the court found the dismissal was justified, since leaving the face uncovered was one of the “undisputed basic rules of communication” in the country. The court did, however, find it discriminatory that when the woman previously wore a headscarf rather than a full-face veil, she was only used as witness for wills of persons with an “immigrant background.” In addition, the court agreed that the language her supervisor used (he called her manner of dress an “experiment of ethnic clothing” and a “disguise”) was discriminatory, even if he were justified under the constitution in refusing to allow her to wear the veil at work, and awarded her compensation of 1,200 euros ($1,264). A spokesperson for the Islamic Faith Community stated in a July 4 press release the ruling was “understandable, pointing to the fact that facial expressions were important for communication, particularly in professions where employees had frequent personal contact with the public.”

During the presidential election, held in December rescheduled from October after the May election was annulled, Freedom Party (FPO) candidate Norbert Hofer campaigned against immigration and vowed to “stop the invasion of Muslims.” FPO party chairman Strache said April 2 at the campaign launch of Hofer’s presidential run “the only immigration cap that should be tolerated is that of zero immigration.” During a televised debate on November 20, Hofer said referring to the situation in 2015, “hundreds of thousands of people crossed our country without being checked; and there were perpetrators among them who carried out the horrible murders in Paris – that I would not allow.”

On November 8 in Vienna, Hofer said, “Let’s not make the mistake and direct the hatred which previously targeted Jews, now against single Muslims…Islam does not form a part of Austria. But this does not mean there is no room for Islam here.” Hofer stated in an interview in March “we have to ensure that any anti-Semitic tendencies created by immigration in Europe are nipped in the bud,” and that, in view of the country’s history, “there is no tolerance for anti-Semitism of any kind.”

The president of the Jewish Faith Community in Vienna stated June 8 “the Jewish community did not have any contacts with the Freedom Party and has no plans to initiate such contacts in the future.” FPO party leader Heinz-Christian Strache visited the Israeli Holocaust Museum Yad Vashem in May.

The Ministry for Education and Women conducted teacher-training projects with the Jewish Anti-Defamation League (ADL). Seminars were available on Holocaust education, and Holocaust survivors talked to school classes about National Socialism and the Holocaust. In the course of the year, ADL conducted two one-day seminars promoting diversity for teachers in technical schools, and 20 three-day workshops in police schools. There were also three-day refresher courses for trainers.

The Division of Dialogue of Cultures and Religions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a conference in September on Austrian constitutional and legal frameworks used to promote interreligious harmony, with a focus on Islam, examining whether the country could serve as a model in Europe. Several European countries participated and announced they would continue this exchange.

In July Chancellor Christian Kern and State Secretary in the Chancellery Muna Duzdar met with leading Muslim community representatives to discuss cooperation with regard to Muslim immigrants.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

In May the interior ministry released a report that stated in 2015 there was a steep rise in right-wing extremism, xenophobic sentiment, and aggression and linked it to the migrant crisis. According to the ministry’s statistics, there were 1,156 right-wing extremist, xenophobic/racist, anti-Islamic, anti-Semitic, and/or otherwise extremist incidents that year, an increase of 54 percent over the 750 reported in 2014. The ministry classified 31 incidents as anti-Islamic, an 82 percent increase over the 17 recorded in 2014. Incidents the ministry characterized as anti-Semitic decreased by 29 percent, from 58 in 2014 to 41 in 2015. The types of incidents ranged from bodily harm and property damage to fanning hatred against foreigners, with violent crime accounting for 3 percent of the total.

In September the head of the Jewish Faith Community said that anti-Semitic incidents, especially by Muslims, had increased. He did not cite statistics on the number of incidents. He cited rising anti-Semitic sentiment resulting from the 88,912 asylum seekers who arrived in 2015, the majority of whom came from Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Ministry of Interior published figures showing a decrease in asylum seekers in 2016, with 36,030 asylum applications accepted as of year’s end. In July the Documentation Center for the Islamic Faith Community reported mounting anti-Muslim sentiments.

In February four Chechen men told four women in a nightclub in Vienna to go home because it was not appropriate for them as Muslim women to be there. The four men engaged in a fistfight with the father and the husband of two of the women, and suffered light injuries.

The Documentation Center for the Islamic Faith Community reported the number of anti-Muslim incidents had been increasing since it began collecting such statistics in mid-2014. In 2015, the center received 156 reports of anti-Islamic incidents, most of them directed against women. Forty percent were verbal attacks, 12 percent physical assaults, and 5 percent incidents of discrimination, while 3 percent concerned graffiti. Nineteen percent of incidents were directed against Islamic institutions rather than individuals, and 7 percent consisted of hate speech on the internet. The center also registered 20 reports of incidents in June and July 2016, following terrorist attacks in Europe, compared to almost no reports in April and May. The center reported a positive relationship with government authorities on investigations and prosecutions.

The office against discrimination of the provincial government in Styria reported rising anti-Islamic incidents in July, following terrorist attacks in Belgium, France, and Germany. The office did not have a tally on the number of incidents, which it said included spitting, ripping off headscarves, and the posting of hate speech on the internet. The office stated Muslims increasingly did not report incidents because they felt ashamed about the terrorist attacks.

In April members of the anti-immigrant youth group the Austrian Identitarian Movement stormed a stage at the University of Vienna, where mostly Muslim asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan were performing a play against xenophobia. They threw fake blood into the audience and fliers stating “multiculturalism kills.” Theater organizers said some of the migrants were beaten and injured.

According to the government’s Equal Treatment Agency, 131 cases of religious discrimination came before the equal rights commissioner in 2015, compared to 81 cases in 2014. The agency did not provide additional information on the nature of the cases or of the groups targeted.

In March the Vienna prosecutor’s office investigated an individual who had posted approximately 25 anti-Semitic messages at Jewish institutions and Jewish-owned businesses in Vienna, among them the Jewish Museum and a real estate agency owned by a prominent Jewish community figure. At year’s end there was no further information on the case.

In October a Lower Austrian court convicted a man who had called for the burning of copies of the Quran in 2015, while using a false female name. The court sentence the man to a four-month suspended prison sentence on charges of denouncement of religious teachings.

In May a court in Feldkirch, Vorarlberg convicted a 17-year-old to a two-year prison term, of which 16 months were suspended, on charges of neo-Nazi activity for writing anti-Semitic graffiti on Jewish and Muslim cemeteries in Vorarlberg.

In March the University of Vienna student council condemned calls for a boycott of Israel by the Boycott, Diversity, and Sanctions movement against Israel as a “new form of anti-Semitism.”

In July a court in Linz, Upper Austria, convicted a 45-year-old man of neo-Nazi activity and incitement after the man posted anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim messages on the internet. He received an 18-month suspended sentence.

The Islamic Faith Community, the Jewish Faith Community, and Catholic leaders again raised concerns about the perceived rise of extremist parties throughout Europe, religious radicalization, and the recruitment of foreign fighters. In public statements, they stated the need for religious groups to promote moderation and dialogue. In November the heads of the Muslim and Jewish Communities met and discussed ways to collaborate on a religious education project. The Archdiocese of Vienna published a brochure aimed at explaining Christian symbols and culture to Muslim migrants. The Catholic Church said it hoped to become involved in the integration of new migrants in the country. The Catholic charity Caritas counseled predominantly Muslim asylum seekers and provided housing to them in Catholic Church facilities.

Fourteen Christian churches, among them the Catholic Church, various Protestant denominations, and eight Orthodox and Old Oriental churches, continued to meet within the Ecumenical Council of Austrian Churches. Baptists and the Salvation Army had observer status on the council.

The U.S. Ambassador and other embassy representatives met regularly with government officials to discuss religious freedom, the integration of Muslim refugees, and efforts to combat foreign terrorist fighters, including with the Department for Integration and the Division of Dialogue of Cultures at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In May the U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom met with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials to discuss efforts to ease the challenges of integrating diverse communities into Austrian society. He also met with the Muslim community to discuss the update to the law on Islam. During his visit, he underscored the importance of combating religious intolerance and discrimination, while at the same time ensuring that governments protect the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, and belief. He advocated for sharing leadership on greater interfaith cooperation and collaborative action to solve common problems and promote religious freedom.

In June the U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism met with Jewish community leaders to discuss the situation of Jewish communities in Austria and Europe.

Embassy representatives continued to meet frequently with religious leaders, throughout the country, including with the leadership of the Islamic Faith Community, Jewish Faith Community, Catholic Church, and other Christian organizations, to discuss the relationship between these groups and the government, discriminatory or inflammatory incidents, and religious education.

The embassy continued to engage with and support the Jewish community to promote religious tolerance and combat continued anti-Semitic sentiment among some sectors of society.

In May a senior embassy official attended the commemoration of the liberation of the Mauthausen concentration camp and delivered remarks at the victims’ memorial.

The embassy provided funding for the staging of the Pulitzer Prize-winning play “Disgraced,” which condemned anti-Muslim sentiment and religious discrimination. The sold-out production, which included a performance for high school students, promoted a dialogue of religious tolerance and freedom in the country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 9.8 million (July 2016 estimate). According to 2011 data from the SCWRA, 96 percent of the population is Muslim, of which approximately 65 percent is Shia and 35 percent Sunni. Groups that together constitute the remaining 4 percent of the population include members of the Russian Orthodox, Georgian Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic Churches, Seventh-day Adventists, Molokans, Roman Catholics, other Christians, Jews, Bahais, and those professing no religion. Since independence in 1991, a number of religious groups have established a presence, including Pentecostal and other evangelical Christians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and members of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKON).

Christians live mainly in Baku and other urban areas. Approximately 15,000 to 20,000 Jews live in Baku, with smaller communities throughout the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates the separation of state and religion and equality of all religions and all individuals regardless of belief. It protects freedom of religion, including the right of individuals to profess, individually or together with others, any religion or to profess no religion, and to express and spread religious beliefs. It also provides for the freedom to carry out religious rituals, provided they do not violate public order or public morality. The constitution states no one may be required to profess his or her religious beliefs or be persecuted for such, and the law prohibits forced expressions or demonstrations of religious faith.

The law requires religious organizations, which are termed “associations” in the country’s legal code and encompass religious groups, communities, and individual congregations of a denomination, to register with the government through the SCWRA, which controls the registration process and may appeal to the courts to suspend a religious group’s activities. Registration of a religious community is tied to the physical site where the community is located as stated in its application. A subsequent move or expansion to other locations requires reregistration. Registration allows a religious organization to hold meetings, maintain a bank account, rent property, act as a legal entity, and receive funds from the SCWRA. A religious organization failing to register may be outlawed and its activities declared illegal.

The Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) oversees the activities of registered Islamic organizations, including training and appointing clerics to lead Islamic worship, periodically monitoring sermons, and organizing pilgrimages to Mecca. Muslim communities must receive an approval letter from the CMB before submitting a registration application to the SCWRA.

To obtain registration, a religious organization must submit to the SCWRA a notarized application signed by at least 50 of its members, a charter and founding documents, the names of the organization’s founders, and the organization’s legal address and bank information.

According to the law, the government must rule on a registration application within 30 days, but it does not specify any consequences if the government fails to act by the deadline. Authorities may deny registration of a religious organization if its actions, goals, or religious doctrine contradict the constitution or other laws. Authorities may also deny registration if an organization’s charter and other establishment documents contradict the law or if the information provided is false. Religious groups are permitted to appeal registration denials to the courts.

While the law prohibits the government from interfering in the religious activities of any individual or group, there are exceptions for suspected extremist, or other illegal, activity. The law states government entities and citizens have rights and responsibilities to combat “religious extremism” and “radicalism,” referring to other criminal, administrative, and civil provisions of the law in prescribing punishments. The law defines religious extremism as behavior motivated by religious hatred, religious radicalism (described as believing in the exceptionalism of one’s religious beliefs) or religious fanaticism (described as excluding any criticism of one’s religious beliefs). According to the law, this behavior includes forcing a person to belong to any specific religion or to participate in specific religious rituals, but also includes activities seeking to change by force the constitutional structure of the country’s government, including its secular nature, or setting up or participating in illegal armed groups or unions, and engaging in terrorist activities. Per an amendment to the criminal code passed by the parliament on October 28, the law penalizes actions aimed at changing the constitutional order or violating the territorial integrity of the country on the grounds of religious hatred, radicalism, or fanaticism, with prison terms from 15 years to life.

The law also specifies cases in which religious organizations may be dissolved, including if they act contrary to their founding objectives; cause racial, national, religious, or social animosity; or proselytize in a way that degrades human dignity or contradicts recognized principles of humanity, such as “love for mankind, philanthropy, and kindness.” Other grounds for dissolution include hindering secular education or inducing members or other individuals to cede their property to the organization.

According to the law, religious rituals and ceremonies may only be led by citizens who are educated within the country or whose religious education abroad is approved by the government. The law stipulates punishments for individuals who lead Islamic religious ceremonies in violation of the restrictions against citizens receiving unauthorized religious education abroad. The penalties include up to one year’s imprisonment or fines from 1,000 manat (AZN) ($540) up to 5,000 AZN ($2,700). A longstanding agreement between the government and the Holy See allows foreigners to lead Catholic rituals.

The law also restricts the use of religious symbols and slogans to the inside of places of worship.

According to the law, the SCWRA reviews and approves all religious literature for legal importation, sale, and distribution. Punishment for the illegal production, distribution, or importation of religious literature can include fines ranging from 5,000 to 7,000 AZN ($2,700 to $3,800) or up to two years’ imprisonment for first offenses, and fines of 7,000 to 9,000 AZN ($3,800 to $4,900) or imprisonment of between two and five years for subsequent offenses.

There is no separate religious component in the curriculum at public or private elementary or high schools. Students may take courses in religion at higher educational institutions, and the CMB sponsors some religious training abroad. Individuals wishing to participate in state-supported religious education outside the country, whether supported by the national or foreign governments, must obtain permission from, or register with, the SCWRA or the Ministry of Education. If religious education abroad is not supported by the national or foreign governments, individuals are not required to obtain advance permission from authorities. Individuals who pursue foreign government-supported or privately funded religious education abroad without permission from the government are not allowed to hold official religious positions, preach, or lead sermons after returning to the country.

Although the constitution allows alternative service “in some cases” when military service conflicts with personal beliefs, there is no legislation permitting alternative service, and refusal to perform military service is punishable under the criminal code with imprisonment of up to two years or forced conscription.

New amendments introduced in December to the provisions of the law relating to citizenship specify new grounds for losing citizenship, including participation in terrorist actions, participation in religious extremist actions or military training abroad under the guise of receiving religious education, propagating religious doctrines in a hostile manner (the law does not further define what a hostile manner is), or participation in religious conflicts in a foreign country under the guise of performing religious rituals.

According to the constitution, the law may restrict participation of “religious officials” in elections and bars them from election to the legislature. By law, political parties may not engage in religious activity. The law does not define “religious officials.” The law prohibits religious leaders from simultaneously serving in any public office and in positions of religious leadership. It proscribes the use of religious facilities for political purposes.

The constitution prohibits “spreading and propaganda of religions humiliating people’s dignity and contradicting the principles of humanism,” as well as “propaganda” inciting religious animosity. The law also prohibits threats or expressions of contempt for persons based on religious belief.

The law prohibits proselytizing by foreigners but does not prohibit citizens from doing so. In cases of proselytization by foreigners and stateless persons, the law sets a punishment of one to two years in prison.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to detain religious activists who local human rights groups deemed to be political prisoners. There were no reliable figures on the number of religious activists detained or released during the year, although the estimated total detained as of the end of the year was 86, compared to 46 in 2015, according to data collected by the Working Group for the Unified List of Political Prisoners and other NGOs. The registration process restricted the activities of religious groups the government considered nontraditional, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, and some Islamic religious organizations. Authorities continued to close mosques and interrupt religious services of unregistered communities. The government also imposed limits on the importation, distribution, and sale of religious materials. The government took some steps to promote religious tolerance.

According to the international NGO Forum 18, Inqilab Ehadli, a Shia Muslim, was arrested in January and transferred to the secret police Investigation Prison for allegedly supporting the Muslim Unity Movement. A human rights activist reportedly told Forum 18 Ehadli had been in poor health when arrested and as of April was in critical condition in a prison hospital. No further information on his case was available.

According to press and government reports, the government continued to detain representatives of minority religious groups, including Salafis and Baptists, in various parts of the country.

Throughout the year, but particularly after the attempted coup in Turkey in July, police conducted raids on, and confiscated religious materials from, purported followers of Turkish Islamic cleric and theologian Fethullah Gulen on charges of religious hatred and discrimination.

On March 23, police raided a gathering of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Gakh, briefly detained 56 people, and confiscated religious materials that had not been authorized by the government. The court later imposed 1,500 AZN ($820) fines on 34 individuals on charges of participating in an illegal religious gathering.

According to the World Watch Monitor, a Christian NGO, two home church leaders in the southern village of Aliabad were fined 1,500 AZN ($820), after police raided a prayer meeting at their home and initially arrested all 30 participants before releasing them. At a December 12 court hearing, the two leaders were reportedly warned not to hold any further meetings unless they first sought official registration and permission, or there would be “more serious consequences.” National television reports described their arrest as based on “illegal religious activities” and “spreading illegal religious doctrines.”

During the year, the government continued the trials of 17 imprisoned Nardaran settlement residents, as well as theologian and chairman of the Muslim Unity Movement Taleh Baghirov (also known as Taleh Baghirzade), all of whom had been arrested in 2015 on charges of religious extremism. The trial was ongoing at year’s end. Police officers reportedly stood outside every mosque in Nardaran in an effort to intimidate villagers at the end of Ramadan. A human rights activist reported an “undeclared state of emergency” had been in effect in Nardaran since the November 2015 police action.

The Baku City Court of Grave Crimes in July began hearing the case of religious scholar Elshan Mustafayev (also known as Mustafaoghlu), a former department head at the CMB originally arrested in 2014 for treason. During the court hearings, Mustafayev stated he was subjected to physical abuse by the police in efforts to coerce his testimony against Muslim community leader Sheykhulislam Allahshukur Pashazade. Mustafayev also stated authorities did not permit visits from his family and appealed to the Prosecutor General and Ombudswoman to investigate his mistreatment. Authorities did not respond to his allegations. On December 30, Mustafayev was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

On April 19, the Baku Court of Appeals released Nurju followers Ravan Sabzaliyev, Zakariyya Mammadov, and Shahin Hasanov, who had been arrested in 2013 on charges of producing and distributing illegal religious materials and committing civil rights violations under the guise of performing religious rituals. The court also reduced the sentences of Eldaniz Hajiyev and Ismayil Mammadov, arrested for the same reasons, from five to three years in prison.

On September 30, authorities released theologian Jeyhun Jafarov from prison, reducing his sentence to house arrest. Security services had arrested Jafarov in March 2015 on charges of treason, after searching the offices of his translation center and confiscating computers and mobile phones.

On January 28, the Pirallahi District Court in Baku released two imprisoned Jehovah’s Witnesses, Valida Jabrayilova and Irina Zakharchenko, after 11 months in prison for illegal distribution of religious literature.

Members of unregistered Muslim and non-Muslim religious groups, which the government considered to be nontraditional, continued to report they had difficulty functioning, and the government continued to levy fines against them for gathering as unregistered religious groups. A number of Protestant leaders continued to report that registration problems prevented them from openly worshiping, conducting sacraments, or advertising their locations to bring in new members. Home church leaders reported they continued to keep their activities discreet after past registration attempts had brought them what they said was unwanted attention from the authorities.

According to many religious communities, the government continued to delay the registration application process and returned some applications because of what the government said were technical or administrative problems with the information provided. Seventh-day Adventists, however, reported some progress with their application to register their Baku church, although it was still not registered as of the end of the year. Religious groups whose registration applications remained pending included minority Muslim groups, Jehovah’s Witnesses outside of Baku, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists in Ganja, and the Baku International Fellowship, a nondenominational Protestant church. Many communities that had been registered prior to the 2009 law requiring all registered religious communities to reregister continued to report the SCWRA either rejected or did not adjudicate reregistration applications. Almost all religious groups awaiting registration, whether registered prior to the 2009 law or not, had submitted their original registration applications by the original January 2010 deadline and reported they had been involved in the process of making minor corrections to their applications since then as required by the government.

According to the SCWRA, previously registered communities whose new registration applications were pending were able to operate under their previous registration, and the SCWRA continued to provide the communities with letters authorizing them to operate. Some religious communities that were unable to reregister continued to report confusion within the Ministry of Justice about the validity of their preexisting registration. According to these communities, police continued to reject SCWRA letters authorizing them to continue operations with their pre-2009 documents; they said police had told them only communities listed on the SCWRA website as currently registered were allowed to operate.

The SCWRA reported it had approved the registration of 75 religious communities during the year, while 22 communities had dissolved themselves for unspecified reasons. The SCWRA continued to report it had not denied any new registration applications from religious communities during the year; however, the SCWRA reportedly returned registration applications to communities as incomplete or failed to take action on some applications. In addition, the SCWRA continued to consider pre-2009 registration status for such communities to apply only to the physical structures mentioned in their pre-2009 registration form. The SCWRA stated any religious activities of these communities in additional facilities or new locations acquired since 2009 were not covered under their pre-2009 registration status.

According to government officials, the 75 new registrations brought the total number of registered religious groups to 707, of which 25 were non-Muslim – 16 Christian, six Jewish, two Bahai, and one ISKON group. The SCWRA also reported there were 2,054 registered mosques.

In September according to the news service of Forum 18, authorities closed a Sunni mosque in Gobustan for operating without registration. Subsequently, the court found community leader Ahmad Simirov guilty of violating religious registration requirements and ordered him to pay a 1,500 AZN ($820) fine.

Local religious experts continued to report local authorities closed mosques, stating they were in need of renovation or had safety issues. Some mosques closed as long ago as 2010 remained closed. According to these experts, the closures were attempts by the government to counter extremism, especially in the Baku area. Government officials stated, in particular, the threat posed by ISIS remained a serious concern.

In July authorities closed the Ashurbey Mosque in the Old City of Baku for renovation. Some civil society activists stated the closure was related to the use of the mosque by Salafi Muslims. According to press and government reports, authorities confiscated religious materials and replaced community leaders and imams in other mosques suspected of being Salafi gathering places. Although Salafis were allowed to attend these mosques, they were prohibited from holding positions of leadership, leading prayers, or delivering sermons.

In January according to Forum 18, police closed a Sunni home mosque in Shirvan that had functioned for 20 years for operating without registration. No further information about the case was available as of the end of the year.

In May authorities and the police demolished a Shia seminary in Nardaran reportedly in order to widen a street that residents said could not be widened. Community members filed a complaint with the judicial authorities. No further information was available about this case as of the end of the year.

On February 22, according to an independent news agency, police stopped a religious ceremony devoted to the daughter of the Prophet Muhammed at a mosque in Nardaran, because they had not received prior notification of the ceremony.

According to Forum 18, some Muslim groups not part of the CMB, particularly Sunni groups, objected to the imposition of a calendar by the state stipulating when they were allowed to pray and celebrate Islamic festivals. They reportedly said they feared arrest if they prayed according to the calendar they believed to be correct.

The government continued to allow head coverings in most public places but not in photographs for official identity documents. According to local observers, the government and the majority of school administrators throughout the country also continued to allow girls to wear the hijab in primary and secondary schools, despite a prior directive not to do so.

The government continued its controls on activities by Muslim groups, including on the content of religious television broadcasts and the sale of religious literature. According to local religious experts, the authorities continued to confiscate banned books.

Several Muslim and Christian groups continued to complain of censorship and of a lengthy and burdensome process to obtain permission to import religious literature. According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, although the SCWRA allowed the importation of Jehovah’s Witness publications, the government allegedly ran out of the stamps necessary to mark the publications as approved so the group was unable to use or distribute the publications.

Domestic human rights monitors continued to criticize the government for not offering any form of alternative service to conscientious objectors in place of military service. Government officials stated the reason for this situation was the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The supreme court continued to deny Jehovah’s Witnesses’ appeals on the lack of alternative services despite the government’s July 14 statement to the UN Human Rights Council saying alternative service was an option provided by the law. According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the State Service for Mobilization and Conscription (SSMC) threatened Jehovah’s Witness Daniel Khutsishivili with criminal prosecution for requesting conscientious objector status to military service. When Khutsishivili requested alternative service, the SSMC reportedly informed him no provision of law existed to implement conscientious objector status, even though the constitution allowed it.

The government allocated 1 million AZN ($543,000) to the Caucasus Muslim Board for the needs of Muslim communities, and 800,000 AZN($435,000) to non-Muslim communities, both traditional and nontraditional, to use at their discretion. According to SCWRA officials, 2.5 million AZN ($1.4 million) was allocated to their budget for religious education programs.

In February President Ilham Aliyev participated in the opening ceremony of the Shia Imamzade religious center in Ganja after its extensive renovation. Authorities also renovated 12 mosques, two churches, and one synagogue during the year.

The SCWRA held 14 regional conferences during the year on multiculturalism, tolerance, and combating religious radicalism as part of its annual work aimed at increasing religious tolerance and coexistence. The conferences, as well as training sessions and seminars, cosponsored by the Eurasian Regional Center of Islamic Conference Youth Forum, brought together representatives of different faiths to discuss religion and state affairs.

The government hosted the 7th Global Forum of the UN Alliance of Civilizations in April. The meeting focused on developing inclusive societies and issued a declaration rejecting the advocacy of religious hatred as a means of inciting discrimination, hostility, or violence.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

The government did not exercise control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Religious groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, and NGOs, including Forum 18, continued to report the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh restricted religious activities in general, but information on specific abuses was unavailable.

In October Pope Francis visited the country, meeting with Muslim, Jewish and Russian Orthodox Church leaders, as well as leading a Mass for the country’s small Catholic community. Media coverage reported the pope made positive reference to the tradition of religious tolerance in the country and avoided public discussion of religious problems or other human rights issues.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy officers continued to urge government representatives, including senior SCWRA officials, to address longstanding religious registration issues as well as obstacles to the importation and publication of religious literature. Embassy officers continued to hold meetings with the SCWRA, the Caucasus Muslim Board, and the MFA to address the government’s treatment of the religious communities having difficulties fulfilling the reregistration requirements, including the Jehovah’s Witnesses and other religious minorities. Embassy representatives also observed the trial of Jehovah’s Witnesses Valida Jabrayilova and Irina Zakharchenko and met with community representatives to discuss their health and welfare after the court released them in January.

The Ambassador and embassy officers continued to meet regularly with leaders of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish groups and NGO representatives to discuss obstacles to registration and the importation of religious materials.

The Ambassador and embassy officers continued to issue public statements on the need to perpetuate the country’s history of religious tolerance for future generations. In June the Ambassador hosted an iftar for government officials, Muslim and non-Muslim religious leaders, and NGO representatives to emphasize mutual tolerance and respect among the country’s religious communities.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 1.4 million (July 2016 estimate). Of the total population, citizens number 585,000, according to 2015 estimates, the latest available. According to U.S. estimates, Muslims make up 70 percent of the total population; Christians 14.5 percent, Hindus 9.8 percent, Buddhists 2.5 percent and Jews 0.6 percent. Local sources estimate 99 percent of citizens are Muslim, while Christians, Hindus, Bahais, and Jews constitute the remaining 1 percent.

The government does not publish statistics regarding the sectarian breakdown between Shia and Sunni Muslims; most estimates state Shia constitute a majority (55 to 60 percent) of the country’s citizen population. According to Jewish community members, there are approximately 36-40 Jewish citizens, from six families, in the country.

Most of the foreign residents, who make up approximately half of the total population, are migrant workers from South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and other Arab countries. Over half of the foreigners are non-Muslim, including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians (primarily Roman Catholic, Protestant, Syrian Orthodox, and Mar Thoma from South India), Bahais, and Sikhs.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, Islam is the official religion and the state safeguards the country’s Islamic heritage. The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, the inviolability of places of worship, the freedom to perform religious rites, and the freedom to hold religious parades and religious gatherings, “in accordance with the customs observed in the country.” The constitution guarantees the freedom to form associations as long as these do not infringe on the official religion or public order, and it prohibits discrimination based on religion or creed. There is no legal statute implementing the latter provision.

The constitution guarantees the right to express and publish opinions provided these do not infringe on the “fundamental beliefs of Islamic doctrine,” do not prejudice the unity of the people, or arouse discord or sectarianism.

The law prohibits anti-Islamic publications and broadcast media programs and mandates imprisonment for no less than six months for “exposing the state’s official religion to offense and criticism.”

Religious groups must register with the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs (MOJIA) to operate. Sunni religious groups register with the ministry through the Sunni Waqf, while Shia religious groups register through the Shia Waqf (the Waqfs are endowment boards, which supervise and fund the work of mosques and prayer halls). Non-Muslim groups also register with the MOJIA. In order to register, a group must submit an official letter requesting registration; copies of minutes from the founders’ committee meeting; a detailed list of founders, including names, ages, nationalities, occupations, and addresses; and other information such as the group’s bylaws and bank account information. Religious groups also may need approval from the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Labor and Social Development (MOLSD), the Ministry of Information Affairs, or the Ministry of Interior (MOI), depending on the nature of the group’s intended activities. If any religious group organizes functions outside of its designated physical space without approval, it may be subject to government prosecution and a fine. The law prohibits activities falling outside of an organization’s charter. The penal code does not specifically address the activities of unregistered religious groups, but provides for the closing of any unlicensed branch of an international organization plus imprisonment of up to six months and fines of up to 50 Bahraini dinars (BD) ($130) for the individuals responsible for setting up the branch.

Nineteen non-Muslim religious groups are registered with the MOJIA, including the Sacred Heart Catholic Church, Our Lady of Visitation Catholic Church, St. Christopher’s Anglican Church, the National Evangelical Church, the Awali International Church, Good Shepherd Four Square Church, the Church of South India, The Mar Thoma Church, the New Apostolic Church, the Seventh-day Adventist Church, the Brethern Assembly, the Malayalee Christian Congregation, St. Peter’s Jacobite Syrian Orthodox Church, the Malnakara Orthodox Church, and St. Mary’s Indian Orthodox Cathedral. Non-Christian registered groups include a Hindu temple and Bahai, Buddhist, and Jewish communities.

The penal code calls for punishment of not more than one year imprisonment or a fine of no more than BD100 ($270) for offending one of the recognized religious groups or their practices, or for openly defaming a religious figure considered sacred to members of a particular group.

The law stipulates fines or imprisonment for insulting an institution, announcing false or malicious news, spreading rumors, attending conferences abroad without authorization, encouraging others to show contempt for a different group of people, illegally gathering, and advocating for a change of government, among other offenses. The Office of the Ombudsman addresses the rights of prisoners, including the right to practice their religion.

The MOJIA operates both the Sunni Waqf and the Jafaari (Shia) Waqf. Its Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs oversees the work of both boards, which are partially funded by the state and partially funded by tithes, income from property rentals, and other private sources. The Sunni Waqf and the Shia Waqf issue licenses to clerics and preachers allowing them to preach, as well as to religious sites allowing them to operate. They also review and approve clerical appointments for religious sites under their purview and pay for salaries, supplies, and building expenses for the religious sites. They also collect rental payments and sign leases on real estate owned by the groups they supervise.

The king has sole legal authority to allocate public land, including for religious purposes, although he may delegate this authority to government officials, including the prime minister. By law, construction of places of worship requires approvals from the appropriate national and municipal authorities. Government entities involved in allocating building permits include the MOJIA for non-Muslim religious sites, either the Sunni Waqf or the Shia Waqf under the MOJIA for Muslim sites, the Survey and Restoration Directorate, and the Survey Department.

The law regulates Islamic religious instruction at all levels of the educational system. The government funds public schools from grades 1-12; Islamic studies are mandatory for all Muslim students, and are optional for non-Muslims. Many students attend private schools, which must be registered with the government and, with a few exceptions (e.g., a foreign-funded and operated school), are also required to provide Islamic religious education for Muslim students. Private schools wishing to provide non-Islamic religious education to non-Muslims, in addition to the required Islamic religious education for Muslim students, must receive permission from the Ministry of Education to do so. Outside of school hours, both Muslim and non-Muslim students may learn about religions as their parents decide.

The Maliki school of Sunni jurisprudence forms the basis of the Islamic studies portion of public school curriculum, which does not include the Jaafari traditions of Shia Islam. One public school, the Jaafari Institute, provides religious instruction in Shia Islam; the remainder of its curriculum is consistent with the nonreligious curriculum in other public schools. An estimated 1,200 students attend the Jaafari Institute from elementary level through high school.

For adult religious education, the University of Bahrain offers separate degree programs in religious studies for Shia and Sunni. There are five registered institutes, publicly funded and overseen by the Sunni Waqf, offering religious education for Sunnis. There are several dozen hawzas (Shia seminaries), some registered and some not registered. Some of the registered hawzas are publicly funded; others by choice are privately funded. Non-Muslim groups are also permitted to offer religious instruction to their adherents.

According to the constitution, sharia forms a principal basis for legislation although civil and criminal matters are governed by a civil code. With regard to family and personal status matters, the constitution states inheritance is a guaranteed right governed by sharia. It also guarantees the duties and status of women according to sharia. The law codifies the Sunni interpretation of sharia with regard to family matters, including inheritance, child custody, marriage, and divorce, but it is only applicable to Sunnis. There is no codified Jaafari (Shia) personal status law. The Shia population uses a court system in which personal status matters are decided by judges who use their own discretion to interpret Islamic tradition. Mixed Sunni-Shia families may choose which court system will hear their case. The provisions of the law on personal status require a Sunni woman’s consent for marriage and permit Sunni women to include conditions in the marriage contract. There is no comparable provision affecting Shia women. Non-Muslims may marry in civil or religious ceremonies, and civil courts make decisions for them on matters such as divorce and child custody.

The government does not designate religious affiliation on national identity documents, including birth certificates. Applications for birth certificates, however, record a child’s religion, but not denomination. Hospital admission forms and school registration forms may also request information on an individual’s religion.

The constitution says the state shall strive to strengthen ties with Islamic countries. It specifies the succession to the position of king is hereditary, passing from eldest son to eldest son. The royal family is Sunni.

On May 22, parliament passed a new provision of law prohibiting individuals from being members of political societies or becoming involved in political activities while they serve in a clerical role at a religious institution, including on a voluntary basis.

By law, the government regulates and monitors the collection of money by organizations, including religious ones. The law provides for fines of BD500 to 1,000 ($1300 to $2700) or imprisonment of at least 6 months for organizations which collect money without permission. On January 3, MOJIA published an update to the law stating organizations wishing to collect money must first obtain authorization from the MOJIA to do so.

The country is party to the ICCPR with reservations stating it interpreted the covenant’s provisions relating to freedom of religion, family rights, and equality between men and women before the law as “not affecting in any way ” the prescriptions of sharia.

Government Practices

There were scores of attacks on police during the year, some of which were accompanied by social media messages using Shia religious terminology to justify attacks on the authorities. In one such attack on April 16 in Karbabad, one policeman died. The government continued to question, detain, and arrest clerics, community members, and opposition politicians associated with the country’s Shia community. It convicted a Shia cleric on charges of giving an unauthorized sermon and revoked the citizenship of Sheikh Isa Qassim, identified by the media as the leading Shia cleric in the country, on the grounds he had sought to form an organization supporting foreign religious leaders. In June the police closed off access to Qassim’s home village following a sit-in around his house by his supporters who protested the revocation of his citizenship. The police detained over 70 individuals in connection with the sit-in, which continued at year’s end, and sentenced two Shia clerics to prison terms for alleged involvement in the demonstration. The authorities also brought money laundering charges against Qassim, but he chose not to attend the hearings and the trial continued in absentia at year’s end. In December an appeals court agreed with an earlier appeals court and resentenced Sheikh Ali Salman, Secretary General of the Shia opposition society Wifaq, to nine years after he continued to appeal his original four-year sentence, handed down in 2014, on charges of inciting hatred and promoting disobedience to the law. As of year’s end he had not refiled a final appeal to the Court of Cassation, but planned to do so in 2017. In June the authorities obtained a court order to shut down Wifaq, accusing it of creating “an environment for terrorism, extremism, and violence.” International human rights organizations published reports stating Shia prisoners were vulnerable to intimidation, harassment, and mistreatment by prison guards because of their religious affiliation. Shia community representatives complained about what they said was ongoing discrimination in government employment, education, and the justice system. Government officials continued to allege some Shia opposition members were supporters of terrorism and engaged in treasonous behavior. The government permitted Shia groups to hold processions to commemorate Ashura and Arbaeen. Registered non-Muslim communities reported the government seldom interfered with their religious observances. Because religion and political affiliation were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

There were numerous attacks on security personnel during the year. Some of these were accompanied by social media messages using Shia religious terminology to justify attacks on the authorities. In one such attack on April 16 on police in Karbabad, a police officer was killed and two others were critically injured. The authorities arrested 11 individuals in connection with the attack and referred the case for trial, but as of year’s end the trial had not begun. Similar attacks on the police, although not involving any reported fatalities, took place in Karzakan, Sitra, Mayamaar, Marraq, Belad Al Qadeem, Sharkan, Aker, and Nuwaidrat. The perpetrators of these attacks often filmed themselves attacking police using improvised weapons, including in close proximity to bystanders. They sometimes wore religious garb such as burial shrouds. They posted many of these videos on social media. In October one such social media campaign likened the authorities to an old enemy of the religion, Yezid, the one responsible for the killing of the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Hussain.

The government monitored sermons and brought charges against clerics who repeatedly spoke on unapproved topics. On April 15, the authorities arrested Shia cleric Sheikh Mohammed Al-Mansi for giving an unauthorized sermon. The authorities had previously censured him in 2014 for speaking out against the government’s demolition of 30 Shia mosques in 2011. On May 24, Al-Mansi was sentenced to a year in prison for inciting hatred against the regime and insulting the Ministry of Interior.

The government charged some individuals with crimes related to defamation of religion and inciting hatred against another denomination. On October 9, the authorities arrested journalist Faisal Hayyat and charged him with making “defamatory statements against one of the country’s main Muslim sects” in conjunction with tweets Hayyat had posted calling for God to curse religious figures revered by Sunni. The lower criminal court found him guilty on November 29 and gave him a three-month prison sentence.

On June 20, the government announced it had revoked the citizenship of Sheikh Isa Qassim, the leading Shia cleric according to the media, and had frozen his bank accounts. The Minister of Interior stated Qassim’s citizenship had been revoked because he had sought to form an organization supporting foreign religious and political leaders, and had promoted a sectarian environment in the country. On the evening his citizenship was revoked, Qassim’s supporters began a sit-in demonstration around his house in the village of Diraz, which continued at year’s end. Following the start of the sit-in, the authorities set up checkpoints to control access to and egress from the village and surrounding neighborhoods, which they continued to restrict through the end of the year. Although the MOI allowed most local residents to enter the village, it prevented nonresidents, including Shia clerics, from entering to attend or lead prayers at village mosques. A few outside clerics were able to obtain letters of permission from the police to give sermons at small events held during Islamic holiday periods.

In July the authorities indicted Qassim and two of his staff, Mirza Al-Dirazi and Sheikh Hussain Al-Mahrous, on money laundering charges involving large transfers of funds overseas. All three defendants denied the charges. The trial continued at year’s end. Qassim’s supporters reported his office had collected the money and spent the funds in accordance with Shia customs and obligations, and said the government had targeted Qassim due to his status in the Shia community.

On July 17, the government shut down the Islamic Enlightenment Society, which had been originally registered in 1973 and had operated in its present form since 2001. The society was registered as a charity with the MOLSD, but it was reportedly headed by Qassim, and its members were largely Shia clerics and religious workers such as teachers and chanters.

In October residents of Diraz reported the MOI prohibited guest speakers from entering the village to teach at prayer halls during Ashura celebrations. International NGOs reported the police had summoned over 73 individuals, including 44 clerics, for questioning in relation to the sit-in at Qasim’s house. The police held many overnight; some individuals were arrested and remained in custody as of year’s end, while Qassim remained at his home.

Several Shia clerics were sentenced to prison terms for participating in the demonstrations in support of Qassim. On August 31, a court sentenced Sayed Majeed al-Mashaal, former leader of the Ulama Islamic Council, to two years in prison based on accusations he had calling on the population to rally outside Qassim’s house. On August 18, a court convicted Sheikh Ali Humaidan of “illegal gathering” and sentenced him to one year in prison for his involvement in the sit-in.

On August 14, police summoned Sheikh Maytham al-Salman for questioning and held him overnight, on suspicions he had participated in the sit-in in Diraz. Police reportedly refused four requests by him to have a lawyer present, saying they had no orders to allow a lawyer to be present. They reportedly kept him awake in an interview room for more than a day without allowing him to change his clothes or take a shower and required him to remove his clerical robe and turban, which he said was a measure intended to “insult and intimidate a Shia cleric.” He was released on August 15, and as of year’s end a date had not been set for his trial.

In December an appeals court concurred with an earlier appeals court and resentenced Sheikh Ali Salman, Secretary General of the Shia opposition political society, Wifaq, to nine years on charges of inciting hatred and promoting disobedience to the law. Salman had originally been convicted in 2015 and sentenced to four years in prison, which he had appealed. The prosecution also appealed, however, seeking to overturn Salman’s acquittal on the charge of inciting to change the government by force. In May the appeals court overturned the acquittal and increased Salman’s sentence to nine years in prison. In October the Court of Cassation dismissed the Court of Appeal’s verdict on the basis it did not take into consideration new video evidence presented in court at the trial. The court of Cassation returned the case to the Court of Appeal. In December a Court of Appeal with a different panel of judges than the first Court of Appeal also sentenced Salman to nine years. At year’s end Salman had not refiled a final appeal to the Court of Cassation, and he remained in custody at Jaw Prison. He reportedly planned to file an appeal in 2017

On September 15, police questioned Salman in connection with a letter submitted with his name on it to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, but as of year’s end, the authorities had not filed any new charges against him.

Several Shia clerics arrested in 2011 remained in prison at year’s end. They had been associated with the political opposition and given sentences ranging from 15 years to life imprisonment on charges related to terrorist activity or inciting hatred.

Former Wifaq MP Hasan Isa remained in prison while his trial on charges of helping to finance a terrorist bomb attack continued. Authorities had arrested Isa in August 2015 following a July 2015 bombing in Sitra, which killed two policemen. Isa denied involvement in the bombing, saying he had not given money to terrorists, but had distributed funds to poor families in his role as a religious leader of his neighborhood.

The government continued to not provide regular statistics on detainees, but according to a report on Jaw Prison published in January by the government-funded Prisoner and Detainee Rights Commission, the courts had sentenced 1021 of the 2468 inmates in the facility for riot-related crimes. Local human rights organizations and activists stated individuals imprisoned for riot-related crimes, including assaulting police officers and possession or use of explosives, were overwhelmingly Shia. International NGOs reported Shia prisoners were vulnerable to intimidation, harassment, and ill-treatment by prison guards because of their religion, which at times led to coerced confessions. Some Shia prisoners at Jaw Prison and at the pretrial Dry Dock facility reported they were not allowed to practice their faith freely. Government officials stated the MOI, which supervised detention facilities, only prohibited practices when they violated prison safety rules, such as waving religious banners, or organizing large-scale gatherings for religious ceremonies.

During the year, the authorities issued at least three individuals limited validity passports and immediately deported them to nearby countries with significant Shia populations, including Sheikh Mohammed Khojasta on February 22, Hussein Khairallah Mahood on February 24, and Masaud Jahromi on March 7. The government had publicly announced it had stripped the citizenship of all three, along with 69 others, in 2015 on the grounds they supported terrorist organizations.

Religious groups trying to register their activities with the appropriate ministry reported at times it was not clear which ministry had jurisdiction over a particular activity and said they had experienced bureaucratic delays trying to complete registration and reregistration processes required by government authorities.

The government reported the same number of 440 licensed Sunni mosques and 80 Sunni community centers as in 2015, while the number of licensed Shia places of worship remained at 609 mosques and 618 ma’atams (Shia prayer houses). In new housing developments, observers reported there continued to be a disproportionate number of Sunni mosques, which they said showed continued government favoritism towards Sunni Muslims.

The MOJIA continued to monitor clerics’ adherence to a pledge of ethics it had created for those individuals engaged in religious discourse. Preachers who diverged from the pledge were subject to censure or removal by the authorities. The MOJIA also continued to announce how much money an adult should give on a voluntary basis to the poor on religious feast days. According to one report, during the month of Ashura, police summoned some Shia chanters and preachers and had them sign pledges to avoid discussing politics from the pulpit.

According to media reports, in June some Shia clerics issued a public statement saying they were ceasing holding congregational prayers because of the government’s restrictions on the freedom of religious worship for Shia. The statement, titled “Those Barred from Praying,” described the situation in the country as “deplorable.” After four weeks, however, they resumed holding regular prayers

The government again permitted Shia groups to hold processions to commemorate Ashura and Arbaeen. As in previous years, the MOI provided security for the processions, but again removed some Ashura flags, banners, and decorations from streets and private property, according to Shia leaders. The government stated MOI personnel had removed the banners because they violated zoning restrictions or because they contained a political message.

The government continued to permit registered non-Muslim communities to maintain identifiable places of worship, hold religious gatherings, and display religious symbols. The MOI continued to provide security for large events held by religious communities, including non-Muslim ones. Security forces stated they continued to monitor religious gatherings and funerals to maintain peace and security.

Adherents of minority religious groups reported they were able to produce religious media and publications and distribute them in bookstores and churches, although the government only permitted publications, which did not criticize Islam.

Construction on a cathedral to serve as headquarters for the Catholic Apostolic Vicariate of Northern Arabia continued to make little progress during the year. Christian community leaders stated there was also little progress in the government’s continuing effort to develop options for expanding Christian cemeteries.

Architects engaged on a project to renovate Manama’s souk on behalf of the government met with non-Muslim religious leaders for the purpose of ensuring non-Islamic religious sites would not be adversely affected. Work on the project remained in a preliminary stage as of the end of the year.

On October 14 the king announced he would permit a Coptic Orthodox church to be built in Manama.

The government again reported no significant reconstruction work had been done on the three remaining Shia mosques from the 30 it had damaged or destroyed in 2011. Some in the Shia community remained dissatisfied with three of the 27 reconstructed mosques because they had been rebuilt in different locations from where the old ones had been. Shia leaders stated the mosque grounds should have been preserved as they were. There were social media postings critical of the Shia Waqf for not pressing the government harder on these cases, as well as complaints about a mosque in Zinj, which had been destroyed by the government in 2011, but was not listed in the BICI report, and had not been reconstructed. Other social media postings complained about management of the Shia Waqf, such as a report on a Shia wedding hall near the village of Jidhafs, under the control of the Shia Waqf since 2011, which was being rented out to a commercial company for use as a warehouse.

NGOs reported the government showed disparate treatment to Shia versus Sunni and stated this different treatment fueled perceptions among the Shia community of a justice system stacked against them. For example, several times during the year the government reported it had investigated a number of officials from the mostly-Sunni police and military services for breaking the law or violating official procedures, but the government did not name any of individuals, including those who had been convicted of crimes, were in jail, or had been removed from their positions. On the other hand, the Public Prosecution Office, the MOI, and the Bahrain News Agency regularly published names and pictures of Shia who were accused of crimes, and at times published their names before the persons were indicted.

The government-run television station continued to air Friday sermons from large Sunni mosques, but not sermons from Shia mosques.

Shia politicians and community activists continued to make complaints about the government’s naturalization and citizenship process, which they said favored Sunni applicants over Shia applicants. They said the government continued to recruit Sunnis from other countries to join the security forces, granted them expedited naturalization, and provided them with public housing while excluding Shia citizens from those forces. According to Shia community activists, this continued recruitment and expedited naturalization of Sunnis represented an ongoing attempt to alter the demographic balance among the country’s citizens.

According to Shia leaders, Sunni citizens continued to receive preference for government scholarships, employment as teachers, and employment in government positions, especially in the managerial ranks of the civil service and the military. They continued to report few Shia citizens served in significant posts in the defense and internal security forces. According to the Shia leaders, senior civil service recruitment and promotion processes continued to favor Sunni candidates. They said educational, social, and municipal services in most Shia neighborhoods remained inferior to those in Sunni communities. The government repeated its statements affirming a policy of nondiscrimination in employment, promotions, and the provision of social and educational services.

Human rights activists reported discrimination against Shia in education continued. They stated the government hired foreign teachers over qualified Bahraini Shia teachers, although other observers, including education specialists and parents, said foreign contract teachers were willing to work longer hours, for less pay, and often had skills not available within the country’s pool of teachers. Activists also continued to report the interview panel for university scholarships asked about students’ political views and family background if their name or address suggested they might be Shia, and believed the panels used such information to select out Shia. The activists said many top scoring Shia applicants continued to receive scholarship offers in less lucrative or less prestigious fields. There were continued reports of the MOE refusing to recognize the foreign degrees of some students, although the reason the MOE failed to do so could not always be attributed to discrimination as some students may not have consulted with the MOE’s list of accredited foreign schools published on the government’s internet portal before they enrolled.

Political commentaries about the new provision of the law prohibiting clerics from involvement in political activities, such as an assessment from the Citizens For Bahrain organization, stated the provision was designed to ensure the separation of religion from state affairs, and spoke in broad terms of how this would have a positive effect on both politics and religion in the country. Some Shia commentators stated the new provision of the law was meant to target the better-organized Shia political societies.

The 40-member Shura Council, the appointed house of parliament, continued to include 15 Shia members, one Jewish member, and one Christian member, while 23 of its members were Sunni. Shia continued to hold five of the 23 cabinet positions, including one of the five deputy prime minister positions.

On June 14, the MOJIA filed a motion against the Shia opposition political society, Wifaq, with the administrative court requesting an emergency order to shut down the group and accusing the society of creating “an environment for terrorism, extremism, and violence.” The judge agreed to the immediate suspension of Wifaq’s activities. Police on the same day sealed Wifaq’s buildings, removed its signs, froze its bank accounts, and blocked its website. Days later the MOJIA announced it was bringing an additional motion to dissolve Wifaq on an expedited basis. On June 28, judges denied Wifaq’s legal team access to records at its headquarters, and additional time to prepare its defense. Wifaq’s lawyers resigned in protest, but the case continued before the court. On July 17, the judges formally ordered Wifaq closed and its assets seized. On September 22, the administrative appeals court denied Wifaq’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s order to shutter the organization. Wifaq appealed to the Court of Cassation, and as of year’s end no date had been set for the trial.

Throughout the year government officials made statements directed at Shia, accusing individuals or segments of the Shia community of specific crimes, alleging they were supporters of terrorism, or threatening future legal action. In a February 21 speech, the minister of the interior stated some Bahraini Shia had been “seduced” by Iran to act against their country based on statements made by Shia religious leaders in Iran about Bahrain, and warned against using religious rituals to “spread chaos.” The minister further called for the government to regulate the days, times, and locations of religious ceremonies, and to monitor their organizers.

Government officials spoke out against the Iranian Shia political concept of Wilayat al-Faqih (which advocates a guardianship of the political system by Shia jurists), while acknowledging not all Shia sought this type of political structure.

NGOs reported the government closely monitored the collection of funds by religious organizations, including charity donations. The NGOs said religious leaders and organizations not authorized to collect money, or whom the government believed handled the money in improper ways, were potentially subject to government legal action.

Non-Muslim religious community leaders reported there continued to be some Muslims who changed their religious affiliation, despite ongoing societal pressure not to do so, but those who did remained unwilling to speak publicly about their conversion.

NGOs working on civil discourse and interfaith dialogue reported regional Sunni-Shia tensions and historical political divisions continued to affect intra-Muslim relations. Shia representatives stated the continued higher unemployment rate and lower socioeconomic status of Shia, exacerbated by continued discrimination in the private sector against Shia, added to the tensions between the two communities. Because religion and political affiliation were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Representatives of non-Muslim religious groups continued to report they generally were able to operate without threats or intimidation. They were able to hold religious festivals and ceremonies and perform religious rites, such as burials, without interference. They stated there continued to be general acceptance of their presence and activities in the country. NGOs reported, however, some employers denied the right of migrant workers, especially female domestic workers, to practice their religion, display religious symbols, or take leave on religious holidays.

Some social media accounts repeated allegations that prominent Shia leaders supported terrorism or had engaged in what was termed “treasonous behavior.” Comments continued to refer to the Shia political opposition as “Iranian subordinates,” “coup plotters,” and “Safavids” (referring to a 1500 Persian dynasty which forcibly converted Sunnis to Shi’ism). Other social media posts accused prominent Sunnis of being “terrorists,” “baby killers,” and “takfiri” (Muslims who kill other Muslims who don’t follow the same belief structure).

The Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, the Ambassador and embassy officers met with government officials to urge them to implement fully the BICI’s recommendations on the reconstruction of places of worship; to respect freedom of expression for clerics; to ensure Shia had equal access to employment and services; to pursue reconciliation between the government and Shia communities; and to further empower the human rights ombudsman to engage with the government in support of the right of prisoners to practice their religions. In this connection, U.S. officials urged the government to observe the religious freedom provisions contained in the ICCPR. U.S. officials both publicly and in private meetings continued to advocate for the government to pursue political reforms, which would take into consideration the needs of all citizens regardless of religious affiliation.

The Ambassador and embassy officers continued to meet regularly with religious leaders of all faiths, representatives of NGOs, and political groups to discuss their freedom to worship, the welfare of detainees, and the status of the mosque reconstruction projects.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 156.2 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, the latest available, Sunni Muslims constitute 90 percent of the total population, and Hindus 9.5 percent. The remainder of the population is predominantly Christian (mostly Roman Catholic) and Theravada-Hinayana Buddhist. There are also small numbers of Shia Muslims, Bahais, animists, Ahmadi Muslims, agnostics, and atheists. Many of these communities estimate their numbers at between a few thousand and 100,000 adherents. Many ethnic minorities practice minority religions and are concentrated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and northern districts. For example, the Garo in Mymensingh are predominantly Christian as are the Santal in Gaibandha. Most Buddhists are members of the indigenous (non-Bengali) populations of the CHT. Bengali and ethnic minority Christians live in communities across the country, with relatively high concentrations in Barisal City, Gournadi in Barisal District, Baniarchar in Gopalganj, Monipuripara, and Christianpara in Dhaka city, Nagori in Gazipur and Khulna city.

The largest noncitizen population consists of Rohingya Muslims. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, there are 32, 967 Rohingya refugees from Burma registered in the country residing in one of two official refugee camps within Cox’s Bazar district. The International Organization for Migration estimates another 200,000 to 500,000 unregistered Rohingya from Burma are in the southeast in Cox’s Bazar district. As many as 90,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh following violence in Rakhine State in October.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, “the state religion of the Republic is Islam, but the State shall ensure equal status and equal rights in the practice of the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and other religions.” The constitution also stipulates the state shall uphold secularism by not granting political status in favor of any religion and by prohibiting the abuse of religion for political purposes and discrimination or persecution of persons practicing any religion. It also provides for the right to profess, practice, or propagate all religions “subject to law, public order, and morality,” and states religious communities or denominations have the right to establish, maintain, and manage their religious institutions. The constitution stipulates no one attending any educational institution shall be required to receive instruction in, or participate in ceremonies or worship pertaining to, a religion to which he or she does not belong.

Under the penal code, statements or acts made with a “deliberate and malicious” intent to insult religious sentiments are subject to fines of up to two years in prison. Although the code does not define “intent to insult religious sentiments,” the courts have interpreted it to include insulting the Prophet Muhammad. The criminal code allows the government to confiscate all copies of any newspaper, magazine, or other publication containing language that “creates enmity and hatred among the citizens or denigrates religious beliefs.” The law applies similar restrictions to online publications.

The constitution limits freedom of association in instances where an association is formed for the purpose of destroying religious harmony or creating discrimination on religious grounds among citizens.

There is no registration requirement for individual houses of worship, but religious groups that wish to form associations with multiple houses of worship are required to register with either the NGO Affairs Bureau if they receive foreign assistance for development projects, or the Ministry of Social Welfare if they do not. Parliament enacted a new law in October further regulating institutions that receive foreign funding. The law places restrictions on the receipt of foreign funds by NGOs, including religious organizations. The act requires the NGO Affairs Bureau to approve and monitor all projects. The director general has the authority to impose sanctions on NGOs for violating the law, including fines of up to three times the amount of the foreign donation or closure of the NGO. NGOs are also subject to penalties for “derogatory” comments about the constitution or constitutional institutions (i.e. the government). Expatriate staff must receive a security clearance from the National Security Intelligence Agency, the Special Branch of the police, and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence.

The registration requirement and procedures are the same as for secular associations. The requirements to register with the Ministry of Social Welfare include submission of certification that the name being registered is not taken; provision of the bylaws/constitution of the organization; a security clearance for leaders of the organization from the country’s intelligence agency; minutes of the meeting appointing the executive committee; a list of all executive committee and general members and photographs of principal officers; a work plan; a copy of the deed or lease of the organization’s office and a list of property owned; a budget; and a recommendation by a local government representative. Requirements to register with the NGO Affairs Bureau are still in flux, but they are expected to be similar.

Family law concerning marriage, divorce, and adoption has separate provisions for Muslims, Hindus, and Christians. These laws are enforced in the same secular courts. There is a separate civil family law for mixed faith families or those of other faiths or no faith. The family law of the religion of the two parties concerned governs their marriage rituals and proceedings. A Muslim man may have as many as four wives although he must obtain the written consent of his existing wife or wives before marrying again. A Christian man may marry only one woman. Under Hindu law, men may have multiple wives, but there are officially no options for divorce. Women may not inherit property under Hindu law. Buddhists are covered under Hindu law and divorced Hindus and Buddhists may not legally remarry. Divorced men and women of other religions and widowed individuals of any religion may remarry. Marriage between members of different religious groups is allowed and occurs under civil law. To be legally recognized, Muslim marriages must be registered with the state by either the couple or the cleric performing the marriage, but many are not. Registration for Hindus is optional, and other faiths may determine their own guidelines.

Under the Muslim family ordinance, a widow receives one eighth of her husband’s estate, and the remainder is divided among the children with each female child receiving half the share of each male child. Wives have fewer divorce rights than husbands. Courts must approve divorces and the law requires a Muslim man to pay a former wife three months of alimony, but these protections generally apply only to registered marriages; unregistered marriages are by definition undocumented and difficult to substantiate. In addition, authorities do not always enforce the alimony requirement even in cases involving registered marriages.

Alternative dispute resolution is available to all citizens, including Muslims, for settling family arguments and other civil matters not related to land ownership. With the consent of both parties, lawyers may be identified to facilitate the arbitration, the results of which may be used in court.

Fatwas may be issued only by Muslim religious scholars, and not by local religious leaders, to settle matters of religious practice. Fatwas may not be invoked to justify meting out punishment, nor may they supersede existing secular law.

Religious studies are compulsory and part of the curriculum for grades three through 10 in all government-accredited schools. Private schools do not have this requirement. Students receive instruction in their own religious beliefs from teachers provided by the government although the teachers are not always adherents of the students’ faith.

The code regulating prisons allows for observance of religious commemorations for prisoners, including access to extra food on feast days or permission to fast for religious reasons. The law does not guarantee prisoners regular access to clergy or regular religious services, but prison authorities may arrange special religious programs for them. Prison authorities are required to provide prisoners facing the death penalty access to a religious figure from a religion of their choice before execution.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government arrested suspects in the killings of several secular bloggers who reportedly “offended Islam.” On July 20, five men were charged in Oyasiqur Rahman’s March 2015 killing and their trial began on August 4. Three of the suspects remained in custody, including Akram Hossain Hasib (also known as Boro Bhai), while the other two were released on bail. Police also arrested Patwary, a suspect in the killing of Ahmedur Rashid Tutul, and Moinul Islam Shamim, a suspect in the killing of Bangladeshi American writer Faisal Arefin Deepan, on June 15 and August 24, respectively. Shariful Islam Shihab, a suspect in the killing of Avijit Roy, was killed during a “gunfight” with police on June 19, although human rights organizations stated that this and other gunfights with police were in fact extrajudicial killings. Police offered monetary rewards for leads in the secular blogger killings, which led to the May 19 arrest of two members of the militant group Ansarullah Bangla Team who were suspected to have links to the attacks.

Religious minority communities such as Hindus and Christians, who are often also ethnic minorities, reported the government continued to displace them, by force if necessary, because of land ownership disputes that disproportionately affected them. According to religious associations, such disputes continued to occur in areas near new roads or industrial development zones, where land prices had recently increased. They also stated local police, civil authorities, and political leaders sometimes enabled property appropriation for financial gain or shielded politically influential property appropriators from prosecution. Some human rights groups attributed the lack of resolution of these disputes to the ineffectiveness of the judicial and land registry systems and to the lack of political and financial clout of the targeted religious communities rather than to government policy disfavoring religious or ethnic minorities.

On November 6, police in Gaibandha fired on Santal tribal people, most of whom were Christian, who were trying to occupy land the government had acquired in 1962 to grow sugarcane for a sugar mill. The Santal people used bows and arrows to fight the police and former mill employees. Three Santal people were killed and 25 were injured in the altercation. In May the media reported that the district administration of Moulvibazar in the northeast issued a notice to 700 mostly Catholic indigenous Khasia people to move from their ancestral lands and accused them of illegally occupying 60 hectares (150 acres) of government property and running betel leaf plantations. Tribal activists stated the district administration was acting in support of the Nahar Tea Estate, a company which had been trying to expand into the property since 2007. Tribal activists continued to fight the order at the year’s end.

In August the media reported Aktar Hossain, a local council member in Rangpur, directed a local woman and man be punished for an “extramarital affair” that occurred when the man broke into the woman’s house while her husband was gone. Without hearing testimony from the woman, council members determined her husband should cane her 101 times before 400 assembled villagers while the council member should cane the man 20 times. In the same month, the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development, and Cooperatives stated it ordered district commissioners to mandate local councils prevent village leaders from using fatwas to punish villagers extrajudicially.

The government continued to provide law enforcement personnel at religious sites, festivals, and events considered targets for violence. The government also provided additional security at the Hindu festival of Durga Puja, Christmas, Easter, the Buddhist festival of Buddha Purnima, and the Bengali New Year or Pohela Boishakh.

Although most mosques were independent of the state, the government continued to provide guidance to imams throughout the country on some aspects of the content of their sermons. Following well publicized terrorist attacks on the Holey Artisan Bakery and the Sholakia Eid prayer grounds in July, the government-funded Islamic Foundation issued a sermon denouncing militancy, and suggested imams use it during Friday afternoon prayers. After a backlash from imams against government interference, the Islamic Foundation issued key passages from the Quran, which it suggested imams highlight. A prominent government-aligned cleric issued a religious edict denouncing militancy, which more than 100,000 imams reportedly signed but which many nongovernment-aligned imams rejected.

As part of its antimilitancy drive, the government pledged in July to monitor the sermons of the country’s more than 250,000 mosques for provocative messaging using the Islamic Foundation’s 1,400 regular staff, civil servants, law enforcement authorities, and the general public. The government could appoint and remove imams and had a strong influence over sermon content at the state-run National Mosque in Dhaka. Religious community leaders said imams in all mosques usually avoided sermons that contradicted government policy.

The government prohibited transmission of India-based Islamic televangelist Zakir Naik’s Peace TV Bangla, which it stated spread extremist ideologies, and closed “peace schools” affiliated with his teachings. According to civil society organizations, the government overreached in its efforts to ban Peace TV Bangla and could have allowed the locally produced programs featured on the channel to air, even if they wanted to censor Zakir Naik’s show.

On May 4, Minister of Information Hasanul Haque Inu announced the implementation of a media monitoring cell, which he stated would follow media and blogs that write negatively about Hindu, Muslim, and other religious beliefs, which he said contributed to theist-atheist divisions in the country. Activists stated the government Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission took steps in May to block the popular online blog platform somewhereinblog, a site used in the past by secular bloggers.

Following attacks against bloggers whom militants accused of offending Islam, Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan stated bloggers “should control their writing…people should be careful not to hurt anyone by writing anything” that might hurt “any religion, any people’s beliefs, and religious leaders.” Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed stated “It’s not at all acceptable if anyone writes against our prophet or other religions.”

The government again did not adjudicate any of the more than one million pending restitution cases involving land seized from Hindus who left Bangladesh before the nation’s independence and were characterized as enemies of the state at that time. The cases have remained pending since a 2011 law allowed the prior owners of the land to appeal the seizures.

Religious minorities said minority students sometimes were not able to enroll in religion classes of their faith because of a lack of minority teachers for mandatory religious education classes. In these cases, school officials generally allowed for arrangements with local religious institutions, parents, or others to hold religious studies classes for such students outside of school hours and sometimes exempted the students from the religious education requirement.

Civil society groups, including Manusher Jonno Foundation (MJF), Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), Bangladesh Mahila Parishad, and Banchte Shekha criticized the government for maintaining restrictive laws with regard to Hindu marriage and divorce. A survey conducted during the year by Research Initiatives in Bangladesh and MJF showed that 26.7 percent of Hindu men and 29.2 percent of Hindu women would like to obtain a divorce but did not do so because of existing laws.

The government provided the Islamic Foundation, administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, with 3.5 billion taka ($44.3 million) in 2015, the latest figures available, from a line item in the government budget for activities relating to promoting the values and ideals of Islam, including religious education and provision of training for imams. The government also provided grants in aid to 2,134 Muslim institutions amounting to 185.49 million taka ($2.3 million). In 2016, the government worked with representatives from three trusts intended to benefit minority religious groups: the Hindu Welfare Trust (with assets of 205 million taka, $2.6 million), the Christian Religious Welfare Trust (assets of 50 million taka, $633,000), and the Buddhist Welfare Trust (assets of 70 million taka, $886,000). The three trusts were managed by trustees who were members of their respective religious communities and used interest from their assets to fund temple, church, and monastery development and repairs.

During the year, the Hindu and Buddhist trusts received support from the government for religious education. In addition, the Hindu Welfare Trust received from the government payment for staff salaries. Also, 1,173 Hindu institutions received 41.95 million taka ($531,000) from parliament from the revenue budget for temple development and a 15 million taka ($190,000) donation from the prime minister to celebrate Durja Puja. One hundred and forty six Buddhist institutions received 4.13 million taka ($52,300) for temple development and repairs and the Buddhist Welfare Trust received 5 million taka ($63,300) from the prime minister to celebrate religious festivals.

Fifteen Christian institutions received 3.15 million taka ($39,900) from the government for church upkeep and repair. The Christian Religious Welfare Trust did not apply for additional special grants from the government. Minority religious leaders continued to state the government did not fund the trusts on an equal basis with the Islamic Foundation. They reported the foundation received yearly allocations of funds from the state budget while the trusts had to rely on income generated from government contributions to their capital funds.

The president continued to host receptions to commemorate each of the principal Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian holidays.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Extremist groups, many claiming to be affiliated with ISIS or al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), attacked religious minorities. Assailants used machetes in most of the attacks. The majority of attacks targeted members of the Hindu community. Ten Hindus, including priests, temple workers, teachers, and businesspeople, were killed in 10 separate attacks between February and July, compared to three attacks resulting in one death in 2015. ISIS claimed responsibility for seven of the attacks.

On July 1, five militants killed 24 people, most of them non-Muslims, at the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka. Assailants reportedly targeted non-Muslims and asked some hostages to recite verses from the Quran. The media reported the attackers tortured some of the hostages and killed them with machetes. Military forces killed the five attackers during a rescue operation. In August police killed Tamim Ahmed Chowdhury, one of the suspected organizers of the attack and captured or killed other suspected collaborators during a series of raids in the second half of 2016. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, but the government stated the perpetrators belonged to an offshoot of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, to which it referred as the Neo JMB.

There were also attacks directed against Muslims. On July 7, ISIS claimed responsibility for a bomb blast and gun battle near the site of a mass Eid al-Fitr prayer in Sholakia in which four people were killed and seven wounded.

ISIS claimed responsibility for the killing of two people who converted from Islam to Christianity. In the first incident on January 7, Chhamir Uddin Mandal, an 85-year-old homeopathic doctor, was found in his office in Jhenaidah with stab wounds to the chest. In the second incident on March 22, Hussein Ali Sarkar, also a Christian convert, was hacked to death in Kuringram.

ISIS also claimed the June 30 killing using machetes of Buddhist farmer and local Awami League leader, Mong Shwe Lung Marma, in the Bandarban area.

ISIS claimed responsibility for the killing of Christian grocer, Sunil Gomez, in Baraigram on June 5.

ISIS claimed responsibility for a May 20 attack in which homeopathic doctor and Baul enthusiast (a disappearing style of folk song often performed by followers of Sufism) Sanaur Rahman and friend Saif uz Zaman were riding on a motorcycle when they were attacked by at least three men, also riding motorcycles. Rahman was killed while Zaman, a university professor, was seriously wounded. The attack took place in Kushtia in Khulna District.

ISIS claimed responsibility for killing an elderly Buddhist monk, Mong Shu You Chak, on May 14 in his monastery in Bandarban district.

On April 23, Professor Rezaul Karim Siddique was killed on his way to work in Rajshahi. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack and stated Siddique was killed for “calling others to atheism.” Siddique was reportedly Muslim and had founded a music school and was editor of a literary magazine – activities ISIS conflated with “atheism.”

On April 6, attackers claiming affiliation with AQIS used machetes to kill Nazimuddin Samad, a graduate law student at Jagannath University, whom they accused of “abusing God, the Prophet Muhammad, and Islam.” In February an unknown group released a list of bloggers to target. On April 13, AQIS released a video online claiming responsibility for past blogger killings and calling for “killing all those who slander and insult Prophet Muhammad.”

ISIS also claimed responsibility for the killing of a Shia preacher, Hadith Abdur Razzak, who was stabbed to death in Jhenaidah on March 14.

ISIS news agency Amaq claimed responsibility for an August 23 machete attack on a Hindu grocer, Chittaranjan Arjya, in Narsingdi District. Arjya survived the attack. He was a patron of Kali Temple, located next to his store.

Communal violence involving minority religious groups continued to result in deaths, injuries, and damage to property. Land disputes at times disproportionately affected religious minorities, particularly the Hindu community. Members of religious minorities also stated they experienced continued discrimination in employment and housing. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

According to the human rights NGO ASK, attacks targeting Hindus or their property during the year killed seven persons and injured 67, compared to none killed and 60 injured in 2015. Attackers destroyed 197 statues, monasteries, or temples compared to 213 in 2015; and destroyed 192 homes and 2 businesses compared to 104 homes and six businesses in 2015. The motivation for these incidents was often unclear.

On February 21, attackers in Panchagarh slit the throat of Jogeshwar Das Adhikari, a Hindu priest, and he was reported dead. The attackers reportedly threw homemade bombs as they escaped on motorcycles. Two witnesses also were injured.

The media reported that no one claimed responsibility for the May 6 killing of a Sufi Pir Mohammed Shahidullah, found hacked to death in the village of Tanore near Rajshahi. Police stated the attack resembled those of previous militant attacks, in which Sufis were targeted for their beliefs.

On January 9 in Naogaon District, authorities found the disfigured, partially burned body of a tribal Catholic killed by unknown attackers, according to media reports.

On July 2, three machete-wielding masked men assaulted Hindu priest Palash Chakrabarty in the Kishoreganj district northwest of Dhaka, but he fended off his attackers by striking them with an iron rod, according to Bangladeshi press. In a separate incident on July 2, Bhabashindhu Bar, a Hindu priest in Satkira was hospitalized in critical condition after assailants tried to hack him to death. On July 1, a masked individual with knives reportedly tried to enter the room of Hindu priest Babul Chakraborty in Bandarban. The individual fled when spotted by the priest’s daughter in law. Media reported the incident as an “attempted murder.”

In May media reported attackers threw six to seven crude bombs into the home of a family living in Western Chuadanga who had converted from Islam to Christianity, critically injuring one man.

Buddhist monk Tain Dima Bikkhu survived an attack at Dabonkhali Marma Para Buddhist Temple in Bandarban District on the evening of August 4. Four to five men wielding knives allegedly broke down the door to the temple, but Dima was able to ward them off by activating a loudspeaker and calling for help.

There were attacks against followers of the mystic/religious Baul practice. Several Baul followers, who reportedly lived together, survived another attack in Chuadanga on July 17. On July 30, media reported 22 to 25 men assaulted three members of the Baul faith again in Chuadanga. The attackers restrained the Baul followers for approximately 90 minutes, burned their akhra (religious structure) and literature, cut off their hair, and threatened to return to kill them and blow up their house if they continued their religious practice in the area.

There was communal violence against Hindus. On January 11, a crowd besieged a Hindu ashram and temple after a local imam and madrassah head claimed the adherents had burned copies of the Quran. Although the crowd did not damage the ashram and temple, unknown attackers set fire to the house of the Hindu man who was accused of burning the Quran.

Individuals continued to kill and threaten bloggers whom they accused of offending Islam. In May messaging on the website Salauddiner Ghora urged followers to behead five Bangladeshi bloggers living overseas for blasphemy against Islam. Many bloggers and activists reportedly continued to limit their publications because of the ongoing threats. Some sought refuge in neighboring countries, including Nepal and Sri Lanka.

During local elections in June, violence reached unprecedented levels and members of religious minorities were attacked. In a suburb of Dhaka, media reported hundreds of attackers used sticks and bamboo poles to beat a group of Catholics and vandalize their homes and shops to stop them from voting for three Catholic candidates. An estimated 60 people, including 10 women, were injured in the attacks. Police later charged 25 people in the case and arrested four people in connection with the attacks. The suspects had reportedly been released on bail at year’s end.

On October 30, 100 to150 villagers in Nasirnagar in the eastern part of the country reacted violently to a Hindu resident’s Facebook post showing a Hindu deity pasted over the Kaaba in Mecca. They vandalized 52 Hindu homes and 15 temples, injured more than 100 people, and set fire to eight shops during the Diwali holiday. The violence followed public rallies in the same area protesting the Facebook post by Muslim groups and local ruling party politicians. Law enforcement officials arrested 104 people in connection with the attack, and the National Human Rights Commission conducted a fact-finding mission which stated the attack was orchestrated to drive Hindus from the area to obtain their land. According to media accounts, the attacks on Hindu homes and temples resulted from acrimony between two factions of the local chapters of the ruling Awami League Party. The reports also stated some Hindu protesters blamed local current cabinet member Sayedul Haque for inciting violence and insulting Hindus. In January, October, and November, individuals destroyed idols and vandalized and looted Hindu temples in Gopalganj, Chittagong, Netrokona, and Barisal. Authorities arrested suspects, who were undergoing trial at the year’s end. In a video conference on November 12, Prime Minister Hasina instructed field-level officials to ensure the security of members of minority groups.

NGOs continued to report tensions in the CHT between the predominantly Muslim Bengali settlers and members of indigenous groups, primarily Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian, largely over land ownership. The government worked to resolve land ownership disputes with an amendment to the existing law that provides for a more inclusive decision making and harmonization of the law with the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord. In Bandarban, an NGO stated that Muslim residents attempted to convert indigenous Christian and Hindu children to Islam.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy staff met with officials from the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Home Affairs as well as local government representatives to underscore the importance of religious freedom and tolerance. They discussed the interface between religion and violent extremism and the positive impact of respecting human rights and religious freedom in counterterrorism efforts. The embassy officials noted the importance of respecting religious minorities’ viewpoints and protecting such minorities in the wake of violent extremist attacks on these groups.

During his visit to the country in December, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom stressed with government interlocutors the importance of upholding the country’s tradition of religious tolerance and bringing perpetrators of attacks on religious minorities to justice. In meetings with government and civil society interlocutors, the Ambassador at Large highlighted the interdependence of the rights to freedoms of religion and expression and noted that restricting offensive speech for the purposes of maintaining public order was counterproductive.

Embassy officials also met with government officials to discuss protection and humanitarian assistance for the increasing numbers of Rohingya Muslims crossing into the country from Burma. The Ambassador, embassy officials, and the Ambassador at Large visited refugee camps and makeshift settlements in the southeastern part of the country to speak directly with Rohingya about their ability to pursue their religious practices. Embassy officials met with Buddhist groups in Cox’s Bazar to learn about the status of their case for a 2012 attack on their temples. As part of community policing training, the embassy encouraged law enforcement officials to protect the rights of religious minorities.

Embassy and other U.S. government officials expressed support for religious minorities in public and private forums. During a March visit to the Hindu Dhakeshwari national temple, the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights expressed U.S. support for enforcement of laws ensuring protection of all religions. In January, February, March, October, and December, the Embassy hosted roundtable discussions with members of Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian minority groups, both individually and with multiple faiths represented, to discuss challenges faced by their respective communities. Embassy officials also met with Muslim leaders and groups to discuss the balance between countering violent extremism and religious freedom and the intersection of politics and religion. Embassy officials met regularly with a wide range of religious organizations and representatives, some of the most prominent including the Saadi Foundation (a nonpolitical Islamic organization), the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, the Bangladesh Christian Association, Hindu Mohajote, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness – Bangladesh, the Christian Religious Welfare Trust, the apostolic nuncio, the Asian Conference of Religion and Peace Central Committee, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat (Bangladesh), the Bangladesh Purja Celebration Committee, Hotline Human Rights Bangladesh , and the Human Rights Congress for Bangladesh Minorities.

Embassy officials met regularly with a working group of 11 foreign missions to discuss assistance to secular bloggers under threat, including several bloggers stating their desire to take refuge in the United States. Many bloggers were able to identify means for increasing their personal protection using programs and resources identified by the embassy. During the Ambassador at Large’s visit, the embassy convened heads of mission from countries participating in the International Contact Group on Freedom of Religion or Belief to discuss coordination of efforts to address issues of concern, including impunity for perpetrators of violence against religious minorities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 291,000 (July 2016). According to the 2010 census, the most recently available, approximately 76 percent of the population is Christian. The two largest groups are Anglicans (23.9 percent) and Pentecostals (19.5 percent), followed by Seventh-day Adventists (5.9 percent), Methodists (4.2 percent), Roman Catholics (3.8 percent), Wesleyans (3.4 percent), Nazarenes (3.2 percent), and the Church of God (2.4 percent). Religious groups with 2 percent or less of the population each include Baptists, Moravians, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other Christian groups. Approximately 20.6 percent of respondents did not identify a religious affiliation. Other religious groups, which together constitute less than 3 percent of the population, include Muslims, Jews, Rastafarians, Hindus, Buddhists, and Bahais. The Barbados Muslim Association states there are 3,000 Muslims.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, including the freedom of individuals to change their religion, and prohibition of discrimination based on creed. A law criminalizing “blasphemous libel” is unenforced.

Religious groups are not required to register. If they wish to obtain duty free import privileges and tax benefits, however, they are required to register with the Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office. To do so, a religious group must file the applicable form, with a resolution passed by the majority of its board of trustees expressly authorizing the application, and a related statutory declaration.

The public school curriculum includes religious “values education.” The focus is on Christianity, but representatives from other religious groups are also invited to speak to students. The constitution grants religious groups the right to establish and maintain private schools and provide religious instruction. The government provides subsidies or financial assistance to some of these schools. As laid out in the constitution, no person attending any place of education is required to take part in religious instruction, ceremony, or observance without personal consent or (if under the age of 21) consent of the guardian.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Rastafarians continued to state their objection to the government’s enforcement of the prohibition on marijuana use, which they said was integral to their religious rituals. A Rastafarian activist said that police and immigration officials required Rastafarians to remove head coverings and gave extra scrutiny to Rastafarian women at checkpoints, which they said was a pretext for searching for marijuana.

A Rastafarian activist stated the requirements for vaccinations to enroll in public schools violated Rastafarian religious beliefs.

Representatives from the Barbados Muslim Association said they objected to a government policy requiring women to remove all head coverings for identification and passport photographs. The association continued to ask the government to change its practices to permit head coverings in identification photographs, including passports.

Rastafarians stated they faced discrimination, but that they had not faced hostile actions or were refused services. They said discrimination took on the form of being equated with troublemakers. An activist said he felt public attitudes regarding Rastafarianism were becoming more positive, but not fast enough.

The U.S. embassy raised general religious freedom issues with the government.

Embassy officials engaged religious group leaders and civil society, including the leadership of the Muslim and Rastafarian communities, on freedom of religious expression and discrimination. The Ambassador held meetings with representatives from the Barbados Muslim Association and met with the Catholic and Anglican bishops.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 9.6 million (July 2016 estimate). According to a January 2016 survey by the state Information and Analytical Center of the Presidential Administration, approximately 53 percent of the adult population belongs to the BOC and 6 percent to the Roman Catholic Church. Eight percent of the adult population said they were atheist, and 22 percent said they were not sure. Smaller religious groups together constituting approximately 2 percent of the population include Jews, Muslims, Greek Catholics (“Uniates”), Old Believers (both those who practice their faith with priests, usually termed “priestist,” and those who practice their faith without priests, usually termed “priestless”) and other Orthodox groups besides the BOC, Lutherans, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Apostolic Christians, Presbyterians, other Protestant groups, Armenian Apostolics, Latin Catholics, ISKON, Bahais, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Buddhists. Jewish groups state there are between 30,000 and 40,000 Jews. Ethnic Poles, who constitute approximately 3 percent of the population, tend to be Roman Catholic.

Legal Framework

The constitution grants individuals the freedom to profess any religious beliefs and to participate in the performance of acts of worship not prohibited by law. It stipulates all faiths are equal before the law. The constitution states relations between the state and religious organizations shall be regulated by the law “with regard to their influence on the formation of the spiritual, cultural, and state traditions of the Belarusian people.” It prohibits activities by religious groups that are directed against the country’s sovereignty, its constitutional system, and civic harmony, involve a violation of civil rights and liberties, “impede the execution of state, public, and family duties” by its citizens, or are detrimental to public health and morality. The constitution states the law shall determine the conditions for exemption from military service and the performance of alternative service as a substitute.

The Office of the Plenipotentiary Representative for Religious and Nationality Affairs (OPRRNA) regulates all religious matters.

The law recognizes the “determining role” of the BOC in the development of the traditions of the people as well as the historical importance of religious groups commonly referred to as “traditional” faiths: Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, and evangelical Lutheranism. The law does not consider newer religious groups or groups such as the priestless Old Believers and Calvinist churches, which have roots in the country dating to the 17th century, as “traditional” faiths.

A concordat between the government and the BOC provides the BOC with autonomy in its internal affairs, freedom to perform religious rites and other activities, and a special relationship with the state. The concordat recognizes the BOC’s “influence on the formation of spiritual, cultural, and national traditions of the Belarusian people.” Although it states the agreement does not limit the religious freedom of other religious groups, the concordat calls for the government and the BOC to combat unnamed “pseudo-religious structures that present a danger to individuals and society.” The BOC, unlike other religious communities, receives subsidies from the state. In addition, the BOC possesses the exclusive right to use the word “orthodox” in its title and to use as its symbol the double-barred image of the Cross of Saint Euphrosyne, the country’s patron saint.

The concordat also serves as the framework for agreements between the BOC and individual state agencies. There are at least a dozen such agreements, including an agreement with the Ministry of Education (MOE) covering cooperation on education through 2020 and providing for joint projects for the “spiritual and moral education” of students based on BOC traditions and history.

The law establishes three tiers of registered religious groups: religious communities, religious associations, and national religious associations. Religious communities must include at least 20 persons over the age of 18 who live in one or several adjoining areas. Religious associations must include at least 10 religious communities, one of which must have been active in the country for at least 20 years, and may be constituted only by a national-level religious association. National religious associations may be formed only when they comprise active religious communities in at least four of the country’s six regions.

According to the government data collected in 2015, the most recent available, there are 26 religious faiths and denominations registered in the country, encompassing 3,315 religious communities and 173 religious associations, monasteries, missions, brotherhoods, sisterhoods, and schools. The BOC has 1,643 religious communities, 15 dioceses, seven schools, 35 monasteries, 15 brotherhoods, and 10 sisterhoods. The Roman Catholic Church has four dioceses, five schools, 11 missions, nine monasteries, and 491 communities. Protestant religious organizations of 14 denominations have 1,057 religious communities, 21 associations, 22 missions, and five schools. There are 33 religious communities of Old Believers registered. There are three Jewish religious associations – Orthodox, Chabad-Lubavitch, and Reform Judaism – comprising 52 communities, including 10 autonomous communities. In addition, 25 Muslim religious communities, 24 Sunni and one Shia, are registered.

National religious associations include the BOC, the Roman Catholic Church, the Old Believers Church, the Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists, the Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith, the Confederation of Christian Seventh-day Adventists, the Association of New Apostolic Churches, the Union of Full Gospel Christian Churches, the Association of Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Union of Evangelical-Lutheran Churches, the Jewish Religious Union, the Association of Jewish Religious Communities, the Union of Reform Judaism Communities, the Muslim Religious Association, the Spiritual Board of Muslims, and the Religious Association of Bahais.

To register, a religious community must submit an official application with the following information: a list of its founders’ names, places of residence, citizenship, and signatures; copies of its founding statutes; the minutes of its founding meeting; and permission from the regional authorities confirming the community’s right to occupy or use any property referenced in its founding statutes. A religious group not previously registered by the government must also submit information about its beliefs. In the latter case, the law stipulates authorities may take up to six months to review a registration application due to an additional evaluation of the religion by a state-appointed religious commission of experts. The commission evaluates the fundamental teachings of the religion; its rituals, practices, history, forms and methods of activities; its welfare and charitable services; its proselytizing and missionary activities; its approaches towards marriage and family; its educational activities; its attitudes toward healthcare; and its compliance with legal requirements. In addition, the community must submit any texts written by its founder or considered sacred by the followers of the religion; information about prohibitions on clergy or adherents; a list of countries where the religion is widely practiced; a list of countries officially recognizing the religion; information about countries which have refused to recognize the religion; and information about court cases against followers of the religion in other countries.

Regional government authorities as well as the Minsk city authorities or local municipal authorities (for groups outside of Minsk) review all registration applications. Permissible grounds for denial of registration are broad and include failure to comply with requirements for establishing a community; an inconsistent or fraudulent charter or other required document; violations of the procedures to establish religious organizations; or a negative evaluation by the state-appointed religious commission of experts. Communities may appeal refusals in court.

In order to register as a religious association or national religious association, a group must provide an official application with a copy of the founding statutes, a list of members of the managing body with biographical information, proof of permission for the association to be at its designated location, and the minutes from its founding congress. Religious associations have the exclusive right to establish religious educational institutions and organize cloistered and monastic communities. All applications to establish associations and national associations must be submitted to OPRRNA, which has 30 days to respond. Grounds for refusal are the same as for religious communities except they also include failure to comply with requirements for establishing an association rather than a community. Refusals or a failure by OPRRNA to respond within the 30-day period may be appealed in court.

The law confines the activities of religious communities and associations to the jurisdictional area where they are registered. The law permits state agencies in charge of registration to issue written warnings to a registered religious group for violating any law or undertaking activities outside the scope of responsibilities in the group’s charter. The government may apply to a relevant court, depending upon jurisdiction, to shut down the group if it has not ceased the illegal activity outlined in the written warning within six months or if the activity is repeated within one year of the warning. The government may suspend activities of the religious group pending the court’s decision. The law contains no provision for appeal of the warning or suspension.

The law bans all religious activity by unregistered groups and subjects group members to penalties ranging from unspecified fines to two years in prison.

The housing code permits religious groups to hold services at residential premises if the local authorities grant permission. The local authorities must certify the premises comply with a number of regulations, including fire safety, sanitary, and health code requirements. Such permission, however, is not granted automatically, and the law does not permit religious groups to hold services in private residences without prior permission from local authorities.

By law all religious groups are required to seek permits to hold events outside of their premises, including proselytizing.

The law requires all religious groups to receive prior governmental approval to import and distribute religious literature. The approval process includes official examination of the documents by state-appointed religious studies experts.

Although there is no law providing for a systematic restitution process for property, including religious property, seized during the Soviet and Nazi periods, groups may apply for the restitution of property to local authorities. The law on religion specifically bans the restitution of seized property used for cultural or sports purposes.

The law permits associations and national associations to establish schools to train clergy, but does not permit religious communities to do so.

The law only permits registered religious groups which are members of national religious associations to organize extracurricular religious activities at educational institutions. The law states the national religious association must first conclude an agreement on cooperation with the MOE. Students who wish to participate in voluntary “moral, civic, and patriotic education” in collaboration with religious groups must either provide a written statement expressing their desire to participate or secure their legal guardians’ approval. According to the law, “such education shall raise awareness among the youth against any religious groups whose activities are aimed at undermining Belarus’ sovereignty, civic accord, and constitutional system or at violating human rights and freedoms.”

The law prohibits religious groups from conducting activities in schools without identifying themselves. It also prohibits visits from representatives of foreign religious groups; missionary activities; collections of donations or fees from students for religious groups or any charity; distribution of religious literature, audio, video, and other religious materials; holding prayer services, religious rituals, rites, or ceremonies; and placing religious symbols or paraphernalia at educational institutions.

The law does not allow homeschooling for religious reasons, or private religious schools.

The law establishes penalties ranging from fines to five years in jail for failure to fulfill mandatory military service, with an exemption for conscientious objectors for religious reasons. On July 1, the government enacted a new provision of law allowing for alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors. An individual seeking to perform alternative civilian service in place of military service must provide a written justification, including his biographic details, religious beliefs, and any other documents to prove his affiliation with a religious group. The length of alternative service for individuals without a bachelor’s degree is 36 months and for those with bachelor’s degree 24 months. If approved, individuals will serve at healthcare institutions, nursing homes, housing and public utility services, forestry and agricultural institutions, or road maintenance and construction agencies, and have the right to ask to change the place of alternative civilian service. Within three months after completion of their service, individuals have the right to obtain permanent employment where they performed their alternative service. By law individuals who evade alternative civilian service may face up to five years in jail.

Only registered religious associations may apply to OPRRNA for permission to invite foreign clergy to the country. OPRRNA must grant permission before foreign religious workers may serve in local congregations, teach or study at local institutions, or participate in charitable work. Such permission is generally granted for a period of one year, which may be reduced or extended. OPRRNA has 30 days to respond to requests for foreign clergy permits (religious visas), and may deny requests without explanation. There is no provision for appeals.

By law the government permits foreign missionaries to engage in religious activity only in the territorial area where their religious association is registered. Transfers of foreign clergy within a religious association, including from one parish to another, require prior government permission. By law foreigners may not lead religious groups. The authorities may reprimand or expel foreign citizens who officially are present in the country for nonreligious work if they lead any religious activities. Law enforcement agencies on their own initiative or in response to recommendations from other government entities, such as the security service, may require foreign clergy to depart the country.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to detain or fine individuals for organizing or hosting unauthorized religious meetings in private homes, for proselytizing, and for refusing to serve in the military despite the enactment of a law permitting alternative service. Minority religious groups continued to have difficulty registering and in some cases remained reluctant to apply for registration, reportedly out of fear of harassment and punishment. The government stated it might revoke the registration of several Jehovah’s Witnesses communities. The government also continued its surveillance of minority and unregistered religious groups, especially those it labeled as “foreign” or “cults.” According to human rights groups, prison authorities denied Muslim and Protestant clergy, as well as clergy from nontraditional faiths, access to prisoners of their faiths, while they granted such access to BOC and Roman Catholic clergy. Protestant and other minority religious groups continued to have difficulties obtaining buildings to use as houses of worship. The government denied visas and requests to extend the stay of some foreign missionaries, but also rescinded denials previously given to other clergy.

According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, there were three incidents in which authorities detained Jehovah’s Witnesses for sharing their beliefs with others. In Stalbtsy, on June 2, police detained two Jehovah’s Witnesses who were expressing their beliefs to their neighbors. On July 4, the case went to court but was dismissed. The authorities also briefly detained Jehovah’s Witnesses in Krychau and Minsk but subsequently released them without charge.

On February 8, a court in Horki fined Liliya Shulhan, a member of the local Baptist community, 210 rubles ($110) for hosting a religious meeting in her private home in December 2015. Shulhan disputed the charge saying “it was not a worship service but a friendly meeting of people who shared the same beliefs.”

On July 18, a district court in Homyel fined Siarhei Bondarau, a local ISKON community member, 42 rubles ($21) for holding an unsanctioned demonstration and singing religious songs in public in Pinsk on May 24.

On May 18, a Brest district court fined local Jehovah’s Witnesses member Viktar Kalina 2,100 rubles ($1,100) for refusing to serve in the army. The court rejected Kalina’s request for alternative civilian service. A higher court dismissed his appeal on June 24, leaving Kalina on the verge of entry into the military, while he filed another request for the alternative service. As of the end of the year, Kalina had not been drafted into the military and there were no further developments.

Christian groups continued to state the registration requirements for religious groups remained complex and difficult to fulfill, which they said restricted their activities, suppressed freedom of religion, and legalized criminal prosecution of individuals for their religious beliefs. The government’s guidelines for evaluating registration applications remained sufficiently broad, they said, to continue to give authorities a pretext for denying applications from groups they considered unacceptable. Authorities in Mariyna Horka refused registration to a Jehovah’s Witnesses community on February 19. Local authorities in Barysau and Lida continued to deny registration applications from Jehovah’s Witnesses. Authorities also continued to deny registration to several Protestant religious communities, including a Baptist community in Slutsk.

The PRRNA on February 2 stated the government might revoke the registration of “some Jehovah’s Witnesses communities across the country” for allegedly violating laws, including the purported illegal distribution of religious literature. The Association of Jehovah’s Witnesses communities disputed the allegations and stated their communities had not received any warnings of possible violations of the law and would work with local authorities to ensure compliance with the law.

Independent religious experts continued to report minority religious groups remained reluctant to apply for registration because members continued to be unwilling to provide their names as part of the application process out of fear of harassment and punishment by the authorities.

The government continued to monitor minority religious groups, especially those it labeled “foreign” or “cults.” According to various observers, government ideology officers continued to monitor the activities of members of unregistered religious groups in their workplaces, although there were no reports of prosecutions. According to religious leaders, state security officers also continued to attend religious services of registered Protestant communities to conduct surveillance, which group members described as intimidation and harassment.

According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, in Mahilyou, local authorities sent letters to schools and state-run institutions in the region in May, notifying administrators about members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, their places of worship, and reportedly describing them in offensive terms.

Many unregistered religious groups stated they continued to maintain a low profile because of what they believed to be government hostility and out of fear of criminal prosecution. According to independent religious experts, many registered religious communities also remained reluctant to report abuses and restrictions out of fear of punishment.

Nontraditional religious groups continued to state the procedure for registering and using residential premises for religious gatherings remained cumbersome and arbitrary. On May 17, authorities revoked permission granted in 2014 for a registered Jehovah’s Witness community in Homyel to hold religious services at a private home.

In March authorities in Mahilyou warned the local Jehovah’s Witnesses community it could be held liable for holding religious events in public venues and residential areas and for distributing religious materials without permits.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses reported local officials in Vitsebsk denied a request for a convention to be held in the city without providing any explanation.

Human rights groups reported prison administrators continued to deny Muslim and Protestant clergy, as well as clergy from nontraditional faiths (any faiths not among the four recognized “traditional”), permission to visit inmates in prison. At the same time, they said, authorities continued to grant BOC or Roman Catholic clergy permission to visit believers in jail on a regular basis, and many prisons had designated Orthodox religious facilities.

On February 2, the PRRNA made a public statement criticizing the Roman Catholic Church for failing to train local clergy, resulting in a “shortage of human resources” which the Church tried to rectify by subsequently inviting a large number of clergy from abroad to practice in the country. He said complaints about the lack of fluency of foreign priests in either Russian or Belarusian were “justified.” On February 5, the Conference of Roman Catholic Bishops in the country issued a statement objecting to the PRRNA statement, saying the Church trained clergy at its “discretion” and the issue was an internal matter for the Church. The statement by the Conference of Bishops included information about 19 Belarusian students enrolled in 2015 in seminaries in the country and abroad for training.

Religious groups, especially Protestants, continued to report they remained cautious about proselytizing and distributing religious materials due to what they said was the general atmosphere of intimidation and fear of punishment. Orthodox literature, they said, remained available countrywide. They also said the BOC remained able to proselytize freely and, unlike other religious groups, continued to be allowed to participate in government-sponsored public events, such as rallies, without the need to seek prior approval from authorities.

In April the OPRRNA denied a request by the Jehovah’s Witnesses to import the April issue of the magazine The Watchtower on the basis the magazine contained materials aimed at the “infringement of rights, freedoms, and lawful interests of the citizens, which impede performance of their duties in the society and their family.” The Jehovah’s Witnesses stated the government’s denial did not specify what the “materials” in question were and did not outline the reasoning used to reach the decision.

Religious groups continued to report problems purchasing properties as places of worship. Converting residential property to religious use also remained difficult, they said. Renting a public facility to hold religious services remained difficult as well, especially for unregistered groups. For example, some Protestant communities continued to report they were only able to conclude short-term lease agreements with the owners of the facilities the communities rented, which continued to allow authorities to pressure owners to terminate or not renew lease agreements as a means of preventing religious activities. Protestant groups stated they continued to be more severely affected than other groups in this regard due to the fact they were less likely to own religious facilities and their private homes were too small to accommodate their numbers.

There continued to be no progress on the freeze placed on the assets of the New Life Church (NLC), although the Minsk authorities did not renew their attempts to evict the Church from its premises, which had begun in 2007 and continued through 2012 after the authorities had refused to register the Church at its location. The NLC continued to use the space for religious purposes but remained unable to obtain proof of ownership from the authorities and had no access to electricity. The NLC leadership continued to meet with Minsk city authorities to negotiate the status and operations of the Church, but without result as of the end of the year.

Following articles in independent media outlets and reported complaints from local residents, authorities in Minsk reburied remains unearthed during work in April to expand a road at the site of a former Lutheran cemetery, which had stopped operating in 1968. Authorities installed a plaque to commemorate the remains buried at a cemetery on August 4.

The government continued the requirement for students to use textbooks which representatives of nontraditional religious groups said promoted intolerance towards them, citing chapters in the books which labeled such groups as “sects” as discriminatory. The government continued to make no changes to these textbooks despite requests from religious groups.

School administrators continued to cooperate only with the BOC among registered religious groups based on the BOC’s concordat with the government. School administrators continued to invite BOC priests to lecture to students, organize tours of BOC facilities, and participate in BOC festivities, programs, and humanitarian projects.

Religious groups said the government continued to apply visa regulations in ways restricting the ability of foreign missionaries to live and work in the country. According to Forum18, an international NGO, in April the OPRRNA denied a Catholic priest from India permission to enter the country for spiritual exercises he was due to lead in the Roman Catholic parish in the village of Ross in the Hrodna region on July 22-24. The authorities had approved Manjackal’s two previous visits, including in 2015. In May the authorities did not extend the permission previously granted to a Polish priest to conduct religious activities in the Hrodna diocese and denied him a residence permit although he had served in the diocese since 1991.

In July OPPRNA revoked a previous decision not to renew religious work permits for three Polish priests, allowing them continue their service in parishes in Mahilyou, Ivyanets, and Kalodzishchy, respectively.

On November 10, authorities in the Mahilyou region warned a local Baptist community in the town of Babruisk they would remove the community’s registration if the community again invited foreign citizens to speak at the community’s prayers without official permission from the local authorities. This warning was in response to a visit by a group of U.S. citizens who reportedly attended and spoke at the Baptist services on September 9 and 10.

The authorities continued to give permission to the BOC to collect charitable donations in public as well as on its religious property. While the law did not restrict other religious groups from raising donations in public, the groups said they continued to limit their fundraising activities to their own places of worship or other properties based on the harassment they had received from the authorities if they tried to raise donations at other locations.

The BOC, in particular the Minsk-based parish of the Feast of the Presentation of Blessed Virgin, continued its annual commemoration honoring Hauryil Belastoksky, a child allegedly killed by Jews near Hrodna in 1690, as one of its saints and martyrs. Jewish community leaders again expressed concern over the memorial prayer recited on the anniversary of Belastoksky’s death on May 3, the text of which included a passage stating the “martyred and courageous Hauryil exposed Jewish dishonesty.”

In Valozhyn in May unknown individuals vandalized a memorial honoring 800 local Jews killed in 1942 near the town of Ivianets. Part of the plaque was broken and a swastika was painted on the fence of the memorial. On May 25, authorities in Valozhyn opened a criminal case, but the investigation yielded no developments as of the end of the year.

On July 9, Minsk Jewish community members reported they saw yellow paint on sculptures at the Holocaust memorial called “Yama” (the Pit) dedicated to the Minsk ghetto victims. Authorities opened an investigation after appeals from the National Union of Jewish Communities and Organizations but as of the end of the year, they had no developments to report.

On November 19, local Jewish activists reported unidentified vandals had sprayed black paint on a monument commemorating thousands of Jews killed by Nazis in the local ghetto during the Holocaust in Mahilyou. Police opened a criminal case and on November 22 detained four individuals, who reportedly expressed Nazi ideas and belonged to a local skinhead group. Police identified and charged four suspects. The case remained under investigation as of the end of the year.

In November unidentified individuals painted a swastika on the plaque of a memorial, located on the site of the former Jewish ghetto in central Pinsk, honoring Jewish victims of the Holocaust as well as commemorating the killing of the Roma, partisans, and underground fighters by the Nazis during World War II. On November 30, the Pinsk police opened an investigation into the vandalism of the memorial. There was no information available on the status of the investigation as of the end of the year.

In May U.S. embassy officials and a visiting professor of religion from the U.S. sponsored by the U.S. embassy met with the PRRNA to discuss the religious situation in the country, including requirements for registration and operation of religious groups, visa regulations for foreign clergy, and distribution of religious literature.

The Charge d’Affaires and other embassy officers continued to meet regularly with representatives of minority religious groups. They discussed anti-Semitism and the preservation of Jewish religious heritage with Jewish religious groups, and government restrictions on registration and operations with the Jehovah’s Witnesses, ISKON, and Protestant groups. Embassy officers also continued to hold regular discussions about restrictions on religious freedom with religious freedom activists, religious leaders, lawyers for religious groups, and representatives of the For Freedom of Religion initiative, a group of civil society activists promoting religious tolerance.

As part of the embassy-sponsored visit of the U.S. professor of religion, the Charge d’Affaires organized a meeting with representatives of the country’s minority religious communities, which provided another opportunity to discuss their situation and the best means of protecting their right to practice their faiths.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11.4 million (July 2016 estimate).

The government does not collect or publish statistics on religious affiliation, and privacy laws generally restrict their collection or publication. A 2011 report (based on 2009 data) by the King Baudouin Foundation estimates the religious affiliation of the population to be 50 percent Roman Catholic, 33 percent without affiliation, 9 percent atheist, 5 percent Muslim, 2.5 percent non-Catholic Christian, and 0.4 percent Jewish. The Muslim population is highest in Antwerp and Brussels, where some studies estimate it at more than 25 percent of the respective metropolitan areas. According to the report, other religious groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, and Scientologists. A 2015 study by the Catholic University of Louvain updates the estimate of the Muslim portion of the population to approximately 7 percent.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of worship (including its public practice) and freedom of expression, provided no crime is committed in the exercise of these freedoms. It states no individual may be barred from religious ceremonies or from observing religious days of rest and bars the state from interfering in the appointment of religious clergy or blocking the publication of religious documents. The constitution requires teaching in public schools to be neutral with respect to religious belief. It obligates the state to pay the salaries and pensions of religious clergy who are certified by the official organizations of recognized religions and are officially employed in recognized houses of worship. The law prohibits discrimination based on religious or philosophical (e.g., nonconfessional) orientation.

Federal law prohibits public statements inciting religious hatred, including Holocaust denial. The maximum sentence for Holocaust denial is one year in prison.

The government officially recognizes Catholicism, Protestantism (including evangelicals and Pentecostals), Judaism, Anglicanism (separately from other Protestant groups), Islam, Orthodox (Greek and Russian) Christianity, and secular humanism.

The requirements to obtain official recognition are not legally defined. The legal basis for official recognition is comprised of the constitution and other laws and interpretations, some of which predate the constitution itself. A religious group seeking official recognition applies to the Ministry of Justice, which then recommends approval or rejection. The government evaluates whether the group meets organizational and reporting requirements and applies criteria based on administrative and legislative precedents in deciding whether to recommend parliament grant recognition to a religious group. The religious group must have a structure or hierarchy, a “sufficient number” of members, and a “long period” of existence in the country. It must offer “social value” to the public, abide by the laws of the state, and respect public order. The government does not formally define “sufficient number,” “long period of time,” or “social value.” Final approval is the sole responsibility of the federal parliament; however, parliament generally accepts the ministry’s recommendation.

The law requires each officially recognized religion to have an official interlocutor, an office comprised of one or more representatives of the religion plus administrative staff, to support the government in its constitutional duty of providing the material conditions for the free exercise of religion. The functions performed by the interlocutor include certification of clergy and teachers of the religion, assistance in the development of religious curriculum, and oversight of the management of houses of worship.

The federal government provides financial support for officially recognized religious groups. The subsidies for recognized groups include payment of clergy salaries, maintenance, and equipment for facilities and places of worship, and tax exemptions. Denominations or divisions within the recognized religious groups (Shia Islam, Reform Judaism, or Lutheranism, for example) do not receive support or recognition separate from their parent religious group. Unrecognized groups outside of these recognized religions do not receive government subsidies but may worship freely and openly.

There are procedures for individual houses of worship of recognized religious groups to obtain recognition and state subsidies. To do so a house of worship must meet requirements set by the region in which it is located and by the federal Ministry of Justice. These requirements include transparency and legality of accounting practices, renunciation of foreign sources of income for ministers of religion working in the facility, compliance with building and fire safety codes, certification of the minister of religion by the relevant interlocutor body, and a security check. Recognized houses of worship also receive subsidies from the linguistic communities and municipalities for the upkeep of religious buildings. Houses of worship or other religious groups that are unable or choose not to meet these requirements may organize as nonprofit associations and benefit from certain tax advantages (but not government subsidies). Houses of worship in this situation (i.e., not completing the recognition process) may still be affiliated with an officially recognized religious group.

There is a federal ban on covering one’s face in public. Women who wear the full-face veil in public face a maximum fine of 137.50 euros ($150).

The Wallonia and Flanders regional governments, which have jurisdiction over animal welfare, ban animal slaughter without prior stunning in temporary slaughtering facilities in use during Muslim holidays. Certified permanent slaughterhouses in those regions may slaughter animals without prior stunning in accordance with kosher and halal practices. The Brussels regional government this year authorized a new slaughterhouse specifically for slaughter without prior stunning during Muslim holidays.

All public schools offer mandatory religious instruction or, alternatively, “moral” instruction (which is oriented towards citizenship and moral values), although parents in Flemish schools may have their children opt out of such courses. A constitutional court ruling in 2015 allows French community parents to opt out of primary school religion and ethics classes for their children, pursuant to the court’s finding those classes not to be “objective, critical, and pluralistic.”

Schools provide teachers for each of the recognized religious groups, as well as for secular humanism, according to the student’s preference. The public education system requires neutrality in the presentation of religious views outside of religion classes. Teachers of religion are permitted to express their religious beliefs and wear religious attire, even if school policy otherwise forbids such attire. Public school religion teachers are nominated by a committee from their religious group and appointed by the linguistic community government’s education minister. Private, authorized religious schools following the same curriculum as public schools are known as “free” schools. They receive government subsidies for operating expenses, including building maintenance and utilities. Teachers in these schools, like other civil servants, are paid by their respective linguistic community governments.

Unia (the new name for the former Interfederal Center for Equal Opportunity) is an independent but publicly funded agency responsible for litigating discrimination cases, including those of a religious nature.

The justice minister appoints a magistrate in each judicial district to monitor discrimination cases and facilitate prosecution of discrimination as a criminal act.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Following the March 22 terrorist attacks at the Brussels airport and a metro station in downtown Brussels in which 32 civilians died and another 300 were injured, the government reemphasized its concern over “hate preachers “ in mosques. It intensified efforts, begun in reaction to the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, to counter violent extremism and urged the regional governments to encourage more mosques in their territories to obtain official recognition. Regional government ministers and other observers said fulfillment of the requirements for recognition would strengthen governmental oversight of the mosques taking this step. The federal and regional governments announced plans to encourage a wave of recognitions and allocated funding sufficient to nearly double the number of recognized mosques beyond the currently recognized 81 mosques: 28 in Flanders, 14 in Brussels and 39 in Wallonia. According to the federal and regional governments, tens of mosques were at some stage in the recognition procedure, although media reports suggested only a few had completed the process.

According to press reports, the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs (“Diyanet”) was regulating the content of religious sermons in its network of mosques in the country and had lobbied the federal and regional governments to allow it to determine the administrative and educational requirements for the appointment of imams and other officials. In addition, the press reported the Diyanet monitored and reported information to the Turkish government on persons it suspected of belonging to dissident or terrorist groups. There were also reports the Government of Morocco had lobbied the country’s Muslim institutions to adopt specific religious points of view and pressured those who publicly expressed dissenting points of view.

On March 11, concluding a judicial process lasting 18 years, the Brussels Court acquitted the Church of Scientology of the illegal practice of medicine, fraud, organized criminal activity, and the violation of privacy laws. The Court said the prosecution had failed to prove its case, which the court said was based more on allegations than on facts.

In September the representative of the leading Buddhist organization in the country stated he was hopeful of obtaining recognition of his religious community soon. In September, however, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Justice stated no draft bill providing such recognition was ready to put before the parliament. Despite the lack of recognition of Buddhism, the government continued to provide subsidies to the Buddhist community reportedly in preparation for its recognition as a “nonconfessional philosophical community.”

The Hindu community’s request for recognition remained pending with the Ministry of Justice at the end of the year.

On February 1, the Council of State issued a ruling allowing teachers of Islam to wear headscarves, including for activities in the school other than teaching. The Flemish Community Education Network refused to alter its general ban on the headscarf, arguing the ruling referred to a specific case in a specific school (a school in Flanders where an Islamic teacher was denied the right to wear a headscarf outside her classroom).

Individual public schools continued to have the right to decide whether to impose a ban on religious attire or symbols such as headscarves on schoolteachers, students, and staff. Most public schools continued policies restricting headscarves. Bans on headscarves remained in place in at least 90 percent of public schools sponsored by the francophone community and in virtually all Flemish public schools. Three (out of 98) Brussels public schools allowed headscarves.

In August a school for adult learners in Uccle (Brussels) first forbade two veiled students from taking their exams, and then allowed them to take the exam later the same day. On September 1, the school changed its internal regulations to ban headscarves. The minister for continuing education of the French-speaking community stated the school’s actions were contrary to the objectives of education in general and of social promotion schools in particular. She urged the school to demonstrate a solid rationale for the ban.

The government continued its ban on Muslim women and girls wearing headscarves in public sector jobs requiring interaction with the public.

The largest party in the Flemish government, the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) proposed a ban on the “burqini” on the country’s beaches in August. Many municipalities had already banned full-body swimsuits in municipal swimming pools. Other politicians publicly criticized the wearing of burqinis while opposing a legal ban, according to public press statements.

The Ministry of Justice allocated just above 100 million euros ($105.37 million) for clergy salaries and other financial support for recognized religious groups, a small increase from the previous year. Catholic groups continued to receive approximately 85 percent of the total available funding for religious groups, followed by secular humanists (8 percent) and Protestant groups (2.5 percent). Muslims continued to receive approximately 2 percent of the funding. Muslim observers stated the distribution of government subsidies continued not to account for the actual number of practicing believers and the actual level of services required for imams and mosques.

Separately, the government allocated an additional 3.3 million euros ($3.48 million) to pay the salaries of 80 new imams and double the number of Muslim clergy previously receiving funding. The governments of the francophone community and the region of Wallonia founded a new institute for the education of Muslim clergy and scholars.

Municipalities reportedly continued to allocate more money for the maintenance of local Catholic Church buildings than for the construction or maintenance of other places of worship.

Muslim groups and the federal government reported the Flemish regional government was slow to approve recognition of mosques already approved at the federal level. The Flemish Government cited security concerns.

Muslim groups reported city and town administrations often withheld approval, or were slow to approve construction of new mosques and Islamic cultural centers. For example, in Court-Saint-Etienne city authorities denied an application for the construction of a new mosque three times over the past four years, citing incompatibility with zoning and architectural regulations.

The city of Mechelen allocated a part of the town cemetery for gravesites oriented to the southeast. The city’s Muslim residents had long requested the option for Mecca-facing burial.

Some Muslim parents reportedly withdrew their children from Gulenist schools in Flanders following verbal and physical attacks and vandalism of buildings across the country after the July coup attempt in Turkey. Flemish Minister President Geert Bourgeois expressed concern over parents being pressured to remove their children from the Lucerna Schools, saying it should not happen.

The municipality of Molenbeek announced it had closed a small Quranic school for young children. The municipality cited violations of building safety codes and a lack of training of the instructors.

Primary school religion teachers in French-speaking schools reportedly expressed concern registration for their classes would decline following the 2015 constitutional court ruling allowing parents to opt out of religion and ethics classes for their children.

Representatives of the Muslim community, such as the League of Imams and the Muslim Executive, publicly condemned the March 22 attacks, for which ISIS claimed responsibility. Local and international media accounts contained quotes from numerous Muslim organizations and individual Muslims deploring the attacks. There were also some media reports of isolated groups of Muslims celebrating the attacks. NGOs and other civil society representatives said these reports, including comments by Minister of the Interior Jan Jambon, overstated the number of sympathizers for the attacks.

Both Unia and NGO Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie (CCIB) reported a significant increase in anti-Muslim incidents in the wake of the Brussels attacks. In March individuals characterized in the media as soccer hooligans carried an anti-Islamic State banner and shouted Nazi slogans in a clash with riot police. A bystander was quoted as saying the men were also making “the Nazi salute, shouting ‘death to Arabs’.” Anti-Muslim protestors also demonstrated in Brussels and Antwerp in April and May.

The media also reported counter-demonstrations against hatred of Muslims. In April police reportedly arrested 24 individuals for going ahead with a banned demonstration against hatred of Muslims.

Incidents of discrimination against Muslims continued to occur in the workplace. Muslim women wearing headscarves said they continued to be targets of discrimination. In January the director of a Brussels school rejected the application of a French language teacher with a common Muslim name for a full time position. When she reapplied the next day, changing her name to a common French name, the school director promptly offered her an appointment. Confronted with the facts, the school director stated the position had been closed but then re-opened.

Private employers continued to have the right to ban religious attire such as headscarves if they believed such attire would interfere with the performance of an employee’s duties. Employers said the law justified such restrictions based on a written company policy of “religious neutrality.”

Preliminary figures from Unia on workplace discrimination during the year showed 88 complaints based on religious discrimination, compared to 46 in 2015.

In terms of overall religious discrimination and harassment, Unia reported it had received 330 complaints in 2015, the most recent year for which comprehensive data was available, although this did not include anti-Semitic incidents. This total compared with 297 such complaints reported by Unia in 2014. Ninety-one percent of the religious discrimination or harassment complaints in 2015 concerned Muslims. The vast majority of the complaints involved hate speech on the internet, but many cases concerned labor or education issues. Fifty-five percent of incidents were media-related, 14 percent labor-related and 11 percent school-related.

In the wake of the Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks, media reported increases in anti-Muslim statements on social media and online forums, and in public opinion surveys. As part of a survey measuring public trust in government institutions, involving interviews conducted with a sample of citizens during 2015 and again during the current year, questions concerning the influx of immigrants revealed 63 percent of ethnic Belgians (Flemings and Walloons) stated they were “afraid” of the influx of refugees into Europe because the refugees were Muslim. The survey, which was commissioned by the French-language daily newspaper Le Soir and the French-language public broadcaster RTBF, also included interviews with a sample of Muslim citizens, who were questioned about whether they “liked” Western culture, the Western way of life, and other issues. Although 91 percent of the Muslim citizens surveyed condemned the terrorist attacks, media coverage highlighted the 33 percent who allegedly preferred another type of political system. Some survey researchers criticized the wording of the questions measuring this sentiment as unclear and potentially slanting the results.

Anti-Semitic acts and threats recorded by Unia decreased from 130 in 2014 to 57 in 2015, the last year for which data was available. According to academic and other observers and press reporting, segments of the Muslim community continued to be responsible for most anti-Semitic activity. Unia attributed the decline to the increased security at Jewish institutions, which it said probably discouraged potential perpetrators.

Jewish groups reported there were anti-Semitic statements and attitudes in the media, especially but not exclusively related to the government of Israel and the Holocaust. Jewish pupils also reportedly faced anti-Semitic abuse in public schools In one case, the mother of a 12-year-old filed a police complaint in June reporting anti-Semitic bullying at a school in the Brussels suburbs, including jokes referencing the Holocaust, which had taken place over two years. LBCA president Joel Rubinfeld stated it was one of several recent anti-Semitic bullying incidents in schools. The education board continued to investigate the case as of year’s end.

In March a visiting Dutch rabbi told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency that stones were thrown at him and a friend by unseen individuals while he was walking through a park in the south of Brussels. He said he thought the stones were thrown at him because he was “visibly Jewish.” No one was hurt in the incident.

In July during a tennis tournament, as two players were arguing over a point, one of them shouted to his opponent “They should have gassed you all.”

In August media reported the 15-year old son of an imam published a video calling for the “murder of all Christians.” While the son later reportedly expressed regret for the video and said he had used the wrong words, the incident again called attention to his father. In November the father, who was not a Belgian citizen, was deemed a “hate preacher” by the authorities and was ordered to leave the country. He left the country later in November.

Embassy officers met with representatives from the prime minister’s office; the ministries of foreign affairs, interior, and justice; and the regional governments to discuss anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic incidents, foreign government pressure on the country’s Muslims, the prospects for official recognition of Buddhism and Hinduism, and plans for recognition of additional places of worship. The State Department’s Special Representative to Muslim Communities visited in March and met with officials at the ministries of justice and interior. He discussed efforts to strengthen tolerance in civil society and the country’s relations with Muslim majority countries.

Embassy officers continued to engage leaders and activists within the Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish communities to promote interreligious understanding. Embassy officers continued to meet regularly with NGOs monitoring incidents of religious discrimination. Embassy also continued to discuss anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic incidents and discrimination with religious community leaders.

During his visit, the State Department’s Special Representative to Muslim Communities also organized workshops for civil society groups concerned with discrimination and freedom of religious expression. In June another visiting U.S. government official met with Jewish community representatives and the European Network Against Racism to discuss anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic sentiment.

The embassy sponsored the visit of a U.S. imam, who met with several activists and Muslim representatives to discuss recent developments in the country’s Muslim community.

The embassy financially supported programs promoting interfaith dialogue and antidiscrimination among Brussels youth. Both programs brought together Muslim and Jewish youth, along with youth adhering to other religions or to no religion, to learn about their common heritage and citizenship.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 354,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2010 census (the most recent), the Roman Catholic Church is the largest religious group, accounting for 40 percent of the population. Protestants make up 31.8 percent, including Pentecostals (8.5 percent), Seventh-day Adventists (5.5 percent), Anglicans (4.7 percent), Mennonites (3.8 percent), Baptists (3.6 percent), Methodists (2.9 percent), and the Church of the Nazarene (2.8 percent). Jehovah’s Witnesses make up 1.7 percent of the population, while other religious groups, which include The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, Rastafarians, the Salvation Army, and Bahais, together constitute 10.9 percent. The percentage of the population not belonging to any listed religious affiliation is 15.6.

No religious group is a majority in any of the country’s six districts. Catholics live throughout the country. Mennonites and Pentecostals live mostly in the rural areas of the Cayo and Orange Walk Districts.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, freedom to change religion or belief, and freedom – either alone or in community with others – to manifest and propagate one’s religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance. It states that no one may be compelled to take an oath contrary to one’s religion or belief. The constitution stipulates that religious groups may establish places of education and states that “no such community shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for persons of that community.” Discrimination on religious grounds is illegal.

The preamble to the constitution acknowledges “the supremacy of God.” The governor general appoints one of the 12 members of the senate following the advice of the Council of Churches and the AEC. The two groups together include the Anglican, Catholic, Methodist, and Presbyterian churches, the Salvation Army, the Chinese Christian Mission, the Church of Christ, Assembly of God Church, the Seventh-day Adventists, and other evangelical Protestant groups.

An unenforced law limits speech that is “blasphemous or indecent.”

Religious groups must register with the official Companies Registry in a process similar to that of a business. Registration permits the religious organization to operate legally in the country, be recognized by the state, negotiate, sue and be sued, own property, hire employees, and lend or borrow money. There is a onetime registration fee of 295 Belize dollars ($148) and a yearly fee of five Belize dollars ($2.50). Requirements for registration are a memorandum of association with the government, which sets out the group’s objective and mission, an article of association, and a letter from the central bank, if the organization has foreign financial contributors. The government may shut down the facilities of groups that fail to register.

The government does not levy property taxes on churches and other places of worship, but other church-owned buildings occupied on a regular basis, such as clergy residences, are not exempt. Religious organizations may also partner with the state to operate schools, run hospitals and other charity organizations, and, depending on funding availability, receive financial assistance from the government.

Foreign religious workers require a religious worker’s visa to enter the country and proselytize. They must also purchase a religious worker’s permit.

The public school curriculum includes weekly nondenominational “spirituality” classes including morals, values, and world religions for students in both public and church-run schools from kindergarten through sixth grade. While there is no official rule governing students’ ability to opt out of these sessions, parents may decide their children will not attend. The constitution prohibits any educational institution from obligating a child to attend any religious ceremonies or observances. Most public elementary schools, high schools, and some colleges are church-managed. Catholic and other Christian holidays are routinely observed.

The defense force retains a Christian chaplain. Clergy from different religious groups have applied and regularly been granted access to serve inmates at the Belize Central Prison.

Government Practices

In late 2015, a dispute over church representation in the senate caused a division among members of the Belize Association of Evangelical Churches (AEC), leading to the formation of a new group called the National Evangelical Association (NEA). As the NEA was not officially recognized by the government, it could not contribute to the choice of the church representative in the senate.

The government continued to own a single prison, managed by a Christian NGO, the Kolbe Foundation. The foundation coordinated religious instruction for inmates. Religion formed the basis of the prisoner rehabilitation program. Religious leaders from varying denominations visited the prison to hold services at a nondenominational chapel within the prison. The prison respected dietary restrictions for prisoners from various religious backgrounds.

Leaders of the Council of Churches said certain evangelical pastors acted irresponsibly in their radio and television broadcasts, attacking religious leaders who supported an August Supreme Court ruling that found parts of the criminal code criminalizing consensual same-sex activities unconstitutional. A representative from the council said there was “a need for respect and responsibility” in practicing religious freedom.

U.S. embassy representatives interacted with a wide spectrum of religious groups to reinforce the importance of religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 10.7 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2013 census, 48.5 percent is Christian, 27.7 percent Muslim (mostly Sunni), 11.6 percent Voodoo, 2.6 percent indigenous religious groups, and 2.6 percent other religious groups. The largest Christian denominations are Roman Catholic with 25.5 percent of the population and Celestial Christian with 6.7 percent. Groups each constituting less than 5 percent of the population include Methodists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Bahais, Baptists, Pentecostals, followers of the Family Federation of World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), and Eckankar followers. The census reported 5.8 percent declare no religious affiliation.

Many individuals who identify themselves as Christian or Muslim also practice Voodoo or other traditional religions.

Most Muslims are concentrated in northern areas. The few Shia Muslims are primarily foreign residents. Southern areas are more heavily Christian.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes a secular state, prohibits religious discrimination, and provides for freedom of religious thought, expression, and practice, consistent with public order as established by law and regulations.

The Ministry of Defense through its gendarmes, generally in rural areas, and the Ministry of Interior through the police, generally in cities, have the authority to intervene in conflicts between religious groups to ensure public order and social peace, provided the intervention complies with the principle of state neutrality in religious affairs.

Persons who wish to form a religious group must register with the Ministry of Interior. Registration requirements include submission of administrative materials (including the applicant’s birth certificate, police record, request letter, copy of identification, and the group’s internal rules) and payment of a registration fee of 50, 000 CFA francs ($80). If a group is not registered, the Ministry of Interior will order the closing of the religious facilities until the group is registered.

By law, public schools may not provide religious instruction. Religious groups may establish private schools given the authorization of the state and may benefit from state subsidies.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Following a dispute between two relatives competing to become the imam of a mosque in Semere in the commune of Ouake, local authorities in October closed the mosque to allow for the two sides to come to an understanding. Supporters of the disputing parties, however, forced the mosque doors open for Friday prayers, according to the local police chief. Security forces intervened, resulting in five dead and many others injured.

On July 3, two factions of the Protestant Methodist Church of Benin signed an agreement that ended a 19-year-old feud between the two groups. Political leaders and media commentators attributed the agreement largely to President Patrice Talon’s mediation efforts. The two factions disagreed over the ownership of specific properties, despite a court ruling in favor of one faction. President Talon coordinated and attended a church service on July 3 at the Palais des Congres in Cotonou where leaders of the two factions signed a memorandum of understanding on reaching reconciliation.

On the occasion of Eid al-Fitr, the government, supporting an initiative of the former ombudsman, officially launched a petition requesting that the UN Secretary General create an appropriate structure for interreligious and intercultural dialogue for peace. The initiative was a follow-up to the May 2015 international symposium held in Cotonou on the theme “African Initiative on Education for Peace and Development through Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue.” Many local religious and political leaders committed themselves to this initiative and to implementing projects to increase religious tolerance.

Government officials attended inductions, funerals, and other religious ceremonies organized by various groups. State-owned television often broadcast these events. Police provided security for any religious event upon request.

There were reports of interreligious conflict that involved intervention by government security forces. On the night of May 10, a group of Voodoo followers vandalized the Catholic prayer center of Notre Dame de Lanta in the commune of Klouekanmey in the southwestern part of the country. According to media reports, the Voodoo followers accused the chaplain in charge of the prayer center with counteracting the efficacy of their rituals intended to make rainfall in the region. They reportedly also blamed the chaplain for angering their deity by building the prayer center and practicing Catholic rites in the area. Gendarmes intervened in the conflict to restore peace to the community.

Residents of Save destroyed one of the mosques belonging to the Benin chapter of the Ahmadi Muslim Association in Save, in the central part of the country. A larger mosque was erected on the site of the old mosque with foreign funding, but the Ahmadi community stated that they had no role in the new mosque.

Several NGOs, including UNICEF and Plan International, raised concerns about the inability for individuals in Voodoo convents to leave or convert from the religious group. International media sources reported that children were often abducted and forcibly enrolled in such convents and were sometimes restricted when attempting to leave. UNICEF reported 432 convents in five of 77 municipalities.

Interfaith dialogue occurred regularly. On May 14, the Ecumenical Foundation for Peace in Africa (EFPA) gathered religious and traditional leaders from Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, France, and Asia in the city of Azove. Participants made a pledge to advance peace in the country and in Africa by fostering interreligious dialogue. In a keynote address, the president of EFPA cited potential threats to religious concord in the country and called for concerted efforts to address them. The president of EFPA raised issues about conflict within the Protestant Church, minor conflicts between the Catholic Church and Voodoo followers, land disputes involving religious groups, among other topics. The event concluded with a parade and a concert in Azove to engage the local population.

During the year, embassy officials met with imams and other religious leaders to encourage religious tolerance. On January 28, embassy officials met with representatives of the Framework for Interfaith Dialogue in Kandi to discuss religious freedom and tolerance. Discussions focused on strategies developed by the Framework to promote religious tolerance while countering the threat of violent extremism in Kandi.

On June 27, the Ambassador hosted an iftar for prominent imams and Islamic scholars. The Ambassador highlighted the importance of tolerance and interfaith dialogue.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 750,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the Pew Research Center, approximately 75 percent of the population follows the Drukpa Kagyu or Nyingma schools of Buddhism, while Hindus comprise approximately 22 percent of the total population and reside mostly in southern areas of the country.

Estimates of the size of the Christian community range from 2,000 (from the Pew Research Center) to 15,000 (from the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Transformation Index 2016 country report). The estimates by local and international Christian groups range from 3,000 to15,000. Most Christians are reportedly concentrated in towns in the south of the country. Although traditional Bon practices are often combined with Buddhist practices, very few citizens adhere exclusively to this religious tradition, according to scholars. The Sharchop ethnic group, which forms the majority of the population in the east, practices elements of Tibetan Buddhism combined with elements of the Bon tradition and Hinduism, according to the advocacy group Alliance Defending Freedom.

According to a December estimate by the Ministry of Labor and Human Resources there are 54,000 Indian laborers in the country, most of whom are Hindu or Muslim.

Legal Framework

The constitution recognizes Buddhism as the state’s “spiritual heritage” and stipulates it is “the responsibility of all religious institutions and personalities to promote the spiritual heritage of the country.” The constitution states every citizen has “the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” and bans discrimination based on religion. The constitution states the king must be Buddhist and requires the king to be the “protector of all religions.”

The constitution states “no person shall be compelled to belong to another faith by means of coercion or inducement.” The penal code criminalizes coercion or inducement to convert as a misdemeanor, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment.

The law prohibits oral or written communication “promoting enmity between religious groups” and provides for sentences of up to three years’ imprisonment for violations. There were no reports of prosecutions.

The penal code states individuals found guilty of promoting civil unrest by advocating “religious abhorrence,” disturbing public tranquility, or committing an act “prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony” between religious groups shall be subject to punishment of five to nine years’ imprisonment. There were no reports of prosecutions.

The law requires religious groups to register with the CRO. In order to register, a religious group must submit an application demonstrating its leaders are citizens and disclosing their educational background and financial assets. The law also specifies the organizational structure, bylaws, and procedural rules registered religious organizations must follow. The law prohibits religious organizations from “violating the spiritual heritage” of the country and requires them to protect and promote it. The law also states no religious organization shall do anything to impair the sovereignty, security, unity, or territorial integrity of the country. The law mandates the CRO certify religious groups applying for registration meet the requirements specified in the law.

Registered religious groups may raise funds for religious activities and are exempt from taxes. Registered groups require permission from local government authorities to hold public meetings outside of their registered facilities and must seek permission from the Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs to invite foreign speakers to address them or to receive foreign funds.

Unregistered religious groups may not organize publicly, own property, raise funds, conduct outreach activities, or import literature. According to the law, these activities are subject to penalties ranging from fines to prison terms, depending upon the offense. Unregistered religious groups may hold private worship services in homes. The law states it is an offense for a religious group to provide false or misleading information in its religious teachings, to misuse investments, or to raise funds illegally. The CRO has authority to determine whether the content of a group’s religious teachings is false or misleading, as well as whether it has raised funds illegally. Sanctions include fines and potential revocation of registration.

The law states the CRO shall consist of an eight-member board responsible for overseeing the structure of religious institutions, enforcing the constitutional separation between the government and religious organizations, and monitoring religious fundraising activities. The chairperson of the board is a cabinet minister appointed by the prime minister. A senior official from the Ministry of Finance and one of the king’s appointees to the National Council also sit on the board. The director of culture in the Ministry of Home Affairs serves as an ex-officio secretary. The remaining seats are occupied by the heads of Buddhist religious bodies and a Hindu body. The law requires the CRO to “ensure that religious institutions and personalities promote the spiritual heritage of the country” by developing a society “rooted in Buddhist ethos.”

The constitution states the king shall appoint the chief abbot of the central monastic body on the advice of the five masters of the monastic body. Those individuals and a civil servant administrative secretary make up the Commission for Monastic Affairs, which manages issues related to Buddhist doctrine. The constitution says the state will provide funds and “facilities” to the central monastic body.

The law permits the government to “avoid breaches of the peace” by requiring licenses for public assembly, prohibiting assembly in designated areas, and imposing curfews. The government may apply these measures to groups and organizations of all kinds, including religious groups.

Government approval is required to construct religious buildings. All religious buildings are legally required to adhere to traditional Bhutanese architectural standards. The CRO determines conformity with these standards.

The constitution states religious institutions have the responsibility to ensure religion remains separate from the state. It also says “religious institutions and personalities shall remain above politics.”

The law prohibits religious organizations from involvement in political activity. Ordained members of the clergy of any religion are prohibited from engaging in political activities, including running for office or voting.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

NGO representatives continued to express concern over the lack of a clear definition in the constitution and legal code for terms such as “inducement to religious conversion.” They stated the lack of clarity continued to put the religious activities of minority religious groups at risk, citing religious teaching, charitable services, and public education as examples of activities that could be penalized. Civil society representatives continued to say there was the potential for misuse and arbitrary action by the government, but they confirmed religious conversions nonetheless continued to take place. They stated the government had not used the law to penalize anyone as of the end of the year.

At least one group of Christian churches reportedly applied for registration, but did not receive a response from the CRO as of year’s end. As it had in previous years, the CRO reported no Christian groups had applied for registration. Members of Christian associations reported Christian groups had similarly attempted to register on multiple occasions in the past, but had also received no official response. Christian groups said the lack of registration meant they continued not to be able to raise funds.

Christian groups and media sources reported the government continued to provide preferential treatment for Buddhist groups in terms of registration and financial support. Of a total of 96 registered groups, the Hindu Dharma Samudaya, an umbrella body representing the Hindu population, remained the only registered non-Buddhist organization.

NGO representatives reported unregistered religious groups continued to be able to worship in private, but remained unable to exercise certain rights such as property ownership.

Members of the Christian community continued to report holding religious meetings discreetly in private facilities. They also continued to report some Christians living close to the country’s border traveled to India for worship.

The government continued its financial assistance for the construction of Buddhist temples and shrines, as well as funding for monks and monasteries. Government construction continued on a large Hindu temple in Thimphu.

Local NGOs reported there continued to be compulsory Buddhist prayer sessions in schools every morning. There were reports children of Christian families faced discrimination from teachers and were sometimes denied access to schools. The government reportedly continued to provide scholarships for Hindus to study Sanskrit in India.

Some government institutions, such as courts, remained housed within Buddhist monasteries. Some religious groups stated government ceremonies continued to involve mandatory Buddhist prayer rituals. Although there were reports of Christians employed in government contracting positions, NGO representatives continued to report government pressure on non-Buddhists to observe “traditional Drukpa values” and participate in Buddhist prayer rituals. According to NGOs, some non-Buddhist government employees continued to say their participation in these ceremonies was a requirement for career advancement.

According to NGOs, there continued to be societal pressure on individuals to participate in Buddhist traditions and practices.

The NGO Open Doors reported Christians continued to face discrimination in their personal and professional lives.

The United States does not have a diplomatic presence in the country and does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with the government. The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi continued to conduct informal relations through periodic visits, including by the Ambassador. Embassy officers promoted tolerance of religious minorities in meetings with government officials and discussed issues affecting religious minorities in meetings with NGOs and members of various religious communities.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 10.9 million (July 2016 estimate). According to U.S. government figures, 77 percent of the population identifies as Roman Catholic and 16 percent as Protestant, including evangelical and Pentecostal groups. Approximately two percent identify with smaller religious groups and five percent self-identify as nonbelievers. There are between 300-400 Muslims and approximately 500 Jews. Many indigenous communities, concentrated in rural areas, practice a mix of Catholic and indigenous traditions.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, the state respects and provides for “freedom of thought, spirituality, religion and cult, expressed individually or collectively, in public and in private.” The constitution stipulates the state is independent of all religion.

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination, including in access to educational institutions, and protects the right of access to public sport and recreational activities without regard to religion.

The law requires religious groups to register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Office of Religion and Nongovernmental Organizations as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in order to operate legally. Registered religious groups receive tax, customs, and other legal benefits. To register, religious organizations must file a notarized listing of the names, identification numbers, tax certificates, and police files of national leaders, as well as notarized lists of names and identification numbers of their entire membership. They also must submit a report of their general activities and financial records. They must repeat this process annually to remain registered; the government reserves the right to revoke an organization’s operating permit if it does not comply. The government may not deny legal recognition to any organization based on its articles of faith, and there is no fee for registration. The complexity of the procedure, however, including several bureaucratic antecedents such as registering the legal name of the organization, causes many organizations to seek legal assistance in order to comply.

Pursuant to an accord with the Holy See, which has diplomatic representation in the country, the Catholic Church is exempt from the registration law.

The constitution and other laws give educational institutions the option to teach religion, including indigenous spiritual belief classes, with the aim of encouraging mutual respect among religious communities. While religion classes are optional, schools must teach ethics with curriculum materials that promote religious tolerance.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights.

Government Practices

The registry of the MFA’s Office of Religion and Nongovernmental Organizations counted 434 registered religious groups and approximately nine religious groups in the process of registering. The Constitutional Court in July ruled against a motion filed by the National Association of Evangelicals that challenged the constitutionality of the law requiring churches to register their legal charters with the government. In what they described as an act of “civil disobedience,” several evangelical leaders established “house churches” to avoid having to comply with the government’s registration requirements. Evangelical groups stated their concern that government registration processes required too much information that could be misused or used malignantly. Evangelical leaders worked with the president and other government officials to create legislation to suspend the registration requirements for all churches for five years. The proposal remained pending in congress.

In April the Bolivian Bishop’s Conference publicly stated that narcotraffickers had infiltrated and compromised government institutions. These leaders further stated the drug situation had worsened and narcotraffickers used children as drug mules in the Chapare region. The Bishop’s Conference published a letter saying the government was not doing enough to combat the drug problem. In response to these criticisms, President Morales challenged the Catholic Church authorities to provide names of the government officials they alleged were involved in drug trafficking. Morales publicly criticized certain Catholic leaders and issued threats of legal action for alleged crimes, including what the government said were the rapes of children by priests. Catholic Church leaders said the government had placed restrictive reporting requirements on church programs and projects and tax inspectors had increased their scrutiny of all church activities.

According to several evangelical leaders, government officials often participated in interfaith meetings and religious ceremonies. These leaders said the government invited certain groups more frequently than others to participate in official government ceremonies. Catholic and Christian evangelical leaders, said the government favored an Andean spiritual philosophy, especially that of the ethnic Aymara community, over other religious beliefs, for public statements and ceremonies. They stated this was a violation of the constitution’s separation of religion and state. Other observers said senior government officials, including the vice president and regional governor, also attended Catholic masses in their official capacity.

President Morales made verbal statements against various Christian and Catholic Church leaders, saying these leaders and the religions they represented were “pro-imperialist.” According to church leaders, the president believed organized Christian religions, including the Catholic Church, shared the beliefs of the “colonizers,” and the government should diminish such influences.

Evangelical leaders said several of their pastors in rural areas were victims of physical abuse by indigenous religious leaders for refusing to participate in ancestral rituals. Evangelical Christians reported instances of forceful expulsions of their missionaries or pastors from rural communities by adherents of traditional Andean spiritual beliefs.

U.S. government access to Bolivian government officials is limited. Embassy staff, however, routinely engaged religious leaders to underscore the importance of tolerance and religious freedom. The Charge d’Affaires in October hosted an interfaith meeting for religious leaders to discuss religious freedom issues and to engage religious leaders in interfaith dialogue. Religious representatives discussed the government’s respect for religious freedom and practices, the alleged favoring of Andean religious ceremonies and rituals, and longstanding tensions between the Catholic community and the Morales administration.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.9 million (July 2016 estimate). On June 30, the country’s Agency of Statistics released the results of the first post-conflict population census conducted in October 2013. According to the results, Sunni Muslims constitute approximately 51 percent of the population, Serbian Orthodox Christians 31 percent, Roman Catholics 15 percent, and others, including Protestants and Jews, approximately 3 percent.

There is a strong correlation between ethnicity and religion: Bosnian Serbs with the SOC, and Bosnian Croats with the Roman Catholic Church. Bosniaks are predominantly Muslims. According to the Jewish community, it has approximately 1,000 members, with the majority living in Sarajevo. The majority of Serbian Orthodox adherents live in the RS, and the majority of Muslims and Catholics in the Federation. Protestant and most other small religious communities have their largest membership in Sarajevo and Banja Luka.

Legal Framework

Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which serves as the country’s constitution, provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. It stipulates no one shall be deprived of citizenship on grounds of religion and all persons shall enjoy the same rights and freedoms without discrimination as to religion. The entity constitution of the Federation states all individuals shall have freedom of religion, including of public and private worship, and freedom from discrimination based on religion or creed. It defines religion as a vital national interest of constituent peoples.

The entity constitution of the RS establishes the SOC as “the church of the Serb people and other people of Orthodox religion.” It guarantees equal freedoms, rights, and duties for all citizens, irrespective of religion, and specifies religious communities shall be equal before the law and free to manage their religious affairs and hold religious services; open religious schools and conduct religious education in all schools; engage in commercial activities; receive gifts; and establish and manage legacies in accordance with the law.

A state law on religion guarantees freedom of conscience, grants legal status to churches and religious communities, and grants to registered religious communities numerous rights, including the right to assemble, to conduct collaborative actions such as charity work, to raise funds, and to construct and occupy places of worship. The law states churches and religious communities serve as representative institutions and organizations of believers, founded in accordance with their own regulations, teachings, beliefs, traditions, and practices. The law recognizes the legal status of four “traditional” religious communities: the IC, the SOC, the Catholic Church, and the Jewish community. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) maintains a unified register of all religious communities, and the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees is responsible for documenting violations of religious freedom.

According to the law, any group of 300 or more adult citizens may apply to register a new religious community or church through a written application to the MOJ. Other legal requirements for registration include the development of a statute defining the method of religious practice and a petition for establishment with the signatures of at least 30 founders. The ministry must issue a decision within 30 days of receipt of the application, and a group may appeal a negative decision to the state-level Council of Ministers. The law allows registered religious organizations to operate without restrictions. The law also stipulates the ministry may deny the application for registration if it concludes the content and manner of worship may be “contrary to legal order, public morale, or is damaging to the life and health or other rights and freedoms of believers and citizens.”

The law states no new church or religious community may be founded bearing the same or similar name as an existing church or religious community. The law also states no one may use the symbols, insignia, or attributes of a church or a religious community without their consent.

A concordat with the Holy See recognizes the public juridical personality of the Catholic Church and grants a number of rights, including establishing educational and charitable institutions, carrying out religious education, and official recognition of Catholic holidays. The commission for implementation of the concordat comprises five members from the government and five from the Holy See. A similar agreement exists with the SOC, but a commission for implementation does not yet exist.

The state recognizes the IC as the sole supreme institutional religious authority for all Muslims, including immigrants and refugees, as well as for Bosniaks and other Muslim nationals living outside the country who accept the IC’s authority. According to law, no Islamic group may register with the MOJ, or open a mosque, without the permission of the IC.

The law affirms the right of every citizen to religious education. The law calls for a representative of each of the officially registered religious communities to be responsible for teaching religious studies in all public and private pre-, primary, and secondary schools and universities. Children from minority religious groups are entitled to religious education only when there are 18 or more students from that religious group in one class. Religious communities train and select their respective religious education teachers. These individuals are employees of the schools in which they teach, but receive accreditation from the religious body governing the curriculum.

The IC, the SOC, and the Catholic Church develop and approve religious curricula across the country. Public schools offer religious education in a school’s majority religion, with some exceptions. Secondary students who do not wish to attend the religion class have the legal right to opt out if their school offers a class in ethics as an alternative, which many schools do. Primary school students may do the same at their parents’ request.

In the Federation’s five Bosniak-majority cantons, primary and secondary schools offer Islamic religious instruction as a twice-weekly course. In cantons with Croat majorities, Croat students in primary and secondary schools attend an elective Catholic religion course twice a week. In the 13 primary and secondary Catholic schools in the Federation, parents may choose either an elective Catholic religion course or a course in ethics. In Sarajevo and Tuzla, primary and secondary students may either opt out or take ethics courses in lieu of religious education classes. The Sarajevo Canton Ministry of Education offers Orthodox and Protestant religious education in addition to classes offered to the Muslim and Catholic communities.

A law against discrimination prohibits exclusion, limitation, or preferential treatment of individuals based on religion in employment, and the provision of social services in both the government and private sectors.

The Bosnia and Herzegovina constitution provides for representation of the three major ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) in the government and the armed forces. The constitution makes no explicit mention of representation for religious groups, although each ethnicity mentioned by the constitution is associated with a particular religion. Parliamentary seats and government positions are apportioned among the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) according to quotas set by constitutional provisions.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Legal proceedings in Livno Municipal Court continued throughout the year without conclusion against eight individuals charged with perpetrating a 2015 attack on a mosque in the Omerovici village of Tomislavgrad, which involved verbally attacking worshippers, breaking windows, and placing a propane tank in front of the premises.

In February, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council reconfirmed its 2015 decision prohibiting employees of judicial institutions from wearing any form of “religious insignia” at work, including headscarves. On February 7, according to media reports, more than 2,000 women marched in Sarajevo to protest the measure.

According to IC officials, Croat and Serb members of the presidency reportedly continued to resist an agreement between the government and the IC approved in 2015 by the Council of Ministers on dietary restrictions in public institutions, employer accommodations for daily prayer, time off to attend Friday prayers, and a one-time trip to Mecca for the Hajj. As of year’s end, the presidency had neither approved the agreement nor sent it to parliament for ratification.

According to representatives of the Catholic Church, the joint commission for implementation of the concordat with the Holy See made gradual progress but failed to reach agreement because the government and parliament remained unwilling to implement the church’s proposals, including specific legislation on observing religious holidays.

There continued to be no agreement on establishing a commission to implement the government’s agreement with the SOC. According to SOC representatives, the lack of government initiative and the SOC’s inability to reach internal consensus among its bishops regarding the composition of the commission contributed to the continued failure to reach an agreement.

Religious officials of minority populations throughout the country continued to report discrimination by local authorities regarding the use of religious property and the issuance of permits for new religious properties. In one instance, the Banja Luka Catholic diocese reported the Drvar municipal authorities continued to refuse construction permits for a new Catholic Church, emphasizing there had not been one prior to the 1990s conflict. Catholic Church officials in Banja Luka also reported the continued refusal of municipal authorities to return any of their nationalized properties, even after the authorities returned most of the previously nationalized property to the SOC.

Mostar city officials continued to deny issuance of the necessary reconstruction permits to the Mostar Evangelical Church to rebuild the church in the city center, as they have for the past 17 years, despite the evangelical church’s reported completion of all the legal and administrative requirements. Church representatives said this was the result of their continued failure to pay a bribe to municipal officials, as well as active lobbying by local Catholic Church officials against the evangelical church’s presence in Mostar.

Officials continued not to implement provisions in the law regarding religious education, particularly in segregated school systems or where there was resistance from party officials at the municipal level. In the RS, parents of more than 500 Bosniak returnee children in several communities, including Konjevic Polje in the Bratunac municipality and Vrbanjci in the Kotor Varos municipality, continued to boycott public schools for a fourth year, choosing instead to send their children to alternative schools organized by the IC and financed by the Federation Ministry of Education. Parents organized the boycott in response to a refusal by the RS Ministry of Education to approve a group of national subjects, including religious education, for the Bosniak returnee community. According to academics and representatives from NGOs, students from both majority and minority religious communities continued to face social pressure from teachers and peers to attend instruction in their respective religions.

Religious minorities, especially those comprising refugees returning to their original communities pursuant to the Dayton Peace Agreement, such as Bosniak communities in the RS, continued to report selective enforcement of their rights by government authorities. They said the authorities often failed to provide government services and protections to the minorities, including access to health care, pensions, and other social benefits, and the transfer of student records between districts as needed. Leaders of minority religious groups also continued to report discrimination by local authorities in terms of providing police protection and investigating threats of violence, harassment, and vandalism. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many actions as being solely based on religious identity.

Government authorities continued not to implement a 2009 decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) calling for an amendment to the constitution to allow religious and other minorities, including Jews, to run for president and the parliament’s upper house. According to the ECHR ruling, observers said, the constitution discriminated against minority groups in apportioning government positions and seats in the parliament only among Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, which by extension meant to the SOC, the Catholic Church, and the Muslim community, respectively. Individuals who did not self-identify with one of the three major ethnic/religious groups said they continued to be unable to hold one of the proportionally guaranteed government positions, including president.

Political parties dominated by a single ethnic group continued to identify closely with the religion associated with that ethnic group. The biggest ethnic Bosniak party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), remained aligned with the IC. The biggest ethnic Croat party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), remained associated with the Catholic Church. The two largest Serb parties, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), remained associated with the SOC.

In October, the Sarajevo Canton Assembly named a street and an elementary school after Mustafa Busuladzic, a World War II-era anti-Semite who glorified Hitler. The president of the Jewish Community strongly condemned the act. As of the end of the year, the school had not officially changed its name.

On August 22, Sarajevo Canton Police arrested an individual on suspicion of arson related to a blaze set the day before to a work shed attached to the SOC Holy Transfiguration Church in Sarajevo. Police identified and detained the suspect through a video surveillance tape obtained from the church. The police established no motive for the arson. The investigation remained ongoing as of the end of the year. Representatives from each of the religious communities, the IRC, and numerous local politicians and citizens condemned the incident. According to SOC officials, the church had been subject to more than 40 acts of vandalism since 2000.

The arson case was the only one out of nine cases involving attacks against religious sites in which the police arrested a suspected perpetrator, according to the IRC. The other eight cases involved vandalism at seven Islamic sites (primarily in the RS) and at one other Orthodox site in the Federation. The police investigated but did not report results in most of these eight cases, which mainly involved breaking windows and vandalizing graves, although the vandalism was accompanied by verbal attacks on religious officials in a few of the cases. Police did not ascribe these incidents to religious hatred, but stated the individuals responsible were either juveniles or intoxicated or mentally unstable. For example, police charged an individual with a misdemeanor and fined him 1,000 convertible marks ($539) for urinating on a memorial at the Atik Mosque in Bijeljina dedicated to Bosniak war dead. According to the IRC, which continued to monitor attacks on religious sites and advocate for the criminal prosecution of the perpetrators, the police response continued to reflect ignorance about hate crimes and a desire to deflect attention away from possible religious intolerance.

There were continued reports of conflicts between members of the IC and minority Muslim groups, some of them Shia, who practiced outside the IC’s purview. Incidents included physical and verbal confrontations during Friday prayers, when minority Muslims disrupted prayers to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with traditional Bosniak interpretations of Islam, according to the IC. There were no reports of injuries. Some members of the IC continued to refer to adherents of minority Salafist groups as intolerant or extremist or as “Wahhabis.”

In February, the IC called on 64 unregistered Islamic congregations (or para-jamaats), which gathered predominantly Salafist followers and operated outside the purview of the IC, to cease their “unsanctioned” religious practices and officially unite with the IC. By the end of March, of the 38 para-jamaats that had entered into negotiations, 14 had joined the IC. Beginning in March the Federation Administration for Inspection Affairs and the Federation Police supported by the State Investigation and Protection Agency and the Intelligence Security Agency, carried out unannounced inspections of several unregistered para-jamaats, reportedly issuing fines for improper registration with the MOJ.

On April 2, unknown perpetrators verbally attacked the imam in the Catholic majority town of Kupres, in front of his house and city mosque. The local Catholic priest and his assistant received a delegation from the IC soon afterwards and condemned the attack. In response, the police pledged increased patrols of the area.

According to a media report, an individual who had reportedly gone abroad to join ISIS threatened the country’s grand mufti via the internet. In an online video clip, the individual said he would “cut the throat” of the mufti and stated the mujahedin were “coming to Bosnia.” The grand mufti had previously repeatedly condemned Islamic extremism. He asked the authorities for protection, which they reportedly were providing.

According to the IRC, the nine attacks on religious sites and officials recorded from January through December represented a “significant decrease” compared to the 19 acts the IRC recorded in 2015 and the 28 acts it recorded in 2014. The IRC attributed the decrease to continued monitoring, public condemnation of attacks, and community engagement.

On January 1, unidentified perpetrators broke the windows on the house adjacent to Careva Mosque in Foca.

The IRC sponsored numerous projects involving women and youth to advance interfaith dialogue, including visits by IRC youth representatives to places memorializing the suffering of each of the country’s dominant religions, such as sites where Bosniaks were massacred during the 1990s conflict and the Ustasha concentration camps that held Serbs and Jews during World War II.

On May 7, representatives of the Orthodox, Jewish, and Catholic communities, along with high-level RS officials, joined the Islamic community in the RS capital of Banja Luka for the ceremonial re-opening of the rebuilt historic Ferhadija Mosque. Mufti Osman Effendi Kozlic focused his remarks at the event on the revitalization of the country’s historic interreligious harmony and reconciliation. Observers called the re-opening the most significant interfaith event of the year.

Embassy officers engaged with the Presidency and a range of government ministries to discuss the government’s efforts to combat violent extremism related to religion.

The embassy continued to meet regularly with the leaders and representatives of the four traditional religious communities, both individually and collectively, as well as leaders of smaller religious communities such as evangelical Protestants to promote increased interreligious dialogue and to discuss ways the religious communities could contribute to the further development of a peaceful and stable society. Embassy officials regularly attended significant events in the various religious communities, including Eid-al-Fitr celebrations with the IC, Christmas and Easter celebrations with the Orthodox and Catholic communities, and a Passover Seder hosted by the Jewish community. On May 7, the Ambassador attended the opening of the newly rebuilt historic Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka, along with representatives of the Islamic, Orthodox, Jewish, and Catholic communities, as well as high level state and entity officials, to demonstrate continued U.S. support for interfaith reconciliation.

The embassy maintained regular contact with the IRC to support its work, and engaged with regional and religious authorities, particularly the SOC, to help overcome political obstacles to IRC activities. The embassy explored grant opportunities with the IRC leadership to develop its institutional capacity further. The IRC also participated in U.S. government funded programs aimed at addressing and overcoming ethnic/religious divisions in communities through dialogue, and restoring trust among the country’s multiple ethnic and religious groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.2 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 Population and Housing Census reporting on the population 12 years and over, 79 percent of citizens are members of Christian groups, 15 percent espouse no religion, 4 percent are adherents of the Badimo traditional indigenous religious group, and all other religious groups comprise less than 1 percent of the population.

Anglicans, Methodists, and members of the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa make up the majority of Christians. There are also Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Mormons, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, members of the Dutch Reformed Church, Mennonites, and members of other Christian denominations. According to the 2011 census, there are approximately 11,000 Muslims, many of whom are of South Asian origin. There are small numbers of Hindus and Bahais, as well as a small Jewish community. Immigrants and foreign workers are more likely to be members of non-Christian religious groups than are native-born citizens.

Legal Framework

Under its broader protections of freedom of conscience, the constitution provides for freedom of thought and religion, the right to change religion or belief, and the right to manifest and propagate religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance. The constitution permits the government to restrict these rights in the interest of protecting the rights of other persons, national defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or public health when the restrictions are deemed “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.” The government has never exercised this provision. The constitution’s provision of rights also prohibits discrimination based on creed.

The constitution permits every religious group to establish places for religious instruction at the group’s expense. The constitution prohibits requiring religious instruction, as well as requiring participation in religious ceremonies in a religion other than one’s own. The constitution also prohibits compelling an individual to take an oath that is contrary to that individual’s religious beliefs. The penal code criminalizes “hate speech” towards any person or group based on “race, tribe, place of origin, color or creed” with a maximum fine of 500 pula (BWP) ($47).

All organizations, including religious groups, must register with the government. To register, a group must submit its constitution to the registrar of societies section of the Ministry of Nationality, Immigration and Gender Affairs. A group must register to conduct business, sign contracts, or open an account at a local bank. Any person who manages, assists in the management of, or holds an official position in an unregistered group is subject to a fine of up to BWP 1,000 ($94) and up to seven years in prison. Any member of an unregistered group is subject to penalties including fines up to BWP 500 ($47) and up to three years in prison.

Senior government officials indicated the country changed its policy to eliminate long-term residence permits for all religious workers; the policy change was not announced publicly until November.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

As of the end of the year, an amendment passed in March 2015 raising the minimum membership threshold for registration for new religious groups from 10 to 250 members had not been implemented as it was pending presidential assent. Previously registered groups were not affected by the amendment.

Optional religious education remained part of the curriculum in public schools; this curriculum continued to emphasize Christianity but also addressed other religious groups in the country. Government regulation of private schools did not distinguish among Christian, Muslim, or secular schools.

Some registered Christian organizations reported some of their missionaries had difficulty obtaining residence permits for missionary work. For example, the government denied multiple applications for residence permits to Mormon missionaries, continuing a pattern that started in October 2013. The Ministry of Nationality, Immigration and Gender Affairs attributed this difficulty to unspecified “security issues.” President Ian Khama expressed concern about unregulated and unscrupulous churches coming into the country to take advantage of local citizens. There were anecdotal reports of pastors, including some from other African countries, demanding tithes and donations for routine services or special prayers.

The government deported a U.S. pastor from the Faithful World Baptist Church on September 20 for visa improprieties and for what the government determined to be “hate speech” during the pastor’s participation on a live radio interview earlier that morning. In the radio interview, the pastor called for LGBTI persons “to be stoned to death.” President Khama ordered the pastor’s immediate deportation stating, “We do not want hate speech in this country.”

Although it was common for government meetings to begin with a Christian prayer, members of non-Christian groups occasionally led prayers as well.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The U.S. Ambassador and senior Department of State officials engaged the president, vice president, and relevant ministries at the highest level, urging greater transparency on resident permit regulations for missionaries and advocating on behalf of religious freedom generally.

After the U.S. pastor’s September deportation, the embassy hosted a media roundtable underscoring U.S. support for freedom of speech and religion, as well as the human rights of LGBTI persons.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 205.8 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2010 census, 64.6 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 22 percent is Protestant. Approximately 60 percent of Protestants belong to Pentecostal churches, 18 percent to “mainstream” Protestant churches, and 22 percent to other Protestant groups. Other Christian groups, each constituting less than 1 percent of the population, include Jehovah’s Witnesses and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). Atheists, agnostics, those who claim no religion, and those whose religion is unknown make up roughly 8 percent of the population.

Other groups, each constituting less than 1 percent of the population, include Buddhists, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and African and syncretic religious groups such as Candomble and Umbanda. There are a small number of adherents of indigenous religious beliefs.

According to the 2010 census, there are approximately 35,200 Muslims, while the Federation of Muslim Associations of Brazil states the number at approximately 1.5 million. Other observers estimate the number of Muslims to be between 400,000 and 500,000. There are significant numbers of Muslims in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba, and Foz do Iguazu, as well as in smaller cities in the states of Parana and Rio Grande do Sul.

According to the Jewish Confederation of Brazil, there are approximately 125,000 Jews, 65,000 of whom reside in Sao Paulo State and 25,000 in Rio de Janeiro State. Many other cities have smaller Jewish communities.

Legal Framework

The federal constitution states that freedom of conscience and belief is inviolable, and the free exercise of religious beliefs is guaranteed. The constitution prohibits federal, state, and local governments from either supporting or hindering any specific religion. The law provides penalties of up to five years in prison for crimes of religious intolerance. Courts may fine or imprison for two to five years any individual who displays, distributes, or broadcasts religiously intolerant material. It is illegal to write, edit, publish, or sell literature that promotes religious intolerance.

Religious groups are not required to register to establish places of worship, train clergy, or proselytize, but groups seeking tax-exempt status must register with the Department of Federal Revenue and the local municipality. States and municipalities have different requirements and regulations for obtaining tax-exempt status. Most jurisdictions require groups to document the purpose of their congregation, provide an accounting of finances, and have a fire inspection of any house of worship. Local zoning laws and noise ordinances may limit where a religious group can build houses of worship or hold ceremonies. A constitutional provision provides the right of access to religious services and counsel in all civil and military establishments.

Public schools are required to offer religious instruction, but neither the constitution nor legislation defines the parameters. By law the instruction should be nondenominational and without proselytizing, with alternative instruction for students who do not want to participate. The law prohibits public subsidies to schools operated by religious organizations.

The law requires religious access, including for members of African-originated religions, in public institutions such as hospitals, prisons, and other institutions. African-originated religions are understood, but not officially recognized, to be “religions whose theological and philosophical essences have their roots in traditional African religions.”

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The SDH released the preliminary results of its Report on Religious Intolerance and Violence in Brazil covering the period 2011-2015. The report included press coverage of religious violence and intolerance reported to national ombudsmen, and analysis of current jurisprudence. Of the 409 articles published on religious violence and intolerance from 2011 to 2015, 53 percent involved victims who practiced African-originated religions. Print media published more than half of these stories, 212, in 2015, a sharp increase from the 84 published in 2014 and 45 in 2013.

SDH requested data on reported incidents of religious intolerance from 113 ombudsmen offices; only 37 responded to the inquiry. Of these 37 offices, 14 reported they had received 1,031 complaints of religious violence and intolerance during the reporting period. The largest proportion of victims – 27 percent – professed to practice African-originated religions, and 83 percent of all reported incidents took place in private homes.

On January 21, the National Day to Combat Religious Intolerance, the federal government hosted a panel discussion in which the representative of the Ministry of Culture’s Palmares Foundation – mandated to promote and protect the country’s culture of African descent – spoke about the link between racism and cases of religious intolerance. The Palmares Foundation launched a new national Network for Protection of Victims of Religious Intolerance at the event.

In July the city of Sao Goncalo completed demolition of the home where Brazilians founded the African-originated religion known as Umbanda. The city first scheduled demolition of the house in 2011. The CCIR stalled complete demolition for five years while it led preservation efforts, lobbying the city mayor, the governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro, the Office of the President, and the Institute of National Historic and Artistic Heritage. The Office of the President has yet to deliver on promises to build an Umbanda Museum at the site.

Although religious instruction was optional, a large portion of public schools considered it mandatory and continued not to offer alternatives or opt-out options for students. The SDH Report on Religious Intolerance and Violence in Brazil found 25 percent of 110 legal cases from 2011 to 2015 concerned incidents that occurred in schools.

The federal government launched national public awareness campaigns on social media to highlight respect for racial equality and religious plurality. #AcrediteNoRespeito (I believe in respect) and #SouFilhoDoBrasil (I am a child of Brazil) were hashtags used to underscore the cultural importance of African-originated religions. The federal government created a new website to raise awareness about religious diversity and intolerance. Another initiative included capacity building and training for government officials, particularly in law enforcement to assist them in understanding crimes involving religion. In November the state government of Paraiba, for example, carried out training on combating racism and religious intolerance in the city of Joao Pessoa for members of the civil police units that work in the Integrated Operations Center.

The CNRDR identified ensuring safe spaces for refugees of various religions to practice their faiths, and maintaining respect for the country as a secular state as their goals. In April the Committee released a statement expressing concern for the “depredation of spaces of worship of religions of African origin.”

A number of state and municipal legislatures held public hearings on combating religious intolerance. In a hearing in the Federal District of Brasilia, the governor cited the creation of a specialized police station to receive reports of crimes related to discrimination on the basis of race, sexual orientation, and religion. The Federal Public Ministry in Rio Grande do Sul State held a hearing to develop practices to combat what it characterized as the “trivialization” of public demonstrations of political and religious intolerance.

The Rio de Janeiro city government launched the Municipal Office for the Respect of Religious Diversity in May. Representatives of religious groups and local NGOs (including the CCIR, the NGO responsible for the Annual Walk in Defense of Religious Freedom in Rio de Janeiro) criticized the city government for filling the office’s 19 positions with individuals they said were political allies who lacked experience and technical knowledge of religious affairs. The representatives said the lack of dialogue between the city government and civil society before the office opening called into question the legitimacy of the initiative.

The report also analyzed 110 legal cases. Contrary to the trend exhibited in print media stories, 45 percent of the victims in the cases examined were Adventist while only 7 percent were practitioners of African-originated religions. The cases included a Seventh-day Adventist college student in Sao Paulo who requested makeup sessions for night classes missed because of the Adventist observance of the Sabbath. Similarly, the Center for Jewish Education requested an alternative date for the National Secondary School Examination on behalf of 22 Jewish students because the original exam date coincided with Shabbat; the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in both cases. In another case, the Federal Public Ministry sued Google Brazil to secure the immediate removal from YouTube of videos that fostered prejudice against African-originated religions; the Ministry also asked for the identities of the account holders responsible for posting the videos for possible criminal investigation.

The SDH report recommended more awareness raising campaigns about institutional resources, highlighting the low number of complaints filed with ombudsmen as an example of the disconnect between the general population and public institutions available to provide assistance. The report cited the 12th National Conference on Human Rights, which took place in Brasilia in April, during which participants shared the difficulty of filing formal complaints of religious violence and intolerance at police stations and public prosecutors’ offices throughout the country.

Between January and September SDH’s Dial 100 human rights hotline registered 300 complaints related to cases of religious intolerance, exceeding the 252 total complaints during 2015. The CCIR released in January a national report that revealed that 70 percent of religious intolerance cases in the State of Rio de Janeiro during the period July 2012 to August 2015 were directed against practitioners of African religions. In April CNRDR expressed concern about an increasing trend of religious intolerance and called for respect of religious beliefs and the secular state.

In April an Ubanda practitioner stabbed his evangelical Christian neighbor for lighting candles that he said would bring “negative vibrations.” The victim was admitted to the hospital with non-life-threatening injuries; the assailant was detained by police.

In August a group of unidentified men broke into a temple for the practice of an African-originated religion in Nova Iguacu (Baixada Fluminense, on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro), destroying religious images and statues and burning the temple to the ground. The person responsible for the temple stated the attack was motivated by religious intolerance. Police registered the incident as a case of domestic break-in instead; the police were investigating the case at year’s end.

Civil society representatives and government officials continued to state that religious intolerance was often related to racism.

Givania Maria da Silva, the former Secretary for Traditional Community Policies of the former Ministry of Women, Racial Equality, and Human Rights, attributed acts of aggression against African-originated religions to historical religious discourse that demonized these religions for polytheism, deities of various genders, and racism.

The Ambassador discussed interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance in meetings with the president and secretary general of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) and the Patriarch of the Syriac Orthodox Church, among others. Embassy officials met with CNRDR to discuss tolerance and religious diversity. U.S. officials also met with the president of the Palmares Foundation of the Ministry of Culture to learn about its initiative to promote respect for the practice of African-originated religions in the country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 437,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to a 2011 census, approximately 78.8 percent of the population is Muslim, 8.7 percent Christian, and 7.8 percent Buddhist, while the remaining 4.7 percent consists of other religions including indigenous beliefs.

There is significant variation in religious identification among ethnic groups. According to official statistics (Brunei Darussalam Statistical Yearbook 2015), ethnically Malay Bruneians comprise 66 percent of the population, and are presumed to be Muslim as an inherited status. The Chinese population, which is approximately 10 percent of the total population and includes both citizens and permanent residents, is 65 percent Buddhist and 20 percent Christian. Indigenous tribes such as Dusun, Bisaya, and Murut make up approximately 4 percent of the population and are roughly 50 percent Muslim, 15 percent Christian, and the remainder are other religious groups, including adherents of traditional practices. The remaining fifth of the population includes foreign-born workers, primarily from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Asia, and stateless residents. According to official statistics, approximately half of these temporary and permanent residents are Muslim, more than one quarter Christian, and 15 percent Buddhist.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the religion of the country shall be the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam, but allows all other religions to be practiced “in peace and harmony” by the persons professing them.

The legal system is divided between civil law and sharia, which run parallel systems of both criminal and civil/family law and operate separate courts under a single judiciary department. While the civil courts are based on common law, the sharia courts follow Islamic jurisprudence, including no law of precedence. Sharia courts have jurisdiction over both criminal law and civil/family matters involving Muslims and hear cases brought under longstanding sharia legislation as well as under the SPC. In some cases non-Muslims are subject to sharia courts.

Almost all crimes included in the first phase of the SPC, currently in force, were already prohibited in the country; however, the SPC applies some laws to non-Muslims for the first time, increases penalties such as fines, and broadens some definitions. Phase one of the SPC runs in parallel with the existing common law-based criminal law system and primarily involves offenses punishable by fines or imprisonment. It expands restrictions in longstanding domestic sharia law on drinking alcohol, eating in public during the fasting hours of Ramadan, cross-dressing, close proximity between unmarried people of different genders, and propagating religions other than Islam. It includes a prohibition of “indecent behavior,” which criminalizes any act that “tends to tarnish the image of Islam, deprave a person, bring bad influence, or cause anger to the person who is likely to have seen the act.” The SPC applies to both Muslims and non-Muslims, including foreigners, as well as to offenses committed outside the country by citizens or permanent residents. Non-Muslims are exempted from certain sections, such as requirements for men to join Friday prayers or payments of zakat (obligatory annual alms-giving). It states that Muslims will be identified for purposes of the law by “general reputation.”

The second phase of the SPC, which would include amputating the hands of thieves, is not scheduled to come into effect until one year after the publication of a Sharia Courts Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). The government has not published the CPC. Phase three of the SPC – which includes punishments, in certain situations, such as stoning to death for rape, adultery, or sodomy, and execution for apostasy, contempt of the Prophet Muhammad, or insult of the Quran – is scheduled to be implemented two years after the publication of the CPC. The punishments included in phases two and three include different standards of proof than the common law-based penal code, such as requiring four pious men to witness personally an act of fornication to support a sentence of stoning. Stoning sentences, however, could be supported by a confession in lieu of evidence at the discretion of a sharia judge.

The government describes its official national philosophy as Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB), or Malay Islamic Monarchy, which the government defines as “a system that encompasses strong Malay cultural influences, stressing the importance of Islam in daily life and governance, and respect for the monarchy as represented by His Majesty the Sultan.” The government has said this system is essential to the country’s way of life and its main defense against extremism. A government body, the MIB Supreme Council, seeks to spread and strengthen the MIB philosophy and ensure MIB is enshrined in the nation’s laws and policies. MIB is a compulsory subject for students in both public and private schools, including at the university level.

The Religious Enforcement Division under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) is the lead agency in many investigations related to religious practices, but other agencies also play a role. MORA’s Religious Enforcement Division leads investigations on crimes that exist only in the SPC and other sharia legislation, such as male Muslims failing to pray on Fridays. Cases involving crimes that are not covered by sharia legislation such as human trafficking are investigated by the Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF). Cases involving crimes covered by both sharia and the existing civil code are also investigated by the RBPF and referred to the Attorney General’s Chamber (AGC). In these cases, the AGC determines in each case if a specific crime should be prosecuted and whether it should be filed in the sharia or civil court. No official guidelines for the AGC’s determination process have been published.

The government bans several religious groups it considers deviant, including the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Al-Arqam, Abdul Razak Mohammad, Al-Ma’unah, Saihoni Tasipan, Tariqat Mufarridiyyah, Silat Lintau, Qadiyaniah, the Bahai Faith, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. The list is based on fatwas made by the state mufti or the Islamic Religious Council – a government body and the sultan’s highest authority on matters on Islam – and is publicly available on the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ website. The SPC also bans any practice or display of “black magic.”

The SPC includes a list of words and expressions, including the word “Allah,” reserved for use by only Muslims or in relation to Islam.

The law forbids the teaching or promotion of any religion other than Islam to Muslims or to persons of no faith. Under the first phase of the SPC, the penalty for propagating religions other than Islam is up to five years in prison, a fine of up to 20,000 Brunei dollars (BND) ($13,840), or both. The SPC includes a provision that makes it illegal to criticize Islam, including the SPC itself, though no cases, arrests, or charges under this provision have been reported.

Muslims are legally permitted to renounce their religion until phase three of the SPC is implemented but must inform the Islamic Religious Council in writing. The law states the conversion of children is not automatic with the conversion of the parent. A person must be at least 14 years and seven months old to convert to Islam. Children are presumed to be of the same religion as their parents.

The law requires all organizations, including religious groups, to register and provide the names of their members. Applicants are subject to background checks for leaders and board members, and proposed organizations are subject to naming requirements. Registered organizations must furnish information on leadership, election of officers, members, assets, activities, and any other information requested by the registrar. Benefits of registration include the ability to operate, to reserve space in public buildings, and to apply for permission to raise funds. The registrar of societies oversees the application process, exercises discretion over applications, and is authorized to refuse approval for any reason. Organizations are prohibited from affiliation with any organization outside the country without written approval by the registrar. Unregistered organizations may face charges of unlawful assembly and may be subject to fines. Individuals who participate in or influence others to join unregistered organizations may be fined, arrested, and imprisoned. The general penalty for violating laws on the registration and activity of organizations is a fine of up to BND 10,000 ($6,920), imprisonment for up to three years, or both.

The law states that any public assembly of five or more persons requires official approval in advance. Under longstanding emergency powers, this applies to all forms of public assembly, including religious. In practice, however, places of worship are viewed as private.

The law establishes two sets of schools: those offering the national or international curriculum and administered by the Ministry of Education (MOE), and those offering supplemental religious education (ugama) that are administered by MORA. MOE schools teach a course on Islamic religious knowledge, which is required for all Muslim children aged seven to 15 who reside in the country and who have at least one parent who is a citizen or permanent resident. Ugama instruction in the MORA schools is a seven to eight-year course that teaches the day-to-day practice of Sunni Islam according to the Shafi’i school and is mandatory for Muslim students aged seven to 14 who hold citizenship or permanent residency. Ugama is studied alongside the national curriculum. Alternatively, MORA also administers a set of schools taught in Arabic that offer the national curriculum combined with ugama religious education. Muslim parents who fail to enroll their children in ugama school may face a BND 5,000 ($3,460) fine, imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or both. The law promulgates the officially recognized Shafi’i school and does not make accommodations for Muslims who have non-Shafi’i beliefs.

Public and private schools, including private schools run by churches, are prohibited from providing religious instruction in beliefs other than the Shafi’i school of Islam during school hours. Schools may be fined or school officials imprisoned for teaching non-Islamic religious subjects. The SPC criminalizes exposing Muslim children or the children of parents who have no religion to the beliefs and practices of any religion other than Islam. The law also requires practitioners to obtain official permission before teaching any matter relating to Islam. Churches and religious schools are permitted to offer non-Shafi’i Islam education in private settings.

Laws and regulations limit access to religious literature. The law states it is an offense for a person to import any publication deemed objectionable, which is defined in part as describing, depicting, or expressing matters of race or religion in a manner likely to cause “feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will, or hostility between different racial or religious groups.” The law also bans distributing materials relating to religions other than Islam to Muslims or persons of no faith.

All parental rights are awarded to the Muslim parent if a child is born to mixed-faith parents. The non-Muslim parent is not recognized in any official document, including the child’s birth certificate, unless that parent has converted to Islam. The law bans any Muslim from surrendering custody of a minor or dependent in his or her guardianship to a non-Muslim.

Under the SPC, non-Muslims may be arrested for zina (fornication or adultery) or khalwat (close proximity between the sexes), provided that the other accused party is Muslim. Foreigners are also subject to these laws.

The country is not a party to the ICCPR.

Government Practices

The government continued to enforce sharia restrictions and prosecute offenses under the SPC. It continued to apply sharia to Muslims and, for certain offenses, non-Muslims, resulting in arrests, fines, and confiscations, as well as to impose traditional Islamic social norms more broadly. These included placing limitations on businesses, activities suspected of encouraging mingling of men and women, proselytizing, and religious education.

The authorities continued to arrest and prosecute persons for offenses under both the SPC and longstanding sharia. From January to August the government reported 52 criminal cases prosecuted under sharia including not respecting the month of Ramadan, intercourse or pregnancy out of wedlock, and alcohol consumption. During the same period the government also prosecuted 55 khalwatcases, resulting in 46 convictions including one of a non-Muslim. Not all of those investigated or accused of sharia crimes were formally arrested. There were some reports of administrative penalties, such as travel bans or suspension from government jobs, for individuals accused but not yet convicted of khalwat, but application of such practices reportedly was not consistent. Implementing regulations governing sharia proceedings were not issued by year’s end.

In August a local man was arrested for wearing women’s clothing in a public area as part of a joint operation between religious enforcement officers and the RBPF, but was not convicted. Other arrests and prosecutions under sharia were generally not reported by local media.

The government continued to enforce restrictions on non-Muslims proselytizing to Muslims or people with no religion. During the year, religious enforcement officers investigated an accusation of “propagating a faith other than Islam” against a manager of an international franchise.

Friday sermons were uniform across all mosques with approved texts drafted by MORA and preached by registered imams. The government periodically warned the population about “outsiders” preaching non-Shafi’i versions of Islam, including both “liberal” practices and those associated with jihadism, Wahhabism, or Salafism. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah in December warned students studying abroad not to misuse the internet and to be cautious of religious gatherings so as to not “fall into any activities that violate any laws and religion.” In February the sultan called for the strengthening of da’wah (dissemination of Islamic teachings) amid “uncertain times” and “social ills” affecting the country.

During the Christmas season religious leaders and government officials warned citizens that the act of publicly displaying symbols of religions other than Islam could be seen as the propagation of religions other than Islam, an offense under the SPC. In February the minister of religious affairs spoke at an education seminar in which he encouraged Muslims to be respectful and tolerant of other religions as commanded in the Quran, while also reminding them of the restriction imposed in Islam that forbids one to imitate or copy other religious practices or beliefs. There were no reports of raids or charges, although businesses and members of the Christian community reported practicing self-censorship. As with past years, the government limited traditional Lunar New Year lion dance performances to a three-day period and restricted them to the Chinese temple, Chinese school halls, and private residencies of Chinese Association members. There were no reports of charges. Members of the royal family and the minister of religious affairs publicly attended Lunar New Year celebrations and lion dance performances during the allowed period, with extensive coverage in state-influenced media.

There was no legal requirement for women to wear head coverings in public; however, religious authorities continued to reinforce social customs to encourage Muslim women to wear the tudong (a traditional Muslim head covering) and many women did so. Muslim civil servants were expected to join prayers in the workplace, and some employees reported being pressured by supervisors to attend. Muslim women employed by the government were expected to wear a tudong to work, although some chose not to with no reports of official repercussions. In government schools and institutions of higher learning, Muslim female students were required to wear a uniform that includes a head covering. Male students were expected to wear the songkok (a traditional hat), although this was not required in all schools. Women who were incarcerated, including non-Muslims, were required to wear a uniform that included a tudong.

The government continued to enforce strict customs controls on importing non-Islamic religious texts such as Bibles, as well as on Islamic religious teaching materials or scriptures intended for sale or distribution.

The MOE required courses on Islam and MIB in all schools, with non-Muslims exempted from some religious requirements. The government reported many non-Muslim children elected to take courses on Islam. MORA posted religious teachers in some embassies abroad to teach Brunei citizens in those locations. Most school textbooks were illustrated to portray Islam as the norm, and women and girls were shown wearing the tudong. There were no depictions of the practices of other religious groups in textbooks.

Authorities continued to prohibit non-Muslims and non-Shafi’i Muslims from receiving non-Shafi’i religious education in schools. The government tolerated non-Islamic religious education in private settings, such as at home or in approved churches. All church-associated schools were recognized by the MOE and remained open to students of any religion, although they were not permitted to teach religions other than Shafi’i Islam.

Churches confirmed that a longstanding fatwa that discourages Muslims from assisting in perpetuating non-Muslim faiths continued to inhibit expansion, renovation, or construction of new facilities. With only six approved churches in the country, facilities were often too small to accommodate their congregations without significant overflow seating outdoors. Chinese temples were also subjected to the same fatwa, with only one official Chinese temple in the country preserved as a cultural heritage. Data from 2015 indicated there were 99 registered mosques. Christian churches and associated schools were generally allowed, for safety reasons, to repair and renovate buildings on their sites, but the approval process remained lengthy and difficult and there were reports of the government stalling new construction projects for not meeting the complicated permitting process requirements. Government officials denied permission for a church to shift the location of one of its facilities. Christian worshippers reported difficulty accessing churches on some Sundays because of road closures by the government for official events, with some services being rescheduled to other times.

Throughout the year, the government enforced business hour restrictions for all businesses, requiring they close for the two hours of Friday prayers. Religious enforcement officers continued to enforce a ban on restaurants serving dine-in food during the fasting hours of Ramadan, although take-out food to be consumed in private was permitted, and officers issued verbal warnings to restaurants and customers found in breach of the ban. According to Chinese social media, at least three restaurants were raided, with religious enforcement officers issuing warnings to those present. The government continued to enforce a ban on eating, drinking, or smoking in public during the fasting hours of Ramadan, which was applied to both Muslims and non-Muslims. The government reported 17 convictions during the year for not respecting Ramadan.

The government maintained a longstanding ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes, and a restriction against the import or consumption of alcoholic beverages by Muslims. Religious authorities partnered with the RBPF in conducting “anti-vice raids” in which they confiscated alcoholic beverages and nonhalal meats brought into the country without proper customs clearance. They also monitored restaurants and supermarkets to ensure conformity with halal practices. In June the sultan warned the government to avoid shortcuts in halal certification that could violate Islamic law. Religious authorities allowed non-halal restaurants and non-halal sections in supermarkets to operate without interference, but continued to hold public outreach sessions to encourage restaurants to become halal.

The government continued to favor the propagation of Shafi’i beliefs and practices, particularly through public events and the education system.

The government clarified that the use of certain words, such as “Allah” by non-Muslims, did not constitute an SPC offense when used in a nonreligious context or social activity, and there were no reports during the year of charges or prosecutions based on violations of using words or expressions in question.

Incentives offered to prospective converts to Islam and the Shafi’i school, especially those from indigenous communities in rural areas, included help with housing, welfare assistance, or funds to perform the Hajj. In April the Islamic Da’wah Center gave three Muslim convert families new homes using zakat funds, and in August, seven converts each received BND 14,000 ($9,688) in funding for the Hajj as a gift from the sultan. The government gave presentations on the benefits of converting to Islam that received extensive press coverage in state-influenced media, which reported conversions to Islam increased in the first half of the year. According to government statistics, each year an average of 500 people convert to Islam. Converts included citizens and permanent residents, as well as foreigners. Official government policy supported the Islamic faith through the national MIB philosophy as well as through government pledges to make the country a zikir nation (a nation that remembers and obeys Allah).

Despite the absence of a legal prohibition of Muslims marrying non-Muslims, all Muslim weddings required approval from the sharia courts, and officiants, who are imams approved by the government, required the non-Muslim party to convert prior to the marriage.

Most government meetings and ceremonies commenced with an Islamic prayer, which the government continued to state was not a legal requirement but a matter of custom.

The government required residents to carry identity cards that stated the bearer’s ethnicity, which were used in part to determine whether he or she was Muslim; for example, all Malays were assumed to be Muslim. Female Muslim citizens were required to wear a tudong in photographs on national identity cards and passports, and non-Muslim women were required to dress conservatively. Ethnic Malays traveling in the country were generally assumed to be Muslim and required to follow certain Islamic religious practices or potentially face fines, arrest, and imprisonment. Religious authorities reportedly checked identity cards for ethnicity when conducting raids against suspected violators of sharia. Visitors to the country were asked to identify their religion on their visa applications and foreign Muslims were subject to the same laws governing local Muslims.

In February the sultan called on his officials to proceed with finalizing the CPC, the prerequisite for implementing phases two and three of the SPC. Officials continued to state the harshest punishments included in the later phases of the SPC, if implemented, would rarely if ever be applied because of the extremely high standards of proof required.

Non-Muslims and Muslims faced social pressure to conform to Islamic guidelines regarding behavior. There were fewer reports of public debate and more reports of Muslims being open to allowing other religious groups to celebrate their holidays than in the years since the SPC launched. For example, Christian leaders reported more Muslims wished Christians a “Merry Christmas” and attended holiday parties.

Some Muslims who wished to convert to another religion reportedly feared social retribution, such as ostracism by friends, family, and their community. If parents converted to Islam, there was often family and official pressure for the children to do the same. Some non-Muslims said they felt pressured in the workplace or in social groups to convert to Islam.

Residents who questioned the SPC or Islamic values on social media sometimes received online abuse and threats, and reported official monitoring. One social media user relayed how positive reactions to his postings criticizing sharia would disappear on some sites while only the negative comments remained. Some vocal activists who challenged established norms reported family and friends would pressure them to keep quiet out of fear they would attract the attention of authorities or damage the family’s reputation.

In August a self-identified Bruneian made a post on social media calling for the demolition of churches in Malaysia along the highway between Brunei and the Malaysian city of Miri. The individual accused the churches of proselytizing to Muslims by displaying “provocative” words praising Jesus Christ and God on exterior walls. The post launched a social media debate in which online users also identifying as Bruneian chastised the poster, many of whom applauded the religious unity displayed in Miri.

Some Muslim women who did not cover their heads before the SPC was implemented said they started to do so because of social pressure.

After the sultan indicated he would continue implementation of the SPC, the U.S. President, Secretary of State, and U.S. Trade Representative exchanged letters with him and Foreign Minister II Pehin Lim Jock Seng in which U.S. officials urged the government to commit, including publicly, that implementation of sharia would be consistent with international human rights obligations and standards; to ratify the UNCAT and the ICCPR; and to establish a national human rights commission.

In July the Secretary of State met with the foreign minister II in Laos to emphasize the SPC, if implemented, should be fully consistent with Brunei’s international human rights commitments and obligations, including the UNCAT.

The U.S. Special Representative to Muslim Communities (SRMC) returned to the country in August to follow up on previous conversations and visits. He met with the sultan, the state mufti, minister of religious affairs, and other key officials. He urged the government to delay further implementation of the SPC until it could ensure that implementation would not undermine the country’s international human rights commitments. The SRMC encouraged open academic discussions on religion and human rights and interfaith dialogue. The meetings received wide and positive press coverage. The SRMC followed up on these points in a meeting with the foreign minister II in September.

The Ambassador and other U.S. officials repeatedly raised concerns and suggestions about religious freedom throughout the year to government officials on all levels. U.S. officials coordinated with other governments including Australia and the United Kingdom to raise concerns about implementation of the SPC and suggested postponing implementation. U.S. embassy officials emphasized the seriousness with which the United States takes assurances from the government that the evidentiary and witness standards in the SPC would as a matter of procedure and policy be so exacting as to effectively guarantee that torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment will not be carried out in practice. The Ambassador and other U.S. government officials also raised concerns that a confession could be used in lieu of evidence, and that those accused could feel social pressure to confess. They urged officials to defer the publication of the procedural code that is a necessary precursor to the remaining phases of the SPC. Embassy officials also urged compliance with international human rights norms with religious enforcement officers and officials involved in drafting, implementing, and enforcing the SPC.

Embassy exchange programs exposed students to concepts of religious freedom in other countries and allowed them to discuss religion and religious freedom with individuals of other faiths. Events with U.S. government officials also encouraged discussion of these ideas. In August the SRMC engaged local youth in a roundtable conversation on “Being Muslim in America” and discussed the value of interfaith dialogue and interfaith action locally and around the world. The embassy also selected an official from the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports to visit the United States on a three-week exchange project on community engagement with young people to examine policies and practices used in the United States to prevent at-risk youth and individuals from engaging in violent activities and becoming attracted to extremist views.

Embassy officials met with representatives of all principal religious groups, sharia court judges, and religious enforcement officers, as well as lawyers defending individuals charged with violations of sharia.

Embassy and other U.S. government officials visited places of worship, spoke with leaders of various religious groups, and facilitated discussions on religious freedom issues, including obstacles to practicing religions and beliefs other than Shafi’i Islam and laws and policies affecting religious freedom, including provisions of sharia. The embassy hosted a holiday reception that brought together the minister of religious affairs and leaders of religious minority groups. The Ambassador emphasized religious tolerance by participating in numerous Lunar New Year celebrations and attending a Christian schoolchildren’s Christmas event, while a senior embassy official represented the embassy at a Catholic Mass on Christmas Eve. Embassy officials, including the Ambassador, as well as other official visitors, engaged legal, religious, and political leaders on the SPC and the country’s international human rights and religious freedom commitments.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 7.1 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, 76 percent of the population identifies as Eastern Orthodox Christian, mostly affiliated with the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The census reports Muslims, the second-largest religious group, are approximately 10 percent of the population, followed by Protestants at 1.1 percent and Roman Catholics at 0.8 percent. Orthodox Christians from the Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church (AAOC), Jews, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hare Krishnas, and others together make up 0.2 percent of the population, while 4.8 percent of respondents said they had no religion, and 7.1 percent did not indicate a religion, according to the census.

Some religious minorities are concentrated geographically. Many Muslims, including ethnic Turks, Roma, and Pomaks (descendants of Slavic Bulgarians who converted to Islam under Ottoman rule) live in the Rhodope Mountains along the southern border with Greece and Turkey. Ethnic Turkish and Roma Muslims also live in large numbers in the northeast and along the Black Sea coast. Some recent Roma converts to Islam live in towns in the central part of the country, such as Plovdiv and Pazardjik. According to the census, nearly 40 percent of Catholics live in and around Plovdiv. The majority of the small Jewish community lives in Sofia, Plovdiv, and along the Black Sea coast. Protestants are widely dispersed, but many Roma are Protestant, and Protestants are more numerous in areas with large Roma populations. Approximately 80 percent of the urban population and 62 percent of the rural population identify as Orthodox Christian. Approximately 25 percent of the rural population identifies as Muslim, compared with 4 percent of the urban population.

Legal Framework

The constitution states freedom of conscience and choice of religion or no religion are inviolable, prohibits religious discrimination, and stipulates the state shall assist in maintaining tolerance and respect among believers of different denominations as well as between believers and nonbelievers. It states the practice of any religion shall be unrestricted and religious beliefs, institutions, and communities shall not be used for political ends. It restricts freedom of religion to the extent that its practice would be detrimental to national security, public order, health, and morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. It states no one shall be exempt from obligations established by the constitution or the law on grounds of religious or other convictions. The constitution also stipulates the separation of religious institutions from the state and prohibits the formation of political parties along religious lines, as well as organizations that incite religious animosity. The law does not allow any privilege based on religious identity.

The constitution names Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the country’s traditional religion. The law establishes the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as a legal entity, exempting it from the court registration that is mandatory for all other religious groups wishing to acquire national legal recognition.

The penal code prescribes up to three years’ imprisonment for participants in attacks on individuals or groups based on their religious affiliation. Instigators and leaders of an attack may receive prison sentences of up to six years. Those who obstruct the ability of individuals to profess their faith or carry out their rituals and services or for compelling another to participate in religious rituals and services may be sentenced to up to one year in prison. Violating a person’s or group’s freedom of acquiring or practicing a religious belief is subject to a fine of between 100 and 300 levs ($54 to $162). If the infraction is committed by any legal entity, the fine can range from 500 to 5,000 levs ($269 to $2,694).

To receive national legal recognition, the law requires groups other than the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to register with the Sofia City Court. Applications must include: the group’s name and official address; a description of the group’s religious beliefs and service practices, organizational structure and bodies, management procedures, bodies, and mandates; a list of official representatives and the processes for their election; procedures for convening meetings and making decisions; and information on finances and property and processes for termination and liquidation. The Directorate for Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers provides expert opinions on registration matters upon request of the court. Applicants have the right to appeal negative registration decisions to the Sofia Appellate Court. The law does not require the formal registration of local branches of registered groups, only that the branches notify local authorities of the national registration of their group. There are 156 registered religious groups in addition to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.

The law requires the government to provide funding for all registered religious groups, though there is no legal requirement on how to allocate the budgetary funds among each group. Registered groups have the right to perform religious services, own assets such as houses of worship and cemeteries, provide medical, social, and educational services, receive property tax exemptions, and participate in commercial ventures. Unregistered religious groups may practice their religion freely but lack privileges granted to registered groups, such as access to government funding and the right to own property, establish financial accounts in their name, operate schools and hospitals, receive property tax exemptions, or sell religious merchandise.

In September the National Assembly passed a law restricting the wearing of face-covering garments in public places. The law, widely known as the “burqa ban,” imposes a fine of 200 levs ($108) for a first offense and 1,500 levs ($808) for repeat offenders. In April and May the municipal councils in Pazardjik, Stara Zagora, Sliven, and Burgas had passed local regulations imposing similar restrictions, which were superseded by the national law passed in September.

The law allows registered, but not unregistered, groups to publish, import, and distribute religious media. The law does not restrict proselytizing by registered or unregistered groups. Some municipal ordinances, however, require local permits for distribution of religious literature in public places, and some municipalities have adopted local regulations that restrict proselytizing.

By law public schools at all levels are allowed, but not required, to teach the historical, philosophical, and cultural aspects of religion and introduce students to the moral values of different religious groups as part of the core curriculum. A school may teach any registered religion in a special course as part of the elective curriculum upon request of at least 13 students, subject to the availability of books and teachers. The Ministry of Education and Science approves and provides books for these special religion courses. If a public school is unable to pay for a religion teacher, it may accept financial sponsorship from a private donor or a teacher from a registered denomination. The law also allows registered religious groups to open schools and universities. Education in schools operated by religious groups must meet government standards for secular education.

The Commission for Protection against Discrimination is an independent government body charged with preventing and protecting against discrimination, including religious discrimination, and ensuring equal opportunity. It functions as a civil litigation court adjudicating discrimination complaints. If the commission decides to accept a case, it assigns it to a panel and then reviews it in open session. If it makes a finding of discrimination, the commission may impose a fine of 250-2,000 levs ($135-$1,078). The commission may double fines for repeat violations. Regional courts may also try civil cases involving religious discrimination.

The law establishes an independent ombudsman to serve as an advocate for citizens who believe that public or municipal administrations or public service providers have violated their rights and freedoms, through their actions or inaction. The ombudsman may request information from authorities, act as an intermediary in resolving disputes, make proposals for terminating existing practices, refer information to the prosecution service, and request the Constitutional Court to abolish legal provisions as unconstitutional.

The penal code provides up to three years’ imprisonment for forming “a political organization on religious grounds” or using a church or religion to spread propaganda against the authority of the state or its activities; and up to three years in prison and a fine of 5,000 levs ($2,694) for using a religious organization to spread “fascist or another antidemocratic ideology” or to advocate replacing public and governmental order by force. It provides for up to four years’ imprisonment and a fine of 5,000 to 10,000 levs ($2,694 to $5,388) for propagating hatred on religious grounds by means of mass and electronic information systems, and up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 3,000 to 10,000 levs ($1,616 to $5,388) for religious desecration, including the destruction or damage of religious buildings, places of prayer, symbols, or gravestones.

In April the National Assembly passed amendments to the law that specifically identified foreign members of religious denominations as a category of persons eligible to obtain long-term residence, making it easier for foreign religious workers to serve in the country.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Supreme Cassation Court revoked the guilty verdict and ordered a retrial of one Muslim leader and rescinded the administrative punishments of 12 other Muslims charged with spreading Salafi Islam and hatred of other religious groups. The Pazardjik District Court started a trial against 14 Roma Muslims on charges of propagating antidemocratic ideology and incitement to war and aiding ISIS. Jehovah’s Witnesses and other minority religious groups continued to state that local authorities in certain municipalities discriminated against them, despite their national registration status. Schools banned the wearing of religious symbols, including the hijab and cross, and local governments continued to deny requests to construct new mosques or other religious buildings or repair existing ones. The Organization of the Jews in Bulgaria (Shalom) expressed concern over hate speech and what they said was government passivity in addressing it. The National Assembly passed on first reading amendments that would criminalize “radical Islam,” but by year’s end the amendments had not become law. The assembly was also considering five amendments affecting the practices of religious groups, which generated significant controversy. In September the city of Sofia cosponsored the Festival of Religions to promote religious tolerance.

In July the Supreme Cassation Court vacated the guilty verdict against Ahmed Mussa for preaching Salafi Islam, which a lower court had determined was an “antidemocratic ideology.” The court also rescinded the guilty verdict and administrative punishment against 12 other Muslims on the same charges. In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that the lower court had failed to identify what traits of Salafism determined its antidemocratic nature and had instead focused on its differences in ritual from the “traditional” Islam in the country. The Supreme Cassation Court ordered the Plovdiv Apellate Court to retry Mussa and the 12 other defendants. At year’s end, the cases were ongoing.

In February the Pazardjik District Court began hearing the case against 14 Roma Muslims, including Ahmed Mussa, who were standing trial for supporting ISIS, assisting foreign fighters, and propagating antidemocratic ideology and incitement to war. As of the end of the year, the trial was ongoing and Mussa remained in custody, 12 others were under house arrest, and the 14th defendant was released on his own recognizance.

On June 23, a National Assembly committee took the first step towards enacting amendments to the penal code that would criminalize “radical Islam.” According to the draft amendments, preaching of radical Islam would be understood as calling for establishing a caliphate, enforcing the rule of sharia, or forcing religious principles and norms on others. Conviction would carry up to three years’ imprisonment or a maximum fine of 5,000 levs ($2,694). Theologians and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) argued that proving “radical Islam” was a crime would be practically impossible and the punishments would effectively restrict religious freedom. The Office of the Grand Mufti made efforts to highlight the distinction between Islam and religious extremists, particularly ISIS. At year’s end, the assembly had not enacted the amendments into law.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported that two nationalist political parties, the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), which together comprised the Patriotic Front political alliance in the National Assembly, continued a campaign against them. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, in March approximately 10 IMRO supporters intruded on a Witnesses meeting in Petrich, repeatedly interrupted the service, harassed the attendees, and refused to leave. Witnesses reported they were the targets of harassment, insults, and death threats for days after local media publicized the incident.

During the year, in separate cases, local authorities in Pazardjik fined a total of 11 Roma women 300 levs ($162) each for wearing niqabs in violation of regulations banning face veils passed by the municipal council in May. By year’s end, the police had not issued any fines under the national law enacted in September.

The High Muslim Council called the law banning face-covering garments in public places an act of “Islamophobia” which “offends Muslims’ religious rights and feelings” and incriminated an established Islamic tradition. The country’s Helsinki Committee, an NGO, said the law violated the constitution and encouraged the national ombudsman to petition the Constitutional Court and request its abolition. The ombudsman had not reacted to the law by year’s end.

The government permitted religious headdresses in official photos for national identity documents as long as both ears and 1 centimeter (2/5 of an inch) of hair were visible. The Commission for Protection from Discrimination and most schools interpreted the law denying privileges based on religious identity as banning the display of all “religious symbols,” such as hijabs and crosses, in public schools.

Five amendments to the law that would prohibit noncitizens from participating in the leadership and day-to-day running of religious organizations, as well as from preaching and proselytizing and would place other restrictions on religious groups’ activities were pending in the National Assembly at year’s end. An independent member of parliament, the Socialist Party, and the nationalist Ataka (Attack) Party each submitted one amendment and the Patriotic Front the other two. The amendments would stipulate the obligatory use of the Bulgarian language for religious purposes, allowing simultaneous use of a foreign language in “certain rituals.” They would also restrict the religious activities of persons who did not obtain their theological education in the country and require religious denominations to report their financing and donors. The National Council of Religious Communities, an NGO promoting religious tolerance, protested, stating the amendments would infringe on religious freedom and attempt to put religious denominations under government control. The Patriotic Front stated the intent was to remove the possibility that foreign individuals would abuse faith for political purposes, and that the amendments would protect national security by preventing attempts by Turkey to interfere in the internal religious affairs of the country. Georgi Kadiev of the Normal State Party said the aim of the amendments was to introduce accountability for registered religious groups, so that authorities could ensure national security and prevent Islamic or other religious radicalism. The Muslim community, Shalom, and many NGOs stated that, while their professed purpose was to protect national security, the draft amendments would violate basic human rights and religious freedom and affect nearly every religious denomination in the country.

Minority religious groups continued to report discrimination and prejudice from local authorities in certain municipalities. At least 27 municipalities, including regional cities such as Burgas, Kyustendil, Stara Zagora, Silistra, Vratsa, Shumen, Razgrad, Haskovo, Pleven, and Varna, had ordinances, cited on their websites, prohibiting door-to-door proselytizing and the distribution of religious literature.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses said many municipalities had ordinances restricting their religious activities, including ones preventing them from expressing their religious convictions in public, carrying out “religious agitation on city streets” by distributing free printed materials, and prohibiting “religious propaganda” in the homes of citizens. They cited multiple instances in which police fined, threatened, warned, or issued citations to Witnesses for violating these ordinances. For example, on May 19, two police officers approached two Jehovah’s Witnesses in Burgas and told them that offering and distributing religious literature was against the law. The police officers seized their books and issued a fine. In some cases, the Witnesses appealed the fines. Jehovah’s Witnesses accused the VMRO and NFSB political parties of seeking to ban them, using the media to libel them, and encouraging enactment of ordinances to prohibit Witnesses from proselytizing.

Despite letters of protest by the Directorate for Religious Affairs and the ombudsman against the municipal restrictions on religious activities, only the regional governor of Silistra appealed to the Administrative Court of Silistra to revoke the ordinance. Eight municipalities applied the ordinances and imposed fines. Jehovah’s Witnesses challenged the ordinances in administrative courts in Kyustendil and Burgas. The courts ruled the ordinances violated the country’s constitution, declaring them null and void. By year’s end, both municipalities had appealed the decisions to the Supreme Administrative Court.

In January the Supreme Cassation Court ruled that the Muslim denomination that had filed for a determination that it was the rightful successor to the properties of pre-1940s Muslim religious communities seized by the communist government had done so under the wrong procedure. The case was returned for review to the Sofia City Court. Pending resolution of the issue, all restitution claims by the Office of the Grand Mufti remained suspended.

Muslims complained of a lack of cooperation from the authorities on the restoration and maintenance of historic mosques, such as Makbul Ibrahim Pasa in Razgrad, which were declared national cultural monuments and managed by the Ministry of Culture. The municipality of Gotse Delchev continued to withhold issuance of a construction permit to build a mosque, arguing that the plot’s zoning designation was for a shopping center. The Sofia municipal government continued to withhold permission to build a second mosque in Sofia on the grounds that the application for a building permit was not complete. By year’s end, the Muslim community had yet to take further action in either case.

Jehovah’s Witnesses stated local authorities refused to issue building permits or deliberately altered zoning regulations to prevent them from erecting buildings for religious purposes. By year’s end, the local administration of Kyustendil continued to ignore a ruling by the Kyustendil Administrative Court directing the municipality to overcome the obstacles to issuing a building permit for a Jehovah’s Witness prayer house. In November 2015, the Shumen Administrative Court ruled in favor of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ appeal of the Shumen mayor’s refusal of a construction permit and the religious group was in the process, at year’s end, of building a prayer house there.

Some registered minority religious groups, including Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses, reported the government continued to fail to prosecute past cases of assault and harassment against their members. According to the groups, some of these attacks were carried out by members of nationalist political parties, particularly NFSB and IMRO.

On April 25, according to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, IMRO Party member and Vratsa Municipal Councilor Marin Tsvetkov approached two Jehovah’s Witnesses on the street and threatened to “destroy their sect so that there will be no more such people in Vratsa.” The police issued a warning to the councilor. According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, a few days later Tsvetkov wrote a highly critical newspaper article about the group.

In May Member of Parliament Atanas Stoyanov called the Jehovah’s Witnesses a “dangerous sect,” stating the group was banned in numerous European Union countries.

The Jewish service organization B’nai B’rith expressed concern over what it stated was pressure at a high political level to revise Holocaust history, deny that the country was involved in the deportation of Jews from Macedonia and Northern Greece to death camps, and to identify “saviors” who “included persons of questionable reputation who had been on the side of the persecutors.”

In June President Rosen Plevneliev hosted his third annual iftar, inviting leaders of the six religious communities comprising the National Council of Religious Communities: Bulgarian Orthodox Church members, Muslims, evangelical Protestants, Catholics, AAOC members, and Jews. The council is a government-supported nonprofit group with the goal of promoting religious tolerance. At the iftar, Plevneliev said a nation should build its unity on all communities and their joint cause for peace and prosperity.

In September the Sofia municipality, in partnership with the National Council of Religious Communities, organized the third annual Festival of Religions, a day of arts and music performances, open houses, and sharing of information about each religious group. Titled “Together for a Better World,” the event included written remarks by Sofia Mayor Fandakova, who said the city continued to be an example of tolerance and that the presence of houses of worship of five different denominations within a few blocks of each other was proof that peaceful coexistence of different religions was possible.

The government continued to recognize Orthodox Christianity, Hanafi Sunni Islam, Judaism, and Roman Catholicism as holding a historic place in the country’s culture, expressed a willingness to work more closely with these groups, and provided specific funding for them in the national budget.

The budget allocated 5 million levs ($2.7 million) for construction and maintenance of religious facilities. The government allocated 3.76 million levs ($2.0 million) for the Bulgarian Orthodox Church; 360,000 levs ($194,000) for the Muslim community; and 50,000 levs ($26,900) each for the Roman Catholic Church, AAOC, and the Jewish community. It distributed 80,000 levs ($43,100) among nine other registered denominations, which applied for funds to the Directorate for Religious Affairs. The directorate stated its goal was to make sure denominations that had not received funds previously received funding if they applied. The government also allocated 450,000 levs ($242,000) for maintenance of religious facilities of national importance, 50,000 levs ($26,900) for publication of religious books and research, and 15,000 levs ($8,080) to the National Council of Religious Communities, while maintaining another 135,000 levs ($72,700) in reserve, including 15,000 levs ($8,080) for updating the electronic register and digital database of religious facilities in the country.

The country is an observer at the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Jehovah’s Witnesses and Mormons reported physical assaults, harassment, and threats. Social network and online media users posted anti-Semitic statements. According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the media published libelous information about them. Vandals desecrated religious buildings and painted offensive graffiti.

As of November, Mormons reported 31 instances of physical assault and harassment of missionaries in Blagoevgrad, Burgas, Pleven, Sliven, Ruse, Veliko Turnovo, Haskovo, Plovdiv, and Sofia. They said police did not identify the attackers in any of these incidents and speculated that in some cases the police may have decided the incidents were not worth pursuing.

On September 18, in Veliko Turnovo, a young man attacked two Mormon missionaries on the street. The man punched one of the missionaries in the face as they were passing by, knocking him down. The victim required surgery. At year’s end, the police had not identified the perpetrator.

On May 13, a man approached two Mormon missionaries in one of the public parks in central Sofia and insulted them. When they started to move away, he chased them and attempted to attack one of them with a knife. The missionaries escaped unharmed. When the missionaries tried to file a report of the incident, police told them a written report was unnecessary because no one was hurt.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported six cases of physical assault and threats in Petrich, Vratsa, Shumen, Elhovo, Mezdra, and Sofia. They stated that, while the police usually noted their complaints, prosecutors later closed the cases due to lack of evidence.

On July 30, after a Jehovah’s Witness invited a man in Shumen City Park to a convention, the man attacked him, causing multiple bruises and a concussion. The court initially placed the alleged perpetrator under house arrest, but released him in December. At year’s end, authorities were reportedly still investigating the incident and had not charged the man. The newspaper Vseki Den wrote an article about the attack, which, according to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, contained several false and derogatory statements, including a statement that the Witness was beaten because he was “agitating” people.

On October 1, a man chased two Jehovah’s Witnesses who were proselytizing door-to-door in a residential building. The man yelled at them, pushed them down the stairs, spat at them, and hit them. He then followed them onto the street and emptied a bottle of water over them, threatening to break their teeth if they ever returned. Police had not made an arrest by year’s end.

On October 21, approximately 30 persons participated in a protest organized by nationalist political parties IMRO, NFSB, and Ataka in front of the court in Pazardjik prior to the hearing of the case against 14 Roma Muslims accused of supporting ISIS. The participants stated their protest was against the spread of radical Islam and in defense of constitutional order.

In February Shalom and B’nai B’rith, with the support of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms Party and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, protested and called for a ban of the annual march on February 13 honoring Hristo Lukov. Lukov headed the pro-Nazi Union of Bulgarian National Legions prior to and during World War II. Sofia municipality officials again withheld permission for the march on grounds it would pose a risk to public order and only allowed supporters to lay flowers at Lukov’s memorial plaque. Despite the prohibition, the nationalist Bulgarian National Union Party organized a march of several hundred people in downtown Sofia under tight police security. Prior to the march, police detained three participants for wearing masks and carrying batons and later released them without pressing charges.

According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the media continued to misrepresent their activities and beliefs on a regular basis. They said reporters from the SKAT TV cable television company harassed them, accused them of criminal acts, and encouraged their audience to report the Jehovah’s Witnesses to the police each time they came across any. On October 31, the Burgas Administrative Court rejected SKAT TV’s appeal against a decision of the Commission for Protection against Discrimination levying a 2,000 lev ($1,077) fine on SKAT and a 1,200 lev ($647) fine on two of its journalists for spreading false information and making comments constituting discrimination against the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Jehovah’s Witnesses stated national dailies Trud and 24 Chasa, as well as the regional daily Konkurent, regularly published libelous statements about them as part of an ongoing campaign to discredit them as a “dangerous sect.”

Jewish community leaders continued to express concern over increasing incidents of anti-Semitism on social media and online forums. They said examples included accusations that Jews hated all other people and were enemies of the state, that Jews caused the crises in the Middle East with the intent to cause a refugee wave that would destroy Europe, and statements such as “Crush the dastardly Jewish scum! Khazar plague!” In some cases, the same statements were reposted or shared on mainstream media websites.

Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, and the Office of the Grand Mufti continued to report incidents of desecration such as painted swastikas, offensive graffiti, and broken windows in their places of worship. On several occasions, vandals painted graffiti on the mosques in Karlovo, Pleven, and Medovets. In September vandals spray-painted nationalist symbols on the front of the Office of the Grand Mufti. Jehovah’s Witnesses reported vandalism involving the throwing of stones and breaking of windows at their prayer houses in Pleven on April 21 and in Sofia on April 21 and July 30. Police had not made arrests in any of the incidents by year’s end.

In January Grand Mufti Mustafa Hadji delivered a public lecture at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in which he reviewed the doctrinal problems in the ideology of terrorist organizations. He stated the justification for violence espoused by that ideology was the complete opposite of what the Quran extolled, which was to “live in peaceful coexistence with others, resort to war only as a measure of self-defense, and commit to interreligious mutual cooperation in order to build and affirm universal values in society.”

U.S. embassy officials regularly communicated with the Directorate for Religious Affairs, the ombudsman’s office, the Commission for Protection against Discrimination, local government administrations, and law enforcement agencies to discuss religious freedom issues such as the Pazardjik trials, discrimination cases, legislative initiatives, and the denial of permits for construction of new places of worship.

In January the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs and the Charge d’Affaires discussed religious affairs with Foreign Minister Mitov and encouraged him to consult with the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe regarding draft legislation affecting religious activity, such as the five legislative amendments under consideration in the National Assembly. On a number of occasions, the Ambassador met with Foreign Minister Mitov, and embassy representatives met with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to encourage support for religious freedom and to express the need for relevant draft legislation to balance measures to protect security with religious freedom considerations.

In December the Ambassador met with Sofia Mayor Fandakova to plan a visit by an ex-neo-Nazi speaker and activist from the United States to speak to high school youth on the dangers of hate groups and to promote tolerance. As part of a group of concerned ambassadors, the Ambassador met with Sofia Mayor Fandakova to protest the march held in honor of Hristo Lukov. In February the embassy released a statement in response to the march, encouraging people to speak out against intolerance and urging respect for human dignity.

The embassy maintained an active dialogue on the state of religious freedom with leaders of the Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, other Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities, human rights groups, and other activists.

The Ambassador met with the patriarch of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the grand mufti, and Shalom to discuss religious freedom issues, such as the need for tolerance of different religious communities and the need to counter hate speech. Embassy representatives met with the regional muftis of Gotse Delchev and Razgrad to learn more about their communities, local religious relations, property disputes, and court trials. Embassy representatives met frequently with leaders of the Jewish community, the Office of the Grand Mufti, Mormons, Catholics, and Jehovah’s Witnesses to discuss infringements on freedom of religion and proposed changes in legislation related to religion.

The Ambassador expressed support for religious tolerance in his remarks at a gathering with the B’nai B’rith Turkish and Bulgarian Chapters in October, in his speech at a Shabbat dinner in July, and while attending the commemoration of the 73rd anniversary of the saving of the country’s Jewish population in March. A senior embassy representative discussed religious tolerance during the iftar hosted by President Plevneliev in June and at a meeting with the abbot of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church’s Rila Monastery in March.

In September the Ambassador wrote a letter to the editor-in-chief of newspaper Sega, expressing his disappointment in its publication of cartoons of Jews that perpetuated anti-Semitic stereotypes and calling for the paper to issue an apology. In response, the editor-in-chief wrote a letter apologizing for the publication.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 19.5 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2006 census, 61 percent of the population is Muslim, predominantly Sunni, 19 percent is Roman Catholic, 4 percent belong to various Protestant groups, and 15 percent maintain exclusively indigenous beliefs. Less than 1 percent is atheist or belongs to other religious groups. Statistics on religious affiliation are approximate because Muslims and Christians often adhere simultaneously to some aspects of indigenous religious beliefs.

Muslims reside largely in the northern, eastern, and western border regions, and Christians are concentrated in the center of the country. Indigenous religious beliefs are practiced throughout the country, especially in rural communities. The capital has a mixed Muslim and Christian population. There is no significant correlation between religious affiliation, ethnicity, or political or socio-economic status.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the country is secular, and both it and other laws provide for the right of individuals to choose and change their religion and to practice the religion of their choice. The constitution states freedom of belief is subject to respect for law, public order, good morals, and “the human person.” Political parties based on religion, ethnicity, or regional affiliation are forbidden.

The law allows all organizations, religious or otherwise, to register with the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Internal Security, which is in charge of religious affairs. The ministry, through the Directorate for Customary Affairs and Worship, monitors the implementation of standards for burial, exhumation, and transfer of the remains; helps organize religious pilgrimages; promotes and fosters interreligious dialogue and peace; and develops and implements measures for the erection of places of worship and the registration of religious organizations and religious congregations. The registration process usually takes approximately three to four weeks and costs less than 50,000 CFA francs ($80). Registration confers legal status but no specific obligations or benefits. Religious organizations are not required to register, but when they do so, failure to comply with applicable regulations required by all registered organizations may result in a fine of 50,000 to 150,000 CFA francs ($80 to $240).

Religious groups operate under the same regulatory framework for publishing and broadcasting as other entities. The Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Internal Security has the right to request copies of proposed publications and broadcasts to verify they are in accordance with the nature of the religious group as stated in their registration.

Religious teaching is not allowed in public schools. Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant groups operate private primary and secondary schools and some schools of higher education. By law, schools (religious or otherwise) must submit the names of their directors to the government and register their schools with the Ministry of National Education and Literacy, but the government does not appoint or approve these officials.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The National Observatory of Religious Facts (ONAFAR), an organization created by the government to “monitor regulations on cultural practices” and promote tolerance and interfaith dialogue, continued to monitor religious communities and cultural practices. Along with monitoring, the ONAFAR played a mediator role within the religious community. In August the ONAFAR monitored a dispute among members of the Federation of Burkina Islamic Associations (FAIB), an organization intended to unite Muslim organizations in Burkina Faso, on the renewal of their leadership.

The government gave all religious groups equal access to registration and routinely approved their applications, according to religious group leaders.

The government did not fund religious schools or require them to pay taxes unless they conducted for-profit activities. Likewise, the government taxed religious groups only if they engaged in commercial activities, such as farming or dairy production. The government reviewed the curricula of religious schools to ensure they offered the full standard academic curriculum; however, the majority of Quranic schools were not registered, and thus their curricula were not reviewed.

The government allocated 75 million CFA francs ($120,000) each to the Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, and traditional animistic communities. According to the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Internal Security, the government could provide an additional subsidy when the religious community or organization pursued a mission of general interest, such as education, health, or vocational training; when the religious community conducted an activity of national interest, such as promoting peace or social stability; or when the success or failure of an activity could have affected a significant part of the population, as in the case of religious pilgrimages. For example, in September the government allocated approximately 1.1 billion CFA francs ($1.76 million) to subsidize the cost of the pilgrimage of the 5,500 Muslims going on the Hajj. The government also provided funding to registered Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim (commonly referred to as “Franco-Arabic”) schools through subsidies for teacher salaries, which were typically less than those of public school teachers.

In March the government established a constitutional commission to draft a new constitution. Of the 92 members appointed in June, six were representatives of the main religious communities.

The ethics commission of the High Council of Communication (CSC), the governmental body in charge of regulating media, summoned and questioned officials of the Al Houda and Femina FM radio stations on August 12 for content it stated was “undermining the principle of religious tolerance” and violating the terms of agreements signed between the CSC and media organizations. According to the CSC, Al Houda and Femina FM broadcast “offending” sermons. The government stated the broadcasts in question provided a comparative analysis of Islam and other religions with a “strong tendency to denigrate other religions, including Christianity.” The media executives present at the hearing reportedly indicated to the CSC they had not listened to the sermons in question beforehand and pledged to take steps to prevent such content in the future.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

On January 15, gunmen armed with heavy weapons attacked a restaurant and two hotels in Ouagadougou, killing 30 and wounding more than 50. A counterattack by Burkinabe and international forces killed three attackers and freed 176 people who had been trapped in one of the hotels. AQIM and Al-Mourabitoun claimed responsibility for the attacks, which they described in a statement as being targeted against the “enemies of religion.”

In July in the midst of a years-long dispute and an ongoing legal battle between the Muslim community and members of the Siamou ethnic group about ownership of a plot of land in Orodara, a group of Siamou youths looted and vandalized a Sunni mosque located on the disputed land. According to media reports, a recent addition to the mosque, built on land the Siamou community reportedly considered sacred, triggered the incident. Local and national authorities attempted unsuccessfully to mediate between the two groups. In August the minister of territorial administration, decentralization, and internal security met with delegations of the FAIB and ONAFAR to discuss the dispute in Orodara and encourage the parties to find a peaceful resolution. Both delegations stated they welcomed the initiative of the minister and said they were committed to bring key actors together to find “consensual and durable solutions.”

Members of the Burkinabe Muslim Community Organization, the Catholic Archdiocese of Ouagadougou, and the (Protestant) Federation of Evangelical Churches stated religious tolerance was widespread and numerous examples existed of families of mixed faiths.

Embassy staff regularly discussed incidents affecting religious freedom with the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Internal Security, including the incident in Orodara.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy officials met separately with Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant religious leaders throughout the country, at the local and national levels, to encourage their efforts to promote interfaith dialogue and advocate for religious tolerance and freedom.

The embassy organized a roundtable on religious freedom on September 15. Guests included two representatives of each of the Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant communities; the director of religious affairs at the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Internal Security; the president of the ONAFAR; and two journalists. The discussion focused on the participants’ views of the state of religious freedom in the country, ways to promote interfaith dialogue, and how to maintain peaceful coexistence among the various religious communities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 56.9 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the most recently available estimates, approximately 88 percent are Theravada Buddhists. Approximately 6 percent are Christians (primarily Baptists, Roman Catholics, and Anglicans, along with several small Protestant denominations). Muslims (mostly Sunni) comprise approximately 4 percent of the population. The Rohingya population, which is predominantly Sunni Muslim, is estimated at approximately 1 million by NGOs, with more than 800,000 stateless individuals in Rakhine State, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There are small communities of Hindus and practitioners of traditional Chinese and indigenous religions. There is a very small Jewish community in Rangoon.

There is significant correlation between ethnicity and religion. Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion among the majority Bamar ethnic group and also among the Shan, Rakhine, and Mon ethnic groups. Christianity is dominant among the Kachin, Chin, and Naga ethnic groups. Christianity also is practiced widely among the Karen and Karenni ethnic groups, although many Karen and Karenni are Buddhist and some Karen are Muslim. People of South Asian ancestry, who are concentrated in major cities and in the south central region, are predominantly Hindu or Muslim, although some are Christian. Islam is practiced widely in Rakhine State and in Rangoon, Irrawaddy, Magwe, and Mandalay Divisions by some Bamar and ethnic Indians as well as ethnic Kaman Muslims and Rohingya. Chinese ethnic minorities generally practice traditional Chinese religions and to a lesser extent Islam and Christianity. Traditional indigenous beliefs are practiced widely among smaller ethnic groups in the highland regions.

Legal Framework

The constitution states that every citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess and practice his or her religious beliefs. The constitution limits those rights if they threaten public order, health, morality, or other provisions of the constitution. It further provides that every citizen has the right to profess and practice his or her religion if not contrary to laws on security, law and order, community peace, or public order and morality.

The law prohibits deliberate and malicious speech or acts intended to outrage or wound the religious feelings of any class by insulting or defaming its religion or religious beliefs. The law also prohibits injuring, defiling, or trespassing on any place of worship or burial grounds with the intent to insult religion.

All organizations, whether secular or religious, are required to register to obtain official status. This official status is required for organizations to gain title to land, obtain construction permits, and conduct religious activities.

The law bars members of religious orders (such as priests, monks, and nuns) from running for public office, and the constitution bars members of religious orders from voting. The government restricts by law the political activities and expression of the Buddhist clergy (sangha). The constitution forbids “the abuse of religion for political purposes.” Although there is no official state religion, the constitution notes that the government “recognizes the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union.” The constitution “also recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Animism as the religions existing in the Union at the day of the coming into operation of this Constitution.”

The government bans any organization of Buddhist monks other than nine state-recognized monastic orders. Violations of this ban are punishable by immediate public defrocking and criminal penalties. The nine recognized orders submit to the authority of the State Sangha Monk Coordination Committee (SSMNC), the members of which are elected by monks.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Department for the Perpetuation and Propagation of the Sasana (Buddhist teaching) oversees the government’s relations with Buddhist monks and schools.

The package of four laws passed in 2015 for the “protection of race and religion,” remains in effect. The Buddhist Women Special Marriage law stipulates notification and registration requirements for marriages between non-Buddhist men and Buddhist women and introduces new obligations to be observed by non-Buddhist husbands and penalties for noncompliance. The Religious Conversion law regulates conversion through an extensive application and approval process. The Population Control Law allows for the designation of special zones for which population control measures could be applied, including authorizing local authorities to implement three-year birth spacing. The Monogamy Law bans polygamous practices, which were already criminalized under the country’s penal code.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

There were reports of killings, sexual abuse, arbitrary arrest, burning of structures, continued detention of Rohingya Muslims, restrictions on religious practice and travel, forced displacement, discrimination in employment, granting of building permits, and access to citizenship. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Following October and November attacks on security forces that killed dozens, Burmese military and police forces conducted “security operations” that suspended access to humanitarian aid, independent media, and human rights monitors over a broad area. The government reported that during these operations in northern Rakhine State there were approximately 100 civilian deaths, 200 arrests, as well as 900 homes burned down. According to UNHCR, the operations displaced approximately 93,000 civilians, of which approximately 70,000 fled to Bangladesh. While close linkages between religion and ethnicity made it difficult to categorize alleged incidents of abuse as solely based on religion or ethnicity, some refugees in Bangladesh reported to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights instances in which security forces forcibly shaved the beards of imams and burned or desecrated Qurans. Human Rights Watch released satellite imagery showing at least 1,500 structures had been burned down during the “security operations” and said the Burmese military was responsible; the government said the buildings were burned down by “extremists.”

On December 30, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it would take back in 2017 2,415 Rohingya Muslims from the larger population of long-term refugees who were living in Bangladesh over the years that it had recognized as citizens of Burma.

On December 3, during conflict with ethnic armed groups, media reports indicated the Burmese military took refuge and stored weapons in the Saint Francis Xavier Catholic Church in Mong Ko, northern Shan State. According to reports, the military left the area following the battle and subsequently bombed the church to prevent armed groups from obtaining the weapons there. The government said that the church was damaged by ethnic armed groups during fighting. On December 24, Kachin State Baptist Pastors Dom Dawng Nawng and La Jaw Gam Hseng were reported missing after they helped journalists report on the bombed church, according media reports. Civil society groups reported that the military had arrested the pastors and held both incommunicado. The pastors’ whereabouts remained unknown at year’s end.

On October 6, a Maha Aungmye Township, Mandalay Division court sentenced Dutch tourist Klaas Haytema to three months of hard labor in prison for “disturbing religious assembly.” Haytema had originally been charged with a more serious charge of “defiling a place of worship” after he unplugged an amplifier sound system broadcasting a Buddhist sermon in September, but the court changed the charge upon conviction. Haytema said he had no intention of insulting religion and had unplugged the amplifier after it woke him up at night. He was released December 27.

In October three Muslim men stood trial for illegally importing over 90 cows intended for ritual slaughter during Eid al-Fitr after MaBaTha monks reportedly pressured local authorities to ban the practice. According to a news report, the police were looking for 30 other people in the case and a local Muslim leader said the case amounted to religious persecution. The cows were confiscated and kept in police custody, drawing criticism from social media users that the monks’ complaints led to a waste of public resources. The cows were subsequently released to a local market and the three men were released on bail. The trial remained unresolved at the end of the year.

On February 26, a court convicted interfaith activists Zaw Zaw Latt, Pwint Phyu Latt, and Zaw Win Bo of entering the country illegally and sentenced each to two years in prison and hard labor. On April 8, Zaw Zaw Latt and Pwint Phyu Latt were additionally convicted of unlawful association with banned organizations and each sentenced to an additional two years in prison. Zaw Win Bo was released April 17 through a presidential pardon while Zaw Zaw Latt and Pwint Phyu Latt remained in detention through the end of the year and continued to appeal the ruling.

Unlike in previous years, the government did not take action against individuals whose actions were construed to be insulting to religion. In January and April the president released and pardoned approximately 400 political prisoners and political detainees including Htin Lin Oo, an information officer of the National League for Democracy (NLD) who was detained in 2015 and charged with religious defamation for a public speech deemed as insulting Buddhism.

New Zealander Philip Blackwood was released from prison in January. Blackwood and two Burmese colleagues, Htut Ko Ko Lwin and Tun Thurein, were sentenced in 2015 to two and a half years of hard labor for posting an image to Facebook of the Buddha wearing headphones to promote their bar in Rangoon, and had been charged with insulting religion. Htut Ko Ko Lwin and Tun Thurein were not pardoned and remained in detention at the end of the year.

The government also released Shin Nyana, a monk sentenced in 2010 to 20 years in prison for teaching a religious doctrine that did not comport with Theravada Buddhism as part of the January presidential pardons.

Religious organizations said that an estimated 100 people of predominantly Buddhist faith had been arrested in violation of the Monogamy Law due to extramarital affairs, but that the 2015 laws adopted for the “protection of race and religion” remained largely unenforced around the country and the government did not draft any implementation guidelines. In July, however, the government defended the package of laws at the UN following criticism that it was discriminatory towards women. The Population Control Law drew local and international condemnation for providing the government the ability to designate geographic areas where a waiting period between births could be enforced, which some press and civil society groups said could disproportionately impact Muslim communities. The UN panel at the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women raised concerns that the law could be used to target ethnic minorities, such as Rohingya Muslims, and could allow state officials to enter into homes and perform spot checks. In response, the government delegation said there was no such thing in the country as targeting or marginalizing of minority groups, and that the law would be voluntary. As of the end of the year, the government said it had not used the law to designate any geographic area where a waiting period between births applied.

During the year, the number of Rohingya who left the country by boat to countries such as Thailand or Malaysia declined to its lowest level since 2011, with only a few hundred leaving the country by boat, and unlike in previous years, there were no reports of associated human rights abuses.

The government said it completed resettlement of all 3,700 internally displaced persons (IDPs) displaced by intercommunal violence in 2013 in Meiktila Township, Mandalay Division, completely closing the IDP camps at the beginning of the year. According to civil society and the government, the estimated 200 displaced persons who remained during the year resettled with family in Mandalay. The media reported some remaining IDPs were unable to return to their original homes and encountered barriers to resettling in neighboring communities. Some Muslim IDPs said they faced conflict from the residents of villages where they were resettled, who said they were trespassers. The Muslim IDPs said some of them were evicted by the villagers, and the township government and police said they could not guarantee their security. Interfaith leaders encouraged local governments to resolve these issues peacefully and indicated that by the end of the year all IDPs had resettled with family in other communities.

According to various religious organizations and NGOs, the registration process remained lengthy and, due largely to what they say is bureaucratic inefficiency in local administrative governments, was often not completed. Except in a few cases, however, organizations noted the lack of registration did not hinder the majority of religious practices.

There were reports of local authorities preventing Muslims from conducting prayer services at religious facilities in some villages.

There were approximately 3,900 Hajj pilgrims. The government expedited passport issuance for 280 of the pilgrims and simplified procedures for all Hajj travelers.

The government continued to subject all public events, including religious ceremonies and festivals, to security regulations and other controls. There were reports that any public religious event (i.e., outside a house of worship) required prior written permission from ward, township, police, district, and division-level authorities. All public religious celebrations also required prior written permission from religious affairs authorities and applications needed to be submitted approximately three weeks in advance. Some religious minority groups, primarily Christians and Muslims, reported longer delays in approving some of their applications.

Some Christian theological seminaries and Bible schools continued to operate, along with several madrassahs.

The government continued to fund two state sangha universities in Rangoon and Mandalay, respectively, which trained Buddhist monks under the purview of the SSMNC, as well as the International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University in Rangoon.

The government continued to financially support Buddhist seminaries and Buddhist missionary activities. Religious organizations said Buddhist groups generally did not experience difficulty obtaining permission to build new pagodas, monasteries, or community religious halls, in contrast with minority religious groups. According to religious organizations, the Ministry of Religious Affairs financially supported the SSMNC and religious ceremonies.

Some teachers at government schools reportedly continued to require students to recite Buddhist prayers, although such practices were no longer a mandated part of the curriculum. Many classrooms displayed Buddhist altars or other Buddhist iconography.

Due to movement restrictions, reportedly many Rohingya could not access education in state-run schools. Authorities did not permit Rohingya high school graduates from Rakhine State and others living in IDP camps to travel outside the state to attend college or university. Authorities continued to bar Muslim university students who did not possess citizenship scrutiny cards from graduating. These students were permitted to attend classes and take examinations, but they could not receive diplomas unless they claimed a “foreign” ethnic minority affiliation.

On June 30, in Lone Khin Village, Hpakant Township, Kachin State, following months of complaints by Buddhist villagers over reported illegal construction at a mosque, village administrators ordered the mosque to be dismantled despite the Muslim leaders reportedly providing the administrators with the requisite construction permits. The religious leaders of the mosque appealed to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the State Counsellor’s Office, but on July 1, a crowd estimated between 400 and 1,000 people marched to the mosque and burned it to the ground. There were no reports of injury from the attack. Nearly 30 Muslim families fled the village after the riot, according to media reports. On July 5, authorities in Kachin arrested five people in connection to the incident. No formal charges were filed and the five individuals were reportedly released on July 6. Police reportedly responded to prevent the mob violence but stated they were unable to intervene due to the size of the crowds.

On June 23, in Thaye Thamain Village, Waw Township, Bago Division, local leaders and media reported that an argument over the legality of new construction near a local mosque following a Facebook post led to a group of approximately 200 villagers to attack and injure the man building the new structure, destroying his home and the mosque itself. The structure was reportedly slated to be a storehouse with no religious purpose. No one was arrested following the attack; the local government said any arrests would only worsen local tensions and police reportedly did not further intervene due to the size of the mob. All 44 villagers who fled the violence returned home within two weeks of the incident.

Religious leaders continued to note delays by local authorities in issuing permits for repairs of non-Buddhist religious buildings, as well as on permits authorizing construction of new facilities around the country. Christian communities in Chin and Kachin States reported that while applications to local authorities for property registration, construction, and renovation were not denied, the applications encountered delays spanning several years or were lost altogether. These included continued reports that local government officials delayed permits to restore crosses previously destroyed, or to renovate and build Christian churches in Chin State. Local authorities in Chin State also continued to delay applications from Christian groups and churches from buying land in the name of their religious organizations. Religious groups said individual members circumvented this requirement by purchasing land on behalf of the group, a practice the government tolerated.

Christian and Muslim groups that sought to build small places of worship on side streets or other inconspicuous locations continued to be able to do so only with informal approval from local authorities, according to religious groups.

Muslim groups reported official building requests encountered significant delays, and even when approved could subsequently be reversed. They also reported it remained extremely difficult for them to acquire permission to repair existing mosques, although authorities permitted internal maintenance in some cases. Historic mosques in Meiktila in Mandalay Division, Mawlamyine in Mon State, and Sittwe in Rakhine State, as well as in Rangoon and other areas continued to deteriorate because authorities did not allow routine maintenance.

Rohingya were unable to obtain employment in any civil service positions. Rohingya couples needed to obtain government permission to marry. In addition, some Rohingya sources expressed concern about the two-child policy for Rohingya families, referring to a 2005 local order promulgated in northern Rakhine State.

In Rakhine State, the government and security forces imposed restrictions on the movement of various ethnic groups, particularly Rohingya Muslims, including IDPs, both before and during the violence beginning in October. The government stated it imposed these restrictions because of reported threats of violence received from members of Rakhine communities. These restrictions impeded the ability of Rohingya and some non-Rohingya Muslims to pursue livelihoods, gain access to markets and other basic services, and engage other communities. According to civil society groups, government officials denied this population access to basic services, including hospitals. Additionally, as the vast majority of the restricted groups in the area were Muslim, individuals stereotyped by security forces as appearing to be Muslim received additional scrutiny on movements in the region, regardless of their actual religion.

Restrictions governing the travel of foreigners, Rohingya, and others between townships in northern Rakhine State varied depending on the township, usually requiring submission of an immigration form. The traveler could obtain this form only from the Township Immigration and National Registration Department and only if that person provided an original copy of a family list, temporary registration card, and two guarantors. Travel was authorized under the form for 14 days. Authorities granted Muslims outside of Rakhine State more freedom to travel, but they still faced restrictions on travel into and out of Rakhine State.

Muslim community representatives reported that in some cases Muslim-owned businesses encountered significant delays to procure government contracts without a Buddhist “front” person. Media and religious sources said local authorities in some villages restricted the licensing and butchering of cattle by slaughterhouses, the vast majority of which are owned by Muslims, which negatively affected business operations and the ability of Muslim communities to celebrate Islamic holidays.

While the military and civil service continued outreach to various ethnic groups, including by inviting various ethnic groups to attend the Defense Services Academy in an effort to support a more ethnically and religiously diverse workforce; nearly all senior officials within the military and civil service remained Buddhist. Applications for civil service and military positions required the applicant to list his or her religion. Unlike in past years, there were no reports of officers being encouraged to convert to Buddhism in order to be promoted.

In June the government relaunched its citizenship verification exercise to address the status of the Rohingya in Rakhine State. As of the end of the year, more than 2,000 Rohingya and Kaman Muslims had gained either full or naturalized citizenship since the program began in 2015, primarily from Myebon and Kyaukpyu Townships. Recipients of naturalized citizenship were ineligible to participate in some political activities and professions, although all citizens had the right to vote. Although recognized by law as one of the 135 ethnic groups that automatically qualifies for citizenship, religious groups said some Kaman Muslims in Rakhine State chose to participate in the citizenship verification pilot as a quick means to gain status after being displaced by the 2012 violence and living in IDP camps alongside Rohingya. The government no longer required participants to identify as “Bengali” if they wished to be verified for citizenship, and did not permit race or religion on any of the forms at the earliest phases of the process. The government continued to call for Rohingya to participate but communities expressed a variety of objections to the exercise and the need for more assurances about the results of the process before taking part. Reportedly, the program initially received significant numbers of participants in Kyaukpyu and Myebon Townships, but was met with strong resistance in other townships of Rakhine State, with local Muslims rejecting the verification and identification forms, in some cases because individuals wanted to clearly state their ethnicity as “Rohingya” on their documentation. Reportedly, residents said they would not participate or accept the new cards until “Rohingya Muslim” was available as the identifying ethnicity and religion. Officials said they would not allow individuals to identify as such; government policy since May was to avoid using either terms of “Bengali” or “Rohingya,” saying both are emotive terms that could hinder progress between communities in Rakhine State.

Authorities required citizens and permanent residents to carry government-issued identification cards that permitted holders to access services and prove citizenship. These identification cards often indicated religious affiliation and ethnicity, but there appeared to be no consistent criteria governing whether a person’s religion was indicated on the card. The government also required citizens to indicate their religion on certain official applications for documents such as passports, although passports themselves do not indicate the bearer’s religion. Members of religious minorities, particularly Muslims, faced problems obtaining identification and citizenship cards. Some Muslims reported that they were required to indicate a “foreign” ethnicity if they self-identified as Muslim on applications for citizenship cards.

The SSMNC and the government denounced what they said was MaBaTha’s “propagation of conflict” and the government began drafting legislation to prohibit hate speech. On July 3, during a trip to Singapore following intercommunal violence against Muslims in Bago Division and Kachin State, Chief Minister of Rangoon Phyo Min Thein responded to questions about MaBaTha by stating the group was unnecessary. Despite criticism from MaBaTha, he clarified his statement on July 6 in Rangoon stating that MaBaTha was duplicative of the SSMNC and was an unnecessary, unofficial governing council of Buddhism in the country. MaBaTha said it would hold national protests absent an official apology. On July 8, MaBaTha said the government would be held responsible if it did not address the chief minister’s comments by July 14 – which the government refused to do. On July 13, during a plenary meeting, the SSMNC leaked a statement stating that no Sangha convention had endorsed MaBaTha’s legitimacy. This statement reportedly distanced the SSMNC from MaBaTha, delegitimized the organization in the eyes of many Buddhists around the country, and signaled that the group would be subject to state regulation. The Ministry of Religious Affairs continued to draft a law prohibiting hate speech through the end of the year and publicly warned MaBaTha that its existence would be uncertain if it continued using religion to spread conflict. MaBaTha subsequently reportedly called itself a religious missionary group committed to the peaceful resolution of religious conflict.

State-controlled media frequently depicted government officials and family members paying respect to Buddhist monks; offering donations at pagodas; officiating at ceremonies to open, improve, restore, or maintain pagodas; and organizing “people’s donations” of money, food, and uncompensated labor to build or refurbish Buddhist shrines nationwide. The government published and distributed books on Buddhist religious instruction.

Although the law prohibits mixing of religion and politics, some local political parties developed campaign slogans and platforms to protect Buddhism. According to civil society organizations, anti-Muslim campaign slogans leading into the 2015 elections declined following the elections. The Arakan National Party convened a meeting in June with Arakanese (ethnic Rakhine) “nationalists,” monks, and civil society organizations in Sittwe, Rakhine State, to launch a poster campaign protesting the government’s use of the term “the Muslim community in Rakhine State” to refer to Rohingya Muslims, calling for the government to instead refer to Rohingya as “Bengali,” reportedly to imply that they are undocumented immigrants from Bangladesh and not legal citizens of Burma. Earlier in June, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi had said the government would avoid using the term “Rohingya” when referring the group and instead use “‘the Muslim community in Rakhine State’ for the sake of harmony and trust between two communities.”

The government officially recognized a number of interfaith groups, including the Interfaith Dialogue Group of Myanmar, which organized monthly meetings and sponsored several religious activities promoting peace and religious tolerance around the country throughout the year. The group’s leadership included Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, and Hindu leaders as well as other religious groups.

The government permitted foreign religious groups to operate. Local religious organizations were also able to send official invitations for visa purposes to clergy from faith-based groups overseas, and foreign religious visitors acquired either a tourist or business visa for entry. Authorities permitted Rangoon-based groups to host international students and experts.

During clashes between government security forces and a militant group the government called Aqa Mul Mujahideen following the October attacks in northern Rakhine State, there were reports of reprisal killings inside the Rohingya community, with Rohingya killing other Rohingya for being informants or “collaborators” with the government.

MaBaTha published and spread what the government considered to be anti-Muslim hate speech in print and social media, although Buddhist religious leaders said its influence waned following the government and SSMNC denunciation in July. Wirathu, a MaBaTha monk, continued using social media to inflame religious tensions by using terms widely considered racially and religiously derogatory and divisive towards Muslims as well as calling for violence against Muslims, including following the October 9 attack in Rakhine State. There were reports anti-Muslim literature continued circulating in some communities and included incitement to violence.

On July 3, thousands of Buddhists in Rakhine State, including monks, participated in protests against the government’s announced use of the term “Muslim community in Rakhine State” to refer to Rohingya, and demanded that Rohingya be referred to as “Bengali.” The Buddhists also protested the government’s announced change in nomenclature from “ethnic Rakhine” to “the Buddhist community in Rakhine State,” saying ethnic Rakhine Buddhists originated from Rakhine State and that their identity should not be attenuated. The government withdrew use of “the Buddhist community in Rakhine State” the day following the protest.

There were reports of some local Buddhist-majority village leaders preemptively placing sign posts deterring Muslims from buying land or moving into the villages. In October ethnic Rakhine groups in Minbya Township distributed pamphlets encouraging residents to avoid trading, employing, or interacting socially with Muslims in villages in central Rakhine State. In Karen and Mon States there were anti-Muslim sermons and campaigns to prohibit business dealings between Buddhists and Muslims. In other areas, Buddhists reportedly would not sell or rent property to Muslims.

In April in Karen State, followers of monk Myaing Gyi Ngu constructed a stupa (a mound-like structure that contains relics and is used as a place of meditation) and planted a Buddhist flag in the St. Mark Anglican Church. His supporters said the land had previously held a Buddhist structure. They subsequently built a pagoda in Hlaingbwe, a Muslim-majority village, near a mosque. This was the third religious building commissioned by Myaing Gyi Ngu, following similar construction in Hpa-An in September 2015. According to media reports, Buddhist authorities, local government authorities, the Myanmar Baptist Convention, and ethnic armed groups in the area asked the monks to stop to prevent religious tensions, but construction continued unabated. According to news reports, to avoid further conflict, Bishop Saw Stylo of the Anglican Church and other Christian leaders allotted tracts of the land for the Buddhists and said they would not pursue actions against them.

In October a small group of Buddhist monks gathered at a longstanding madrassah in Thaketa Township, Rangoon Division, demanding the owners to show authorized permits for the building and its religious activities. The monks reportedly threatened those in the madrassah unless they stopped teaching. After the monks left, the madrassah owners reported the incident to local police who reportedly did not respond.

Buddhist and Muslim communities continued collaborating to quell rumors and prevent violence through formal and informal community-centered mechanisms. For example, in June in northern Shan State, stories reporting Muslim children had spray-painted images of the Buddha in a monastery began spreading through social media. Administrators of a local social media platform prevented photos of the vandalism from spreading further and worked with religious and community leaders to quell rumors and calm voices that were advocating violence. Subsequently, local police disciplined the children for vandalism and there were no reports of communal violence.

Religious and community leaders and civil society activists organized intrafaith and interfaith events and worked jointly to develop mechanisms to monitor and counter hate speech and to promote religious tolerance and diversity. A coalition of interfaith civil society groups worked throughout the year to draft legislation to counter hate speech and promote interfaith harmony. In Mandalay Division, various NGOs and interfaith leaders continued to hold meetings and public events to promote peace and religious tolerance for community leaders and youth. A number of interfaith groups continued mobilizing civil society around the country to promote religious tolerance. A leader active in the Interfaith Dialogue Group, Catholic Cardinal Charles Maung Bo, was honored for his work by the Parliament of the United Kingdom in May where his speech, widely covered in Burmese press, called on the international community to encourage the country’s new government to take action against hate speech, reinstate and allow humanitarian access to displaced communities, address citizenship issues for Rohingya Muslims, and establish a credible independent investigation with international experts into the crisis in Rakhine State. He also focused on the importance of truly democratic societies celebrating religious diversity and protecting the basic human rights of every person.

In June the Rangoon Heritage Trust NGO recognized the country’s only synagogue as a site of historical significance and heritage. Only 11 other buildings in the city have received similar recognition.

Senior U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State, the Ambassador, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator, the Deputy National Security Advisor, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Counselor of the State Department, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stability Operations, consistently raised ongoing U.S. concerns about religious freedom, the plight of the Rohingya in Rakhine State, hardships facing religious minority communities in Kachin and northern Shan states in the midst of ongoing military conflicts, and hate speech on social media. They and other U.S. government officials consistently called for long-term and durable solutions to the root causes of longstanding issues in Rakhine State and the lack of citizenship status for Rohingya Muslims, including a voluntary and transparent path to restoration and provision of citizenship, and the reinstatement of access to humanitarian aid for the Muslim-majority region. Embassy officials also urged government and interfaith leaders to improve efforts to mitigate religiously motivated violence such as that in Kachin State and Bago Division.

Embassy officials at all levels discussed the importance of addressing the lingering effects of past ethnoreligious-based violence and hate speech, including anti-Muslim rhetoric, and promoting religious freedom and tolerance in meetings with high-level government officials, including then-President Thein Sein, civilian Vice President Henry Van Thio, State Counsellor Suu Kyi, the ministers of foreign affairs, home affairs, and the president’s office, the deputy minister of religious affairs, the speaker of the lower house of parliament, parliamentarians, members of civil society, scholars, and representatives of other governments.

Embassy officials traveled to states containing ethnic minorities to discuss religious freedom and tolerance with state and local government officials, NGOs, and members of community-based organizations and religious communities. The Ambassador visited Rakhine and Kachin states, areas affected by ethnoreligious-based violence since 2012, and other areas that had suffered from and were identified as at risk of ethnoreligious conflict. An embassy-based conflict advisor traveled to nine states and divisions over the course of six months to analyze the root causes and effective prevention mechanisms of interreligious conflict. The Ambassador and embassy officials used this analysis to guide their public and official engagements with various religious leaders and organizations to promote religious tolerance. The Ambassador’s multiple visits to Rakhine State to assess the situation helped inform the embassy’s efforts and strategies in engaging the government and advocating for the rights of all communities in the state.

The embassy continued to call for respect for religious freedom, tolerance, and unity in its interactions with all sectors of society, and on its widely viewed Facebook page. Embassy representatives spoke out against intercommunal conflict and hate speech, and for religious freedom at high-profile events. Interfaith breakfasts hosted by the Ambassador, and publicized on Facebook, emphasized the value of bringing representatives together from diverse religious backgrounds. Embassy representatives, including the Ambassador, met repeatedly with Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, Hindu, and Muslim leaders, including ethnic minority religious leaders, members of faculties of theology, and other religiously affiliated organizations – including MaBaTha – and NGOs to promote religious freedom, diversity, and tolerance. The Ambassador hosted a breakfast on July 15 to bring civil society leaders and various faith communities together to discuss issues pertaining to religious freedom and communal relations in celebration of Eid al-Fitr. The embassy also shared multiple posts with its audience on Facebook about religious pluralism, tolerance, and shared identity in the United States.

The embassy regularly published statements highlighting concerns about religious-based tension and anti-Muslim discrimination as well as called for respect for religious diversity, unity, and tolerance. On April 20, the embassy released a statement on Rakhine State, welcoming the new government’s commitment to protect all communities. After the violent incident on October 9, the embassy issued a statement in support of the government’s stated efforts to resolve the underlying causing of conflict in Rakhine. U.S. Embassy facilities in Rangoon and Mandalay respectively also hosted numerous discussions for youth and civil society on religious tolerance. A U.S. government-sponsored program on supporting political and civic engagement provided several courses to civil society representatives on pluralism, as well as hosted a well-attended youth forum on interfaith advocacy in June. As in prior years, the embassy partnered with and supported numerous faith-based and civil society organizations working on programs promoting religious freedom and tolerance.

Since 1999, Burma has been designated as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On October 31, 2016, the Secretary of State redesignated Burma as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11.1 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2008 national census, 62 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 21.6 Protestant, 2.5 Muslim, and 2.3 Adventist. Another 6.1 percent have no religious affiliation and 3.7 percent belong to indigenous religious groups. The Muslim population lives mainly in urban areas, and the head of the Islamic Community of Burundi (COMIBU) estimates Muslims constitute closer to 10-12 percent of the population. Most Muslims are Sunni. There are some Shia Muslims and also a small Ismaili community. Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent include Jehovah’s Witnesses, Orthodox Christians, The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Hindus, and Jains.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes a secular state, prohibits religious discrimination, recognizes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and provides for equal protection under the law regardless of religion. These rights may be limited by law in the general interest or to protect the rights of others, and may not be abused to compromise national unity, independence, peace, democracy, or the secular nature of the state, or to violate the constitution. The constitution prohibits political parties from preaching religious violence, exclusion, or hate.

The government recognizes and registers religious groups through its law covering nonprofit organizations, which states these organizations must register with the Ministry of Interior. Each religious group must provide the denomination or affiliation of the institution, a copy of its bylaws, the address of its headquarters in the country, an address abroad if the local institution is part of a larger group, and the names and addresses of the association’s governing body and legal representative. Registration also entails identifying any property and bank accounts owned by the religious group. The ministry usually processes registration requests within two to four weeks. Leaders of religious groups who fail to comply or who practice in spite of denial of their registration are subject to six months’ to five years’ imprisonment.

The law does not generally grant tax exemptions or other benefits to religious groups. Some religious and nonreligious schools have signed agreements with the government entitling them to tax exemptions when investing in infrastructure or purchasing school equipment and educational materials.

According to the Ministry of Education, the official education program includes religion and morality classes in the curriculum for all secondary and primary schools. The program offers religious classes for Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam, although all classes may not be available if the number of students interested is insufficient in a particular school. Students are free to choose from one of these three religion classes or attend morality classes instead.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In March media sources reported President of the National Assembly Pascal Nyabenda accused the Catholic Church of playing a “purely political, not spiritual role” and said the government would not talk to “sponsors of terrorism.” A representative of the Association of Member Episcopal Conferences in Eastern Africa denied the Church was sponsoring violence and said government critics should not be deemed “terrorists.” In November Nyabenda publicly sought a rapprochement with the Church, appearing before thousands of church-goers in Bujumbura and asking for the Church’s assistance in engaging with international donors to encourage them to provide assistance to the country. He also asked the Church to support the government’s efforts to repatriate refugees.

In June the Conference of Catholic Bishops of Burundi (CCBB) issued a message read in all churches that expressed compassion for what they said were those who were suffering as a result of President Pierre Nkurunziza’s bid for a third term in 2015 and suggested ways forward. The CCBB characterized the president’s third term as a political crisis in the wake of killings, property destruction, thefts, exile, and economic deterioration. Their suggestions included ways to resolve the political crisis. The ruling party issued a counterstatement, which Catholic Church officials stated they perceived as an attempt to deter the Church from preaching freely on sensitive issues.

All of Eusebie Ngendakumana’s followers detained in prison were released after varying lengths of time in custody, according to Ngendakumana’s lawyer. Ngendakumana was accused of leading an unrecognized cult that formed after she reported seeing visions of the Virgin Mary in 2013. She was, however, never formally charged with any crime. Forty of her followers were convicted of rebellion against administrative orders and sentenced to prison from six months to five years. According to their lawyer, a number of those convicted were freed before the expiration of their sentences if they pledged to refrain from going on a pilgrimage to the location where the Virgin Mary was said to appear. Ngendakumana reportedly fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo with many of her followers in 2015.

A Catholic representative reported the University of Burundi chaplain and two other priests who fled the country in April 2015 had not returned as of the end of the year. The three fled after receiving anonymous death threats accusing them of supporting an insurgency against the government. The chaplain provided moral support to, and helped identify temporary shelter for, approximately 600 university students who sought refuge outside the U.S. embassy in April 2015 after authorities closed the university (including their housing) amid protests and violence related to the president’s re-election bid.

The government administration comprised both Christian and Muslim officials. The president was a Protestant while several prominent members of his cabinet were Catholic or Muslim.

Government benefits – such as tax waivers – were granted to religious groups for the acquisition of materials to manage development projects. According to the Burundi Revenue Authority, the Catholic Church was granted a tax waiver in August for the import of a car for one of its seminaries and another tax waiver was granted in October for construction materials for Office of the Development of the Archdiocese of Gitega, one of the Church’s development agencies.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The U.S. embassy continued to encourage and support broad based religious tolerance and dialogue.

The embassy encouraged societal leaders to support religious tolerance and promote interfaith discussion of the collaborative role religious groups could play in disseminating a message of peace and tolerance to the population.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 553,000 (July 2016 estimate). The national government’s statistics indicate 77 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 10 percent Protestant, 2 percent Muslim, and 1 percent does not identify with any religion. The second largest Christian denomination is the Church of the Nazarene. Other Christian denominations include Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Assemblies of God, Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, and other Pentecostal and evangelical groups. There are small Bahai and Jewish communities.

Legal Framework

The constitution states freedom of conscience, religion, and worship are inviolable rights and protects the right of individuals to choose, practice, profess, and change their religion, and to interpret their religious beliefs for themselves. It provides for the separation of religion and state and prohibits the state from imposing religious beliefs and practices on individuals. It prohibits political parties from adopting names associated with particular religious groups. The constitution prohibits ridiculing religious symbols or practices. Rights may only be suspended in a state of emergency or siege under the constitution.

Violations of religious freedom are crimes subject to penalties of between three months and three years in prison.

The law codifies the constitution’s religious freedom provisions by providing for equal rights and guarantees for all religions in accordance with the constitution and international law. The law separates religion and state, but allows the government to sign agreements with religious entities on matters of public interest. Specific sections of the law guarantee the protection of religious heritage, the right to religious education, freedom of organization of religious groups, and the free exercise of religious functions and worship.

A 2014 concordat between the government and the Holy See recognizes the legal status of the Catholic Church and its right to carry out its apostolic mission freely. The concordat further recognizes Catholic marriages under civil law, the right of Catholics to carry out religious observances on Sundays, and specifies a number of Catholic holidays as public holidays. It protects places of worship and other Catholic properties and provides for religious educational institutions, charitable activities, and pastoral work in the military, hospitals, and penal institutions. The concordat exempts Church revenues and properties used in religious and nonprofit activities from taxes and makes contributions to the Church tax deductible.

The law requires all associations, whether religious or secular, to register with the Ministry of Justice. The constitution states an association may not be armed; be in violation of penal law; or promote violence, racism, xenophobia, or dictatorship. To register, a religious group must submit a copy of its charter and statutes signed by its members. Failure to register does not result in any restriction of religious practice, but registration provides additional benefits such as exemptions from national, regional, and local taxes and fees. Registered religious groups may receive exemptions from taxes and fees in connection with places of worship or other buildings intended for religious purposes, activities with exclusively religious purposes, institutions and seminaries intended for religious education or training of religious leaders, goods purchased for religious purposes, and distribution of publications with information on places of worship. Legally registered churches and religious groups may use broadcast time on public radio and television at their own expense.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to grant privileges to the Catholic Church that other groups did not receive including in educational institutions, in government facilities, and in access to media. Some minority religious groups said this practice strengthened the perception the government favored the Catholic Church as the “official religion” over other religious groups. The government used Catholic Church representatives to inaugurate public buildings throughout the country. Public television transmitted religious programming paid for by the Catholic Church, most of which was of Catholic services. A Brazilian-owned television network (TV Record) covered the religious activities of the Universal Church. Other religious groups received minimal TV broadcast time reportedly because they did not request it or had no means to pay for it.

Muslim community leaders expressed concerns regarding the “nonlegalization” of mosques in the country, referring to the cases of individuals intending to open mosques in their residences and mentioned the existence of some restrictions when requesting visits to prisons in order to meet with Muslim prisoners. Prison authorities did not grant some requests to visit on Fridays to meet with prisoners and hold Friday prayers. Muslim leaders stated the registration process was straightforward.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy representatives promoted religious freedom in discussions with government officials at all levels, including the minister of parliamentary affairs (responsible for issues related to religion). After meeting with Islamic community representatives, embassy officials addressed issues raised in the meeting, including establishment of mosques and prison visits, with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice. The embassy also spoke with civil society representatives regarding religious freedom. Embassy representatives reiterated the importance of respecting religious freedom in formal meetings with the Catholic Church, the Muslim community, and the Church of the Nazarene, among others. The embassy also used social media channels to raise awareness about the need to protect religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 16.0 million (July 2016 estimate). The 2013 Inter-censal Population Survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics said Buddhists make up 97.9 percent of the population, and an estimated 95 percent of the population is Theravada Buddhist, according to the Ministry of Cults and Religions (MCR). The vast majority of ethnic Khmer Cambodians are Buddhist. Ethnic Vietnamese who reside in the country traditionally practice Mahayana Buddhism although there are many who have adopted Theravada Buddhism. Other ethnic Vietnamese practice Roman Catholicism, and they make up the vast majority of Catholics in the country. Ethnic Vietnamese make up approximately 5 percent of the population. According to government estimates, approximately 2.6 percent of the population is Muslim, although some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) estimate the Muslim population to be 4 to 5 percent. The Muslim population is predominantly ethnic Cham, although not all Cham are Muslim. The Cham typically live in towns and rural fishing villages on the banks of the Tonle Sap Lake and the Mekong River, as well as in Kampot Province. There are four branches of Islam represented in the country: the Shafi’i branch, practiced by as many as 90 percent of Muslims in the country; the Salafi (Wahhabi) branch; the indigenous Iman-San branch; and the Kadiani branch. The remainder of the population includes Bahais, Jews, ethnic Vietnamese Cao Dai, and members of various Christian denominations.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of belief and religious worship, provided such freedom neither interferes with others’ beliefs and religions nor violates public order and security. The constitution establishes Buddhism as the state religion and provides for state support of Buddhist education; it also prohibits discrimination based on religion. The law requires that religious groups refrain from openly criticizing other religious groups, although this provision is rarely tested. The law also forbids religious organizations from organizing events, rallies, meetings, and training sessions that are politically focused.

The law requires all religious groups, including Buddhist groups, to register with the MCR to conduct religious activities. The law mandates that groups must inform the government of the goals of their religious organization, describe its activities, provide biographical information of all religious leaders, describe funding sources, commit to submitting annual reports detailing all activities, and refrain from insulting other religious groups, fomenting disputes, or undermining national security. Registration requires approvals from numerous local, provincial, and national government offices, a process which can take up to 90 days. The MCR, however, has no authority to punish religious groups for failing to register, and there are no associated penalties for failing to register. Registered religious groups receive an income tax exemption from the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

While the law formally bans non-Buddhist groups from door-to-door proselytizing and stipulates that non-Buddhist literature may only be distributed inside religious institutions, the MCR reports some Christian groups still carry out these activities without facing arrest. The law also prohibits offers of money or materials in order to convince people to convert.

The law requires separate registration of all places of worship and religious schools. Unregistered places of worship and religious schools may be shut down temporarily until they are registered, although the MCR reports it has not taken such action. The law also makes a legal distinction between “places of worship” and “offices of prayer.” The establishment of a place of worship requires that the founders own the structure and the land on which it is located. The facility must have a minimum capacity of 200 persons, and the permit application requires the support of at least 100 congregants. By contrast, an office of prayer may be located in a rented property and has no minimum capacity requirement. The permit application for an office of prayer requires the support of at least 25 congregants. Places of worship must be located at least two kilometers (1.2 miles) from each other and may not be used for political purposes or to house criminals or fugitives. The distance requirement applies only to the construction of new places of worship and not to offices of religious organizations or offices of prayer.

Religious schools must be registered with the MCR and the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport (MOEYS). Religious schools are advised to follow the MOEYS core curriculum which does not include a religious component; however, schools may supplement lessons with a religious curriculum in addition to the ministry-core curriculum. The government promotes Buddhist religious instruction in public schools in coordination with MOEYS, although non-Buddhist students were allowed to opt out of this instruction. The law does not mandate non-Buddhist religious instruction, and no other religions are taught in public schools. Non-Buddhist religious instruction may, however, be provided by private institutions.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In early June the government closed Radio Sap Cham, a daily hour-long radio program broadcasting since 2004 on issues related to the preservation of Cham identity, language, religion, and culture. It was the only Cham-language radio program in the country and the closure drew criticism from the Cham community on social media. The government did not elaborate on the reasons for shutting down the program.

In June the Ratanakiri provincial government dispersed a group of approximately 50 ethnic minority Jarai Christians who had gathered for a Bible study session, saying they had not obtained proper permission from the local authorities. Later that month, provincial police briefly detained three ethnic Jarai and ordered them to delete photographs of prayer meetings stored on their personal electronic devices. Local media reported that authorities broke up the gatherings because of fears the group was focusing on political issues.

In September the National Election Committee released a statement reaffirming the rights of Muslims to wear religious headscarves or caps in voter registration photographs, marking a departure from previous restrictions against wearing headscarves and caps in photographs used for official identification documents.

The government continued to promote Buddhist holidays, provide Buddhist training and education to monks and others in pagodas, and provide financial support to an institute that performed research and published materials on Khmer culture and Buddhist traditions.

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, continued to hear testimony related to charges of ethnic- and religious-based genocide against the Cham population during the Khmer Rouge era from 1975 to 1979.

According to Radio Free Asia, in June authorities allowed police from Vietnam to question a group of approximately 150 Vietnamese Montagnard Christian refugees in Phnom Penh. Activist groups and the representatives of the UNHCR said refugees should not be subject to interviews from police of the country they fled. According to media reports, the Montagnards expressed fear following the questioning that the Cambodian government would deport them back to Vietnam, which they reportedly fled because of religious and other reasons. In a statement to Radio Free Asia, government officials said they were unaware of the Vietnamese police visit; some of the Montagnards said, however, that the Vietnamese police were accompanied by local police. In October the Ministry of Interior announced that a majority of the remaining Montagnards had not been granted asylum following extensive interviews, stating “their answers do not comply with the convention on refugees.” Local media initially reported the ministry provided them two weeks’ notice to leave the country or face arrest and immediate deportation to Vietnam. In December the UNHCR escorted 13 of the Montagnards back to their villages in Vietnam. Because religion, ethnicity, and politics are closely linked, it was difficult to categorize the government’s actions as being solely based on religious identity.

During Ramadan, Prime Minister Hun Sen hosted an iftar for members of the Muslim community. In his speech, he told his guests there was no basis for political discrimination in the country and called on Buddhist followers to be tolerant and accepting of the Muslim and Christian communities.

There were reports from some members of the Cham Muslim community of barriers to full integration into society. Local media reported some members of the majority Buddhist community and other minority ethnic groups continued to view the Cham with suspicion and superstition as purported practitioners of “black magic.” In some cases, those who were suspected of practicing black magic were killed by villagers or even their own family members. In April 62-year-old Soa Siv was beheaded by his daughter-in-law Mao Channy and her aunt Em Sun because they said he had killed Channy’s father with black magic.

In January unidentified individuals sent death threats and attacked teachers and school officials of a Muslim school for young women in a predominantly Cham community in Tbong Khmum Province, resulting in the deployment of police to protect the premises. In one instance, a rock thrown over the wall was reportedly wrapped in a piece of paper written with death threats mentioning the school’s founder and local Imam Muhammad Abdulrahman, as well as his son and the school’s teachers, according to Commune Police Chief Seng Ly. In other incidents, Abdulrahman reported unknown individuals throwing firecrackers against dormitory walls as students slept and placing feces in the water tanks from which students drink.

U.S. embassy officials raised religious freedom with MCR representatives and other government officials. Embassy officials also discussed the issue of deportation and residency of Montagnard Christians with government officials and members of international and local NGOs.

The embassy underscored the importance of acceptance of religious diversity with leaders of Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim groups, emphasizing the importance of interfaith tolerance in a democratic society. Embassy programs focused on faith-based communities and promoted pluralism through exchanges and youth programs.

The embassy continued several programs specifically focusing on the Cham population. One of the programs sought to help preserve Cham heritage, including religious heritage, through reading and writing instruction in the native Cham language, and included the preservation and study of religious artifacts from the ancient Kingdom of Champa from which present-day Cham trace their lineage. Another program consisted of a series of speaking engagements and focus groups in which Islamic leaders from around the world engaged with the Cham community to provide the Cham with a deeper understanding of the constructive role that various Muslim populations play throughout the world in their workforces and communities.

Other embassy programs invited Muslims to participate in workshops with guest speakers from throughout Southeast Asia. The workshops focused on interfaith cooperation, community leadership, and conflict resolution. Embassy officials toured the country on several occasions to meet members of the community, in the process promoting religious tolerance, showing respect for Cham culture, lessening the isolation of the Cham, and supporting Cham integration into the wider culture. They discussed ways the Cham could further integrate into society while preserving their cultural and religious identity, and lay the groundwork for genuine, long-lasting religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 24.4 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2005 census released in 2010, the most recent available, 69.2 percent of the population is Christian, 20.9 percent Muslim, 5.6 percent animist, 1.0 percent other religions, and 3.2 percent report no religious affiliation. Of Christians, approximately 38.4 percent are Roman Catholic, 26.3 percent Protestant, 4.5 percent other Christian denominations, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, and less than 1 percent Orthodox. There are growing numbers of Christian revivalist churches.

Christians are concentrated primarily in the southern and western parts of the country. The two Anglophone regions are largely Protestant, and the five southern Francophone regions are mostly Catholic. The Fulani (or Peuhl) ethnic group is predominantly Muslim and lives in the northern Francophone regions; the Bamoun ethnic group is also predominantly Muslim and lives in the West Region. Many Muslims, Christians, and members of other faiths also adhere to some aspects of animist beliefs.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes the state as secular, prohibits harassment or discrimination on grounds of religion, and provides for freedom of religion and worship.

The law on freedom of association governs relations between the government and religious groups. The government must approve religious groups or institutions as a prerequisite for lawful operation. Although the law prescribes no specific penalties for operating without official recognition, the government may suspend the activities of unregistered groups. The government does not require indigenous religious groups to register, characterizing the practice of traditional religion as a private concern observed by members of a particular ethnic or kinship group or the residents of a particular locality.

To become an authorized entity, a religious group must legally qualify as a religious congregation, defined as “any group of natural persons or corporate bodies whose vocation is divine worship” or “any group of persons living in community in accordance with a religious doctrine.” The religious group must submit a request for authorization as a religious group, including the group’s charter describing planned activities, the names and functions of the group’s officials, and a declaration of commitment to comply with the law on freedom of association, to the relevant divisional (local level) office. The relevant office forwards the documents to the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MINATD). MINATD reviews the file and sends it to the presidency with a recommendation to approve or deny. Authorization may then be granted by presidential decree. Official authorization confers no general tax benefits but allows religious groups to receive real estate as a tax-free gift for the conduct of their activities and to gather publicly and worship. It also permits missionaries to receive visas with longer validity. Unauthorized religious groups may gather publicly and worship under a policy of “administrative tolerance” as long as public security and peace are not disturbed.

MINATD may issue an order to suspend any religious group for “disturbing public order,” which is not defined in the law. The president may dissolve any previously authorized religious organization that “deviates from its initial focus.”

The Ministry of Basic Education and the Ministry of Secondary Education require private religious schools to comply with the same curriculum, infrastructure, and teacher-training standards as state-operated schools. Unlike public schools, private schools may offer religious education.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government often temporarily closed churches, including two chapels of the Presbyterian Church in Cameroon (PCC) in Abong-Mbang, East Region, in a stated attempt to solve protracted leadership crises within Christian groups. The government stated it used the measure as a means to preserve order and encourage a solution and reconciliation among those involved. PCC members stated they were frustrated with the government decision, but hoped the closures might lead to an enduring solution.

By year’s end, a Quranic instructor who was arrested after security forces raided a number of Quranic schools in Quirvidig, Far North Region, in December 2014, was acquitted and released, according to the human rights organization OS-Civiles Droits de l’Homme. The organization reported at least 13 others were in pretrial detention, while according to Amnesty International there were 43 adults still being held from the raid, excluding two who subsequently died. In the same raid, 84 children were detained at a children’s center for six months.

Modestine Yida Mbukwe, the plaintiff in an August 2015 case, abandoned her efforts to bring judicial action against a gendarme officer when the military tribunal did not convene a hearing. She said the gendarme insulted her because she was wearing an Islamic headscarf and tried to remove her veil by force.

The government took no action to adjudicate applications for legal status by a number of religious groups whose applications had been pending for years. The government has approved only one religious group in the last 17 years and none since 2010. According to MINATD, incomplete application submissions and lengthy background investigations contributed to delays. Although by law groups must register, the government continued to allow numerous unregistered small religious groups to operate freely under the government’s policy of “administrative tolerance.” While 47 religious groups were legally registered as of the end of the year, hundreds more operated without official government authorization according to religious leaders. One of these organizations, the Cameroon Bible Fellowship, has been seeking government recognition since 2002.

Unlike the previous year, authorities did not take measures to ban the wearing of full-face Islamic veil in their constituencies. While the ban implemented in July 2015 in the Far North Region remained in force, the government did not enforce the ban and many Muslim women wore burqas in other regions without issue.

During the year the government ordered a survey of religious groups operating in the country. MINATD officials said the survey would help the government gain better insight into religious organizations by researching registration status, places and times of worship, structure, and general practices. Officials also said the survey would potentially lead to issuing new authorizations or withdrawing active ones. At the end of the year, the survey was ongoing. During the biannual conference of regional governors held in Yaounde in July, the minister of MINATD urged governors to speed up investigations related to the survey and submit their assessment reports.

The government continued to grant broad legal authority to traditional leaders to manage their districts. As part of this authority, traditional leaders continued to exercise control over local mosques, with the right to appoint or dismiss imams.

The state-sponsored television station and radio stations regularly broadcast Christian and Islamic religious services and ceremonies on national holidays and during national events. Government ministers or the president often attended these ceremonies.

The government provided an annual subsidy to all private primary and secondary education institutions, including those operated by religious denominations. The size of each subsidy was proportional to the size of the school.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

The Islamic State in West Africa Province, more commonly known as Boko Haram, designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, continued committing acts of mass violence in its quest to impose its religious and political beliefs. Boko Haram perpetrated numerous attacks, including mass killings, often directly targeting civilians, but also against government officials and military forces. It also threatened populations in the Far North Region. The attacks against civilians were indiscriminate and included killings and kidnappings of Muslims and Christians. The insurgents attacked places of worship. While there are no accurate estimates of total numbers killed and kidnapped, reports suggest Boko Haram killed more than 400 civilians, police, military, and gendarmes as of the end of the year.

Boko Haram carried out many suicide bombings and deadly attacks during the year. On January 13, a suicide bomber killed 12 worshippers at a mosque in Kouyape. On January 18, a suicide bomber killed four worshippers at a mosque in Nguetchewe. On January 25, a quadruple suicide bomb attack killed 32 people at a market in Bodo. On February 10, two suicide bombers killed six people at a funeral in Nguetchewe. On May 20, Boko Haram killed at least nine persons and set 39 houses on fire in Indoua, near the border with Nigeria. On June 4, Boko Haram attacked Ali Touboun near Darack, around Lake Chad, killing 10 fishermen and injuring or abducting several others. On June 29, media sources reported a suicide bomber affiliated with Boko Haram killed at least 11 people in Djakana near the border with Nigeria. The victims were gathering near a mosque to break their fast during Ramadan. Minutes later, an attack at a video club killed at least four individuals. On September 21, Boko Haram launched a suicide attack in Djakana, Mayo Sava division, killing four civilians and wounding two others. On November 22, media sources reported suspected Boko Haram fighters launched three attacks in the northern part of the country. One of the attackers killed six individuals. No one was killed in the other two attacks.

Governor Midjiyawa Bakari of the Far North Region reported that members of a local self-defense group spotted a suspected Boko Haram fighter riding his bicycle towards the town of Mora where Christians were assembling for Christmas Mass on December 25. The defense group attempted to stop and search the man, but he detonated his explosives killing himself, a nearby civilian, and two members of the defense group. Local media also reported three other armed attacks on Christmas day in Fotokol, Belgede, and Madam, which left several wounded.

The government worked in conjunction with the Nigerian government in a joint forces campaign to free citizens under the control of Boko Haram and arrest Boko Haram fighters. On February 26, the government reported the joint forces killed 92 Boko Haram members and freed 850 individuals from their stronghold. On March 17, local media reported a military court sentenced 89 members of Boko Haram to death under the 2014 antiterror law for terrorist attacks committed in the country’s North Region. On April 5, Cameroon’s commander of the joint forces against Boko Haram reported more than 300 Boko Haram members were arrested and at least 2,000 people were freed from their strongholds along the Cameroon, Nigeria, and Chad borders. On May 15, the government reported the joint forces arrested five Boko Haram leaders and freed 18 women and 28 children in the northern Madawaya forest. On December 16, the border between Cameroon and Nigeria reportedly reopened for the first time in three years, signifying a decrease in threat from Boko Haram attacks.

On July 14, Amnesty International released a report suggesting more than 1,000 of the people accused and arrested of supporting Boko Haram were dying from disease and malnutrition in detention under the Cameroonian government. The report suggested that many of the people were arrested “without reasonable suspicion that they had committed any crime” and brought to trial in “unfair trials” in military courts.

In several instances, disputes within religious communities over church personnel, church management, and the creation of new ecclesiastical districts and bylaws prevented the holding of worship or resulted in the temporary closure of churches. The churches most affected include the PCC parishes in Ebolowa, Abong-Mbang, and Ngaoundere, as well as the Anglican Church of Cameroon Archdiocese of Northwest and West regions.

Deputy Administrator of Northwest and West regions’ Archdeaconry Board of the Anglican Church of Cameroon Reverend Nchinda stated in a letter dated February 5 that the Bishop of the Anglican Diocese of Cameroon, Dibo Thomas Babyngton Elango, infringed on Nchinda’s group’s right to freedom of worship. The accusation was in response to an ongoing dispute since 2013 in which Archdeacon Emmanuel Yuh sought to separate from the Anglican Diocese of Cameroon and form a separate diocese, stating that Elango gave preferential treatment to Nigerian clergy over the Cameroonian clergy who were fewer in number. As a result, Elango reportedly suspended Yuh for six months without pay, banned him from the premises, and named new pastors to run the archdeaconry.

On August 11 in Ebolowa, South Region, authorities temporarily closed the Elat PCC church following debates among three of its factions. In January the PCC General Assembly created three separate pastoral units out of the existing Ntem presbytery, the Ntem, Endam, and Mvangan-Jerusalem presbyteries. The three conflicting factions could not agree on the church’s administration.

Similarly, on February 24, local authorities upheld the closure of the Nkol-Mvolan and Mbama chapels in Abong-Mbang, East Region, which have been closed since 2014. On May 3, Justin Mvondo, the senior divisional officer (SDO) for Vina in Adamawa Region, attempted to evict PCC Pastor Bouloumegue Boyomo from Ngaoundere as a result of an internal conflict regarding the creation of new pastoral units. The SDO and pastor belonged to opposing factions of the PCC. According to media sources, the SDO intended to use his prerogatives as SDO to have his own faction control the Philadelphie PCC parish in Ngaoundere. The governor of Adamawa and the delegate general for national security, with MINATD’s approval, intervened to prevent Boyomo’s expulsion. The MINATD minister declared that the SDO’s decision was a threat to public order and stated the SDO would be held personally liable for the consequences of his actions against unity, peace, and freedom of worship.

Many prominent religious leaders and organizations spoke out against Boko Haram, its attacks against security forces, and its attempts to elicit support from local populations. In May the Council of Imams and Religious Dignitaries of Cameroon (CIDIMUC), a civil society organization aimed at promoting interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance, met for its fourth annual conference and raised awareness about peace and security challenges and “responsible citizenship” of imams.

Christian and Muslim leaders reported they worked together to protect their communities from violence from Boko Haram. In addition, the media reported some Christians secured mosques during prayer sessions while Muslims reciprocated and guarded churches on Sundays, therefore minimizing a surprise terrorist attack by Boko Haram. This grassroots-led strategy of protecting one another’s place of worship was tested in certain villages of the Far North Region along the Nigerian border and was expected to be extended to the entire region, according to Governor Midjiyawa Bakary.

Some Muslim leaders in the northern part of the country stated that Boko Haram was not about religion but about terrorism alone. Some also noted that the greatest issue was not of interreligious tensions, but intrareligious. Many individuals continued to associate Boko Haram with Islam and/or a specific ethnic group, which further increased stigmatization of some Muslims. The Muslim leaders stated that the more moderate versions of Islam (i.e., Tijaniyya) were being threatened by more fundamentalist versions (i.e., Wahhabism), which in some cases was exacerbated by generational gaps. Other Muslim leaders believed there was no such conflict within Islam.

In December during the Feast of Tabaski in Yaounde, some Christians joined Muslim groups to celebrate. According to media, community members commented that religious tolerance was a necessary strategy to combat Boko Haram. Furthermore, according to a Muslim leader, Christians and Muslims sang and paraded together in Foumban during Ramadan.

The U.S. embassy regularly discussed religious freedom and the importance of interfaith dialogue with government officials including the first vice president of the senate who is also a Lamido (traditional Islamic leader); the minister delegate of external relations in charge of “relations with the Islamic World; and divisional level administrative officers. In exchanges with the government, embassy officers advocated for greater transparency and efficiency in approving the registration of religious groups. Embassy officers also raised the matter of protracted issues over church leadership and personnel within Christian groups.

On November 14, the Ambassador visited the northern part of the country where he met with Muslim traditional leaders and local government officials. Embassy officers also met with prominent leaders from Christian and Muslim communities, including the coordinator of CIDIMUC, a former president of World Conference of Religions for Peace, and the secretary general of the Islamic Union of Cameroon. In addition they met with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Garoua, the Archbishop Emeritus of Douala, the Garoua principal imam, Garoua Poumpoure Imam, and the deputy administrator of Northwest and West regions’ archdeaconry board of the Anglican Church of Cameroon. The conversations included discussions on promoting religious tolerance and peacebuilding. The embassy underscored the commitment of the United States to interfaith dialogue and cooperation in the face of threats by Boko Haram.

The embassy sponsored a project to engage youth to prevent violent extremism and radicalization. The project helped raise the awareness of 500 youth leaders across the country about the importance of preventing radicalization in the name of religion. The messages delivered to youth leaders during the project included calls for religious tolerance and interfaith dialogue, and rejection of a religious struggle between Muslims and Christians.

The embassy funded two projects promoting religious tolerance. The first brought together more than 150 civil society and religious leaders with government and U.S. embassy representatives to address and promote intergenerational, interreligious, and multicultural dialogue. As part of the project, three participants traveled to Maroua, two weeks after the bomb blast in the market square, to interact with the victims of the Boko Haram attack. The three participants held a workshop with 40 youth leaders from Maroua in which they shared their experiences with Boko Haram attacks and discussed strategies and best practices for how youth could fight radicalization.

The second project addressed issues of religious intolerance among youth and used drama, poetry, spoken word, and music to promote diversity and inclusion and build religiously tolerant communities. The project trained 100 peer leaders to train other youth using social media to spread peaceful messages on religious tolerance. The project sponsored the first national spoken word and poetry contest on religious tolerance, and participants contributed to the development and production of a radio drama series on religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 35.4 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census (the latest data available), approximately 67 percent of the population is Christian. Roman Catholics constitute the largest group (38 percent of the total population), followed by the United Church of Canada (6 percent), Anglican (5 percent), Baptist (1.9 percent), and Christian Orthodox (1.7 percent). Presbyterian, Lutheran, and Pentecostal groups each constitute less than 2 percent of the population. Approximately 3 percent of the population is Muslim and 1 percent Jewish. Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, Scientologists, Bahais, and adherents of Shintoism, Taoism, and aboriginal spirituality together constitute less than 4 percent of the population. Approximately 24 percent of the population claims no religious affiliation.

According to the 2011 census, 56 percent of immigrants who arrived in Canada from 2006-2011 were of Asian origin and 12 percent were of African origin; these groups generally adhere to religious beliefs that differ from the majority of native-born citizens. According to the 2011 census, non-Caucasian, non-Aboriginal ethnic minorities constitute 19.1 percent of the overall population and adhere to a diverse range of religious practices.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, and expression. Every individual is equal under the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination based on religion. The law imposes “reasonable limits” on the exercise of these religious rights only where such restrictions can be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” The law permits individuals to sue the government for violations of religious freedom. Federal and provincial human rights laws prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion. Civil remedies include compensation and/or changes to the policy or practice responsible for the discrimination.

The law does not require religious groups to register, but the government grants tax-exempt status to religious groups that register as nonprofit organizations with the Charities Directorate of the tax authority, the Canada Revenue Agency. Nonprofit status provides federal and provincial sales tax reductions, rebates, and exemptions. To gain and retain tax-exempt status, a group must be nonpolitical and undergo periodic audits. Charitable status also grants clergy various federal benefits, including a housing deduction under the tax code and expedited processing through the immigration system. Clergy includes persons whose communities have licensed, ordained, or otherwise formally recognized them for their religious leadership and authority to perform spiritual duties and services within their religious organization. Individual citizens who donate to tax-exempt religious groups receive a federal tax receipt entitling them to federal income tax deductions.

The criminal code prohibits the practice of polygamy, which is an indictable offense subject to imprisonment of up to five years.

Government policy and practices with respect to education, including religious schools, fall under the purview of the provincial, rather than federal, governments. Six of the 10 provinces provide full or partial funding to some religious schools.

Catholic schools in Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan retain the constitutionally protected provincial funding they had when those provinces joined the federation. Federal statutory protection for Catholic and Protestant publicly funded minority education exists in the Northwest Territories, Yukon, and Nunavut, which do not have provincial status. Constitutional or federal statutory protection for public funding of religious education does not extend to schools of other religious groups. The law permits parents to homeschool their children and to enroll them in private schools for religious reasons.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In June the British Columbia (BC) Court of Appeal upheld a lower court decision affirming the province’s authority to appoint a special prosecutor to issue polygamy charges against two Mormons in Bountiful, BC. The original charges of polygamy were at first dropped for fear they violated constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion. In 2011 the BC Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion that the harm polygamy represented outweighed the right to religious freedom. The province brought charges against the individuals in August 2014 and alleged one of the accused had 24 wives, several of whom were under the age of 18 at the time of marriage.

The Quebec Assembly continued to debate a bill, tabled in June 2015, which would ban women from wearing religious attire that covered their faces during public ceremonies. At a press conference in October, provincial Justice Minister Stephanie Vallee of the Quebec Liberal Party stated that banning the burqa was necessary for the sake of identification, communication, and security at public services, including naturalization ceremonies.

In October the Quebec Superior Court ruled a provincial judge erred in refusing to hear the case of a Muslim woman in February 2015 who refused to remove her hijab. The court offered “regrets” to the woman, but found no breach of her right to freedom of religion and declined to issue a declaratory judgment affirming the right to wear religious attire in Quebec courtrooms. The Superior Court agreed with a separate finding by the provincial judicial council in September that judges have the authority to interpret the law on appropriate dress within their courtrooms on a case-by-case basis.

Montreal’s Outremont borough passed a bylaw in May banning the opening of new places of worship on two streets in its busiest commercial zone. The bylaw applied to all faith groups. In November, residents of the borough voted in favor of maintaining the ban, which representatives of the Hasidic Jewish community said targeted their community and worsened “already tense relations between elected officials and Hasidic Jews.” Approximately one quarter of Outremont borough residences belong to members of the Hasidic Jewish community.

In November, a BC woman filed a legal challenge against the local school district, stating her child was forced to participate in an aboriginal religious ceremony without her consent and against the wishes of the child. She sought a court order from the Supreme Court to prevent the school district from hosting any expressions of religion, including indigenous ceremonies. The school district, in court documents, denied it violated any rights and said its actions had not favored one belief over another.

In November a Hamilton, Ontario court rejected a parent’s complaint that the Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board, the provincial elementary teachers’ union, and the Ontario government infringed on his right to religious freedom when they failed to inform him of the content of the mandatory provincial sexual education curriculum in public schools. The parent stated he lacked the necessary information to determine whether the content conflicted with his Christian views. The school board stated the curriculum promoted tolerance, including tolerance of the LGBTI community, and the father’s request was impossible to fulfill as it did not apply to a specific class but to the curriculum as a whole. The judge said the school board was not obligated to inform the parent of topics he might find objectionable, as inclusion and equality come before “individual religious accommodations in public education.”

Courts in Ontario, BC, and Nova Scotia heard cases during the year regarding decisions by legal societies in the provinces to deny accreditation to future graduates of Trinity Western University (TWU), a Christian university in BC. In Ontario, the law society argued TWU’s requirement that students sign a “Christian covenant” pledging to abstain from sexual relations outside heterosexual marriage discriminated against homosexuals and violated same-sex equality laws. In June the Ontario appeals court found the law society’s decision to deny accreditation to future TWU graduates was reasonable. In September TWU asked the federal Supreme Court for permission to file an appeal of the Ontario decision, citing infringement on freedom of religion. The court had not granted permission as of the end of the year, and the request remained pending. In July a Nova Scotia appeals court ruled the province’s law society exceeded its jurisdiction in denying accreditation to future TWU graduates, because TWU was located in BC and was outside the jurisdiction of the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act. In November the BC Court of Appeal held that the decision of the BC provincial law society to refuse accreditation to TWU graduates was unlawful. The law society decided against further appeal. The court did not comment on the constitutional arguments related to religious freedom.

A coalition of groups representing Christian physicians in Ontario filed a request in June for judicial review of the province’s requirement that physicians who oppose assisted death on moral grounds make an “effective [active] referral” to another medical provider for patients who seek the service. Under Ontario’s regulations, physicians who fail to make such referrals could face sanctions up to and including the loss of their medical license. The request for judicial review followed enactment of a new federal law that legalized assisted death but specified doctors had the right of freedom of conscience and the right not to perform or assist in providing the procedure. Ontario was the only province to require referral to another physician rather than to a registry or other mechanism. The plaintiffs argued the referral to another practitioner, rather than to a registry, constituted facilitation and violated constitutional guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion.

Ontario-based physician faith groups continued a suit filed in 2015 against the province’s medical regulator. The suit challenged a provincial policy requiring doctors who decline to provide access to contraception and decline to perform abortions on religious or moral objections to refer the patient to another physician. The legal challenge remained pending at year’s end.

In September the Alberta Court of Appeal ruled that courts could exercise jurisdiction in matters of religious edicts when it allowed a Calgary man’s appeal of his “shunning” by a community of Jehovah’s Witnesses to proceed in a lower provincial court. The plaintiff had won approval for judicial review of the act of “disfellowship” in the lower court on the grounds it was procedurally unfair and adversely affected his civil and property rights as a real estate agent whose clientele was largely composed of members of his former religious community. The appeals court dismissed the church’s challenge of the review, allowing the case to proceed.

A Quebec court in December cleared an individual in a slander case brought by a private Islamic school in Montreal of charges that in a blog post and radio broadcast she likened the school’s teaching to extremist instruction delivered in terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The school sought damages for the costs of increased security at the school and harm to its reputation. The judge ruled the comments could be deemed hurtful, but were not erroneous or made in bad faith and the individual had a right to freedom of speech and expression.

The government closed the Office of Religious Freedom within Global Affairs Canada (GAC) in May and replaced it with an Office of Human Rights, Freedoms, and Inclusion. The new office includes religious freedom as one of three divisions, which also include human rights, indigenous affairs, and democracy. GAC’s external advisory committee on religious freedom and Canada’s chairmanship of the International Contact Group on the Freedom of Religion or Belief remained in place.

In August the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) stated female Muslim officers could wear the hijab as part of their uniform. The RCMP became the third police force to add the hijab option after Toronto and Edmonton.

The city of Montreal created a hate crimes unit in May to centralize information, facilitate analysis, and improve prevention of hate-motivated crimes, including religious hate crimes. The new unit will also provide support to victims.

The government remained a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). The government supported, both domestically and abroad, Holocaust education, remembrance, and research, and recommended continued participation in the IHRA.

In his statement to recognize Holocaust Memorial Day on May 4, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau reiterated the government’s commitment to fighting anti-Semitism, racism, and all forms of discrimination.

There were reports of incidents against religious groups, in particular anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim incidents including physical violence, destruction of places of places of worship, vandalism, hate speech, and harassment.

In January an unknown assailant pepper-sprayed a crowd gathered outside a Muslim community center after an event that welcomed Syrian refugees in Vancouver, BC. The prime minister, federal immigration minister, premier of BC, and Mayor of Vancouver publicly condemned the attack. Police investigated the incident as a potential hate crime, but did not make an arrest.

A woman reportedly spit on and pulled at the hijab and hair of a Muslim female shopper in a London, Ontario supermarket in June. Police arrested the assailant and charged her with assault.

The BC Human Rights tribunal awarded an individual C$8,500 ($6,300) in March following its 2015 ruling that in 2014 the Vancouver, BC office of the Amaruk Wilderness Corporation, a Norwegian company, had refused to hire her because she was a Christian. As of the end of the year, the company had not provided the monetary award to the individual.

Montreal police arrested an individual in June who posted messages on social media against Muslims and Islam and threatened the prime minister. The individual was released from custody and his trial was scheduled for October, but no verdict had been published by year’s end.

Unknown individuals dropped off a gift-wrapped pig’s head in a mosque at an Islamic cultural center in Quebec City in June. The Premier of Quebec and the Mayor of Quebec City publicly condemned the act. Police investigations were ongoing as of the end of the year.

Police identified two suspects (one a minor) from a 2015 incident in which two men and a woman made anti-Muslim slurs against two Muslim women on public transit in Toronto. As of the end of the year, the police had not filed charges against the two suspects.

Police in London, Ontario investigated whether an article in the June-July edition of Al Saraha, an independent Arabic language newspaper, stating Jews inflated the number of Holocaust victims from 100,000-600,000 to six million constituted a hate crime. The article, reprinted from an Egyptian newspaper, blamed Jews for Germany’s economic collapse in the 1920s and for promoting promiscuity, homosexuality, and sexual deviance. The publication is distributed in Middle Eastern restaurants and grocery stores throughout the Greater London area. The premier of Ontario condemned the article.

A Jewish school, synagogue, and rabbi’s home in Ottawa were vandalized with graffiti within the span of one week in November with anti-Semitic messages. Police arrested and charged a minor in connection with the vandalism; the minor may face up to 20 charges, including charges of “uttering threats” and “mischief to religious buildings.”

CBC news reported in April vandals wrote the words “Muslim terrorists” over a picture of a Muslim woman wearing a niqab at a library exhibit on the lives of Muslims in Quebec. The library staff reported the incident to the police, but the police did not identify any suspects.

In August B’nai B’rith reported unknown vandals defaced the playground of the Gray Academy of Jewish Education in Winnipeg, Manitoba with graffiti. In September vandals painted swastikas and anti-Semitic graffiti on the walls of a separate Winnipeg-area elementary school. School officials removed the graffiti but did not report the incidents to police.

The B’nai B’rith Canada League for Human Rights received 1,277 reports of anti-Semitic incidents in 2015, the most recent year for which data were available, compared to 1,627 incidents in 2014, which had the highest number of incidents since B’nai B’rith began its survey in 1981. Ontario was the source of 914 incidents, 71 percent of those reported. Reports included harassment such as verbal slurs; hate propaganda via the web, telephone, or printed material (1,123 incidents); vandalism such as graffiti, attacks on synagogues, private homes, community centers, and property, and desecration of cemeteries (136); and physical violence or credible threat of assault (10).

Embassy officers and other U.S. government officials met with government representatives to discuss religious freedom. They conducted regular outreach to religious leaders, NGOs, and religious groups to discuss strategies for combating religious intolerance.

The Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South and Central Asia visited Ottawa in March and met with GAC’s Office of Human Rights, Freedom, and Inclusion to discuss opportunities for collaboration on religious freedom issues globally through the International Contact Group on the Freedom of Religion or Belief.

The Consul General in Montreal hosted a lunch in March for leaders of Montreal’s immigrant communities to exchange best practices to combat religiously motivated discrimination and compared experiences with other forms of discrimination. The group discussed working together in future events to address shared challenges.

In May the U.S. Consulate General in Montreal participated in the city’s annual Holocaust memorial ceremony hosted by the Mayor of Montreal to underscore U.S. commitment to fighting anti-Semitism globally. U.S. participation sought to highlight the commemoration as a global issue beyond the Jewish community. The event attracted religious leaders and members of different faith groups, elected officials, and members of the diplomatic corps.

The Ambassador’s wife delivered remarks relating her Jewish family’s immigrant experience and her reflections as a Jew in North America. She stressed religious tolerance and the U.S. commitment to religious freedom at an iftar hosted by the mayor of Ottawa and the Association of Progressive Muslims of Canada in June. She was the first female keynote speaker invited to address this annual event.

Following his attendance at the dedication of the site of the country’s planned new National Holocaust Monument in September, the Ambassador amplified the event and recognized Holocaust victims and survivors through social media postings.

The U.S. Consulate General in Montreal organized a roundtable meeting in September at which senior U.S. government officials, Quebec’s minister of immigration, religious leaders, and refugee assistance organizations discussed the importance of religious diversity and tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.5 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2003 census, the population is 51 percent Protestant, 29 percent Roman Catholic, 10 percent Muslim, and 4.5 percent other religious groups, with 5.5 percent having no religious beliefs. The nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Oxfam and Coef5 estimate the percentage of Muslims at up to 15 percent. Some Christians and Muslims incorporate aspects of indigenous beliefs into their religious practices.

Legal Framework

The Transitional National Charter, adopted in 2013, and the constitution, adopted by referendum in December 2015 and which went into effect on March 30 when the newly elected president was inaugurated, both provide for freedom of religion under conditions set by law and equal protection under the law regardless of religion. They prohibit all forms of religious intolerance and “religious fundamentalism,” which is not defined in law. They specify an oath of office for the head of state made “before God” that includes a promise to fulfill the duties of the office without any consideration of religion or faith.

Religious groups, except for indigenous religious groups, are required to register with the Ministry of the Interior, Public Security, and Territorial Administration. To register, religious groups must prove they have a minimum of 1,000 members and their leaders have adequate religious education, as judged by the ministry.

The law permits the ministry to deny registration to any religious group it deems offensive to public morals or likely to disturb social peace, and to suspend the operation of registered religious groups if it finds their activities subversive. Registration is free and confers official recognition and certain benefits, such as customs duty exemptions for vehicles or equipment. There are no penalties prescribed for groups that fail to register.

The law does not prohibit religious instruction in public or private schools, but it is not part of the public school curriculum.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to media reports and religious and civil society leaders, civilian authorities did not maintain effective control over the security forces. Human rights organizations stated the government did not take steps to investigate and prosecute officials who committed violations, whether in the security forces or elsewhere in the government, which they stated was a longstanding problem and one that fostered a climate of impunity. In June the government removed the commander of the Central Office for the Repression of Banditry following accusations of extrajudicial killings, but did not investigate or punish suspected perpetrators of human rights abuses.

Muslims continued to report harassment outside of PK5, a Muslim enclave in Bangui, and exclusion from national decision making. Muslim leaders cited situations where Muslims were treated as outsiders or as a different class of citizens, especially when requesting government services. Muslim leaders were reportedly harassed, beaten, and restricted from free movement in the country. According to a group of Muslim youth, after being identified as Muslim (by name or by appearance) by government officials, they were charged bribes and other fees exceeding those charged to Christians.

According to a truck driver in the PK5 neighborhood, when driving between Bangui and Bambari in September, Muslim drivers were systematically singled out at security checkpoints, harassed, and forced to pay money to police, gendarmerie, and FACA. The driver stated that officials seized and destroyed identity cards or other official documents of those who did not pay.

On June 24, the interior minister issued a statement that security services should not arrest citizens on the basis of their religion in response to an incident where members of the ex-Seleka in PK5 took six police officers hostage.

In February during his inaugural address, President Touadera pledged to be “the protector of the weak and the defender of the rights of all citizens, without exception.” Touadera appointed three Muslim ministers to his 23-member cabinet. Media sources reported his actions were intended to send a message of reconciliation which was reflected in the composition of the government. In previous years, the government received some criticism for not appointing more Muslims into senior government positions. In March a Muslim was elected president of the National Assembly.

Some government officials stated they intended to focus efforts on reconciliation among religious groups, although observers stated they made limited progress by year’s end. Following elections in March, President Touadera listed reconciliation among one of the highest priorities of the new administration and subsequently created the position of presidential advisor for national reconciliation. In his June 7 address to the National Assembly, Prime Minister Simplice Sarandji announced the government would establish a Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission intended to reconcile differences across religious lines, among other objectives. The commission was not active at year’s end. The Ministry of Social Affairs and National Reconciliation announced plans to establish Local Peace and Reconciliation Committees throughout the country, in accordance with a recommendation adopted at the May 2015 Bangui Forum. The committees were officially launched by President Touadera on December 21 in Bangui.

On June 27, President Touadera hosted an iftar at the presidential palace, reportedly the first time that a Central African president has done so. The government declared July 5 a public holiday in observance of Eid al-Fitr and September 12 a public holiday in observance of Eid al-Adha. The two holidays were added to the official permanent calendar of national holidays. Unlike corresponding Christian holidays, however, both were unpaid.

On September 14, President Touadera visited the Catholic Church of Fatima in the third district of Bangui where he joined a large congregation for Mass on the occasion of the Feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross. At the end of the Mass, the president delivered a speech encouraging the faithful to engage in social cohesion and donated money to support the IDPs taking refuge at the church compound.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Armed groups, which generally operated freely in certain areas of the country, committed many of the actions affecting religious freedom. The government remained incapable of imposing its authority throughout the territory, preventing violations or ensuring the rule of law and the administration of justice, according to many observers.

Armed groups, such as the anti-Balaka (mostly Christian) and ex-Seleka (mostly Muslim), controlled significant swaths of territory throughout the country and acted as de facto governing institutions, according to media and UN reports.

Police and gendarmerie failed to stop or punish abuses committed by the ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka militias, including abductions, physical mistreatment, extortion, killings, and gender-based violence.

MINUSCA was deployed to multiple areas within the country in response to the rising violence between anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka elements in the second half of the year.

According to MINUSCA, clashes between the anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka militias broke out on September 16 in Kaga Bandoro, which resulted in the death of six Christian civilians and the injury of one peacekeeper.

The death of an ex-Seleka fighter on October 11 was quickly followed by a large clash in the northern town of Kaga Bandoro. According to reports, ex-Seleka fighters attacked the predominantly Christian town, including an IDP camp, a Catholic Church compound, and a school, which resulted in 30 people dead – including 12 ex-Seleka fighters – and over 40 wounded. According to MINUSCA, a local peace committee secured commitments from anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka fighters to allow freedom of movement for the local population which it said helped reduce tensions.

On October 4, an armed gang killed Marcel Mobeka, a high-ranking FACA military officer, in PK5. After Mobeka was killed, anti-Balaka and FACA elements killed several Muslims. President Touadera and his security team promised to apprehend the men responsible for the retaliatory killings; however, the government took no known action. The individuals responsible for killing Mobeka remained under the protection of ex-Seleka. According to the government, the act further fueled the sectarian violence within the capital.

On June 19, ex-Seleka fighters took six police officers hostage in the PK5 neighborhood. Police reported at least two people were shot and killed in the chaos. The police officers were released on June 24. According to media reports, the kidnapping was a retaliatory action after police arrested 26 residents suspected of illegally bringing in arms. The following day, fighting erupted within PK5 between MINUSCA and ex-Seleka elements, leading to the closing of the neighborhood’s sole police station. As of the end of the year, the police station had not reopened, which Muslim sources said contributed to greater insecurity within PK5.

On October 23, following the funeral of a Muslim who had been killed by anti-Balaka fighters in the village of Barya in Koui, an unknown number of Muslim community members and fighters from the armed group Return, Reclamation, and Rehabilitation (3R) killed one Christian man in retaliation. The 3R, comprising hundreds of predominantly Muslim armed fighters, was formed to protect the ethnic Peulh minority from anti-Balaka militias and controlled territory along the border with Cameroon, according to an international human rights organization.

According to the July UN Report of the Independent Expert, between January and June there were 63 documented cases of violence against people accused of practicing witchcraft. The report stated that for the most part anti-Balaka forces located in the capital and in the western part of the country committed these acts. Women were the most frequently accused, except in Bangui where these accusations were levied mainly against children. The report stated that accusations of witchcraft were more often than not actually attempts by armed groups to extort money from the victims.

MINUSCA reported that on August 29, ex-Seleka elements assaulted a 62-year-old man for practicing witchcraft near the town of Bria. MINUSCA also reported that on November 7 two suspected anti-Balaka individuals in Bandjiti village killed a 55-year-old woman accused of witchcraft.

While most observers stated violent conflict and instability in the country had other sources, religion continued to be used as a tool to divide the population. Many but not all members of the ex-Seleka and its factions were Muslim, having originated in neighboring countries or in the remote Muslim north. Members of the anti-Balaka were mostly Christian and continued to control the western part of the country. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

On June 11, an assailant robbed and stabbed to death a Muslim motorcycle taxi driver in Bangui. The killing was reportedly regarded as a direct attack on Muslims by many in the PK5 neighborhood. Two Christians were subsequently killed on June 12, in what observers described as a revenge killing in response to the incident the night before.

According to MINUSCA, on October 20, assailants killed a Muslim man in Bangui, cut his remains into pieces, and deposited them at the Central Mosque. In retaliation, assailants abducted a Christian man, although it was unclear whether he was safely returned to his family.

On October 23, MINUSCA reported a Muslim was severely beaten and presumed dead following a fight with a Christian and thrown into the Sangha River. He reportedly regained consciousness and was rescued by Muslims.

On November 17, individuals conveyed three Muslim men to the Kouango health center following an attack by a group of anti-Balaka militiamen in Bangao and Pende. The town was reportedly deserted the next morning and seven houses were burned.

On November 6, a government official and a Muslim community leader each confirmed that four men armed with automatic weapons and hand grenades interrupted a church service in Bangui’s predominantly Muslim third district and threatened the worshippers. The men chased members of the congregation and caused some damage to church property. The individuals were arrested shortly after the incident by members of a self-defense group and later released.

The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bangui led an interfaith peace march on October 12 through the third district.

Hate speech and negative comments about or directed toward Muslims were still common in most media outlets. Private media outlets reportedly continued to be heavily influenced by their financers, generally representing a Christian perspective, and led by Christian editors. There has been no Muslim-operated radio station or Muslim-oriented program on the national radio station since September 2015.

Muslims continued to report facing consistent social discrimination, including an inability to move freely and therefore feeling “marginalized” by a lack of access to schools, hospitals, and basic necessities, including services provided by the government, as well as those provided by private donors and organizations. One imam in PK5 raised concerns about discrimination due to religious beliefs and the difficulties in carrying out commercial activities. Muslims also expressed a general discomfort in wearing traditional dress outside of the PK5 enclave, stating it drew negative attention or comments from non-Muslims.

Muslims reported facing several challenges within their community, including identity, discrimination, and internal division over leadership. A conference focused on intra-Muslim dialogue in Vienna from February 25-26 to addressed concerns over leadership, the marginalization of Muslim women in social cohesion work, policies and practices of discrimination against Muslims, and the role of Islam in the country.

The Lakouanga Mosque in Bangui, destroyed for a second time during intercommunal violence in September 2015, reopened in April. A Muslim cemetery in Bangui closed in October due to ongoing tensions reopened on December 13.

The Muslim community in the third district and the Christian community of Bimbo signed a “nonaggression and community reconciliation pact” at a public ceremony on February 11. The pact guaranteed free access for Muslims to an important Muslim burial ground in Bimbo’s Boeing neighborhood. Muslims had been unable to access the cemetery since September 2015 and were forced to bury their deceased at home. The pact was reported as a step forward for interfaith relations.

On December 11, Muslims and Christians attended a symbolic reconciliation ceremony at a Mass at Bangui stadium.

The Interreligious Platform, consisting of members from the Protestant, Catholic and Muslim faiths, continued to spread messages of peace and reconciliation throughout the country. In September the platform outlined its plan to expand the scope and geographical reach of its activities, including the establishment of health clinics, vocational education programs, and a radio station to promote peace and social cohesion. According to the Interreligious Platform, the newly elected government had a perceived lack of interest in engaging with it.

The U.S. Ambassador raised religious freedom concerns and encouraged outreach to all religious communities in high-level meetings, including with President Touadera, the presidential advisor for national reconciliation, and the minister of social affairs and reconciliation.

The Ambassador and embassy officials engaged regularly with religious leaders, including the leaders of the Interreligious Platform, the Imam of the Central Mosque, and the Coordinating Committee for Central African Muslim Organizations on issues related to religious freedom and reconciliation, and discussed ways to broaden access and dialogue to elected officials.

In January the Ambassador met with members of a Muslim Youth Association and a Muslim student organization to discuss the concerns of young Muslims and ways to promote tolerance and social cohesion.

In May the Ambassador delivered remarks at the Central African Interfaith Peacebuilding Partnership launching ceremony. In June the embassy organized a leadership training workshop on resolving identity-based conflicts. Participants included imams, youth leaders, women, and members of community-based organizations in PK5. The program came about after community members stated that the neighborhood suffered from a divisive identity crisis that interfered with reconciliation.

In February the Ambassador attended the burial of three Muslims who had been killed in a car accident. The event was the first burial at the Muslim cemetery in the Boeing community in predominantly Christian Bimbo following the signing of the “nonaggression and community reconciliation pact” between Christians in Bimbo and Muslims in the third district. Muslims had previously been unable to access the cemetery.

On July 6, the U.S. Ambassador joined President Touadera for a visit to Bangui’s Lakouanga Mosque for Eid al-Fitr. The president called the mosque, which was rebuilt after being destroyed during the intercommunal violence in September 2015, a “symbol of reconciliation.”

During a visit in March the U.S. Ambassador to the UN delivered remarks at a reception honoring the inauguration of President Touadera in which she paid tribute to the religious leadership in the country and its work to promote peace. She also traveled to the Boeing community in Bimbo to visit the site of the Muslim cemetery. While there, the UN Ambassador participated in a meeting with Christian and Muslim members of the community to hear their concerns and express U.S. commitment to peace and reconciliation.

During a visit in September and October, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom met with Muslim and Christian leaders, government officials, and residents of Christian and Muslim IDP camps to discuss progress on religious tolerance and reconciliation since the installation of the elected government. He also discussed continuing challenges faced by citizens, especially Muslims and IDPs.

In October a visiting Assistant Secretary of State met with senior government and UN officials, civil society, and religious leaders to discuss issues related to reconciliation and inclusivity, the protection of civilians and atrocity prevention, and community violence reduction. He visited PK5 and met with residents to better understand the ongoing struggles faced by Muslims in Bangui under the new government; he also met with the Imam of the Central Mosque.

In April a visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, along with the U.S. Ambassador, visited Bangui’s Central Mosque. He also met with Muslim leaders, officials from the newly installed government, and residents of Muslim and Christian IDP camps to discuss challenges facing the Muslim community, particularly in the PK5 district, and displaced persons.

In February the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, the Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic States, and an embassy official participated in the conference in Vienna focused on intra-Muslim dialogue and capacity building in the Central African Republic. In their remarks, both the Ambassador at Large and the Special Envoy reiterated the U.S. government remains a committed partner to faith communities in the country and encouraged religious solidarity, tolerance, and a peaceful resolution to ongoing conflict.

An officer from the Department of State’s Office of International Religious Freedom visited Bangui in June to meet with religious leaders, Muslim and Christian youth, and civil society organizations working on mediation programs in Bangui. The embassy increased its outreach to Muslim youth and community members in its public events and program of exchanges to the United States.

On June 29, the U.S. Ambassador hosted an iftar, bringing together members of the Muslim community and non-Muslim government officials and representatives of international organizations. During the iftar, the Ambassador asked all participants to adhere to a sense of community and mutual understanding while also promoting peace and stability. There were 48 participants, including representatives from 20 Muslim organizations, the Interreligious Platform, the minister of reconciliation, the presidential advisor on reconciliation, and two of the cabinet’s four Muslim ministers.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 11.9 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the Second General Population Census (2009), approximately 58 percent of the population is Muslim, 18 percent Roman Catholic, 16 percent Protestant, and the remaining 8 percent practices indigenous religious beliefs. Most Muslims adhere to the Sufi Tijaniyah tradition. A small minority hold beliefs associated with Wahhabism or Salafism. The majority of Protestants are evangelical Christians. There are also small numbers of Bahais and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Most northerners practice Islam, and most southerners practice Christianity or indigenous religions; religious distribution is mixed in urban areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes the state as secular and affirms the separation of religion and state. The constitution provides for freedom of religion and equality before the law without distinction as to religion. These rights may be regulated by law and may only be limited by law to ensure mutual respect for the rights of others and for the “imperative” of safeguarding public order and good morals. It prohibits “denominational propaganda” that infringes on national unity or the secular nature of the state.

Under the law, all associations, religious or otherwise, must register with the Ministry of Territorial Planning, Urban Development, and Housing. The associations must provide a list of all the founding members and their positions in the organization, the founders’ resumes, copies of the founders’ identification cards, minutes of the establishment meetings, a letter to the minister requesting registration, the principal source of the organization’s revenue, the address of the organization, a copy of the rules and procedures, and the statutory documents of the organization. The Ministry of Public Security and Immigration conducts background checks on every founding member and establishes a six-month temporary but renewable authorization to operate, pending the final authorization and approval. Failure to register with the ministry may lead to the banning of a group, one month to a year in prison, and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 CFA francs ($80 to $804). Organizations that fail to register are not considered legal entities and may not open a bank account or enter into contracts. Registration does not confer tax preferences or other benefits.

Burqas, defined in a ministerial notice as a burqa, or any other garment where one sees only the eyes, are forbidden in the entire national territory by ministerial decree.

The constitution states public education shall be secular. The government prohibits religious instruction in public schools but permits religious groups to operate private schools.

The government-created High Council for Islamic Affairs (HCIA) oversees Islamic religious activities, including some Arabic-language schools and institutions of higher learning, and represents the country at international Islamic forums. The Salafi community is not a party to the council. The Grand Imam of N’Djamena, who is selected by a committee of Muslim elders and approved by the government, is the de facto president of the HCIA and oversees the grand imams from each of the country’s 23 regions. He has the authority to restrict Muslim groups from proselytizing, regulate the content of mosque sermons, and control activities of Islamic charities.

The constitution states military service is obligatory and prohibits invoking religious belief to “avoid an obligation dictated by the national interest.” The government does not enforce conscription, however.

The Office of the Director of Religious and Traditional Affairs under the Ministry of Territorial Planning, Urban Development, and Housing oversees religious matters. The office is responsible for mediating intercommunal conflict, reporting on religious practices, coordinating religious pilgrimages, and ensuring religious freedom.

According to regulations of the government board that oversees the distribution of oil revenues, Muslim and Christian leaders share a rotational position on the board.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government maintained its ban on the leading Salafist association but anecdotal evidence suggested that enforcement of this ban proved difficult. Those practicing this interpretation of Islam continued to meet and worship in their own mosques.

On July 6, during a speech marking the Eid al-Fitr Muslim holiday at the end of Ramadan, Prime Minister Albert Pahimi Pakacke stated that religious leaders of different faiths, through their prayers and actions, were the cornerstone of the country’s peace. Religious leaders of various faiths, diplomats, and other officials all attended the speech. The prime minister called on religious leaders to intensify interreligious dialogue and to continue to raise awareness about what he termed the trap of religious extremism. The prime minister congratulated young people who helped secure places of worship by using their own funds to purchase metal detectors, participating in interfaith vigilance committees, monitoring perimeters, and sometimes searching individuals entering places of worship to ensure that people could worship safely. On several occasions, Muslims and Christians coordinated this security jointly.

President Idriss Deby Itno encouraged religious tolerance in public statements and urged religious leaders to promote peaceful relations among religious groups. During the celebration of Eid al-Adha in September, political and religious authorities called on all religious groups to coexist peacefully and promote national unity. The president remarked, “The interreligious dialogue which has already proved its worth must be maintained on a permanent and lasting basis.” During a December 14 meeting with members of the Episcopal Conference, The president reiterated his appreciation of the religious leaders’ efforts for peaceful cohabitation in the country. He encouraged them to continue building a foundation of peace among different religious groups.

On April 23, the Episcopal Conference of Chad (CET) dedicated a new headquarters building constructed with financial support from the government. The structure centralized the CET’s various organizations working in the service of education, health, justice, peace, and rural development. On October 15, the prime minister, accompanied by several cabinet members, represented the president at Catholic Archbishop Edmond Djitangar’s installation ceremony.

The government conducted a long running public education campaign in the national media to inform people of the burqa ban; however, during the year there were no known prosecutions for violating this ban.

The government generally did not fund construction or maintenance of places of worship. The government offered, however, to contribute partial funding towards the construction of the country’s first Catholic basilica, as well as restoration of the Catholic Notre Dame Cathedral in N’Djamena. Both construction projects remained incomplete at the end of the year.

In May a group that included foreign government officials and representatives of Sufi and Salafi Islamic traditions met in N’Djamena to examine the state of relations between the Sufi and Salafi communities. The group concluded that intra-Muslim tensions in the country were high, pointing to the absence of a Salafi representative in the HCIA as a particular concern.

Religious leaders, including the secretary of the Chadian Churches and Evangelical Mission for Harmony, the vice president of the Catholic Church’s Episcopal Conference of Chad, and the HCIA publicly stated they supported the president’s statements advocating religious tolerance.

Religious leaders continued to raise awareness of the risks of terrorist attacks and to advocate for security in places of worship. In July during Eid al-Fitr, the imam of the Great Mosque of Am-Djarass stated, “Anyone who kills in the name of Islam is a disbeliever. Islam is far from these barbaric acts.”

The Regional Forum on Interfaith Dialogue, comprising representatives of evangelical Protestant churches, the Catholic Church, and the Islamic community, met three times during the year to promote religious tolerance and combat prejudice.

On July 6, during Ramadan, members of the HCIA discussed the country’s socio-economic challenges, peaceful interreligious coexistence, and global terrorism. They pledged to support the government in the fight against religious extremism, and made speeches explaining the purpose of the burqa ban. The HCIA and Radio al-Quoran used positive messaging to strengthen communities and counter religious extremism.

In October local Roman Catholic bishops called for “a new Chad,” committing the Church to supporting development, education, health care, and national reconciliation, with particular emphasis on Christian unity and interreligious dialogue. They denounced corruption and mismanagement of land resources, advocated for reform of international donor cooperation, and reminded government authorities and citizens about the value of education.

Muslims and Christians commonly attended each other’s ceremonies and celebrations. For example, Christians regularly attended iftars celebrating Muslim holidays, and in October, several imams attended the installation of the new Catholic Archbishop of N’Djamena.

The Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights visited the country in October to discuss strategies for combating violent religious extremism with the president and other government officials. She also met with staff at Radio al-Quoran and imams from the HCIA.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy representatives met with N’Djamena’s grand imam and with Catholic and Protestant leaders to monitor and promote religious freedom and tolerance and to discuss efforts to counter extremist messages. The Ambassador attended events of the Union of Quranic Schools, including the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday. The Ambassador hosted an iftar attended by more than 40 religious leaders, including Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and Bahai representatives, and government officials. At the iftar, attendees discussed religious freedom and tolerance in the country. Embassy officials met regularly with imams in training sessions and workshops to promote tolerance and human rights.

The U.S. government provided funding to the nongovernmental organization Equal Access, which worked with religious leaders of all faiths to promote moderate messaging on community radio stations. For example, Equal Access created and promoted moderate content for programming on Muslim radio stations.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 17.7 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2002 census, 70 percent of the population over the age of 14 self-identifies as Roman Catholic and 15 percent identifies as “evangelical,” a term that refers to all non-Catholic Christian groups except The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Orthodox churches (including the Armenian, Greek, Persian, Serbian, and Ukrainian communities), and Seventh-day Adventists. Bahais, Buddhists, Jews, Muslims, members of the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of the Orthodox churches, Seventh-day Adventists, and unspecified members of religious groups together constitute less than 5 percent of the population. According to the ONAR, approximately 90 percent of those who identify as evangelical belong to Pentecostal movement churches. A more recent census taken in 2012 was deemed flawed and subsequently annulled by the government. According to that census, however, 68 percent of the population identifies as Catholic, 16 percent Protestant or evangelical, 1 percent Jehovah’s Witnesses, less than 5 percent other or unspecified, and 12 percent no religious identification.

According to the 2002 census, 5 percent of the population self-identifies as indigenous, of whom 65 percent identify as Catholic, 29 percent as evangelical, and 6 percent as other, which includes adherents of traditional indigenous faith practices.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience and the free exercise of worship. These practices must not be “opposed to morals, to good customs or to the public order.” Religious groups may establish places of worship, as long as the locations are in compliance with hygiene and security regulations.

According to the constitution, religion and state are officially separate. The law prohibits religious discrimination and provides civil legal remedies to victims of discrimination based on religion or belief and increases criminal penalties for acts of discriminatory violence.

The law does not require religious groups to register with the government; however, there are tax benefits available to those that register. Once registered, a religious group is recognized as a religious nonprofit organization. This differs from the nonprofit status for other nongovernmental organizations in that religious organizations have the option of adopting a charter and bylaws suited to a religious entity rather than a private corporation or a secular nonprofit. Additionally, under the law, religious nonprofit organizations may create affiliates such as charitable foundations, schools, or additional houses of worship, which retain the tax benefits of the religious parent organization. There are currently more than 3,000 religious entities registered, the majority of which are small Pentecostal faith communities. By law, the Ministry of Justice may not refuse to accept the registration petition of a religious entity, although it may object to petitions within 90 days if legal prerequisites for registration are not satisfied.

Applicants for religious nonprofit status must present the Ministry of Justice with an authorized copy of their charter and corresponding bylaws with signatures and identification numbers of those who signed the charter. The bylaws must include the organization’s mission, creed, and structure. The charter needs to specify the signers, the name of the organization, its physical address, and must include confirmation that bylaws have been approved. In the event the ministry raises objections to the group, the petitioner has 60 days to address objections the ministry raises or can challenge the ministry in court. Once registered, the state may not dissolve a religious entity by decree. If concerns are raised postregistration about a religious group’s activities, the semiautonomous Council for the Defense of the State may initiate a judicial review of the matter. The government has never deregistered a legally registered group. One registration per religious group is sufficient to extend nonprofit status to affiliates, which can be additional places of worship or schools, clubs, and sports organizations, without registering them as separate entities. According to ONAR, the Ministry of Justice receives approximately 30 petitions monthly; the ministry has not objected to any petition and registered every group that completed the required paperwork.

Publicly subsidized schools must offer religious education for two teaching hours per week through high school. Local school administrators decide how religious education classes are structured. The majority of religious instruction in public schools is Catholic, although the Ministry of Education has approved instruction curricula designed by 14 other religious groups. Schools must provide religious instruction for students in the curriculum requested by their parents, and parents may have their children excused from religious education. Parents also have the right to homeschool their children for religious reasons or may enroll them in private, religiously oriented schools.

The law grants religious groups the right to appoint chaplains to offer religious services in public hospitals and prisons. Prisoners may request religious accommodation. Regulations for the armed forces and law enforcement agencies allow officially registered religious groups to appoint chaplains to serve in each branch of the armed forces, in the national uniformed police, and the national investigative police.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Catholic Church continued to have a presence in public and some private schools, private hospitals, prisons, and the military as it founded and managed many social services and institutions beginning in colonial times. The Church, however, did not hold any rights or privileges additional to other religious groups. Representatives from ONAR regularly met with religious leaders with the stated aim of ensuring minority religious practices were respected in state institutions. Authorities continued to support the implementation of the requirement to provide non-Catholic religious education in public schools when requested by parents. Authorities engaged and supported schools through municipal offices of religious affairs, encouraged the development of community-supported religious curricula, and provided religious diversity training to public servants. While prisons and military chaplains were predominately Catholic, ONAR made an effort to counter perceptions of bias and support diversity in the chaplaincy by encouraging other faith communities to prepare and present candidates for these positions. The independent government agency, the National Institute of Human Rights (INDH) reported observing flourishing Protestant faith communities within the prison system.

The ONAR continued to work through the Interfaith Advisory Council – a roundtable organization comprising religious leaders representing the country’s religious communities, including Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, and Bahais, and designed to further facilitate and enhance interreligious dialogue within the country by establishing standing meetings among religious leaders and offering government space to host those conversations. At the suggestion of the Advisory Council, President Michelle Bachelet hosted an inaugural iftar to bring together the country’s diverse interfaith community. From October 13-16 the Bahai community dedicated its South American Bahai temple in Santiago, with both government and interfaith participation.

During the year arsonists set on fire and burned down more than 10 rural churches and a Catholic seminary in the Araucania Region. In some cases, a group claiming to be linked to the indigenous Mapuche community took credit for the destruction. Investigations of these arson attacks by law enforcement remained pending at the end of the year; the attacks appeared to fit into a pattern of sabotage directed against a wide range of institutions and business interests in the Araucania region, with the churches representing one of many targets.

Jewish community leaders reported concern about the tone of several social media postings they perceived as threatening. The commentary primarily referenced frustration with Israeli policies and did not specifically mention either the local Jewish community or Jewish people as a whole. For example on August 18, the Palestinian Federation of Chile published on its Facebook site a cartoon depicting a figure smoking a missile cigar and sitting on a Star of David, the bottom point of which is sticking into the back of a dead Palestinian baby, as part of an article protesting Israeli policies.

U.S. embassy officials met with officials from the ONAR, regional government leaders, and law enforcement to express concern about the role of the church burnings on the religious life in Araucania and neighboring regions.

The Ambassador and embassy officials met with religious leaders to discuss religious freedom, security, and institutional cooperation among government and religious organizations.

In June the Charge d’Affaires hosted leaders of religious communities at an interfaith iftar. The event celebrated religious diversity, interfaith dialogue, and religious tolerance, and sought to increase cooperation among religious organizations in light of the arson attacks in the Araucania Region.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.4 billion (July 2016 estimate). According to the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), there are more than 200 million religious believers in the country. Many experts, however, believe that official estimates underestimate the total number of religious adherents. The U.S. government estimates that there are 657 million religious believers in the country, including 250 million Buddhists, 70 million Christians, 25 million Muslims, 301 million observers of folk religions, and 10 million observers of other faiths, including Taoism (July 2010 estimate). According to 2014 data from the Jewish Virtual Library, the country’s Jewish population is 2,500.

The 2014 Blue Book of Religions, produced by the Institute of World Religions at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a research institution directly under the State Council, reported the number of Protestants to be between 23 and 40 million. A June 2010 SARA report estimated there are 16 million Protestants affiliated with the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), the state-sanctioned umbrella organization for all officially recognized Protestant churches. According to SARA more than 5.5 million Catholics worship in sites registered by the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), the state-sanctioned organization for all officially recognized Catholic churches. According to the most recent outside surveys by Pew in 2010 and 2012, respectively, there are nine million Catholics and 68 million Protestants, of which 5.7 million Catholics and 23 million Protestants are affiliated with state-sanctioned umbrella organizations. Accurate estimates are difficult to make, however, because many adherents practice exclusively at home.

According to SARA, there are more than 21 million Muslims in the country, with 10 ethnic minorities practicing Islam. Hui Muslims are concentrated primarily in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan provinces. Uighur Muslims live primarily in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. The State Council’s 2015 White Paper on Xinjiang reports Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uighur, and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities constitute 14.63 million residents in Xinjiang, or 63 percent of the total population.

Prior to the government’s 1999 ban on Falun Gong, the government estimated that there were 70 million adherents. Falun Gong sources estimate that tens of millions continue to practice privately.

Some ethnic minorities retain traditional religions, such as Dongba among the Naxi people in Yunnan Province and Buluotuo among the Zhuang in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Media sources report Tibetan Buddhism is growing in popularity among the Han Chinese population.

Legal Framework

The constitution states citizens have “freedom of religious belief,” but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities.” The constitution does not define “normal.” It says religion may not be used to disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system. The constitution provides for the right to hold or not hold a religious belief and states that state organs, public organizations, and individuals may not discriminate against citizens “who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.” The law does not allow for legal action to be taken against the government on the basis of the religious freedom protections afforded by the constitution. Criminal law allows the state to sentence government officials to up to two years in prison if they violate a citizen’s religious freedom.

CCP members and members of the armed forces are required to be atheists and are forbidden from engaging in religious practice. Members who are found to belong to religious organizations are subject to expulsion, although these rules are not universally enforced. The vast majority of public office holders are CCP members, and being a member is widely considered a prerequisite for success in a government career.

Certain religious or spiritual groups are banned by law. The criminal law defines banned groups as “cult organizations,” and those belonging to them can be sentenced up to life in prison. There are no published criteria for determining, or procedures for challenging, such a designation. A national security law explicitly bans “cult organizations,” and the CCP maintains an extralegal, party-run security apparatus to eliminate the Falun Gong movement and other such organizations. The government continues to ban Falun Gong, the Guanyin Method religious group (Guanyin Famen or the Way of the Goddess of Mercy), and Zhong Gong (a qigong exercise discipline). The government also considers several Christian groups to be “evil cults,” including the Shouters, Eastern Lightning, Society of Disciples (Mentu Hui), Full Scope Church (Quan Fanwei Jiaohui), Spirit Sect, New Testament Church, Three Grades of Servants (San Ban Puren), Association of Disciples, Lord God religious group, Established King Church, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), Family of Love, and South China Church.

The Counterterrorism Law effective January 1 describes “religious extremism” as the ideological basis of terrorism that uses “distorted religious teachings or other means to incite hatred, discrimination, or advocate violence.” In August the regional People’s Congress in Xinjiang passed its own counterterrorism law.

Regulations require religious groups to register with the government. Only religious groups belonging to one of the five state-sanctioned “patriotic religious associations” (Buddhist, Taoist, Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant) are permitted to register with the government and legally hold worship services. These five associations operate under the direction of the CCP United Front Work Department. Other religious groups, such as Protestant groups unaffiliated with the official patriotic religious association or Catholics professing loyalty to the Vatican, are not permitted to register as legal entities. The government does not recognize Judaism as an ethnicity or religion. The country’s laws and policies do not provide a mechanism for religious groups independent of the five official government patriotic religious associations to obtain legal status.

All religious organizations are required to register with SARA or its provincial and local offices. Registered religious organizations are allowed to possess property, publish approved materials, train staff, and collect donations. According to regulations, religious organizations must submit information about the organization’s historical background, doctrines, key publications, minimum funding requirements, and government sponsor, often a “patriotic religious association.” According to the SARA, there are more than 360,000 clergy, 140,000 places of worship, and 5,500 registered religious groups in the country. Also according to SARA, there are 60,000 registered Protestant churches and 23 Christian theological colleges, as well as approximately 35,000 mosques and 40,000 imams.

Religious regulations also vary by province, with many provinces updating their regulations during the year following the National Work Conference on Religion in April.

In addition to the five nationally recognized religions, local governments permit certain religious communities and practices, such as Orthodox Christianity in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, and Guangdong provinces. Worship of Mazu, a folk deity with Taoist roots, has been reclassified as “cultural heritage” rather than religious practice.

The government and the Holy See do not have diplomatic relations, and the Vatican has no representative in the country. The CPA does not recognize the authority of the Holy See to appoint Catholic bishops; approximately 30 Catholic bishops remain independent of the CPA and operate unofficially. In some locations, however, local authorities reportedly pressured unregistered Catholic priests and believers to renounce all ordinations approved by the Holy See. The Regulation on the Election and Consecration of Bishops requires candidate bishops to pledge publicly support for the CCP.

SARA states through a policy posted on its website that family and friends have the right to meet at home for worship, including prayer and Bible study, without registering with the government.

According to the law, inmates have the right to believe in a religion and maintain their religious beliefs while in custody.

Tibetan Buddhists in the country, including outside the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), are not free to venerate the Dalai Lama openly. Proselytizing in public or meeting in unregistered places of worship is not permitted.

The religious and social regulations permit official patriotic religious associations to engage in activities, such as building places of worship, training religious leaders, publishing literature, and providing social services to local communities. The CCP’s United Front Work Department, SARA, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs provide policy guidance and supervision on the implementation of these regulations.

An amendment to the criminal law and a judicial interpretation by the national Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Supreme People’s Court published in November criminalizes the act of forcing others to wear “extremist” garments. Neither the amendment nor the judicial interpretation defines what garments or symbols are considered “extremist.” Regulations in Urumqi prohibit residents from wearing veils that cover the face. A separate regulation approved by the Xinjiang People’s Congress Standing Committee in January bans the practice of religion in government buildings and the wearing of clothes associated with “religious extremism.”

National printing regulations restrict the publication and distribution of literature with religious content. Religious texts published without authorization, including Bibles and Qurans, may be confiscated and unauthorized publishing houses closed. The government allows some foreign educational institutions to provide religious materials in Chinese, which are used by both registered and unregistered religious groups.

The government offers some subsidies for the construction of state-sanctioned places of worship and religious schools.

By regulation, if a religious structure is to be demolished or relocated because of city planning or construction of key projects, the party responsible for demolishing the structure must consult with its local Bureau of Religious Affairs (administered by SARA) and the religious group using the structure. If all parties agree to the demolition, the party conducting the demolition must agree to rebuild the structure or provide compensation equal to its appraised market value.

Under national regulations, parents are permitted to instruct children under 18 in the beliefs of officially recognized religious groups, and children may participate in religious activities. Xinjiang officials, however, require minors to complete nine years of compulsory education before they can receive religious education outside of school. In Xinjiang, regulations forbid minors from participating in religious activities and impose penalties on organizations and individuals who “organize, entice, or force” minors to participate in religious activities. According to press reports, a new regulation in effect November 1 further bans any form of religious activity in Xinjiang schools and stipulates that parents or guardians who “organize, lure, or force minors into religious activities” may be stopped by anyone and reported to the police. The new Xinjiang law also amended its regional version of the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency Law to require children taking part in religious activities to be sent to “specialized schools for correction.”

The teaching of atheism in schools is mandated and a CCP directive provides guidance to universities on how to prevent foreign proselytizing of university students.

The law states job applicants shall not face discrimination in hiring based on factors including religious belief.

Birth limitation policies remain in force, but Chinese authorities further relaxed the one child policy on January 1 to allow all married Chinese couples to have two children. Chinese authorities ended the exemption from birth restrictions on the ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, including the Muslim-majority Uighurs.

The law permits domestic NGOs, including religious organizations, to receive donations in foreign currency. The law requires documented approval by SARA of donations from foreign sources to domestic religious groups of more than one million renminbi (RMB) ($144,000).

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). With respect to Macau, the national government notified the UN Secretary General, in part, that residents of Macau shall not be restricted in the rights and freedoms that they are entitled to, unless otherwise provided for by law, and in case of restrictions, the restrictions shall not contravene the ICCPR. With respect to Hong Kong, the national government notified the secretary general, in part, that the ICCPR will also apply to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Government Practices

Throughout the country, there continued to be reports of deaths, in detention and otherwise, of religious adherents and that the government physically abused, detained, arrested, tortured, sentenced to prison, or harassed adherents of both registered and unregistered religious groups for activities related to their religious beliefs and practices. Religious affairs officials and security organs also scrutinized and restricted the religious activities of registered and unregistered religious groups, including assembling for religious worship, expressing religious beliefs in public and in private, teaching youth, and publishing religious texts. Falun Gong reported that dozens of its members died in detention. In Henan Province, a government-sponsored demolition crew buried alive a pastor of an unregistered church and his wife who were protesting the demolition of their church; the wife died of suffocation while the pastor was able to dig his way out. There were also reports of the disappearance of a Catholic priest and a Protestant pastor – the pastor resurfaced during the year – and the death of an activist for Hui Muslim minorities and others that the government said was suicide. The government cited concerns over the “three evils” of “ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism” as grounds to enact and enforce restrictions on religious practices of Uighur Muslims. The government’s repression of religious freedom remained most severe in Xinjiang and in Tibetan areas, according to media and NGO sources. According to reports, the government continued to extract unpaid labor, conduct indoctrination sessions, and closely monitor and restrict the movements of Uighurs to counteract what it considered religious extremism in Xinjiang.

According to Falun Gong, 80 practitioners died either in custody or shortly following their arrest during the year. On March 13, Falun Gong practitioner Yan Guoyan reportedly died shortly after being released from detention, reportedly due to maltreatment while in custody. She was arrested on January 15 in Hebei Province for suing former CCP leader Jiang Zemin. On March 27, a Falun Gong practitioner identified as Sun reportedly died of injuries suffered on November 9, 2015, when security personnel outside a military academy in Yanggu County, Shangdong Province, severely beat him for talking to students about the persecution of Falun Gong, reportedly leaving a hole in his skull.

On April 14, a demolition team reportedly buried alive the pastor of an unregistered or house church, Li Jiangong, and his wife Ding Cuimei while they protested the government-ordered demolition of their Beitou Church in Zhumadian, Henan Province. According to reports from the NGO ChinaAid, Li and Ding stepped in front of a bulldozer as a government-supported local developer crew shoved them into the pit and covered their bodies in soil. Ding died of suffocation while Li was able to dig his way out. Authorities reportedly detained two crew members and opened a criminal investigation.

On April 15, “underground” Catholic priest Yang Jianwei reportedly disappeared from a government building in Baoding, Hebei Province. Local police said they lacked sufficient manpower to investigate the case and said they would review security footage from the building with Yang’s family once they had enough men. Activist organizations said the arrests of Catholics in Baoding were in possible connection to authorities’ demolition of a prayer venue the previous year. According to the Union of Catholic Asian News, at least five underground priests were detained by authorities in Hebei that month. Two were subsequently released. A Protestant pastor in Henan Province who disappeared reportedly escaped.

In May Pastor Han Zhonglie was found dead in a mountainous area near Changbai County, Jilin Province. South Korean media reported that he was killed by agents from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea due to his work assisting North Korean defectors and helping them go to South Korea through a third country.

According to the human rights monitoring NGO Dui Hua Foundation, as of the end of the year, at least 232 Protestants, 73 Muslims, 25 Buddhists, and 11 Catholics were imprisoned as a result of religious activities, while two Buddhists, six Catholics, and 49 Protestants were detained on charges related to religious activities. Dui Hua reported that at least 3,403 Falun Gong practitioners were imprisoned and 330 were detained for the same reasons during the year, but Falun Gong itself reported significantly higher numbers of its members were arrested and sentenced.

The arrest and harassment of church leaders in Zhejiang Province, where the government conducted its “Three Rectifications and One Demolition” campaign, continued. Church pastors and members of their congregations openly resisted cross removals, including by forming human chains, and replacing or reattaching crosses, resulting in repeated clashes and standoffs with police. Some observers estimate as many as 2,000 crosses and buildings may have been demolished in Zhejiang since 2014 when the campaign began.

Authorities released Wen Xiaowu, the pastor of an unregistered church in Zhejiang, in September after he and his wife and son were detained in April for protesting church demolitions. Wen had provided legal assistance to churches affected by the cross takedown campaign and was charged with “gathering a crowd to disturb social order.” Authorities detained Wen after he contacted foreign journalists and foreign diplomats to discuss Zhejiang’s cross demolition campaign. Wen remained under residential surveillance through the end of the year.

In January authorities detained Joseph Gu Yuese, the Pastor of Chongyi Church in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, one of the country’s largest Protestant churches, on embezzlement charges his supporters said were fabricated to punish him for publicly opposing Zhejiang’s cross demolition campaign. On February 4, Gu released what was said to be a confession letter to his congregation saying the investigation was for his “own benefit” and asking Christians to “have faith in our government and judicial department.” Although authorities released Gu for nine months during the year, they confined him to his home and barred him from meeting or communicating with others without permission during that time.

In February a court convicted Bao Guohua, a pastor in Jinhua, Zhejiang Province who refused to remove a cross from his church’s roof, on charges of “corruption” and “gathering people to disturb social order” and sentenced him to 14 years in prison. The court also convicted Bao’s wife, Xing Wenxiang, of the same charges and sentenced her to 12 years in prison. Authorities detained Bao and his wife in August 2015 and charged them with embezzlement shortly afterwards. Their supporters stated they believed Bao and his wife were among several from government-approved religious groups punished for protesting the removal of their church crosses.

In Guizhou Province, authorities in February detained and charged Zhang Xiuhong, a deacon at Guiyang Huoshi Church (Living Stone Church) in charge of the church’s finances, with running an illegal business. On December 30, a court sentenced another leader of Huoshi Church, Pastor Yang Hua, also known as Li Guozhi, to two and a half years in prison for leaking state secrets. Attorneys for Zhang and Li reported that authorities tortured and mistreated Li in detention, leading to “serious health problems,” and said authorities also repeatedly threatened to kill Li and harm his family if he did not confess. Authorities reportedly harassed and detained Huoshi Church’s leaders because they were unwilling to register the church under the TSPM, and authorities shut down the church in December 2015.

Police arrested a member of the unregistered Zhongfu Tongxin Church in Shantou, Guangdong Province, on Lunar New Year’s Day while they were distributing Christian pamphlets on the streets, according to a congregant. The church member had been detained for refusing to attend a TSPM church.

According to news reports, a court tried Hong Kong church minister Ng Wah at the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court on February 19 on charges of illegal fundraising involving more than RMB 100 million ($14.4 million). Ng, who focused on Mainland church development, was reportedly arrested by Mainland authorities in July 2015 for printing Christian books and raising money. Authorities prosecuted Ng, saying that he did not have a license to raise money. According to church members, Ng had raised donations from members to print Christian books. Ng was reportedly released without sentencing, although his church refused to comment publicly on Ng’s status.

On September 27, more than 100 law enforcement officers from the local police bureau and religious affairs bureau reportedly raided a Zhuhai, Guangdong unregistered church during the church service and detained all members. The authorities forced the church members to provide their personal identity information. Police detained eight church staff for questioning and subsequently released all of them in the early morning of September 28.

In December a Xinjiang court sentenced a Christian woman, Ma Huichao, to three years in prison for “gathering a crowd to disturb public order” after holding a Bible study in her home in Urumqi. A fellow congregant said that the Bible study was not a formal gathering – there were no pastors present and there were only a few people reading the Bible in Ma’s home.

In March authorities arrested and detained for 10 days Zhou Jinxia, a Christian from Dalian, for illegal petitioning and “disturbing social order.” Zhou had travelled to Zhongnanhai (the headquarters of the CCP) in Beijing and held up a banner with Chinese characters saying “God calls to Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan,” referring to the president and his wife, “God So Loved the World,” and “The Kingdom of Heaven is close.”

Pastor Zhang Shaojie, a TSPM pastor in Nanle County, Henan Province remained in prison after a court sentenced him to 12 years for “picking quarrels and disturbing public order” and “fraud” in July 2014. Zhang and several members of his congregation had been involved in a land dispute between the church and the Nanle County government.

In Guangdong Province, founder of the Buddhist Huazang Dharma group Wu Zeheng, also known as Master Xingwu, remained in prison after being sentenced to life in prison in 2015 on charges including rape, fraud, producing and selling toxic food, and organizing a “cult.” Some human rights organizations and media reports stated that authorities targeted Wu for his religious beliefs and his human rights activism and that the criminal charges were spurious.

Buddhists monks reported that authorities harassed them and their family members. Zen Buddhist monk Lin Bin (also known as Master Wangyun) of Fujian Province was reported incommunicado by friends and family members in October after being released from detention in September, according to Radio Free Asia (RFA). Initially detained in July 2015 on subversion of state power charges, police arrested Lin while visiting Sichuan Province during a nationwide operation targeting rights lawyers.

In some parts of the country, authorities charged religious believers not affiliated with any of the five patriotic religious associations with various crimes, including “illegal religious activities” or “disrupting social stability.”

Relations between the Vatican and the Chinese government reportedly improved over the year, leading to a decrease in the harassment of unregistered bishops and priests. Some unregistered bishops and priests, however, reported continued government surveillance and repeated detentions. According to AsiaNews, authorities detained Peter Shao Zhumin, the Coadjutor Bishop of Wenzhou, in September shortly before the funeral of the Bishop of Wenzhou Vincent Zhu Weifang. Local worshippers said authorities wanted to prevent Shao from taking possession of the diocese after Zhu’s death, in accordance with canonical tradition, as the Vatican-backed Shao is not a member of the government-backed Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association. Although authorities released Shao, he was prevented from taking over the diocese as of year’s end. Authorities also prevented members of the underground Catholic community from attending Bishop Zhu’s funeral. Some local authorities also reportedly pressured unregistered Catholic priests and believers to renounce all ordinations approved by the Holy See.

Religious groups continued to report that “patriotic religious associations” were subjected to various forms of CCP interference in matters of doctrine, theology, and religious practice. Local authorities pressured religious believers to affiliate with patriotic associations and used administrative detention, including confinement and abuse in administrative detention centers, to punish members of unregistered religious or spiritual groups. Patriotic religious associations regularly reviewed the sermons of churches and sometimes required church leaders to attend education sessions with religious bureau officials. They also closely monitored and sometimes blocked the ability of religious leaders to meet freely with foreigners. While re-education-through-labor camps were officially abolished in 2013, advocacy groups and international media continued to report some camps simply had been relabeled and continued to hold members of religious and spiritual groups.

International Falun Gong-affiliated NGOs and international media reported detentions of Falun Gong practitioners continued to increase around “sensitive” dates, such as in the lead-up to the Lianghui (the annual meetings convened by the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference). Authorities instructed neighborhood communities to report Falun Gong members to officials and offered monetary rewards to citizens who informed on Falun Gong practitioners. Reports from overseas Falun Gong-affiliated advocacy groups estimated thousands of adherents in the country had been given terms of up to three years in administrative detention.

According to Ming Hui, during the year there were a series of cases in which prosecutors, courts, and police departments declined to press charges against arrested Falun Gong practitioners. On December 23, Ming Hui reported a public prosecutor in Chongqing, overseeing the case of Falun Gong practitioner Zhang Jun charged with “using a cult to undermine law enforcement,” said “We have not found any laws or statutes and don’t have any evidence that can prove that Falun Gong is a ‘heretical cult.’”

Hezhou’s Babu District Court sentenced in May three Falun Gong members to from one to two years and six months in prison for allegedly sabotaging law enforcement by organizing as a “heretical cult.” According to the indictment, the three individuals publicly distributed and posted Falun Gong pamphlets and posters in a residential area.

Authorities continued to subject Falun Gong practitioner Wang Zhiwen to heavy surveillance after his October 2014 release from prison. Following his 15-year sentence for “cult-related” activities, authorities continued to prevent him from traveling overseas to reunite with family members; Wang in August said authorities had cancelled his passport and banned his travel until 2018. He was reported to be in poor health and lacking adequate medical care.

Human rights lawyers defending religious adherents reportedly continued to be subject to harassment and detention, often being forbidden to meet with clients and threatened with revocation of their professional licenses. During the year, authorities tried and convicted several prominent Christian legal rights activists and lawyers on charges of subversion of state power.

In March authorities released Christian rights lawyer Zhang Kai on bail after he was held for six months on suspicion of “gathering a crowd to disturb the social order” and leaking state secrets to foreign entities. Zhang had provided legal counsel to churches facing cross removals and church demolitions as part of Zhejiang Province’s campaign against “illegal structures.” His release came after a February televised interview on state-controlled Wenzhou TV in which Zhang confessed to violating the code of conduct for lawyers and endangering state security. He later recanted his confession, saying it was coerced, and authorities reportedly detained him again in August, according to his lawyer. In December authorities reportedly again detained Zhang for two days before releasing him. Zhang had been initially detained in August 2015 before a scheduled meeting with the U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom during the latter’s visit to Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province.

In June human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who had defended religious groups including Christians and Falun Gong members, released a memoir published in Taiwan detailing reported abuses he had suffered during six years of harassment from authorities including abductions, followed by five years of detention and physical abuse in prison, such as beatings to his face with an electric baton. Gao and his family said after his release in 2014, government agents continued to subject him to intrusive visits at home and deny him permission to travel for medical treatment.

The government continued not to renew the professional licenses of a number of attorneys who advocated for religious freedom, and it imprisoned other religious freedom activists or otherwise impeded their work on behalf of religious clients. Authorities also harassed or detained the family members, including children, of religious leaders and religious freedom activists. Some family members also received travel bans, restricting their movement.

Authorities detained or harassed journalists reporting on actions against Catholics and other Christians in Zhejiang Province. Christian newspapers reported authorities often temporarily shut down their websites when they reported on Zhejiang Province. Authorities physically prevented other journalists from reporting on cross demolitions in the region by both denying them access to and deporting them from Zhejiang.

Security officials frequently interrupted outdoor services of the unregistered Shouwang Church in Beijing and detained people attending those services for several days without charge. Church Pastor Jin Tianming continued to be closely monitored and harassed by security services, according to reports from advocacy groups.

In Guizhou Province, authorities’ harassment and intimidation of parishioners of an unregistered church reportedly became more systematic, with arrests of prominent church leaders, and anecdotal reports of threats from authorities to suspend social welfare payments to attendees of local unregistered churches. In June a Huaqui Church official said local authorities in Huaqiu, Guizhou Province sent notices to all parents that if their children did not cease to attend the house or unregistered church or failed to join the TSPM, they would be barred from taking the gaokao college entrance examination and thus attending college or entering the military. Authorities also reportedly coerced church members to sign a document saying that they would no longer take minors to church; violators who brought their children to church would be sued. In July police detained and subsequently released approximately 30 students in Guizhou for attending a student religious camp.

In January a Xinjiang court sentenced Zhang Haitao, a rights activist based in Xinjiang, to 19 years of imprisonment on state security charges. Despite requests to appeal, the court had delayed the appeal in September, according to the Hong Kong Free Press. Zhang, a Han Chinese who was reportedly in poor health, had criticized government policy against Uighur Muslims.

The government sought the forcible return of Uighur Muslims living outside the country, many of whom had sought asylum from religious persecution, according to human rights organizations. The government continued to state the Uighurs were criminals and not refugees, and some countries complied with the government’s requests for the forcible return of Uighur asylum seekers. In December authorities in Xinjiang detained the brother, father, and sister of a Uighur Muslim man seeking asylum in Turkey to coerce him to return.

Authorities successfully forced some prisoners and detainees to recant their beliefs (particularly Falun Gong practitioners, whom the government reportedly subjected to “transformation through re-education”), or failed to provide adequate access to religious materials, facilities, or clergy. For example, in Zhejiang Province, detention centers denied family members’ requests to deliver Bibles and food to the detained. Prison authorities reportedly subjected detained Falun Gong practitioners to various methods of physical and psychological coercion, such as sleep deprivation, in attempts to force them to renounce their beliefs.

Chinese authorities frequently tightened security in both the TAR and the Tibetan plateau in advance of major Tibetan holidays and the birthday of the exiled Tibetan religious leader, the Dalai Lama.

The government did not recognize house or unregistered churches and closely monitored their activities. Some officials reportedly denied the existence of house churches or unregistered churches. Although SARA has said family and friends had the right to worship together at home, including prayer and Bible study, without registering with the government, authorities still regularly harassed and detained small groups that did so.

Despite an overall tightening in spaces for unregistered churches to operate, in some areas, members of unregistered churches said they had more freedom than in the past to conduct religious services, as long as they gathered only in private and kept congregation numbers low. In some areas, however, authorities also shut down churches that tried to maintain a low profile. According to RFA, authorities in Guangdong Province targeted unofficial house churches not regulated by the CCP through its TSPM. In February the Dongguan local religious affairs bureau sent an official “cease all illegal religious activities” letter to the Zhongfu Wanmin Church in Tangxia Township, forcing the church to leave its location, according to Pastor Li Peng. On May 29, authorities shut down the Zhongfu Wanmin Church, telling the pastors to register at the local Religion Administration Authority and join the TSPM. On June 13, authorities spent hours trying to persuade Li to register with the TSPM, RFA reported. This was reportedly the seventh time during the year officials pressured Li to join the TSPM. In September local authorities shut down a six-year-old unregistered church in Sichuan Province’s Jiuzhaigou County for not registering officially.

Some unregistered churches reported authorities harassed and pressured their landlords to break property leases with the churches. Authorities shut down the unregistered Guangfu Protestant Church in Guangzhou’s Baiyun District on June 23 after the landlord terminated a 10-year lease. The church’s property was sealed, and local authorities told the church to leave Guangzhou and to provide the personal information of the church’s staff to authorities. According to a church member, over the past five years, the authorities had repeatedly tried to force the church to move out.

According to ChinaAid, on August 8, police broke into the Renyi Church, an unregistered church in Xinhui Township, Jiangmen Municipality, Guangdong Province, during a church service attended by more than 100 church members. The landlord was reportedly pressured by police to expel the group, and police officers ordered the church to relocate immediately. Police confiscated all church property including Bibles and other equipment, and evicted the church members. According to the pastor, the action stemmed from the church’s refusal to join the TSPM or to disclose church members’ identities to the authorities.

Nationwide, churches reported stricter requirements on the design of their buildings, sermon content, and the management of their finances. Some local governments continued to restrict the growth of unregistered Protestant church networks and cross-congregational affiliations. According to Christian Daily, in Pingyang County, Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, local authorities told churches to submit all their monetary donations and income to the government as part of new regulations. Any purchases for churches, including equipment or decor, would require permission for the government. Other churches reported they were unable to organize prayer meetings without first obtaining permission from authorities.

According to RFA, in August Zhejiang Province authorities issued a public notice banning all forms of religious activities at Central Hospital in Wenzhou. The new rules banned both patients and clergy from holding prayer meetings or reading the Bible in the hospital.

In the lead-up to the September Group of 20 (G20) Summit in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, authorities banned large-scale religious activities in Hangzhou from late August until the end of the G20. Local religious affairs officials sent a notification to a Hangzhou unregistered church of approximately 2,000 members to “reform its illegal gathering activities” and banned the church from meeting, according to the church’s lawyer.

Religious leaders and groups reported the proposed new regulations governing religious activities affected their ability to practice their religions. Unregistered Christian churches reported that the release of draft new regulations caused officials to take a more systematic approach to monitoring their behavior such as increased contact and issuing explicit warnings against conducting certain activities, causing many churches to cease their normal activities.

In Xinjiang, the government continued to cite concerns over the three evils – “ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism” – as a reason to enact and enforce repressive measures against the religious practices of Uighur Muslims. Authorities typically characterized these operations as targeting “separatists” or “terrorists.” Such police raids and restrictions on Islamic practices were part of “strike hard” campaigns, which began in 2014. Many incidents related to pressure on Uighurs, however, went unreported.

According to an international legal expert, the new Counterterrorism Law, which prohibits the broadcasting of “terrorist activity,” grants “discretionary powers to a government that already has broad, intrusive competences.” Human rights groups said the vague definition of “terrorism” and “religious extremism” could be used to criminalize peaceful expressions of religious belief. Authorities often failed to distinguish between peaceful religious practice and criminal or terrorist activities, according to human rights organizations. It remained difficult to determine whether particular raids, detentions, arrests, or judicial punishments targeted those pursuing political goals, the right to worship, or criminal acts.

According to RFA, in a period of three months during the year, authorities demolished 5,000 mosques in Xinjiang under the government’s “Mosque Rectification Campaign”. Several officials said the demolitions were for residents’ “safety.” The head of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee in Kashi (Kashgar) City said authorities demolished nearly70 percent of the city’s mosques. The deputy police chief in Mush Township said authorities destroyed 46 of the 65 mosques there.

According to the New York Times, Kashi (Kashgar) officials in Xinjiang banned mosques from broadcasting the call to prayer, forcing muezzins (individuals who perform the call to prayer) to shout out the invocation. In Hetian (Hotan), authorities banned two dozen names as “too Muslim,” according to the report.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to deny international media reports stating Uighur Muslims were banned from Ramadan fasting, and maintained that Uighurs’ religious freedoms were guaranteed by the country’s constitution. Reports published on the official websites of local governments in Xinjiang, however, indicated authorities restricted or banned certain groups of Uighurs from observing Ramadan, including CCP members, their relatives, students, and the employees of state-owned enterprises and state-run organizations, and hosted “atheist education events.” Authorities ordered restaurants and grocery stores to remain open and serve alcohol during Ramadan, according to the website of the Qapqal County, Yili (Ili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture government.

Reportedly, official campaigns in Xinjiang increased pressure to dissuade women from wearing religious clothing and men from growing beards. Restrictions across Xinjiang that required worshippers to apply for mosque entry permits remained in place. Beginning in October, authorities in several prefectures in Xinjiang further restricted movement by requiring that residents turn their passports into their local police station for an annual review. Ethnoreligious minorities also reported increased screening at airport and train station security checks.

The media reported Muslims could apply online or through local official Islamic associations to participate in the Hajj. According to government reports, more than 14,500 Muslim citizens participated in the Hajj, consistent with 2014 and 2015 numbers. In July the Chinese government also applied to the Saudi Arabian government to allow for 1,000 more participants from China to reduce the long waiting time to make the Hajj, according to the state-run China Daily. These figures included China Islamic Association and security officials sent to monitor Muslim citizens and prevent unauthorized pilgrimages. Uighur Muslims reported difficulties taking part in state-sanctioned Hajj travel due to their inability to obtain travel documents in a timely manner and difficulties in meeting criteria required for participation in the official Hajj program run by the China Islamic Association. The government prohibited Uighur Muslims from making private Hajj pilgrimages outside of the government-organized program. Uighurs allowed to attend the Hajj were reportedly forced to participate in political education every day during the Hajj. Ethnic and religious committee staff from across Xinjiang were again sent to international airports in China in June and July to ensure Uighurs were not making private Hajj pilgrimages outside of government-sanctioned programs, a government source reported. Organizations reported that the government favored Hui Muslims over Uighur Muslims in the Hajj application process. Muslims that chose to travel outside of legal government channels reportedly often risked deportation when they tried to travel through third countries. According to RFA, on June 27 Saudi police, in cooperation with Chinese diplomats, repatriated approximately 100 Uighur and 10 Hui Muslims participating in the Hajj. The Chinese Muslims had reportedly made the Hajj outside of official China Islamic Association channels on work visas. In Turkey, 98 Chinese Uighurs were detained on May 17 while attempting to travel to the Hajj on false passports due to lack of permission from the Chinese government, according to the World Uyghur Congress (WUC).

Hui Muslims in Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, and Yunnan provinces engaged in religious practice with less government interference than did Uighurs, according to local sources. Hui Muslims reported they were free to practice as they wished with regard to family customs such as fasting during Ramadan, clothing, prayer, and performing the Hajj. They reported, however, they did not receive special accommodations for time to pray during their work day nor were they given time off for Islamic holidays but said they were treated in the same way as others in their community.

Authorities continued to restrict the printing and distribution of religious materials. The government limited distribution of Bibles to CPA and TSPM/Chinese Christian Council entities such as churches, church bookshops, and seminaries. Individuals could not order Bibles directly from publishing houses. Members of unregistered churches reported the supply and distribution of Bibles was inadequate, particularly in rural locations. There were approximately 11 provincial TSPM Christian publishers. Only the national TSPM was legally allowed to publish the Bible in the country. According to reports, while there were no independent domestic Christian booksellers, nonreligiously affiliated publishers could publish Christian books. Approximately 20 distribution centers and bookstores were linked to the national TSMP. In addition, churches with over 2,000 members reportedly were allowed to sell books at their church facilities. Approximately 700 churches had such bookstores. During the year, authorities continued to limit the number of Christian titles that could be published annually, with draft manuscripts closely reviewed. Authorities also restricted the ability of some bookstores to sell Christian books. Christian organizations seeking to use social media and smartphone applications, however, reported that the government did not generally censor such materials.

Authorities often confiscated Bibles in raids on unregistered churches. In June Shenzhen authorities shut down a Christian house church, or unregistered church, in Bao’an District, Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, and confiscated its “illegal publications,” including Bibles. Authorities said the church infringed on religious regulations by mailing its publications to its members. Authorities also continued to fine individuals for studying the Quran in unauthorized sessions and detained people for carrying “illegal” religious materials.

The People’s High Court, Public Security Bureau, Bureau of Culture, and Bureau of Industry and Commerce in Xinjiang continued to implement restrictions on videos and audio recordings the government defined as promoting terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism. Authorities prohibited dissemination of such materials on the internet, social media, and online marketplaces. As part of these measures, police randomly stopped individuals to check their mobile phones for any sensitive content. According to RFA, in January Uighur Muslims and local authorities reported police in three prefectures of Xinjiang increased and extended security checks of Uighurs who used smartphones. An ethnic Uighur officer said police manned checkpoints in Hetian (Hotan) Prefecture for 24 hours when the new year began to check residents’ smartphones and other electronic devices capable of connecting to the internet for Islamic extremist or religious texts and videos. Uighur residents in Kashi (Kashgar) and Akesu (Aksu) Prefectures also reported increased police smartphone checks. According to an RFA source, in May authorities in Hetian (Hotan) cut services to 17 social media platforms, which an official notice said, was in order to “clean” religious content and other material deemed extremist.

Due to the difficulty of fulfilling registration requirements, many religious organizations either remain unregistered or registered as commercial enterprises. Unregistered groups reported they were vulnerable to coercive and punitive action by SARA, the Ministry of Public Security, and other party or government security organs. In some parts of the country, local authorities allowed or at least did not interfere with the activities of some unregistered groups, while in other areas, local officials restricted events and meetings, confiscated and destroyed property, physically assaulted and injured participants, or imprisoned leaders and worshippers, according to reports.

SARA conducted training for Muslim leaders at the local and national levels to train them on religious regulations and their rights under the constitution. SARA officials stated they acknowledged the importance of cultivating the talents of religious leaders to promote the country’s social development.

There were widespread reports of prohibitions on children participating in religious activities in various localities throughout Xinjiang, but observers also reported seeing children in mosques and at Friday prayers in some areas. Xinjiang authorities prohibited children from attending Islamic schools, banned Uighur Muslim youth under the age of 18 from attending mosque, and discouraged parents from teaching religion to children at home.

Authorities continued their “patriotic education” campaign, which in part focused on preventing any illegal religious activities in Xinjiang and prioritizing Chinese language and culture over Uighur language and culture. Patriotic education, in general, promoted loyalty to the Communist Party as the most important value. Reportedly, authorities encouraged thousands of Uighurs to participate in ceremonies wearing traditional Han Chinese clothing and to perform taichi and sing the national anthem.

The government asked students in northwestern Xinjiang to report to teachers information on their family’s religious practices, including who in their family prayed, attended religious ceremonies, or wore a hijab or beard. Such surveys were conducted annually, passed to security authorities, and meant to stop religious ideology from entering schools, according to media reports.

The government continued to restrict religious education in institutions across the country. Muslims and Christians also reported restrictions on their ability to speak about their faith among university students; the government strictly banned meetings of student religious organizations. Local public security bureau officials regularly warned religious student groups against meeting.

Individuals seeking to enroll at an official seminary or other institution of religious learning had to obtain the support of the official patriotic religious association. The government continued to require students to demonstrate “political reliability,” and political issues were included in examinations of graduates of religious schools. Protestant representatives reported that in seminaries controlled by the TSPM, officials directed faculty to engage in “theological reconstruction” to make Protestant doctrine conform to socialism. Both registered and unregistered religious groups reported a shortage of trained clergy due in part to government controls on admission to seminaries.

Officials continued to hold “anticult” education sessions and propaganda campaigns affecting school children and their families. Some officials required families to sign statements guaranteeing they would not take part in unregistered churches and “cult organization” activities related to Falun Gong as a prerequisite for registering their children for school. The media reported government employees in Xinjiang were forced to sign guarantees they would refrain from religious or political expression. The penalty for not signing could be barring their children from entering university or being subject to administrative investigation.

Authorities continued to allow some patriotic religious association-approved Catholic and Protestant seminarians, Muslim clerics, and Buddhist monks to travel abroad for additional religious study. Religious workers not affiliated with a patriotic religious association stated they faced difficulties in obtaining passports or official approval to study abroad.

According to reports, authorities continued to increase restrictions on teaching methods and other activities in private Muslim schools in Xinjiang following the new education law in November banning minors from participating in religious activity in schools.

Authorities sometimes prevented professors from lecturing on topics relating to religion. In September a renowned Chinese American scholar of social and religious studies from a U.S. university had planned to deliver a lecture at the Public Administration School of South China University of Science and Technology. The authorities suddenly cancelled his engagement, saying that the “power of speech shall not sit in the hand of foreign hostile forces.”

There were reports that authorities restricted the acquisition or use of buildings for religious ceremonies and purposes. The demolition of church buildings continued in Zhejiang Province, where authorities said that the buildings were “illegal” structures. Christian communities reported many churches that were targeted had building permits and other official documents demonstrating their building had been approved by the proper authorities.

In September the New York Times reported that members of the Kaifeng Jewish community in Henan Province came under pressure from authorities. Approximately 1,000 Kaifeng citizens claim Jewish ancestry. Media reports stated that the only Jewish learning center in the community was shut down. Two hospital employees said city officials ordered that an inscribed stone marking the site of the historic synagogue be removed from the front of a hospital and that an ancient well behind the hospital be buried.

In April the government and CCP convened its first National Work Conference on Religion in 15 years. During the conference, President Xi Jinping told authorities to “guide religious believers to be patriotic, protect national unity, and serve the overall interests of the Chinese nation,” and emphasized that religious groups “must adhere to the leadership of the CCP and support the Chinese socialist system,” according to official state media Xinhua News Agency. Xi also said the government “must guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringements by extremists.” He said religions should localize by accepting Chinese traditions and socialist core values and that the legitimate rights of religious people should be respected. Other provinces also held local work conferences on religion, including Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces.

Government policy continued to allow religious groups to engage in charitable work. Regulations specifically prohibited faith-based organizations from proselytizing while conducting charitable activities. Faith-based charities, like all other charitable groups, were required to register with the government. Once registered as an official charity, they were allowed to raise funds publicly and to receive tax benefits, in accordance with the law. The government did not permit unregistered charitable groups to raise funds openly, hire employees, open bank accounts, or own property. According to several unregistered religious groups, the government required faith-based charities to obtain official cosponsorship of the registration application by the local official religious affairs bureau. These groups often were required to affiliate with one of the five patriotic religious associations.

Registered religious groups continued to provide social services throughout the country. For example, the TSPM/Chinese Christian Council created the Department of Social Service in 2003. According to the 2015 Annual Report of the Social Service Ministry, the most recent available, the department provided financial and technical assistance in eight categories of service ministries, such as education assistance and child care, community development, and medical and health care throughout the country.

Authorities allowed certain overseas faith-based aid groups to deliver services in coordination with local authorities and domestic groups. Some unregistered religious groups reported local authorities placed limits on their ability to provide social services. In some provinces, such as Hebei, some registered charitable religious groups reported a positive working relationship with their local religious affairs bureau officials, allowing them to engage in disaster relief and social service activities. Following the passage of a new law on foreign NGOs, however, some faith-based foreign organizations chose to leave the country, believing authorities would not allow them to register, given their religious affiliations.

Buddhist religious groups reported increased ability to fundraise for their charitable activities. The Anshan City Buddhist Association used social media to receive donations, using the money to provide supplies and scholarships to the children of migrant workers, according to a government report.

Foreign residents belonging to religious groups not officially recognized by the government reported being permitted to worship although, according to policy, foreigners could not proselytize, conduct religious activities at unregistered venues, or conduct religious activities with local citizens at religious venues. In many cases, authorities prohibited citizens from attending the services of religious organizations permitted to operate for foreign residents. In some cases, authorities reportedly expelled foreign residents who attempted to conduct religious activities with Chinese citizens outside government approval. Some foreign residents whose appeals for registration were denied still met without government approval. On several occasions, police raided those meetings, with increased pressure reported during sensitive holidays.

The government also tried to restrict the movement of the Dalai Lama. In September the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the visit of the Dalai Lama to the European Parliament “mistaken actions” that supported the Dalai Lama’s “spiritual terrorism.” The government in September warned Taiwan’s new administration not to allow the Dalai Lama to visit. In October the Chinese government openly rebuked India for inviting the Dalai Lama to visit a contested stretch of land on the China-India border. The government also demanded that Mongolia not allow the Dalai Lama to visit in November, saying that economic relations between the two countries would be harmed if the visit took place.

Because religion, culture, and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents of societal discrimination as being solely based on religious identity. Religious and ethnic minority groups, such as Tibetan Buddhists and Uighur Muslims, experienced institutionalized discrimination throughout the country both because of their religious beliefs and their status as ethnic minorities with distinct languages and cultures.

In Xinjiang, tension between Uighur Muslims and Han Chinese migrants continued, exacerbated by government policies discriminating against Uighurs. Tensions also continued among ethnic and religious groups in Tibetan areas, particularly between Han Chinese and Tibetans, and, in some areas, between Tibetans and Hui Muslims. Comments on social media often disparaged Muslims, with many criticizing what was perceived as too favorable treatment toward Muslim populations. Because of the perception that Muslims were terrorists, online commentators were upset by government policies in certain provinces that were seen as favorable toward Muslim practices, such as the building of more mosques.

Despite labor law provisions against discrimination in hiring based on religious belief, some employers openly discriminated against religious believers. Some Protestant Christians reported employers terminated their employment due to their religious activities. Muslims in Xinjiang faced discrimination in hiring, lost their positions, and were detained by authorities for praying in their workplaces. There were also reports from Falun Gong practitioners who were dismissed for practicing Falun Gong. One source reported that the ability to pray in the workplace was negotiated between the employee and his or her employer, preventing a consistent policy being implemented nationwide and leaving it up to the discretion of employers. In some instances, landlords discriminated against potential tenants based on their religious beliefs.

U.S. officials repeatedly and publicly expressed concerns and pressed for the expansion of religious freedom. The President reiterated the importance of upholding religious freedom for all people in the country, including for ethnic and religious minorities, and noted restrictions on churches during his discussions with President Xi. The Secretary of State raised religious freedom concerns during the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in June.

Embassy officials, including the Ambassador, regularly urged government officials at the central and local levels to implement stronger protection for religious freedom and to release prisoners of conscience. This included officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Council. The Ambassador highlighted religious freedom in public speeches and private diplomacy with senior officials. The Department of State, the embassy, and the consulates general regularly called upon the government to release prisoners of conscience, including religious prisoners.

The Ambassador met with religious groups and other embassy officials continued to meet regularly with academics, NGOs, members of registered and unregistered religious groups, and family members of religious prisoners to reinforce U.S. support for religious freedom. The Ambassador hosted events for religious leaders and practitioners to convey the importance of religious pluralism in society. The embassy supported a number of religious leaders and scholars to participate in exchange programs related to the role of religion and religious tolerance. The embassy arranged for the introduction of religious officials to members of U.S. religious communities and U.S. government agencies that engaged with those communities. The embassy and consulates general regularly hosted events for the public to promote understanding and tolerance.

Since 1999, China has been designated as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On October 31, the Secretary of State redesignated China as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing restriction on exports to China of crime control and detection instruments and equipment, under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246), pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

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The U.S. government estimates the total population at 7.2 million (July 2016 estimate). The Hong Kong government’s Information Services Department data states that approximately 43 percent of the population practices some form of religion. The two most prevalent religions are Buddhism and Taoism, which are often observed in the same temple. According to SAR government statistics, there are approximately two million Buddhists and Taoists; 480,000 Protestants; 379,000 Roman Catholics; 100,000 Hindus; 20,000 members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons); 12,000 Sikhs, and 5,000-6,000 Jews. Local Muslim groups estimate the SAR has approximately 300,000 Muslims. Small communities of Bahai and Zoroastrians also reside in the SAR. Confucianism is widespread, and in some cases elements of Confucianism are practiced in conjunction with other belief systems. Human rights organizations estimate there are between 500 and 1,000 practitioners of Falun Gong.

There are approximately 50 Protestant denominations, including Anglican, Baptist, Christian and Missionary Alliance, the Church of Christ in China, Lutheran, Methodist, Pentecostal, and Seventh-day Adventists. The Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong recognizes the pope and maintains links to the Vatican; the Bishop of Hong Kong and his retired predecessor are the only Catholic cardinals in greater China.

Legal Framework

Under the Basic Law, the Hong Kong SAR has autonomy in the management of religious affairs. The Basic Law calls for ties between the region’s religious groups and their mainland counterparts based on “nonsubordination, noninterference, and mutual respect.” The Basic Law states residents have freedom of conscience; freedom of religious belief; and freedom to preach, conduct, and participate in religious activities in public. The Basic Law also states the government cannot interfere in the internal affairs of religious organizations or restrict religious activities that do not contravene other laws.

The Bill of Rights Ordinance incorporates the religious freedom protections of the ICCPR, which include the right to manifest religious belief individually or in community with others, in public or private, and through worship, observance, practice, and teaching. The Bill of Rights Ordinance states persons belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their own religion, and use their own language. The ordinance also protects the right of parents or legal guardians to “ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.” These rights may be limited when an emergency is proclaimed and “manifestation” of religious beliefs may be limited by law when necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights of others. Such limitations may not discriminate solely on the basis of religion.

Religious groups are not legally required to register with the government; however, they must register to receive government benefits, such as tax-exempt status, rent subsidies, government or other professional development training, the use of government facilities, or a grant to provide social services. To qualify for such benefits, the group must prove to the satisfaction of the government that it is established solely for religious, charitable, social, or recreational reasons. The government determines whether a religious group’s application for tax-exempt status is accepted. Registrants must provide the name and purpose of the organization, identify its office-holders, and confirm the address of the principal place of business and any other premises owned or occupied by the organization. If a religious group registers with the government, it is entered into the registry of all NGOs, but the government makes no adjudication on the validity of any registered groups. Religious groups may register as a society and/or tax-exempt organization as long as they have at least three members who hold valid SAR identity documents; the registration process normally takes approximately 12 working days. Falun Gong is not classified as a religious group under the law, as it is currently registered as a society, under which its Hong Kong-based branches are able to establish offices, collect dues from members, and have legal status.

The Basic Law allows private schools to provide religious education. The government offers funding to cover 90 percent of the budget of schools built and run by religious groups, should they seek such support. Government subsidized schools must adhere to government curriculum standards and may not bar students based on religion, but they may provide religious instruction as part of their curriculum, which may be mandatory for all students. Teachers, however, may not discriminate against students because of their religious beliefs. The public school curriculum mandates coursework on ethics and religious studies, with a focus on religious tolerance; the government’s curriculum also includes elective modules on different world religions.

Religious groups may apply to the government to lease land at concessional terms through Home Affairs Bureau sponsorship. Religious groups may apply to develop or use facilities in accordance with local legislation.

The only direct government role in managing religious affairs is the Chinese Temples Committee, led by the secretary for home affairs. The SAR Chief Executive appoints its members. The committee oversees the management and logistical operations of 24 of the region’s 600 temples and provides grants to other charitable organizations. The committee provides grants to the Home Affairs Bureau for disbursement as financial assistance to needy ethnic Chinese citizens. The colonial-era law does not require new temples to register to be eligible for Temples Committee assistance.

Hong Kong’s Chief Executive is elected by an approximately 1,200-member Election Committee. The Basic Law stipulates that the Election Committee’s 1,200 members shall be “broadly representative.” Committee members come from four sectors, divided into 38 subsectors, representing various trades, professions, and social services groups. The religious subsector is comprised of the Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, the Chinese Muslim Cultural and Fraternal Association, the Hong Kong Christian Council, the Hong Kong Taoist Association, the Confucian Academy, and the Hong Kong Buddhist Association. These six bodies are each entitled to 10 of the 60 seats for the religious subsector on the Election Committee. The religious subsector is not required to hold elections under the Chief Executive Election Ordinance. Instead, each religious organization selects its electors in its own fashion. Each of the six designated religious groups is also a member of the Hong Kong Colloquium of Religious Leaders.

Government Practices

During the year, Falun Gong practitioners reported generally being able to operate openly in Hong Kong and engage in behavior that is forbidden elsewhere in the PRC, such as distributing literature and conducting public exhibitions. They were able to obtain the required permits to display information in high-traffic areas and conducted public protests against the treatment of fellow practitioners in Mainland China.

In June Hong Kong Falun Gong Association representatives said Hong Kong government action prompted the cancellation of a prepaid venue contract between Falun Gong-affiliated New Tang Dynasty Television (NTD-TV) and a district council organization-owned theater to host a classical Chinese dance competition. According to the Falun Gong-affiliated Epoch Times, NTD-TV said the theater’s management cancelled the contract to allow the government to use the theater to train local election monitors in preparation for September legislative elections. The district council organization that owns the theater said the cancellation was routine, noting the management group’s longstanding policy is to prioritize government requests over all other bookings. The Hong Kong government said it requested the use of the dance hall and many other district council-controlled spaces across Hong Kong simultaneously for election-related training, as part of its longstanding practice. According to the Legislative Council, district councils across Hong Kong had the option of working with the government to reschedule the training, or rebooking outside groups who had leased their respective spaces. The theater’s management said they also offered NTD-TV a full refund of its contract and assistance in arranging an alternate site for the dance recital, which was planned to be moved to a government-subsidized stadium. According to Epoch Times, the stadium also cancelled its contract with NTD-TV, citing “safety issues” after reportedly CCP-sponsored groups began protesting outside the stadium on July 20. Other sources said NTD-TV feared the performance would be disrupted by similar groups and decided to move the dance competition to Taiwan.

Several Hong Kong religious NGOs stated their members faced harassment after entering the Mainland, while some Mainland religious practitioners reported Mainland authorities barred them from entering Hong Kong to practice their faith.

According to Christian Daily, in April more than 50 Christians marched to the Hong Kong-based Central Government Liaison Office to protest the Central Government’s treatment of Christian groups on the Mainland, including demolitions of crosses at over 2,000 churches in the Mainland’s Zhejiang Province. The Christian Daily article stated the Catholic Bishop Emeritus of Hong Kong, Joseph Cardinal Zen, said he believed the anti-Christian campaign on the Mainland could reach Hong Kong in the future.

One NGO expressed concern that the draft PRC religious affairs regulations could have a negative effect on Hong Kong’s religious freedom. NGO representatives said the Mainland’s draft law would require religious groups to register and obtain approval from both government-sanctioned religious bodies and Central Government religious affairs authorities in order to operate legally on the Mainland. The group said language in the draft law regarding Hong Kong-Mainland exchanges offered few protections for religious organizations. The draft language stated, “Religious exchanges between the Mainland and Hong Kong SAR are handled in accordance with relevant laws, administrative regulations, and relevant national provisions.”

Religious groups stated their faith leaders were freely able to meet with and administer to the religious needs of prisoners and detainees of all nationalities in Hong Kong prisons. They reported the Hong Kong Correctional Services Department accommodated prisoners’ and detainees’ religious-based dietary restrictions and actively solicited religious groups’ advice in ensuring prisoners’ and detainees’ religious requirements were met during incarceration.

The Home Affairs Bureau functioned as a liaison between religious groups and the government. The government invited all interested groups, including affected organizations or individuals, to provide views on whether proposed measures would discriminate on the basis of religion.

Senior government leaders often participated in large-scale events held by religious organizations. For example, clergy from all major faiths led a prayer or recitation at a Remembrance Day Ceremony to pay respects to all who died during the two World Wars. The SAR government and legislative council representatives participated in Confucian and Buddhist commemorative activities, Taoist festivals, and other religious events throughout the year.

In January an anonymous bomb threat to a police emergency hotline prompted the disruption and evacuation of approximately 1,000 local and visiting Falun Gong followers attending a meeting in a local hotel ballroom. The South China Morning Post reported police immediately evacuated the area and the bomb unit found a package containing gas canisters and stopwatches, which was later determined to be a fake bomb incapable of causing an explosion and presenting no threat to conference attendees. The conference did not resume. The Epoch Times reported the threat came from the Hong Kong Youth Care Association, a reportedly CCP-affiliated group that has harassed Falun Gong practitioners in the past. The police in February arrested five individuals in conjunction with the bomb threat, all of whom were suspected of affiliation with local criminal triad groups, according to local press reports and police statements.

Religious groups, some of which received government funding, provided a wide range of social services open to those of all religious affiliations including welfare, elder care, hospitals, publishing services, media and employment services, rehabilitation centers, youth and community service functions, and other charitable activities. Jewish leaders hosted public Holocaust awareness events.

The Hong Kong Colloquium of Religious Leaders took steps to promote interfaith understanding and dialogue. It donated more than 3,400 documents and images, as well as a time capsule to the Department of Cultural and Religious Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), to help preserve the history of interreligious dialogue in the territory. CUHK will use the collection as part of a publicly-accessible electronic database intended to increase the public’s understanding about different faiths and religious traditions.

Catholic and Protestant clergy from Hong Kong accepted invitations from state-sanctioned patriotic religious associations on the Mainland to teach at religious institutions. There were also student exchanges between state-sanctioned religious groups on the Mainland and Hong Kong-based religious groups.

In July an international ecclesiology research institute organized a four-day conference in Hong Kong addressing the future of Christianity in the PRC. Religious scholars and leaders from various denominations gathered at the conference to discuss challenges worshippers faced on the Mainland, including the appointment of Catholic bishops.

Religious groups continued to provide input in the government and civil society’s politics and governance. The Hong Kong Christian Council, in response to criticism that its internal voting procedures to select its 10 representatives to Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Election Committee favored larger denominations, in October switched from elections to a lottery system. Under the new arrangements, the Christian Council’s electors can be nominated from four categories: individuals, denominations, churches, and organizations. Some groups said the new system also discriminated against small groups because a candidate must be nominated by 20 Christians to participate in the lottery in the “individuals” category. Others said that religious groups should not participate on the electoral committee to keep church and the government separate.

Consulate general officers at all levels, including the Consul General, stressed the importance of religious freedom and interfaith dialogue in meetings with Hong Kong government officials including the Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, Home Affairs Bureau, several legislative representatives, and other high-level government officials.

Consulate general representatives also met regularly with religious leaders, NGOs, and community representatives to receive reports about the status of religious freedom both in Hong Kong and in the Mainland.

The Consul General met with Buddhist, Taoist, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim leaders throughout the year to emphasize the importance of religious freedom and tolerance. In these interactions, he discussed the work of Hong Kong’s Colloquium of Religious Leaders, a local organization aimed at fostering interreligious dialogue and promoting tolerance. He also attended events to commemorate the Holocaust. In each of these interactions, the Consul General voiced support for religious freedom and emphasized the importance of tolerance.

The Consul General met frequently with leaders and members of the local Islamic community. Noting that Hong Kong is one of the only communities in the world in which Sunni and Shia Muslims regularly worship together, the Consul General discussed the community’s contributions to the protection of religious freedom. In June he hosted an iftar at which he discussed the importance of religious freedom and cooperative activities to counter violent extremism, as well as the promotion of religious tolerance.

Throughout the year, the Consul General showed American respect for all religious traditions by marking all major Chinese traditional holidays through regular visits to local Taoist, Confucian, and Buddhist temples. He also participated in festival celebrations with the Zoroastrian, Hindu, and Christian communities. Coverage of the Consul General’s activities on consulate general social media platforms, which regularly included captions highlighting the importance of religious freedom, received positive comments from communities on the internet.

Other consulate general officials participated in Holocaust-related events and hosted religious leaders at prominent events.

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The U.S. government estimates the total population at 597,000 (July 2016 estimate). The SAR Government Information Bureau reports nearly 80 percent of the population practices Buddhism. There are approximately 30,000 Roman Catholics (of whom more than half are foreign domestic workers and other expatriates) and more than 8,000 Protestants. Protestant denominations include the Anglican, Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, Pentecostal, and Presbyterian Churches. Evangelical Christian and independent local nondenominational churches, some of which are affiliated with Mainland churches, are also present. The government reports smaller religious groups include Bahais (estimated at 2,500 persons), Muslims (estimated at 400 persons), and Falun Gong practitioners (estimated at 50 persons).

Legal Framework

The Macau Basic Law states residents have freedom of religious belief and the freedom to publicly preach and conduct and participate in religious activities. These rights may be limited in extreme situations for national security reasons. The Basic Law further stipulates that the government shall not interfere in the internal affairs of religious groups or in their relations with their counterparts outside Macau. It bars the government from restricting religious activities that do not contravene the laws of the Macau SAR.

Under the Basic Law, the government of the Macau SAR, rather than the central government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), is charged with safeguarding religious freedom in the SAR. Religious groups coordinate their relations with coreligionists in the PRC through the Central Government Liaison Office (CGLO). The CGLO also engages in dialogue with religious groups in the SAR.

The law states the Macau SAR government does not recognize a state religion and stipulates all religious denominations are equal before the law. The law further provides for freedom of religion, including privacy of religious belief, freedom of religious assembly, freedom to hold religious processions, and freedom of religious education.

Religious groups are not required to register in order to conduct religious activities, but registration enables them to benefit from their legal status. Religious groups register with the Identification Bureau providing their names, identification card numbers, contact information, as well as the group’s name and a copy of the group’s charter to register. To receive tax-exempt status or other advantages, religious groups register as charities with the Identification Bureau by submitting the same information and documents as are required to register. Several religious groups reported they had tax exemptions for land use and business operations, enabling them to afford to fund charity work and operate schools.

The law guarantees religious organizations may run seminaries and schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions and provide other social services.

Schools run by religious organizations may provide religious education under the law. The Catholic Diocese of Macau runs most educational institutions; only 10 of 77 are public schools, according to government statistics. Within these 10 schools, several require coursework on ethics and/or a world religions course, although no religious education is required in public schools.

The law guarantees religious organizations the right to acquire, use, dispose of, and inherit property.

By law, religious groups may develop and maintain relations with religious groups abroad. The Catholic Church in Macau, in communion with the Holy See, recognizes the pope as its head. The Vatican appoints the bishop for the diocese.

Government Practices

Religious groups were able to apply to media organizations and companies to use mass media outlets (e.g., television or public radio) for religious purposes. No groups reported their applications were denied.

Falun Gong members continued to regularly set up informational sites at public venues without incident.

Some religious groups reported the CGLO supported their activities and exchanges with coreligionists on the Mainland. Others said the government acknowledged and did not obstruct charity work conducted on the Mainland. Religious groups said they retained their ability to conduct activities in cooperation with Mainland partners, but they said their partners from Christian groups and civil society throughout Mainland China faced increased pressure throughout the year. No Macau-based religious groups reported incidents of interference from either the Macau government or the central government in their activities.

The government provided financial support, regardless of religious affiliation, for the establishment of schools, childcare centers, clinics, homes for the elderly, rehabilitation centers, and vocational training centers run by religious groups. The government also continued to refer victims of human trafficking to religious organizations for the provision of support services.

Many religious groups, including Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, and Bahais, provided social services to individuals of all faiths.

Public ceremonies and dedications often included prayers by both Christian and Buddhist groups.

The private University of Saint Joseph, an affiliate of the Catholic University of Portugal, offered a Christian studies course that included Catholic seminary students from the Mainland. University staff and students reported the St. Joseph’s course was one of the few Catholic courses in which students from Mainland China were able to enroll, and said students faced greater difficulty and substantial restrictions when matriculating in Mainland seminaries. The University of Macau’s Philosophy and Religious Studies Program also accepted Mainland students.

U.S. consulate general officers at all levels, including the Consul General, stressed the importance of religious freedom and religious diversity and discussed religious communities’ relations with their coreligionists on the Mainland and in Hong Kong in meetings with top Macau SAR officials and civil society interlocutors, including the Catholic Bishop of Macau, Catholic theology professors at local universities, Baptist and Methodist church leaders, Protestant nonprofit organizations, and local Muslim organizations.

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According to official data from China’s most recent census in November 2010, 2,716,400 Tibetans make up 90 percent of the TAR’s total population. Han Chinese make up approximately 8 percent. Other ethnicities make up the remainder. Some experts, however, believe the number of Han Chinese and other non-Tibetans living there is significantly underreported. Overall, official census data show Tibetans constitute 24.4 percent of the total population in Qinghai Province, 2.1 percent in Sichuan Province, 1.8 percent in Gansu Province, and 0.3 percent in Yunnan Province, although the percentage of Tibetans is much higher within jurisdictions of these provinces designated as autonomous for Tibetans.

Most Tibetans practice Tibetan Buddhism, although a sizeable minority practices Bon, a pre-Buddhist indigenous religion, and small minorities practice Islam, Catholicism, or Protestantism. Some scholars estimate there are as many as 400,000 Bon followers across the Tibetan Plateau. Scholars also estimate there are up to 5,000 Tibetan Muslims and 700 Tibetan Catholics in the TAR. Other residents of traditionally Tibetan areas include Han Chinese, many of whom practice Buddhism (including Tibetan Buddhism), Taoism, Confucianism, or traditional folk religions, or profess atheism; Hui Muslims; and non-Tibetan Catholics or Protestants.

Legal Framework

The constitution of the People’s Republic of China states citizens enjoy “freedom of religious belief,” but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities” without defining “normal.” The constitution bans the state, public organizations, and individuals from compelling citizens to believe in, or not believe in, any religion. It says religion may not be used to disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system. The constitution states religious bodies and affairs are not to be “subject to any foreign control.” The constitution also stipulates the right of citizens to believe in or not believe in any religion. Only religious groups belonging to one of the five state-sanctioned “patriotic religious associations” (Buddhist, Taoist, Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant), however, are permitted to register with the government and legally hold worship services or other religious ceremonies and activities.

Regulations issued by the central government’s State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) codify its control over the selection of Tibetan religious leaders, including reincarnate lamas. These regulations stipulate that, depending on the perceived geographical area of influence of the lama, relevant administrative entities may deny permission for a lama to be recognized as reincarnated and relevant administrative entities must approve reincarnations. The State Council has the right to deny the recognition of reincarnations of high lamas of “especially great influence.” The regulations also state no foreign organization or individual may interfere in the selection of reincarnate lamas, and all reincarnate lamas must be reborn within China. The government maintains a registry of officially recognized reincarnate lamas.

Within the TAR, regulations issued by SARA assert state control over all aspects of Tibetan Buddhism, including religious venues, groups, and personnel. Through local regulations issued under the framework of the national-level Management Regulation of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries, governments of the TAR and other Tibetan areas control the registration of monasteries, nunneries, and other Tibetan Buddhist religious centers. The regulations also give the government formal control over the building and management of religious structures and require monasteries to obtain official permission to hold large-scale religious events or gatherings. To establish places of worship, religious organizations must receive approval from the religious affairs department of the relevant local government both when the facility is proposed and again before services are held. Religious organizations must submit dozens of documents in order to register during one or both approval processes, including detailed management plans of their religious activities, exhaustive financial records, and personal information on all staff members.

The TAR government has the right to deny any individual’s application to take up religious orders. The regulations also require monks and nuns to obtain permission from officials in both the originating and receiving counties before traveling to other prefectures or county-level cities within the TAR to “practice their religion,” engage in religious activities, study, or teach. Tibetan autonomous prefectures outside of the TAR have formulated similar regulations.

At the central government level, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee’s Central Tibet Work Coordination Group, the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), and SARA are responsible for developing religious management policies, which are carried out with support from the five “patriotic religious associations.” At local levels, party leaders and branches of the UFWD, SARA, and the state-controlled Buddhist Association of China (BAC) are required to coordinate implementation of religious policies in monasteries, and many have stationed party cadres and government officials, including public security agents, in monasteries in Tibetan areas.

CCP members, including Tibetans, are required to be atheists and are forbidden from engaging in religious practices. CCP members who belong to religious organizations are subject to expulsion, although these rules are not universally enforced.

Government Practices

Across the Tibetan Plateau there were reports of forced disappearance, physical abuse, prolonged detention, and arbitrary arrest of people due to their religious practice, as well as forced expulsions from monasteries, restrictions on religious gatherings, and destruction of monastery related dwellings, according to media reporting and human rights organizations. Although the number of self-immolations has continued to decline, there were three cases of self-immolation and three other suicides in protest of government policies. Human rights advocates stated authorities used intimidation, including collective punishment of family or community members for acts of dissent, to compel acquiescence with government regulations and to attempt to reduce the likelihood of antigovernment demonstrations, thereby projecting an image of stability and the appearance of popular support. Security forces maintained a permanent presence at some monasteries. In many Tibetan areas police detained monks and lay persons who called for freedom, human rights, and religious liberty, or who expressed support for the Dalai Lama or solidarity with individuals who had self-immolated. Several monks were detained without formal criminal charges. Restrictions on religious activities were particularly severe around politically and religiously sensitive anniversaries and events. Tibet scholars stated the Chinese government’s ban on minors entering monasteries and nunneries and restrictions on travel of monks and nuns threatened the traditional transmission and practice of Tibetan Buddhism. According to human rights organizations, authorities scrutinized and sought to control monastic operations and restricted travel for religious purposes, including to neighboring countries such as India and Nepal. According to reports, Bon members are subject to many of the same restrictions as Tibetan Buddhists.

Nyima Lhamo, the niece of prominent Buddhist reincarnate lama and political prisoner Tenzin Delek Rinpoche escaped to India in July, one year after her uncle’s death in prison. In India, she said that Chinese authorities had denied requests by the rinpoche’s family for his body to be returned to them for traditional Tibetan Buddhist funeral rites following his death, allowing relatives and religious leaders to witness the cremation of the rinpoche’s body in prison but prevented his followers from constructing a stupa. According to Radio Free Asia (RFA), authorities later forced his family to return his ashes. The rinpoche’s family also reported the government continued to deny their requests for his religious order to search for his reincarnation, and detained Nyima Lhamo and her mother for 18 days on accusations of leaking state secrets to outside media following the funerary proceedings.

During the year, there was a report that Chinese officials said for the first time that Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama, is living within the TAR. Authorities, however, continued to ignore requests by international observers to visit him. Chinese authorities detained him and his parents in 1995 when he was six years old. The Panchen Lama is Tibetan Buddhism’s second-most prominent teacher after the Dalai Lama. The government continued to insist that Gyaltsen Norbu, whom it selected in 1995, was the Panchen Lama’s true reincarnation, and not Gedhun Choekyi Nyima. According to numerous Tibetan Buddhist monks and scholars, UFWD and Religious Affairs Bureau officials frequently pressured monks and laypeople, including government officials, to attend religious study sessions presided over by Gyaltsen Norbu, including ordering every Tibetan family in Xigaze (Shigatse) City to send at least two members to a July Kalachakra (Wheel of Time) ceremony in order to ensure hundreds of thousands of people attended.

The government continued to exercise its authority over the approval of reincarnations of Tibetan Buddhist lamas and the supervision of their religious education. In addition, authorities closely supervised the education of many key young reincarnate lamas. In a deviation from traditional custom, government officials, rather than religious leaders, managed the selection of the reincarnate lamas’ religious and lay tutors in the TAR and some other Tibetan areas. According to state-run media reports, in April the BAC announced its database of 1,311 “living buddhas” that it deemed “authentic” was nearly complete. The Dalai Lama was not on this list.

Although the number of self-immolations has continued to decline, as in previous years some Tibetans engaged in self-immolation as a protest against government policies. During the year, three Tibetans reportedly self-immolated, as compared to seven individuals in 2015, 11 in 2014, and 26 in 2013. Some experts attributed reports of the declining number of self-immolations to tighter controls by authorities. Local authorities prosecuted and imprisoned an unknown number of Tibetans whom authorities said had aided or instigated self-immolations, including family members and friends of self-immolators, according to press reports. Authorities also reportedly took measures to limit news of self-immolations and other protests from spreading within Tibetan communities and beyond. There were also numerous reports of officials shutting down or restricting local access to the internet and cellular phone services for this purpose.

In one case of self-immolation from the year, the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) reported that Tashi Rabten self-immolated in Maqu (Machu) County, Gansu Province, in December while calling for the return of the Dalai Lama. According to the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy, county police detained Rabten’s wife, two children, and other relatives when they requested the return of his body following the incident. According to RFA, police then beat and tortured Rabten’s wife and daughters after they refused to sign a document saying Rabten had self-immolated because of domestic conflicts, rather than as a response to government policies. Rabten’s wife and children subsequently signed the document, and authorities released them.

In September Chinese authorities detained Sangdak Kyab, who had evaded custody for three years, for supporting a self-immolation protest in 2013 by removing the protester’s remains to the man’s home. On September 12, two monks from the Labrang Monastery, Jinpa Gyatso and Kelsang Monlam, were each sentenced to a year and a half in prison in a secret trial for what authorities said was their suspected involvement in a May 2015 self-immolation protest, according to RFA.

The government placed restrictions on the size of Buddhist monasteries and institutions. During the year, the government announced that by September 30, 2017, Larung Gar, Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, the site of the world’s largest Tibetan Buddhist institute, must reduce the number of residents, including monks, nuns, and laypeople, to half its current size, not to exceed 5,000 persons, with all other homes set to be demolished. According to Human Rights Watch and multiple media outlets, beginning in July officials demolished more than 2,000 residences and an estimated 1,500 police and paramilitary troops expelled more than 2,000 monks and nuns from the site. According to press reports, the government said the demolition was to prevent fires and promote crowd controls. Local sources reported that the destruction was to clear way for tourist infrastructure, and to prevent nuns and monks from outside the area, particularly ethnic Han, from studying at the institute. Larung Gar’s monastic leadership reportedly advised residents not to protest the demolitions in hopes of saving the institute.

According to ICT, authorities also expelled 1,000 religious practitioners from Yachen Gar, also in Ganzi (Kardze) Prefecture. Human Rights Watch reported that nuns from Yachen Gar who have returned to their hometowns were told they were prohibited from joining any other monastery or nunnery there, or participating in any public religious practices.

There were reports of the arbitrary arrest and physical abuse of religious prisoners and prolonged detention of religious figures without criminal charges. In October authorities detained Lobsang Tsultrim, a monk from Kirti Monastery, for shouting slogans supportive of the Dalai Lama in public. RFA reported police severely beat Tsultrim; at year’s end, he was awaiting trial at Wenchuan County Detention Center in Aba (Ngaba) Prefecture.

In September family members located Lobsang Kelsang, a Kirti Monastery monk missing since his 2015 detention by police following a solitary protest while carrying an image of the Dalai Lama in Sichuan Province, in Deyang Prison after being sentenced to three years in a secret trial, according to RFA. RFA’s source said another Kirti monk named Adak was also secretly given a three year sentence in August.

In February media reported Ven Pagah and Geshe Orgyen, the Abbot and a monk from the Chongri Monastery in Ganzi (Kardze) Prefecture, Sichuan Province, were detained after the monastery helped organize a mass prayer for the recovery of the Dalai Lama, who was then undergoing medical treatment in the United States.

In June Lobsang Tsering, a monk from Kirti Monastery, was reportedly detained in Aba (Ngaba) County following a solo protest against Beijing’s rule in Tibet in which he wore a ceremonial scarf and carried a photo of the Dalai Lama, calling for his long life. He was reportedly beaten in custody.

In December nine Tibetans were sentenced to prison terms of five to 14 years for their participation in the Dalai Lama’s 80th birthday celebration the previous year. Some of them were monks from Kirti Monastery, and had previously been imprisoned and reportedly tortured.

Limited access to information about prisoners made it difficult to ascertain the exact number of Tibetan prisoners of religious conscience, determine the charges brought against them, or assess the extent and severity of abuses they suffered. The U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s Political Prisoner Database included records of 649 Tibetan political prisoners who had been detained by October 11, and who were presumed to remain detained or imprisoned. Of the 649 political prisoners, 640 were detained on or after March 10, 2008, the start of a wave of political protests that spread across the Tibetan areas of China. Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, and teachers made up 277 cases, of the 640.

“Patriotic education” campaigns, in which authorities forced monks and nuns to participate in “legal education,” denounce the Dalai Lama, study materials praising the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system, and express allegiance to the government-recognized Panchen Lama, continued at many monasteries and nunneries across the Tibetan Plateau, according to reports. In a November UFWD-organized training course, ICT reported authorities “compelled” newly recognized reincarnate lamas to “demonstrate their allegiance to the CCP” by visiting military bases and Mao Zedong’s birthplace in Hunan Province and by “paying tribute” to him. According to RFA, authorities forced many monks and nuns evicted from Larung Gar to attend “patriotic” re-education classes for up to six months.

According to many observers, primary sources of grievances among Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns included the requirement that all monks under the age of 18 studying at monasteries and Buddhist religious institutions undergo “patriotic education;” strict controls over religious practice; and intrusive surveillance of many monasteries and nunneries, including the permanent installation of CCP and public security officials and overt camera surveillance systems at religious sites and monasteries.. Senior monks at some monasteries reported informal agreements were reached with local officials whereby resident monks would not stage protests or commit self-immolation as long as the government adopted a hands-off approach to the management of their monasteries.

The CCP forbid its members from participating in religious activities of any kind, despite reports that many Tibetan government officials and CCP members held religious beliefs. The new TAR Party Secretary Wu Yingjie said in September that countering the Dalai Lama would be the top priority during his term in office and later stated publicly on November 15 that the “Dalai Clique” was the biggest threat to the region, and that the Party must exert religious, political, and economic control over monasteries. Government officials regularly denigrated the Dalai Lama publicly and accused the “Dalai Clique” and other outside forces of instigating Tibetan protests, stating such acts were attempts to split China. Authorities in the TAR continued to prohibit the registration of children’s names that included parts of the Dalai Lama’s name, or names included on a list blessed by the Dalai Lama.

Although authorities permitted some traditional religious ceremonies and practices, they maintained tight control over the activities of religious leaders and religious gatherings of laypeople, confining many religious activities to officially designated places of worship, restricting or canceling religious festivals, and preventing monks from traveling to villages for politically sensitive events and religious ceremonies. The government suppressed religious activities it viewed as vehicles for political dissent. For example, during July celebrations of the Dalai Lama’s 81st birthday, and the anniversaries of the March 10, 1959 Tibetan uprising and the March 14, 2008 outbreak of unrest, local authorities ordered many monasteries and laypeople not to celebrate or organize any public gatherings. Sichuan provincial authorities cancelled the annual Sangsol religious festival at Dhargye Monastery in August after local Tibetans refused to fly the PRC flag and cancelled the Dechen Shingdrup festival at Larung Gar Buddhist Institute in November.

During Lunar New Year celebrations in February, RFA reported authorities imposed “intense restrictions” in Tibetan areas. At Kumbum Monastery in Haidong (Tsoshar) Prefecture, authorities deployed large numbers of police and, according to a local RFA source, conducted exercises to “intimidate the monks and other Tibetans in the area.”

Multiple sources reported open veneration of the Dalai Lama, including the display of his photograph, remained prohibited in almost all areas. Local officials, many of whom considered the images to be symbols of opposition to the CCP, removed pictures of the Dalai Lama from monasteries and private homes during visits by senior officials. The government also banned pictures of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, whom the Dalai Lama and the overwhelming majority of Tibetan Buddhists recognize as the 11th Panchen Lama. Punishments in certain counties for displaying images of the Dalai Lama included closing of venues, expulsion from monasteries, and criminal prosecution.

The TAR government maintained tight control over the use of Tibetan Buddhist religious relics and declared the relics, as well as religious buildings and institutions themselves, to be state property.

Sources continued to report security personnel targeted individuals in religious attire, particularly those from Naqu (Nagchu) and Changdu (Chamdo) Prefectures in the TAR and Tibetan areas outside of the TAR, for arbitrary questioning on the streets of Lhasa and other cities and towns. Many Tibetan monks and nuns reportedly chose to wear nonreligious garb to avoid such harassment when traveling outside of their monasteries and around the country.

In many areas, monks and nuns under the age of 18 were forced to leave their monasteries. In March Shiqu (Dzachuka) County in Ganzi (Kardze) Prefecture reported the government had removed 300 minors from local monasteries following a January 2015 provincial mandate to remove all monks and nuns under the age of 18 from monasteries and Buddhist schools to receive “patriotic education.”

The traditional monastic system continued to decline as many top Buddhist teachers remained or died in exile in India or elsewhere, and some of those who returned from India were not allowed to teach or lead their institutions. The heads of most major schools of Tibetan Buddhism – including the Dalai Lama, Karmapa, Sakya Trizin, and Taklung Tsetrul Rinpoche (who died in December 2015), as well as Bon leader Gyalwa Menri Trizin – all resided in exile.

Multiple sources also reported over the past two years the Chinese government has increasingly restricted Tibetan Buddhist monks from visiting Chinese cities to teach. For example, prominent Larung Gar Buddhist Institute religious leaders Khenpo Tsultrim Lode and Khenpo So Dargey, who both previously taught in Chinese cities, were no longer allowed to do so. Authorities also restricted Tibetans’ travel inside China, particularly for Tibetans residing outside the TAR who wished to visit the TAR, during sensitive periods. During the year, many religious figures reported it was very difficult for them to enter the TAR to teach or study. Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns stated these restrictions have negatively impacted the quality of monastic education. Many monks expelled from their TAR monasteries after the 2008 Lhasa riots and from Kirti Monastery after a series of self-immolations from 2009 to 2015 still had not returned, some because the government prohibited them.

Many Tibetans, including monks, nuns, and laypersons, continued to encounter difficulties in traveling to India for religious purposes. In many cases, Public Security Bureau officials refused to approve the Tibetans’ passport applications. In other cases, prospective travelers were able to obtain passports only after paying bribes to local officials, or after promising not to travel to India or to criticize Chinese policies in Tibetan areas while overseas. Numerous Tibetans in Gansu, Qinghai and Sichuan provinces waited for up to five years before receiving a passport, often without any explanation for the delay, according to Human Rights Watch and local sources. There were also instances of authorities confiscating and canceling previously issued passports as a way of preventing Tibetans from participating in the 34th Kalachakra Initiation by the Dalai Lama in India. Event organizers in India estimated as many as 7,000 Chinese Tibetans were barred from attending the 34th Kalachakra, some of whom were detained en route to the pilgrimage after they had left China. Authorities warned participants or any who were involved would face jail terms from 10 days to five years.

Authorities reportedly often hindered Tibetan Buddhist monasteries from delivering religious, educational, and medical services.

According to government policy, newly constructed government-subsidized housing units in many Tibetan areas were located near township and county government seats or along major roads, with no nearby monasteries where resettled villagers could worship. Traditionally, Tibetan villages were clustered around monasteries, which provided religious and other services to members of the community. Many Tibetans continued to view such measures as CCP and government efforts to dilute religious belief and weaken the ties between monasteries and communities.

Authorities often justified interference with Tibetan Buddhist monasteries by associating the monasteries with “separatism” and pro-independence activities, as reported in state media. General administrative affairs in TAR monasteries, which traditionally were managed by monks, were overseen by Monastery Management Committees and Monastic Government Working Groups, both of which were composed primarily of government officials and CCP members, together with a few government-approved monks. Since 2011, China has established such groups in all monasteries in the TAR and in many major monasteries in other Tibetan areas, such as Sichuan Province’s Kirti Monastic Management Committee.

In accordance with official guidelines for monastery management, leadership of and membership in the various committees and working groups remained restricted to “politically reliable, patriotic, and devoted monks, nuns, and party and government officials.” The TAR CCP committee and government required all monasteries to display prominently the PRC flag and the portraits of five CCP chairmen from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping.

Provincial, prefectural, county, and local governments stationed CCP cadres in, and established police stations or security offices adjacent to or on the premises of many monasteries. For example, the TAR had more than 8,000 government employees working in 1,787 monasteries, according to local sources and Chinese government reporting in September. Security forces continued to block access to and from important monasteries during politically sensitive events and political religious anniversaries.

Authorities hindered Tibetan Buddhist monasteries from carrying out environmental protection activities, an important part of traditional Tibetan Buddhist practices, out of fear such activities could create a sense of pride among Tibetans, particularly children, and an awareness of their distinctness from Chinese culture, according to Phayul, an exile-run online news portal.

In some cases, authorities enforced special restrictions on Tibetans staying at hotels inside and outside of the TAR. Police regulations forbade some hotels and guesthouses in the TAR from accepting Tibetan guests, particularly monks and nuns, and required other hotels to notify police departments when Tibetan guests checked in, according to an RFA report and confirmed by several hotels.

Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity. Tibetans, particularly those who wore traditional and religious attire, regularly reported incidents in which they were denied hotel rooms, avoided by taxis, and discriminated against in employment opportunities or business transactions.

In August some Tibetan writers and monks reportedly tried to organize an informal event to discuss the current trends of Tibetan literature in a hotel in Chengdu’s Tibet Town, but the hotel refused to rent the conference room and police officers told the organizers that “religious gatherings” required advance approval from relevant government departments. As a result, the event was cancelled.

Many Han Buddhists were interested in Tibetan Buddhism and donated money to Tibetan monasteries and nunneries. Tibetan Buddhist monks frequently visited Chinese cities to provide religious instruction to Han Buddhists. In addition, a growing number of Han Buddhists visited Tibetan monasteries, although officials sometimes imposed restrictions that made it difficult for Han Buddhists to conduct long-term study at many monasteries in Tibetan areas.

U.S. government officials, including the President, the Secretary of State, the U.S. Ambassador in Beijing, and the U.S. Consul General in Chengdu, continued the sustained and concerted effort to encourage greater religious freedom in Tibetan areas.

During several visits to China, the Secretary of State consistently raised Tibet and called for the protection of human rights in Tibetan regions. The Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, who also serves as Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, continued to coordinate U.S. government programs to preserve Tibetan heritage as well as promote dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama. U.S. officials repeatedly raised Tibetan religious freedom issues – such as the Chinese government’s refusal to engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama and the ongoing demolition campaign at the Larung Gar Tibetan Buddhist Institute – in public remarks and with Chinese government counterparts at multiple levels. In December the Under Secretary said decisions regarding the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama belongs to him and leaders of his faith, and not to the state. In addition to raising systemic issues, such as passport issuance to Tibetans, U.S. officials expressed concern and sought further information about individual cases and incidents of religious persecution and discrimination.

In June the President met with the Dalai Lama and emphasized the United States’ strong support for the preservation of Tibet’s religious, cultural, and linguistic traditions and heritage and the equal protection of Tibetan human rights in China. The President also expressed support of the Dalai Lama’s commitment to peace and nonviolence and encouraged meaningful and direct dialogue between the Dalai Lama and his representatives with Chinese authorities to lessen tensions. In December the U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom met with the Dalai Lama and Tibetan exile community in India. The Ambassador at Large attended the inauguration ceremony of the Dalai Lama Institute for Higher Education. He also met with Tibetan monks and students who expressed interest in returning to Tibet in the future and reopening their monasteries there that remained vacant. The Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights met with the Dalai Lama in India in January to discuss nonviolent approaches to conflict resolution and preservation of Tibetan religion and culture.

U.S. officials maintained contact with a wide range of religious leaders and practitioners as well as NGOs in Tibetan areas to monitor the status of religious freedom, although travel and other restrictions made it difficult to visit and communicate with these individuals. Although diplomatic access to the TAR remained tightly controlled, U.S. officials did receive access during the year, with authorities granting one visit for a delegation led by the U.S. Consul General in May, as well as U.S. consular visits in June and December.

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The U.S. government estimates the total population at 47.2 million (July 2016 estimate). The Catholic Church estimates 75 percent of the population is Catholic but notes the government has never taken a precise census. According to a November 2014 study by the Pew Research Center, 79 percent of the population is Catholic, 13 percent Protestant, and 6 percent atheist and agnostic. Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include nondenominational worshipers or members of other religious groups, including Jews, Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Mennonites. The Colombian Confederation of Jewish Communities estimates there are approximately 4,200 Jews in the country. There is also a small population of adherents to animism and various syncretistic beliefs.

Some religious groups are concentrated in certain geographical regions. Most of those who blend Catholicism with elements of African animism are African Colombians and reside on the Pacific coast. Most Jews reside in major cities, most Muslims on the Caribbean coast, and most adherents of indigenous animistic religions in remote rural areas. A small Taoist community is located in a mountainous region of Santander Department.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and the right to profess one’s religious beliefs. It prohibits discrimination based on religion. There is no official state church or religion, but the law says the state “is not atheist or agnostic, nor indifferent to Colombians’ religious sentiment.” The constitution states all religions and churches are equal before the law. A 1998 Constitutional Court ruling upheld the right of traditional authorities to enforce the observation of and participation in traditional religious beliefs and practices on indigenous reserves. More recent rulings have referred to the 1998 decision to reaffirm the right of indigenous governors to prohibit the practice of certain religions on indigenous reserves. A concordat between the Holy See and the government, made into law, recognizes marriages performed by the Catholic Church, allows the Church to provide chaplaincy services, and prohibits members of the clergy from being compelled into public service, including military service. The law prohibits any official government reference to a religious characterization of the country.

The MOI is responsible for legally recognizing churches, religious denominations, religious federations and confederations, and associations of religious ministers, as well as keeping a public registry of religious entities. Entities legally recognized by the MOI can then confer legal recognition, called “extended public recognition,” to affiliated groups sharing the same beliefs. The application process requires submission of a formal request and basic organizational information, including copies of an act of constitution and an estimation of the number of members, to obtain legal recognition. The government considers a religious group’s total membership, its degree of acceptance within society, and other factors, such as the organization’s statutes and its required behavioral norms, when deciding whether to grant the religious group legal recognition. The MOI is authorized to reject requests that are incomplete or do not fully comply with established requirements. The MOI provides a free web-based registration process for religious and faith-based organizations seeking recognition. Legally recognized entities may collect funds and receive donations, establish religious education institutions, and perform religious services not including marriages. Unregistered entities may still perform religious activities without penalty, but may not collect funds or receive donations.

The state recognizes as legally binding religious marriages performed by the Catholic Church, the Jewish community, and the 13 religious groups that are signatories to the 1997 public law agreement. This agreement enables non-Catholic religious groups to engage in a number of activities previously restricted to the Catholic Church, such as marriages, funeral services, and spiritual assistance in prisons, hospitals, military facilities, and educational institutions. Under this agreement members of religious groups that are neither signatories to the agreement nor affiliates must marry in a civil ceremony for the state to recognize the marriage. Non-Catholic religious groups seeking to provide chaplaincy services and conduct state-recognized marriages must also solicit formal state recognition from the MOI.

The constitution recognizes the right of parents to choose the education their child receives, including religious instruction. No religious component exists in the public school curriculum. Religious groups, including those that have not acceded to the public law agreement, may establish their own schools, provided they comply with Ministry of Education requirements. A Constitutional Court ruling obligates schools to implement alternative accommodations for students based on their religion, which could include students at religious institutions opting out of prayers or religious lessons.

The law imposes a penalty of one to three years in prison and a fine of approximately 5.3 million to eight million Colombian pesos (COP) ($1,770 to $2,670) for violations, including discrimination based on religion. The penal code also contains a chapter prohibiting discrimination, including on the basis of religious beliefs.

A Constitutional Court ruling states citizens, including members of indigenous communities, may be exempt from compulsory military service if they can demonstrate a serious and permanent commitment to religious principles that prohibit the use of force. Conscientious objectors who are exempt from military service are required to complete alternative, government-selected public service.

Foreign missionaries must possess a special visa, valid for up to two years. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues visas to foreign missionaries and religious group administrators who are members of religious organizations legally recognized and registered with the MOI. Foreign missionaries must have a certificate from either the MOI or church authorities confirming their religious group is registered with the ministry when they apply for the visa. Alternatively, they may produce a certificate issued by a registered religious group confirming the applicant’s membership and mission in the country. The visa application also requires a letter issued by a legal representative of the religious group stating the organization accepts full financial responsibility for the expenses of the applicant and family, including funds for return to their country of origin or last country of residence. Applicants must explain the purpose of the proposed sojourn and provide proof of economic means. A Constitutional Court ruling stipulates that no group may force religious conversion on members of indigenous communities.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The MOI reported it received 574 applications for legal recognition of religious entities, approved 311, and archived 17 due to failure to complete the required documentation during the year. The MOI continued to review the remaining applications, some of which awaited additional information to be supplied by applicants. The MOI said almost all of the applications were from evangelical Christian churches; the remaining were from Orthodox or Anglican churches. Applicants who submitted incomplete applications or incorrect supporting documents were given 30 days to bring their applications into compliance. If an application was deemed incomplete, the MOI could deny the application; however, the applying organization was able to resubmit an application at any time. There was no waiting period to reapply. The MOI reported it only rejected applications because they were determined to be incomplete.

Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) reported that, in some communities, traditional authorities used the 1998 decision allowing traditional leaders to enforce the observation of and participation in traditional religious beliefs on indigenous reserves as justification for forced church closures, threats of violence, threats of forced displacement, and the use of corporal punishment on individuals who refused to reconvert to traditional belief systems. When CSW representatives met with members of indigenous groups, one group in Huila expressed concern that the situation was tense on their reserve as one large group of Nasa Christians was at risk for forced displacement.

The Traditional Episcopal Church and International Ministerial Church of Jesus Christ filed petitions to accede to the 1997 public law agreement enabling religious groups to provide chaplaincy services and perform marriages. The petitions remained pending at year’s end.

A May 10 administrative court ruling discontinued prayer at the start of plenary sessions of the District Council in Cartagena, as well as in public schools and other public activities. The decision overturned an article of a 2014 District Council agreement, which ordered prayer at the beginning of daily local government functions. More than 1,000 Christians held a protest in front of Cartagena City Hall, performing public prayers and picketing.

According to religious groups, individuals continued to have difficulty obtaining exemptions from military service on religious grounds. Justapaz reported an increase in requests for conscientious objector status. It said the military had been increasingly responsive in creating internal committees to respond to these requests but had been unable to do so within the mandated 15 days.

According to a CSW report, the army detained a member of the Mennonite Church travelling by bus in January and asked him to provide identity documents. He was forced to board an army truck when he could not provide papers proving prior military service, even though he told the army that he was a conscientious objector and a religious studies student. Although he had previously voluntarily presented himself to the military base to declare his conscientious objector status, he was informed that he had broken the law for not defining his military situation and was declared fit for service. He was allowed to leave only after proving that he was a student, but had no resolution of his conscientious objector status, leaving him vulnerable to future arbitrary detention and recruitment. The Association of Conscientious Objectors of Colombia (ACOOC) said indigenous peoples were often unaware of their rights to object on religious grounds because of language differences.

An article added to the National Development Plan in May 2015 required the MOI to develop a public policy on freedom of religion. The MOI was called upon to work with religious groups to develop a policy to guarantee freedom of religion and equal treatment among religious groups. The MOI worked during the year to collect data from religious organizations throughout the country that would allow it to develop informed policy, and said it expected to release a report of its findings and a final public policy in 2017. In addition, the MOI worked to provide extra security for religious sites under threat.

President Juan Manuel Santos declared July 4 as the National Day of Religious Freedom, to be observed each year. The president signed the declaration in the presence of 110 religious leaders as well as representatives from national and international religious organizations.

There were reports that guerrillas, illegal armed groups, and organized crime groups threatened leaders and members of religious groups and targeted them for extortion. According to Global Ministries, Pastor Oscar Leonardo Rodriguez Ariza was killed while inside his Baptist church in Bucaramanga on June 22. While the motives and perpetrators of this killing were unknown, Global Ministries stated the location suggested it was motivated by the pastor’s religious beliefs.

Pentecostal leaders reported the Church had to close 18 congregations in four departments because of threats and forced displacement from illegal armed actors.

Protestant leaders continued to state that isolation and fear of retribution in rural communities led to underreporting of clergy assault, harassment, and killings. Some religious leaders said they chose not to report cases formally to law enforcement or seek government security assistance because of fear of retribution by illegal armed groups. Global Ministries reported that one pastor was afraid to report threats from illegal armed groups because the Attorney General’s Office had been unresponsive regarding prior threats.

Justapaz continued to report threats from criminal groups and forced displacement of clergy and parishioners of the Baptist Church, Presbyterian Church, Anglican Church, Mennonite Church, and House on the Rock Church. Global Ministries reported threats, forced displacement, and arbitrary detentions by illegal armed groups against members of the Catholic Church, Anglican Church, and Baptist Church in Santander and Antioquia. As of late November, the Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Directorate of the Attorney General’s Office reported 17 open investigations of religious leaders threatened, harassed, or harmed as a result of their religious affiliations, compared to 11 open cases at the end of 2015. In addition, the Attorney General’s Office reported two open investigations into the killing of religious leaders allegedly targeted due to their religious affiliations.

The NGO Witness for Peace reported guerillas and illegal armed groups threatened, displaced, or attacked religious leaders for promoting human rights, assisting internally displaced persons, assisting with land restitution claims, and discouraging coca cultivation. Religious groups, including Justapaz and Global Ministries, reported armed groups further restricted religious freedom by limiting freedom of movement and preventing people from attending religious services.

The Attorney General’s Office reported no religiously motivated killings, compared with six in 2015.

Bogota’s Israelite Center reported instances of anti-Israel rhetoric that emerged around events in the Middle East and were accompanied by anti-Semitic graffiti near synagogues, as well as demonstrations in front of the Israeli Embassy that were sometimes accompanied by anti-Semitic comments on social media. In February vandals hurled rocks at a mosque in Bogota, breaking several windows. The government subsequently provided extra security for religious sites.

A number of faith-based and interfaith NGOs promoted religious freedom and tolerance through their programs and community engagements. ACOOC, Justapaz, Pastoral Social, and the Colombian Confederation of Jewish Communities advocated for conscientious objectors, regardless of their religious affiliation. The groups reported they were working together to document cases of religious intolerance and violence resulting from the armed conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with the stated purpose of truth and reconciliation. They also participated in interfaith dialogues that encouraged religious tolerance.

U.S. embassy officials discussed issues of religious freedom, including conscientious objection to military service and the effect of guerrilla and illegal armed groups on religious freedom, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Attorney General’s Office, and the MOI. In July, the U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism met with Jewish leaders and representatives from other religious groups in Bogota to discuss their concerns about anti-Semitism and the Jewish community’s relationship with other religious communities. The Special Envoy also met with national religious and civic leaders, including MOI Acting Vice Minister Pedro Posada, who said anti-Semitism in the country was usually linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and manifested itself through political discourse as opposed to systemic discrimination. The Ambassador in May discussed discrimination against the Jewish community with representatives of Global Jewish Advocacy and the Colombian Confederation of Jewish Communities.

Embassy representatives maintained regular communication with representatives of the Catholic Church, Justapaz, Witness for Peace, and faith-based NGO Pastoral Social to discuss the effect of ongoing internal conflicts on religious practice. Given the presence of illegal armed actors in many parts of the country, religious leaders and faith-based NGOs reported in meetings with embassy officials that they continued to focus much of their efforts on ensuring the safety of their communities as they sought to practice their faith. Embassy representatives discussed religious freedom issues during an embassy-hosted working group session attended by government representatives, civil society, and religious leaders that emphasized the importance of continued interfaith dialogue and coordination with government partners as the country worked toward finalizing and implementing its peace accord with the FARC.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 795,000 (July 2016 estimate). The U.S. government estimates the population is 98 percent Sunni Muslim. Roman Catholics, Shia, Sufi, and Ahmadi Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Protestants together make up less than 2 percent of the population. Non-Muslims are mainly foreign residents and are concentrated in the country’s capital, Moroni, and the capital of Anjouan, Mutsamudu. Shia and Ahmadi Muslims mostly live in Anjouan.

Legal Framework

The constitution states Islam is the state religion and citizens shall draw the state’s governing principles and rules from Islamic tenets. It proclaims equality of rights and obligations for all individuals regardless of religion or belief. A law establishes the Sunni Shafi’i doctrine as the “official religious reference” and provides sanctions of five months to one year imprisonment and/or a fine of 100,000 to 500,000 Comorian francs ($216 to $1,081) for campaigns, propaganda, or religious practices or customs in public places which could cause social unrest or undermine national cohesion.

Proselytizing for any religion except Sunni Islam is illegal, and the law provides for deportation of foreigners who do so. The penal code states “whoever discloses, spreads, and teaches Muslims a religion other than Islam will be punished with imprisonment of three months to one year and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 Comorian francs” ($108 to $1,081).

There is no official registration for religious groups. The law allows Sunni religious groups to establish places of worship, train clergy, and assemble for peaceful religious activities. It does not allow non-Sunni religious groups to assemble for peaceful religious activities in public places.

The proselytizing or performance of non-Sunni religious rituals in public places is prohibited on the basis of “affronting society’s cohesion and endangering national unity”. Without specifying religion, the penal code provides penalties for the profaning of any spaces designated for worship, interfering with the delivery of religious leaders in the performance of their duties, or in cases where the practice of sorcery, magic, or charlatanism interferes with public order.

By law the president nominates the grand mufti, the senior Muslim cleric who is part of the government and manages issues concerning religion and religious administration. The grand mufti heads an independent government institution called the Supreme National Institution in Charge of Religious Practices in the Union of the Comoros. The grand mufti counsels the government on matters concerning the practice of Islam and Islamic law. The grand mufti chairs and periodically consults with the Council of Ulema, a group of religious elders cited in the constitution, to assess whether citizens are respecting the principles of Islam.

The law provides that before the month of Ramadan, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the Council of Ulema publish a ministerial decree providing instructions to the population for that month.

The government uses the Quran in public primary schools for Arabic reading instruction. There are more than 200 public schools with Quranic instruction. The tenets of Islam are sometimes taught in conjunction with Arabic in public and private schools at the middle school and high school levels.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government did not consistently enforce the law prohibiting proselytizing and did not prosecute any such cases during the year.

In October just before Ashura, the minister of the interior issued a ban on non-Sunni religious practices. Several Shia Muslims nonetheless observed Ashura in private residences. After a video of their activities appeared on Facebook, gendarmerie officers arrested Shia clerics and temporarily detained them in Moroni and Mutsamudu. A number of blogs and media articles criticized the intervention as illegal. A Sunni cleric in Anjouan stated the detention of the Shia clerics during Ashura was justified because they were considered to be practicing “in public.” Given the alleged razing of nine or 10 Shia mosques over the years, the imam allocated a part of his home as a “mosque” and invited his congregation to worship there. The Sunni cleric explained that local religious authorities understood “in private” to mean “with your immediate family only.” This case was never tried in court, however.

Gendarmes in Mutsamudu prevented Ahmadi Muslims from celebrating the inauguration of the first Ahmadi mosque in the country, which opened on October 21.

During the year the minister of interior banned alcohol consumption and daytime swimming during Ramadan, which the police enforced.

The grand mufti regularly addressed the country on the radio, applying Islamic principles to social issues such as delinquency, alcohol abuse, marriage, divorce, and education.

Almost all children between the ages of three and six attended private, informal schools at least part-time to learn to read and recite the Quran. During the year, the government announced its plans to expand religious and Arabic teaching to all public schools to further reduce the demand for unlicensed and unregulated private classes and reduce the potential for abuse in private facilities.

The government funded an Islamic studies program, known as the Faculty of Arabic and Islamic Science (Imam al-Shafi’i Faculty) within the country’s only public university. The government stated it initiated this step in 2003 to ensure the availability of local educational opportunities and to respond to concerns that youth who studied abroad in countries with differing or no Islamic traditions could return home and attempt to influence what the government considered to be the moderate Sunni tradition on the islands. The government restricted study by its citizens in Iran and Pakistan.

As in previous years, there were reports communities unofficially shunned from their activities individuals who were suspected of converting from Islam to Christianity. Societal abuse and discrimination against non-Muslim citizens persisted, particularly against Christians or those who were converts from Islam. Non-Muslim foreigners reported little to no discrimination. All citizens faced pressure to practice elements of Islam, particularly during Ramadan. Most societal pressure and discrimination occurred behind closed doors at the village level. The extent of de facto discrimination typically depended on the level of involvement of local Islamic teachers. Most non-Muslim citizens reportedly did not openly practice their faith for fear of societal rejection. Persons who raised their children with non-Muslim religious teachings faced societal discrimination. Societal pressure and intimidation continued to restrict the use of the country’s three churches to non-citizens.

There is no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in the country. Representatives from the U.S. embassy in Antananarivo, Madagascar visited the country and engaged with government officials on issues of religious freedom, including the minister of justice, the minister of interior, the commander of the gendarmerie, and the governors of Anjouan and Moheli. Embassy representatives met with the minister of education to discuss madrassas. Embassy officers also met with Muslim religious and civil society leaders and others on issues of religious freedom, including the NGO Service d’Ecoute.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.9 million (July 2016). According to a 2013 survey by the Center for Investigations and Political Studies of the University of Costa Rica, an estimated 72.8 percent of the population is Catholic, 14.8 percent Protestant (including evangelical Protestants), 3.6 percent other religious groups, and 8.4 percent without religious affiliation. The majority of Protestants are Pentecostal, with smaller numbers of Lutherans and Baptists. There are an estimated 60,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses, predominantly on the Caribbean coast. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) estimates its membership at 35,000. The Jewish Zionist Center estimates there are between 3,000 and 3,500 Jews. Approximately 1,000 Quakers live near the cloud forest reserve of Monteverde, Puntarenas. Smaller groups include followers of Islam, Taoism, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Scientology, Tenrikyo, and the Bahai Faith. Some indigenous people practice animism.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the state religion and requires the state to contribute to its maintenance. The constitution prohibits the state from impeding the free exercise of other religions that do not undermine “universal morality or proper behavior.” Unlike other religious groups, the Catholic Church is not registered as an association and receives special legal recognition. Its assets and holdings are governed consistent with Catholic canon law.

The constitution recognizes the right to practice the religion of one’s choice. By law, a person claiming a violation of religious freedom may file suit with the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, and may also file a motion before the Constitutional Chamber to have a statute or regulation declared unconstitutional. Additionally, a person claiming a violation of religious freedom may appeal to the Administrative Court to sue the government for alleged discriminatory acts. Legal protections cover discrimination by private persons and entities.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religion is responsible for managing the government’s relationship with the Catholic Church and other religious groups. According to the law, a group with a minimum of 10 persons may incorporate as an association with judicial status by registering with the public registry of the Ministry of Justice. The government does not require religious groups to register; however, religious groups must register if they choose to engage in any type of fundraising. Registration also entitles them to obtain legal representation and standing or own property.

An executive order provides the legal framework for religious organizations to establish places of worship. Religious organizations must submit applications to the local municipality to establish a place of worship and to comply with safety and noise regulations established by law.

The law establishes that public schools must provide religious instruction by a person able to promote moral values and tolerance, and be respectful of human rights. If a parent on behalf of a child chooses to opt out of religious courses, the parent needs to make a written request. The government allows non-Catholic religion courses in public schools in accordance with a 2010 Supreme Court ruling annulling a regulation limiting public school religious instruction to Catholic courses. The Ministry of Public Education provides assistance for religious education to private schools, both Catholic and non-Catholic, including directly hiring teachers, providing teacher salaries and other funds.

The law allows the government to provide land free of charge to the Catholic Church only. Government-to-church land transfers are typically granted through periodic legislation.

Only Catholic priests and public notaries may perform state-recognized marriages. Wedding ceremonies performed by other religious groups must be legalized through a civil union.

The constitution forbids Catholic clergy from serving in the capacity of president, vice president, cabinet member, or Supreme Court justice. This prohibition does not apply to non-Catholic clergy based on a decades-old ruling by the Supreme Elections Tribunal later confirmed by a Constitutional Chamber decision.

Immigration law requires foreign religious workers to belong to a religious group accredited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religion, and stipulates religious workers may receive permission to stay at least 90 days but not more than two years. The permission is renewable. Immigration regulations require religious workers to apply for temporary residency before arrival.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Catholic leaders stated the Supreme Electoral Tribunal threatened civil penalties for sermons attempting to influence or specifying criteria influencing voting decisions. According to a representative of the Archdiocese of San Jose, such pressure was directed only towards Catholic leaders, while other religious groups did not face such threats even though they directly sponsored political parties.

The Constitutional Chamber ruled in favor of a Syrian woman who stated the freedom to exercise her religion was restricted while in prison. She stated authorities did not allow her to conduct Islamic prayers regularly and wear a veil while doing so. The court ordered the chief of prisons to allow her to pray and wear a veil.

The government earmarked approximately 16,800,000 Colons ($30,800) for construction or improvement projects for Catholic and non-Catholic churches around the country in the supplemental budget approved in November.

Some non-Catholic leaders continued to state the constitution did not sufficiently address the specific concerns of non-Catholic religious groups. Protestant groups registered as secular associations said they preferred a separate registration that would specifically cover church construction and operation, permits to organize events, and pastoral access to hospitals and jails for non-Catholic religious groups. In the case of the Catholic Church, the government continued to address such concerns through the special legal recognition afforded the Church under canon law.

Members of the Evangelical Alliance and Catholic Church criticized the government for supporting proposed legislation for a secular state, fearing it could erode rather than favor religious freedom for all faiths. Opponents argued a secular state would undermine the legal basis for traditional stances on issues such as abortion, same sex marriage, and in-vitro fertilization.

Arguments over same sex marriage and abortion on social media networks were occasionally accompanied by insults and intolerance disparaging the beliefs of Catholics and other Christians, according to a legislative advisor from one of the Christian parties at the National Assembly.

The Jewish community reported instances of anti-Semitic comments on social media.

The U.S. Ambassador hosted a Rosh Hashanah dinner to promote mutual respect and tolerance. Jews, Muslims, evangelical Protestants, Catholics, other religious communities, and government representatives participated.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 23.7 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the most recent census in 2014, 42 percent is Muslim, 34 percent Christian, and 4 percent adherents of indigenous religious beliefs. Many Christians and Muslims also practice some aspects of indigenous religious beliefs.

Traditionally, the north is associated with Islam and the south with Christianity, although adherents of both religious groups live throughout the country.

Christian groups include Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, Presbyterians, Harrists, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Southern Baptists, Copts, adherents of the Celestial Church of Christ, and members of the Assemblies of God. Muslim groups include Sunnis, Shia, and Ahmadis. Other religious groups include Buddhists, Bahais, Rastafarians, followers of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, and Bossonists, who follow traditions of the Akan ethnic group.

Legal Framework

The new constitution adopted during the year continued to stipulate a secular state that respects all beliefs and treats all individuals equally under the law, regardless of religion. It prohibits religious discrimination in public and private employment and provides for freedom of conscience and religious belief and worship consistent with the law, the rights of others, national security, and public order. It prohibits “propaganda” that encourages religious hatred. It recognizes the right of political asylum in the country for individuals persecuted for religious reasons.

The Ministry of Interior’s Department of Faith-Based Organizations is charged with promoting dialogue among religious groups and between the government and religious groups, providing administrative support to groups trying to become established, monitoring religious activities, and managing state sponsored religious pilgrimages and registration of new religious groups.

The law requires all religious groups to register with the government. Groups must submit an application to the Department of Faith-Based Organizations. The application must include the group’s bylaws, names of the founding members and board members, date of founding, and general assembly minutes. The department investigates the organization to ensure the religious group has no members or purpose deemed politically subversive and that no members are deprived of their civic and political rights. There are no penalties prescribed for groups that do not register, but those that register benefit from government support. For example, the government provides free access to state-run television and radio for religious programming to registered religious groups that request it. Registered religious groups are not charged import taxes on devotional items such as religious books and religious items such as rosaries.

Religious education is not included in the public school curriculum, but is often included in private schools affiliated with a particular faith.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government refused to register some religious groups because of internal disputes involving applicant groups and the submission of forged documents as part of the applications, according to an official at the Department of Faith-Based Organizations. Specifically, he said the department received some minutes from religious groups’ founding general assemblies that appeared to be forged and did not accurately reflect the organizations from which they were allegedly sent.

The government continued to fund and to organize Hajj pilgrimages for Muslims and pilgrimages to Israel and France for Christians, as well as local pilgrimages for members of independent African Christian churches.

The government included prominent Muslim, Catholic, and other Christian religious leaders in political and social reconciliation efforts. A Catholic bishop and an imam held roles as vice presidents of the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission and subsequently of the National Commission for Reconciliation and Victims Compensation. The Catholic Church and the Muslim community both had representatives as commissioners on the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI).

On March 13, a group of six attackers killed 22 people and injured 33 others in Grand Bassam. The terrorists allegedly shouted “Allahu Akbar” during the attack; Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Mourabitoun claimed responsibility for the attack. Several religious leaders responded to the issue. The High Council of Imams expressed its deep sorrow after the “horrifying” attack and denounced the “barbaric methods” of the extremists. Members of the Ahmadiyya Islamic Mission Community publicly denounced it as “an atrocious act” after news reports suggested that a leaflet distributed the day of the attack was linked to their community. The Catholic Church called for “peaceful coexistence” among citizens.

The National Forum of Religious Confessions held a peace conference a week after the attack, which included Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, and Seventh-day Adventist religious leaders. A spokesman and member of the National Islamic Council stated at the conference that “no religion should lead somebody to kill his or her fellow beings.”

On the Day of Remembrance for those killed during the terrorist attack in Grand Bassam, held a week after the attack, the government hosted a public interfaith ceremony attended by the president and the first lady at which a priest and an imam said prayers for the victims and an indigenous priest made an offering.

U.S. embassy representatives frequently discussed the importance of religious tolerance with political figures in the government and the opposition. In January the Ambassador hosted the Dr. Martin Luther King prayer breakfast that brought together government officials from the Ministry of Communication and the Ministry of Regional Integration and approximately 40 religious leaders to discuss the role of religious tolerance in promoting reconciliation and nonviolence. In May the Ambassador visited the Mayor of Grand Bassam to thank him for his assistance on the day of the attacks, lay down a wreath to the victims, and emphasize the need for religious tolerance.

The Ambassador and U.S. embassy representatives met with religious and civil society leaders to discuss religious freedom, tolerance, and reconciliation. In March the embassy hosted a remote video conference between a former U.S. diplomat and religious leaders to discuss religious freedom and tolerance and the important role religious leaders play in preventing radicalization of young people. The embassy provided financial and technical assistance support to a civil society platform of election observers that included a multidenominational council of religious leaders to represent the religious community perspective in the political discourse. During the October constitutional referendum and the December legislative elections, the platform promoted responsible rhetoric and urged religious leaders to encourage peace.

Under an agreement between Voice of America (VOA) and Al-Bayane Radio, VOA’s French-language Dialogue des Religions (Dialogue of Religions) continued to reach millions of listeners across the country with its weekly broadcast on the Islamic radio station. Dialogue des Religions is an interactive program featuring a host and guests – often religious scholars or journalists – who discussed religious issues in the news and answered listeners’ questions on various facets of religion. The embassy launched a radio program called Hello, America! in partnership with the Al-Bayane Islamic radio station. The first edition of the program in October featured an interview with an American official who is Muslim and discussed the values of religious tolerance and diversity.

On April 14, the embassy hosted a seminar on countering violent extremism in the country, which brought together religious leaders, security and government officials, civil society leaders, academics, and media. One of the panels emphasized the peaceful coexistence of religions in the country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.5 million (July 2016 estimate). The Bureau of Statistics reports 86.3 percent of residents are Catholic, 4.4 percent Serbian Orthodox, and 1.5 percent Muslim. Nearly four percent self-identify as nonreligious or atheist. Other religious groups include Jews, Protestants, and other Christians. According to the Coordination of Jewish Communities in Croatia, the country’s Jewish community numbers between 2,000 and 2,500.

Religious affiliation correlates closely with ethnicity. Ethnic Serbs are predominantly members of the SOC and live primarily in cities and areas bordering Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most members of other minority religious groups reside in urban areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for equality of rights regardless of religion, freedom of conscience, and religious expression. It prohibits incitement of religious hatred. According to the constitution, religious groups are equal under the law and separate from the state; they are free to publicly conduct religious services and open and manage schools and charitable organizations under the protection and assistance of the state.

The Catholic Church receives state financial support and other benefits established in four concordats between the government and the Holy See. These agreements allow state financing for salaries and pensions of some religious officials associated with religious education through government-managed pension and health funds. These agreements also stipulate state funding for religious education in public schools. The law stipulates the same rights and benefits for other registered religious groups as those specified for the Catholic Church in the concordats, which were signed first.

The law defines the legal position of religious groups and determines eligibility for government funding and tax benefits; recognized religious communities are exempt from real estate taxes, the profit/capital gains tax, and taxes on donations. To obtain legal status as a recognized religious community, a religious group must have at least 500 members and be registered as an organization for at least five years. To register as an organization, groups submit a list of its members and documentation outlining the group’s bylaws and describing its mission to the Ministry of Administration. Nonregistered religious groups may operate freely but without tax or other benefits. The state recognizes marriages conducted by recognized religious communities, eliminating the need for civil registration. To be recognized legally, marriages by nonregistered religious groups require civil registration. Nonregistered religious groups cannot conduct religious education in schools or access state funds in support of religious activities, including charitable work, counseling, building costs, and clergy salaries; they may engage in worship, proselytize, own property, import religious literature, and provide spiritual counsel in prisons, hospitals, and the military.

There are 54 recognized religious communities, including the Catholic Church, the SOC, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Christian Adventist Church, the Church of Christ, the Church of God, the Croatian Old Catholic Church, the Evangelical Church, the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Pentecostal Church, the Reformed Christian Church, the Union of Baptist Churches, the Seventh-day Adventist Reform Movement, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Union of Pentecostal Churches of Christ, the Coordination of Jewish Communities in Croatia (an umbrella group of nine distinct Jewish communities), the Jewish Community of Virovitica, Bet Israel (a Jewish group), and the Islamic Community of Croatia.

The government requires religious education be offered in public schools, although attendance is optional. The Catholic catechism is the predominant religious text used. Nineteen additional religious communities offer religious education in schools in which there are seven or more students of a given faith. Eligible religious groups provide the instructors and the state pays their salaries. Students may opt out of religious education without providing specific grounds.

The law currently does not allow individuals whose property was confiscated during the Holocaust era to seek compensation in court if those individuals subsequently obtained another nationality. This affects Jewish property holders disproportionately.

Government Practices

According to the government Commission for Relations with Religious Communities, the Catholic Church received 285.7 million kuna (HRK) ($40.5 million) in government funding during the year for religious education, salaries, pensions, and other purposes. The government offered funding to other religious institutions, a portion of which was based on their size, in addition to funds provided to support religious education in public schools (all offered on an opt-in basis), as well as the operation of private religious schools. The government provided HRK 20.04 million ($2.84 million) to these groups.

The government did not resolve any of the outstanding property restitution cases involving the SOC, including claims for land in Osijek County and properties in Vukovar and Vinkovci.

Several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including the Simon Wiesenthal Center, criticized the January appointment of Zlatko Hasanbegovic as culture minister, saying the historian had praised the WWII-era, Nazi-allied Ustasha movement and downplayed the crimes from that era.

On April 22, government ministers attended the annual official commemoration at the site of the WWII-era Jasenovac death camp. Before the event, Jewish and Serb leaders announced they would not participate. The president of the Coordinating Committee of the Jewish Communities stated his group boycotted the event because the government was downplaying the crimes committed by the Ustasha regime. The Jewish community held a separate commemoration at the site, and representatives of Serbian organizations and the Anti-Fascists’ League also held separate commemorations. President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic met with representatives of the Jewish and Serb communities to hear their concerns, and Prime Minister Tihomir Oreskovic issued a statement condemning the Ustasha’s crimes.

President Grabar-Kitarovic participated in Poland’s commemorations of the 71st anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz camp, saying “it is necessary to do everything in our power to prevent something like this from ever happening again.” Prime Minister Oreskovic and Speaker of Parliament Zeljko Reiner commemorated the day in parliament. Oreskovic said the world must be united against all who “pave the way for new holocausts by denying the Holocaust.” Reiner stated “in order to never allow totalitarian or racist ideology to be repeated… we must always keep the horrors of the Holocaust in our memories and honor the memory of all victims of Nazi and Fascist ideology.”

During a visit to Israel in May Foreign Minister Miro Kovac told the Jerusalem Post he rejected perceptions of anti-Semitism in his country and called it “a role model” with respect to tolerance and protection of minorities.

On July 22, the Zagreb County Court overturned a 1946 sentence against Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, Archbishop of Zagreb during WWII, for collaboration with the Ustasha regime. Pope John Paul II beatified him in 1998, but many Orthodox Serbs and others stated they viewed him as a collaborator with the Ustasha. Citing the reversal, Efraim Zuroff, head of the Jerusalem office of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, said it was “absolutely shameful and horrible, and it attempts to change history.” The Croatian Democratic Union, a political party, said the reversal “corrected a historical injustice.”

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on ethnic identity. SOC and Jewish representatives expressed concern over a perceived increase in societal intolerance. The office of the ombudsman for human rights reported 117 individuals filed discrimination complaints on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national identity, up from 68 in 2015. The ombudsman’s office did not report how many incidents included a religious motivation, but ethnic Serbs, without citing a specific number, reported increased incidents against them, consisting primarily of property crimes, vandalism, and hate speech. While these incidents were not specifically religiously based, ethnic Serbs constituted the largest religious minority community. On April 19, the ombudsman expressed concern regarding “noticeably harsher rhetoric in the public arena during the election in 2015” and called for “the regular and more consistent use of powers at the disposal of police and judicial staff in the prevention and punishment of hate speech and hate crimes.”

After a visit in April, Nils Muiznieks, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed concern at the reported rise in ethnic intolerance, hate speech, and other forms of hate crime targeting members of national minorities, in particular ethnic Serbs and Jews.

Speaking at a “European Islamophobia Summit” in Sarajevo in June, Dino Mujadzevic, an academic from the University of Zagreb, stated anti-Muslim sentiment was growing in the country following the arrival of migrants and asylum seekers in 2015. According to Mujadzevic, “right-wing parties were exploiting the idea of a Muslim threat… and media were reporting on crimes committed by Muslims or asylum seekers in other countries.”

In January, 5,000 people marched outside of the Electronic Media Council, a government-chartered independent media regulator, to protest the three-day suspension of local private television station Z1 after a talk show host urged viewers to stay away from an area in Zagreb where a SOC church was located, saying “Chetnik [a Serbian guerrilla force in WWII] vicars” could emerge and “slaughter” innocent bystanders.

In March, spectators gave the Ustasha salute and chanted slogans associated with the Ustasha regime, such as “Za Dom Spremni” (“For the homeland, ready”) during a soccer match against Israel attended by Prime Minister Oreskovic and the Israeli ambassador. Prior to the match, President Grabar-Kitarovic had called on Facebook for spectators to “show that we are fans who love our team but respect others, and say no to racism.” After the match, the government issued a statement condemning “all forms of expression which promote or incite hate speech or intolerance.” The statement did not specifically cite the pro-fascist slogans at the match.

Director Jakov Sedlar screened his Jasenovac – The Truth documentary in Zagreb, which questioned the number of killings at the WWII-era death camp. The director said the number of victims killed at the camp was exaggerated and “between 20,000 and 40,000 would be somewhat realistic.” The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum estimated 77,000-99,000 people were killed at Jasenovac, including 45,000-52,000 Orthodox Serbs and 12,000-20,000 Jews. Representatives of the Jewish community condemned the documentary, stating it attempted to revise history, but the documentary was praised by Culture Minister Hasanbegovic, who said the documentary was a great way to “shed light on a number of controversial places in Croatian history.”

During a nationally televised, live broadcast of a Sunday morning Mass at a Catholic church in Split in May, Dominican Friar Luka Prcela criticized President Grabar-Kitarovic’s comments the WWII-era, pro-Nazi government represented a criminal regime. The Dominican Order said Prcela’s sermon represented his personal views and did not reflect the views of the order.

SOC representatives expressed concern about societal intolerance and estimated there were approximately 20 incidents of vandalism during the year, five fewer than the previous year, which included spray painting, destruction of church property, and burglaries. SOC representatives stated they cooperated with relevant elements of the government, including law enforcement, to respond to the vandalism, although only two perpetrators were identified, whose trials were pending. SOC representatives said these incidents occurred in larger cities, including Zagreb, Sibenik, Bjelovar, and Sisak, while in previous years vandalism was largely concentrated in rural areas.

On September 9-10, Bartholomew I of Constantinople, the Patriarch of the Eastern Orthodox Church, visited the country on the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the Jasenovac death camp. The patriarch met with the president and prime minister and reportedly discussed tolerance, respect, and the importance of dialogue as a means of solving problems. He officiated at services and hosted an academic roundtable on WWII-related atrocities.

On April 27, the Islamic community celebrated the 100th anniversary of the legal recognition of Islam with numerous events attended by senior government and visiting foreign officials. Prime Minister Oreskovic stated the integration of the Muslim community served as a model for other European Union states.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy staff regularly discussed religious freedom issues, including concerns related to the status and treatment of religious minorities, with representatives of the government’s Office for Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, and other officials. The Ambassador, embassy staff, and the U.S. Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues engaged with and encouraged the government to adopt measures for restitution of religious property seized during and after WWII, including those that would unequivocally allow for foreign claims. Embassy engagement focused on the restitution of Jewish properties such as cultural centers, synagogues, cemeteries, and private property, as well as creation of a claims process for victims.

The embassy discussed religious freedom issues, including concerns related to freedom of expression and efforts to counter discrimination, with the NGO Society for Promotion of Religious Freedom and other civil society organizations, and representatives from Catholic, Serbian Orthodox, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, and other religious groups.

In cooperation with the Ministry of Science, Education, and Sports, the embassy funded Holocaust education training in the United States for two high school teachers. The annual program was organized by the Department of State, the Association of Holocaust Organizations in New York, and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11.2 million (July 2016 estimate). There is no independent, authoritative source on the overall size or composition of religious groups. The Roman Catholic Church estimates 60 to 70 percent of the population identify as Catholic. Membership in Protestant churches is estimated at 5 percent of the population. Pentecostals and Baptists are likely the largest Protestant denominations. The Assemblies of God reports approximately 110,000 members and the Four Baptist Conventions estimate their combined membership at more than 100,000 members. Jehovah’s Witnesses estimate their members at 96,000; Methodists at 36,000; Seventh-day Adventists at 35,000; Anglicans, 22,500; Presbyterians, 15,500; Episcopalians, 6,000; Quakers, 300; and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), 100. The Jewish community estimates it has 1,500 members, of whom 1,200 reside in Havana. According to the Islamic League, there are 2,000 to 3,000 Muslims residing in the country, of whom an estimated 1,500 are Cubans. Other religious groups include Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Buddhists, and Bahais.

Many individuals, particularly in the African Cuban community, practice religions with roots in West Africa and the Congo River Basin, known collectively as Santeria. These religious practices are commonly intermingled with Catholicism, and some require Catholic baptism for full initiation, making it difficult to estimate accurately their total membership.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, “the state recognizes, respects, and guarantees freedom of religion” and states “different beliefs and religions enjoy the same considerations under the law.” The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion. It also declares the country to be secular and provides for the separation of church and state, but says “the Communist Party of Cuba …is the superior leading force of the society and the State…”

The MOJ, which includes the ORA, regulates religious institutions and the practice of religion.

By law, religious groups are required to apply to the MOJ for official recognition. The application process requires religious groups to identify the location of their activities, their proposed leadership, and the source of their funding. Once the ministry grants official recognition, the religious group must request permission from the ORA to conduct activities such as holding meetings in approved locations, publishing major decisions from meetings, receiving foreign visitors, importing religious literature, purchasing and operating motor vehicles, and constructing, repairing, or purchasing places of worship. Groups that fail to register may face penalties ranging from fines to closure of their organizations.

Military service is mandatory for all men. For religious groups that actively oppose military participation, there are no legal provisions exempting their members as conscientious objectors; in practice, the authorities allow conscientious objectors to perform alternative service.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Religious and human rights groups stated that the government harassed and detained outspoken religious figures, especially those who discussed human rights or collaborated with independent human rights groups. Government security forces took measures, including detentions that were sometimes accompanied by violence, which inhibited the ability of members of the peaceful protest group Ladies in White to attend Catholic Mass. According to a researcher for the charity Open Doors, Christians were harassed and subject to strict surveillance and discrimination, including occasional imprisonment of leaders. The researcher added that “all believers are monitored and all church services are infiltrated by informers.” Some independent evangelical Christian churches said government authorities closely monitored and detained, for unspecified periods of time, their leadership and members of their families. CSW reported that Baptist pastor Reverend Mario Felix Lleonart Barroso was arrested on March 20 and his wife was put under house arrest. CSW reported Lleonart Barroso was denied food, water, and necessary medical care while in detention and that the phone lines to his house were cut.

CSW published a report in January that stated there was an increase in what it termed violations of freedom of religion and belief from 220 in 2014 to 2,300 in 2015. The report stated that the majority of the incidents involved the government declaring illegal more than 2,000 Assemblies of God churches, the forced closure or dismantling of Assemblies of God churches, and the expropriation of church properties from various Christian denominations. The report also stated there were numerous detentions, many involving individuals who were forcibly removed from Sunday worship services. The leadership of the Assemblies of God said in September that the Church had reached an oral agreement with the government to keep its churches open and that the forced closure of churches had ceased.

Morning Star News, a Christian news agency, reported the sentencing of Pastor Juan Carlos Nunez to house arrest for one year for “disturbing the peace.” His case was under appeal at year’s end. According to Nunez, his neighbors complained that his speakers were too large and loud during his Sunday sermons. He stated he reduced the size of the speakers, but neighbors and police said the volume was still too loud. Nunez’s church was part of the apostolic movement, an unregistered network of Protestant churches. The authorities dismantled the church structure, which was located on his private property, on January 8 and the 550 members had to meet in the courtyard of the house since that time. The report stated Nunez was sentenced before his attorney had adequate time to defend him.

CSW reported the dismantling of an Apostolic Church in Las Tunas on April 9. The church’s pastor, Reverend Mario Jorge Travieso, stated he was detained by authorities during the dismantling process and threatened with seven years’ imprisonment if he spoke publicly about the incident.

In January the government dismantled at least two other open-air structures that members of the evangelical apostolic movement used as unregistered churches.

Many religious leaders stated they stayed away from overtly political topics. Some said they feared their direct or indirect criticism of the government could result in government reprisals, such as denials of permits from the ORA, dismantling of religious buildings, or other measures that could limit the growth of their religious groups.

The ORA allowed the use of private homes, known as “house churches,” for religious services but required that applicant groups be recognized and seek approval for each proposed location through the formal registration process. Many religious groups used private homes as house churches in response to restrictions on constructing new buildings. Estimates of the total number of house churches for Protestant groups varied significantly, from fewer than 2,000 to as many as 10,000. Religious groups said authorities approved many applications within two to three years from the date of the application, but did not respond to or denied other applications arbitrarily.

According to the Protestant community, some groups were only able to register a small percentage of house churches. In practice, most unregistered house churches reportedly operated with little or no interference from the government. A number of religious groups, including the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Mormons, continued to wait for a decision from the MOJ on pending applications for official recognition, some dating as far back as 1994. These groups reported the authorities permitted them to conduct religious activities, hold meetings, receive foreign visitors, make substantial renovations to their facilities, and send representatives abroad. They also reported that state security monitored their movements, telephone calls, visitors, and religious meetings.

The government reportedly interpreted the law on association as a means for the MOJ to deny the registration of certain religious groups. If it decided that a group was duplicating the activities of another, it denied recognition. In some cases, the MOJ delayed the request for registration or cited changing laws as a reason why a request had not been approved.

Both the Catholic Church and the CCC reported they were able to conduct religious services in prisons and detention centers in some provinces. The Protestant seminary in Matanzas and churches in Pinar del Rio continued to train chaplains and laypersons to provide religious counseling for prison inmates and to provide support for their families. In November the CCC opened a training facility at which they offered courses on chaplain work as well as courses on caring for sacred religious objects, gender and women’s issues, and seminars for international students. The CCC stated it had an agreement with the Ministry of Interior that allowed it to operate a nationwide prison chaplain system.

Religious groups reported their leaders continued to travel abroad to participate in two-way exchanges between local faith-based communities and those in other countries. The majority of religious groups continued to report improvement in their ability to attract new members without government interference, and a reduction in interference from the government in conducting their services.

The ORA continued to require a license to import religious literature and other religious materials. The government owned nearly all printing equipment and supplies and regulated printed materials, including religious literature, although some religious leaders said they had received permission to print religious materials on their own presses. The CCC reported it received permission to import $300,000 worth of new high-tech printers that it would use to augment its established press capability.

World Watch Monitor, an international web-based Christian news outlet, reported a local Christian pastor saying that Christian literature was only rarely available and that the government considered such literature a threat. Other religious leaders reported few restrictions in their ability to import religious materials and donated goods. Several groups were successful in importing large quantities of Bibles, books, clothing, and other donated goods, although the importation of computers and electronic devices was reportedly much more difficult. The Catholic Church and Protestant religious groups were able to maintain small libraries, print periodicals and other information, and operate their own websites with little or no formal censorship. The Catholic Church continued to publish periodicals and hold regular forums at the Varela Center that sometimes criticized official social and economic policies.

In November the archbishop publicly requested the government to allow the Church to reopen religious schools and have open access to broadcast on television and radio. The Church had been limited to broadcasts of Christmas and Easter messages on state-run radio stations. The ORA authorized the CCC to host a monthly radio broadcast, which allowed the council’s messages to be heard throughout the country. No other churches had access to media, all of which were owned by the state. Several religious leaders protested the restriction on broadcasting religious services over the radio or on TV. Church leaders said that a lack of access to media platforms hindered their ability to promote their faiths.

A government decree in 2015 granted government officials the power to expropriate property under new zoning restrictions and to change the status of the churches to rent paying tenants. Some religious leaders reported the government attempted to stop or limit activity by threatening to expropriate property. Members of the Assemblies of God requested the government pass reforms to the law on association that would validate and legalize the property the church owned, as well as allow the church to build new temples. The ORA stated in November that the law was being revised, although it did not provide a timeline for when the revisions would be finalized.

Several religious leaders stated the ORA granted new permits to repair or restore existing buildings, allowing the expansion of some structures and in some cases the construction of essentially new buildings on the foundations of the old. Some leaders stated the government would regularly grant permits to buy properties to be used as house churches and in some cases would do so even if the titleholder to the property did not plan to live there. Other religious groups stated securing permission for the purchase or construction of new buildings remained difficult, if not impossible.

Several religious leaders, particularly those from smaller, independent house churches or Santeria communities, expressed concern the government was less tolerant of groups that relied on informal locations, including house churches and private meeting spaces, to practice their beliefs. They reported being monitored, and at times being prevented from holding religious meetings in their spaces.

With the exception of established seminaries and interfaith training centers, the government continued to prevent religious groups from establishing accredited schools. Although not specifically allowed or accredited, the government did not interfere with the efforts of some religious groups to operate before- and after-school programs and eldercare programs, weekend retreats, workshops for primary and secondary students, and higher education programs. The Catholic Church offered coursework that led to a bachelor’s and master’s degree through foreign partners, and several Protestant communities offered bachelor’s or master’s degrees in theology, the humanities, and related subjects via distance learning.

Leaders of the Jehovah’s Witnesses encouraged members to avoid university education in the country, finding the requirements for university admission and the course of study incompatible with the group’s beliefs prohibiting political involvement. Jehovah’s Witnesses specifically objected, based on incompatibility with their beliefs, to the expectation that students participate in political activities in support of the government and the requirement they be available for assignment to government duties for three years after graduation. By avoiding universities and corresponding political activities, Jehovah’s Witnesses were ineligible for some professional careers.

Church leaders reported the government continued an unofficial practice of allowing civilian public service to substitute for mandatory military service for those who objected on religious grounds. Church leaders submitted official letters to a military committee, which then decided whether to grant these exemptions. Jehovah’s Witnesses and Seventh-day Adventist leaders stated their members generally were permitted to perform social service in lieu of military service.

Some religious leaders reported restrictions on their ability to receive donations from overseas. They cited a measure that prohibited churches and religious groups from using individuals’ bank accounts for their organizations, and required existing individual accounts used in this way to be consolidated into one per denomination or organization. According to these religious leaders, the regulations allowed the government to curb the scope and number of activities of individual churches and to single out groups that could be held accountable for withdrawing money intended for purposes not approved by the government.

Religious groups continued to report they were able to engage in community service programs, including assisting the elderly, providing potable water to small towns, growing and selling fruits and vegetables at below-market prices, and establishing health clinics. International faith-based charitable operations, such as Caritas, Sant’Egidio, and the Salvation Army maintained local offices in Havana.

The Director of the ORA stated that the government considered religious communities to be important partners, including in the process of what she said was perfecting the country’s economic and social models. She acknowledged some of the challenges that certain religious groups have had in gaining recognition, and said the government is in the process of updating its registration process.

Multiple high-level Catholic, Protestant, and minority religious leaders agreed that the religious freedom environment had improved compared to past years.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy officers met with officials in the ORA and the head of the Council of Cuban Churches. U.S. officials raised concerns about the ability of unregistered churches to gain official status, as well as the rights these unregistered churches have to practice their religion. ORA officials met with the U.S. Special Representative for Religion and Global Affairs, the first ever meeting between the U.S. government and the ORA. The ORA officials welcomed increased engagement with U.S. religious groups and U.S. government counterparts.

In a July meeting led by the Special Representative for Religion and Global Affairs, multiple high-level Catholic, Protestant, and minority religious leaders discussed the current state of religious freedom in the country. The Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom met with Baptist and independent church leaders in October.

In public statements, the U.S. government called upon the government to respect fundamental freedoms of its citizens, including the freedom of religion.

Embassy officers met frequently with a wide range of religious groups, including Protestants, Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, and Catholics, to discuss the principal issues of religious freedom and tolerance affecting each group. Religious groups noted a wide range of concerns, including those involving free assembly, church expansion, access to state-owned media, and the ability to open private religious schools. Embassy engagement with smaller religious groups under pressure from the government included an assessment of how the recent change in diplomatic relations affected these communities.

Embassy engagement included facilitating exchanges between visiting religious delegations and religious groups, including between visiting representatives of religious organizations from the United States and local institutions. Officials from the U.S. embassy met frequently with U.S. citizens visiting as part of faith-based exchanges and humanitarian aid programs and encouraged these faith-based representatives to engage directly with local faith-based institutions.

The U.S. government estimates the total population of the island at 1.2 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, the population of the government-controlled area is more than 858,000. Of that total, 89.1 percent is Greek Orthodox Christian and 1.8 percent Muslim. Other religious groups include Roman Catholics (2.9 percent), Protestants (2 percent), Buddhists (1 percent), Maronite Catholics (0.5 percent), Armenian Orthodox (0.3 percent), Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Bahais. Recent immigrants and migrant workers are predominantly Roman Catholic, Muslim, and Buddhist. The country’s chief rabbi estimates the number of Jews at approximately 3,000, most of whom are foreign-born.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and protects the right of individuals to profess their faith and to worship, teach, and practice or observe their religion, individually or collectively, in private or in public, subject to limitations due to considerations of national security or public health, safety, order, and morals, or the protection of civil liberties. The constitution specifies all religions whose doctrines or rites are not secret are free and equal before the law. It protects the right to change one’s religion and prohibits the use of physical or moral compulsion to make a person change, or prevent a person from changing, his or her religion. The ombudsman is an independent state institution that has the power to investigate complaints made against any public service or official for actions that violate human rights, including freedom of religion, or are exercised in contravention of the laws or the rules of proper administration, and to protect citizens’ rights and human rights in general. The ombudsman makes recommendations to correct wrongdoings but does not issue remedial steps.

The constitution states the Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus (Church of Cyprus) has the exclusive right to regulate and administer the Church’s internal affairs and property in accordance with its canons and charter. By law, the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus pays taxes only on commercial activities.

The constitution sets guidelines for the Vakf. The Vakf is tax exempt and has the exclusive right to regulate and administer its internal affairs and property in accordance with its laws and principles. According to the constitution, no legislative, executive, or other act may contravene or interfere with the Church of Cyprus or the Vakf. The Vakf operates only in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots and does not administer mosques located in the government-controlled area. The Vakf acts as caretaker of religious properties in the Turkish Cypriot community. The government serves as caretaker and provides financial support to mosques in government-controlled areas.

Besides The Church of Cyprus and Islam, the constitution recognizes three other religious groups: Maronite Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, and “Latins” (Cypriot Roman Catholics). Their institutions are exempt from taxes and eligible for government subsidies for cultural and educational matters, depending on the needs of each group, for example, to cover costs to operate their own schools or for school fees for members of the groups attending private schools or for activities to preserve their cultural identity.

Religious groups not among the five recognized in the constitution must register with the government as nonprofit organizations in order to engage in financial transactions and maintain bank accounts. In order to register as a nonprofit organization, a religious group must submit through an attorney an application to the Ministry of Commerce stating its purpose and provide the names of its directors. Religious groups registered as nonprofit organizations are treated the same as any other nonprofit organization, are tax exempt, and must provide annual reports to the government; they are not eligible for government subsidies.

The government requires Greek Orthodox religious instruction and attendance at religious services before major holidays in public primary and secondary schools. The Ministry of Education may excuse primary school students of other religious groups from attending religious services and instruction at the request of their guardians, but Greek Orthodox children in primary school may not opt out. All secondary school students may be excused by the Ministry of Education from religious instruction on grounds of religion or conscience, and they may be excused from attending religious services on any grounds at the request of their guardians, or at their own request if over the age of 16.

Conscientious objectors on religious grounds are exempt from active military duty and from reservist service in the National Guard but must complete alternative service. There are two options available for conscientious objectors: unarmed military service, which is a maximum of four months longer than the normal 14-month service; or social service, which is a maximum of eight months longer than normal service but requires fewer hours of work per day. The penalty for refusing military or alternate service is up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to 6,000 euros ($6,322), or both. Those who refuse both military and alternate service, even if objecting on religious grounds, are considered to have committed an offense involving dishonesty or moral turpitude and are disqualified from holding elected public office and are not eligible for permits to provide private security services.

Government Practices

The government granted Turkish Cypriots access to religious sites in the area it controlled; however, Muslim community leaders stated the government had not granted them full access to 17 mosques located on cultural heritage sites and denied them any administrative authority over the sites. Eight of these 17 mosques in the government-controlled area were open. Six of those were available for all five daily prayers and had the necessary facilities for ablutions. A Muslim leader reported there were no ablution facilities and no bathrooms at Bayraktar or Dhali mosques in the government-controlled area. The Ministry of Interior, which has oversight of Turkish Cypriot properties in the government-controlled area, reported that, with the exception of Bayraktar and Dhali Mosques, all other functioning mosques had ablution and bathroom facilities, including Paphos Mosque. The Ministry of Communications and Works’ Department of Antiquities reported it provided bathroom facilities at a distance of approximately 100 meters (330 feet) away from Bayraktar Mosque, because the mosque was part of the medieval Venetian wall of the city, making it impossible to install sewage pipes. By year’s end, the government had again not responded to a Muslim leader’s request for permission to make improvements at the functioning mosques, and there was no change from previous years in either the number of open mosques or the number of ablution and bathroom facilities available at those mosques.

As in previous years, the Department of Antiquities kept the Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque, the most important Islamic religious site in the country, open during standard museum hours, limiting access to the mosque to two of the five daily prayer times. The mosque’s imam had to ask permission of the Ministry of the Interior and Department of Antiquities to keep the mosque open after 5:00 p.m. in the autumn/winter months and after 7:30 p.m. in the spring/summer months. In order to cross the “green line” without identification checks to visit religious sites, Turkish Cypriots were required to submit their requests to UNFICYP, which then facilitated the approval process with the government.

The government again waived visa requirements for the movement of non-Turkish Cypriot pilgrims south across the “green line” to visit Hala Sultan Tekke to conduct prayers and services on special occasions. On July 1, more than 1,000 pilgrims crossed into the government-controlled areas for a pilgrimage to Hala Sultan Tekke on Eid al-Fitr. On September 15, the police escorted approximately 1,000 Turkish Cypriots, Turks, and other foreign nationals to Hala Sultan Tekke for prayers on Eid al-Adha.

Rejecting a 2015 statement made by the pastor of the Evangelical Christian Center that evangelical prisoners in the central prison did not receive the same treatment as Christian Orthodox and Muslim prisoners, a Cyprus Police sergeant stated all religious groups had the same rights in prison and were free to hold services more frequently if requested. A response from the pastor was unavailable.

In January the ombudsman’s office, in its capacity as the Anti-Discrimination Authority, reported that the law’s requirement to designate a person’s religion on the civil marriage certificate violated individuals’ right to privacy and exposed them to possible discrimination in dealings with government and other authorities. The ombudsman recommended that the relevant provision of the law be amended to eliminate any reference to religion. At year’s end, the civil marriage certificates continued to designate religion.

In August the ombudsman issued a report on a complaint submitted by the Cyprus Humanists Association against the Ministry of Education that a state nursery school took students to a church to worship “holy remains” without the consent of the parents. The ombudsman concluded the visit was incompatible with the principles of religious freedom and state’s neutrality towards all religions. The report said schools should abstain from such activities and called on the Ministry of Education to take appropriate action to prevent recurrence. Reacting to the ombudsman’s report, the archbishop of the Church of Cyprus stated on September 22 that it was not the ombudsman’s job to tell people how to practice their faith and she should not involve herself in matters of faith.

Commenting on the relevant Ministry of Education circular on rules exempting students from religious instruction in schools, the Commissioner for the Protection of the Rights of the Child, an independent state official with oversight on children’s rights, wrote in August that students and/or their guardians should not be required to state the reasons they requested exemption from religious instruction.

On November 9, Minister of Defense Christoforos Fokaides unveiled a memorial to Jewish Holocaust survivors who were interned in camps on the island after World War II.

As in previous years, military recruits were required to take part in a common prayer led by Church of Cyprus clergy during swearing-in ceremonies. Recruits of other faiths, atheists, and those who did not wish to take the oath for reasons of conscience were not required to raise their hand during the swearing-in ceremony. They instead gave a pledge of allegiance at a separate gathering.

Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity. Representatives of the Jewish community continued to report incidents of assault and verbal harassment directed against people with yarmulkes and payot (hair side curls). By year’s end, the police had not arrested any suspects for any of the incidents.

Minority religious groups continued to report societal pressures to participate in public religious ceremonies. For example, they said children of various religious minorities faced pressure to attend religious ceremonies at school, even though they had the option to request they be exempted from participation. The Maronite community also reported Maronite national guard conscripts faced such pressure. Greek Orthodox adherents who converted to other faiths, including Islam, reportedly continued hiding their conversion from family and friends out of fear of social ostracism.

On February 21, Dhenia mosque, an official heritage site located in the buffer zone in Dhenia village west of Nicosia, suffered extensive damage after arson. The government condemned the attack and contributed to the restoration of the mosque, completed on March 2. A police investigation did not lead to any arrests.

In April the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage (TCCH), one of the bicommunal working groups set up as part of the UN-facilitated settlement talks, announced that, as part of its Small Project Activities initiative, it would accelerate the restoration of Arnavut and Koprulu mosques in Limassol and of Mathiatis mosque in Nicosia district.

The leaders of the main religious groups on the island continued to meet regularly and visit places of worship on both sides of the buffer zone. On February 10, the leaders of the five principal religious groups, Archbishop Chrysostomos II of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus; Dr. Talip Atalay, Mufti of Cyprus; Archbishop Soueif of the Maronite Catholic Church; a representative of the Armenian Orthodox Church (the archbishop was out of the country); and Father Jerzy Kraj, representing the Latin Catholic Church, made a joint call through the press for further easing of restrictions on freedom of religion, including improved access to destroyed or neglected places of worship and cemeteries. In March the religious leaders sent a joint letter to the leaders of the two communities outlining their expectations from a settlement with regard to the administration of properties belonging to religious institutions. In the same month, Mufti of Cyprus Atalay and Bishop Porfyrios of Neapolis, representing Archbishop Chrysostomos II, made a joint presentation at the Human Rights Council in Geneva, in which they highlighted their cooperative efforts for the realization of religious freedom across the island.

Members of all minority religious groups continued to report relations between the Church of Cyprus and other religious communities in the government-controlled area were cordial.

U.S. embassy representatives continued to meet frequently with the government, including with officials from the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Defense, as well as the Department of Antiquities and the Office of the Ombudsman, to discuss religious freedom issues, such as access to religious sites on either side of the “green line” dividing the country.

The U.S. Special Representative for Religion and Global Affairs visited Cyprus in March and met jointly and separately with the leaders and representatives of the five main religious groups such as the mufti and the Greek Orthodox archbishop. He discussed the ongoing dialogue among the religious leaders, access to religious sites, and the religious leaders’ contribution to the efforts for a settlement. He visited several religious sites on both sides of the island and met with members of the Greek Cypriot and the Maronite communities residing in the area under Turkish Cypriot administration.

Embassy staff continued to discuss religious freedom issues with the NGOs Movement for Equality, Support, Anti-Racism (KISA) and Future Worlds Center, and met with representatives of the Armenian Orthodox, Bahai, Buddhist, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witness, Jewish, Latin, Maronite, and Muslim communities to listen to their concerns about access to and the condition of religious sites, and inquire about incidents of discrimination or violence based on religion, societal attitudes toward minority religions, and obstacles to full enjoyment of religious freedom. Embassy officials were supportive of the ongoing religious leaders’ dialogue and encouraged the continuing reciprocal visits of Christian and Muslim leaders to places of worship on both sides of the “green line.”

READ A SECTION: REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS (ABOVE) | THE AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS

According to 2011 census information from the Turkish Cypriot authorities, the population of the area administered by Turkish Cypriots is 286,000. The census contains no data on religious affiliation. Sociologists estimate as much as 97 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim. Religious groups report an estimated 10,000 migrant workers of Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab origin are Alevi Muslims, and there are 100-200 members of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. According to sociologists, other small groups include approximately 330 members of the autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, 200 members of the Russian Orthodox Church, 150 Bahais, 150 Maronite Catholics, 180 Anglicans, 150 Jews, 300 Turkish-speaking Protestants, and 40 Jehovah’s Witnesses. There are approximately 450 African students who are predominantly Pentecostals and Roman Catholics.

Legal Framework

The Turkish Cypriot “constitution” states the territory is a “secular republic” and provides for freedom of conscience and religious faith and unrestricted worship and religious ceremonies, provided they do not contravene public order or morals. It prohibits forced prayer, forced attendance at religious services, condemnation based on religious beliefs, and compelling of individuals to disclose their religious beliefs. It stipulates religious education may only be conducted under “state” supervision. The “law” does not recognize any specific religion, and individuals cannot “exploit or abuse” religion to establish, even partially, a state based on religious precepts or for political or personal gain. The Vakf has the exclusive right to regulate and administer its internal affairs and property in accordance with Vakf laws and principles. Although the “constitution” states the Vakf shall be exempt from all taxation, its commercial operations are subject to applicable taxes. It also receives income from properties it manages. According to the “constitution,” the Turkish Cypriot authorities shall help the Vakf in the execution of Islamic religious services and in meeting the expenses of such services. No other religious organization is tax exempt or receives subsidies from the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

The 1975 Vienna III Agreement covers the treatment of Greek Cypriots and Maronite Catholics living in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots and the treatment of Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area. Among other provisions, the agreement provides for facilities for religious worship for Greek Cypriots, stating they are free to stay and “will be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practice of their religion.”

Turkish Cypriot “regulations” stipulate Greek Orthodox residents may conduct liturgies or masses led by three priests designated by the Orthodox Church at three designated functional churches in the Karpas Peninsula without seeking permission, and Maronite residents may hold liturgies or masses at four designated functional Maronite churches by Maronite-designated clergy without seeking permission. Religious groups must submit applications to the authorities for permission to hold religious services at churches or monasteries other than these seven designated churches. For the application to be considered, the date should be of significance to that religious group; the church or monastery must be structurally sound; it must not be located in a military zone; and it must not have a dual use, for example, as a museum. Permission is also necessary for priests other than those officially predesignated to conduct services. Specific permission is required for services in which Cypriots who are not residents in the Turkish Cypriot-administered area, such as members of the Greek Orthodox, Maronite Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox Churches, participate. UNFICYP coordinates applications, which must be submitted 10 days before the date of the requested service.

The “Religious Affairs Department” represents Islam in the area administered by the Turkish Cypriots. Whereas the Vakf manages land that has been donated as an endowment by Muslims for charitable purposes, the “Religious Affairs Department” oversees how imams conduct prayers and give sermons in mosques.

Religious groups are not required to register with authorities as associations in order to assemble or worship, but only associations registered with the “Ministry of Interior (MOI)” have the right to engage in commercial activity and maintain bank accounts. Religious groups and nonreligious groups have the same registration process and are required to submit the founders’ names and photocopies of their identification cards to the “MOI,” along with a copy of the association’s rules and regulations. Associations do not receive tax-exempt status or any “government” benefits or subsidies. Religious groups are not permitted to register as associations if the stated purpose of the association is to provide religious education to their members.

There is compulsory instruction covering religion in grades four through eight in all schools. These classes focus primarily on Islam but also include sessions on comparative religion. The “Ministry of Education (MOE)” chooses the curriculum, which is based on a textbook commissioned by the “MOE” in Turkey. Non-Muslim students may be excused from attending on an individual basis by schools or teachers at the request of their guardians, but there is no formal process to request such an exemption. At the high school level, religion classes are optional.

There are no provisions or “laws” allowing Turkish Cypriots to conscientiously object to military service, which includes a one-day annual reserve duty requirement in addition to the 12-15-month initial service requirement.

Government Practices

Authorities continued to restrict access to Greek Orthodox, Maronite Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox places of worship. Turkish Cypriot authorities announced restrictions on church access, stating Greek Cypriots were abusing the right to religious freedom and politicizing the situation by increasing the number of requests for access to churches. One Greek Orthodox monastery was open for prayer but still required special permission for Mass.

Authorities continued restrictions on regular religious services in certain churches. UNFICYP reported that, of 163 requests received during the year, 109 were approved, compared with 128 requests and 88 approvals in 2015.

In May the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)” announced new restrictions on religious services. Speaking to the press, “Foreign Minister” Tahsin Ertugruloglu said Apostolos Andreas, St. Barnabas, and St. Mamas churches would remain open for religious services throughout the year, but all other churches, except for St. George Exorinos, which would be the site of monthly religious services, would be available for religious services only once a year, either on their name day, or on Easter or Christmas. “Prime Minister” Huseyin Ozgurgun said his “government” would implement these new arrangements, because Greek Cypriots were exploiting religious freedom for political gains and some churches had been turned into “political symbols.” He said there had been a significant and deliberate increase in Greek Cypriot requests to hold religious services in the north, adding that the “government” had reviewed religious access procedures and formulated new technical criteria to deal with such requests. “MFA” Under Secretary Mustafa Lakadamyali told the press it was difficult for police to be present at different churches at the same time.

In May Republican Turkish Party “Member of Parliament” Erkut Sahali criticized the “MFA” for restricting religious services. Rejecting the “government’s” assertion that the new criteria were technical, Sahali said decisions to allow services should be standard and made consistently, blaming the “government” for using technicality as a guise when decisions were actually arbitrary. UN Special Advisor of the Secretary General on Cyprus Espen Barth Eide, mediator in ongoing reunification talks, said restrictions went against the bicommunal spirit and stated to the press that he had asked Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci to rectify this new policy.

In June a UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom and Cultural Rights condemned Turkish Cypriot authorities’ restrictions on church services and expressed concern about the “possible violations of cultural rights and the rights of religious freedom” that could arise from these attempts.

“President” Mustafa Akinci reacted to the “MFA’s” once-a-year rule, saying he did not support restrictions on religious freedom. Turkish Cypriot NGOs and political parties also reacted to the “MFA’s” decision and said further restrictions would negatively influence the peace process. Republic of Cyprus and Greek Cypriot religious authorities referred to the restrictions as “a very negative development” and said freedom of faith was a basic right that should be respected and protected. The Religious Track Cyprus Peace Process, a peacebuilding initiative with religious leaders established under the auspices of the embassy of Sweden, said it would have been better to make such decisions only after discussing them with all stakeholders, including “government” officials, religious communities, and NGOs.

In June the press reported the “MFA” turned down the request of Greek Cypriots to hold a religious service at Saint George Exorinos Church in Famagusta on June 19 for Pentecost. The “MFA” said Pentecost was not a special day.

Between January and September the authorities allowed church services to take place, on a one-time basis, in five additional churches: Church of Timiou Prodromou in Argaki/ Akcay; Church of Neo Chorio in Neo Chorio/Minarelikoy; Church of Agia Eirini in Karavas/Alsancak; Church of St. Anne in Famagusta; and Church of Prophet Elias in Fylia/Serhatkoy. This brought to 39 the total number of churches at which authorities, beginning in 2013, have allowed services after a hiatus of more than 40 years.

In May the press reported approximately150 Greek Cypriots attended a prayer at the Agios Epihanios Church in the village of Yildirim, the second such prayer since 1974. The ceremony was supposed to have been held on May 12, but Turkish Cypriot authorities said permission was requested late by the Greek Cypriots and had to be held on May 21.

Some minority religious groups, including evangelical Christians, continued to report Turkish Cypriot authorities, including the police, monitored their activities. A Greek Orthodox priest reported heavy police presence during church services, including police inside the church videotaping services held by the enclaved Greek Cypriot community. In September the press reported heavy security measures at a religious ceremony at St. Mamas Church in Morphou.

The Turkish-Speaking Protestant Association (TSPA) reported some families of its members were frightened to attend religious services due to police pressure; therefore, TSPA representatives visited families instead. Heavy Police escorts continued to accompany visiting Greek Orthodox worshippers. According to press reports, Turkish Cypriot police individually searched the Greek Cypriots before entering the church. Turkish Cypriot representatives stated the purpose of the police presence was to provide security and protect religious icons and artifacts; however, religious groups said they viewed the police presence as intimidation and harassment.

The “Religious Affairs Department” staffed 190-200 mosques, all Sunni, with 360 imams. Members of the majority Sunni religious community continued to voice concerns the “government” was interfering with religious affairs by selecting imams.

Some non-Sunni Muslims reported they lacked places of worship and funding to construct such facilities. Alevi Muslims reported the authorities treated them and other minority religious groups unequally. The Alevi Culture Association continued to report that due to the lack of a house of worship, Alevis were required to conduct funerals inside mosques, contrary to their traditions. They also said they perceived favoritism in “state” funding toward the Sunni Muslim population through financing of mosque construction and support for administration of mosques. One Alevi representative reported there were 196 “state” funded mosques for Sunnis, but only one cemevi (place of worship) for Alevis, which had been under construction for several years.

A representative of the Greek Orthodox Church stated that some religious sites, to which they had little or no access, were damaged or close to collapse due to decades of neglect.

Greek Orthodox religious groups continued to complain that religious items, including icons, were held in storage rooms or displayed in museums against the wishes of the communities to whom they were sacred.

Turkish Cypriot religious groups continued to report Muslim parents seeking to send their children to religious summer courses faced strong public criticism from secular community members, particularly local “government” teachers.

Some Alevis and Christians stated the mandatory religious education in schools was overly focused on Sunni Islam, and their children had no formal recourse to opt out of the classes. Alevis reported the education system discriminated against Alevis and disregarded them in religious education. One Alevi representative reported 100 percent of scholarships were provided to students who would study at religious schools and at the Hala Sultan Religious High School, which promoted and taught only Sunni Islam.

Four Turkish Cypriots had ongoing cases at the “Constitutional Court” for not attending their one-day annual military reserve duty requirement. Two Turkish Cypriots declared they were conscientious objectors in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots.

The TSPA reported local authorities removed the association’s sign installed outside its fellowship house in January, stating it was against the rules governing associations to put up such a sign. In September the TSPA also reported Turkish Cypriot police interrupted a congregation of 35 foreign worshippers who were staying at a private apartment building and asked for their names, passports, and identification information. The group refused and contacted the association’s lawyer. The TSPA said the police paid monthly visits to the association to check on the group and monitor its activities.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Non-State Actors

According to a representative of the Maronite community, the Turkish military continued to grant Maronites limited access to their churches and villages located within Turkish military zones. The Turkish military allowed Maronites to celebrate Mass once a year in the Church of Ayia Marina. It denied Maronites access to the Church of Marki near Kormakitis/Kormacit. The Maronite Church of Archangelos Michael in the village of Asamatos/Ozhan was also located within a Turkish military zone but did not require permission to function regularly on Sundays.

A representative of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus stated 50-55 religious sites remained inaccessible due to being located within Turkish military zones.

The TSPA continued to report discrimination within the Turkish Cypriot community toward Protestants.

The TCCH and the UN Development Program Partnership for the Future continued restoration work at the Greek Orthodox Apostolos Andreas Monastery in the Karpas Peninsula, a popular destination for pilgrims. The first phase of the restoration, which consisted of the restoration of the main church building and annex buildings, was completed in October and opened on November 7. Republic of Cyprus President Nicos Anastasiades tweeted “Completion of the renovation project by Greek and Turkish Cypriots offers a message of hope.” The second phase of the project, which included the small chapel, surrounding buildings, and an environmental landscaping, was expected to be completed by the end of 2017.

Muslim and Orthodox religious leaders continued to promote religious dialogue by meeting at pilgrimages they organized for their congregations to places of worship across the “green line,” such as Hala Sultan in the Republic of Cyprus and St. Banabas in the “TRNC.”

U.S. embassy representatives continued to meet with Turkish Cypriot authorities to discuss access to religious sites and the ability to hold religious services at sites without restrictions.

Embassy officials continued to meet with leaders from the Alevi, Bahai, Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Protestant, and Sunni communities living in the areas controlled by Turkish Cypriots to discuss freedom of worship and access to religious sites.

All references to place names within this report are for reference purposes only and are meant to convey meaning. They should not be interpreted as implying or indicating any political recognition or change in longstanding U.S. policy.

READ A SECTION: REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS | THE AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS (ABOVE)

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 10.6 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, of the 56 percent of citizens who responded to the question about their religious beliefs, 18 percent said they were Catholic, 12 percent listed no specific religion, and 7 percent belonged to a variety of religious groups, including the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, the Czechoslovak Hussite Church, other Protestant churches, other Christian groups, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism. Approximately 62 percent of respondents held no religious beliefs. Academics estimate there are approximately 10,000 Jews; the Federation of Jewish Communities estimates there are 15,000 to 20,000. Leaders of the Muslim community estimate there are 10,000 Muslims, most of whom are immigrants.

Legal Framework

The constitution does not explicitly address religious freedom, but the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, a supplementary constitutional document, guarantees freedom of religious conviction and the fundamental rights of all regardless of their faith or religion. It states every individual has the right to change religion or faith; to abstain from religious belief; and to freely practice religion, alone or in community, in private or public, “through worship, teaching, practice, or observance.” The charter defines religious societies, recognizing their freedom to profess their faith publicly or privately and to govern their own affairs, independent of the state. It stipulates conscientious objectors may not be compelled to perform military service and the conditions for religious instruction at state schools shall be set by law. The charter states religious freedom may be limited by law in the event of threats to “public safety and order, health and morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.”

The law states the MOC’s Department of Churches is responsible for religious affairs. While religious groups are not required by law to register with the government and are free to perform religious activities without registering, they have the option to register with the MOC. The law establishes a two-tiered system of registration for religious groups. The MOC reviews applications for first- and second-tier registration with input from other government bodies, such as the Office for Protection of Private Data, and outside experts on religious affairs. The law does not establish a deadline for the MOC to decide on a registration application. Applicants denied registration can appeal to the MOC to reconsider its decision and, if again denied, to the courts.

To qualify for the first (lower) tier, a religious group must have the signatures of at least 300 adult members permanently residing in the country, a founding document that lists the basic tenets of the faith, and a clearly defined structure of fiduciary responsibilities. First-tier registration confers limited tax benefits, including exemptions from interest rate tax and taxes on donations and members’ contributions, and establishes annual reporting requirements on activities, balance sheets, and use of funds.

For second-tier registration, a group must have been registered with the Department of Churches for 10 years, have published annual reports throughout the time of its registration, have membership equal to at least 0.1 percent of the population, or approximately 10,600 persons. The group must provide this number of signatures as proof. Second-tier registration entitles religious groups to government subsidies. In addition, only clergy of registered second-tier religious groups may perform officially recognized marriage ceremonies and serve as chaplains in the military and at prisons. Prisoners who belong to unregistered religious groups or groups with first-tier status may receive visits from their own clergy, outside of the prison chaplaincy system.

Religious groups registered prior to 2002 have automatic second-tier status without having to fulfill the requirements for second-tier registration.

There are 38 state-registered religious groups; 16 groups are first tier and 22 are second tier.

Unregistered religious groups are free to assemble and worship, but may not legally own property. The law provides unregistered groups the option of forming civic associations to manage their property.

The law on church restitution authorizes the government to return to 17 religious groups (including the Federation of Jewish Communities) land and other property confiscated during the communist era and still in the government’s possession, the total value of which is estimated to be approximately 75 billion koruna ($3.1 billion). It also sets aside 59 billion koruna ($2.5 billion) for financial compensation for lands that cannot be returned, to be paid over 30 years to 17 second-tier religious groups that received state subsidies prior to the enactment of the restitution law, such as the Roman Catholic Church, the Federation of Jewish Communities, the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, the Hussite Church, and other churches. Using a mechanism prescribed by law based on the quantity of property that cannot be returned, the government allocates slightly more than 79 percent of the financial compensation to the Catholic Church. Religious groups had a one-year window, which ended in 2013, to make restitution claims for confiscated land and other property, which the government is processing. If the government rejects a property claim, the claimant may appeal the decision in the courts.

A separate law provides for subsidies to second-tier religious groups and contains provisions for phasing out direct state support to religious groups over a 17-year period.

The law permits second-tier registered religious groups to apply through the MOC to teach religion in state schools; 11 of the 22 second-tier groups have applied and received permission. The teachers are supplied by the religious groups and paid by the state. If a state school does not have enough funds to pay for its religious education teachers, teachers are paid by parishes or dioceses. Although the law makes religious instruction in public schools optional, school directors must introduce instruction in the beliefs of a religious group if seven or more students of that religious group request it, in which event the religious instruction is provided only to the students who requested it.

The government does not regulate instruction in private schools.

The penal code outlaws denial of Nazi, communist, or other genocide, providing for prison sentences of six months to three years for public denial, questioning, approval of, or attempts to justify the genocide committed by the Nazis. The law also prohibits the incitement of hatred based on religion and provides for penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment.

Foreign religious workers must obtain long-term residence and work permits to remain in the country more than 90 days. There is no special visa category for religious workers; foreign missionaries and clergy are required to meet the conditions for a standard work permit.

The law designates January 27 as Holocaust Remembrance Day.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In January the MOC rejected the first-tier registration applications of two groups, the Lions of the Round Table – Order of the Lands of the Czech Crown, which had applied in 2014, and the Poor Fellow-Soldiers of Christ – Temple of Solomon (aka the Knights Templar), which had applied in 2015. The MOC stated the groups’ applications lacked a sufficient number of signatures of adherents. Both groups appealed the decision; the MOC rejected the appeals in May and December, respectively.

The MOC did not register any religious groups during the year. Registration applications by four religious groups remained pending at year’s end: the Path of Guru Jara (PGJ), which applied in 2015, the Community of Buddhism in the Czech Republic, which applied in January, the Cannabis Church, which applied in July, and the Priestly Fraternity of St. Pius X, which applied in November.

In February as a supplement to its 2015 registration application, the PGJ submitted 450 signatures to meet the 300 minimum requirement. The MOC, which was expected to decide on the application early in 2017, ordered verification of the signatures and stated most were forged or obtained under false pretenses. According to the PGJ, the MOC and the Society for the Study of Sects and New Religious Movements – an organization which the MOC consults on an ad hoc basis on religious registration issues and which the PGJ said was one of the main groups persecuting the PGJ – contacted some of the 450 signatories directly. As a result of this contact, according to the PGJ, some of its members felt harassed and withdrew from the group.

The government provided 17 second-tier religious groups with approximately 3.4 billion koruna ($142 million), with approximately 1.4 billion koruna ($58.5 million) given as a subsidy and 2 billion koruna ($83.6 million) as compensation for communal property in private and state hands that would not be returned to churches. Five of the 22 second-tier groups declined all state funding. While accepting the state subsidy, the Baptist Union opted not to accept the compensation for unreturned property. The MOC provided 4 million koruna ($167,000) in grants for religiously oriented cultural activities in response to applications from a variety of religious groups.

PGJ leader Jaroslav Dobes and PGJ member Barbora Plaskova remained in detention in the Philippines where they had been seeking asylum since 2015. According to PGJ, Philippine authorities denied the first and second asylum claims based on a finding that there was no religious persecution of the group in the Czech Republic. PGJ stated Czech authorities sought deportation of Dobes and Plaskova. The Czech MFA stated that international arrest warrants issued at its request were outstanding and the Czech government was interested in their return. In February the director of Belgian NGO Human Rights Without Frontiers, Willy Fautre, stated Dobes and Plaskova should be freed in the Philippines and “granted asylum.”

In November media reported on the trial of a state nursing school head teacher being sued by a former Muslim student. The student said she was discriminated against in 2013 because she was prohibited from wearing a hijab during classes. The school said the complaint was untrue. The court ruled in favor of the school, finding the student had not been formally enrolled in the school.

The government continued to address outstanding religious communal property restitution cases. These included claims of the Roman Catholic authorities and other religious groups concerning property seized during the communist era. Although the government returned most Catholic churches, parishes, and monasteries in the 1990s, much of the land and forests previously owned by the Catholic Church remained in state possession and were being returned in the framework of 2012 restitution legislation. Between January and June the government settled 8,010 claims with religious groups for agricultural property and 177 claims for nonagricultural property. As of June there were 744 unresolved agricultural property claims and 1,209 unresolved nonagricultural property claims. As of April 559 lawsuits filed by religious groups appealing government restitution decisions remained pending in the courts.

In April the Ministry of Interior (MOI) signed an agreement with representatives of the Jewish community to better protect Jewish sites in Prague and across the country, including the establishment of a law enforcement coordination center to cooperate more closely with the Jewish community on site protection.

In January the South Moravian Municipal Court in Brno ruled in favor of the Brno Jewish Community (BJC), holding that it had legal title to a property in possession of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The ministry appealed the municipal court’s decision to the regional court in February. The appeal was pending at year’s end. The BJC had filed its claim in 2013 based on revised church restitution legislation, and the ministry had rejected the claim in 2014. The case was pending at year’s end. In accordance with restitution legislation, the Brno Jewish community had previously submitted multiple claims for the property, which the ministry had rejected.

President Milos Zeman continued to make several public statements against Muslim immigration. In January President Zeman stated in a media interview that Islamic culture should not be brought to Europe as it was incompatible with Western values, and that the integration of the Muslim community was “practically impossible.” On a separate occasion in January the president said Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was responsible for the influx of Muslim refugees in Europe. He further stated the group was receiving funds from several nations to finance the influx in order to “control Europe.”

In January Tomio Okamura, the leader of the opposition Party of Direct Democracy published an article on his website stating that Muslims considered all Europeans enemies and subordinates and that the country needed to be protected against Islamization.

The opposition Usvit (Dawn) – National Coalition political party, which held seats in parliament, organized a dozen rallies against Islam and against admitting Muslim refugees. Some of these rallies attracted several hundred protestors and took place in major cities, including Prague, Brno, Ostrava and Pilsen. Rallies were organized in conjunction with the Block against Islam, a national organization against Muslim immigration, and included German participants from the nationalist movement PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West).

In addition to Usvit, the Party for Direct Democracy, the National Democracy Party, and the Worker’s Party of Social Justice organized a number of demonstrations against refugees, which drew between several dozen and one thousand participants.

In a newspaper interview on July 30, Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka said that “collective guilt and saying every Muslim is a terrorist” was not the way to proceed in countering threats.

In May the government approved the Strategy to Combat Extremism, which outlined tasks for various ministries, such as the MOI, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Culture, in fighting extremism, including religiously motivated extremism. The tasks included improving communication with the public, combating hate speech on the internet, and educating the public about extremism and crime prevention. The MOI continued to monitor the activities of groups and political parties espousing anti-Semitic views, including National Democracy, National Revival, and the Workers’ Party of Social Justice. From January to September the MOI reported 16 “white power” music concerts took place in the country, where participants expressed anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi views.

In April Adam Bartos, Chairman of the extra-parliamentary National Democracy Party, which did not hold political office at any level, was charged with crimes against humanity for his anti-Semitic writings on social media. By year’s end, the case remained pending. In October Bartos was sentenced in an unrelated case to one year of imprisonment and probation of two years for incitement to hatred and defamation over a note he wrote in 2015 supporting an 1899 Jewish blood libel trial. Another member of the party who was charged with Bartos pleaded guilty and was not sentenced.

In April Deputy Chairman of the Senate Premysl Sobotka and Minister of Culture Daniel Herman sponsored and participated in an annual march and concert against anti-Semitism. Approximately 800 people attended the event.

In February the government reported it was reviewing the applications of 91 Chinese Christians who applied for asylum on grounds of religious persecution in China. At year’s end, the review process was ongoing.

The government funded religiously oriented cultural activities, including the Night of Churches, the National Pilgrimage of St. Wenceslaus, Culture against Anti-Semitism, Prayer for Home, Kristfest of the Apostolic Church, and the Catholic-associated Romani Pilgrimage.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and the founder of ESLI.

According to estimates from NGO In Iustitia, which stressed the figures were preliminary and subject to confirmation, from January to September there were reports of 20 religiously motivated hate incidents during the year, 16 against Muslims, three against Jews and one against a Christian. Details of the incidents were unavailable.

The MOI recorded 47 criminal offenses with anti-Semitic motives during 2015, the last year for which data were available, compared with 45 cases in the previous year. In 2015, the Federation of Jewish Communities reported 39 anti-Semitic incidents, including damage to property; spray-painting of anti-Semitic remarks and Nazi symbols; threats via telephone calls, emails, text and social media messages; and harassment. An annual study by the Jewish community in Prague reported 182 anti-Semitic postings on the internet in 2015, compared with 191 in 2014.

According to the OSCE’s 2015 Hate Crime Report, the latest year for which data were available, civil society actors reported three violent attacks against Jews, compared to one in 2014; and six violent attacks against Muslims, compared to zero in 2014.

Throughout the year, there were several demonstrations against accepting migrants and refugees, many of whom were Muslim, and against the European Union for imposing quotas for refugee resettlement or relocation. The number of participants in these demonstrations generally varied between dozens and hundreds. At the largest such demonstration, held in Prague in February, which numbered approximately 3,000 participants, police arrested and then released 13 demonstrators. In another demonstration in April, demonstrators waved Czech and National Democracy Party flags and flags reading “We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic.” There were also counter protests in support of refugees, usually in direct opposition to these anti-Muslim and antirefugee protests, but generally smaller, with participants generally numbering in the dozens, according to media reports.

In July more than 60 neo-Nazis and others demonstrated against a xenophobia awareness event in Ostrava. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s August visit to Prague prompted seven demonstrations both supporting and criticizing her policies on refugees and migration. There were a greater number of participants at the anti-Merkel demonstrations.

A group called NO to Islam in the Czech Republic transformed itself into the organization Block Against Islam and organized approximately 20 anti-Islam rallies throughout the country during the year. The group strongly opposed entry of Muslim refugees and called for restrictions on the Muslim community in the country, including the outlawing of halal butchery. In April the group’s leader, Martin Konvicka, was charged with incitement of hatred and suppression of rights and freedoms for his statements against Islam and Muslims in his internet postings. In June he staged a mock attack by ISIS in the center of Prague. Police investigated him for scaremongering. Authorities did not file charges, and police were continuing their investigation at year’s end. Prague Municipality officials dispersed a demonstration led by Konvicka in front of the Saudi Arabian embassy on the anniversary of September 11, on grounds the demonstration incited religious hatred and intolerance.

More than 33 practitioners of the PGJ reported societal discrimination, including receiving threats on the internet, defamatory media coverage, and derogatory remarks by politicians. Several reported being threatened by the police with arrest when reading religious materials, being fired from their jobs, being excluded from participating in conferences, or being threatened with losing their jobs if they professed their faith openly. Speaking about the PGJ in March, the director of the Czech Helsinki Committee stated, “I have never encountered such a complex case of discrimination in connection with a religious theme in the Czech Republic.”

In August a group of approximately 80 Czech Muslims attended Mass at the Catholic Church of the Most Sacred Heart of Our Lord in Prague to express solidarity after ISIS killed French priest Jacques Hamel in July. After the Mass, Muslim representatives spoke about the tenets common to both religions and condemned terrorism, and approximately 400 people formed a human chain around the church to show support for victims of terrorist attacks.

In October a group of Jews protested the naming of a children’s volleyball team at an orphanage charity tournament after a poison, “Zyklon B [Cyklon B in Czech],” used to kill Jews during the Holocaust. The Czech Freedom Fighters Association, an umbrella group for victims of Nazism and persecution during World War II, condemned the choice of the name and the organizers of the tournament, as well as the orphanage, apologized.

In March the Jewish community in Liberec received a hate letter from unknown authors accusing them of terrorism for laying Holocaust memorial stones in the city. Police investigated the case but had been unable to track the author of the letter by year’s end.

The MOI and Federation of Jewish Communities reported neo-Nazi groups continued to express anti-Semitic views, as did some nationalist groups and Islamic groups, including the Muslim Union. Groups such as the National Resistance and the Autonomous Nationalists held public gatherings and published internet blogs that included anti-Semitic statements, Holocaust denial, the dissemination of neo-Nazi propaganda, and anti-Muslim sentiments, according to the MOI.

The government-funded Endowment Fund for Holocaust Victims, established by the Federation of Jewish Communities, contributed 4.5 million koruna ($180,000) to 14 institutions providing health and social care to approximately 500 Holocaust survivors.

In March, 30 tombstones were damaged at the Jewish cemetery in Korycany near Kromeriz. Police were investigating the case at year’s end.

The U.S. embassy continued to engage government officials from the Ministry of Culture, especially the Department of Churches, on religious freedom issues such as church restitution and religious tolerance. In January the U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, the U.S. Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues (SEHI) and embassy officials discussed issues of anti-Semitism at a meeting with the European Union Coordinator on Combating Anti-Semitism organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Embassy officials monitored the process of restitution of church property and participated in meetings on restitution matters with representatives from the MOC, the Catholic and Protestant churches, and the Federation of Jewish Communities. Embassy officials responded to a request for assistance from a U.S. citizen Holocaust victim seeking compensation for property seized in the past.

Representatives from the SEHI office and embassy officials met with representatives of the Prague-based ESLI and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss progress in fields specified in the 2009 Terezin Declaration, especially property restitution and welfare of Holocaust survivors.

The Ambassador visited the Brno Mosque in March, the first visit to a Czech mosque by a U.S. ambassador. The Ambassador met with leaders of the Muslim community and highlighted the U.S. commitment to religious freedom and confronting prejudice.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials continued to meet with representatives of Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim groups to reaffirm support for religious freedom and to hear the groups’ views on religious freedom developments in the country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 25.1 million (July 2016 estimate). In a 2002 report to the UN Human Rights Committee, the government reported there were 12,000 Protestants, 10,000 Buddhists, and 800 Roman Catholics. The report noted that Cheondoism, a modern religious movement based on a 19th century Korean neo-Confucian movement, had approximately 15,000 practitioners. Consulting shamans and engaging in shamanistic rituals is reportedly widespread but difficult to quantify. The South Korea-based Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) reported in its 2016 white paper that five priests from the Russian Orthodox Church are in Pyongyang. South Korean and other foreign religious groups estimate the number of religious practitioners in the country is considerably higher. The UN estimates there are between 200,000 and 400,000 Christians in the country. According to a September Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) report, Cornerstone Ministries International (CMI) stated in 2012 that it was in contact with 37,000 churchgoers in the country. CMI said it presumed based on its research that 10-45 percent of those imprisoned in detention camps are Christians. The COI report stated that based on the government’s own figures, the proportion of religious adherents among the population dropped from close to 24 percent in 1950 to 0.016 percent in 2002.

Legal Framework

Article 68 of the constitution provides that, “Citizens shall have the right of faith. This right guarantees them chances to build religious facilities or perform religious rituals.” It further provides, however, that “religion must not be used as a pretext for drawing in foreign forces or for harming the state and social order.”

The 2014 Report of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies, an official government document, states “Freedom of religion is allowed and provided by the State law within the limit necessary for securing social order, health, social security, morality and other human rights.”

Ownership of Bibles or other religious materials brought in from abroad is reportedly illegal and also punishable by imprisonment and severe punishment, including, in some cases, execution.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to deal harshly with those who engaged in almost any religious practices through executions, torture, beatings, and arrests. An estimated 80,000 to 120,000 political prisoners, some imprisoned for religious reasons, were believed to be held in the political prison camp system in remote areas under horrific conditions. CSW said a policy of guilt by association was often applied in cases of detentions of Christians, meaning that the relatives of Christians were also detained regardless of their beliefs.

Religious and human rights groups outside the country provided numerous reports that members of underground churches were arrested, beaten, tortured, or killed because of their religious beliefs. According to the NKDB, there was a report during the year of disappearances of people who were found to be practicing religion within detention facilities. International NGOs reported any religious activities conducted outside of those that are state-sanctioned, including praying, singing hymns, and reading the Bible, could lead to severe punishment including imprisonment in political prison camps.

In 2015, the NKDB aggregated 1,165 violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief within the DPRK, with charges including propagation of religion, possession of religious items, religious activities, and contact with religious practitioners. According to a survey of 10,000 defectors from North Korea referenced in the 2015 NKDB white paper, 99.6 percent said there was no religious freedom in the country. Just 4.2 percent said they had seen a Bible when they lived there, although survey data reflects a slight increase in recent years.

According to media reports, in April Christian Pastor Han Choong Yeol was killed in China by whom activists said were DPRK agents. The pastor operated a church in Changbai, Jilin Province, and had provided aid to defectors from North Korea. DPRK authorities said South Korea was responsible for the killing.

The DPRK has in the past detained foreigners allegedly engaging in religious work within its borders, and reports indicate at least one foreign Christian remained detained by DPRK authorities.

In January and September the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK and in February the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights released reports reiterating concerns about the country’s use of arbitrary executions, political prison camps, and torture amounting to crimes against humanity. In March and December the UN Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly plenary session, respectively, adopted resolutions by consensus which “condemned in the strongest terms” longstanding and ongoing systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations, including denial of the right to religious freedom, and urged the government to acknowledge such violations of human rights and take immediate steps to end all such violations and abuses through the implementation of relevant recommendations by the UN. The annual resolutions again welcomed the Security Council’s continued consideration of the relevant conclusions and recommendations of the COI. The February 2014 COI final report concluded there was an almost complete denial by the government of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as well as the rights to freedom of opinion, expression, information, and association. It further concluded that, in many instances, the violations of human rights committed by the government constituted crimes against humanity, and it recommended that the United Nations ensure those most responsible for the crimes against humanity were held accountable.

The COI report found the government considered Christianity a serious threat, as it challenged the official cult of personality and provided a platform for social and political organization and interaction outside of the government. The report concluded Christians faced persecution, violence, and heavy punishment if they practiced their religion outside the state-controlled churches. The report further recommended the country allow Christians and other religious believers to exercise their religion independently and publicly without fear of punishment, reprisal, or surveillance.

Defectors reported the government increased its investigation, repression, and persecution of unauthorized religious groups in recent years, but access to information on current conditions was limited.

According to the South Korean government-funded Korea Institute for National Unification’s (KINU) 2016 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, while Article 68 of the constitution provides for freedom of religion, the report states “it is practically impossible for North Korean people to have a religion in their daily lives.” According to the NKDB, Article 68 of the constitution represents only a nominal freedom granted to supporters, and only when the regime deems it necessary to use it as a policy tool.

Juche, or self-reliance, and Suryong, or “supreme leader,” remained important ideological underpinnings of the government and the cult of personalities of the late Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and current leader Kim Jong Un. Refusal on religious or other grounds to accept the leader as the supreme authority was regarded as opposition to the national interest and reportedly resulted in severe punishment.

Some scholars stated the Juche philosophy and reverence for the Kim family resembled a form of state-sponsored theology. Approximately 100,000 Juche research centers reportedly exist throughout the country. The government’s 2014 Report of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies stated that, “Every citizen has chosen to follow the Juche Idea…and is firmly believing in JucheIdea thinking and acting according to its requirement” and that Juche is a belief system not forced upon citizens.

While shamanism has always been practiced to some degree in the country, NGOs noted an apparent increase in shamanistic practices, including in Pyongyang. These NGOs reported that government authorities continued to react by taking measures against the practice of shamanism.

In April an NGO reported a government official was accused of having consulted a fortune teller. According to a defector residing in South Korea, the government repeatedly reinforced the declaration that “fortune telling and superstitious beliefs are toxins that damage society and human beings,” and to only trust a future provided by the state. Defector reports cited an increase in party members consulting fortune tellers in order to gauge the best time to defect.

The NKDB estimated the existence of 121 religious facilities in the country, including 64 Buddhist temples, 52 Cheondoist temples, and five state-controlled Christian churches. The government’s 2014 Report of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies also cited the existence of 64 Buddhist temples, but said that the temples have lost religious significance in the country and only remained as cultural heritage sites or tourist destinations. The KINU white paper counted 60 Buddhist temples, and noted that most North Koreans did not realize Buddhist temples were religious facilities nor see Buddhist monks as religious figures.

The five state-controlled Christian churches in Pyongyang included three Protestant churches (Bongsu, Chilgol, and Jeil churches), a Catholic church (Jangchung Cathedral), and Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church. Chilgol Church was dedicated to the memory of former leader Kim Il Sung’s mother, Kang Pan Sok, who was a Presbyterian deaconess. The number of congregants regularly worshiping at these five churches was unknown, and there was no information available on whether scheduled services were available at these locations. Reports from visitors taken to these churches to attend services when visiting Pyongyang reported local Koreans in attendance appear to have been brought in for the occasion, but they seemed to be observers rather than participants. Numerous defectors from outside of Pyongyang reported no knowledge of these churches, and according to the 2016 KINU white paper, no Protestant or Catholic churches existed in the country except in Pyongyang.

KINU also reported in 2015 the existence of state-sanctioned religious organizations in the country such as the Korean Christians’ Federation (KCF), Korean Buddhists Federation, Korea Catholic Association (KCA), Korea Cheondoist Society, and the Korean Association of Religionists. The NKDB white paper also noted the existence of the Korean Orthodox Church Committee. There was minimal information available on the activities of such organizations, except for some information on inter-Korean religious exchanges in 2015.

The government-established KCA provided basic services at the Jangchung Roman Catholic Cathedral, but had no ties to the Vatican. There also were no Vatican-recognized Catholic priests, monks, or nuns residing anywhere in the country. Visiting priests reportedly celebrated Mass at the Jangchung Cathedral in the past. In April the South Korean Catholic Archbishop of Gwangju celebrated Easter Mass in Pyongyang following a December 2015 government agreement with the Catholic Church in South Korea to send priests to the country on a “regular basis.”

According to religious leaders who have traveled to the country, there were Protestant pastors at the Bongsu and Chilgol churches, although it was not known if they were resident or visiting pastors.

Five Russian Orthodox priests served at the Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church, purportedly to provide pastoral care to Russians in the country. Several of them reportedly studied at the Russian Orthodox Seminary in Moscow.

In its July 2002 report to the UN Human Rights Committee, the government reported the existence of 500 “family worship centers.” According to the KINU white paper, however, while some Pyongyang residents had heard of them, most people living outside of Pyongyang were not aware of the existence of such family churches. Those who were aware of their existence were not able to identify them as places of worship. According to a survey of more than 9,000 defectors cited in the 2014 NKDB white paper, not one of the defectors had ever seen any of these purported home churches, and only 1.2 percent of respondents believed they existed. Observers stated that “family worship centers” may be part of the state-controlled KCF.

The COI report concluded that authorities systematically sought to hide from the international community the persecution of Christians who practiced their religion outside state-controlled churches by pointing to the small number of state-controlled churches as exemplifying religious freedom and pluralism.

The KINU white paper indicated the government continued to use authorized religious organizations for external propaganda and political purposes and reported citizens were strictly barred from entering places of worship. According to the white paper, ordinary citizens considered such places primarily as “sightseeing spots for foreigners.” Foreigners who met with representatives of government-sponsored religious organizations stated they believed some members were genuinely religious, but noted others appeared to know little about religious doctrine. KINU concluded the lack of churches or religious facilities in the provinces indicated ordinary citizens did not have religious freedom.

The NKDB white paper stated that officials conduct thorough searches of incoming packages and belongings at ports and airports to search for religious items as well as other items deemed objectionable by the government.

Little was known about the day-to-day life of individuals practicing a religion. There were no reports that members of government-controlled religious groups suffered discrimination, but the government reportedly regarded members of underground churches or those connected to missionary activities as subversive elements. NKDB reported that in its survey of more than 10,000 defectors, none reported fleeing in the first instance due to religious persecution, indicating limited knowledge of and access to religion in the country. Scholars said authorities meted out strict punishment to forcibly returned defectors, including those who had contact with Christian missionaries or other foreigners while in China.

The government reportedly allowed certain forms of religious education, including programs at three-year colleges for training Protestant and Buddhist clergy, a religious studies program at Kim Il-sung University, a graduate institution that trained pastors, and other seminaries related to Christian or Buddhist groups.

Christians were restricted to the lowest class rungs of the songbun system, which classifies people on the basis of social class, family background, and presumed support of the regime based on political opinion and religious views. The songbun classification system results in discrimination in education, health care, employment opportunities, and residence. According to the KINU white paper, the government continued to view Christianity in particular as a means of foreign Western encroachment. The white paper again reported that citizens continued to receive education from authorities at least twice a year emphasizing ways to detect and identity individuals who engage in spreading Christianity.

The government reportedly was concerned that faith-based South Korean relief and refugee assistance efforts along the northeast border of China had both humanitarian and political goals, including the overthrow of the government, and alleged these groups were involved in intelligence gathering.

The government allowed some overseas faith-based aid organizations to operate inside the country to provide humanitarian assistance. Such organizations reported they were not allowed to proselytize; their contact with nationals was limited and strictly monitored, and government escorts accompanied them at all times. Some workers of such organizations reported being permitted to take their personal Bibles into the country.

Defector accounts indicated religious practitioners often concealed their activities from neighbors, coworkers, and other members of society for fear their activities would be reported to the authorities.

The COI report concluded government messaging regarding the purported evils of Christianity led to negative views of Christianity among ordinary citizens.

The 2015 KINU white paper reported credible accounts of private Christian religious activity in the country, although the existence of underground churches and the scope of underground religious activity remained difficult to verify. While some NGOs and academics estimated there may be up to several hundred thousand Christians practicing their faith underground, others questioned the existence of a large-scale underground church or concluded it was impossible to estimate accurately the number of underground religious believers. Individual underground congregations were reportedly very small and typically confined to private homes. Some defector reports confirmed unapproved religious materials were available and secret religious meetings occurred, spurred by cross border contact with individuals and groups in China. Some NGOs reported individual underground churches were connected to each other through well-established networks. The government did not allow outsiders access to confirm such claims.

Foreign legislators who attended services in Pyongyang in previous years reported congregations arrived and departed services as groups on tour buses, and some observed the worshipers did not include any children. Some foreigners noted they were not permitted to have contact with worshipers, and others stated they had limited interaction with them. Foreign observers had limited ability to ascertain the level of government control over these groups, but generally assumed the government monitored them closely.

According to the KINU white paper, defectors reported being unaware of any recognized religious organizations that maintained branches outside of Pyongyang. Religious ceremonies such as for weddings and funerals were almost unknown.

The U.S. government does not have diplomatic relations with the DPRK and has no official presence in the country. It used other mechanisms to address religious freedom concerns, however.

The United States cosponsored resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council that condemned the country’s “systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations.” The resolutions further expressed grave concern over the DPRK’s denial of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as well as of the rights to freedom of opinion, expression, and association, and urged the government to take immediate steps to ensure these rights.

On July 6, the Department of State submitted the first biannual Report on Human Rights Abuses and Censorship in North Korea to Congress. The report identified eight entities and 15 government officials, including Kim Jong Un, as responsible for or associated with serious human rights abuses or censorship. The report stated, “The government also maintains an extensive system of forced labor through its rigid controls over workers, and restricts the exercise of freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, association, religion or belief, and movement.”

The U.S. government raised concerns about religious freedom in the DPRK in other multilateral forums and in bilateral discussions with other governments, particularly those with diplomatic relations with the country. The United States has made clear that addressing human rights, including religious freedom, would significantly improve prospects for closer ties between the two countries. Senior U.S. government officials, including the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea, met with defectors and NGOs that are focused on the country, including some Christian humanitarian organizations.

Since 2001, the country has been designated as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On October 31, 2016, the Secretary of State redesignated the country as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing restrictions to which North Korea is subject, pursuant to sections 402 and 409 of the Trade Act of 1974 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment) pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 81.3 million (July 2016 estimate). The last national census was performed in 1981, and many existing demographic statistics vary in estimates and reliability. The Pew Research Center estimates 95.8 percent of the population is Christian, 1.5 percent is Muslim, and 1.8 percent report no religious affiliation (2010 estimate). Of the Christian groups, 48.1 percent are Protestant, including evangelical Christians and the Church of Jesus Christ on Earth through the Prophet Simon Kimbangu (Kimbanguist), and 47.3 percent are Catholic. Other Christian groups include the Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and the Greek Orthodox Church. There are small communities of Hindus, Jews, Buddhists, Bahais, and followers of indigenous religious beliefs. Muslim leaders estimate their community to be approximately 5 percent of the population, rather than the 1.5 percent reported by Pew.

A significant portion of the population combines traditional beliefs and practices with Christianity or other religious beliefs.

Most religious groups are found throughout the country and are widely represented in cities and large towns. Muslims mainly reside in the provinces of Maniema, North Kivu, and Kinshasa, and in the former provinces of Orientale, Kasai Occidental, and Bandundu.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and provides for freedom of religion and the right to worship subject to “compliance with the law, public order, public morality, and the rights of others.” It stipulates the right to religious freedom cannot be abrogated even when the government declares a state of emergency or siege.

The law regulates the establishment and operation of religious groups. According to the law, the government may legally recognize, suspend recognition of, or dissolve religious groups. The government grants tax-exempt status to recognized religious groups. Nonprofit organizations, including religious groups, foreign and domestic, must register with the government to obtain official recognition by submitting a copy of their bylaws and constitution. Religious groups must register only once for the group as a whole, but nonprofit organizations affiliated with a religious group must register separately. Upon submission, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (MOJ) issues a provisional approval and, within six months, a permanent approval or rejection. Unless the ministry specifically rejects the application, the group is considered approved and registered after six months even if the ministry has not issued a final determination. Applications coming from international headquarters of religious organizations must be approved by the presidency after submission through the MOJ. The law requires officially recognized religious groups to operate as nonprofits and respect the general public order. It also permits religious groups to establish places of worship and train clergy. The law prescribes penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment and/or 200,000 Congolese francs (CDF) ($165) for groups which are not properly registered but receive gifts and donations on behalf of a church or religious organization.

The constitution allows public schools to work with religious authorities to provide religious education to students in accordance with students’ religious beliefs, provided the parents request it.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Because religious and political issues overlap, it was difficult to categorize some incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

In March a dozen armed men wearing FARDC uniforms killed Rev. Vincent Machozi, a Catholic priest, at a gathering of tribal and religious leaders in North Kivu. Machozi was a member of the Augustinians of the Assumption religious order and operated a website documenting atrocities committed against ethnic Nande (Yira) people. In October armed assailants shot and killed another Catholic priest, Rev. Joseph Milimbi Nguli, in Lubumbashi. Milimbi had previously preached in favor of respect for presidential term limits and respect for the constitution. Authorities arrested three FARDC soldiers in connection with the killing, but there was no information on their status at year’s end.

Authorities arrested several local imams in Beni territory along with dozens of ADF members following an August 13-14 ADF attack in Luhanga that killed approximately 50 people. Several imams were charged with involvement with the armed militia group. Separately, the government arrested and sentenced one imam to death, which was commuted to life in prison, in an expedited trial for recruiting youth to join “terrorist” groups.

Some religious organizations criticized the government’s failure to hold constitutionally mandated elections during the year and there were reports of retaliatory political intimidation. Two Catholic priests were arrested during antigovernment protests on September 19-20, but were released several days later. The ANR arrested Protestant minister Remy Flame Manguamba on September 15 during a civil society workshop hosted by his church, and held him incommunicado and without charge until he was released on October 17.

Some representatives of the Catholic Church, which publicly urged the government to abide by constitutionally mandated electoral deadlines, stated they were subjected to verbal harassment and government interference based on their political advocacy.

In conjunction with government military operations in North Kivu against the ADF, there were reports that in the Beni and Goma areas the national police and army harassed members of the Muslim community, particularly those dressed in a way that identified them as Muslim. According to reports, this usually involved demanding money or property such as cell phones. Leaders of the Muslim community reported they kept in frequent contact with the government to share information regarding the ADF.

The MOJ has not issued final registration permits for religious groups since 2014, reportedly due to an internal investigation into registration practices resulting in fraud. In the interim, however, groups have been presumed approved and have been permitted to organize, and unregistered domestic religious groups reported they operated unhindered. The MOJ estimated over 2,000 registration applications for both religious and nonreligious NGOs remained pending. Foreign religious groups reported they operated without restriction after receiving registration approval from the government.

Leaders of all major denominations reported their members practiced their faith without interference from the government or local authorities and fully participated in their communities without religious discrimination. Aside from tension over electoral issues, Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, and Kimbanguist religious leaders stated they had a good relationship with the government, and the government continued to rely on religious organizations to provide public services such as education and healthcare throughout the country. According to the Ministry of Education, approximately 72 percent of primary school students and 65 percent of secondary school students attended government-funded schools administered by religious organizations.

Muslim community leaders said the government did not afford them some of the same privileges as larger religious groups. The government continued to deny Muslims the opportunity to organize chaplains to provide services for Muslims in the military, police force, and hospitals, despite a complaint filed the previous year with the president and his cabinet.

One of the civil society positions on the Independent National Electoral Commission continued to be reserved for a member of the clergy.

According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of their community were sometimes targeted by members of other groups, in particular some members of the Lega tribe, for refusing to participate in traditional Kimbilikiti rituals.

On October 2, Kibuya Matangi, a 60-year-old Jehovah’s Witness woman, was stabbed to death by villagers in Bulungu, Kwilu Province, after refusing to consult a traditional healer. Matangi reported previously receiving death threats because of her refusal on religious grounds to participate in customary exorcism practices. Local authorities arrested four individuals, including family members, thought to have been complicit in the killing, but the two main suspects, including the chief of the local community, remained at large and the case was ongoing at year’s end.

On August 3, a court convicted and sentenced to life in prison Jedidia Mwanga for the 2015 killing of a Jehovah’s Witness, Kingeleji Mukoso, for allegedly refusing to consult a traditional healer. A second Jehovah’s Witness was injured in the attack. The court also ordered Mwanga to pay reparations to the victim’s family.

In late September a Muslim man killed a Christian woman in a financial dispute in Katale, South Kivu Province. According to a local Muslim leader, as retribution for the killing, the woman’s family, along with other members of the local Christian community, burned down two local mosques in early October.

On November 8, local media reported members of the Lega ethnic group in Kindu, Maniema Province, had targeted village members, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, who refused to participate in traditional Kimbilikiti initiation rituals. Kimbilikiti followers reportedly raped two women and beat several members of local Jehovah’s Witness families. The group also destroyed a local Jehovah’s Witness worship hall, assaulted two individuals, and robbed and destroyed the homes of three Jehovah’s Witness families. On November 9, local police with reinforcements from the FARDC arrested 12 people in connection with the attacks. The governor and mayor both later visited to assess damages.

On July 29, three men assaulted Bernard Nzela, a Jehovah’s Witness in Makalanga, South Kivu Province, and kidnapped his son because they reportedly refused to participate in or support local Kimbilikiti initiation rituals. Nzela was temporarily hospitalized for his injuries.

Some religious leaders reported continued tensions between Christian and Muslim communities in the eastern part of the country linked to the government’s ongoing fight against the ADF.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy representatives met regularly with the government to discuss issues of religious freedom, such as government attitudes and actions toward religious organizations. The Ambassador and embassy representatives regularly urged the government and other community and political leaders to refrain from violence and respect the rights of civil society, including religious groups, to assemble and express themselves freely.

The embassy also discussed these issues with religious leaders, particularly in the eastern part of the country, and human rights organizations and used social media to highlight religious freedom issues and promote tolerance. The U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom met with Conference of Catholic Bishops leaders during their visit to Washington, D.C. in April to discuss the political advocacy of the Catholic Church.

To address the role of religious groups in promoting religious tolerance and general peacebuilding efforts, the embassy included members of different religious groups on professional exchange programs to the United States. For example, the head of the Muslim community in Goma was selected to attend a program focused on using interfaith dialogue to support peace efforts.

The U.S. government estimates the total population is 5.6 million (July 2016 estimate). According to Statistics Denmark, the government statistical office, as of January 1, 77 percent of all Danes were members of the ELC.

According to Statistics Denmark, Muslims constitute 5 percent of the population. Muslim groups are concentrated in the largest cities, particularly Copenhagen, Odense, and Aarhus. There has been an increase in immigrants in recent years, most of whom are Muslim. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates that religious groups constituting less than 1 percent of the population include, in descending order of size, Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Serbian Orthodox Christians, Jews, Baptists, Buddhists, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Pentecostals, and nondenominational Christians. Academics and polling institutions estimate that up to 12-20 percent of the population, some of whom are classified as members of the ELC, identify as atheist, while as many as 40 percent of the population identify as nonreligious. Although estimates vary, the Jewish Society places the Jewish population at between 5,500 and 7,000, most of whom live in the Copenhagen metropolitan area.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares the ELC as the Established Church, which shall receive state support and to which the reigning monarch must belong. The constitution also states individuals shall be free to form congregations to worship according to their beliefs, providing nothing “at variance with good morals or public order shall be taught or done.” It specifies that “rules for religious bodies dissenting from the Established Church shall be laid down by statute.” It stipulates that no person may be deprived of access to the full enjoyment of civil and political rights because of religious beliefs, and that these beliefs shall not be used to evade compliance with civic duty. It prohibits requiring individuals to make personal financial contributions to religious denominations to which they do not adhere.

The criminal code prohibits blasphemy, defined as public mockery of or insult to the doctrine or worship of a legally recognized religion, with a maximum penalty of up to four months in prison and a fine. The law prohibits making a public statement in which persons are threatened, scorned, or degraded on the basis of their religion or belief. The maximum penalty is up to two years in prison and a fine. The law also prohibits hate speech, including religious hate speech; the maximum penalty for hate speech is a fine or two years’ imprisonment.

The ELC is the only religious group that receives funding through state grants and voluntary taxes paid via payroll deduction of congregation members. The voluntary taxes account for an estimated 86 percent of the ELC’s operating budget; the remaining 14 percent is provided through a combination of voluntary donations by congregants and grants from the government. Members of other recognized religious communities may donate to their own community voluntarily and receive a credit towards their personal income tax liability. The ELC and other state-sanctioned religious communities carry out registration of civil unions, births, and deaths for their members.

In 2015 the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs assumed responsibility for granting official status to other religious groups in addition to the ELC through recognition by historic royal decree or through official registration; on November 28, the government announced the planned merger of the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Ecclesiastic Affairs into a new Ministry of Cultural and Ecclesiastic Affairs. According to the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, there are a total of 176 registered religious groups: 113 Christian groups and congregations, 30 Muslim groups, 8 Hindu organizations, 15 Buddhist groups, three Jewish communities, the Bahai Faith, the Alevi Muslim community, and five other religious groups, including followers of the indigenous Norse belief system, Forn Sidr.

Registered religious groups have the right to perform legal marriage ceremonies, name and baptize children with legal effect, issue legal death certificates, obtain residence permits for foreign clergy, establish cemeteries, and receive tax deductible financial donations and various valued added tax exemptions. For religious communities that do not perform baptisms, paper forms provided on the citizen services website are filled out and delivered to the pastor or office of the religious community who in turn registers the child in the Population Register. Individuals unaffiliated with a registered religious group may opt to have birth and death certificates issued by the Danish Health Authority.

Religious groups not recognized by either royal decree or by a government registration process, such as the Church of Scientology, are entitled to engage in religious practices without any kind of public registration, but members of those groups must marry in a civil ceremony in addition to any religious ceremony. Unrecognized religious groups are not granted fully tax-exempt status, but do have some tax benefits; for example, contributions by members are tax deductible.

In order for a religious community to be registered, it must have at least 150 members, while a congregation, which the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs considers as a group within one of the major world religions (Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam), must consist of at least 50 adult members to be approved. For congregations located in sparsely populated regions, such as Greenland, a lower population threshold is used. The threshold number varies, depending on the total population of a given area. The guidelines for approval of religious organizations require religious groups seeking registration to submit a document on the group’s central traditions; descriptions of its most important rituals; a copy of its rules, regulations, and organizational structure; an audited financial statement; information about the group’s leadership; and a statement on the number of adult members permanently residing in the country.

The law bans judges from wearing religious symbols such as headscarves, turbans, skullcaps, and large crucifixes while in court.

All public and private schools, including religious schools, receive government financial support. Public schools must teach Evangelical Lutheran theology; the instructors are public school teachers rather than provided by the ELC. The religion classes are compulsory in grades 1–9, although students may be exempted if a parent presents a request in writing. No alternative classes are offered. The curriculum from grades 1-6 focuses on life philosophies and ethics, biblical stories, and the history of Christianity. In grade 7-9 the curriculum adds a module on world religions. The course is optional in grade 10. If the student is 15 years old or older, the student and parent must jointly request the student’s exemption. Private schools are also required to teach religion classes in grades 1-9, including world religion in grades 7-9. The religion classes taught in grades 1-6 need not be about ELC theology. Noncompulsory collective prayer in schools is allowed if it does not include proselytizing. Prayers are optional at the discretion of each school. They may consist of ELC, or other Christian, Muslim, or Jewish prayers, and students may opt out of participating.

Military service is compulsory, but there is an exemption for conscientious objectors, including for religious reasons. Those who do not want to serve in the military may apply for either alternative civilian service or not to serve at all. The period of alternative service for a conscientious objector is the same as the period required for military service. An individual must apply to perform service as a conscientious objector within eight weeks of receiving notice of military service. The application must go to the Conscientious Objector Administration and must show that military service of any kind is incompatible with one’s conscience. The alternative service may take place in various social and cultural institutions, peace movements, organizations related to the United Nations, churches and ecumenical organizations, and environmental organizations throughout the country.

A new law, which entered into force in January, prohibits ritual slaughter of animals without prior stunning, including kosher and halal slaughter. The law allows for slaughter according to religious rites with prior stunning and limits such slaughter to cattle, sheep, goats, and chickens. All slaughter must take place at a slaughterhouse. Slaughterhouses practicing ritual slaughter are obliged to register with the Veterinary and Food Administration. Violations of this law are punishable by fines or up to four months in prison. Halal and kosher meat may be imported.

On December 15, parliament passed legislation to be enacted on May 1, 2017 requiring clergy members with legal authorization to officiate at marriages to complete a two-day course on family law and civil rights, administered by the Ministry of Ecclesiastic Affairs. The law also includes a requirement that religious workers “must not behave or act in a way that makes them unworthy to exercise public authority.” Religious workers perceived to not comply with the new provisions could be stripped of their ability to conduct marriage ceremonies.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In September Copenhagen City Court acquitted four citizens accused of aiding and abetting in terrorism by assisting Omar El-Hussein, the gunman who carried out deadly attacks at a free speech forum and a synagogue in Copenhagen in 2015. The Jewish community expressed regret at the acquittal. Two of the men were additionally charged and convicted of assisting in the disposal of the rifle used by El-Hussein and sentenced to three years and two-and-a-half years in prison, respectively. A third man was sentenced to 60 days in prison for drug possession and possessing ammunition similar to that used in the terrorist attack.

Jewish community leaders stated that the current and previous governments had provided state-funded security improvements which greatly increased the perceived safety of the Jewish community following the February 2015 Copenhagen attacks.

In May the publicly funded Center for Adult Education in Lyngby prohibited six Muslim women from wearing the niqab in school and referred them to the center’s e-learning service. School officials stated the niqab limited the interaction between teacher and student. Minister of Education Ellen Trane Noerby supported the school’s decision, stating to the Danish Broadcasting Corporation that she fully supported the management’s right to enforce the prohibition so that training could take place “in an orderly manner.” She added that the education center was an independent entity and agreed with its argument that interaction between student and teacher was an important part of the learning experience, with which the niqab interfered.

Schools had the option to ban prayer during school hours. In June a Muslim student and teaching assistants at a publicly funded school for healthcare in Hilleroed were informed by the school director that prayer would no longer be possible during school hours. In a Facebook post, a student protested the decision, prompting hundreds of responses approving or denouncing the ban. The school’s director stated that he was unable to grant religion-specific requests or accommodations. Member of Parliament (MP) Alex Ahrendtsen of the Danish People’s Party gave his full support to the ban. A similar ban was put in place in an Aarhus region high school in September, where the majority of the students were Muslim.

Schools offered foods that satisfied different religious requirements. The options varied by school. Some schools offered halal meals while others did not serve pork. In January the Randers city council voted that traditional meals, including pork-based meals, would be mandatory in the municipality’s public institutions, including schools and day care centers. The text of the bill stated that “nobody must be forced to eat anything that is against their attitude or religion,” and alternative meal options continued to be provided. Martin Henriksen, a spokesman for the Danish People’s Party that backed the measure, explained on his Facebook page that the bill would help uphold Danish culture, stating that his party was: “…fighting against Islamic rules and misguided considerations dictating what Danish children should eat.” Some members of the Muslim community and migration advocates objected to the bill as stigmatizing Muslims.

In discussions in March with then-United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Heiner Bielefeldt, members of the Jewish community expressed concerns over the ban on slaughter of animals without prior stunning, which they said was enacted without prior consultation with the community.

In February national television network TV2, a publicly owned broadcaster with an independent editorial board, aired a four-part investigative documentary that depicted Islam in an unflattering light. The program used undercover videography that depicted imams at eight well known Sunni mosques encouraging members to carry out domestic abuse, including bigamy and rape.

Using hidden cameras, reporters posed as a married couple and secretly recorded conversations with imams and others at eight Sunni mosques in Aarhus, Odense, and Copenhagen. The imams were taped telling the undercover couple not to report spousal abuse to authorities, and stating that under Islam husbands were permitted to engage in domestic violence.

The series also depicted alleged abuses of welfare benefits and tax fraud by local Muslims. An imam in Odense was shown advising the couple on how to “trick” the municipality into paying for their apartment by misrepresenting their income; he was later reported to be under investigation by the National Police for potential tax and welfare fraud. The series also questioned whether public funds were truly being used for their intended purpose of better integrating Muslim communities into society. In several examples featured in the documentary, mosques founded an association to apply for a municipal grant, but never created any community organization.

Aarhus Mayor Jacob Bundsgaard cited his loss of confidence in the local Muslim community after broadcast of the negative TV2 television documentary series and withdrew a municipal commitment to provide land for a “grand mosque” project that had been under consideration for the previous 17 years.

In February a district court ruled that hate speech posted on Facebook may be prosecuted under hate speech laws and fined a citizen 1,600 kroner ($227) for anti-Islamic postings from 2013. In February Danish People’s Party councilman Mogens Camre was fined 8,000 kroner ($1,130) for tweeting anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim remarks. Also in February the state prosecutor said that Hajj Saeed, who gave a sermon inciting violence against Jews in the Masjid Al-Faru mosque in Copenhagen during 2015, would not be prosecuted for his statements. In response to those rulings, parliament reexamined the hate speech provisions within the penal code to assess whether the laws were working as intended. In response to a formal question asked by parliament, on March 9, the minister of justice read a statement prepared by his ministry that the current provisions in the penal code were adequate and working as intended.

In November Sheikh Muhammad Al-Khaled Samha, an imam at a mosque run by the Islamic Society in Denmark in the Odense suburb of Vollsmose, was criminally indicted for a sermon he gave in September 2014 where he called Jews “the offspring of apes and pigs” and added “Oh Muslims, oh Servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.” Media reported that prosecutors indicted him for violating the penal code prohibition against threatening or scorning people on the basis of their religion, and he could face up to two years in prison or a fine. Samha was found guilty by the Odense city court on December 20 and received a 14-day suspended jail sentence.

On November 8, the municipality of Copenhagen and the Jewish community inaugurated an information center to educate teachers who would then visit schools, other educational institutions, ‎and youth clubs to inform the general population about the ‎Jewish minority. The municipality funded the Jewish community-run center. Copenhagen Mayor of Employment and Integration Anna Mee Allerslev told the media in February that “we have too many instances of anti-Semitism or hatred of Jews and we want ‎to help break down prejudices and…eliminate discrimination and hate ‎crimes.”

Prime Minister Rasmussen invited all political party leaders to a March 30 closed meeting on countering religious extremism, where he called for legislative action to counter religious hate speech that was contrary to the constitution and to bar entry to designated hate preachers before the summer parliamentary recess. Following the passage in December of legislation requiring additional coursework on family law and civil rights for clergy eligible to perform marriage ceremonies, non-Islamic religious minorities expressed concern about changes in legislation which could have a negative impact on their communities and threaten religious freedom.

The government observed International Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27 with ceremonies, public speaking events, and educational events. Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen released a statement on his social media page and the Copenhagen mayor of culture and leisure provided the opening speech on the year’s theme of inclusive citizenship. The speech cited the stripping of civil rights of European Jews during World War II and decried any government actions that could erode civil rights for minorities. Many observers interpreted the speech as alluding to the rights of recently arrived refugees, many of whom were Muslim. Other locations throughout the country held talks and discussions throughout the year in remembrance of victims of the Holocaust. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, the private think tank Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) offered lectures on the Holocaust from national and international experts for students in lower and upper secondary schools and provided teachers with materials on the Holocaust to use in their classes.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. Throughout the year, several municipalities held events in coordination with the alliance, locally cosponsored by DIIS, including providing speakers and hosting local conferences.

There were reported incidents of anti-Semitic, anti-Islamic, and anti-Christian harassment, demonstrations, propaganda, threats, and assaults throughout the year.

In January authorities arrested a 16-year-old girl after police found bomb manuals and chemicals for making explosives at her residence. In March the girl was charged with preparing a terrorist attack against the Jewish private school in Copenhagen as well as another school. In addition, a 24-year old friend of the girl who had recently returned from fighting in Syria was arrested for acquiring bomb-making materials and plotting attacks on two additional schools. Both individuals were in custody and awaiting trial at year’s end.

In May three men at a bar in Odense yelled anti-Islamic slurs at two Muslim girls as they walked by and pulled off the headscarf of one of them. One of the girls told the press no onlookers attempted to stop the altercation.

According to an informal survey of 14 priests living near asylum centers conducted in July by the newspaper Kristeligt Dagblad and to reports by the Danish Institute for Human Rights, Christian asylum seekers were subjected to death threats, threats of violence, and epithets at asylum centers. The Ministry of Integration, Immigration, and Housing was investigating the reported incidents.

For Freedom, formerly known as PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) Denmark, and the Stop the Islamification of Denmark group organized anti-Islamic protests throughout the year. In September For Freedom organized a demonstration in Copenhagen attended by a several hundred participants, which was met with a larger counterprotest. There were reports of minor episodes of violence. Police arrested 11 people from both groups of demonstrators.

In June MP Alex Ahrendtsen made remarks to TV2, stating “there is only one thing worse than devout Muslims, and that is converts” because they are “more extreme.” The NGO Report Hate filed a formal complaint against Ahrendtsen with the national police on June 13, stating that his remarks violated the penal code’s “racism section” (the colloquial name for the legal provisions barring hate speech, including against religion).

In May the Mariam Mosque, Scandinavia’s first women-led mosque, located in Copenhagen, opened to the public. Eight women (titled either: imam, khatibah, dhikr-facilitator, murshidat, or Islamic spiritual care persons) led religious services at the mosque. Friday prayers were for women only, but men could attend the mosque outside of Friday prayer hours. At year’s end, the mosque was awaiting a response to its application for status as an officially recognized religious congregation. The mosque performed one religious marriage and created its own six-page marriage charter focused on four key principles: polygamy is not an option; women have the right to divorce; a marriage will be annulled if psychological or physical violence is committed; and, in the event of divorce, women have equal rights over any children.

Leaders from 31 Islamic organizations, including the eight mosques featured in the investigative documentary series aired by TV2, issued a statement on March 12 condemning the documentary series, accusing the program of having set integration efforts back 30 years. In response to the condemnation, six other Islamic institutions, led by the Danish Islamic Center, issued a joint statement critical of the March 12 condemnation and stating that the investigative series highlighted many challenges facing Muslim communities, including gender-based violence, crime, and chronic unemployment. They called for openness and dialogue, and urged all parties to refrain from smear attacks.

Multiple daily national newspapers, academics from Copenhagen University, and immigrant and religious freedom advocates criticized the investigative series as oversimplifying and sensationalizing the attitudes of Muslims and further fueling national tensions over the integration of refugees and migrants. They said the series’ producers had oversimplified Islam and downplayed the challenges Muslims faced in achieving social and economic integration. The NGO Center for the Prevention of Exclusion stated that editing choices were tailored to sensationalize the series. Radio24Syv received and aired omitted audio clips that said painted a more nuanced picture of many of the statements made by several of the filmed imams. Islamic scholars at Copenhagen University stated the undercover reporters focused only on communities with “extremist” imams, where controversial statements were “practically guaranteed.”

A spokesperson for Mosaiske, the largest Jewish community organization, expressed the Jewish community’s continued concern regarding a growing movement to ban male circumcision. Members of the Jewish community also told then-UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Bielefeldt in March that their biggest worry was public demands for outlawing circumcision of male infants. On March 3, a group of 417 doctors sent an open letter to the DMA requesting that it take a formal stance against the circumcision of minors. The DMA adopted a stance against elective circumcision on December 6, stating that it was ethically wrong to circumcise a person without his consent as an adult but making clear that it would not pursue legislation on the matter. The Danish Health Authority and other government officials also indicated they did not intend to recommend changes to the existing rules and regulations on this issue. Organizations such as Intact Denmark and several MPs of the Danish People’s Party, Social Democrats Party, and Liberal Alliance Party, and members of the European Parliament continued to campaign to ban the practice.

In March an assailant threw a brick through the display window of a kosher butcher shop in Copenhagen. Police made no arrests.

On August 10, unknown perpetrators vandalized a Muslim school. They spray painted walls, woodwork, and windows with anti-Islamic epithets, such as “Islam out of Denmark.” They also painted targets on several of the windows. Police were investigating but had made no arrests by year’s end.

On September 15, individuals who said they belonged to an anti-Islamic group named The Resistance Group – Monoculture is Peaceful Culture vandalized a Muslim cemetery in Broenby. The men doused a grave with blood or a blood-like fluid and placed a severed pig head on top of the grave. According to photographs and an anonymous email to the media, the perpetrators stated that the vandalized grave belonged to Omar Hamid El-Hussein, who carried out terrorist attacks in 2015 in Copenhagen. The pictures of the grave showed that the surrounding ground was covered in small Danish flags and a handwritten sign saying: “Here lies the terrorist Omar Hamid El-Hussein. Allah never forgave you, neither does Denmark.” According to the individual who initially reported the vandalism, the grave did not belong to El-Hussein. Police did not confirm who was buried in the grave and made no arrests. Following the incident, a group of volunteers watched over the cemetery to guard against further vandalism.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy officers met with cabinet members of the government as well as foreign ministry officials to raise concerns over access to circumcision and the safety of the Jewish community.

In April and May embassy officers visited the refugee arrival processing centers in Sandholm, Haderslev, and Sommersted where refugees from diverse religious backgrounds were screened upon entry into the country.

In May an officer from the Department of State Office of Religion and Global Affairs participated in the Danish-Arab Interfaith Dialogue conference that focused on promoting better understanding between Christians and Muslims through shared values. The individual discussed respecting the autonomy of leaders and members of religious minorities and also gave a radio interview outlining the role religious leaders could play in promoting deradicalization.

In May the Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues visited the women-led Mariam Mosque and participated in a roundtable discussion on the difficulties faced by Muslim women in Muslim and Danish society.

The U.S. embassy, together with other institutions, sponsored the 2016 Jewish Cultural Festival, an event showcasing Jewish culture that encouraged interfaith dialogue and understanding among religious groups in the country. In February on the one-year anniversary of a terrorist attack in Copenhagen, the ambassador attended a memorial event for the two victims. The embassy met regularly with leaders and representatives from Mosaiske, the largest Jewish community organization, on the growing concern in the Jewish community over a movement to ban male circumcision.

In August as part of Copenhagen Pride Week’s theme of building bridges in the community, the U.S. embassy hosted a screening of A Jihad for Love and a follow-on discussion on how one can identify as both Muslim and gay. Attendees included leaders of the country’s Muslim LGBT community and government officials. Additionally, the Ambassador hosted a round table discussion with leading Muslim and other minority LGBT members on the unique challenges they faced as “double” or “triple” minorities.

In September embassy staff conducted a workshop on countering extremism within religious communities at the annual Youth Folkemoedet political event in Copenhagen. More than 90 youth aged 15-20 took part.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 847,000 (July 2016 estimate), of which 94 percent is Sunni Muslim. Shia Muslims, Roman Catholics, Protestants, Ethiopian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hindus, Jews, Bahais, and atheists constitute the remaining 6 percent. Non-Muslims are generally foreign-born citizens and expatriates, highly concentrated in Djibouti City.

Legal Framework

Islam is the religion of the state, according to the constitution. The constitution mandates the government respect all faiths and guarantees equality before the law, regardless of one’s religion. The law does not impose sanctions on those who do not observe Islamic teachings or who practice other religious beliefs. The constitution prohibits religiously based political parties.

The Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs has authority over all Islamic matters and institutions, including mosques, religious events, and private Islamic schools. The Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs and the Ministry of Education jointly oversee the school curricula and teacher certification of approximately 40 Islamic schools. The public school system is secular.

The president swears an Islamic religious oath.

Muslims may bring matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance either to family courts whose code includes elements of civil and Islamic law or to civil courts. Civil courts address the same matters for non-Muslims. In legal matters, citizens are officially considered Muslims if they do not specifically identify with another religious group.

The government requires all foreign and domestic non-Muslim religious groups to register by submitting an application to the Ministry of Interior, which conducts a lengthy background investigation of the group. Domestic and foreign Muslim religious groups must inform the Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs of their existence and intent to operate and are neither subject to registration nor investigation by the Ministry of Interior. Muslim and non-Muslim foreign religious groups must also gain approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to operate in the country. Once approved, every foreign religious group signs a one-year agreement detailing the scope of its activities. Foreign religious groups must submit quarterly reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and renew their agreements every year. The quarterly report details the activities, origin of funding for activities, scope of work completed, and identifies beneficiaries. Non-Muslim religious groups may not operate in the interim while awaiting registration.

The government is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The government declared a reservation regarding proselytizing in open public spaces.

Government Practices

The Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs continued its efforts to implement a 2014 decree executing a law on state control of mosques, which converted the status of imams to civil service employees under the ministry and transferred ownership of mosque properties and other assets to the government. Government officials stated the decree aimed to eliminate political activity from mosques, provide greater government oversight of mosque assets and activities, and counter foreign influence. The implementation process has been slow. Fewer than half of the mosques in the country had an imam who was considered a civil service employee. The High Islamic Council met with an association of civil service employee imams to provide training and to have discussions. The training and discussions covered topics on the management of facilities, operational needs, the volume of microphones, not using the mosque as a political platform, and the uniformity of sermons across all mosques.

At the beginning of the year President Ismail Omar Guelleh issued a decree forbidding outside gatherings from December 2015 to mid-April. The Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs postponed a regional conference of Muslim religious leaders until after the April election.

The government continued to permit registered non-Islamic groups, including Catholic, Protestant, Greek Orthodox, and Ethiopian Orthodox churches, to operate freely, according to Christian leaders. For several of these groups, the government subsidized the cost of utilities at church properties as it considered some church properties to be part of the national patrimony. Religious groups not independently registered with the government, such as Ethiopian Protestant and non-Sunni Muslim congregations, operated under the auspices of registered groups. Smaller groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Bahais, were not registered with the government, but operated privately without incident, according to Christian leaders.

The government legally recognized Islamic marriages conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and civil marriages conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior for non-Muslims and interfaith couples. The government also recognized non-Islamic religious marriages, when documentation from the religious organization performing the ceremony was provided.

The Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs sponsored a program in which religious leaders visited public schools for one-hour sessions to answer students’ questions about religion. These weekly sessions were not mandatory.

The government allowed non-Islamic religious groups to host events and proselytize on the groups’ private property; in practice, groups refrained from proselytizing in public spaces, such as hotels or street corners due to restrictions by the government. The government permitted a limited number of Christian missionaries to sell religious books and pamphlets at a local book store.

The government issued visas to foreign Islamic and non-Islamic clergy and missionaries, but required they belong to registered religious groups before they could work in the country or operate nongovernmental organizations.

In response to the violent attack on an Orlando nightclub by a Muslim claiming allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), President Ismail Omar Guelleh sent messages of condolence condemning the attack and expressing his solidarity with the victims’ families. The government-run newspaper, La Nation, published President Guelleh’s message.

Societal norms and customs discouraged conversion from Islam, but conversions still occurred. There was a report from the Markazi refugee camp (a camp for Yemeni refugees) of abuse and intimidation of a convert to Christianity by fellow refugees and local authorities. Christian groups reported discrimination in employment and education against converts to Christianity who changed their names.

Some representatives of Christian denominations reported incidents of animosity by individuals, such as throwing stones at church property. Representatives of Christian denominations reached out to students and staff at neighboring schools in an effort to foster religious tolerance and understanding, leading to a decrease in stoning of church property, according to a Christian leader.

U.S. embassy officials met with the secretary general of the Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs to discuss issues of religious freedom, including the transfer of mosques’ assets and personnel to government control and outreach to refugee camps. The Ambassador shared President Obama’s Ramadan message on the importance of religious freedom with government, religious, and civil society leaders, including at an embassy-hosted iftar. The Ambassador posted on the embassy’s Facebook page an Eid al-Adha greeting in French, Arabic, Afar, and Somali, while wearing traditional Djiboutian clothing. Over 100,000 people viewed the video, and the government-run newspaper, La Nation, released an article about the post. La Nation featured President Obama’s Ramadan statement on the front page.

Embassy officials met with Christian and Muslim leaders to discuss interfaith relations and issues of respect for religious freedom. For instance, during a meeting to discuss the safety and security concerns of converts to Christianity, a Christian leader expressed his willingness to assist the converts and provided housing and protection for a Yemeni refugee.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 73,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to preliminary data from the 2011 census, approximately 53 percent of the population is Roman Catholic. Evangelical Protestants comprise approximately 20 percent of the population. The largest evangelical Protestant groups are Pentecostals with 6 percent, Baptists with 5 percent, and the Christian Union Mission with 4 percent. Seventh-day Adventists comprise 7 percent of the population. Other smaller religious groups include Anglicans, Methodists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, and Rastafarians. Nine percent of the population professes no religious affiliation.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, including freedom of thought, freedom to practice religion, and freedom from taking oaths contrary to one’s beliefs. By law, the government may make exceptions to constitutionally required provisions in the interests of public order and morality if the exceptions being made are for activities “shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.”

Religious groups seeking nonprofit status must register with the attorney general’s office. They must submit a letter signed by five executives of the religious group and provide the official name of the religious group with an address identifying the place of worship. The registration fee is 25 Eastern Caribbean dollars ($9.25). The attorney general’s registry office reviews and approves applications. Any organization denied permission to register has the right to apply for judicial review. By law, religious groups must also register buildings used to publish banns of marriage (announcements of marriage) or used as places of worship.

The constitution grants religious groups the right to establish and maintain schools and to provide religious instruction.

The government prohibits the use of marijuana, including for religious purposes.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Rastafarians stated they continued to disagree with the government’s prohibition of marijuana use, which they described as integral to their religious rituals. They said the government continued to enforce a ban on marijuana but reported no arrests during the year. Rastafarians protested the marijuana ban occasionally through marches, including a march on April 20.

The government subsidized teacher salaries at schools affiliated with the Catholic, Methodist, and Seventh-day Adventist Churches.

At public schools, teachers, principals, and students led nondenominational prayers during morning assemblies. Students were not required to participate.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The U.S. embassy raised general religious freedom subjects with the government.

Embassy officials engaged religious group and civil society leaders and, including the leadership of the Rastafarian communities, on issues of religious freedom and discrimination.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 10.6 million (July 2016). According to a 2015 Latinobarometer poll, the population is 57 percent Catholic, 25 percent evangelical Protestant, and 13 percent have no declared religion. Groups which together make up 5 percent of the population include Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), non-evangelical Protestants, atheists, and others.

There are approximately 2,500 to 3,000 Muslims, located across the country. Most of the approximately 350 members of the Jewish community live in Santo Domingo, with a small community in Sosua. There are small numbers of Buddhists and Hindus.

Most Haitian immigrants are Catholic. An unknown number practice Voodoo or other African Caribbean beliefs such as Santeria.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and belief. A concordat with the Holy See, in place and unmodified since 1954, designates Catholicism as the official religion and extends special privileges to the Catholic Church not granted to other religious groups. These include the legal recognition of Catholic law, use of public funds to underwrite some Catholic Church expenses, and exclusion from customs duties. The Catholic Church retains the authority to revise all textbooks used in public schools throughout the country.

To request exclusion from customs duties, non-Catholic religious groups must register as NGOs with the attorney general’s office and later with the Ministry of Finance and the Directorate General of Customs. Registration with the attorney general’s office is a two-step process. First, the organization must provide documentation of a fixed address and the names of seven elected officers, have a minimum of 25 members, and pay a nominal fee. Second, the organization must draft and submit statutes and provide copies of government-issued identification documents for the board of directors. After registering, religious groups may request custom duties exclusion from the Ministry of Finance.

The law provides for government recognition of marriages performed by religious groups that register with the Central Electoral Board, provided they otherwise comply with the law.

As part of the concordat with the Vatican, the law requires Bible studies in all public schools; the government does not normally enforce this law. The concordat provides parents with the option of exempting their children from religious studies in public schools. Private schools are exempt from the Bible studies requirement.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Non-Catholic religious groups continued to say the Catholic Church had advantages that they did not. According to these groups, the Catholic Church received significant financial support from the government, including properties that were transferred to the Catholic Church as well as subsidies to the salaries of Catholic Church officials. The Catholic Church reportedly enjoyed broader customs exemptions than non-Catholic organizations, which were required to pay customs duties and then seek refunds on imported food or other goods intended for religious use. These religious groups also continued to report difficulties when applying for and receiving customs duty refunds from the Ministry of Finance. Additionally, non-Catholic missionaries and religious leaders could not obtain visas under the same immigration category as Catholic religious leaders, which non-Catholic groups said made it more expensive and difficult to bring missionaries into the country.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy officials maintained ties with religious representatives and faith groups, meeting with leaders from the Catholic Church, the United Dominican Council for Evangelicals, which represents the Protestant community, officials from the Jewish community, including the one Hasidic rabbi in the country, and leaders from the Muslim community, to discuss religious freedom issues and promote religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 16.1 million (July 2016 estimate). According to a 2012 survey by the National Institute of Statistics and Census, approximately 92 percent of the population professes a religious affiliation or belief. Of those, 80.4 percent are Roman Catholic; 11.3 percent are evangelical Christian, including Pentecostals; and 1.3 percent are Jehovah’s Witnesses. Seven percent belong to other religious groups including Muslims, Buddhists, Jews, Hindus, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Anglicans, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Eastern Orthodox, Presbyterians, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, Bahais, spiritualists, followers of Inti (the traditional Inca sun god), and indigenous and African faiths. There are also practitioners of Santeria, primarily resident Cubans.

Some groups, particularly those in the Amazonian jungle and Choco regions, combine indigenous beliefs with Catholicism. Pentecostals draw much of their membership from indigenous people in the highland provinces. Jehovah’s Witnesses have members throughout the country, with the highest concentrations in coastal areas. Many evangelical Christian churches are not affiliated with a particular denomination.

Legal Framework

The constitution grants all individuals the right to practice and profess publicly and freely the religion of their choice, and prohibits discrimination based on religion. It states the government has a responsibility to “protect voluntary religious practice, as well as the expression of those who do not profess any religion, and will favor an atmosphere of plurality and tolerance.” Individuals have the right to change their religion.

The law requires religious groups to register with the MOJ. Registration in the Register of Religious Entities provides the religious group with legal and nonprofit status. An officially registered organization is eligible to receive government funding, exemptions from certain taxes, and legal recognition as an organization with permission to operate in the country. To register, a religious group must possess a charter, include in its application all names used by the group to ensure that names of previously registered groups are not used without their permission, and provide signatures of at least 15 members, typically leaders of the organization. The application is evaluated by three experts in religious matters appointed by the ministry, in consultation with religious organizations that are already legally established within the country. The registration process is free. All nonprofit organizations, including the more than 2,200 registered religious groups, must report on the expenditure of any government funding received. Groups that do not register are not penalized but are ineligible to receive the aforementioned benefits.

The law prohibits public schools from providing religious instruction, but private schools may provide religious instruction. There are no legal restrictions or regulations on which religious groups may establish a school.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Evangelical Christian representatives said religious organizations often encountered barriers to registration. They noted legal representatives were required to travel to the capital, Quito, to register rather than being able to register in their local communities. An evangelical Christian leader said administrative costs, delays in processing, and demands by some officials for the payment of bribes created additional obstacles to registration of several of the churches. He said the slow process and delays led many groups not to apply for registration. Without a legal representative, groups were unable to open bank accounts or engage in formal land transactions. According to evangelical Christian representatives, unregistered groups often met in private homes or ad hoc structures on the private land of a group member.

The MOJ provided training to religious groups to help them navigate the registration process. According to the ministry, roughly 4,000 religious groups operated in the country, although only half were actually registered with the government. The MOJ provided no public information on specific groups that were denied registration or the reasons for their denial.

As of the end of the year, a case filed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses and accepted for review in September 2014 remained pending before the constitutional court. The case involved a conflict in the northern town of Iluman between Jehovah’s Witnesses who wanted to build a new assembly hall and indigenous residents who opposed it. Two lower courts had previously ruled in favor of the residents, concluding that their right to self-determination was a valid rationale for preventing the practice of religion. Representatives of the Jehovah’s Witnesses said they hoped to set a legal precedent with the case, which they said would establish that an indigenous community’s constitutional right to self-determination could not violate individuals’ right to practice freely the religion they chose. The Jehovah’s Witnesses said they requested information from the MOJ but did not receive explanation for why the case was pending more than two years after it was accepted for review by the constitutional court.

Catholic, Jewish, and Seventh-day Adventist representatives stated the government’s standard academic calendar, which applied to private and public schools, made it difficult for some schools to observe their religious holidays. Catholic representatives said religious schools received scrutiny from the government. Whereas public schools and nonreligious private schools were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education only, both the Ministry of Education and the MOJ conducted visits to religiously affiliated schools and reviewed their curricula. Some religious leaders stated regulatory burdens made it extremely difficult to run a private religious school. An evangelical Christian leader said that in the past five years the government increased technology requirements for schools to maintain accreditation. He stated private schools, including religiously affiliated schools, were held to a higher standard than public schools. For example, he said public schools either were given the resources to comply with regulations or were given relaxed treatment on inspections regardless of compliance. Some private and religious schools were shut down for not complying with the technology standard.

In September the MOJ sanctioned the director and chief of security of the Quito Provisional Detention Center for allowing the use of an official stamp with a Nazi swastika for visitors entering the facility. The MOJ condemned the use of any offensive symbol that could compromise human rights. According to media reports, the Office of the Public Defender reported the use of the stamp in July 2015. In September the media reported on criticism by Public Defender Ernesto Pazmino about the delay in the government’s response and questioned why the stamp was permitted for so long.

Representatives of the Catholic Church stated they collaborated with government institutions on social assistance projects, particularly in coastal regions devastated by an earthquake on April 16. They said the government imposed restrictions on religious groups’ social welfare activities in which the government was active. Leaders of other religious groups said they did not seek government funding for social welfare projects either because of internal policies averse to government involvement or to avoid conditions the government might place on them. After the earthquake, some religious groups stated the government required all disaster relief assistance to be channeled through the military. Despite this policy, many religious groups distributed disaster assistance through their own networks.

A gated community near Guayaquil banned proselytization by Jehovah’s Witnesses following complaints from community residents. In January the Jehovah’s Witnesses filed a complaint against the community before a lower court. The court ruled against the Jehovah’s Witnesses, citing the community’s right to prevent trespassing on private property. In February the Jehovah’s Witnesses were notified of the court’s decision and appealed to the judicial court of Guayas Province. The appeal was rejected in May. On June 1, the Jehovah’s Witnesses filed for a “special action of protection” before the constitutional court. The law required the constitutional court to decide whether to accept the case within 20 days; however, at year’s end the constitutional court had not accepted the case for review.

Religious leaders said societal respect for religious diversity was generally good, but some expressed concerns about what they perceived to be an erosion of traditional religious values and an increase in secularism. Religious leaders also expressed concerns about promoting religious values among youth, burdensome government regulations that they said made it difficult to operate religious schools, and the lack of mechanisms for interfaith dialogue.

U.S. embassy representatives requested clarification on the registration process for religious groups and on the government’s efforts to promote interfaith dialogue from the MOJ. The MOJ did not provide this information during the year.

Embassy and consulate officials met with leaders of Catholic, evangelical Christian, Jehovah’s Witness, Jewish, Mormon, and Muslim communities, among others, to discuss religious freedom, societal respect for religious diversity, and their relations with the government and other religious communities. In commemoration of Religious Freedom Day, U.S. officials hosted a breakfast on January 15 for religious leaders from Guayaquil to discuss challenges facing their communities. The event was attended by leaders from the evangelical Christian, Jewish, Mormon, and Muslim communities.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 94.7 million (July 2016 estimate). Most media reports state that approximately 90 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim and approximately 10 percent Christian (estimates range from 5 percent to 15 percent). Approximately 90 percent of Christians belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church, according to Christian leaders.

Other Christian communities together constitute less than 2 percent of the population and include the Armenian Apostolic, Catholic (Armenian, Chaldean, Melkite, Maronite, Greek, Latin, and Syrian), Orthodox (Greek and Syrian), Anglican/Episcopalian, and other Protestant churches, which range in size from several thousand to hundreds of thousands. The Protestant community includes Presbyterians, Baptists, Brethren, Open Brethren, Seventh-day Adventists, Revival of Holiness (Nahdat al-Qadaasa), Faith (Al-Eyman), Church of God, Christian Model Church (Al-Mithaal Al-Masihi), Apostolic, Grace (An-Ni’ma), Pentecostal, Apostolic Grace, Church of Christ, Gospel Missionary (Al-Kiraaza bil Ingil), and the Message Church of Holland (Ar-Risaala). Jehovah’s Witnesses account for 1,000-1,500 people, according to media estimates. Christians reside throughout the country, although the percentage of Christians is higher in Upper Egypt and in some sections of Cairo and Alexandria, according to religious and civil society groups.

Estimates regarding the number of Shia Muslims range from 800,000 to two million, according to media reports. There are also small groups of Quranist Muslims and Ahmadi Muslims.

According to an estimate by the Washington, D.C.-based media site Al Monitor, the number of atheists may be as high as four million, although other accounts place their number in the low thousands.

Accurate numbers for the Jewish community are difficult to determine, but it is believed to number approximately 23 persons, according to members of the community. There are between 2,000 and 3,000 adherents of the Bahai Faith, according to media estimates.

There are many foreign resident adherents of various religious groups, including Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Mormons. There is also a small Dawoodi (a branch of Ismaili Shia Islam) Bohra Community, numbering approximately 660, mostly comprising Indian nationals, according to a member of the community.

Legal Framework

The constitution specifies Islam as the state religion and the principles of sharia as the primary source of legislation. The constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion and makes incitement to hate a crime. It describes freedom of belief as absolute; however, it limits the freedom to practice religious rituals and establish places of worship to adherents of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. The constitution prohibits the exercise of political activity or the formation of political parties on the basis of religion.

While neither the constitution nor the civil or penal codes prohibit apostasy from Islam or efforts to proselytize Muslims, and the law states individuals may change their religion, the government does not recognize conversion from Islam for those born Muslim. The government does recognize conversion from Islam for individuals who were not born Muslim but later converted to Islam, according to an MOI decree pursuant to a court order. In those cases in which Muslims not born Muslim convert from Islam, their minor children, and in some cases adult children who were minors when their parents converted, automatically remain classified as Muslims.

In keeping with sharia, non-Muslim men must convert to Islam to marry Muslim women, although Christian or Jewish women need not convert to marry Muslim men. A non-Muslim woman who converts to Islam must divorce her husband if he is not Muslim and is unwilling to convert. Under the law, a divorced mother is entitled to custody of a child until the age of 10 in the case of a son and until the age of 12 in the case of a daughter.

According to the penal code, using religion to promote extremist thought with the aim of inciting strife, demeaning or denigrating Judaism, Christianity, or Islam, and harming national unity carries penalties ranging from six months’ to five years’ imprisonment.

Christian, Muslim, and Jewish denominations may request official recognition from the government, which gives a denomination the right to be governed by its canonical laws, practice religious rituals, establish houses of worship, and import religious literature. To obtain official recognition, a religious group must submit a request to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) Religious Affairs Department. The department then determines whether the group poses a threat to national unity or social peace. As part of this determination, the department consults leading religious institutions, including the Coptic Orthodox Church and Al-Azhar, the nation’s premier institution of Islamic education. The president then reviews and decides on the registration application.

The law does not recognize the Bahai Faith or its religious laws and bans Bahai institutions and community activities. Although the government lists “Christian” on the identity cards of Jehovah’s Witnesses, a presidential decree bans all Jehovah’s Witnesses’ activities. The law does not stipulate any penalties for banned religious groups or their members who engage in religious practices, but these groups are barred from rights granted to recognized groups, such as having their own houses of worship or other property, holding bank accounts, or importing religious literature.

The government appoints and monitors imams who lead prayers in licensed mosques and pays their salaries. According to law, penalties for preaching or giving religious lessons without a license from the Ministry of Awqaf (Religious Endowments) or Al-Azhar include a prison term of up to one year and/or a fine of up to 50,000 Egyptian pounds (EGP) ($2,800). The penalty doubles for repeat offenders. Ministry of Awqaf inspectors also have judicial authority to arrest imams violating this law. A decree prevents unlicensed imams from preaching in any mosque, prohibits holding Friday prayers in mosques smaller than 80 square meters (861 square feet), bans unlicensed mosques from holding Friday prayer services (other prayer services are permitted), and pays bonuses to imams who deliver Friday sermons consistent with Ministry of Awqaf guidelines. Any imam who fails to follow the guidelines loses the bonus and can be subject to disciplinary measures, including potentially losing his preaching license. The ministry also issues prewritten sermons, but use of them by imams is voluntary.

The Ministry of Education (MOE) bans wearing the hijab in primary schools, but allows it in middle and high schools upon written request from a girl’s parent. Cairo University, which falls under the supervision of the Ministry of Higher Education, bans professors in certain fields from wearing the niqab during class.

The prime minister has authority to stop the circulation of books that “denigrate religions.” Ministries may obtain court orders to ban or confiscate books and works of art. The cabinet may ban works it deems offensive to public morals, detrimental to religion, or likely to cause a breach of the peace. The Islamic Research Center of Al-Azhar has the legal authority to censor and confiscate any publications dealing with the Quran and the authoritative Islamic traditions (hadith), and to confiscate publications, tapes, speeches, and artistic materials deemed inconsistent with Islamic law.

A law enacted at the end of September delegates authority to approve requests for church building and renovation permits to governors, rather than the president as was required previously. The governor is to respond within four months; any refusal must include a written justification. The new law also includes provisions to legalize existing unlicensed churches and rescinds preconditions established in the 1930s. It stipulates that, in the event a request to license an existing building used as a church is refused, the use of the building to conduct church services and rites may not be prevented. Under the new law, the size of new churches depends on a government determination of the “number and need” of Christians in the area. New churches must also meet land registration and building codes not required for mosques.

Under a separate law governing the construction of mosques, the Ministry of Awqaf approves permits to build mosques. The law does not stipulate any government role in reviewing the number or size of mosques based on its assessment of the number of Muslims in the area, but there is a provision regarding the minimum distance between mosques. The law does not require Ministry of Awqaf approval for mosque renovations.

In public schools, Muslim students are required to take courses on “principles of Islam,” and Christian students are required to take courses on “principles of Christianity” in all grades. Students who are neither Muslim nor Christian must choose one or the other course; they may not opt out or change from one to the other.

The constitution states that Al-Azhar is “the main authority in theology and Islamic affairs.” The constitution stipulates that the canonical laws of Jews and Christians form the basis of legislation governing their personal status, religious affairs, and selection of spiritual leaders.

The penal code criminalizes discrimination based on religion and defines it as including “any action, or lack of action, that leads to discrimination between people or against a sect due to … religion, or belief.” The law stipulates imprisonment and/or a fine of no less than 30,000 EGP ($1,700) and no more than 50,000 EGP ($2,800) as penalties of discrimination. If the perpetrator is a public servant, the law states that the imprisonment should be no less than three months, and the fine no less than 50,000 EGP ($2,800) and no more than 100,000 EGP ($5,600).

The government recognizes only the marriages of Christians, Jews, and Muslims with documentation from a cleric. Since the state does not recognize Bahai marriage, married Bahais are denied the legal rights of married couples of other religious beliefs, including those pertaining to inheritance, divorce, and sponsoring a foreign spouse’s permanent residence.

In matters of family law, when spouses are members of the same religious denomination, courts apply that denomination’s canonical laws. In cases where one spouse is Muslim and the other a member of a different religion, both are Christians but adhere to different denominations, or the individuals are not clearly a part of a religious group, the courts apply sharia. In accordance with sharia, the law forbids adoptions for all. In matters of inheritance, the courts generally apply sharia unless a will instructs otherwise.

The law requires the government to specify religion on national identity cards, with the only options being Islam, Christianity, or Judaism. According to an MOI decree pursuant to a court order, the government may enter a “dash” in place of religion for Bahais.

According to the law, a minimum of 24 Christians must be elected out of the total 120 members elected as members of party lists in the first parliamentary elections after the constitution’s 2014 ratification.

The National Council for Human Rights (NCHR), whose members are appointed by parliament, is charged with strengthening protections, raising awareness, and ensuring the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including religious freedom. It is also charged with monitoring enforcement and application of international agreements pertaining to human rights. The council’s mandate includes investigating reports of alleged violations of religious freedom.

The constitution mandates the state to eliminate all forms of discrimination through an independent commission to be established by parliament. By year’s end, the government had not yet established such a commission.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights but declared in a reservation that it became a party considering that the provisions of sharia do not conflict with the covenant.

Government Practices

In spite of numerous speeches by President Sisi underscoring that all Egyptians were equal citizens under the law, numerous religious freedom and human rights activists said that government officials, courts, and prosecutors sometimes did not extend procedural safeguards and rights of due process to members of minority faiths. For example, prison authorities at the local level delayed a court-ordered release of a noted convert from Islam to Christianity, according to international human rights groups and the press. According to sources in the Christian community, security and police officials sometimes failed to respond in a timely manner to attacks on Christians and their homes, businesses, and places of worship, especially in Upper Egypt. The government frequently failed to investigate or prosecute such attacks, relying instead on the controversial practice of “customary reconciliation” sessions whereby both sides in a dispute negotiated a settlement brokered by religious or other community leaders. Although there were reports that police rescued Christian victims of kidnappings, police action was not always prompt, activists said.

On June 16, Grand Imam of Al Azhar Ahmed el-Tayeb appeared on multiple television channels stating that all four Sunni schools of jurisprudence agreed that an apostate “should be pressed upon to recant…or be killed,” and calling apostasy from Islam “high treason.” He also presented evidence from Islamic doctrinal sources, however, to defend the view that ex-Muslims who posed no threat to society should be left alone.

Subsequently, at an October conference on fatwa issuance for imams serving in Muslim expatriate communities, the grand imam encouraged qualified Islamic scholars to use their analytical reasoning skills in issuing fatwas appropriate for the modern-day societies in which they live, and not allow fear of going against centuries-old jurisprudence to cause their fatwas to “stagnate.” Subsequently he announced that Al Azhar would establish a “Committee of Fiqh” (jurisprudence) which would engage in ijtihad (analytical reasoning) to address some Islamic doctrinal issues, thereby asserting space for renewal of religious discourse, although the scope remained limited.

In July Mohamed Hegazy, known as Bishoy Armia Boulous after his conversion from Islam to Christianity, was released after spending over 18 months in detention, beyond the six-month legal limit for those charged with misdemeanors, pending investigation for “denigrating Islam.” On June 26, a court ordered Boulous/Hegazy’s release on bail. Authorities subsequently stated they had lost the court order, required him to produce additional documentation, and “transferred him from prison to prison across Egypt under the orders of the Ministry of the Interior” without informing his attorney, according to Morning Star News, a news service that reports on persecution of Christians. Ultimately, Boulous/Hegazy recorded a video testifying that he was reconverting from Christianity to Islam and was released on bail on July 23. His legal case remained pending at year’s end.

Local authorities frequently encouraged participation in “customary reconciliation” sessions to address incidents of sectarian violence, saying such sessions prevented further violence by quickly defusing tensions. According to the authorities, the intent was for the parties to agree on measures to stop the conflict, which might include punishment of the perpetrators by expulsion from the village, compensation for the affected parties, or a penalty clause for the future breaching of any agreement. Beginning in 2014, the Coptic Orthodox Church refused to participate in customary reconciliation as a substitute for the rule of law, only approving its use as an immediate measure to stop bloodshed and deescalate tensions. Human rights groups and members of the Coptic community said that such sessions regularly led to outcomes unfavorable to minority parties and effectively precluded recourse to the judicial system in most cases, as victims were regularly pressured to retract their statements and deny facts, leading to the dropping of charges. One human rights NGO said “customary reconciliation” constituted an encroachment on the judicial system and on the principles of nondiscrimination and citizenship.

Courts continued to apply the penal code to prosecute those charged with denigrating Judaism, Christianity, or Islam. Government prosecutors investigated criminal complaints filed by private citizens on such charges, leading to prosecution of at least 13 individuals, including two convictions pending from 2015 and six convictions from cases in 2016. Citizens charged under the penal code included Muslim reformers, Christian children, a social media tweeter, an atheist, and a Salafi television preacher.

On January 26, Al-Khalifa Misdemeanor Court convicted writer Fatima Naoot in absentia and sentenced her to three years in prison and a fine of 20,000 EGP ($1,100) for denigrating Islam by describing the Islamic ritual of sacrificing cows or sheep during Eid al-Adha as a “massacre,” in a tweet on her personal account in December 2014. On November 24, the Sayeda Zeinab Appellate Misdemeanor Court affirmed Naoot’s conviction of denigration of religion but reduced her sentence to a suspended six months’ imprisonment.

On February 23, Edko Misdemeanor court upheld Mostafa Abdel-Naby’s three-year prison sentence for denigrating religion for declaring his atheism and insulting Allah on Facebook in 2014.

On February 25, Bani Mazar Juvenile Misdemeanor Court sentenced four Christian males ages 16 to 17 to five years’ imprisonment for “denigrating Islam” after they appeared in a half-minute-long video clip in which they allegedly mocked Islamic prayer and made silly gestures. Villagers had discovered the video on a phone allegedly belonging to their teacher, Gad Youssef Younan, whom the same court had convicted in December 2015 for capturing the youths’ actions on video. According to international press reports, the youths fled the country.

On May 25, El-Gamaliya Misdemeanor court sentenced El-Sayed Youssef Ahmed El-Naggar to one year in prison and a fine of 1,000 EGP ($55) for denigrating Islam after he burned a volume of Al-Bukhari, a ninth century compilation of sayings and deeds (hadith) attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, in front of Al Azhar as a protest of such books for “espousing extremist thought,” according to a local human rights organization. On September 21, El-Gamaliya Appellate Misdemeanor Court confirmed the sentence.

On May 28, First October 6 Misdemeanor Court acquitted Salafist television preacher Mohamed Hassan of denigrating Islam when he recounted a story from early Islamic sources that Khadija, one of the Prophet Muhammad’s wives, had deliberately plied her father with wine and extracted his approval of the marriage when he was drunk.

In July the Court of Cassation (appellate court) rejected an appeal by Islam El-Beheiry of his one-year prison sentence for “defaming religious symbols.” He received a presidential pardon in late November. Prosecutors had pressed charges against the TV host after a lawyer filed a complaint accusing him of denigrating Islam through his critique of Islamic texts with links to violence, including certain hadith, on his show Ma’a Islam (With Islam). This case, based on the blasphemy law, was widely regarded in the press as undercutting President Sisi’s ongoing calls for Islamic scholars to “renew religious discourse” and “combat the ideology of extremists.”

In the wake of these and other convictions for denigration of religions, a coalition of 13 human rights organizations, four political parties, and a number of lawyers, journalists, and public figures issued a statement condemning the rulings for “supporting terrorism” by “suffocating every opinion exposing the roots of terrorism in our heritage and ideas.” Signatories included the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, the Arab Network for Human Rights Information, and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies.

The government did not prevent members of unregistered religious groups, such as Bahais, Mormons, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, from worshiping privately in small numbers. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, the government sometimes engaged in surveillance of their homes, questioned them about their activities, and continued to confiscate personally owned religious materials from them at airports. The government continued to ban the importation and sale of Bahai and Jehovah’s Witnesses literature.

The government closed the tomb of Imam Al-Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, located in Al-Hussein Mosque in Old Cairo, during the three-day commemoration of Ashura in October, for what it said were security reasons. The mosque remained open.

By year’s end, the government had nearly completed rebuilding and restoring 78 churches and other Christian sites damaged or destroyed by mob violence after the 2013 forcible dispersal of Muslim Brotherhood-led sit-ins in Cairo and Giza, according to Christian leaders. President Sisi announced that two sites remained in need of painting, which was expected to be completed within two months. While still defense minister, Sisi had vowed to have the military rebuild the churches immediately after they were attacked in 2013. He apologized to attendants at the Christmas Eve service at St. Mark Coptic Orthodox Cathedral on January 6 that the government had not been able to complete rebuilding them in 2015 and promised to try to complete the work in 2016.

President Sisi approved the licenses of three new churches during the first eight months of the year, until the new law transferred this authority to governors.

After a string of violent sectarian incidents in Minya, the government replaced the governor and chief of security there as part of a larger reshuffle. According to press reports, Copts regarded the move as a positive step toward improving security in the region. When the new governor visited the Coptic Orthodox Bishop of Minya on his first day in office on September 9, the governor stated that Minya’s sectarian problems should be resolved by upholding the law, according to press reports. The bishop called for the rule of law, justice, and equality, and said the governor’s appointment “promised a new era of peace and security,” according to press reports. The Bishop of Minya repeated in several statements to the media that he would no longer agree to deal with sectarian incidents through customary reconciliation. According to a study published July 27 in Watani, the country’s Coptic-run weekly, 65 percent of violent attacks against Copts took place in Minya.

Efforts to revise textbooks were ongoing, according to government and religious officials, in a response to President Sisi’s continuing calls for Islamic scholars to renew religious discourse and challenge the ideology of extremists.

All 27 of Egypt’s governors, appointed by the president, were Muslim.

Children legally identified as Muslims but who self-identified as Christians and who lived in Christian homes were required to attend religion classes for Muslim students, as a matter of policy. In addition, such children could not be admitted to a Christian orphanage and had no recourse to choose their religion when they reached legal age.

Two public middle schools in Zaqaziq, Sharqia Governorate, designated the hijab as part of its mandatory uniform for female students. After complaints from parents, the Ministry of Education issued an administrative decision on October 23 prohibiting schools from mandating the hijab and referred the principal of one of the schools for internal investigation, according to the local woman’s rights group New Women Foundation.

According to members of academia, no Christians served as presidents of the country’s 25 public universities and few Christians occupied dean or vice dean positions in the public university system. Only Muslims could study at Al-Azhar University, a publicly funded institution. The government barred non-Muslims from employment in public university training programs for Arabic language teachers, because the curriculum involved study of the Quran.

On October 11, after a Christian applicant to a postgraduate program at Cairo University complained that his rejection likely was due to his religion, Cairo University President Dr. Gaber Nassar issued an official directive to remove any indication of a student’s religion on any application, certificate, or document issued by the university. A university investigation had determined that none of nine Christian applicants to the program in question had been accepted. Nassar subsequently ordered that the nine Christian students be accepted into the program and issued a directive to remove the question of religion from application forms. In December the Religious Committee of the House of Representatives rejected the university’s directive, describing it as “unnecessary,” and recommended that Nassar annul it. Nassar rejected the recommendation, stating that university application forms were not under the purview of parliament.

The Ministry of Education withdrew its appointment of Mervat Abo Sefein as Director of Beni Mazar Secondary Girls’ School, Minya, after students chanted that they would not accept a Christian director, according to human rights organization Tahir Institute. The ministry then appointed Abo Sefein as Director of the Boys’ Technical School of Beni Mazar but rescinded the appointment after students protested it. The ministry stated it had reversed the decision based on complaints from “earlier in Abo Sefein’s career,” according to media outlet Youm7.

In January Al Azhar canceled a competition entitled “The Spread of Shia Islam in the Sunni Community: Reasons, Dangers, and How to Confront It.” According to press reports, the cancellation was due to the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar’s desire to promote unity and fraternity among Muslims.

The government generally failed to take action against or condemn anti-Semitic comments that appeared in government-owned and private media. State-owned and private media used anti-Semitic rhetoric, including by academics, cultural figures, and clerics, and published cartoons and commentary demonizing Jews and Israel.

In May and June the government-owned newspaper Al Ahram published a five-week series of articles accusing Jews of “plotting to enslave the world,” “claiming that their religion is the only religion,” “inventing atheism,” “leading countries to religious and political extremism,” and staging an “economic takeover of the world.” Most of these allegations of “evil” referenced the long-debunked Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

Positive coverage of the country’s Jewish community appeared in government-owned media as well. On May 30, state television aired an interview with the president of the Cairo Jewish community during which she spoke about Judaism as a religion and corrected what she said were misconceptions about the Jewish community in the country. The interview took place in one of Cairo’s remaining synagogues.

The government generally permitted foreign religious workers in the country on condition they not proselytize to Muslims. According to community representatives, non-Muslim minorities and foreign religious workers generally refrained from proselytizing to Muslims to avoid risking legal penalties and extralegal repercussions from authorities and members of the local community.

During the year, government officials took custody of historical records of births, marriages, deaths, and other community records of the greatly diminished Jewish community whose membership at one time exceeded 75,000 people. Officials stated that they were taking the records in order to preserve them, according to members of the community. The Ministry of Antiquities, which is charged with preserving Egyptian heritage, began to assess Egyptian Jewish heritage sites and to catalogue their contents; however, important Jewish religious and historical sites, including a grand synagogue in Alexandria and a millennium-old Jewish cemetery in Cairo, continued to deteriorate from decades of disuse. The newspaper The Arab Weekly estimated there were 19 synagogues in the country, a few in good condition, the others in very poor condition.

Dar Al Ifta, the official government institute for issuing fatwas and Islamic legal research, issued a fatwa in June stating, “Openly violating the fast during Ramadan does not fall under personal freedom but, rather, is a kind of chaos and assault on the sanctity of Islam.” According to Mada Masr, a news website, social media users regarded the statement as an attack on personal freedom, with some seeing it as potentially inciting violence against individuals who publicly eat during Ramadan. Despite the fatwa, restaurants remained open during Ramadan in parts of Cairo, and there were no reports of harassment of those eating during the day.

Construction continued on a state-funded church in honor of 20 Egyptian Copts beheaded by an ISIS affiliate in Libya.

Lethal violence connected with religion continued. On December 11, 29 people were killed in a suicide bomb attack during Sunday services at Saints Peter and Paul Coptic Orthodox Church in Cairo. In attacks claimed by a terrorist organization that had pledged allegiance to ISIS, a Coptic priest and a Sufi sheikh in northern Sinai were killed. Assailants killed a Christian in Minya. The construction of churches continued to meet societal resistance, including acts of violence. According to International Christian Concern, there were kidnappings of Christian women and children. Muslim Brotherhood groups adopted rhetoric targeting Christians and Jews, according to media reports.

On December 11, 29 people were killed in a suicide bomb attack during Sunday liturgy in the women’s section of Saints Peter and Paul Church, which is part of the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral complex in Cairo. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack and vowed to further attack Christians in “a war against polytheism,” referring to the Christian belief in the Trinity. The Ministry of Interior said it had arrested four people in connection with the bombing. The army repaired the damage in two weeks’ time, following President Sisi’s order for it to be completed in time for Coptic Orthodox Christmas on January 7.

On June 30, three armed men in a truck shot and killed Father Raphael Moussa, a priest at St. George Coptic Orthodox Church in al-Arish in North Sinai, according to press reports. The local ISIS affiliate claimed responsibility on social media the same day. The attack took place on the third anniversary of the mass protests calling on the army to oust former president Mohamed Morsi.

The same group abducted Suleiman Abu Heraz, a renowned 98-year-old blind Sufi sheikh, from his home in North Sinai, accused him and another sheikh of sorcery, and beheaded both of them, according to press reports. In a November 19 statement, the ISIS affiliate claimed responsibility for the beheadings and published a video of the attack.

There were numerous reports of incidents of sectarian mob violence against Coptic Christians, including attacks resulting from Muslim opposition to the presence of churches in their communities. On July 17, assailants armed with bats and knives attacked the families of two Coptic priests in their homes in Tahna El-Gabal village in Minya, killing one family member and injuring three, including an elderly man, according to an official statement by the local Coptic Orthodox bishopric. Several news outlets reported that the attack was the result of a fight between the assailants and the priests’ families; however, a Christian news outlet reported that a group of 100 villagers had attacked the victims in response to a rumor that the community was building a new church in the village. A human rights activist told Mada Masr news that the villagers were mobilized against the Christian family due to their religious identity.

On November 24, the press reported that a mob of Muslim residents in Al-Naghameesh village in Sohag Governorate burned a Christian-owned guesthouse that was being used for worship services. Christians had applied to have the building registered as a church, under the new law on licensing churches. Four Christians were injured in the attack, and the mob also looted three Christian-owned stores and damaged or destroyed 10 Christian-owned properties, consisting of nine homes and a garage. According to press reports, security and military forces used tear gas to disperse the mob. On November 26, prosecutors ordered the detention of 14 suspects pending investigations. The governor of Sohag promised to restore the guesthouse at governorate expense.

According to press reports, on May 20 in the village of El-Karm in Minya Province, approximately 300 Muslim villagers stripped naked an elderly Coptic Christian woman, Souad Thabet, and paraded her through the streets after a rumor spread that her son was having an affair with a married Muslim woman. The villagers also set fire to the woman’s house, along with three other houses owned by Coptic Christians unrelated to the woman, looted two others, and injured two Christians. The fire spread to several neighboring houses. According to one witness, during the attacks the mob shouted slogans against Copts and called them infidels. Police did not arrive until more than an hour after the incidents, according to press reports. The Minya Bishopric stated that Thabet and her husband had filed a formal police complaint the day before the attacks about receiving threats, stating that they expected an attack the following day, but police had not responded. In the days following the incidents, police arrested 16 Muslim suspects and several Christians whom they accused of setting fire to the neighboring houses that had caught fire, three of which were owned by Muslims, according to press reports. Immediately after the attack, President Sisi announced that the perpetrators would be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. By July 13, all suspects had been released on bail pending criminal investigations. On October 6, 25 suspects were referred to criminal court on charges of illegal assembly, arson, vandalism, and illegal possession of firearms.

On June 29, Muslims in Kom al-Loufi village in Minya Governorate attacked a Christian-owned home after rumors spread that he intended to use the new house he was building as a church. The assailants set fire to the home and to three other homes owned by the Christian resident’s brothers. Two days earlier, security officers had forced construction workers to stop work at the house, reportedly due to tensions between Christians and Muslims in the community. Following the attack, police arrested 19 suspects on charges of “creating chaos,” arson, and resisting authorities. All were released on bail within a month. An MP told the press that victims had received death threats if they did not agree to customary reconciliation and withdraw their complaints. The victims refused, insisting that the perpetrators be prosecuted in court.

On July 9, a journalist for the newspaper Watani specializing in coverage of sectarian violence incidents reported the victims in Kom al-Loufi were living under poor conditions, “almost locked up, in fear of leaving their temporary residence, due to the threats they were receiving.” He quoted a threat by one of the village elders against the victims: “Not a single Copt will live in the village, if the police complaints are not withdrawn.” The Minya Governorate disbursed compensation to the victims, but the funds covered only a fraction of the costs of repair, according to press reports. The case remained pending at year’s end. The village continued without a church; a request to build one had remained pending for 10 years.

On July 22, several dozen residents returning from Friday prayers attacked the homes of Christians, throwing rocks and glass, in Saft Al Kharsa village in the Governorate of Beni Suef. According to media outlet Youm7 and videos of the attack on Youtube, the attack was incited by a rumor that a Christian resident intended to transform the second floor of his house into a church. Police arrested 18 Muslims for the violence, as well as eight Christians, following the attack. According to press reports, the Muslim suspects were detained pending investigation on charges of inciting violence, rioting, and attacking the houses and property of Christians, but released after several weeks. Christian news outlet Watani reported that eight Christians were also held without charge for varying periods, with some for up to one month. Two were released after 18 days of detention and three after 29 days on August 19, while the remaining three were released a few days after that.

Numerous press outlets reported arson attacks by Muslims opposed to the presence of churches in El-Ameriya village in Alexandria and Abo Yacoub in Minya, leading to the arson and destruction of five Christian-owned houses and injuries to at least two Christians. In El-Ameriya, six suspects were arrested and released the next day; in Abo Yacoub, 16 were arrested but released on bail after victims withdrew their complaints during customary reconciliation, according to press reports. By year’s end, authorities had not referred any of the attackers to court in either incident.

Kidnappers disproportionately targeted Christians, according to International Christian Concern, a human rights organization. On April 5, unknown assailants kidnapped a 13-year-old Christian boy outside his school in the village of Mansheyet Manbal in Minya, according to press reports. The kidnappers released the boy 12 days after his family paid 300,000 EGP ($16,700) in ransom. Police arrested the child’s three kidnappers on April 25 and returned the ransom money to his family. Also according to International Christian Concern, on May 12 a Muslim man abducted a 16-year-old Christian female from Bani Mazar, Minya and demanded 250,000 EGP ($13,900) in ransom. Police rescued her two weeks later, after her family staged a sit-in at the Bani Mazar police station demanding that police take action against a known suspect. On May 26, police raided the man’s hideout, rescued the youth, and arrested the kidnapper, who had been torturing and abusing her, according to the organization.

On November 5, the press reported that residents in Ezbet Talata village in Damietta Governorate filed a complaint about a teacher who had converted from Sunni to Shia Islam and whom they alleged was preaching the Shia faith to her students. Residents had learned about her conversion after she called in to a Shia satellite channel. The Ministry of Education subsequently transferred the teacher to another school in a different village. When her landlord in the new village learned that she was a Shia he evicted her, according to the mayor of Ezbet Talata. The teacher returned to Ezbet Talata but residents there ostracized her, the mayor told the press in a video interview.

On May 12, the makeshift Coptic Virgin Mary Church in the village of Ismailia, Minya was burned down, according to an official statement from the Minya Coptic Orthodox Bishopric. The congregation had been using the church for more than a year, with the knowledge of security agencies and local authorities, who had closed its previous location due to opposition from Muslim residents of the village. Police arrested two men on May 14 in connection with the crime.

On April 20, an Islamic militant group calling itself “Popular Resistance” claimed responsibility for setting fire to St. George Coptic Catholic Church in Luxor. The group issued a statement on Facebook stating it had set the fire as a “warning to the church to stop what happens against Muslims,” alluding to perceived Christian support for the government.

On July 16, fire broke out in a second church in Luxor, Coptic Orthodox Archangel Michael Church, in Madamod village. No group claimed responsibility and authorities never announced a final determination as to whether the case was arson; however, according to one journalist, the congregation had faced resistance from “extremists in the area” when attempting to build the church.

In September during a television interview, lawyer and political commentator Nabih Al Wahsh physically attacked an Islamic scholar who had stated Islamic doctrine did not require a woman to cover her hair.

Public discussions continued among policy makers and in the media about universities, hospitals, and other service-oriented entities that adopted policies prohibiting professors, doctors, nurses, and others from wearing the niqab while at work. Banha University investigated a dean after he asked a female security officer to verify a student’s identity in order to prevent cheating during a final exam, according to press reports. The student union issued a statement complaining that security officers had asked the student to lift her niqab in front of others. The statement stated that choosing to cover the face was “an act of personal freedom.”

Representatives of some Salafist groups, including the Coalition of Muslims in Defense of the Companions and the Prophet’s Family, published negative remarks about Shia Muslims. On February 1, the group threatened to sue the minister of culture for “spreading Shia ideology” when the minister rejected their calls to confiscate Shia books exhibited at the Cairo International Book Fair.

Discrimination in private hiring continued to occur, according to sources within human rights groups and religious communities. According to the NGO Coptic Solidarity, Christians also faced discrimination in sports, especially soccer, with some players unable to pursue careers in sports or join prominent teams due to religious discrimination. The NGO stated that, despite passing selections stages, Christian athletes had been excluded from national and international competitions due to their religious identity. For example, it said that none of the country’s participants in the last two Olympics was a Copt and that there were no Copts represented as players, coaches, or trainers in any of the clubs in the country’s premier soccer league.

Islamic groups continued to use discriminatory speech against Christians in the press and on websites. In September the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood-associated Freedom and Justice Party published an op-ed on its website in which it denounced the new law governing the construction and renovation of churches. It called Christianity a “rogue sect” for challenging the beliefs of Muslims and said that Christians wanted to create a Christian state in Egypt, thereby changing the identity of society, and that Christians “look forward to the day Egypt becomes Christian.”

Societal anti-Semitism was widespread, including by media commentators. In May lawyer and political commentator Nabih Al Wahsh appeared in a television interview during which he accused Israel of shooting down Egypt Air flight 804 with a missile and of “exporting AIDS, aphrodisiac bubble gum, and all kinds of catastrophes” to the country. He called on “any Egyptian or Arab man who comes across an Israeli person to kill him and mutilate his body” and for “death squads to hunt down any Israeli anywhere in the world,” according to the Middle East Media Research Institute. Copies of anti-Semitic literature, including translations of Mein Kampf, were widely available for purchase.

In July professor and political activist Mamdouh Hamza posted a series of tweets in which he expressed his opposition to a rumored proposed law to sell Egyptian citizenship. Hamza said he feared Jews who had been forced out of the country in the 1950s and 1960s might return to “overturn Egyptian laws” and “confiscate” land. The press repeated Hamza’s statements.

Presbyterians, Baptists, Brethren, Open Brethren, Seventh-day Adventists, Revival of Holiness (Nahdat al-Qadaasa), Faith (Al-Eyman), Church of God, Christian Model Church (Al-Mithaal Al-Masihi), Apostolic, Grace (An-Ni’ma), Pentecostal, Apostolic Grace, Church of Christ, Gospel Missionary (Al-Kiraaza bil Ingil), and the Message Church of Holland (Ar-Risaala) constituted the Protestant Council. The Anglican Church in Egypt operated outside the council as a diocese of the Province of Jerusalem and the Middle East.

U.S. government officials at multiple levels, including the Ambassador and other Department of State and embassy officials, raised religious freedom concerns with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior. These included cases in which the government failed to hold the perpetrators of sectarian violence accountable; prosecuted individuals for religious defamation; participated in customary reconciliation sessions to address sectarian violence which human rights groups and many Christians described as unfair; placed restrictions on religious discourse; and failed to recognize conversion of Muslim-born citizens. Embassy representatives also met with leading religious figures, including the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Grand Mufti of Dar Al-Iftaa, the Coptic Orthodox Pope, other leading Christian clergy, and representatives of the Jewish and Bahai communities.

In addition, Department of State officials, including the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South and Central Asia, met with representatives of these and other religious minority communities. In meetings with high level officials at the Ministries of Foreign affairs and Interior, the Special Advisor emphasized the U.S. commitment to religious freedom and raised a number of cases, for example of attacks on Christians, recognition of Bahais and Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the rights of Shia to publicly perform religious rituals. Embassy officials maintained an active dialogue with human rights advocates, religious leaders, and community members on questions of religious freedom, for example, on combating anti-Semitism, supporting the rights of all citizens to choose their religion, build houses of worship, and practice their religious rituals as well as the government’s responsibility to prosecute perpetrators of sectarian attacks.

The U.S. government estimates the total population of El Salvador at 6.2 million (July 2016 estimate). According to a July 2016 survey by the University of Central America’s Institute of Public Opinion, 50.6 percent of the population identifies as Roman Catholic, 32.9 percent as evangelical Protestant, 14.4 percent have no religious affiliation, and 2.1 percent state “other,” which includes Jehovah’s Witnesses, the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, and members of The Church of Latter Day Saints (Mormons). A small segment of the population adheres to indigenous religious beliefs, with some mixing of these beliefs with other religions such as Catholicism.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the free exercise of religion. It states all persons are equal before the law and prohibits discrimination based on religion.

The constitution states members of the clergy may not occupy the positions of president, cabinet ministers, vice ministers, Supreme Court justices, judges, governors, attorney general, public defender, and other senior government positions. The clergy may not belong to political parties. The electoral code requires judges of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and members of municipal councils to be laypersons.

The constitution allows religious groups to apply for official recognition by registering with the government. The Catholic Church, which is recognized in the constitution, is exempted from registration requirements. Religious groups may operate without registering, but registration provides tax-exempt status and facilitates activities requiring official permits, such as building places of worship. To register, a religious group must apply through the Office of the Director General for Nonprofit Associations and Foundations (DGFASFL) within the Ministry of Governance. The group must present its constitution and bylaws describing the type of organization, location of its offices, its goals and principles, requirements for membership, function of its ruling bodies, and assessments or dues. DGFASFL analyzes the group’s constitution and bylaws to ensure both are in compliance with the law. Upon approval, the group’s constitution and bylaws are published in the official gazette. DGFASFL does not maintain records on religious groups once it approves their status.

By law, the Ministry of Governance has authority to register, regulate, and oversee the finances of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), non-Catholic churches, and other religious groups. Foreign religious groups must obtain special residence visas for religious activities and may not proselytize while on visitor or tourist visas.

Public education is secular. The constitution grants the right to establish private schools, including schools run by religious groups, which operate without government support. Parents choose whether their children receive religious education. Public schools may not deny admittance to any student based on religion. All private schools, whether religious or not, must meet the same standards to obtain Ministry of Education approval.

The Penal Code imposes criminal sentences of six months to two years on individuals who publicly offend or insult the religious beliefs of others, or damage or destroy religious objects. If such acts are carried out for the purpose of gaining media attention, sentences increase to one to three years. Repeat offenders face prison sentences of three to eight years. There have been no prosecutions under this law.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In January the government agreed to cooperate with INTERPOL to arrest 17 former soldiers accused of shooting six Jesuit priests (five of whom were Spanish) in 1989 to silence criticism of civil rights abuses during the country’s civil war. When a Spanish judge renewed his country’s request with INTERPOL to arrest those implicated in the killings, the government agreed to cooperate. In February the National Police arrested four former Salvadoran soldiers accused of the killings. The United States government approved the extradition of former Colonel Montano Morales, accused of having orchestrated the killings.

There were 151 new requests for registration of religious groups from January through September, of which 49 were approved, 102 were pending, one was withdrawn, and none were denied.

The Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights reported it had not received notice of any cases of alleged violations of religious freedom since 2006.

Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders stated their clergy could sometimes not reach their respective congregations in gang-controlled territory out of fear of crime and violence. Religious leaders joined other members of civil society in the government-led National Security Council, helping to develop a new security plan, Plan El Salvador Seguro.

U.S. embassy officials discussed the importance of government officials carrying out their official duties regardless of their personal religious affiliation or beliefs with the new ombudsman for human rights.

Embassy officials discussed internal displacement and restriction of movement because of gang activity with the faith-based NGO Cristosal and the executive director of the Institute of Human Rights at Central American University, a Jesuit institution, stressing the importance of filing a complaint with law enforcement agencies and the ombudsman for human rights.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 759,000 (July 2016 estimate). A local 2015 census conducted in collaboration with the United Nations, however, puts the total population at 1.2 million. According to the most recent estimates, 88 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 5 percent is Protestant. Many Christians reportedly practice some aspects of traditional indigenous religions as well. Two percent of the population is Muslim (mainly Sunni). The remaining 5 percent adhere to animism, the Bahai Faith, and other beliefs.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and worship and prohibits political parties based on religious affiliation. The law also states the country has no national religion. The law states individuals are free to change religions. Christians converting to Islam are permitted to add Muslim names to their Christian names on their official documents.

Regulations establish an official preference for the Roman Catholic Church and the Reformed Church of Equatorial Guinea. Neither group is required to register. The state provides funding to the Roman Catholic Church for its schools, the only religious group to receive such funding for operating educational institutions.

Catholic and Reformed churches are not required to register with the MJRAPI. Some long-standing religious groups such as Muslims or Bahais hold permanent authorizations and are not required to renew their registrations with the MJRAPI. Newer groups and denominations may be required to renew their registration annually. To register, religious groups at the congregational level must submit a written application to the director general of religion in the MJRAPI. Those seeking to register must supply detailed information about the leadership (e.g., curriculum vitae) and members of the group; construction plans of the religious building; property ownership documents, accreditations, and religious mandate; and pay a fee of 100,000 Central African Francs (CFA) ($161). The director general of religion adjudicates these applications and may order an inspection by the MJRAPI before processing.

The adjudication of the registration application rests solely with the director general of religion – the commission of representatives of several government agencies that is supposed to adjudicate the applications has been inactive for several years. Those seeking to register must supply information about the group such as a list of members, and the MJRAPI may conduct an inspection before processing an application. The government may fine or shut down unregistered groups. The law requires a permit for door-to-door proselytism.

A MJRAPI decree specifies that any religious activities taking place outside the hours of 6 a.m. to 9 p.m., or outside of registered places of worship, require prior authorization from the MJRAPI. The decree prohibits religious acts or preaching within private residences if those acts involve people who do not live there. Foreign religious representatives or authorities must obtain advance permission from the MJRAPI to participate in religious activities. The decree exempts the Catholic Church.

The government recognizes official documents issued by authorized religious groups, such as birth certificates and marriage certificates.

The constitution states individuals are free to study religion in schools and may not be forced to study a faith other than their own. Catholic religious classes are part of the public school curriculum, but with a note from a leader of another religious group, such study may be replaced by non-Catholic religious study, or by a recess.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

While the government routinely granted religious groups permission for any activities outside of places of worship, except in private homes, it usually denied permits to hold activities outside of the prescribed hours of 6 a.m. to 9 p.m. All religious groups, including small Bahai and Jewish groups, were allowed to hold services as long as they finished before 9 p.m. and did not disturb the peace. Evangelical Christian groups continued to hold activities outside the prescribed period. The authorities routinely issued permits for proselytism. Religious leaders said door-to-door proselytism occurred without incident.

Foreign evangelical missionaries were required to obtain residency permits to remain in the country. Evangelical Christians reported the permits were prohibitively expensive, leading some missionaries to risk the consequences of not obtaining or renewing such permits. The local police reportedly enforced the requirement with threatened deportation and requested a small bribe as an alternative. There were no deportations reported. The residency permits were not required for Catholic missionaries.

Protestant groups, including the Reformed Church, Seventh-day Adventists, Assemblies of God, Baptists, and other evangelical Christians operated primary and secondary schools. These schools had to be registered with the government and fulfill standard curriculum requirements.

Catholic masses were a normal part of all major ceremonial functions, such as National Day on October 12 and the President’s Birthday on June 5. Catholic leaders met publicly with government officials and were usually the only religious leaders to do so. Catholic and Reformed Church leaders were often seated in preferred locations at official functions. On May 28, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo opened the new Catholic Church of Our Lady of Bisila, which was totally financed by the government, on the mountain peak above Malabo.

The President of the Federation of Evangelical Churches stated that its annual Easter procession went smoothly and without any intervention from the police. In previous years, the national police initially tried to stop the procession, but the event was allowed to proceed after proof of government authorization.

Some non-Catholics who worked for the government continued to report that their supervisors strongly encouraged participation in religious activities related to their government positions, including attending Catholic masses. Government officials stated they were expected to attend the president’s birthday Mass at the Catholic Church.

Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim leaders, as well as other religious leaders with large congregations, reported no incidents involving restriction of religious practice, and had not heard of any incidents against other groups.

U.S. embassy officials met with the director general of religion to discuss religious freedom and the ability of individuals to practice any religion free of discrimination. The embassy also met with the imam for Malabo, the Archbishop of Malabo, evangelical Christian pastors, Protestant leaders, and a representative of the Bahai Faith, to acquire their insights as well as to discuss the need to promote mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect for all religious groups, especially for minority religious groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.8 million (July 2016 estimate). The Eritrean government estimates the population at 3.5 million. There are no reliable figures on religious affiliation. Government, religious, and local UN sources estimate the population is approximately 48-50 percent Christian and 48-50 percent Sunni Muslim. The Christian population is predominantly Eritrean Orthodox. Catholics, Protestants, and other Christian denominations including the Greek Orthodox Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Pentecostals, total less than 5 percent of the Christians. Some estimates suggest approximately 2 percent of the population is animist, and there is a small Bahai community of approximately 300 members. There is a very small Jewish community.

Legal Framework

The law and unimplemented constitution prohibit religious discrimination and provide for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief and the freedom to practice any religion.

A longstanding proclamation requires religious groups to register with the government or cease activities. Members of religious groups that are unregistered or otherwise not in compliance with the law are subject to penalties under the provisional penal code. Such penalties may include fines and prison terms. The Office of Religious Affairs has authority to regulate religious activities and institutions, including approval of the applications of religious groups seeking official recognition. Each application must include a description of the religious group’s history in the country, an explanation of the uniqueness or benefit the group offers compared with other religious groups, names and personal information of the group’s leaders, detailed information on assets, a description of the group’s conformity to local culture, and a declaration of all foreign sources of funding.

The government has registered and recognizes four religious groups: the Eritrean Orthodox Church, Sunni Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Eritrea. It also appoints the heads of the Eritrean Orthodox Church and the Sunni Islamic community.

Groups must renew their registration every year. In 2002, the minister of information issued a decree requiring all religious groups, except the Eritrean Orthodox Church, Sunni Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Eritrea (affiliated with the Lutheran World Federation), to submit registration applications and cease religious activities and services until these applications were approved. Since 2002, the government has not approved the registration of additional religious groups; information on how many registrations are pending is not available.

Religious groups may print and distribute documents only with the authorization of the Office of Religious Affairs, which has only approved requests from the four officially registered religious groups. If a religious institution disseminates a publication or broadcast through the media without government approval, the author of the publication or director of the broadcast is subject to a fine of up to 10,000 nakfa ($667) and/or two years’ imprisonment.

Religious groups must obtain government approval to build facilities for worship.

The law does not address religious education in public school. Religious education is allowed in private schools.

By law all citizens between 18 and 50 must perform national service, with limited exceptions, including for health reasons such as physical disability or pregnancy. In 2012, the government instituted a compulsory citizen militia, requiring persons not already in the military, including many who were demobilized, elderly, or otherwise exempted from military service in the past, to carry firearms and attend militia training. Failure to participate in the militia or national service could result in detention. Militia duties mostly involve security-related activities, such as airport or neighborhood patrolling. Militia training primarily involves occasional marches and listening to patriotic lectures. The law does not provide for conscientious objector status for religious reasons, nor are there alternative activities for persons willing to perform national service but unwilling to engage in military or militia activities.

The law prohibits any involvement in politics by religious groups and prohibits religiously affiliated media outlets from commenting on political matters.

All citizens must obtain an exit visa prior to departure. The application requests the applicant’s religious affiliation, but the law does not require that information.

The law limits foreign financing for religious groups. The only contributions legally allowed are from local followers, from the government, or from government-approved foreign sources.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Government lack of transparency and intimidation of sources made it difficult to obtain accurate information on specific religious freedom cases. According to the international NGO Human Rights Watch, all religious groups, to varying degrees, continued to be subject to government restrictions. Other observers noted that the government continued to impose restrictions on proselytizing, accepting funding from NGOs and international organizations, groups selecting their own religious leaders, gathering for worship, constructing places of worship, and teaching religious beliefs to others. Amnesty International stated that the government subjected members of unrecognized religious groups to arbitrary detention, torture, forced recanting as a condition of release, and other ill-treatment.

According to the June 2016 COI report, individuals stated that members of nonauthorized religious groups continued to suffer acute discrimination, detention, beatings, and coercion to renounce their religion. There was a reported incident where military police forced individuals to sign documentation stating their commitment to Eritrean Orthodox Church in 2014 and 2015. A witness who reported being detained several times, including from 2014 to November 2015 for practicing a nonauthorized religion and who fled the country this year, told the COI that “Protestants detained are only released after denouncing their faith and promising to worship in the Eritrean Orthodox Church.” Authorities reportedly sometimes released detainees who promised to renounce adherence to an unregistered religious group.

The June 2016 COI report concluded that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that Eritrean officials have and still continue to deprive Eritrean ‘Pentes,’ and some Muslims, of fundamental rights contrary to international law on religious grounds. Muslims were targeted, in particular in the 1990’s, in 2007-2008, and after the Forto incident in 2013. Jehovah’s Witnesses have been targeted since May 1991, and other nonauthorized religious denominations since no later than 2002.” The COI also concluded, “Persecution on both religious and ethnic grounds has been an integral part of the Eritrean leadership’s plan to maintain its authority in a manner contrary to international law.” This caused the commission to conclude “that Eritrean officials have committed the crime of persecution, a crime against humanity, in a large-scale and routine manner since May 1991.” The COI found “that, at a minimum, the persecution of members of nonauthorized religious denominations persists.” The government continued to deny the COI access to the country.

According to international representatives of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, on April 5, Saron Gebru, a 28-year-old female Jehovah’s Witness, began serving a six-month sentence after “being convicted for attending the 2014 Memorial of Christ’s death.” She was released on October 5. Jehovah’s Witnesses also reported on the case of Meraf Seyum Habtemariam, a 53-year-old female Jehovah’s Witness, who remained in jail after being arrested for taking part in a “religious activity” in October 2015.

Government secrecy and intimidation of sources made it impossible to determine the precise number of those imprisoned because of their religious beliefs. Releases and arrests often went unreported. Information from outside the capital was extremely limited. Independent observers noted that many people remained imprisoned with no charges.

International religious organizations reported that authorities interrogated detainees about their religious affiliation and asked them to identify members of unregistered religious groups.

January marked the tenth year of Patriarch Abune Antonios’s house arrest. Patriarch Antonios was appointed by the Orthodox Church leadership in Cairo and put under house arrest in 2006 for protesting government interference in Church affairs. Church leaders and several NGOs, including Christian Solidarity Worldwide, raised concerns about his poor health and called for his release. The COI was also able to corroborate reports that more than 10 Orthodox priests were detained in April 2016 for protesting his continued detention and expressing concern about government plans to appoint a new patriarch following the death of Abune Dioskoros, who was appointed by the government following the detention of Patriarch Abune Antonio.

The government continued to detain persons associated with unregistered religious groups without due process, occasionally for long periods of time, and sometimes on the grounds of threatening national security. According to World Watch Monitor, the majority of the pastors arrested after the government began to crack down on banned religious groups in 2002 remained imprisoned. None have been charged with a crime or brought before a court.

The government continued to single out Jehovah’s Witnesses for particularly harsh treatment because of their blanket refusal to bear arms. Jehovah’s Witnesses estimated that 54 of their members were in detention as of October, including three men imprisoned without charges for more than 20 years. Other NGO sources corroborated reports of such detentions.

The government continued to consider Jehovah’s Witnesses and other religious prisoners as being held for their religious affiliation or for national security reasons. Prisoners held for national security reasons were not allowed visitors, and families often did not know where they were being held. Authorities generally permitted family members to visit prisoners detained for religious reasons only. Released prisoners who had been held for their religious beliefs reported harsh detention conditions, including solitary confinement, physical abuse, and inadequate food, water, and shelter.

The government continued to require students in their final year of secondary school to attend the Sawa National Training Center where military training occurs. Students who did not want to attend military training at Sawa, including some conscientious objectors, sometimes fled the country, according to many media sources. The COI found that religious practice was “severely restricted” in the military; authorities informed conscripts that they were prohibited from practicing their religion. One refugee reported to an NGO that Muslims were allowed to pray in the army, but Christians were banned from reading the Bible and from praying or talking with others. He said that possessing a Bible was seen as a sign that the person was a Pentecostal Christian.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported that members continued to be unable to obtain official identification documents. Jehovah’s Witnesses were collectively stripped of citizenship in 1994 after their refusal to participate in the country’s 1993 independence referendum. The government continued to withhold documents and entitlements such as passports, national identification cards (required for employment), exit visas, and ration cards. In October the government began requiring customers to present a national identification card in order to use the computers at private internet cafes.

Official attitudes toward members of unregistered religious groups worshipping in homes or rented facilities differed. Some local authorities tolerated the presence and activities of unregistered groups, while others attempted to prevent them from meeting. According to an NGO representative who spoke with refugees outside the country, members of some unregistered Christian groups continued to meet, worship, and evangelize despite the dangers. The refugee also reported that individuals known to be practicing Christians did not receive the water distributions when neighbors did, and that they did not receive special government coupons to purchase subsidized food as did others in their communities. Local authorities sometimes denied government coupons (which allowed shoppers to buy at a discounted price at certain stores) to Jehovah’s Witnesses and members of Pentecostal groups.

The leaders of the four recognized religious groups stated that their officially registered members did not face impediments to religious practice.

Most religious facilities not belonging to the four officially registered religious groups remained closed. The government continued to allow the practice of Sunni Islam only and banned all other practices of Islam. Religious structures used by unregistered Jewish and Greek Orthodox groups continued to exist in Asmara. The government protected the historic Jewish synagogue building. Other structures belonging to unregistered groups, such as Seventh-day Adventists and the Church of Christ, remained shuttered. The government allowed the Bahai center to remain open, and, according to reports, the members of the center had access to the building for at least some forms of meetings. The Greek Orthodox church remained open, but there were no services. There were services held in the Anglican church building, but only under the auspices of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. There were reports of other Protestant denominations holding services in homes, but not openly.

Some church leaders stated the government’s restriction on foreign financing reduced church income and religious participation by preventing the churches from training clergy or building facilities. The government permitted the Catholic Church to receive financing from the Holy See. The government also allowed funding from the Papal Foundation in the amount of $90,700 to “subsidize the cost of the elderly priests’ residence.” The government did not permit the Evangelical Lutheran Church to receive foreign funding.

Government control of all mass media restricted the ability of unregistered religious group members to bring attention to religious persecution, which observers indicated was caused by government officials. Restrictions on public assembly and freedom of speech severely limited the ability of unregistered religious groups to assemble and conduct their worship, according to members of these groups.

The sole political party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), appointed both the Mufti of the Sunni Islamic community and the Patriarch of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, as well as some lower-level religious officials for both communities. PFDJ-appointed lay administrators managed some operations of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, including disposition of donations and seminarian participation in national service.

The government continued to permit a limited number of Sunni Muslims, mainly the elderly and those not fit for military service, to take part in the Hajj, travel abroad for religious study, and host clerics from abroad. The government generally did not permit Muslim groups to receive funding from governments of nations where Islam was the dominant religion on grounds that such funding threatened to import foreign “fundamentalist” or “extremist” tendencies.

The government sometimes granted visas permitting Catholic dioceses to host visiting clergy from Rome or other foreign locations. Catholic clergy were permitted to travel abroad for religious purposes and training, although not in numbers Church officials considered adequate; they were discouraged from attending certain events while overseas. Students attending the Roman Catholic seminary as well as Catholic nuns did not perform national service and did not suffer repercussions from the government, according to Church officials. Some religious leaders stated, however, that national service requirements prevented adequate numbers of seminarians from completing theological training in Rome or other locations, because those who had not completed national service were not able to obtain passports or exit visas.

Some Eritrean Orthodox clergy operating outside the country said the government sought to control Eritrean Orthodox churches in foreign countries. Authorities reportedly pressured one such overseas Eritrean Orthodox church to send money to the government or risk preventing church members from visiting relatives in Eritrea and potential seizure of assets held by the church members in the country.

Government control of all media, expression and public discourse has made it difficult to observe any potential societal actions impacting religious freedom. Foreign diplomats have reported that individuals in positions of power were often reluctant to share power with Muslim countrymen and were distrustful of Muslims outside of the country. Some Christian leaders, however, have reported that Muslim leaders and communities have been willing to work with them on community projects.

Refugees outside the country reported that neighbors in the country sometimes turned in to local authorities members of unregistered religious groups that met together in homes to worship.

U.S. embassy representatives met periodically with government officials to raise religious freedom concerns, including advocating for the release of Jehovah’s Witnesses and alternative service for conscientious objectors refusing to bearing arms for religious reasons. Embassy officers raised issues of religious freedom with a wide range of interlocutors, including visiting international delegations, Asmara- and regionally based diplomats accredited to Eritrea, and UN and other international organization representatives.

Embassy staff met with clergy, leaders, and other representatives of most religious groups, including unregistered ones. Embassy officials attended religious celebrations, weddings, and funeral ceremonies of the four registered faiths as invitees of the government or of religious leaders and on an ad hoc basis.

The embassy’s social media platforms regularly posted articles that focused on tolerance of religious diversity in the United States and the U.S. commitment to human rights. The embassy hosted well-attended public events such as the public screening of President Obama’s talk at the Islamic Society of Baltimore and a Muhammad Ali film festival tribute that allowed embassy staff to engage members of the public on issues of religious freedom and religious tolerance in the United States.

Since 2004, Eritrea has been designated as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On October 31, 2016, the Secretary of State redesignated Eritrea as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act. Restrictions on U.S. assistance resulting from the CPC designation remained in place.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.3 million (July 2016 estimate). According to 2011 census data, 29 percent is religiously affiliated, 54 percent does not identify with any religion, and 17 percent declined to answer the question on the census. According to 2015 data from churches and congregations, the Estonian Orthodox Church (EOCMP), which is subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, has approximately 170,000 members (13.1 percent of the population), while the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church has 159,000members (12.2 percent). The Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church has 30,000 members (2.3 percent). Other Christian groups, including Baptists, Roman Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Russian Old Believers, members of the Christian Free Congregations, and Pentecostals, collectively constitute 1.2 percent of the population. Members of the Russian Old Believers live primarily along the west bank of Lake Peipsi in the east. According to the census, there are more than 2,000 Jews and 1,500 Muslims. Most religious adherents among the Russian-speaking population are EOCMP members and reside mainly in the capital or the northeastern part of the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution states there is no state church and stipulates freedom for individuals to belong to any religious group and practice any religion, both alone and in community with others, in public or in private, unless doing so is “detrimental to public order, health, or morals.” The constitution also prohibits incitement of religious hatred, violence, or discrimination. Violations are punishable by fines or up to three years in prison. The constitution recognizes the right to refuse military service for religious reasons but requires conscientious objectors to perform alternative service as provided by law.

The law regulates the activities of religious associations and religious societies. Religious associations are defined as churches, congregations, unions of congregations, and monasteries. Religious societies are defined as voluntary organizations whose main activities include religious or ecumenical activities relating to morals, ethics, culture, and social rehabilitation activities outside the traditional forms of religious rites of a church or congregation and need not be connected with a specific church or congregation.

The registration office of the Tartu County Court registers religious associations. Associations that are churches, congregations, and unions of congregations are required to have a management board; only citizens and legal residents may be members of the board. Monasteries are required to have an elected or appointed superior. In order to register formally, a religious association must have at least 12 members, and its management board must submit an application signed and notarized by all board members, the minutes of its constitutive meeting, and a copy of its statutes. The registration requirements for religious associations fall under the law governing nonprofit associations. The law treats registered religious associations as nonprofit entities entitled to some tax benefits, such as a value-added tax exemption. There are more than 550 religious associations registered with the government.

The law does not prohibit activities of religious associations that are not registered. Unregistered religious associations, however, cannot act as legal persons and do not receive tax benefits.

Religious societies are registered according to the law governing nonprofit associations and are entitled to the same tax benefits as religious associations. In order to register as an NGO, a religious society must have a founding contract and statutes approved by its founders, which may be physical or legal persons. The minimum number of founders is two. The society must submit its registration application to the business registry electronically or on paper.

The law requires the commanding officer of each military unit to provide its members the opportunity to practice their religion. Prison directors must also provide the opportunity for inmates to practice their religious beliefs. The state funds military and prison chaplains, who may belong to any registered religious denomination and must serve individuals of all faiths.

Optional basic religious instruction is available in public and private schools, funded by the state. A school must offer religious studies at the primary or secondary level if at least 12 students request it. Courses offer a general introduction of different faiths. Religious studies instructors may be lay teachers or clergy provided by religious groups. There are no restrictions on private religious schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Two religious associations were registered throughout the year, one in Valga, the Rescue Ship Christian Pentecostal Congregation, and one in Narva, the 12 Sacred Apostles Congregation of the Estonian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate.

The government provided 646,000 euros ($681,000) to the Estonian Council of Churches, comprised of 10 Christian churches, including the Lutheran Church and both Orthodox churches. The state did not determine how the funds were allocated; some of these funds were distributed among the member churches and some were used for ecumenical projects and training for members of the boards of council-member congregations to encourage participation in civil society. The government consulted with representatives of the Muslim community and the Council of Churches regarding pending legislation on refugee and immigration issues.

On February 6, the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE), which held seven seats in parliament, organized events at cafes to protest against immigration and the “Islamization of Europe.” EKRE participated in Fortress Europe, which united anti-immigration movements (such as PEGIDA) in European countries.

On January 27 the government, in association with the Jewish Community, held an annual memorial event on Holocaust Remembrance Day at Rahumae Jewish Cemetery in Tallinn. The minister of culture delivered a speech on religious tolerance and laid a wreath in memory of victims of the Holocaust. On the same date schools participated in Holocaust commemorative activities throughout the country.

On January 29 the ministry of education and research in cooperation with other organizations sponsored a seminar for history and civics teachers to introduce them to best practices in the classroom for Holocaust commemoration. The event took place in the Museum of Occupations.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Local media, including the newspaper Eesti Paevaleht, reported more instances of hostility based on anti-Muslim sentiments than in previous years. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

The Soldiers of Odin, a self-proclaimed patriotic group, which professed its aim as countering crime by “Islamist intruders,” started a branch in Finland early in the year. According to Reuters and other media, the group announced plans to set up vigilante groups in several cities throughout the country. The prime minister and defense minister condemned the plans. By year’s end, there were no reports of any vigilante groups having formed.

The Jewish Community confirmed in August that unidentified individuals vandalized a Holocaust monument with a swastika in Kalevi-Liiva, Harju County. Police investigated the incident but had not identified the perpetrators by year’s end.

Two Lutheran congregations, Harju Risti Congregation and Tallinn Bethel Congregation, accommodated refugee families.

The U.S. embassy discussed religious freedom issues with the ministries of internal, social, and foreign affairs and engaged the government on promoting religious tolerance, particularly in light of the crisis of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe.

Embassy officials met with members of the Jewish community, the NGO Human Rights Center, and the Estonian Council of Churches, an association of Christian groups, to discuss religious freedom in the country.

The education ministry and embassy jointly funded the travel of two teachers to a summer teacher-training program on Holocaust education in the United States. The teachers incorporated the training into the Holocaust education program included in the national curriculum.

The ambassador spoke about the importance of a thriving Jewish community at the annual Yahad event, organized by the Jewish community.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 102.3 million (2016 estimate). The most recent census of 2007 estimated 44 percent of the population adheres to the EOC, 34 percent is Sunni Muslim, and 19 percent belongs to Christian evangelical and Pentecostal groups. The EOC is predominant in the northern regions of Tigray and Amhara and present in Oromia. Islam is most prevalent in the Afar, Oromia, and Somali regions. Established Protestant churches are strongest in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region, Gambella, and parts of Oromia. There are small numbers of Eastern Rite and Roman Catholics, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, and followers of indigenous religions.

Legal Framework

The constitution requires the separation of state and religion, establishes freedom of religious choice and practice, prohibits religious discrimination, and stipulates the government shall not interfere in the practice of any religion. It permits limitations on religious freedom as prescribed by law in order to protect public safety, education, and morals, and to guarantee the independence of government from religion. The law criminalizes religious “defamation” and incitement of one religious group against another. The law permits sharia courts to adjudicate personal status cases, provided both parties are Muslim and consent to the court’s jurisdiction.

Under the state of emergency, which went into effect on October 8, the government limits constitutionally granted freedoms, including religious freedom, for a period of six months that may be renewed. Individuals are prohibited from inducing fear or inflicting conflict during sermons in religious institutions.

Registration and licensing of religious groups are the mandate of the MFPDA. The MFPDA requires unregistered religious groups to submit a founding document, the national ID cards of its founders, and the permanent address of the religious institution and planned regional branches. The registration process also includes an application letter, information on the board members, meeting minutes, information on the founders, its financial reports, offices, name, and symbol. Religious group applicants must have at least 50 individuals for registration as a church and 15 for a ministry or association to be considered. During the registration process, the government publishes the religious group’s name and logo in a local newspaper and, if there are no objections, registration is granted.

All religious institutions, including the EIASC, are registered by the MFPDA. The EOC, however, is registered in a provision under the civil code passed during the imperial era, which is still in force.

All groups must register with the Directorate of Faith and Religious Affairs at the MFPDA to gain legal standing. Most religious groups are registered by the MFPDA. Religious groups must renew their registration at least every five years; failure to do so could result in a fine.

Registered religious organizations are required to provide annual activity and financial reports. Activity reports must describe evangelical activities and list new members, new pastors ordained, and new buildings opened or built. The Charities and Societies Proclamation prohibits certain charities, societies, and associations, including those associated with faith-based organizations that engage in rights-based advocacy, and prevents civil society organizations from receiving more than 10 percent of their funding from foreign sources. Rights-based advocacy includes activities promoting human and democratic rights or equality of nations, nationalities, peoples, genders, and religions; protecting the rights of children or persons with disabilities; advancing conflict resolution or reconciliation; and enhancing the efficiency of the justice system or law enforcement services.

Religious groups undertaking development activities were required to register their development arms as charities with the Charities and Societies Agency and follow legal guidelines.

The constitution prohibits religious instruction in schools, whether public or private. The law permits religious instruction in churches and mosques, and schools may organize clubs based on shared religious values.

Under the constitution the government owns all land and therefore individuals, private businesses, and religious groups must apply to both the regional and local governments for land allocation, including for land to build places of worship, schools, hospitals, and cemeteries. The Charities and Societies Association and the Ministry of Health regulate religious schools and hospitals, which the government may close at any time for not following regulations.

The law prohibits the formation of political parties based on religion.

The government mandates a two-hour break on Fridays for Islamic prayers.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights without reservations.

Government Practices

On October 2, at least 55 were killed at a religious and cultural festival in Bishoftu. The government’s response to the highly charged environment reportedly led to the deadly stampede that resulted in most of the confirmed deaths. The initial cause of the disruption remained unclear, but according to media sources there were sounds of gunfire, teargas, and helicopters overhead. During protests that followed the incident and on social media, many individuals blamed the government for instigating the stampede and for incompetence in securing the gathering, among other accusations. On October 7, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights noted there was a need to investigate what occurred and urged the government allow independent observers access to Oromia and Amhara regions. On October 10, a group of UN human rights experts highlighted the October 2 events and urged the government to allow an international commission of inquiry to investigate the protests and any violence used against protesters since November 2015.

The government used the six-month state of emergency declared on October 9, the ATP, and other measures, to restrict organized opposition and antigovernment protests, including through the detention and prosecution of Muslims engaged in nonviolent protests. The state of emergency, in particular, restricted freedom of speech and media consumption while earlier restrictions prevented the use of social media. There were no new violent protests focused solely on Muslim grievances, but some Muslims participated in larger Oromo protests airing past Muslim grievances. Some Muslim community members stated the government co-opted religious leaders to impose Al-Ahbash, a Sufi religious movement rooted in Lebanon and different from indigenous Islam, on local Islamic religious practice. The government stated in 2015 that it no longer supported the program to impose Al-Ahbash on Islamic religious practice, although reports suggested Al-Ahbash teachings were still disseminated and Friday prayers generally conformed to Al-Ahbash teachings.

Muslim community sources stated there continued to be widespread sentiment in the community that the government exercised excessive influence over the EIASC. Some Muslim community members also reported government interference in religious affairs, including the government’s refusal to allow elections in mosques because women would not be allowed to vote. Muslim groups continued to reject the 2012 EIASC elections for alleged government interference and the lack of new elections since then. There were mostly peaceful protests by Muslims against this perceived interference; however, the number of protests this year sharply declined compared to previous years and were incorporated into demonstrations addressing broader grievances, such as the rights of Oromo people. The state of emergency further discouraged such protests. Muslims in Jemo and Furi areas in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Chiro, Jimma, and Gondar protested during the celebration of Eid al-Adha on September 12. Protestors showed red cards, crossed their arms above the head and carried placards that read “We Need Freedom!,” “Hear our Voices!,” and “A Government that Refuses to take Criticism, Will not Last long!”

The government continued to take actions regarding the Muslim Arbitration Committee, a group identified with the 2012 protests. In 2015, the Federal High Court found 18 members and supporters of the Muslim Arbitration Committee guilty of terrorism under the ATP and sentenced the individuals to imprisonment ranging from seven to 22 years. Later that year, the government pardoned and released five of those convicted. In early September the government pardoned two arbitration committee leaders (Abubeker Ahmed Mohamed and Kemal Shemsu Siraj), four members (Bedru Hussein, Sheik Seid Ali, Sheik Mekete Muhe, and Mubarek Adem) and three journalists (Yusuf Getachew, Murad Shekur Jemal, and Nuru Turki Nuru). On December 21, the Federal High Court found guilty 20 supporters of the Muslim Arbitration Committee. The defendants were convicted for “participation in a terrorist organization,” a crime under the ATP, and for committing or conspiring to commit crimes. The defendants found guilty included a leading Muslim scholar, Kedir Mohammed, and two radio journalists.

On January 19, the Federal High Court sentenced all 16 defendants in the 2013 Elias Kedir case to seven years in prison under the charge of participation in a terrorist organization, a crime punishable under the ATP. The defendants said they were protesting government interference in Muslim affairs and called for the release of the Muslim Arbitration Committee members through writings in various media and peaceful protests in mosques. Police arrested the defendants in 2013 in Addis Ababa and Wolkite town in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s (SNNPR) Region. On December 16, the Federal Supreme Court reduced the sentences of 12 of the defendants from seven years to three years and four months following the defense’s appeal of the High Court’s original sentences. Authorities also pardoned and released four other defendants in September.

The Federal High Court heard the case of 28 Muslim individuals, 11 of whom were tried in absentia, and found 24 of the defendants guilty of terrorism under the ATP. Some of the defendants told the court they had taken military and political training with Al-Shabaab and worked towards establishing an Islamic state in their country. The court acquitted four individuals of the charges in February. In March the court passed sentences ranging from four-year to 21-year prison terms.

The trial of 14 Muslims charged with the July 2013 killing of Sheikh Nuru in Dessie town continued into its third year. According to media sources, Sheikh Nuru was a follower of Al-Ahbash teachings and defended the government’s policy of imposing the new teachings. The government charged the individuals in November 2013 under the ATP law for “terrorist activity.” At year’s end, the prosecution and defense rested their cases and were awaiting a verdict. One of the 14 defendants reportedly died while in prison.

In November three teenage Christian girls and one young woman were sentenced to one month in prison after distributing a Christian book that allegedly sought to counter widely-circulated writings by a well-known Islamic critic. The four individuals were charged with inciting religious violence in October in Babile. Muslim communities in the area stated the book was an insult to Islam. Four teenagers attacked a local church shortly after the book was distributed; four suspects in the church burning were arrested in October.

The Directorate for Registration of Religious Groups within MFPDA reported it registered 1,600 religious groups and associations as of year’s end.

There were reports of discrimination in registration and land allocation. Members of some religious groups stated the exemption of the EOC and the EIASC from the registration requirement amounted to a double standard between the EOC and EISAC, on the one hand, and other religious groups on the other.

Protestants privately reported unequal treatment by local officials compared to the EOC and the EIASC with regard to religious registration and allocation of land for churches and cemeteries. The MFPDA, which had oversight responsibility for religious affairs, stated the perceived inequities were a result of poor governance at the local level and of zoning regulations governing a property’s existing and proposed communal use.

Some religious groups, mainly Protestant, continued to work through private and unofficial channels to seek the return of property confiscated between 1977 and 1991. Although some property was returned in previous years, there were no reports the government returned any property during the year.

The MFPDA, working with the EIASC and other civil society groups, sponsored workshops and training of religious leaders, elders, and influential community members with the stated intention of addressing the potential for sectarian violence.

Protestors in the predominantly Muslim West Arsi area of Oromia region reportedly burned down 15 churches and related facilities belonging to Kale Hiwot, Full Gospel, Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist, and Orthodox churches in attacks carried out in February and confirmed by the independent Human Rights Council. The attacks followed an incident several days earlier in which police stopped a bus en route to a wedding and then fired shots. The government stated that the attacks on the places of worship were carried out by “Islamist extremists” who received funding from foreign sources and opposition political groups. Some residents said the attacks were also linked to ethnic tensions and economic disparities. The government brought the suspects to trial at Oromia regional courts.

In most regions, Orthodox Christians and Muslims reportedly generally respected each other’s religious observances and tolerated intermarriage and conversion. Some Orthodox Christians and Protestants continued to accuse each other of heresy and of actively working to convert adherents from one faith to the other; observers stated these mutual recriminations increased tensions between the groups.

The EIASC and the government continued to express concern about what they said was the increasing influence of foreign Salafist groups within the Muslim community. The EIASC stated it held these groups responsible for exacerbating tensions between Christians and Muslims and within the Muslim community.

Embassy officials engaged with the MFPDA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on religious tolerance and peace and security.

U.S. embassy representatives observed some trials of Muslims accused of terrorism charges, including the trials of Elias Kedir et al., Kedir Mohammad et al., and Aman Assefa et al.

The Ambassador, embassy representatives, and visiting U.S. officials discussed religious freedom, the role of faith-based organizations, and tolerance with religious leaders, including the Office of the Patriarch of the EOC, the president of the EIASC, the cardinal heading the Catholic Church in Ethiopia, and leaders from Kale Hiwot Church. They discussed a range of issues, including the importance of religious freedom.

Embassy officials engaged with members of the IRCE to discuss religious tolerance and attacks on places of worship in the Oromia region and to emphasize religious freedom and tolerance. The embassy’s support of IRCE was designed to strengthen IRCE’s resolve to curb violence through increased dialogue among religious communities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 105,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to government statistics, approximately 99 percent of the population identify as Christian. Several Protestant denominations, as well as the Roman Catholic Church, are present in every state. According to the Office of Statistics, 55 percent of long-term residents are Roman Catholic and 42 percent are Protestant. The United Church of Christ is the main Protestant denomination. Other Christian groups include Baptists, Assemblies of God, the Pentecostal Church, the Apostolic Church, the Salvation Army, Mormons, Seventh-day Adventists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Other religious groups exist in very small numbers, including Bahais, Ahmadi Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, and Hindus. According to a 2014 Pew Research Center report, 2.7 percent follow folk religions.

In Kosrae State, 90 percent of the population is Protestant, with the Congregational Church the most prominent. In Pohnpei State, the population is evenly divided between Protestants and Catholics – more Protestants live on the western side of Pohnpei, while more Catholics live on the eastern side. In Chuuk State, an estimated 60 percent is Catholic and 40 percent is Protestant. In Yap State, an estimated 80 percent of the population is Catholic and the remainder is Protestant. Religious affiliation often tends to follow clan lines.

The majority of foreign workers are Filipino Catholics, who number approximately 850.

Legal Framework

The constitution forbids the establishment of a state religion or governmental restrictions on freedom of religion, although the government may fund nonreligious activities in religiously-affiliated schools. The constitution provides for the free exercise of religion. It also provides that the traditions of the country may be protected by statute and, if such statue is challenged as violating rights provided in the constitution, protection of the tradition “shall be considered a compelling social purpose warranting such governmental action.”

There are no registration requirements for religious groups. There is no religious education in public schools, but religion is taught in private religious schools in addition to the curriculum established by the Department of Education.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

During the year, Ahmadi Muslims reported continuing incidents of discrimination and denial of services in predominantly Protestant Kosrae State. The community reported a local government refused to provide it with water services; a neighboring municipality provided them instead. An Ahmadi imam reported local merchants also denied service to Ahmadis based on anti-Muslim statements by state government officials, such as those saying Christians should not serve non-Christians.

National and state government activities and events routinely opened and closed with a prayer, invocation, or benediction from a Protestant or Catholic clergy member, and often from one of each group.

The government continued to provide grants to private, church-affiliated schools. The government continued to make no distinction between public and private schools in its grants programs.

The Inter-Denominational Council (of Christian churches) in Pohnpei existed to address social problems and promote official cooperation among its member Christian groups. The council met monthly and conducted a youth program and hosted a thanksgiving service to support Christian unity. Other groups, including Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses, reported the council’s charter was not inclusive. Such councils were not known to exist in other states.

Ahmadi Muslims reported incidents of vandalism, including graffiti and stone throwing, at their religious centers and homes.

The U.S. embassy discussed religious freedom and held regular meetings with the Department of Foreign Affairs and senior cabinet officials. They stressed the primacy of the constitution over local laws or practices that potentially privilege one religious group over others. With both national and state levels of government, the embassy continued to promote religious tolerance through social media and direct outreach to students, women’s groups, and local leaders. The embassy also worked with faith-based NGOs to promote religious tolerance. In Kosrae State, embassy officials regularly met with local religious leaders and state government officials on religious tolerance based on the constitution.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 915,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2007 census, approximately 64.5 percent of the population is Christian, 28 percent Hindu, and 6.3 percent Muslim. The largest Christian denomination is the Methodist Church, which makes up approximately 34.6 percent of the population. Other Protestant denominations account for 10.4 percent of the population, Roman Catholics 9.1 percent, and other Christian groups 10.4 percent. There are also small communities of Bahais and Sikhs.

Religious affiliation runs largely along ethnic lines. According to the 2007 census, most indigenous citizens, who constitute 57 percent of the population, are Christian. The majority of the country’s traditional chiefs belong to the Methodist Church, and the Church remains influential among indigenous people, particularly in rural areas where 49 percent of the population lives. Most Indian Fijians, who account for 37 percent of the total population, are Hindu, while roughly 20 percent are Muslim and 6 percent Christian. Approximately 60 percent of the small Chinese community is Christian. The small community of mixed European and Fijian ancestry is predominantly Christian.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes a secular state and protects freedom of religion, conscience, and belief. The government may limit these rights by law to protect the freedoms of others, or for reasons of public safety, order, morality, health, or nuisance. Citizens have the right, either individually or collectively, in public and private, to manifest their religion or beliefs in worship, observance, practice, or teaching. The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religious affiliation, and laws make inciting hatred or “disaffection” against religious groups a criminal offense. The constitution provides that individuals may not assert religious belief as a reason for disobeying the law. The constitution places limits on proselytizing on government premises and at government functions.

By law, religious groups must register with the government through trustees who may then hold land or property for the groups. To register, religious bodies must submit applications to the registrar of titles office. Applications must include names and identification of the trustees signed by the head of the religious body to be registered, a copy of the constitution of the proposed religious body, land title documents for the land used by the religious body, and a registration fee of 2.30 Fiji dollars ($1.10). Registered religious bodies may receive an exemption from tax after approval from the national tax agency on the condition they operate in a nonprofit and noncompetitive capacity. Under the law, religious bodies that hold land or property must register their houses of worship including their land and show proof of title. There is no mention in the law of religious organizations that do not hold land.

Permits are required for any public meeting on public property, outside of regular religious services and houses of worship, organized by religious groups.

There is no required religious instruction under the law. The law allows religious groups the right to establish, maintain, and manage places of education, whether or not they receive financial assistance from the state, provided the institution maintains educational standards prescribed by law. The law permits noncompulsory religious instruction in schools, enabling schools owned and operated by various religious denominations to offer religious instruction. Schools may impart religious elements such as class prayer as long as they do not force teachers to participate, and students may be excused should their parents request it.

The country is not party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama continued to emphasize religious tolerance during public addresses at home and overseas, stating the country is a multifaith nation with religious freedom guaranteed in the constitution. As keynote speaker at a September 15 celebration for the Hindu Ganesh Utsav, the prime minister said “When people of all faiths come together in tolerance and understanding…peace, justice and prosperity flourish.” Representatives of the minority Hindu community expressed support for the prime minister’s message.

The prime minister criticized the Methodist Church for allowing opposition political leaders to serve as lay preachers and for not having its representatives attend an interfaith service for returning peacekeepers. The Methodist Church defended its political neutrality and asserted the rights of politicians of all faiths to practice their religion.

On August 17, the Office of Public Prosecutions charged three staff members of the Fiji Times newspaper and the author of a letter to the editor for violating the crimes decree that prohibits publishing articles that incite and cause dislike, hatred, and antagonism toward any community. The charges alleged the men incited communal antagonism against the Muslim community in a letter to the editor published on April 27 in the Fiji Times indigenous language edition. The letter said in part, “Muslims are not the indigenous of this country. These are people that have invaded other nations, for example, Bangladesh and India, where they killed, raped, and abused their women and children. Today they have gone to the extent of having a part in the running of the country.” The case remained pending as of the end of the year.

On September 29, the parliament voted to suspend opposition Parliamentarian Ratu Isoa Tikoca for two years for a speech he made on July 5, questioning the leadership of Attorney General and Minister of Finance Aiyaz-Sayed Khaiyum and other Muslims holding high-level positions in the government. The parliament’s Privileges Committee ruled that Tikoca’s comments breached a standing order that states, “It is out of order for a member…to use words that are likely to promote feelings of ill-will or hostility between communities or ethnic groups within Fiji.” Non-Muslim opposition members criticized the length of the suspension.

Most schools in the country were established by community organizations and later came under the authority of the Ministry of Education. Private or religious groups sometimes owned or managed the school property but the Ministry of Education administered and regulated the curriculum and teachers. Some of these schools maintained a religious and/or ethnic origin, but they remained open to all students. The government provided funding and education assistance to public schools, including schools owned and operated by religious organizations.

Because religion, ethnicity, and politics are closely linked, it was difficult to categorize the government’s actions as being solely based on religious identity.

The Anglican, Catholic, and Methodist Churches, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon) and Seventh-day Adventist Church, as well as Hindu and Muslim groups operated numerous schools, including secondary schools, which were eligible for government subsides based on the size of the student population.

The Hindu and Muslim communities maintained a number of religious and cultural organizations. Interfaith organizations regularly brought together people from different religious groups, including Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, with the aim of building bridges of respect and understanding between different religious traditions.

During a spate of robberies around the country, three Hindu temples were broken into and desecrated in January, August, and September. One of the temples was broken into several times. The authorities arrested a man for one of the attacks and released him subject to curfew pending trial.

U.S. embassy officials held meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with Christian, Muslim, and Hindu religious leaders to discuss the importance of respect for religious freedom as a universal human right. The Ambassador visited local temples, mosques, and religious schools to demonstrate U.S. support for religious freedom and tolerance. The embassy used social media to highlight the ambassador’s religious outreach and demonstrate appreciation of and respect for the country’s religious diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.5 million (July 2016 estimate). The government statistics office and the Ministry of Education and Culture estimate approximately 73 percent of the population belongs to the ELC and 1 percent to the Finnish Orthodox Church. Other religious communities, each accounting for less than 1.6 percent of the population, include Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roman Catholics, Muslims, Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jews, and the Free Church of Finland. The statistics office reported in 2015 there were 1.3 million people (approximately 23.5 percent of the population) with no religious affiliation.

Although there are no accurate statistics, according to a 2016 estimate from the Ministry of Education and Culture, there are approximately 65,000 Muslims, of whom approximately 80 percent are Sunni and 20 percent Shia. With the exception of Tatars, most Muslims are immigrants or descendants of immigrants who arrived in recent decades from Somalia and North Africa, Iraq, the Balkans, Syria, Turkey, and Iran.

Legal Framework

The constitution bars discrimination based on religion “without an acceptable reason.” It stipulates freedom of religion and conscience, including the right to profess and practice a religion, to express one’s convictions, and to be a member or decline to be a member of a religious community. It states no one is under the obligation to participate in the practice of a religion. The law criminalizes the “breach of the sanctity of religion,” including blasphemy against God, publicly defaming or desecrating, for the purpose of offending, something a church or religious community holds sacred, and disturbing worship or funeral ceremonies. Violators are subject to fines or imprisonment for up to six months. The law is rarely invoked.

The law explicitly prohibits religious discrimination and prescribes a nondiscrimination ombudsman responsible for supervising compliance with the law. The ombudsman investigates individual cases of discrimination and has the power to levy fines on violators, offers counseling and promotes conciliation, and lobbies for legislation, among other duties and authorities.

Individuals and groups may exist, associate, and practice their religion without registering with the government. In order to be eligible to apply for government funds, however, religious groups must register with the Patent and Registration Office as a religious community. To register as a community, a group must have at least 20 members, have as its purpose the public practice of religion, and be guided in its activities by a set of rules. A registered religious community is a legal entity that may employ persons, purchase property, and make legal claims and is also governed by several provisions of law. As long as an association – including a registered religious community – does not generate a profit, it is generally exempt from paying taxes. According to the Ministry of Education and Culture, there are 100 recognized religious communities, most of which have multiple congregations. Persons may belong to more than one religious community.

All citizens who belong to either the ELC or the Orthodox Church pay a church tax set by each congregation at between 1 to 2 percent of income, as part of their income tax. These taxes are not levied on any other religious groups. Those who do not want to pay the tax must terminate their ELC or Orthodox congregation membership. Membership may be terminated by contacting the official congregation or the local government registration office, either electronically or in person. Local parishes have fiscal autonomy to decide how to use funding received from taxes levied on their members.

Registered religious communities other than the ELC and the Orthodox Church are also eligible to apply for state funds. The law states registered religious communities that meet the statutory requirements (number of members and other income through donations) may receive an annual subsidy from the government budget in proportion to the religious community’s percentage of the population.

The ELC and the Orthodox Church are required to maintain cemeteries and account for the spending of public funds. All registered religious communities may own and manage property and hire staff, including appointing clergy. The law authorizes the ELC and the Orthodox Church to register births, marriages, and deaths for their members in collaboration with the government’s Population Register Center. State registrars do this for other persons.

On January 1, a new law entered into force changing how the government disburses public funds to the ELC and the Orthodox Church. Both churches formerly received a percentage of state-collected corporate taxes (in addition to the church tax). Under the new law, the government budgets amounts for each church that may change from year to year.

Parents may determine their child’s religious affiliation if the child is under 12 years of age. The parents of a child between the ages of 12 and 17 must pursue specific administrative procedures with their religious community and the local population registration officials to change or terminate religious affiliation.

All public schools provide religious teaching in accordance with students’ religions. Students who do not belong to a religious group study ethics. Students 18 or older may choose to study either subject. Schools must provide religious instruction in religions other than the Lutheran faith if there is a minimum of three pupils representing that faith in the municipal region, the religious community in question is registered, and the students’ families belong to the religious community. If a student belongs to more than one religious community, the parents decide in which religious education course the student participates.

Religious education focuses on familiarizing students with their own religion, other religions, and general instruction in ethics. Although teachers of religion must have the required state-mandated training for religious instruction, they are appointed by the state and are not required to belong to any religious community. The National Board of Education provides a series of textbooks about Orthodox and Lutheran Christianity, Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam, as well as a textbook on secular ethics.

The government allows conscientious objectors to choose alternative civilian service instead of compulsory military service; only Jehovah’s Witnesses are specifically exempt from performing both military and alternative civilian service. Other conscientious objectors who refuse both military and alternative civilian service may be sentenced to prison terms of up to 173 days, one-half of the 347 days of alternative civilian service. Regular military service ranges between 165 and 347 days.

The law bans certain types of animal slaughter, requiring that animals be stunned prior to slaughter or that they be killed and stunned simultaneously.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Leaders of the Jewish and Muslim communities continued to raise concern about the long-standing ban against certain types of animal slaughter, which they said prevented them from killing the animals in a religiously-prescribed manner. Because the animals could not be slaughtered in a religiously approved manner domestically, members of these communities imported meat at higher prices. Government officials stated the provision allowing simultaneous stunning and slaughter of animals was meant to accommodate religious slaughter.

On March 31, the Supreme Court issued two preliminary decisions regarding male circumcision. The Court ruled that circumcision would not be considered an offense if it were in the child’s best interest, both parents consented to the procedure, and the circumcision was performed with great attention to detail. In its rulings, the Supreme Court strongly criticized the lack of clear legal guidelines surrounding male circumcision.

Ministry of Social Affairs and Health guidelines discouraged circumcision of males, including through dialogue with religious communities, and continued to withhold public healthcare funding for such procedures. In its guidelines, the ministry stated that non-medical circumcision of boys should only be performed by licensed physicians, that a child’s guardians should be informed of the risks and irreversibility of the procedure, and that it should not be carried out on boys old enough to understand the procedure without their consent. Religious communities, including members of Muslim and Jewish communities, expressed disagreement with the guidelines and said they were having discussions about the issue with the government.

According to the Ministry of Justice, there were 52 objectors to both military and alternative civilian service during the year, 10 of whom were imprisoned. The ministry did not indicate how many of these individuals objected to service for religious reasons. Forty-two objectors were allowed to serve their sentence at home but were required to wear electronic ankle monitors and follow a daily program approved as part of an individual enforcement plan. According to media and Ministry of Defense reports, the government exempted 100 to 150 Jehovah’s Witnesses from military service.

The government allocated 114 million euros ($120 million) to the ELC and 2.5 million euros ($2.8 million) to the Orthodox Church during the year in place of the corporate tax revenue payments. The government allocated a total of 532,000 euros ($560,600) among the 23 registered religious communities who applied for and received government funding (excluding the ELC and Orthodox Church), compared to 200,000 euros ($210,800) allocated in 2015. Registered religious communities could apply for separate funding for refurbishment projects for premises of registered religious communities, but the government granted no such funding during the year.

A government action plan to foster social inclusion entitled “Meaningful in Finland” included as one of its themes measures to strengthen interfaith dialogue through government grants. The Ministry of Education and Culture allocated approximately 80,000 euros ($84,300) for other interfaith dialogue initiatives.

Muslim religious leaders and Helsinki law enforcement officials continued to meet in an ongoing dialogue to try to overcome rifts within the Muslim community, and to build trust between Muslim communities and law enforcement. Representatives of various religious communities, including the Muslim community, continued to engage in dialogue with government authorities on ways to counter violent extremism as part of preventive policing efforts.

On May 21, at a Ministry for Foreign Affairs-hosted religious freedom seminar, Foreign Minister Timo Soini highlighted his concern about “increasing instances of religious intolerance, discrimination, and violence in many countries.” He called on governments and religious leaders to counter the trend by protecting religious minorities and continuing to promote religious freedom and understanding between communities.

There were incidents in which politicians made discriminatory remarks on social media aimed at Muslims. On July 19, Finns Party youth leader Sebastian Tynkkynen wrote on his Facebook account that the state must stop a “phenomenon of Islamification,” stating that the “fewer Muslims we have, the safer.” He added that “Islam needs to be ripped out of Finland,” and that although the state may not limit freedom of speech, it should “start up the reverse vending machine at full swing and empty Finland of those people who have no reason to be in our country.” On August 8, following a complaint from a member of the public, police in Oulu started a preliminary investigation into whether Tynkkynen incited racial hatred on social media. Tynkkynen resigned as Finns Party youth leader on July 12. On November 11, public broadcaster YLE reported that a deputy state prosecutor charged Tynkkynen with incitement of ethnic and religious hatred, and “breaching religious peace.”

On March 21, YLE reported the chair of the Tampere Finns Party chapter and Tampere city council member Terhi Kiemunki wrote a Facebook post after seeing children dressed in hijabs participating in an Easter event, stating “Is this some kind of integration [program] where Muslim children go around giving Easter blessings? Or does Allah also have some kind of anniversary today?” After being criticized for her comments, Kiemunki issued an apology on Facebook and requested a police investigation into whether her original Facebook post violated the law.

On September 27, Minister of the Interior Paula Risikko hosted a meeting for representatives of Christian, Jewish, and Shia and Sunni Muslim groups to “promote peaceful coexistence.” The groups signed a joint declaration to combat hate speech and advance cooperation.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Between January and October, the nondiscrimination ombudsman reviewed 38 religious discrimination cases, compared with 22 cases in all of 2015. According to a police report on hate crimes released in October, in 2015, the most recent year for which data were available, police recorded 133 suspected hate crimes related to religion or beliefs, compared to the 67 cases recorded a year earlier. Slightly more than half of the 2016 incidents (71 cases) were related to anti-Islamic sentiment or were between members of different Muslim groups. Crimes targeting religion or beliefs comprised 10.6 percent of all hate crimes recorded by police in 2015.

A November 2015 MOI report identified the PVL, a branch of a larger Nordic movement, as a right-wing extremist group. PVL had local branches in Helsinki, Turku, Tampere, Pori, Jyvaskyla, and Oulu, with an estimated 60 people taking part in its activities and events.

On September 16, a 28-year-old man died after suffering head injuries following an altercation with a member of PVL at the group’s September 10 protest in downtown Helsinki. On December 30, national broadcaster YLE reported that the Helsinki District Court convicted PVL member Jesse Torniainen of aggravated assault and sentenced him to two years in prison. The prosecution sought a five and one-half-year to six-year sentence, and the prosecutor told YLE she planned to appeal the verdict. According to YLE, the lead investigator for the case said Torniainen was a founding member of PVL.

PVL made statements supporting discrimination or violence against persons based on their religion. PVL wrote on its homepage, Vastarinta.com, that it is “a news site that stands out and dares to challenge the old, often Jewish-owned and/or -controlled mass media empires.” On January 30, PVL’s website also posted a story about “educating people against lies and false stories on [the] Holocaust.”

According to local and international media reports, leaders of the Soldiers of Odin said they organized the group in response to a security threat posed by incoming asylum seekers. Reuters reported members of the group blamed “Islamist intruders” for an increase in crime and carried signs with slogans such as “Migrants not welcome.” The group’s Facebook page included language reading “No more [expletive] mosques.” The Soldiers of Odin’s main activities included voluntary street patrols. By January the group had expanded to different cities within the country as well as to other countries. In February group members organized a march in Tampere that attracted 150 people.

Minority religious communities continued to report discrimination. For example, representatives of Muslim immigrant communities continued to report workplace discrimination such as in hiring decisions. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity. Between October 2015 and March 2016, the Finnish Somali League, an umbrella organization for Somali associations in the country, surveyed 105 people of Somali origin in the country’s largest metropolitan areas about the prevalence of discrimination. Of 85 percent of respondents who answered a question specifically about religious discrimination, 65 percent reported that they had experienced discrimination based on religion. Another 32 percent of respondents who had applied for a job in the past 12 months, said they experienced some form of discrimination (not specifically religious) during the application process.

The National Forum for Cooperation of Religions, an interfaith organization consisting of members from the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim communities, published a statement on March 24 reemphasizing its goals of preventing violent behavior, terrorism, and hate speech. According to the Forum, the statement was intended to further the group’s overarching goal of strengthening religious freedom by promoting interfaith dialogue and cooperation.

The website Magneettimedia, known for its anti-Semitic content, continued to post discriminatory statements online. On September 24, the Iltalehti newspaper reported that PVL member Torniainen chaired the Pohjoinen Perinne (Northern Heritage) Association, which Magneettimedia cited on its website as its publisher. The Magneettimedia website had approximately 3,200 likes on its Facebook page. In July it posted an article titled “Nelson Mandela – Terrorist: Who is Nelson Mandela, Nobel Prize laureate who cooperated closely with Jews.”

U.S. embassy staff continued to meet with officials from the Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Justice, Parliament’s Human Rights Center, as well as Helsinki police officials, to discuss their policies towards religious freedom issues, including religious intolerance, religious instruction in schools, the rights of conscientious objectors, and restrictions on animal slaughter.

Embassy staff also met with various religious leaders, including representatives from the Jewish and Muslim communities, the Finnish Ecumenical Council, and Islamic youth groups, to discuss the state of religious freedom in the country, including concerns by members of the Jewish and Muslim communities about the impact of the ban against certain types of animal slaughter on their religious practices, and guidelines that discourage male circumcision.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 66.8 million (July 2016 estimate). The French government does not maintain official statistics on religious affiliation, but government studies occasionally provide estimates. According to the most recent study by the National Institute for Demographic Studies, conducted in 2008 and published in 2010, 45 percent of respondents aged 18-50 reported no religious affiliation, 43 percent identified as Roman Catholic, 8 percent as Muslim, 2 percent as Protestant, and the remaining 2 percent as Orthodox Christian, Buddhist, Jewish, or other.

A 2012 poll by the private firm Conseil, Sondage et Analyse found 56 percent of respondents older than 18 years identify as Catholic. The Ministry of Interior estimates 8 to 10 percent of the population is Muslim. The Muslim population consists primarily of immigrants from former French colonies in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa and their descendants.

The daily newspaper Le Parisien estimates there are 1.2 million Protestants, 500,000 of whom are evangelical. Many evangelical churches primarily serve African and Caribbean immigrants. The Buddhist Union of France estimates there are one million Buddhists, mainly Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants and their descendants. According to press reports, the Jewish community numbers approximately 500,000; approximately 40 percent identifies as Sephardic, 26 percent as Ashkenazi, and 14 percent as a mix from the two communities, while the remaining 20 percent identifies only as Jewish. Other religious groups estimate their numbers as follows: Jehovah’s Witnesses, 120,000; Orthodox Christians, most of whom are associated with the Greek or Russian Orthodox Churches, 80-100,000; The Church of Scientology, 45,000; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), 36,000 in metropolitan France and 22,000 in overseas departments and territories; and Sikhs, 30,000, with the largest concentration in the Parisian suburbs.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the country is a secular republic and the state “shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law,” regardless of religion, and respect all beliefs. The law provides for the separation of religion and state and guarantees the free exercise of religious worship except in the interest of maintaining the public order.

The law, as well as international and European covenants, which carry the force of law in the country, protects the freedom of individuals to choose, change, and practice their religion. Interference with the freedom of religion is subject to criminal penalties, including a fine of 1,500 euros ($1,580) and imprisonment of one month. Individuals who are defendants in a trial may challenge the constitutionality of any law they say impedes their freedom of religion.

Laws increase the penalties for acts of violence or defamation when they are committed because of the victim’s actual or perceived membership or nonmembership in a given religious group. For acts of violence which courts determine are religiously motivated, the penalties are three to five years’ imprisonment and fines of 45,000-75,000 euros ($47,418-$79,031), depending on the severity of the victims’ injuries. For religiously motivated acts of public defamation, the penalties are one year’s imprisonment and/or a fine of 45,000 euros ($47,418). The government may expel noncitizens for inciting discrimination, hatred, or violence against a specific person or group of persons based on religion.

Although not required by law, religious groups may apply to register to gain official recognition and become eligible for tax-exempt status. The law defines two categories under which religious groups may register: associations of worship, which are exempt from taxes; and cultural associations, which normally are not exempt. Associations in either category are subject to fiscal oversight by the state. An association of worship may organize only religious activities, defined as liturgical services and practices. Although not tax-exempt, a cultural association may engage in profit making as well as nonprofit activity and receive government subsidies for its cultural and educational operations. Religious groups normally register under both of these categories. For example, Mormons perform religious activities through their association of worship and operate a school through their cultural association.

Religious groups must apply at the local prefecture to be recognized as an association of worship and receive tax-exempt status. Once granted, the tax-exempt status is applicable nationwide. In order to qualify, the group’s sole purpose must be the practice of religion, which may include religious training and the construction of buildings serving the religious group. Among excluded activities are those purely cultural, social, or humanitarian in nature. The government does not tax associations of worship on donations they receive. If the prefecture determines an association is not in conformity with the law, however, the government may change the association’s status and require it to pay taxes at a rate of 60 percent on past, as well as future, donations until it regains tax-exempt status. According to the Ministry of Interior, approximately 109 Protestant, 100 Catholic, 50 Jehovah’s Witnesses, 30 Muslim, and 15 Jewish associations have tax-exempt status.

The law prohibits covering one’s face in public places, including public transportation, government buildings, and other public spaces such as restaurants and movie theaters. If the police encounter someone in a public space wearing a face covering such as a mask or burqa, they are legally required to ask the individual to remove it to verify the individual’s identity. Police officials may not remove it themselves. If an individual refuses to remove the garment, police may take the person to the local police station to verify his or her identity. An individual, however, may not be questioned or held for more than four hours. Refusal of a police instruction to remove the face-covering garment carries a maximum fine of 150 euros ($158) or attendance at a citizenship course. Individuals who coerce another person to cover his or her face on account of gender by threat, violence, force, or abuse of power or authority are subject to a fine of 30,000 euros ($31,612) and can receive a sentence of up to one year in prison. The fine and sentence are doubled if the victim is a minor.

According to the law, the government may not directly finance religious groups to build new mosques, churches, synagogues, or temples. The government may, however, provide loan guarantees or lease property to groups at advantageous rates. The law also exempts places of worship from property taxes. The state owns and is responsible for the upkeep of most places of worship, primarily Catholic, built before 1905. The government may fund cultural associations with a religious connection.

There are three classes of territories where the law separating religion and state does not apply. Because Alsace-Lorraine was part of Germany when the law was enacted, members of Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Jewish groups there may choose to allocate a portion of their income tax to their religious group. Local governments in that region may also provide financial support for constructing religious buildings. French Guiana, which is governed under 19th century colonial laws, may provide subsidies to the Catholic Church. Overseas departments and territories, which include island territories in the Caribbean, the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, and several sub-Antarctic islands, may also provide funding for religious groups. This also applies to the portion of Antarctica which the government claims as an overseas territory.

Public schools are secular. The law prohibits public school employees and students from wearing “conspicuous religious symbols,” including the Muslim headscarf, Jewish skullcap, Sikh turban, and large Christian crosses. Religious instruction is not provided in public schools, except in Alsace-Lorraine, French Guiana, and overseas departments and territories. Information about religious groups, however, is taught as part of the history curriculum. Parents who wish their children to wear conspicuous religious symbols or to be given religious instruction in school may homeschool or send their children to a private school. Homeschooling and private schools must conform to the educational standards established for public schools.

By law the government subsidizes private schools, including those affiliated with religious organizations. In 98 percent of private schools, in accordance with the law, the government pays the teachers’ salaries, provided the school accepts all children regardless of an individual child’s religious affiliation. The law does not address the issue of religious instruction in government-subsidized private schools or whether students must be allowed to opt out of such instruction.

The law states “detained persons have the right to freedom of opinion, conscience, and religion. They can practice the religion of their choice … without other limits than those imposed by the security needs and good order of the institution.”

Missionaries from countries not exempted from entry-visa requirements must obtain a three-month tourist visa before traveling to the country. All missionaries who wish to remain longer than 90 days must obtain long-duration visas before entering the country. Upon arrival, missionaries must provide a letter from their sponsoring religious group to apply to the local prefecture for a temporary residence card.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government investigated and prosecuted crimes against religious groups, including anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim violence, hate speech and vandalism. The government’s ban against face coverings in public places was confirmed by various court rulings. The highest administrative court rejected the city of Villeneuve-Loubet’s ban on “clothes demonstrating an obvious religious affiliation worn by swimmers on public beaches.” Several city mayors – including the mayor of Nice – dismissed the verdict and said they would continue to enforce bans on full-body swimwear at public beaches, arguing that its use could disturb public order by leading to fights on the beach, but there were no additional reported cases. ISIS claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack in Nice during the July 14 independence day celebration that killed 84 people without regard for their religious belief. President Hollande condemned the attack as an act of radical Islamic terrorism. PM Valls cautioned against scapegoating Muslims or Islam for the attack by a radical extremist group. The government extended the state of emergency which the government originally declared following the November 13, 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, until July 2017. It ended the permanent deployment of security forces at religious sites across the country which had been in effect since the January 2015 terrorist attacks but continued to use roving security forces to monitor the religious sites. Government officials and political party members made statements condemning “Islamic extremism.” The president and government officials condemned anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, and anti-Catholic acts. The government continued efforts to promote interfaith understanding through public awareness campaigns and by encouraging dialogue in schools, among local officials, police, and citizen groups.

A French Tunisian man, Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, drove a large truck into a crowd of people, without regard for their religious affiliation, celebrating the Bastille Day holiday in Nice on July 14, killing 84 people and injuring 434. On July 16, ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack and called Bouhlel a “soldier of Islam.” President Hollande condemned the attack as an act of radical Islamic terrorism. PM Valls said the act of Islamic terrorism was designed to challenge “tolerance and secularism.” He also condemned any “scapegoating of Muslims, Islam, and immigrants,” highlighting that many “Muslim compatriots” were among the victims of the attack.

On May 24, a court ordered the chief suspect in a deadly attack on a Paris synagogue in 1980 to be sent back to jail, 10 days after he was released on bail. Hassan Diab, a Lebanese Canadian sociology professor who had been detained for 18 months, was accused of being part of the Special Operations branch of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The PFLP was blamed for the bombing on October 3, 1980 that left four dead and around 40 injured. Diab, 62, was extradited from Canada in November 2014 and charged with the attack. He maintained his innocence and denied he was a member of the PFLP. On May 12, a judge authorized his release on bail after ruling there was doubt over the “fundamental question” of whether he was in France on the day of the attack. His exwife had told investigators that he was in Beirut on September 28, 1980, despite stamps in his passport indicating that he was already in Europe. Diab was charged with murder, attempted murder and destruction of property as part of a terrorist enterprise. The date of the trial had not been set by year’s end.

On February 10, local media quoting a Jordanian judicial source reported the Jordanian Ministry of Justice rejected a 2015 French extradition request for two Jordan-based suspects in the August 1982 shooting attack at Goldenberg, a Jewish restaurant in Paris’ historically Jewish Marais district, that killed six people and wounded 22 others. Media identified suspects Zuhair Mohamad al-Abassi (aka Amjad Atta) and Nizar Tawfiq Hamada, 54. Jordanian authorities rejected the extradition request for Abassi because at the time the French government made it in February 2015, an extradition agreement between Jordan and France had not entered into force, according to the source. The agreement was signed in 2011, but did not come into force until July 2015. Jordanian authorities reported the request for Hamada was rejected because the statute of limitations concerning the criminal allegations against him had expired. French authorities stated they might try the suspects in absentia. No trial date had been set at year’s end.

The nationwide state of emergency, which the government originally declared following the November 13, 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, was extended on February 19, May 20, July 21, and December 15 and was scheduled to continue until July 15, 2017. The state of emergency continued to give significantly expanded powers to the police and other state authorities. The government was allowed to dissolve associations deemed to be working towards the serious disruption of public order. Prefects in all regions were given the authority to order the provisional closure of concert halls, restaurants, or any public place. They were also granted authority to prohibit public demonstrations or gatherings, as they deemed appropriate. The state of emergency enjoyed widespread legislative and public support throughout the year. The National Assembly approved the most recent extension of the state of emergency in December by a large majority.

On November 3, then-Minister of the Interior Bernard Cazeneuve (before he became PM in December) ordered an end to the permanent deployment of guards at places of worship throughout the country that had been in place since the January 2015 terrorist attacks, but maintained permanent roving patrols. The decision was made public in a November 15 report issued by the independent AEF Global Security research agency at the directive of the interior ministry, which stated Cazeneuve made this decision due to resource concerns and the evolving threat environment, and to allow police forces to refocus on their core mission. During sensitive times, the agency reported, the Ministry of Interior would assign permanent patrols to maintain security at these sites. According to the report, guards belonging to the prefecture of police in the greater Paris area were not affected by the police shift. According to statistics released by Cazeneuve in January, 15,000 security forces were deployed to protect 1,000 mosques, 717 Jewish sites, and 178 Catholic sites throughout the country.

On October 4, Junior Minister for Relations with Parliament Jean-Marie Le Guen announced, in response to a question by a national assembly member, that since November 2015 authorities had closed nine “radical” mosques or prayer rooms under the state of emergency. Le Guen added that the Council of Ministers had also dissolved, under a provision of the internal security law, three Islamic associations “allegedly dedicated” to religious activity, for promoting radical ideology.

According to the Ministry of Justice, as of June 30, the penitentiary system employed 690 Catholic (760 in 2015), 349 Protestant (377 in 2015), and 217 Muslim (193 in 2015) chaplains. The most recent figures for chaplains from other groups were from January 2015, at which time there were 75 Jewish, 52 Orthodox, 111 Jehovah’s Witness, and 10 Buddhist chaplains, as well as 50 chaplains representing other religious groups. In the general detainee visiting area, any visitor could bring religious objects to an inmate or speak with the prisoner about religious issues, but could not pray. Prisoners could pray individually in their cells, with a chaplain in designated prayer rooms, or, in some institutions, in special apartments in which they could receive family for up to 48 hours.

Jehovah’s Witnesses officials reported 19 cases of authorities interfering with the community’s public proselytizing during the year and one case where officials refused to rent community centers for religious celebrations. On January 6 in the region of Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur, the municipal police prevented the group’s members from proselytizing on the grounds that a municipal decree prohibited this activity. On March 18 in Ile-de-France, the town mayor stopped Jehovah’s Witnesses from participating in their community service activity and stated it was prohibited in his town. The president of the local association of Jehovah’s Witnesses wrote a letter to the mayor, including a statement from a lawyer citing the law. No formal legal complaint was filed.

The Interministerial Mission for Vigilance and to Combat Sectarian Abuses (MIVILUDES) continued to observe and analyze the activities of minority “sectarian” groups, including “new age” and other religious and “jihadist” groups, which it considered to constitute potential threats to public order, including what it termed radicalized jihadist groups or cults. MIVILUDES coordinated responses to abuses – which included psychological and sexual abuse as well as fraud – violations of law, and threats to public order, and provided assistance to victims of these groups. It continued to offer training to public service employees providing support to families touched by “radical jihadism.”

According to the Ministry of Justice, the government issued 223 fines for violating the law prohibiting face coverings in public spaces and government buildings in 2015, a 40 percent decrease compared to the 397 fines issued in 2014.

On June 8, the Observatory for Secularism, a body comprised of 15 senior civil servants, parliamentarians, legal experts, and intellectuals who advise the government on the implementation of the “principle of secularism,” released its third annual report evaluating secularism in schools, public spaces, and hospitals. The 400-page document analyzed religion’s place during a year marked by terrorist attacks and heated debate on the influence of Muslim fundamentalist networks in the country. The report notably did not recommend legislating against the wearing of religious symbols – including headscarves – at universities. It noted that economic and social crisis, insufficient mixing of different groups in certain neighborhoods and schools, and the international situation had led in some cases to “reinvented and radical religious practices.” It praised efforts by the ministries of education and interior to encourage greater social mixing and to pursue an open dialogue with religious groups.

On November 9, the Council of State, which had been asked to rule on whether city halls could install nativity scenes, decreed they were permissible in town halls and other public buildings if the intent was “cultural, artistic, or festive.”

On August 26, the highest administrative court, the Council of State, rejected the city of Villeneuve-Loubet’s ban on “clothes demonstrating an obvious religious affiliation worn by swimmers on public beaches.” In its ruling, the court stated, “no evidence was presented that risks of breaches against peace and good order existed on the beaches of Villeneuve-Loubert in relation with the clothes worn by certain people. Considering that such risks did not exist … there are no sufficient legal grounds to justify the mayor’s order.” Several city mayors – including the mayor of Nice – dismissed the verdict and said they would continue to enforce bans on full-body swimwear at public beaches, but there were no additional reported cases of local governments enforcing the ban. In response to the swimwear controversy, head of the Foundation for Islam in France Jean-Pierre Chevenement tweeted that Muslims should be “discreet” in public. Speaking to journalists on November 7, Chevenement called on conservative Muslims to “try harder to integrate” into society.

On October 18, a 19-year-old French Muslim woman won a court order lifting a travel ban that she said was imposed due to her ultraconservative Salafist beliefs. The woman, who was raised Catholic and had converted to Islam two years earlier, stated she wished to go to Saudi Arabia to study, but her mother and authorities suspected her of wanting to joining ISIS. As a result, the government had banned her on antiterrorism grounds from traveling abroad. “I am a Salafist, but I am not Da’esh [ISIS]. There is a big difference,” she stated.

Citing security and sanitation concerns, in February authorities cleared the southern portion of the unsanctioned Calais refugee camp, which included the destruction of many makeshift shelters that refugees had constructed in the camp, including a church and mosque. The migrants affected by the demolition were moved to heated shipping container shelters in the northern part of the camp where one church and six mosques remained. According to uncorroborated press reports, some migrants and activists said authorities had told them the church and mosque were not included in the demolition plans and would not be destroyed. After relocating all migrants from Calais, the government closed the remainder of the camp in October.

The Bordeaux-based Center for Action and Prevention Against Radicalization of Individuals (CAPRI) began operations in late 2015 with the aim of intervening with youth before they become radicalized and to provide opposing narratives to deconstruct extremist arguments and conspiracy theories. Funded by the central and local governments, CAPRI included participation by several local Islamic organizations, such as the Muslim Federation of the Gironde, and the Regional Councils of the Muslim Religion of Aquitaine and Poitou-Charentes. It operated on a voluntary basis, with participants attending therapy or religious counseling sessions, often with members of their family. The cases treated were typically young people, converts to Islam in almost half of cases, who showed a sudden change in behavior, cut themselves off from friends, or had been found consuming jihadist information online.

The Ministry of Education continued to mandate nationwide courses and exams designed to educate students about discrimination and tolerance. It partnered with the NGO International League Against Anti-Semitism and Racism to educate students and teachers about anti-Semitism and racism by including more discussion of these topics in the national curriculum. Beginning in September 2015, the national curriculum mandated an additional 300 hours over the course of a pupil’s academic career, from elementary school to high school, dedicated to “moral and civic education,” including “issues of combating racism, anti-Semitism, prejudice, and all forms of discrimination.” At the same time, the education ministry launched an online platform to provide training, teaching materials, and resources for teachers on issues of secularism, antidiscrimination, racism, and anti-Semitism. The education ministry also sponsored the Week of Education and Actions Against Racism and Anti-Semitism on March 21-28. The ministry created an interactive internet-based platform to highlight the nearly 200 projects and activities by youth, education, and cultural associations to prevent racism and anti-Semitism.

In collaboration with Catholic universities and local mosques, the Ministry of Interior continued to provide funding for an education program in Lyon, Paris, Strasbourg, and Aix-en-Provence aimed at providing students, including future clergy members, with a broad understanding of national legal, historical, and social norms on secularism and fostering integration. The program lasted one academic year, from September to June. Government officials collaborated with academic specialists to create the curriculum. The training was open to high-level officials and clergy from all religious groups. Muslims continued to express the greatest interest in the program, which included French language training, since most imams came from abroad and did not speak the language, hindering communication with their congregations. Students were primarily immigrants from North and sub-Saharan Africa.

On October 25, the European Parliament (EP) voted to lift the immunity of one of its members, National Front (FN) Party founder and former leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, opening the door for prosecution by authorities, who had requested the move. Prosecutors stated they wanted to put Le Pen on trial for comments he made in 2014 about several artists, including Jewish singer Patrick Bruel. In what was widely interpreted by the EP and media outlets as a reference to the crematory ovens used by the Nazis during World War II, Le Pen was recorded in a video saying, “Listen, we’ll just bake a batch [fournee] next time.”

In March during a television interview, Minister for Families, Children and Women’s Rights Laurence Rossignol made remarks comparing Muslim women who choose to wear head coverings to American slaves who supported slavery. She also condemned retailers who sold product lines designed for Muslim women, saying these companies were “promoting the confinement of women’s bodies.” In response, the human rights NGO Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF) and the Frantz Fanon Foundation called on their members to file a lawsuit against Rossignol for “racist insults.”

In October leader of the FN Marine Le Pen stated that, if elected president in April 2017, she would extend the current ban on all religious clothing and symbols in public places in order to defeat the advance of political Islam, because “the situation is too serious today.”

On January 5, during their annual New Year’s meeting, President Francois Hollande thanked a group of seven religious leaders, including Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and Buddhist leaders, for what they were doing to “promote understanding between our citizens and to deter anyone who wants to promote a message of hate,” following a difficult year marked by terrorism and incidents of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim behavior. “While having different approaches, we participate in the same objective: to unite our country and contribute to peace,” he concluded. He thanked these communities for their efforts in combatting violent extremism, racism, and anti-Semitism and for their work in welcoming refugees.

On January 9, speaking at a ceremony commemorating the first anniversary of the killing of four Jewish victims in a terror attack outside a kosher supermarket, PM Manuel Valls said he regretted the large numbers of Jews emigrating to Israel.

President Hollande and government ministers condemned anti-Semitism and stated support for Holocaust education on many occasions, including the March 7 annual dinner hosted by the largest Jewish umbrella organization, the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France (CRIF); the March 19 commemoration of the fourth anniversary of the killings of three Jewish children and their teacher by Mohammed Merah in Toulouse; the April 27 Holocaust Remembrance Day commemoration; the June 1 French Judaism Day observance; and the July 21 anniversary of the Velodrome d’Hiver roundup of Jews during World War II.

During his address at the March 7 dinner, PM Valls said he understood Jews’ fears amid heightened religious tension in the country after attacks by Islamic extremists in Paris the previous year. Valls expressed his “solidarity” with the country’s Jewish community and strongly condemned anti-Semitism whether from the “far left” or the “far right.” “Yes, Jews of France are afraid to wear the kippa, to go to the synagogue, to do shopping in a kosher market, to send their children to public school. That’s a reality, and a reality we do not accept,” Valls said.

On June 29-30 in Jerusalem, government representatives and Israeli counterparts held a second annual meeting of a bilateral working group on anti-Semitism, established after an Israeli request for more information on anti-Semitism efforts in France. The French delegation was led by then-Ambassador-at-Large for Human Rights Patrizianna Sparacino-Thiellay and included the head of DILCRAH and CRIF representatives. The meeting reviewed anti-Semitism programs and best practices.

President Hollande, PM Valls, and other senior government officials met regularly with leaders from the Muslim community, including Anouar Kbibech, President of the French Council of Muslim Faith (CFCM). They strongly denounced anti-Muslim acts and stressed the government’s commitment to combat acts of hatred directed against Muslims.

On January 10, during an “open mosque weekend” organized by the Muslim community on the one-year anniversary of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, President Hollande made a surprise visit to the Grand Mosque of Paris and had tea with its rector, Dalil Boubakeur, and CFCM President Kbibech. Minister of the Interior Cazeneuve also participated in the CFCM-organized outreach event, visiting a mosque north of Paris in the town of Saint-Ouen l’Aumone.

On July 31, PM Valls called for a “reconstruction of French Islam” and asked Muslims to help combat radicalism. He said, “France has strong ties with Islam… and because France invented secularism, France is the target of the Islamic State.” Valls stated that, despite the country’s strict law on secularism, the state was going to have to intervene to ensure Islam could coexist within the country. “Our country must show the world that Islam is compatible with democracy,” said Valls. He said the state should not have to deal with teaching theology, but insisted it needed to help create solid learning institutions, based on openness. For this to happen, Valls said “a pact” was needed with Muslims in which the republic would guarantee freedom of worship and Muslims would fight radicalization from within. “If Islam does not help the republic to fight for civil liberties, it will become increasingly difficult to ensure freedom of worship,” he said.

On August 1, Interior Minister Cazeneuve met with the leaders of the CFCM. They announced the ministry and CFCM would begin a new initiative to work together against jihadism, including a countermessaging campaign and additional training for French imams to combat radicalism. The initiative began in the fall.

On August 29, Interior Minister Cazeneuve hosted approximately 50 Muslim leaders in Paris to discuss the government’s 2015 decision to relaunch the Foundation for Islam in France. At the meeting, he appointed former Minister of the Interior Jean-Pierre Chevenement, a non-Muslim, as president of the foundation, which sparked controversy among Muslim community leaders. On December 8, the Ministry of Interior officially launched the Foundation for Islam in France, after the foundation’s advisory board met for the first time. The meeting was held at the National Assembly, led by Chevenement. The new foundation, officially under the umbrella of the MOI, was to focus on cultural initiatives, such as civic training of imams, support for Islamic cultural centers, promotion of events and conferences related to Islam, and support for the study of Islam as a discipline in French universities. Members of the advisory board included CFCM President Anouar Kbibech, writer Tahar Ben Jelloun, theologian Ghaleb Bencheikh, rector of the Lyon mosque Kamel Kabtane, and businesswoman Najoua Arduini-Elatfani. The government-controlled French National Railways, Paris Airports Authority, and National Real Estate Company were founding members of the foundation. The new foundation replaced a previous, largely inactive foundation from which it inherited approximately one million euros ($1.05 million) for financing projects. The task of encouraging greater transparency in the foreign sources of financing of Islamic institutions in France was to be undertaken by another organization, yet to be launched.

On March 21, the government opened the second meeting of its dialogue on the Muslim faith, held under the auspices of the interior ministry. The meeting was part of a plan the government announced after the Charlie Hebdo attacks to broaden its dialogue with Muslim communities. The closed-door meeting brought together 150 representatives of the Islamic faith and was devoted to the prevention of radicalization. Agenda topics for this meeting included: prevention and radicalization in prisons; countermessaging strategy to prevent radicalization; engaging youth in prevention efforts; and grassroots mobilization. In an opening speech, PM Valls said the government needed “a strong Islam” as a partner in the fight against radicalization. He recalled the “major responsibility” of Muslim representatives “to fight against the fundamentalist propaganda that inundates the social media.” In closing remarks, Interior Minister Cazeneuve hailed “the commitment to engagement that sincerely drives the Muslims of France” and pledged “the republic’s support.”

On December 12, the government opened the third meeting of its dialogue on the Muslim faith, again under the auspices of the interior ministry. Cazeneuve, newly appointed as PM, gave opening remarks. The meeting brought together 200 representatives of the French Muslim community. The topics discussed were related to the launch of the Foundation for Islam in France, primarily on the financing of Islam and on training for imams working in the country.

The government hosted 44 imams from Algeria to work temporarily in France to attend training to promote religious tolerance and combat violent extremism within Muslim communities. The government of Algeria paid the imams’ salaries while on their temporary assignment.

On September 13, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted the second day of a summit sponsored by the NGOs Coexister and Human Rights First dedicated to the creation of coalitions and advocacy campaigns to counter hate speech including religious hate speech, on the internet and on social media.

On August 17, PM Valls announced that since 2012, the government had issued deportation orders for more than 80 “preachers of hate” or “pseudo-imams,” including 13 since the beginning of the year. Citing interior ministry sources, Valls said the government would issue additional deportation orders in coming months.

On August 17, President Hollande and Interior Minister Cazeneuve met Pope Francis at the Vatican. While no official statement was released, in comments to the press prior to the meeting, Hollande said he intended to thank Pope Francis for his “very comforting words” in the wake of the summer’s terrorist attacks in the country. Hollande also said he hoped to discuss the situation facing Christians in the Middle East, noting France was among the “protectors” of Christians in the region. Hollande emphasized the principle of national secularism means “protecting all religions…and ensuring the freedom to believe or to not believe,” on the condition that others’ rights were respected.

In March Mayor of Montpellier Philippe Saurel joined Mayors United against Anti-Semitism, an initiative calling on municipal leaders to publicly address and take concrete actions against anti-Semitism. Other cities with mayors participating in the initiative included Paris, Toulouse, Strasbourg, Bordeaux, Nice, and Nancy.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

There were violent, including lethal, attacks and other religiously motivated incidents directed against Christians, Jews, and Muslims. According to government, Jewish and Muslim sources, the number of anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim acts decreased from 2015. Jews continued to emigrate to Israel due to anti-Semitic sentiment throughout the country, according to Jewish leaders, but at a lower rate than in 2015. Representatives from the Jewish and Muslim communities, the Protestant Federation, and the Catholic Conference of Bishops took steps to condemn intolerance and promote interfaith dialogue. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it is difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

According to the Ministry of Interior, based on complaints filed with police, the number of anti-Muslim incidents (including threats and attacks) decreased by 58 percent to 182 cases, from 429 in 2015. Anti-Semitic incidents declined by 59 percent to 335 cases, from 808 in 2015. Anti-Christian incidents, however, increased by 17 percent to 949, compared with 810 in 2015. The Ministry of Interior stated the acts against Christian religious sites represented 90 percent of all attacks against places of worship, and that not all of these incidents had a religious motivation. (399 were linked to vandalism, 191 to theft, 14 to Satanism, and 25 to anarchism.)

Both the National Observatory Against Islamophobia (ONCI), a part of the CFCM, and CCIF confirmed the ministry’s statistics regarding a decrease in reported anti-Muslim acts in 2016 compared to 2015. The two organizations cautioned, however, against equating the decrease in reported acts with increased tolerance for Muslims. Instead, the ONCI pointed to “institutional discrimination in schools, by the police, and by local authorities” as cause for concern, while the CCIF highlighted that victims were “reticent” to report anti-Muslim acts due to a loss in confidence in the justice system. The CCIF warned that, by conflating fighting terrorism with promoting anti-Muslim policies, the state of emergency since the November 2015 attacks disproportionally targeted Muslims. The ONCI report stated anti-Muslim acts were mainly directed at mosques and women wearing veils and headscarves. ONCI stated that anti-Islamic hate speech on the internet had been growing since the July 14 attack in Nice.

In 2016, based on information provided by the interior ministry, ONCI reported 182 anti-Muslim incidents, comprised of 64 acts against Muslims and 118 verbal threats.

On July 26, Adel Kermiche and Abdel-Malik Nabil Petitjean attacked a Catholic church in Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray, killing a priest, Father Jacques Hamel, by cutting his throat and seriously wounding a male worshipper during a Mass. Police shot and killed the two assailants. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, which was widely condemned by the local and national authorities and community and religious leaders. On July 26, President Hollande expressed support to Catholics and described the priest’s death as a “desecration of the French Republic, which guarantees freedom of conscience.”

Jehovah’s Witnesses officials reported 28 cases where members were physically attacked during the year. On June 24 in Bordeaux, two Jehovah’s Witnesses, Huguette Dias and Monique Labecot, were proselytizing door-to-door when a man approached them shouting insults. The man kicked Labecot in the back of the head and punched Dias in the face, which resulted in her falling and hitting her head on the ground. Dias died as a result of her injuries. Police arrested the perpetrator and placed him in the psychiatric unit of a prison pending legal proceedings. A judge of the Bordeaux court was investigating the case at year’s end. The second victim, Monique Labecot, was scheduled to appear before the investigating judge in early 2017. The assailant had not been formally charged and no trial date was set by year’s end.

On January 11, a 15-year-old Turkish teenager of Kurdish origin stabbed a Jewish teacher with a machete in Marseille, wounding him slightly on the shoulder. The attack took place as the 35-year-old teacher, who was wearing a yarmulke, was on his way to work at the Franco-Hebraic Institute. Police arrested the assailant shortly after the incident. On January 13, authorities placed him in pretrial detention and charged him with “attempted murder on the grounds of religion and terrorist sympathizing.” On March 2, 2017, the Paris juvenile court found the attacker guilty of terrorism, attempted murder, and anti-Semitism and sentenced him to seven years in prison. The incident sparked widespread debate among the country’s Jewish leaders on whether they should advise Jews to refrain, for safety’s sake, from wearing a yarmulke in public.

On March 5 in Paris, a 13-year-old boy wearing a yarmulke was attacked by three men who, according to the boy’s description, appeared to be North African. The perpetrators shouted anti-Semitic slogans at the boy, such as “dirty Jew,” took off his yarmulke, and beat him. The victim suffered bruises to the face and filed a complaint to the police. The independent anti-Semitism watchdog NGO National Bureau of Vigilance Against Anti-Semitism denounced and condemned the attack and urged police to make efforts to identify the attackers. Police had made no arrests by year’s end.

On July 20, a Muslim man, while yelling “Allahu Akbar,” stabbed a mother and her three young daughters near the commune of Largne-Monteglin. The assailant, whom authorities charged with attempted murder, said he carried out the attack because he saw the father of the girls scratching his upper thigh in front of his wife.

On July 27, in an act of revenge one day after the killing of Father Jacques Hamel, a 33-year-old assailant in Barentin insulted, threatened, and hit a Senegalese Muslim man in his seventies. The victim’s children and three NGOs filed a lawsuit. There was no update on the case by year’s end.

According to statistics released by the NGO Jewish Agency for Israel, approximately 5,000 Jews emigrated from France to Israel during the year compared to 7,835 people in 2015. In total, 40,000 Jews emigrated since 2006, according to the agency. Some leaders in the Jewish community linked the continued emigration to anti-Semitism and violent acts against Jews. Commenting on the decline in emigration in 2016, the head of the Jewish Agency for Israel office in Paris said emigration was not just a reaction to events in the country but was also a result of religious or political motivations. He also cited authorities’ efforts to protect French Jews and the generalization of terror attacks to the population of the country as a whole, which “paradoxically” restored confidence among Jews, because they were not the only target. According to the agency’s estimates released in December, 3,000 French Jews who had emigrated to Israel over the previous three years returned to France.

The annual report of the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, an advisory body to the prime minister, included the results of a poll conducted by the BVA Institute, a research and consulting company, on January 4-11, involving face-to-face interviews with a representative sample of more than 1,000 residents over the age of 18. According to the poll, 41 percent of the respondents believed Jews had more influence over finances in their country than other groups, and 20 percent thought Jews had too much power in France. According to the same poll, 34 percent of respondents had a negative image of Islam and 50 percent of them considered it a threat to national identity. The report also cited persistent societal rejection of Islamic religious practices such as praying and women wearing a veil.

According to a Pew Research survey in May, 85 percent of respondents had a very or mostly favorable opinion of Jewish people. According to the same poll, 67 percent of respondents had a very or mostly favorable opinion of Muslims.

An April IFOP poll, however, found that 68 percent of respondents believed Muslims were not well integrated into French society and 47 percent considered the presence of unintegrated Muslim communities to be a threat to the country’s national identity. According to another IFOP/Fiducial poll conducted September 16-20, 56 percent of respondents considered “Islam is not compatible with the values of French society,” which included the value of secularism and keeping religion out of the public sphere. The majority said they opposed outward symbols of Islam, such as women wearing a veil (63 percent) and the construction of mosques (52 percent), two highly politicized and controversial issues in France. The same poll found 53 percent of respondents agreed that Muslims were becoming the scapegoats of society’s problems.

On April 20, hundreds of students participated in a “Hijab Day” at the Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po) in Paris, one of the country’s most selective institutions of higher learning. The organizers of the event invited fellow students to cover their hair to “demystify” the headscarf and to end the stigma around those who wear them. Politicians and students criticizing the event charged the participants were proselytizing. Sciences Po administrators stated it neither prohibited nor supported the event.

On April 30, fire destroyed a Muslim prayer hall in Corsica, according to media reports. According to Ajaccio’s public prosecutor, the fire was probably a criminal act, based on hydrocarbon traces found inside the hall. No one was injured in the fire. President Hollande issued a statement on April 30 expressing his solidarity with the Muslims of Corsica and vowing a swift investigation, which was still ongoing at the end of the year.

According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, on March 23 the local Chalons-en-Champagne branch of the labor union the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) organized a demonstration to protest a decision by the town’s mayor to provide the Witnesses with the use of a community center free of charge for a religious ceremony on Good Friday. According to the Witnesses, a dozen CGT activists stood in front of the center and blocked access to it in a hostile manner. As a result, the mayor found another hall for the Jehovah’s Witnesses to use for their commemoration.

In July the European Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion that Micropole, an information technology consultancy company, unlawfully discriminated against a Muslim woman whom it fired in 2009 for not complying with the company’s request to remove her headscarf when meeting with clients. The final ruling was set to take place early in 2017.

In August the mayor of Colombes, a Paris suburb, ordered the owner of a halal market, who leased the space from the housing authority, to adhere to the terms of the lease and stock additional products, including alcohol and pork, to serve non-Muslim, as well as Muslim, customers. Authorities threatened to close the store if the owner did not comply. The owner said he was “merely catering to the demands of his customers.” The mayor filed a lawsuit with the Paris court to try to close the store and the shop manager Soulemane Yalcin filed a countersuit to keep it open. The case had not been heard at year’s end.

On June 23, Muslim and Jewish community leaders announced at the National Assembly they were forming a joint commission to protect the practice of religious slaughter, which they said was under threat. CFCM President Anouar Kbibech said the joint committee would be “tasked with reviewing and working on the challenges common to both religions” in the face of attempts to limit the custom. Joel Mergui, president of the French Consistoire – the community organ responsible for providing Jewish religious services – said attacks against ritual slaughter were making some Jews question their future in the country.

In June the Paris Criminal Court charged writer Alain Soral with a 12,000 euro ($12,645) fine and a suspended prison sentence of six months for saying in a Facebook post in 2015 that the Nazis should have finished killing the Jews of Europe. A judge found Soral guilty of “justifying war crimes and crimes against humanity,” Le Figaro reported Tuesday. Soral had had multiple previous convictions for minimizing or mocking the Holocaust. The judge also ordered Soral to pay 2,000 euros ($2,107) to the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism, which filed the complaint against Soral for his Facebook post.

On March 9, a Paris criminal court sentenced an activist to a two-month prison sentence for incitement to racial hatred and slander towards Jews following the publication of two messages on his Twitter account in April 2015. The tweets said Jews “were responsible for the killing of 30 million Christians in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1947;” and that “if Jewish people were not held accountable for their innumerous crimes, they would try to blame others.”

On July 28, the CFCM encouraged all Muslims in the country to attend their local Catholic church for Sunday Mass to express solidarity and sorrow with Christians after the terrorist killing of Father Hamel on July 26. According to press reports, Muslims across France answered the call, including more than 100 Muslims who were among the 2,000 attending a Mass at the cathedral of Rouen to pay tribute to the slain priest. Hundreds of people of many faiths marched together in towns across the country in tribute to Father Hamel on July 30, in solidarity and to reject terrorism associated with religion.

In January the CFCM called for an “open mosque weekend” across France, on the first anniversary of the Charlie Hebdo attacks. Mosques throughout the country invited their non-Muslim neighbors in for tours, open prayer services, tea, and calligraphy courses over the weekend. The objective of the event, according to the CFCM, was to discuss Islam in a country shaken by jihadist attacks and to “create a convivial environment for the exchange of ideas between believers and their fellow citizens.” Of the 2,500 mosques in France, “several hundred” reportedly participated, although no official count was available. The CFCM called this “first open door a successful operation, both for the mosques and for the visitors” and said it would repeat the open house annually.

On March 18, the interfaith community held events in Toulouse and Montauban to commemorate the Jewish and military victims killed by Mohammed Merah in 2012. Interior Minister Cazeneuve attended the ceremony. During his speech, Cazeneuve renewed calls for Jews not to leave the country, stating, “France wants to hold French Jews close and not let them leave.”

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported 68 acts of vandalism, an increase from 57 in 2015. They did not provide details on the incidents.

On June 8, the remains of a boar were found in front of a mosque in Nice. Police arrested two individuals for vandalism. On October 12, a Nice criminal court sentenced them to 80 hours of community service, a fine of 1,000 euros ($1,054) to be paid to a worship association, and a symbolic payment of one euro ($1.05) to three NGOs who had brought civil action.

On October 11, a boar’s head and skin were discovered in front of the same mosque in Nice. The imam filed a lawsuit against an unnamed assailant and police opened an investigation that was still pending at the end of the year.

Jewish and Muslim communities held a series of interfaith dialogues on November 25-27, an annual event. Jews and Muslims, along with government and community leaders, gathered in 30 different places of worship to discuss belief systems, recent government actions, and religious activities in an effort to facilitate communication, religious tolerance, and understanding between the two groups.

The Council of Christian Churches, composed of 10 members from the Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox Churches, and Armenian Apostolic Church, continued to serve as a forum for dialogue. One observer represented the Anglican Communion on the council.

The Catholic Bishops’ Conference’s National Service for Relations with Islam, an organization for engagement with Muslims, hosted an annual training session on Islam in June to promote religious tolerance and understanding and maintain regular contacts with Muslim associations.

The U.S. Ambassador and other embassy representatives as well as staff from the consulates general and the APPs met with government officials responsible for religious freedom matters, including at the interior ministry and its religious affairs office and the foreign ministry’s religious affairs office, to discuss religious tolerance, cooperation, addressing anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim actions, and the role of religious freedom in lessening violent extremism. On March 4 in Paris, the Deputy Secretary of State met over a working lunch with leaders of the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim faiths and with members of civil society engaged in interfaith dialogue to discuss relations among religious groups, anti-Semitism, anti-Islamic sentiment, and violent extremism and radicalization. In June the U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism visited and engaged government and community leaders in discussions of anti-Semitism and racism. The senior advisor from the office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism met with government, religious, and community leaders to discuss anti-Semitism in September. On September 13, a senior embassy representative and members of the government participated in a workshop organized by local NGO Coexister and U.S. NGO Human Rights First to discuss how to build an inclusive society against online hatred and promote religious and ethnic tolerance. The same night, the embassy representative hosted a reception that brought together the workshop’s participants – including NGO representatives and a senior foreign ministry representative – with other high-level government representatives as well as representatives from civil society, technology companies, and religious communities.

Embassy officials discussed religious freedom, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim acts, and interfaith dialogue and tolerance with private citizens, senior representatives from major religious groups, and NGOs, and hosted meetings with the CRIF, the CFCM, and Catholic priests working on interfaith dialogue.

Embassy officials met with interfaith leaders regularly to address issues facing both the Jewish and Muslim communities. The embassy met with Muslim community leaders, activists, and ordinary citizens throughout the country to discuss issues of discrimination and concerns over radicalization and to advocate tolerance for diversity. The Ambassador hosted iftars in June attended by leaders of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities, in which she emphasized U.S. support for interfaith dialogue, religious tolerance, and nondiscrimination. In October a senior embassy official attended a Yom Kippur observance with the Jewish community, where she expressed support for the Jewish community and for religious freedom and tolerance.

In March the U.S. Special Representative to Muslim Communities conducted a series of meetings and engagements with Muslim youth and community leaders, discussing inclusion, identity issues, and community activism to promote equal rights for minority and underserved religious communities.

The embassy awarded small grants to various local NGOs to support projects aimed at furthering tolerance and coexistence, including a program to provide young people from diverse backgrounds with skills and tools to combat anti-Muslim sentiment and a program to enable young people from diverse religious backgrounds to explore issues of religious tolerance with U.S. counterparts.

Two prominent interfaith advocates received prestigious Department of State awards recognizing their efforts to advance religious freedom, which received broad and positive press coverage in the country. Samuel Grzybowski, founder of the innovative interfaith nongovernmental organization Coexister, was the recipient of the Emerging Young Leaders Award. French Moroccan interfaith activist Latifa Ibn Ziaten – mother of Imad ibn Ziaten, the first soldier Mohamed Merah killed in Toulouse in 2012 – won the International Women of Courage Award.

Staff from the consulates general and the APPs met with members of religious communities, including local imams, representatives from the Muslim Federation, local grand rabbis, regional CRIF presidents, and representatives of the Christian communities (Catholic, Anglican, and Protestant) in Strasbourg, Marseille, Toulouse, Rennes, Bordeaux, and Lyon in order to promote religious tolerance and interfaith dialogue. During these meetings, they discussed relations between Muslim and Jewish communities, the development and current status of the CAPRI program to assist Muslim youth at risk of radicalization, and how to increase knowledge and tolerance of minority religious communities. The embassy sponsored a program in the United States on interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance for the Rabbi of Toulouse, a Marseille imam, and the Strasbourg-based director of the museum commemorating the victims of the only Nazi internment camp in the country.

In January staff from APP Rennes met with local Muslim community leaders, including Ait Lahbib, the President of a local Muslim youth association, to discuss religious tolerance and promoting interfaith understanding. In October staff from the APP in Bordeaux took part in a panel discussion on the separation of church and state as part of the City Hall of Bordeaux’s Two Weeks of Equality series. The annual event aimed at celebrating diversity and promoting tolerance, including religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.7 million (July 2016 estimate). Demographic studies do not track religious affiliation, and estimates from religious leaders and government agencies vary widely. The Episcopal Conference of Gabon estimates approximately 80 percent of the population is Christian. Of the Christian population, approximately two thirds is Roman Catholic and one third Protestant. The High Council of Islamic Affairs estimates approximately 10 percent is Muslim, including many noncitizen residents with origins in West Africa. The remaining 10 percent of the population practices animism exclusively or does not identify with any religious group. Many individuals practice a syncretic faith that combines elements of Christianity with traditional indigenous faiths, Voodoo, or animism. There is a very small Jewish community.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the state as secular and establishes separation of religion and state. It prohibits religious discrimination and holds all citizens equal before the law regardless of religion. The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, the free practice of religion, and the right to form religious communities that may govern and manage their affairs independently, “consistent with public order.” The constitution stipulates that religious communities whose activities are contrary to law or promote conflict among ethnic groups may be banned.

The law does not require religious groups to register, but those that do are eligible for exemptions from fees for land use and construction permits. To register, a group must present to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) copies of its founding statutes and internal rules, a letter attesting to publication of these documents in the applicable local administrative bulletin, a formal letter of request for registration addressed to the minister of interior, a property lease, the police records of the group’s leaders, and the group’s bank statements. Registered religious groups must also provide the MOI with proof of nonprofit status to receive exemptions from local taxes and customs duties on imports. The MOI maintains an official registry of religious groups.

The constitution states parents have the right to choose their children’s religious education. The state provides for public education based on “religious neutrality” but permits religious instruction in public schools if the parents request it. Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant groups operate primary and secondary schools. These schools must register with the Ministry of Education, which ensures they meet the same standards as public schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The MOI reported it generally processed registration requests from religious groups within one month. The government denied some applications for registration during the year; the MOI estimated that it rejected over 30 such applications in the past two years. Ministry officials described the religious groups it rejected as often “one-man operations” practicing a mixture of Christianity and traditional animist beliefs. Their difficulty with registration usually concerned gathering the appropriate documents, according to ministry officials. Whether registered or not, ministry officials stated these groups were allowed to operate freely if they obeyed the law and did not harm their neighbors.

Muslim leaders reported the MOI did not request they discourage Muslim women from wearing the full-face veil in public as they had requested in previous years. Muslim leaders and the MOI reportedly remained cooperative and in agreement on this issue.

Interfaith dialogues among senior Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic leaders concluded there were no significant societal pressures or actions against religious freedom. Leaders of all three faiths met regularly, attended each other’s major festivals and worked together to promote religious tolerance and to defend freedom of religion. The interfaith dialogues and activities included discussion on religious issues. Prior to the August presidential elections, leaders of all three major faiths made a joint appeal for domestic peace and interfaith dialogue.

A newly arrived rabbi stated he hoped to reach out to the Jewish community.

U.S. embassy staff met with senior government officials from the MOI to encourage continued respect for religious freedom, to discuss registration issues, and to ask government officials to continue their outreach to religious communities to discuss religious freedom.

Embassy staff encouraged Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic leaders to continue their interfaith dialogue and activities promoting interreligious tolerance and understanding, such as regular meetings among religious leaders of different faiths.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.9 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2014 census, Georgian Orthodox Christians constitute 83.4 percent of the population, followed by Muslims at 10.7 percent and members of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) at 2.9 percent. According to the census, Roman Catholics, Kurdish Yezidis, Greek Orthodox, Jews, growing numbers of “nontraditional” religious groups such as Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, and the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKON), and people who profess no religious preference, constitute the remaining 3 percent of the population.

There is a strong correlation between ethnicity, religious affiliation, and region of residence. Most ethnic Georgians are affiliated with the GOC. A small number of mostly ethnic Russians are members of several Orthodox groups not affiliated with the GOC, including the Molokani, Staroveriy (Old Believers), and Dukhoboriy (Spirit Wrestlers). Ethnic Azeris are predominantly Shia Muslims and form the majority of the population in the southeastern region of Kvemo-Kartli. Other Muslim groups include ethnic Georgian Muslims in Adjara and Chechen Kists in the northeast, both of which are predominantly Sunni. Ethnic Georgian Sunni Muslims, originally from Adjara, migrated to Samtskhe-Javakheti in the 1980s. Ethnic Armenians belong primarily to the AAC and constitute the majority of the population in Samtskhe-Javakheti.

According to a census reportedly conducted in 2011 by the de facto government of Abkhazia, there are 241,000 residents of Abkhazia. A survey reportedly conducted in 2003 by the de facto government listed 60 percent of respondents as Christian, 16 percent as Muslim, 8 percent as atheists or nonbelievers, 8 percent as followers of the pre-Christian Abkhazian religion, and 1 percent as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews or other religions, with the remaining 6 percent undecided.

According to a 2015 census reportedly taken by the de facto government of South Ossetia, there are 53,000 residents of South Ossetia. Estimates are the majority of the population practice Christianity followed by Islam and the “Right Faith,” a revival of the pre-Christian ethnic Ossetian religion.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for “complete freedom of religion” and equality for all regardless of religion. The constitution prohibits persecution on the basis of religion and prohibits compelling anyone to express his or her opinion about religion. The constitution also prohibits public and political associations which stir up religious animosity. The law provides for freedom of religious belief, denomination, and conscience, including the right to choose and change religious affiliation.

The constitution recognizes the special role of the GOC in the country’s history, but stipulates the GOC shall be independent from the state and relations between the GOC and the state shall be governed by a constitutional agreement (also called a concordat). The concordat grants rights not given to other religious groups, including legal immunity for the GOC Patriarch, exemption of GOC clergy from military service, and a consultative role in government, especially in education. The concordat states some of its provisions, including the GOC’s consultative role in education, require additional legislation before they may be implemented.

A religious group may register with the government’s National Agency of the Public Registry (NAPR) as a Legal Entity of Public Law (LEPL) or as a nonprofit organization, both of which offer essentially the same benefits, including legal recognition when conducting activities, partial tax exemptions, and the right to own property and open bank accounts. Unregistered religious groups may carry out religious activities but do not receive the legal status or benefits conferred on registered groups.

To register as an LEPL, an organization must have historic ties to the country or legal recognition from Council of Europe member states as a religious organization, but the law does not state who determines what constitutes “historic ties.” In addition, an organization registering for LEPL status must submit to the NAPR information regarding its objectives and procedures and a list of its founders and governing body. The civil code defines the activities and rights of denominations registered under LEPL status. Groups registering as nonprofit religious organizations do not have to demonstrate historical ties to the country or recognition by Council of Europe members but are required to submit to the NAPR similar information about their objectives, governing procedures, and names of founders and members of their governing body.

The tax code considers religious activities not to be economic activities, and grants registered religious groups’ partial tax exemptions for donations. Religious groups other than the GOC pay profit tax on the sale of religious products, value added taxes on the provision or importation of religious products, and taxes on all activities related to the construction, restoration, and maintenance of religious buildings.

According to property law, no religious organization registered as an LEPL, except the GOC, may acquire nonagricultural state property through a direct sale. A denomination registered as a nonprofit organization may purchase state property. The law also grants the GOC the right to acquire state-owned agricultural land free of charge, while other religious groups must pay for land.

The criminal code prohibits interference with worship services, persecution of a person based on religious faith or belief, and interference with the establishment of a religious organization, although the code provides no definition for the meaning of “establishment” in this formulation. Violations are punishable by fines, imprisonment, or both; violations committed by a public officer or official are considered abuses of power and are punishable by fines or longer terms of imprisonment if committed by force or arms, or by insulting the dignity of a victim. In cases of religious persecution, the perpetrator may be imprisoned for up to three years depending upon the use or threat of violence, his or her official position, and damages caused. In cases of unlawful interference in the right to perform religious rituals involving the use or threat of violence, offenders may be imprisoned for up to two years, or in cases where the offender holds an official position, for up to five years. Interference in the establishment of a religious organization is punishable by fine, correctional work for up to one year, or imprisonment for up to two years.

Pursuant to the law, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office (CPO) prosecutes human rights violations involving religious intolerance. The Human Rights Unit within the CPO monitors the protection of religious freedom, while the PDO serves as the country’s human rights ombudsman and monitors complaints of restrictions on religious freedom. The Tolerance Center, under the PDO, coordinates the PDO’s Council of Religions and Ethnic Minorities, carries out educational activities, and monitors and analyzes cases of religious and ethnic discrimination and xenophobia.

SARI distributes the government’s compensation to Islamic, Jewish, Roman Catholic, and AAC religious organizations registered as LEPLs for “the material and moral damages inflicted upon them during the Soviet period.” According to SARI, its mandate is to promote and ensure a peaceful coexistence on the basis of principles of equality and tolerance. In its draft strategy on religious policy, published in February 2014, SARI stated its key responsibilities include researching the existing religious situation and reporting to the government; preparing recommendations and draft legal acts for the government; serving as a consultative body and intermediary for the government in disputes arising between religious associations; and issuing recommendations to relevant state institutions on the construction of religious buildings, the determination of their location, and the transfer of such properties to religious organizations.

Although the law states public schools may not be used for the purposes of religious indoctrination, proselytizing, or forcible assimilation, the concordat gives the GOC the right to teach its religion in educational institutions and authorizes the state to pay for GOC religious schools. The law states students have the right to pursue religious study and practice religious rituals in schools “of their own accord” for the purpose of acquiring religious education, but only after school hours. The law cites no special regulations for private religious schools. Outside instructors, including clergy, may only attend or direct student religious education or activities if they are directly invited to do so by the students themselves. School administration and teachers may not be involved in this process.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Although the CPO reported it had investigated 19 cases involving crimes potentially based on religious intolerance, NGOs and the PDO continued to state the government was ineffective in its investigation of crimes motivated by religious hatred. NGOs and minority religious groups continued to express concern over government actions, at both the national and local level, resisting the construction of places of worship for minority religious groups and showing what they said was favoritism towards the GOC in the restitution of buildings confiscated by the state in the Soviet era. They also criticized SARI’s distribution of compensation funds for damages sustained in the Soviet era. Despite the government resistance, there were some court rulings in favor of the rights of minority religious groups to build places of worship and schools and at least one group, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, opened a new place of worship. The government opened the first Muslim prayer house for members of the armed forces, but only the GOC continued to have chapels in prisons. The government included a section on the protection of religious minorities in its 2016-2017 Human Rights Action Plan. Some NGOs and the PDO said the government inadequately addressed acts of religious intolerance and discrimination favoring the GOC in public schools.

The CPO investigated 19 cases involving alleged crimes committed on the basis of religious intolerance during the year. The 19 cases involved one beating, five of illegal interference with the performance of religious rites, twelve of persecution, and one of damage or destruction of property. According to the CPO, 12 individuals were prosecuted for crimes based on religious intolerance, including 10 individuals for persecution and two individuals for illegal interference with the performance of religious rites. Four cases were terminated without further action.

The Tolerance and Diversity Institute (TDI), an NGO, reported a lack of effective investigations into crimes motivated by religious hatred. The PDO’s annual report again stated the ineffective investigation of crimes probably committed on religious grounds remained a major problem.

According to NAPR’s website, it had accepted all registration applications submitted by religious organizations during the year but did not specify how many. SARI reported at year’s end, a total of 39 religious organizations were registered as LEPLs and “dozens” of religious organizations as nonprofit organizations.

Most prisons reportedly continued to have GOC chapels but no areas for nondenominational worship. According to SARI, Roman Catholic, AAC, Baptist, Muslim, and Jewish religious services remained available upon request in the military and in prisons.

On March 6, former Defense Minister Tina Khidasheli announced the opening of the first prayer house for Muslims serving in the armed forces. She also announced two additional Islamic prayer houses would be established.

According to the Tolerance Center, non-GOC churches continued to face government resistance when attempting to obtain construction permits for churches, and it continued to attribute the resistance to what it termed a general societal bias in favor of the GOC.

After the Rustavi City Court in June ruled the Rustavi municipality should grant the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) a permit to build a church, in November the Rustavi municipality appealed the ruling, according to the Human Rights Education and Monitoring Centre (EMC), which represented the RCC in the case. As of year’s end, the appeal remained under consideration at the Tbilisi Court of Appeal with no trial date set.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses completed construction on their kingdom hall in Terjola and began to use it for services following a 2015 Kutaisi Court of Appeal order requiring the municipal council of Terjola to re-issue a construction permit it had previously suspended. According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses and EMC, the court of appeal did not rule on the issue of whether the municipal council had acted in discriminatory fashion in suspending the permit initially. The Supreme Court did not accept appeals from both the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Terjola municipality to hear arguments to determine whether discriminatory conduct had occurred.

SARI continued to chair the Recommendatory Commission on the Study of Property and Financial Issues of Religious Organizations, which issued nonbinding recommendations on property issues involving religious organizations. According to TDI, the commission continued to issue recommendations only on properties claimed by a single religious group and did not address the transfer of properties which were in dispute between two or more religious groups.

The AAC continued to request restitution of three churches in Tbilisi and one in Akhaltsikhe, all of which had been registered as state property and claimed by both the AAC and the GOC. The AAC reported it operated 57 churches in the country but did not have formal ownership of any of them.

The Muslim community continued to dispute the government’s ownership of mosques in Kvemo Kartli, Adigeni, and Adjara. Muslim community leaders and local and central government authorities remained unable to reach a mutually agreeable solution to address overcrowding in the mosque in Batumi, which was state-owned property. The government drafted blueprints to remodel and expand the existing mosque, but as of year’s end no agreement had been reached on remodeling the building. The All Muslims of All Georgia organization (AMAG) acquired its first madrassah, located in Batumi, with government funds. NGOs and Muslim community leaders stated the government continued to exert direct influence over AMAG.

In October media reported local law enforcement officials had blocked the entrance of a building in the village of Mokhe in Samtskhe-Javakheti, ownership of which was claimed by local Muslims as a 20th century mosque and also by the GOC community as the site of a former church, after representatives of the Muslim community started gathering there daily to perform prayers. SARI reported it had organized five official meetings and 10 unofficial meetings as of October in an effort to reach a consensus solution to the issue. In December a SARI commission on the status of a building issued a report recommending several places in the center of the village be offered to the Muslim community for constructing a new mosque and the existing disputed structure be given the status of a cultural heritage building. The PDO stated the SARI commission report did not resolve the two-year dispute between local Muslims and Christians, and stated the commission had not accomplished its stated goal of establishing the origin and ownership of the building. There was no further action on the case as of the year’s end.

The government continued to pay subsidies for the restoration of religious properties it considered to be national cultural heritage sites. The Ministry of Culture and Protection of Monuments provided 557,000 lari ($209,000) during the year for the restoration of religious buildings on cultural heritage sites but did not provide a breakdown of how the money was spent.

In September the Batumi City Court ruled residents of Kobuleti had discriminated against Muslims in 2014 by nailing a pig’s head to the front door of a planned Muslim boarding school and by erecting a cross near the property, thereby delaying the school’s opening. The court ruled the individuals involved in the vandalism were obligated to provide compensation. As of October, the boarding school’s administrators stated they intended to open the facility in 2017. The court did not rule on whether the Ministry of Internal Affairs also had engaged in discriminatory behavior towards Muslims in the 2014 incident by failing to stop the actions of the residents. EMC appealed the court’s lack of a ruling on the behavior of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. EMC expected the appellate court to rule on its appeal shortly after the end of the year.

NGOs continued to report cases of religious discrimination in schools, including incidents involving the promotion of GOC theology in religion courses, GOC prayers conducted in classrooms, and the display of icons and other religious symbols in schools, despite prohibition of proselytization in the law. In its annual report, the PDO stated students adhering to minority religions not observing the same religious rituals as the GOC did not feel free to disclose their religion and felt forced to participate in the GOC religious rituals against their will. The Ministry of Education’s general inspection department continued to be responsible for dealing with complaints of inappropriate teacher behavior.

In August the Union of All Muslims of Georgia (an NGO), the Evangelical Baptist Church of Georgia, the Pentecostal Church of Georgia, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Georgia, and the Redeemed Christian Church of God in Georgia, represented by the Tbilisi Free University Law Clinic and TDI, all filed a constitutional claim regarding discrimination by the government in transferring state property to non-Orthodox religious organizations. At year’s end, the Constitutional Court had not started discussing the claim.

In December the Constitutional Court began hearing an October 2015 case brought by the Caucasus Apostolic Administration of Latin Rite Catholics, the Evangelical-Baptist Church of Georgia, the Union of All Muslims of Georgia, the Pentecostal Church of Georgia, the Trans-Caucasian Union of Seventh-day Adventist Church, the Word of Life Church of Georgia, the Holy Trinity Church, and the Church of Christ to obtain equal tax status for all religious organizations. The court postponed deliberations shortly after they began, reportedly due to the absence of a relevant expert. TDI, which represented the claimants along with the Constitutional Law Clinic of the Free University, said the hearing was expected to continue in 2017.

The government distributed 25 million lari ($9.4 million) to the GOC in compensation for “the material and moral damages” inflicted upon it during the Soviet period. In addition, in accordance with a 2014 resolution by parliament allowing the government to compensate Islamic, Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Armenian Apostolic religious organizations registered as LEPLs, SARI disbursed compensation funds totaling 4.5 million lari ($1.7 million) to those four religious groups in coordination with the Ministry of Finance. NGOs continued to question the criteria by which the government selected the four denominations and to criticize the exclusion of other faiths.

SARI reported this year’s government disbursements as follows: 2,750,000 lari ($1,000,000) to the Muslim community, represented by the AMAG; 550,000 lari ($207,000) to the RCC; 800,000 lari ($300,000) to the AAC; and 400,000 lari ($150,000) to the Jewish community. In making the disbursements, SARI again stated the compensation was “partial and of symbolic character,” and maintained the government continued to take into account level of damage and “present day negative conditions” of denominations during the selection process.

In June the government approved a 2016-2017 Human Rights Action Plan, which included a section on the protection of religious minorities. Specific objectives included improving religious tolerance among public servants, revising the existing legal framework for the protection of individual and collective rights of freedom of religion and belief, and the implementation of secularism and religious equality in the education system. TDI expressed concern over the recommendation in the action plan to revise the existing legal framework regarding freedom of religion and belief, saying the majority of religious organizations believed discrimination stemmed from the failure of the government to implement existing legislation, and not from a lack of legal regulations.

As of the end of the year, the government continued its investigation into two November 2015 incidents at the Jehovah’s Witnesses Kingdom Hall in Vazisubani, a Tbilisi suburb, in which bullets were fired at the building. No individuals were harmed in either incident.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained outside the control of the central government, and reliable information from those regions continued to be difficult to obtain.

According to the de facto “constitution” adopted in Abkhazia, all people there are equal before the law regardless of religious beliefs, everyone there has a right to freedom of religion, and it is forbidden to form associations or parties aimed at sowing religious discord.

According to media sources, in South Ossetia the de facto government did not recognize Jehovah’s Witnesses as an official religious group, while the de facto government in Abkhazia continued to impose a ban on the group. In October media sources reported the de facto South Ossetian government stated up to 1,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses were in the territory and it was considering legislation to ban the distribution of Jehovah’s Witnesses literature as “extremist.” The de facto government was also reportedly considering the introduction of legislation to impose fines from 50,000 to 100,000 rubles ($819 to $1639) on individuals renting property to religious groups.

According to a SARI report, as well as media and online accounts, there were efforts by local religious figures in Abkhazia to make the region’s churches autocephalous, although some local religious officials wished to resubordinate the GOC churches in the region under the Russian Orthodox Church, while others wished to resubordinate the churches under the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

The de facto government authorities in the Gali district of Abkhazia reportedly did not permit GOC clergy to conduct religious services in any of the four GOC churches and ethnic Georgians were unable to attend services in their own language. According to a SARI report, the ethnic Georgian population in the district reportedly traveled to Zugdidi and attended worship secretly at night, especially during major holidays, because the GOC clergy was not permitted to conduct services openly.

According to a SARI report, in three out of the four districts of South Ossetia (Tskhinvali, Znauri, and Java), GOC churches reportedly broke away from the GOC and merged with the Greek Orthodox Church. In the fourth district, Akhalgori, only two GOC clergy, the Metropolitan of Nikozi and Tskhinvali Diocese, Isaiah Chanturia, and one priest, Antoni Chakvetadze, reportedly were available to provide worship services at eight operating GOC churches.

Individuals living outside Abkhazia and South Ossetia reported continued difficulties crossing into these territories, including for the purpose of visiting the gravesites of family members.

According to SARI, there remained the potential local authorities in South Ossetia might whitewash or otherwise deface GOC religious statues in Samachablo and frescoes at Tiri Monastery.

In Abkhazia SARI reported GOC churches were in a “deplorable state” and local authorities had erased frescoes in almost all of them.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses reported continued interference with their religious activity, including 11 physical assaults. In one of these incidents, in July, two female Jehovah’s Witnesses were sharing a Bible verse at Alexandre’s Square when a passerby began kicking and verbally attacking them, ripping their clothes. The police were notified and the case remained under investigation as of the end of the year. In another of these incidents unknown assailants threw stones at members of the group.

Representatives of minority religious groups continued to report what they termed a widespread societal belief about minority religious groups posing a threat to the GOC and to the country’s cultural values. Some NGOs reported GOC clergy continued to contribute to hostile societal attitudes towards minority religious communities.

In October during Pope Francis’s visit, the media reported some protestors, including a small number of GOC clergy, greeted the pope with signs calling him the anti-Christ and other derogatory names. Other GOC representatives called the pope a “heretic”, “the greatest enemy of orthodoxy, greater than Islam” and “a wolf in sheep’s clothing”. Several Western media outlets also reported the GOC leadership “snubbed” Pope Francis by not attending the papal Mass in Tbilisi on October 1. The GOC Patriarch, however, met Pope Francis upon his arrival and issued a statement condemning the Orthodox priests who criticized the pope’s visit.

Minority religious communities, including Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Catholics, and Protestants, continued to report resistance to their establishing places of worship and religious schools.

From January to October, the most recent period for which data was available, the MDF documented at least 69 instances of religiously intolerant statements on TV, online, and printed media by media representatives, political parties, clergy, public organization, and others. The instances included 31 “Islamophobic” or “Turkophobic” statements related to the construction of new mosques, 18 anti-Catholic statements in connection with the pope’s visit, six statements against the Jehovah’s Witnesses, three against the Evangelical Baptist Church of Georgia, and 11 against other religious groups.

The Jehovah’s Witnesses reported seven cases of damage to their property and three incidents of vandalism. On May 25 and August 10, individuals threw stones at the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Kvemo Kartli, damaging the facade and the building’s siding each time. Police identified the perpetrator of the May incident and questioned him, but no charges were brought against him. The police continued to investigate the August incident.

The Ambassador and U.S. embassy officers regularly met with officials from the government, including SARI, the prime minister’s adviser on human rights and gender equality, and the president’s adviser on national minorities to encourage dialogue between the government and religious minorities. Embassy officers also continued to meet with the PDO and with officials in its Tolerance Center in this connection.

The embassy continued to meet with NGOs concerned with religious freedom issues, including 21st Century Union, EMC, and TDI, as well as with religious community leaders, to promote religious tolerance and the integration of religious minorities into society.

The Ambassador and embassy officers met with leaders from traditional and nontraditional denominations. Embassy officers, including the Ambassador, visited the Pankisi Gorge, Akhalkalaki, Kvemo Kartli, and Adjara regions on several occasions to hold meetings with local religious leaders from the Sunni Muslim, Armenian Orthodox, and Shia Muslim communities. In the meetings, embassy officials promoted interfaith understanding, dialogue, respect, and the peaceful coexistence of all religions.

In February and November the Ambassador met with GOC Patriarch Ilia II. In both meetings, the Ambassador stressed the importance of the Church’s role in promoting religious diversity and tolerance, especially during the parliamentary elections cycle.

In March the Ambassador hosted representatives of the RCC, Evangelical Baptist, Seventh-day Adventist, Pentecostal, AAC, Yezidi, Jewish, Muslim, and Lutheran communities to discuss their ability to practice their religious beliefs freely.

In April the embassy sponsored the participation of four civil society representatives in a program in the U.S. on religious freedom and interfaith issues to learn about how community outreach programs can build societal resistance to violent extremism.

In October embassy officers visited the planned Kobuleti boarding school to show support for the school’s administrators and the local Muslim community.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 80.7 million (July 2016 estimate). Unofficial estimates and figures provided by religious groups indicate approximately 30 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, while 28 percent belongs to the EKD – a confederation of Lutheran, Reformed (Calvinist), and United (Prussian Union) Protestant regional Churches. Other Protestant denominations (New Apostolic Church, Baptist communities and other nondenominational Christians) combined account for less than 1 percent of the population. Orthodox Christians represent 2 percent of the population.

According to government estimates, approximately 5 percent of the population is Muslim, of which 65 percent is Sunni, 12.5 percent Alevi, and 5.6 percent Shia. According to the Ministry of the Interior, Muslims accounted for approximately 70 percent of the 890,000 refugees and asylum seekers that entered the country in 2015. In 2016, 280,000 refugees and asylum seekers arrived. Estimates of the Jewish population vary widely, between 100,000 and 250,000. Groups that together constitute less than 1 percent of the population include Buddhists (270,000); Hindus (100,000); Jehovah’s Witnesses (222,000); The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) (40,000); COS (5,000-10,000); Sikhs, and Yezidis. Approximately 33 percent of the population either have no religious affiliation or are members of unrecorded religious groups.

Legal Framework

The Basic Law, which fulfills the role of the constitution, prohibits discrimination on the basis of religious opinion and provides for freedom of faith and conscience and the freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed and to practice one’s religion. The Basic Law also prohibits a state church. It stipulates people shall not be required to disclose their religious convictions or be compelled to participate in religious acts. The Basic Law states religious instruction shall be part of the curriculum in public schools and parents have the right to decide whether children shall receive religious instruction. It recognizes the right to establish private denominational schools. The Basic Law guarantees the freedom to form religious societies and states groups may organize themselves for private religious purposes without constraint. It allows registered religious groups with “public law corporation” (PLC) status to receive public subsidies from the states and to provide religious services in the military, at hospitals, and in prisons.

Religious groups wishing to qualify as nonprofit associations with tax-exempt status must register. State-level authorities review registration submissions and routinely grant tax-exempt status; if challenged, their decisions are subject to judicial review. Religious groups applying for tax-exempt status must provide evidence through their statutes, history, and activities that they are a religious group.

A special partnership exists between the states and religious groups with PLC status, as outlined in the Basic Law. Any religious group may request PLC status, which – if granted – entitles the group to levy tithes (averaging 9 percent of income tax), which each state collects on its behalf, separately from income taxes, but through the state’s tax collection process. PLCs pay fees to the government for the tithing service, but not all groups utilize the service. PLC status also allows for tax exemptions (larger than those given to groups with nonprofit status), representation on supervisory boards of public television and radio stations, and the right to special labor regulations, for example requiring that employees of a religious group working, for example, in hospitals, kindergartens, or NGOs run by the group be members of that group. State governments subsidize institutions with PLC status providing public services, such as religious schools and hospitals.

According to the Basic Law, the decision to grant PLC status is made at the state level. Individual states base PLC status decisions on a number of varying qualifications, including an assurance of the group’s permanence, size, and respect for the constitutional order and fundamental rights of individuals. An estimated 180 religious groups have PLC status, including the EKD, the Catholic Church, the Jewish community, Mormons, Seventh-day Adventists, Mennonites, Baptists, Bahais, Methodists, Christian Scientists, and the Salvation Army. Fifteen of the 16 federal states have granted the Jehovah’s Witnesses PLC status. Ahmadi groups have obtained PLC status in Hesse and Hamburg; no other Muslim communities have PLC status. The COS does not have PLC or nonprofit status in any state.

According to a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court, headscarf bans for teachers at public schools are a violation of religious freedom, but implementation is left to the states. For example, the state of North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) changed its laws to enable headscarf-wearing women to work as teachers, whereas Bavaria and Saarland render decisions on a case-by-case basis.

Some federal and state laws affect religious practices. Federal animal protection laws prohibit the killing of animals without anesthesia, including when part of halal and kosher slaughter practices, although some exceptions exist. For example, a federal administrative court decision from 2006 allows for slaughter without anesthesia if trained personnel conduct the slaughter in a registered slaughterhouse under observation of the local veterinary inspection office, and the meat is for consumption only by members of religious communities requiring slaughter without anesthesia.

According to federal law, religious groups may appoint individuals with special training to carry out circumcision of males under the age of six months. After six months, the law states circumcisions must be performed in a “medically professional manner” and without unnecessary pain.

The federal criminal code prohibits calling for violence or arbitrary measures against religious groups or their members or inciting hatred against them. It also prohibits assaulting the human dignity of religious groups or their members by insulting, maliciously maligning, or defaming them. The federal criminal code prohibits disturbing religious services or acts of worship. Infractions are punishable by up to five years in prison and a fine. The law bans Nazi propaganda, Holocaust denial, and fomenting racial hatred.

All states offer religious instruction and ethics courses in public schools. Religious communities with PLC status (or a special agreement with the state that grants them this right despite the lack thereof) appoint religious teachers and work with the states to set the basic curriculum in line with the basic law; the states pay for the teachers’ salaries. Most public schools offer the option of Protestant and Catholic religious instruction in cooperation with those churches, as well as instruction in Judaism if enough students (usually 12, although regulations vary state to state) express an interest. The states of Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, NRW and Rhineland-Palatinate also offer some religious classes on Islam. Students who do not wish to participate in religious instruction may opt out; in some states those who opt out may substitute ethics courses. State authorities generally permit religious groups to establish private schools as long as they meet basic curriculum requirements. Schooling is constitutionally-mandated, and homeschooling is prohibited, including for religious reasons.

The law permits the federal government to characterize “nontraditional” religious groups as “sects,” “youth religions,” and “youth sects,” and allows the government to provide “accurate information” or warnings about them to the public. The law does not permit the government to use terms such as “destructive,” “pseudo-religious,” or “manipulative” when referring to these groups. Several court decisions have found the government must remain neutral towards a religion and can provide a warning to the public only if an “offer” by a religious group would endanger the basic rights of an individual or place the individual in a state of physical or financial dependence.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

State governments continued not to recognize the COS as a religious group, which made it ineligible for tax benefits. NRW did not recognize the Jehovah’s Witnesses as a religious group. The government continued to investigate COS and Muslim groups for reported constitutional violations. COS continued to report instances of government criticism and discrimination, such as the use of “sect filters” to block them from public sector employment. Some senior government officials condemned anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment; other politicians used anti-Islamic and anti-Semitic rhetoric.

According to federal and state OPC reports and COS members, the federal and state OPCs in Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, NRW, and Thuringia monitored the activities of the COS, reportedly by evaluating Scientology publications and members’ public activities to determine whether they violated the Basic Law. At least four major political parties (the Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union, Social Democratic Party, and Free Democratic Party) continued to exclude Scientologists from party membership.

Federal and state OPCs continued to monitor a number of Muslim groups. The website of the NRW OPC states the Muslim Brotherhood “rejects democracy”. According to the federal OPC, the Muslim Brotherhood had 1,040 members in the country. The federal OPC annual report also stated the Milli Gorus Islamic Community, an organization of the Turkish diaspora, “sought to achieve its interpretation of an Islamic order.” The report estimated there were tens of thousands of Milli Gorus supporters, including as many as 10,000 militant supporters, in the country.

The Federal Prosecutor’s Office indicted four individuals in the Higher Regional Court in Munich on January 14 for creating and belonging to what the court labeled a terrorist group, the “Old School Society,” and for planning a bomb attack against Salafists and refugees. The trial began in April and was ongoing at year’s end.

In August the government of NRW suspended its negotiations regarding PLC status with four Islamic organizations, including the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB) and the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD). According to media reports, the suspension of the negotiations was linked to the government’s concern about DITIB’s ties to Turkey. The suspension took place despite ZMD adopting structural reforms to meet the legal requirements for PLC status in March. NRW had earlier agreed to an advisory council as a temporary workaround solution that would allow these organizations to provide input on Islamic religious instruction in the state. The workaround agreement is expected to end at the end of 2018.

In May the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court allowed the prosecution of eight members of a self-declared “Sharia Police” group to move forward, overruling a local court’s 2015 decision that the group did not violate a ban on wearing uniforms. The “Sharia Police” group staged patrols in Wuppertal, NRW in September 2014 to counter “non-Muslim behavior,” including alcohol consumption, gambling, and smoking and to pressure youth to convert to Islam. On November 21, the local court in Wuppertal, NRW acquitted seven of the members. Proceedings for the eighth member of the group were suspended, pending the conclusion of a separate trial in which he was a defendant on an unrelated terrorism charge.

The wearing of headscarves by public schoolteachers and courtroom officials generated significant debate about religious freedom and requirements that civil servants refrain from displaying religious symbols. On November 28, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in favor of a Muslim kindergarten educator in Baden-Wurttemberg who had challenged a written warning from her employer after she refused to take off her headscarf at work.

Berlin-based NGO Network against Discrimination and Islamophobia reported a teacher was rejected in 2014 from a position at a Berlin elementary school because she wore a headscarf at work. In April the Berlin city labor court ruled against her and in favor of the Berlin state neutrality law which prohibits public employees from wearing headscarves or other religious symbols.

In August the Social Democratic Party (SPD) Mayor of Luckenwalde in the state of Brandenburg, terminated a woman’s internship because she refused to remove her headscarf while working in the city hall. According to the mayor, the wearing of a headscarf in the city hall was a violation of the constitutional neutrality law.

In December the federal cabinet approved a draft law, which, if approved by parliament, would prohibit civil servants and soldiers from wearing a full-face veil. The draft law further specifies that faces must be visible during identity checks. The draft law was scheduled to be submitted to parliament for debate and a vote in early 2017.

Speaking at the International Parliamentarians’ Conference of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) Parties in Berlin on September 14, Chancellor Merkel said, “Although some religiously-motivated behavior may seem strange, we must always keep the high value of religious freedom in mind.” She referred to the full-face veil as “a great obstacle in integration” and stated there should be “precise plans of action for places where a full-face veil is not warranted,” such as in the public sector or in court. At a CDU conference on December 6, Chancellor Merkel called for a partial ban on full-face veils and stated, “The full-face veil is not acceptable in our country. It should be banned wherever legally possible.”

Interior Minister de Maiziere supported the partial ban on full-face veils, specifying that it was important to introduce a legal requirement to show one’s face in public “where it is necessary for social coexistence – at the wheel, at public offices, at the registry office, in schools and universities, in the civil service, in court.” De Maiziere stated integration meant that German values and the limits of tolerance towards cultural practices that conflicted with those values must be made clear to new arrivals.

On June 30, Augsburg District Court in Bavaria ruled in favor of a law student who brought a complaint against the state for prohibiting her from wearing a headscarf at public court appearances while in training. The judge found there was no legal basis for the ban and “no formal law that obliges legal interns to promote a religiously neutral worldview.” The Bavarian justice minister said he would appeal the ruling. Following this ruling, the NRW justice minister stated that female Muslim judges and prosecutors in NRW must observe neutrality and were not allowed to wear a headscarf.

Media reported in June that a public pool in Neutraubling, Bavaria banned swimmers from wearing burqinis, a full-body swimsuit some Muslim women wear. The Bavarian integration commissioner stated the burqini case in Neutraubling was the first one he had heard of and that a decision about burqinis should be left to the municipalities. City councils in other cities, including Konstanz and Munich, publicly declared burqinis were allowed.

The Federal Constitutional Court ruled in December that Muslim girls were required to participate in co-ed swimming classes at school despite the argument by the parents of an 11-year-old Muslim student that their daughter should be allowed an exception. The girl stated that even if she were permitted to wear a burqini rather than a swimsuit, it would violate Islamic dress code.

In June the interior ministers of the 16 federal states announced at the conclusion of a session that “Islamophobia” would be listed as a separate category of hate crime within the criminal statistics collected by police, effective January 1, 2017.

State governments provided funds to Jewish communities and organizations in various amounts, which included the renovation and construction of synagogues. The federal government continued to cover 50 percent of maintenance costs for Jewish cemeteries. State and local police units continued to provide security for synagogues and other Jewish institutions.

On November 11, the federal government announced that in 2017 it would provide six million euros ($6.3 million) and 2.5 million euros ($2.6 million), respectively, in support of the Augsburg and Luebeck Synagogues and two million euros ($2.1 million) for the enlargement of the Jewish educational center Chabad Lubawitsch Berlin.

In an April interview with daily newspaper Berliner Zeitung, CDU/CSU Caucus Chairman Volker Kauder argued for increased state oversight of mosques. In the same interview, Kauder stressed Islam should not be feared; he rejected a call by CSU Secretary General Andreas Scheuer for imams to preach only in German.

Media reported that in March, the Bavarian branch of the Alternative for Germany party (AfD) called for a ban on the construction and operation of mosques. The plan was articulated in a policy document, which stated “Islam does not belong in Germany” and that mosques led to “the spread of Islamic teachings directed towards the removal of our legal order.” The AfD did not include the proposed ban in its national policy platform document.

At a national convention in May, the AfD called minarets and Muslim calls for prayer “symbols of Islamic power that inhibit coexistence with other religions”. The AfD also declared support for a ban on headscarves in public service professions and schools, and a ban on full-face veils in all public places.

CSU Secretary General Scheuer called for an “Islam law” to prevent foreign financing of mosques and kindergartens. He stated all imams intending to work in Germany should be trained in Germany and “share our fundamental values.” Scheuer stated that refugees who did not properly integrate into society should be deported.

Unlike Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish groups, the Muslim community did not have one sole representative body to work with states to plan the curriculum for religious classes. Some states, such as Baden-Wurttemberg, formed advisory councils with representation from several Muslim groups to assist in planning the curriculum for Islamic classes. The Alevi community continued to offer separate religious lessons in schools in seven federal states for approximately 1,500 students.

In July the Berlin state government announced it would fund a new academic center in Islamic theology – headed by a chairperson at the city’s Humboldt University – to train imams and religious teachers as of 2018. Humboldt would become the sixth university in the country with a chair in Islamic theology.

COS continued to report instances of governmental discrimination. “Sect filters,” signed statements by potential employees to confirm they had no contact with COS, remained in use in the public and private sectors. Firms owned or operated by COS members reportedly also suffered discrimination. According to COS, some of its members who suffered discrimination refrained from taking legal action because they felt a trial would be time-consuming and because they feared stigma and loss of business contracts.

According to press reports, there were an estimated 1,600 Muslims serving in the military. In September Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen emphasized in media interviews the need for Muslim soldiers in the army. In November the minister stated she was open to the idea of establishing Muslim military chaplains.

On July 5, the Baden-Wurttemberg State Parliament caucus of the AfD split over a disagreement about an AfD state parliament member. The state parliament member refused to disassociate himself from his anti-Semitic publications comparing Holocaust deniers to Chinese dissidents and stating “Talmudic ghetto Jews” were internal enemies of the Christian West. The two AfD factions reunited after four months. The state parliament member recused himself from the AfD caucus on July 5, hours after the split, but remained in parliament as an independent member.

On February 7, an AfD board member posted an anti-Semitic cartoon on his Facebook page. The post was deleted shortly thereafter.

In January police arrested two men on charges they had incited racial hatred by operating a neo-Nazi internet portal, “Altermedia Deutschland.” The government banned the website for inciting violence against foreigners, spreading anti-Semitic material, and denying the Holocaust.

At an inter-parliamentary conference on anti-Semitism in March Chancellor Merkel condemned any form of anti-Semitism, stating everyone who lived in the country, whether long-established or newly-arrived, must be aware there was no room for anti-Semitism in the country. Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said anyone who entered the country must reject anti-Semitism. He further stated “there is and can be no place for anti-Semitism” in “a free, democratic and tolerant Germany.” Federal Parliament President Norbert Lammert called upon Germans to resolutely fight anti-Semitism, adding hostility towards Jews is “totally unacceptable”.

During a press conference in April Chancellor Merkel stated, “In Germany, we have freedom of religion that is guaranteed by our basic law. This of course also applies to Muslims in our country… the majority of [whom] follow their religion within the framework of the Basic Law.”

During a CDU/CSU conference on religious tolerance in September Chancellor Merkel stated that many refugees came from countries with limited religious freedom where anti-Semitism is widespread. She called for religious tolerance and freedom.

In September Interior Minister de Maiziere chaired the German Islam Conference, a forum that began in 2006 to foster dialogue about Muslim intergration among federal and state government representatives, Islamic organizations, and prominent Muslims. De Maiziere criticized outside influence on domestic Muslim organizations and called for an intensified debate on security issues. Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble called for tolerance of new immigrants and the development of a “German Islam” based on liberalism and tolerance.

On July 28, the Turkish Consulate in Stuttgart requested the Baden-Wurttemberg state government examine clubs, schools, and organizations affiliated with the religious and social Gulen movement led by Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen. The Baden-Wurttemberg minister-president said the state government would not do this and that the request was “highly disconcerting” and an inappropriate attempt by the Turkish government to influence German politics.

The government’s first International Report on Freedom of Religion and Belief was adopted by the cabinet on June 8 and submitted to parliament. The 72-page report, published on June 14, is organized by topic and includes input from 93 German embassies and the MFA on religious issues, including anti-Semitism, protection of religious freedom and refugees in Germany.

On June 13 in Berlin, Joachim Gauck became the first president in the country’s history to attend an iftar, organized by local religious and civil society organizations.

The government continued to subsidize some Jewish groups. Based on an agreement between the federal government and the Central Council of Jews, the federal government continued to provide 10 million euros ($10.5 million) annually to help maintain Jewish cultural heritage, restore the Jewish community, and support integration and social work. In addition, the federal government provided financial support to the Institute for Jewish Studies in Heidelberg, the Rabbi Seminar at the University of Potsdam, and the Leo Baeck Institute.

Within the framework of the country’s Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) chairmanship, the MFA organized and hosted a number of events on anti-Semitism and Holocaust remembrance, such as a conference in June on combating anti-Semitism and an event in November to discuss Holocaust crimes and their present-day relevance.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

In what authorities labeled a terrorist attack, in December a Tunisian man hijacked a truck and drove it into a crowd at a Christmas market in Berlin, killing 12 people and injuring 56. There were anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, and anti-Christian incidents, including physical and verbal attacks against religious minorities, attacks against religious property, and statements appearing in the media. Authorities attributed the incidents to adherents of the extreme right as well as to some Muslims.

On December 19, a Tunisian man killed a Polish truck driver and drove his truck at high speed through a Christmas market on Breitscheidplatz in Berlin. The attack killed 12 persons and injured 56. ISIS claimed responsibility and, in a video which surfaced on the internet after the attack, the accused attacker pledged allegiance to ISIS. Four days after the attack, he was killed in a shootout with police near the Italian city of Milan. Chancellor Merkel, Interior Minister de Maiziere, police, and the public prosecutor all condemned and labeled the incident as a terrorist attack. In her annual New Year’s address, Merkel said “It is particularly bitter and sickening when terror attacks are committed by people who claim to seek protection in our country.” At the same time, she defended her government’s decision to accept refugees, stressing the importance of helping those in need of protection.

According to the 2015 OSCE report (the most recent available) on hate crimes, published in November, police authorities recorded 192 anti-Semitic hate crimes and 339 crimes based on religiously-motivated bias against Christians and members of other religious groups. In the same year, according to the OSCE, 11 local civil society groups reported 134 anti-Semitic incidents consisting of 58 violent attacks, 10 threats, and 66 attacks against property; five anti-Muslim incidents consisting of two violent attacks, one threat, and two attacks against property; and 26 incidents against Christians and members of other religious groups consisting of six violent attacks, three threats, and 17 attacks against property.

According to a report from the Ministry of Justice, there were 2,083 criminal investigations of anti-Semitic incidents in 2015 committed by right-wing attackers, compared to 773 in 2014. According to the ministry, due to an error, the 2014 figures did not include statistics from Berlin. In addition, the ministry used a different methodology than the police in compiling its statistics.

According to the most recent federal OPC report, authorities categorized 29 violent incidents in 2015 as manifestations of anti-Semitism motivated by right-wing extremism (down from 31 in 2014).

Federal authorities generally investigated offenses that were reported as anti-Semitic. Government officials stated it was sometimes difficult to classify reported incidents as anti-Semitic because the motivation of the perpetrators was not always clear. Nonviolent incidents, including verbal assaults on, and harassment of, Jews occurred in public places, such as public transportation, sports events, and school grounds. NGOs and members of Jewish communities stated many anti-Semitic incidents, especially among youth in and near schools, were not reported.

According to two surveys by the evangelical NGO Open Doors Germany, there were 743 cases of religiously-motivated criminal acts against Christian refugees in asylum centers between January and September, and the number of incidents accelerated over the period. Incidents included sexual and other violent assaults as well as death threats. Respondents reported fellow Muslim refugees were among those responsible in 91 percent of the incidents. An NGO and several media questioned the methodology and accuracy of the surveys, stating that two thirds of respondents came from a single parish in Berlin, that the motivation of some respondents may have been to move to more comfortable accommodations, and that many incidents in overcrowded shelters may not have been religiously motivated.

The CDU/CSU parliamentary caucus hosted an expert workshop in April on the issue of religious freedom and violence against Christians in refugee shelters in the country. The experts concluded that, while religious persecution of Christians existed, it was difficult to quantify and to separate acts of religious discrimination from other criminal acts.

On January 1, in Nuremberg, an intoxicated man shouted at another man that he smelled bad and that he was Jewish. The man pushed the victim onto the subway tracks, stamping on the victim’s head and fingers to prevent him from getting back onto the platform. A subway employee blocked the tracks for trains until police subdued the perpetrator. In October the man was sentenced to five years in prison.

On April 16, a bomb exploded at the entrance of the Sikh temple in Essen, NRW. Three persons were hurt, one of them seriously. On April 21, police classified the attack as an act of terror. Police arrested five people. In July one person involved in the attack received a 20-month suspended sentence, 100 hours of community service, and mandatory participation in an Islamic de-radicalization program. On December 8, another person involved in the attack received a prison sentence of 2.5 years. The trial against the remaining three defendants began on December 7 and was continuing at year’s end.

In June a 27-year-old man shouted anti-Semitic slurs at a 75-year-old man near a subway station in Berlin and broke a glass bottle on his head, injuring him. Police arrested the perpetrator and released him shortly after.

On December 16, a 12-year-old boy was held on suspicion of an attempted bomb attack in a Christmas market in Ludwigshafen. Prosecutors said he left a backpack with explosives in a Christmas market in Ludwigshafen on November 26 and then placed another explosive device near the town hall on December 5; both explosives failed to detonate. The public prosecutor’s office in Frankenthal did not bring the case to trial because the boy was underage.

On September 26, a bomb exploded at a mosque in Dresden. There were no reported injuries, and no one claimed responsibility. On December 9, the police detained a 29-year-old man suspected of having carried out the attack. The daily newspaper Bild reported the man had spoken at a PEGIDA rally in the summer of 2015 about “criminal foreigners” and “lazy Africans.” According to the police, the suspect was acting alone.

On January 12, the offices of the Central Council of Muslims had to be evacuated under police protection after receiving a threatening letter according to the head of the council. After the incident, he expressed concerns about Muslims being used as scapegoats for criminal incidents throughout the country.

Daily newspapers FAZ, Die Welt, and Die Zeit reported some refugees had chosen to convert to Christianity. The newspapers stated reliable numbers on this issue were not available. Die Zeit reported a church in Berlin baptized approximately 850 Iranians from 2011- 2016. The spokesperson of the Baptist Church in Germany stated their congregation baptized approximately 700 Afghans and Iranians in 2015 and 2016. He noted a “clear increase, especially among Iranians.” Frankfurter Allgemeine reported on refugees from Iran who chose Christianity out of protest against the Islamic lifestyle in their country.

According to NGO Network against Discrimination and Islamophobia, there were reports of discrimination against women wearing headscarves during the job application process, partly because job resumes in Germany often include photos of the applicants. A study by the research institute Bonn Institute of Labor Economics reported in September that women who wear headscarves have to apply to four times the number of jobs as women who do not wear headscarves in order to gain employment.

In February the Dortmund Technical University closed its nondenominational meditation space after Muslim students turned it into a prayer room with a separate space for women and laid out Qurans and prayer rugs. When more than 40 students complained about the closure, the university leadership published an open letter stating the university had an obligation to maintain gender-equal treatment and the space was neither intended to be gender-separated nor to be converted into a Muslim prayer room. The Technical University (TU) of Berlin and the University of Essen Duisburg also closed their prayer rooms. The president of TU Berlin stated higher education and religion should be kept separate, while the University of Essen Duisburg stated in an official letter that with over 130 nations represented at the university, rooms could not be offered for every religion and culture.

On June 28, the head of the Munich Forum for Islam (MFI) and former Mayor of Munich Christian Ude declared the temporary suspension of the construction of an Islamic Center in downtown Munich due to lack of funding. The project was unable to raise the 4.5 million euros ($4.7 million) needed to secure the designated property from the Munich government. Ude said he would continue to pursue a “scaled-down version” of the center which he hoped would facilitate integration of Muslims in Germany.

On August 24, the Dusseldorf Jewish community opened the “Albert Einstein Gymnasium,” the first Jewish high school in NRW and the second in the country. Starting with 37 enrolled students, the school’s goal was to increase the student body to 500, from all religious backgrounds, in coming years. The school included Hebrew instruction and mandatory Jewish religion classes. The Dusseldorf Jewish community also operated a primary school in the city.

The Catholic Church and the EKD continued to oppose COS publicly. “Sect commissioners” of the EKD and the Catholic Church investigated “sects and cults” and publicized what they considered to be the dangers of these groups. EKD “sect commissioners” warned the public about what they said were the dangers posed by the COS, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), Bhagwan-Osho, Transcendental Meditation, and Universal Life. “Sect commissioners” produced print and internet literature portraying these groups unfavorably.

In October according to media reports, a waiter refused to serve coffee to an Israeli tourist at a fast-food restaurant in Berlin. The waiter stated, “I don’t serve Jews.” Police were investigating the case at year’s end.

A November 2015 Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency study published in March found that 80 to 90 percent of approximately 1,500 respondents living in the country held positive or very positive attitudes towards Jews, Buddhists, Christians, and those who have no religion, while 64 percent held positive or very positive attitudes towards Muslims. A third of respondents saw the growth of religious plurality as positive, while 50 percent were concerned it could lead to conflicts. Almost half of the respondents (47 percent) approved of easing restrictions on new non-Christian religious buildings such as mosques, while just over half of respondents rejected the display of religious symbols by teachers at school – such as the wearing of crosses or headscarves.

In June the president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany warned of rising Jewish fears of new cases of anti-Semitism as a result of recent immigration. He stated many Arab immigrants had grown up in environments where anti-Semitism and hostility towards Israel was common. He also stated, “Jews in Germany are afraid that, if unchecked, this anti-Semitism rooted in Arab culture and politics could grow rapidly.”

The director of the Berlin American Jewish Committee said in a press statement in March that many Jews felt increasingly insecure because of growing attacks and anti-Semitic hostility. According to the director, who said she had observed anti-Semitism in the country for 30 years, “Fewer Jewish people identify themselves in public as being Jewish.”

According to British newspaper The Daily Mail, on the anniversary of the 1938 anti-Jewish pogrom Kristallnacht on November 9, the neo-Nazi group Free Forces Berlin Neukoelln posted on Facebook a map of the names and addresses of 70 Jewish-owned business, kindergartens, and cemeteries. The Berlin State Protection Office was investigating the case at year’s end.

In February a Bavarian blogger was sentenced to eight months of probation and fined 15,000 euros ($15,806) for posting a video referring to a rail workers union as “vermin” who “should be gassed”. He further said, “You know how Jews were transported to Auschwitz? That’s where these train drivers should be taken. I’ll drive the train… for free.” He posted images of Auschwitz prisoners alongside the video link.

In March protesters stood outside of the screening of an anti-Zionist documentary film about the occupation of Palestine in Berlin. When the film ended, film attendees shouted, “Jews to the gas!” at the protesters.

The PEGIDA movement continued to organize weekly demonstrations in Dresden. Amid calls to curb immigration, PEGIDA supporters regularly expressed anti-Muslim sentiments during the rallies. Journalists reported being pushed and threatened when reporting on the demonstrations. The number of participants at PEGIDA marches decreased to approximately 2,500 protesters per rally, down from 5,000-10,000 protesters per event in 2015, according to several media reports. Similar, smaller groups, such as “Thuegida” in Thuringia and “LEGIDA” in Leipzig, held protests in several towns and cities across the country.

In February deputy leader of PEGIDA Tatjana Fersterling called for refugees to be shot and for Europeans to “forget about decency” in fighting mass immigration. She also stated headscarves should be banned and radical mosques should be closed. “We need to make life uncomfortable for them,” she said.

During the height of PEGIDA demonstrations, thousands of counterdemonstrators gathered throughout the country to support tolerance. On April 18, 200 integration officers from the federal, state and local levels, who help integrate migrants, joined the anti-PEGIDA protesters in Dresden. In advance of a planned right-wing demonstration in Berlin on July 30, Berlin Mayor Michael Mueller called for counterprotests to demonstrate tolerance and inclusion.

An atheist man in Muenster was fined 500 euros ($527) in February for breaking the blasphemy law. A court ruled the anti-Christian slogans painted on his car defamed Christianity.

Approximately 85,000 copies of the republished edition of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf were sold during the year. Since 1948, the copyright had been with the state of Bavaria which prohibited publishing of the book. The copyright ended in December 2015 and on January 8, the Munich Institute for Contemporary history presented an annotated edition stating, “The edition unmasks Hitler’s false allegations, his whitewashing and outright lies.” Opinion was divided among the Jewish community. Some Jewish community leaders said the “anti-Semitic diatribe” should not be republished while the President of the Central Council of Jews said he welcomed the publication of the annotated version as it would serve to “undo the myth of this book” and show how “completely wrong and ridiculous Hitler’s theories” were.

Muslim groups condemned the use of terror and violence via press statements that were also published on their homepages. The Central Council of Muslims published its “strong condemnation” of the attacks in Brussels, Nice, and Munich; DITIB declared “shock” about the attack in Munich; and the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers strongly condemned the Brussels attack and called the Nice attack “a cowardly act of inhumanity.”

In April the archbishop of Cologne spoke out against anti-Muslim hatred, specifically by the AfD. He said, “Anyone who denigrates Muslims, as the AfD leadership does, should realize prayer rooms and mosques are equally protected by our constitution as our churches and chapels.”

Civil society representatives spoke out against anti-Semitism. The Amadeu Antonio Foundation and the Anne Frank Center organized the “Weeks of Action against Anti-Semitism,” consisting of four weeks of workshops, concerts, and youth exchanges dedicated to fighting anti-Semitism. Referencing the forthcoming 500th anniversary of Martin Luther’s posting of his 95 Theses, the EKD assembly condemned Luther’s anti-Semitism and stated a special responsibility to oppose any type of hatred toward Jews.

On April 24, a ceremony on the 71st anniversary of the liberation of the Brandenburg-Gorden Prison recognized the persecution and extermination of Jehovah’s Witnesses during the Holocaust. More than 200 guests attended the ceremony. The Brandenburg state secretary for finance delivered remarks commemorating the victims.

In March in Hanover, an annual dialogue on anti-Semitism took place between representatives of the Jewish community, Catholic bishops, and Protestant church leaders. The Protestant church collaborated with the Coordinating Council of Muslims on a mutual manifesto to “support the encounter between Christians and Muslims in Germany.

In April DITIB reported 99 attacks on mosques in 2015 (up from 73 in 2014). There were seven cases of arson, nine of threatening letters, 21 of burglary and vandalism, 13 of incitement to hatred, one of an extremist flyer, and three of graffiti.

In October a pig’s head was found in front of Brandenburg’s only mosque. The imam blamed the incident on the “Islamophobic AfD,” which had protested in front of the mosque two days earlier.

On January 27, Holocaust Memorial Day, unknown perpetrators overturned six headstones in the Jewish cemetery in Kropelin.

According to the Amadeo Antonio Foundation NGO, the incidence of Jewish cemetery desecrations, previously one of the most common anti-Semitic acts, had decreased substantially in recent years. In contrast, anti-Semitic threats and hate speech, much of it online, have become relatively more common.

On February 5, the walls of a Jewish community nursing home in Frankfurt-Bornheim were defaced with Nazi symbols. At year’s end, police had made no arrests.

On November 7, the mayor of Frankfurt condemned anti-Semitic graffiti at a Holocaust memorial in the city and stated the city of Frankfurt would continue to fight anti-Semitic acts.

The U.S. embassy and five consulates general continued to closely monitor the government’s responses to incidents of religious intolerance. Embassy and consulate general representatives expressed U.S. government concern about discrimination, anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic acts, and the safety of asylum seekers to state and federal officials, including at the Federal Commission for Integration, Migration, and Refugees, as well as at the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior.

In various meetings throughout the year with government officials, members of parliament, and religious groups, embassy and consulate general representatives continued to encourage direct dialogue between the government, law enforcement, and minority religious groups and engaged in activities to promote positive attitudes toward minority religious groups, including the Muslim community.

In January the Ambassador hosted a gathering of religious and ethnic community leaders to discuss interreligious tolerance and understanding. The Ambassador encouraged the approximately 170 guests to continue their condemnation of anti-Semitism and their efforts to promote religious tolerance. In addition to government leaders, guests included members and representatives from various levels of the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities. In addition, German, Turkish, and Arab leaders in business, politics, and civil society were included, as were minority youth leaders. Participants stated it was the only event of its kind in the country where such a diverse group of religious leaders felt comfortable discussing common challenges.

In September the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom addressed the “2nd International Parliamentarians’ Conference – An Embattled Right: Protecting and Promoting Freedom of Religion or Belief,” hosted by the CDU/CSU parliamentary caucus. He also met with various political interlocutors and representatives of the COS and Yezidi communities to discuss challenges they faced in the country. The COS listed government monitoring and discrimination in the workplace as challenges. Yezidis expressed appreciation of the country’s political support and efforts – particularly in the state of Baden-Wurttemberg – to provide refuge for Yezidis persecuted in their countries of origin. At the same time, they asked that more be done to increase awareness of the plight of Yezidi refugees. The Ambassador-at-Large met with the Coordination Council of Muslims, who raised animal slaughtering, lack of prayer rooms, and lack of clarification on headscarves as topics of concern.

In September the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues met with government officials to discuss Holocaust commemoration and compensation issues, including art confiscated by the National Socialists Party.

Embassy and consulate general representatives met with members and leaders of numerous local and national religious and civil society groups about their issues of concern related to religious freedom, including the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches; the Bahai Faith, Jehovah’s Witnesses; the Konrad Adenauer Foundation; the Central Council of Muslims; the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers; the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany; the Central Council of Yezidis; the Central Council of Jews; the COS; the Alevis; and human rights NGOs. Some groups, such as the Bahais in Berlin, reported they did not encounter discrimination based on their beliefs. Others, such as the Alevi community in Cologne, stated that they felt well-integrated – they were recognized as a religion in 10 of 16 states – but they reported some Muslims within the country did not recognize them as a religion.

On June 20, the U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism attended an OSCE conference on combating anti-Semitism hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The purpose of the conference was to share best practices and discuss the working definition of anti-Semitism. The Special Envoy emphasized the value of the working definition of anti-Semitism as a useful tool in the effort to combat anti-Semitism. He also stressed the role of civil society in combating anti-Semitism.

The embassy helped fund a Muslim Jewish Conference in August in Berlin, where 140 young Muslims and Jewish leaders from 40 countries debated various issues related to religious freedom and identity. The U.S. Special Adviser for Global Youth Issues spoke at the conference opening and gave remarks about religious tolerance. Embassy representatives also participated in the conference.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 26.9 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2010 government census, approximately 71 percent is Christian, 18 percent is Muslim, 5 percent adheres to indigenous religious beliefs, and 6 percent belongs to other religious groups or has no religious beliefs. Other religious groups include the Bahai Faith, Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism, Shintoism, Eckankar, and Rastafarianism.

Christian denominations include Roman Catholic, Methodist, Anglican, Mennonite, Evangelical Presbyterian, African Methodist Episcopal Zion, Christian Methodist, Evangelical Lutheran, Eden Revival Church International, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon), Seventh-day Adventist, Pentecostal, Baptist, African independent churches, the Society of Friends (Quaker), and numerous charismatic religious groups.

Muslim communities include Sunni, Ahmadiyya, Tijaniyah and Qadiriyya orders of Sufism, and Shia.

Many individuals who identify as Christian or Muslim also adhere to some aspects of indigenous beliefs. There are syncretic groups that combine elements of Christianity or Islam with traditional beliefs. Zetahil, a practice unique to the country, combines elements of Christianity and Islam.

There is no significant link between ethnicity and religion, but geography is often associated with religious identity. Christians live throughout the country; the majority of Muslims resides in the northern regions and in the urban centers of Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Tamale, and Wa; and the majority of the followers of traditional religious beliefs resides in rural areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and stipulates individuals are free to profess and practice any religion and manifest such practice. These rights may be limited for stipulated reasons, which include “restrictions that are reasonably required in the interest of defense, public safety, public health or the running of essential services, on the movement or residence within Ghana of any person or persons generally, or any class of persons.”

Religious groups must register with the Office of the Registrar General in the Ministry of Justice to receive formal government recognition and status as a legal entity, but there is no penalty for not registering. The registration requirement for religious groups is the same as for other nongovernmental organizations. In order to register, groups must fill out a form and pay a fee. Most indigenous religious groups do not register.

According to the law, registered religious groups are exempt from paying taxes on nonprofit ecclesiastical, charitable, and educational activities. Religious groups are required to pay progressive taxes, on a pay-as-earned basis, on for-profit business activities.

The Ministry of Education includes compulsory religious and moral education in the national public education curriculum. There is no provision to opt out of these courses, which incorporate perspectives from Islam and Christianity. There is also an Islamic education unit within the ministry responsible for coordinating all public education activities for Muslim communities. The Ministry of Education permits private religious and nonreligious schools; however, they must follow the prescribed curriculum set by the ministry. International schools are exempt from these requirements.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Muslim leaders reported some publicly-funded Christian mission schools forced female Muslim students to remove their hijabs and forced Muslim students to participate in Christian worship services, despite a Ministry of Education directive prohibiting these practices. Similarly, there were reports some publicly-funded Muslim mission schools required female Christian students to wear the hijab.

There were reports that administrators at some hospitals did not allow Muslim staff members to wear the hijab in spite of Ministry of Health guidance barring this practice. For example, a nurse in the Ashanti region reported her superiors threatened termination if she refused to remove her hijab.

Government officials leading meetings, receptions, and state funerals offered Christian and Muslim prayers and occasionally traditional invocations. The president and vice president continued to make public remarks about the importance of peaceful religious coexistence.

Muslim and Christian leaders reported cordial relations among the country’s religious communities, facilitated through regular dialogue between their respective governing bodies and the National Peace Council, an independent, statutory institution with religious reconciliation as part of its mandate. For example, in October the Presbyterian Interfaith Research and Resource Center sponsored a large interfaith gathering. Attendees included Minister of the Interior Prosper Bani, Christian Council General Secretary Reverend Dr. Kwabena Opuni Frimpong, and Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission of Ghana General Secretary Alhaji Ahmad Suleman Anderson. The participants discussed the roles religious actors could play in promoting peaceful elections and peaceful coexistence and civic engagement of religious communities. In August at an Ahmadiyya gathering in the United Kingdom, the national chief imam praised Ahmadiyya contributions to the country and stressed the importance of harmony among Muslim communities.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy representatives discussed with government officials the importance of mutual understanding, religious tolerance, and respect for all religious groups. The embassy also discussed these subjects with a broad range of other actors, including Muslim civil society organizations and Christian groups.

In July the Ambassador hosted an iftar with National Chief Imam Sheikh Dr. Osmanu Nuhu Sharubutu and other religious leaders from various faiths. The event emphasized inclusion regardless of faith, gender, and ethnicity; religious tolerance; and freedom of expression.

In August the Ambassador presented the embassy’s annual Martin Luther King, Jr. award to National Chief Imam Sharubutu in recognition of his commitment to promoting peace, mutual understanding, and harmony within Muslim communities and with other religious groups. The award ceremony emphasized the importance of interfaith understanding and included participation from a wide range of religious leaders from various faiths.

In October the embassy sponsored a two-day capacity-building workshop in Accra for 100 young Muslim leaders aged 25-35 representing each region of the country. The workshop promoted interfaith cooperation among the younger generation.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 10.8 million (July 2016 estimate), of whom 98 percent are Greek Orthodox, 1.3 percent Muslim, and 0.7 percent other religions. Kappa Research Firm, a local private research firm, estimated that in 2015, 81.4 percent of the population self-identified as Greek Orthodox, 2.9 percent as belonging to other religious groups, and 14.7 percent as atheist.

Muslims constitute a number of distinct communities including, according to the Council of Europe’s European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, approximately 100,000-120,000 individuals in Thrace descending from the Muslim minority officially recognized in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. According to local religious leaders and migrant activists, approximately 150,000 Muslim immigrants and foreign workers from Southeastern Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa reside mostly in the Attica region, in and around Athens, and are clustered together based on their countries of origin. Other religious groups that together are estimated to constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Old Calendarist Orthodox, atheists and agnostics, Roman Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, members of polytheistic Hellenic religions, Scientologists, Bahais, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Sikhs, Seventh-day Adventists, and the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKON).

According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, between January 1 and September 25, approximately 166,000 migrants and asylum seekers from mainly Muslim majority countries arrived in the country, many transiting to other nations in Europe. As of November 21, the government estimated approximately 62,517 remained. The Migration Ministry, as of October 21, estimates there are 2,437 Yezidi migrants and asylum seekers from Iraq and Syria in the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution recognizes Greek Orthodoxy as the “prevailing religion.” The constitution states freedom of religious conscience is inviolable and provides for freedom of worship under the protection of the law with some restrictions. The constitution prohibits proselytizing, and no rite of worship may “disturb public order or offend moral principles.” The constitution allows prosecutors to seize publications that offend Christianity or other “known religions.” The law prohibits offenses against “religious peace,” including blasphemy and religious insult, which are punishable by prison sentences of up to two years. Blasphemy cases may be brought before civil and criminal courts. Development of religious conscience among citizens is listed as one of the goals of state education according to the constitution.

The constitution stipulates ministers of all known religions shall be subject to the same state supervision and the same obligations to the state as clergy of the Greek Orthodox Church. It also states individuals shall not be exempted from their obligations to the state or from compliance with the law because of their religious convictions.

The Greek Orthodox Church, the Jewish community, and the Muslim minority of Thrace have long-held status as official religious legal entities. The Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, two evangelical Christian groups, and the Ethiopian, Coptic, Armenian Apostolic, and Assyrian Orthodox Churches automatically acquired the status of religious legal entities under a 2014 law. The same law also provided for groups seeking recognition to become religious legal entities under civil law. The recognition process involves filing a request at the civil court, providing documents proving the group has open rituals and no secret doctrines, supplying a list of 300 signatory members who do not adhere to other religious groups, and demonstrating that there is a leader who is legally in the country and is otherwise qualified, and that their practices do not pose a threat to public order. Once the civil court recognizes the group, it sends a notification to the Secretariat General for Religions. With legal status, the religious group can legally transfer property and administer houses of prayer and worship, private schools, charitable institutions, and other nonprofit entities. Some religious groups have opted to retain their status as civil society nonprofit associations that they acquired through court recognition prior to the 2014 law. Under this status, religious groups may operate houses of prayer and benefit from real estate property tax exemptions, but may face administrative and fiscal difficulties in transferring property and operating private schools, charitable institutions, and other nonprofit entities.

The law allows religious communities without status as legal entities to appear before administrative and civil courts as plaintiffs or defendants.

On February 21, parliament passed a law that protects the individual’s right to predetermine his or her form of funeral service and burial location in the presence of a notary. The law ensures “the choice of burial location is an individual right,” and provides for the designation of location, method of funeral service (provided that it is “not against public order, hygiene or moral ethics”), and person responsible for the execution of the individual’s funeral preference. The law protects the individual’s wishes from objections by direct relatives not designated by the individual to carry out funeral responsibilities. It also facilitates the establishment of crematory facilities by allowing these facilities to be established both on municipally-owned plots of land and on real property donated to the municipality for that specific purpose.

A religious group that has obtained at least one valid permit to operate a place of prayer is considered a “known religion” and thereby acquires protection under the law, including a tax exemption for property used for religious purposes. Membership requirements for house of prayer permits differ from the requirements for religious legal entities. The granting of house of prayer permits is subject to approvals from local urban planning departments attesting to the compliance of a proposed house of prayer with local public health and safety regulations, and the application requires at least five signatory members of the group. Once a house of worship receives planning approvals, a religious group must submit a file including documents describing the basic principles and rituals of the religious group as well as a biography of the religious minister or leader; the file must be approved by the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs. The leaders of a religious group applying for a house of prayer permit must be Greek citizens, European Union nationals, or legal residents of the country and must possess other professional qualifications, including relevant education and experience. A separate permit is required for each physical place of worship.

The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne gives the recognized Muslim minority of Thrace the right to maintain mosques and social and charitable organizations (awqafs). Government-appointed muftis are allowed to practice sharia and render religious judicial services in the area of family law for those members of the Muslim community in Thrace who opt to use the services of a mufti instead of civil courts. The government, in consultation with a committee of Muslim leaders, appoints three muftis in Thrace to 10-year terms of office, with the possibility of extension. Civil courts in Thrace routinely ratify the family law decisions of the muftis. The muftis also appoint imams to serve in the community’s mosques.

The law requires all civil servants, including cabinet and parliament members, to take an oath before entering office; individuals are free to take a religious or secular oath in accordance with their beliefs. Witnesses in trials must also take oaths before testifying in court, and can also select between a religious and a secular oath in both civil and criminal cases.

Greek Orthodox religious instruction in primary and secondary schools is included in the official school curriculum. School textbooks include some basic information on other known religions but focus mainly on Greek Orthodox teachings. Students may be exempted from religious instruction upon request, but parents of students registered as Greek Orthodox in school records are required to state the students are not Greek Orthodox believers in order to receive the exemption. There are no private religious schools, although individual churches may teach optional religious classes on their premises, which students may attend on a voluntary basis. The law provides for optional Islamic religious instruction in public schools in Thrace for the recognized Muslim minority and optional Catholic religious instruction in public schools on the islands of Tinos and Syros.

In Thrace, the government operates secular Greek-Turkish bilingual schools and two Islamic religious schools. The law in Thrace provides for Islamic religious instructors to teach Islam to the Muslim minority in Greek-language public schools in lieu of mandatory twice weekly Greek Orthodox religious courses. Muslim students in Thrace who wish to study the Quran may also attend after-hours religious classes in mosques.

The law establishes an annual 0.5 percent quota for admission of students from the recognized Muslim minority to universities, technical institutes, and civil service positions. A new presidential decree requires that 2 percent of students entering the national fire brigade school and academy be from the Muslim minority in Thrace.

The law provides for alternative forms of mandatory service for religious conscientious objectors in lieu of the nine-month mandatory military service. Conscientious objectors are required to serve 15 months of alternate service in state hospitals or municipal and public services. On February 1, parliament amended the law to allow conscientious objectors on religious grounds over the age of 35 to shorten their alternative service upon certain conditions. It also addressed longstanding penal issues for religious conscientious objectors prior to the 1997 law that institutionalized alternative service. New provisions allow for their acquittal on all charges and the closing of all relevant cases. For those declared insubordinate prior to this legislation, the law provides that they will be acquitted and freed from any obligation to pay administrative fines if they have already completed, or were about to complete, alternative service by December 2017.

All religious groups are subject to taxation on their property used for nonreligious purposes. Property used solely for religious purposes remains exempt from taxation and municipal fees for groups classified as “known religions.”

The law prohibits discrimination and criminalizes hate speech on the grounds of religion. Individuals or legal entities convicted of incitement to violence, discrimination, or hatred on the basis of religion, among other factors, may be sentenced to prison terms of between three months and three years and fined 5,000 to 20,000 euros ($5,269 to $21,075). Violators convicted of other crimes motivated by religion may be sentenced to an additional six months to three years, with fines doubled. The law criminalizes approval, trivialization, or malicious denial of the Holocaust and “crimes of Nazism” if that behavior leads to incitement of violence or hatred, or has a threatening or abusive nature towards groups of individuals. A law adopted in 2015 established the National Council against Racism and Xenophobia, an advisory body under the Ministry of Justice, Transparency, and Human Rights charged with preventing, combating, monitoring, and recording racism and intolerance and protecting individuals and groups targeted on several grounds, including religion. The National Commission for Human Rights, comprised of government and NGO members, serves as an independent advisory body to the government on all human rights issues.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government provided funding and other benefits to the Greek Orthodox Church and, to a lesser extent, to the Muslim community of Thrace and the Jewish communities, not available to other religious groups. Courts ruled favorably on one application by a group seeking legal recognition as religious entity; rulings for the applications of two more separate religious groups were pending at year’s end. Some members of the Thrace Muslim community objected to the government’s practice of appointing muftis, pressing for direct election of muftis. Muslims also criticized the lack of government action to provide for Islamic cemeteries outside of Thrace. The government assigned three religious officials to provide services to Muslims in migrant facilities. The government had still not built a mosque for which parliament approved funding in 2014. The government approved permits for 11 houses of prayer, including the first Muslim prayer house outside of Thrace and greater Athens in Thiva. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled the government had improperly ruled against the son of a Jehovah’s Witness who had applied for civilian service as an alternative to military service in 2013.

According to media reports, on July 24 in Thrace, participants in a demonstration organized by GD threw rocks and shouted racially charged slogans, including “Turks, Mongols, murderers,” at approximately 800 members of the officially-recognized Muslim minority who were commemorating the 21st anniversary of the death of Muslim Member of Parliament (MP) Ahmet Sadik, the founder of the Muslim minority party of Equality, Peace and Friendship. This was reportedly the first time demonstrators had disrupted this memorial event. Police intervened by using tear gas and stun grenades to disperse the crowd. No arrests were made.

On May 25, the criminal trial of 69 far-right GD party members and supporters, including 18 of its current and former MPs, resumed after a five-month break. Charges, related to a string of attacks against migrants and others, include murder, conspiracy, weapons possession, and membership in a criminal organization. The trial continued through the end of the year.

On July 13, human rights activists, including members of the NGOs Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM) and the Humanist Union of Greece, reported 25 criminal prosecutions and trials since 2014 involving charges based on blasphemy law. At least one of them was registered during the year in the city of Drama, against a local soccer player who reportedly offended Christian believers by “insulting the divine” with comments he made during a game. The trial of a blogger appealing his 2014 conviction for blasphemy and his sentence to prison for 10 months remained pending. Government officials from the Syriza Party and some of the opposition parties represented in parliament, such as the Democratic Alignment and the River, publicly stated that existing blasphemy legislation should be abolished.

The government continued to state that Muslims who were not part of the recognized minority created by the Treaty of Lausanne were not covered by that treaty and therefore did not have the rights related to it, such as right to bilingual education, special quotas for university entry and jobs in the public sector, the use of sharia in family matters, and optional Islamic religious classes in public schools.

Courts received and agreed to examine applications filed by four religious groups seeking recognition as religious legal entities: Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Christians, German-speaking Protestants, Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, and Old Calendarists in the region of Oropos and Fyli, in greater Athens. A court granted recognition to the first group; court decisions for the remainder were pending at year’s end except for German-speaking Protestants, who decided to withdraw their request.

Religious groups that did not have religious entity status and had never received house of prayer permits, including Scientologists, ISKON, and polytheistic Hellenic groups, were only able to function as registered nonprofit civil law organizations. The government did not legally recognize weddings conducted by those religious groups.

The Greek Orthodox Church received direct support from the government, including payment of salaries, religious training for clergy, and funding for religious instruction in schools. It maintained an institutionalized link to the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, which continued to partially fund retirement pensions of Orthodox monks and monitor vocational training for Orthodox clergy.

Members of the Thrace Muslim minority continued to press for direct election of muftis. The government responded the practice of government appointment was appropriate because the muftis had judicial powers and the government appointed all judges. Academics and activists said the ability of courts in Thrace to provide judicial oversight of muftis’ decisions was limited by the lack of translation of sharia into Greek and lack of familiarity with sharia in general. They also continued to criticize the appointment by the government, rather than election of members of the Muslim minority in Thrace entrusted with the administration of the awqafs.

Muslim leaders criticized the lack of Muslim cemeteries outside of Thrace, stating this obliged Muslims to transport their dead to Thrace for Islamic burials. Additionally, Muslim leaders said municipal cemetery regulations requiring exhumation of bodies after three years because of shortage of space contravened Islamic religious law. The government operated at least three unofficial cemeteries for the burial of Muslim migrant and asylum seekers, in Lesvos, Schisto (in Athens), and Evros. On April 8, the Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church agreed, at the request of the government, to grant 20,000 square meters (215,000 square feet) inside an existing cemetery at Schisto for the burial of Muslims.

On January 15, the media reported that three municipalities, Athens, Thessaloniki, and Patras, initiated the process to establish crematories by searching for suitable land and seeking approval of the necessary municipal committees. The city of Patras was reported to have identified a suitable plot of land and was in the process of requesting the issuance of a presidential decree to deter appeals by precertifying the land transfer as constitutional. As of year’s end, there were no crematories in the country.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported that police in Athens and in provincial towns attempted to intimidate and discourage preaching or distributing and displaying information and religious material in public, citing prohibition of proselytism by the constitution.

The Orthodox Church’s Holy Synod criticized the government for failing to issue a denunciation and not taking action after 26 individuals entered the Thessaloniki cathedral of the Greek Orthodox Church and interrupted services on July 3. The government subsequently issued a statement condemning the incident.

The Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs assigned three Islamic experts to offer religious services in camps hosting Muslim refugees and migrants in the region of central and eastern Macedonia. The three experts included an imam from Xanthi, the director of one of the two Islamic religious schools in Thrace, and a scholastic expert in Islamic law and studies. On June 6, the Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction issued a directive to the managers of reception facilities hosting migrants and refugees, instructing them to alter food distribution times – and the type of food served – to allow Muslims to observe the Ramadan fast.

Muslim leaders continued to criticize the absence of a mosque in Athens, the financing of which the government approved in 2014. On July 13, the Council of State overruled an appeal submitted by local residents of Votanikos, where the Athens official mosque is to be built, requesting the tendering process for the mosque be ruled unconstitutional due to environmental protection considerations. On August 4, parliament approved by a wide majority an amendment to regulate technical issues and accelerate the construction of the mosque. The amendment provided for the division of the plot from other land, the construction of new buildings, and the creation of parking spaces and other facilities. On October 10, the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport, and Networks signed a contract with a consortium of four companies for the building of the mosque. The construction is slated to be completed by the end of 2017. On November 3, riot police ended an occupation by a group of protestors at the Votanikos site after the mayor of Athens asked for the central government’s intervention. GD praised the occupiers.

On February 26, the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs issued a permit to establish a Muslim house of prayer in the city of Thiva. This was the first permit granted to a Muslim house of prayer operating outside of the greater Athens region, excluding Thrace. The ministry also issued 10 additional house of prayer permits. These were granted to a Buddhist group in the Chalkidiki region, a Coptic Orthodox group in Athens, a Protestant group in Athens, a Pentecostal group in Veria, and to Jehovah’s Witnesses in two separate locations in Attica, in the islands of Corfu and Cephalonia, as well as in Trikala and Drama. The ministry additionally approved the construction of five new houses of worship: four of them were granted to Jehovah’s Witnesses in Thessaloniki, Karditsa, Aliveri and Maroussi in Athens and one for an Old Calendarist Orthodox church in Kryoneri, in greater Athens.

On May 10, the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs revoked, for the first time ever, a house of prayer permit of the “Church of Christian Faith.” The ministry cited a pending judicial investigation and complaints filed against the house’s religious leader for conducting marriages of convenience and weddings of minors without the consent or prior knowledge of their parents.

Some religious groups reiterated complaints from previous years that the house of prayer permit process constrained freedom of religion.

On February 7, the daily newspaper Kathimerini reported the Greek Orthodox Church was unable to sell or utilize 123 real estate property assets it owned in the Athens, Vouliagmeni, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki regions. According to the report, the authorities had previously initiated procedures to expropriate these assets without concluding the process or providing any compensation. The disposition of the assets had been pending for years while the Orthodox Church was unable to sell or use them. A portion of these properties was considered by the state to be forestry lands in need of protection; as of the end of the year, the Greek Orthodox Church was in the process of challenging the government’s stance.

The government continued to provide public space free of charge to groups of Muslims whose members requested places of worship during Ramadan and for other religious occasions. On July 7, Eleftheria news reported Muslim migrant residents prayed in a public square in Larisa. The report stated some local inhabitants expressed discontent with the use of a public square for open-air prayer. Officials from the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs contacted the Larisa municipality, which verified that it had approved a request filed by local Muslims for the use of the square. The ministry advised the municipality to grant use of interior rather than open-air facilities in response to similar requests in the future.

On March 30, the media reported on a new circular by the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs restricting the presence of outside visitors in school classes for the remainder of the school year. Speeches and presentations by outside visitors to school audiences had to take place strictly after hours, and only following authorization from school principals and teachers and the written consent of parents. Some Greek Orthodox Church leaders interpreted the policy as a government effort to restrict access of priests to schools for purposes other than teaching formal religion classes.

In September the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs sent new guidelines to school principals and staff for the teaching of religion class in schools. According to the guidelines, religious education should not be based solely on the official textbook – which primarily covers Greek Orthodox doctrine – and teachers were urged to discuss and initiate projects dealing with other religions. The government stated students needed to become more familiar with other religions present in the country and the world. Greek Orthodox Church leaders objected and reacted publicly to this change, stating the government was disrespectful to the constitution and to the faith of the majority of the country’s citizens.

The government provided funding to the Muslim minority in Thrace to select and pay salaries of teachers of Islam in state schools and the salaries of the three official muftis and some imams. The government funded Catholic religious training and teachers’ salaries in state schools on the islands of Syros and Tinos, and also provided funding for awareness raising activities and trips for non-Jewish students to Holocaust remembrance events, and for Holocaust education training for teachers.

Some leaders of the recognized Muslim minority continued to criticize the absence of bilingual kindergartens in Thrace. Greek government authorities stated that Greek-language kindergartens helped students to better integrate into the larger society.

On April 19, President Prokopis Pavlopoulos signed a decree establishing a special division of Muslim Studies within the Department of Theology at the School of Theology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, beginning in the 2016-17 academic year. Metropolitan of Thessaloniki Anthimos publicly objected to the establishment in Thessaloniki rather than in Thrace, where the recognized Muslim minority resides. Anthimos argued that Islam and Christianity could not coexist in the same school and warned that clashes might result if students of the two disciplines accidentally or purposefully insulted each other.

On July 13, GHM, Minority Rights Group Greece, and the Humanist Union of Greece again stated courts did not always enforce the right of witnesses to take an alternate secular oath, noting even Supreme Court prosecutors failed to apply this legal provision.

Some religious groups and human rights organizations continued to state the discrepancy between the length of mandatory alternate service for conscientious objectors (15 months) and for those serving in the military (nine months) was discriminatory. On September 15, the ECHR ruled the country the article of the European Convention on Human Rights providing for the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion in the case of a conscientious objector brought by the son of a Jehovah’s Witness who stated he was influenced by his mother’s religious beliefs in forming his own pacifist views. A government committee had rejected the objector’s application for alternative service in 2013 and the Council of State had upheld the committee’s decision. The ECHR ruled the process lacked procedural impartiality, independence, and the equal representation required by domestic law; stipulating the government award 5,000 euros ($5,269) to be paid to the conscientious objector.

The Central Board of Jewish Communities (KIS) expressed concern about anti-Semitic attitudes among GD party members, including inside the parliament. On March 19, activists monitoring anti-Semitic rhetoric and Holocaust trivialization criticized on social media Minister for Interior and Administrative Reconstruction Panayotis Kouroumplis as well as New Democracy Spokesperson Giorgos Koumoutsakos for statements they made on March 18 comparing conditions in the unofficial refugee and migrant camp of Idomeni to the Nazi concentration camp of Dachau.

In May GD MP Christos Pappas stated Israel constituted “the eternal enemy of Greece and Orthodoxy” during a hearing of parliament’s Standing Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs. KIS condemned this statement.

On September 15, Deputy Education Minister Theodosis Pelegrinis stated in a parliamentary speech, “the Jewish people appropriated the Holocaust in order to earn the sympathy of the civilized world and be justified.” The president of KIS condemned the speech. Political parties of the opposition, such as New Democracy, PASOK, and the River, also denounced the speech.

The GD official website and weekly paper continued publishing references to conspiracy theories involving international Zionism and alleged plans for the country’s “Islamization,” while opposing the construction of an official mosque in Athens and the operation of private Muslim houses of prayer. For example, on October 24 the website posted a video of GD leader Nikos Michaloliakos’ commenting “it is an insult to Greek history and civilization to build a mosque in the shadow of the Acropolis.” On October 2, the website posted an article blaming the “Jewish lobby of the United States” for “dismantling the Hellenic state.”

On May 9, KIS wrote to the Greek Tourism National Organization to protest its website’s reference to the custom of burning an effigy of Judas (practiced during the Easter season) as “folkloristic,” stating it perpetuated anti-Semitic feelings. Jewish groups stated they saw the practice as encouraging the belief that the Jews killed Jesus, long a source of anti-Semitism. KIS requested its removal and the GTNO complied. KIS noted the Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church had an explicit and long-standing demand for the abolition of this custom.

On January 27, President Pavlopoulos inaugurated a memorial to the Greek Righteous Among the Nations at the main Athens synagogue, to honor non-Jews who risked their lives during World War II to save Jews. On the same day, for the first time in history according to KIS, parliament held a special plenary session to honor Greek Jews who died in the Holocaust and those who survived as well as non-Jewish Greeks who protected Jews. A Greek Jewish delegation, including Holocaust survivors, and representatives of all parliamentary parties except GD attended the session. Speaker of Parliament Nikos Voutsis announced parliament would participate in sponsoring the creation of a memorial space in Auschwitz for the Greek Jews who perished there.

Most parties represented in parliament issued statements on Holocaust Remembrance Day, paying homage to the thousands of Greek Jews who fell victim to the Nazis and condemning anti-Semitism, Nazism, and Holocaust denial. A series of commemorative events took place in many cities around the country with the presence of government officials throughout the year, such as the minister of education, regional governors, city mayors, MPs, and a former prime minister.

On February 2, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the publication of a volume entitled “The Greek Righteous Among the Nations.” The work – published in collaboration with the Foundation for the Memory of the Martyrs and Heroes of the Holocaust Yad Vashem – was the final installment in a trilogy dedicated to the history of Greek Jewish communities, their destruction in the Holocaust, and the rescue of dozens of Greek Jews by Greek Christians.

On February 2, the media reported on the availability of a new mobile application allowing users to discover Thessaloniki’s Sephardic Jewish heritage. The application was made available with the collaboration of foreign embassies and various other entities.

On March 4 and 5 in Kavala, the History and Ethnology School of the Democritus University of Thrace, in cooperation with the local Union of Philologists, organized a Holocaust education training seminar for 40 teachers.

On April 20, the speaker of parliament unveiled a monument inside the parliament building dedicated to Greek Jewish MPs who were Holocaust victims.

In June the Secretariat General for Religious Affairs funded an annual commemorative trip to Auschwitz for 84 students from 19 schools throughout the country.

In March Athens Mayor Giorgos Kaminis signed a declaration against anti-Semitism, joining 60 other European mayors participating in an American Jewish Committee initiative to combat anti-Semitism.

On January 22, the Ministry of Education, Research, and Religious Affairs issued a circular urging regional primary and secondary school directorates and principals to dedicate two hours of their school program to Holocaust-related activities on January 27, in commemoration of Holocaust Remembrance Day. In response, Thessaloniki Mayor Yiannis Boutaris called on schools to add more hours of Holocaust education into their curricula. Boutaris publicly stated the term Holocaust is wrongfully used to describe different tragedies such as mass killings of unarmed populations during the Nazi occupation and argued the misuse of the term Holocaust was aimed at lessening the importance of the Holocaust.

There were incidents of anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic discrimination and hate speech, including against immigrants. There were reports of vandalism against religious property, including for the first time in recent history, Greek Orthodox churches

On February 19, the Racist Violence Recording Network, an umbrella organization established by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the National Commission for Human Rights, reported that in 22 of the 75 incidents recorded against refugees and immigrants in 2015, the victims stated their religion was among the reasons they were targeted. In 2014, the same network reported victims cited religion in 17 of 46 recorded incidents.

On March 28, unknown perpetrators attempted to detonate a homemade bomb comprised of a gas canister and a car tire approximately 150 feet from the residence of the mufti of Didimoticho in Evros. There were no reports of damages. Police launched an investigation but made no arrests by year’s end. The perpetrators’ motives were unclear.

On August 8, unknown individuals threw eight Molotov cocktails at the Petrakis Monastery in central Athens, which shelters the Holy Synod. Two parked cars inside the monastery’s yard were damaged. Police initiated an investigation but made no arrests at year’s end. The attack was condemned by government officials.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported incidents of societal discrimination when preaching or distributing informational and religious material in Athens and in other cities, including being subjected to physical violence, verbal attacks, harassment, and intimidation by laypersons and Greek Orthodox priests. In January a young Jehovah’s Witness in Galatsi, Athens was distributing religious material door-to-door when a resident exited his apartment and began punching and kicking him. On March 12, in Andros Island, two male Jehovah’s Witnesses were distributing religious literature door-to-door when they visited a local priest’s residence. The priest reportedly released his dog and attacked the two Jehovah Witnesses with a metal shovel and issued a death threat. The two men reported the attack to the local police station, but the police did not file charges or make arrests. On January 15, the media reported a Greek Orthodox priest in Konistres had placed posters on columns along a street depicting Jehovah’s Witnesses as heretics and unpatriotic. The media also reported the same priest tried to prevent Jehovah’s Witnesses from distributing religious materials by standing next to them and hindering local residents from approaching them.

Before the country’s northern border was closed in February, an estimated 171,284 migrants and refugees, mostly Muslims, arrived in the country from the beginning of the year through November 20. Approximately 110,000 of them left for other nations in Europe.

Academics, activists, and journalists stated the Greek Orthodox Church exercised significant social, political, and economic influence. Members of non-Orthodox religious groups reported incidents of societal discrimination, including being told they were “heretics” or “not truly Greek.”

On January 14, the Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church issued a statement expressing disagreement with a government initiative to draft legislation allowing individuals to predetermine their form and location of burial, including cremation. The statement noted “it is not dignified for a person to be cremated” and “there are no particular differences between cremation and the procedures for recycling trash.” The Holy Synod urged the local authorities “to look after their overcrowded and neglected cemeteries first, before rushing to spend money on purchasing plots of land and the necessary equipment in order to establish cremation centers.”

There were instances of metropolitan bishops of the Greek Orthodox Church making anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic statements in public letters and on social media while others stated Catholicism was heresy. On March 3, media reported the Greek Orthodox bishop of Kalavryta objected publicly to the transfer of Muslim migrants and refugees to Kalavryta, stating “they do not match [Greek] ethics and customs.” He added that “… we do not like their culture! We do not accept their religion! …Let us not receive any migrants in the Peloponnese. Let’s keep ourselves and our population pureblooded!” On June 15, Bishop of Piraeus Seraphim wrote on his website “the attachment of the Orthodox Church leaders to the global system equals….surrender to the American-Zionist world power system.”

On January 8, KIS publicly reacted to the use of a drawing of the Western Wall of Jerusalem in a cartoon posted on the Facebook account of “Paratiritirio” (Observatory) to mock the government’s decision to erect a monument dedicated to left-wing activists executed during the country’s civil war.

In February the anti-Semitic organization “Unaligned Meander Nationalists” claimed responsibility for several incidents of desecration of Jewish monuments and cemeteries throughout the country which had taken place in previous years, and posted pictures on the internet of individuals performing the Nazi salute in the city of Patras in front of swastikas and slogans such as “Juden Raus” (German for “Jews out”).

In March local media reported newly discovered video footage from 2014 showing a religious figure from the Muslim minority in Xanthi, Thrace stating, “Curse Israel! For these are the ones turned into soap by the Germans. But Hitler was right when he said, now you will be angry with me but one day I will be proved right about the Jews. Now our curse goes upon them and our prayers upon our brothers.” KIS denounced the statements.

On July 4, the president of the urban transportation workers union in Thessaloniki made statements about “God [mistakenly] creating Jews” and about “Hitler, who did not finish the job.” The local bus owners association and the local workers’ union, Anatropi, publicly condemned the statements. In August a public prosecutor in Thessaloniki ordered a preliminary investigation into whether the union president committed the crime of publicly instigating racist violence.

According to a foreign newspaper, an asylum seeker held at a reception and registration center in Lesvos reported Christian aid workers tried to convert some of the Muslim refugees to Christianity. He said aid workers distributed citations of the Gospel in Arabic and conversion forms to the refugees, who considered the distribution “insensitive.” The newspaper reported the aid workers’ employer, an NGO, disapproved of the conversion efforts and removed the individuals from their positions.

Some Orthodox leaders attended religious ceremonies of other religious groups. On April 16, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and Catholic Pope Francis visited migrants in Lesvos. Greek Orthodox and Catholic priests gathered at some private schools to bless the beginning of the school year.

Authorities reported acts of vandalism against Jewish sites and Greek Orthodox churches throughout the country. The media reported that on September 12, vandals defaced the exterior walls of the historic synagogue of Ioannina with swastikas. KIS condemned the attack. On September 14, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also condemned the attack, describing it as a “hideous act” and stated “this barbaric action offends the memory of Greek Jews and all our fellow citizens who were the victims of fascism.” On June 28, the media reported Athens police initiated an investigation into a June 10 vandalism incident at the Athens Holocaust Memorial in which unknown perpetrators wrote a word believed to be interpreted as “roasting.” Two incidents of vandalism on Greek Orthodox churches were recorded in June and in July in Crete. Unknown perpetrators vandalized 13 icons and the altar, also writing anti-Christian epithets. In the second incident, vandals defaced the altar and all icons in the church.

On February 23 and March 5, the media reported unknown individuals placed pigs heads on fences of army camps intended to host migrants and refugees, mostly originating from Muslim countries. The reports stated that the perpetrators aimed to discourage the settlement of Muslims in these areas.

On December 15, the German Parliament approved a 10 million euro ($10.5 million) grant for the construction of a Holocaust Museum and Educational Center in Thessaloniki. The Niarchos Foundation, an international philanthropic organization, matched this grant with an additional 10 million euros. According to Thessaloniki Mayor Boutaris and Jewish Community President David Saltiel, construction of the center will cost 20 million euros ($21.1 million) and is expected to open at the end of 2019.

The U.S. Ambassador, visiting officials, and embassy and consulate representatives met with officials and representatives from the Ministry of Education Research and Religions including the Minister for Education and the Secretary General for Religious Affairs. They also met with religious leaders including the Archbishop and other representatives of the Greek Orthodox Church, as well as members of the Muslim, Jewish, Yezidi, Bahai, and Jehovah’s Witnesses communities to promote interfaith dialogue, religious tolerance, and diversity, and to express concern about anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim acts and rhetoric. Through these meetings, the embassy monitored the ability of religious minority groups to freely practice their religion and the extent of societal discrimination against both indigenous religious minorities and newly-arrived migrants from religious minorities.

The U.S. Special Representative for Religion and Global Affairs attended the Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church on June 25-26 in Kolymbari, Crete, where he met with senior Church leadership, including Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and discussed religious freedom issues.

Embassy and consulate representatives engaged regularly with civil society representatives and religious groups in several outreach programs. From May 7-22, the embassy held a minority outreach incentive program which included the head of NGO “Lighthouse of the World,” the director of the Program for the Education of Muslim Children in Thrace, and the president of the Xanthi Association of Pomaks. The program involved discussion of youth education on diversity and religious pluralism. Also in May, the embassy sponsored the visit to the United States of two NGO staff members for a program focusing on acceptance of religious and ethnic differences. Participants met with organizations promoting cross-cultural dialogue and fighting discrimination. On June 14 and15, the embassy supported a workshop in Athens, “Building Resilience in Humanitarian Staff,” where Greek Orthodox and Muslim first responders to migrants discussed intercultural communication regarding religious beliefs and religious lifestyles.

The Ambassador and embassy representatives met with members of the Jewish community and attended Holocaust memorial events to emphasize the components of religious freedom and bolster societal religious tolerance. On February 10, the Consulate General in Thessaloniki hosted the 10th annual David Tiano Lecture commemorating a Greek Jewish employee of the consulate who was killed in the Holocaust. A curator from the Jewish Museum of Thessaloniki spoke about Tiano’s life and emphasized the theme of religious freedom. The consul general gave remarks on the theme of combating religious hatred and encouraging religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 111,000 (July 2016 estimate). The U.S. government estimates that 44.6 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 11.5 percent Anglican, 11.3 percent Pentecostal, 10.5 percent Seventh-day Adventist, 2.9 percent Baptist, and 2.6 percent Church of God. Religious groups with totals of 2 percent or less of the population include Methodists, evangelical Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Rastafarians. Smaller groups include Brethren, Bahais, Hindus, Moravians, Muslims, Mennonites, and members of the Salvation Army and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). There is a small Jewish community. Those belonging to no religion represent 3.6 percent of the population.

Legal Framework

The constitution protects “freedom of conscience, including freedom of thought and of religion.” It guarantees the right to change one’s religion and to manifest and propagate it. The constitution prohibits forced participation in any religious ceremony or instruction.

The government allows religious headdress of certain types in photographs for national identity documents, provided the face is visible and not shadowed. The criminal code prohibits written blasphemous language.

The government funds public schools administered by Christian groups, including the Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Seventh-day Adventists, and Mennonite communities. In accordance with the constitution’s protections for freedom of conscience and religion, students at such schools are not obliged to attend religion classes, and alternatives to religion classes are available. Public funding is not limited to these groups. The government provides subsidies to denominational schools, which are managed by a board of directors and staffed by the faith-based organization to which they are aligned.

In order for religious groups to qualify for customs and tax exemptions, they must be recognized as nonprofit organizations, register with the Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office (CAIPO) and Inland Revenue, and provide a letter of request to the Ministry of Finance. Applications are routinely granted. Recognition as a nonprofit requires the group to submit details to CAIPO regarding the organization, including information on directors, location of activities, and the general nature of its activities.

Foreign missionaries require a worker’s permit costing 1000 to 5000 East Caribbean dollars ($370 to $1,852) or a waiver costing 100 East Caribbean dollars ($37) from the Minister of Labor. They must demonstrate prior experience and be sponsored by a registered religious group.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to fund public schools administered by long-established Christian groups, including the Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Seventh-day Adventist, and Mennonite communities.

In November voters defeated all seven proposals of a constitutional referendum, including a Rights and Freedom bill that would have provided greater protection of fundamental rights, including on the basis of religion.

The Ministry of Youth, Sports and Religious Affairs organized meetings for all faith-based organizations to discuss areas for collaboration with the government to “improve national society.” One of the discussion topics was working with the government to combat the growing incidences of heart disease, diabetes, and certain types of cancer by educating congregants on how to adopt a healthier lifestyle.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

Embassy officials engaged government officials and members of the country’s religious communities to discuss religious freedom in law and in practice.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 15.2 million (July 2016). According to a 2015 survey by ProDatos, approximately 45 percent of the population is Catholic and 42 percent Protestant. Approximately 11 percent of the population professes no religious affiliation. Groups that together constitute less than 3 percent of the population include Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, Jews, and adherents of Mayan or Garifuna religions.

Christian groups include the Full Gospel Church, Assemblies of God, Central American Church, Prince of Peace Church, numerous independent evangelical Protestant groups, Baptists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Episcopalians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Russian Orthodox, and Seventh-day Adventists.

Catholics and Protestants are present throughout the country, with adherents among all major ethnic groups. According to leaders of Mayan spiritual organizations, as well as Catholic and Protestant clergy, many indigenous Catholics and some indigenous Protestants practice some form of syncretism with indigenous spiritual rituals. Mayan spiritual leaders estimate there are between 10,000 to 20,000 accredited guides of Mayan spirituality in the country.

Approximately 1,500 Jews and a small number of Muslims reside primarily in Guatemala City.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, including the free expression of all beliefs and the right to practice a religion or belief, in public and private. The constitution recognizes the distinct legal personality of the Catholic Church.

The constitution does not require religious groups to register for the purpose of worship. Non-Catholic religious groups must register for legal status, however, in order to conduct activities such as renting or purchasing property, entering into contracts, and to receive tax-exempt status and tax exemptions for properties used for worship, religious education, and social assistance. To register, a group must file a copy of its bylaws, which must reflect an intention to pursue religious objectives, and a list of its initial membership, with at least 25 members, with the Ministry of Government. The ministry may reject applications if the group does not appear to be devoted to a religious objective, appears intent on undertaking illegal activities, or engages in activities that appear likely to threaten public order. All religious groups must obtain the permission of the respective municipal authorities for construction and repair of properties and holding public events, consistent with requirements for nonreligious endeavors.

The constitution protects the rights of indigenous groups to practice their traditions and desired forms of cultural expression, including religious rites. The criminal code penalizes violation of the freedom of religious celebration and sentiment, and the desecration of burial sites or human remains; however, charges are seldom filed under these laws.

According to the constitution, no member of the clergy of any religion may serve as president, vice president, a government minister, or a judge.

The constitution permits, but does not require, religious instruction in public schools. There is no national framework for determining the nature or content of religious instruction. In general, public schools have no religious component to the curriculum. Private religious schools are allowed and can be found in all areas of the country.

The government requires foreign missionaries to obtain tourist visas, which authorities issue for renewable periods of three months. After renewing their tourist visas once, foreign missionaries may apply for temporary residence.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In June a court ordered the house arrest of former mayor Antonio Adolfo Perez y Perez during his trial for discrimination and abuse of authority. Perez was mayor in 2014 of the indigenous town San Juan La Laguna, which threatened expulsion of the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Jewish group Lev Tahor after tensions in the community arose, reportedly because of the group’s presence and customs. Lev Tahor voluntarily relocated to Guatemala City after the group was unable to reach a resolution with the local indigenous council.

Lev Tahor representatives said the community faced discrimination and harassment by authorities after the attorney general’s office executed a search warrant of the group’s residences in Guatemala City in September. Authorities carried out the operation in response to allegations of child neglect. Human rights observers were present at the search, and stated it was carried out in a generally sensitive manner. After the operation, Lev Tahor voluntarily left Guatemala City and relocated to the small town of Oratorio where it began building a new religious center and living quarters.

Non-Catholic religious groups reported problems or delays with municipal authorities regarding exemption from taxation and approval for construction or repairs of churches. For example, the Mormon Church brought several court cases against the municipal government of Guatemala City for continuing to charge local taxes on its religious installations, which the Church stated were tax exempt. The Church appealed one tax-related case in 2007 to the Constitutional Court, the highest court in the nation, which ruled in its favor. The Church reported it was unable to carry out repairs needed in some installations because of this ongoing issue.

Although the law permits Mayan spiritual groups to conduct religious ceremonies at Mayan historical sites on government-owned property, some Mayan leaders stated the government continued to limit their access to some religious sites. Many Mayan religious and archeological sites are national parks or protected areas that charge admission fees to all visitors. According to leaders from the Committee on the Designation of Sacred Sites, practitioners of Mayan spirituality were generally only able to obtain free access to sites if they were accredited and issued an identification card by certain indigenous organizations as spiritual guides, and received written permission from the Culture Ministry 15 days before the scheduled ceremony/religious practice. Mayan leaders stated written permission was difficult and expensive for many to obtain, requiring travel to the capital as well as fluency in Spanish, which many indigenous persons do not speak. Mayan advocates stated they should have access, within reasonable parameters, to all sacred sites (an estimated 2,000 locations on both public and private land).

The Presidential Commission against Discrimination and Racism against the Indigenous People of Guatemala (CODISRA) continued its legal support of cases against several property owners for denial of access or damage to cultural sites. For instance, CODISRA brought a case against a hydroelectric company for damaging cultural heritage. Explosives used during the construction of a hydroelectric plant on privately owned land, caused the entrance to one of two caves on the property sacred to the local Mayan people to collapse, rendering it inaccessible. CODISRA said the local community was able to coordinate with the owner of the land for access to the other cave, which was undamaged.

Several missionaries, even some in the country for a number of years, reported they chose to remain on tourist visas to avoid what they said was the complicated procedure of applying for temporary residence.

The Ministry of Education continued to consult with religious groups on a national values program called Living Together in Harmony (Vivamos Juntos en Harmonia) that integrated the groups’ shared values, such as honesty, fraternity, responsibility, and respect, without citing religion or religious teachings, into school curricula.

The Catholic Church reported some clergy received threats and were slandered on social media for their support of protests against large scale natural resource projects, with the most intense conflict surrounding a mining project near San Rafael Las Flores. According to the Catholic Church, clergy have taken a greater role in community debates about natural resources after Pope Francis’ encyclical Laudato Si’ called on them to protect the environment as God’s creation.

In May during a protest against an Israeli-owned power distribution company, protestors used anti-Semitic placards and held a banner with an image of Jesus stating, “Jews killed me on the cross. Now Jews … are killing my people in Guatemala with energy.” Leaders of the local Jewish community filed a complaint with the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDH) against the protesting group, the Rural Development Committee. Authorities facilitated a reconciliation meeting between the group and the Jewish community, which agreed to settle the matter out of court upon receiving a formal apology.

Some private owners of land in locations considered sacred by Mayan religious groups, such as caves, lagoons, mountains, and forests, continued to deny access, according to Mayan spiritual groups.

U.S. embassy officials met with PDH and CODISRA to discuss religious freedom issues, including the Lev Tahor case, threats against Catholic clergy, and reported lack of access to Mayan spiritual sites.

U.S. embassy officials met with leaders of major religious groups and representatives of faith-based nongovernmental organizations to promote freedom of religion, including the importance of tolerance and appreciation for diversity. Embassy officials continued outreach to religious leaders, including those from the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Alliance (the largest organization of Protestant churches, representing more than 30,000 individual churches), the Catholic archbishop’s offices, the Jewish community, representatives from the Commission for the Designation of Sacred Places for the Maya, Xinca, and Garifuna communities, and other organizations to strengthen understanding of religious freedom issues.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 12.1 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the SRA, approximately 85 percent of the population is Muslim, 8 percent is Christian, and 7 percent adheres to indigenous religious beliefs. Much of the population incorporates some indigenous rituals into its religious practices. Muslims are generally Sunni; however, Sufism is also present. Christian groups include Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, and several evangelical groups. There is a small Bahai community. There are also small numbers of Hindus, Buddhists, and adherents of traditional Chinese religious beliefs among foreign residents.

Muslims constitute a majority in all four regions of the country. Christians are most numerous in Conakry, large cities, the south, and the eastern Forest Region. Adherents of indigenous religious beliefs are most prevalent in the Forest Region.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the state is secular, prohibits religious discrimination, and provides for the right of individuals to choose and profess their religious faith. It recognizes the right of religious institutions and groups to establish and manage themselves freely. It bars political parties that identify with a particular religious group. These rights are subject only to “those limits that are indispensable to maintain the public order and democracy.”

By law, the SRA must approve all religious groups. Groups must provide a written constitution and application to the SRA along with their address and a fee of 250,000 Guinean francs (GNF) ($27). The SRA then sends the documents to the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization for final approval and signature. Once approved, the group becomes an officially recognized religion. Each registered religious group must present to the government a report on its affairs every six months. Registration entitles religious groups to value-added tax (VAT) exemptions on incoming shipments and to select energy subsidies.

Unregistered religious groups are not entitled to VAT exemptions and other benefits. By law, the government may shut down unregistered groups and expel foreign group leaders. There is limited opportunity for legal appeal of these penalties.

Religious groups may not own radio or television stations.

The compulsory primary school curriculum does not include religious studies.

The imams and administrative staff of the principal mosque in Conakry and the principal mosques in the main cities of the four regions are government employees. These mosques are directly under the administration of the government. Other mosques and some Christian groups receive government subsidies for pilgrimages.

The SRA secretary general of religious affairs appoints six national directors to lead the Offices of Christian Affairs, Islamic Affairs, Pilgrimages, Places of Worship, Economic Affairs and the Endowment, and Inspector General. The SRA is charged with promoting good relations among religious groups and coordinates with other members of the informal Interreligious Council, which is composed of Muslims and members from Catholic, Anglican, and other Protestant churches as well as the SRA.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The SRA continued to issue mandatory weekly themes for inclusion in Friday sermons at mosques and Sunday sermons in churches. The stated purpose of the weekly guidance was to harmonize religious views in order to prevent radical or political connotations in sermons. Although the SRA did not monitor sermons at every mosque and church, its inspectors were present in every region and responsible for ensuring that mosque and church sermons were consistent with SRA directives. Clerics whom the SRA judged to be noncompliant were subject to disciplinary action.

Opposition politicians continued to say some imams who supported them or their parties were replaced by the government, but offered no specific examples.

After two years of Ebola outbreaks, Saudi Arabia resumed allowing Guineans to participate in the Hajj. The SRA facilitated and organized the travel of approximately 6,000 applicants who each had to pay approximately 40 million GNF ($4,340) toward the cost of travel. The government continued to subsidize the travel of Catholics on pilgrimages to the Holy Land, Greece, and Italy, providing 2 billion GNF ($217,000) compared to 3 billion GNF ($325,000) in 2015. The decrease in subsidy from the previous year led the government to decide to rotate the benefits to a different Christian group each year, including Anglican, Catholics, and Adventists, for their pilgrimages to the holy sites. The decision to alternate benefits to Christian groups will be implemented beginning in 2017.

According to the SRA, several unregistered religious groups operated freely but did not receive the tax and other benefits received by registered groups. The small Jehovah’s Witness community reportedly proselytized from house to house without interference, although neither it nor the Bahai community requested official recognition. Some groups stated they preferred not to have a formal relationship with the SRA.

The congregation of a mosque closed in December 2015 by the government due to its proximity to Conakry international airport runway said that they accepted the closure but complained about the lack of communication from the government. Authorities said they closed the mosque in response to terrorist attacks in neighboring countries and said the closure was to prevent a “potential attack” against the airport. The mosque was not compensated for the closure.

Islamic schools were prevalent throughout the country and were the traditional forum for religious education. Some Islamic schools were wholly private, while others received local government support. Islamic schools, particularly common in the Fouta Djalon region, taught the compulsory government curriculum along with additional Quranic studies. Private Christian schools, which accepted students of all religious groups, existed in the nation’s capital and most other large cities. They taught the compulsory curriculum but did not receive government support and held Christian prayers before school.

The government allocated free broadcast time on state-owned national television for Islamic and Christian programming, including Islamic religious instruction, Friday prayers from the central mosque, and church services. Muslim broadcasts received more air time, while different Christian groups received broadcast time on Sundays on a rotating basis. The government permitted religious broadcasting on privately owned commercial radio.

In some parts of the country such as the middle and the upper regions, strong familial, communal, cultural, social, or economic pressure discouraged conversion from Islam.

Members of the Bahai Faith reported being discriminated against, and banned from their families because of their religious beliefs. The wife of the secretary of the spiritual assembly of Conakry reported she received pressure from her family who did not accept her union with her husband, a member of the Bahai Faith.

In February unidentified individuals burned a mosque built and led by the president of the Islamic organization Nourdine Islam, a well-known scholar from Kankan. The incident was followed by clashes between groups supportive of the scholar and the suspected perpetrators. The investigation did not conclude why the incident occurred; the scholar stated that it was triggered by family rivalries and jealousy over his fame.

The Office of Christian Affairs reported that the father of two Muslim women accused a pastor of kidnapping his daughters, aged 27 and 29. The women converted to Christianity and started to attend the pastor’s church in the suburbs of Conakry. The pastor was interviewed by the police in February but was not detained or charged. According to sources the women were threatened with death by their father for their conversion.

The SRA did not resolve disputes among the Karambaya and Touraya Muslim communities in Touba. No trial took place following 2015 clashes between the two Muslim groups that resulted in five deaths. The two groups quarreled about the building of a new mosque.

The Kalima Catholic Mission did not begin construction on a church despite authorization by the government in 2015. The Muslim community reportedly lobbied against and stopped the project from proceeding the previous year. Religious authorities of both sides continued to work on resolving this issue. The chief of the mission reported local authorities of the region were influenced by Muslims to stop issuing necessary permits in this case.

Many Muslim students not enrolled in private Islamic schools received religious education at madrassahs, some of which were associated with mosques and others supported by local communities. Unlike the Islamic schools, the madrassahs did not teach the compulsory primary school curriculum. Although the government did not recognize the madrassahs or require them to register, it allowed them to operate freely. They focused on Quranic studies and instruction was in Arabic rather than French. Funds from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states supported some madrassahs. Most students in madrassahs also attended public or private schools teaching the compulsory curriculum, which did not include religious studies.

The Ambassador met several times with the secretary of the religious affairs and the grand imam of Conakry. He also met with the grands imams of Labe and Kankan. Each time, he delivered messages of religious tolerance.

U.S. embassy personnel worked closely with the SRA and religious leaders, including the grand imams of Conakry, Kankan, and Labe; Catholic and Anglican bishops; and Islamic and Christian clergy. Embassy officers advocated for religious tolerance.

U.S. embassy personnel participated in several iftar celebrations nationwide to promote good relations and mutual understanding among religious groups and as an opportunity to relay a message of respect for religious freedom and reconciliation among religious groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.8 million (July 2016 estimate). Estimates of the religious composition of the population vary widely, but according to a 2010 study by the Pew Research Center, approximately 45 percent is Muslim, 31 percent follows indigenous religious practices, and 22 percent is Christian. There are small communities of Buddhists, Hindus, and Jews, many of whom are foreign nationals.

The Fula (Peuhl or Fulani) and Mandinka (Malinke) ethnic groups are the most numerous followers of Islam. Muslims generally live in the north and northeast, and most Muslims are Sunni. Adherents of indigenous religious beliefs generally live in all but the northern parts of the country. The Christian population, including Roman Catholics and Protestants, are primarily from the Pepel, Manjaco, and Balanta ethnic groups and are concentrated in Bissau and along the coast. Large numbers of Muslims and Christians hold indigenous beliefs as well.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates the state shall be separate from religious institutions and shall respect and protect legally recognized religious groups, whose activities shall be subject to the law. It holds freedom of conscience and religion as inviolable, even if the state declares a state of siege, and provides for freedom of worship as long as it does not violate the fundamental principles cited in the constitution. It establishes that all citizens are equal under the law with the same rights and obligations, irrespective of their religion. Political parties and labor unions are barred from affiliating with a particular religious group. The constitution recognizes the freedom of religious groups to teach their faith.

The government requires religious groups to obtain licenses. The formal process, which is not often followed, entails providing information on the name, location, type, and size of the organization to the Ministry of Justice.

According to the constitution, there is no religious instruction in public schools. The Ministry of Education regulates and enforces the decree against religious teaching in public schools. There are some private schools operated by religious groups.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

There were no reports of significant government action affecting religious freedom.

Some Muslim community members reported concerns about foreign imams teaching what they termed radical Islamic practices to the local Muslim population.

Religious group representatives reported there was positive societal respect among religious groups, in line with a tradition of religious moderation and tolerance.

There is no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in the country. Representatives from the U.S. Embassy in Dakar, Senegal, discussed religious freedom, including the presence of foreign Christian and Muslim missionaries in the country, with government officials and representatives of religious groups. These included the minister of justice and the attorney general. Embassy representatives from Dakar also met with and discussed religious activity and religious freedom with representatives of an Islamic women’s organization, members of the Islamic Council, U.S. and Brazilian Protestant missionaries, the Bishop of Bissau (the country’s leading Roman Catholic official), and various Catholic priests.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 736,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2012 census, 64 percent of the population is Christian, 25 percent Hindu, 7 percent Muslim (mainly Sunni), and less than 1 percent belong to other religious groups. Among Christians, Pentecostals make up 23 percent of the total population; Roman Catholics, 7 percent; Anglicans, 5 percent; Seventh-day Adventists, 5 percent; Methodists, 1 percent; and other Christians, 21 percent. Groups that together constitute less than 1 percent of the population include Rastafarians and Bahais. An estimated 3 percent of the population does not profess any religious affiliation.

The membership of most religious groups includes a cross section of ethnic groups, although nearly all Hindus are of Indian descent and most Rastafarians are of African descent.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and worship, including the right to choose and change one’s religion. An unenforced law requires a prison term of one year for a blasphemous libel conviction, but exempts religious expression made in “good faith and decent language.”

There is no system to register a religious group, but to receive formal recognition all places of worship must be registered with the government through the deeds registry. The deeds registry requires an organization to submit a proposed name and address for the place of worship, as well as the names of executive group members or congregation leaders. Once formally recognized, a place of worship falls under legislation governing not-for-profit organizations, which allows the organization to conduct financial operations, buy property, and receive tax benefits in its name.

Foreign religious workers require a visa from the Ministry of Citizenship. Religious groups seeking to enter Amerindian villages for the purpose of proselytizing must apply for and obtain the permission from the village council.

There are both public and private religiously-affiliated schools. Private schools are operated entirely by private groups and are not funded by the state; students of private schools pay fees to attend, which are not controlled by the government. Religious education is compulsory in all private schools with a religious affiliation. There is no religious education in public schools, whether religiously-affiliated or not. Most public schools’ religious affiliations are Anglican or Methodist.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government declared holy days of Guyana’s three major religious groups as national holidays.

The government maintained regulations which limited the number of visas for foreign representatives of religious groups based on historical trends, the relative size of the group, and the president’s discretion; however, religious groups reported the visa quotas allotted to them did not adversely affect their activities, as the visa-limitation rule was rarely applied stringently.

The Guyana Defense Force (GDF) coordinated with civilian religious groups to provide military personnel with access to religious services. Leaders of the three major religious groups conducted prayer services and counseling on GDF bases.

Government representatives participated regularly in the observance of Christian, Muslim, and Hindu religious holidays throughout the year. In September the president and government ministers participated in an interfaith ceremony to celebrate the country’s indigenous people.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy officials joined the Ministry of Social Cohesion on several occasions throughout the year at interfaith and religious events. Embassy officials engaged in social media discussions and promotion of religious freedom and tolerance after these events.

Embassy representatives met with the major religious groups and attended various religious and interfaith functions to support and advance religious tolerance and inclusion. At these events, embassy officials spoke on acceptance, tolerance, and harmony in a multifaith cultural context.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 10.5 million (July 2016 estimate). The U.S. government estimates that 55 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 29 percent Protestant, 7 percent adhere to other religions, and 5 percent do not subscribe to any religion. Groups present in small numbers include The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, Rastafarians, Scientologists, and atheists. According to societal leaders, an estimated 50 to 80 percent of the population practices some form of Vodou, often blended with elements of other religions, usually Catholicism. Muslim leaders estimate their community at approximately 8,000 to 10,000. There are fewer than 100 Jews.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the free exercise of all religions and establishes laws to regulate the registration and operation of religious groups. The constitution protects against being compelled to belong to a religious group contrary to one’s belief. The MFA is responsible for monitoring and administering laws relating to religious groups, while the Bureau of Worship, an office within the ministry, is responsible for registering churches and other religious buildings, clergy, and missionaries of various religious denominations.

An 1860 concordat between the Holy See and the state remains in effect and gives the Vatican power to approve and select a specific number of bishops in the country with the consent of the government. Under the concordat, the government provides a monthly stipend to Catholic priests. Catholic and Episcopalian bishops have official license plates and carry diplomatic passports.

All religious groups are legally required to register with the MFA. Registration affords religious groups standing in legal disputes, provides tax-exempt status, and extends civil recognition to documents such as marriage and baptismal certificates, which are issued in a similar way to birth certificates. The government does not tax registered religious groups and exempts their imports from customs duties. Requirements for registration include information on qualifications of the group’s leader, a membership directory, and a list of the group’s social projects. Registered religious groups must submit annual updates of their membership, projects, and leadership to the MFA. Foreign missionaries are required to submit registration paperwork to operate privately funded clinics, schools, and orphanages.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Although Vodou was registered in 2003, the government continued not to recognize Vodou marriage and baptism ceremonies. The MFA continued to accept applications requesting such recognition.

The MFA did not act on a pending request for registration of Islam as a religious group or communicate an explanation for the inaction to the National Council of Muslims. Muslims were required to obtain civil marriage licenses while Christian clergy were able to conduct government-recognized ceremonies.

The government continued to provide financial support for the maintenance of Catholic churches and some Catholic schools. Despite ongoing negotiations between the Protestant Federation and the MFA, the Protestant Federation said in May that the system of financial support was still unavailable to other religious groups.

Muslims and many nondenominational Christian groups stated they operated freely without formal registration.

Government sources stated their continued limited institutional capacity restricted their ability to provide the full range of religious services for prisoners requested by Muslims, particularly in facilities outside of Port-au-Prince. Volunteers provided religious services in some prisons, and prisoners were unhindered from exercising their religious beliefs.

Protestant and Catholic clergy continued to report good working relationships with the government. The Catholic Church and Protestant groups operated schools and provided numerous social services.

According to media reports, a mob decapitated a Vodou houngan – a male Vodou priest – in the town of Toman in May. Members of the community reportedly believed the houngan had used his spiritual powers to cause the death of a local woman and a former director of a local church. No one was charged in the case.

According to the MFA, while many Christians were tolerant of Vodouism, others rejected it as incompatible with their beliefs. Vodou community leaders stated Vodou practitioners continued to experience some social stigmatization for their beliefs and practices. The KNVA leadership stated that in Catholic and Protestant schools, teachers and administrators at times openly rejected and condemned Vodou culture and customs as contrary to the teachings of the Bible.

U.S. embassy representatives met regularly with government officials, including the minister of foreign affairs and religious denominations, to advocate for fair and equal treatment for all religious groups as well as to advocate for registration of religious groups that have completed the requisite registration procedures.

Embassy officials met with faith-based NGOs and religious leaders in the Protestant, Catholic, and Vodou communities to discuss their views on religious freedom, clergy, and marriage recognition, as well as on the registration of religious minority clergy. In meetings with religious leaders, embassy officials stressed the importance of religious freedom and tolerance and discussed the influential role of religion in society.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 8.9 million (July 2016 estimate). The principal religious groups are Roman Catholics and evangelical Protestants. The Catholic Church states it has approximately 6.85 million adherents, constituting 77 percent of the population. The Evangelical Fellowship of Honduras (CEH) points to a 2016 survey by a local marketing research and public opinion company that reported 48 percent of respondents self-identified as evangelical Protestants, 41 percent as Catholics, 3 percent as other, and 8 percent as unaffiliated with any religious organization.

In the 2015 Latinobarometro regional public opinion survey, 43.6 percent of respondents identified as Catholic, 42.1 percent as evangelical, 1.8 percent as other, and 12.4 percent as unaffiliated. Other religious groups with their stated number of adherents include Seventh-day Adventist (172,000); The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) (165,000); Jehovah’s Witnesses (22,000); and a variety of Anabaptist/Mennonite groups (18,000). Additionally, there are small communities of Episcopalians, Lutherans, Orthodox Christians, and Bahais. The most prominent evangelical Protestant churches include Church of God, Assemblies of God, Abundant Life Church, Living Love Church, International Christian Center, and various Great Commission churches. A growing number of evangelical Protestant churches have no denominational affiliation. The Moravian Church has a broad presence in the La Mosquitia region in the eastern part of the country. Some indigenous groups and African Hondurans practice African and Amerindian faiths or incorporate elements of Christianity, African, and Amerindian religions into syncretistic religious practices and beliefs.

The Muslim community reported they have 1,500 members and the Jewish community said they had several hundred members.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the free exercise of all religions as long as that exercise does not contravene other laws or public order. Religious leaders are prohibited from holding public office or making political statements.

The law distinguishes among legally recognized religious organizations, religious organizations registered as NGOs, and nonregistered religious organizations. The government does not require religious groups to register. By law, only the legislature has the authority to confer status as a legally recognized group; only the Catholic Church has received such recognition. Those recognized by law receive benefits such as tax exempt status for staff salaries and church materials.

Religious organizations not individually recognized by law may register as NGOs. The government does not significantly distinguish between religious and nonreligious NGOs. To register as an NGO, organizations must have a board of directors and juridical personality. Associations seeking juridical personality must submit an application to the Secretariat of State for Human Rights, Justice, Governance, and Decentralization describing their internal organization, bylaws, and goals. The Office of the Solicitor General reviews applications for juridical personality and renders a constitutional opinion. Approved organizations must submit annual financial and activity reports to the government. They may apply to the Ministry of Finance to receive benefits such as tax exemptions and customs duty waivers.

Unregistered religious organizations are allowed to operate but are unable to obtain tax-exempt status or other benefits.

The constitution states public education is secular and allows for the establishment of private schools. Parents have the right to choose the education their children receive, including religious education. The government dictates a minimum standardized curriculum for all schools.

The government requires foreign missionaries to obtain entry and residence permits, and mandates a local institution or individual sponsor a missionary’s application for residency and submit it to immigration authorities. The government has agreements with members of the Evangelical Fellowship of Honduras (CEH), the Mormons, and the Seventh-day Adventists, among others, to facilitate entry and residence permits for their missionaries. Groups with whom the government does not have written agreements are required to provide proof of employment and income for their missionaries.

Foreign religious workers can request residency for up to five years. To renew their residence permits, religious workers must submit proof of continued employment with the sponsoring church at least 30 days before their residency expires. The law prohibits the immigration of foreign missionaries who practice religions saying they use witchcraft or satanic rituals, and allows the deportation of foreigners who practice witchcraft or “religious fraud.” According to the immigration law, individuals who “fraudulently exercise their [religious] profession or office, or commit fraud against the health or religious beliefs of citizens of the country, or the national patrimony,” may be fined or face other legal consequences.

The criminal code protects clergy authorized to operate in the country from being forced to testify about privileged information obtained in confidence during a religious confession. Vicars, bishops, and archbishops of the Catholic Church and comparably ranked individuals from other legally recognized religious groups are not required to appear in court if subpoenaed. They are required, however, to make a statement at a location of their choosing.

Religious officials face fines of 50,000-100,000 lempiras ($2,100 – $4,300) and legal bans on performing religious duties for four to six years if they perform a religious marriage without a civil marriage license.

The government is a party to the Ibero-American Convention on Young People’s Rights, which recognizes the right to conscientious objection to obligatory military service.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to identify legally the Catholic Church as the only recognized church, and to classify other religious groups as religious associations. Non-Catholic religious groups criticized the government’s not recognizing them as churches and their inability to receive benefits such as tax exemptions for clergy salaries and imported religious materials. Religious groups criticized the government’s not recognizing religious marriages conducted without a civil license.

Religious organizations continued to criticize the application of one uniform set of registration rules for all nonprofit organizations, and said they should be recognized as religious groups rather than NGOs. They also criticized the government’s requirement that, in order to register, all such groups have a board of directors registered with the government and file annual financial and activity reports. Small and nondenominational groups said it was particularly difficult for them to meet these requirements. The government’s registration office for civil organizations published separate but almost identical guidelines for churches as for other NGOs. The government started providing a separate intake process for religious groups seeking to register, and instituted a simplified on-line reregistration process for all NGOs.

The official NGO registry office (Unidad de Registro y Seguimento de Asociaciones Civiles URSAC) in the Ministry of Governance received 1,228 applications during the year. This included 189 from religious associations, of which 148 were approved for registration. In comparison, all 476 community councils that applied were registered and 359 of 567 civil association applicants were registered. The Ministry of Governance rejected applications that did not fit within the legal categories for which the ministry had legal authority.

Some Muslims expressed concern that Muslim women were not permitted to wear the hijab while working as government employees in certain public healthcare facilities, the offices of the national healthcare system, or in judicial facilities. Private female lawyers were reportedly allowed to wear the hijab in court.

Despite a letter issued by the Secretary of Education in 2014 excusing members of the Seventh-day Adventist Church from Saturday school attendance, Church members reported some teachers and principals still expected Saturday attendance at public and private schools. Church leaders also stated public universities failed to respond to, or rejected entirely, requests by Church members to provide alternatives to Saturday classes and exams for Adventist students. The National Autonomous University of Honduras had not responded to requests on this issue submitted in 2013. In addition, the Supreme Court had not addressed the Church’s 2014 appeal in a case against the National Teachers University.

A rule drafted in 2010 that required Jehovah’s Witnesses to sing the national anthem, salute the national flag, and participate in other patriotic events remained in the Secretariat of Education’s school guidelines, despite a 2014 ruling by the secretariat’s legal director that the rule was not enforceable. Representatives of the Jehovah’s Witnesses noted their concern over continuing punishment – including refusals to provide a graduation diploma – by some individual school administrations or teachers after Jehovah’s Witness students abstained from singing the national anthem or participating in other patriotic events. Universities permitted students to abstain from patriotic activities after presenting a written statement of their affiliation with the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Some public hospitals reportedly refused to treat Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused blood transfusions; one individual was refused treatment for kidney failure after refusing to accept a blood transfusion. Jehovah’s Witness representatives expressed concern at what they said was unequal treatment by municipal authorities in the capital, Tegucigalpa; authorities reportedly refused to issue them permits to distribute religious material in public areas, but issued permits to commercial vendors conducting similar but nonreligious business. The Jehovah’s Witnesses said they have been unable to receive tax exemptions for imported religious materials since 2010.

Although religious leaders are prohibited from holding political office, some Protestant pastors reportedly held elected office in the national congress, including one who was third in the presidential line of succession established by the constitution.

Reportedly, military base commanders preferentially selected Catholic or Protestant chaplains.

The government routinely invited Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders to lead prayers at government events.

On December 15, unknown gunmen attacked the house of the executive director of the CEH, killing one of his government-assigned military bodyguards and injuring a second. Reports speculated the attack was linked to the executive director’s work as a civil society representative providing support to the ongoing Police Purge Commission, which was charged with reviewing cases of police corruption.

Some sectors of society criticized some evangelical Protestant groups and, to a lesser degree, the Catholic Church for what they said was political activism and close ties to the government. These activities included Protestant pastors holding public office, CEH members serving on the Police Purge Commission, and Catholic and Protestant prayers at government events. Religious groups continued to say media sometimes reported incorrect and inflammatory information about the activities of religious leaders.

Some Muslim women reported they were denied the right to wear the hijab in private sector offices, or were asked to remove it when passing through bank security. Some Muslims reported being denied the right to pray during work hours. Seventh-day Adventists reported the continued refusal of certain private institutions, including places of employment and schools, to permit them to observe Saturday as a day of rest.

The U.S. government supported a development program with the Ministry of Governance to improve registration processes for civil society organizations by creating an on-line application and renewal process aimed at reducing the burden for NGOs, including religious organizations, to register and file required reports. U.S. embassy officials maintained a dialogue with religious leaders and organizations, which included discussions of the unequal treatment of religious groups. A particular topic of discussion was the absence of a religious registration law that afforded all religious groups the same rights and privileges as the Catholic Church.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 9.9 million (July 2016 estimate). The Hungarian government does not collect official data on religious affiliation; however, the 2011 national census included an optional question on religious affiliation. Of the 73 percent who responded, 51 percent identified as Roman Catholic, 16 percent as Hungarian Reformed Church (Calvinist), 3 percent as Lutheran, 2 percent as Greek Catholic, less than 1 percent as Jewish, 23 percent indicated no religious affiliation, and 2 percent indicated they were atheists. Religious groups together constituting less than 5 percent of the population include Greek Orthodox, the Faith Congregation (a Pentecostal group), other Orthodox Christian groups, other Christian denominations, Buddhists, and Muslims. The Jewish population is largely concentrated in the capital, while other religious groups are distributed around the country.

Legal Framework

The Fundamental Law, the country’s constitution, provides for freedom of conscience and religion, including freedom to choose or change religion or belief and freedom – alone or in community with others and in public or in private – to manifest religion or belief through religious acts or ceremonies, or in any other way, in worshipping, practice, and observance. It prohibits religious discrimination as well as speech “aimed at violating the dignity” of any religious community.

The constitution’s preamble states that “We recognize the role of Christianity” in preserving the nation and “value the various religious traditions” in the country. The constitution stipulates separation between religious communities and state and the autonomy of religious groups. According to the constitution, the state may, at the request of religious communities, cooperate with them on community goals. Implementing legislation provides for a dual system of religious communities, consisting of “incorporated churches” with which the state cooperates on community goals as outlined in the constitution, and “organizations engaged in religious activity” (religious organizations). Neither category is limited to Christian organizations.

Religious organizations acquire incorporated church status through an application submitted to the MHC and, if found eligible, by a subsequent two-thirds vote of parliament. The church is then by law entered onto a list of incorporated churches. The MHC has 60 days to assess whether the group fulfills all the administrative criteria, which include a variety of documentation and qualification requirements. To qualify for incorporated church status, a religious group must have existed as a religious organization in the country for 20 years, in which case it must have a membership of 0.1 percent of the total population, (approximately 10,000 people) or be registered as a religious organization and have existed for at least 100 years internationally, in which case its foreign affiliation must be certified by at least two other churches of “similar doctrine” recognized in foreign countries. Its activities must not conflict with the constitution or other laws or violate the rights and freedoms of other communities. A group must also prove that its primary purpose is to conduct religious activity; have a formal statement of faith and rites, bylaws and internal rules, and elected or appointed administrative and representative bodies; and officially declare that its activities are not in violation of the laws or the freedom of others. The MHC is obligated to consult with a qualified lawyer, a historian of religions, a scholar of religions, or sociologist with an academic degree prior to issuing its decision. Applicants may appeal the MHC’s decision in the Budapest Public Administration and Labor Court and, ultimately, to the Curia, the country’s highest judicial authority.

Following a favorable MHC decision on the applicant’s eligibility, the MHC submits the application to parliament’s Judiciary Committee, which has 60 days to invite the applicant to a public hearing and to submit an assessment to parliament on the group’s compliance with additional criteria. These criteria include an assessment that the group poses no threat to national security (provided by parliament’s National Security Committee), that it does not violate the right to physical and mental health or the protection of life and human dignity, and that the group is suitable for long-term cooperation with the state in promoting community goals based on its founding documents, number of members, network of institutions providing public services, and access by larger societal groups to such services.

Approval of a request for incorporated church status requires a two-thirds majority vote by parliament, which must take place within 60 days of a motion by parliament’s Judiciary Committee. If a religious group receives such parliamentary approval, the state must grant specific licenses to the group to support its participation in tasks to achieve community goals. If parliament rejects the application, a detailed explanation is required and the applicant may challenge parliament’s decision in the Constitutional Court within 15 days. The law does not prescribe any consequences if parliament does not act within the 60-day period, nor is there opportunity for appeal.

A 2011 law on religion automatically deregistered more than 300 religious groups and organizations which had previously had incorporated church status. Those organizations were required to reapply if they wished to regain incorporated church status; their applications were also subject to the approval of a two-thirds majority of parliament.

The law lists 27 incorporated churches, including the Catholic Church, a variety of Protestant denominations, a range of Orthodox Christian groups, other Christian denominations such as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Seventh-day Adventists, the Salvation Army, several Jewish groups, and the Hungarian Society for Krishna Consciousness, the sole registered Hindu organization. The list also includes Buddhist and Muslim umbrella organizations, each encompassing a number of individual groups, bringing the total number on the registered list of incorporated churches to 32 individual religious groups. Including dioceses and monastic orders, 202 entities are associated with the 32 incorporated churches.

The law authorizes the Budapest Metropolitan Court to register a group as a religious organization if it has at least 10 founding individual members whose primary objective is to conduct religious activities that do not violate the constitution, other laws, or the rights and freedom of other communities. The organization’s membership may consist only of individuals; no “legal persons” such as corporations or other associations may be members. The court must approve applications that meet all of these criteria. Applicants must submit the name and address of the organization, names and addresses of founding members, identifying information for the group’s legal representative and the term of his or her appointment, the founding documents of the group, and the statement that the primary objective of the organization is to conduct religious activities. If the court rejects an organization’s application, the decision is subject to appeal to the Budapest Metropolitan Court of Appeals. Unregistered groups are allowed to function and to worship but lack legal status and the rights and privileges granted exclusively to registered religious communities.

Every registered religious community may use the word “church” in its official name regardless of whether it is officially recognized by parliament as an “incorporated church.” Officials from both incorporated churches and registered religious organizations not recognized by parliament are not obligated to disclose information shared with them in the course of their faith-related service, such as during rites of confession.

By law no state office may determine or supervise a registered religious community’s faith-based activities. Their doctrines, internal regulations, and statutes are not subject to state review, modification, or enforcement. Their names, symbols, and rites are protected by copyright law, while buildings and cemeteries are protected by criminal law.

The constitution establishes a unified system for the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (ombudsman). The ombudsman investigates cases related to violations of fundamental rights – including religious freedom – and initiates general or specific measures for their remedy.

Incorporated churches have certain privileges not available to religious organizations, such as greater access to state funding and exemption from state oversight of their financial operations connected to religious activities. Incorporated churches and their associated institutions (classified as “internal religious legal entities”) that provide public services, such as healthcare, education, or other social services, are automatically eligible for full state subsidies (a subsidy based on the number of people receiving services coupled with a supplementary subsidy) for all their public service activities. Religious organizations may also take over or establish public service institutions and are entitled to receive a per capita state subsidy to cover the wages of the staff employed by these institutions.

Incorporated churches and religious organizations receive a per capita subsidy, based on the number of students enrolled, from the state for employee wages at their schools, but only incorporated churches automatically receive a supplementary subsidy for operating expenses. According to the law, religious organizations may apply to the MHC for a supplementary operational subsidy covering approximately 30 percent of their total costs for schools, and the MHC decides whether to grant it on a case-by-case basis.

Taxpayers may allocate 1 percent of their personal income taxes to a nongovernmental organization (NGO), including a religious organization, and another 1 percent to an incorporated church, which then receives additional matching funds from the government. Both incorporated churches and religious organizations are free to use taxpayer donations as they wish. Only officials of incorporated churches are exempt from personal income tax under certain conditions. Land owned by a religious group deregistered in 2011 may be retained by the religious organization that is the deregistered group’s legal successor. Both religious organizations and incorporated churches are prohibited from purchasing agricultural land. Incorporated churches, but not religious organizations, may acquire new agricultural land as a gift or as inheritance.

If incorporated churches or religious organizations cease to exist (e.g., by dissolving themselves) and have no legal successor, their assets become state property that must be used to finance public services. This may also occur if, upon the initiative of the government, the Constitutional Court issues an opinion that the activity of the incorporated church violates the constitution, which requires confirmation by a two-thirds parliamentary majority. The Constitutional Court also issues opinions upon the request of the Budapest Metropolitan Court on whether a religious organization is in violation of the constitution, but the decision on its dissolution depends solely on the Budapest Metropolitan Court.

Treaties with the Holy See regulate relations between the state and the Catholic Church, including financing of public services and religious activities and the settlement of claims for property seized by the state during the Communist era. These treaties serve as a model for regulating state relations with other religious groups, although there are some differences in the rights and privileges the state accords to each of the religious groups with which it has agreements. The state has also concluded formal agreements with the Hungarian Reformed Church, the Hungarian Lutheran Church, the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary (MAZSIHISZ), and four Orthodox churches.

Military and law enforcement personnel may freely practice their religion in private and also at their workplace if their religious practice does not violate their mandatory service duties. The Catholic Church, the Reformed Church, the Lutheran Church, and Jewish congregations receive automatic authorization to provide chaplain services to the military; other incorporated churches and religious associations must seek permission.

Penitentiaries generally allow inmates free practice of religion, including providing them with special diets, such as kosher, vegetarian, and pork-free meals. All incorporated churches and religious organizations must seek permission to offer pastoral services in prisons. Rejection of access requests may be appealed to the National Prison Service, the prosecutor’s office, or the ombudsman. Detainees have the right to participate in communal religious services three times a week and to contact without supervision representatives of incorporated churches or religious organizations having permission to access the facility. Detainees in special security regimes may only receive individual spiritual care and are excluded from community spiritual programs. In the case of pretrial detainees, during the course of the criminal investigation a public prosecutor or judge may restrict personal interaction with a religious representative but not participation in communal religious services.

Incorporated churches receive automatic authorization to provide pastoral services in hospitals, while religious organizations must seek permission.

One-hour-per-week faith and ethics or ethics-only education is mandatory through the first eight grades of public school. Students and their parents choose between the faith and ethics class provided by an incorporated church of their choice and a generic ethics course taught by public school teachers. Churches are entitled to prepare their own textbooks and determine curricula for their faith and ethics classes. Private schools are not obligated to introduce faith and ethics or ethics classes. Unincorporated religious organizations are not entitled to provide religious education as part of the mandatory curricula in public schools, but they may offer extracurricular, optional religious education in public schools if requested by students or parents.

Incorporated churches and religious organizations have the right to open their own schools. In addition, the law affords incorporated churches and religious organizations the right to assume operation of public schools through a formal agreement with the MHC. Religious communities, school teachers, the affected parents, or the operator of the school can initiate such transfers, but they can only be executed if the designated religious community is able to collect the signatures of more than 50 percent of the parents and adult students enrolled at the school. Whether newly established or converted from public status, religious schools are free to conduct their own religious teaching without government input and to make faith education mandatory and not substitutable with an ethics class. The government inspects both religious and public schools every two years to ensure standards conform to those of government-run schools.

The constitution prohibits speech that violates the dignity of any religious community. On October 11, parliament amended the law to include a prohibition of “calling for violence” – in addition to inciting hatred – against a religious community or its members, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment. The law provides a maximum punishment of three years in prison for impeding someone else from freely exercising his or her religion through violence or threats. Abusing an individual because of his or her religious affiliation is punishable by up to three years in prison.

Physical assault motivated by the victim’s actual or suspected religious affiliation is a felony punishable by one to five years in prison. Violence against a member of the clergy is classified as violence against an “individual providing public service” and is similarly punished with a prison sentence of one to five years. Any person who engages in preparation for the use of force against any member of a religious community is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two years.

The law prohibits public denial, expression of doubt, or minimization of the Holocaust, genocide, and other crimes against humanity committed by the National Socialist or Communist regimes, punishing such offenses with a maximum sentence of three years in prison. The criminal code makes wearing, exhibiting, or promoting in public the swastika, the logo of the Nazi SS, or the arrow cross in a way that harms the human dignity or the memory of victims a misdemeanor, punishable by detention for a period ranging from five to 90 days.

The law provides for the lifting of official immunity of a member of parliament (MP) who incites hatred against religious communities or publicly denies crimes of the Communist or National Socialist regimes. No MP has been the subject of such a proceeding.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

Government Practices

There were numerous reports of perceived anti-Muslim rhetoric by government officials and politicians, including at the highest levels, voiced in connection with the European refugee crisis, as well as government endorsement of an individual who engaged in anti-Semitic rhetoric. The government initiated a national referendum (held on October 2) on whether the EU should be able to establish quotas for the settlement of refugees, most of whom were Muslim, in the country without the approval of parliament. In the months preceding the referendum, the government ran a media and political campaign in which governing officials repeatedly stated that European and Christian values needed to be protected from the threat posed by Islam. On July 26, Prime Minister Orban described the arrival of asylum seekers in Europe as “a poison” and said his country did not want or need “a single migrant,” adding that “every single migrant poses a public security and terror risk.” An official government booklet mailed to all 4.1 million households in the country stated “illegal immigration increases the threat of terror. We reject forced settlement, because it would increase the danger of terror. The immigrants largely come from places where European states are engaged in military campaigns. This significantly increases safety risks.” The overwhelming majority of participants voted no to the EU quotas, but a low participation rate rendered the referendum results invalid. On November 8, parliament narrowly failed to enact a constitutional amendment to block the EU quota of refugees. Law enforcement and judiciary agencies continued to prosecute anti-Semitic incidents, including assault and hate speech, but Muslim groups cited a fear among community members of reporting assaults and other incidents to authorities. Parliament failed to amend the provisions of the religion law the Constitutional Court had previously found unconstitutional and those the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had previously declared in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights. The ECHR awarded monetary compensation to seven religious groups with outstanding claims against the government for nonpecuniary damages, while the decision on the claim of the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (MET) remained pending. Unincorporated religious organizations had limited access to public funding and to religious activities in public institutions. Some religious groups questioned the transparency of income tax donations for incorporated churches. Numerous groups and individuals criticized the government’s decision to award a state decoration to journalist and political activist Zsolt Bayer, whom critics denounced for his defamatory writings about Jews and other groups.

During the first seven months of the year, courts convicted 23 individuals of violence against members of religious, ethnic, racial, or other societal groups. Details on the incidents and their motivation were unavailable. As of August 1, there were no final court convictions for incitement of religious hatred.

MAZSIHISZ registered one incident of public expression of anti-Semitism by political party representatives and national or local government officials during the first six months of the year and the Action and Protection Foundation (TEV), an NGO monitoring and combating anti-Semitism in the country, reported two such cases. All the reported cases were connected to Jobbik Party members.

MAZSIHISZ reported that on January 11, Elod Novak (Jobbik Vice President and Member of Parliament) reacted to the international success of the domestic Holocaust movie production, the Son of Saul, on Facebook by criticizing the “Holocaust industry” and asking why more “national” topics were not turned into movies. On June 6, the president of Jobbik called on Novak to resign from his parliamentary seat, which he did effective August 31. Novak remained a member of Jobbik.

On July 31, the high commissioner of the national police ordered police protection of churches following the July 26 killing of a Catholic priest in France reportedly carried out in the name of ISIS. After inquiry into affected religious groups, on August 6, the Ministry of Interior informed the public of the increased police patrols around all religious buildings during masses and other religious services. The special protection measures remained in force at the end of the year.

On September 20, Zoltan Bolek, President of the HIC, sent a private letter to Prime Minister Orban, asking for protection against what he called the growing number of physical and verbal attacks and threats against Muslims. In the letter, Bolek said “the conflicting and irresponsible statements of many politicians and journalists” was the cause of public hatred against Muslims in the country. At year’s end, the prime minister had not responded to Bolek’s letter. Also in September The Bangkok Post newspaper quoted Bolek as saying, “…state media keeps putting out stories about anything a Muslim has done or is alleged to have done somewhere.”

Parliament again failed to amend those provisions of the religion law that the Constitutional Court had previously found unconstitutional, and the contested provisions remained in effect at the end of the year. On June 28, the ECHR awarded monetary damages to seven deregistered churches (four Buddhist groups, two Neopagan groups, and one Taoist group) which had been plaintiffs in a 2014 case in which the ECHR had ruled that parts of the religion law violated the plaintiffs’ freedom of association with respect to the freedom of religion. These groups had gone back to the ECHR in 2015 when they had been unable to reach a satisfactory settlement with the government. The government paid the ECHR-ordered total of 540,000 euros ($569,000) to the seven plaintiffs before the September 28 deadline. Each of the plaintiffs received amounts ranging between 40,000 and 140,000 euros ($42,100 to $147,000). In addition, the ECHR awarded two Jewish groups, plaintiffs in a case filed in 2012, 800 euros ($840) and instructed the two groups to split the award between them. The nine groups remained unincorporated.

The government and MET failed to reach a final settlement after the ECHR gave them another six months to reach an agreement. On June 16, the MET submitted its compensation claim of 450 million forints ($1.53 million) to the government for its losses in 2015 of the unpaid 1 percent personal income tax allocation for incorporated churches, the supplementary state subsidies for its social welfare and educational institutions, and the wage supplement for its staff working in its institutes. The parties failed to reach an agreement by the December 28 deadline. MET also continued its legal effort to gain access to financial subsidies for 2015 and 2016 at the Budapest Metropolitan Public Administration and Labor Court and at the Curia and to regain its lost incorporated church status at the Constitutional Court. Six cases involving MET were pending at year’s end.

On June 29, in a case involving the Brunstad Christian Church (Kereszteny Testveri Gyulekezet), the Constitutional Court repeated its July 2015 ruling (which had applied only to the case of the Budapest Autonomous Congregation) that the provision in the law requiring the length of operation (either 20 years domestically or 100 years internationally) of religious groups applying for incorporated status violated the European Convention on Human Rights. This Constitutional Court ruling applied only to the Brunstad Christian Church. Based on the Constitutional Court ruling, the Budapest Metropolitan Public Administration and Labor Court ordered the MHC to reconsider the Brunstad Christian Church’s application for incorporated church status, which it had previously rejected in 2014. By year’s end, the MHC had not reconsidered the Church’s application. At the end of the year, four other constitutional compliance cases involving the religion law were pending at the Constitutional Court.

Since 2013, out of the total of 29 applications for incorporated church status, the MHC rejected 15 cases and found 14 applicant groups eligible for incorporation and had moved their applications forward for parliamentary action. Despite the 60-day legal deadline for action on an MHC referral, parliament had not voted on any of the 14 applications. The MHC reported no religious groups submitted new applications for incorporated church status during the year.

On March 30, the Curia ruled that the Budapest Autonomous Congregation (BAC) could not gain automatic inclusion in the list of incorporated churches. The BAC, which had been seeking recognition as an incorporated church since losing its church status in 2011, had won favorable decisions in the Constitutional Court and the Budapest Metropolitan Public Administration and Labor Court, which the MHC had appealed to the Curia in 2014. According to the Curia’s ruling, the religious organization needed to complete the registration process for incorporated church status and obtain parliamentary approval of that status before it could be listed in the official state registry of incorporated churches. Two other cases filed by religious groups remained pending at the Curia at the end of the year. The Curia did not name the groups.

During the year, courts closed out the cases of 13 deregistered churches, which had no remaining assets for the government to liquidate. Seven such cases remained pending at the end of the year.

Many smaller congregations, mostly Christian but also Jewish and Buddhist, continued to struggle to survive following their deregistration and loss of state funding as a result of the 2011 religion law. “We are nearly dying,” said Mihaly Ungvari, a member of Church of God United Pentecostal, which had about 2,000 members. Ungvari stated the head of the Church had to take a second job and “many members had left for established churches.” A U.S. academic suggested the government was waging a war of attrition on religious groups through the religion law and said the government would win because it was not honoring the rule of law.

News website Politico reported in November that government spokesman Zoltan Kovacs stated the previous system of church subsidies existing prior to the 2011 religion law had been abused and needed to be “reined in.” He said, “It’s not about curtailing freedom of religion or curtailing freedom of worship in any way.” Politico cited Fidesz Member of Parliament Gergely Gulyas as blaming the opposition for failing to pass proposed amendments to the religion law in 2015, which would have created a three-tier system for religious groups. According to Politico, Gulyas said the government fully intended to amend the law to bring it in line with the decisions of the ECHR and the Constitutional Court.

The government continued to provide approximately 90 percent of its total financial support to the Roman Catholic Church, the Hungarian Reformed Church, the Lutheran Church, and the Jewish community, which it considered to be the country’s four “historical” religious groups, an unofficial designation by which the media also referred to these groups. The government did not specify how much it provided to each group.

The government provided 5.6 billion forints ($19.1 million) supplemental funding in fiscal year 2015 to match the 4.3 billion forints ($14.6 million) allocated by taxpayers as 1 percent of personal income tax to the 31 incorporated churches that requested listing on tax declaration forms. On the 2015 personal income tax return forms, 50 formerly recognized churches that became religious organizations received the allowed 1 percent tax contribution for their work as NGOs, with total contributions reaching 16.7 million forints ($56,900). During 2016, none of the 59 formerly recognized churches that were not yet registered as religious organizations succeeded in completing the necessary administrative court process for registration. These churches thus remained ineligible to receive the 1 percent tax donation for churches, which had a combined worth of 85 million forints ($289,000) for those churches in 2011 and 2012, the last two years they were eligible to receive such donations. The Budapest Municipal Court did not provide any information as to why none of the 59 formerly recognized churches were able to complete the registration process or how long the registration applications had been pending.

During the year, the government provided 46.2 billion forints ($157 million) to incorporated churches for a range of activities, including maintenance of buildings; support for religious instruction and culture; support for community programs and investments; and wages of church employees. The government allocated additional funding for churches providing public educational and social services. The government also provided a total of 121.7 million forints ($414,000) to religious organizations for operational costs of religious activities. The 46.2 billion forints in government support for incorporated churches included two billion forints ($6.8 million) in grants to a dozen churches for renovating their buildings and organizing community programs. Of the two billion forints, MAZSIHISZ received 31.2 million forints ($106,000); the Orthodox Jewish community 9.5 million forints ($32,300); and the Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation (EMIH) nine million forints ($30,700) for the renovation of their cemeteries and synagogues. In addition to the two billion forints, and as part of its 46.2 billion forint grant, the government gave the Orthodox Jewish community 603 million forints ($2.05 million) for schools, elderly homes, and synagogues.

On December 20, as a result of an unexpected budget surplus, the government awarded an additional one-time payment of 121 billion forints ($412 million) to 43 incorporated churches and religious organizations for various operational costs, which they received by the end of the year. The payments ranged from 1 million to 2.2 billion forints ($3,400 to $7.5 million), and were dispersed throughout various local units of the major denominations, as well as other religious organizations.

EMIH continued to criticize the system of an additional 1 percent in income tax allocations for incorporated churches on the basis of the lack of transparency and inability to verify the counting of individual taxpayers’ donation slips. On November 4, EMIH Rabbi Slomo Koves sent a letter to the minister of national economy in which he requested that individuals be able to voluntarily share their personal information with the incorporated church to which they allocated their tax donation.

The MHC continued to provide supplementary operational funding to three religious organizations maintaining schools: the MET, the Dzsaj Bhim Buddhist community, and the Christian Family Church Religious Association. During the year, the three groups received a total of 569 million forints ($1.94 million). The MHC reported that no other religious associations requested a supplementary subsidy during the year.

On November 23, upon the proposal of Mayor Laszlo Toroczkai (vice president of the Jobbik Party), the Council of Asotthalom, a village in Csongrad County, adopted a decree that banned public Muslim calls to prayer on the basis that they “disturbed public peace and generated fear” and banned wearing clothes that covered the full body (burqa, niqab, chador, and “burkini”). The HIC criticized the decree and appealed to the Constitutional Court to rescind it. On December 14, the Csongrad County government office declared the Asotthalom Council decree unlawful. On December 16, the ombudsman filed a petition with the Constitutional Court seeking the annulment of the decree on the basis that it violated freedom of religion and freedom of expression. The petition remained pending. Jobbik Party leader Gabor Vona publicly criticized the decree. The decree remained in effect at the end of the year.

On December 24, Jobbik Party leader Vona and party Spokesperson Adam Mirkoczy sent Hanukkah greetings to the EMIH, in which they wished the rabbi and his community “blessed, peaceful, and happy holidays.” On December 27, leading EMIH Rabbi Slomo Koves published a long response letter highlighting previous anti-Semitic statements made by Vona and his fellow party members and urged them to make such gestures in the same forums where they had previously spread hatred. On December 28, Vona responded in a Facebook post that he was surprised by Koves’ letter, which Vona said suggested Koves would have preferred not to receive a good wishes message from Jobbik. Vona said that in the previous year Jobbik had not made any anti-Semitic remarks and that “the party has emerged from adolescence… into responsible and constructive adulthood.” On the same day, the local chapter of Jobbik in the town of Vecses distanced itself from Vona’s Hanukkah greeting in another Facebook post. Subsequently, Vona said he had initiated ethical proceedings against the chapter’s leadership for what he said was a “sacrilegious” comment “completely contrary to Jobbik’s position.” Vona also stated that the ethical proceedings could have only one outcome, as “those who make such comments have to leave the party.”

The HIC reported several municipalities rejected their repeated requests to buy land for opening a new cemetery and stated they believed political reasons to be behind the refusal. According to HIC President Bolek, the existing Muslim cemetery in Budapest was expected to reach capacity by the end of the year and the community would have no place left to bury their dead.

Of elementary and secondary schools, 14.2 percent were operated by incorporated churches and 0.1 percent by religious organizations in the 2015-2016 school year. Of preschools (ages 3-7), 6.9 percent were operated by incorporated churches and 0.1 by religious organizations. Approximately 204,000 students studied at preschools and elementary and secondary schools operated by registered religious communities (incorporated churches and religious organizations), compared to 200,000 in 2014.

On February 24, the government initiated a national referendum on the following question: “Do you agree that the European Union should have the power to impose the compulsory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the parliament of Hungary?” Referring to the referendum in an interview with the news website Business Insider in February, Prime Minister Orban said, “If somebody takes masses of nonregistered immigrants from the Middle East into a country, this also means importing terrorism, criminalism [sic], anti-Semitism, and homophobia.” Preceding the October 2 referendum, the government conducted an intensive public campaign promoting a “no” response to the referendum via billboards and posters spread around the country featuring slogans such as “Forced settlement endangers our culture and traditions.” On the day of the referendum, the Associated Press cited Imam Tayseer Saleh of the Darussalam Mosque in Budapest as commenting, “We could say that this (referendum) campaign is against the migrants but in reality it is covertly against Islam, that’s how most people understood it.” Approximately 98 percent of participants voted no, but because the participation rate fell short of the minimum threshold of 50 percent of eligible voters required by law, the referendum was invalid.

Following the referendum, Prime Minister Orban led a ruling party effort to amend the constitution via a parliamentary vote to block the refugee quotas. On November 8, parliament fell just short of the two-thirds majority vote required to enact the amendment.

In connection with the migration crisis in Europe, the prime minister and other senior government officials stated the importance of defending the “Christian values of Europe” against the flow of Muslim migrants. In a national day speech on March 15, Prime Minister Orban said “… the masses of people coming from other civilizations pose a threat to our way of life…our Christian traditions.” Citing a need to oppose the immigration policies of the European Union, Orban added that “We shall not import … crime, terrorism, homophobia, and synagogue-burning anti-Semitism. There shall be no urban districts beyond the reach of the law, there shall be no … immigrant riots here, and there shall be no gangs hunting down our women and daughters.” In a speech in March the prime minister said about mass migration, “It is masquerading as a humanitarian cause, but its true nature is the occupation of territory.” On October 20, the German newspaper Passauer Neue Presse published an interview with Prime Minister Orban in which he said, “The civilization that stems from Christianity and the civilization that stems from Islam are not compatible. They cannot mingle, but can only exist side by side. … Our perceptions of the world are so different that they lead to parallel worlds. This is not a political issue, but the reality of life.”

On February 9, Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjen said at a town hall meeting in Salgotarjan prior to local elections, “Hungarians had protected Christian Europe” from Islamic conquest “with their own bodies for 150 years,” so Hungarians possessed a “historic right to keep our common sense” regarding migration.

On April 14, Janos Lazar, Minister of the Office of the Prime Minister, stated at a press conference, “Refugees entering Europe now are strongly anti-Semitic,” when describing his government’s decision to block the vast majority of asylum seekers from Syria and Iraq from entering the country.

On August 8, Bence Retvari, State Secretary of the Ministry of Human Capacities and Vice President of the governing coalition partner Christian Democratic Party (KDNP), stated in a newspaper interview, “In the Muslim narrative, migration is nothing else but the Islamization of Europe. Therefore the main question now is who integrates whom: whether those arriving will change the customs and way of life of the European people.”

On August 20, Gyorgy Schopflin, Fidesz Member of the European Parliament, said in an exchange on Twitter with human rights activists that a “pig’s head would deter more effectively” Muslim asylum seekers at the nation’s border.

Muslim groups and human rights organizations criticized the government for what they said was spreading anti-Muslim sentiment by portraying asylum seekers and migrants, most of whom were Muslim, as dangerous for Europe’s future and linking migration to terrorism.

On August 18, Zsolt Bayer received a state honor, the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Merit, from Minister of the Office of the Prime Minister Janos Lazar. Bayer received the award in part for his “exemplary work as a journalist.” Bayer worked as a columnist for the Hungarian daily Magyar Hirlap and an anchor for Echo TV, and was a founding member of the Fidesz Party. On April 4, the Israeli Ambassador sent a letter to the chief editor of Magyar Hirlap stating that a series of Bayer’s articles “openly advocate anti-Semitic sentiments and incite against the Jewish People and the State of Israel.” The Ambassador stated that Bayer’s articles “not only relativize the Shoah… but also make general and false accusations against the Hungarian Jews, as if they are to be blamed for the Hungarian tragedies.” On May 17, the Media Council, the state body responsible for regulating the media, imposed a fine on Magyar Hirlap and its website in connection with a Bayer article from 2015, which the council found promoted hatred and exclusion. According to the council, Bayer “described the community of migrants as a homogenous group… calling every member of this community above the age of 14 potential murderers.” More than 100 former state award recipients, including MAZSIHISZ President Andras Heisler, returned their decorations in protest, many citing Bayer’s anti-Semitic writings and other work inciting hatred against various groups. On August 25, Minister Lazar rejected calls to withdraw Bayer’s award and stated that certain aspects of his work, especially his coverage of those who were imprisoned and perished in Soviet gulags, merited state recognition.

Senior government officials continued to state their concerns about a “Jewish Hungarian American businessman.” The officials reported his activism to be supporting the flow of migrants by financing NGOs assisting migrants, and said his intention was to weaken the government’s power by gaining political influence via the human rights NGOs he had been supporting financially. On May 20, Prime Minister Orban stated in a radio interview that the Hungarian opposition was less powerful than the political influence of organizations funded by this individual. On June 6 in parliament, Orban stated that “certain international forces were working to bring in as many migrants as possible into the EU, including Hungary.” He said anyone who financed this inflow was acting against the country’s national interests. Jewish organizations stated the government’s political attacks against this individual were disguised anti-Semitism.

On June 24, Sandor Szakaly – Director of the government history research foundation, Veritas Institute – gave an interview in which he described the 1920 Numerus Clausus law as an act of limitation, instead of deprivation, of rights of the Jewish people, while ensuring opportunities for others. Szakaly argued that the law, which limited the number of students who could study at a university, did not use the term Jew, but instead prescribed that the representation of any race or nationality at universities should not exceed that group’s overall ratio in the country. Szakaly also denied that the Numerus Clausus had connections to Auschwitz and said neither the vast majority of Jews, nor of Hungarians knew what would happen to those deported. On June 27, MAZSIHISZ issued a public condemnation of Szakaly’s statement on the Numerus Clausus law and urged the government to clarify its position on the matter. On June 29, Fidesz Party Vice President Gergely Gulyas, referring to Szakaly’s statement, declared that laws passed on racial grounds were irreconcilable with the rule of law. At a June 29 meeting, Deputy Minister at the Office of the Prime Minister Nandor Csepreghy, speaking on behalf of his minister, disassociated the government from Szakaly’s June 24 statements.

On March 30, the Debrecen Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of Tibor Agoston, Jobbik representative on the Debrecen city council, for violating the law banning public denial of the crimes committed by National Socialist or Communist regimes. The court ruling imposed a fine of 750,000 forints ($2,600) on Agoston for referring to the Holocaust as a “Holoscam” at a gathering in 2014.

On May 23, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (ombudsman) released a report within the framework of the National Preventive Mechanism of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT) on an unannounced site inspection in the Somogy County Prison in Kaposvar. The report criticized the practice of ordering prisoners to undress in groups in the prison’s chapel in order to conduct full body searches, including of the genitals. The report concluded this practice was in violation of the constitutionally provided right to religious freedom because the chapel was a site for religious practice and should be protected from desecration and “scandalous behavior.”

On September 29, the HIC filed a police report for incitement and violence against a community in connection with flyers and pamphlets distributed in the city of Veszprem. According to the HIC, flyers titled “Notes on Islam” and a pamphlet titled “The Whole World is Asking Why the Muslim-Migrant Terrorists are so Eager to Commit Suicide?” generated fear within the Muslim community. The flyer stated “Jihad is the inalienable part of Islam… every tool is acceptable for Jihad: including … mass murder.” The flyer was signed by the Veszprem chapter of the Christian Democratic People’s Party and the Archbishop of Veszprem. On October 7, the Veszprem Police Headquarters rejected the HIC complaint because it said no crime had been committed.

In October the government formed a new deputy state secretariat in the MHC with responsibility for monitoring and combating persecution of Christians worldwide, to raise broad public awareness of the issue, and to maintain contact with subject matter experts and think tanks. The government pledged 3 million Euros ($3.2 million) in humanitarian assistance to help Christians facing violence and oppression around the world.

The government’s plan to establish a new Holocaust museum, the House of Fates, remained pending, and no new action was taken during the year. In July the Office of the Prime Minister reiterated the need for support from the Jewish community and Holocaust survivors, and stated that without that support the museum would not be built. By year’s end, the government had spent 7.5 billion forints ($25.6 million) on the project and completed the physical infrastructure of the museum.

A total of 18,706 schoolchildren visited the Hungarian Holocaust Memorial Center (HDKE), compared with 16,934 the previous year. The government reimbursed the travel expenses of school groups arriving by train to visit the center.

The Jewish Community Roundtable Educational Expert Group (ZSKK) – an ad hoc alliance of 18 Jewish organizations – reported it concluded the first phase of its collaboration with the government aimed at adjusting educational materials to contain more information about Israel and to more prominently feature the role of Jews in the country’s history and culture. According to the ZSKK, the government incorporated approximately 70 percent of its recommendations for the fifth and ninth grade textbooks, and discussions on the remaining grades continued.

On July 14, the eight Fidesz members (including the mayor) and four opposition members of the city council of Vac voted to change the name of a street named after Balint Homan. Only the local Jobbik representative rejected the initiative. Homan was minister of religion and education between 1932 and 1942, a member of parliament during the Nazi Arrow Cross party’s rule in 1944, a cosponsor of legislation that stripped Hungarian Jews of their citizenship rights, and an advocate for the deportation of Hungarian Jews in 1944.

The government hosted three intergovernmental roundtable discussions with representatives of the Jewish community during which the community members discussed current issues of importance with relevant cabinet members and other senior government officials. At the roundtable discussions, Minister of the Office of the Prime Minister Lazar discussed renovation of Jewish cemeteries, cultural programs, the national education curriculum, and the archives of personal documentation connected to restitution for the Holocaust.

On March 30, Minister of Human Capacities Zoltan Balog gave remarks at a conference marking the centenary of the nation’s official recognition of Islam. Balog stated at the conference, “ we are at war, but not with Islam as a religion, a culture or community; we are at war with those who organize forces from the community of Islam by stealth and want to keep them fearful and change them forever and occupy Europe in the name of Islam.”

On June 7 and 8, the MHC and the national commission for UNESCO held the third interreligious dialogue conference “Common Reflection on our Future – Conference on the Unity of Man and the Environment” in the Benedictine Abbey of Tihany. At the conference, Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, and Society for Krishna Consciousness representatives participated in panel discussions aimed at fostering interfaith dialogue on various societal challenges.

On April 15, Minister of Human Capacities Balog gave remarks in the Kozma street Jewish cemetery at an ecumenical burial service for the remains of people killed in 1944. The minister said in his speech, “the occupying forces [Nazi Germany] and Hungarian state organs jointly destroyed … innocent Jewish lives.” Representatives of the Catholic and Lutheran Churches also gave remarks at the burial ceremony. On May 21, at a conference of B’nai B’rith in Budapest, State Secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister and International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) Chair Szabolcs Takacs described the nation’s involvement in the Holocaust as an act of treason and reiterated that manifestations of anti-Semitism would not be tolerated.

On March 8, the government completed its year-long chairmanship of the IHRA. Outgoing IHRA Chair Takacs cited the increase of IHRA’s visibility during the year and the group’s success in exempting Holocaust archives from the EU’s new data protection regulation, thereby making them more accessible.

The government provided 400 million forints ($1.36 million) for the MTK sport club to sponsor Hungary’s successful bid to host the 2019 European Maccabi Games, the largest European competition of Jewish athletes.

The number of physical and verbal anti-Muslim incidents increased, while the level of anti-Semitic incidents remained largely unchanged compared to the previous year, according to the accounts of the respective communities. Muslim leaders attributed the increase in incidents against them largely to government rhetoric. Incidents against the two groups included assault, discriminatory treatment, hate speech, and vandalism. Jewish community representatives and other civil society groups heavily criticized the erection of a bust honoring wartime member of parliament Gyorgy Donath in Budapest; the group responsible removed the statue from its site two days later in response to the negative public reaction.

MAZSIHISZ registered 19 incidents of anti-Semitism (one killing, seven threats of violence, five incidents of hate speech, four political statements of anti-Semitism, and two incidents of vandalism), during the first six months of the year. It reported 46 anti-Semitic incidents for all of 2015. TEV registered 48 acts of anti-Semitism during the year, but no cases of physical assault, compared to 52 anti-Semitic incidents in 2015, including 2 cases of physical abuse.

While they did not keep statistics, the Muslim community reported a continued increase in anti-Muslim public sentiment. Muslim leaders said public hostility toward the community stemmed largely from the anti-Muslim rhetoric of senior government officials, including a state-sponsored antimigrant campaign, and some media outlets.

According to the HIC, individuals physically attacked four women wearing headscarves in separate incidents. The HIC president reported that perpetrators pulled on the headscarves but did not injure the women. In one case, a man threatened and pulled the hair and the clothes of a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf at a gasoline station in Orbottyan on September 27. The woman reported the incident to the police. Police characterized the incident as “rowdyism” and on October 12, said they had initiated a procedure for an “administrative offense,” which remained pending at year’s end.

Muslim community leaders reported Muslim women wearing headscarves were spat upon or verbally harassed daily, but they generally did not report these incidents to the police because the latter did not respond sympathetically to such complaints. The Bangkok Postnewspaper in September quoted Muslim converts as saying they were verbally harassed “all the time.” One reported she was “knocked off a bicycle by a driver who said, ‘Why don’t you go back to the desert!’” According to the article, groups representing the Muslim community said discrimination and expressions of racial hatred were on the rise. HIC President Bolek said, “The coded message is that migrants … Muslims are terrorists or criminals.”

On October 9, staff members in Budapest’s Szechenyi Baths asked two female swimmers wearing “burkinis” to change their clothes to other swimsuits after a visitor complained to the staff. The staff members cited house rules prohibiting swimsuits from reaching below the knee or above the shoulder, which they said was for health reasons, and offered alternative swimsuits for rental on site. Reportedly, the two women chose to leave the site rather than change their clothing.

The TEV continued to provide legal counseling and representation for victims of anti-Semitic incidents. The TEV filed 13 new complaints of anti-Semitic incidents, 11 for Holocaust denial and two for incitement of hatred against a community. Of the 13 cases, authorities rejected one, terminated two after finding there was no crime committed, and temporarily suspended four. Six cases remained pending with investigators. During the year, the courts issued rulings in four Holocaust denial cases initiated by the TEV in previous years.

MAZSIHISZ reported the killing of an Israeli tourist on April 22 in Tiszakecske. Police investigating the man’s disappearance found his body in an abandoned house in the woods; his money and cellphone were missing. Police arrested two men as homicide suspects who confessed to the killing. Police cited no evidence indicating a religious motivation. The case remained pending at year’s end.

On February 17, the Kaposvar regional court convicted a man for violating the law banning public denial of the crimes committed by National Socialist or Communist regimes. Following a 2014 report by the TEV, the court imposed a fine of 150,000 forints ($510) for posting a comment on Facebook stating “there was no Holocaust” and referring to the Holocaust as a “Holoscam” in a Facebook post in August 2014.

On February 6, the Uj Magyar Garda (New Hungarian Guard), the 64 Counties Youth Movement, Betyarsereg (Army of Outlaws), and other nationalist groups gathered in Szekesfehervar to pay tribute to the German and Hungarian soldiers who attempted to break out of Buda Castle in 1945 while surrounded by Soviet forces. On February 9, MAZSIHISZ President Heisler wrote Interior Minister Sandor Pinter, asking how a neo-Nazi rally could have been permitted to take place openly in Szekesfehervar. On February 8, the Fejer County police initiated a criminal proceeding against a participant in the February 6 rally on charges of displaying banned symbols of tyranny for wearing a World War II military uniform with the symbol of the Nazi SS. On March 10, the Szekesfehervar District Court ruled in the indictment put forward by the Szekesfehervar district prosecutor’s office in a fast-track procedure against the man and sentenced him to one year of parole. On October 25, the Second Instance Szekesfehervar Regional Court upheld the first instance ruling. On June 5, the Szekesfehervar district prosecutor’s office pressed charges in the Szekesfehervar District Court against another participant in the February 6 rally for public denial of National Socialist crimes, which remained pending.

On February 12, upon the initiative of Mayor Andras Cserpalkovics (a Fidesz member) the City Council of Szekesfehervar adopted a decree condemning the February 6 event and expressing solidarity with those who felt “hurt and frightened” by the program. The decree also stated that any programs aiming to incite hatred against particular social groups were not welcome in the city and urged state authorities to take all possible legal actions to prevent such events in the future.

On February 24, the Community of the Politically Convicted (CPC), an NGO that commemorates the victims of communism, unveiled a bust of wartime parliament member Gyorgy Donath (1939-1944), a supporter of anti-Jewish legislation who was executed by the communist government in 1947. Several Jewish organizations and other NGOs protested the statue, located a few blocks from the HDKE. The district mayor’s office posted an invitation to the unveiling ceremony on its official website, and governing party officials had been scheduled to speak at the event. Following the protests, the CPC cancelled the unveiling ceremony and removed the statue two days later.

In an interview with the newspaper Lokal published on July 28, HIC Deputy President Istvan Toth denounced terrorist attacks committed in Europe and rejected that “they have anything to do with Islam,” adding that the Quran said Muslims should not commit murder.

On September 16, at a World Zionist Congress conference in Budapest, MAZSIHISZ President Heisler said, “We firmly believe that interspersing issues of anti-Semitism with the current European migration crisis in an unreflecting way is, in many ways, manipulative and deceptive…The teachings of our faith and the experience of history warn Jews to stand against all forms of hate speech. Hatred against …Christians …Muslim or other refugees is just as unacceptable for us as it is when directed against Jews.”

During the first nine months of the year, the police registered 542 cases of vandalism of religious properties. The police did not provide a breakdown of incidents by religious group targeted or other details.

On February 29, a menorah was sawn off and stolen from the Holocaust memorial in Zalaegerszeg, a loss with an estimated cost of 200,000 forints ($680). MAZSIHISZ reported that “it is possible that the vandalism may be motivated by the collection of scrap metal rather than anti-Semitism.”

On April 21, vandals painted a cross turned upside down and a swastika on the Grand Reformed (Calvinist) Church in Debrecen, the city’s most prominent building. Debrecen police launched an investigation. Mayor Laszlo Papp (a Fidesz member) condemned the act and stated Debrecen was proud that religious denominations carried on their activity in harmony.

On September 9, the Living Memorial, an unofficial, ad hoc collection of memorabilia in Budapest’s Liberty Square commemorating the country’s 600,000 Holocaust victims, was vandalized. The perpetrators tore up photographs and destroyed or stole items left at the memorial. The destroyed and stolen items had only symbolic value, according to the Living Memorial group. The group filed a police report on the same day, but police closed the investigation for what they said was “lack of a crime.”

On April 19, the TEV published its 2015 annual report on domestic anti-Semitism based on a survey conducted by the Median Opinion and Market Research Institute. The report concluded that, accounting for both cognitive (receptivity to stereotypes, misconceptions, conspiracy theories) and affective anti-Semitism (emotional rejection of the Jews), 35 percent of citizens harbored anti-Semitic views. The percent of extreme anti-Semites had grown from 21 percent in 2014 to 23 percent in 2015; while the percent of those with moderately anti-Semitic views increased from 10 percent (2014) to 12 percent (2015). With respect to Holocaust denial, 11 percent of respondents said there were no gas chambers in the concentration camps, 19 percent said Jews had “made up” a large part of the history of the Holocaust, and 23 percent said the number of Jewish victims was much less than generally stated. According to the survey, Holocaust denial had increased since 2006, when 7 percent of survey respondents said there were no gas chambers in concentration camps.

On March 24, the Nezopont Institute, a think tank, released the results of its phone survey of 1,000 people on domestic attitudes toward Islam. It found 64 percent of respondents believed terrorism was more characteristic of Muslims than others, 73 percent that Muslims who arrived on the continent in recent years could not integrate into European societies, 78 percent that Islam oppressed women, 64 percent that Islam was a threat to European societies, and 57 percent that Islam could not be reconciled with the European way of life, while 56 percent feared that Muslims could become the majority in Europe.

The EMIH completed the full renovation of the synagogue and rabbinical center in Mad for which the government contributed 31.1 million forints ($106,000). The center featured an exhibit presenting the history of Jewish life in the region.

Christian churches and the Jewish community continued to organize events under the auspices of the Christian-Jewish Society, an NGO, and brought together religious scholars for discussions. The society organized approximately 30 lectures and cultural events on Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and promoted religious tolerance and mutual understanding. On May 23, the society organized an interfaith conference at the Church of the Great Saint Teresa of Avila in Budapest, which featured Catholic Bishop Lajos Varga, Rabbi Gabor Finali, Abdul-Fattah Munif from the Organization of Muslims in Hungary, Matyas Mero from the Hungarian Society for Krishna Consciousness, Jeno Szigeti from the Adventist School of Theology, and Jozsef Szecsi from the Christian-Jewish Society.

In numerous meetings with government officials, including cabinet ministers, state secretaries and deputy state secretaries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Office of the Prime Minister, and MHC, the Ambassador and other U.S. embassy representatives continued to advocate for religious freedom and to urge reconsideration of the religion law to amend those provisions that resulted in discrimination against minority religious groups. U.S. officials voiced concerns regarding the government’s anti-Islamic rhetoric, and at various meetings with senior government officials the Ambassador strongly criticized the issuance of a state award to Zsolt Bayer.

On January 27, President Obama cited the country in remarks delivered on International Holocaust Remembrance Day at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C. The President referenced the 2015 plans to erect a statue of Balint Homan in Szekesfehervar when he said, “when a statue of an anti-Semitic leader from World War II was planned in Hungary, we led the charge to convince their government to reverse course.”

On September 6, the U.S. ambassador to the UN raised concerns regarding the level of anti-Semitism in Hungary at a UN forum devoted to anti-Semitism. The ambassador noted in her speech the granting of a state award to “virulent anti-Semitic columnist Zsolt Bayer took place amidst growing anti-Semitism.” She also remarked that the Hungarian prime minister was “barring Muslim refugees who seek sanctuary from mass atrocities and persecution,” and had “fanned popular fears by claiming that all terrorists in Europe are migrants.”

Also in September the Ambassador’s keynote address to the Hungarian Journalists’ Association’s National Press Day event stressed the responsibility of all to speak out to counter racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic hate speech.

On May 26, the visiting Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights met with representatives of the Muslim community, the Catholic and Reformed Churches, and the Reform Jewish community and discussed with them the state of religious freedom, growing anti-Muslim sentiment and harassment, and the government’s antimigrant messaging campaign. On May 27, the Under Secretary met with representatives of the three incorporated Jewish communities. She discussed their concerns regarding local anti-Semitism and the level of cooperation with the government, and encouraged the groups to form broader coalitions to resist discrimination.

On September 22, visiting State Department officials met with representatives of the three incorporated Jewish communities and discussed their concerns about anti-Semitism and the level of cooperation with each other and with the government. On September 23, the embassy hosted a meeting for these officials with the rector of Pazmany Peter Catholic University and representatives of the MHC, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, and a Reform Jewish congregation to discuss the religion law. Participants discussed the 2014 ECHR ruling and subsequent governmental actions to redraft the religion law, which parliament failed to enact in 2015. The visiting officials also met with representatives from the Muslim community, with whom they discussed the rise of anti-Islamic sentiment in the country, including harassment faced by Muslim women, hate speech on the internet, and what the Muslim representatives said was the failure of law enforcement to act when hate crimes were reported. In meetings with the head of the MET and the head of the Faith Congregation, the State Department and embassy officials discussed the religion law, including the 2011 mass deregistration and government compensation for deregistered churches.

Embassy and visiting State Department officials met with representatives of the Jewish communities and Jewish youth NGOs to discuss anti-Semitism and the challenges of promoting tolerance education and historical truth.

Embassy officers met regularly with leaders of religious organizations to discuss the effects of the 2011 religion law, including MET, the HIC and the Faith Congregation. Embassy staff maintained contact with the country’s diverse Jewish community to discuss issues related to its legal status and relationship with the government, anti-Semitism, restitution issues, and commemoration of the Holocaust.

On February 4, the Ambassador hosted an “ecumenical breakfast” in the spirit of the annual National Prayer Breakfast attended by the President of the United States every year. Leaders of the Catholic, Hungarian Reformed, and Lutheran Churches joined the breakfast along with representatives of the Jewish, Buddhist, Muslim, evangelical Christian, and Baptist communities, and noted the event was the first such interfaith gathering to which they had been invited. The main focus of discussion during the breakfast was the situation of religious freedom and the separation of state and religion in the country. Several religious leaders who attended the breakfast later informed embassy officials that their relations with some other participating churches significantly improved as a result of the event.

On March 30, the Ambassador gave remarks at the centennial ceremony of the official recognition of Islam in the country. She offered support to the Muslim community just after the March 22 bombings in Brussels, saying, “As an embassy, one of our primary goals is to promote tolerance for minorities in Hungary. In pursuit of that goal, the United States stands steadfastly with Hungary’s Islamic community against all forms of Islamophobia.” Deputy State Secretary Laszlo Hegyi of the Ministry of Human Capacities also gave remarks at the event.

On April 22, the Ambassador participated at a Seder organized by the Bet Orim Reform Jewish community to express her support for the group’s struggle to regain its lost legal status and gave remarks supporting religious freedom.

On August 4, the Ambassador gave remarks at a ceremony to commemorate the birthday of Raoul Wallenberg. In her remarks, the Ambassador drew parallels between Wallenberg’s heroism in the face of the Holocaust and the country’s current challenges. “When somebody is victimized, whether they are a migrant …Jew, or anyone else, we all have the moral responsibility to stand up against their victimization. This is never easy, and sometimes it comes at great cost.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade State Secretary for Cultural Diplomacy Istvan Ijgyarto and Jakab Istvan, Deputy Speaker of Parliament and Fidesz MP, also gave remarks at the event.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 336,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the government national statistical institute, approximately 71.6 percent of the population belongs to the ELC, and 5.8 percent belongs to Lutheran Free Churches. Approximately 16.9 percent of the population belongs to other religious as well as “life-stance” groups. The largest non-Lutheran group is the Roman Catholic Church, with 3.7 percent of the population, of which 80 percent is foreign born, mostly from Poland, other European countries, and the Philippines. Approximately 5.8 percent do not identify with any religious or life-stance group. The Association of Muslims in Iceland estimates there are 1,000 to 1,500 Muslims. The Jewish community reports there are approximately 100 Jews.

Legal Framework

The constitution states all individuals have the right to form religious associations and practice religion in accordance with their personal beliefs, as long as nothing is “preached or practiced which is prejudicial to good morals or public order.” It stipulates everyone has the right to remain outside religious associations and no one shall be required to pay personal dues to any religious association of which he or she is not a member. The constitution also specifies individuals may not lose their civil or national rights or refuse to perform civic duties on religious grounds. The constitution bans only religious teachings or practices harmful to good morals or the public order. The law further specifies the right of individuals to choose or change their religion.

The official state religion is Lutheranism. The constitution establishes the ELC as the national church and grants it state support and protection. The law grants the ELC official legal status, and the government directly funds the Church from the state budget. The ELC also receives indirect funding along with other registered religious and life-stance groups from church taxes.

The penal code establishes fines and up to two years’ imprisonment for hate speech, including mocking, defaming, denigrating, or threatening an individual or group by comments, pictures, or symbols based on religion.

Religious groups other than the ELC and life-stance organizations apply for recognition and registration to a district commissioner’s office (at present, designated as the District Commissioner of Northeast Iceland), who forwards the application to a four-member panel, whom the minister of the interior appoints by law, to review applications. A university faculty of law nominates the chairman of the panel, and the University of Iceland’s Departments of Social and Human Sciences, Theology and Religious Studies, and History and Philosophy, respectively, nominate the other three members. The district commissioner then approves or rejects the application in accordance with the panel’s decision. Applicants may appeal rejections to the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). The applicant may resubmit his/her application, and if the resubmission provides new information, the district commissioner will review it again. To register, a religious group must “practice a creed or religion” and a life-stance organization must operate in accordance with certain ethical values, and “deal with ethics or epistemology in a prescribed manner.” The law does not define “certain ethical values” or the prescribed manner in which groups must deal with ethics or epistemology. Religious groups and life-stance organizations must also “be well established;” “be active and stable;” “not have a purpose that violates the law or is prejudicial to good morals or public order;” and have “a core group of members who participate in its operations, support the values of the organization in compliance with the teachings it was founded on, and pay church taxes in accordance with the law on church taxes.” The law does not define “well established” or “active and stable.”

The law specifies the leader of a religious group or a life-stance organization must be at least 25 years old and fulfill the general requirements for holding a public position. These include being physically and mentally healthy and financially independent, not having been sentenced for a criminal offense as a civil servant, and having the general and specialized education legally required for the position. Unlike the requirements for most public positions, the religious or life-stance group leader need not be a citizen, but he or she must have legal domicile in the country. All registered religious groups and life-stance organizations must submit an annual report to a district commissioner’s office (the government has designated the District Commissioner of Northeast Iceland) describing the group’s operations during the previous year. Religious groups and life-stance organizations are required to perform state sanctioned functions such as marriages and the official naming of children and also preside over other ceremonies such as funerals. The law places no restrictions or requirements on unregistered religious groups or on their right to own property, but they may not carry out legally recognized ceremonies such as marriages or receive state funds.

The law provides state subsidies to registered religious groups and life-stance organizations. For each individual 16 years of age and older who belongs to any one of the officially registered and recognized religious groups and life-stance organizations, the government allocates an annual payment of 10,776 kronur (ISK) ($95) out of income taxes, called the “church tax,” to the individual’s respective organization.

By law a child’s affiliation, or nonaffiliation, with a registered religious or life-stance group is as follows: (1) if the parents are married or in registered cohabitation and both belong to either the same registered organization or no organization, then the child’s affiliation shall be the same as its parents; (2) if the parents are married or in registered cohabitation, but have different affiliations or if one parent is nonaffiliated, then the parents shall make a joint decision on what organization, if any, the child should be affiliated with; until the parents make this decision, the child shall remain nonaffiliated; (3) if the parents are not married or in registered cohabitation when the child is born, the child shall be affiliated with the same registered organization, if any, as the parent who has custody over the child. Change in affiliation of children under age 16 requires the consent of both parents if both have custody; if only one parent has custody, the consent of the noncustodial parent is not required. The law requires parents to consult their children about any changes in the child’s affiliation between age 12 and 16. After turning 16, children may choose affiliation on their own.

By law, “learning and teaching objectives and the manner of operation of compulsory schools shall be such as to prevent discrimination” on the basis of religion. Grades one through 10 (ages six-15) in public and private schools must provide instruction in social studies, which includes subjects such as Christianity, ethics, and theology. Regular staff teachers teach these classes. The law also mandates that “the Christian heritage of Icelandic culture, equality, responsibility, concern, tolerance, and respect for human value” shape general teaching practices. The compulsory curriculum for Christianity, ethics, and theology takes a multicultural approach to religious education and emphasizes teaching a variety of beliefs.

Parents wishing to exempt pupils from compulsory instruction in Christianity, ethics, and theology must submit a written application to the school principal. The principal may request additional information, if necessary. The principal then registers the application as a “special case” and writes an official response to the parents, accepting or denying the request. School authorities are not required to offer other religious or secular instruction in place of these classes.

Of the 12 largest municipalities in the country, eight have adopted guidelines or rules governing the interaction between schools and religious/life-stance groups. The Reykjavik City Council prohibits religious and life-stance groups from conducting any activities, including the distribution of proselytizing material, in municipal preschools and compulsory schools (grades one through 10) during school hours or during afterschool programs. Reykjavik school administrators, however, may invite the representatives of religious and life-stance groups to visit the compulsory classes on Christianity, ethics, and theology, and on life skills. These visits must be under the guidance of a teacher and in accordance with the curriculum. Any student visits to the gathering places of religious and life-stance groups during school hours must be under the guidance of a teacher as part of a class on religion and life-stance views. During such classes or visits, students may only observe rituals, not participate in them. The municipality of Hafnarfjordur has similar rules governing the interaction between schools and religious/life-stance organizations. The other six municipalities have either adopted or adapted guidelines on these interactions that the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture has set. The ministry’s guidelines are broadly similar to those of Reykjavik and Hafnarfjordur.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Three groups submitted registration applications during the year. Two groups, the Society of Tibetan Buddhists and the Islamic Foundation of Iceland, applied as religious organizations. The third group, DiaMat, applied as a life-stance organization. The office of the district commissioner of Northeast Iceland approved the application of DiaMat in November but had not issued a decision on the other two applications by the end of the year. In February the district commissioner’s office rejected the 2015 application of Ananda Marga as a life-stance organization on grounds that it was not “well established,” did not sufficiently explain how it would perform state-sanctioned functions, and it provided insufficient information about those responsible for the group. At Ananda Marga’s request, the district commissioner’s office reviewed the application a second time, but said the group did not provide the necessary information in order for the district commissioner’s office to complete its review. In February the district commissioner’s office also rejected the 2015 application of the Rastafarian religious group as a religious organization because it was not “well established.”

In February the Supreme Court upheld a district court’s ruling that Akureyri school officials had illegally dismissed a grade school teacher in 2012 after parents of students complained about his personal blog that year. In the blog, the teacher had highlighted what he considered to be justification in the Bible for his views against homosexuality. The mayor of Akureyri had stated that the school had dismissed the teacher based on his job performance and not because of the expression of his religious beliefs. The teacher was not reinstated.

According to government policy, individuals who applied for a passport at a district commissioner’s office needed to present proof of religion from a religious organization if they wished to receive an exemption on religious grounds allowing them to wear a head covering for their passport photographs.

During the year, the government provided the ELC with approximately ISK 6.04 billion ($53.5 million), consisting of direct subsidies from the state budget as well as indirect funding from church taxes. The church tax also provided a total of ISK 410.5 million ($3.6 million) to the other 44 recognized religious and life-stance groups. The ELC operated all cemeteries, and all religious and life-stance groups had equal access to them. At least one cemetery had a special area designated for burials of Muslims and people of other faiths. The ELC and the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the state-owned University of Iceland had a cooperative agreement on training theology students for positions within the ELC.

The state directly paid the salaries of the 135 ministers (including three bishops) in the ELC, who were considered public servants under the MOI. State radio broadcast Lutheran worship services every Sunday morning as well as a daily morning devotion.

In January, following the preparation of a report by the Reykjavik City human rights office on what rules applied to foreign financial contributions to the planned construction of a mosque in Reykjavik, the Reykjavik City Executive Committee advised parliament that religious organizations did not have a legal obligation to disclose the sources of funding for their houses of worship. The city’s executive committee, however, passed another nonbinding motion requesting that religious organizations reveal their sources of funding.

In April authorities prosecuted Sturla Thordarson and an unnamed woman, who in 2014 had posted comments online about the prospective construction of a mosque in Reykjavik. In their comments, the two individuals had called for the chairman of the Association of Muslims in Iceland and other Muslims to be killed. The trial began in December and was ongoing at year’s end.

In October Market and Media Research, a well known market research company, conducted an online survey about public attitudes towards the construction of houses of worship. The company emailed an invitation to participate in the survey to a portion of its pool of volunteer respondents assembled from the country’s national registry, resulting in responses from 985 individuals. The poll showed 42.1 percent of the respondents opposed the erection of a mosque while 32.4 percent were in favor. The same poll registered 28.5 percent of respondents as being against the building of a Russian Orthodox church, while 35.5 percent approved of it; 20.6 percent disapproved of the building of a Buddhist temple, while 41.4 percent were in favor; and 12.1 percent opposed the construction of a pagan temple, while 54.4 percent approved. The poll also showed that 11.2 percent disapproved of the building of additional ELC churches, while 62.2 percent approved.

The Forum for Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation, whose membership consisted of a large number of registered religious groups, including the ELC, Muslim, Buddhist, and Protestant, Catholic, and other Christian groups, continued to meet every two months. The forum celebrated its 10th anniversary by organizing an open meeting on November 24, where the topic of the keynote speech was “The Value of Religion in Modern Society in Iceland and Abroad – Positive and Negative Perspectives.” The forum’s stated goal was to foster dialogue and strengthen links between religious groups and life-stance organizations. Any registered religious or life-stance group could join, as well as unregistered religious and life-stance groups approved by pre-existing members. No life-stance groups had joined the forum at year’s end.

An ELC minister served immigrant communities and helped recent arrivals of all religious groups integrate into society. Clergy from other religions were free to serve immigrant communities on an informal and voluntary basis.

U.S. embassy representatives regularly engaged with officials from the MOI, who agreed on the importance of respecting religious freedom. Embassy officials also met with representatives of a broad spectrum of religious organizations, including the ELC, the Association of Muslims in Iceland, the Islamic Foundation of Iceland, as well as nongovernmental organizations such as the Icelandic Human Rights Center to discuss the importance of religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.3 billion (July 2016 estimate). According to India’s 2011 census, the most recent year for which disaggregated figures are available, Hindus constitute 79.8 percent of the population, Muslims 14.2 percent, Christians 2.3 percent, and Sikhs 1.7 percent. Groups that together constitute less than 1 percent of the population include Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians (Parsis), Jews, and Bahais. The Ministry of Tribal Affairs officially classifies the more than 104 million members of Scheduled Tribes – indigenous groups historically outside the caste system who often practice animism and indigenous religious beliefs – as Hindus in government statistics.

According to the same government estimates, there are large, minority Muslim populations in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Telangana, Karnataka, and Kerala; Muslims constitute 68.3 percent of the population in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the only state in which they constitute a majority of the population. Slightly more than 85 percent of Muslims are Sunni; most of the rest are Shia. Christian populations are found across the country but in greater concentrations in the northeast, as well as in the southern states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Goa. Three small northeastern states have large Christian majorities: Nagaland (90 percent), Mizoram (87 percent), and Meghalaya (70 percent). Sikhs constitute 54 percent of Punjab’s population, with an estimated 16 million members according to the 2011 census. The Dalai Lama’s office estimates there are significant resettled Tibetan Buddhist communities in Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Uttarakhand, and Delhi. In a 2009 parliamentary report, the MHA estimated the total number of Tibetan Buddhists in India to be 110,000.

Legal Framework

Subject to considerations of public order, morality, and health, the constitution provides for freedom of conscience and the right of all individuals to profess, practice, and propagate religion freely, and mandates a secular state. It prohibits government discrimination on the basis of religion, including with regard to employment, as well as any religion-based restrictions on individuals’ access to public or private facilities or establishments open to the general public. The constitution states religious groups have the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, manage their own affairs in religious matters, and own, acquire, and administer property. It prohibits compelling anyone to pay taxes to promote or maintain any specific religion. National and state laws make freedom of religion “subject to public order, morality, and health.” The constitution stipulates that the state shall endeavor to create a uniform civil code applicable to members of all religions across India.

There are laws restricting religious conversion in seven of the 29 states: Arunachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan. Six of these states enforce the laws; there is no implementing legislation for the anticonversion law in Arunachal Pradesh. Gujarat mandates prior permission from the district magistrate for any form of conversion and punishes forced conversions with up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine up to 50,000 rupees ($751). Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh prohibit religious conversion by the use of “force,” “allurement,” or “fraudulent means” and require district authorities be informed of any conversions one month in advance. Violators are subject to fines and other penalties, including prison sentences of up to three years in Chhattisgarh and up to four years in Madhya Pradesh if the converts are minors, women, or members of government-designated, historically disadvantaged groups (known as Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes). According to the Supreme Court, converting from Hinduism to another religion ordinarily “operates as an expulsion from the caste” since caste is a function of Hindu society, and members of that society determine caste affiliation. Societal definitions of caste affiliation are determinative of a person’s eligibility for government benefits based on caste.

Himachal Pradesh and Odisha maintain similar prohibitions against conversion through force, inducement, or fraud and bar individuals from abetting such conversions. In Himachal Pradesh, penalties are up to two years’ imprisonment and/or fines of 25,000 rupees ($375). Punishments for conversions involving minors, Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe members, or, in the case of Odisha, women, may consist of jail sentences rather than fines. Separately, the law in Odisha requires individuals who wish to convert to another religion, and clergy intending to officiate in a conversion ceremony, to make a formal notification to the government. In Rajasthan, the law requires any citizen intending to convert to give the government 30 days’ notice or face a fine of 1,000 rupees ($25). The Rajasthan law includes restrictions on the use of money by religious societies or trusts and additional penalties, including imprisonment or increased fines, for forced or induced conversions of underage persons, women, or members of the low-caste Dalit community.

Under Andhra Pradesh and Telangana law, authorities may prohibit proselytizing near a place of worship of another religion. Punishment for violations can include imprisonment for up to three years and fines of up to 5,000 rupees ($75).

Federal law empowers the government to ban religious organizations that provoke intercommunal tensions, are involved in terrorism or sedition, or violate laws governing foreign contributions.

The federal penal code criminalizes “promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion,” as well as “acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony,” including acts that cause injury or harm to religious groups and members. The penal code also prohibits “deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.” Violations of any of these provisions are punishable by imprisonment for up to three years, a fine, or both. If the offense is committed at a place of worship, imprisonment may be for up to five years.

There are no requirements for registration of religious groups, although federal law requires religiously affiliated organizations to maintain audit reports on their accounts and a schedule of their activities and to provide these to state government officials upon request.

The constitution states any reference to Hindus is construed as containing a reference to followers of Sikhism, Jainism, and Buddhism, who are subject to Hindu laws, such as the Hindu Marriage Act. Subsequent legislation passed throughout the 1950s continues to use the word Hindu to include Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains and others, but clarifies that these are separate religions whose followers are included under this legislation.

Federal law provides minority community status to six religious groups: Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis, Jains, and Buddhists. State governments have the power to grant minority status to religious groups that are minorities in a particular region and designate them as minorities under the law in that state. In May and June respectively, the Gujarat government legally recognized the Jain community and the Maharashtra government legally recognized the Jewish community as minority religious groups. The status makes these groups eligible for several government assistance programs. The constitution states the government will protect the existence of religious minorities and encourage conditions for the promotion of their individual identities.

Personal status laws are applicable only to certain religious communities in matters of marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance. The government grants significant autonomy to personal status law boards in drafting these laws. Law boards are selected by community leaders; there is no formal process and selection varies across communities. Hindu, Christian, Parsi, and Islamic personal status laws are legally recognized and judicially enforceable. These laws, however, do not supersede national- and state-level legislative powers or constitutional provisions. If the law boards cannot offer satisfactory solutions, the case is referred to the civil courts.

Federal law permits interreligious couples to marry without religious conversion. Interreligious couples, as all couples marrying in a civil ceremony, are required to provide public notice 30 days in advance, including addresses, photographs, and religious affiliation, for public comment. Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, or Jains who marry outside their religions, however, face the possibility of losing their property inheritance rights under those communities’ laws.

The law recognizes the registration of Sikh marriages. There are no divorce provisions for Sikhs under the personal status laws, however, and other Sikh personal status matters fall under Hindu codes. Any person, irrespective of religion, may seek a divorce in civil court under the law.

The constitution prohibits religious instruction in government schools. The law permits private religious schools.

Twenty-four of the 29 states have imposed full to partial restrictions and penalties on the slaughter of bovines. Penalties vary among states, and may also vary based on whether the animal is a cow, calf, bull, or ox. In the majority of the 24 states where bovine slaughter is banned, punishments range from six months’ to two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of 1,000 to 10,000 rupees ($15 to $151). Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir penalize cow slaughter with imprisonment of two to 10 years.

On May 6, the Bombay High Court decriminalized possession of beef imported from outside Maharashtra. The court ruled that a portion of the state’s beef ban enacted in 2015 was unconstitutional, and the state could not disallow possession of beef from cows slaughtered outside the state, as it violated a citizen’s right to possess and consume food of his or her choice.

A federal law, known as the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA), regulates foreign contributions to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including faith-based organizations. Organizations with “definite cultural, economic, educational, religious or social programs” must receive a certificate of registration from the government in order to receive foreign funds. The federal government may also require that certified organizations obtain prior permission before accepting or transferring foreign funds. The federal government may reject an application for a certificate of registration or a request for prior permission to transfer funds if it judges the recipient to be prejudicially affecting “harmony between religious, racial, social, linguistic, regional groups, castes, or communities.”

The National Commission for Minorities, which includes representatives from the five designated religious minorities and the National Human Rights Commission, is tasked with investigating allegations of religious discrimination. The Ministry of Minority Affairs may also conduct investigations. These bodies have no enforcement powers but launch investigations on the basis of written complaints by plaintiffs charging criminal or civil violations and submit their findings to law enforcement agencies for action. Sixteen of India’s 29 states and the National Capital Territory of Delhi have state minorities commissions, which also investigate allegations of religious discrimination.

The constitution allows for a form of affirmative action for Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe communities, and the law subsequently added the “Other Backward Class” category for groups deemed to be socially and educationally disadvantaged. Since the constitution specifies only persons who are Hindu, Sikh, or Buddhist shall be deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste, the only means through which Christian and Muslim individuals may qualify for affirmative action benefits as members of religious communities is if they are considered members of the “backward” classes due to their social and economic status.

The government requires foreign missionaries of any religious group to obtain a missionary visa.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Authorities investigated 12 police officers in Madhya Pradesh on charges of attempted murder of a Hindu nationalist arrested for writing defamatory comments about Islam. Authorities often failed to prosecute violence by cow protection groups against persons, mostly Muslims, suspected of slaughtering or illegally transporting cows or trading in or consuming beef. Courts issued final verdicts in several long-standing legal cases related to religiously motivated violence and riots. Other such cases continued to go forward slowly. The government challenged the minority status of Muslim educational institutions in the Supreme Court. The Bombay High Court rejected an application to suspend a local government order making yoga and “sun salutation” mandatory in public schools in Mumbai. The Supreme Court was hearing an appeal of a case challenging the constitutionality of the Islamic practice of instantaneous “triple talaq” divorce, based on the argument that it violates gender equality protections under India’s constitution. The federal government supported the challenge.

In September prosecutors in Madhya Pradesh filed charges against 12 police officials for attempted murder after Suresh Yadav, a member of Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS), a Hindu nationalist organization, reported that he was tortured and severely beaten while in police custody. On September 25, Balaghat police had detained Yadav after a group of Muslims complained that he had posted a defamatory comment about Islam on social media. The court case against the 12 police officers had not yet begun at year’s end. On September 28, the Madhya Pradesh government suspended a senior police official and his subordinates posted in Balaghat after charging them with attempted murder. In October the family members of police officials charged in the case sought protection, citing fear of backlash from RSS, Hindu nationalist group Bajrang Dal, and other Hindu groups.

On September 6, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) charged Dr. Virendra Tawade and two other members of Hindu nationalist group Sanatan Sanstha with the 2013 killing of “antisuperstition” activist Dr. Narendra Dabholkar in Pune. The CBI had arrested Tawade on June 10. According to Maharashtra Andhashraddha Nirmoolan Samiti, an NGO, “antisuperstition” activists oppose harmful superstitions, promote humanism and critical thinking, and encourage critical analysis of religion and are often referred to as “rationalists.”

On July 31, police used batons and fired 24 tear gas shells to subdue Muslim demonstrators in Surat, Gujarat. The demonstrators sought immediate police action against those responsible for a viral internet video accusing Muslims of “love jihad,” a term describing an alleged strategy by Muslim men of marrying women of other faiths for the purpose of converting them to Islam.

In February police started an investigation into Mumbai resident Sadik Shaikh’s accusation that the police in Malad, a suburb of Mumbai, assaulted and threatened to frame him in a terror-related case after his stepmother filed a police complaint objecting to his conversion to Islam. The investigation remained ongoing at year’s end.

On January 13, Madhya Pradesh police arrested two members of the Gau Raksha Samiti (Cow Protection Committee) following their assault of a Muslim couple at the Khirkiya railway station. The members of the Gau Raksha Samiti stated they seized a bag of beef, although laboratory tests later confirmed it was buffalo meat.

On August 6, the former Press Council of India Chairman and retired Supreme Court Justice Markandey Katju led a commission investigating police shootings of Sikh protesters during widespread protests, in which two people were killed and 80 injured in Punjab in October 2015. The Sikhs protested in five districts after reports a Sikh holy book had been desecrated by unknown assailants. The commission carried out its investigation of the incident, known as the Behbal Kalan Firing, at the behest of NGOs such as the Sikhs for Human Rights, the Punjab Human Rights Organization, and Lawyers for Human Rights International, after the groups stated that the Punjabi police force used excessive and unprovoked force against a peaceful gathering. The commission recommended charges against the police officers involved for “unwarranted firing” and compensation within six months of 2.5 million rupees ($36,700) and regular employment to family members of Gujreet Singh and Krishan Bhagwan Singh, who were killed in the shootings. The government also established its own parallel investigation, which remained ongoing at year’s end. By year’s end, authorities had not paid compensation to the victims. According to family members, authorities had provided one of the next of kin of one of the dead men with a job at a government school.

On August 4, the Gujarat High Court sentenced to life imprisonment 11 of the 27 people accused of burning a father and his daughter to death in Mehsana District during 2002 Gujarat communal riots. The High Court acquitted the remaining 16. Four of the 11 convicted were fugitives who remained at large at year’s end.

In a July 27 ruling on an appeals case, the Gujarat High Court sentenced seven people to life imprisonment and upheld life imprisonment for two others for killing three Muslims near Valana railway crossing in Viramgam during the 2002 Gujarat riots. The High Court acquitted the 10th person accused in the case. A lower court had previously acquitted or given reduced sentences to the seven people the High Court subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment.

On June 17, a Gujarat special court convicted 24 people (11 of whom received sentences of life imprisonment), and acquitted 36 others for their role in the Gulberg Society neighborhood attack involving a mob killing of 69 people during the 2002 Gujarat riots. This was one of 10 mass killings in 2002 in Gujarat in retaliation for the burning to death of 59 Hindu pilgrims on a train on February 27, 2002. At year’s end, the Gujarat High Court was still reviewing an appeal brought by Zakia Jafri, one of the Gulberg Society survivors, of a Gujarat lower court’s 2013 verdict.

In November the central government announced it would reopen 58 cases under the purview of a special investigation team within the home ministry related to anti-Sikh riots that occurred in Delhi and Punjab in 1984. In August the Haryana State government was the first in the country to disburse compensation to victims of the 1984 riots. Based on recommendations from a commission of inquiry headed by former Punjab and Haryana High Court Justice T.P. Garg, the state government allotted 120 million rupees ($1.8 million) in July for the victims residing within the Gurgaon and Pataudi area. The Chairman of the National Minorities Commission, Naseem Ahmed, distributed checks to the first 42 victims.

On August 2, the Supreme Court asked the Odisha government to reinvestigate 315 cases pertaining to anti-Christian violence in 2008 in Kandhamal District. The 315 cases, part of a total of 827 registered cases involving the 2008 violence, had been closed on grounds there was insufficient evidence against the accused or the offenders could not be traced. According to an affidavit filed by the Odisha government, charges were filed in the other 512 cases. Of these 512, trials were completed in 362 cases, resulting in only 78 convictions. The other cases in which the government filed charges remained pending. The Supreme Court also directed the state government to pay additional compensation of 200,000 rupees ($2,928) to each of the families of the dead, 70,000 rupees ($1,025) to those whose houses were fully damaged, 30,000 ($439) rupees to those whose houses were partially damaged, and 10,000-30,000 rupees ($146-$439) to the injured based on the seriousness of the injury. Although reportedly pleased with the Supreme Court’s intervention, Christian groups expressed dissatisfaction with the manner of prosecuting these cases and with the compensation given to victims.

The high-profile killing of Mohammad Akhlaq Saifi by a mob who believed he had slaughtered a cow in Dadri, Uttar Pradesh in September 2015 continued to generate publicity and controversy. A local court ordered a criminal complaint to be filed against the family of Akhlaq under existing legislation protecting cows. In September investigating officials concluded there was no evidence to prove Akhlaq or the family ever slaughtered a cow. The men charged with killing Akhlaq remained in prison, and their case was pending with the Allahabad High Court at year’s end.

In April the Madhya Pradesh High Court granted bail to six Muslims arrested on sedition charges after their counsel argued that police had added sedition charges following pressure from the nationalist Hindu group Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP).

On January 14, Madhya Pradesh police arrested 12 people, including a visually impaired couple, from the village of Pipirpura, after Hindu activists alleged they had attempted to convert Hindus to Christianity. The local court released them on bail the next day.

On March 14, police in Rajasthan arrested four students from Jammu and Kashmir after local students had confronted the Kashmiris and accused them of cooking beef in a hostel in Mewar University in Chittorgarh. The Kashmiri students were released on bail, and charges were later dropped after a lab report determined the meat was not beef.

On April 27, the Madhya Pradesh police stopped a wedding ceremony in a church in Satna and arrested 10 people after Bajrang Dal and a Madhya Pradesh Backward Caste Commission member, Laxmi Yadav, alleged conversion of a minor Hindu girl to Christianity through the marriage. The court released those arrested, including the pastor and the groom’s parents, a day later.

At year’s end, the Supreme Court was still considering an appeal filed in February by a Muslim woman, Shayara Banu, arguing that the practice of Muslim personal law allowing men to execute a divorce by saying “talaq” (Arabic for divorce) three times and engage in polygamy, as well as the practice of halala (by which a woman cannot remarry a husband from whom she is divorced without first consummating and ending a marriage with another man) was unconstitutional. On October 7, the federal government filed an affidavit in support of Banu’s case, pleading that triple talaq and polygamy violated the constitution’s guarantee of gender equality. During his speech at Mahoba, Uttar Pradesh on October 24, Prime Minister Modi stated there should be no discrimination against women on the basis of religion and the government had the responsibility to protect Muslim women’s constitutional rights. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board, an NGO established to protect the applicability of sharia law to Muslims, and some Muslim clergy criticized the government for interfering in personal religious laws protected by the constitution. Muslim community leaders characterized government actions as interfering in religious life and maintained that religious decisions should remain the exclusive domain of religious communities. Muslim women’s rights groups, such as the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan and All India Muslim Women’s Personal Law Board, however, opposed triple talaq in the Supreme Court, stating the practice was not supported in the Quran.

On August 16, the central government submitted a petition to the Supreme Court challenging the codification of Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), the oldest Islamic university in the country, as a “minority status” institution. The petition argued AMU received funds from the central government without reserving the required seats for members of disadvantaged castes and tribes, and the institution had not originally been founded as a minority university by the British. AMU was given time to argue its case before the Supreme Court. AMU stated that it was open to students from all religious groups and courses on Islam were optional. University administrators and other critics charged the central government with trying to undermine the autonomy of one of the world’s leading Islamic institutions of higher learning. AMU advocates said without minority status the university would lose its ability to make its own hiring decisions and choose its curriculum.

On September 16, the Bombay High Court refused to grant an interim stay filed by Massod Ansari, a social worker, on the resolution by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai’s (the municipal council) to make yoga and surya namaskar (sun salutation) mandatory in public schools. The court ruled the sun salutation was a form of exercise and rejected Ansari’s argument that it would force non-Hindu children to follow a Hindu faith practice. At year’s end, yoga and sun salutation remained mandatory in public schools in Mumbai.

On May 6, the Bombay High Court decriminalized possession of beef imported from outside Maharashtra. The court ruled that a section of Maharashtra’s 2015 beef ban was unconstitutional and the state could not disallow possession of beef from cows slaughtered outside the state, as doing so would violate a citizen’s right to possess and consume food of their choice. Consumers, butchers, and sellers among others in Maharahstra State said they remained vulnerable to prosecution in court because the burden of proof that the cow was not slaughtered in Maharashtra rested on the accused.

In early December 2015, Haryana Chief Minister M.L. Khattar established a government entity called Gau Seva Ayog (Cow Service Organization) to prevent cow slaughter in the state. On August 28, shortly before Eid al-Adha, the Gau Seva Ayog directed Haryana police to collect seven samples of biryani from roadside sellers to ensure they did not contain beef. According to media reports, Muslim communities stated they felt specifically targeted. On September 6, social activist Shehnaz Poonawalla submitted a petition to the National Commission for Minorities (NCM) against the Gau Seva Ayog, asking the NCM to direct the central government and Ministry for Home Affairs to demand the group cease its activities, stating that the entity was harassing Muslim communities.

In June then-Member of Parliament (MP) and later Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stated Mother Teresa had been on a mission to “Christianize India.” Catholic Archbishop Thomas Menamparampil called Adityanath’s comments “rash” and denied Mother Teresa had engaged in proselytizing. EFI reported tensions surrounding the canonization of Mother Teresa, which occurred on September 4. Some social media users stated Mother Teresa had engaged in forcible conversions.

On July 24, the President of the regional Maharashtrian Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena Party, Uddhav Thackeray, in an interview with his party’s publication Samana, called for declaring the country a Hindu state in order to prevent attacks on Hindus.

Members of civil society expressed concerns that, under the BJP government, religious minority communities felt vulnerable due to Hindu nationalist groups engaging in violence against non-Hindu individuals and places of worship. Religious minority communities stated that, while the national government sometimes spoke out against incidents of violence, local political leaders often did not, which left victims and minority religious communities feeling vulnerable. Minority religious groups expressed concern national education reforms would incorporate Hindu practices and teachings into secular public schools and private schools operated by minority faith communities. Christian groups cited the government’s introduction of Good Governance Day on December 25, as an effort to diminish the significance of Christmas, which is an official national holiday. Groups expressed fears of further reforms to education policies and civil laws that would minimize religious minority communities’ control over their own affairs.

In November MHA denied FCRA registration renewals for NGO Compassion International’s two main implementing partners. While MHA stated more than 1,300 other NGOs of various types also had their registration renewals denied because of FCRA regulation compliance issues, Compassion International and some media and civil society representatives stated Compassion International’s partner organizations were targeted because MHA alleged they were involved in conversions or other religious activities. Some other foreign-funded religious NGOs did not report any FCRA-related issues with operations in India.

On May 15, local government officials demolished a cross and an altar of a makeshift church erected on a piece of land allotted by the government to the Agape Gospel Ministries, a registered Christian NGO, in Nizampet village near Hyderabad, Telangana State. A police investigation initiated at the direction of the State Commission for Minorities concluded the government officials demolished the cross and the altar “by misconception.” On August 11, the commission directed the Telangana State government to either reconstruct the demolished portions of the church or pay suitable compensation. By year’s end, information as to whether the state government had complied with the directive was unavailable.

The central government stated the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community would be included, for the first time, as a subset of the Muslim community in the next census in 2021.

On October 14, Minister of Home Affairs Rajnath Singh addressed the National Christian Leaders Conference and said, “Tolerance is essential for peaceful existence. People from all religions live peacefully in India and practice their religion without any fear of discrimination … I would like to say that religious persecution will never be allowed in India.”

There were reports of hundreds of religiously motivated killings, assaults, riots, restrictions on the right to practice religion and proselytize, discrimination, and attacks against property. Groups most frequently targeted were Muslims and Christians. Cow protection groups, many of whose members believed cow slaughter and eating beef were an attack on the Hindu deities representing motherhood, carried out an increasing number of violent attacks, including killings, beatings, harassment, and intimidations, against consumers of beef or those involved in the beef industry.

According to the MHA 2015-16 Annual Report, 751 communal incidents (defined by authorities as violent conflicts involving religious communities on the issues of organizing religious congregations, desecration of religious symbols, and the ownership of community properties and facilities) took place in 2015, resulting in 97 deaths and 2,264 injuries. Although MHA stated there were no major outbreaks of communal violence in the country in 2015, statistics showed an increase in overall instances of communal violence reported compared to the previous year when the MHA recorded 644 communal incidents, resulting in 95 deaths and 1,921 injuries.

EFI reported more than 300 attacks against Christians or their churches during the year, compared to 177 in 2015. Incidents included assaults on religious workers and attacks on Christian churches, private property, and missionary schools and institutions. According to EFI, local police seldom provided protection, did not accept complaints, and rarely investigated incidents.

On March 18, villagers of Jhabar in Jharkhand’s Latehar District found the dead bodies of Muslim cattle traders Mohammad Majloom and Inayatullah Khan hanging from a tree. Police arrested five men, including one linked to a cow protection group.

On April 17, there was a violent altercation between Hindus and Muslims in Hazaribagh, a town in Jharkhand State. Media outlets reported a Hindu Ram Navami festival procession played recorded slogans while passing through a predominantly Muslim neighborhood, which the neighborhood’s residents found objectionable. According to media reports, in the ensuing violence, three people were killed and six injured, while 30 shops – most of them belonging to Muslims – were burned. Police arrested approximately 25 individuals.

On April 2, the body of a man missing for a month was found in Kurukshetra in Haryana. The victim’s father accused four members of a cow protection group, and the Haryana High Court ordered a CBI probe.

On August 18, Mangalore Catholic Diocese members said supporters of Hindu nationalist group Jagrana Vedike attacked and killed a Hindu, Praveen Poojary, in Karnataka State’s Udupi district, while he was transporting calves, which the attackers believed he was going to slaughter. Police arrested 18 individuals for the killing and were investigating the incident at year’s end.

On August 25, according to press reports, a group of armed members of a cow protection group in Haryana State beat a Muslim man and his wife to death and raped the man’s adult niece and her 14-year-old cousin. The adult victim said her attackers told her they were being raped because they ate meat. A two-member delegation of the NCM visited the area where the attack took place and supported the reports that cow protection groups played a role in the attack. Authorities charged four suspects with rape and murder. The case was pending at year’s end.

On September 16, a Muslim man died from injuries sustained from a beating by a mob who suspected he was carrying two calves for slaughter for Eid al-Adha. The Ahmedabad police registered complaints against the victim for “illegally ferrying animals” and against the attackers. The police filed charges against the victim before he died and against three of the alleged attackers for murder. The case against the accused killers remained pending at year’s end.

On September 20, police in Thane, Maharashtra State arrested a Muslim man, Shafiq Shamsuddin, for killing his cousin, Sufiya Mansuri, and her Hindu husband, Vijay Yadavat their residence. Shamsuddin was opposed to their interfaith marriage.

On March 23, a Pune court in Maharashtra State rejected the bail plea of Sameer Gaikwad, a member of Hindu nationalist group Sanatan Sanstha, who was arrested on charges of killing antisuperstition activist Govind Pansare on February 20, 2015. The trial had yet to begin at year’s end.

On April 17, a Hindu attacked a Protestant Christian pastor and his pregnant wife, and tried to set them on fire in Bastar, Chhattisgarh.

On December 14, online magazine Horizon Asia reported 30 youths armed with sticks and batons beat a group of 20 Catholics (mostly women and children), including a parish priest, while the Catholics were returning from a carol service in Tikariya village in Rajasthan. The attackers reportedly chanted slogans of “Bharat Mata ki Jai” (Victory to Mother India). No arrests were reported.

On January 17, EFI reported a group of Hindus beat a Christian missionary for giving a Bible to a Hindu in Tamil Nadu State’s Erode District. The Hindu had reportedly asked for the Bible. In a separate incident on the same day in Tamil Nadu’s Theni District, assailants attacked a Pentecostal pastor with knives and sickles while he was conducting a prayer service, according to NGO Barnabas Aid. Police opened an investigation but had made no arrests by year’s end.

On January 28, Human Rights Forum of Coimbatore, an NGO that investigates and assists victims of human rights violations, reported a group of young men attacked a Catholic priest working for Assissi Snehalaya, a home for people with AIDS near Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu State. In a separate incident on the same day, unidentified individuals attacked three employees of Assissi Snehalaya. Police arrested two persons in connection with the first attack, who were subsequently released on bail. In the second incident, police charged five individuals, who fled and remained at large at year’s end. Investigations remained ongoing at year’s end.

On March 6, Chhattisgarh police arrested nine people after they attacked a Protestant congregation in the village of Kachna, disrupted the congregation’s prayer service, and vandalized their church. There were reports of minor injuries.

On July 26, two women were injured after members of a cow protection group beat them outside a railway station in Mandsaur, Madhya Pradesh State, after police arrested them for beef possession. Video by a spectator showed police taking no action during the beatings, which reportedly lasted close to half an hour. The women possessed 30 kilos of buffalo meat, which is not illegal. After tests determined the meat was buffalo and not beef, authorities charged the women with possessing the meat without a permit. Police arrested four men accused of assaulting the Muslim women. Authorities took no action against the police who stood by while the women were beaten.

In August the Chhattisgarh State Catholic Council held a press conference and made a public statement expressing concern over what the council said were increasing attacks on the community and its institutions, and the leveling of false charges of forced conversions and beef possession against Christians.

On February 20, 65 members of a Hindu nationalist group, Shivaji Jayanti Mandal, assaulted a Muslim police official, forced him to hoist a saffron flag – frequently a symbol of nationalist groups – and paraded him through Pangaon, Maharashtra State. The assault took place the day after police prevented the raising of the saffron flag to mark Shivaji Jayanti, a Hindu holiday, in a neighborhood with historically tense interfaith relationships. The police officer called his station for reinforcements, but they did not arrive in time to stop the attack. Police arrested 46 people in connection with the incident; their trial remained pending at year’s end.

On March 18, according to a media report that quoted police officials, unknown persons burned down a makeshift Christian prayer hall in Nizamabad District of Telangana State. The report stated that, prior to the arson, a mob attacked a local pastor and members of his congregation for allegedly trying to convert Hindus to Christianity. The attack on the pastor and congregation resulted in the hospitalization of six persons, including a four-year-old girl. A Telangana Rashtra Samithi MP representing the area, K. Kavita, dismissed any communal dimension to the incident and described it as an “accident.”

On March 28, a member of a cow protection group stopped a truck carrying buffalo tallow on the Rupnagar-Kurali road in Punjab State and beat the driver, Balkar Singh. Singh was charged under a Punjabi law that restricts the slaughter of buffalo without a permit. His attacker was not charged.

On May 6, three cow protection group members beat a man in Sohna, Haryana State on suspicion that he was carrying beef. A fourth man recorded the beating while the others threatened the victim with a gun. According to press reports, authorities were investigating a complaint against the victim, but not his attackers.

On June 10, cow protection group members force-fed a cow-dung mixture to two men after intercepting them while transporting beef in Faridabad, Haryana State. A court sentenced the two men to jail for smuggling beef; the length of their sentence was pending at year’s end. Authorities filed no charges against the attackers.

On July 31, cow protection group members beat a man for allegedly slaughtering cows in Muktsar District, Punjab. Authorities charged the man under the state’s cow slaughter law. There were no charges against the attackers.

On May 31, a cow protection group seized seven men in Pratapgarh, Rajasthan for transporting 96 water buffalo in two trucks. A crowd of 100-150, which reportedly included members of Bajrang Dal, beat the three truck occupants, set the trucks on fire, and attacked police when they tried to intervene. Police arrested the two truck drivers and one attacker. Buffalo transport and slaughter in Rajashtan is legal.

On September 23, Muslim leaders in Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu State said members of VHP damaged shops of Muslim traders after accusing four men of killing their leader, C. Sasi Kumar. VHP members attacked the shops when Kumar’s body was taken to a crematorium. Media reported the VHP members entered the majority-Muslim area of Kottaimedu and threw stones. A photojournalist who witnessed the incidents said VHP workers threw stones at every shop on Cross Cut Road in Coimbatore during the funeral procession. Police made no arrests. Media reported that, on the same day, individuals, who many believed were VHP members, threw a Molotov cocktail at a mosque in Rathina Sabapathi Puram in Coimbatore.

According to EFI’s Hate and Targeted Violence report, on June 21, Hindu extremist groups threatened Pastor Shiv Dutt from the Brethren Assembly Billawar Church and told him to stop worship and prayer meetings in the Ramkote village of Kathua District in Jammu and Kashmir State.

On June 4, in New Delhi, EFI reported that a crowd of nearly 40 Hindus surrounded a vacation Bible school program for youth led by Pastor Rajpal Yadav. With nearly 200 students inside, the group shouted anti-Christian slogans and vandalized the venue. Police detained the pastor and an aide for what the pastor said was their protection.

A July report by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) cited harassment and threats of violence as the reasons for a mass migration of Hindu families from the Muslim majority city of Kairana, Uttar Pradesh State. There was an inflow of Muslim residents to Kairana after they were displaced by anti-Muslim violence in Uttar Pradesh in 2013. The NHRC report followed statements by BJP MP Hukam Singh, citing the exodus of Hindus from Kairana because of criminal activity by Muslim migrants. According to the NHRC report, 346 Hindu families were displaced. Citing 24 witnesses, the NHRC attributed the migration of Hindu families to the actions of Muslims, including taunting and shouting lewd remarks. After an inquiry, however, the Shamli District Administration, where Kairana is located, reported that of the 346 Hindu families the NHRC said had been displaced, 66 families had left Kairana more than 10 years earlier and 188 families had left more than five years earlier. Human rights activists acting on behalf of the Muslim community in Kairana, such as Harsh Mander, disputed the NHRC’s findings that Hindus had been driven out by Muslim crime and called on the NHRC to withdraw and apologize for the report, which the human rights activists stated had been used to spread prejudice against the Muslim community.

The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Hyderabad complained of intimidation by other Muslim groups that considered the Ahmadis apostates. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community representatives stated that other Muslim groups often prevented them from organizing public meetings, even after they obtained police permits.

On January 29, Catholic Archbishop Leo Comelio of Bhopal stated anticonversion legislation was misused in Madhya Pradesh to falsely accuse Christians of forced conversions.

According to a May 15 media report, police averted a clash between two groups in Keonjhar District in Odisha following Hindu protests against conversion of the local residents to Christianity by “force” or “allurement.” The protestors alleged that pastors from the neighboring state of Jharkhand were encouraging conversions with financial inducements and the conversions had led to rifts within families.

On July 18, three Muslim students at St. John Baptist High in Thane, Maharashtra State, complained to police that their principal, Father Michael Pinto, ridiculed them for being Muslims. They said Pinto accused the students’ community of being behind terrorist attacks earlier in the year in France and Bangladesh. According to media sources, the principal also directed a Muslim teacher trainee not to wear a burqa while attending the school. The police took Pinto into custody but released him a short time later after his accusers declined to formally register a case against him.

On February 15, a 19-year-old Hindu woman, Neeraja, told News Minute website that the Muslim Educational Society Fathima Gafoor Memorial Women’s College, a minority institution located in Kozhikode, Kerala State, had barred her from entering its premises because she had married a Muslim. Neeraja alleged that the vice principal told her marrying outside her religion was an “unpardonable offense” per the college’s policy on interreligious marriage.

On June 6, St John’s Attamangalam Church near Kottayam, Kerala State denied permission for the burial of Madhu Jyotsana Akhauri on the grounds she had married a Hindu. Authorities told the media the church had disowned Akhauri because she had lived as a Hindu. Akhauri was later buried at St. Thomas Jacobite Church in Ponkunnam in the same district.

According to the Commission for Minorities for Telangana and Andhra Pradesh States, the commission received complaints about the demolition of a cross and altar in an Agape Gospel Church in Nazempet Village, an area where there had been conversions to Christianity. The commission stated it had also received several other complaints of illegal occupation of Christian and Muslim community properties, including graveyards. The commission, which collected data on incidents but lacked enforcement powers, said most local government officials failed to address complaints by religious minorities.

In June Hindu residents of Vadodara, Gujarat State petitioned the civic authorities to stop the relocation to the city of 218 displaced families (primarily Muslims) under a government housing initiative for the urban poor.

According to media reports, in June Manu Dabhi, a Dalit land owner in Ahmedabad, Gujarat State, refused to sign a note promising never to sell his land to a Muslim, as residents, with the support of VHP, had pressured him to do. Dabhi’s employer, a Muslim, denied residents’ charges he was using Dabhi as a front to own the land. The neighborhood where the property was located required legal permission of authorities to transfer real estate between owners of different faiths.

On September 19, Mumbai police arrested nine members of a housing association in Vasai, a Mumbai suburb, after a Muslim buyer, Vikar Ahmad Khan, objected to the association’s unofficial policy prohibiting house sales to Muslims. On September 20, the housing association reversed its previous policy and allowed Khan to buy an apartment. The association also issued an apology to Khan. The arrested members were later released.

On October 4, Mumbai police arrested Barun Kashyap, alleging he falsely reported cow vigilante harassment in social media postings. Mumbai police investigating the incident charged Kashyap with fabricating the complaint and promoting enmity between Hindus and Muslims. At year’s end Kashyap was free on bail pending trial.

On August 29, Muslim leaders of Dakshina Kannada District in Karnataka State said male students of Dr. K. Shivaram Karanth Government First Grade College in Bellare Village began wearing saffron shawls around their necks at the college in protest against female Muslim students wearing headscarves. Of the college’s 492 students, 19 were Muslim, including 15 females. According to a local Hindu leader, after a meeting of parents and teachers, the boys agreed not to wear saffron shawls and the Muslim girls not to wear headscarves inside the college.

During an August speech in Delhi, the U.S. Secretary of State discussed the importance of tolerance to counter violent extremism, saying “I applaud all those people who engaged in the interfaith efforts to reach out and define tolerance and also the beauty of their own religions.” The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs discussed religious tolerance with more than a dozen interfaith leaders at a Sufi shrine following his participation in a food distribution ceremony for Eid al-Fitr. The U.S. Special Representative to Muslim Communities returned in September to continue discussions with government officials and Muslim community members about the role religious communities play in the global fight against violent extremism. He met with Muslim community leaders in Mumbai, including leaders of Anjuman-i-Islam and Beebak Collective.

In December the U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom engaged government officials in New Delhi on issues of religious freedom, tolerance, and nondiscrimination and discussed opportunities for collaboration within the country, in the region, and internationally. The Ambassador at Large also met with members from the Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and Jewish communities and with human rights and women’s rights activists, in New Delhi, Bangalore, and Mumbai to hear about religious life in India and explore opportunities to advance religious freedom.

The U.S. Ambassador gave a speech at Jamia Millia University in New Delhi on the importance of religious diversity in the country in November. He also met leaders across India’s religious communities to understand their concerns. Embassy representatives met with government representatives, civil society, and religious leaders to discuss the issue of Islamic divorce and the challenge of protecting personal religious laws in accordance with the constitution, the minority status of universities, beef bans, and religiously motivated political violence.

The embassy and consulates general continued to meet with religious organizations, missionary communities, and NGOs of all religious backgrounds to discuss religious freedom concerns and U.S. responses. These included the Cardinal of the Syro-Malankara Catholic Church, Metropolitan Bishop of the Mar Thoma Church, Imam of Jama Masjid, India Islamic Cultural Center, All India Imams’ Organization, leaders of several mosques, Akshardham Temple Hindu Priests, priests from the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, the Catholic Bishops Conference of India, the Church of North India, the Delhi Archdiocese, community leaders in Buddhist-dominated Kushinagar, Bharatiya Sant Samiti, the Chinmaya Mission, Hindu priests, and Sikh leaders.

The embassy and consulates general hosted celebrations marking major religious holidays, including Ramadan, Holi, Eid al-Fitr, and Easter throughout the country to bring together leaders from different religious groups, and at which embassy representatives and interfaith guests spoke about religious freedom and tolerance in speeches and informal discussions. Embassy and consulate general officials continued to monitor cases involving reports of religious persecution, religious intolerance, and religiously motivated attacks.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 258.3 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2010 census, approximately 87 percent of the population is Muslim, 7 percent Protestant, 3 percent Roman Catholic, and 1.5 percent Hindu. Those identifying with other religious groups, including Buddhism, traditional indigenous religions, Confucianism, and other Christian denominations, and those who did not respond to the census question comprise approximately 1.3 percent of the population.

The Muslim population is overwhelmingly Sunni. An estimated one to three million Muslims are Shia. Many smaller Muslim groups exist; estimates put the total number of Ahmadi Muslims at 200,000 to 400,000.

An estimated 20 million people, primarily in Java, Kalimantan, and Papua, practice various traditional belief systems, often referred to collectively as aliran kepercayaan. There are approximately 400 different aliran kepercayaan communities throughout the archipelago. Many religious groups incorporate elements of Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, making it difficult to disaggregate the exact number of followers.

There is a small Sikh population estimated at between 10,000 and 15,000, primarily in Medan and Jakarta. There are very small Jewish communities in Jakarta, Manado, Jayapura, and elsewhere. The Bahai Faith and Falun Dafa (or Falun Gong) community report thousands of members, but no independent estimates are available. The number of atheists is also unknown, but the group Indonesian Atheists states it has more than 500 members.

The province of Bali is predominantly Hindu, and the provinces of Papua, West Papua, East Nusa Tenggara, and North Sulawesi are predominantly Christian.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees the right to choose and practice the religion of one’s choice and specifies that freedom of religion is a human right that cannot be limited. The constitution states, “The nation is based upon belief in one supreme God,” but guarantees all persons the right to worship according to their own religion or belief. The law restricts citizens from exercising these rights in a way that impinges on the rights of others, oversteps common moral standards and religious values, or jeopardizes security or public order.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) extends official status to six religious groups: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. The law prohibits deliberate public statements or activities that insult or defame any of the six official religious groups, or have the intent of preventing an individual from adhering to an official religion. The law also stipulates that in any case of defamation of the six officially recognized religions, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), the MRA, and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) must first warn the individual in question before he or she can be charged. The law also forbids the dissemination of information designed to spread hatred or dissension among individuals and/or certain community groups on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or race. Individuals may be prosecuted for blasphemous, atheistic, or heretical statements under either of these provisions or under the laws against defamation, and can face a maximum jail sentence of five years. The internet law forbids the electronic dissemination of the same types of information, with violations carrying a maximum six-year sentence. Religious groups other than the official six may also register with the government, making them eligible to establish a place of worship, register marriages and births, and obtain national identity cards (KTPs). Laws allow followers of beliefs outside the six recognized religious groups to leave the religion section blank on their KTPs.

Organizations representing one of the six official religious groups are not required to obtain a legal charter if they are established under a notary act and obtain approval from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Unofficial religious organizations must obtain a legal charter as a civil society organization from the MOHA. Both ministries consult with the MRA before granting legal status to religious organizations. For an organization to be considered a religion, it must have a prophet, holy book, deity, and be recognized internationally. By law, all religious groups must be registered in some form. Under the law, civil society organizations are required to uphold the national ideology of Pancasila, which encompasses the principles of belief in one God (although Buddhism and Hinduism are official religions), justice, unity, democracy, and social justice, and they are prohibited from committing blasphemous acts or spreading religious hatred. Violations of the law could result in a loss of legal status, dissolution of the organization, and arrest of members under the blasphemy law or other applicable laws. Indigenous religious groups may also register with the Ministry of Education and Culture as aliran kepercayaan rather than as religious organizations.

A joint ministerial decree bans both proselytizing by the Ahmadi Muslim community and vigilantism against the group. Violation of the proselytizing ban carries a maximum five-year prison sentence on charges of blasphemy. No Ahmadis have ever been charged with blasphemy, but provincial and local regulations based on this decree place tighter restrictions on Ahmadis than on recognized religious groups. The proselytizing ban does not prohibit Ahmadi Muslims from worshipping or continuing to practice within their community.

The government requires all officially registered religious groups to comply with directives from the MRA and other ministerial directives on issues such as construction of houses of worship, foreign aid to domestic religious institutions, and propagation of religion.

According to a joint ministerial decree, religious groups seeking to build a house of worship are required to obtain the signatures of at least 90 members of the group and 60 persons of other religious groups in the community stating they support the construction. Local governments are in charge of implementing the decree, and local regulations, implementation, and enforcement vary widely. The decree also requires approval from the local interfaith council, the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB). Government-established FKUBs exist at the city or district level and comprise religious leaders from the six official religious groups. They are responsible for mediating interreligious conflicts.

The law requires religious instruction in public schools. Students have the right to request religious instruction in any one of the six official religions. Individuals are not allowed to opt out of religious education requirements.

Under the terms of a 2005 peace agreement that ended a separatist conflict, Aceh Province has unique authority to implement sharia regulations. The law allows for provincial implementation and regulation of sharia, and extends the jurisdiction of religious courts to economic transactions and criminal cases. Aceh’s provincial sharia regulations criminalize homosexuality, adultery, gambling, consumption of alcohol, and proximity to members of the opposite sex outside of marriage for Muslim residents of the province. An Aceh governor’s decree forbids women from working in or visiting restaurants unaccompanied by their spouse or a male relative after 9:00 p.m. A Banda Aceh mayoral decree forbids women from working in coffee shops, internet cafes, or sports venues after 10:00 p.m. Female Muslim residents of Aceh are prohibited from wearing tight pants in public and must wear headscarves. One district in Aceh prohibits women from sitting astride motorcycles when riding as passengers. A new criminal code that took effect in Aceh during the year calls for caning of those convicted of homosexuality, adultery, and other offenses. The maximum penalties for violations of sharia regulations include imprisonment and public caning. There are also regulations limiting the amount of force that may be applied during a caning.

Many local governments outside of Aceh have enacted regulations based on religious considerations. Most of these are in majority Muslim areas, although local governments in non-Muslim majority areas also have enacted regulations based on religious considerations. Many of these regulations relate to matters such as religious education and only apply to a specific religious group. Some religiously inspired local regulations in effect, however, apply to all citizens. For instance, some local regulations require restaurants to close during Ramadan fasting hours, ban alcohol, or mandate the collection of zakat (Islamic alms). Other local regulations forbid or limit the religious activities of minority religious groups, especially Shia and Ahmadi Muslims.

The marriage law does not explicitly forbid interfaith marriage, but it contains an article stipulating that a marriage must be performed according to the rituals of a religion that is shared by both the bride and groom. This means that a man and woman of different religions who seek to marry may have difficulties finding a religious official willing to perform a wedding ceremony.

The law allows a Muslim man to have up to four wives, provided he is able to support each equally. For a man to take a second, third, or fourth wife, he must obtain court permission and the consent of the first wife. These conditions, however, are not always met in practice.

The marriage law makes polygamy illegal for civil servants, except in limited circumstances. Government regulations require Muslim male civil servants to receive permission from a government official and their first wives prior to marrying a second, third, or fourth wife, and prohibit female civil servants from becoming second, third, or fourth wives.

The law requires the leader of an aliran kepercayaan group must prove there are group members in at least three regencies before legally officiating a wedding. This constraint effectively bars believers of some smaller groups without such geographic presence from receiving official marriage services from a member of their faith, although groups can aid each other and facilitate marriages by a group with a similar faith tradition and rituals.

A joint ministerial decree requires domestic religious organizations to obtain approval from the MRA to receive funding from overseas donors and forbids dissemination of religious literature and pamphlets to members of other religious groups as well as going door to door for the purposes of converting others.

Foreign religious workers must obtain religious worker visas, and foreign religious organizations must obtain permission from the MRA to provide any type of assistance (in-kind, personnel, or financial) to local religious groups.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

There were arrests and charges for blasphemy and insulting religion, including charges filed against the governor of Jakarta for insulting the Quran and a man charged in Central Java who reportedly tore apart the Quran. In Aceh, there were public canings by local officials for sharia violations, including for the first time of a non-Muslim. There were reports of government attempts of forced conversions of Ahmadi Muslims to Sunni Islam. Members of the Ahmadi Muslim community on Bangka Island were threatened with forced expulsion from the island in January for not converting. The government banned the Gafatar group and there were reports authorities were complicit in the eviction of nearly 8,000 members from their homes. The government took steps to address certain longstanding religious disputes, including the displacement of Ahmadis on Bangka Island and defacement of Buddhist temples in Tanjung Balai, but not all were resolved. There were instances where local governments and police gave in to the demands of “intolerant groups” to close houses of worship for permit violations, or otherwise restrict the rights of minority religious groups. The National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) reported the government at both the national and local levels at times failed to prevent or appropriately address intimidation and discrimination against individuals based on their religious beliefs. Reportedly people who left the religion portion of their identity card blank were denied public services at times.

The Setara Institute, a domestic nongovernmental organization (NGO) that conducts advocacy and research on religious and political freedom, stated the central government made efforts to reaffirm constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, promote tolerance, and prevent religiously motivated violence. It also stated the central government did little to intervene at the local level or solve past religious conflicts through its mandate to enforce court rulings, override unconstitutional local regulations, or otherwise uphold the constitutional and legal protections afforded to minority religious groups. Local governments selectively enforced blasphemy laws, permitting regulations, and other local regulations in ways that affected various religious groups. For example, local governments issued decrees banning Ahmadi and Shia teachings, and reportedly did not act when threats were made against these groups. Government officials and police sometimes failed to prevent “intolerant groups” from infringing on others’ religious freedoms and committing other acts of intimidation. Police did not always actively investigate and prosecute crimes by members of “intolerant sectarian groups.” President Joko Widodo publicly stated he expected the police to protect religious communities of all faiths when the new National Police Chief Tito Karnavian was inaugurated in June.

The Setara Institute reported 44 cases of government abuses of religious freedom between January and August, compared to 70 cases in the first eight months of 2015. Abuses cited included the closure of houses of worship and statements by public officials that condoned violence towards minorities, especially Ahmadi Muslims and members of the Gafatar group.

On April 12, a 60-year-old Christian woman was caned in Aceh for selling alcohol, marking the first time a non-Muslim was punished under Aceh’s special sharia-based law. A ban on selling alcohol is both a local and sharia regulation that applies to all residents of the province. Muslims who violate the ban are punished under sharia while non-Muslims may choose to be punished under either sharia or civil procedures. Aceh provincial officials in charge of sharia law enforcement stated the woman chose to be punished under sharia rather than the criminal statutes, which may carry fines and imprisonment. Authorities in Aceh issued a public statement saying sharia did not apply to non-Muslims, foreigners, or Muslim Indonesians not resident in Aceh. In October Aceh authorities also publicly caned 13 men and women for violating sharia laws on proximity and intimacy, such as touching, hugging, and kissing between unmarried people. Aceh’s deputy mayor said that one 22-year-old woman who was pregnant was granted a temporary reprieve to be carried out after she gave birth.

The MRA maintained its authority at both the national and local level to conduct “development” of religious groups and believers, including efforts to convert minority religious groups to Sunni Islam. In several West Java regencies, local governments continued efforts to force or encourage conversion of Ahmadi Muslims with a requirement that Ahmadis sign forms renouncing their beliefs in order to register their marriages or participate in the Hajj.

On January 5, the Regent of Bangka Belitung issued a letter threatening to expel 22 Ahmadi families from Bangka Island where they had lived for decades. The regent gave the families a deadline to convert to Sunni Islam or leave their homes, saying the Ahmadi Muslims were upsetting local community members and threatened local peace and stability. According to news reports, Ahmadi children also received death threats and on February 5, the Ahmadis left their homes. The regency said its decision to expel the Ahmadis was based on a meeting with the FKUB and on a joint agreement signed by three local ministers. On February 10, then National Police Chief Badrodin Haiti gave orders to Bangka police to protect Ahmadi families from expulsion from the island, and instructed police chiefs throughout the country to prevent acts of coercion or violence against Ahmadis. After these efforts the local government and Ahmadi community said the issue was resolved. Some Ahmadis chose to move to other regions with larger Ahmadi populations.

On March 23, the MRA, MOHA, and AGO released a joint decree banning Gafatar and all associated groups, saying the group’s teachings constituted a deviant form of Islam. On May 25, police arrested the founder and two top leaders of Gafatar on accusations the group was creating a separatist state. The police stated the group would face blasphemy and treason charges. As of the end of the year, the three individuals were awaiting trial.

According to a Human Rights Watch report in May, government officials and security forces were complicit in the forced eviction of 7,000 Gafatar members from their homes after the local government declared Gafatar to be an illegal organization that must disband its activities. The NGO said in other cases security forces prevented attacks on Gafatar members but only by forcibly evacuating them from Kalimantan to Java, then arbitrarily detaining, interrogating, and threatening them with criminal charges. Gafatar members indicated the number of evicted members was closer to 8,000 by year’s end and that many of those forced to move to Central and East Java were unable to obtain new KTPs after authorities had confiscated their previous identity cards during their stays in shelters. Reportedly, some were forced to undergo reeducation programs or mandatory all-day “patriotic education.” On January 19, approximately 1,200 Gafatar members were forced to evacuate their village in Mempawah Regency, West Kalimantan after a mob set fire to nine homes.

On June 14, police detained eight Ahmadis on Lombok for participating in Ramadan prayers in their village’s Sunni mosque. According to media reports, police detained the Ahmadis “for their own protection.” An Ahmadi spokesperson said police had asked members of the Ahmadi congregation to sign a letter denouncing their beliefs. The Ahmadi community refused to sign but agreed not to gather together in one place or carry out Ramadan prayers in public mosques with Sunnis. The eight detained were subsequently released. Village authorities also reportedly forced the Ahmadi members to surrender all Ahmadi-related books and forbade Ahmadi preachers from other regions from entering the village. Approximately 200 Ahmadis remained internally displaced in cramped apartments in the main city of Mataram after a mob expelled them from their Lombok village in 2006.

On July 29, a mob looted or burned down 12 Buddhist temples in Tanjung Balai, North Sumatra, after a Buddhist woman of Chinese descent asked the Al Maksum Mosque to lower its loudspeaker volume. President Joko Widodo publicly condemned the act and called upon regional leaders to promote “unity in diversity” and build a tolerant society. He also sent the chief of national police to the city in an effort to contain the situation. Other local and national leaders, including Vice President Jusuf Kalla, called for greater religious and racial tolerance in North Sumatra. More than 20 local government, religious, and ethnic leaders representing the Muslim and ethnic Chinese communities signed a formal memorandum of understanding committing to promote harmony between different religions and ethnicities and supporting law enforcement action against those who would disturb interfaith relations. Police reported the arrests of 21 young men who were directly involved in the incident.

In December the Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known as “Ahok”), the first Christian governor of Jakarta in more than 50 years, was charged with blasphemy for defaming the Quran during a campaign speech in September in which he told a crowd of voters it was wrong to manipulate verses from the Quran for political gain. The speech was met with criticism from the FPI, the Indonesia Ulema Council (MUI), and other Muslim groups who filed a police complaint to launch an investigation. Minister of Religious Affairs Lukman Hakim Saifuddin said, “Let the police resolve the matter in a civilized manner, without Muslims being provoked and aggravated.” On November 4, an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 people participated in a protest in Jakarta organized by the FPI and other groups calling for Ahok’s arrest for blasphemy. The protest ended in riots that injured more than 100 people, and on November 16, authorities officially named Ahok a suspect. On December 2, a reported 200,000 to 450,000 people rallied in Jakarta in a second protest against the governor. Ahok apologized but denied he committed blasphemy, saying he had no intention to insult the Quran and that his comments were directed at his political opponents, not Islam.

On October 31, police in Central Java charged a man with blasphemy because he reportedly tore apart the Quran. Police said the man tore his girlfriend’s Quran as an act of jealousy during an argument. The man reportedly converted to Islam in December and as of the end of the year was waiting for trial.

Members of minority religious groups continued to seek official recognition from the government.

On July 26, the local government closed an Ahmadi mosque in Sukabumi, West Java. According to the local officials, the closure was undertaken to preserve public order following complaints against the mosque’s Ahmadi affiliation.

East Java Ahmadi leaders said a village leader shut down their mosque in rural Tulungagung in January, citing a 2011 decision by East Java Governor Soekarwo to freeze Ahmadi activities. Ahmadis stated the local leader, supported by local police, had misinterpreted a freeze (which would not have affected private activities) as a ban (which would have required the group to stop practicing its faith altogether). The mosque remained closed at year’s end.

Ahmadis reported feeling under constant threat from militant groups. An Ahmadi mosque in South Jakarta remained officially closed by the local government after a July 2015 incident in which members of the FPI blocked the entrance of the Ahmadi headquarters building and mosque. Ahmadis said legal uncertainty among local officials and police, anonymous threats of violence, insufficient police protection, and fear of publicity were the barriers to reopening the building.

There were other cases of local governments, sometimes supported by police, closing houses of worship of minority groups for permit violations, often after protests from “intolerant groups” even if the minority groups had a proper permit. NGOs estimated, however, that as many as 85 percent of houses of worship, the majority of which are Sunni mosques, were operating without a permit. Many houses of worship operated without permits in office buildings, malls, private homes, and shops. Some houses of worship that were established before the joint ministerial decree on house of worship construction came into effect were still obligated to meet the requirements or face closure.

Mayor of Bandung Ridwan Kamil issued a ruling that an “intolerant group’s” December 6 disbandment of a large Christmas service held at a public convention center was against the law. He demanded the Muslim group, Pembela Ahli Sunnah, issue a formal apology.

National Police Chief Karnavian said an MUI fatwa prohibiting Muslims from wearing Christmas attire was not a law in the country and instructed police to arrest members of “intolerant groups” who conducted raids to enforce the fatwa. Karnavian reprimanded local police who circulated leaflets based on the MUI edict but said the police would not tolerate companies or store owners who forced their employees to wear Christmas attire. Karnavian’s remarks came after reports FPI members, accompanied by about 200 police officers, went to shopping malls in Surabaya to remind businesses not to require Muslim employees to wear Christmas attire such as Santa hats. President Joko Widodo and Minister of Religious Affairs Saifuddin also urged the public to respect Christians and to be tolerant of the country’s diverse religious groups.

Minority religious groups reported difficulty in meeting permit requirements for new and existing houses of worship and stated local government officials declined to approve construction permits, in one case for more than 15 years for a church. Many could not obtain the requisite number of outside signatures supporting the construction and often faced protest from “intolerant groups” making getting permits nearly impossible. Even when permits were attained, some houses of worship were forced to close or halt construction after facing legal challenges and public protest. Churches also reported “intolerant groups” forced them to pay protection money to continue operating without a permit.

On March 7, approximately 700 protesters who said they represented the Bekasi Islamic Outreach Forum marched to the construction site of Santa Clara Catholic Church in Bekasi to protest its construction. Local police protected the site and in general kept protesters under control. Minister of Religious Affairs Saifuddin issued a statement urging the dispute to be resolved through peaceful dialogue rather than through “excessive force aimed at disturbing interfaith harmony.” Construction of the church was still in progress as of the end of the year.

An Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) congregation in Bogor, West Java, continued negotiating issues related to its building permit after it was closed in 2010 by local authorities who complied with public pressure to close the church. The national ombudsman previously tried unsuccessfully to convince Bogor Mayor Bima Arya to uphold a Supreme Court ruling in favor of the congregation in its dispute with the local government over the building permit. The congregation regularly held services outside of the Presidential Palace.

Across the eastern part of the country, the requirement to cite support from 90 followers and 60 nonadherent neighbors to build a place of worship was not followed in practice. Balinese Christians and Muslims stated the official requirement to cite a specific number of supporters was undermined, either because governments did not issue permits when the requisite numbers were obtained or because neighbors were pressured to not approve. In many local cases, a few vocal opponents from the local majority religious affiliation were reportedly sufficient to stop construction approvals. State-recognized religious leaders in government-supported interfaith forums reportedly found ways to block aliran kepercayaan believers from constructing places of worship, largely through stringent house of worship permit requirements. Aliran kepercayaan adherents said they were fearful of being accused of atheism were they to fight this in court. Other religious minorities such as Ahmadi and Shia Muslims and Christians faced problems even when seeking approval to move to temporary facilities while a primary place of worship underwent renovation. Protestant leaders said local and provincial governments did not understand different Christian denominations and were suspicious when members of congregations traveled far to attend church instead of going to whatever church was closest to their residence. Religious minority communities said administrative suspicions and inaction blocked renovation or construction of new facilities even when they fulfilled the legal prerequisites.

Civil rights activists said locally implemented sharia-based regulations violated the constitution and called on the central government to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to revoke or review these regulations. A 2014 law reaffirmed the MOHA’s authority to revoke local regulations concerning religious matters that violated the constitution or national law, but there were no reports the MOHA had exercised this authority.

In May sharia police officers, who are part of the Aceh provincial government’s sharia implementation apparatus, stopped dozens of women in Lhokseumawe who were not riding motorcycles sidesaddle, and reprimanded approximately 100 people, both men and women, who were not dressed according to sharia regulations.

On July 4, Armed Forces Commander Gatot Nurmantyo issued an order to allow female soldiers to wear hijabs. In August a fifth-grade student at a state elementary school in Christian-majority Jayapura was given a written warning not to wear a hijab in school on the grounds that it was not in line with the school’s uniform.

In May the police chiefs of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area and East Aceh issued directives forbidding “intolerant groups” from conducting sweeps of food stalls open for business before sundown during Ramadan.

Aliran kepercayaan followers said they were pressured to send their children to a religious education class of one of the six recognized religions. Bahai followers said schools often allowed their children to spend religious education time in study hall, but parents were required to sign documents stating their children received official religious education. Ahmadi Muslim students reported religion classes for Islam only focused on Sunni teaching.

Civil servants who openly professed an adherence to an indigenous belief system said they had difficulty getting promoted.

Although the government generally allowed citizens to leave the religion column blank on their KTPs, some members of minority religious groups reported difficulties accessing government services and experiencing other forms of discrimination if they exercised this right. The lack of a KTP led to issues ranging from an inability to register for health insurance to problems applying for mortgages. Faced with this problem, many religious minority members reportedly chose to identify as a member of an officially recognized religion that is close to their beliefs or reflects the locally dominant religion. This practice obscured the real number of adherents to any particular religious group in government statistics. The government continued to allow aliran kepercayaan believers to omit religious information on their identity cards, but when accessing basic social services other government forms did not always permit leaving this section blank.

Several NGOs and religious advocacy groups continued to urge the government to delete the religion field from the identity cards. Religious minorities reported they sometimes faced discrimination after others saw their religious affiliation on the KTP. Members of the Jewish community said they felt uncomfortable stating their religion on their KTPs and often chose to state that they were Christians. According to a report in the Jakarta Post, followers of Javanese faith Sapto Darmo reported they were prohibited from burying the remains of their family members in public cemeteries after community members realized they did not identify as one of the six official religions on their KTP. Members of the indigenous Parmalim faith also reported being refused KTPs when the officials who processed their registration application saw that they did not declare a religion. Data from an NGO showed approximately 42,000 followers of several traditional faiths were denied basic civil registry documentations such as KTPs, birth certificates, and marriage licenses, and approximately 80,000 could not access public services. In response, the MOHA said members of indigenous religions were entitled to the same access to basic services, regardless of what they did or did not declare as their religion on their KTP, and that such discrimination was a violation of the law.

Minority Muslim groups also continued to report resistance when they tried to apply for KTPs as Muslims. Many Ahmadis continued to be able to acquire KTPs listing their religion as Islam; Ahmadis in Jakarta, however, reportedly faced difficulties acquiring KTPs, effectively denying them access to public services. Like other religious minorities, Ahmadis and Shia reported discrimination in the administration of public services if they chose to leave the religion column blank on their KTPs. Bahai followers also reported difficulties, as many local officials were unaware of the option to leave the religion section blank and refused to issue the KTP.

Both the central and local governments included elected and appointed officials from minority groups. For example, the Governor of Jakarta was a Protestant, the Mayor of Solo was a Catholic, and a leading Shia figure held a seat in the House of Representatives, elected from a majority Sunni district in Bandung, West Java. As of July, President Joko Widodo’s 34-member cabinet included five members of minority faiths.

Foreign religious workers stated they found it relatively easy to obtain visas. Despite laws restricting proselytizing, foreign religious groups reported little government interference with preaching or religious conversions. Police provided special protection to some churches in major cities during Sunday services and Christian holidays.

One child was killed and three children were injured in what security officials said was a lone-wolf ISIS-inspired attack on November 13 when a former terrorist prisoner detonated a Molotov cocktail in front of a church in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, following a Sunday service. The suspect was arrested and the president called for a thorough investigation and condemned religious violence. Investigation into the attack remained ongoing.

On August 29, a man attacked a priest holding Mass at St. Joseph Catholic Church in Medan. The man had failed to detonate a homemade suicide bomb and instead assaulted the priest with a knife before being overpowered by parishioners. Police said the man was a lone-wolf attacker who was inspired by ISIS propaganda online, had a connection with an Indonesian in Syria, and was not motivated by sectarian tensions within Indonesia. The priest suffered minor injuries. Government officials and Muslim community leaders condemned the attack.

A Molotov cocktail was thrown at a Buddhist temple in Singkawang, West Kalimantan early in the morning on November 14. The government spoke out against religious intolerance, offered protection and assurances for the religious community affected, and as of the end of the year, had questioned eight people as part of an investigation into the incident, according to media reports.

NGOs warned of rising anti-Shia sentiment in East Java, the heartland of the Nahdlatul Ulema (NU) Sunni Muslim organization. According to reports, local NU-affiliated imams continued to block reconciliation and the return of Shia internally displaced people (IDPs) to their homes in a case that has continued for several years. Several days before Eid al-Fitr, certain local Sunnis in East Java prevented hundreds of Shia IDPs from returning to their homes on Madura for the holiday. They threatened to kill Shia who tried to return and harm people who assisted them. No violent clashes were reported during this event, but there were no reports of Shia being able to return home because of the intimidation and threats of violence. More than 300 Shia reportedly remained displaced and unable to return to Madura. Anti-Shia rhetoric was also common in some online media outlets and on social media.

On April 1, hundreds of people calling themselves the Aswaja (Adherents to the Sunnah and the Community), a loose coalition of a number of NU and Persatuan (an Islamic educational organization) schools, broke up a gathering of 100 Shia women in Pasuruan district south of Surabaya. The women were celebrating the birthday of the Prophet’s daughter, Fatima, an important event in Shia tradition. Police, military, and district public order forces who were present to safeguard the event responded to Aswaja’s demands, and after two hours the Shia dispersed.

On April 6, more than 10,000 Shia from East Java gathered in Bondowoso for a religious commemoration, despite vows by 3,000 anti-Shia protestors to disrupt the event. According to local media, security forces deployed 1,751 police and military to prevent the protestors from disrupting the Shia gathering. The local police chief attended the Shia events as an observer to help prevent clashes, according to a Shia leader.

In Christian-majority North Maluku, on August 24, seven members of the Shia Jafariyah congregation led by Nawawi Husni were subject to intimidation by local residents after holding a religious event in Marikurubu Subdistrict. Local police were deployed to ensure the safety of the Shia members. The police later evacuated the congregation to the police headquarters after local residents tried to damage their houses. The Shia eventually returned safely to their homes.

Members of Manado’s small Jewish community reported being intimidated by their Christian neighbors after a weekly Shabbat observance.

People affiliated at the local level with the MUI used rhetoric religious minorities considered intolerant. The MUI issued edicts against members of Gafatar in February. On June 13, the MUI protested the clothing worn by two female hosts of a Ramadan television show, stating it depicted Christian crosses. On August 25, the MUI and FPI protested the uniforms of a group of people raising the national flag in Banten, stating their uniforms depicted the Christian cross.

In March a group of church leaders in a Christian-majority region of Papua called on local officials in the highland town of Wamena to prevent the expansion of an existing mosque, ban the use of mosque loudspeakers, prohibit the wearing of headscarves in public, and stop forcing Papuan children to attend Islamic boarding schools. Several prominent Papuan religious leaders disavowed the petition of the Wamena churches as harmful to religious harmony. Komnas HAM called on the church groups to revoke the petition but agreed that Papuan children, the majority of whom are Christian, should not be forcibly sent to Islamic boarding schools. Papuan provincial Governor Lukas Enembe convened a meeting with the Papuan FKUB, religious leaders, and police to call on all sides to engage in interfaith dialogue to prevent any further escalation.

Religious minorities in Bali stated the close association of Balinese traditional culture with Balinese Hinduism created problems for Balinese who converted to Christianity, Islam, or another religion. Religious minority leaders reported Balinese women could maintain their family and social ties after converting to a new religion under recently introduced laws articulating the rights of inheritance and custody, but the laws were ignored in practice. Balinese men who converted to a new religion faced social banishment and loss of inheritance rights.

According to news reports, unknown perpetrators vandalized an Ahmadi mosque in Purworejo village, Kendal Regency, Central Java Province on May 23. The Ahmadi congregation had been in an ongoing dispute with local leaders over the construction of the mosque and the local Ahmadi leader cited a recent argument with the local village head as the provocation for the incident. On May 25, the local government facilitated mediation and the Ahmadis agreed to halt construction on the mosque pending a police investigation. Following the police investigation, the local village leader initiated a community effort to reconstruct the mosque, and police publicly stated they would protect the Ahmadi’s right to worship in the community.

Many in the media, civil society, and the general population were vocal and active in protecting and promoting tolerance and pluralism. NGOs reported large numbers of Christian-to-Muslim and Muslim-to-Christian conversions, particularly in urban centers and the province of West Java. Many people who converted faced discrimination. The largest and most influential religious groups and NGOs, including the two largest Islamic groups in the country – NU and Muhammadiyah, with some 40 and 30 million members, respectively – officially endorsed and advocated for tolerance, pluralism, and the protection of minority groups. On April 9, for instance, NU Chairman Said Aqil Siradj publicly called on all NU members to uphold tolerance and moderate values as part of Islam. Muhammadiyah Chairman Haedar Nasir called on Indonesians to respect other religions and reject all communal violence after the August temple burnings in Tanjung Balai. “Intolerant groups” that were accused of using religion to justify criminal activity and vigilantism, however, continued to take actions against minority religious groups, including intimidation, extortion, vandalism, and protest. “Intolerant groups” reportedly accept bribes to advance corrupt political and business interests through their protests and actions. Komnas HAM stated “intolerant groups” in West Java extorted “hundreds of millions” of rupiah (thousands of dollars) from churches by threatening to vandalize and protest outside churches if they did not comply.

Leaders of the High Council of Indonesian Traditional Belief Adherents reported their numbers were in decline, largely due to formal and informal discrimination from government practices and societal attitudes.

Religious groups cooperated with each other and with other organizations on interfaith conferences and events, advocating for respect and tolerance, and speaking out against violence. For instance, NU Deputy Secretary General Imam Pituduh told the Jakarta Postmembers of the organization’s youth wing “will be at the forefront of protecting Christian fellow citizens while conducting prayers and activities ahead of Christmas. This is in the name of tolerance.” A local Hindu leader in Bali suggested the people of Denpasar participate in the takbiran, which are festivities that occur the night before Eid al-Fitr. An estimated 1,500 non-Muslims in Denpasar participated. Muhammadiyah maintained an interfaith humanitarian network, and throughout the country, FKUB chapters took steps to affirm religious pluralism by mediating interreligious conflicts. Christians in Maluku provided free rides for Muslims going to prayer services during Eid al-Fitr after Muslims offered Christians rides to attend Christmas Eve services and safeguarded their churches during religious services in December 2015.

The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, the Consulate General in Surabaya, and the Consulate in Medan regularly engaged with all levels of the government on specific religious freedom issues, such as actions against religious minorities; closures of places of worship; arrests for blasphemy and defamation of religion; the undue influence of “intolerant groups” and the importance of the rule of law; the application of sharia to non-Muslims; religious registration requirements on KTPs; the importance of education and interfaith dialogue in promoting tolerance; and promotion of tolerance in international forums. During his October visit, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom conducted public outreach and met with government, NGO, and religious leaders in Jakarta, Banda Aceh, Bali, and Surabaya to discuss the importance of promoting religious freedom and protecting the rights of all in the country, a message he also underscored through public outreach events.

Representatives of the embassy, consulate general, and consulate spoke publicly about the importance of religious tolerance and protecting minorities from acts of violence. Embassy staff at all levels met frequently with religious leaders, representatives of social organizations, and human rights advocates to clarify U.S. policy in support of religious freedom, discuss religious tolerance, and promote respect for religion. Embassy and consulate officials also met with members of minority religious groups who were victims of religious intolerance.

The United States-Indonesia Society, a nonprofit organization endorsed by the U.S. and Indonesian governments, collaborated with Indonesian and U.S. religious leaders to launch the Indonesia-U.S. Council on Religion and Pluralism in Yogyakarta on August 10-11. The nongovernmental council convened a diverse group of experts, academics, and religious and civil society leaders to promote interfaith dialogue, pluralism, and tolerance, and to combat violent extremism in both countries.

The embassy held numerous events at its cultural center venues that directly and indirectly supported religious freedom. For example, the embassy sponsored a series designed for local audiences to hear directly from prominent local Muslims about their experiences in the United States. An August event in the series focused on the 2016 presidential election and discussed its relation to religious freedom. An Indonesian American imam and a local representative of the Center for Strategic and International Studies discussed the inclusion and involvement of the U.S. Muslim community in the presidential election, and broader themes of fundamental American values such as freedom of religion. Two local TV stations and three print media outlets covered the event.

Embassy and consulate staff appeared on a number of nationally televised programs to discuss themes related to religious tolerance and diversity. Previous participants in U.S. government-funded student exchange programs appeared with embassy and consulate officials to provide accounts of their experiences in the United States including religious tolerance. Embassy and consulate personnel also led discussions and gave presentations at venues throughout the country, conveying the importance of diversity and religious tolerance to thousands of high school, Islamic boarding school, and university students. Collectively, these outreach activities carried messages of religious tolerance and religious freedom to tens of millions of viewers.

During Ramadan, embassy and consulate staff held numerous events and outreach activities that promoted religious tolerance. The embassy again sponsored a team of reporters who visited the United States to create news and documentary stories on topics that included U.S. religious life. The stories were again featured as part of the Muslim Travelers reality show during Ramadan and received an award in 2015 from the Indonesian Broadcasters Association for Best Ramadan Program. Muslim Travelers videos can be viewed on the embassy’s YouTube page. The embassy hosted iftars to advocate for tolerance and pluralism through remarks and discussions to a wide cross section of society, including political figures, civil society representatives, and students.

Embassy and consulate staff conducted extensive print, TV, and digital outreach, including the Ambassador’s Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr greeting videos and other religious pluralism initiatives that reached millions of individuals throughout the country. The embassy continued to manage a regular English language-learning column titled “Miss Understanding” on Facebook that aimed to promote religious freedom, diversity, and pluralism. The embassy, consulate general, and consulate also sponsored study exchanges and other civil society programs focusing on religious pluralism and tolerance, including programs for rising leaders and scholars.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 82.8 million (July 2016 estimate). According to U.S. government estimates and other statistical reports, including Global Security and Iran Press Watch, Muslims constitute 99 percent of the population; 89-94 percent are Shia and 5-9 percent Sunni (mostly Turkmen, Arabs, Baluchis, and Kurds living in the northeast, southwest, southeast, and northwest, respectively). Afghan refugees, economic migrants, and displaced persons also make up a significant Sunni population but accurate statistics on the breakdown between Sunni and Shia are unavailable. There are no official statistics available on the number of Muslims who practice Sufism, although unofficial reports estimate several million.

According to U.S. government estimates and other statistical estimates, including Global Security, Iran Press Watch, and Iran Primer, groups together constituting the remaining less than 1 percent of the population include Bahais, Christians, Jews, Sabean-Mandaeans, Zoroastrians, and Yarsanis. The three largest non-Muslim minorities are Bahais, Christians, and Yarsanis.

There is no official count of Yarsanis, but one NGO and some Yarsani leaders estimate there are up to one million. Yarsanis have often been classified by the government as Shia Muslims practicing Sufism, but Yarsanis identify Yarsan as a distinct faith (known as Alhe Haq or Kakai). Yarsanis are mainly located in Loristan and the Kurdish regions.

According to Human Rights Watch data, Bahais number at least 300,000.

According to World Christian Database statistics, there are approximately 285,000 Christians, although some estimates suggest there may be many more Christians than actually reported. While the government’s Statistical Center of Iran reports there are 117,700, Elam Ministries, an Iranian Christian organization, estimates that there could be between 300,000 and one million Christians. The majority of Christians are ethnic Armenians concentrated in Tehran and Isfahan. Estimates by the Assyrian Church of the total Assyrian and Chaldean Christian population put their combined number at 7,000. There are also Protestant denominations, including evangelical groups, but there are no authoritative data on their numbers. Christian groups outside the country estimate the size of the Protestant community to be less than 10,000, although many Protestants and other converts to Christianity from Islam reportedly practice in secret.

According to Zoroastrian groups and the Statistical Center of Iran, there are approximately 25,000 Zoroastrians.

According to the Tehran Jewish Committee, there are approximately 9,000 Jews, while one British media report estimated their number at 18,000-20,000. There reportedly are 5,000 to 10,000 Sabean-Mandaeans.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as an Islamic republic, and Ja’afari Shia Islam to be the official state religion. The constitution stipulates all laws and regulations must be based on “Islamic criteria” and official interpretation of sharia. The constitution states citizens shall enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, “in conformity with Islamic criteria.”

The constitution states the investigation of an individual’s ideas is forbidden, and no one may be “subjected to questioning and aggression for merely holding an opinion.” The law prohibits Muslim citizens from changing or renouncing their religious beliefs. The only recognized conversions are from another religion to Islam. Apostasy from Islam is a crime punishable by death. Under the law, a child born to a Muslim father is considered to be Muslim.

By law, non-Muslims may not engage in public persuasion, or attempted conversion of Muslims. These activities are considered proselytizing and are punishable by death. In addition, citizens who are not recognized as Christians, Zoroastrians, or Jews may not engage in public religious expression, such as worshiping in a church, or wearing religious symbols, such as a cross. Some exceptions are made for foreigners belonging to unrecognized religious groups.

The penal code specifies the death sentence for moharebeh (enmity towards or waging war against God or “drawing a weapon on the life, property or chastity of people or to cause terror as it creates the atmosphere of insecurity”), fisad fil-arz (corruption on earth – including apostasy or heresy), and sabb al-nabi (“insulting the prophets” or “insulting the sanctities”).

The constitution states the Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi Sunni schools of Islam are “deserving of total respect” and their followers are free to perform religious practices. It states these schools may follow their own jurisprudence in matters of religious education and certain personal affairs, including marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

The constitution states Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians are the only recognized religious minorities. “Within the limits of the law,” they have permission to perform religious rites and ceremonies and to form religious societies. They are also free to address personal affairs and religious education according to their own religious canon. The government does not recognize evangelicals as Christian. Because the law prohibits citizens from converting from Islam to another religion, the government only recognizes the Christianity of citizens who are Armenian or Assyrian Christians, since the presence of these groups in the country predates Islam, or, reportedly, of citizens who can prove that they or their families were Christian prior to 1979 revolution. The government also recognizes Sabean-Mandaeans as Christian, even though the Sabean-Mandaeans do not consider themselves to be Christians. Any citizen who is not a registered member of one of these three groups or of Judaism or Zoroastrianism or who cannot prove that his or her family was Christian prior to 1979 is considered Muslim. Citizens who are members of one of these recognized religious minorities must register with the authorities.

Registration conveys certain rights, including the use of alcohol for religious purposes. Failure of churchgoers to register and attendance at churches by unregistered individuals may subject a church to closure and arrest of its leaders by the authorities. Christian converts are not recognized as Christian under the law; they cannot register, and are not entitled to the same rights as recognized members of Christian communities.

The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security monitor religious activity, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also monitors churches.

The constitution provides for freedom of the press except when it is “harmful to the principles of Islam or the rights of the public.” Unrecognized religious minorities, such as Yarsanis and Bahais, report they are unable to legally produce or distribute religious literature.

The religious curriculum of public schools is determined by the Ministry of Education. All school curricula, public and private, must include a course on Shia Islamic teachings and all pupils must pass this course in order to advance to the next educational level through university. Sunni students and students from recognized minority religious groups must also take and pass the courses on Shia Islam, although they may also take courses on their own religious beliefs separately.

Recognized religious minority groups, except for Sunni Muslims, may operate private schools. The Ministry of Education supervises the private schools operated by the recognized minority religious groups and imposes certain curriculum requirements. The ministry must approve all textbooks used in coursework, including religious texts. These schools may provide their own religious instruction and in languages other than Farsi, but authorities must approve those texts as well. Minority communities must bear the cost of translating the texts into Farsi so the authorities can review them. Directors of such private schools, whether Muslim or of another religious affiliation, must demonstrate loyalty to the official state religion (a requirement known as gozinesh review, an evaluation to determine adherence to the government ideology and system as well as knowledge of the government interpretation of Shia Islam).

The law bars Bahais from founding their own educational institutions. A Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology order requires universities to exclude Bahais from access to higher education or expel them if their religious affiliation becomes known. Government regulation states Bahais are permitted to enroll in schools only if they do not identify themselves as such. To register for the university entrance examination, Bahai students must identify themselves as followers of a religion other than Bahai. To pass the entrance examination, university applicants must pass an exam on Islamic, Christian, or Jewish theology based on their official religious affiliation.

According to the constitution, Islamic scholars in the Assembly of Experts, an assembly of 86 popularly elected clerics, whose qualifications include piety and religious scholarship, elect the supreme leader, the country’s putative head of state. To “safeguard” Islamic ordinances and to ensure the compatibility with Islam of legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (i.e., the parliament or Majlis), a Guardian Council composed of six Shia clerics appointed by the supreme leader, and six Shia legal scholars nominated by the judiciary must review and approve all legislation. The Guardian Council also reviews all candidates for the Assembly of Experts, president, and parliament and supervises elections for those bodies.

The constitution bans the parliament from passing laws contrary to Islam and states there may be no amendment to its provisions related to the “Islamic character” of the political or legal system or to the specification of Shia Ja’fari Islam as the official religion.

Non-Muslims may not be elected to a representative body or hold senior government, intelligence, or military positions, with the exception of five of the 290 parliament seats reserved by the constitution for recognized religious minorities. There are two seats reserved for Armenian Christians, one for Assyrian and Chaldean Christians together, one for Jews, and one for Zoroastrians.

The constitution states, in regions where followers of one of the recognized Sunni schools constitute the majority, local regulations are to be in accordance with that school within the bounds of the jurisdiction of local councils and without infringing upon the rights of the followers of the other schools.

According to the constitution, a judge should rule on a case on the basis of the codified law, but in a situation where such law is absent, he should deliver his judgment on the basis of “authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwas.”

The constitution specifies the government and all Muslims are “required to treat non-Muslims in conformity with the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human rights, as long as those non-Muslims have not conspired or acted against Islam and the Islamic republic.

The law authorizes collection of “blood money” or diyeh as restitution to families for the death of Muslims and members of recognized religious minorities. Bahai families are not entitled to receive diyeh. This law also reduces the diyeh for recognized religious minorities and women to half that of a Muslim man.

By law, non-Muslims may not serve in the judiciary, the security services (separate from regular armed forces), or as public school principals. Officials screen candidates for elected offices and applicants for public sector employment based on their adherence to and knowledge of Islam and loyalty to the Islamic republic (gozinesh requirements), although members of recognized religious minorities, may serve in the lower ranks of government if they meet these gozinesh requirements. Government workers who do not observe Islamic principles and rules are subject to penalties and may be fired or barred from work in a particular sector.

Bahais are banned from all government employment. They are not allowed to participate in the governmental social pension system. Bahais cannot receive compensation for injury or crimes committed against them and cannot inherit property. A religious edict (fatwa) from the supreme leader encourages citizens to avoid all dealings with Bahais.

The government does not recognize Bahai marriages or divorces, but allows a civil attestation of marriage to serve as a marriage certificate, which allows for basic recognition of the union but does not offer legal protections in marital disputes. Bahai activists report this often leaves women without legal protections provided for in government-recognized marriage contracts.

Recognized religious groups issue marriage contracts in accordance with their religious laws.

The constitution permits the formation of political parties based on Islam or on one of the recognized religious minorities, provided the parties do not violate the “criteria of Islam,” among other stipulations.

The constitution states the military must be Islamic, must be committed to Islamic ideals, and must recruit individuals who are committed to the objectives of the Islamic revolution. In addition to the regular military, there is an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps charged with upholding the Islamic nature of the revolution at home and abroad. The law does not provide for exemptions from military service based on religious affiliation. The law forbids non-Muslims from holding positions of authority over Muslims in the armed forces, thus limiting upward mobility of religious minorities. Members of recognized religious minorities with a college education may serve as officers during their mandatory military service, but may not continue to serve beyond the mandatory service period to become career military officers.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to Amnesty International and other international human rights NGOs, the government convicted and executed dissidents, political reformers, and peaceful protesters on charges of moharebeh and anti-Islamic propaganda. The government executed more than 20 Sunni Kurds on charges of moharebeh and incarcerated numerous prisoners on varying charges related to religion. According to the U. S.-based NGO United for Iran, there were 198 political prisoners incarcerated on charges “waging war against God,” 31 for “insulting Islam,” and 12 for “corruption on earth.” Shia religious leaders who did not support government policies reportedly continued to face intimidation and arrest. The government continued to harass, interrogate, and arrest Bahais. The government also continued to regulate Christian religious practices closely to enforce the prohibition on proselytizing and conversion. Security officials continued to raid and demolish existing prayer sites belonging to Sunnis; the government reportedly barred the construction of new Sunni mosques. Authorities continued demolition of a Bahai cemetery in Shiraz. There were reports of authorities placing restrictions on Bahai businesses or forcing them to shut down.

According to multiple reports from international media, such as Reuters, and NGOs, including the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (ICHRI) and Amnesty International, on August 2, one week after airing their confessions on television, the government executed more than 20 Sunni Kurdish prisoners at Rajai Shahr Prison on charges of moharebeh, “being affiliated with Salafi groups”, and “acting against national security.” Those executed included Bahman Rahimi, Mokhtar Rahimi, Yavar Rahimi, Arash Sharifi, Kaveh Veisi, Ahmad Nasiri, Kaveh Sharifi, Behrouz Shahnazari, Talek Malek, and Shahram Ahmadi. Courts had upheld the death sentences even though NGOs reported the charges were based on confessions obtained through torture.

Courts also upheld the 2015 death sentences of Sunni prisoners Mohammad Kayvan Karimi, Amjad Salehi, and Omid Payvand, on charges of “enmity against God through spreading propaganda against the system,” despite NGO reports the convictions were based on confessions obtained through torture.

IHRDC reported the government executed one individual with the initials H.S. on charges of moharebeh in January in Zanjan. Additional information about the case was unavailable.

According to the Iranian Human Rights News Agency, on November 18, Mohammad Eshaqabadi, a member of the Gonabadi community of Sufi dervishes, died several days after he was detained by plainclothes policemen in Tehran.

Residents of provinces with large Sunni populations, including Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and Sistan-Baluchistan, reported continued repression by the judiciary and security services, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest, and torture in detention, as well as discrimination, including suppression of religious rights, lack of basic government services, and inadequate funding for infrastructure projects. Sunnis reported it was sometimes difficult to distinguish whether the cause of government discrimination against them was religious or ethnic, since most Sunnis were also members of ethnic minority groups.

According to Baluchi rights activists, Baluchi journalists and human rights activists faced arbitrary arrest, physical abuse, and unfair trials. Baluchi rights activists reported families of those in prison were often pressured to remain silent and threatened with retaliation for speaking out about cases. Baluchistan Human Rights Group reported on October 19 that Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) agents arrested Ameneh Issazadeh, a Sunni Baluchi girl from Sirik Township, at her home for criticizing religious ceremonies on social media during the month of Moharam. She contacted her family from a MOIS detention center in Bandar Abbas after several days, but her family was not allowed to see her.

Christians who were arrested were reportedly subject to severe physical and psychological mistreatment. The Christian news website, Mohabat News, said the mistreatment sometimes included beatings and solitary confinement.

According to the Iran Prison Atlas data set from United for Iran, there were 31 political prisoners incarcerated on charges of “insulting Islam,” 198 for moharebeh, and 12 for “corruption on earth” and at least 103 members of minority religious groups remained imprisoned for their religious activities. According to the Bahai International Community (BIC), there were 86 Bahai prisoners incarcerated at year’s end. According to Christian World Watch Monitor, there were 82 arrests of Christians (including converts) during the year. According to IHRDC, at least 261 people remained imprisoned at the end of the year for their membership in or activities on behalf of a minority religious group, including at least 115 Sunnis, 80 Bahais, 26 Christian converts, 18 Sufis, and 10 Yarsanis.

Mohammad Ali Taheri, founder of the spiritual doctrine Interuniversalism, remained in prison serving a life sentence for “insulting the sanctities.” Taheri reportedly began a hunger strike on September 28 and was transferred to the hospital after fainting, according to local media reporting. One of his supporters, Sara Saei was summoned to court in January for participating in protests of Taheri’s prison conditions, according to IHCRI. In October security forces, using tear gas and beating participants with batons, reportedly broke up a gathering of Taheri’s supporters in front of Baghiatollah Hospital, where he was believed to be hospitalized, and arrested 15 people.

The September 6 report of the UN by Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Iran, Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, stated that flogging continued to be used as punishment for not fasting during the month of Ramadan.

Multiple Bahais remained incarcerated, serving sentences on charges including “insulting religious sanctities,” “corruption on earth,” “propaganda against the system,” and actions against national security, or for their involvement with the Bahai Institute for Higher Education (BIHE), a university-level educational institution the government considered illegal. Of seven Bahai leaders serving 20-year terms after 2011 convictions, one, Afif Naeimi, was provisionally released in July for medical reasons due to a heart condition. He remained out of jail at year’s end. Two of the remaining six, Fariba Kamalabadi and Mahvash Sabet received five-day furloughs before returning to prison. Prison authorities denied Abdolfattah Soltani, an attorney who defended teachers at BIHE and was serving a 13-year sentence, family visitation and adequate medical treatment, according to an August 17 report by ICHRI. Amanollah Mostaghim, who had been serving a five-year sentence, was released due to continued medical issues, according to official online Bahai records.

The BIC reported that on January 24, 24 Bahais were sentenced to long-term imprisonment for religious activity. At year’s end, the individuals were free on bail awaiting the outcome of an appeal. Police arrested 14 Bahais in Shiraz and Karaj for their religious beliefs on September 28 according to the BIC. Police arrested Behzad Zabihi Mahforouzaki, a Bahai business owner, on March 8, first charging him with “propaganda against the regime” and later with “propaganda against Islam and the Quran.” Zabihi spent seven days in a detention center and was released on bail of 900 million rials ($27,800). Zabihi said he was illegally arrested, subjected to torture and insults, prevented from defending himself, and pressured to abandon his faith. There was no further information on the status of his case. Peyman Koushk-Baghi, who was sentenced to five years in prison in 2015 for his activities at BIHE, appealed both his sentence and that of his wife, Azita Rafizadeh, who had been previously convicted of similar charges and was serving a four-year prison sentence. Rafizadeh continued to serve her sentence, but Koushk-Baghi remained free at year’s end pending his appeal.

According to the BIC, the government continued to prohibit Bahais from officially assembling or maintaining administrative institutions, actively closed such institutions, harassed Bahais, and disregarded their property rights. On October 4 in Qorveh, security forces raided the home of, and arrested Bahai homeopathic physician Maria Kosari on charges that she was violating sanitary codes by practicing in a field banned to Bahais.

Christians, particularly evangelicals and converts from Islam, continued to experience disproportionate levels of arrests and detention, and high levels of harassment and surveillance, according to reports from exiled Christians. Numerous Christians remained imprisoned at year’s end on charges related to their religious practices. Prison authorities reportedly continued to withhold medical care from prisoners, including some Christians, according to human rights groups. According to human rights NGOs, the government also continued to enforce the prohibition on proselytizing.

Several converts who used wine during communion services were arrested during the year. According to reporting from the NGO Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Christian converts Yasser Mossayebzadeh, Saheb Fadaie, and Mehdi Reza Omidi were arrested on May 13 for drinking communion wine and convicted and sentenced to 80 lashes each in the city of Rasht on September 10. All were appealing their sentences at year’s end.

According to Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Amin Afshar Naderi, Hadi Asgari, Amir Saman Dashti, Mohammad Dehnavi, and Ramil Bet-Tamraz were arrested on August 26 in a private garden in Firouzkooh for having Bibles. Four of the five were Christian converts. According to Mohabat Christian news site, Naderi was beaten by security forces for resisting arrest. On October 18, Christian Solidarity Worldwide reported that two of the arrested Christians, Ramil Bet-Tamraz and Mohammad Dehnavi, were released on bail. The rest remained in Evin prison. In August authorities arrested a Christian convert after raiding his house, confiscating religious materials found there. He was convicted of “acting against national security” and sentenced to one year in jail. According to the British online news site Christian Today, on June 24, police arrested three Azerbaijani Christians while they were leading a Bible study in a private apartment. After being detained for two months at Evin Prison, the three were released after paying bail and returned to Azerbaijan.

According to Mohabat News, prison guards beat Ebrahim Firouzi on July 12 for writing an open letter stating he would not attend any hearings about his case. Firouzi was serving a five-year sentence at Rajai Shahr Prison after a 2013 conviction for “collusion against national security” for converting to and practicing Christianity.

Christian convert Maryam Naghash Zargaran, originally arrested in 2012, continued to serve beyond her original four-year sentence on charges of “propaganda against the Islamic regime and collusion intended to harm national security” for her activities in the Christian community. According to Mohabat News, Zarfaran went on two hunger strikes to seek conditional early release under a provision of the penal code. She was reported to be in poor health but was not on medical furlough.

Pastor Yousef Nadarkhani was rearrested in Rasht on May 13 for proselytizing. His wife and three members of his church were also arrested, but their charges were not specified. Pastor Nadarkhani’s wife was subsequently released, and the pastor was released on bail July 24. The three church members remained in custody at year’s end.

The authorities often arrested members of unrecognized churches for operating illegally in private homes or on charges of supporting and accepting assistance from enemy countries. Many arrests reportedly took place during police raids on religious gatherings, during which the authorities also confiscated religious property.

Other unrecognized religious minorities such as Bahai and Yarsan also often gathered in private homes to practice their faith in secret.

According to the Article 18 Organization, an NGO, on April 27, plainclothes security agents arrested 17 Christians who were attending a private social event in Tehran. Following this incident, attendees of the event were reportedly subjected to interrogations and intimidation and had their private property seized. Two attendees were reportedly banned from continuing their university studies for engaging in “illegal activities” while other attendees lost their jobs. Several other attendees were charged with crimes against national security by propagating Christianity in a house church. On October 4, university authorities expelled a Christian pastor post-graduate student for engaging in unauthorized religious activities.

The government continued to regulate Christian religious practices closely. The authorities prevented Muslim converts to Christianity from entering Armenian or Assyrian churches, according to UN Special Rapporteur Shaheed. According to Christian community leaders, if the authorities found Armenian or Assyrian churches were baptizing new converts or preaching in Farsi, they closed the churches. The authorities reportedly also barred all unregistered or unrecognized Christians from entering church premises, closed churches that allowed them to enter, and arrested Christian converts. Christian advocacy groups stated the government, through such pressure and through church closures, had eliminated in recent years all but a handful of Farsi-language church services, restricting services to the Armenian and Assyrian languages. The government continued to ban Farsi-language churches, according to Christian Solidarity Worldwide. Security officials monitored registered congregation centers to perform identity checks on worshippers to confirm non-Christians or converts did not participate in services. In response, many citizens who had converted to Protestantism or other Christian faiths practiced their religion in secret.

The government continued to monitor the statements and views of senior Shia religious leaders. Shia religious leaders who did not support government policies or supreme leader Ali Khamenei’s views reportedly continued to face intimidation, arrest, and imprisonment on charges related to religious offenses.

The supreme leader oversaw the extrajudicial Special Clerical Courts, not provided for by the constitution. The courts, headed by a Shia Islamic legal scholar, operated outside the judiciary’s purview and were charged with investigating offenses committed by clerics, including political statements inconsistent with government policy and nonreligious activities. The courts also issued rulings based on independent interpretation of Islamic legal sources. Critics stated clerical courts were used to control non-Shia Muslim clerics, as well as to prosecute Shia clerics who expressed controversial ideas and participated in activities outside the sphere of religion, such as journalism or reformist political activities. On August 16, Vice President for Legal Affairs Majid Ansari declared cases of individuals and entities who insulted the president would be tried in the Special Clerical Courts.

Local media reported the Qom branch of the Special Clerical Court interrogated prominent cleric Hojjatoleslam Ahmad Montazeri on August 14 for posting audio recordings of his father, the late cleric Hossein Ali Montazeri, condemning a 1988 mass execution of political prisoners. After Hojjatolleslam Ahmad Montazeri’s interrogation, he was arrested September 4 for “endangering national security” and “leaking secrets of the Islamic system.” On September 5, he was released on a 700 million rials ($21,620) bail. On November 27, he was sentenced to 21 years in prison, of which he was ordered to serve six. The government suspended 15 years of his sentence because of what it said was respect for his family’s role and sacrifice in the 1979 revolution.

According to Amnesty International, Shia cleric Ayatollah Hossein Kazemeini Boroujerdi, serving an 11-year sentence after conviction on charges including “moharebeh” and “abusing his clerical flock,” was transferred to a medical clinic on January 19 to treat recurring stomach pain, nausea, vomiting, and dizziness, but was returned by prison officials to his cell the same day without undergoing full treatment.

Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Nekounam, who was originally arrested in 2015, remained in prison in Qom despite appeals for his release on medical grounds to the Special Clerical Court after he suffered a stroke during the year while in solitary confinement, according to Human Rights Activist News Agency (HRANA). Reportedly, the authorities brought him before the Special Clerical Court in June for further investigation.

There continued to be reports of arrests and harassment of Sunni clerics and congregants. ICHRI reported that in August Hassam Amini, a Sunni cleric and Islamic judge, was interrogated for two days by the intelligence ministry for his criticism of the execution of the 20 Sunni Kurdish prisoners in Rajai Shahr Prison and visiting the victim’s families. His interrogators reportedly said Amini “had acted against the state,” that his criticisms “disturbed the public and undermined the judiciary,” and his visit with the families meant he was supporting their positions. The intelligence ministry also interrogated Sunni religious scholar Hashemi Hossein Panahi on August 8 after he criticized the executions.

According to Majzooban-e-Noor, a website reporting on the Gonabadi (Sufi) dervish community, Gonabadi followers Kazem Dehghan and Salahaddin Moradi were charged with being members of an illegal group, a group countering the government and/or its theology, and conspiring to disrupt the country’s security. There was no further information on their case.

According to a February 1 report by Majzooban-e-Noor, a special clerical court sentenced seven dervishes of Kavar to internal exile on charges including moharebeh. The court sentenced Kazem Dehghan, Hamid Reza Arayesh, and Mohammad Ali Shamshirzan to permanent internal exile, and sentenced Mohammad Ali Dehghan, Mohammad Ali Sadeghi, Ebrahim Bahrami, and Mohsen Esmaeili to seven years of internal exile.

Security officials continued to raid prayer sites belonging to Sunnis. News media outlet Al Sharq Al Awsat reported 18 parliamentarians had presented a warning to Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli after the closure of a Sunni mosque in Eslamshahr, west of Tehran. Parliament member Mahmoud Sadeghi said the closure of the mosque “contradict the Shia-Sunni unity that is always stressed by the supreme leader.” Sadeghi also said authorities had blocked attendance at other Sunni mosques, including at Tehran Pars Mosque. HRANA reported plainclothes security agents raided a mosque in northwest Tehran and attacked worshippers there on the eve of Eid al-Fitr.

The government continued to require women of all religious groups to adhere to “Islamic dress” standards in public, including covering their hair and fully covering their bodies in loose clothing – a manteau (overcoat) and a rousari (headscarf), or, alternatively, a chador(full body length semicircle of fabric worn over both the head and clothes). Although the government at times eased enforcement of rules for such dress, it also punished “un-Islamic dress” with arrests, lashings, fines, and dismissal from employment. In May according to media reports, 99 students in Qazvin, both men and women, were each given 99 lashes for attending a coed party where the women were, according to authorities, improperly dressed in accordance with Islam.

According to members of the Sabean-Mandaean and Yarsan religious communities, authorities continued their harassment of these communities, including by denying them permission to perform religious ceremonies in public and denying them building permits for places of worship. The government continued to classify Yarsanis as Shia Muslims practicing Sufism, although Yarsanis identified themselves as practitioners of a distinct faith. Yarsanis reported continued discrimination in the military and school systems, where they faced harassment. They also faced discrimination in the birth registration system, which prevented them from giving their children Yarsani names. Without providing details, Yarsanis in exile reported thousands of community members remained missing after arrests by security forces.

The intelligence and security services reportedly continued their harassment of prominent Sufi leaders and raided Sufi businesses as a means of intimidation and information gathering. Government legal restrictions on Sufi groups and their husseiniya (auxiliary prayer and teaching spaces) also continued due to the groups’ differences with the government’s interpretation of Islam.

According to human rights activists, the government maintained a legal interpretation of Islam that required citizens of all faiths to follow strict rules based on the government’s interpretation of Shia jurisprudence, creating differentiation under the law between the rights granted to men and women. The government continued to enforce gender segregation and discrimination throughout the country without regard to religious affiliation.

The authorities, employers, bureaucrats, hotels, and others reportedly often used marriage contracts to identify and discriminate against religious minorities.

Government restrictions on published religious material continued. Government officials frequently confiscated Bibles and pressured publishing houses printing Bibles or unsanctioned non-Muslim materials to cease operations. Books about the Yarsan religion remained banned. Books published by religious minorities, regardless of their topic, were required to carry labels on the cover denoting their non-Shia authorship.

Iranian media reported there were nine Sunni mosques operating in Tehran and 15,000 across the country. International media and the Sunni community reported no new Sunni mosques were allowed to be built in Tehran to meet demand. Sunnis reported the existing number of mosques in the country did not meet the demands of the local population. Sunnis continued to cite the absence of a Sunni mosque in Tehran, despite the presence of more than one million Sunnis in the city, as an example of government discrimination. Sunni leaders said, because the government barred them from building or worshiping in their own mosques, they relied on ad hoc, underground prayer halls, or namaz khane, to practice their faith.

According to the BIC website, authorities continued demolition of the Bahai cemetery in Shiraz. A cultural and sports recreation center for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps built on the site of the cemetery was reportedly near completion. The BIC reported authorities representing the Ardestan Municipal Council bulldozed the Bahai cemetery in Ardestan on October 27. Although the BIC presented an official petition to the Municipal Council and the office of the Friday prayer leader of Ardestan, authorities did not launch an investigation. Instead, the BIC reported the municipal council put up a banner requiring any burial in the area to have a special permit and stipulating that anyone carrying out a burial without a permit could be prosecuted.

The government continued to hold many Bahai properties it had seized following the 1979 revolution, including cemeteries, holy places, historical sites, and administrative centers. The government also continued to prevent Bahais from burying their dead in accordance with their religious tradition.

According to the BIC, authorities continued to restrict Bahai businesses, making it difficult for Bahais to earn their livelihood. The government continued to raid Bahai homes and businesses and confiscated private and commercial property, as well as religious materials. There were reports of authorities placing restrictions on Bahai businesses or forcing them to shut down when they had temporarily closed in observance of Bahai holidays. On April 20, authorities sealed off 17 Bahai owned shops after the owners closed their businesses for Bahai holy days. The shops included two toy stores, two pharmacies, a tire repair shop, a women’s clothing store, and two optical stores. Authorities also reportedly asked managers of private companies to dismiss Bahai employees, and denied applications from Bahais for new or renewed business and trade licenses.

The Bahai community wrote a public letter to President Hassan Rouhani in September protesting the government’s continuing seizure of Bahai personal property and stating its denial of access to education and employment eroded the Bahai community’s economic base and threatened its survival. There was no public response from the government to the letter.

According to the Article 18 Organization, on July 26, the Third Branch of Tehran’s Revolutionary Court confirmed a 2015 court order to seize an Assemblies of God retreat center in Mohammadshahr. The court stated the U.S. Government funded the Assemblies of God to infiltrate the country and the Islamic world by conducting evangelistic activities.

Sunni leaders reported the authorities had banned Sunni religious literature and teachings from religion courses in some public schools, even in predominantly Sunni areas. Other schools, notably in the Kurdish regions, included specialized Sunni religious courses for the students. Assyrian Christians reported the government continued to permit their community to write its own religious textbooks for use in schools, after the government reviewed and authorized their content.

Members of the Bahai community reported teachers and administrators in public schools continued to try to convert Bahai children to Islam. The BIC stated in its October report, The Bahai Question Revisited, that “students were being pressured to convert to Islam, were required to endure slander of their faith by religious instructors, and were being taught and tested … from authorized texts that denigrate, distort, and brazenly falsify Bahai religious heritage.” According to the report, Bahai students were often transferred to schools farther from home and told not to teach or discuss their religion with other students.

According to the Tehran Jewish Committee, five Jewish schools and two kindergartens continued to operate in Tehran, but authorities required their principals to be Muslim. The government reportedly continued to allow Hebrew instruction but limited the distribution of Hebrew texts, particularly nonreligious texts, making it difficult to teach the language, according to the Jewish community. The government reportedly required Jewish schools to remain open on Saturdays, in violation of Jewish religious law, to conform to the schedule of other schools.

Public and private universities continued to deny Bahais admittance and to expel Bahai students once their religion became known. ICHRI reported the June expulsion of Faraz Karin-Kani Sisan from Ghiyaseddin Jamshid Kashani Institute for Higher Education (GJKI) in Abyek, Alborz Province, although he had already completed two years of study, after administrators found out he was Bahai. Many Bahais reportedly did not try to enroll in state-run universities because of the Bahai Faith’s tenet not to deny one’s faith.

During the year Bahai students reported they were unable to register for university, even if they passed entrance exams, because of error messages in the online registration system. According to HRANA, a Bahai high school graduate in Abadan, Seraj Azadi, was told by university admissions he could not register for university, despite successfully passing entrance exams, because he had “insufficient/incomplete documentation,” a statement reportedly used to deny Bahai students entrance into universities.

Many Bahais reportedly turned to online education at BIHE despite government censorship through use of internet filters and blocking of websites and the arrests of teachers associated with the program. As the BIHE’s operations, online and offline, were illegal, students and teachers faced risk of arrest for participation. BIHE instructor Azita Rafizadeh remained in prison serving out her four-year sentence for teaching at the institution. The government’s lack of recognition of degrees from BIHE resulted in employment barriers for graduates from the institution.

Authorities reportedly continued to deny the Sabean-Mandaean and Yarsan religious communities access to higher education and government employment unless they declared themselves to be Christian or Muslim, respectively, on their application forms.

According to Majzooban-e-Noor website, at the beginning of the new school year, authorities continued to bar Gonabadi Sufis from studying and teaching at universities. In September security at Azad University of Shiraz refused to allow Farshid Yadollahi, Sufi attorney and activist in his second year of graduate studies, to continue his education at the university.

Representatives of minority religious groups, such as the Bahais and Yarsanis, reported the government continued to avoid investigating crimes committed against members of religious minority groups and against their property, including religious sites and graveyards.

International news media, such as the UK newspaper The Independent, quoted Jewish community representatives as saying there continued to be government restrictions and discrimination against Jews, but little interference with Jewish religious practices. According to the government, there were 31 publicly-listed synagogues in Tehran. The Tehran Jewish Committee reported in 2015 there were 13 active synagogues in Tehran.

Jewish community representatives said they were free to travel in and out of the country, and the government generally did not enforce a prohibition against travel to Israel by Jews, although it enforced the prohibition with other citizens.

The government officially did not limit voting rights on account of religion, although there were separate election processes for the seats reserved for representatives of the recognized religious minority communities in parliament. The government continued to permit Sunnis, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Jews to serve in parliament but not the Assembly of Experts. Through the end of the year, the Guardian Council, assigned by the constitution to confirm the eligibility of candidates for the presidency, had deemed only Shia Muslims eligible for the presidency.

According to reporting from Mazjooban-e-Noor, university professor Sharam Pazouki was prevented from teaching at Azad University after authorities discovered his ties to the Gonbadi dervish community.

Sunnis reported continued underrepresentation in government-appointed positions in the provinces where they formed a majority, such as Kurdistan and Khuzestan, as well as inability to obtain senior government positions.

Sunni activists reported that throughout the year, and especially during the month of Moharam, the government sent hundreds of Shia missionaries to areas with large Sunni Baluch populations to try to convert the local population.

According to the Bahai International Community, government regulations continued to ban Bahais from participating over 25 types of work, many related to food industries, because the government deemed Bahais to be “unclean.”

The government allowed operation of a 100-bed Jewish hospital in Tehran, according to the Tehran Jewish Committee.

According to reports from the Bahai community, government-sponsored public denunciations of Bahais continued to increase steadily, as they had for several years, with over 20,000 pieces of anti-Bahai propaganda in the Iranian media during the year. Government media statements continued to accuse Bahais of sexual deviance and illegitimate relations, calling them members of a “cult” which was a threat to national security.

Former parliamentarian Faezeh Hashemi Rafsanjani was publicly criticized for visiting Bahai prisoner of conscience, Fariba Kamalabadi, in her home during a five-day furlough from jail. In response to Rafsanjani’s visit, on May 16, the Tasnim news agency quoted Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Sadeq Amoli-Larijani as saying the Bahai Faith “is a threat to Iran’s national security” and that relatives of senior clerics who socialized with Bahais “damage the norms.” An article in Javan magazine stated “…the deviant Bahai sect was created by colonists,” and called on Rafsanjani to apologize for her visit. Rafsanjani’s father, former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, also criticized his daughter’s visit.

Government officials continued to employ anti-Semitic rhetoric in official statements and sanction them in media outlets, publications, and books. On January 27, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s official website posted a video that questioned whether the Holocaust happened and criticized the U.S. and European governments for disapproving of Holocaust denial.

On April 29, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum cited the Iranian government’s partial funding of a Holocaust cartoon contest, which included anti-Semitic cartoons, stating, “The organizations associated with the contest are sponsored or supported by government entities, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Islamic Guidance.” There continued to be reports of government officials and government-affiliated religious figures making anti-Semitic statements, including a January video produced by the office of the supreme leader, questioning the facts surrounding the Holocaust. Government-sponsored rallies continued to include chants of “death to Israel” and accused other religious minorities, such as Bahais and Christians, of collusion with Israel. On June 30, Kayhan newspaper, whose management is appointed by the office of the supreme leader, published an article stating the Holocaust was a myth and a figment of Jewish historians’ imaginations.

Official reports and the media continued to characterize Christian house churches as “illegal networks” and “Zionist propaganda institutions.”

The government continued to allow recognized religious minority groups to establish community centers and certain self-financed cultural, social, athletic, and/or charitable associations.

Bahais, and those who advocated for their rights, reported Bahais continued to be a major target of social stigma and violence. According to The Bahai World News Service, Farhang Amiri, was stabbed to death outside his residence in Yazd on September 26 by individuals, one of whom stated during the police investigation that he had carried out the killing because Amiri was Bahai.

In March an attacker involved in 2014 acid attacks against women was arrested by authorities and charged with “deliberate destruction, arson, and attacks on women.” The media had reported at the time the attacks were being motivated by the women’s “improper Islamic dress.”

There continued to be reports of non-Bahais dismissing or refusing employment to Bahais, sometimes in response to government pressure, according to BIC.

Yarsanis outside the country reported there was widespread discrimination against Yarsanis in the country. Yarsani children were socially ostracized in school and shared community facilities. Yarsani men, recognizable by their particular mustaches, often faced employment discrimination. Friday preachers often encouraged such social discrimination against the Yarsani. During the year, protests broke out in the city of Eslamabad after police officers were seen mocking Yarsani men’s mustaches in the street.

According to Christian Solidarity Worldwide, converts from Islam faced societal pressure and rejection by family or community members.

Shia clerics and prayer leaders reportedly continued to denounce Sufism and the activities of Sufis in both sermons and public statements.

Sunni students reported professors routinely insulted Sunni religious figures in class.

On May 20, Fars Provincial TV aired a sermon by Shiraz Imam Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Razavi-Ardakani, who said the Bahai religion is not a religion but a political party that was created by the United Kingdom and that intelligence and security services should be attentive to Bahais operating in some of the cities in the country.

Bahai representatives in the U.S. reported there were at least three cases of destruction or vandalism of Bahai cemeteries. In July the Bahai cemetery in Ghorveh was completely destroyed and the gravestones razed to the ground. The Semnan Bahai cemetery was also vandalized in July. In October according to Iran Press Watch, vandals attacked the Bahai cemetery in Urmieh for the second time, cutting down trees, burning parts of the grounds, and demolishing graves. Local Bahais reported the incident to the police, who reportedly took no action.

The United States has no diplomatic relations with the country, and therefore did not have regular opportunities to raise concerns directly with the government over its religious freedom abuses and restrictions.

The U.S. government continued to call for the government to respect religious freedom and continued to condemn its abuses of religious minorities in a variety of ways and in different international forums. This included public statements by senior U.S. government officials and reports issued by U.S. government agencies, support for relevant UN and NGO efforts, diplomatic initiatives, and sanctions. Senior U.S. government officials publicly reiterated calls for the release of prisoners held on grounds related to their religious beliefs. For example, in May the Department of State issued a press statement condemning the continued detention of the seven members of the Bahai leadership council and called for their release. The Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom regularly criticized the country’s continued discrimination against Bahais and other religious minorities. In an August 24 statement, the Ambassador called upon the country to end the use of blasphemy and apostasy laws. In an October 4 Voice of America editorial, he reiterated the U.S. government’s concerns with the Iranian government’s discriminatory actions against religious minority groups, specifically Bahais. In other statements, U.S. government officials, including the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, called attention to the situation of Bahais and Christians in the context of supporting religious freedom for members of all minority religious groups in the country.

The United States supported an extension of the mandate of the UN special rapporteur for human rights in Iran in a vote at the UN Human Rights Council. The United States also voted in November and December in the UN General Assembly in favor of resolutions expressing concern over Iran’s human rights practices, including the continued persecution of religious minorities.

Since 1999, Iran has been designated as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On October 31, 2016, the Secretary of State redesignated Iran as a CPC and identified the existing sanctions as ongoing travel restrictions based on serious human rights abuses under section 221(a)(1)(C) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the population of Iraq to be 38 million (July 2016 estimate). According to 2010 government statistics, the most recent available, 97 percent of the population is Muslim. Shia Muslims, predominantly Arabs but including Turkmen, Faili (Shia) Kurds, and others, constitute 55 to 60 percent of the population. Sunni Muslims make up approximately 40 percent of the population: approximately 15 percent of the total population are Sunni Kurds, while approximately 24 percent are Sunni Arabs, and the remaining 1 percent are Sunni Turkmen. Shia, although predominantly located in the south and east, comprise the majority in Baghdad and have communities in most parts of the country. Sunnis form the majority in the west, center, and the north of the country.

Christian leaders estimate there are fewer than 250,000 Christians remaining in the country. The Christian population has declined over the past 15 years from a pre-2002 population estimate of between 800,000 and 1.4 million persons. Approximately 67 percent of Christians are Chaldean Catholics (an eastern rite of the Roman Catholic Church); nearly 20 percent are members of the Assyrian Church of the East. The remainder are Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Anglican, and other Protestant. Only 50 evangelical Christian families reportedly remain in the IKR, down from approximately 5,000 in 2013.

Yezidi leaders report most of the approximately 350,000 to 400,000 Yezidis reside in the north. Estimates of the size of the Sabaean-Mandaean community vary. According to Sabaean-Mandaean leaders, 10,000 remain in the country, mainly in the south with small pockets in the IKR and Baghdad. Bahai leaders report fewer than 2,000 members, spread throughout the country in small groups. The Shabaks constitute about 350,000-400,000 people, two-thirds to three-fourths of whom are Shia and the rest Sunni, and are mostly located in Ninewa. According to Kaka’i (also known as Yarsani) activists, their community has approximately 300,000 members, traditionally located in the Ninewa Plains, but also in villages southeast of Kirkuk, as well as in Diyala, Erbil, and Karbala. The Jewish representative in the KRG Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs (MERA) reports 430 Jewish families reside in the IKR. Fewer than 10 Jewish families are known to reside in Baghdad.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq was 3.06 million at year’s end. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the IOM estimate one million citizens remain internally displaced as a result of sectarian violence dating from 2006 and 2008 before ISIS became active. During the conflict with ISIS beginning in 2014, up to 3.5 million persons were internally displaced. Difficulties in gaining access to IDPs in areas of conflict, as well as the government’s limited capacity to register IDPs, means estimates of religious minorities among the IDPs are imprecise. According to international sources, more than 60 percent of Iraqi IDPs are Arab Sunni, approximately 17 percent are Yezidi, approximately 8 percent are Turkmen Shia, approximately 3 percent are Arab Shia and 3 percent are Kurdish Sunni. Shabak, Chaldean, and Assyrian Christians, Turkmen Sunni, and Kurdish Shia account for approximately 6 percent of the IDP population.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam to be the official religion of the state, and a “foundation source” of legislation. It states no law may be enacted contradicting the “established provisions of Islam,” but also states no law may contradict the principles of democracy or the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in the constitution.

The constitution protects the “Islamic identity” of the Iraqi people, although it makes no specific mention of Sunni or Shia Islam. The constitution also guarantees the freedom of religious belief and practice for Christians, Yezidis, and Sabaean-Mandeans. The law, however, prohibits the practice of the Bahai Faith and the Wahhabi branch of Sunni Islam.

The constitution states each individual has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and belief, and followers of all religions are free to practice religious rites and manage religious endowment affairs, and religious institutions. The constitution guarantees freedom from religious coercion, and states all citizens are equal before the law without regard to religion, sect, or belief.

In August the Council of Representatives passed an Amnesty Law, which includes a provision allowing for reinvestigation and retrial of detainees who were convicted under the antiterrorism law based solely on the information provided by secret informants.

Personal status laws and regulations prohibit the conversion of Muslims to other religions, and require administrative designation of minor children as Muslims if either parent converts to Islam.

The following religious groups are recognized by the law and thereby registered with the government: Islam, Chaldean, Assyrian, Assyrian Catholic, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Armenian Catholic, Roman Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Latin-Dominican Rite, National Protestant, Anglican, Evangelical Protestant Assyrian, Adventist, Coptic Orthodox, Yezidi, Sabaean-Mandaean, and Jewish. Recognition allows groups to appoint legal representatives and to perform legal transactions such as buying and selling property. All recognized religious groups have their own personal status courts which are responsible for handling marriage, divorce, and inheritance issues. There are three diwans (chambers) responsible for administering matters for the recognized religious groups within the country: the Sunni Endowment Diwan, the Shia Endowment Diwan, and the Endowment of the Christians, Yezidi, and Sabaean-Mandaean Religions Diwan. The three waqfs operate under the authority of the prime minister’s office to disburse government funds to maintain and protect religious facilities.

Outside of the IKR, the law does not provide a mechanism for a new religious group to obtain legal recognition. Iraqi law allows punishment for anyone practicing the Bahai Faith with 10 years’ imprisonment. For unrecognized religions other than Bahai – e.g., Wahhabi, Zoroastrian, and Kaka’i – the law does not specify penalties for practicing; however, contracts signed by institutions of worship for unrecognized religions are not legal or permissible as evidence in court.

In the IKR, religious groups obtain recognition by registering with the KRG Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs (MERA). To register, a group must have a minimum of 150 adherents, provide documentation of the sources of its financial support, and demonstrate it is not anti-Islam. Eight faiths are registered with the KRG MERA: Islam, Christianity, Yezidi, Judaism, Bahai, Sabean-Mandean, Zoroastrian, and Kaka’i (Yarsan).

In addition to the Christian denominations recognized by the government of Iraq, the KRG has registered nine evangelical Protestant churches: Rasolia Church, Baptism Church, Kurd-Zman Church, Unite Evangelical Church, Mushikha Evangelical Church, Ashti Evangelical Church, International Church, al-Nahda Church, and Evangelical Free Church.

In the IKR, Christian groups may register separately with the Council of Iraqi Christian Church Leaders, an independent group formed by church leaders, consisting of representatives from Christian churches and six evangelical Protestant churches with Christian-background membership. Registration with the Council of Iraqi Christian Church Leaders provides Christian churches and leaders with access to the KRG MERA and to the KRG’s Christian endowment (waqf).

The KRG MERA operates endowments (waqfs) which pay salaries of clergy and fund construction and maintenance of religious sites only for Sunni Muslims, Christians, and Yezidis.

The constitution requires the government to maintain the sanctity of holy shrines and religious sites and guarantee the free practice of rituals for recognized religious groups. The penal code criminalizes disrupting or impeding religious ceremonies and desecrating religious buildings. The penal code imposes three years’ imprisonment or 300 dinars (25 cents) for such crimes.

By law, the government provides support for Muslims outside the IKR desiring to perform the Hajj and Umrah, organizing travel routes and immunization documents for entry into Saudi Arabia. The Sunni and Shia waqfs accept Hajj applications from the public and submit them to the Supreme Council for the Hajj. The council, attached to the prime minister’s office, organizes a lottery process to select pilgrims for official Hajj visas. According to the law for the high commission for Hajj and Umrah, the commission offers 3.5 million dinars ($3,000) for Hajj travel by land, and 4.2 million dinars ($3,600) for travel by air. The commission chooses pilgrims to receive the benefit based on a lottery system. The KRG also funds Hajj and Umrah travel, but individuals are only eligible to receive government assistance once.

The constitution guarantees minority groups the right to educate children in their own languages. While it establishes Arabic and Kurdish as official state languages, it makes Syriac, typically spoken by Christians within the country, and Turkmen official languages only in the administrative units in which those groups “constitute density populations.” The constitution provides the federal Supreme Court be made up of judges, experts in Islamic jurisprudence, and legal scholars. The constitution leaves the method of regulating the number and selection of judges to legislation that requires a two-thirds majority in the Council of Representatives for passage.

The constitution guarantees citizens the right to choose which court (civil or religious) will adjudicate matters of personal status, including marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, endowments, and other personal matters. Islam takes precedence when one of the parties to the dispute is from a nonrecognized faith. The law states civil courts must consult the religious authority of a non-Muslim party for its opinion under the applicable religious law and apply the religious authority’s opinion in court. In the IKR, the Personal Status Court adjudicates personal disputes between Muslims, and the Civil Status Court handles all other cases.

National identity cards denote the holder’s religion. The only religions which may be listed on the national identity card are Christian, Sabaean-Mandean, Yezidi, and Muslim, and there is no distinction between Shia and Sunni Muslim affiliation nor designation of Christian denominations. Individuals practicing other faiths may only receive identity cards if they self-identify as Muslim, Yezidi, Sabaean-Mandean, or Christian. Without an official identity card, non-Muslims and those who convert to faiths other than Islam may not register their marriages, enroll their children in public school, acquire passports, or obtain some government services. Passports do not specify religion.

The law states constitutional guarantees providing for the reinstatement of citizenship to individuals who gave up their citizenship for political or sectarian reasons do not apply to Jews who emigrated and gave up their citizenship under a 1950 law.

The Rights of National and Religious Minorities Protection Law in the IKR, which formally recognized the Bahai, Zoroastrian, and Sabean-Mandean faiths, promotes equal political, cultural, societal, and economic representation of all minority groups and forbids “religious, or political, media speech individually or collectively, directly or indirectly that brings hate and violence, terror, exclusion, and marginalization based on national, ethnic, or religious or linguistic claims.”

Of the 328 seats in the Council of Representatives, Iraqi law reserves eight seats for members of minority communities: five for Christian candidates from Baghdad, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Dahuk; one for a Yezidi; one for a Sabaean-Mandaean; and one for an ethnic Shabak. The Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament reserves 11 of its 111 seats for minorities: five for Christians, five for Turkmen, and one for Armenians.

On October 22, the Council of Representatives passed a law which contained an article banning the sale, import, and production of alcoholic beverages. The law had yet to take effect as of the end of the year, however, as the president returned the law to the COR for further consideration.

Islamic education, including study of the Quran, is mandatory in primary and secondary school, except in the IKR. Non-Muslim students are not required to participate in Islamic studies. The government provides Christian religious education in public schools in some areas where there are concentrations of Christian populations, and there is a Syriac curriculum directorate within the Ministry of Education.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Government Practices

There continued to be reports that local police and Shia militia killed Sunni detainees. International and local NGOs reported the government continued to use the antiterrorism law as a pretext for detaining Sunnis without timely access to due process. Community leaders said forced conversion was the de facto result of the national identity card law. Some Yezidi and Christian leaders continued to report harassment and abuses by KRG Peshmerga and Asayish forces in the portion of Ninewa Province controlled by the KRG or contested between the central government and the KRG. Displaced members of certain religious groups report they were prevented from returning to their homes after their cities were liberated from ISIS. Yezidi groups said the presence of armed affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Sinjar and the imposition of security restrictions on the district by the KRG hindered the return of IDPs. In May KRG representatives revoked permission for Yazda, the largest Yezidi-run humanitarian and political advocacy organization, to operate in IDP camps. Officials restored access in October. In some parts of the country, non-Muslim religious minorities, as well as Sunni and Shia in areas where they formed the minority, faced harassment and restrictions from the authorities. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continued to deploy police and army personnel to protect religious pilgrimage routes and sites, as well as places of worship, during Islamic and non-Islamic religious holidays. The KRG also offered support and funding to some non-Muslim minorities, but other minorities in the IKR, such as evangelical Christians, faced difficulties registering and proselytizing. Because religion, politics, and ethnicity were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI) reported evidence of torture and ill-treatment of Sunni detainees by Iraqi Security Forces (including PMF fighters), as well as the deaths of Sunni men who were in custody, detained under the antiterrorism law.

In October, AI reported that men in Federal Police (a Shia-dominated organization) uniforms carried out multiple unlawful killings of Sunnis suspected of being ISIS militants or sympathizers in and around Mosul. In some cases, AI stated individuals were tortured before they were shot and killed execution style or run over with armored vehicles. In October in the Al-Shora subdistrict, men in Federal Police uniforms reportedly brutally beat and killed Ahmed Mahmoud Dakhil and Rashid Ali Khalaf, villagers from Na’na’a, as well as a third man from the village of Tulul Nasser.

In an October report, AI reported Sunni Arab IDPs from parts of Salah al-Din and Diyala Provinces feared attacks by Shia militias in control of those towns, and said the militias had committed gross human rights abuses against residents. AI documented what it referred to as “war crimes and gross human rights violations,” including extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings, torture, and enforced disappearances, committed against Sunnis fleeing Saqlawiya and al-Sijir and accused of being complicit in ISIS crimes or having supported the group. AI stated the violations were committed by Shia PMF militias and fighters wearing military or Federal Police uniforms. For example, AI reported the extrajudicial execution of at least 12 men and four boys from the Sunni Jumaila tribe in al-Sijir by armed men in various security force uniforms. The Iraqi Federal Police denied any involvement in the abuses.

Hundreds of men seized by the PMF on May 27 and June 3 remained unaccounted for at year’s end. According to the testimonies of some survivors, ISF and the Shia militia group Kata’ib Hizballah had been close by when these individuals were captured. Iraqi forces had been stationed near the sites of crimes in Tarek’s Military Camp (Mu’askar Tarek), located along the old Baghdad-Falluja road. On June 5, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi established a committee to investigate the May and June disappearances, vowing to punish those responsible, and announced the arrest of an unspecified number of individuals who had committed the crimes. The prime minister, however, said the abuses were not part of a systematic pattern, and should not overshadow the battlefield successes and the assistance provided by Iraqi forces to Sunni Arab IDPs. In many cases, Shia PMF units reportedly operated independently and without oversight or direction from the government.

International and local NGOs stated the government continued to use the antiterrorism law as a pretext for detaining Sunni men – and their female relatives – for extended periods of time without access to a lawyer or due process. In October courts in Basrah announced 1,251 Sunni detainees had been affected by the new Amnesty Law, which allowed some individuals convicted under the antiterrorism law to apply for judicial review, and 538 had already been retried. The Ministry of Interior’s spokesperson reported that in June, 700 Sunni men were detained following the battle of Falluja based on their confessions of being ISIS supporters. According to the Anbar Police Command, out of 19,400 Sunni men initially arrested under the antiterrorism law for suspected connections to ISIS, 2,046 men were detained, while the remaining individuals were released. AI reported evidence of torture and ill-treatment of Sunni detainees, as well as deaths of Sunni men who were in custody, detained under the antiterrorism law. Religious organizations such as the Association of Muslim Scholars spoke publicly about human rights abuses in prisons in their annual report.

Official investigations of abuses by government forces, armed groups, and terrorist organizations continued to be infrequent, and the outcomes of investigations which did occur continued to be unpublished, unknown, or incomplete, according to NGOs.

According to local human rights organizations, the KRG internal security service had temporarily detained Yezidi activists and demonstrators in Dahuk.

Yezidi groups said the presence of armed affiliates of the PKK in Sinjar and the KRG’s impositions of security restrictions on the district have hindered the return of IDPs.

Christian groups and political leaders accused members of the KRG Peshmerga and other security forces of taking over homes abandoned by Christians as they fled from ISIS to safety in Erbil and other areas of the IKR.

According to the Hammurabi Human Rights Organization and a Christian political leader, Peshmerga fighters removed generators and water pumps from the town of Tal Skuf after liberating it from ISIS in May, and restricted some Christians from entering the town.

Advocacy groups and representatives of religious minority communities reported continued emigration of minority community members subjected to ISIS violence in Mosul and across the Ninewa Plain.

Members of religious minority communities, civil society organizations, and the media continued to report some non-Muslims, including Yezidis and Christians, chose to reside in the IKR and areas under KRG control because they continued to consider these areas to offer greater security, tolerance, and protection for minority rights.

Christian, Yezidi, and Kaka’i community leaders said that forced conversion was the de facto result of the national identity card law, which stated that children of one Muslim parent would be automatically identified as Muslim. Christian leaders said, in some cases, families formally registered as Muslim, but actually practicing Christianity or another faith, reportedly fled to avoid being forced to register their child as a Muslim or to have the child remain undocumented.

The KRG MERA banned 14 Muslim preachers from preaching Friday sermons because of defamation and incitement against religious minorities, including Christians. The imams were placed on administrative leave, and drew salaries while undergoing required rehabilitation training. The KRG MERA announced as of September, the KRG had shut down 10 media outlets accused of promoting extremism; they also lacked proper licenses.

While the government continued to support the establishment of armed volunteer groups to counter ISIS, Prime Minister Abadi repeatedly called for these groups to place themselves under the command and control of the security forces. In 2015, the Council of Ministers announced the PMF was an official body reporting to the prime minister, but the prime minister’s ability to control the PMF remained a source of disagreement and debate.

NGOs continued to state constitutional provisions on freedom of religion should override laws banning the Bahai Faith and the Wahhabi branch of Sunni Islam, but there continued to be no court challenges lodged to invalidate them, nor was legislation proposed to repeal them.

According to evangelical Christian representatives, evangelical Christian groups could not register with the MERA in the IKR without first obtaining clearance from the KRG Ministry of Interior. Evangelical Christian pastors in Erbil stated other religious groups were not required to undergo this step. The evangelical Christians also reported they were unable to meet the minimum requirements for registration, resulting in their lack of recognition by the Council of Iraqi Christian Church Leaders. They said the inability to register also constrained the ability of evangelical Christians to proselytize, and subjected them to unfair scrutiny by the government.

The KRG recognized two evangelical churches with Muslim-background membership; other evangelical Christian churches proselytizing to Muslims said the registration process was onerous, and their groups were subject to scrutiny and harassment by the internal security service.

The KRG provided several religious groups with offices within the KRG MERA following the passage of the KRG Rights of National and Religious Minorities Protection Law. In September Zoroastrians opened a temple in Sulaimaniya with KRG MERA approval and support. Additionally, representatives from the Zoroastrian and Bahai faiths were provided with offices housed within MERA.

The ISF continued to deploy police and army personnel to protect religious pilgrimage routes and sites, as well as places of worship, during religious holidays. For example, during the Shia religious ceremony of Arbaeen, ISF deployed security to protect pilgrims walking to Karbala. Even with added protection, many worshippers said they did not attend religious services or participate in religious events because of the repeated attacks on religious pilgrims in the past and the continued threat of violence.

Non-Muslims said they had difficulties persuading local authorities to take steps to resolve issues involving their holy sites, such as evicting squatters from the grounds of churches, temples, and cemeteries.

The government continued to provide increased protection to Christian churches during the Easter and Christmas holidays. Bahais reported they continued to celebrate the festivals of Naw-Ruz and Ridvan without government interference or intimidation. Provincial governments also continued to designate these as religious holidays in their localities. Followers of the Bahai and Yezidi faiths reported the KRG allowed them to observe their religious holidays. Yezidis used Kurdish, one of the languages officially sanctioned by the constitution, in their worship services. The Maysan Provincial Council reportedly continued to recognize a Sabaean-Mandaean holiday as an official holiday, to provide physical protection for the Sabaean-Mandaean community during times of worship, and to excuse the group from Shia Islamic dress codes during times of mourning.

Government policy continued to require Islamic religious instruction in public schools, but non-Muslim students were not required to participate. In most areas of the country, primary and secondary school curricula included three classes per week of Islamic education, including study of the Quran, as a graduation requirement for Muslim students. Syriac and Christian religious education was included in the curricula of 152 public schools in Baghdad, Ninewa, and Kirkuk. Private Islamic religious schools continued to operate in the country, but had to obtain a license from the director general of private and public schools and pay annual fees.

In the IKR, private schools were required to pay a registration fee of 750,000 to 1,500,000 Iraqi dinars ($640 to $1,290) to the Ministry of Education or Ministry of Higher Education, depending on the type of school. To register with the KRG, private schools needed to provide information on the school’s bylaws, number of students, size, location, facility and safety conditions, financial backing, and tax compliance, and undergo an inspection. In February the Catholic University in Erbil opened with KRG approval, open to students of all faiths.

While the government continued not to require non-Muslim students to participate in religious instruction in public schools, some non-Muslim students continued to report pressure to do so from teachers and classmates. There were also continued reports that some non-Muslim students felt obliged to participate because they could not leave the classroom during religious instruction. Christian and Yezidi leaders reported continued discrimination in education and lack of minority input into issues such as school curricula and language of instruction. By year’s end, schools had not universally adopted the 2015 Ministry of Education curriculum incorporating lessons of religious tolerance. Many Christians who spoke the Syriac language stated it was their right to use and teach it to their children as a matter of religious freedom. The Chaldean church in Basrah, seeking to establish private Christian schools, said local authorities mandated the inclusion of Islamic religious instruction in their curricula for the Muslim students enrolled.

The KRG Ministry of Education continued to fund the religion curriculum for Islam and Christian classes for students of those faiths per ministry regulations. The KRG Ministry of Education continued to fund Syriac-language public schools (elementary and high school), intended to accommodate Christian students, in its territory; the curriculum does not contain religious or Quranic studies. In June Salahaddin University, a government-run institution in Erbil, approved the creation of a Syriac language department.

Christian leaders reported the KRG continued to provide land and financial support for construction of new, and renovation of existing, structures for use as educational facilities, although budget cuts halted some projects.

Non-Muslims have generally not held positions in the Iraqi Council of Ministers (COM), or in the KRG’s COM, although there is no legal bar to ministerial appointments for members of religious minorities. Members of minority religious communities held senior positions in the national parliament and central government, as well as in the KRG, although minority community leaders said they were proportionally underrepresented in government appointments, in elected positions outside the Council of Representatives, and in public sector jobs, particularly at the provincial and local levels. Minority community leaders continued to say this underrepresentation limited minorities’ access to government-provided economic opportunities. The federal Supreme Court continued to represent a cross section of ethnicities and religions in its nine-member composition.

Some Sunni Muslims continued to say they perceived an ongoing campaign of “revenge” by Shia government officials against them in retribution for the Sunnis’ favored status and abuses against Shia during the Saddam Hussein regime. Sunnis continued to complain about discrimination in public sector employment as a result of de-Baathification, a process originally intended to target loyalists of the former regime. According to Sunnis and local NGOs, the government implemented the de-Baathification provisions of the law selectively and used the law to render many Sunnis ineligible for government employment. The government established a committee to rectify sectarian imbalances in ministries, but to date have implemented no reforms. Sunni Arab government officials, particularly those from ISIS-stricken Ninewa Province, have complained about a political “witch hunt” against Sunni Arab ministers, led by allies of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The parliamentary Reform Front movement’s political targets have largely been Sunni Arabs from Ninewa, a proposition leading Sunnis stated came from Shia majoritarian sectarian tendencies.

Human rights NGOs and Yezidi leaders stated KRG authorities discriminated against organizations providing humanitarian assistance to Yezidi communities. Starting in April, KRG authorities maintained a blockade of goods into Sinjar District that prevented the return of most Yezidi families. While the KRG said the blockade was designed to constrain the PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that had established a presence in the Sinjar area, HRW stated that these restrictions caused “unnecessary harm to people’s access to food, water, livelihoods, and other fundamental rights.” Security forces restricted items such as food, medicines, and farming supplies needed for local livelihoods.

The 2015 national identity card law, adopted by the Council of Representatives, did not clarify whether the national identity card would continue to identify the holder’s religion. The law has prevented Yezidis (many of whom consider themselves to be a distinct ethnic group as well as a religious group) and Shabaks from self-identifying with their religious and ethnic group and from official government recognition through official documentation. President Fuad Masum returned the bill to parliament for further debate, however, following protests from minority communities.

Christian groups said the KRG did not consistently enforce court decisions regarding land disputes, many of which stemmed from the Saddam Hussein regime’s Anfal campaign. Many Christians left the country during the Saddam Hussein regime, they stated, and when these Christian families returned home, they found Kurdish families occupying their residences. On July 26, KRG security forces demolished buildings built on land illegally occupied by a Muslim Kurd and owned by Christians, pursuant to a court order. The demolition sparked violent reactions from Muslims in the neighboring town of Bakrman, who harassed some Christians in response.

In May KRG representatives revoked permission for Yazda, the largest Yezidi-run humanitarian and political advocacy organization, to operate in IDP camps. Officials restored access in October.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

ISIS continued to target victims on the basis of their religious identity, killing and subjecting people of all faiths to violence, abductions, and intimidation. Media reported the security situation remained precarious as a result of ISIS’s occupation of territory and the escalation of fighting between ISIS and government forces in Ninewa and Kirkuk; although the Iraqi military and progovernment forces retook large amounts in territory in both provinces, fighting continued in some areas of Anbar and Salah al-Din. In areas under its control, ISIS continued to commit individual and mass killings, and to engage in rape, kidnapping, and detention, including mass abductions and enslavement of women and girls from minority religious communities. ISIS also continued to engage in harassment, intimidation, robbery, and the destruction of personal property and religious sites. In areas not under ISIS control, it continued suicide bombings and VBIED attacks against civilians. ISIS also targeted religious pilgrims and pilgrimage sites for attack. ISIS enforced strict rules on dress, behavior and movement on the inhabitants who remained in the areas it controlled, and severely punished infractions. Its fighters carried out execution-style public killings and other punishments, including after its “courts” condemned people for transgressing its rules or its interpretation of Islamic law. ISIS fighters burned or destroyed Shia, Yezidi, and other religious shrines and cultural artifacts.

UNAMI reported in December that 12,038 people were killed during the year and another 411 were wounded as a result of bombings and acts of violence, mostly in Baghdad and in the northern and western provinces. ISIS claimed responsibility for the majority of these bombings.

After forcibly transferring large numbers of civilians from subdistricts of Mosul to Tal Afar, ISIS killed 172 civilians held in al-Jazeera secondary school in the Hay al-Khadraa neighborhood of Tal Afar, according to UNAMI. Reportedly, among those killed were 43 Yezidi and Shia girls and women who had been enslaved by the group since June 2014.

In November ISIS posted on its Wilayat al-Jazeera website photos of victims killed under the slogan Iqamat al-hudud’(imposing legal penalties) for allegedly committing breaches of sharia, including smoking. One of the victims portrayed in the photos was reportedly a cigarette merchant. The exact dates of the killings are not known. In some photos, children are seen witnessing the executions.

ISIS posted a video on the Wilayat al-Jazeera website showing four children between the ages of 10 to 12 shooting and killing four civilians accused of spying for the ISF and Peshmerga. The video shows two children aiming their guns at the heads of two kneeling civilians and then shooting them. The other two children performed the same act against two other civilians in a location near a river. The video identifies two of the children as originally from Uzbekistan and Russia and the other two from Iraq, while the victims were identified as shop owners from the Baaj District of Ninewa Governorate. One of the children in the video was recognized by his Yezidi parents, having been abducted from his family by ISIS at an earlier date.

ISIS targeted all religious minorities who refused to convert to Islam or who opposed the terrorist group. ISIS also targeted Sunni civilians who cooperated with the ISF. The Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights reported cases of ISIS killing women for not wearing a veil. According to multiple reports from international NGOs and the local press, ISIS fighters continued to question members of detained groups to determine if they were Sunni, and then killed or abducted the non-Sunnis.

Coordinated ISIS bomb attacks continued to target Shia neighborhoods, markets, mosques, and funeral processions, as well as Shia shrines. On July 3, a coordinated bomb attack in Baghdad resulted in the deaths of more than 300 and injuries to hundreds more. A few minutes after midnight, a suicide bomber in a truck targeted the mainly Shia district of Karrada, busy with late-night shoppers for Ramadan. A second roadside bomb was detonated in the suburb of Sha’ab, killing at least five. On April 4, there were multiple coordinated suicide bombings, including two in the Shia-majority southern provinces of Basrah and Dui War. Five people died in Basrah and in Dui War, and 14 people were killed and 27 wounded at a restaurant popular with Shia PMF fighters. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attacks.

ISIS fired chemical weapons into the Salah al-Din villages of Tara and Basheer on March 16 and May 2, respectively. The attacks injured more than 400 victims, who were primarily Turkmen Shia civilians. ISIS fighters continued their practice of claiming responsibility for these attacks via social media postings.

Large celebrations of Ashura in Najaf and Karbala were violence free, in part because of extensive security efforts.

According to the mayor of Sinjar, as of September 27, mass graves containing the remains of ISIS victims were under investigation, others were located, and potentially dozens more remained in ISIS-controlled territory in Sinjar district. On April 26, Yezidi religious leaders in Lavish published an open letter to diplomats and human rights organizations reporting 410 Yezidi men had been missing for a year after the men were directed to a mosque in the ISIS-controlled city of Tal Afar and taken away by truck.

In August the Associated Press reported that analysis of satellite imagery identified a possible mass grave site at Badmouth Prison near Mosul, where more than 600 inmates died. The KRG exhumed 67 remains from a mass grave in Sinjar for DNA analysis.

According to the KRG MERA, 3,735 Yezidis captured by ISIS remained in ISIS captivity or were unaccounted for at year’s end.

The Yezidi Organization for Documentation reported ongoing cases of rape, forced labor, forced marriage, forced religious conversion, material deprivation, and battery by ISIS. ISIS provided videos of its fighters continuing sexual assaults on captured Yezidi women. ISIS repeatedly said it had conducted the “large-scale enslavement” of Yezidi women and children because of their religious beliefs.

NGOs reported ISIS continued to kidnap religious minorities for ransom. According to officials from a Turkmen Women’s Association, ISIS militants had kidnapped and held 500 Turkmen women and children from Tal Afar and Mosul since June 2014. A Shabak member of the Ninewa Provincial Council said ISIS held over 250 Shabak people (most of whom are thought to be Shia) captive, and had executed three Shabaks in October. UNAMI reported that between October 27 and the beginning of November, ISIS had relocated between 64 and 70 abducted Yezidi women from Aaliyah subdistrict of Tal Afar, Muhalabiya subdistrict of Mosul, and from Qayrawan subdistrict of Sinjar, to the Seventeen-Tamouz area in Mosul city. On November 4, ISIS allegedly brought an unspecified number of Yezidi women to Tal Afar and placed them in one of the schools. ISIS reportedly gave some of the women to its militants and sent others to Raqqa, Syria.

According to religious leaders, killings, forced conversion, threats of violence, and intimidation continued to motivate many minorities to leave ISIS-controlled areas. Yezidi civil rights activists reported 400,000 Yezidis were displaced to Dahuk Province in the IKR because of ISIS in 2014. Yezidi and Kaka’i IDPs largely remained in place during the year, with a limited number returning to liberated areas of Ninewa. Sources said between 10 to 15 Christian families were leaving the country daily.

In an October report, UNAMI stated ISIS’s attacks against Christians, Faili (Shia) Kurds, Kaka’i, Sabaean-Mandeans, Shabak, Shia Arabs, Turkmen, Yezidis, and others appeared to be part of a systematic campaign to suppress, permanently expel, or eradicate entire religious communities from their historic homelands now under ISIS control. ISIS continued to publish open threats via leaflets, social media, and press outlets of its intent to kill Shia “wherever they were found” on the basis of being “infidels.”

In Mosul, ISIS fighters reportedly continued to threaten with death local residents who did not convert to Islam. They also continued to punish those who failed to adhere to the group’s strict interpretation of sharia. ISIS continued to impose severe restrictions on women’s movement and dress, and enforcement patrols by ISIS forces were reportedly routine occurrences. According to local press reports, in June the director general of Yezidi affairs at the Ministry of Waqf said ISIS compelled captured Yezidis to fast during Ramadan, and beat those who refused to perform Islamic prayers five times daily.

ISIS fighters continued to attack mosques and other holy sites, including Sunni religious sites, rendering many of them unusable. They converted Christian churches into mosques, and looted and destroyed religious and cultural artifacts. In January UNESCO reported ISIS destroyed the Monastery of Saint Elijah, which was more than 1,400 years old, and the oldest Christian monastery in the country. In April ISIS destroyed Mosul’s “Clock Tower Church” with explosives. Based on their interpretation of Islam, in June ISIS members removed Islamic motifs and Quranic verses on Mosul’s mosques, and also converted churches to weapons storehouses or offices after destroying crosses and religious motifs in the churches. ISIS also damaged many churches and Yezidi temples located in the Ninewa plains during its occupation, including 17 Yezidi shrines in the towns of Bashiqa and Bahzani in the Bashiqa subdistrict. In addition, ISIS blew up the clock tower of the Roman Catholic Church of Al-Sa’a in Mosul city and the Church of Al-Qiayama in Bakhida city in al-Hamdaniya District. The terrorist organization also destroyed the Christian Shrine of Bahnam and Sara in the Nimrud subdistrict.

There were continued reports of societal violence, mainly by sectarian armed groups in many parts of the country. Non-Muslim minorities reported abductions, threats, pressure, and harassment to force them to observe Islamic customs. In many regions, minority groups, whatever their religious adherence, said they experienced violence and harassment from the majority group in the region.

Sabaean-Mandaean leaders reported threats and robberies. On November 27, an unidentified gunman shot and killed a Sabean-Mandaean goldsmith.

On July 21, an unknown group kidnapped the head of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in the country, and released him on July 27. The leader believed he was targeted for both religious and economic motives.

Authorities made no arrests in the 2015 case of four Sunni clerics who were killed in a drive-by shooting in Basrah’s Zubayr District, and observers stated there was no indication the case was being actively investigated.

Shia religious and government leaders urged PMF volunteers not to commit abuses.

Christians in the south and Sabaean-Mandaeans in Basrah, Dhi Qar, and Maysan Governorates reported they avoided celebrating their religious festivals when those festivals coincided with Islamic periods of mourning.

There were continued reports that non-Muslim minorities felt obliged to adhere to certain Islamic practices, such as wearing the hijab or fasting during Ramadan. Non-Shia Muslim and non-Muslim women felt societal pressure to wear hijabs and all-black clothing during the month of Muharram, particularly during Ashura, to avoid harassment. Shia Muslims consider it inappropriate and disrespectful to wear bright colors or to hold public celebrations during this month when they mourn the death of Imam Hussein, (who was killed, along with all of his followers, in Karbala in 680), holding funeral processions and gathering to mourn together publicly. According to representatives of Christian NGOs, some Muslims continued to threaten women and girls, regardless of their religious affiliation, for refusing to wear the hijab, for dressing in Western-style clothing, or for not adhering to strict interpretations of Islamic norms governing public behavior. Numerous women, including Christians and Sabaean-Mandaeans, reported opting to wear the hijab after being harassed.

Minority religious leaders continued to report pressure on minority communities to cede land rights to their businesses unless they conformed to a stricter observance of Islamic precepts. This included demands to close liquor stores and nightclubs. At times, shopkeepers were subject to violence for noncompliance. Since 2012, Basrah’s government has refused to renew liquor licenses for any stores and nightclubs that previously sold alcohol, and Basrah, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Muthanna provinces have made it illegal to sell or transport alcohol, though southern Iraqis could legally consume and own alcohol. Christian churches continued to be allowed to have wine for communion, but they could not buy any locally and needed to rely on foreign contacts and coreligionists in the north to bring bottles of wine when they came south. Public reaction to the new national law banning the sale, import, and production of alcoholic beverages was overwhelmingly negative, with opponents declaring it violated language in the constitution that guaranteed the personal freedoms of minority groups.

Leaders of non-Muslim communities said corruption, uneven application of the rule of law, and nepotism in hiring practices throughout the country by members of the majority Muslim population continued to have detrimental economic effects on non-Muslim communities and contributed to their emigration. Sabaean-Mandeans said they continued to face discrimination that limited their economic opportunities, such as their inability to sell alcohol because of the law. Sunni Muslims also reported continued discrimination based on a public perception that the Sunni population sympathized with terrorist elements, including ISIS.

Zoroastrian activists stressed the importance of adopting the broad concept of freedom of religion or belief, giving them the right to choose their religion and the right to convert from one religion to another without harassment or discrimination from the government and society. Journalists reported Zoroastrians who converted from Islam to Zoroastrianism continued to carry their Islamic identity cards because of the additional rights afforded to Muslims.

During the year, civil society and religious institutions held numerous conferences and workshops to promote religious tolerance. In April an NGO in Samawa organized a workshop to train clergy, teachers, journalists, and civil activists to promote peaceful coexistence and religious tolerance in Muthanna Province.

At the highest levels, the U.S. government continued to address the full range of religious freedom concerns in the country through speeches, meetings, coordination groups, and assistance programs. At the UN General Assembly, the President again called on the country’s political, civic, and religious leaders to take concrete steps to address the danger posed by religiously motivated extremists, to reject sectarianism, and to promote tolerance between religious groups.

During a February 21-24 visit to Baghdad, Erbil, and Lalish, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the U.S. Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South Asia urged the government to protect civil society, including the country’s diverse religious communities. In meetings with various government officials, they underscored the U.S. commitment to defeating ISIS and its divisive ideology. The two U.S. officials also met with NGO representatives, civil society activists, religious minority leaders, students, and journalists to discuss the need for religious tolerance and dialogue. The Ambassador joined the Assistant Secretary’s visit and discussion with Yezidi leaders at Lalish to hear the concerns of the Yezidi people and to convey ongoing U.S. support for the Yezidi community. It was the highest level U.S. delegation to visit Lalish.

In September the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS and Deputy Special Envoy consulted with a range of Iraqi leaders, including representatives of religious minority communities, to better understand the needs of communities liberated from ISIS. Also in September the Deputy Secretary of State led a delegation to Baghdad and Erbil, meeting with government officials, religious and ethnic minority leaders, and displaced persons to discuss efforts to defeat ISIS and respond to the urgent humanitarian and IDP crises in Iraq.

The Ambassador and embassy and consulate general officers continued to meet regularly with national and regional Ministries of Education, Justice (which includes the functions of the former Ministry of Human Rights), and Labor and Social Affairs, and with the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights, as well as with members of parliament, parliamentary committees, and minority group representatives serving in government positions, to emphasize the need for full inclusion of religious minorities and protection of their rights.

U.S. officials in Baghdad, Basrah, and Erbil also held regular discussions with government officials, waqf leaders, and UN officials coordinating international assistance to IDPs to address problems identified by religious groups with overall humanitarian aid distribution.

The Ambassador and the Consuls General in Erbil and Basrah met leaders of minority religious groups and civil society groups to address their concerns, particularly regarding security and protection. Embassy officers often met religious leaders and clergy to demonstrate U.S. interest and support for resolving issues with the provision of humanitarian assistance. In particular, they met with Yezidi, Christian, Shabak, Turkmen, and other religious and minority leaders to promote reconciliation within their communities and to advocate more effectively for minority needs with the government.

On March 17, the Secretary of State stated that, in his judgment, ISIS was responsible for genocide against groups in areas under its control, including Yezidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims. The embassy continued to support programs that support Iraqi and Kurdish organizations documenting ISIS atrocities. During an August visit to Erbil and Lalish, the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South Asia commemorated the anniversary of the start of the Yezidi genocide and stressed the U.S. commitment to protecting minority communities in meetings with political, security, and religious leaders, as well as with coalition partners.

On July 28 and 29, the United States convened an international meeting on Threats to Religious and Ethnic Minorities under ISIS in Washington, in which the Deputy Secretary of State, Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South Asia, and a variety of Iraqi government and civil society leaders participated. In August the State Department and Smithsonian Institute convened a workshop at the Iraqi Institute for the Conservation of Antiquities and Heritage in Erbil to better understand the cultural preservation needs of religious and ethnic minorities in northern Iraq and to help them protect and preserve their religious and cultural heritage.

The U.S. government continued to develop, finance, and manage projects to support all religious communities, with special emphasis on assistance to IDPs. One example was a program to promote ethnosectarian reconciliation by enhancing the institutional capacity of minority civil society organizations, improving their ability to conduct advocacy campaigns, and to mediate conflicts peacefully.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.9 million (July 2016 estimate). The most recent census data available (2011) indicates the population is approximately 84 percent Roman Catholic, 3 percent Church of Ireland (Protestant), 1 percent Muslim, 1 percent Orthodox Christian (including Greek, Russian, and Coptic Orthodox), and 1 percent unspecified Christian, with 6 percent stating no religious affiliation. There are small numbers of Presbyterians and Jews. According to the 2011 census, the Jewish community numbers approximately 2,000. The number of Christians and Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa, Muslims from North Africa and the Middle East, Muslims and Hindus from South Asia, and Orthodox Christians from Eastern Europe continues to grow, especially in larger urban areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of religion, subject to public order and morality. The constitution prohibits promotion of one religious group over another, as well as discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. The law does not restrict the teaching or practice of any faith.

The constitution makes blasphemy a punishable offense, although it was last prosecuted in 1855. The law makes it an offense, punishable by a fine of up to 25,000 euros ($27,203), to utter or publish material that is “grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters held sacred by any religion” when the intent and result are “outrage among a substantial number of the adherents of that religion.”

There is no legal requirement for religious groups to register with the government, nor is there any formal mechanism for government recognition of a religious group. Religious groups may apply to the Revenue Commissioners and register as a charity or an NGO to receive tax exemption benefits.

Under the constitution, the Department of Education provides funding to all public schools, which can be government owned or privately owned but publicly funded. Most schools are privately owned but publicly funded, with the government paying most of the building and administrative costs, teachers’ salaries and a set amount per pupil. In funding schools, the government is mindful of the “rights of parents, especially in the matter of religious and moral formation.”

Almost all primary schools and about half of the secondary schools are religiously affiliated. At the primary level, 90 percent of all schools are Catholic, 6 percent Church of Ireland, 2 percent multidenominational,1 percent other religious groups, and 1 percent are not religiously affiliated. Most school boards are appointed by patrons, similar to trustees, who are usually members of religious groups. These groups often provide land for schools and also contribute to building and administrative costs. The law permits schools with a religious patron to discriminate in admissions on the basis of religion.

The government permitted, but did not require, religious instruction, faith-based classes or general religion classes, in public schools. Although religious instruction was part of the curriculum of most schools, parents could exempt their children from such instruction. Catholic majority schools teach about Catholicism but multidenominational schools generally teach about religion in a broader context. Students who opt out sit in another classroom. The government funds salaries for those teachers who teach a religion class in public schools.

The Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) hears cases of reported workplace discrimination, including on the basis of religion. The WRC may refer cases for mediation or investigate or decide the case itself. If the adjudication officer finds there has been discrimination he or she can order compensation for the effects of discrimination and/or corrective action.

The Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission is an independent public body accountable to the parliament, whose purpose is to protect and promote human rights and equality and to build a culture of respect for human rights, including religious freedom, equality, and intercultural understanding across society. The commission works at the policy level to review the effectiveness of human rights and equality law, and policy and practice in the state and within public bodies. It also works with communities, including religious groups, and other civil society groups to monitor and report on the public’s experiences of human rights, religious freedom, and equality.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In August the new government formed in May said it was committed to holding a constitutional referendum, after completing consultations and preparing the necessary legislation, on the question of whether to revoke the constitutional provision making blasphemy a punishable offense.

In January then-Minister for Education Jan O’Sullivan abolished a 50-year-old official rule giving religion a privileged status in schools: “Of all the parts of the school curriculum religious instruction is by far the most important, as its subject-matter, God’s honor and service, includes the proper use of all man’s faculties, and affords the most powerful inducements to their proper use.” Previously, 30 minutes of each primary school day were allocated for religious education, which often consisted of teaching about the religious group of the school’s patron. Equate, an NGO for children’s rights that advocates for changes in primary and secondary school education, said the abolition of the rule was “a very significant moment for education reform.”

In September the Archbishop of Dublin said that the process of divestment – the process of denominational schools becoming nondenominational – was too slow. He also said he did not believe it was appropriate for school enrollment to depend on a baptismal certificate. In June Minister for Education Richard Bruton said he wanted to accelerate the divestment of some Catholic primary schools, but there were no schools divested during the year. He outlined plans to provide an average of 20 new multidenominational and nondenominational schools per year by 2030.

The government began to open more schools with nonreligious patronage. The New Schools Establishment Group advised Minister Bruton on patronage of new schools to be established. In November the minister announced nine new post-primary schools (total of 8,200 places) would be established in 2017 and 2018, under the patronage of nondenominational groups Educate Together and the Education and Training Boards (statutorily based local authorities) as recommended by the New Schools Establishment Group. Five new nondenominational primary schools opened in September including four Educate Together schools. A similar number is to open in September 2017 and 2018 but no decision has yet been made on who should run the new schools.

School patrons, generally affiliated with religious denominations, continued to define the ethos of the schools and determine the development and implementation of religious education curriculum in primary schools. The curriculum varied by school and could include teaching about the patron’s religion, the religious history of the country, or an overview of world religions. The NGO Equate released the results of a survey conducted in 2015 in which 87 percent of respondents agreed the government had a responsibility to ensure children did not experience religious discrimination in school curricula and 84 percent agreed the education system should be reformed so no child was excluded because of his or her religion or lack of religion.

Parents of non-baptized children continued to report difficulty in enrolling in some local, religiously based schools that were oversubscribed because schools were allowed to accept Catholic children first. In rural areas, parents said finding alternatives to schools with Catholic patrons was especially difficult. According to the media website TheJournal.ie, parents were angry with the slow divestment process and reported feeling they had no other option than to have their children baptized in order to obtain admission into their only local school, which in most cases was Catholic. Other parents said they refused to baptize their children and demanded the provision of a baptismal certificate be dropped as a requirement for school enrollment. In a January compliance review of the country by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the committee raised concerns at the small number of nondenominational schools in the country and with discriminatory practices in admissions policies on the basis of a child’s religion. The NGO Education Equality organized a march, which gathered 600 participants, in July to call for equality in the provision of education regardless of religion.

In December Lord Mayor of Dublin Brendan Carr launched a Dublin City Interfaith Charter to promote religious freedom, interfaith dialogue, and religious diversity in Dublin. The charter was signed by members of the Bahai, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Jewish and Sikh communities.

Several state agencies, including the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission and the Garda (national police) Racial and Intercultural Office (GRIO), continued to enforce equality legislation and worked on behalf of minority religious groups. They organized community events to include individuals of diverse faiths and reviewed legislation about religious hate crimes, among other topics. The GRIO’s liaison officers continued to engage with immigrant minority religious groups on a regular basis to inform them of police services and educate them on their rights. They supported integration by involving members of ethnic and religious minority communities in community social events. For example, in July Garda officers attended an interfaith celebration to mark the end of Ramadan in Cork.

On January 24, the prime minister, the foreign minister, and other senior government officials participated in the national Holocaust Day Memorial commemoration organized by the Holocaust Education Trust Ireland, in association with the Department of Justice and Equality, the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration, and Dublin City Council.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity. According to media reports, on May 5, a group of four men physically and verbally attacked two young Afghan men and a 13-year-old Afghan boy as they were cycling home. The victims said the men who attacked them shouted “Why are you here? Go back to your country,” and used an obscenity about their being Muslim. The Garda investigated the incident and charged one of the four men, Joseph Connors, with assault. The case was pending at year’s end. On May 10, about 200 people held a demonstration in solidarity with the victims of the attack.

In June an assailant attacked Imam Ihab Ahmed of the Cork Mosque Foundation, pushing him to the ground and stealing his taqiyah(skull cap). The imam said he believed the attack was religiously motivated, according to media reports. Other religious leaders in Cork, such as the Church of Ireland’s Bishop of Cork, condemned the attack. The Garda treated the incident as a theft.

On November 14, a Dutch man made anti-Semitic threats and behaved “erratically” towards his neighbors in Cork. According to the neighbors, the man called them Zionists, threatened to behead Jews, and rubbed his hand against one of the neighbors’ throat. The man was arrested and faced charges of making threats to kill or cause serious harm. He was refused bail and a judge ordered him to undergo a psychiatric assessment while in custody.

The Irish Council for Civil Liberties, Immigrant Council of Ireland, Anti-Racism Network Ireland, and the European Network Against Racism Ireland lobbied for legislation against hate crimes including religiously motivated hate crimes, or to ensure prejudice was taken into account as an aggravating factor when sentencing criminals. The NGOs stated the country was the only western democracy without specific hate crime legislation. A report published by the association Atheist Ireland stated secular and minority religious students were compelled to take Catholic religious education in schools, despite rules making such courses optional. Association member John Hamill said many parents had been told religion was a core subject and that students who opted out of these classes would be forced to sit in the back of the classroom with no alternative coursework to study. According to TheJournal.ie, the activities of a nonreligious child in a religion class varied from school to school. The site stated the separation of children from their peers was not just difficult for children and their parents but often for the schools as well, given the limitations of extra supervision. “There are no alternatives available as this is a primary school where each class teacher gives religious instruction to his/her own class,” said Principal of Scoil Mhuire Ben Dorney.

A Syrian refugee complained about a requirement that all students who take the Arabic exam must study the Quran for their final high school examinations. The refugee, whose daughter is Christian, said the requirement was unfair and discriminatory. The National Council for Curriculum and Assessment said the Quran was included on the basis of its linguistic and literary value and not because of its association with religion. The council said the syllabus would be reviewed and would consider the “range and sources” of the prescribed Quranic texts in the exam.

PEGIDA announced the opening of an Irish branch at a Dublin rally in February, to protest the growth of Islam in Europe. Cofounder of the unregistered political party Identity Ireland, Peter O’Laughlin, stated PEGIDA “is giving the people of Europe a chance to speak out and have a voice against the absolutely disastrous policies of the EU.” Hundreds of antiracism and migrant support groups held a counter rally to protest the establishment of PEGIDA. There were reports of assaults between the counter protesters and PEGIDA supporters when scuffles broke out. Members of the Garda Public Order Unit intervened to prevent violence.

In support of religious freedom goals, U.S. embassy officials discussed the integration of religious minorities and incidents of discrimination with representatives of the Human Rights Unit of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Education and Skills, and the Garda.

Embassy representatives discussed with religious groups and NGOs the importance of promoting tolerance and diversity and the challenges of religious minorities, including crime, integration, education admissions policy, and practicing their faith in security.

In January the Ambassador hosted a lunch for interfaith leaders that focused on tolerance and diversity, and underscored efforts to engage faith communities, including Catholic, Church of Ireland, Muslim, Hindu, and Jewish groups, to support the integration of refugees and asylum seekers, some of whom were member of religious minorities, into society.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 8.2 million (June 2016 estimate), which includes Druze residents and Israelis living in the Golan Heights, as well as 200,000 Israelis in East Jerusalem. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) classification system, approximately 75 percent of the population is Jewish, 18 percent Muslim, 2 percent Christian, and 1.6 percent Druze. The remaining 4 percent consists of relatively small communities of Bahais, Samaritans, Karaites, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and those the CBS classifies as “other” – mostly persons, including many immigrants from the former Soviet Union, who identify themselves as Jewish but do not satisfy the Orthodox Jewish definition of “Jewish” the government uses for civil procedures. The majority of non-Jewish citizens are of Arab origin.

According to a poll by the Pew Research Center published in March, 49 percent of Jewish Israeli adults identify themselves as secular, 29 percent as “traditional,” 13 percent as “religious” or “modern Orthodox,” and 9 percent as “ultra-Orthodox/Haredi.” There is also a community of approximately 15,000 Messianic Jews, as reported by the Messianic Jewish community.

Bedouin Muslim communities are concentrated in the Negev (south) and many majority Druze, Christian, and Muslim communities are located in the Galilee region (north), some of which are homogenous and some a mix of these religious groups. There are several Druze communities in the occupied Golan Heights, as well as an Alawite community in Ghajar.

According to government statistics, as of September 30 there were approximately 81,000 legal foreign workers in the country and 16,736 undocumented workers. According to the government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), there are approximately 40,000 African migrants and asylum seekers residing in the country, down from 45,000 the previous year. Foreign workers include Protestants, Roman Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and Muslims.

Legal Framework

There is no constitution. The Basic Law describes the country as a “Jewish and democratic state” and references the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, which promises freedom of religion and conscience and full social and political equality, regardless of religious affiliation.

According to Supreme Court rulings, the Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty protects freedom to practice or not practice religious beliefs, including freedom of conscience, faith, religion, and worship, regardless of an individual’s religion. The law incorporates religious freedom provisions of international human rights covenants into the country’s body of domestic law.

The Chief Rabbinate retains the authority to issue certificates of conversion to Judaism within the country under Orthodox rabbinic law. The Council of the Chief Rabbinate consists of Orthodox rabbis chosen by an assembly consisting of rabbis, local government leaders, government ministers, and laypersons appointed by the government.

The government provides funding for both Orthodox and non-Orthodox conversion programs. Relatives of Jewish converts may not receive residency rights, except for the children of male or female converts born after the parent’s conversion is complete. Following a February decision by the Supreme Court ordering public mikvah ritual baths be opened up to non-Orthodox conversion rites, the Knesset passed a law in July, to take effect in 2017, authorizing local rabbinates to determine who can use their mikvahs, potentially preventing Reform and Conservative Jews from using these facilities for conversions.

The law recognizes the religions of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, the Druze, and the Bahai Faith. Christian religious communities recognized according to the adopted Ottoman millet (court) system include: Eastern Orthodox, Latin (Roman Catholic), Gregorian-Armenian, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Chaldean (Chaldean Uniate Catholic), Greek Catholic Melkite, Maronite, Syrian Orthodox, and Evangelical Episcopal. The Anglican and Bahai communities are recognized through a British Mandate-era law adopted by the government. The government does not recognize other religious communities, including major Protestant denominations with a presence in the country, as distinct ethnoreligious communities. There are two legal pathways to formal recognition, according to laws adopted from the British Mandate period: through a government declaration in response to a petition to the Prime Minister’s Office according to the Order in Council, or by petitioning the Ministry of Interior for recognition. Groups may appeal rejected applications to the Supreme Court.

Recognized religious communities are exempt from taxation of places of worship and may have separate courts to apply their religion’s personal status law. Some nonrecognized religions, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, receive a property tax exemption on their houses of worship, although others, such as Buddhism and Scientology, do not. While members of recognized religious communities only require approval for visas from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visas for members of nonrecognized religious communities also require Ministry of Interior (MOI) approval for stays longer than five years. Members of nonrecognized religious groups may practice their beliefs.

Legislation establishes religious councils for Jewish communities and for the Druze. The Ministry of Religious Services (MRS) has jurisdiction over the country’s 133 Jewish religious councils, which oversee the provision of religious services for Jewish communities. The government finances approximately 40 percent of the religious councils’ budgets, and local municipalities fund the remainder. The MOI Department of Non-Jewish Affairs has jurisdiction over religious matters concerning non-Jewish groups and oversees the religious council for the Druze. The Department of Non-Jewish Affairs convenes an interreligious council of all recognized religions, including Judaism, which serves as a discussion forum for recognized religious communities. The MOI maintains a program to provide religious training, and trains those Druze and Muslim clerics who are employees of the state on how to work with government ministries. Approximately 50 percent of Muslim imams are state employees and receive their salaries and continuing religious training through the Ministry of Interior. The salaries of the remaining imams are privately funded.

The law criminalizes willfully and unjustly disturbing any meeting of persons lawfully assembled for religious worship or assaulting someone at such a meeting. It also criminalizes intentionally destroying, damaging, or desecrating any object held sacred by any group of persons, with punishment of three years’ imprisonment.

The law requires individuals to obtain a permit from the minister of the interior or the prime minister for travel to “hostile” countries, including Saudi Arabia, which is the destination for those participating in the Hajj. Illegal travel is punishable by a prison sentence or fine if the traveler does not request prior approval.

Proselytizing is legal for all religious groups. The law prohibits offering a material benefit in the course of proselytizing. It is also illegal to proselytize to a person less than 18 years of age without the consent of both parents.

The law criminalizes the damage, destruction, or desecration of religious sites (subject to seven years’ imprisonment) and actions to “harm the freedom of access” of worshippers to religious sites (subject to five years’ imprisonment). Certain religious sites considered antiquities are provided further protection under the antiquities law. The Ministry of Tourism is responsible for the protection and upkeep of non-Jewish religious sites, while the MRS protects and maintains Jewish religious sites. The law also provides for up to five years’ imprisonment for actions “likely to violate the feelings of the members of the different religions” with regard to their religious sites. The law grants the government, not the courts, the authority to decide the scope of the right to worship at certain religious sites, and the Supreme Court has upheld this governmental authority.

Public Hebrew-language state schools teach Jewish history and some basic religious texts. These classes primarily cover Jewish heritage and culture rather than religious belief. Public Arabic-speaking schools with Arab student bodies teach religion classes on the Quran and the Bible to both Muslim and Christian Arab students. A few independent mixed Jewish-Arab schools also exist and offer religion classes. For example, the curriculum at the nonprofit school Hand-in-Hand: Center for Jewish-Arab Education emphasizes commonality and similar storylines in the holy writings of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. By law, the state provides the equivalent of public school funding to two systems of ultra-Orthodox religious schools, the United Torah Judaism-affiliated Independent Education system and the Shas-affiliated Fountain of Torah Education system. Minors have the right to choose a public secular school instead of a religious school regardless of parental preference.

The law provides the right for any Jew, or any child or grandchild of a Jew, to immigrate to the country from a foreign country with his or her spouse and children. The minor children of a grandchild of a Jew are granted humanitarian status, but are not automatically granted citizenship. Under the Law of Return those who completed an Orthodox conversion inside or outside Israel are entitled to immigration, citizenship, and registration as Jews in the civil population registry. Those who completed conversion to Judaism outside Israel, regardless of affiliation, are eligible for these benefits even if they are not recognized as Jewish by the Chief Rabbinate; this would include Reform, Conservative, and other affiliations of Judaism. A ruling by the Supreme Court in March expanded immigration rights (including citizenship) under the Law of Return to those who complete private (non-Rabbinate) Orthodox conversions in Israel. Descendants of Jews qualify for immigration under the Law of Return regardless of the religious beliefs with which they were raised, although the law considers those who as adults convert to other religious groups, including Messianic Judaism, to have “opted out” of the protections of the Law of Return.

The Chief Rabbinate determines who may be buried in Jewish state cemeteries, limiting this right to individuals considered Jewish by Orthodox standards. The law provides for the right of any individual to be buried in a civil ceremony, and requires that civil cemeteries be established in various areas around the country, sufficiently distant from one another so that all those who wish to take advantage of them may reasonably be able to do so. The law criminalizes the intentional desecration of, or trespass on, places of burial, which is punishable by three years’ imprisonment.

Laws inherited from the Ottoman Empire and British Mandate periods give jurisdiction over personal status issues to certain religious communities. Religious courts operated by officially recognized religious communities have legal authority over their members in matters of marriage, divorce, and burial. Jewish, Druze, Muslim, and Christian families may ask for personal status cases, including alimony, child custody, guardianship, domestic violence, paternity, and property division, to be adjudicated in religious or civil courts. Exceptions to this provision include cases of divorce where Jewish women are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts if their spouses file the case there first, and paternity cases among Muslim citizens, which are the exclusive jurisdiction of Islamic law courts. Members of religious groups not permitting divorce, such as Catholics, may not obtain a divorce unless they convert to a different religion that authorizes divorce. Personal status cases in mixed-religion families are usually adjudicated in civil courts.

The law allows for civil registration of two people as a married couple only if both partners are recognized as “lacking religion,” if they married outside the country, or if the partners are of different religions and their respective religious courts do not object to a civil registration. According to the law, persons are classified as “lacking religion” if they do not belong to one of the recognized religions as recorded in the National Registry. This includes approximately 322,000 immigrants and their children, primarily from the former Soviet Union, who gained Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return but are not recognized as Jewish by the Chief Rabbinate, which applies the Orthodox definition of matrilineal descent.

Secular courts have primary jurisdiction over questions of inheritance, but parties may file such cases in religious courts by mutual agreement. Decisions by these bodies are subject to Supreme Court review. The rabbinical courts, when exercising their power in civil matters, apply religious law, which varies from civil law, including in matters relating to the property rights of widows and daughters.

Military service is compulsory for Jewish citizens, except for Orthodox women. It is also compulsory for male citizens who are Druze, and male citizens in the 5,000-member Circassian community (Muslims originally from the northwestern Caucasus region who migrated in the late 19th century). Arab Christian and Muslim citizens are exempt from compulsory service, although the government encourages them to volunteer.

In July the Knesset passed a law establishing the penalty for inciting or seeking to persuade a volunteer soldier to desert the military, or for giving shelter to a volunteer who deserts, at three to 15 years in prison, which is equivalent to that already established regarding conscript soldiers. The sponsor of the law said he initiated it to deflect pressures away from Christian Arab soldiers who are volunteering in the military.

The law provides the minister of defense some discretion to provide exemptions from compulsory military service for conscientious objectors. A special committee evaluates applications for conscientious objection and may recommend exemptions if it determines an applicant objects to the inherent use of violent force in the military framework and to war in a way that prevents him or her from serving in the military. The committee is also authorized to recommend certain accommodations to conscientious objectors’ concerns, including permission not to hold weapons or wear uniforms. The committee chair is authorized to grant exemptions, and committee decisions may be appealed in writing to the Ministry of Defense or the courts.

To receive benefits similar to those accorded military veterans, Arabs and others exempted from compulsory military service may enlist in an alternative service program run by the Ministry of Science and Technology for one or two years as volunteers in health, education, and welfare with local NGOs and institutions.

Membership in a recognized religion is recorded in the National Registry and passed from parents to children, unless a person changes it through a formal conversion. Membership in a religious group which is not recognized is recorded as “lacking religion.” All Jews are recorded as Jewish, whether Orthodox or not (unless they convert to something else).

The law criminalizes calling for, praising, supporting, or encouraging acts of violence or terrorism where such actions are likely to lead to violence, including calls for violence against religious groups.

The law criminalizing incitement to racism, defined as statements demeaning or degrading or showing violence toward someone on the basis of race, provides an exception for statements citing a religious source, unless an intent to incite racism is proven.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with a reservation stating that matters of personal status are governed by the religious law of the parties concerned, and the country reserves the right to apply that religious law when inconsistent with its obligations under the Covenant.

Government Practices

Increased violent clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinians in Israel, Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank began in September 2015 and continued into this year following altercations between Jewish activists and Muslim activists worshipping at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif site. As a result of this violence, seven Israelis, one U.S. citizen, and five Palestinian attackers were killed, and 62 Israelis injured, inside the Green Line. Because religion and ethnicity were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize much of this violence as being solely based on religious identity. The number of Jewish visitors, reportedly including Temple Mount activists, to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif increased to record levels during the Jewish holidays and national holidays. In April, June, and August there were incidents of violence at the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif compound, usually after Muslim visitors or Waqf guards (the Jordanian-funded Islamic trust and charitable organization that administers the site) said they observed Jewish visitors praying on the site. In a break from past practices, Israeli authorities that facilitated these visits also permitted non-Muslim visits to the site during some of the last 10 days of Ramadan. Israeli police citing security concerns continued to restrict broad Muslim access at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, albeit for fewer days (two) than in 2015 (27). The Waqf continued to restrict non-Muslims who visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif from entering the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque. The government allowed both Muslims and Christians to pray at the Western Wall, but with separation of women and men, and did not implement a compromise reached with non-Orthodox Jewish activists regarding “egalitarian prayer,” i.e., Reform and Conservative Jewish services. Israeli security restrictions limited the access of Palestinians to the Western Wall Plaza. The government implemented policies based on Orthodox Jewish interpretations of religious law.

Arab citizen of Israel Nashat Milhem killed two people and injured seven others in a bar on Dizengoff Street in Tel Aviv on January 1. He later killed a taxi driver. Evidence of the use of religious material in preparation for the attack was found on his phone along with a video expressing his hatred toward “enemies of Islam.” Security forces killed Milhem in a shootout after a weeklong manhunt.

On March 8, Palestinian Bashar Massalha stabbed to death one U.S. citizen and injured 10 Israelis in attacks in Jaffa. Security forces killed Massalha during his attack.

On June 28, the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif was closed to non-Muslim visitors for three days by Israeli police, citing security concerns after attacks on Jewish visitors during the last few days of Ramadan. Following the closure, The Jerusalem Post reported a group of masked Muslim youths threw rocks and other objects at Israeli police officers stationed at the site and then barricaded themselves in al-Aqsa Mosque. The police arrested dozens of Arabs suspected of throwing objects at Jewish visitors and police officers.

A group of Modern Orthodox rabbis continued to operate a private conversion court for children of families whose Judaism was not recognized by the state or the rabbinical courts. A ruling by the Supreme Court on March 31 expanded immigration rights under the Law of Return to those who completed private (non-Rabbinate) Orthodox conversions in the country. The Chief Rabbinate continued not to recognize non-Orthodox converts to Judaism as Jews, although they continued to be accepted for the purpose of immigration under the Law of Return. In four incidents during the year, the Chief Rabbinate also refused to recognize conversions approved by the chief presiding rabbinical judge of the Rabbinical Council of America (Orthodox).

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to sponsor expedited Orthodox Jewish conversion courses for Jewish soldiers who were not recognized as Jewish by the Chief Rabbinate.

The government rejected applications for official recognition by evangelical Christian churches. The government also rejected an application by the Jehovah’s Witnesses in November 2015, noting the government had not recognized any additional religion for over 40 years, although there are many religious groups that would like to gain recognition, because of the “wide-ranging implications” of recognizing new religious groups. The government stated members of nonrecognized religions remained free to practice their religion, and that leaders of these religions are invited and participate along with the leaders of officially recognized religions at official events or ceremonies.

Many mosques continued to lack an imam appointed by the MOI; the government continued to permit nonstate employees to be imams in mosques if the community preferred them.

Pursuant to a 2013 High Court ruling on easing the funding conditions for activities by the Reform and Conservative Jewish communities, the government continued to pay the salaries of 12 non-Orthodox rabbis serving local councils. In addition, the Ministry of Housing provided funding to build non-Orthodox Jewish religious institutions, which it designated “seminaries,” according to the Israel Religious Action Center.

The government continued to control access to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, preventing non-Muslim worship and prayer at the site, and limiting access for visits by non-Muslim groups to specific times. The government said these restrictions were imposed on the basis of maintaining the status quo. The media reported in September that police had extended the ban on non-Muslim prayer to the entire Muslim Quarter of Jerusalem. The government denied this, but noted the police “have prevented provocations intended to incite the local population.”

The INP continued to be responsible for security at the entrances of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, with police stationed both inside the site and outside each entrance. The INP conducted routine patrols on the outdoor plaza and regulated traffic in and out of the site.

Waqf officials repeated previous years’ complaints about what they said were violations of the status quo agreements by Israeli police regarding control of access to the site. They stated Israeli police did not coordinate with the Waqf on decisions to allow non-Muslim visitors onto the site or to restrict access to broad categories of Muslim worshippers or to individual Palestinians whom police suspected could disrupt the non-Muslim visits. Waqf employees remained stationed inside each gate and on the plaza but Waqfofficials said they were able to exercise only a limited oversight role. They reportedly could object to the presence of particular persons, such as individuals dressed immodestly or causing disturbances, but lacked the authority to remove such persons from the site.

Waqf officials reported the Israeli police on occasion briefly detained Waqf guards or expelled them from the site and from the vicinity of visiting Jewish activist groups. The government stated Waqf guards involved in disturbances were treated the same as any other individual in such situations, and attributed any instance of police action against a guard to the guard’s activity. Israeli police also arrested Waqf maintenance employees conducting renovation work inside the Dome of the Rock for failing to conduct the work under the supervision of the Israel Antiquities Authority (whose authority on the site the Waqf does not recognize). Police also prevented the Waqf from carrying out routine repairs such as to leaking water pipes as well as 20 major renovation projects, and refused to permit the entry of most maintenance equipment onto the site, according to Waqf officials. Police citing security concerns intervened in the delivery of iftar meals during several days of Ramadan. The government said the delivery of 15 trucks filled with meals during Ramadan was successfully coordinated between the Waqf and police, and the only deliveries not permitted were those not coordinated ahead of time with the police, including from organizations known for terrorist activity. Waqf officials said that the Israel police’s regular use of a small electric “patrol” vehicle on the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif – beginning during Ramadan and continuing throughout the year – was unprecedented and a violation of the status quo. The government said the vehicle was used to transport supplies between police positions. It also said police vehicles entering the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif were not new and not a violation of the status quo. The government also said the Waqf itself used electric vehicles with no objection from the Israeli police.

Israeli police citing security concerns continued to restrict broad Muslim access at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, albeit for fewer days (two) than in 2015 (27). The government continued to permit approximately 100-200 Gazans over the age of 60 to travel to Jerusalem for weekly Friday prayers at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif for most weeks throughout the year. On December 6, Israeli authorities cancelled most of these permits indefinitely, saying some of those receiving permits did not return through Erez the same day.

Muslim officials, including representatives of the Waqf and representatives of the Joint List, an alliance of the country’s Arab-majority political parties, continued to object to the government’s temporary access restrictions on Muslim worshippers at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and repeated previous years’ complaints about what they said were police violations of the status quo agreements regarding control of access to the site, including during Ramadan.

The Waqf continued to restrict non-Muslims from entering the Dome of the Rock shrine and the Al-Aqsa Mosque and prohibited individuals from wearing non-Muslim religious symbols on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.

The INP continued to screen non-Muslims for religious paraphernalia, and generally prohibited them from praying publicly on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. The police continued to have exclusive control of the Mughrabi Gate entrance – the only entrance through which non-Muslims could enter the site – and allowed visitors through the gate during set visiting hours, although the INP sometimes restricted this access because of security concerns. For example, Israeli police continued to enforce a six-month restraining order issued in November 2015 that prohibited a leader of the Return to the Mount, a Jewish Temple Mount activist group, from entering the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif after the group publicly advocated Jewish prayer during visits to the site and offered monetary rewards to activists who were arrested for praying on the site.

Israeli authorities in some instances barred specific individuals from the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif site, including Jewish activists believed to have violated rules against non-Muslim prayer, Muslims believed to have acted violently against non-Muslim visitors to the site, and public figures, including members of the Knesset, whose presence authorities feared would inflame tensions. The Supreme Court ruled in December that unofficial, verbal bans by police on Jewish activists ascending the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif were illegal. Some Jewish and non-Jewish members of the Knesset condemned the government’s ban on all members of the Knesset from ascending the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Israeli police continued to enforce “black lists” barring at least 50 Muslim men and women they accused of verbally harassing Jewish visitors, whom Muslim worshippers stated they perceived to have been attempting to break the injunction against non-Muslim prayer on the site.

Many Jewish leaders, including the government-appointed Rabbi of the Western Wall, continued to say Jewish law prohibited Jews from entering the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, a view the ultra-Orthodox community supported. Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi David Lau stated in June, however, that he would like to see a Third Temple built on the site without demolishing Muslim structures. Increasing numbers of the self-identified “national religious” Zionist community stated they found meaning in setting foot on the site. Some government coalition Knesset members called for reversing the policy of banning non-Muslim prayer at the site. NGOs, such as the Temple Institute and Temple Mount Faithful, continued to call on the government to implement a time-sharing plan at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif to set aside certain hours for Jewish worship, similar to the practice at the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. Muslim authorities continued to oppose this idea.

Prime Minister Netanyahu reiterated his support for the status quo arrangement at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. He reaffirmed the government’s respect for the role of Jordan and the Jordanian king in administering the site, and stated his government had no intention of dividing the site.

The government continued to permit people of all faiths to make individual prayers at the Western Wall, the place of worship nearest the holiest site in Judaism. The Rabbi of the Western Wall continued to set the guidelines for religious observance mandating separation of women and men, with the women’s section being less than half the size of the men’s section, and the government continued to enforce these rules. Authorities continued to prohibit anyone from bringing private Torah scrolls – although the media reported that police issued a special permit to bring private Torah scrolls for a planned act of civil disobedience on November 2 – and to prohibit women from accessing the public Torah scrolls or giving priestly blessings at the site. On June 7, police briefly detained Lesley Sachs, the executive director of the NGO and prayer group Women of the Wall, for questioning on charges of breaching public order after she smuggled a private Torah scroll into the Western Wall Plaza for use in an egalitarian prayer service. The authorities permitted women to pray with tefillin and prayer shawls pursuant to a 2013 Jerusalem District Court ruling stating it was illegal to arrest or fine them for such actions. The police continued to assist Women of the Wall to enter the women’s area of the Western Wall for its monthly service. In April police prevented ultra-Orthodox protesters from disrupting a Passover prayer service, sponsored by Women of the Wall in the women’s section.

The authorities continued to allow use of a platform south of the Mughrabi ramp and adjacent to the Western Wall for religious rituals. The authorities designated the platform for members of the Conservative and Reform movements of Judaism. Non-Orthodox and mixed gender groups also continued to use it for religious ceremonies such as bar and bat mitzvahs. Women of the Wall said the platform, built by the Ministry of Religious Services without the requisite permits, did not constitute a permanent solution for “egalitarian” Jewish prayer (permitting Reform and Conservative or other non-Orthodox Jewish services) at the site.

On January 31, following three years of negotiations, the Cabinet passed an agreement to double the size of the non-Orthodox section immediately south of the main plaza, currently “administered with a pluralistic approach” and used by non-Orthodox Jews for prayer and ceremonies, according to the government. This would have created a single entrance for all worshippers to replace the separate entrance currently used to access the non-Orthodox section. Following condemnations from members of the Knesset from the ultra-Orthodox parties, the government did not implement the agreement, drawing criticism from the Supreme Court in September during its consideration of a related case. After the government did not implement the January agreement, leaders of the Reform and Conservative Jewish movements joined Women of the Wall on November 2 in bringing publicly available Torah scrolls from the men’s prayer area at the Wall to the women’s prayer area. Ultra-Orthodox Jewish protesters and officials of the Western Wall Heritage Foundation tried to prevent physically the Women of the Wall from moving the public Torah scrolls. The police did not make any arrests. Prime Minister Netanyahu criticized the demonstration but said his government continued to work towards a solution. A September poll by The Jerusalem Post Magazine found 61 percent of Jewish Israelis favored establishing an egalitarian prayer plaza at the Western Wall.

The government continued to prohibit Israeli citizens in unofficial capacities from traveling to parts of the West Bank under the civil and security control of the Palestinian Authority (Area A). Jewish leaders said this restriction prevented Jewish Israelis from routinely visiting several Jewish religious sites, although the IDF occasionally provided security escorts for groups to visit some Jewish religious sites.

Although the law included Saudi Arabia as a “hostile” country, religious authorities, including the head of Israel’s sharia court, stated they were not aware of any requirement for a government-issued permit to travel to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj.

Some former mosques, which belonged to a Muslim organization until confiscated by the state in accordance with the Absentee Property Law adopted after the 1948 War of Independence, continued to be used as municipal buildings and entertainment facilities. Muslim community leaders reported Be’er Sheva’s Muslim population of approximately 10,000 had no mosque in which to pray, and the government would neither allow them to use the Ottoman-era mosque, which was converted to a museum of Islamic culture following a 2011 Supreme Court ruling, nor authorize the construction of another mosque.

On December 1, Rabbi Eyal Krim, who previously made controversial comments about women, homosexuals, and Palestinians, became the new IDF Chief Rabbi. The Israeli Supreme Court lifted an injunction preventing his appointment after Rabbi Krim apologized for his previous statements.

After being threatened with a lawsuit, the Histadrut (national labor union) resumed renting a public hall in Petah Tikva to the Jehovah’s Witness community during the year, reversing the Histradut’s decision in 2015 to stop renting to the community on the basis it was conducting “forbidden missionary work.”

While the government provided the funds legally required to cover the operating costs of the two school systems affiliated with the ultra-Orthodox political parties Shas and United Torah Judaism, the government provided lesser amounts to support other private schools classified as “recognized but not official,” including Christian and other ultra-Orthodox school systems. After successive years of budget cuts for the “recognized but not official” category, which the government said was an effort to encourage schools to become public, some ultra-Orthodox schools in this category chose to challenge this funding level in court; as of the end of the year this case remained pending. Officials of the Secretariat of Christian Schools, which represent Christian schools in negotiations with the government over support, said they had only received a quarter of the extra funds promised them by the government after a month-long strike in 2015 for funding equal to that of the two politically affiliated ultra-Orthodox school systems.

Government resources available for religious or heritage studies to Arab and non-Orthodox Jewish public schools remained significantly less than those available to Orthodox Jewish public schools. Public and private Arab schools continued to offer studies in both Islam and Christianity, but state funding for such studies remained proportionately lower than the funding for religious education courses in Orthodox Jewish schools.

Many ultra-Orthodox religious schools continued not to offer a basic humanities, math, and science curriculum, and a group of formerly ultra-Orthodox students who graduated from these schools sued the state in December 2015 for allowing them to graduate without the requisite knowledge to participate in the economy. They said they were denied basic education and left lagging far behind secular Israelis in topics such as science, math, history, English, and geography. In April the government filed a Statement of Defense in this case and a Third Party Complaint against the schools and parents. The case remained pending at year’s end.

The media reported in September that municipal authorities denied at least 50 school girls entry into Haredi schools to which they had been assigned because of their lack of “spiritual suitability.” The government stated that approximately 25 girls were denied entry. Reportedly, the Ministry of Education effectively used its control of the budget to persuade schools to change their policy towards some of these students, but the cases of other students who continued to be unenrolled remained unresolved as of the end of the year. At year’s end, the Ministry of Education was pursuing an administrative appeal in the unresolved cases.

The Custody of the Holy Land, a priory of the Franciscan order, reported local municipalities, such as Tel Aviv, began charging property tax on church property. The government stated only properties that are mainly used for worship and have no business activities were exempt from property tax under the law, while religious organizations were obligated to pay taxes on other property and assets. The government, however, acknowledged that some municipalities which had not previously enforced the collection of taxes had begun to do so.

Authorities continued to enforce rulings by the High Court declaring the segregation of men and women on public streets and sidewalks in the ultra-Orthodox Jewish neighborhood of Mea She’arim in Jerusalem to be illegal. The authorities also enforced the High Court’s ruling against the imposition of gender segregation on buses. Communities could voluntarily self-segregate on public transportation, but could not impose this on others; authorities had to post signs informing passengers they were free by law to sit in any available seat.

The NGO Hiddush reported in May that only 30 percent of local religious councils had at least one female member. In response to a petition from women’s rights organizations regarding the lack of female leadership in the religious establishment, in August the Supreme Court ordered the appointment of a female deputy director-general of the rabbinical courts. As of December 28, no woman had yet been appointed.

The MRS listed 21 Jewish cemeteries with plots for civil burial and 21 dedicated cemeteries for persons the government defined as “lacking religion.” Additionally, 13 cemeteries in 10 agricultural localities were authorized to conduct civil burial for these localities and nearby residents.

The IDF continued to have only Orthodox Jewish chaplains; the government employed civilian non-Jewish clergy as chaplains at military burials when a non-Jewish soldier died in service. The MOI continued to provide imams to conduct military funerals according to Islamic customs.

According to government figures and Hiddush, the 2015 budget for religious services (the latest available) for the Jewish population, including funding for religious councils, salaries for religious personnel, funding for the development of cemeteries, and funding for the construction of synagogues and ritual baths, was approximately 511 million shekels (NIS) ($133 million). Religious minorities, which constituted slightly more than 20 percent of the population, received approximately NIS 65 million ($16.92 million), which included NIS 3.6 million ($937,000) for development of religious sites and structures. In December 2015 the government added additional funds, some of which were rolled over from previous years, for both Jewish communities and religious minorities, increasing the totals to NIS 828 million ($215.57 million) for religious services for Jewish communities; and NIS 121million ($31.5 million) for religious minorities, of which NIS 51.8 million ($13.49 million) was dedicated to development of religious sites and structures. Some Muslims stated there was insufficient state funding for Islamic affairs, including for building and restoring mosques and cemeteries, although the state provided municipalities with religious development budgets and religious institutions with operational support funds.

The government continued to implement policies based on Orthodox Jewish interpretations of religious law. For example, the only in-country marriages the government recognized for Jews were those performed by the Chief Rabbinate, which refused to perform marriages involving citizens without maternal Jewish lineage, because the Chief Rabbinate did not consider them Jewish according to halacha (Jewish law). Likewise, men with ancestry in the Jewish priesthood (cohanim) were not allowed to marry converts or divorcees, in accordance with halacha. The Chief Rabbinate required individuals who qualified to marry to follow a procedure which included sessions with a rabbi and classes for the bride to learn about her duties and responsibilities under halacha.

Those who self-identify but are not recognized by the Chief Rabbinate as Jewish, including Reform and Conservative converts to Judaism and others without Jewish matrilineage, were prohibited from accessing official Jewish marriage, divorce, and burial services in the country, although some Orthodox and non-Orthodox rabbis did officiate at these ceremonies outside of the Rabbinate.

The MRS continued to authorize the civil registration of the marriages performed by some nonrecognized religious communities, such as the evangelical Christian community, but in general the only domestic marriages which had legal standing and could be registered were marriages performed according to the religious statutes of recognized religious communities. Members of other nonrecognized groups could attempt to process their personal status documents, including marriage licenses, through the authorities of one of the recognized religious communities if those authorities agreed. The MRS was in the final stages of drafting a marriage registration procedure for nonrecognized religious groups as of the end of the year. The government allowed civil registration of marriages held outside the country.

According to NGOs working with women of all religious backgrounds, although women could choose between civil and religious courts to adjudicate personal status matters other than marriage or divorce, societal pressures at times prevented Muslim women from adjudicating personal status issues in civil courts.

Although the government continued to exempt Christian and Muslim citizens from compulsory military service, the government continued to encourage Christian citizens to volunteer for military service.

The government continued to approve annual “delays” of conscription to military service for individual Jehovah’s Witnesses upon presentation of documentation of their continued affiliation with their religious community, although without acknowledgment of their right to conscientious objection. Since members of the community have not been technically exempt from military service, they could not participate in the national civil service program as an alternative service.

Official identity cards noted only the name and the birthdate. Religious identification was listed in the National Registry. Other forms, such as some school enrollments, listed “nationality,” e.g. Jewish or Arab. In response to a petition to require the government to issue an official birth document listing both parents’ names, the Supreme Court ruled on June 1 that until the government’s transition to computerized hospital birth notices was complete, the Ministry of Interior should issue birth certificates showing all details listed in the birth notices currently prepared by the hospital, including the father’s name if declared at the time of the birth. Previously the ministry had not recorded the names of fathers it considered non-Jewish in the case of mixed marriages.

The government continued to allow Christians and individuals who spoke Aramaic to register with their national or ethnic group listed as Aramean instead of Arab.

Christian leaders reported visas for clergy to serve in the country became increasingly difficult to obtain, especially for those holding citizenship of an Arab-majority country, but also for clergy from Africa and Europe. The government denied any change regarding visas for clergy, and stated that the government did not receive any such complaints.

Asylum seeker and monk Aba Samrab, the head of the Eritrean Orthodox Church in Tel Aviv, throughout the year appealed his summons to the Holot detention facility as an irregular migrant because his religious vows prevented him from sleeping, eating, or praying among nonmonks. The judge in a municipal court hearing on September 18 recommended the government make special accommodations for him in Holot, but did not cancel the summons. Soon after this ruling, the Interior Ministry used its discretion to grant him an exemption from Holot on humanitarian grounds rather than make the accommodations suggested by the judge.

The MOI continued to rely on the guidance of the Jewish Agency, a nonprofit NGO with strong ties to the government, to determine who qualified to immigrate as a Jew. Prospective immigrants faced questioning about their religious beliefs to determine their qualifications for citizenship. The government continued to deny immigration benefits to individuals based on their religious beliefs, and also denied or delayed family reunification to some citizens based on their religious beliefs. This included cases of individuals who immigrated under the Law of Return as Jews but were discovered to hold Messianic or Christian beliefs.

The government operated a special department in the state attorney’s office for prosecution of “incitement-related” crimes and a police unit based in Jerusalem for the investigation of such crimes in Israel and the West Bank, including “price tag” attacks (violence by Jewish individuals and groups against non-Jewish individuals and property with the stated purpose of exacting a “price” for actions the government had taken against the group committing the violence). The most common offenses, according to police, were attacks on vehicles, defacement of real estate, harm to Islamic and Christian holy sites, assault, and damage to agricultural lands. In July the nationalist crimes unit of the police arrested three Jewish minors on suspicion of burning cars and spray-painting in the Arab village of Yafia one month earlier. According to the police, two of the suspects admitted committing the vandalism as revenge for the June 8 attack by Palestinians at Sarona marketplace in Tel Aviv that left four people dead. Authorities indicted two of the minors for arson, malicious damage due to nationalistic motives, and obstruction of justice, and indicted the third for failure to prevent a crime. The case was ongoing as of the end of the year.

The Church of the Multiplication of Loaves and Fishes on the Sea of Galilee in Tabgha still had not received full compensation from the government under a property tax law for victims of violence committed “on account of national-ethnic affiliation.” The government agreed to pay 3.9 million NIS ($1.02 million) to restore the site. As of the end of the year, the government had transferred 1.5 million NIS ($391,000) and negotiations were ongoing for another 800,000 NIS ($208,000). In June 2015, arsonists burned a large section of the church and defaced the walls of the building with comments denigrating Christians. As of the end of 2016, one of the suspects was under arrest and another was under house arrest until the end of the court proceedings. The investigation of the incident also led to the sentencing of another suspect for two years on charges of sedition (possessing a publication that incites violence or terror, according to the government), but an appeal of the sentence was ongoing at the end of the year.

A Supreme Court ruling in June confirmed the Chief Rabbinate had sole legal authority to issue certificates of kashrut, which certify a restaurant’s adherence to Jewish dietary laws. The Chief Rabbinate did not issue certificates to restaurants that remained open on the Jewish Sabbath or holidays, even if the food was kosher. In addition, some nonkosher restaurants that opened on the Sabbath paid fines that varied according to local laws.

In October the Petah Tikva Magistrate Court issued a restraining order against a Be’er Sheva resident after he allegedly made threatening phone calls to Deputy Defense Minister Eli Ben-Dahan for his work promoting ultra-Orthodox enlistment to the IDF.

In September the government postponed maintenance on the public train system from a Saturday to the workweek because of objections from ultra-Orthodox political parties. The decision led to a disruption in commuter traffic and drew criticism from secular parties and civil society groups. Following this incident, the NGO Be Free Israel stated that the media company holding the contract to place advertisements on public buses refused to place its ads calling for public transportation on the Sabbath, out of fear of offending passengers and vandalism.

In October, top Jewish and Palestinian Muslim religious leaders met with President Reuven Rivlin to promote peace and affirm their opposition to all forms of religiously inspired violence. Participants included Sephardic Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef and Palestinian Supreme Sharia Court judge Sheikh Mahmoud Habbash. President Rivlin also hosted Buddhist, Hindu, and Sikh leaders from India, Japan, China, Burma, and South Korea in September to promote interfaith dialogue.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

According to the government, Palestinian militants fired 27 rockets and mortars into Israel from Gaza, and there were over 120 incidents of mortar fire or cross-border shooting from Syria. Militant and terrorist groups, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, issued anti-Semitic statements in conjunction with attacks launched at Israel from the Gaza Strip. For example, the media reported in October that a Salafi militant group in Gaza announced after launching a rocket at the southern town of Sderot that the attack was part of the “jihad against Jews.”

Because religion and ethnicity were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

On March 8, Palestinian Abed el-Rahman Mahmoud Radad stabbed in the neck an ultra-Orthodox Jewish man who was collecting for charity in Petah Tikvah. The man used Radad’s own knife to kill him as he was attacking others.

On February 4, two 14-year-old girls, Arab citizens of Israel, attacked a security guard in Ramle with knives. The guard suffered slight injuries to his hands and legs. Authorities indicted the girls a week later on charges of attempted murder, conspiracy, and possession of a knife. Police said the attack had nationalistic motives. The case was ongoing as of the end of the year.

On June 8, Palestinian cousins Khaled and Mahmoud Mahamrah opened fire on customers in a popular Tel Aviv marketplace, killing four Israelis. The two gunmen were captured and indicted for murder on July 4 in Tel Aviv District Court. Yunis Aish Musa Zin, from the same West Bank town as the cousins, was indicted on charges of aiding and abetting a terrorist attack. The cases were ongoing as of the end of the year.

On June 30, a Palestinian man stabbed two Israelis in the city of Netanya. One of the wounded was a 40-year-old ultra-Orthodox man and the other was a 62-year-old woman. The attacker, Wa’il Abu Saleh, was shot and killed by an armed civilian.

Religious freedom and democracy monitoring organizations reported continued tension between the ultra-Orthodox community and other Israelis, including concerns related to housing, public transportation, service in the IDF, and participation in the workforce. There continued to be reports of Haredi men spitting at non-Haredi Jews and persons of other faiths, including those wearing Christian clerical clothing. In September the Rabbi of Kiryat Gat was attacked in his home by ultra-Orthodox men reportedly because of his support for military conscription.

In September police closed without charges the investigation into the January 2015 beating of Druze IDF veteran Tommy Hasson by 10 Jewish assailants suspected of being activists from the anti-assimilation group Lehava, reportedly after they overheard him speaking Arabic. Police did not file charges because of insufficient evidence following the loss of investigative files by police. According to the news outlet Ynet, after police arrested several suspects, a judge found the attack was committed with nationalistic motivations. Hasson was subsequently recognized by Israel’s National Insurance Institute as someone who survived “enemy hostilities.”

Also in September, Lehava activists disrupted a performance by the Armenian Church Choir at a mall in Jerusalem. Police removed two of the Lehava protesters when they refused to disperse after reportedly shouting at the choir, “Christians, go to Syria!” and “Jew murderers!”

Jehovah’s Witnesses were subject to multiple incidents of societal violence. For example, Church leaders said that on January 9, two young men attacked two Church members who were preaching in a park. Police closed the investigation because they were unable to identify the perpetrators. On June 16, the neighbor of a man with whom a Jehovah’s Witness member was speaking allegedly threw the Jehovah’s Witness to the floor and beat him. The police notified Church leaders that they closed their investigation into the incident because “the circumstances of the case do not justify continuation of the investigation.”

Panel Politics research institute conducted a survey of 1,000 Jews on May 8 regarding perceived contributions of different groups to Israeli society. The Jews surveyed gave the highest marks to soldiers, Ashkenazim, and secular Jews, and the lowest marks to left-wing political party supporters, ultra-Orthodox, and Muslims.

In March Sephardic Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef said non-Jews should not live in the country if they do not follow seven Noahide laws mandated by Judaism. In December he stated women should not serve in the military or the civilian National Service alternative because it was inconsistent with “the Torah’s way.”

Although many rabbis of all denominations continued to discourage Jewish visits to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif site, some Orthodox rabbis continued to say entering the site was permissible. Media reported over 11,000 Jews visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif from January to October, including more than 3,000 during the period of Jewish holidays in October. Groups such as the Temple Mount Faithful and the Temple Institute continued to call for increased Jewish access and prayer there, as well as the construction of a third Jewish temple on the site. On November 7, for the first time, Member of Knesset Yehuda Glick held the annual Temple Mount conference in the Knesset and announced the creation of a Temple Mount lobby. The northern branch of the Islamic Movement, which the government declared illegal in November 2015, continued to speak of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif as “under attack.” Individuals affiliated with the group reportedly entered the compound as worshippers to “defend” the Al-Aqsa Mosque from those they perceived as attempting to take control away from Muslims.

The ultra-Orthodox organization Yad L’Achim reportedly continued to pressure Jewish women not to date non-Jewish men and offered Jewish women what it termed “escape” assistance from cohabitation with Arab men, i.e. facilitating the covert departure of women and their children from the homes they shared with their Arab spouses, sometimes by “launching military-like rescues from hostile Arab villages,” according to the organization. Lehava continued to operate a hotline for citizens to inform on Jewish women who were suspected of having romantic relationships with Arab or other non-Jewish men and reportedly made public the names and phone numbers of the men involved to discourage intermarriage.

According to the Religion and State Index published by Hiddush, a local NGO, 66 percent of Israelis surveyed (up 2 percent from 2015) supported recognizing all types of marriage, including civil, Reform, and Conservative. The proportion of Israeli Jews who preferred a non-Orthodox wedding for themselves or their children increased from 37 percent in 2015 to 47 percent. A majority expressed dissatisfaction over the Chief Rabbinate’s monopoly on kashrut certifications and opposed making these certifications conditional upon businesses’ observance of the Sabbath. Eighty-four percent of Israelis surveyed (down 2 percent) supported the general principle of freedom of religion and conscience.

According to media reports, in December 2015, at a conference in Bnei Brak, leading rabbis in the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox community issued an order to the principals of ultra-Orthodox institutions not to recognize the degrees of women who study in academic institutions. They also banned ultra-Orthodox women from attending colleges and universities, saying a woman’s higher pay resulting from higher education was “a danger to the entire structure of the household.”

According to NGOs, societal attitudes toward missionary activities and conversion to other religions continued to be negative. Many Jews continued to oppose missionary activity directed at Jews, saying it amounted to religious harassment and reacted with hostility toward Jewish converts to Christianity. Religious groups including the Messianic Jews and Jehovah’s Witnesses continued to proselytize and invited members of the public to participate in peaceful religious observances in public spaces such as parks and public walkways, according to observers. Those perceived as attempting to proselytize Jews faced harassment by the anti-assimilation groups Lehava and Yad L’Achim. In June hundreds of demonstrators organized by Yad L’Achim gathered outside a hall in Rishon Lezion where Jehovah’s Witnesses had scheduled a “Bible lecture,” preventing many participants from entering the premises. Police launched an investigation into the incident but the investigation was closed in August with no charges being filed. Reportedly Yad L’Achim encouraged Jews not to attend a Christian-sponsored sightseeing tour on September 24 that Yad L’Achim activists said was a missionary event. Several Jews did not board the tour buses and reportedly thousands left the final event in Caesarea when Christian preachers began to speak.

A vandal spray-painted black crosses on a synagogue in southern Jerusalem in September and October. Media reported in October that a Jewish resident of Jerusalem was arrested in connection with both incidents. The motive was unknown. Investigations into the two incidents were ongoing as of the end of the year.

On November 24, three weeks after the November 2 protest at the Western Wall, an unknown vandal painted graffiti and death threats against Reform Jewish leaders on a reform synagogue in Ra’anana. Prime Minister Netanyahu quickly condemned the vandalism, as did Minister of Education and Diaspora Affairs Naftali Bennett. In response to the vandalism, Women of the Wall said Orthodox rabbinical leaders had been demonizing and delegitimizing progressive Jewish movements over the past several years, and said Prime Minister Netanyahu remained silent even when those verbal attacks came from within his coalition.

In January vandals knocked over dozens of tombstones at a Christian cemetery west of Jerusalem, and wrote anti-Christian graffiti on the walls and doors of the Dormition Abbey, a Catholic monastery in the Jerusalem area. Government officials, including the prime minister, condemned the vandalism. In February arsonist(s) burned the tomb of military commander Hussam al-Din Abu al-Hija, considered an important figure in Islamic history, but did not write any anti-Muslim graffiti. An unknown person or persons attacked the Church of Transfiguration on Mount Tabor in Israel’s Lower Galilee on October 24. The attacker destroyed the tabernacle, scattered hosts (sacramental bread) on the floor, vandalized statues, and stole the contents of the donation box. The motive of the attack was unknown.

A variety of NGOs continued to try to build understanding and create dialogue among religious groups and between religious and secular Jewish communities, including Neve Shalom-Wahat al-Salam, the Abraham Fund Initiative, Givat Haviva, the Hagar and Hand-in-Hand bilingual schools, Hiddush, the Israeli Religious Action Center of the Reform Movement, Mosaica, and Interfaith Encounters.

On November 17, a group of prominent Israeli and Palestinian religious figures met at a summit in Spain and issued a joint denunciation of religious violence and incitement. Among the participants were Israeli Chief Rabbi David Lau, Sheikh Raed Badir – a leading sharia scholar and member of the Palestinian Ulama Council, Sheikh Imad Falouji, one of the founders of the Izzadin Kassam armed wing of Hamas who now serves as the chairman of the Adam Center for Dialogue of Civilizations in Gaza, Melchite Archbishop George Bakuni; the Latin Bishop of Jerusalem William Shomali; the Lutheran Bishop Munib Younan; and the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan Timotheos Margaritis.

The NGO Tag Meir continued to organize visits to areas where “price tag” attacks occurred and sponsored activities to promote tolerance in response to the attacks.

Following the continued tensions at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and violent incidents between Israelis and Palestinians, the Ambassador and embassy officers spoke with government officials and Knesset leaders about the importance of maintaining the agreed-upon status quo at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and not escalating tensions through provocative actions or statements. In meetings with government officials, visiting high-level U.S. government officials and embassy officers also stressed the importance of religious pluralism and respect for all streams of Judaism.

During a visit in February, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations met with the prime minister and other government officials, members of the Knesset, UN agencies, and civil society organizations working on religious pluralism issues. Discussions included the equal treatment of religious communities, combating acts of extremism, and strategies for calming tensions at religious sites. She visited religious sites and the Yad Vashem memorial for Holocaust victims in Jerusalem, as well as the Max Rayne Hand-in-Hand School, an institution dedicated to the education of Muslim and Jewish students together, which experienced an arson attack in 2014.

In April the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs visited Jerusalem and Tel Aviv for discussions with government officials, UN officials, and human rights experts, including on topics relating to religious minorities. In a May visit to Israel, Jerusalem, and the West Bank, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor met with government officials, Members of the Knesset, and NGOs to discuss a wide range of human rights issues, including issues related to religious minority groups, “price tag” attacks, and other instances of religiously motivated violence. Also in May a senior advisor in the office of the U.S. Special Representative for Religion and Global Affairs met with the Bahai religious minority and civil society groups working to promote religious pluralism.

Embassy-supported initiatives focused on interreligious dialogue and community development, and advocated a shared society for Arab and Jewish populations, including conferences at which embassy officers spoke out in support of the right of persons of all faiths to practice their religion peacefully, while also respecting the beliefs and customs of their neighbors.

Embassy officers participated in religious events organized by Jewish, Muslim, Druze, and Christian communities and used embassy social media channels to express U.S. support for tolerance and openness to other religions.

Embassy-hosted events, including an interfaith Ramadan iftar and an interfaith Thanksgiving dinner, promoted the reduction of tensions between religious communities and an increase in interreligious communication and partnership within society by bringing together representatives of many faith communities to advance shared goals and exchange knowledge and experience. Embassy programs supported mixed Jewish-Arab educational and community initiatives to reduce societal tensions and violence, including a project by the Citizens Accord Forum that brought together ultra-Orthodox and Arab citizens to create a shared civic agenda and implement activities related to social issues of common concern in their communities, in addition to a project supporting deliberative dialogue between religious Jewish and Arab women.

The embassy provided grants to organizations advocating religious tolerance among different ethnic groups, such as a three-year project by the NGO Sikkuy, which arranged a series of cultural tours to Arab majority towns in the Galilee and Wadi Ara during Ramadan for the purpose of introducing 2,000 Jews to Arab culture and religious practices during the Muslim holiday season.

The embassy also supported NGO Tsofen’s project to mitigate the interreligious and intercommunal tensions between Israel’s Arab and Jewish citizens through economic integration of the two communities and the creation of sustainable cycles of intergroup collaboration. The project’s activities promote the participation of Arab citizens in Israel’s high-technology industry, diversifying work environments, and facilitating intergroup collaboration.

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The U.S. government estimates the Palestinian population at 2.7 million in the West Bank and 1.8 million in the Gaza Strip (July 2016 estimates). According to U.S. estimates, the Palestinian residents of these territories are predominantly Sunni Muslims. The 2014 statistics published by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS) estimate 521,000 Jews live in Jerusalem – including areas in East Jerusalem which Israel took over in 1967 and unilaterally annexed in 1980 – accounting for approximately 61 percent of the city’s population. JIIS estimates the Muslim population of Jerusalem at 303,400 and the Arab Christian population of Jerusalem at 12,300. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics reported that 385,000 Jews reside in Israeli settlements in the West Bank as of 2015. Although there is no official count, in 2008 there were approximately 52,000 Christians residing in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem according to a survey conducted by the Diyar Consortium, a Lutheran ecumenical institution. The Holy See estimates the Christian population in the West Bank to be below 2 percent of the overall population, or fewer than 54,000 Palestinians. According to a YMCA survey of Christians in Gaza, there were approximately 1,300 Christians residing there as of March 2014. According to local Christian leaders, Palestinian Christian emigration has continued at increased levels since 2001. A majority of Christians are Greek Orthodox; the remainder includes Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Copts, Maronites, Ethiopian Orthodox, Episcopalians, Lutherans, and other Protestant denominations. Christians are concentrated primarily in East Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Nablus, although smaller communities exist elsewhere. Approximately 360 Samaritans (practitioners of Samaritanism, which is related to but distinct from Judaism) as well as a small number of evangelical Christians and Jehovah’s Witnesses reside in Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Legal Framework

The inhabitants of the different portions of the Occupied Territories are subject to the jurisdiction of different authorities. Israelis living in East Jerusalem fall under Israel’s civil and criminal law system (the Israeli government formally annexed East Jerusalem in 1980, although no other government, including the United States, has recognized this annexation). Palestinian residents (not holding Israeli citizenship) of Jerusalem are also subject to Israeli civil and criminal law. Israelis living in West Bank settlements are nominally subject to military law but Israeli authorities apply Israeli civil and criminal law to them. Palestinians living in the portion of the West Bank designated as Area C in the Oslo II Accord fall under Israel’s military legal system for criminal and security issues as well as civil issues, while Palestinians who live in Area B fall under PA civil law and Israeli military law for criminal and security issues. Although per the Oslo II Accord, only PA civil and security law applies to Palestinians living in Area A of the West Bank, Israel applies Israeli military law whenever its military enters Area A. The Gaza Strip officially comes under the jurisdiction of an interim PA government, although Hamas exercises de facto authority over it.

An interim Basic Law applies in the areas under PA jurisdiction. The Basic Law states Islam is the official religion, but calls for respect of “all other divine religions.” It provides for freedom of belief, worship, and the performance of religious rites unless they violate public order or morality. The Basic Law also proscribes discrimination based on religion and stipulates all citizens are equal before the law. The Basic Law states the principles of sharia shall be the main source of legislation.

There is no specified process by which religious organizations gain official recognition; each religious group must negotiate its own bilateral relationship with the PA. Nineteenth century status quo arrangements reached with the Ottoman authorities, which are observed by the PA, recognize the presence and rights of the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Assyrian, Coptic, Ethiopian Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Syrian Orthodox Churches. Later agreements with the PA recognized the rights of the Episcopal (Anglican) and Evangelical Lutheran Churches. Legally recognized religious groups are empowered to adjudicate personal status matters. They may establish ecclesiastical courts to issue legally binding rulings on personal status and some property matters for members of their religious communities.

Churches not officially recognized, but with unwritten understandings with the PA based on the basic principles of the status quo agreements, including the Assemblies of God, the Nazarene Church, and some Baptist churches, may operate freely and some may perform some official functions such as issuing marriage licenses. Churches not recognized by the PA generally must obtain special one-time permission from the PA to perform marriages or adjudicate personal status matters if these groups want the ceremonies to be recognized by and registered with the PA. These churches may not proselytize. There are a small number of churches which became active within the last decade and whose legal status remains uncertain.

By law, Islamic institutions and places of worship receive financial support from the government.

Religious education is part of the curriculum for students in grades one through six in public schools the PA operates. There are separate courses on religion for Muslims and Christians. Students may choose which class to take but may not opt out of religious courses. Recognized churches operate private schools which include religious instruction in the West Bank. Private Islamic schools also operated in the West Bank. Churches also operate “recognized but unofficial” (a form of semiprivate) schools in East Jerusalem, and the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf operates private schools in East Jerusalem; both include religious instruction.

Islamic or Christian religious courts handle legal matters relating to personal status, including inheritance, marriage, dowry, divorce, and child support. For Muslims, sharia determines personal status law, while various ecclesiastical courts rule on personal status matters for Christians. Legally, members of one religious group may submit a personal status dispute to a different religious group for adjudication if the disputants agree it is appropriate to do so.

Six seats in the 132-member Palestinian Legislative Council (which has not met since 2007) are reserved for Christians; there are no seats reserved for members of any other religious group. In August the PA renewed a decree mandating a majority-Christian quota for city councils and a Christian mayor in eight West Bank municipalities because these cities are historically Christian areas.

Government Practices

Violence between Palestinians and Israeli security forces in Israel, Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank continued. During the year 91 Palestinians and 8 Israelis were killed in attacks outside the Green Line in Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank. Because religion and ethnicity or nationality are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize much of this violence as being solely based on religious identity.

Visits by Jewish Temple Mount activists facilitated by Israeli authorities to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount increased to record levels during the Jewish holidays and Israeli national holidays. In April, June, and August there were incidents of violence at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif compound, usually after Muslim visitors or Waqf guards (a Jordanian government body entrusted with the care of Muslim sites in Jerusalem) said they observed Jewish visitors who were praying on the site. In a break from past practices, Israeli authorities that facilitated these visits also permitted non-Muslim visits to the site during some of the last 10 days of Ramadan. Israeli police, citing security concerns, restricted broad Muslim access at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount on two days, compared to 27 days in 2015. The Waqf continued to restrict non-Muslims who visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif from entering the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque. In addition, travel restrictions, such as limits on travel between the West Bank and Jerusalem for Jewish holidays, as well as further construction of the Israeli separation barrier, impeded the ability of Muslims to enter Jerusalem and Christian clergy to reach churches to conduct services. The authorities permitted both Muslims and Christians to pray at the Western Wall, although Israeli security restrictions limited the access of Palestinians to the Western Wall Plaza.

Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall were separated by gender. The Israeli government did not implement a cabinet agreement reached in January – reflecting initial compromise arrangements between Reform and Conservative and women’s Jewish groups, some Orthodox Jewish women’s groups, and the Rabbi of the Western Wall – to establish a Reform, Conservative, and mixed gender prayer platform south of the women’s section of the Western Wall. The Israeli government and the PA sometimes prevented Jewish Israelis from visiting Jewish religious sites in PA-controlled territory in the West Bank for security reasons.

Religiously intolerant material continued to appear in official PA media. Israeli and PA officials condemned “price-tag” attacks and vandalism, but prosecutions were rarely successful, according to local human rights groups.

Israeli forces killed 91 Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem, including some who killed or were reportedly attempting to kill or attack Israelis. Palestinian groups and unaffiliated individuals carried out attacks in the West Bank and Jerusalem that resulted in the deaths of eight Israelis, including five civilians and three Israeli security forces officers. For example on July 1, a Palestinian shot and killed 48-year-old Israeli Michael Mark and injured his wife and two children near the West Bank settlement of Otniel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fatally shot the suspected attacker, 29-year-old Muhammad Jbarah Ahmad al-Faqih, during a clash in the West Bank town of Surif on July 27.

In some cases the Palestinians killed reportedly did not pose a threat to life at the time they were shot, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) published reports saying that Israeli security forces committed unlawful killings. For example, on March 24, IDF soldier Elor Azaria fatally shot 20-year-old Abed al-Fatah al-Sharif after he stabbed and injured a soldier in the Tel Rumeida neighborhood of Hebron. Human rights groups reported that eyewitness video footage indicated Azaria shot al-Sharif in the head after he lay injured and incapacitated on the ground. As of December, Azaria remained on trial for manslaughter. On June 20, Israeli security forces opened fire at a car of Palestinian teenagers, killing 15- year-old Mahmoud Badran and wounding four others. The IDF initially announced that the security forces had “targeted terrorists” during a search operation in the area for Palestinian suspects who had reportedly thrown rocks and Molotov cocktails at Israeli vehicles on a nearby highway. The IDF later revised its account to say that “uninvolved bystanders were mistakenly hit during the pursuit.” The IDF’s Military Police Investigative Unit launched an investigation, which remained open as of December.

In January the Israel Central District Attorney’s Office indicted two Jewish suspects in the July 2015 “price tag” arson attack on a Palestinian home in the West Bank village of Douma, which killed a toddler and his parents and severely injured his four-year-old brother. The perpetrators also spray-painted “Revenge!” and a Star of David on the wall of the home. The trial continued throughout the year without any convictions being handed down.

On May 4, a Jerusalem court sentenced the last of three Jewish suspects in the 2014 kidnapping and killing of 16-year old Muhammad Abu Khdeir to life imprisonment plus 20 years.

There were isolated incidents of violence during visits to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount by Jewish Temple Mount activists. The visits were facilitated by Israeli authorities. On April 26, Israeli police clashed with guards employed by the Waqf, resulting in injuries to the guards, after three Jewish Temple Mount activists lay on the ground and began to pray during their tour of the site. The Waqf director and an Israeli police commander intervened to calm the situation. Beginning June 26, in a break from past practices, Israeli authorities permitted non-Muslim visits to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount during some of the last 10 days of Ramadan. During and following these visits, violent confrontations broke out between small numbers of stone-throwing Muslim youth and Israeli police, who responded with stun grenades and batons, leading to injuries on both sides. Separately, on August 14, during the visit of a then-record number of Jewish Temple Mount activists (403, compared to 326 in 2015) for the Jewish holiday of Tisha B’Av – commemorating the destruction of the Jewish temples – police using batons injured three Muslim worshippers after they sought to confront seven Jewish activists who prayed or tore their clothing in traditional mourning for the temple.

Palestinians reportedly threw stones and clashed with IDF escorts during visits of Jewish groups to Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus on several days during the year. The IDF used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse Palestinian protesters, to secure the site, and/or to evacuate Jewish worshippers.

The PA continued to implement its policy of providing imams with themes they were required to use in weekly Friday sermons in West Bank mosques and prohibited them from broadcasting Quranic recitations from minarets prior to the call to prayer.

Nonrecognized churches such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and some evangelical Christian groups, which faced a ban on their normal practice of proselytization, reported they were able to conduct most other operations unhindered by the PA. The PA, however, continued to refuse to recognize personal status legal documents issued by some of these nonrecognized groups, which the groups said made it difficult for them to register newborn children under their fathers’ names or as children of married couples. For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses representatives reported that the PA issued birth certificates for their members but would not issue marriage licenses, resulting in children born to these couples listed as having been born out of wedlock, which also complicated inheritance claims. Many nonrecognized churches advised members with dual citizenship to marry or divorce abroad in order to register the action officially in the second country.

The Israeli government continued to control access by Muslims and Jews to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. Although the Waqf continued to administer some aspects of the site, the Israeli government restricted the Waqf’s ability to control visitors’ access. In accordance with status quo arrangements with the Waqf, the Israeli government continued to prevent non-Muslim worship and prayer at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, but also imposed access restrictions on Muslim worshippers in what the Waqf said was a breach of the status quo, including temporary blanket age restrictions on two days during the year. The Israeli National Police (INP) continued to be responsible for security at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, with police officers stationed both inside the site and outside each entrance. Israeli police conducted routine patrols on the outdoor plaza and regulated pedestrian traffic in and out of the site.

Waqf officials repeated previous years’ complaints over what they said were violations by Israeli police of the status quo arrangements regarding control of access to the site, saying Israeli police did not coordinate with the Waqf on decisions to allow non-Muslim visitors onto the site or to restrict access to broad categories of Muslim worshippers or to individual Palestinians whom police suspected could disrupt the non-Muslim visits. For example, during the Tisha B’Av holiday on August 14, Israeli police imposed broad access restrictions, for the first time since October 2015, barring Muslim visitors under 50 from entering the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount during that morning’s Jewish activists’ tours. On December 12, Israeli police unilaterally extended the daily visiting hours for non-Muslims at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount by as much as one hour, which the Waqf also said was a breach of the status quo. Waqf employees remained stationed inside each gate and on the plaza but Waqf officials said they were able to exercise only a reduced oversight role. They reportedly could object to the presence of particular persons, such as individuals dressed immodestly or causing disturbances, but lacked the authority to remove such persons from the site. Waqf officials reported the Israeli police on occasion briefly detained Waqf guards or expelled them from the site and from the vicinity of visiting Jewish activist groups. Israeli police also arrested Waqf maintenance employees conducting renovation work inside the Dome of the Rock for failing to conduct the work under the supervision of the Israel Antiquities Authority (whose authority on the site the Waqf does not recognize). Police released the employees several days later. Police also prevented the Waqf from carrying out routine repairs, such as to leaking water pipes, as well as 20 major renovation projects, and refused to permit the entry of most maintenance equipment onto the site, according to the Waqf. Police citing security concerns prohibited delivery of iftar meals to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount during several days of Ramadan. Waqf officials said that the Israel police’s regular use of a small electric patrol vehicle, which struck and injured a Waqf guard, on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount – beginning during Ramadan and continuing throughout the year – was unprecedented and another violation of the status quo.

Israeli authorities in some instances barred specific individuals from the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount site, including Jewish activists believed to have violated rules against non-Muslim prayer, Muslims believed to have acted violently against non-Muslim visitors to the site, and public figures whose presence authorities feared would inflame tensions. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu continued to instruct police to bar sitting government ministers and members of Knesset from visiting the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, saying it would help calm tensions at the site. Some Jewish as well as Arab Muslim members of Knesset condemned their inclusion in the ban. Israeli police continued to enforce “black lists” barring at least 50 Muslim men and women they accused of verbally harassing Jewish visitors to the site. Israeli police said some of these banned Muslim worshippers had objected vocally to what they perceived as attempts by Jewish Temple Mount activists to break the injunction against non-Muslim prayer on the site.

According to media reports, the Israeli government permitted approximately 100-200 Gazans over the age of 60, as well as UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) staff in Gaza, to transit the Erez crossing to Jerusalem for weekly Friday prayers at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount for most weeks throughout the year. On December 6, Israeli authorities cancelled most of these permits indefinitely, saying some of those receiving permits did not return through Erez the same day; the Israeli government continued to permit UNRWA staff to transit Erez for Friday prayers in Jerusalem.

Muslim officials, including representatives of the Waqf, continued to object to Israeli restrictions on access to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount for Muslim worshippers, and they opposed calls from some Israeli groups to divide visiting hours between Muslims and non-Muslims and to allow non-Muslim prayer there.

The Waqf continued to restrict non-Muslims who visited the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount from entering the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque – a practice it started in 2003 when Israel ended coordination with the Waqf over non-Muslim visits. The Waqf also lodged objections with Israeli police over non-Muslim visitors wearing religious symbols or religious clothing, such as Jewish prayer shawls, on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. The INP sometimes acted upon these objections and/or enforced the restrictions of its own accord.

Israeli police continued to screen non-Muslims for religious paraphernalia, and prohibited them from praying publicly on the site. Israeli police continued to have exclusive control of the Mughrabi Gate entrance – the only entrance through which non-Muslims could enter the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount – and allowed visitors through the gate during set visiting hours, although the police sometimes restricted this access due to what they stated were security concerns. For example, Israeli police continued to enforce a six-month restraining order issued in November 2015 that prohibited a leader of a Jewish Temple Mount activist group, Return to the Mount, from entering the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount after the group publicly advocated Jewish prayer during visits to the site and offered monetary rewards to activists who were arrested for praying on the site. Israeli police maintained checkpoints outside other gates to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, preventing non-Muslims from entering these other areas, but did not coordinate with Waqf guards inside.

Despite the Israeli government’s policy prohibiting non-Muslim worship at the site, some Jewish groups escorted by Israeli police at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount performed religious acts such as prayers and prostration. Incidents of attempted Jewish prayer at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount increased from previous years, according to local NGOs, media, and Jewish Temple Mount movement groups, and occurred on a near-weekly basis. During Jewish holidays, such as Passover, Tisha B’Av, and Sukkot, tens of Jewish Temple Mount activists engaged in prayer on the site. In most cases, Israeli police acted to prevent them from praying and removed them, but in other cases, some of which were documented on social media in photos and videos, the police appeared not to notice the acts of prayer. Some Jewish Temple Mount activists toured the site in bare feet, consistent with their interpretation of Jewish tradition at the temple, to which the Waqf raised objections. Israeli authorities sometimes barred individual Jewish Temple Mount activists who had repeatedly violated rules against non-Muslim prayer on the site, including Temple Mount movement leaders.

Some government coalition Knesset members and Israeli NGOs, such as the Temple Institute and Temple Mount Faithful, continued to call on the Israeli government to implement a temporal division at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount to set aside certain days or hours for Jewish access and/or worship, similar to the arrangement used at the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. Several coalition Knesset members and government ministers in November publicly criticized the status quo arrangements at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount as restricting Jewish rights there, and called for the Israeli authorities to end the ban on Knesset members’ and government ministers’ visits and/or the ban on non-Muslim prayer.

The Israeli government continued to permit both Muslims and Christians to pray at the Western Wall, the place of worship nearest the holiest site in Judaism, although Israeli police frequently limited access to Palestinians to the Western Wall Plaza for what they stated were security reasons. The Rabbi of the Western Wall continued to set the guidelines for religious observance mandating the separation of women and men, which the Israeli government continued to enforce. Men and women at the Western Wall had to use separate areas to visit and pray, with the women’s section being less than half the size of the men’s section. The Jewish authorities continued to prevent women from accessing the public Torah scrolls at the site for use in the women’s section (both men and women were barred from bringing outside Torah scrolls into the Plaza) and giving the priestly blessing. They continued, however, to allow both men and women to practice their religious rituals as desired on a temporary mixed gender platform located south of the Mughrabi ramp and adjacent to the Western Wall. The Israeli government designated the platform for members of the Conservative and Reform movements of Judaism and in January approved a plan to establish a permanent, expanded prayer platform for these groups there. Non-Orthodox and mixed gender groups continued to use the temporary platform for religious ceremonies such as bar and bat mitzvahs. This accommodation of the desire for “egalitarian” Jewish prayer (permitting Reform, Conservative, and/or mixed gender prayer) remained a subject of debate in the Jewish community throughout the year. Ultra-orthodox Jewish leaders including the Rabbi of the Western Wall and some members of Knesset continued to oppose egalitarian prayer spaces at the traditional Western Wall Plaza, as well as the establishment of a different permanent egalitarian prayer area, and the government did not implement the January cabinet agreement. Activist groups such as Women of the Wall, an NGO and prayer group, supported the plan to establish a permanent mixed gender prayer space, but Women of the Wall and other Jewish women’s groups also continued to assert their demands to conduct Jewish prayer services, including the use of Torah scrolls and the priestly blessing, at the traditional Western Wall site.

The Israeli police continued to assist Women of the Wall to enter the women’s area of the Western Wall for its monthly service, but sometimes enforced Jewish authorities’ prevailing guidelines for religious observance there as well. In April police prevented ultra-Orthodox protesters from disrupting a Passover prayer service sponsored by Women of the Wall in the women’s section. On June 7, police briefly detained the executive director of Women of the Wall for questioning on charges of breaching public order after she smuggled a private Torah scroll into the Western Wall Plaza for use in an egalitarian prayer service. On November 2, ultra-Orthodox Jewish protesters and officials of the Western Wall Heritage Foundation tried to physically prevent the Women of the Wall from bringing Torah scrolls into the women’s section for prayers. Following the clashes, Israeli police and border guards separated Women of the Wall activists, along with Reform and Conservative Jewish leaders, from the protesters. The police did not make any arrests.

The Israeli police continued to put up security checkpoints in the Old City during major religious holidays, including the Orthodox Easter holiday, which Christian leaders said reduced the ability of congregants and clergy to enter the Church of the Holy Sepulcher to participate in religious services. Israeli police agreed to increase the number of Christian pilgrims permitted through security checkpoints in the Old City during these holidays, but church officials reported there was no improvement in coordination between police and Christian leaders to deal with the resulting increase in pedestrian traffic to the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. During busy periods the Israeli police site commander continued to provide security and facilitate access to the church and managed tensions between followers of different streams of Christianity at the site, according to some Christian leaders. Other Christian leaders said police used excessive force in their efforts to regulate crowds in the Old City during the Easter events.

The Israeli government imposed increased movement restrictions on Palestinians in the West Bank, October 2-4 for the Rosh Hashanah holiday, October 11-12 for the Yom Kippur holiday, and October 16-24 for the Sukkot and Simchat Torah holidays. As in previous such closures, during these periods authorities prohibited Palestinian West Bank residents including those who held Israeli-issued access permits, from entering Jerusalem or Israel, except those working for international organizations or in a humanitarian capacity.

The Israeli government again announced it had increased the number of permits for Palestinians from the West Bank to access Jerusalem for religious holidays, such as during Christmas season, from December to January, and for Ramadan, June 5-July 5, but Palestinian Muslim and Christian leaders said the Israeli government prevented many of these permits from being used in practice. For example, they stated Israel had granted permits to some but not all members of the same immediate family thereby discouraging families not wishing to be separated from children or others from traveling. The Israeli government provided fewer special permits than in 2015 to West Bank Muslims during Ramadan for access to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount or to Jerusalem for family unification visits. Israeli authorities also revoked at least 83,000 travel permits for West Bank Palestinians during Ramadan following a Palestinian terror attack in Tel Aviv, in which the two perpetrators shot and killed four Israelis.

The Israeli government continued to prohibit Israeli citizens in unofficial capacities from traveling to the parts of the West Bank under the civil and security control of the PA (Area A). While these restrictions in general prevented Jewish Israelis from visiting several Jewish religious sites, the IDF provided special security escorts for Jews to visit religious sites in Area A of the West Bank, particularly Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus – a site of religious significance to Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Some Jewish religious leaders said this policy prevented Jewish Israelis from freely visiting several Jewish religious sites in the West Bank, such as Joseph’s Tomb, because they were denied the opportunity to visit the site on unscheduled occasions or in larger numbers than may be permitted through IDF coordination. IDF officials said that requirements to coordinate Jewish visits to Joseph’s Tomb were needed to ensure Jewish Israelis’ safety. For example, the IDF escorted buses carrying hundreds of Jewish Israelis for overnight visits to Joseph’s Tomb on October 9 and 19. The IDF clashed with Palestinian protesters from the nearby Balata refugee camp during these and other visits. On November 8, PA police briefly detained four Jewish Israelis for attempting to visit Joseph’s Tomb without coordinating with Israeli or Palestinian authorities. The PA police transferred the four Israelis to IDF custody.

According to local Palestinian political leaders and the local press, Israeli authorities continued to prevent most Palestinians from accessing Rachel’s Tomb, a Bethlehem shrine of religious significance to Jews, Christians, and Muslims and under Israeli jurisdiction in Area C, but continued to allow relatively unimpeded access to Jewish visitors. Israeli police closed the site to all visitors on Saturdays, for the Sabbath (Shabbat). Police forcibly dispersed dozens of ultra-Orthodox Jewish protesters who tried to visit the Tomb on the night of November 11 during the Sabbath and arrested two of the Jewish protesters who threw rocks, smashing a Palestinian driver’s windshield.

The IDF continued to limit access to the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, another site of significance to Jews, Christians, and Muslims as the tomb of Abraham. Muslim leaders continued to oppose publicly, in statements to local media, the IDF’s control of access, citing Oslo-era agreements which gave Israel and the PA shared responsibility for the site. The IDF again restricted Muslim access on 10 days corresponding to Jewish holidays and Jewish access on 10 days corresponding to Muslim holidays. The IDF restricted Muslims to one entry point with IDF security screening. The IDF granted Jews access to several entry points without security screening. The IDF also periodically closed roads approaching the site, and since 2001 has permanently closed Shuhada Street to Palestinian pedestrians, citing security concerns. Both Muslims and Jews were able to pray at the site simultaneously but in separate physical spaces. Israeli authorities continued to implement frequent bans on the Muslim call to prayer from the Ibrahimi Mosque, saying it disturbed the Jewish settlers in the surrounding areas or posed a security concern.

Israeli authorities blocked all of the access roads to the Palestinian village of Nabi Samwil, north of Jerusalem, June 4 to 6 to facilitate the visit of hundreds of ultra-Orthodox Jewish Israelis to the nearby Tomb of Samuel, which is also of religious significance to Jews, Christians, and Muslims and is collocated inside a mosque. Palestinian residents were prevented from leaving the village or receiving outside visitors during this period. Local NGOs reported this was the first year in which the Palestinian village was forcibly closed during the annual Jewish pilgrimage festival.

Israeli authorities threatened and in some cases attempted to enforce restrictions on the volume level of the call to prayer from some mosques in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. On November 3, a spokesperson for the Jerusalem Municipality said the municipality was developing a plan in collaboration with Israeli police to issue and enforce noise regulations for the call to prayer from mosques in East Jerusalem. The spokesperson said the plan would respect freedom of worship while allowing “reasonable quiet” for Jerusalem residents. The PA and other Palestinian officials condemned the plan. On November 4, Israeli security forces raided the Palestinian West Bank (Area B) town of Abu Dis, just east of Jerusalem, and instructed three mosques to stop broadcasting the call to prayer using electronic loudspeakers, according to the head of the local town council.

The Israeli government continued building the separation barrier, particularly south of Jerusalem in the West Bank. Religious organizations providing education, health care, and other humanitarian relief and social services to Palestinians in and around East Jerusalem stated the barrier impeded their work. Clergy members stated the barrier and additional checkpoints impeded their movements between Jerusalem and West Bank churches and monasteries, as well as the movement of congregants between their homes and places of worship. For example, Christian leaders said the separation barrier hindered Bethlehem-area Christians from reaching the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem. They also said it made visits to Christian sites in Bethlehem difficult for Palestinian Christians who lived on the west side of the barrier. Foreign pilgrims and religious aid workers also reported difficulty or delays accessing Christian religious sites in the West Bank because of the barrier.

The Israeli Ministry of Defense (MOD) in June completed construction of what the MOD and Israel High Court stated they considered a temporary segment of the separation barrier south of Jerusalem, near the Cremisan Valley convent of Salesian nuns and their school containing approximately 170 Muslim and Christian Palestinian students. Despite appeals from the convent and affected landowners, the Israeli High Court of Justice issued a ruling in January permitting the MOD to continue construction of the barrier in the area as a temporary measure, on the condition that the MOD leave a 225-meter (738-foot) gap near the convent, include an agricultural access gate for residents separated from their land, and afford these communities the opportunity to approve or appeal the final route of the barrier when it is submitted by the MOD. According to the convent leadership, local Christian advocacy NGOs, and Jerusalem-based church leaders, the completed (temporary) barrier impeded access to the convent and school from the Palestinian communities in nearby Beit Jala. These groups also said the gate would not provide area residents reliable access to privately-owned agricultural lands.

Israel’s Nature and Parks Authority demolished 12 gravestones on two different occasions in July and November in the Muslim Bab al-Rahmeh cemetery, adjacent to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. Israeli officials said the gravestones lay in an expanded area of the cemetery that Israel considers a national park, where private construction is prohibited. Palestinian officials and Muslim religious leaders condemned the destruction and said all graves lie within the documented historical borders of the cemetery. On December 12, Israeli police intervened to prevent the burial of a Palestinian woman in a section of the cemetery Israeli authorities considered to be part of the zoned national parkland, and briefly detained two family members.

Jerusalem municipal regulations specified that city budget requests for the construction of new houses of worship in Jerusalem must be used for the establishment of synagogues, and as written provided no funding to support construction of new churches or mosques in the city, according to a city council representative and local media.

The PA Ministry of Waqf (religious endowments) and Religious Affairs continued to pay for the construction of new mosques, the maintenance of approximately 1,800 existing mosques, and the salaries of most Palestinian imams in the West Bank. The ministry also continued to provide limited financial support to some Christian clergy and Christian charitable organizations.

Authorities continued to enforce rulings by Israel’s High Court declaring the segregation of men and women on public streets and sidewalks in the ultra-Orthodox Jewish neighborhood of Mea She’arim in Jerusalem to be illegal.

Although the PA removed the religious affiliation category from Palestinian identity cards in 2014, older identity cards continued to circulate, listing the holder as either Muslim or Christian per requirements existing before 2014.

There continued to be instances in which official PA media carried religiously intolerant and anti-Semitic material. In January PA television aired a documentary stating European countries sought to expel Jews and support a Jewish homeland in Israel because these countries suffered from European Jews’ “schemes, character traits, monopolies, and corruption.” After Morad Bader Abdullah Adais, a Palestinian teenager, was sentenced on November 2 to life imprisonment for killing Otniel settlement resident Dafna Meir, the media reported that, according to his January 14 indictment, Adais had confessed to being motivated by anti-Semitic incitement on “Palestinian media.”

PA President Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat, and the Council of Religious Institutions of the Holy Land (CRIHL) – a group bringing together the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, the heads of churches in Jerusalem, and the chief judge of the PA sharia courts – continued to condemn “price tag” attacks. The Israeli government continued to designate “price tag” perpetrators as members of “illicit organizations,” and an Israeli police unit specialized in investigating “price tag” attacks and other attacks on places of worship. Israeli police and the IDF reported investigating all known instances of religiously motivated attacks and making arrests where possible, although NGOs, religious institutions, and the media continued to state that those arrests rarely led to successful prosecutions. Many “price tag” attacks reportedly continued to go unprosecuted. For example, in March and July, residents of the Palestinian village of Douma, south of Nablus, reported that suspected Jewish settlers set fire to two homes of members of the extended family which was targeted in the deadly arson attack in July 2015. Israeli authorities did not identify any suspects for the March and July arson attacks.

The CRIHL issued statements condemning “price tag” attacks including desecration of religious sites, such as the arson of the outpost synagogue in Givat Sorek, but did not meet in full during the year.

Observers of archaeological practices in Jerusalem and the West Bank continued to state the Israel Antiquities Authority, an Israeli government entity, exploited archaeological finds bolstering Jewish claims, while overlooking other historically significant archaeological finds of other religions or the needs of Palestinian residents at these sites. Israeli NGO Emek Shaveh said the development of an archaeological site near the West Bank settlement of Shiloh associated with the Tabernacle and the Ark of the Covenant displaced Palestinians who lived within the site. An Israeli State Comptroller report in April said the Israel Antiquities Authority had authorized Elad, a private Israeli settler group, to conduct an archaeological dig in the East Jerusalem Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan, near the Israeli “City of David” tourist center, which NGOs said improperly excavated layers of Muslim Mamluk, Byzantine Christian, and Roman ruins to expose building remains dating to the period of the Second Jewish Temple. The Western Wall Heritage Foundation continued to promote ongoing archaeological excavations north and west of the Western Wall Plaza, including in tunnels underneath the Old City’s Muslim Quarter, which the Waqf stated were altering the religious landscape of the area around the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. In December Emek Shaveh, an Israeli archaeological NGO in Jerusalem, petitioned the Israeli High Court to nullify the Israel Ministry of Religious Services’ declaration of the Western Wall tunnels as an exclusively Jewish holy site. The NGO said the excavations also unearthed a Christian chapel, Muslim school, and Muslim Mamluk-era buildings.

The Israeli government retained its previous regulations regarding visa issuance for foreigners to work in Jerusalem and the West Bank, which Christian institutions said impeded their work by preventing many foreign clergy from entering and working. Christian advocates from multiple denominations continued to express concerns about the difficulty of obtaining visas for clergy. The Israeli government continued to limit Arab Christian clergy serving in the West Bank or Jerusalem to single entry visas, which local parish leaders in the West Bank said complicated needed travel to other areas under their pastoral authority outside the West Bank or Jerusalem, such as Jordan. Clergy, nuns, and other religious workers from Arab countries said they continued to face long delays before they received visas, and reported periodic denials of their visa applications. The Israeli government stated visa delays or denials were due to security processing. Officials from multiple churches expressed concerns that non-Arab visa applicants and visa renewal applicants also faced long delays.

According to some church officials, Israel continued to prohibit some Arab Christian clergy from entering Gaza, including bishops and other senior clergy seeking to visit congregations or ministries under their pastoral authority. Israel facilitated visits by clergy including bishops from non-Arab countries to Gaza on multiple occasions, such as delegations from Europe, North America, and South Africa in January and November.

According to church leaders and lay Palestinians, a combination of factors continued to provide the impetus for increased Christian emigration from Jerusalem and the West Bank, including the limited ability of Christian communities in the Jerusalem area to expand due to building restrictions maintained by the municipality in Jerusalem or Israeli authorities in Area C; the difficulties Christian clergy experienced in obtaining Israeli visas and residency permits; Israeli government family reunification restrictions; taxation problems; and economic hardship created by Israeli-imposed travel restrictions.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other militant and terrorist groups were active in Gaza.

In Gaza, there continued to be instances where Hamas “morality police” or internal security officers punished men and women with fines for infractions such as dressing “inappropriately,” (e.g., wearing Western-style or close-fitting clothing, such as jeans or T-shirts, or not wearing a head covering) in public areas, although according to media and local NGOs, enforcement was inconsistent.

Christian groups reported Hamas tended to tolerate the small Christian presence in Gaza and did not force Christians to abide by Islamic law. Israeli military operations in 2014 damaged many Christian buildings and destroyed Christian homes, leaving them concerned about their continued ability to live there. In April Palestinian Christians accused Hamas authorities in Gaza of failing to prevent damage to the remains of a Byzantine church unearthed during excavations for the construction of a shopping mall in Gaza city.

In April an imam affiliated with the Gaza Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs led schoolchildren in a compulsory mass repentance event that Palestinian political groups criticized as traumatizing and harmful to the children and an attempt to forcibly indoctrinate them in a conservative interpretation of Islam.

Some Muslim students continued to attend schools run by Christian institutions or NGOs in Gaza.

According to media accounts, Hamas’ de facto control of Gaza continued to prevent the PA from investigating and prosecuting Gaza-based cases of religious discrimination, including reported anti-Christian bias in private sector hiring and in police investigations of anti-Christian harassment.

Militant and terrorist groups, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, frequently issued anti-Semitic statements. In November a Hamas official appearing on Al Jazeera television said the most important thing in Judaism was money and accused Jewish Americans of buying off U.S. presidents. Hamas-run media continued to broadcast anti-Semitic programming including encouraging violence against Jews. For example, in April Hamas-affiliated Al-Aqsa television aired an interview with a Palestinian economist who claimed that “global Jewish hegemony” caused the 2008 global financial crisis. In August Al-Aqsa television broadcast a sermon from a Hamas legislator calling the Jewish people “the vilest nation in history.”

In addition to the wave of societal/nationalist violence, there were other incidents of violence including deadly violence which perpetrators said was justified at least partly on religious grounds. Actions included killings, physical and verbal attacks on worshipers and clergy, and vandalism against religious sites. There was also harassment by members of one religious group against another, social pressure to stay within one’s religious group, and anti-Semitic media items.

On June 30, a Palestinian teenager stabbed to death 13-year-old Israeli American dual citizen Hallel Ariel in her home in the West Bank settlement of Kiryat Arba. The attacker, 16-year-old Muhammad Naser Mahmoud Tarayrah, also stabbed and wounded a private settlement security guard before the guard shot and killed him.

On November 10, unknown gunmen in Gaza killed Mithqal al-Salmi, a local activist, who was known to support Shia Islam. Hamas-run police had previously arrested al-Salmi in February for posting pro-Iran and Hezbollah stories and casting doubt about Sunni scholars on Facebook. Hamas police in Gaza announced they were investigating the shooting.

Palestinian youths threw stones and Molotov cocktails and committed other acts of violence against Jewish visitors to Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus. For example, on August 23, rock-throwing local Palestinians attacked Jewish groups visiting Joseph’s Tomb without a security escort, according to local press, resulting in injuries to two of the Jewish Israelis, before the IDF intervened to disperse the Palestinian suspects.

Suspected Jewish militants carried out “price tag” attacks against Christian and Muslim religious properties, including assaults on Christian clergy and vandalism and anti-Christian graffiti at the Dormition Abbey and the Greek and Armenian Orthodox cemeteries on Mt. Zion near Jerusalem’s Old City, and arson at several homes in the West Bank village of Douma. The graffiti painted at the Dormition Abbey in January included Stars of David, a bloody sword, and dozens of anti-Christian slogans such as “send Christians to hell, you must slay the idolaters;” “erase [Jesus’] name and memory;” and “the revenge of Israel’s sons is coming.”

Palestinian youths reportedly committed arson and vandalism against the Mount of Olives cemetery and synagogues in Jerusalem and at a West Bank Israeli settlement near Hebron. In February Palestinian suspects set fire to the makeshift synagogue in the Givat Sorek outpost settlement near Hebron, destroying several Torah scrolls. In September suspects spray-painted crosses on the side of a Jerusalem synagogue. In November two Jewish tombs dating roughly to the Second Temple period, popularly known as “Absalom’s Pillar” and the “Tomb of Jehoshaphat,” located in the Kidron Valley at the foot of the Mount of Olives cemetery just east of the Old City, were burned in what Israeli authorities stated they suspected was a Palestinian arson attack. NGOs reported no other incidents in which Jewish gravestones at the cemetery were vandalized during the year, which some attributed to improved security monitoring around the cemetery.

Harassment of and attacks against Muslims and Christians in Jerusalem by Jewish groups reportedly increased. The Jewish Israeli organization Lehava continued to protest social relationships between Jews and Palestinians, made anti-Christian and anti-Muslim statements, and reportedly assaulted Palestinians in West Jerusalem. Israeli media reported that Palestinians or their Israeli employers filed at least 20 complaints of harassment and assault – including with rocks and pepper spray – by Lehava activists in central Jerusalem during the year. Israeli authorities rarely prosecuted these attacks successfully, failing to open investigations or closing cases for lack of evidence, according to local human rights groups and the media. In September the Jerusalem district attorney’s office closed its investigation into the beating of an Israeli Druze man in Jerusalem by suspected Lehava activists who overheard the man speaking Arabic, because according to police they lost the investigative file and had insufficient evidence to file charges. In January local media reported earlier public comments from the head of Lehava saying Christians were not welcome in Jerusalem, and that Jews should work to block their immigration to the city. In September Lehava leaders disrupted an Armenian church choir performance at a mall in downtown Jerusalem by shouting, “Christians, go to Syria!” and “Jew murderers!” Police removed two of the Lehava protesters when they refused to disperse.

Participants, including some from Lehava, in the “march of flags” on Jerusalem Day, commemorating Israel’s 1967 conquest of East Jerusalem, shouted anti-Muslim chants in the Old City’s Muslim Quarter such as “the Temple will be built, [Al-Aqsa] mosque will be burned,” and “Mohammed is dead.” Police arrested some Lehava supporters during the march. The Jewish Israeli organization Yad L’Achim reportedly continued to pressure Jewish women not to date Palestinian men and to warn Palestinian men to stay away from Jewish women. The organization also continued to encourage people to inform on Jewish-Palestinian couples.

Local Christian clergy said some Jewish Israelis in Jerusalem continued to subject them to nonphysical abuse, including insults and spitting. These incidents occurred most often near churches on the seam line between East and West Jerusalem, in the Old City, and near the shared holy site of the Cenacle (devotional site of the Last Supper)/David’s Tomb near the Old City.

Dozens of Jewish students tried to disrupt Greek Orthodox Pentecost prayer services at the Cenacle/David’s Tomb. The protesters reportedly yelled “we will tear down this abomination,” and, “you are evil,” and, “may the name of your so-called God be blotted out forever.” Israeli police ensured the protesters did not prevent the Orthodox service from continuing and arrested several demonstrators.

Drivers who operated motor vehicles in or near ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods on the Sabbath in Jerusalem reported incidents of harassment – such as slurs or spitting – by ultra-Orthodox Jewish residents in those neighborhoods. According to the local press, some ultra-Orthodox groups continued to criticize Jerusalem residents who did not adhere to their strict interpretation of Orthodox Jewish law on issues including whether businesses in non-ultra-Orthodox majority neighborhoods in Jerusalem – such as a major movie theater completed in West Jerusalem – could remain open on the Sabbath.

Ultra-Orthodox Jews at the Western Wall continued to harass verbally visitors and Jewish worshippers who did not conform to Jewish Orthodox traditions, such as modest dress or gender segregation at the Western Wall Plaza. Members of the Jewish Conservative and Reform movements continued to criticize gender segregation and rules governing how women pray at the Western Wall.

According to Jehovah’s Witnesses and evangelical Christians, established Christian groups opposed their efforts to obtain official recognition from the PA because of their proselytizing.

Jewish proponents of accessing and performing religious rituals at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount site, such as Return to the Mount, the Temple Mount Faithful, and the Temple Institute, continued to call for increased Jewish access and prayer at the site, although some Orthodox rabbis continued to discourage Jewish visits to the site. Some Jewish groups continued to call for the destruction of the Islamic Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque to enable the building of a third Jewish temple. For example, a mock ritual sacrifice ceremony on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem in April organized by Temple Mount movement activist groups during Passover included calls for the “abomination” on the Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount to be removed and alluded to a time the site would be “flattened and cleaned” for the rebuilding of a Third Jewish Temple. The northern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, a political and religious group opposed to participation in local or national governance, which the Israeli government declared illegal in November, continued to call on members to “defend” the Al-Aqsa mosque.

According to Palestinian sources, most Christian and Muslim families in the Occupied Territories reportedly continued to pressure their children, especially their daughters, to marry within their respective religious groups. Couples who challenged this societal norm, particularly Palestinian Christians or Muslims who sought to marry Jews, could encounter considerable societal and family opposition. Families sometimes disowned Muslim and Christian women who married outside their faith. NGOs and local clergy reported it was more difficult for Christian Palestinians to obtain a divorce because of restrictions by some churches, including the Latin (Catholic) and Anglican/Episcopal Churches, against deciding divorce cases in their courts handling personal status issues.

Independent Palestinian media outlets continued to broadcast anti-Semitic programming. Palestinian Awdah Television in July aired a children’s cartoon depicting Jews as evil and the representatives of Satan, fighting on his behalf and doing his bidding on earth.

According to local press and social media, some Israeli settlers in the West Bank continued to justify their attacks on Palestinian property, such as the uprooting of Palestinian olive trees or “price tag” attacks, as necessary for the defense of Judaism.

On October 13, Chief Judge of the PA Sharia Courts Mahmoud al-Habash and Israeli Chief Sephardi Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef met at a summit in Jerusalem, alongside several other Israeli rabbis and Palestinian Muslim figures, to discuss religious tolerance. On November 17, a group of prominent Israeli and Palestinian religious figures met at a summit in Spain and issued a joint denunciation of religious violence and incitement. Among the participants were Israeli Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi David Lau; Sheikh Raed Badir – a leading Islamic sharia scholar and member of the Palestinian Ulama Council who also directs the Adam Center for Interreligious Dialogue; Sheikh Imad Falouji, one of the founders of the Izzadin Qassam armed wing of Hamas who became chairman of the Adam Center for Dialogue of Civilizations in Gaza; Melkite Archbishop George Bakuni; Auxiliary Bishop to the Latin (Catholic) Patriarch of Jerusalem William Shomali; Lutheran Bishop Munib Younan; and Greek-Orthodox Metropolitan of Bostroi Timotheos Margaritis.

Officials from the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem met with PA officials to discuss religious tolerance and their perceptions of changes to the status quo of religious sites, including Palestinian concerns about restrictions on Muslim access to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. These discussions included requests to PA and PLO officials to remove religiously intolerant material or language glorifying violence from a Fatah party Facebook account and other Palestinian media and social media. Consulate general officials also expressed concerns about UNESCO resolutions sponsored by the PA that minimized or ignored the Jewish religious and historical connection to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and Western Wall. Consulate general officers raised with local authorities the views and concerns expressed by both majority and minority religious groups.

Visiting senior U.S. officials including the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor met with politicians and local religious and civil society leaders to discuss religious tolerance and the need for cooperation against religious prejudice, such as “price tag” attacks in Jerusalem and the West Bank. The U.S. Representative to the UN Human Rights Council met with local Palestinians to hear their concerns that construction of Israel’s separation barrier in the Cremisan Valley impeded access to the Catholic convent and school and agricultural lands near Beit Jala and Bethlehem.

The Consul General and consulate general officers met regularly with representatives of a full range of religious groups from Jerusalem, the West Bank, and where possible, the Gaza Strip. This included meetings with the Waqf and Muslim leaders in Jerusalem and throughout the West Bank; meetings with Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox rabbis, and representatives of various Jewish institutions; regular contacts with leaders of the CRIHL, the Greek Orthodox, Latin (Roman Catholic), and Armenian Orthodox patriarchates; and meetings with the Holy See’s Custodian of the Holy Land, leaders of the Anglican and Lutheran Churches, and leaders of evangelical Christian groups. These meetings included discussions of the groups’ concerns about religious tolerance, access to religious sites, respect for clergy, and attacks on religious sites and houses of worship. For example, the Consul General visited the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives with the NGO International Committee for the Preservation of Har Hazeitim to discuss visitor access and safety, and acts of vandalism against gravestones there. Consulate officers spoke to local Christians’ concerns about impeded access to their agricultural lands and local monastery due to the construction of the Israeli separation barrier in the Cremisan Valley, and to Waqf officials about Muslim access to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and Israeli police restrictions on Waqf renovation projects there. Consulate officers also spoke with Jews, Christians, and Muslims who had suffered from “price-tag” attacks, including following up with family members about the condition of the five-year old sole survivor of the deadly July 2015 arson attack on a Palestinian home in the West Bank village of Douma. Consulate general officers objected to instances of intolerant and anti-Semitic material in PA and Fatah party media and social media.

Consulate general officers examined a range of charges, including allegations of damage to places of worship, intolerant speech, and allegations concerning access to religious sites, and issued statements condemning these acts, including statements against “price tag” attacks.

READ A SECTION: ISRAEL | THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (ABOVE)

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 62 million (July 2016 estimate). According to a 2016 survey by the private Institute for Political, Social, and Economic Studies, 71 percent of citizens identify as Roman Catholic. Religious groups together accounting for less than 5 percent of the population include other Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Bahais, and Buddhists. Non-Catholic Christian groups include Eastern Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Assemblies of God, the Confederation of Methodist and Waldensian Churches, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and a number of smaller Protestant groups. The remaining 24 percent have no religious affiliation. According to estimates by the Initiatives and Studies on Multiethnicity Foundation, of approximately five million resident foreigners, there are 1.6 million Muslims, 1.6 million Eastern Orthodox Christians, one million Roman Catholics, and 250,000 Protestants. The prime minister’s office estimates the Jewish population at approximately 30,000.

According to the MOI and the national agency for statistics, the Muslim population is composed of native-born citizens, immigrants, and resident foreigners, but most of its growth comes from large numbers of immigrants from Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, the majority of who live in the north. Moroccan and Albanian immigrants are the two largest groups. The MOI reports Muslims are overwhelmingly Sunni.

Legal Framework

The constitution states all citizens are equal before the law regardless of religion and are free to profess their beliefs in any form, individually or with others, and to promote them and celebrate rites in public or in private, provided they are not offensive to public morality. According to the constitution, each religious community has the right to establish its own institutions according to its own statutes as long as these do not conflict with the law. It stipulates the state may not impose special limitations or taxes on the establishment or activities of groups because of their religious nature or aims. The constitution specifies the state and the Catholic Church are independent of each other and their relations are governed by concordat between the government and the Holy See.

The law considers insults against any divinity to be blasphemy, a crime punishable by a fine ranging from 51 euros ($54) to 309 euros ($326). The government generally does not enforce the law against blasphemy.

The constitution states all religious groups are equally free and relations between the state and non-Catholic groups are governed by law based on agreements (“accords”) between them. Representatives of a non-Catholic faith requesting an accord must first submit their request to the Office of the Prime Minister. The government and the group’s representatives then negotiate a draft agreement, which the Council of Ministers must approve. The prime minister then signs and submits the agreement to parliament for final approval. Once the parliament approves the implementing legislation, the accord governs the relationship between the government and the religious group, including state support. Groups with an accord include the Confederation of Methodist and Waldensian Churches, Seventh-day Adventists, Assemblies of God, Jews, Baptists, Lutherans, Mormons, Orthodox Church of the Constantinople Patriarchate, the Italian Apostolic Church, the Buddhist Union, Soka Gakkai Buddhists, and Hindus.

The law provides religious groups with tax-exempt status and the right to recognition as legal entities as long as they have completed a registration process with the MOI. Legal recognition is a prerequisite for any group seeking an accord with the government. A religious group may apply for recognition of its legal status by submitting to a prefect, a local representative of the MOI, a request including the group’s statutes, a report on its goals and activities, information on its administrative offices, a three-year budget, certification of its credit status by a bank, and certification of the Italian citizenship or legal residency of its head. To be approved, a group’s statutes must not conflict with the law. If approved, the MOI is required to monitor the religious group. The MOI may appoint a commissioner to administer the group if it identifies irregularities in its activities. The Catholic Church is the only legally recognized group exempted from MOI monitoring, in accordance with the concordat between the government and the Holy See.

An accord grants clergy automatic access to state hospitals, prisons, and military barracks; allows for civil registry of religious marriages; facilitates special religious practices regarding funerals; and exempts students from school attendance on religious holidays. Any religious group without an accord may request these benefits from the MOI on a case-by-case basis. An accord also allows a religious group to receive funds collected by the state through a voluntary 0.8 percent set-aside on taxpayer returns. Taxpayers may specify to which eligible religious group they would like to direct these funds. The Catholic Church received more than 80 percent of the total 1.24 billion euro ($1.3 billion) set aside by the government in 2015, the most recent year for which data were available.

On April 6, the regional council of Veneto adopted a law confining new places of worship to urban peripheries and introducing new requirements regarding the use of the Italian language in religious services, the availability of adequate parking spaces and bank guarantees, and approval by public referendum prior to construction. On September 27, the regional government of Liguria enacted similar legislation allowing municipalities to require prior authorization of construction of new places of worship, and to hold referenda to measure public opinion on the issue.

The law allows the Catholic Church to select teachers, paid by the state, to provide instruction in weekly “hour of religion” courses taught in public schools. The courses are optional, and students who do not wish to attend can study other subjects or, in certain cases, leave school early with parental consent. Church-selected instructors are lay or religious, and the instruction includes material determined by the state and relevant to non-Catholic religious groups. Government funding is available only for these Catholic Church-approved teachers. If a student requests a religion teacher from a non-Catholic religious group, that group must cover the cost of instruction. Some local laws provide scholarship funding for students to attend private religiously affiliated schools, usually but not always Catholic, that meet government educational standards.

Hate crimes, including those motivated by religious hatred, are punishable by up to four years in prison. On June 8, parliament approved a law codifying Holocaust denial as an aggravating circumstance in the prosecution of hate crimes, punishable with two to six years in prison and fines up to 6,000 euros ($6,300). The law applies also in case of denial of genocide or crimes against humanity.

All missionaries and other foreign religious workers must apply for special religious activity visas before arriving in the country.

This country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

There was no progress in ongoing negotiations for accords between the government and the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Romanian Orthodox Church, and the Episcopal Church. Through the end of the year, no Muslim groups had obtained an accord with the government or begun negotiations for one.

In a regular periodic review of the accord system published on November 2, the national Court of Audit noted the lack of checks on the use of funds the government provided to religious groups and the risk of discrimination against faiths that had not signed an accord with the government.

Following the decision of 30 French municipalities to ban the burkini swimsuit, in August former Interior Minister Angelino Alfano discounted the possibility of any such prohibition in Italy, citing the freedom of religion provided for in the constitution. Afterward, Vice President of the Senate Roberto Calderoli, a member of the Northern League Party, called for a new law banning both burqas and burkinis. On October 10, Roberto Maroni, the Northern League Governor of Lombardy, appealed to parliament to amend an existing law banning head coverings in public places for security reasons to include explicit prohibitions on burqas and niqabs. There were no reports of enforcement of a ban on garments impeding personal identification in public hospitals that the Lombardy government announced in late 2015.

On February 8, Florence Mayor Dario Nardella and Izzedin Elzir, a local imam and president of the Union of Italian Muslim Communities (the country’s largest Muslim organization), signed a first-of-its-kind agreement committing the local Muslim community to hold Friday religious ceremonies in the city in Italian. The agreement called for Arabic translation to be provided for those who did not understand Italian. It also specified mosques would be open to people of all faiths and provided for the establishment of booths in Muslim places of prayer to give information on local religious and cultural events.

Muslims continued to encounter difficulties acquiring permission from local governments to construct mosques. As of November there were four officially recognized mosques, one each in Ravenna, Rome, Colle Val D’Elsa, and Milan, but more than 800 unofficial, informal places of worship for Muslims. Local officials continued to cite a lack of zoning plans authorizing the establishment of places of worship on specific sites.

Some regional governments continued to impose restrictions on the construction of new places of worship. On February 24, the Constitutional Court ruled that a 2015 regional law introducing strict new construction requirements for religious buildings by unregistered religious groups in Lombardy was partially unconstitutional. The court declared some aspects of the law limited the freedom of religion of non-Catholic religious groups that had not signed an agreement with the national government, violating the principle of equality of all religious groups. The court upheld other parts of the regional law, recognizing the power of regional governments to adopt general rules (mostly related to urban planning) on places of worship.

Following the court’s February 24 ruling declaring parts of the Lombardy law unconstitutional, on March 31, the municipal government of Milan suspended the designation of three sites for the construction of two mosques and a Protestant church announced by the previous administration in August 2015, citing technical problems with one of the proposals and obstacles stemming from the portions of the regional law that remained in effect. On October 31, the Bangladesh Cultural and Welfare Association, which had been assigned one of the sites on which to build a mosque, submitted an appeal against the suspension to the Lombardy regional administrative court. On October 17, newly elected Mayor of Milan Giuseppe Sala told reporters that a new mosque might be built in two years based on new requirements, and indicated the municipality was considering allowing the construction of several smaller mosques instead of the two previously called for. On November 3, religious associations from a variety of faiths submitted 23 plans for the establishment of places of worship to Milan municipal authorities for approval.

The Veneto and Liguria laws placing restrictions on the construction of new places of worship drew widespread criticism. On April 5, the Catholic Patriarch of Venice, Archbishop Francesco Moraglia, said the Veneto law limited religious freedom. Representatives of the Confederation of Methodist and Waldensian Churches, as well as the Union of Italian Muslim Communities, stated the initiatives were intended to block the construction of mosques. On September 26, Raffaella Paita, the Democratic Party leader in the Liguria regional council, called the law “misguided and unconstitutional,” saying, “it violates the right of Ligurian citizens to practice their own religion.”

Between July and September local authorities closed five of the 14 informal Muslim places of worship, commonly referred to as “garage mosques” (many function in spaces intended for use as garages) used by members of Rome’s Bangladeshi community, citing irregularities such as lack of construction permits or safety requirements. Community representatives organized public demonstrations, stating they had no legal means of establishing new places of worship. In October hundreds of Muslims in Rome held peaceful prayer protests against the closure of the five “garage” mosques, stating that the administrative reasons given for the closures, such as limited numbers of toilets, could have been addressed.

Local government officials in Rome met with community members to identify temporary and permanent facilities to use as place of worship and a cultural center. On May 31, soon after the Veneto law restricting unregistered religious groups from building houses of worship was enacted, the government filed an appeal to the Constitutional Court for review. The court had not issued a decision at year’s end.

Local governments continued to rent out public land at discounted rates to religious groups, usually Catholic, for constructing places of worship. Government funding also helped preserve and maintain historic places of worship, which were almost all Catholic.

In August the local chapter of the Forward Italy (Forza Italia or FI) Party led a campaign against the construction of a mosque in Pisa, which the city council had provisionally approved. Provincial council member and FI member Gianluca Gambini said a poll showed that 57 percent of Pisa residents opposed it, and that people were aware that mosques were places with “a risk of radicalization.”

On January 19, then-Interior Minister Alfano announced the creation of a new “Council of Relations with Italian Islam,” an advisory body on the integration of Muslims in the country. The minister was quoted as saying Muslim members of the group would work towards “the formation of an Italian Islam “that would align the religion more with the country’s “Christian and humanist tradition.” Alfano said the council aimed to further integrate Muslim immigrants and prevent extremism by providing guidance on training and certification of imams and establishment of new mosques. The council met approximately once a month.

In comments to the Washington Post in December, the leader of the Northern League party, Matteo Salvini, spoke out against the immigration of Muslims to Italy saying, “The problem of the Muslim presence is increasingly worrying. There are more and more clashes, more and more demands and I doubt the compatibility of Italian law with Muslim law, because it’s not just a religion but a law.”

The government held a series of events in commemoration of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp on Holocaust Remembrance Day, January 27. President Sergio Mattarella hosted a ceremony in which he encouraged the public “to learn, investigate, study, reflect and prevent” intolerance, discrimination, and violence. On January 18 and 19, Minister of Education Valeria Fedeli accompanied a group of 100 students to visit the Auschwitz concentration camp in cooperation with the Union of the Italian Jewish Communities.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

The Observatory of Contemporary Anti-Jewish Prejudice recorded 82 acts of anti-Semitism in 2016, compared with approximately 90 incidents 2015. The Union of Italian Jewish Communities and the Center for the Jewish Contemporary Documentation (CDEC), which continued to operate an anti-Semitism hotline for victims of, and witnesses to, anti-Semitic incidents, reported receiving 62 calls between January 1 and November 30, a slight increase over the same period in 2015. Reports of anti-Semitic incidents included online and verbal harassment, graffiti, and discrimination.

In 2015, the most recent year for which data were available, the contact center of the National Office against Racial Discrimination (UNAR) received 28 reports of discrimination based on religion, three of which concerned online discrimination. The Observatory for the Security against Discriminatory Acts of the national police reported four anti-Islamic incidents in 2015.

On May 24, teenagers verbally and physically assaulted a group of Jewish boy scouts in Milan who were wearing clothing identifying them as Jewish, shouting anti-Semitic profanities and punching one of the scouts. There were no reports of arrests or injuries.

On March 8, a 22 year-old Somali imam and asylum seeker was arrested for telling migrant residents in Campobasso that God ordered them to kill his enemies, organize a “jihad market,” preach sharia, and “punish the sinner.”

On January 8, five teenagers reported being threatened by a group of five Muslim men (four North African and one Albanian) in Vignola, Modena Province. The assailants, who were reportedly drunk, lined the teenagers up, shot a gun into the air, and asked if they believed in Allah or were Christians. After the teenagers stated they did not believe in anything the group left them alone. There were no injuries reported. The national police (Carabinieri) investigated the incident. The Northern League organized a candlelight vigil to protest the incident in Vignola.

In March the Catholic bishop of Pistoia, Fausto Tardelli, told two priests in his Tuscan diocese not to allow Muslims to pray inside their churches. The priests had pledged to allow 18 Muslim refugees to pray inside their churches. According to media reports, the regional council of bishops backed Tardelli’s order, while at the same time underscoring the need for parishes to welcome and help Muslim refugees. The priests told media they would defy the bishop’s orders and respond to Pope Francis’ plea to help and support immigrants. Both priests reported receiving threats by telephone and online.

In March the newly appointed Archbishop of Bologna, Matteo Maria Zuppi, called for the construction of a mosque in the city at a conference organized by the local Muslim community. He also called for the inclusion of Islamic celebrations in schools, “as already requested by Archbishop of Milan Angelo Scola.” He stated, “We shouldn’t be carried away by hateful generalizations, like the comparison between Muslims and terrorists.”

On June 11, the national daily Il Giornale distributed free copies of an annotated version of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf to readers who bought the newspaper and the first volume of William Shirer’s book “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich,” generating protests from Jewish community leaders and the Israeli embassy. The president of the Union of the Jewish Communities of Italy, Renzo Gattegna, characterized the initiative as “indecent” and “light years away from any logic of study and research on the Holocaust.” Then-Prime Minister Matteo Renzi also criticized the giveaway, tweeting that it was “sleazy.” The editor of the newspaper, Alessandro Sallusti, defended the decision, stating that, to understand the birth of pure evil, it was necessary to go to the source.

Press reported online hate speech was the fastest growing source of anti-Semitism. In September the Observatory on Anti-Semitism reported an increase in anti-Semitic attacks on social media following the death of former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres on September 28.

In a presentation of its annual report to the Chamber of Deputies on July 12, CDEC Director Betti Guetta cited statistical studies showing 7 to 12 percent of the population held unfavorable views of Jews.

According to a July poll released by the Pew Research Center, 69 percent of respondents held unfavorable views of Muslims in the country, up from 61 percent in 2015.

On January 27, Holocaust Remembrance Day, the newspaper Il Foglio distributed kippot (male Jewish headcovering) in its daily edition as a “sign of solidarity” and in response to a French Jewish leader who had called on Jews to hide their identities to prevent physical attacks. The paper stated, “the West should not obscure its roots and its religious symbols” and “the Jews and the West must not hide.”

On July 31, thousands of Muslims attended Mass in Catholic churches in several cities to express solidarity after the July 26 killing of a Catholic priest by two supporters of ISIS in the French city of Rouen.

On September 30-October 1, four churches in Rome were vandalized and had property damaged or destroyed, including statues, crucifixes, and candlesticks. Police arrested a 39-year-old Ghanaian man as a suspect in all four attacks, whose motives were under investigation.

The press reported examples of anti-Semitic graffiti and posters including depictions of swastikas on walls, anti-Semitic stereotypes, and praise of neo-Nazi groups in cities including Viareggio, Rome, Turin, and Vicenza. On April 17, authorities found dozens of swastikas painted on bus stops and street signs in the town of Gargazzone, in the province of Bolzano.

On June 26, in Bologna, vandals spray-painted the base of a statue of Saint Petronio with the text “Allahu Akbar.” The mayor and the Archdiocese of Bologna condemned the act. Police made no arrests.

Representatives from the U.S. embassy and consulates general met with national and local government officials in Rome, Milan, Turin, Bologna, Florence, Prato, and Ravenna to encourage respect for religious freedom, particularly within the context of the continuing unprecedented arrivals of migrants and asylum seekers, most of whom were Muslim. These meetings included discussions with the MOI and the presidency of the Council of Ministers, as well as UNAR, on the government’s efforts to promote integration of immigrant communities, their ability to worship freely and build places of worship, to prevent the spread of violent extremism, as well as the lack of official accords between the state and Muslim groups. At these meetings, the officials emphasized their government’s support for religious freedom and hope for eventual formalization of relations with the country’s Muslim communities.

The U.S. embassy and consulates also continued to meet with representatives of civil society groups including Caritas, Sant’Egidio, Integra, and Anolf, as well as Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish leaders in cities throughout the country, to promote social inclusion of immigrants, many of whom were Muslim, and dialogue among various religious groups, and to monitor their ability to practice their religion freely.

The Ambassador hosted an annual Eid al-Adha reception, attended by many representatives of Muslim groups throughout the country. At the reception, the Ambassador stressed the importance of ensuring that all religious groups have the freedom to practice their religion and emphasized the need for the country to continue to work to integrate the thousands of arriving migrants and refugees, many of whom were Muslim.

The embassy and consulates continued to meet regularly with Jewish leaders to discuss the state of the country’s Jewish community and concerns over anti-Semitic incidents. The Ambassador met with the newly elected president of the Italian Union of Jewish Communities in September to discuss anti-Semitism in the country and reiterate the importance of religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3 million (July 2016). According to the most recent census (2011), 26 percent of the population belongs to various branches of the Church of God, 12 percent is Seventh-day Adventist, 11 percent Pentecostal, 7 percent Baptist, 3 percent Anglican, 2 percent Roman Catholic, 2 percent United Church, 2 percent Methodist, 2 percent Jehovah’s Witnesses, 1 percent Moravian, and 1 percent Brethren. Two percent declined to answer questions about religious affiliation. Other religious groups constitute 8 percent of the population, including approximately 29,000 Rastafarians, 1,500 Muslims (Muslim groups estimate their current numbers at 6,500), 1,800 Hindus, 500 Jews, and 270 Bahais. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) indicates approximately 5,000 members reside on the island. The census reports 21 percent have no religious affiliation.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of thought and religion, including the freedom to change one’s religion or belief and the freedom, either alone or in community with others, both in public and in private, to manifest and propagate one’s religion or belief in worship. It prohibits discrimination based on belief. The constitution provides that rights and freedoms are protected to the extent they do not “prejudice the rights and freedoms of others.”

A law criminalizing Obeah and Myalism, religious practices with West African influences, remains in effect. In 2013, the parliament amended the law to remove flogging as a possible punishment, but left the possibility of imprisonment for up to 12 months for practicing or consulting a practitioner of Obeah or Myalism. Authorities have rarely enforced the law since the country became independent in 1962.

Registration with the government is not mandatory for religious groups, but groups that register obtain incorporated group status and gain benefits such as the ability to hold land, to enter into legal disputes as an organization, and for clergy to visit members in prison. Groups may seek incorporated status by applying to the government’s Companies Office. The Companies Office application comprises a standard form and a fee of 24,500 Jamaican dollars ($191). Nongovernmental organizations register via the same form and fee to gain incorporated status. Groups incorporated through this process must subsequently submit annual reports and financial statements to the Companies Office.

Alternatively, groups may petition the parliament to be incorporated by parliamentary act. Such groups receive similar benefits to those that incorporate through the Companies Office, but parliament does not require annual reports or regulate the organizations it incorporates.

Regardless of incorporation status, religious groups wanting to engage in tax-exempt transactions must register as charities. To be considered as charities, organizations, including religious groups, must apply to the Cooperatives and Friendly Societies Department at the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Agriculture, and Fisheries. Once registered, groups must submit their registration to the customs department or apply to the tax administration to be considered for tax-free status.

The constitution states that religious groups have the right to provide religious instruction to members of their communities. No individual may be required to receive religious instruction or participate in religious observances contrary to his or her beliefs. The public school curriculum includes nondenominational religious education, which focuses on the historical role of religion in society and philosophical thought. Students may not opt out of religious education; however, religious devotion or practice during school hours is optional. A number of private schools are operated by churches and a number of public institutions have church affiliations. Some public schools also are run by churches, but receive funding from the government and are required to abide by the rules of the Ministry of Education. Religious schools are not subject to any special restrictions and do not receive special treatment from the government based on their religious or denominational affiliation. Most religious schools are affiliated with Catholic or Protestant churches; there are two schools run by the Islamic Council of Jamaica. Regulations require that children must be immunized in order to attend schools, whether run by the government or a religious organization.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Rastafarians stated that the 2015 passage and attendant enforcement of the law that legalized marijuana usage for religious purposes assuaged their concerns about the government’s longstanding ban on marijuana use. Rastafarians stated law enforcement officials adopted appropriate changes in applying and enforcing the new law, but in rare cases continued to profile, stop, and search for possession of marijuana over the decriminalized limit. Rastafarians continued to state their religious opposition to immunization, which is a requirement for children to register and attend school.

Rastafarians stated elements of their religious observances, such as wearing dreadlocks and smoking marijuana, still presented barriers to their ability to find employment and achieve professional status. They stated, however, such discrimination had diminished considerably in recent years, especially as their style of clothing and music gained wider acceptance.

Seventh-day Adventists reported instances of difficulty finding or keeping work due to their observance of the Sabbath from sunset on Friday to sunset on Saturday. They stated the “flexi-work” law passed by parliament in 2014 had alleviated but not solved the problem, as some businesses remained reluctant to hire employees who could not work Saturdays.

Muslim, Jewish, and Christian groups reported society was tolerant of religious diversity and pointed to their involvement, along with other faiths, in the Jamaica Council for Interfaith Fellowship. The Islamic Council of Jamaica also cited large groups of school students visiting the council’s mosques as part of the government’s religious education syllabus. Ninety percent of the students in the Council’s two schools are non-Muslim.

Local media outlets continued to provide a forum for extensive coverage and open debate on religious matters through radio and television shows, such as the program Religious Hardtalk on Television Jamaica, and on opinion pages and letters to the editor in newspapers such as The Gleaner and the Jamaica Observer.

The U.S. embassy held meetings and encouraged dialogue among religious groups, including Christians, Muslims, Jews, and Rastafarians, as part of its overall efforts to promote religious freedom. The Ambassador and other embassy officers promoted religious tolerance and included references to religious freedom and tolerance in speeches and other official communications. U.S. embassy officers met with religious leaders who had taken part in a U.S.-sponsored citizen exchange program to discuss advocacy for minority rights. In its dialogue with government officials and religious groups, the embassy discussed religious freedom, citizen security, human rights, and social inclusion.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 126.7 million (July 2016 estimate). A report by the government’s Agency for Cultural Affairs (ACA) indicates that membership in religious groups totaled 190 million as of December 31, 2014. This number, substantially more than the country’s population, reflects many citizens’ affiliation with multiple religions. For example, it is common for followers of Buddhism to participate in religious ceremonies and events of other religions, such as Shinto, and vice versa. Also, the definition of follower and the method of counting followers varies with each religious organization, according to the ACA. According to the ACA, religious affiliation includes 92 million Shinto followers (48.5 percent), 87 million Buddhists (45.8 percent), and 1.9 million Christians (1 percent), while 8.9 million (4.7 percent) followed other religions. The category of “other” and nonregistered religious groups includes Islam, the Bahai Faith, Hinduism, and Judaism.

The indigenous Ainu people mainly practice an animist faith and are concentrated in northern Honshu and Hokkaido with smaller numbers in Tokyo. Most immigrants and foreign workers practice religions other than Buddhism or Shinto, according to a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in close contact with foreign workers.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of religion and requires the state to refrain from religious education or any other religious activity. It states that the people shall not abuse these rights and shall be responsible to use these rights for the public welfare.

The government does not require religious groups to register or apply for certification, but certified religious groups with corporate status do not have to pay income tax on donations and religious offerings used as part of the groups’ operational and maintenance expenses. The government requires religious groups applying for corporate status to prove they have a physical space for worship, and that their primary purpose is disseminating religious teachings, conducting religious ceremonies, and educating and nurturing believers. To that end, an applicant is required to present in writing a three-year record of activities as a religious organization, a list of members and religious teachers, the rules of the organization, information on the method of making decisions about managing assets, statements of income and expenses for the past three years, and a list of assets. The law stipulates that prefectural governors have jurisdiction over groups that seek corporate status in their prefecture, and registration must be made with prefectural governments. Exceptions are granted for groups with offices in multiple prefectures, which may register with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) minister. After the MEXT minister or a prefectural governor confirms an applicant meets the legal definition of a religious organization, the law requires the applicant formulate administrative rules pertaining to its purpose, core personnel, and financial affairs. By law, the applicants become religious corporations after the MEXT minister or governor approves their application and they register.

The law provides the government with some authority to supervise certified religious corporations. The law requires certified religious corporations to disclose their assets, income, and expenditures to the government. The law also empowers the government to investigate possible violations of regulations governing for-profit activities. Authorities have the right by law to suspend a religious corporation’s for-profit activities for up to one year if the group violates these regulations.

The law stipulates that worship performed by an inmate alone in penal institutions shall not be prohibited.

The law states that schools established by the national and local governments must refrain from religious education or other activities in support of a specific religion. The law also states that an attitude of religious tolerance and general knowledge regarding religion and its position in social life should be valued in education. Both public and private schools must develop curriculum in line with MEXT standards. These standards are based on the country’s law and stipulate that any religious content aimed at junior and high school students be considered carefully and taught properly.

Labor law states a person may not be disqualified from union membership on the basis of religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to grant status to Chinese nationals self-identifying as Falun Gong practitioners, allowing them to remain in country, while also allowing overseas artists affiliated with Falun Gong to enter the country in conjunction with performances.

The government continued to issue temporary stay visas to Rohingya Muslims who came to the country on the basis of ethnic and religious persecution in Burma. Most of these individuals have resided in Japan more than five years, and some for more than 15 years. Some still remained undocumented and were not associated with any formal resettlement program. Their temporary visas required frequent renewal by regional immigration offices. While temporary status carries some legal risk of deportation, no Rohingya Muslims from Burma were deported during the year. Representatives of the Rohingya population said the government was reluctant to grant refugee status to Rohingya who feared religious persecution in Burma.

According to the ACA, approximately 181,400 religious groups have been certified as religious groups with corporate status by the central and prefectural governments as of December 31, 2014. The large number reflected local units of religious groups registering separately.

After Tottori Prison prohibited a Christian inmate from possessing a Bible while he was placed in solitary confinement in 2014, the Tottori Prefecture Bar Association demanded on April 27 that the prison exercise its discretionary power on the basis of religious freedom to allow access to the Bible. The Tottori Prison reportedly responded that it did not allow inmates to access books in order to make inmates under disciplinary confinement reflect on their violations of prison rules. They further said that prohibiting access to a Bible did not hamper individual religious activities.

According to news reports, in August a Muslim immigrant awaiting deportation began a hunger strike after being fed ham at the Yokohama immigration facility. The report said the country’s immigration offices were to “implement a standing policy that allows detainees in their facilities to observe any religious dietary restrictions” and that the facility apologized.

According to MOJ, penal institutions gave inmates access to 8,873 religious groups and there were 6,621 individual religious observances and/or counseling sessions by civil volunteer chaplains in 2014. There were approximately 1,860 volunteer chaplains from Shinto, Buddhist, Christian, and other religious groups available to prisoners as of the end of the year, according to the National League of Chaplains, a public interest incorporated foundation that trains chaplains.

On July 19, a Tokyo High Court ruling found in favor of a Christian former primary school teacher who refused an official order to play the national anthem on the piano at a 2010 school ceremony. According to the teacher’s attorneys, she stated the national anthem represented Shinto, which was contrary to her faith. The high court upheld the 2015 lower court decision and revoked a salary reduction the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Personnel Commission had imposed on her as a disciplinary action. The high court found the teacher’s refusal was based on her religion. The high court, however, ruled against the plaintiffs claim that the school’s order was unconstitutional.

In May the Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s decision to award 17 Muslim plaintiffs 90 million yen ($769,000) in total for invasion of privacy arising from reported police profiling and surveillance of Muslims. The court, however, did not find a violation of constitutional provisions for religious freedom. Different Muslim community groups subsequently expressed a range of opinions on their experience in the country, from reporting positive relations with the police to saying that official surveillance continued.

On January 26, the Supreme Court ordered a national university to pay compensation to a former student and member of the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, and the member’s parents, for slander and derogatory comments that a faculty member made about their faith. According to press reports, the university announced on October 3 that it suspended the faculty member for six months as a disciplinary action over the incident and his additional harassment by email.

In May the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) reported that in 2015, its human rights division received 300 inquiries (compared to 340 in 2014) related to religious freedom violations. It confirmed 51 cases (compared to 42 in 2014) as highly likely to be religious freedom violations, out of 22,312 suspected human rights violations, and assisted potential victims in 27 cases (compared to 20 in 2014), including by referring them to competent authorities for legal advice.

The press reported some Muslim organizations and mosques continued to receive phone calls they considered harassing in the aftermath of the January 2015 killing of Japanese citizens by ISIS. The National Police Agency directed local police offices nationwide to boost security for Islamic facilities and safeguard Muslims from harassment or illegal conduct directed at them. A Muslim individual reported receiving threatening phone calls, and notified local police, who were responsive.

Halal food remained available in many communities. In July a hotel for Muslim travelers offering halal menus and prayers rooms opened in the Yamanashi Prefecture town of Fujikawaguchiko.

The Jewish Community of Japan reported it did not receive reports of anti-Semitic activity during the reporting year.

The U.S. embassy and consulates informed the local and national governments of the U.S. government’s positions on the promotion of respect for religious freedom. In meetings with the ACA, the embassy emphasized interfaith respect and coexistence. In support of U.S. religious freedom goals, embassy personnel engaged minority religious groups, including the Muslim, Jewish, and Falun Gong communities, and foreign workers, in particular

Embassy officers met with representatives of the Rohingya Muslims who have sought refugee status in the country to discuss their needs and to underscore U.S. promotion of respect for religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 8.2 million (July 2016 estimate). According to U.S. government estimates, Sunni Muslims make up 97.2 percent of the population and Christians 2.2 percent. Groups together constituting less than 1 percent include Shia Muslims, Bahais, and Druze. These estimates do not include migrant workers or Syrian refugees. According to the Ministry of Labor (MOL), there are approximately 316,000 migrant workers in the country, mostly from Egypt, South and East Asia, and Africa. Migrant workers from Africa and South and East Asia are often Hindu or Christian. There are more than 655,000 Syrian refugees in the country registered with UNHCR. The Syrian refugee population is mostly Sunni Muslim.

Christians tend to live in urban areas such as Amman, Fuhais, and Madaba.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam the religion of the state. According to the constitution, the state shall safeguard the free exercise of all forms of worship and religious rites in accordance with the customs observed in the kingdom, unless those are inconsistent with public order or morality. The constitution stipulates there shall be no discrimination in the rights and duties of citizens on grounds of religion. It states the king must be a Muslim.

The constitution does not address the right of Muslims to convert to another faith, nor are there penalties under civil law for doing so. The constitution and the law accord primacy to sharia, however, which prohibits Muslims from converting to another religion. Under sharia, converts from Islam are still considered Muslims but regarded as apostates. The law does not specify a penalty for apostasy, but apostates may have their marriages annulled or may be disinherited. Any member of society may file an apostasy complaint against such individuals.

Individuals who proselytize Muslims may be prosecuted in the State Security Court under the penal code’s provisions against “inciting sectarian conflict” or “harming the national unity.” Both of these offenses are punishable by imprisonment for up to one year or a fine of up to 50 JD ($71).

The constitution does not address the right of non-Muslims to convert to Islam or to convert from one recognized non-Islamic faith to another. Nor are there penalties under civil law or sharia for doing so.

Islamic religious groups are granted recognition through the constitution and do not need to register. Non-Islamic religious groups must obtain official recognition through registration. If registered as “denominations,” they may administer religious rites such as marriage. They may also own land, open bank accounts, and enter into contracts. Religious groups may also be registered as “associations;” if so, they must work through a recognized denomination on matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, but may own property and open bank accounts. They must obtain government approval to accept foreign funding. Recognized non-Islamic religious groups are tax exempt, but do not receive the government subsidies granted to Islamic religious groups.

Nonrecognized religious groups lack legal status and may not undertake basic administrative tasks such as opening bank accounts, purchasing real estate, or hiring staff. These groups may designate an individual to exercise these functions on their behalf.

To apply for registration, a religious group must submit its bylaws, a list of its members, its budget, and information about its religious doctrine. In determining whether to register or recognize Christian groups, the prime minister confers with the minister of the interior and the Council of Church Leaders (CCL), a government advisory body. The government also refers to the following criteria when considering recognition of Christian groups: the group’s teachings must not contradict the nature of the constitution, public ethics, customs, or traditions; the Middle East Council of Churches, a regional body comprising Christian religious groups, must recognize it; its religious doctrine must not oppose Islam as the state religion; and the group must include a number of citizens, although a precise figure is not specified.

The law lists 11 officially recognized Christian denominations: Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Melkite Catholic, Anglican, Maronite Catholic, Lutheran, Syrian Orthodox, Seventh-day Adventist, United Pentecostal, and Coptic. Five Christian groups are not recognized as denominations by the government but are registered (and recognized) as associations: the Free Evangelical Church, Nazarene Church, Assemblies of God, Christian and Missionary Alliance, and Baptists.

The CCL consists of the heads of the country’s 11 officially recognized Christian denominations and serves as an administrative body to facilitate tax and customs exemptions, as well as the issuance of civil documents (marriage or inheritance). On other issues, such as issuing work permits or purchasing land, the denominations interact directly with the relevant ministries. Groups recognized as associations do not have representatives on the CCL and handle administrative tasks through the ministry with which they are registered as nonprofit organizations, or the ministry relevant to the task. Nonrecognized Christian groups do not have representatives on the CCL and have no legal status as entities and must have individual members of their groups conduct business with the government on their behalf.

According to the constitution, a special provision of the law shall regulate the activities and administration of finances of Muslim Waqfs (religious endowments). Per this provision of the law, the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs manages Islamic institutions and mosque construction. It also appoints imams, pays mosque staff salaries, manages Islamic clergy training centers, and subsidizes certain mosque-sponsored activities such as holiday celebrations and religious observances.

According to the law, clergy who do not follow government policy may be suspended, issued a written warning, banned from delivering Friday sermons for a certain period, or dismissed from Ministry of Awqaf employment. In addition to these administrative measures, a preacher who violates the law may be imprisoned for a period of 1 week to 1 month, or given a fine not to exceed 20 JD ($28).

The law prohibits the publication of media items which slander or insult “founders of religion or prophets” or are deemed contemptuous of “any of the religions whose freedom is protected by the constitution,” and imposes a fine on violators of up to 20,000 JD ($28,250).

By law, public schools provide Islamic religious instruction as part of the basic national curriculum, although non-Muslim students are allowed to opt out. Private schools may offer alternative religious instruction. The constitution provides “congregations” (a term not defined in the constitution, but legally including religious groups recognized as denominations and associations) with the right to establish their own schools provided “they comply with the general provisions of the law and are subject to the control of government in matters relating to their curricula and orientation.” In order to operate a school, religious institutions must receive permission from the Ministry of Education, which ensures the curriculum meets national standards. The Ministry of Education does not oversee religious courses if religious groups offer them at their places of worship. In several cities, recognized Christian groups – including Baptist, Orthodox, Anglican, and Roman Catholic – operate private schools, and are able to conduct classes on Christianity. The schools are open to adherents of all religions.

Non-Muslim students in both public and private schools are required by law to demonstrate the same knowledge of the Quran as Muslim students in determining eligibility to attend university. Every student must pass the same exam in their final year of high school, which includes mastery of the verses of the Quran in relation to both religion and the Arabic language.

The constitution specifies the judiciary shall be divided into civil courts, religious courts, and special courts, with religious courts divided into sharia courts and tribunals of other religious communities. According to the constitution, matters concerning personal status, which include religious affiliation, marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance, are under the jurisdiction of religious courts. Matters of personal status where the parties are Muslim fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the sharia courts. A personal or family status case in which one party is Muslim and the other is non-Muslim is heard by a civil court unless both parties agree to use a sharia court. Per the constitution, matters of personal status of non-Muslims whose religion the government officially recognizes are under the jurisdiction of denomination-specific courts of religious communities. Such courts exist for the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Melkite Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Coptic, Syrian Orthodox, and Anglican communities. According to the law, members of recognized denominations lacking their own courts must take their cases to civil courts, which, in principle, follow the rules and beliefs of the litigants’ denomination in deciding cases, unless both parties to a case agree to use a specific religious court. There are no tribunals for atheists or adherents of nonrecognized religious groups. Such individuals must request a civil court hear their case.

According to the constitution, sharia courts also exercise jurisdiction with respect to cases concerning “blood money” (Diya) where the two parties are Muslims or where one of the parties is not a Muslim and the two parties consent to the jurisdiction of the sharia courts, and with regard to matters pertaining to Islamic Waqfs. Muslims are also subject to the jurisdiction of sharia courts on civil matters not addressed by civil status legislation.

The Sharia Judicial Council appoints sharia judges, while each recognized non-Muslim religious community selects the structure and members of its own tribunal. The law stipulates the cabinet must ratify the procedures of each Christian ecclesiastical court. All judicial nominations must be approved by a royal decree.

The sharia courts do not recognize converts from Islam as falling under the jurisdiction of their new religious community’s laws in matters of personal status. Sharia court judges may annul the marriages of converts, transfer child custody to a nonparent Muslim family member or declare the children “wards of the state,” and convey an individual’s property rights to Muslim family members.

Per sharia, marriages between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man are not permitted; the man must convert to Islam for the marriage to be considered legal. If a Christian woman converts to Islam while married to a Christian man, her husband must also convert for their marriage to remain legal. There is no legal provision for civil marriage or divorce for members of nonrecognized religious groups. Members of nonregistered Christian groups, as well as members of groups registered as associations, may obtain marriage certificates from the Anglican Church (or from another Christian church), which they then may take to the Civil Status Bureau to receive their government marriage certificates.

Sharia governs all matters relating to family law involving Muslims or the children of a Muslim father. If a Muslim husband and non-Muslim wife are divorced, the wife loses custody of the children when they reach seven years of age. Minor children of male citizens who convert to Islam are considered Muslims and are not legally allowed to reconvert to their father’s prior religion or convert to any other religion. In accordance with sharia, adult children of a man who has converted to Islam become ineligible to inherit from their father if they do not also convert to Islam. All citizens, including non-Muslims, are subject to Islamic legal provisions regarding inheritance if no equivalent inheritance guidelines are codified in their religion or if the state does not recognize their religion.

The law requires religious affiliation be stated on national identification records and legal documentation, including on marriage and birth certificates, but not on travel documents such as passports. New national identification cards issued as of this year do not list religion, but religious affiliation is contained in records embedded in the card’s electronic chip. Atheists and agnostics may list the religious affiliation of their families as their own. Per the ban on conversion from Islam under sharia, converts from Islam to Christianity are not allowed to change their religion on their identification records. Converts from Christianity to Islam may change their religion on their civil documents.

According to the new electoral law passed during the year, Christians are allotted nine seats out of 130 seats in parliament (6.9 percent). Christians may not run for the remaining 121 seats. No seats are reserved for adherents of other minority religious groups. The government classification of Druze as Muslims permits them to hold office.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The public prosecutor ordered the detention of a public school teacher on October 20 for allegedly promoting Shia Islam and insulting Prophet Muhammad’s wife. The teacher was charged with “instigating sectarian sedition” and insulting Aisha, the wife of the Prophet. The case was ongoing as of the end of the year.

Converts to Christianity from Islam continued to report security officials interrogated them about their religious beliefs and practices as part of the government’s ongoing effort to place obstacles to conversion from Islam. Some converts reported they continued to worship in secret to avoid scrutiny by security officials.

Members of religious groups who were unable to obtain religious divorces continued to convert to another Christian denomination or to Islam to divorce legally, according to reports from religious leaders and the Ministry of Justice. The chief of the Justice Department reportedly continued to try to ensure Christians wanting to convert to Islam did not have a pending divorce case at the Christian tribunal courts to prevent them from converting for the sole purpose of obtaining a legal divorce.

The government continued to monitor sermons at mosques and to require preachers to refrain from political commentary which the government deemed could instigate social or political unrest. Imams who violated these rules continued to risk fines and a ban from preaching. Following a terrorist attack in the city of Karak in December, the government dismissed 15 imams who did not perform services in memory of the victims as instructed. There continued to be unofficial mosques operating outside Ministry of Awqaf control in many cities, as well as imams outside of government employment who preached without Ministry of Awqaf supervision.

The government policy of not recognizing the Bahai Faith continued, but the government also continued to allow Bahais to practice their religion, although it did not officially recognize Bahai places of worship or schools. Sharia courts and the courts of other recognized religions continued not to issue to Bahais the marriage certificates required to transfer citizenship to a foreign spouse or to register for government health insurance and social security. The Department of Civil Status and Passports also continued not to recognize marriages conducted by Bahai assemblies, but it did issue family books (a national registration record issued to every head of family) to Bahais, allowing them to register their children, except in cases of marriages between a Bahai man and a Bahai woman erroneously registered as Muslim. In those cases, the children were considered illegitimate and were not issued birth certificates or included in the family and subsequently were unable to obtain citizenship or register for school.

Other nonrecognized religious groups reported they continued to operate schools and hospitals, and hold meetings if they were low profile.

According to observers, the rights and privileges associated with membership in the CCL were guarded by religious groups with this status, and fostered a degree of competition among religious groups hoping to attain this status. Despite efforts to alter their status, both the Mormons and the Jehovah’s Witnesses remained unrecognized either as denominations or as associations.

The government continued not to require registration of religious groups among refugees.

After the terrorist attack in Karak in December, some Christian leaders reported a continued presence of security officers in civilian clothes outside their churches. Christian leaders said they regarded this presence part of the government effort to provide additional security at public gathering places, including security for religious worshippers. The church leaders said they especially appreciated the extra protection during religious holidays and large events.

Some Christian leaders continued to express concern the CCL did not meet regularly and lacked the capacity to manage the affairs of both recognized and nonrecognized Christian groups effectively and fairly.

Druze continued to worship at mosques and at social halls belonging to the Druze community. Druze reported the government continued to permit them to worship freely.

Members of non-Muslim religious groups continued to report occasional threats by the government to arrest them for violating the public order if they proselytized Muslims. There were no reported cases of prosecution or deportation for proselytizing during the year.

The government continued to permit non-Muslim members of the armed forces to practice their religion.

There continued to be two recognized Bahai cemeteries registered in the name of the Bahai Faith through a special arrangement previously agreed between the group and the government. Bahai leaders reported they continued to be unable to register other properties under the name of the Bahai Faith but remained able to register property under the names of individual Bahais. In doing so, the Bahai leaders said, they continued to have to pay new registration fees whenever they transferred property from one person to another at the death of the registered owner, a process constituting a large financial burden.

The Ministry of Education announced revisions to the school curriculum at the beginning of the academic year, which included pictures of women without head coverings and mention of the coexistence of Islam with other religions in textbooks. Following the announcement, the media reported teachers unions, Muslim groups, and parent groups objected to the changes with book burnings, social media campaigns, and calls for the education minister to resign. The media reported the changes were part of a government strategy to combat radical Islam, but the opposing groups stated the changes were distancing students from Islamic values. The teachers association said the changes were an attempt to change the country’s Islamic values and to “promote normalization of relations with Israel.” The Islamic Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political organization in the country, also publicly criticized the changes. Other groups said the revisions did not go far enough towards promoting tolerance and inclusion. Following the criticism, the minister of education stated the amended curriculum was in conformity with the principles of the constitution, which included respect for the opinions of others and pluralism, and was intended to instill true Islamic values in students through the promotion of tolerance and respect.

Following the introduction of the new curriculum, there continued to be complaints from some citizens groups over what they stated was the curriculum’s continued failure to promote religious diversity and tolerance, and its continued inclusion of negative examples about non-Muslims, which could incite violence against non-Muslims.

The new curriculum continued the past practice of not including mention of the Holocaust.

The Bahai community reported the government continued to record Bahais as Muslims on official identification documents, or left blank the space listing religion, or marked it with dashes. The Bahais said this had implications for the legality of certain marriages. For example, because a woman registered as Muslim was not permitted to marry a non-Muslim man, a Bahai man with no officially recorded religion could not marry a Bahai woman erroneously registered as Muslim.

The government continued to record Druze as Muslims on civil documents identifying the bearer’s religious community, reportedly without objection from the Druze.

Three Christians continued to serve as cabinet ministers in the 30-member cabinet. A few Christians also achieved the rank of general in the military, but Muslims continued to hold all senior security positions. By keeping the number of reserved seats for Christians at nine, while reducing the total number of seats from 150 to 130, according to the British NGO Minority Rights Group International, the new election law continued the disproportionately high representation of Christians in the parliament, which had been the case since adoption of the constitution in 1952.

In September Riyad Ismail Abdullah shot and killed writer Nahed Hattar in front of the Amman courthouse Hattar was about to enter to face charges of inciting sectarian strife and racism and insulting religion for posting an editorial cartoon (which he had not authored) on his Facebook page that included a personification of God. Hattar had been arrested in August, but had been released on bail when he was killed. Ismail was sentenced to death by hanging in December for carrying out a “deadly terrorist act,” but had not been executed as of the end of the year.

Following Hattar’s publication of the cartoon, his arrest, and killing, the press reported there was a spike in sectarian rhetoric in online postings by the public. Some of the hate speech, referring to Hattar’s Christian heritage, was directed against the Christian community. The Cybercrime Unit of the Public Security Directorate referred dozens of cases of spreading hate speech related to the cartoon and Hattar’s killing to the judiciary for prosecution. The media reported police arrested at least 16 individuals. As of the end of the year, the cases were ongoing.

After Hattar’s killing, King Abdullah repeated previous public statements he had made urging citizens to respect the country’s “long history of religious tolerance and coexistence.” The King said it was a “red line” to use religion as a pretext to spread hate and bigotry. There reportedly were fewer online comments using sectarian rhetoric following the King’s statement.

Converts from Islam to Christianity reported continued social ostracism, threats, and physical and verbal abuse, including beatings, insults, and intimidation, from their families and from religious leaders, along with government surveillance. Some converts from Islam to Christianity reported they continued to worship in secret because of the social stigma they continued to face as converts.

Church leaders continued to report incidents of domestic violence and discrimination against religious converts and individuals in interfaith romantic relationships. Individuals in interfaith romantic relationships continued to report ostracism and, in some cases, feuds among family members and violence toward the individuals involved.

Following a car crash in July in which a Muslim teenager and a Christian teenager were killed, citizens debated on social media whether Islam permitted prayers for a deceased non-Muslim. The country’s Grand Mufti issued a fatwa stating Muslims were permitted to offer their condolences to non-Muslims, and Muslims were permitted to accept condolences from non-Muslims and to express their grief with non-Muslims.

Editorial cartoons, articles, postings on social media, and public statements by politicians continued to present negative images of Jews and to conflate anti-Israel sentiment with anti-Semitic sentiment. The government continued not to take action with regard to anti-Semitic material appearing in the media.

The Royal Center for Interfaith Studies, the Interfaith Coexistence Research Center, and the Catholic Center for Media Studies continued to sponsor initiatives promoting collaboration between religious groups. Bahais continued to be included by other religious groups in interfaith conferences, religious celebrations, and World Interfaith Harmony Week.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers continued to engage with government officials at all levels, including the minister of awqaf, to raise the rights of religious minorities and the inclusion of interfaith tolerance in the new curriculum.

The Ambassador met with Muslim scholars and Christian leaders to encourage greater interfaith dialogue, the protection of the rights of religious minorities, and the promotion of interfaith tolerance in the education system. Embassy officers continued to meet frequently with representatives of religious communities, nonrecognized groups, religious converts, and interfaith institutions such as the Royal Center for Interfaith Studies, to discuss their ability to practice their religion freely.

The embassy continued its sponsorship of the participation of religious scholars, teachers, and leaders in exchange programs in the United States designed to promote religious tolerance and a better understanding of the right to practice one’s faith as a fundamental human right and source of stability.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 18.4 million (July 2016 estimate). The national census reports approximately 70 percent of the population is Muslim, most of whom adhere to the Sunni Hanafi school. Other Islamic groups, together accounting for less than 1 percent of the population, include Shafi’i Sunni, Shia, Sufi, and Ahmadi Muslims.

The CRA classifies approximately 26 percent of the population as Christian. The majority of these are Russian Orthodox. The country also has Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, Mennonites, Pentecostals, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Christian Scientists. Other religious groups representing less than 3 percent of the population in total include Jews, Buddhists, members of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Bahais, and Scientologists.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as a secular state and provides for freedom of religion and belief, as well as for the freedom to decline religious affiliation. These rights may be limited only by laws and only to the extent necessary for protection of the constitutional system, defense of the public order, human rights and freedoms, and the health and morality of the population.

In September the MRCSA was created and took charge of religious issues for the government; it took over from the Ministry of Culture and Sport supervision of the CRA, which continued to operate largely as before. The new ministry took over the functions of facilitating government and civil society engagement, as well as overseeing religious issues. The transfer was largely administrative, but the MRCSA statute also spelled out international cooperation and national security objectives more precisely.

According to law, the MRCSA is responsible for the formulation and implementation of state policy on religious freedom. It also considers issues of potential violations of the laws on religious activity and extremism. The MRCSA drafts legislation and regulations, conducts analysis of religious materials, and makes decisions on censorship. It cooperates with law enforcement to ban religious groups and sanction individuals who violate the religion law, coordinates actions of local government to regulate religious issues, and provides the official interpretation of the religion law.

Under the constitution everyone has the right to follow their religious or other convictions, take part in religious activities, and disseminate their beliefs, but these rights are limited to “traditional” or registered religious groups and other laws are relevant to religious practice. The law states the government shall not interfere with the choice of religious beliefs or affiliation of citizens or residents, unless those beliefs are directed against the country’s constitutional framework, sovereignty, or territorial integrity.

The law prohibits forced conversion of persons to any religion, forced participation in a religious group’s activities, or forced participation in religious rites.

The criminal and administrative codes include additional penalties for unauthorized religious activity, such as the arrangement of and participation in activities of unregistered religious groups, participation in religious activities outside permitted areas, unlicensed distribution of religious materials or training of clergy, sale of religious literature without government approval or in places not approved by the government, and discussion of religion for the purpose of proselytization without the required missionary registration.

The criminal code prohibits the incitement of interreligious discord, which includes “propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of citizens according to their relation to religion [and other] origin.” It also criminalizes the creation and leadership of social institutions that proclaim religious intolerance or exclusivity, an offense punishable with imprisonment from three to seven years.

The extremism law, which applies to religious groups and other organizations, gives the government discretion to identify and designate a group as an extremist organization, ban a designated group’s activities, and criminalize membership in a banned organization. Extremism is considered by law to be the organization and/or commission of acts in pursuit of violent change of the constitutional system; violation of the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the country; undermining national security; violent seizure or retention of power; armed rebellion; incitement of ethnic, religious, or other forms of social discord that are accompanied by calls to violence; or the use of any religious practice that causes a security or health risk. An extremist organization is a “legal entity, association of individuals and (or) legal entities engaged in extremism, and recognized by the court as extremist.” The law provides streamlined court procedures for identifying a group as “terrorist or extremist,” reducing the time necessary for a court to render and act on a decision to 72 hours. After a legal finding of a violation, the law authorizes officials to revoke immediately the organization’s registration, thus ending its legal existence and seizing its property. Prosecutors have the right to inspect annually all groups registered with state bodies.

On December 22, President Nazarbayev signed into law a series of amendments “on countering extremism and terrorism” which increased security forces’ anti-extremist authority and added to existing restrictions on religious practice including in the areas of religious literature or information and religious tourism.

The administrative code prohibits “spreading the creed of religious groups unregistered” in the country, an offense punishable by a fine of 212,100 tenge ($636). A foreigner or stateless person found guilty may also be deported.

A religious organization may be designated “national,” “regional,” or “local.” In order to register at the local level, religious groups must submit an application to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), listing the names and addresses of at least 50 founding members. Communities may only be active within the geographic limits of the locality in which they register, unless they have sufficient numbers to register at the regional or national level. Regional registration requires at least two local organizations, each located within a different oblast (province), and each local group must have no fewer than 250 members. National registration requires at least 5,000 total members and at least 300 members in each of the country’s 14 oblasts and the cities of Astana and Almaty. Only groups registered at the national or regional level have the right to open educational institutions for training clergy.

The law allows denial of registration to religious groups based on an insufficient number of adherents or inconsistencies between the religious group’s charter and any national law, as determined by an analysis conducted by the CRA. According to the administrative code, individuals participating in, leading, or financing an unregistered, suspended or banned religious group may be fined between 106,050 tenge ($318) and 424,200 tenge ($1,273).

According to the CRA, there are 3,636 registered religious associations or branches thereof in the country, representing 18 groups, compared to 3,563 registered associations or branches representing 18 groups in 2015.

The administrative code mandates a 424,200 tenge ($1,273) fine and a three-month suspension from conducting any religious activities for registered groups holding religious gatherings in buildings that are not approved for that purpose; importing, producing, or disseminating religious materials not approved by the CRA; systemically pursuing activities that contradict the charter and bylaws of the group as registered; constructing religious facilities without a permit; holding gatherings or conducting charity events in violation of the law; or otherwise defying the constitution or laws. Private persons engaged in these activities are subject to a fine of 106,050 tenge ($318). Police may impose these fines without first going to court. The fines may be appealed to a court.

If an organization, its leaders, or its members engage in activities not specified in its charter, it is subject to a warning and/or a fine of 212,100 tenge ($636). Under the administrative code, if the same violation is repeated within a year, the legal entity is subject to a fine of 318,150 tenge ($955) and a three- to six-month suspension of activities.

According to the administrative code, if a religious group engages in a prohibited activity or fails to rectify violations resulting in a suspension, an official or the organization’s leader is subject to a fine of 424,200 tenge ($1,273) and the entity is subject to a fine of 1,060,500 tenge ($3,182) and its activities are banned.

The law prohibits coercive religious activities that harm the health or morality of citizens or residents, force them to end marriages or family relations, violate human rights and freedoms, or force citizens to evade performance of duties specified in the constitution and legislation. The law prohibits methods of proselytizing that take advantage of a potential convert’s dependence on charity. The law also prohibits blackmail, violence or the threat of violence, or the use of material threats to coerce participation in religious activities.

The law states in cases when a prisoner seeks the help of an imam, pastor, or other clergy to perform a religious rite, he or she can invite a clergy member of a formally registered religious group to a detention facility, as long as this access complies with the internal regulations of the prison. The law bans construction of places of worship within prison territory. Pursuant to the law, religious organizations may participate in monitoring prisons, including creating and implementing programs to improve the correctional system and developing and publicly discussing draft laws and regulations as they relate to the prison system. Religious groups may identify, provide, distribute, and monitor the use of humanitarian, social, legal, and charitable assistance to prisoners. They may provide other forms of assistance to penitentiary system bodies, as long as they do not contradict the law. According to the law, prisoners may possess religious literature, but only if approved after a religious expert analysis, conducted by the CRA.

The new legislative amendments which went into effect on December 22 define “religious tourism” as a “type of tourism where people travel for performance of religious rites in a country (place) of temporary residence. They require the MRCSA to regulate it and to oversee the process by which individuals participate in the Hajj.

The law prohibits religious ceremonies in government buildings, including those belonging to the military or law enforcement.

The December 22 legislative amendment states production, publication and dissemination of religious literature and information materials of religious content will be allowed only after receiving a positive expert opinion from the CRA. The amendment also limits to one copy per publication the existing exemption from expert review for importing religious materials for personal use. This new requirement defines “personal use” for imported religious literature as possessing “one copy of each title,” which does not require CRA approval.

The law states the government shall not interfere with the rights of parents to raise their children consistent with their religious convictions, unless such an upbringing harms the child’s health or infringes upon the child’s rights.

The law requires organizations to “take steps to prevent involvement or participation of anyone under the age of 18 in the activities of a religious association,” if one of the parents or other legal guardians have objections. The law bans religious or proselytizing activities in children’s holiday, sport, creative or other leisure organizations, camps, or sanatoria. The extent to which organizations must prevent underage persons’ involvement in religious activity is not specifically outlined and has not been further defined by authorities.

The law does not permit religious instruction in public schools, colleges, or universities. Homeschooling for religious reasons is not permitted. After-school and other kinds of supplemental religious instruction are permitted if the religious education is provided by a registered religious group. Following a January 14 decree by the minister of education and science, schoolchildren are required to wear school uniforms which comply with the secular nature of education and prohibit inclusion of any elements of religious affiliation, such as head coverings.

The election law prohibits political parties based on religious affiliation.

The criminal code prohibits creating, leading, or actively participating in a religious or public association whose activities involve committing acts of “violence against citizens or the causing of other harm to their health, or the incitement of citizens to refuse to carry out their civil obligations, as well as the creation or leadership of parties on a religious basis.” The code punishes such acts with a fine of up to 11.9 million tenge ($35,704), or up to six years’ imprisonment.

In order to perform missionary or other religious activity in the country, a foreigner must obtain a missionary or religious visa. These visas allow a person to stay for a maximum of six months with the possibility to apply to extend the stay for another six months. To obtain missionary visas, applicants must be invited by a religious group formally registered in the country. The letter of invitation has to be approved by the CRA. Applicants must obtain consent from the CRA each time they apply. The CRA may reject missionary visa applications based on a negative assessment from CRA religious experts, or if it deems the missionaries represent a danger to the country’s constitutional framework, citizens’ rights and freedoms, or any person’s health or morals. The constitution requires foreign religious groups to conduct their activities, including appointing the heads of local congregations, “in coordination with appropriate state institutions,” notably the CRA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Foreigners may not register religious groups.

Local and foreign missionaries are required to register annually with the local executive body of an oblast or the cities of Astana and Almaty, and provide information on their religious affiliation, intended territory of missionary work, and time period for conducting that work. Missionaries must submit all literature and other materials intended to support their missionary work together with their registration application. Use of materials not vetted during the registration process is illegal. A missionary must produce registration documents and a power of attorney from the sponsoring religious organization in order to work on its behalf. The local executive body of an oblast or the cities of Astana and Almaty may refuse registration to missionaries whose work “constitutes a threat to the constitutional order, social order, the rights and freedoms of individuals, or the health and morals of the population.”

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

During the year, the government continued to arrest, detain, and imprison members of religious groups, criminalize speech “inciting religious discord,” question congregation members about their choice of faith, punish individuals for “illegal missionary activity,” and label “nontraditional” religious groups as “destructive sects” in the media.

On June 25, individuals described by the government as Salafist militants and “followers of radical, nontraditional religious movements” killed eight people and injured 37 individuals in Aktobe in the northwestern region. Four of the attackers were killed in shootouts with the police. On November 28, a court sentenced seven of these people to life in prison, two to 20 and 22 years in prison respectively, and 19 others to two- to four-year terms for “organizing a terror attack on a military unit and a gun shop in June.” One defendant was sentenced to four years of probation.

On July 18, a gunman killed eight law enforcement officials and two civilians and wounded several others near a police station and building of the KNB in Almaty.

Government reporting characterized the June 25 and July 18 incidents as carried out by individuals motivated by radical religious extremism and drew links between the perpetrators and Salafism. The July 18 Almaty shooter stated in court he attacked his victims because “they do not live according to the laws of Allah.”

In both the Aktobe and Almaty incidents local experts said additional factors such as criminal history, poverty, and lack of opportunity may have led to the attackers’ radicalization.

According to the KNB, 14 members of the banned Tablighi Jamaat missionary movement were convicted for violating the criminal code for their participation in a banned religious movement this year, compared to 18 convictions in 2015. Forum 18, however, said 19 members were sentenced this year to prison for terms ranging from nine months to three years, and three members were sentenced to probation.

In December five Sunni Muslims in the Almaty region were imprisoned for up to three years for alleged membership in Tablighi Jamaat. They were arrested by the KNB in July.

On August 1, Baurzhan Beisembay was arrested in Ust Kamenogorsk and charged with participation in Tablighi Jamaat activities. Banned religious literature and videos, as well as reports on his activities, were seized during a search and used as evidence in court. Beisembay reportedly headed the regional cell of Tablighi Jamaat in East Kazakhstan after its previous leader moved to Astana where he was arrested and convicted in 2015. On October 13, the court in Ust Kamenogorsk sentenced Beisembay and seven other followers of Tablighi Jamaat to prison terms ranging from one to two and a half years. Two other defendants were sentenced to one year probation terms.

AROK continued to report law enforcement forces interpreted expressions of religious beliefs during conversations as a form of exalting one religion over others, thus “professing its supremacy.” Authorities then used this as the basis for charges of “incitement of interethnic discord.” In October the appellate panel of the Supreme Court declined Seventh-day Adventist Yklas Kabduakasov’s appeal of a two-year prison term for incitement of religious discord. He was originally sentenced in November 2015 to seven years’ probation, but an appellate court changed the sentence in December 2015 to two years in prison. The prosecutors presented recordings totaling 48 hours, which contained meetings discussing religion between Kabduakasov and four men he thought were students.

In June Rustam Musayev was sentenced to two years in a labor camp under the law against inciting religious discord after talking to others about his Islamic faith during private meetings. According to reports by the NGO Forum 18, the meetings may have been set up by the KNB. An “expert analysis” commissioned by the KNB did not find any instances of inciting “religious discord” in the recorded conversations, but did find instances in one of Musayev’s books, which was subsequently banned. Musayev was also ordered to pay for the “expert analysis,” and in August his bank accounts were frozen when he was put on a Finance Ministry list of individuals “connected with the financing of terrorism or extremism.”

On October 13, religious scholar Kuanysh Bashpayev was arrested by the KNB when he arrived in the country on leave from graduate study in Saudi Arabia. He was arrested and charged with incitement of religious discord for having discussed Islam during a meeting with several young men in a restaurant during a previous visit to the country. One of his interlocutors had recorded his interpretation of the Quran and sharia, and the tape served as grounds for his arrest. According to his lawyer, KNB investigators exerted pressure on him to confess his guilt. At the end of the year, the case had not been brought to trial and Bashpayev was still in prison.

Several members of the Council of Baptist Churches, which continued to refuse on principle to register under the Religion Law, received fines and were jailed in administrative facilities for refusal to pay. In September Zhasulan Alzhanov and Vyacheslav Cherkasov spent two and three days, respectively, in jail for not paying fines levied in 2013 and 2014. Council of Baptist Churches members stated they did not pay fines levied for their religious practices, on principle and as a policy. A Baptist Council representative reported their members faced fines for carrying books and proselytizing. The representative reported that authorities frequently raided and destroyed their Council’s prayer houses.

In July the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community was denied registration again after resubmitting an application in 2015. CRA experts concluded their teaching was not Islamic and demanded that they should change the name of the group by removing the word “Muslim.” The Church of Scientology continued to function and be registered as a public association, rather than as a religious organization.

According to reports, the government continued to recognize as legitimate and legal only those mosques registered with the SAMK, the government-affiliated Sunni Hanafi organization led by the grand mufti, with offices in Almaty and Astana. By joining SAMK, Muslim communities relinquished the right to appoint their own imams, were permitted to take actions on their property (such as sales, transfers, improvements) only with the approval of the SAMK, and were required to pay 30 percent of the mosque’s income to the SAMK. Press reports indicated there were a dozen new mosques built across the country with approval from the SAMK.

The SAMK continued to control the activities of all the 2,529 formally registered Muslim groups affiliated with the Sunni Hanafi school and had authority over the construction of new mosques, the appointment of imams, and the administration of examinations and background checks for aspiring imams. SAMK was responsible for authorizing travel agencies to provide Hajj travel services to citizens. According to SAMK, the Saudi Arabian authorities allocated a quota of 3,000 spots for Kazakhstani Muslims to make the Hajj to Mecca, down from 5,000 last year.

According to Forum 18 and local media, officials raided two summer camps run by the Baptist Union in West Kazakhstan in July, reportedly on suspicion that children were engaged in religious activity without the consent of their parents. The raids followed the arrival of foreigners at the camp who said they came to help repair a church building, but were also involved in reading the Bible to the camp children. Officials took statements and the foreign camp visitors left the country. No legal action was taken against the church members.

Reportedly, on June 28, three Muslim residents of Semey in Eastern Kazakhstan were fined for speaking to people about their faith on their way back from evening prayers in the mosque. They were fined 212,100 tenge ($636) for “carrying out missionary activity without state registration.”

According to Forum 18, on April 17, three members of Council of Baptist Churches congregations were fined by the police without a court hearing for leadership of, or participation in, an unregistered, suspended, or banned religious group. According to human rights sources, this was the first known instance police used their summary power to fine without first going to court. One of the three, 89-year-old former Soviet-era Baptist prisoner of conscience Yegor Prokopenko was fined 212,100 tenge ($636) on May 22 for leading a meeting for worship in Zyryanovsk. The other two were Sofya Bunyak of Ekibastuz, Pavlodar Region, and Aleksandr Belan of Sergeyevka, Akmola Region.

Also according to Forum 18, on April 17, two members of the New Life Protestant Church in the Caspian port of Atyrau, Bagitzhan Zholdybayev and Aleksandr Revkov, were fined after discussing their religion while drinking tea at a cafe with five other church members after their Sunday meeting for worship. They were fined 74,235 tenge ($223) each for “violating procedures established in the law for conducting rites, ceremonies, and meetings.”

According to NGO Forum 18, the CRA forced organizers of a religious musical in Astana and Almaty to cancel all performances in May and stated “if a show is religious, it requires permission in accordance with the law.” Reportedly CRA said the show, which was produced by Russian citizens, was religious material that, according to law, could only be imported by a domestically registered religious group after receiving government permission.

Courts continued to fine individuals found guilty of illegal missionary activity. According to AROK, local law enforcement authorities continued to interpret and label any religious discussions that took place outside of a registered religious building as “illegal missionary activity,” including invitations to religious services and discussions, especially for “nontraditional” religious groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and evangelical Christians.

Dina Sarsebekova, a Jehovah’s Witness in Western Kazakhstan, was charged for inviting two young people to attend the local community’s annual memorial service and for showing them a Jehovah’s Witness video on her computer. On April 25, the Uralsk Specialized Administrative Court in Western Kazakhstan found her guilty of carrying out missionary activities without state registration and imposed an administrative fine of 212, 100 tenge ($636).

On October 14, three members of the Rodnik Evangelic Baptist Church in Ust Kamenogorsk, Eastern Kazakhstan visited a local hospice where they talked to tenants and taught them prayers. Local CRA officials said their meeting was a violation of the procedure for holding religious ceremonies and meetings. The specialized administrative court imposed administrative fines on all three women in the amount of 106,050 tenge ($318) per person.

There were reports of girls being prevented from attending school and young women denied employment because they wore headscarves. On October 24, the SAMK issued a statement in response to disagreements between religious parents and school administrators after local authorities stated headscarves should be banned in schools. The statement called on parents not to force underage girls to wear headscarves or hinder them from getting a secular high school education and stated all Muslims should “abide by and respect the Constitution and the law.” The statement did not ban headscarves but encouraged parents to come to a compromise with school administrations.

The New Life Bible Church reported that on March 25, authorities searched five of their members’ residences and five buildings and confiscated 50 of their computers, as well as money and documents. The authorities said they were investigating fraud. The Church reported the authorities did not adequately make a full inventory of the items confiscated. The authorities subsequently said they found illegal weapons, which the Church denied.

Government officials continued to express concerns about the potential spread of religious extremism. President Nazarbayev described the June 5 Aktobe violent attack as “organized by followers of radical pseudoreligious movements,” who he said were radicalized from abroad. The government later said, however, the attackers may have been inspired by online terrorist propaganda, but were self-radicalized within the country. The president assured the people the state “will always apply the harshest measures to suppress extremists and terrorists.”

As set forth in the 2013-2016 State Program for Countering Religious Extremism and Terrorism, and kept as the main objective of the subsequent 2017-2020 State Program, the fight against religious extremism remained a top priority for the government. Government entities, like the KNB, continued to monitor civil society and religious groups.

On November 17, Minister of Religious Affairs and Civil Society Nurlan Yermekbayev condemned what he termed destructive religious teachings, such as Salafism, and said “secularism is the basis of stability of Kazakhstani society” in his remarks to an annual conference of religious scholars. He stated existing legislation enabled the government to counter extremist groups, but said his ministry may offer amendments to “improve” laws regulating religion, and was drafting a concept paper on how the government will engage civil society to combat extremism and terrorism. He said imams and experts have had success de-radicalizing extremists and said this partnership between civil society and the government was the best approach to combat extremist ideologies, including Salafism. He reiterated the government stood ready to ban Salafism if other means of combating extremism failed.

Individuals reported a tightening of the religious space. An AROK representative said the government was seeking to control religious expression and was especially concerned with controlling proselytizing and what the government saw as Islamic radicalism. A representative of a different NGO said trust between government and civil society was eroding, which was having a “repressive, chilling effect, on all religious groups.” Several “nontraditional” religious groups said they experienced continuing harassment from the government, for example by audits. Yet other activists noted the CRA had taken steps to become more open to feedback from the religious community, and one group reported increased day to day cooperation with CRA.

Before the amendments to “counter extremism and terrorism” became law, the government submitted them in draft for review to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and civil society groups. These entities said there were serious religious freedom problems in the draft text, but the government did not accept their opinions.

The SAMK continued to provide a Russian-speaking preaching group in response to numerous requests by Russian-speaking Muslims in the northern regions. The Russian-speaking religious leaders included theologians and imams who had religious knowledge and a secular education. SAMK experts participate in examination of the growing number of Russian language religious literature and Internet publications to prevent dissemination of extremist books and publications.

Some NGOs reported there were fewer instances of societal discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation, belief, or practice than in the 2008-2010 period, when the government prepared the ground for its new religion law, which the NGOs said was harsh, and took what the NGOs said were aggressive actions to present “nontraditional” religious groups as harmful. Others saw a lull during the early part of the year, followed by resumed societal scrutiny later in the year. Negative media coverage and government raids which targeted “nontraditional” religious groups hindered their acceptance in society, reported some of the groups.

In March following a series of searches of the New Life Church and houses of its leaders in Almaty based on fraud allegations, local media reported on the searches and the charges against its leaders. The church protested against what it called biased coverage and published an open letter to the president seeking his support to put an end to “harassment of believers and clergymen of the ‘New Life’ Church.”

On July 15, the newspaper Liter published an article titled “The Monitoring of a Non-Traditional Church Disclosed Numerous Unpleasant Facts,” describing how the Baptist church in Uralsk attracted children to its activities and how reluctant the church was to let inspectors know what they taught children. The author complained that even if wrongdoings were disclosed, liability under the current legislation was not harsh.

News reports continued to depict “nontraditional” religions as disruptive to society.

NGOs working on religious issues continued to report individuals were wary of “nontraditional” religious groups, particularly those that proselytized or whose dress indicated “nontraditional” beliefs.

The U.S. Ambassador, other high level U.S. government officials, and embassy officers, met with senior government officials in the MFA and MRCSA (CRA) and advocated the importance of respecting religious freedom, and underscored that bilateral cooperation on economic and security issues was a complement to, not a substitute for, meaningful progress on religious freedom. They also raised concerns about the inconsistent application of the existing religion law and the criminal and administrative codes with regard to “nontraditional” versus “traditional” religious groups.

In July the U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom met with government officials, religious organizations, and civil society representatives, to advocate for the essential right to religious freedom for all faiths and emphasizing the significant role freedom of religion played in countering violent extremism. He stated government changes to the law on religion and the implementation of other proposed measures to counter extremism, such as the amendments to the laws on extremism, were prompting international concern that constraints on religious freedom could become a driver of discontent and violent extremism within society. He also said the new amendments would further tighten existing strict controls on religious literature and further constrain religious speech and worship.

In an August visit, the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights discussed ways the United States and the country could work together against the common threat of violent extremism. She stressed the importance of identifying and addressing the root causes of extremism and underscored that governments should take a “no harm” approach by ending counterproductive practices and respecting human rights. Addressing the government’s banning of Tablighi Jamaat, she recommended establishing a clear definition that distinguished between violent and nonviolent groups, cautioning against the potential of driving nonviolent groups to radicalization as a result of perceived government repression.

U.S. officials continued to encourage the government to respect individuals’ rights to peaceful expression of religious belief and practice. They expressed concern about vaguely written laws that were broad in scope and lacked specific definition of legal terms enabled authorities, particularly at the local level, to apply them in an arbitrary manner. They also indicated that any amendments to the law on religions must not constrain the ability of believers to practice their faith.

The Ambassador and other U.S. officials met with the CRA and the newly established MRSCA to reiterate the importance of enabling all citizens to worship freely, regardless of registration status.

U.S. government representatives maintained regular contact with NGOs engaged in religious freedom activities. Embassy officials attended public events in support of religious communities and participated in roundtables and other public debates on religious freedom and tolerance. The embassy and other Department of State officials visited various houses of worship in several regions of the country and met with religious leaders to hear their concerns.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 46.8 million (July 2016 estimate), of which approximately 83 percent is Christian and 11 percent Muslim. Groups constituting less than 2 percent of the population include Hindus, Sikhs, and Bahais. Much of the remaining 4-5 percent of the population adheres to various traditional religious beliefs. Protestants account for 48 percent of the population, Roman Catholics 23 percent, and other Christian denominations, including evangelical Protestants and Pentecostals, 12 percent. Most of the Muslim population lives in the northeast and coastal regions, where religion and ethnicity (Somali and Mijikenda, respectively) are often linked. There are approximately 280,000 refugees and asylum seekers in the Dadaab refugee camps, most of whom are ethnic Somali Muslims. There are approximately 160,000 refugees in the Kakuma refugee camp, including Somalis, South Sudanese, and Ethiopians, who practice a variety of religions.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates there shall be no state religion and prohibits religious discrimination. It provides for freedom of religion and belief individually or in communities, including the freedom to manifest any religion through worship, practice, teaching, or observance. The constitution also states individuals shall not be compelled to act or engage in any act contrary to their belief or religion. These rights shall not be limited except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society.”

The constitution requires parliament to enact legislation recognizing a system of personal and family law adhered to by persons professing a particular religion. It specifically provides for qadi courts to adjudicate certain types of civil cases based on Islamic law, including questions relating to personal status, marriage, divorce, or inheritance in cases in which “all the parties profess the Muslim religion.” The country’s secular High Court has jurisdiction over civil or criminal proceedings, including those in the qadi courts, and accepts appeals of any qadi court decision.

According to the law, new religious groups, institutions or places of worship, and faith-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must register with the Registrar of Societies, which reports to the attorney general’s office. Indigenous and traditional religious groups are not required to register, and many do not. In order to register, registrants must have valid national identification documents and pay a fee. Registered religious institutions and places of worship may apply for tax-exempt status, including exemption from paying duty on imported goods. The law also requires that organizations dedicated to advocacy, public benefit, or the promotion of charity or research to register with the NGO Coordination Board.

A 2013 law formally transferred to the government control of public schools formerly run by religious groups. All public schools have religious education classes taught by government-funded teachers. The national curriculum mandates religious classes, and students may not opt out. Some public schools offer religious education options, usually Christian or Islamic studies, but they are not required to offer both.

The Ministry of Information, Communications, and Technology must approve regional radio and television broadcast licenses, including for religious organizations.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

There were reports by human rights groups of extrajudicial killings of members of Muslim groups by the government. Muslim groups said that the government linked the entire Muslim community with the terrorist group al-Shabaab, and discouraged, through intimidation, Muslim community members from reporting police misconduct. Muslim community leaders also stated they faced difficulties obtaining official identification documents, which they needed for voting and access to government and financial services. As religion and ethnicity are closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Human rights groups and prominent Muslim leaders stated the government targeted Muslims for extrajudicial killing, torture and forced interrogation, arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, and denial of freedom of assembly and worship. A July report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported 34 persons last seen in the custody of government security forces had disappeared over the past two years, and 11 bodies of people previously arrested were recovered. The victims were predominantly ethnic Somalis. The HRW report stated that some of the victims were either imams or Islamic education teachers, Islamic education students, or other Muslims with responsibilities in their local mosques. Imams in mosques or Islamic schools where youths had previously been arrested for alleged links with al-Shabaab told HRW they and their colleagues were frequently targeted for questioning, arbitrary arrests and, in some cases, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. The domestic NGO Independent Medico Legal Unit (IMLU) stated in early October that it had documented more than 100 civilian deaths because of police action in the prior eight months. Cabinet Secretary for the Interior Joseph Ole Nkaissery stated on October 5, “There is no policy whatsoever within the National Police Service to engage in extrajudicial killings,” and called the NGO statistics unsubstantiated.

The attorney general on May 1 suspended the registration of the Atheists in Kenya Society (AIK) following complaints by some religious leaders led by the Kenya National Congress of Pentecostal Churches (KNCPC) regarding AIK’s February 17 registration. The complaints said AIK was not consistent with the constitution, stating the constitution “recognizes Kenya as a country that believes in God.” The AIK appealed the decision in November.

According to media reports, a reported attack on September 11 by three Muslim women on a Mombasa police station prompted the Mombasa County commissioner to direct on September 16 that women in hijabs would be asked to remove their veils to undergo security checks when accessing public facilities. According to human rights organizations, the commissioner promptly clarified thereafter that only face veils needed to be removed for purposes of identification.

The Court of Appeal ruled in September that Muslim female students be allowed to wear a hijab as part of their school uniforms, overturning a March 2015 High Court verdict that said hijabs were discriminatory because they created disparity among students. The legal case arose from a 2014 lawsuit filed by the Methodist Church seeking to ban female students at St. Paul Kiwanjani High School in Isiolo from wearing the hijab and trousers, arguing the Methodist Church, as the school’s principal funder, should have the final say over student dress. The Court of Appeal decision stated that banning the hijab prevented female Muslim students from practicing their religion and therefore discriminated against them. Prior to the September ruling, government schools sometimes prevented girls from attending classes if they wore headscarves or other religious dress, stating such garments violated school uniform policies. It was unclear if the ruling also affected members of the Akorino religious group, which combines Christian and African styles of worship and requires adherents to cover their heads with turbans for men, (referred to as headgear), and veils for women. Members of 47 Akorino churches verbally protested in March over perceived discrimination in public offices and institutions. The church leaders said the government discriminated against their members in hiring and that public schools occasionally ordered their children to remove their headgear or face suspension.

Although the government formally controls public schools run by religious groups, in practice, however, religious groups still have some say in their management and sometimes contest land ownership. For example, Precious Blood Secondary School in Nairobi County is a public school co-located with a Catholic convent and the teaching staff includes Catholic nuns of the order of Precious Blood Sisters.

Muslim leaders stated the police often linked the whole Muslim community to al-Shabaab. The Independent Policing Oversight Authority, a civilian government body that investigates police misconduct, said that intimidation by police often prevented members of the Muslim community from filing complaints about these incidents.

Muslim leaders reported Muslim citizens often faced particular difficulties acquiring national identification from the National Registration Bureau. Identification cards are required by law and are a prerequisite for voting and access to certain government and financial services. Failure to register is a crime. Muslim communities – including ethnic Somali communities, coastal Muslim communities, the Nubian community in Nairobi, and the Galjeel community around the Tana River – reported they were often subjected to more requirements than other groups in order to register. These included presentation of birth certificates and citizenship documents of their fathers and grandfathers. They stated they were also required to make special appearances at specified police stations. The government stated the additional scrutiny was necessary to deter illegal immigration and to fight terrorism and that such scrutiny was not intended to discriminate against certain ethnic or religious groups.

In January the government withdrew proposed Religious Societies Rules in response to religious leaders’ objections. The attorney general proposed the rules in December 2014 to regulate religious organizations and keep their leaders accountable. The Religion News Service reported in January that the Rules came from concerns that some pastors were “fleecing” followers and that some mosques were becoming “centers of radicalization.” Christian and Muslim leaders stated the Rules would “trample” on religious freedom and turn religious institutions into businesses and political entities. The government withdrew the proposed rules after President Uhuru Kenyatta met with religious leaders. They agreed that religious leaders and the public would be consulted and allowed to provide input for a new draft. The draft had not been finalized at year’s end. In the interim, new religious organizations were not able to register with the Registrar of Societies. According to the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya, more than 3,000 registration applications for religious groups were pending as of November.

The Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development, a government body established in 2013 to determine policies related to the national public education curriculum, began developing a new school curriculum that includes religious education material.

During terrorist attacks in northeast Kenya, multiple reports stated attackers targeted non-Muslims. On October 6, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for an attack that killed six people in a residential compound in Mandera County, and stated it had targeted and killed Christians. On October 25, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a similar attack that killed 12 people at a hotel in Mandera. A similar attack resulting in the death of four people occurred on January 31 in Lamu County. Overall, there were fewer attacks on civilians by al-Shabaab and fewer resulting civilian casualties than in the previous two years.

There were reports of threats of violence towards individuals based on religious attire and expressions of intolerance towards members of other faiths. Given that religion and ethnicity are closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being based exclusively on religious identity.

The Daily Nation reported that an improvised explosive device was left at the entrance to a Kianyaga Catholic church in June. The device was discovered and safely detonated following the evacuation of more than 500 Mass attendees. The authorities made no arrests by year’s end.

According to NGO sources, some Muslim community leaders and their families were threatened with violence or death, especially some individuals who had converted from Islam to Christianity, particularly those of Somali ethnic origin.

Interreligious NGOs and political leaders said tensions remained high between Muslim and Christian communities because of the terrorist attacks over the previous three years.

Non-Muslims reportedly harassed or treated with suspicion people of Somali origin, who were predominantly Muslim. This was widely attributed to an escalation of intercommunal fear and outrage after the April 2015 Garissa University College attack in which al-Shabaab terrorists killed 147 people, targeting Christian students in particular, along with other terrorist attacks, predominantly by al-Shabaab, in recent years. Media reports stated that only a small fraction of the previously enrolled 800 students returned when Garissa reopened in January, and that most of those who returned were local and Muslim. The Roman Catholic archbishop of Garissa diocese stated that Christian students were afraid to return.

Media reported that a man who was shot while shielding Christians during an al-Shabaab attack on a bus in December 2015 died during surgery on January 18.

Religious leaders including Anglican, Catholic, evangelical, and others mediated a dispute regarding the political opposition’s call to oust the commissioners of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) over allegations of corruption and lack of integrity. After protracted weekly protests aimed at forcing out the IEBC commissioners turned violent in several cities between May and July, religious leaders joined with private sector leaders and international partners to negotiate a dialogue to reform the IEBC. Following a bipartisan dialogue and discussion of reforms to the IEBC through a parliamentary process, members of civil society and trade unions held a Multi Sectoral Forum to call for urgent adoption of the IEBC reforms to ensure the 2017 general elections could be credible, peaceful, and inclusive.

In June the Daily Nation reported that a group of evangelical Protestant bishops would bar political leaders who incited violence from attending church services ahead of the 2017 elections, and encouraged citizens not to vote for leaders spreading hatred. Bishop Mark Kariuki said, “The church will support politicians who embrace peace among our people.”

The U.S. embassy emphasized the importance of respecting religious freedom in meetings with government officials, especially emphasizing the role of interfaith dialogue in stemming religious intolerance and countering violent extremism (CVE). The Ambassador and embassy staff met frequently with religious leaders and groups, including the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics, the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, the Hindu Council of Kenya, the National Muslim Leaders Forum, and the National Council of Churches of Kenya. In October the Ambassador spoke at a CVE forum organized by a religious organization where he urged civil society and faith-based institutions to build resilient communities able to reject extremists’ efforts to pit members of differing faiths against each other.

The Ambassador supported interfaith efforts to defuse political and ethnic tensions, including efforts to resolve the controversy over the credibility and composition of the IEBC.

In January and April the Ambassador met in Mombasa with Muslim leaders to discuss ongoing challenges of religious tolerance and cooperation in the country. He met periodically throughout the year with Muslim leaders in Nairobi. The Ambassador hosted iftars during Ramadan with Muslim, Christian, and Hindu leaders in Nairobi and Mombasa that emphasized the need for dialogue to defuse religious tensions. The embassy also assisted efforts to promote intra-Muslim dialogue on freedom and tolerance.

Embassy officials met individually with religious and civic leaders to urge them to continue to work across sectarian lines to reaffirm the importance of religious freedom, tolerance, and diversity. The embassy encouraged faith communities and other societal figures to see religious diversity as a national strength, and not as a source of strife and division.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 107,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2010 census, approximately 56 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 34 percent is Kiribati Protestant (a Congregationalist denomination), and 5 percent belongs to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). Groups that together constitute less than 5percent of the population include the Bahai Faith (2 percent), the Seventh-day Adventist Church (2 percent), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Assembly of God, and Muslims. The Mormon Church states it has a higher number of adherents, with membership exceeding 15 percent. Persons with no religious affiliation account for less than 1 percent of the population. Members of the Catholic Church are concentrated in the northern islands, while Protestants constitute the majority in the southern islands.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience (including religion), expression, assembly, and association. These rights may be limited by law “which is reasonably required” in the interests of public defense, safety, order, morality, or health, or to protect the rights of others.

By law any religious group with adult members representing no less than 2 percent of the total population (according to the most recent census) must register with the government. The religious organization submits a request to the Ministry of Women, Youth, and Social Affairs, signed by the head of the group and supported by five other members of the organization. Also required in the request is information and proof of the number of adherents, and the religious denomination and name under which it wishes to be registered. Although the law requires a religious organization representing 2 percent of the population to register, there are no legal consequences for not registering.

There is no mandated religious education in public schools. Public schools in the country allow a variety of religious groups, including Catholics, Methodists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Mormons to provide religious education in schools. Students who opt out of religious education must participate in a supervised study period.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Most governmental meetings and events began and ended with an ordained minister or other church official delivering a Christian prayer.

The government continued to administer a small grants program for church projects from registered religious organizations.

The population of two islands – Arorae and Tamana – remained largely Protestant, at 99 percent and 94 percent respectively, according to the 2010 census, although a small number of Catholic, Seventh-day Adventist, Mormon, and Bahai adherents were also present. The residents of these islands continued their “one-church-only” tradition, which they stated was in deference to Protestant missionaries who came to the islands in the 1800s, according to government reports. On these islands, residents of other religions worshiped in their own homes. Religious groups outside the Kiribati Protestant Church were discouraged by villagers from proselytizing or holding meetings. The Ministry of Women, Youth, and Social Affairs reported receiving no complaints from other groups regarding the tradition.

The U.S. Ambassador to Fiji was accredited to the government. Representatives of the Embassy in Fiji also visited the country and discussed religious tolerance and religious practices on the outer islands with government representatives and Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim leaders. In October the Ambassador visited the country and met with representatives from the Muslim community to discuss issues facing religious minority groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.9 million (July 2016 estimate). Census data from 2011 identifies 95.6 percent of the population as Muslim, 2.2 percent as Roman Catholic, and 1.4 percent as Serbian Orthodox. A boycott of that census by ethnic Serbs resulted in a significant undercounting of SOC members. The SOC estimates there are 120,000 Serbian Orthodox believers in Kosovo, or 6.3 percent. Protestants and those without a religious affiliation said they were incorrectly classified as Muslims by census takers. Per the census regulation, census takers did not inquire if citizens were Protestant. The Protestant community estimates 20,000 followers throughout the country, or 1.1 percent of the population. Census categories for “other,” “none,” or “no response” each constitute less than 1 percent.

The majority of the Muslim population belongs to the Hanafi Sunni school, although a number follow Sufi and Shia traditions that are part of Bektashi or Tarikat groups. Most SOC members reside in majority ethnic Serb municipalities in the south of the country, or in four northern Serb-majority municipalities. The largest Catholic communities are in Gjakove/Djakovica, Janjeve/Janjevo, Kline/Klina, Pristina, and Prizren. Evangelical Protestant populations are located throughout the country and concentrated in Pristina and Gjakove/Djakovica. There are small numbers of Jews in Prizren and Pristina.

Religion and ethnicity are often linked. The majority of ethnic Albanians are Muslim, while some are Catholic and Protestant; almost all ethnic Serbs belong to the SOC. The majority of ethnic Ashkalis, Bosniaks, Egyptians, Goranis, Roma, and Turks are also Muslim, while most ethnic Montenegrins and some Roma belong to the SOC. Ethnic Croats almost all belong to the Catholic Church.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience and religion for all residents, including the right to change, express, or not express religious belief; to practice or abstain from practicing religion; and to join or refuse to join a religious community. These rights are subject to limitations for reasons of public safety and order or to protect the health or rights of others. The constitution provides for the separation of religious communities from public institutions, including the right of religious groups to independently regulate their own organizations, activities, and ceremonies, and the right to establish religious schools and charity institutions. It guarantees equal rights for all religious communities, stipulates the country is secular and neutral with regard to religion, declares that the state shall ensure the protection and preservation of the country’s religious heritage, and prohibits discrimination based on religion. The constitution stipulates the law may limit freedom of expression to prevent provocation of violence and hostility on grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity, or religion. It allows courts to ban organizations or activities that encourage racial, national, ethnic, or religious hatred.

The constitution stipulates communities traditionally present in the country, including religious communities, shall have specific rights, including to maintain, develop, and preserve their religion, use their own language, establish and manage their own private schools with financial assistance from the state, have access to public media, establish and use their own media, maintain unhindered peaceful contacts with persons outside the country with whom they share a religious identity, and have equitable access to public employment. It guarantees 20 of 120 seats in the national assembly to minority communities and stipulates the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any laws pertaining to religious freedom and cultural heritage or to agreements with religious communities requires a majority of the deputies present holding seats guaranteed for minority communities as well as a majority of the all the deputies present.

The constitution provides for the Ombudsperson’s Institution, which is responsible for monitoring religious freedom among other human rights and recommending actions to correct violations. It stipulates the state shall take all necessary measures to protect individuals who may be subject to threats, hostility, discrimination, or violence because of their religious identity.

The law does not provide a legal mechanism or specific guidance for religious groups to obtain legal status through registration or other means. The law does not require groups to register, but without legal status, religious groups may not own property, open bank accounts, employ staff, access the courts, or perform other administrative tasks in their own name.

The law stipulates there is no official religion, but it lists five “traditional” religious communities: the BIK, the SOC, the Catholic Church, the Hebrew (Jewish) community, and the Evangelical (Protestant) Church. The law provides extra protections and benefits to these five groups, such as reduced taxes and relief from water tariffs. According to a law passed in 2015, religious buildings belonging to these five communities, but not their administrative offices, are eligible for waivers of water utility fees. Religious institutions must apply with the public water provider to be granted the waiver.

According to the law, “public education institutions shall refrain from teaching religion or other activities that propagate a specific religion.”

Municipalities hold titles to all public cemeteries, including those for religious communities, and are required by law to maintain them.

The law provides safeguards for religious and cultural Special Protection Zones (SPZs), based on religious and cultural significance, by restricting nearby activities that could damage the surrounding historical, cultural, or natural environment. According to the law, the Implementation and Monitoring Council (IMC) arbitrates disputes between the government and the SOC concerning SPZs and other matters related to protecting the SOC’s religious and cultural heritage. The IMC is a special body that stems from the Comprehensive Plan for Kosovo and the SPZ law. It became operational in 2010. Its mandate includes safeguarding SOC heritage as included in the law on Velika Hoca/Hoce e Madhe village and the law on Prizren’s historic center. The IMC includes the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning (as cochair); the MCYS; the SOC; the Special Representative of the European Union (as cochair) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The IMC’s charter calls for meetings every two months; however, the group only met once during the year in April.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government took steps to counter radicalization and violent extremism related to religion. According to religious communities, the government continued to respond to societal violence and vandalism against several religious minority communities. Parliament considered, but did not vote on, a government-recommended bill that would allow religious groups to register and acquire legal status so they would be able to conduct business. Religious minorities said municipalities failed to act on requests to build churches and cemeteries, and the government failed to assist them with zoning issues. Several longstanding disputes over ownership of religious property remained unresolved.

On January 30, the Kosovo Police (KP) arrested four ethnic Albanians in front of the Visoki Decani Monastery. According to the KP, the suspects were in possession of an AK-47 rifle and a pistol, and some wore clothing that the authorities stated was typically associated with ISIS militants. On February 1, a local prosecutor told the press two of the arrestees had been involved with the conflict in Syria. According to the KP, those arrested were fined for illegal possession of weapons and the case was closed. Father Sava, the monastery’s Abbot, said the KP was uncooperative with the monastery during the investigation and deliberately downplayed the case in public. He said this incident demonstrated the need for Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops to remain at the monastery. Sava also expressed his concern that the suspects were not charged with more serious offenses.

On May 20, the Basic Court of Ferizaj/Urosevac convicted Imam Zekirja Qazimi, formerly from a BIK mosque in Gjilan/Gnjilane, on charges of recruitment for terrorism and incitement of hatred, and sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment. On November 25, the Court of Appeals confirmed his sentence.

On July 26, prosecutors charged Iranian cleric Hasan Azari Bejandi with laundering money through a nominally nongovernmental organization (NGO) he operated. Authorities said Bejandi was the head of the Quran Foundation of Kosovo, the reported umbrella group for five Shia organizations he ran in the country with links to Iran. The KP did not arrest Bejandi, who fled the country on July 28. The government subsequently shut down the five organizations.

On September 15, prosecutors charged four ethnic Albanian imams; two of the imams were charged with committing terrorist acts and the other two were charged with “inciting national, racial, religious, or ethnic hatred.”

The government worked with the BIK and civil society groups to combat violent extremism. As part of the government’s strategy, the BIK held sessions in its madrassahs and Islamic studies facilities that urged students not to fall prey to extremism.

Leaders of the country’s BIK, Catholic, Jewish, Protestant, SOC, Tarikat (Sufi and Shia orders) and Bektashi (Shia orders) communities continued to criticize the government for its failure to complete a draft law that would provide a legal mechanism through which religious groups could gain legal status so they would be able to conduct business and legal matters with the state and private entities. The Bektashi community also requested that such a law should state it is a community constituting part of the historical heritage and cultural and social life of the country. Although many groups said they had found alternative methods to conduct some of their business affairs, most reported difficulties in registering property and vehicles, opening bank accounts, and paying taxes on employee salaries. Some religious communities opened bank accounts that were not in their communities’ names, and the Kosovo Protestant Evangelical Church received a tax accounting number from the government in order to pay taxes as if it were a business. Some communities said it was difficult to undertake basic financial tasks, and that they were taxed as for-profit businesses.

Ethnic Albanian protestors threw stones and bottles and prevented Serbian Orthodox pilgrims from celebrating the Feast of the Assumption on August 28 at the ruins of the SOC Holy Trinity Monastery in the village of Mushutishte/Musutiste in the Suhareka/Suva Reka Municipality. The protestors also targeted police, injuring six. The KP evacuated a local priest and his aide from the monastery and turned back approximately 150 pilgrims, accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Branimir Stojanovic and Communities and Returns Minister Dalibor Jevtic, who observed the holiday in Zociste Monastery (approximately 14 miles away). The KP responded to the violence with tear gas and antiriot measures, and arrested 25 protesters. President Hashim Thaci and Speaker of Parliament Kadri Veseli condemned the violence and called for peace and respect for displaced persons, regardless of their ethnicity. Opposition parties condemned “police violence” against protesters.

Some school officials applied a mandatory administrative instruction previously issued by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology prohibiting primary and secondary students from wearing religious garb on school property; others did not. According to the BIK, public schools did not expel any students for wearing headscarves while attending classes. The Ombudsperson Institution did not receive any reports of a school barring students wearing religious garb, such as headscarves, from attending classes. Some members of the BIK, however, reported girls were forced to remove headscarves in order to study in public schools.

Religious groups said government authorities did not take steps to ensure municipalities treated religious organizations equally on property issues, in particular with regard to churches and cemeteries. Although the law specified that municipalities held title to cemeteries and were responsible for their upkeep, in practice some municipalities allowed religious groups to take de facto possession of public cemeteries. Protestants said most municipalities had not granted land for cemeteries, nor addressed most of their requests to build churches on land the community owned. The Pristina Municipal Assembly approved a Protestant cemetery on December 2; however, at year’s end, challenges remained at the central government level. The Gllogovc/Glogovac Municipality also granted land to the Protestant community for a cemetery and a church, and the community was working with the municipality to implement the decision. At year’s end, none of these municipalities had a Protestant cemetery where Christians could be buried with a cross. Existing Jewish cemeteries were reportedly in disrepair. Members of the Jewish community said they lacked the resources to maintain Jewish cemeteries and local authorities did not maintain these public sites as required by law. The Serbian Orthodox cemetery in Pristina was reportedly also in disrepair and not maintained by municipal authorities. The SOC cited member displacement from the area as a reason for its inability to adequately care for the cemetery. In both cases, the Municipality of Pristina denied these cemeteries were in disrepair.

Protestants continued to lack a designated burial area anywhere in the country. Protestant leaders in Pristina and Gjakove/Djakovica said they faced limitations on holding Protestant funeral services or burying members with crosses at the public cemetery. Protestants said they faced discrimination from municipal or religious leaders who exercised de facto control over some publicly owned burial sites. They said the BIK and the Catholic Church had dedicated spaces, but the Protestant community did not, particularly in Gjakove/Djakovica.

Protestant leaders met with central and local government officials, including Pristina Mayor Shpend Ahmeti, Gjakove/Djakovica Mayor Mimoza Kusari-Lila, Gjilan/Gnjilane Mayor Lutfi Haziri, and former Gllogovc/Glogovac Mayor Nexhat Demaku to discuss these issues. The Protestant community engaged in negotiations with Gjakova/Djakovica municipal officials, including Mayor Kusari-Lila, on providing a dedicated space where its parishioners could be buried in a Protestant ceremony and with a Christian cross at the city cemetery. The municipality stated Protestants could be buried with a cross and that the grave was personal property of the owner. The municipality allowed the Protestant community to join the municipal safety council, which acts as a forum for community institutions to discuss local issues of significance. Municipal officials in Ferizaj/Urosevac issued a decision to cover the burial expenses for all citizens, including Protestants. Ferizaj/Urosevac Mayor Muharrem Svarqa also pledged to identify land for a Protestant cemetery, but at year’s end the municipality had not done so.

Representatives of the Messiah Evangelical Church in Pristina reported the Municipal Assembly agreed to issue a building permit in November for a house of worship, on land the church purchased. Municipal authorities had previously denied a permit for this church for more than a decade. The Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning, however, had not issued a final permit by year’s end.

The BIK expressed concern over what it said were false press reports that the Municipality of Mitrovica/Mitrovice North would seize the site of the former Ibar Mosque for use for an international humanitarian project. On September 27, BIK Mufti Naim Ternava visited the site where the mosque had stood before Serb forces destroyed it in 1999 and confirmed the community’s intention to rebuild the mosque as soon as the European Union completed revitalization work on the adjacent Austerlitz Bridge. In reference to the mosque reconstruction, Mitrovica/Mitrovice Noestarth mayor Goran Rakic told the media on July 22 that a yet-to-be-established association of Serb-majority municipalities would decide upon mosque construction in the north of the country.

On May 20, after 16 years of litigation, the Constitutional Court confirmed the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court’s (SCSC) 2012 ruling that more than 24 acres of land should be returned to the SOC’s Visoki Decani Monastery. The ruling legally ended the SOC’s dispute with a defunct state-owned enterprise from the Yugoslav era and the municipality of Decan/Decani. The Constitutional Court’s decision rejected the 2015 finding of the SCSC’s Appellate Panel that had sought to return jurisdiction of the case to the Basic Court in Decan/Decani. The Mayor of Decan/Decani, Rasim Selmanaj, called the Constitutional Court’s ruling unacceptable and vowed not to implement it, stating he would resign rather than register the SOC as the owner. At year’s end, the mayor had not resigned. Municipal employees went on strike for one week in objection to the ruling. On May 25, the Decan/Decani Municipal Assembly adopted a resolution opposing the ruling, calling the monastery’s property claims dishonest and unjust. Italian KFOR troops continued to provide fixed security at the monastery. In response to a call for action from Decan/Decani Mayor Selmanaj, several hundred protestors demonstrated in opposition to the ruling on May 26. On June 16, approximately 800 people again protested against the Constitutional Court’s decision. The leader of the Vetevendosje party, Visar Ymeri, called the ruling “shameful,” stating it “gave legitimacy to the [Slobodan] Milosevic regime’s decisions.”

The Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) continued to occupy an SOC-owned building and parking lot in Pristina without paying the rent stipulated by a 2011 prime ministerial decision. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MLSW) vacated a second SOC-owned building adjacent to the agency. The MLSW stopped paying the agreed rent on that building to the SOC in 2014. The MLSW said it recognized that rent was owed to the SOC, and negotiated with the ACA to settle with the church on past and future rent. At year’s end, however, no agreement had been reached, and the ACA continued to block a settlement proposed by the MLSW despite multiple years of Auditor General Reports stating it should pay the rent.

On February 17, the SOC received notice that the University of Pristina (UP) had appealed the Pristina Basic Court’s 2015 dismissal of the UP’s 2012 lawsuit that requested the demolition of the unfinished Christ the Savior Church and the transfer of the land back to the university. A municipal assembly decision had transferred the land from the UP to SOC in the 1990s. On February 24, the SOC responded that the UP’s claim should be dismissed as unfounded.

On September 9, unknown persons burned tires inside the SOC St. Saviors Church, which caused large plumes of black smoke to be emitted from the church. The church’s gate, interior, and facade were also damaged. The KP attributed the damage to a homeless person. SOC Bishop Teodosije Sibalic condemned the “arson” of the church, and blamed police for failing to protect the area. He also called for the unfinished church’s construction to recommence. On September 11, Bishop Teodosije, accompanied by clergy and Deputy Prime Minister Branimir Stojanovic, with a KFOR guard, cleaned and attempted to make light repairs to the gate. According to international experts on site, on September 15, Pristina municipal inspectors entered the church without legal permission and ordered the church to stop cleaning debris and repairing the fire damage, on the grounds that it lacked a construction permit to do so. The SOC called the entry official harassment and discrimination. Inspectors, assisted by police, reportedly confiscated the clergy’s IDs and threatened to seal the church with crime scene tape if the clergy failed to report to the municipal inspection department. The SOC presented ownership documents, including those issued by the municipality itself in 2012, and departed the church. The municipal inspectors did not address their complaint in the Serbian language, as required by law. Pristina Mayor Ahmeti stated on social media the municipality had no evidence the SOC owned the property, and Pristina authorities stated the church needed to hold a construction permit to undertake work, including painting over graffiti, inside the church.

On October 12, the MCYS’s Institute for the Protection of Monuments denied the SOC’s request to reconstruct the St. Nicolas Church in the Holy Archangels Monastery in Prizren. The monastery’s only church was destroyed in 1999, and the St. Nicholas Church was destroyed at the end of the 16th century. According to some IMC members, MCYS Minister Kujtim Shala’s refusal to issue the permit for reconstruction prompted the SOC to stop participating in the IMC. In November the SOC submitted additional information, in support of its application, but by years’ end the institute had not issued the permit. Due to the lack of a permit, municipal inspectors ordered the SOC to halt construction on several occasions. The SOC stated the institute’s denial of the permit came after a legal deadline, after which the construction should have been allowed to proceed automatically. Notwithstanding the application, the SOC had full discretion to manage its property based on Annex V of the Ahtisaari plan.

The Municipality of Pristina appealed the Basic Court’s 2015 ruling that the Catholic Church owned property adjacent to the Mother Teresa Cathedral. An appeal was pending at year’s end.

The SOC expressed concern that the MCYS did not consult with it on a draft law on cultural heritage that it said could annul the SOC’s legally guaranteed autonomy and preclude it from independently deciding upon the restoration and renovation of its buildings. At year’s end, the MCYS had not completed development of the new cultural heritage strategy.

The central government provided some funding to Islamic education in BIK madrassahs in Pristina, Prizren, and Gjilan/Gnjilane. The government did not provide funding for religious education to any other religious group. Some members of other religious groups and secular representatives voiced concern about the government’s funding of religious education in madrassahs over others.

Kosovo Serbs, Kosovo Gorani, Kosovo Croatians, and some Kosovo Roma attended Serbian-language public schools that followed a curriculum designed by the Serbian government, based on municipal education laws and in coordination with the education ministry. Restrictions on religious education did not apply to these public schools. Most ethnic Serbs elected to enroll in Serbian Orthodox religious classes instead of civic education. The Serbian government funded the salaries of all teachers in Serbian-language schools, including religious instructors. The Kosovo government supplemented the salaries of some teachers and staff in Serbian-language schools.

On September 23, the Water Regulatory Agency issued an administrative instruction based on the law waiving water utility fees for religious buildings belonging to the five “traditional” religious communities. The instruction directed eligible religious institutions to apply for the waiver with the public water provider. Although the law stipulated the waiver was applicable to all five religious communities, the Protestant community stated it followed the procedure but was not granted a waiver, whereas another religious group had received it.

The police’s unit for specialized protection of cultural and religious heritage sites provided 24-hour security at 24 sites around the country. Despite this protection, theft and vandalism continued at SOC sites, primarily outside of the SPZ where special protection was not provided. For example, individuals set a fire set inside the unfinished Christ the Savior Church in Pristina on September 6. According to SOC Bishop Teodosije, the fire and other acts of desecration were a result of the government’s failure to provide permanent police protection at the church.

On October 3, the SOC said the Pristina Municipality had ignored the vandalism of a chapel at the Serbian Orthodox cemetery in Pristina, stating it had been used as a garbage dump and toilet despite the presence of a guard.

In May the Pristina Municipality approved a request by the Beit Israel NGO to provide assistance in constructing a synagogue. By year’s end, however, the municipality had not provided the assistance, and Beit Israel criticized it for not following through on its approval.

During the year, supporters of Turkish Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen stated authorities, including the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology as well as Kosovo Police, sought to overly regulate their schools and restrict the ability of their affiliated clergy to lead prayers. As a result, Gulenist school representatives said they might be forced to close some of their licensed schools in the country.

As part of its Interfaith Kosovo program, the government undertook several initiatives to promote religious tolerance. The Interfaith Kosovo website provided news about all religious communities in the country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized the fifth International Interfaith Conference on June 1-2, highlighting the role of women in interfaith dialogue and countering violent extremism. On March 19, Interfaith Kosovo organized a workshop in Prizren, focusing on interfaith dialogue and cultural heritage protection to promote reconciliation and combat religious extremism. The workshop gathered 100 participants from around the world.

There were instances of religious-based violence, interference with religious pilgrimages, hate speech, and vandalism. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it is difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

In Gjakove/Djakovica, where a group of 150 Serbian Orthodox pilgrims was visiting a Serbian Orthodox monastery for the Assumption Day Feast, protestors attempted to block the car of a visiting Serbian official and threw stones as he exited the monastery. The pilgrims departed safely to Visoki Decani Monastery.

On June 28, an unidentified person threw stones at a van on its way to the Jarinje border crossing, causing slight injuries to two visiting Serbian pilgrims who were celebrating St. Vitus Day. On the same day, the KP reported unidentified individuals threw two Molotov cocktails at an escorted convoy of buses near Mitrovice/Mitrovica South, causing no damage. There were no arrests in either incident.

On January 6, a group of demonstrators gathered in front of an SOC church in Gjakove/Djakovica to protest Orthodox Christmas services. Protestors threw eggs and snowballs at police and towards pilgrims from Serbia who were refugees and previously lived in the city. Protest organizer Mimoza Shala, an activist from the Vetevendosje Party, told the media “war criminals disguised as pilgrims” were unwelcome in Kosovo. The KP removed the protestors without making any arrests. Gjakove/Djakovica Mayor Kusari-Lila called for peaceful protest and respect for religious rites.

The SOC criticized the media for calling its representatives “criminals” and for what it said was contributing to a climate of intolerance. The BIK said the media generally portrayed Muslims in a negative light.

As of September the police had registered 20 incidents of property usurpation, theft, and damage involving SOC facilities, primarily vandalism or theft of metal objects later sold for scrap.

Early in the year, unknown perpetrators urinated in the SOC’s unfinished Christ the Savior Church in Pristina. Deputy Prime Minister Branimir Stojanovic condemned the act.

On August 14, an ethnic Serb from the village of Pasjane in the Partes/Partesh Municipality broke into a nearby mosque in Velekince/Velekinca village and climbed the minaret, partially dismantling and damaging it. Police arrested the perpetrator, while a local imam helped calm several hundred ethnic Albanians who witnessed the vandalism. On August 15, Kosovo-Serb leaders condemned the incident, and SOC Bishop Teodosije addressed a letter to Mufti Naim Ternava, expressing solidarity and stating the perpetrator suffered from drug addiction and mental health problems. On August 16, the Gjilan/Gnjilane Basic Court ordered the perpetrator to one month’s detention.

On October 9, Catholics inaugurated a new church in the village of Llapushnik/Lapusnik in the Gllogovc/Glogovac Municipality, following protests in 2015 by Muslim residents who opposed the allocation of land to the church.

Leaders of different religious groups reported generally good relations with one another and participated in numerous interfaith discussions and initiatives. The OSCE continued to coordinate some activities among religious groups, including meetings with municipal mayors, to discuss issues such as access to graveyards and permits to build religious buildings.

U.S. embassy representatives met frequently with government officials, including the president, speaker and members of parliament, and prime minister, to urge passage of legislation to allow for the registration of religious institutions and to support full implementation of the law on SPZs. Embassy officials urged increased dialogue between ethnic Albanian members of the government and civil society with SOC members. The embassy urged government officials to resolve the land dispute involving St. Nicolas Chapel in the Holy Archangels Monastery in Prizren and the government’s lack of rent payments owed to the SOC for the ACA’s use of the property in Pristina. The embassy discussed the property issues of other religious groups with government officials on numerous occasions and urged officials to settle the issues based on law.

Embassy officials regularly discussed religious tolerance with leaders of the SOC, as well as with the Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Tarikat, Bektashi, and Jewish communities. The U.S. Ambassador hosted a local ecumenical iftar in Gjilan/Gnjilane, during which he discussed the importance of countering violent extremism, SOC property disputes, providing cemetery space for all communities, and the importance of religious freedom in the country, including the draft law on religious freedom. Embassy officials met with BIK imams to discuss efforts to promote tolerance and counter violent extremism and discussed draft laws on religious freedom and cultural heritage with religious leaders. Embassy officials met with the religious leaders on multiple occasions to discuss their human rights and legal concerns.

The embassy cofunded the International Interfaith Conference 2016, held June 1-2 in Pristina, which focused on the role of women in interfaith dialogue and countering violent extremism. Nobel Peace Laureates Shirin Ebadi and Tawakkol Karman participated at the conference, which included 300 participants and religious leaders from 50 countries.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 2.8 million (July 2016 estimate). The Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI), a local government agency, reports there are 1.3 million citizens and 3 million noncitizens. The national census does not distinguish between Shia and Sunni Muslims. Estimates derived from voting records and personal status documents indicate approximately 70 percent of citizens, including the ruling family, adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam. In the November elections, voting records reflected 14 percent Shia voter participation rate. A few hundred Christians and some Bahais are citizens.

According to PACI, among the noncitizen residents, approximately 28 percent are Christians, 5 percent are Shia, and a larger, although unknown, percentage are Sunni. There are an estimated 2 percent noncitizen Hindus and an estimated 3 percent Buddhists, as well as 10,000 Sikhs and 400 Bahais.

While some areas have high concentrations of either Sunnis or Shia, there is relatively even distribution of the two groups throughout most of the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam to be the religion of the state and the freedom of belief to be “absolute.” It guarantees the state will protect the freedom to practice all religions, provided such practice is “in accordance with established customs, and does not conflict with public policy or morals.”

The constitution declares sharia to be a main source of legislation and all individuals are equal before the law regardless of religion. It declares the amir shall be Muslim and the state shall safeguard the heritage of Islam. The Higher Advisory Committee on Completion of the Application of Islamic Sharia Provisions in the Amiri Diwan (office of the amir) makes recommendations to the amir on ways to bring laws into better conformity with sharia. The committee has no authority, however, to implement or enforce such changes.

The law states apostates lose certain legal rights, including the right to inherit property from Muslim relatives or spouses, but it does not specify any criminal penalty. The marriage of a Muslim man is annulled if he converts from Islam. A Muslim woman may have her marriage annulled if her Muslim husband converts to another religion.

The law prohibits the defamation of the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Islam, and Christianity), denigration of Islamic and Judeo-Christian religious figures, and prescribes a punishment of up to 10 years in prison for each offense.

A national unity law prohibits “stirring sectarian strife,” promoting the supremacy of one religious group, instigating acts of violence based on the supremacy of one group, or promoting hatred or contempt of any group. Acts of violence are punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of 10,000 to 100,000 Kuwaiti dinars (KD) ($32,790 – $327,900). Repeated crimes carry double penalties. If a group or an organization violates the law, the fine may be as much as 200,000 KD.

The law allows any citizen to file criminal charges against anyone they believe has defamed one of the three Abrahamic religions or harmed public morals.

The law criminalizes publishing and broadcasting content, including on social media, which the government deems offensive to religious “sects” or groups, providing for fines ranging from 10,000 to 200,000 KD ($32,790 to $655,740) and up to seven years imprisonment. Noncitizens convicted under this law are also subject to deportation.

There is no registration procedure for religious groups, although all religious groups must apply in writing for a license to establish an official place of worship recognized by the government. In order to obtain an official license, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Ministry of Justice, and the MAIA must grant approval. Once the above three ministries approve the application, the municipality must give final approval.

There continued to be seven officially licensed (recognized) Christian churches: the National Evangelical (Protestant), Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic (Melkite), Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, and Anglican.

A religious group with a license to establish a place of worship may hire its own staff, sponsor visitors to the country, open bank accounts, and import texts needed for its congregation.

The law prohibits nonreligious practices the government deems to be inconsistent with Islamic law, including anything the government deems to be sorcery or black magic, which under the penal code constitutes “fraud and deception” and carries a maximum penalty of three years imprisonment, a fine, or both.

The law prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing.

The law prohibits eating, drinking, and smoking in public between sunrise and sunset during Ramadan, even for non-Muslims, with a prescribed maximum penalty of up to 100 KD ($328) and/or one month’s imprisonment.

It is illegal to possess or import pork products and alcohol. Importing alcohol carries a penalty of up to 10 years’ imprisonment; consuming alcohol may result in a fine of up to a 1,000 KD ($3,279).

If a religious group wishes to purchase land, a citizen must be the primary buyer, and must submit a request for approval to the local municipal council, which may allocate land at its discretion. Citizens may also rent or donate land to religious groups.

The law requires Islamic religious instruction in public schools for all Muslim students and in private schools with one or more Muslim students enrolled, regardless of whether the student is a citizen or not. Non-Muslim students are not required to attend these classes, and there is no penalty for not doing so. The law prohibits organized religious education in public high schools for faiths other than Islam. All Islamic education courses use the Sunni interpretation of Islam.

The law prohibits the naturalization of non-Muslims but allows male citizens of any religion to transmit citizenship to their descendants. The law forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men, but Muslim men may marry women of another Abrahamic faith. The law requires children of such marriages be raised in their father’s faith, and the father’s religion to govern settlement of marital disputes. The determining factor for the couple’s religious status if they go to court is whether the marriage certificate is Sunni or Shia. A Shia notary must authenticate a Shia marriage certificate. If a non-Muslim couple wants to get married, they must get married in another country.

According to the constitution, sharia governs inheritance. Religious courts administer personal status law. Courts may follow Shia jurisprudence in matters of personal status and family law for Shia at the first instance and appellate levels. If the case proceeds beyond the appellate level, the case is adjudicated via Sunni personal status law. An independent Shia waqf (trust) administers Shia religious endowments.

An individual’s religion is not included on passports or national identity documents, with the exception of birth and marriage certificates, on which it is mandatory. On birth certificates issued to Muslims, there is no distinction between Sunni and Shia.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The courts acquitted several individuals arrested in 2015 for violating the national unity law by insulting Shia doctrine. In April the Criminal Court acquitted Salafist cleric Othman Al-Khamees of insulting Shia doctrine during a television interview he gave in 2015 in which he made comments deemed critical of Shia beliefs. In June the Court of Cassation acquitted Professor Abdullah Al-Nafeesi of insulting Shia doctrine and inciting sectarianism by making negative comments about Shia Muslims on social media and during television interviews that took place in 2015.

There were several court cases involving speech related to religion in which the court ruled in favor of the defendants. A criminal court found activist Sara al-Drees innocent of contempt of religion in April after she was sued by several private citizens for social media postings questioning tenets of Islamic practice. In May the public prosecutor dismissed a lawsuit filed against Shaikha Binjassem, a professor at Kuwait University, for contempt of religion. She questioned on television the relation between the Quran and the constitution.

The Ministry of Justice and the MAIA continued to caution imams to ensure their sermons were consistent with the general law on political speech and to avoid discussion of political issues in their sermons or at any other time while in the country. The government continued to appoint Sunni imams, fund Sunni religious institutions, including mosques, and monitor and provide the text of weekly sermons preached at Sunni mosques. Sunni imams were able to add to the content of the sermon but needed to ensure their content adhered to the laws on political speech and avoided what could be seen as stoking sectarianism. The government vetted every Sunni imam to ensure compliance with the government’s view of moderate and tolerant religious preaching and sermons. In January the government prevented several imams from Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, and Europe it accused of “terrorism and sectarianism” from entering the country.

The MAIA interviewed several imams who it considered to have made provocative statements harmful to national unity. Some imams were fined and received temporary suspensions and some were cleared of misconduct. In August the MAIA permanently banned an imam from giving sermons or lectures at mosques because of his alleged failure to refrain from preaching political sermons that violated government standards. The government also permanently banned three Sunni imams from conducting religious services for violation of MAIA regulations against political and/or extremist speech in mosques. In September the criminal court acquitted Shiite cleric Hussain al-Matooq on charges that he spoke poorly about the government in one of his Fridays sermons in 2015.

Religious groups were required to obtain licenses from their respective municipalities for commemorations, and a municipal government had the right to withdraw the license of any husseiniyas (a Shia hall for religious commemorations) not complying with the municipality’s rules.

The government kept in place the ban on outdoor religious observances, for what it stated was security concerns, instituted following the bombing of the Imam al Sadeq Mosque in June 2015, which killed 26 persons. All Ashura activities for the Shia community were required to be conducted inside closed structures rather than at outside locations. The government did not permit public reenactments of the martyrdom of Hussein or public marches in commemoration of Ashura. The government continued to station security forces outside of all religious venues during times of worship throughout the year as a deterrent to further possible attacks. The government also continued to provide security to Shia neighborhoods during Muharram and Ashura.

The authorities prohibited churches from displaying exterior signs, such as a cross or the congregation’s name.

Some Shia leaders said discrimination continued to prevent Shia from obtaining training for clerical positions as well as leadership positions in public sector organizations, including the police force and the military/security apparatus.

The government continued to prevent the establishment of Shia religious training institutions. Shia who wanted religious training had to seek training and education abroad. The College of Islamic Law at Kuwait University, the country’s only institution to train imams, provided some Shia jurisprudence courses but did not permit Shia professors on its faculty.

The government continued to permit the establishment of non-Islamic religious publishing companies to publish religious materials solely for the use of their congregations. The government continued to permit private companies to import Bibles and other Christian religious materials for use by the congregations of licensed churches under the condition none of the content insulted Islam. Congregations who needed material in languages other than Arabic or English reported no problems importing their materials on their own.

The Ministry of Interior provided security and protection for licensed places of worship, while the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor issued visas for clergy and other staff, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Municipality of Kuwait handled building permits and land issues. One new Shia mosque was constructed during the year. The government said it received no applications for construction of new churches from religious groups during the year. In May the Catholic Church renewed its lease for ten more years, and in September the Melkite Catholic Church successfully purchased a place of worship. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) applied for a license to establish a place of worship in 2014. According to a member of the group, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and the Ministry of Justice have approved the application and, as of November, only MAIA’s approval was required before granting municipal approval.

Some religious groups without a licensed place of worship stated they could conduct worship services without government interference provided they did not disturb their neighbors or violate laws regarding assembly and proselytizing. The government continued to allow such groups to operate in rented villas, private homes, or the facilities of licensed churches. Citing security concerns, authorities stated they would take action against unlicensed mosques. The government tasked the MAIA, the Ministry of Interior, the Municipality, and other agencies with finding solutions to end the use of illegal mosques.

Shia and non-Muslim religious groups reported a lack of facilities for worship and difficulties obtaining permission to construct new facilities. Members of the Shia community continued to express concern about what they stated was a lack of Shia mosques, caused by the government’s delay in approving repairs to existing mosques or constructing new ones. They said the government had granted licenses and approved the construction of fewer than 10 new Shia mosques since 2001. According to the government, the country had a total of 50 Shia mosques, with one new mosque approved for construction. There were also 20-30 registered husseiniyas and thousands of small, unregistered ones not falling under the jurisdiction of MAIA whose sermons were not monitored.

Some members of parliament stated they opposed the construction of churches because they believed it would violate sharia law.

The Ministry of Education continued to ban the use of instructional material of any fiction or nonfiction English-language books and textbooks referring to the Holocaust or Israel. The ministry permitted schools to teach and celebrate only Islamic holidays. The government did not interfere with informal religious instruction inside private homes and on church compounds.

Some conservative members of parliament and religious clerics expressed their disapproval of the celebration of non-Muslim holidays and called for more government action to restrict public expression of these holidays; no legislation to limit public expression has been initiated.

According to Shia leaders, the lack of Shia imams continued to limit their ability to staff Shia courts thus causing a backlog of personal status and family cases. To address the backlog and shortage of staff, an ad hoc council created by the government under the regular marital issues court to apply Shia jurisprudence continued to function. The establishment of a Shia Court of Cassation, approved in 2003, remained delayed, according to Shia leaders, because appropriate training for Shia to staff it was unavailable.

Although the law did not prohibit apostasy, the government continued its policy of not issuing new official documents for recording a change in religion.

The government continued to impose quotas on the number of clergy and staff of licensed religious groups entering the country but the government granted additional slots upon request. The government continued to require foreign leaders of unlicensed religious groups to enter the country as nonreligious workers. They then had to minister to their congregations outside the regular hours of their nonreligious employment.

There continued to be societal pressure against conversion from Islam, according to minority religious leaders and citizens. Some foreign residents and citizens reported their families harassed them for their conversion to Christianity, and in some cases asked them to leave their homes.

Observers reported hotels, stores, and other businesses continued to acknowledge non-Muslim holidays such as Christmas, Easter, and Diwali. For example, during the Christmas season, Christmas trees and lights appeared in stores, malls, and homes, and Christmas music played in public places, including songs with Christian lyrics. The news media continued to print information about religious holiday celebrations, including material on the religious significance of Christmas.

A number of religious groups said they were seeking alternative worship venues in response to the expressed wishes of property owners to utilize their properties for purposes that are more lucrative. The groups said a shortage of real estate in prime districts limited their ability to secure land in preferred areas.

In November three individuals harassed a Hindu man who was attempting to worship by himself on a beach. The man fled and a woman called the emergency hotline to report the incident. The dispatcher notified the woman that the issue pertained to freedom of religion and therefore did not warrant a police response. Media reported that the dispatcher was subsequently investigated for failure to adhere to proper protocol in dispatching a unit to assess the citizen’s complaint.

The Ambassador and embassy officers met with central government and local officials to discuss solutions for addressing the shortage of worship facilities for minority religious groups.

The Ambassador and embassy officers also met with leaders and representatives of minority religious groups, and with NGOs involved with religious issues to discuss the challenges religious minorities faced and their interaction with the government, such as difficulties obtaining places of worship. The embassy sponsored the participation of several young professionals in programs in the United States focused on interfaith dialogue.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.7 million (July 2016 estimate). According to Kyrgyz government estimates, approximately 85 percent of the population is Muslim, the vast majority of whom are Sunni. The government estimates Shia make up less than 1 percent of the Muslim population. According to an international organization, there is also a small Ahmadiyya Muslim Community not reflected in government figures estimated at 1000 individuals. According to NGO estimates, 5 percent of the population is Russian Orthodox and approximately 10 percent is unaffiliated or adheres to other religious groups, including Baptists, Lutherans, Pentecostals, Presbyterians, charismatics, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roman Catholics, Jews, Buddhists, and Bahais.

According to the National Statistics Committee, ethnic Kyrgyz make up approximately 73 percent of the country’s population, while ethnic Uzbeks comprise approximately 14.5 percent. Ethnic Uzbeks are most numerous in the South, making up almost half the population of the southern city of Osh, for example. Both ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks are primarily Muslim, making Islam the main religion in both urban and rural areas. Ethnic Russians mostly belong to the Russian Orthodox Church or one of the several Protestant denominations. Members of the Russian Orthodox Church and other non-Muslim religious groups live mainly in major cities.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, the right to practice or not practice a religion, individually or jointly with other persons, and the right to refuse to express one’s religious views. It bans actions inciting religious hatred.

The constitution establishes the separation of religion and state. It prohibits the establishment of religiously based political parties and the pursuit of political goals by religious groups. The constitution prohibits the establishment of any religion as a state or mandatory religion.

The law states all religions and religious groups are equal. It prohibits the involvement of minors in organized, proselytizing religious groups, “insistent attempts to convert followers of one religion to another (proselytism),” and, “illegal missionary activity,” defined as missionary activity of groups not registered with the State Commission on Religious Affairs (SCRA).

The law requires all religious groups, and religiously affiliated schools, to register with the SCRA, which is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the law’s provisions on religion. The law prohibits activity by unregistered religious groups. Groups applying for registration must submit an application form, organizational charter, minutes of an institutional meeting, and a list of founding members to the SCRA for review. Each congregation of a religious group must register separately and must have at least 200 founding resident citizens. Foreign religious organizations are required to renew their registration with the SCRA annually.

The SCRA is legally authorized to deny the registration of a religious group if it does not comply with the law or is considered a threat to national security, social stability, interethnic and interdenominational harmony, public order, health, or morality. The SCRA may also deny or postpone the certification of a particular religious group if it deems the proposed activities of the group are not religious in character. Denied applicants may reapply or may appeal to the courts. Unregistered religious groups are prohibited from actions such as renting space and holding religious services. Violations may result in an administrative fine of 500 soms ($7).

After the SCRA has approved a group’s registration as a religious entity, the group must register with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) to obtain status as a legal entity so it may own property, open bank accounts, and otherwise engage in contractual activities. The organization must submit an application to the MOJ, which includes a group charter with an administrative structure and a list of board and founding members. If a religious group engages in a commercial activity, it is required to pay taxes. By law, religious groups are designated as nonprofit organizations exempt from taxes on their religious activities.

The law gives the SCRA authority to ban a religious group as long as the SCRA delivers written notice to the group stating it is not in compliance with the law. The group may appeal the decision in the courts.

The law prohibits religious groups from “involvement in organizational activities aimed at inciting ethnic, racial, or religious hatred.” A conviction for inciting ethnic, racial or religious hatred may lead to a prison term of three to eight years while a conviction for creating an organization aimed at inciting ethnic, racial or religious hatred may lead to a term of five to 10 years. Murder committed on the grounds of religious hatred is punishable by life imprisonment.

In April President Atambaev signed into law a measure mandating separate prison facilities for prisoners convicted of “terrorism” and “extremism.” In August he signed into law a measure stripping the citizenship of any Kyrgyz national convicted of terrorism or extremism.

According to the law, only individuals representing registered religious organizations may conduct missionary activity. If a foreign missionary represents an organization approved by the SCRA, the individual foreign missionary must apply for a visa with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Visas are valid for up to one year and a missionary is allowed to work three consecutive years in the country. All religious foreign entities, including missionaries, must operate within these restrictions and must reregister annually. Representatives of religious groups acting inconsistently with the law may be fined or deported. Violations of the law may result in fines in the amount of 1000 soms ($14), and deportation in the case of foreign missionaries.

The law provides for the right of religious groups to produce, import, export, and distribute religious literature and materials in accordance with established procedures, which include examination by state “experts.” The law does not define the criteria for religious expert. The law prohibits the distribution of religious literature and materials in public locations or in visits to individual households, schools, and other institutions. The law specifies fines based on the nature of the violations.

The law allows public secular schools an option to offer religion courses which discuss the history and character of religions as long as the subject of such teaching is not religious doctrine and does not promote any particular religion. Private religious schools need to register with SCRA to operate as such.

According to the law, religion is grounds for conscientious objection to and exemption from military service. Conscientious objectors must pay a fee of 18,000 soms ($260) to opt out of military service. Draft-eligible males must pay the fee before turning 27 years of age. Failure to pay by the age limit will require the person to perform 240 hours of community service or a fine of up to 20,000 soms ($289). Draft-eligible men who evade military service and do not fall under an exemption are subject to a fine or imprisonment of up to two years. There is no option to perform alternative service.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The authorities maintained bans on approximately 20 “religiously oriented” groups they considered to be extremist and arrested hundreds of individuals they accused of participating in “extremist” incidents. One suspect in the attempted murder of the director of a religious center had his sentence reduced on appeal from life to 20 years imprisonment. Three individuals previously convicted of religious extremism were sentenced to life imprisonment following criminal acts during a highly publicized prison break which occurred in 2015. The authorities opened a criminal case against one of the police officers accused of attacking participants in a 2015 Jehovah’s Witnesses gathering, while they unsuccessfully appealed the acquittal of the leader of the Jehovah’s Witness service for illegal religious activity. Minority religious groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, continued to face difficulties in registering, but some unregistered groups said they continued to be able to hold religious services without government interference. The defeat of a bill in parliament to amend the labor code by extending Friday lunch breaks to accommodate Muslim prayers was followed by public statements by the ex- grand mufti, criticizing government officials for opposing the bill, and statements by government officials saying the actions of the ex-grand mufti violated the secular nature of the state.

The government continued to maintain bans on approximately 20 “religiously oriented” groups it considered to be extremist, including al-Qaida, the Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkistan, the Kurdish Peoples’ Congress, the Organization for the Release of Eastern Turkistan, Hizb ut- Tahrir (HT), the Union of Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Party of Turkistan, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church; Mun San Men Church), Takfir Jihadist, Jaysh al-Mahdi, Jund al-Khilafah, Ansarullah, At-Takfir Val Hidjra, Akromiya, ISIS, Djabhat An Nusra, Katibat al-Imam al-Buhari, Jannat Oshiqlari, and the Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Authorities also continued the ban on all materials or activities connected to A.A. Tihomirov aka Said Buryatsky.

Law enforcement authorities stated they had recorded 441 extremist incidents for the year. They opened criminal cases for 180 of these events and arrested 418 people. In comparison, there were 360 extremist incidents recorded in 2015, for which132 people were convicted of extremism and terrorism and 278 people were arrested. The Vice-Chairman of the Kyrgyz State Penitentiary Service stated as of March there were approximately 200 individuals accused of affiliation with extremist or terrorist organizations who continued to serve prison sentences.

In June a Bishkek court sentenced Tilek Uulu Alibek to life in prison for attempted murder in the November 2015 attack on Kadyr Malikov, Director of the Religion, Law, and Politics Analytical Center. In August an appeals court reduced Tilek Uulu’s sentence to 20 years, the maximum under the law for attempted murder. Tilek Uulu had left the country shortly after the attack, reaching Turkey at the end of November 2015. Turkey extradited him in March. His suspected accomplice, Yryskul Beishenaliyev remained in Turkey, continuing to fight extradition.

In June three Muslims previously convicted of extremism were sentenced to life imprisonment following their escape in a highly publicized prison break and manhunt in October 2015, which had resulted in the deaths of several prison guards. A man and woman convicted of providing shelter to the escapees were sentenced to four years’ imprisonment and a four-year suspended sentence, respectively.

In July the Prosecutor General’s Office opened a criminal case against one of the police officers accused of attacking participants in an August 2015 Jehovah’s Witness gathering in Osh following an appeal from the Jehovah’s Witnesses to do so. The Prosecutor General’s Office referred the case to the Osh city prosecutor, who had declined to initiate criminal proceedings immediately after the attack, citing a “lack of facts and circumstances” to support a case against the officers. Subsequent to the opening of the case in July, lawyers for the Jehovah’s Witnesses asked the Prosecutor General’s Office to recuse the Osh city prosecutor’s office and to have the criminal case handled in the capital city of Bishkek. In August the Prosecutor General’s office informed the lawyers the case had been transferred to the Osh Regional Prosecutor for investigation, but as of the end of the year there was no report of further developments.

In March the Supreme Court rejected efforts by the Osh Prosecutor to re-open a case against Nurlan Usupbaev, the leader of the 2015 Jehovah’s Witness gathering in Osh. Police had charged Usupbaev with “illegal religious activity” and had reportedly beaten him. The Supreme Court’s decision upheld Usupbaev’s previous acquittal of the charge of “illegal religious activity.” The Supreme Court stated the prosecutor had failed to adhere to the procedural deadline for contesting the lower court’s decision acquitting Usupbaev.

In April the Supreme Court revised its February ruling granting an appeal filed by the Osh City prosecutor contesting the acquittal of two Jehovah’s Witnesses, a mother and daughter, of alleged criminal activities while sharing their faith with others in 2013. A new trial had been scheduled for April 25, but lawyers for the two women successfully argued the three year statute of limitations had passed and the court agreed their acquittal should stand. According to the NGO Forum18, in 2014 the original trial court, in acquitting the two women, stated they had been targeted by the Osh Department of Internal Affairs and Osh City Prosecutor’s office solely because of their religion.

As of June, the most recent date for which statistics were available, authorities had “registered” 4,154 people as “adherents of extremist views.” In 2015, authorities registered 1,866 “adherents of extremist views” in the country and of these they classified 1,361 as adherents of HT. The Ministry of Interior reported there were approximately 200 adherents of HT in Bishkek. Registration meant the police picked up potential suspects for questioning in advance of a possible decision to arrest them. Police continued to register people as extremists without a subsequent arrest, and to keep their names in police files.

MOI data continued to show 62 percent of adherents of extremist views were residents of the south, where most of the religiously active members of the ethnic Uzbek community resided, and 74 percent of crimes of an extremist nature occurred in the south. HT adherents reportedly continued to be mostly active in the south, where 70 percent of the arrests of HT adherents occurred. The authorities also observed continued HT activity in Talas and Chui Provinces. Of the total number of registered adherents of designated religious extremist organizations, the government continued to estimate approximately 23 percent were women.

In February the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the Jehovah’s Witnesses to overturn the SCRA’s refusal to register communities in Osh, Naryn, Jalal-abad, and Batken. Representatives of the Jehovah’s Witnesses stated the refusal to register them was in contravention to a 2014 Supreme Court Constitutional Chamber decision declaring unconstitutional the section of the religion law regarding registration requirements. Jehovah’s Witness leaders reported authorities continued to deny registration to groups if they did not have 200 founding resident citizens in each region. The church leaders continued to assert the SCRA’s policy continued to create difficulties for them because without the required minimum number of members, groups could not register, and without registration they could not meet and recruit members to fulfill the minimum registration requirement. The lawyer representing the church stated the SCRA had refused the application, “by arguing that although Article 10(2) of the Religion Law had been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber, Parliament had not yet amended the Law.”

Although the government continued not to list the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community as a banned organization, the Ahmadiyya Community in the U.S. reported the SCRA continued to deny it re-registration. A U.S. representative of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community confirmed the Community still had not obtained registration. The Ahmadiyya community initially had registered in 2002, but the SCRA had declined to renew its re-registration since 2012.

Religious groups continued to report the SCRA registration process was cumbersome, taking anywhere from a month to several years to complete. Unregistered groups continued to report they were able to hold regular religious services without government interference, especially if they had been registered in the past and their annual application for re-registration was pending. According to Forum 18, Protestant pastors stated there were many new churches in the country which would like to register, but did not have the 200 founders required for registration.

As of the end of the year, the registered religious groups and organizations reported by the authorities included 2,743 mosques;10 Islamic higher educational institutions; 89 madrassas; 74 Muslim foundations, centers and unions; 380 Christian organizations and unions; 51 Russian Orthodox churches; four Catholic communities; 50 Baptist communities; 31 Seventh-day Adventist churches; 56 Pentecost communities; 20 Lutheran communities; 38 Presbyterian communities; 43 Charismatic communities; 26 foreign Protestant organizations; 18 non-denominational Protestant organizations; one Jewish community; one Buddhist community; and 12 Bahai Faith communities.

In June the parliament considered a bill amending the labor code to extend Friday lunch breaks for up to two hours to accommodate Muslim prayer rituals. Proponents of the bill included the country’s Islamic leaders, including ex-Grand Mufti Chubak Ajy Jalilov. When parliament declined to pass the draft bill on the grounds it was unnecessary because the labor code did not prohibit employers from offering an accommodation of a longer lunch hour for those who requested it, Jalilov posted a video message on his Facebook page criticizing members of parliament who opposed the adoption of the bill. Then-director of the State Committee on Religious Affairs, Orozbek Moldaliev, then told the media Jalilov had breached the constitution by calling those who did not pass the law “kafirs” (unbelievers). Moldaliev said Jalilov had “violated the secular system.” On June 9, the State Committee on National Security issued an official warning to Jalilov about the unacceptability of extremist statements. The following day, President Atambayev met with opponents of the draft bill, stating publicly “religious activists should never be allowed to interfere in politics. They attempt to violate the constitutional principle of the secular system of the state.”

The government did not provide religious materials to prisoners charged with affiliation with banned religious groups, according to NGOs, but the government allowed them to practice their religion and conduct prayers in prison. There continued to be no specific procedure for hiring or evaluating the experts performing the examination of religious literature which groups wanted to distribute. According to religious studies academics, SCRA employees or religious scholars with whom the agency contracted continued to be chosen serve as the experts. Attorneys for religious groups continued to say the experts chosen by the SCRA were biased in favor of prosecutors, and were not formal experts under the criminal procedure code.

In March the Bishkek Interdistrict Court rejected a suit filed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses after permission to import the November 2015 issue of its journal Awake! was denied by the SCRA. The court stated it was not competent to overrule the evaluation done by the SCRA.

According to representatives of religious groups, refusal either to serve or to pay a fee to opt out of military service continued to subject a conscientious objector to hardship because military service continued to be a prerequisite for employment in the government and with many private employers.

According to the NGO Forum 18, non-Muslim religious minorities continued to face difficulties arranging for burial of their dead in public cemeteries. In one case in October, local villagers and imams in the Jalal-Abad region twice exhumed the body of a deceased Protestant woman to remove it from public cemeteries while local officials, police officers, and National Security Committee officers reportedly looked on but did not interfere. Regional officials reportedly stated they then buried the woman in a third, undisclosed location. There were contradictory reports whether the authorities were taking any action against the perpetrators of the exhumations. On October 27, the Ministry of Interior announced it had filed a criminal case under the provision of the criminal code prohibiting desecration of the dead and their burial site over the illegal exhumation of the body. According to Forum 18, on December 29, the authorities put three local residents on trial for their involvement in the incident. The authorities reportedly did not charge the imams who had incited the exhumations or the officials who had not prevented the exhumations.

In July giant billboards featuring three groups of women side-by-side in a variety of traditional and religious dress appeared in the capital city, Bishkek, sparking public debate. The billboard portrayed one group of women in traditional Kyrgyz costume, next to women in white hijabs, and finally, women in black niqabs covering their entire bodies. A caption under the photos read, “Oh poor nation, where are we headed?” The arrangement of pictures appeared to some observers as a commentary on the spread of foreign, fundamentalist Muslim customs in the country. A prominent Islamic scholar called the billboards a “provocation” and said the authorities should investigate the billboards for signs of incitement of religious hatred. In response to the controversy, President Atambaev expressed his support for the billboards, saying fundamentalist religious dress common in the Middle East was “alien” to Kyrgyz culture. The muftiate stated the billboards would divide the people of the country while the Bishkek Mayor’s Office stated the billboards did not incite hatred or violence. Many news reports cited social media reaction in support of the billboards, while other reports called the billboards a “provocation” against Muslim practitioners.

The highest Islamic administrative body in the country, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Kyrgyz Republic, known as the “muftiate,” continued to oversee all Islamic entities, including institutes, madrassahs, and mosques. Although an independent entity per the constitution, NGOs reported the government continued to exert influence over the office, including the mufti selection process.

The Hazreti Umar Islamic University, an affiliate of the muftiate, remained responsible for overseeing the work of all Islamic schools, including madrassahs and secondary schools. The university continued its work, projected to take years to complete, to develop a standardized curriculum with the stated goal of curbing the spread of religious teaching deemed extremist by either the muftiate or the SCRA.

The SCRA and the Ministry of Education Science and Culture held a teacher training course in August as part of a pilot program introducing a new, secular course on the “History of Religious Culture” for ninth grade students at 10 Bishkek and Osh area schools.

The Ambassador and embassy officers continued to meet regularly with government officials, including the SCRA, to discuss programs to counter violent extremism, improve the qualifications of religious teachers and the quality of education at religious institutions, and to urge greater religious tolerance.

Embassy officers also continued to engage with representatives of the muftiate, leaders of minority religious groups, NGOs, and civil society representatives to discuss the new law enacted on terrorism and extremism, the ability of independent religious groups to register, and the rights of religious minorities.

The embassy sponsored a conference, led by a visiting Muslim cleric from the U.S., which addressed, among other issues, civic engagement on the part of students and young professionals to promote interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance. The embassy continued its sponsorship of English language classes and vocational training at local madrassas to enable students in remote areas to obtain better access to information on religious tolerance. The embassy continued to fund NGOs whose programs fostered religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 7.0 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2015 national census, 64.7 percent of the population is Buddhist, 1.7 percent is Christian, 31.4 percent has no religion, and the remaining 2.1 percent identify as other or a nonlisted religion. Theravada Buddhism is the religion of the majority of ethnic or “lowland” Lao, who constitute 53.2 percent of the overall population. According to the LFNC and MOHA, the remainder of the population comprises at least 48 ethnic minority groups, most of which practice animism and ancestor worship. Animism is predominant among Sino-Thai groups, such as the Thai Dam and Thai Daeng, as well as among Mon-Khmer and Burmo-Tibetan groups. Among lowland Lao, many pre-Buddhist animist beliefs are incorporated into Theravada Buddhist practice, particularly in rural areas. Roman Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Bahais, Mahayana Buddhists, and followers of Confucianism in total constitute less than 3 percent of the population. The government defines atheists and animists as “nonbelievers.”

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the right and freedom to believe or not believe in any religion and states citizens are equal before the law regardless of their beliefs or ethnic group. The constitution also says the state respects and protects all lawful activities of Buddhists and followers of other religions, and “mobilizes and encourages” Buddhist monks and novices as well as priests of other religions to participate in activities that are “beneficial to the country and people.” It prohibits all acts that create division between religious groups and classes of people.

Prime Ministerial Decree 92, issued in 2002, set forth regulations for religious practice. In August the prime minister issued Decree 315 on religious practice to replace Decree 92. The new decree, however, has not been implemented fully, does not have approved implementation instructions, and is not in official circulation as of the end of the year beyond reported distribution to a few senior religious officials.

The constitution, as well as Decrees 92 and 315, state that religious practice should serve national interests by promoting development and education and by instructing believers to be good citizens.

The government officially recognizes four umbrella religious groups: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and the Bahai Faith, and requires religious groups to register within one of these officially recognized umbrella groups. Recognized Christian groups are limited to the Catholic Church, the Laos Evangelical Church (LEC), and the Seventh-day Adventist Church. All unregistered Christian groups wishing to be recognized must register as part of the LEC or the Seventh-day Adventist Church, instead of receiving separate recognition.

Under both Decrees 92 and 315, nearly all aspects of religious practice – such as congregating, holding religious services, building houses of worship, modifying existing structures, and establishing new congregations in villages where none existed – require permission from a local MOHA branch office, regardless of whether a group is recognized or registered nationally. Some cases require approval from the central-level MOHA. Under the new decree, Buddhism will operate under the same regulations as other registered religions, where previously many of these requirements were not applied to them.

Decree 92 allowed citizens to proselytize, print, and import religious materials, own and build houses of worship, and maintain contact with overseas religious groups. These rights were contingent upon receiving permission through an approval process.

The stated purpose of Decree 315 is to set the principles, regulations, and laws concerning the governance and protection of religious activities for clergy, teachers of religion, members of religions, and religious groups in order to preserve and promote national culture, increase solidarity among members of various religious groups, and “preserve and develop the nation.”

Decree 315 has not yet been implemented, so it is not known how it will be interpreted by authorities. The decree empowers MOHA to order the cessation of any religious activities or beliefs that are not in agreement with policies, traditional customs, laws, or regulations within its jurisdiction. According to the decree, MOHA may stop any religious activity threatening to national stability, peace, and social order, causing serious damage to the environment, or affecting national solidarity or unity between tribes and religions, including the threats to the lives, properties, health, or reputations of others. The decree requires MOHA to collect information and statistics on religious operations, cooperate with foreign countries and international organizations regarding religious activities, and report religious activities to the government.

The new decree prohibits individuals, organizations with a legal personality, and social establishments from causing division among different ethnic groups and religions.

The new decree stipulates that elected or appointed office bearers in committees of responsibility in religious establishments must be presented to national, provincial, as well as district and village level MOHA offices to be reviewed, considered, and certified. MOHA and the related lower-level offices also have authority to issue certificates for religious establishments.

Under the new decree, religious groups operating in multiple provinces are required to obtain national MOHA approval; groups operating in multiple districts are required to obtain provincial level approval; and groups operating in multiple villages are required to obtain district level approval. If a religious group wishes to operate beyond its local congregation, approvals at the corresponding level are required. If a religious activity takes place outside of a religious group’s property, it requires village authority approval. Activities in another village require approval from district authorities, from provincial authorities for activities in another district, and from national authorities for activities in another province. Religious groups must submit annual plans of all activities other than routine events in advance to be reviewed, investigated, and approved by the local authorities within their jurisdictions.

Under Decree 315, all houses of worship must be correctly registered under the law and applicable regulations. Any maintenance, restoration, and construction activities at religious facilities must receive MOHA approval from all levels. Local authorities may provide opinions regarding building, care, and maintenance of religious facilities, present their findings to their respective provincial governors and city mayors for consideration, and subsequently ask the minister of home affairs to investigate, consider, and approve activities conducted in religious facilities.

According to the new decree, those entering the religious clergy for more than three months require approval from district and village authorities, agreement from the receiving religious establishment, and agreement from a guardian or spouse, if applicable. For a period less than three months, the village authority, as well as a guardian or spouse, must approve. The shorter time period stipulations generally apply to Buddhists, as every Buddhist male is expected to enter the monkhood at least once in their lives, often for a duration of less than three months.

Clergy and religious teachers traveling abroad for specialist studies must be approved by both the Ministry of Education and Sports (MOES) and MOHA. Generally, any students going abroad for study requires approval from the MOES. Religious organizations conducting religious activities overseas must receive approval from the appropriate geographical MOHA level in Laos.

Under Decree 315, the LFNC may educate and meet with religious leaders, clergy, teachers, and members to ensure compliance with laws and regulations, aim to reduce ethnic and religious tensions, and “contribute to the development of the nation.” They are able to listen to opinions and concerns of religious communities in order to work with the respective police or other authorities to investigate and resolve issues.

Under Decree 315, the government continues to control written materials for mass consumption, including for religious use. It regulates the importation and printing of religious materials and production of books, documents, icons, and symbols of various religions. MOHA may require the relevant religious group to certify the imported materials are truly representative of their religion, to address issues of authenticity, and to ensure imported materials comport with values and practices in the country. Under the new decree, the import or export of unapproved printed or electronic religious materials is prohibited.

Buddhist clergy are required by the new decree to have identification cards and clergy from other religions are required to have certificates to prove they have received legitimate religious training.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with a declaration made that Article 18 on freedom of religion shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any activities to directly or indirectly coerce or compel an individual to believe or not to believe in a religion or to convert his or her religion or belief, and that all acts that create division and discrimination among ethnic groups and religious groups are incompatible with the article.

Government Practices

There were reports of religious minority members who were subjected to attempted forced renunciations, imprisonment, arrest, and detention. In some cases local officials reportedly threatened Protestants with arrest or expulsion from their villages if they did not comply with certain orders. NGOs stated the relatively decentralized nature of the government structure contributed to abuses on the part of local officials, some of whom were reportedly unaware of laws and policies protecting religious freedom or unwilling to implement them. Religious groups said most, if not all, instances of abuse occurred in remote villages. According to religious leaders and government officials, the further one was from the capital city, the more likely abuses would occur.

There were multiple reports of arrests and detentions of Christian villagers who had reportedly discussed their religion with those of other religious groups. All were eventually released. Some were fined, but none reportedly paid.

There were reports from religious groups that Protestants in some villages were arrested for holding Christian services in their homes without permission. This particularly affected Protestants who had not been given approval to build church structures in their villages because of the moratorium on permits. Persons arrested for such alleged religion-related offenses, as with all criminal offenses, had little protection under the law and could be held for lengthy periods without trial and then released, according to reports.

In October in Huaphou Village, Xiengkhor District, Houaphan Province, local religious groups reported that village officers detained a couple, tied their hands and feet for an entire day, and told them to stop practicing Christianity. The couple was eventually released.

According to religious groups, in April in Khamkeut District, Bolikhamxay Province, a village forced 10 Christian families to leave for allegedly creating conflict and disrupting village harmony by dividing the village into followers of more than one religion. The 10 families were reportedly left homeless and unable to work or send their children to school.

Also in April at another village in Houaphan Province, religious groups reported police demanded five Christian families turn over their Bibles, renounce their faith, provide the names of all family members, and report who was responsible for converting them to Christianity. Authorities also denied the five families their family registration books, documentation required for all citizens to reside legally where they live, access schools, and maintain most aspects of life that require government interaction. Police questioned them about collecting tithes, why they did not cry for or offer food to the dead, and why they reportedly distributed religious literature illegally. Police also said the families degraded the village and district by practicing of their religion.

Religious groups reported multiple cases of Christian families being denied their house registration books, reportedly because of their religion. MOHA said they were aware of issues families that moved from one location to another faced due to errors in the application process or missing documentation. Religious groups reported that families had lived for generations in remote villages but still lacked family registration books and that when a village did begin to receive books, only Buddhist or animist residents had received them, but not Christians. These Christians were reportedly told that they would have to renounce Christianity or leave the village. MOHA said it had not received complaints related to – nor was it aware of – this issue.

Religious groups reported that in April, in Namtha District, Luang Namtha Province, authorities threatened 15 Hmong Christian families so the families would abandon their belief in Christianity.

In Sam Neua District, Houaphan Province, public school authorities reportedly told five Christian families to remove copies of their family registration books from school records, which left their children unable to take exams. Authorities reportedly told the families to either renounce Christianity or leave the village to get their registration books back.

Religious organizations reported that while Decree 92 was in effect, government policy continued effectively to preclude the registration of new religious groups, and registration procedures and timelines outlined in Decree 92 remained unclear. For example, religious organizations reported that according to the decree they were required to “provide a comprehensive set of documents” to the Central Committee of the LFNC “through the concerned local administrative authorities.” The decree did not identify the required documents or the length of the administrative process. Religious organizations reported LFNC authorities asked unregistered religious organizations to register as a subgroup of existing recognized churches, without regard to differences in religious beliefs.

Christian groups reported they were often denied approval to build churches because they had no registered members in the village. Church members, however, could not register unless there was a church, creating an unresolvable issue. As an attempted solution, church members built temporary structures to serve as unofficial churches. They said that as the Christian population grew, they tried to apply for a church permit, prompting government officials’ reported concerns that the structures were unstable, and could not be approved.

Religious groups said denied registrations were largely due to local village leaders belonging to the majority ethnic-religious group in a village, often Buddhist or animist, leading to reported biases against Christians, who were usually the minority.

Government officials said the country was open to all religions, although only four are currently recognized. The LEC continued to serve as an umbrella group for all registered Christian denominations other than Catholic or Seventh-day Adventist, as religious leaders reported applications for new Christian groups has been too difficult. Government officials reported in September one unrecognized Christian group that wished to register with the government separately from the LEC approached an official for advice who told the group to register with MOHA, but to wait until the new decree was being applied. Shortly thereafter, the official said two of the recognized Christian subgroups contacted him to ask he not allow the requesting religious group to register and receive recognition. Religious leaders stated one of the biggest difficulties that currently unrecognized and therefore unregistered groups faced is that, although registration of any religious group is permitted, in practice disparate groups have been forced under one of the recognized subgroups.

One Christian group has continued to seek independent recognition under the Christian banner since 2012 when their request was denied and has operated without legal status. The group’s attempt to purchase property was unsuccessful because they were unrecognized. On October 1, their only church in the country was closed.

Religious leaders indicated Christians appear to be the fastest growing religious community and Christians reported facing the most difficulties with local authorities and the general population. At a national government meeting in October during which an official gave statistics on religious populations, a National Assembly member reportedly asked why the number of Christians in the country had been allowed to increase so much and questioned what the government would do about it. The meeting chair did not allow the question to be answered and ended the session.

Some Christian leaders continued to say the central government has attempted to repress Christianity because it continued to see Christianity as a foreign and subversive religious practice. Many religious leaders said that although MOHA contended that conflicts originated at the local level, local officials had approval for their actions from either the central government or senior officials within the central government. In dealing with local conflicts regarding religious issues, officials at MOHA reported they first waited for the provinces to resolve the issue before getting involved. Government officials from MOHA and the LFNC reported some local officials were on occasion incorrectly applying regulations or in fact, creating their own regulations contrary to national law. MOHA said, because of financial limitations, there are many remote areas where it has yet to reach to disseminate the previous decree and will take some time to do so with the new decree.

Non-Buddhist religious group leaders stated a broad range of their activities such as congregating, building churches, modifying existing structures, and establishing new congregations were limited by requirements to obtain prior permission, sometimes from several different offices. Buddhists received many de facto exemptions from such requirements and were generally permitted to conduct activities without requesting permission.

Both local and central government officials referred to the constitution, the former and current prime ministerial decrees, and social harmony as reasons for restricting and overseeing religious activity, especially the activities of new or small Christian groups among minority ethnic groups.

Although groups not registered with MOHA or the LFNC were not legally allowed to practice their faith, several reportedly did so quietly without interference. Christian groups seeking official recognition as separate from the LEC continued to be the targets of restrictions, and authorities in several provinces insisted independent congregations join the LEC. In many areas, however, unauthorized churches were allowed to conduct services without hindrance by local authorities.

According to Muslim community leaders, Muslims were able to practice openly at the two active mosques in Vientiane, the only mosques in the country. According to the Muslim Association, its leaders met regularly with LFNC officials and maintained an effective working relationship with the government. Daily prayers and the weekly Friday prayer proceeded unobstructed, and all Islamic celebrations were allowed. Muslims were permitted to go on the Hajj. The government permitted groups from Thailand to conduct Tabligh teachings.

While animists generally reported little governmental interference, the government actively discouraged animist practices it deemed outdated, dangerous, or illegal, such as the practice in some tribes of killing children born with defects or burying the bodies of deceased relatives beneath homes.

Representatives of Bahai communities in Vientiane, Savannakhet, and Luang Prabang reported they generally practiced without interference, and Bahai groups faced few restrictions from local authorities. Local Bahai communities and the Bahai National Spiritual Assembly routinely held Bahai Nineteen-Day Feasts and celebrated all holy days without interference. The Bahai National Spiritual Assembly in Vientiane met regularly.

Religious leaders said they were effectively banned from proselytizing in public, although they were seemingly able to do so on a small scale, such as in private settings and among friends. Programs or activities conducted outside houses of worship that could therefore be seen by the public required prior approval from local or higher officials.

The government promoted the teaching of Buddhist practices in public schools as part of national culture. Mandatory cultural sessions included lessons taught in Buddhist temples and, in several provinces, the lessons were required to pass to the next grade level. MOES allowed parents to take their children out if they were dissatisfied with the program. According to the ministry, there was no Buddhist curriculum taught in any public schools; however, several provinces did teach Buddhist curriculum in public schools. Christian students reported discomfort with being forced to pray in Buddhist temples as part of the requirement to pass to the next grade level. A number of private schools affiliated with various religious groups existed throughout the country and accepted students from any religious denomination.

MOHA officials said they were concerned that imported religious materials and texts might have included religious content different from domestic practices, and as such required approval from the religious authority related to that imported material, to avoid misunderstandings.

Provincial, district, and local officials, as well as MOHA’s Department of Ethnic and Religious Affairs (DERA) and LFNC representatives participated in town hall meetings with local Protestant leaders and community leaders to discuss conflicts involving the confiscations of churches in prior years.

As many as three-fourths of the LEC’s congregations throughout the country did not have permanent church structures and conducted worship services in homes. The LFNC’s Religious Affairs Department continued to urge that house churches be replaced with designated church structures whenever possible; local authorities in many areas considered group worship in homes illegal. Protestant groups reported they sometimes could not obtain permission to build new churches. According to MOHA, a moratorium on permits to build new churches continued, pending implementation of the new prime ministerial decree. Religious group representatives said the building permit process began at the local level and then required district, provincial, and ultimately central-level LFNC and MOHA permission. They said local officials used the process to block construction of new churches.

Many religious leaders complained of lengthy delays in getting permits approved for church construction, and generally received no response to requests. According to the LFNC, many of the delays were related to legal matters on construction, or in some cases, a small cluster of Christian families in one village wished to build two or three churches in the same village resulting in more churches than local authorities think the number of Christians justify. The LFNC said this led to conflicts with other religions predominant in the village that often held an equal number of temples, and therefore local authorities did not permit additional churches to be built. The LFNC cited other examples in which a Catholic church, a Protestant church, and several Buddhist temples existed in harmony. The LFNC also said it was not aware there might have been cases where two different LEC subgroups, with quite different doctrines, might have tried to build separate churches in the same village and that might account for the number of churches.

In Savannakhet and Champasak Provinces, Catholics said the government restricted them from obtaining government jobs or being promoted. Other religious groups stated that in general, there were no non-Buddhist or non-animist government officials in higher-level posts at provincial or national levels.

During the year, the government promoted ethnic Lao culture, with a focus on Buddhist practices. Government officials attended some Buddhist religious festivals as well as Christmas and religious New Year celebrations in their official capacity. Under the new Decree 315, the government may continue to sponsor Buddhist facilities, incorporate Buddhist rituals and ceremonies in state functions, and promote Buddhism as an element of the country’s cultural and spiritual identity and as the predominant religion of the country.

In cases where it came to officials’ attention, the government strictly enforced a prohibition on proselytizing by foreigners, which reportedly continued to be widespread although conducted mainly in small, private settings. Christian leaders from foreign countries reported local congregations often requested they not preach from the pulpit to avoid the perception that foreigners were proselytizing to citizens.

The government typically did not acknowledge any religious freedom abuses by its officials. Government authorities often blamed the victims rather than those responsible. Even when central government officials acknowledged certain actions, they often said the actions taken by local officials were not based on religion, but on local officials’ duty to maintain order. Religious groups stated that provincial government officials asked religious leaders not to report grievances to foreigners in exchange for greater religious freedom. Provincial government officials in turn reportedly did not inform the central authority about cases involving religious conflicts out of fear of losing funding and of losing recognition for being a model province. According to religious groups, the central government continued efforts to keep individuals who had been arrested, banished, punished, marginalized, or had otherwise been the victim of abuses due to their religious belief out of sight and mind of the international community.

The LFNC and MOHA continued to visit occasionally areas where abuses of religious freedom had taken place to instruct local officials on government policy and law. LFNC and MOHA officials frequently traveled to the provinces to encourage religious groups to practice in accordance with the country’s laws and regulations. They also hosted training workshops for local officials to explain officials’ obligations under the constitution and the right to believe or not to believe in religion. During these sessions, LFNC and MOHA officials were exposed to religious law and participated in education seminars that reviewed the basic tenets of Buddhism, Christianity, the Bahai Faith, and Islam from religious leaders.

According to the government and religious leaders, in an effort to promote consultation among all stakeholders concerning the drafting of Decree 315, the LFNC and MOHA organized a meeting for recognized religious group representatives. Participants made suggestions that would clarify roles and responsibilities of responsible agencies. Members of religious communities reported concerns that the new decree was a major change of existing rules and a potentially more restrictive set of regulations than what they said was its already restrictive predecessor. In spite of the government’s stated aim to take into account religious groups’ concerns, the government’s initial review of Decree 315 reportedly left some groups feeling that their concerns were not incorporated into the decree as expected. With the decree officially enacted, MOHA, in consultation with LFNC and other relevant ministries and organizations, continued to draft instructions for implementation as of the end of the year. The ministries said they would not include religious groups in the drafting process, but expected religious leaders to challenge the instructions by submitting complaints to MOHA and that revisions may be required after implementation commences. The government expected delays for any approvals required by the new decree would be the norm pending completion of the instructions, as was the case when awaiting amendments to Decree 92 to be finalized in the past.

In collaboration with the LFNC, an international NGO continued to conduct training for provincial and district officials and local religious leaders throughout the year to help both sides better understand each other and the law, and to address religious leaders’ continuing concerns about the eviction of religious minority families and the subsequent confiscation of their property in various villages, as well as their frustration over the arduous registration process involving resistance from village leaders all the way up to MOHA.

According to government officials, some people who committed crimes unrelated to religion later said authorities pursued them because of their religion. The officials said that similar to their proportion of the general population, Buddhists make up the majority of prisoners, and said that no one has said that the government is cracking down on Buddhists. Officials also said there were cases where Buddhist or animist prisoners have converted to Christianity in prison, in the hope that their new religious group may press for their release or a reduced sentence.

The LFNC’s new president entered office in June. Since his appointment, religious leaders said he has reached out to religious communities, including visits to religious leaders in Savannakhet Province. They said they felt cautiously optimistic that his approach to their concerns has been favorable in comparison to that of his predecessor. The LFNC said it is planning quarterly meetings with religious groups both in Vientiane and in the provinces, if requested.

In December a representative of the LFNC attended an event honoring the beatification of 17 Catholic martyrs that included 11 French priests, one Laotian priest, and five Laotian laypeople, 16 of whom were killed by the then insurgent and subsequently government forces between 1957 and just prior to 1975, and one by the former regime. Some 100 Catholic priests and approximately 1,000 laypeople from around the region were in attendance. During the event, the LFNC representative gave a speech discussing Decree 315.

Christian sources reported interreligious tensions on some occasions among some minority ethnic groups, particularly in response to the growth of Christian congregations or disagreements over access to village resources. The refusal by members of non-Buddhist groups, particularly Protestants, to participate in Buddhist or animist ceremonies continued to be a source of tensions in rural areas. In some cases, villagers threatened Christians with expulsion from the village should they not renounce their faith. Christian group leaders, however, encouraged their members to work out a compromise allowing them to support local Buddhist or animist ceremonies without participating in them. Members of some Christian groups said they could not make such compromises, which they said would violate their religious beliefs.

Some members of ethnic groups that were associated with the United States during the Vietnam War era, and related conflicts in Laos, said they felt abandoned by the United States at the time and rejected Christianity, which they viewed as an American religion. This sentiment reportedly led to issues in remote areas where these ethnic communities placed additional pressure on Christians, including within families and from neighbors.

Christians reported concerns among many animists regarding burial practices. Christian groups did not cremate their deceased, and buried them on church land or assigned plots of land near villages. During the year, religious groups reported two cases where a funeral procession was to cross over rice fields in order to reach burial sites. In one case, a farmer requested 5 million Kip ($612) in compensation, as he said the passing of the deceased over his fields would cause a failed crop. The farmer eventually dropped his request for compensation, but authorities only allowed direct family members, and no other church members, to attend the funeral. Some animists said they were alarmed at the Christian practice of burying their dead within the village boundary confines, believing that the deceased’s spirit would bring disharmony to the village and conflict with the village spirits because the body was not cremated.

The LFNC said they have repeatedly seen cases in remote villages in which older family members, who were animists, reported that their Christian convert children or grandchildren damaged or destroyed animist relics. Elder animists said they opposed their younger family members adopting non-animist beliefs and threatened them via various means, including government intervention.

Several private preschools and English-language schools received support from religious groups of various denominations abroad. Many boys received instruction in religion and other subjects in Buddhist temples, which traditionally filled the role of schools and continued to play this role in smaller communities where formal education was limited or unavailable. Two Buddhist colleges and two Buddhist secondary schools provided religious training for children and adults. Christian denominations, particularly the LEC and Seventh-day Adventists, conducted religious education for children and youth. Bahai groups conducted religious training for children and adult members. The Catholic Church operated a seminary in Thakhek for students with high school degrees to study philosophy and theology for two to 10 years. The Muslim community offered limited educational training for its children.

The U.S. President visited the country in September and reiterated the U.S. commitment to promoting respect for human rights and religious freedom. In February officers from the Department of State’s Office of International Religious Freedom visited the country and met with the LFNC, MOHA, and local government officials in Vientiane, Savannakhet, Khammuan, and Xieng Khouang. They encouraged the government to abide by its international commitments on protecting religious freedom and ensure local authorities enforce the law. U.S. embassy officers regularly advocated for religious freedom and amendment of relevant laws and decrees with a range of government officials. In multiple exchanges with MOHA, the National Assembly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and/or the LFNC’s Religious Affairs Department, U.S. embassy officials advocated for the need for swift and appropriate resolution of specific cases of arrest, abuse or harassment; cumbersome registration procedures; trends in and abuses of religious freedom; and government management of religious practices in the provinces, such as forced or threatened detentions, removal from villages, evictions, and other problems for recent converts. The LFNC and MOHA sometimes used this information to intercede with local officials.

The embassy actively engaged with MOHA and the LFNC to learn how the newly issued decree will be implemented.

The embassy offered MOHA and the LFNC assistance in disseminating information on aspects of the law providing legal protections for religious freedom to more remote areas, where reportedly understanding of these aspects may be lacking and there are many religious freedom issues. Both MOHA and LFNC said they were appreciative of the offer and said they would consider how to best make use of the embassy’s outreach. One religious leader suggested that the embassy include the Ministry of Public Security’s local-level counterparts, and others involved in law enforcement in the outreach process, to ensure that those who are involved in many of the issues are properly aware of their responsibilities to protect religious freedom.

Office of International Religious Freedom officers also met with religious communities and NGOs, including Buddhists, Bahais, Seventh-day Adventists, and unrecognized Christians, to discuss the challenges religious groups faced in obtaining government approval for many of their activities.

The Ambassador and a senior embassy official met with religious leaders and advocacy groups to address religious freedom concerns. Embassy officers regularly consulted registered and unregistered religious groups regarding the reports of arrests of religious followers, cumbersome registration procedures, and abuses of freedoms, including during visits to Savannakhet, Khammuan, Bolikhamxay, and Xieng Khouang provinces conducted this year.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.9 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the largest denominations are Lutheran (37 percent), who live throughout the country, Roman Catholic (21 percent), who live predominantly in the east, and Latvian Orthodox Christians (19 percent), who are predominantly native Russian speakers. The Latvian Orthodox Church is a self-governing Eastern Orthodox Church under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Office of Migration and Citizenship estimates approximately 8,600 persons identify as Jews, while the Council of Jewish Communities believes there are as many as 11,000 people with Jewish heritage. The Islamic community reports approximately 1,000 practicing Muslims, while the MOJ Annual Report of Religious Organizations and their Activities lists 337 members. Other religious groups, which together constitute less than 5 percent of the population, include Baptists, Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, Old Believers, evangelical Christians, Methodists, Calvinists, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).

Legal Framework

The constitution states everyone has the right to “freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” and “the church shall be separate from the state.” It allows restrictions on the expression of religious beliefs in order to protect public safety, welfare, morals, the democratic structure of the state, and others’ rights. The law gives eight “traditional” religious groups – Lutherans, Catholics, Latvian Orthodox Christians, Old Believers, Baptists, Methodists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Jews – some rights and privileges not given to other religious groups, including the right to teach religion courses in public schools and the right to officiate at marriages without obtaining a civil marriage license from the MOJ. These eight groups are also the only religious groups represented on the government Ecclesiastical Council, an advisory body established by law and chaired by the prime minister that meets on an ad hoc basis to comment and provide recommendations on religious issues. These recommendations do not carry the force of law.

Separate laws define relations between the state and each of these eight groups. The rights and activities of other religious groups are covered by the law on religious organizations.

Although the government does not require religious groups to register, the law accords registered religious groups a number of rights and privileges, including legal status to own property and conduct financial transactions, eligibility to apply for funds for religious building restoration, and tax deductions for donors. Registration also allows religious groups to perform religious activities in hospitals, prisons, and military units and hold services in public places such as parks or public squares with the agreement of the local government. The law accords the same rights and privileges to the eight “traditional” religious groups without requiring them to register. These groups are only required to submit annual reports on their activities to the MOJ. Unregistered groups do not possess legal status and may not own property, conduct financial transactions, or receive tax-free donations. They may not perform religious activities in hospitals, prisons, and military units, and generally may not hold worship services in public places without special permission. The law stipulates fines if an unregistered group carries out any of these activities.

The law stipulates that, in order to register as a congregation, a religious group must have at least 20 members over the age of 18. Individuals with temporary residency status, such as asylum seekers and foreign diplomatic staff, may count as members for the purpose of registration only during the authorized period of their residency permits. To apply, religious groups must submit statutes stipulating their aims and tasks; a list of all group members (full name, identification number, and signature); minutes of the meeting founding the group; confirmation that members voted on and approved the statutes; a list of members of the audit committee (full name, identification number, and title), which is responsible for preparing financial reports on the group and ensuring it adheres to its statutes; and the names of the persons who will represent the religious organization. The MOJ determines whether to register a religious group as a congregation. The ministry may deny an application if it deems registration would threaten human rights, the democratic structure of the state, or public safety, welfare, or morals. Groups denied registration may appeal the decision in court.

10 or more congregations – totaling at least 200 members – of the same faith or denomination, each with permanent registration status, may form a religious association or church. Groups with religious association status, or status as a private society or foundation, may establish theological schools or monasteries. The law does not permit simultaneous registration of more than one religious association of a single faith or denomination, or of more than one religious group with the same or similar name. For example, the law prevents any association other than the Latvian Orthodox Church from registering with the word “orthodox” in its name. Independent Orthodox groups, such as Old Believers, are registered as separate religious associations.

The law requires religious groups registered for fewer than 10 years to reregister every year. Reregistration requires an MOJ evaluation of the group’s activities in the previous year and submission of the same documentation as first-time registrants.

According to the law, all registered religious organizations are required to submit an annual report to the MOJ by March 1 regarding their activities and goals. They must additionally provide other data, including congregation size, the number of clergy, the number of weddings and other ceremonies performed, and details of group governance and financial status.

The law criminalizes hate speech and the incitement of hatred on the basis of religious affiliation, but requires legal proof, determined at trial, of substantial harm. Penalties range from community service to up to 10 years of imprisonment. Committing a crime for religious reasons may also be considered an aggravating factor at trial.

The government provides funding for religion and ethics classes in public schools. The school must receive the approval of the parents of at least 10 students in order to hold religion classes; if such approval is not obtained, students take courses on general ethics. The Center for Educational Content at the Ministry of Education must review the content of the classes to verify they do not violate freedom of conscience. First- to third-grade public school students must take either a class on religious beliefs or an ethics class; for older students, religious subjects are incorporated into elective ethics and social science classes. If there is a demand, schools are permitted to teach classes on the history of religion. Students at state-supported national minority schools may attend classes on a voluntary basis on the religion “characteristic of the national minority.” Other religious groups without their own state-supported minority schools may provide religious education only in private schools. Religion courses in public schools range from doctrinal instruction by church-approved government-certified instructors (usually at the lower grades), to nondenominational Christian teachings or overviews of major world religions by certified teachers suggested by a religious group and approved by the Ministry of Education (usually at higher grades).

The law establishes an independent ombudsman’s office for human rights. Its mandate includes helping to resolve cases of religious discrimination through collaboration with authorities. While it does not have enforcement powers, it can issue recommendations to specific authorities.

The law permits halal and kosher slaughter.

The law stipulates foreign missionaries may be issued a residency permit, hold meetings, and proselytize only if invited by registered a domestic religious group to conduct such activities. Visa regulations require foreign religious workers to present letters of invitation, typically from a religious organization, and either an ordination certificate or evidence of religious education that corresponds to a local bachelor’s degree in theology.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Eight religious groups applied to register for the first time during the year and the government approved all eight applications. In October the Riga District Administrative Court ruled against an appeal by The Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster (Pastafarians) of the government’s 2015 denial of its registration application. The court ruled that the Church’s teachings and ideas were based on disdain and ridicule of other religious beliefs, which could be perceived as offensive. The MOJ approved all registration renewals.

On February 25, parliament voted to return to the Jewish community five communal properties confiscated during WW II. The Council of Jewish Communities, an umbrella organization representing the majority of Jews, established a foundation to receive the properties and determine how to use the properties for the benefit of community members. The Council stated it regarded this legislation as a first step toward addressing the restitution of remaining Jewish communal property and cited approximately 270 unresolved claims for communal property confiscated during the Soviet era. Government ministries stated the number was significantly lower. Members of parliament (MPs) who worked on the bills to return the five Jewish properties told the media additional restitution legislation was unlikely during the current session of parliament. The Jewish community and the government continued discussions to negotiate a resolution of unresolved claims. These claims remained unresolved because there had been no formal body to file Jewish communal claims until the establishment of the Council of Jewish Communities in 2003, after the window for filing restitution claims had closed. There were no reports of outstanding property restitution claims by other religious groups.

Beginning in February the Riga City Construction Board delayed the opening of a new prayer center for the Islamic Cultural Centre in Latvia (ICCL) due to what it said was a failure to meet fire and safety requirements. The leader of the ICCL stated the delays were unwarranted and constituted discrimination. The prayer center had not yet opened at year’s end.

The leader of the ICCL, Janis Hamza Lucins, said police continued to monitor its members’ activities, but he did not view this as discrimination or a violation of their rights. According to the Security Police report for 2015, a threat assessment published in May, police continued to monitor the ICCL after its former leader traveled to Syria or Iraq to join ISIS in 2015.

The 2015 Security Police Report continued to cite concerns about the potential radicalization of the country’s Muslims as a result of ties between the ICCL and organizations in Persian Gulf countries. As in previous years, the report stated the threat of terrorism within the country remained low but cited a slight increase in the number of people who left the country to fight for ISIS.

In October Riga District Court found a man guilty of hate speech against Muslims and sentenced him to 140 hours of community service. In 2015, the defendant posted a comment to an online news article about a Muslim Latvian woman who wore a niqab, stating “I would burn people like this who spit on their nationality like witches during the inquisition.”

Speaking to a Russian language radio station, a senior lawmaker from the governing political coalition stated Jews “mostly of a very smart ethnicity with lawyers [among them]” were skillful in operating “on the edge” of the law to avoid being charged with violating the criminal code related to challenging the country’s independence. The lawmaker apologized for the remarks and a subsequent parliamentary ethics committee investigation found he had not breached the code of ethics.

The Ecclesiastical Council, composed of members of the eight “traditional” religious groups, met once to discuss government financing for reconstruction of historical buildings and the establishment of a university faculty of Catholic theology in the 2017 budget.

Government officials, including President Vejonis, Prime Minister Maris Kucinskis, and Parliamentary Speaker Inara Murniece, Jewish community representatives, and others attended the annual July 4 Holocaust commemoration ceremony in Riga, held at the former location of the Choral Synagogue, to mark the 75th anniversary of its destruction by the Nazis, who burned it down with approximately 20 people trapped inside in 1941. In his speech, President Vejonis reminded the public that the Holocaust was a tragedy for both Jews and Latvians, and called for the eradication of anti-Semitism and xenophobia.

President Vejonis and other senior government officials regularly met with Jewish groups to discuss Holocaust issues, property restitution, and cooperation efforts between the government and the Jewish community.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

On March 16, an annual march took place commemorating Latvians who fought in the Grenadier Divisions of the Waffen SS against the Soviet Red Army in World War II. Approximately 800 people, including veterans and their families, several MPs, and members of the All for Latvia Party, attended the march. In addition, approximately a dozen activists, whom organizers considered to be ultranationalist and had requested not to participate in the event, laid flowers at the Freedom Monument at the end of the ceremony. Observers stated that, despite the presence of these activists and a small counterprotest (approximately 30 counterdemonstrators) organized by local Kremlin-backed Russian activists and a German anti-fascist group, according to security police, the procession was peaceful. The Cabinet of Ministers agreed that none of its members would participate in the event. Organizers characterized the annual march as a commemoration of Latvian national identity and remembrance of those who fought for independence, rather than as a glorification of Nazism. Efraim Zuroff, head of the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s office in Jerusalem, commented after observing the march that people who fought for Nazi Germany should not be honored, citing the role of the Waffen SS in some of the worst atrocities of the Nazi regime.

The ombudsman and the MOJ stated they did not receive any requests to investigate anti-Semitic or anti-Muslim incidents during the year. Jewish community leaders stated there were instances of anti-Semitic hate speech on the internet, mostly in the form of posts on social media and comments on news articles, although none were reported to police.

The Muslim community reported incidents of hate speech on the internet, mostly in the form of posts on social media and comments on news articles. In September ICCL head Lucins said “Islamophobia” existed, but it stemmed primarily from a more general anti-immigrant sentiment, and that the community, which consisted primarily of Latvian converts to Islam, did not encounter problems with discrimination.

According to a 2014 survey from the Marketing and Public Opinion Research Centre SKDS, 53 percent of Latvians held negative attitudes towards members of the Muslim community.

A representative of the ICCL told journalists that a “sense of alienation” could be a reason some Latvian Muslims had left for Syria to join ISIS. According to the security police, fewer than 10 Latvians had traveled to Syria to join ISIS. Worshippers at the Riga Mosque told the media that radicalization was strongly discouraged.

U.S. embassy officers engaged in regular discussions with government officials, primarily at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Education, and with members of parliament, on the importance of restoring expropriated property to the Jewish community, religious tolerance, and Holocaust education.

The embassy met with leaders of the Catholic and Orthodox churches, the Jewish community, the Mormon community, and NGOs, including the Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Safe House, to discuss the role they could play in advancing religious tolerance.

The embassy funded a history teacher’s trip to the United States for a teacher training program to foster Holocaust education. The embassy also funded a Holocaust education program, the traveling exhibition “No Child’s Play,” and the Zanis Lipke Museum’s exhibition on a Latvian family that saved Jews from the Nazis during World War II. In January to commemorate International Holocaust Remembrance Day, the embassy screened the award-winning Holocaust remembrance documentary Paper Clips in three different cities across the country, and engaged with high school students on the country’s own Holocaust history.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 6.2 million (July 2016 estimate). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other organizations estimate the total population includes approximately 4.5 million citizens and approximately 1.4 million refugees fleeing the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, as well as a Palestinian refugee population present in Lebanon for nearly 60 years. Although the government has not conducted an official census since 1932, Statistics Lebanon, an independent firm, estimates 57.6 percent of the citizen population is Muslim, 28.52 percent Sunni and 28.34 percent Shia (“Twelvers”) plus smaller percentages of Alawites and Ismailis (“Sevener” Shia).

Statistics Lebanon estimates 36.8 percent of the population is Christian. The Maronite community, the largest Christian group, maintains its centuries-long affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church but has its own patriarch, liturgy, and ecclesiastical customs. The second-largest Christian group is Greek Orthodox. Other Christian groups include Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox (Gregorians), Armenian Catholics, Syriac Orthodox (Jacobites), Syriac Catholics, Assyrians (Nestorians), Chaldeans, Copts, evangelical Protestants (including Baptists and Seventh-day Adventists), Latins (Roman Catholics), and members of The Church of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).

According to Statistics Lebanon, 5.6 percent of the population is Druze, who refer to themselves as al-Muwahhideen, or “believers in one God,” and are concentrated in the rural, mountainous areas east and south of Beirut. There are small numbers of Jews, Bahais, Buddhists, and Hindus.

There are approximately one million registered refugees from Syria, of whom approximately 30,000 are Palestinian refugees from Syria. Refugees from Syria are largely Sunni, but include Shia and Christians as well. There are between 250,000 and 300,000 Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank still living in the country as refugees from previous conflicts in the region, living in formal refugee camps dating back to 1948. The Palestinian refugee population is largely Sunni.

Refugees and migrants also include largely Sunni Kurds; Sunni and Shia Muslims and Chaldeans from Iraq; as well as Coptic Christians from Egypt and Sudan. According to the secretary-general of the Syriac League, approximately 10,000 Iraqi Christians of all denominations and 3,000 to 4,000 Coptic Christians reside in the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution states there shall be “absolute freedom of conscience,” and declares the state will respect all religious groups and denominations as well as the personal status and religious interests of persons of every religious group. The constitution guarantees free exercise of religious rites provided public order is not disturbed and declares the equality of rights and duties for all citizens without discrimination or preference.

By law, an individual is free to convert to a different religion if the change is approved by a local senior official of the religious group the person wishes to join. The law does not address the freedom to proselytize.

The penal code stipulates a maximum prison term of one year for anyone convicted of “blaspheming God publicly.” It does not provide a definition of what this entails.

By law, religious groups may apply to the government for official recognition. A religious group seeking official recognition must submit a statement of its doctrine and moral principles to the cabinet, which evaluates whether the group’s principles are in accord with the government’s perception of popular values and the constitution. Alternatively, an unrecognized religious group may apply for recognition by applying to a recognized religious group. In doing so, the unrecognized group does not gain recognition as a separate group, but becomes an affiliate of the group through which it applies. This process has the same requirements as applying for recognition directly with the government.

There are 18 officially recognized religious groups. These include four Muslim groups (Shia, Sunni, Alawites and Ismaili), 12 Christian groups (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and 10 smaller groups), Druze, and Jews. Groups the government does not recognize include Bahais, Buddhists, Hindus, and several Protestant groups.

Official recognition of a religious group allows baptisms and marriages performed by the group to receive government sanction. Official recognition also conveys other benefits, such as tax-exempt status and the right to apply the religious group’s codes to personal status matters. By law, the government permits recognized religious groups to administer their own rules on family and personal status issues such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Shia, Sunni, recognized Christian, and Druze groups have state-appointed, government-subsidized clerical courts to administer family and personal status law.

Religious groups perform all marriages and divorces; there are no formalized procedures for civil marriage or divorce. The government recognizes civil marriage ceremonies performed outside the country irrespective of the religious affiliation of each partner in the marriage.

Nonrecognized religious groups may own property and may assemble for worship and perform their religious rites freely. They may not perform legally recognized marriage or divorce proceedings and they have no standing to determine inheritance issues. Members of these groups do not qualify for certain government positions, including ministerial, parliamentary, secretary general, and director general positions.

The law allows censorship of religious publications under a number of conditions, including if the material is deemed by the government to incite sectarian discord or to be a threat to national security.

According to the constitution, recognized religious communities may have their own schools provided they follow the general rules issued for public schools, which stipulate schools should not incite sectarian discord or be deemed a threat to national security.

The constitution states “sectarian groups” shall be represented in a “just and equitable balance” in the cabinet and high-level civil service positions, which includes the ministry ranks of secretary general and director general. It also states these posts shall be distributed proportionately among the recognized religious groups. This distribution of positions among religious groups also applies to the civil service, the judiciary, military and security institutions, and public agencies at both the national and local levels of government. The parliament is elected on the basis of “equality between Christians and Muslims.”

The constitution also states there is no legitimacy for any authorities which contradict the “pact of communal existence,” thereby giving force of law to the unwritten 1943 National Pact, although that document is not an official component of the constitution nor a formally binding agreement. The pact states the president shall be a Maronite Christian, the speaker of parliament shall be a Shia Muslim, and the prime minister shall be a Sunni Muslim.

The Taef Agreement, which ended the country’s 15-year civil war in 1989, also mandates equal Muslim and Christian representation in parliament, but makes changes in the powers of the Maronite Christian presidency, including by making the designation of the prime minister and other cabinet ministers subject to consultations with the parliament. In addition, the agreement endorses the constitutional provision of appointing most senior government officials according to religious affiliation, including senior positions within the military and security forces. The Taef Agreement mandates a cabinet with seats allocated equally between Muslims and Christians. The Taef Agreement’s stipulations on equality of representation between members of different confessions do not apply to citizens who do not list a religious affiliation on their national registration and may not hold a seat designated for a specific confession.

By law, the synod of each Christian group elects its patriarchs; the Sunni and Shia electoral bodies elect their respective senior clerical posts; and the Druze community elects its sheikh al-aql. The government council of ministers must endorse the nomination of Sunni and Shia muftis, as well as the Druze sheikh al-aql, and pay their salaries. The government also appoints and pays the salaries of Muslim and Druze clerical judges. By law, the government does not endorse Christian patriarchs and does not pay the salaries of clergy and officials of Christian groups, including the Maronites, Greek Orthodox, and Roman Catholics.

Citizens have the right to remove the customary notation of their religion from their identity cards and official registry documents or change how it is listed. Changing the document does not require the approval of a religious official from the religion from which the individual is converting, nor does changing the document require the approval of a religious official from the religion to which the individual is converting (although the act of conversion does require such permission). The government does not require religious affiliation on passports.

The government issues religious workers a one-month visa; in order to stay longer a worker must complete a residency application during the month. A religious worker also must sign a “commitment of responsibility” form before receiving a visa, which subjects the worker to legal prosecution and immediate deportation for any activity involving religious or other criticism directed against the state or any other country except Israel. If the government finds an individual engaging in religious activity while on a tourist visa, the government may determine a violation of the visa status has occurred and deport the individual.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

There continued to be no judicial action on the lawsuit filed in 2015 by Member of Parliament Ziad Aswad of the Free Patriotic Movement against “You Stink” activist Assad Thebian for “defamation and contempt of religion” for comments he had made about Christianity. There were no reports of government prosecutions for blasphemy during the year.

The government requirement continued for evangelical Protestant churches to register with the Evangelical Synod, a self-governing advisory group overseeing religious matters for Protestant congregations, and representing those churches with the government.

Some members of unregistered religious groups said they continued to choose to list themselves as belonging to recognized religious groups in government records in order to confirm their marriage and other personal status documents remained legally valid. Other individuals continued the practice of crossing out the religion listed on their identity cards to express their desire for a secular state.

The government refusal to approve a request from the Jewish community to change its official name to the Jewish Community Council from the Israeli Communal Council remained in place.

Minority non-Maronite Christian groups continued to state the government had made little progress towards the goal called for in the Taef Agreement to eliminate political sectarianism in favor of “expertise and competence.” Members of these groups stated continued government discrimination against them manifested itself in a lack of representation in the cabinet. They also continued to assert their allocation of seats in the parliament remained disproportionately low, with only one seat out of the 64 seats allocated to all Christian groups. The Syriac League, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), called for more representation for minority Christians in parliament and high-level civil service positions.

Some Maronite Christian politicians stated Maronites were marginalized despite filling their designated government seats. They said the current allotment of power did not reflect the intent of the National Pact, even though Christians occupied their constitutionally allotted seats. Many called for a new electoral law with the aim of having predominantly Christian areas voting for Christian allotted seats. Observers ascribed this proposal to political infighting, saying it was a means of favoring specific Christian political parties at the expense of others, who might have benefited from votes potentially cast by Muslim members of the electorate. In their monthly meeting in February Maronite bishops expressed concern over what they said was discrimination against Christians in terms of access to public offices and state financial resources.

At year’s end, at least 30 cases of civil marriage continued to await registration with the Ministry of Interior after an unofficial halt in registration by the ministry in 2013.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

On June 27, eight suicide bombers attacked the predominantly Christian village of Qaa near the Syrian border, killing five and wounding at least 28 others. The media quoted security officials and other experts as believing ISIS was responsible for the attacks, although there was no official claim of responsibility by any group.

Nine government security personnel remained in the hands of the al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaida affiliate, despite a prisoner exchange between the government and al-Nusra in December 2015 involving the release of some of the prisoners.

Hizballah continued to exercise authority over large areas of territory. There continued to be reports of Hizballah controlling access to the neighborhoods under its authority. For example, there were reports of Hizballah checkpoints controlling access to the Dahiyah, a southern suburb of Beirut.

In September Hizballah announced a boycott of the Hajj and threatened to expel any party members who traveled to Mecca.

Leaders of Sunni, Shia, and Christian groups continued to condemn extremism and violence perpetrated in the name of religion following terrorist attacks in countries in the region by both ISIS and al-Nusra.

Religious leaders continued to report the operation of places of worship of every religious group in relative peace and security. They stated relationships among individual members of different religious groups remained amicable. In statements made throughout the year, the Maronite patriarch and the Sunni grand mufti both praised the country as a model of coexistence between religious groups.

Christian and Muslim religious leaders from the major denominations continued to meet regularly at conferences hosted by the National Committee for Muslim-Christian Dialogue and similar events to discuss issues of common concern and to try to alleviate potential conflicts between religious groups. On September 20, following a call by Pope Francis for a world prayer ceremony, representatives of the country’s religious communities gathered for an interfaith prayer for peace at the Virgin Mary’s shrine in Harissa.

The Jewish Community Council reported continued acts of vandalism against the Jewish cemetery in Beirut during the year. Construction rubble and trash were also thrown into the cemetery. The council complained to the security forces but stated they took no action. Three individuals built rooms, shops, a parking lot, and a gas station on the land of the Jewish cemetery in Tripoli. The Jewish Community Council filed a lawsuit against the individuals, but prosecuting authorities reportedly had taken no action by year’s end.

The Ambassador and embassy officers continued to engage government officials on the importance of ending sectarian violence and the need to encourage tolerance, dialogue, and mutual respect among religious groups.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers met with individual politicians representing different religious groups to discuss the views of their constituents and to promote religious tolerance. The Ambassador met with the leadership of the Sunni, Shia, Druze, and many Christian communities to promote interfaith dialogue and to urge them to take steps to counter violent extremism. Embassy officers met with civil society representatives to convey a similar message. The Ambassador and embassy officers continued to work with local religious and community leaders to support their efforts to reduce sectarian tensions spilling over from the violence in Syria.

Embassy public outreach programs continued to emphasize tolerance for all religious faiths. The embassy renewed funding for a local NGO’s program focusing on religious pluralism and operating in 36 public and private high schools throughout the country. The embassy also continued its program of bringing women from different regions and religious groups together for religious dialogue and celebrations. The embassy again selected five students to participate in an annual summer exchange program in the United States focused on religious pluralism and interfaith dialogue. The embassy also sponsored a workshop and other programs on countering violent extremism related to religion for local government officials and civil society actors.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.0 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the Christian Council of Lesotho, approximately 90 percent of the population is Christian, including Roman Catholics, Anglicans, evangelical Christians, Methodists, members of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, and Pentecostals. The remaining 10 percent is Muslim, Hindu, Bahai, belongs to indigenous or other religious groups, or is atheist. Many Christians practice traditional indigenous rituals in conjunction with Christianity. There is a small number of Jews, most of whom are not citizens. Muslims live primarily in the northern area of the country. There is no significant correlation between religious affiliation and ethnicity.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and provides for freedom of conscience, thought, and religion, including the freedom to change religion or belief and to manifest and propagate one’s religion. These rights may be limited by laws in the interests of defense, public safety, order, morality, or protecting the rights of other persons, provided the limitations are the minimum necessary.

The government has no established requirements for recognition of religious groups. By law any group, religious or otherwise, may register as a legal entity with the government, regardless of its purpose, as long as it has a constitution and a leadership committee. Most religious groups register, but there is no penalty for those that do not. The benefits of registration are administrative. It gives a group legal standing and formalizes its structure under the law. In the absence of registration, religious organizations may operate freely and tend to business as they see fit, but without any of the legal standing or protections of registered organizations.

The education ministry pays and certifies all teachers at government funded schools, including religious schools, and requires a standard curriculum for both secular and religious schools. The government does not mandate religious education in schools, and the constitution exempts students at any educational institution from requirements to receive instruction or attend any ceremony or observance associated with a religion not their own. All curricula, including for religious education classes, must be approved by the minister of education.

The country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Churches owned and operated approximately 80 percent of all primary and secondary schools. The Roman Catholic Church, the Lesotho Evangelical Church, the Anglican Church, and, to a lesser extent, the Methodist Church were the primary operators of religious schools, which were publicly funded. In practice, in any school offering religious education – including all religious schools and some secular schools – the subject was mandatory. Children continued to be permitted to attend schools run by a religious group other than their own, and some families chose this option. Others went to public schools or secular private schools.

The Christian Council of Lesotho continued to be regularly invited to open government ceremonies and meetings. On September 15, the government held its annual national independence prayer service in honor of Lesotho’s 50th year of independence. For the first time, the government included Muslim leaders at the event.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The U.S. embassy discussed religious freedom with the government, typically in the context of broader discussions about human rights. The embassy also maintained regular contact with religious leaders, including with representatives of the Christian Council of Lesotho, an umbrella organization of five Christian churches.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.3 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2008 National Population and Housing Census, the population is 85.6 percent Christian, 12.2 percent Muslim, 0.6 percent adherents of indigenous religious beliefs, 1.4 percent persons who claim no religion, and less than 1 percent members of other religious groups, including Bahais, Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists. The Muslim percentage of the population is a source of contention, as unofficial reports and surveys estimate Muslims constitute up to 20 percent of the population. Many members of religious groups incorporate elements of indigenous beliefs into their religious practices. Christian groups include United Methodists, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Baptists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and members of the African Methodist Episcopal (AME), AME Zion, and a variety of Pentecostal churches.

Christians reside throughout the country. Muslims belonging to the Mandingo and Fula ethnic groups reside throughout the country, while Muslims of the Vai ethnic group live predominantly in the west. Traditional practitioners include the secret Sande and Poro societies, seen both as religious and cultural practitioners and highly influential in the northern, western, and central regions of the country. Other secret cultural or religious societies exist in the southeastern counties, including the Kui Society and Bodio priests.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the separation of religion and state, and stipulates all persons are entitled to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. It states no one shall be hindered in the exercise of these rights except as required by law to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights of others. It also provides for equal protection under the law and prohibits political parties that exclude citizens from membership on the basis of religious affiliation.

The government encourages all religious groups, except for indigenous ones who generally operate under customary law, to register their articles of incorporation and their organizations’ statements of purpose. Local religious organizations register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and pay a one-time fee of approximately 5,000 Liberian dollars ($55) to file their articles of incorporation, and an annual fee of 3,500 Liberian dollars ($38) for registration and to receive a registration certificate. Foreign religious organizations are charged $400 (36,400 Liberian dollars) for registration annually, and a one-time fee of $500 (45,500 Liberian dollars) to file their articles of incorporation. Religious organizations also pay 1,000 to 2,000 Liberian dollars ($11 to $22) to the Liberia Revenue Authority for notary services for articles of incorporation to be filed with the MFA and an additional 1,000 Liberian dollars ($11) to receive a registered copy of the articles. An accreditation of the articles of incorporation is awarded at the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.

Registered religious organizations, including missionary programs, religious charities, and religious groups, receive tax exemption and duty-free privileges benefits not afforded unregistered groups. Registered groups may also appear in court as a single entity.

The law requires high-level government officials to take an oath ending with the phrase, “So help me God,” when assuming office. Christians kiss the Bible and Muslims the Quran on those occasions.

Public schools offer nonsectarian religious and moral education as an elective in all grades.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Some religious groups continued to pursue a constitutional amendment declaring the country a “Christian nation,” an effort that developed in 2015 at the Constitutional Review Conference where a majority of delegates endorsed the proposition, known as Proposition 24. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, along with Catholic, Episcopal, Baptist, Lutheran, and Muslim communities, all opposed the initiative, while some evangelical Christian pastors and members of the national legislature supported it.

In March the National Muslim Council of Liberia (NMCL) briefly suspended its membership within the Inter-Religious Council of Liberia (IRCL), a council established to assist post-war Liberia engender religious tolerance. According to the NMCL, the suspension was in response to a campaign by the Liberia Council of Churches (LCC) to pass Proposition 24, which the NMCL said would prejudice other religious groups. The LCC had not publicly voiced opposition to the constitutional amendment until May when it officially rejected Proposition 24. This action reduced tensions, according to Muslim leaders, and subsequently the NMCL restored its membership in the IRCL. The LCC rejection of Proposition 24 splintered the group, and one part launched the National Christian Council of Liberia (NCCL) in July. The NCCL continued to advocate for a countrywide vote on Proposition 24 and for its passage. The NMCL stated the events surrounding Proposition 24 ignited an unfortunate stalemate between Muslim and Christian leaders and threatened to endanger the IRCL. While thus far blocked by the president, the vote on the constitutional amendment remained pending at year end.

In January local media reported that a group of Muslim youths protested the demolition of a mosque in Ganta, Nimba County. The mosque, according to news sources, was among buildings demolished by local authorities to enable road reconstruction, but some members of the Muslim community stated county authorities targeted Muslims and did not consult them before destroying the mosque. The government deployed national police to the site of the protest, which ended peacefully. The National Council of Imams stated it was aware of the incident, but did not consider it serious enough to warrant follow-up actions or discussions.

In July Sheikh Abubakar Sumaworo, Mufti of the NMCL, called on members of the legislature, diplomatic missions, and international partners to pressure the government to declare Eid al-Fitr a national holiday. The request to make Eid al-Fitr a national holiday has been pending since 1995. In August Senator Prince Johnson submitted a bill to the legislature that would have made Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha national holidays. Johnson said the bill would enhance harmony among tribal and religious groups, including Muslims. In September Representative Edwin Snowe submitted a similar bill, proposing to make Eid al-Adha a national holiday, which remained pending at year end.

In response to the Ebola epidemic in 2015, the government continued to discourage traditional and religious burial rites that could potentially increase the number of infections.

The government, through city ordinances and presidential proclamations, required businesses and markets, including Muslim-owned or -operated businesses and shops, to remain closed on Sundays for municipal street cleaning and on Christmas in accordance with the law. Muslim-owned businesses stated they viewed the regular Sunday municipal street cleaning as an excuse for the government to force their businesses to close to honor the Christian Sabbath. According to both the National Imam Council of Liberia (NICL) and the NMCL, the ordinances and proclamations were a violation of the constitution and a threat to the peace. The NMCL reported that it brought action in court seeking redress for the forced closures. Since penalties – consisting of fines of up to 200 Liberian dollars ($2.27) – were not strictly enforced, some Muslim-owned or -operated shops opened for limited hours on Sundays. Both NICL and NMCL said they would not have a problem with the closing of Muslim-owned businesses on Christmas if the end of Ramadan was also observed as a national holiday.

Government ceremonies commonly included opening and closing prayers. The prayers were usually Christian but occasionally were both Christian and Muslim. In Lofa County, where a large number of Muslims reside, opening and closing prayers were alternately Christian and Muslim.

The government subsidized private schools, most of which were affiliated with either Christian or Muslim organizations, and subsidies were provided proportionally, based on the number of students.

In a December 2015 report UNICEF expressed concern over “prayer camps” in the country. Children were reportedly given to a local preacher after their parents were told the children had been inducted into witchcraft, were possessed, and that their ailments/problems could be solved through prayer. According to UNICEF and the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Protection (MGCSP), those inside the prayer camps were not allowed to leave until they paid an undisclosed fee to the preacher. The MGCSP and UNICEF worked to reunite more than 300 children with their parents and guardians in River Gee County. Under MGCSP regulations, “institutions” for children cannot be responsible for more than 28 children. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, however, which has jurisdiction over all traditional religious groups, gave the prayer camp in question a certificate to operate and did not intervene in the case.

UNICEF also stated concern for the increasing number of cases of children being accused of witchcraft and/or demonic possession. The UN labeled certain religious practices harmful, including trial by ordeal, cleansing or exorcism rituals, and forced initiation into secret societies through kidnapping.

Sporadic, localized quarrels between religious and traditional groups occurred in remote parts of the country, but because religion and ethnicity were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity. Religious and tribal leaders mediated such incidents and regularly had the support of the National Police.

According to the IRCL, in Lofa County Christians of the Lorma ethnic group predominantly patronized Christian-owned businesses, while local Muslims predominantly patronized Muslim-owned businesses.

According to St. John York, the consultant for Global Inter-faith relations building at the IRCL and former Secretary General of the IRCL, religious tensions were not always localized, and there was a tendency within the IRCL for Christians and Muslims to form opposing blocs on major issues of conflict, despite the organization’s stated purpose of increasing religious dialogue in support of conflict resolution.

Some employers excused Muslims from employment or classes to attend Friday prayers, although there was no legal requirement to do so.

In response to the campaign to declare the country a “Christian nation,” the U.S. Ambassador and embassy staff engaged with government officials, including officials from the Ministry of Justice’s human rights division, members of the legislature, and others to stress the U.S. government’s support of religious freedom and tolerance. The embassy also met with a variety of civil society and religious figures.

During Ramadan the Ambassador delivered greetings from President Obama on an Islamic radio station that underscored the U.S. commitment to religious freedom and tolerance. The Ambassador met with NCCL representatives to discuss Proposition 24. The Ambassador emphasized the separation of state and religion in both the U.S. and Liberian constitutions. Embassy officials also met with Christian and Muslim religious leaders to discuss tolerance and the importance of religion bringing communities together.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 6.5 million (July 2016 estimate). Sunni Muslims represent 97 percent and the remaining 3 percent includes Christians, Hindus, Bahais, Ahmadi Muslims, Buddhists, and Jews. Many members of the Amazigh ethnic minority are Ibadi Muslims; nearly all other non-Sunni Muslims are foreign residents.

Small Christian communities consist almost exclusively of sub-Saharan African and Egyptian migrants and a small number of U.S. and European foreign residents. The last recorded estimates indicated there are 50,000 Coptic Christians, most of whom are Egyptian foreign residents. According to media reports, the number of Christians has decreased since the outbreak of armed conflict in 2014. Small numbers of Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Greek and Russian Orthodox, and nondenominational Christians, many of whom are foreign workers, remain in the country. Since the evacuation of western diplomatic missions from Tripoli in July 2014, no reliable surveys have been conducted on the number of foreign workers remaining in the country.

There are no reliable estimates of the small Jewish population.

Legal Framework

The constitutional declaration of 2011 functions as the interim constitution. It states Islam is the state religion and sharia is the principal source of legislation, but accords non-Muslims the freedom to practice their religion. The interim constitution also states “there shall be no discrimination among Libyans on the basis of religion or sect” with regard to legal, political, and civil rights. The GNA remains bound by the constitutional declaration until a new constitution is drafted and passed by the HoR and a public referendum is held. The laws governing religious practice predate the internal conflict and provide a national legal framework with regard to religious freedom.

There is no law providing for individuals’ right to choose or change their religion or to study, discuss, or promulgate their religious beliefs, nor is there a law prohibiting conversion from Islam to another religion or prohibiting proselytizing. The law prohibits “instigating division” and insulting Islam or the Prophet Muhammad, charges that carry a maximum sentence of death.

The Ministry for Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MEIA) administers mosques, supervises clerics, and has primary responsibility for ensuring all religious practices within the country conform to state-approved Islamic norms. According to the law, the grand mufti, appointed by the parliament, is the leading religious authority in the country, and Dar al-Ifta is the government office that issues fatwas the grand mufti deems appropriate. In November 2014, the HoR voted to dismiss Grand Mufti Sadiq Al-Ghiryani, dissolve Dar al-Ifta, and transfer its authorities to the MEIA.

Religious instruction in Islam is required in public and private schools. Attendance at religious instruction is mandatory for all students; students cannot opt out.

Sharia governs family matters for Muslims, including inheritance, divorce, and the right to own property. Under sharia, a non-Muslim woman who marries a Muslim man is not required to convert to Islam; however, a non-Muslim man must convert to Islam to marry a Muslim woman. The MEIA administers non-Muslim family law issues, although there is no separate legal framework governing non-Muslim family law. The ministry draws upon neighboring countries’ family law precedents for non-Muslims.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported that courts in the area controlled by the GNA continued to sentence defendants to corporal punishment in accordance with its interpretation of sharia, including flogging for adultery and amputations for theft.

The GNA continued not to respond to reports of groups such as ISIS perpetrating attacks on individuals and religious sites, reportedly on the basis of religious belief. This was partly due to the GNA’s lack of capacity or lack of control over large areas of the country.

The GNA continued to fail to maintain law and order through the justice and security systems. Instead, a variety of groups – revolutionary brigades, tribal militias, and local strongmen – supported local security. The government reported it did not have much control over these groups, and its response to instances of violence against members of minority religious groups was limited to condemnations.

During the year, the LNA operated in the east outside the purview of the GNA, and intensified its military campaign against violent extremist organizations. LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar publicly declared his intention to rid the country of all “Islamists,” and made no distinction between groups that espoused violence as a tactic and those that did not. Neither the HoR nor GNA maintained effective civilian control over the LNA.

According to UNSMIL, the judiciary did not adequately function and citizens had little recourse for violations of religious freedom.

The role of Islam in policymaking remained a major point of contention among members of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly, the elected body in charge of drafting the new constitution. In the current draft constitution, sharia is defined as “the source of legislation”; however, there is a spectrum of dissenting opinions ranging from those calling for a secular constitution to those saying the draft is not “Islamic enough.”

The MEIA provided texts for Friday services to imams, often including political and social messages. The government permitted religious scholars to form organizations, to issue fatwas, and to provide advice to followers. The fatwas did not have legal weight. The GNA, however, did not have effective administrative control of mosques and supervision of clerics outside the limited areas under its control. Political opponents of the GNA stated that the GNA’s “bureaucracy” charged with overseeing religious affairs did not regulate imams and other officials who supported ISIS and other violent extremist organizations.

Former Grand Mufti Al-Ghiryani, who remained influential among Islamist groups, rejected the GNA, publicly opposing its seating in Tripoli in March. Al-Ghiryani said Libyans who supported the GNA would suffer “divine punishment.” Al-Ghiryani also rejected the LNA and called for “revolutionaries” to travel to Benghazi to fight Commander Haftar. The Association of Libyan Religious Scholars criticized Al-Ghiryani’s statements. In August anti-Ghiryani and anti-Muslim Brotherhood posters appeared on a wide scale in Tripoli, seemingly overnight according to media reports. The Muslim Brotherhood quickly sought to distance itself from Al-Ghiryani and his incitement of violence and civil conflict.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations such as Ansar al-Sharia and ISIS operated across large swathes of territory during the year. Ansar al-Sharia operated branches in Benghazi and Derna, and maintained cells in other parts of the country. ISIS effectively controlled Sirte until December when a GNA military operation pushed it out of the city and the GNA declared its liberation; it was reported to have a smaller presence in other areas of the country. While in control of Sirte, ISIS and other extremist groups engaged in forced conversions, killings, and a slave trade of Christian migrants from neighboring countries. In Tripoli, some militias imposed restrictions on women’s dress and movement, and punished men for behavior they deemed “un-Islamic.”

ISIS conducted targeted killings, kidnappings, and suicide bombings that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of citizens, according to media reports and human rights organizations. In August Reuters reported that ISIS had abducted more than 500 Christian migrants en route to Europe, and enslaved, raped, and sold or exchanged at least 63 of the women captured. Many of those abducted were subject to forced conversation to Islam. There were reports of public executions. On February 7, ISIS executed five men in Sirte after accusing them of “Salafism” and of membership in brigades that attacked ISIS in 2015. In April ISIS executed eight people in Sirte and Ben Jawad for being part of a Salafi group. On April 5, ISIS publicly beheaded another man in Sirte for Salafi affiliation.

ISIS was widely reported to have restricted residents’ freedom to worship in areas under its control, and reportedly publicly executed and flogged residents it accused of violating sharia. Restrictions included forcing women to wear veils, banning music and smoking, and closing all shops during prayer times.

The eastern city of Derna was controlled by the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna, an umbrella organization consisting of Salafist groups, including Ansar al-Sharia, opposed to ISIS. This group was widely reported to have restricted Derna’s Sunni Muslims’ freedom to worship. They reportedly publicly executed and flogged residents accused of violating sharia, for instance by drinking alcohol.

Multiple sources, including international media, reported a restrictive social environment, particularly in the capital. This included a continuation of government officials at airports throughout the country preventing women from traveling alone outside the country, although no law or government regulation restricts such travel. NGOs and the UN attributed that environment to conservative interpretations of sharia. NGOs with local staff reported women often had male relatives accompany them to the airport and carried written permission from them to enable them to leave the country.

Following the U.S. embassy evacuation from Tripoli and suspension of operations in July 2014, there were limited opportunities for high-level engagement on religious freedom with Libyan interlocutors. The U.S. government discussed religious freedom on a number of occasions with a variety of local and national leaders, particularly in the context of confronting extremist groups such as ISIS.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 38,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2010 census, religious group membership is as follows: 76 percent Roman Catholic, 6.5 percent Protestant Reformed, 5.4 percent Muslim, 1.3 percent Lutheran, 1.1 percent Christian Orthodox, 1.8 percent other religious groups, 5.4 percent no religious affiliation, and 2.5 percent unspecified.

The great majority of Muslims are Sunni, predominantly from Turkey, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Jewish community consists of approximately 30 individuals. Immigrants come mainly from Switzerland and Austria and predominantly belong to the same religious groups as native-born citizens.

Legal Framework

The constitution states all people shall have the freedom to choose their faith and the state shall be responsible for ‘‘protecting the religious…interests of the People.” The constitution specifies Roman Catholicism is the state religion which “shall enjoy full protection from the state.” The constitution stipulates other religions may practice their beliefs and hold religious services “within the bounds of morality and public order.”

There is no law requiring the registration of religious groups. Religious groups may organize themselves as private associations, which enables public registration in the commercial registry, and must do so to receive government funding for such activities as providing religious education in schools. To publicly register an association in the commercial registry, the association must submit an official letter of application to the Office of Justice, including the organization’s name, purpose, board members, and head office location as well as a memorandum of association based on local law, a trademark certification, and a copy of the organization’s statutes.

The law prohibits the slaughter of animals without anesthetization, making the ritual slaughter of animals for kosher and halal meat illegal. Importation of such meat is legal.

The criminal code prohibits any form of public incitement to hatred or discrimination against or disparagement of any religion or its adherents by spoken, written, visual, or electronic means. The criminal code also prohibits the denial, trivialization, and justification of genocide and other crimes against humanity by spoken, written, visual, or electronic means. Penalties may include a prison sentence of up to two years. The criminal code prohibits refusing service to a person or group of persons based on religious affiliation as well as membership in any association that aims to promote discrimination against a person or persons based on religious affiliation.

The law requires religious education be included in the curriculum in public schools, both at the primary and secondary levels. Catholic or Protestant religious education is compulsory in all primary schools; exemptions are available for children whose parents request them from the Office of Education. Parents are not required to give a reason for exemptions. Islamic education is not compulsory but offered in primary school and funded partly by the respective Muslim community, which provides the teachers, and partly from the government’s integration budget. The Catholic Church determines the Catholic curriculum, with minimal supervision from municipalities. Religious groups provide teachers who are partially supported by the government.

At the secondary school level, parents and students may choose between a course on Catholic religious education, which the government finances and the Catholic religious community organizes, and a general course in religion and culture taught from a sociological perspective.

To receive residency permits, foreign religious workers must have completed theological studies, belong to a nationally known religious group, and be sponsored by a resident clergy member of the religious group.

The country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Funding for religious institutions continued to derive mainly from the municipalities, according to parliamentary or municipal decisions. The government provided Catholic and Protestant churches annual contributions in proportion to membership; smaller religious groups were eligible to apply only for grants for projects, such as language courses aimed at facilitating the societal integration of foreigners. The government spent 82,000 Swiss francs ($80,470) on integration projects in 2015, the last year for which data were available. Within these projects, Islamic education in primary schools received 22,800 Swiss francs ($22,370) in funding. All religious groups were exempt from certain taxes, but not from fees.

Liechtenstein’s state prosecutor said police suspended a criminal investigation for lack of evidence in a case of reported Holocaust denial and pro-Nazi rhetoric by a Liechtenstein member of European Action during a presentation in the Swiss canton of St. Gallen in 2015.

The government’s Immigration and Passport Office did not issue visas for religious workers, granting them residency permits, valid for five years, instead. The government continued to grant one short-term residency permit each year during Ramadan to an imam of either the Turkish Association or the Islamic Community of Liechtenstein, who agreed not to allow or preach sermons that incited violence or advocated intolerance. An imam from the Turkish Association received the short-term permit for 2016. Clergy from other religious groups were required to abide by the same rules and regulations.

Municipalities owned cemeteries and continued to allow all religious groups, including Muslims, to bury their dead in them.

According to the foreign ministry, the country’s integration commission continued to function as the main body responsible for the integration of Muslims due to the inability of the two main representative bodies of the Muslim community, the Islamic Community and the Turkish Association, to reach an agreement on the founding of an Islamic umbrella organization. The Islamic Community and Turkish Association each continued to maintain regular contact with the government.

On January 27, Foreign Minister Aurelia Frick held a service together with the Liechtenstein Friends of Yad Vashem to remember the victims of the Holocaust, during which she stressed the importance of civil courage in fighting racism and anti-Semitism. Approximately 100 people attended the service, including school students and the head of parliament.

Nine public primary schools offered Islamic education twice each month, with a total of 68 students between the ages of six and 12 attending classes.

Schools continued to include Holocaust education as part of their curriculum and held discussion forums on the Holocaust to mark the Day of Remembrance on January 27. In March a primary school invited the honorary president of the Liechtenstein Friends of Yad Vashem to hold a photo exhibition on the Holocaust. In April the Liechtenstein Grammar School held the same photo exhibition as part of a special course on the Holocaust. In June members of Austria’s Ministry of Education met with the country’s education authority to exchange views on Holocaust education and remembrance.

Several churches continued to open their chapels to other denominations and faiths upon request, including to Orthodox and Islamic groups.

The European Action organization continued to advocate for freedom to question and deny the Holocaust on its Facebook page, voicing criticism of prosecutions against persons who deny the Holocaust.

There were no mosques in the country and one Islamic prayer room run by the Turkish Association. An additional prayer room run by the Islamic Community of Liechtenstein existed in the canton of St. Gallen in neighboring Switzerland.

U.S. embassy staff continued to discuss religious freedom issues, such as access to religious education by different religious groups, with the foreign ministry. Embassy staff also continued to discuss the effects of existing laws on religious practices, such as the prohibition of ritual animal slaughter, with civil society organizations, including Amnesty International, the Islamic Community of Liechtenstein, and the Liechtenstein Friends of Yad Vashem.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 2.9 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, of the 90 percent of population that responded to the question about religious affiliation, 86 percent is Roman Catholic and 7 percent does not identify with any religious group. Other religious groups combined, including Russian Orthodox, Old Believers, Lutherans, Reformed Evangelicals, Jews, Muslims, Greek Catholics, and Karaites, constitute less than 5 percent of the population. Karaites traditionally live in Trakai and in the greater Vilnius region. The Jewish population is predominately concentrated in larger cities and numbers 3,100 people. There is no precise estimate of the Muslim population, but the majority of Muslims are Tatars, a community which numbers approximately 2,800 people, and whose members live primarily in Vilnius and Kaunas. The Muslim community also includes recent converts, migrants, refugees, and temporary workers from the Middle East and Africa.

According to the 2011 census, less than 1 percent of the population belongs to religious groups the government designates as “nontraditional.” The most numerous are Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of the Full Gospel Word of Faith Movement, Pentecostals/Charismatics, Old Baltic faith communities, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, and members of the New Apostolic Church and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates there is no state religion and provides for the right of individuals to choose freely any religion or belief, to profess their religion and perform religious practices, individually or with others, in private or in public, and to practice and teach their beliefs. It states no one may compel another person (or be compelled) to choose or profess any religion or belief. The constitution allows limits on the freedom to profess and spread religious beliefs when necessary to protect health, safety, public order, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. It restricts freedom of expression if it incites religious hatred, violence, or discrimination. It stipulates religious belief may not serve as justification for failing to comply with laws.

The constitution acknowledges the freedom of parents or guardians to oversee the religious and moral education of their children without interference and stipulates public education shall be secular, although schools may provide religious instruction at the request of parents. The constitution grants recognition to “traditional” religious groups and provides for recognition of other religious groups if they have support in society and their teachings and practices do not conflict with law or public morals. It states the status of religious groups shall be established by agreement or law and recognized religious groups shall be free to carry out their activities as long as they are not in conflict with the constitution or laws.

The law defines religious groups as (1) religious communities, (2) religious associations, which are comprised of at least two religious communities under common leadership, and (3) religious centers, which are higher governing bodies of religious associations.

The law recognizes as “traditional” those religious groups able to trace back their presence in the country at least 300 years. The law lists nine “traditional” religious groups: Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran, Evangelical Reformed, Russian Orthodox, Old Believer, Jewish, Sunni Muslim, and Karaite. Traditional religious groups do not need to register with the government. They may perform marriages that are state-recognized, establish joint private/public schools, provide religious instruction in public schools, and receive annual government subsidies. Their highest ranking leaders are eligible to apply for diplomatic passports, their clergy and theological students are exempt from military service, and they may provide chaplains for the military, social care institutions, and hospitals. The state provides social security and healthcare insurance contributions for clergy, religious workers, and members of monastic orders of the traditional religious groups. Traditional religious groups are also not required to pay social and health insurance taxes for clergy and most other religious workers and members of monastic orders.

Other (nontraditional) religious associations may apply to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) for state recognition if they have been officially registered in the country for at least 25 years. Parliament votes whether to grant this status upon recommendation from the MOJ. The Evangelical Baptist Union of Lithuania, the Seventh-day Adventist Church, and the Pentecostal Evangelical Belief Christian Union are the only state-recognized nontraditional religious groups.

The MOJ handles official registration of religious communities, associations, and centers. Registration of religious communities and associations associated with religious groups is simplified compared to registration of nontraditional religious communities. The former only need to establish their ties to the traditional religious group.

Unrecognized nontraditional groups must submit an application and supporting documentation to the MOJ, including their bylaws describing their religious teachings and governance, minutes of the founding meeting, and a list of the founders, at least 15 of whom must be citizens. Upon approval of its application, a religious community, association, or center is registered as a legal entity with the State Enterprise Center of Registers.

Traditional religious communities and associations are registered free of charge, while nontraditional communities pay a fee of 32 euros ($34). The MOJ may refuse to register a religious group if full data are not included in the application; the activities of the group violate human rights or public order; or statutes or corresponding documents of the group of the same name has already been registered. As of November 1, there were 1,112 traditional and 187 nontraditional religious associations, centers, and communities officially registered in the register of legal entities.

Official registration is a prerequisite for opening a bank account, owning property, and acting in a legal or official capacity as a community. The law allows all registered religious groups to own property for use as prayer houses, homes, and other functions, and permits construction of facilities necessary for religious activities. All registered groups are eligible for public funds from municipalities for cultural and social projects.

Unregistered communities have no legal status; however, the constitution allows them to conduct worship services and seek new members.

Recognition entitles nontraditional religious groups to perform marriages and provide religious instruction in public schools. Unlike traditional groups, however, they are not eligible for annual subsidies from the state budget, and their clergy and theological students are not exempt from military service. The law provides recognized nontraditional religious groups with legal entity status, but they do not qualify for certain social security and health care contributions by the state.

The Interministerial Commission to Coordinate Activities of Governmental Institutions that Deal with Issues of Religious, Esoteric, and Spiritual Groups coordinates investigations of religious groups if there is a concern a group’s actions may be inconsistent with what the commission perceives to be “principles that stress respect for human freedom of expression and freedom of religion.”

The Journalist Ethics Inspectorate investigates complaints under a law that bars publishing material that instigates hatred, including religious hatred. The inspectorate may levy administrative fines on newspapers under administrative law or refer cases for criminal prosecution.

The government may temporarily restrict freedom of expression of religious belief during a period of martial law or a state of emergency, although it has never invoked this right.

The law permits registered groups to apply to the MOJ for the restitution of religious property owned before June 19, 1948. Some religious properties were confiscated and redistributed by the Soviet Union. Other properties remained intact but were nationalized, often serving as museums. Religious communities can register property nationalized but not confiscated by the Soviet Union to establish a claim. Following receipt of such a claim, the ministry conducts an investigation. If the ministry determines the claim is legitimate, it drafts a resolution officially returning the property to its original owner.

A compensation fund for Jewish-owned property nationalized under totalitarian regimes is designed to support Jewish educational, religious, scientific, cultural, and healthcare projects with public benefits. Pursuant to the law, the government is committed to disbursing 37 million euros ($39 million) over the course of the decade ending March 1, 2023 to the Foundation for the Disposal of Good Will Compensation for the Immovable Property of Jewish Religious Communities, a public institution that oversees the fund and is governed by national and international Jewish leaders.

The country has no law for the restitution of heirless private property.

The government allocates funds to traditional religious communities for refurbishing houses of prayer and other needs. Each traditional religion group receives 3,075 euros ($3,240) as a base fund plus a variable component, which depends on the number of believers of each community.

The law permits and funds religious instruction in public schools for traditional and other state-recognized religious groups. Parents may choose either religious instruction or secular ethics classes for their children. Schools decide which of the traditional religious groups will be represented in their curricula on the basis of requests from parents for children up to age 14, after which students present the requests themselves.

There are 30 private religious schools with ties to Catholic or Jewish groups, although students of different religious groups may attend these schools. All accredited private schools (religious and nonreligious) receive funding from the Ministry of Education and Science through a voucher system based on the number of pupils. This system covers only the program costs of school operation. Founders generally bear responsibility for covering capital outlays; however, the Ministry of Education and Science funds capital costs of private schools of traditional religious groups where the government has signed an international agreement with a religious group to do so. To date the Catholic Church is the only religious group with such an agreement, which the government signed with the Holy See. Under this accord, the government funds both the capital and operating costs of private Catholic schools.

The criminal code prohibits discrimination based on religion and provides penalties of up to two years in prison for violations. The code penalizes interference with religious ceremonies of recognized religious groups with imprisonment or community service and penalizes inciting religious hatred with imprisonment of up to three years.

The Office of the Equal Opportunities (OEO) Ombudsperson investigates complaints of discrimination based on religion directed against state institutions, educational institutions, employers, and product and service sellers and producers.

The parliamentary ombudsperson examines whether state authorities properly perform their duties to serve the population. The law on the parliament ombudsperson specifically includes religious discrimination within the purview of the office. The OEO and parliamentary ombudspersons may investigate complaints, recommend changes to parliamentary committees and ministries regarding legislation, and recommend cases to the prosecutor general’s office for pretrial investigation.

While there is some overlap between the OEO and parliamentary ombudspersons, the OEO ombudsperson has greater authority to hear complaints about individual acts of religious discrimination.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On November 3, parliament granted the status of state-recognized religious association to the Pentecostal Evangelical Belief Christian Union, whose application had been pending since 2002. Two applicants for status as a state-recognized religious association continued to await parliamentary approval at year’s end: the New Apostolic Church (pending since 2003), and the United Methodist Church of Lithuania (pending since 2001).

As in past years, the only chaplains offering religious services to military personnel were Roman Catholic.

The government continued to provide restitution or compensation to a number of religious groups, including the Jewish community, for property seized during World War II and by the communist regime. Information on which property the government restored and to which religious groups was unavailable. During the year, the government allocated 3,620,000 euros ($3,815,000) to the Foundation for the Disposal of Good Will Compensation for the Immovable Property of Jewish Religious Communities. Since 2011, the foundation had received a total of 14,480,750 euros ($15,259,000) from the government.

The government provided 697,000 euros ($734,000) to traditional religious groups to reconstruct religious buildings seized during the Nazi or Soviet eras and to support other religious community activities. The Roman Catholic Church received 626,500 euros ($660,000), 90 percent of the total, the Russian Orthodox community 33,000 euros ($34,800), and the remaining 36,000 euros ($37,900) was divided among the Old Believer, Evangelical Lutheran, Evangelical Reformed, Sunni Muslim, Jewish, Greek Catholic, and Karaite communities.

The government worked closely with the Lithuanian Jewish Community regarding activities surrounding the property of the Vilnius Sports Palace, built in the 1970s above part of the Snipiskes Jewish Cemetery. On August 3, the government suspended construction at a site near the location of Snipiskes after workers unintentionally began digging in the buffer zone surrounding the cemetery. Work at the site resumed only after the Lithuanian Jewish Community and Committee for the Preservation of Jewish Cemeteries in Europe determined the cemetery territory had not been damaged. According to the Ministry of Culture and the Lithuanian Jewish Community, preservation of Jewish cemeteries in the country remained inconsistent, often depending on attitudes and actions of individual municipalities.

The government continued to support Jewish educational, cultural, scientific, and religious projects. These projects included youth camps, photo exhibitions, and restoration of wooden synagogues. The interministerial commission to address Jewish issues met in June and in October and provided research on examples of Jewish property restitution from other European countries. The commission did not have funds to disburse for projects.

In March Raimundas Pankevicius, a member of the Conservatives/Christian Democratic Party, went on trial for making anti-Semitic remarks during a meeting of the Panevezys City Council in 2014. Pankevicius was accused of publicly stating Jews shot Jews during World War II in the country. In November the Panevezys Regional Court acquitted Pankevicius.

In January the publication of a book entitled “Musiskiai,” “(Our People)” by coauthors Ruta Vanagaite and Efraim Zuroff, head of the Jerusalem office of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, generated a nationwide public debate about the country’s complicity in the genocide of Jews during the Holocaust. The Jewish community and the media called on the government to publish a list of suspected war criminals by the government’s Genocide and Resistance Research Center. The center compiled the list in 2012, but the government had not disclosed the names or sought to prosecute anyone on it. The director of the center promised to publish the list of names by June 2017.

Government officials and members of parliament participated in events throughout August and September to mark the 75th anniversary of the Holocaust in the country. On August 29, President Dalia Grybauskaite led a ceremony at the mass killing site in Moletai, saying “we must strive to see our future together with the Jewish people.” On September 20, Vilnius Mayor Remigijus Simasius dedicated a street sign in Yiddish and Hebrew on Zydu (Jewish) street. On September 23, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Mantvydas Bekesius participated in the dedication of a monument to murdered Jewish children at the Sholom Aleichem Jewish school in Vilnius. On the same day, Defense Minister Juozas Olekas, Vice Chancellor Rimantas Vaitkus, and Vice Foreign Minister Bekesius laid wreaths during the annual commemoration at the Paneriai massacre site outside Vilnius. On September 25, parliament hosted a conference to honor the rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust, and President Grybauskaite held an award ceremony for the rescuers on September 28.

On November 2, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Bekesius, Deputy Mayor of Kaunas Simonas Kairys, and the Kaunas Jewish community took part in an event unveiling a monument to commemorate the 5,000 Jews killed at the Seventh Fort in Kaunas in 1941. Bekesius stated, “The words ‘never again’ are neither empty nor declarative …They render an important commitment …to prevent a repeat of the tragedy and to make clear anti-Semitism has no place in Lithuania.”

The government and civil society continued to work together to promote Holocaust education and tolerance in schools with the local Jewish community and NGOs such as the Human Rights Center. Students across the country participated in the Holocaust commemoration events and marches in August and September and a celebration of the 90th anniversary of YIVO Institute, an academic Jewish research institution.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

NGOs such as the Institute for Ethnic Studies and members of the Muslim community reported a continued increase in anti-Muslim sentiment following continued inflows of refugees. As part of the government’s participation in the European Union’s refugee resettlement mechanism, the country accepted 193 refugees.

The media reported two attacks at the Rukla refugee reception center in October. On October 19, two unidentified young men attacked two refugee women, grabbing them by their clothes and breaking the glasses of one of them. After the attack, Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius expressed solidarity with the residents of the refugee center and reassured them that the incident was an “exception rather than the rule.” On October 28, two local youths insulted, pushed, and threw stones at two Syrian teenagers returning from school. Police conducted an investigation but made no arrests because the youths were minors. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize these incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim comments on the internet were common. Comments stated that Jews dominated the economy, controlled the United States, and were arrogant for believing they were a chosen people, and that Muslims were connected to terrorism. There were several reports that some citizens failed to recognize or respect the significance of Jewish historical sites and Holocaust monuments. The media reported some visitors to the 9th Fort in Kaunas (where 10,000 Jews were massacred) posted inappropriate “selfies” on social media, or used the site for social gatherings.

On February 16, the Lithuanian Nationalist Union held a march to commemorate the anniversary of the restoration of the country’s independence in Kaunas, where more than 10,000 Jews were massacred during the Holocaust. The march, which attracted approximately 250 participants, was smaller than in the previous year, although observers described some of the participants as “neo-Nazi.” The Lithuanian Nationalist Union also organized a march in Vilnius on March 11, the country’s independence day, involving approximately 1,000 people; the media reported anti-Semitic caricatures at the event. Police monitored both events, and there were no reports of violence. The Lithuanian Jewish Community expressed concerns regarding the marches, issuing a statement with recommendations the government and the municipalities of Vilnius and Kaunas take measures against “neo-Nazi chants, rallies, and other symbols and events of this kind” during independence festivities.

In May and June three individuals hung banners on a bridge in Kaunas that displayed the swastika and the phrase “Accept Hitler into your heart.” On November 25, a Kaunas court issued 150 euro ($158) fines to the three individuals for displaying Nazi symbols.

On April 28, unidentified persons broke a window at the Lithuanian Jewish Community in Vilnius and police opened a pretrial investigation into the incident on May 2. At year’s end, the investigation was still underway and the vandals had not been identified.

On March 27, the statue of Jewish leader Vilna Gaon in Vilnius was vandalized with paint.

The U.S. embassy continued to maintain a regular dialogue with senior government officials, including members of parliament and officials from the Ministries of Culture, Interior, Social Affairs, Justice, and Foreign Affairs, on the importance of religious freedom. Embassy officials continued to engage with the government on ways to promote tolerance and integration of religious minorities, including Muslim refugees, into society and combating anti-Semitism, and to urge the government to resolve the long-pending issue of compensation for Jewish private property seized during the Nazi and Soviet eras. On two separate visits, the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues discussed these restitution issues and the status of Jewish cemeteries with members of parliament and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Culture. In May embassy officers met with the mayor of Jonava, and, in November, with officials from the Ministry of Social Affairs to discuss integration of Muslim refugees. During September and October embassy officers discussed issues of restitution and Jewish heritage with representatives from parliament and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Culture. In September embassy officers met with the OEO ombudsperson to discuss investigations into citizen complaints on the abridgement of religious freedom.

The Ambassador and embassy staff met regularly with the Jewish community and other religious groups to discuss issues of concern, including property restitution, preservation and restoration of heritage sites, and Holocaust remembrance. In September the Charge d’Affaires spoke on fighting intolerance and anti-Semitism at a conference on the Righteous Among the Nations (a term used by Israel to refer to non-Jews who risked their lives to save Jews during the Holocaust) hosted by parliament.

In August the Charge d’Affaires and embassy staff met with the head of the Muslim community, Mufti Romas Jakubauskas, and another Muslim leader to discuss greater inclusion of Muslim refugees in society. Embassy officers discussed the ongoing refugee integration plans with NGOs, including Caritas and the Lithuanian Red Cross in October and November.

The Charge d’Affaires met with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Vilnius, Gintaras Linas Grusas, in August and discussed religious education, integration of refugees, and the role of the Church in social issues.

The U.S. government estimates the total population is 582,000 (July 2016 estimate). The government of Luxembourg does not collect personal information related to religion and instead relies on religious communities to self-report the number of their adherents. These numbers are then certified by an independent accountant. The government estimates that approximately 70 percent of the population is Roman Catholic; there are approximately 10,000 Protestants, 10,000 Muslims (including cross-border worshippers from neighboring countries), 3,000 members of Orthodox Churches, 2,500 Anglicans, and 1,500 Jews. A 2011 study by the government Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (previously known as the Center for Studies of Population, Poverty, and Socio-Economic Policy) reported small numbers of Bahais and Jehovah’s Witnesses as well as members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) and the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of religion, including the freedom to public religious practice and to manifest religious opinions, as long as no crime is committed in exercising that freedom. While the constitution guarantees the right to assemble peacefully without prior authorization, it stipulates that open-air religious or other meetings are subject to regulation by police. The constitution prohibits compulsory participation in or attendance at church services or observance of religious days of rest and stipulates that a religious marriage ceremony must be preceded by a civil marriage ceremony to be recognized by the state. The constitution provides for the regulation of relations between religious groups and the state, including the role of the state in appointing and dismissing religious clergy and the publication of documents by religious groups, through conventions between the state and individual religious groups.

On July 15, parliament passed a new law that among other things formally approved the new conventions that had been agreed upon in 2015 with six recognized religious communities. The law also eliminated the previous system in which religious workers were civil servants with government-funded salaries and pensions. Previously-employed clergy members continue to receive their salaries from the government and are grandfathered into the government-funded pension system; the government will not fund salaries or pensions for new employees. The government still provides financial support to the six recognized religious communities, but under the new law, the total amount of funding is capped at one-third the previous amount, and the amount for each community is determined based on the number of adherents. Under the new law, the Catholic Church lost significant funding, while the other communities saw increased funding. Under the law, the religious communities will continue to receive the previous funding to cover salaries of religious workers grandfathered into the former system. These numbers will gradually decrease as these religious workers retire or leave for other reasons. The new, agreed-upon levels will apply once the decreasing funding levels reach these newly established minimums. The amounts agreed to in the conventions are as follows: 6,750,000 euros ($7,112,750) to the Catholic community; 315,000 euros ($331,930) to the Jewish community; 285,000 euros ($300,320) to the Orthodox community; 450,000 euros ($474,180) to the Protestant community; 450,000 euros ($474,180) to the Muslim community; and 125,000 euros ($131,720) to the Anglican community.

Under the new law, local administrative communes are no longer responsible for covering deficits of religious communities within their communes. Previously, communes were required to cover the deficit for operating expenses that contributions from parishioners did not cover.

Under the conventions, government funding to any given religious community will be cancelled if the government determines that the religious community does not uphold three agreed-upon principles: respect for human rights, national law, and public order.

To qualify for a convention with the state, a religious community must establish an official and stable representative body with which the government can interact and must be a recognized world religion. The following religious groups signed conventions with the state in January 2015, and therefore receive support: the Catholic Church; the Greek, Russian, Romanian, and Serbian Orthodox Churches as one community; the Anglican Church; the Reformed Protestant Church of Luxembourg and the Protestant Church of Luxembourg as one community; the Jewish community; and the Muslim community. Groups without signed conventions, such as the Bahai community, may operate freely but receive no state support.

Previously, religious instruction in public schools was managed locally, coordinated between representatives of the Catholic Church and 105 communes. Parents and pupils chose between instruction in Catholicism or an ethics course, and government-salaried Catholic religious instructors taught the religion and ethics courses at all levels in public schools. Schools exempted students from the Catholic or ethics instruction on an individual basis.

Under the July 15 law, as well as laws enacted on May 27 and July 7, religious education in public schools was abolished and replaced by a course called “Life and Society.” The July 15 law mandated the new course. The May 27 law effected the change for primary schools, beginning in the 2017-18 scholastic year. The July 7 law applied the change to secondary schools, effective in the 2016-17 year. According to the laws, religious instructors affected by the change in law may teach the new Life and Society course if qualified under the new provisions (including holding a bachelor’s degree), agree to adhere to the new curriculum, and participate in a “reorientation” course.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government stated the law enacted on July 15 aimed to increase the separation between religious groups and the state.

At year’s end, parliament was in the midst of a constitutional reform process, to include amended language eliminating the government’s role in appointing and dismissing clergy and in publishing documents.

A member of parliament representing the Christian Social Party criticized the new religion laws, saying that he did not oppose the separation of church and state, but that the constitution should have been amended before the new laws were passed.

Pursuant to a convention signed between the state and the Catholic Church in 2015, the government issued a directive requesting communes to regulate property relations with the Church by January 1, 2017. Parliament, however, has not enacted a law to implement that convention. The government requested communes to reach a consensus with local church councils regarding which buildings would belong to the communes and which would be transferred to the central fund of Church assets. In December the Syndicate of (Catholic) Church Councils filed a lawsuit over the government’s directive against the minister of religion (also serving as the prime minister), the minister of the interior, and the archbishop, stating it was illegal for the government to dissolve the church councils and transfer ownership and control of the property previously controlled by the councils.

The government subsidized a Catholic seminary which was under the auspices of the Catholic Church. Under the government’s directive requesting communes to regulate Church property relations, the seminary became a public educational institution and research center called the Luxembourg Center of Religion and Society that the Ministry of Higher Education and Research managed in cooperation with the six recognized religious communities.

A representative of the Bahai community said its community had, for religious reasons, opted not to receive government funding and had therefore not signed a convention with the state.

In an informational flyer provided to parents, the government stated the new “Life and Society” course that replaced religion in public schools was a result of conventions signed between the government and religious communities in 2015 and was developed in concert with all concerned parties.

According to data provided by the prime minister’s office, the government granted 1,095 individuals, the majority of whom were Muslim, international protection during the year. The Organization for Welcome and Integration (OLAI), an entity of the Ministry of Family and Integration, stated the government sought to be proactive in assuring refugee access to mosques, halal meals, and same-sex housing for those who requested it. OLAI officials adjusted meal times during Ramadan to accommodate the fast. An OLAI representative stated that refugees had not voiced any concerns related to the free practice of their religion.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Religious leaders continued to confer in an interfaith council, the Council of Recognized Religious Communities, created when the government approached them separately about renegotiating their conventions. The Catholic archbishop and the grand rabbi served as president and vice president, respectively. According to a member of the council, the group had negotiated the new conventions with the government as a unified body rather than as separate communities and insisted the government conclude a convention with the Muslim community, thereby giving it state recognition and funding.

The Catholic Church leadership did not express opposition to the new legislation on relations between religious communities and the state. Church sources stated that the Church was looking at redeveloping Church-owned property to enable the Church to become more self-sufficient.

The national Muslim governing council, the Muslim Shoura, expressed appreciation to other religious leaders for their unified support of the Muslim community in negotiating its convention with the government. Muslim refugees stated they had no complaints about religious discrimination in the country. Several said they had chosen the country specifically because they expected better treatment than in neighboring nations.

In August a U.S. embassy official discussed the religious freedom of refugees in the country with an official at OLAI. In two meetings in September and October, an embassy official met with two senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives, who briefed her on the new law on religion.

In November the Ambassador hosted an interfaith Thanksgiving lunch to provide a platform for the leaders of the country’s religious communities to discuss together the challenges and opportunities presented by the new religious freedom law.

In March embassy officials met with a small group of newly-arrived refugees, most of whom were Muslim. In July the Ambassador and another embassy official met the rabbi, the lay president, and members of the Liberal Jewish Community of Esch-sur-Alzette and discussed the congregation’s efforts to provide an alternative for Jewish observance in the country. The meeting, featured on the embassy’s Facebook page, highlighted U.S. support for religious minorities. In October an embassy official discussed the new religion law with a representative of the Bahai community and, separately, with the chaplain of the Anglican community.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.1 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the last national census in 2002, an estimated 65 percent of the population is Orthodox Christian and 33 percent Muslim. Other religious groups, which together constitute less than 2 percent of the population, include Roman Catholics, various Protestant denominations, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and, according to the Jewish community, an estimated 200-250 Jews.

The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni, and most live in the northern and western parts of the country. The majority of Orthodox Christians live in the central and southeastern regions. There is a correlation between ethnicity and religious affiliation: the majority of Orthodox Christians are ethnic Macedonian, and most Muslims are ethnic Albanians. Additionally, most Roma, and virtually all ethnic Turks and ethnic Bosniaks are Muslim, whereas most ethnic Serbs and Vlachs are Orthodox Christian. There is also a correlation between religious and political affiliation, as political parties are largely divided along ethnic lines.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and provides for equality of rights for all citizens regardless of religious belief. It guarantees freedom of religion and the right of individuals to express their faith freely and in public, individually or with others. It guarantees the religious identity of nationalities and communities in the country. The state recognizes the five religious groups specifically cited in the constitution: the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Methodist Church, and the Jewish Community. The law allows other religious organizations to obtain the same legal rights and status as these five groups by applying for government recognition and registration through the courts. The constitution states the five named religious groups “and other religious communities and groups” are separate from the state, equal before the law, and free to establish schools, charities, and other social institutions. The constitution bars political parties or other associations from inciting religious hatred or intolerance.

The government has granted legal recognition to 33 religious organizations (consisting of 16 churches, nine religious communities, and eight religious groups). Once registered, a church, religious community, or religious group is exempted from taxes and is eligible to apply for property restitution for those properties nationalized during the communist era, government-funded projects, and construction permits for preservation of shrines and cultural sites. It may also establish schools. Failure to register does not prevent a religious group from holding meetings or proselytizing, or result in legal punishment or fines, but prevents the group from engaging in certain activities, such as establishing schools or receiving donations that are tax-deductible for the donor.

Religious organizations may apply to register as a “church,” a “religious community,” or a “religious group.” These classifications are based on group size, internal organization, and internal hierarchy. According to judicial authorities, these three categories are treated equally before the law and do not bestow different legal rights, benefits, or obligations. Skopje Basic Court II accepts registration applications and has 15 business days to determine whether a religious organization’s application meets the legal registration criteria. These criteria are: a physical administrative presence within the country, an explanation of its beliefs and practices that distinguish it from other religious organizations, and a unique name and official insignia. An applicant organization must also identify a supervisory body in charge of managing its finances and submit a breakdown of its financial assets and funding sources and minutes from its founding meeting. The law allows multiple groups of a single faith to register. Registered leaders or legal representatives of religious groups must be citizens of the country.

The court sends approved applications to the Committee on Relations between Religious Communities and Groups (CRRCG), a government body responsible for fostering cooperation and communication between the government and religious groups, which adds the organization to its registry. If the application is denied, the organization may appeal the decision to the State Appellate Court. If the State Appellate Court denies the application, the organization may file a human rights petition with the Constitutional Court on grounds of denial of religious rights. If the Constitutional Court denies the petition, the organization may appeal the case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

The law does not permit religious groups to operate primary schools, but allows them at the secondary level and above. The Ministry of Education requires sixth-grade students and above to take one of three elective courses, two of which have religious content: Introduction to Religions and Ethics in Religion. According to the ministry’s description, these courses teach religion in an academic, nondevotional manner. The courses are usually taught by priests or imams. The Ministry of Education states that all teachers of these subjects receive training from accredited higher education institutions taught by professors of philosophy or sociology. If students do not wish to take a course on religion, they may take the third option, Classical Culture in European Civilization.

All foreigners who seek to enter the country to carry out religious work or perform religious rites must obtain a work visa before arrival, a process that normally takes approximately four months. The CRRCG maintains a register of all foreign religious workers and has the authority to approve or deny them the right to conduct religious work within the country. Work visas are valid for six months, with the option to renew for an additional six months. Subsequent visa renewals are valid for one year. There is no limit to the number of visa renewals a religious worker may be issued. Clergy and religious workers from unregistered groups may be issued visas.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to various university professors, nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders, and legal and political analysts, religious differences continued to play a role in criminal and civil court cases. An example was the retrial of the head of the OAO, Archbishop Jovan Vraniskovski, for money laundering, which began on January 28 but was immediately postponed until March 11, and then postponed again to allow prosecutors to interview witnesses. The court had not set a new hearing date by year’s end. In May of the previous year, the Supreme Court had vacated Vraniskovski’s money laundering conviction based on substantive and procedural irregularities, sending the case back for retrial. Vraniskovski had already spent three years in prison before he was paroled in February 2015. If convicted again at retrial, he would be given credit for jail time already served. OAO representatives stated the trial was politically motivated and intentionally delayed, while the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights called Vraniskovski a political prisoner. The OAO complained that the process was religious persecution and stated that the court’s refusal to unblock the bank accounts of the Anastasija Association, OAO’s registered civic association, impeded the OAO from functioning properly. The prosecution stated the Anastasija Association was used by Vraniskovski for illegal activity. At year’s end, the case was still pending retrial before Basic Court Skopje I.

Separately, the OAO was awaiting a ruling from the ECHR regarding its application to register as a recognized religious organization, which national courts had denied on grounds that it could not substantiate the difference between its name and symbols and those of the MOC-OA.

The ECHR completed its hearing of the case but had yet to issue a verdict by year’s end. Father David from the OAO, which the Serbian Orthodox Church recognized as the sole legitimate autonomous Orthodox Church in the country, stated the government had subjected the OAO to media harassment and undue monitoring due to the OAO’s refusal to recognize the MOC-OA’s complete independence from the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Basic Court Skopje II received four religious registration applications and approved one, from the Evangelical Protestant Church. The court rejected the application of the Bektashi Community of Kichevo. Applications from the Christian Community in Macedonia and the Community of Muslims remained pending.

The Bektashi Community of Macedonia (Tetovo), an Islamic Sufi order, continued to await an ECHR ruling on its 2013 appeal asking the ECHR to overturn the Constitutional Court’s rejection of the community’s appeal of the denial of its registration. The Helsinki Committee reported the ECHR had not yet ruled in the Bektashi case because it was reviewing the case with others of a similar nature before offering a ruling. The Bektashi community reported an ECHR official visited them to discuss the case during the year. The government continued to issue visas to foreign members of the Bektashi Community of Macedonia (Tetovo).

Smaller religious organizations not listed in the constitution, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Evangelical Church, the Bektashi Community (Tetovo), and the OAO said that, although they were registered, the government did not treat them as equals with the five religious organizations recognized in the constitution. For example, they stated the government excluded them from official events such as official holiday celebration events or government building ground-breaking ceremonies, and did not grant them the same level of access to government officials for requested meetings. Additionally, the ICM, one of the five officially recognized religious groups in the constitution, stated the government favored the MOC-OA by granting it unique privileges, such as providing it with public properties free of charge, funding for the construction of new Orthodox churches, and exclusive invitations for its representatives to attend government functions. The MOC-OA denied any affiliation with the government and stated it did not involve itself in politics.

A Muslim doctor from Gostivar reported border police continued to subject him to harassment and undue scrutiny because of his long beard and short pants he wore for religious reasons, which delayed his border crossings whenever he entered and exited the country.

The ICM stated the government continued to prevent construction of a mosque in the ethnically mixed village of Lazhec by denying a construction permit because of pressure from local residents opposed to the mosque. The ICM reported the government also continued to block reconstruction of the mosque in Prilep, which burned down during armed conflict in 2001. According to the ICM, the government denied a permit to rebuild the mosque on the grounds that the Prilep site was a monument of religious culture.

Religious groups, including the Muslim and Catholic communities, reported that restitution of property previously confiscated by the state was a problem. For example, by year’s end, the ICM was still seeking ownership rights to the Yeni Mosque in Bitola, which the state declared a monument of religious culture and had taken ownership of in 1950. The Catholic Church also called on the government to denationalize a property seized before the communist era in the southern village of Paliurci, where it wanted to build a church and a monastery. The dispute over the Paliurci property had been ongoing in the courts for 10 years.

Responding to a 2015 request from the ombudsman’s office, the Ministry of Education Inspectorate investigated and determined that a student march a public school organized in Bitola in celebration of what the media called “good Orthodox holidays” was not a planned activity. The inspectorate reprimanded four elementary schools and their teaching staff.

ICM leadership continued to report that it believed its leaders’ telephones were being tapped illegally.

Civil society groups, such as the Helsinki Committee, and smaller religious communities, including the Protestant Evangelical Church and the Bektashi, stated the government interfered in religious matters and often politicized religion. For example, on February 15, government officials, including Prime Minister Emil Dimitriev, ministers, mayors, and members of parliament of the ruling Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity party (VMRO-DPMNE), participated in a cornerstone-laying ceremony for a large, Russian-style MOC-OA church and complex of related buildings in the Zelezara neighborhood of Skopje. Central and local government officials had previously facilitated the construction and the MOC-OA’s acquisition of land and permits.

On February 28, police intervened to prevent a clash between MOC-OA members and Muslim opponents of the construction of a 180-foot cross in Butel, an ethnically mixed Albanian and Macedonian municipality of Skopje. The head of the CRRCG called on citizens to avoid confrontations and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors helped broker an agreement that halted the construction of the cross. In September the Constitutional Court rejected an initiative by the political party Movement for Reforms – Albanian Democratic Party (LR-PDSH) to assess the legality and constitutionality of the cross construction, stating lack of jurisdiction.

The Ministry of Justice Department for Criminal and Civil Legislation, with assistance from the OSCE, worked on a draft of new hate crimes legislation that included religiously motivated acts. At year’s end, the draft legislation was still not completed.

The CRRCG reported it issued letters of consent to all foreign missionaries and clerics who submitted requests for religious work during the year.

In April the former secretary general of the ICM and the former mufti of Skopje filed charges against the current ICM leadership, alleging their illegal dismissal in 2015. In November and December the Criminal Court in Skopje dismissed the charges against the current ICM leadership.

In a separate case related to those dismissals, the ICM requested the government prosecute 27 individuals for involvement in a 2015 armed attack and 13-day occupation of ICM premises. On November 4, the Criminal Court in Skopje found 23 individuals guilty and sentenced them to three months of probation. The defendants appealed the ruling which was pending at year’s end. The ICM stated that the punishment was too lenient.

The Bektashi continued to report harassment by ICM-affiliated occupants of the Harabati Baba teqe (shrine) compound in Tetovo. Bektashi representatives reported they and visitors to the complex were often verbally harassed, stating that ICM “thugs” told them to leave the compound.

There were instances of anti-Semitic speech on social media. Milenko Nedelkovski, a journalist, twice posted disparaging comments about the Jewish community. He stated Ashkenazi Jews controlled much of the world and depicted them as “ideologues, financiers and organizers of the Holocaust,” and as “creators of the perception that the Jews were the biggest victims of the Nazi.” The Jewish community did not publically respond to the postings, reporting that they did not want to draw additional attention to Nedelkovski’s writings.

In a statement in response to the Brussels terrorist attacks, the ICM condemned any manipulation and criminal behavior in the name of Islam. The ICM called on all Muslim believers to “ally themselves with Western countries and coordinate all actions against all terrorists.”

The Holocaust Fund of the Jews from Macedonia, an NGO, continued to work with the Ministry of Education to implement Holocaust and Jewish history programs and to promote interfaith cooperation. This project provided teachers with tools to teach secondary school students about the Holocaust and Jewish history.

There were reports of vandalism at religious sites. In May unknown vandals looted two mosques in Tetovo. The ICM said it did not want to give small-scale incidents too much publicity in an effort not to fuel extremism or invite more trouble. In February unknown perpetrators stole icons from a MOC-OA church in Delchevo, and in April unknown individuals damaged the premises of an old MOC-OA church in Debar, while, according to MOC-OA and media reports, apparently digging for gold.

The MOC-OA reported a dozen robberies in Orthodox churches and monasteries throughout the country. These robberies were primarily of money collected from donations and a small number of cultural heritage items such as icons. Police made several arrests related to church robberies in February and October. Additionally, in May authorities arrested a Serbian citizen suspected of thefts from a church while attempting to cross the border with Serbia.

The U.S. Ambassador met with then-Minister of Justice Adnan Jashari in March and embassy officials met with Minister of Justice Valdet Xhaferi in September to discuss the new draft legislation on hate speech and hate crimes, which included hate speech and crimes against religious targets. The Ambassador also discussed interfaith tolerance, the importance of open dialogue, and countering violent extremism with senior government officials, including Minister of Interior Oliver Spasovski and Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Institute Abdulkader Memedi, and at public appearances, including a conference on the Middle East and North Africa – Transnational Threats to Security.

The Ambassador met with the head of the ICM in February and June to discuss religious freedom issues, such as political interference and favoritism, and combatting violent extremism. An embassy official met with representatives from smaller religious communities, such as the Bektashi, Christian Evangelical, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and civil society, including the Helsinki Committee and Balkans Institute for Faith and Culture, to discuss religious freedom.

In September the embassy and several U.S. government agencies cosponsored a three-day religious freedom workshop. Attendees included religious leaders, judges, prosecutors, elected officials, and civil society representatives. The Ambassador spoke at the opening of the workshop, highlighting the importance of religious tolerance and encouraging attendees to advocate for tolerance in their respective spheres of influence. The workshop focused on how religious groups and NGOs could advocate for religious freedom and tolerance with government interlocutors, and how to prevent religiously motivated violence. Many participants expressed appreciation for the training and lamented that other forums facilitating open dialogue on religious tolerance among stakeholders did not exist in the country. The embassy also funded a public awareness campaign and a school program to increase religious tolerance, understanding, and respect among ethnic Albanians (mostly Muslim) and ethnic Macedonians (mostly Christian Orthodox). The program provided diversity appreciation training to teachers and incentives to schools for incorporating interethnic integration into extracurricular activities.

In November the embassy hosted a U.S. expert on countering violent extremism and religious tolerance. He discussed with government leaders, political party leaders, the media, and the ICM (both leaders and imams), the importance of dialogue and religious tolerance in order to combat violent extremism.

The embassy supported the Holocaust Fund of the Jews of Macedonia with a small grant which funded a seminar for teachers on Sephardic Jewish history and the Holocaust, and covered the costs for three participants to attend a summer academy focused on the Holocaust in Vienna, Prague, and Berlin.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 24.4 million (July 2016 estimate), and according to the last national census in 1993, 52 percent adheres to indigenous beliefs, 41 percent is Christian, and 7 percent is Muslim. Although precise figures are not available, Muslim leaders and local scholars estimate Muslims currently constitute between 20 and 25 percent of the population, although they state it is common to alternate between religious identities, or to mix traditions. Muslims predominate in the northwestern coastal areas, and Christians predominate in the highlands. According to local Muslim religious leaders and secular academics, the majority of Muslims are Sunni. Citizens of ethnic Indian and Pakistani descent and Comorian immigrants represent the majority of Muslims, although there is a growing number of ethnic Malagasy converts.

Local religious groups state nearly half of the population is Christian. The four principal Christian groups are Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Anglicans, and the (Presbyterian) Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar (FJKM). Smaller Christian groups include The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, and local evangelical denominations.

According to Christian groups, the most numerous non-Christian groups are adherents of indigenous religions. In addition, many individuals hold a combination of indigenous and Christian or Muslim beliefs.

There are small numbers of Hindus and Jews across the country. The Jewish community reported it consists of approximately 150 individuals as of September.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religious thought and expression and prohibits religious discrimination in the workplace. Other laws protect individual religious freedom against abuses by government or private actors.

The constitution also provides that such rights may be limited by the need to protect the rights of others or to preserve public order, national dignity, or state security. The labor code prohibits religious discrimination within labor unions and professional associations. Public schools do not offer religious education. There is no law prohibiting or limiting religious education in public or private schools.

The law requires religious groups to register with the MOI. By registering, a religious group receives the legal status necessary to receive direct bequests and other donations. Once registered, the group may apply for tax exemption each time it receives a gift from abroad. Registered religious groups also have the right to acquire land from individuals to build places of worship; however, the law states landowners should first cede those lands back to the state, and the state will then transfer it to the religious group. To qualify for registration, a group must have at least 100 members and an elected administrative council of no more than nine members, all of whom must be citizens.

Groups failing to meet registration requirements may instead register as “simple associations.” Simple associations may not receive donations or hold religious services, but the law allows them to conduct various types of community and social projects. Associations engaging in additional activities are subject to legal action. Religious associations must apply for a tax exemption each time they receive a donation from abroad. If an association has foreign leadership and/or members, it may form an association “reputed to be foreign.” An association is reputed foreign only if the leader or members of the board include foreign nationals. The law does not prohibit national associations from having foreign nationals as members not in those positions. Such foreign associations may only receive temporary authorizations, subject to periodic renewal and other conditions.

The government requires a permit for all public demonstrations, including religious events such as outdoor worship services.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Muslim leaders continued to state that because of their particular settlement history and mixed marriages over time, Muslims remained negatively affected by the country’s nationality code, which restricts children born of Malagasy mothers and foreign national fathers from obtaining citizenship. While there were no official figures on statelessness, a study by the NGO Focus Development and the UNHCR, which sampled residents in largely Muslim communities between October 2013 and January 2014, estimated that approximately 6 percent of individuals in the communities surveyed were stateless. Of this number, more than 85 percent were born in the country.

The MOI registered seven new religious groups through the middle of October, bringing the total to approximately 283 officially registered groups. Religious groups reported the government did not always enforce registration requirements and in general did not deny requests for registration.

Decisions by local authorities continued to affect the ability of some religious groups to practice their faith, according to religious leaders. Religious leaders also stated that inadequate government enforcement of labor laws resulted in some employers requiring their employees to work during religious services. A Catholic priest in Antananarivo who managed a social services center that caters to factory workers stated some employers failed to respect the labor code provisions requiring a 24-hour break weekly, which affects factory workers’ ability to attend worship services.

The government failed to restore or reimburse the value of FJKM-owned Radio Fahazavana’s equipment, which had been seized by the former government on the stated ground that the station was associated with deposed President Marc Ravalomanana.

Leadership of the Muslim Malagasy Association, which states it represents all Muslims in Madagascar, reported that some Muslims continued to report difficulty obtaining official documents such as national identity cards and passports because of their Arabic-sounding names. Some Muslims reported religious discrimination when applying for civil service positions. For example, to apply to civil service positions, applicants must provide criminal records, which some Muslims found difficult to obtain from the government.

On September 19, local newspapers reported that the MOI deported 10 foreign imams working in the southeast. According to press reports, they were Pakistani nationals operating a mosque in Vohipeno and a Quranic school in Manakara. The MOI confirmed the deportation, noting that the imams had entered Malagasy territory on a 15-day tourist visa which was extended to a three-month visa at the regional police station. They noted that missionary work or other work-related activities were not permitted on a tourist visa. In November Prime Minister Olivier Mahafaly reaffirmed that the imams were deported because of their illegal immigration status. One of the newspapers added that the MOI started an investigation of the imams when the sacrifice of 200 zebus in Manakara and Vohipeno for the Eid al-Adha celebration on September 11-12 aroused local concerns. While zebu sacrifice is common among animists, Muslims, and occasionally at royal funerals, a single sponsor financing 200 zebus is extremely uncommon which led many in the local community to suspect foreign entities funded the sacrifice.

State-run Malagasy National Television continued to provide free broadcasting to the Seventh-day Adventist Church and to Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Anglicans, and Presbyterians on weekends, along with the Muslim community once a week. During Ramadan, the Muslim community was able to purchase additional airtime.

For the fourth year, the government decreed that Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr would be paid holidays for Muslims. Leaders of the Muslim community reported they continued to lobby without success for these holidays to be paid for everyone, rather than just for Muslims, on an equal basis with national holidays based on the Christian faith.

In May after five years of self-study of Judaism, 121 members of a community of formerly messianic Christian individuals underwent formal Orthodox conversions in a process overseen by rabbis from the U.S. and Canada. These took place over a 10-day period and concluded with 12 weddings.

The new converts reported they were subjected to stares and unwelcome comments due to their uncommon attire, and some discrimination by people who learned of their Jewish faith. Some private schools refused to allow them to register their children after discovering they were Jewish. In one case, a landlord cancelled a leasing contract with one of the recent Jewish converts when he found out that the house was going to be used as a religious school.

Members of the Muslim community also reported some of their children were refused admission to private Catholic schools because they were unable to produce a baptismal certificate.

U.S. embassy officials engaged regularly with the government on issues affecting religious freedom. Embassy officials discussed the nationality code with the prime minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, local officials, members of the diplomatic community, and local representatives of the United Nations focused on human rights.

In September the U.S. embassy invited representatives of different religious groups and the MOI to exchange views on religious freedom. In an informal environment, participants openly communicated about the existing relationships among different religious groups in the country. A representative from the MOI answered questions related to the legal framework.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 18.6 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2016 Demographic and Health Survey, 76.9 percent of the population is Christian and 12.5 percent Muslim. Christian denominations include Roman Catholics at 18.1 percent, Central Africa Presbyterians at 17.4 percent, Seventh-day Adventist/Seventh-day Baptists (the survey groups the two into one category) at 6.9 percent, and Anglicans at 2.6 percent. Another 41.9 percent fall under the “other Christians” category. Individuals claiming no religious affiliation are 0.5 percent and 0.1 percent declare other religions including Hindus, Bahais, Rastafarians, Jews, and Sikhs.

The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni. Most Sunnis of African descent follow the Shafi’i School of Islamic legal thought, while the smaller community of ethnic Asians mostly follows the Hanafi School. There is also a small number of Shia Muslims, mostly of Lebanese origin.

According to the 2008 census, there are two majority Muslim districts, Mangochi (72 percent) and Machinga (64 percent). These neighboring districts at the southern end of Lake Malawi account for more than half of all Muslims in the country. Most other Muslims also live near the shores of Lake Malawi. Christians are present throughout the country.

Traditional cultural practices with a spiritual dimension are sometimes practiced by Christians and Muslims. For example, the gule wamkulu spirit dancers remain of importance among Chewas, who are concentrated in the central region of the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion and provides for freedom of conscience, religion, belief, and thought. These constitutional rights may be limited only when the president has declared a state of emergency.

The law states that holders of broadcast licenses “shall not broadcast any material which is…offensive to the religious convictions of any section of the population.”

Religious groups, like nonprofit organizations, must register with the government to be recognized as legal entities. Registered groups, like other legal entities, may own property and open bank accounts in the group’s name. Groups must submit documentation detailing the structure and mission of their organization and pay a fee of 1,000 kwacha ($1.34). The government reviews the application for administrative compliance only. According to the government, registration does not constitute approval of religious beliefs, nor is it a prerequisite for religious activities. Religious groups may apply to the Ministry of Finance for tax exemptions regardless of registration status.

Detainees have a right to consult with a religious counselor of their choice.

Religious instruction is mandatory in public primary schools, with no opt-out provision, and is available as an elective in public secondary schools. According to the constitution, eliminating religious intolerance is a goal of education. In some schools, the religious curriculum is a Christian-oriented “Bible knowledge” course, while in others it is an interfaith “moral and religious education” course drawing from the Christian, Islamic, Hindu, and Bahai faiths. According to the law, local school management committees, elected at parent-teacher association meetings, decide on which religious curriculum to use. Private Christian and Islamic schools offer religious instruction in their respective faiths. Hybrid “grant-aided” schools are managed by private, usually religious, institutions, but their teaching staffs are paid by the government. In exchange for this financial support, the government chooses a significant portion of the students who attend. At grant-aided schools, a board appointed by the school’s operators decides whether the “Bible knowledge” or the “moral and religious education” curriculum will be used.

Foreign missionaries are required to have employment permits.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

A representative of the Rastafarian community reported children with dreadlocks continued to be prohibited from attending public school, where children are required to shave their heads in order to attend. According to the representative, most parents relented and shaved their children’s heads but the children of at least one family continued to be denied access to public school because of their dreadlocks and dropped out of school. The case, and the larger issue of Rastafarian children’s access to education, remained under investigation by the Malawi Human Rights Commission.

Some Muslim groups continued to request the education ministry to discontinue use of the “Bible knowledge” course and use only the broader-based “moral and religious education” curriculum in primary schools, particularly in predominantly Muslim areas. The issue arose most frequently in grant-aided, Catholic-operated schools.

Muslim organizations continued to express concern about the impact of operating schools in two shifts. Due to rapidly rising enrollment, certain schools in urban areas offered classes in two shifts – one in the morning and another in the afternoon, or staggered beginning and ending times. Muslim groups stated the shifts complicated the delivery of religious education at madrassahs in the afternoon on government school premises.

Most government meetings and events began and ended with a prayer, usually Christian in nature. At larger events, government officials generally invited clergy of different faiths to participate.

Christians, Muslims, and Hindus often participated in business or civil society organizations together. Religious organizations and leaders regularly expressed their opinions on political issues and their statements received coverage in the media. For example, the Livingstonia Synod released a statement in November that discussed the “perpetual failure” of the government to have meaningful dialogue about socio-economic challenges.

Religious groups operated 12 radio and four television stations.

The U.S. Ambassador met with representatives of religious groups, including representatives from the Muslim Association of Malawi, the largest Islamic association in the country, to discuss their concerns about the shift system and the “Bible knowledge” course. The Ambassador and embassy officials discussed issues of religious freedom with representatives of religious groups, the interfaith Public Affairs Committee, and members of parliament.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 30.9 million (July 2016 estimate). Census figures from 2010 indicate that 61.3 percent of the population practices Islam; 19.8 percent, Buddhism; 9.2 percent, Christianity; 6.3 percent, Hinduism; and 1.3 percent, Confucianism, Taoism, or other traditional Chinese philosophies and religions. Other minority religious groups include animists, Sikhs, and Bahais. Ethnic Malays, who are defined in the federal constitution as Muslims from birth, account for approximately 55 percent of the population. Rural areas – especially in the east coast of peninsular Malaysia – are predominantly Muslim, while the states of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo have relatively higher numbers of non-Muslims.

Legal Framework

The federal constitution states that “every person has the right to profess and practice his religion,” but gives federal and state governments the power to control or restrict proselytization to Muslims. The constitution names Islam as the “religion of the Federation,” and gives parliament powers to make provisions regulating Islamic religious affairs. Federal and state governments have the power to “control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.” The constitution identifies the traditional rulers, also known as sultans, as the “Heads of Islam” within their respective states. Sultans are present in nine of the country’s 13 states; in the remaining four states and the Federal Territories, the highest Islamic authority is the king. Sultans oversee the sharia courts and appoint judges based on the recommendation of the respective state Islamic religious departments and councils who manage the operations of the courts. In states with no sultan and in the Federal Territories, the king assumes responsibility for this process. The law allows citizens and organizations to sue the government for constitutional violations of religious freedom. Federal law has constitutional precedence over state law, except in matters concerning Islamic law. A 1996 fatwa with the effect of law under the sharia code requires the country to follow only Sunni teachings and prohibits Muslims from possessing, publishing, or distributing material contrary to those teachings.

The law forbids proselytizing of Muslims by non-Muslims, but allows and supports Muslims proselytizing others. The law does not restrict the rights of non-Muslims to change their religious beliefs and affiliation. A non-Muslim wishing to marry a Muslim, however, must convert to Islam for the marriage to be officially recognized. A minor (under the age of 18, according to federal law) generally may not convert to another faith without the explicit permission of his or her guardian; however, some states’ laws allow conversion to Islam without permission after age 15.

Muslims who seek to convert to another religion must first obtain approval from a sharia court to declare themselves “apostates.” Sharia courts seldom grant such requests and can impose penalties on apostates, including enforced “rehabilitation.” In the states of Perak, Melaka Sabah, and Pahang, conversion from Islam to another religion is a criminal offense punishable by a fine or jail term. In Pahang, up to six strokes of the cane may also be imposed. Nationally, civil courts generally cede authority to sharia courts in cases concerning conversion from Islam, and sharia courts remain unwilling to allow such conversions for those who are born Muslims and reluctant to allow conversion for those who had previously converted to Islam. In the states of Perak, Kedah, Negeri Sembilan, Sarawak, and Melaka, sharia allows one parent to convert children to Islam without the consent of the second parent.

Sedition laws regulate and punish, among other acts, speech considered hostile to ethnic groups, which includes speech insulting Islam. The law also bars speech that “promotes ill will, hostility, or hatred on the grounds of religion.”

There is only one approved Islamic organization in each state. There is no legal requirement for other religious groups to register, but in order to become approved nonprofit charitable organizations, all groups must register with the government’s Office of the Registrar of Societies (RoS) by submitting paperwork showing the organization’s leadership, purpose, and rules, and paying a small fee. Many churches and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), however, continue to find registration difficult, with RoS denying many applications for highly technical reasons. Once registered, these organizations continue to be registered as long as they submit annual reports to the RoS as legally required.

All Islamic houses of worship – including mosques and surau (prayer rooms) – fall under the authority of the federal Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM) and corresponding state Islamic departments; officials at these departments must give permission for the construction of any mosque or surau. JAKIM and state Islamic authorities prepare Friday sermons for congregations as well as oversee and approve the appointment of imams at mosques. JAKIM and state Islamic officials must formally approve all Islamic teachers before they may be allowed to preach in any particular mosque within a state or the Federal Territories.

Sharia courts have jurisdiction over Muslims in matters of family law and religious observances. A constitutional amendment provides that civil courts have no jurisdiction with respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the sharia courts. Non-Muslims have no standing in sharia proceedings, leading to some cases where sharia court rulings have affected non-Muslims who have no ability to defend their position or appeal the court’s decision – most frequently in rulings affecting custody and conversion in interfaith families. The relationship between sharia and civil law remains unresolved in the legal system. Two states, Kelantan and Terengganu, have symbolically enacted hudood (Islamic penal law) for Muslims, although the federal government has never allowed the code to be implemented.

The legal age of marriage is 16 for Muslim girls and 18 for Muslim males, although they may marry before those ages with the permission of their parents and the sharia courts. Non-Muslims must be 18 to marry.

Tax laws allow a tax exemption for registered religious groups for donations received and a tax deduction for the individual donors. Donors giving zakat (tithes) to Muslim religious organizations receive a tax rebate. Donations to government-approved charitable organizations (including some non-Muslim religious groups) may receive a tax deduction on the contribution rather than a tax rebate.

National identity cards specify religious affiliation and are used by the government to determine which citizens are subject to sharia. The cards identify Muslims in a printed fashion; for members of other recognized religions, religious affiliation is not printed, but encrypted in a smart chip within the identity card. Married Muslims must carry a special photo identification of themselves and their spouse as proof of marriage.

Islamic religious instruction is compulsory for Muslim children in public schools; non-Muslim students are required to take nonreligious morals and ethics courses. Private schools may offer a non-Islamic religious curriculum as an option for non-Muslims.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to forbid any non-Sunni practice of Islam, barred Muslims from converting to another religion, and imposed fines, detentions, and canings on those classified under the law as Muslim who contravened sharia codes. It also limited proselytization by non-Muslim religious groups and restricted the distribution of religious texts. The government prosecuted some deemed to have “insulted Islam” under sedition laws, often following criticism of the government’s policies on religion. Because Islam, Malay ethnic identity, and the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) political party are closely linked, it is difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

The government continued actions against Shia Muslims engaged in religious practice. In October the Selangor State Islamic Department (JAIS) detained 50 Pakistani nationals believed to be Shia Muslims at an event to mark the day of Ashura. In November the Melaka State Islamic Department arrested 15 suspected members of what authorities said was a “deviant” Shia group. Those arrested were free on bail pending trial as of the end of the year. Under state sharia law, each faced up to three years in jail or a 5,000 ringgit (RM) ($1,115) fine for “insulting Islam.”

JAKIM continued to implement established federal guidelines concerning what constituted deviant Islamic behavior or belief. State religious authorities generally followed these guidelines. Those differing from the official interpretation of Islam continued to face adverse government action, including mandatory “rehabilitation” in centers that teach and enforce government-approved Islamic practices. The government forbade individuals to leave such centers until they completed the program, which varied in length, but often lasted approximately six months. These counseling programs continued to be designed to ensure the detainee adopted the government’s official interpretation of Islam. State Islamic religious enforcement officers continued to have the authority to accompany police on raids of private premises and public establishments, and to enforce sharia, including for violations such as indecent dress, distribution of banned publications, alcohol consumption, or khalwat (close proximity to a nonfamily member of the opposite sex).

Proceedings were ongoing in a civil court in the case of the NGO Sisters in Islam (SIS) against JAIS authorities. The case stemmed from a 2014 fatwa with the force of law labeling the NGO a “religiously deviant organization for subscribing to liberalism and pluralism.” In June a lower civil court ruled only the sharia court had the authority to decide on the validity of the fatwa; SIS filed an appeal of the decision to a higher civil court.

The government used sedition laws to restrict and punish speech seen as criticizing Sunni Islam. Civil society activists said the government selectively prosecuted speech allegedly denigrating Islam and largely ignored criticisms of other faiths. In August authorities detained rapper Wee Meng Chee, who uses the stage name Namewee, in Penang State for releasing a music video they said “defiled a place of worship with the intent of insulting a religion of any class.” The video used the word “Allah” and sounds of the Islamic call to prayer and was partly filmed at a mosque as well as a church and Hindu, Buddhist, and Taoist temples. Namewee was released on bail after four days and could face up to two years in prison. At year’s end, authorities had not charged him with a crime.

In September police conducted a predawn raid on the home of a former journalist after he posted remarks on social media about a recently deceased prominent Islamic political leader. Police detained him twice in 10 days while investigating him under laws against online “abuse” and causing “religious disharmony.” As of the end of the year, authorities had not charged him with a crime.

In June the head Islamic official of the Pahang State government referred to members of a mostly ethnic Chinese opposition party as kafir harbi (nonbelievers who can be slain for waging war on Islam) for their opposition to the adoption of hudood in the country. The police took no action against the religious leader despite calls to do so from civil society and opposition leaders.

Members of banned groups such as Shia, Ahmadi, and Al-Arqam Muslims, could not speak freely about their religious beliefs. Restrictions remained on the use of the word “Allah” by non-Muslims. The Sidan Injil Borneo (an evangelical church), based in Malaysia’s eastern island states, requested the Federal Court, the country’s highest court, consider the right of the church and its Malay language-speaking congregation to use the word “Allah” in Bibles and other religious publications. The court is scheduled to consider the case in 2017.

The government prohibited publications, public events, and public debates that it stated might incite religious disharmony. Officials at the federal and state levels oversaw Islamic religious activities, distributed sermon texts for mosques to follow, used mosques to convey political messages, and limited public expression of religion. In January JAKIM released pamphlets, flyers, and other promotional materials that said Shia Muslims were potential “radical” threats.

The government placed restrictions on religious assembly and denied certain religious groups the ability to register as charitable organizations. Representatives of religious groups complained the registrar had no consistent policy or transparent criteria for determining whether to register religious groups. In cases in which the government refused to register a religious group, the group could pursue registration as a company. Religious groups reported that registering as a company was generally relatively quick and provided a legal basis for conducting business, did not limit the group’s religious activities, and allowed the organization certain activities such as holding a bank account and owning property, but did not give the organization tax-exempt status or government funding. Examples of groups that registered as companies include Jehovah’s Witnesses and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons).

The federal and state governments continued to forbid religious assembly and worship for groups considered to be deviant Islamic groups such as Shia, Ahmadiyya, and Al-Arqam. While Ahmadi Muslims in the country reported generally being able to maintain a worship center, government religious authorities did not allow them to hold Friday prayers as these could only be done in an officially registered mosque.

In August a court in Kuala Lumpur upheld the government’s ban of four books by novelist Faisal Tehrani for allegedly spreading Shia teachings.

State governments had exclusive authority over allocation of land for, and the construction of, all places of worship, as well as land allocation for all cemeteries. Non-Muslim groups reported regular difficulties in obtaining permission from local authorities to build new places of worship, leading many groups to use buildings zoned for residential or commercial use for their religious services. Observers said that this practice has been largely tolerated, but also has left the religious groups vulnerable.

Representatives from one Christian group reported continued frustration at local authorities’ unwillingness over the last several years to approve plans to build a new house of worship. The group said it planned instead to renovate existing warehouse space.

The federal government budget allocated RM 1 billion ($223 million) to JAKIM during the year for a wide variety of Islamic education and mosque-related projects. There were no specifically allocated funds in the government budget for non-Muslim religious groups, although some religious groups reported continuing to receive sporadic funding for temple and church buildings and activities.

At primary and secondary public schools, student assemblies frequently commenced with recitation of an Islamic prayer by a teacher or school leader. Homeschooling remained legal, but some families reported difficulty in obtaining approval from the Ministry of Education. Community leaders and civil liberties groups reported that religion teachers in many public schools, particularly in the peninsula of the country, pressured Muslim girls to wear the tudong (Islamic head covering) at school. Some private schools required Muslim girls to wear veils fully covering the face.

Civil liberty groups and non-Muslim religious leaders said that when civil and sharia jurisdictions intersected, civil courts continued to give deference to sharia courts, creating situations where non-Muslims were affected by sharia judgments. The media and civil liberty lawyers reported that sharia courts often decided child custody cases where one parent converted to Islam while the other did not – and have historically favored the Muslim parent. When facing competing orders by civil and sharia courts regarding custody, they stated the police generally sided with the sharia decisions. In August, however, Prime Minister Najib Razak announced the government’s plans to introduce amendments ensuring interfaith disputes involving civil marriages would be resolved in civil court. Parliamentary debate on the proposed amendments was expected to begin in March 2017.

In May the opposition Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) introduced a bill significantly raising current limits on sharia courts’ punishment powers. States must currently limit sharia court punishments to three years in prison; RM 5,000 ($1,115) fines; and six strokes of the cane. The most recent version of the PAS bill proposed to raise those limits to 30 years in prison; RM 100,000 ($22,297) fines; and 100 strokes of the cane. The bill generated substantial public discussion, with Muslim groups and some official state Islamic authorities supporting the effort. In a November speech Prime Minister Najib reiterated his ruling UMNO party’s position of cooperating with PAS on the bill in order to “develop Islam” and “empower the sharia courts.” Some other Muslim and non-Muslim groups opposed the legislation, which they stated infringed on the country’s civil laws and represented a first step toward the eventual enforcement of hudood.

It remained difficult for those registered as Muslims to have their religious identification changed by the authorities. In August the court of appeal in Sarawak State ruled against three converts to Islam who later said they had left the religion and wanted their identification information changed accordingly. The court decided that the matter needed to be resolved in the state sharia court but the applicants appealed their case to the civil Federal Court.

According to press reports, in April the National Registration Department (NRD) appealed a federal High Court ruling that a Sarawak man who was born into a Christian family that converted to Islam when he was a child had the right to reconvert to Christianity as an adult and have his identity card show his faith as Christian. Reportedly, the NRD argued that only a sharia court could make this decision, but the High Court judge disagreed saying, “…freedom of religion is his constitutional right and only he can exercise that right.”

Government officials made anti-Semitic, and in some cases anti-Christian, statements. In March Member of Parliament and Deputy Minister of Agriculture Tajuddin Abdul Rahman accused former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of working with Jewish-controlled media to bring down Prime Minister Najib.

Some government bodies, including the federal Department of National Unity and Integration, were tasked with encouraging religious harmony and protecting the rights of minority religious groups. Many faith-based organizations, however, continued to state they believed that none had the power and the influence of those that regulated Islamic affairs, citing the large footprint and budget for the Department of Islamic Development, compared to the limited funding for the Department of National Unity and Integration.

Local human rights organizations and religious leaders stated that society continued to become increasingly intolerant of religious diversity. They cited public protests against non-Sunni Muslim groups, some Muslim groups’ continuing public condemnation of events and activities they said were “un-Islamic,” as well as heavily publicized social media posts targeting non-Sunni Muslims and non-Muslim groups.

According to AsiaNews, in February Catholic school leaders reported and denounced what they said was increasingly aggressive proselytism in Catholic schools to convert Catholic students to Islam. The president of the Educational Commission of the Archdiocese of Kota Kinabalu, Sister Rita Chew, said the government denied such activity was taking place but Catholic schools and parents reported their children being taught Islamic prayers and some conversions had taken place.

Hindus protested Indian Imam Zakir Naik’s April speaking tour to the country because they said his message insulted Hinduism and promoted extremism. Naik was welcomed by the government.

Religious converts, particularly those converting from Islam, sometimes faced severe stigmatization. In many cases, converts reportedly concealed newly adopted beliefs and practices from their former coreligionists, including friends and relatives. Muslim women and girls faced social pressure to wear the tudong. Muslim women who did not wear the head scarf or dress modestly were often subject to shaming on social media. In September fans criticized local celebrity Nik Zaris Uqasha Senrose for removing her tudong.

Religious identities continued to affect secular aspects of life. In July Muslim groups including PAS protested Selangor State’s approval of a concert featuring an American pop star deemed “too sexy” and therefore “un-Islamic” and inappropriate for the Muslim-majority city to be hosting the event during the holy month of Syawal. The singer performed in the concert.

At least eight incidents of vandalism at Hindu temples around the country were reported from April to November. In April police charged Fathi Munzir Nadzri with defiling a temple in Perak State, which carried a jail sentence of up to two years and a fine. In November the Sessions Court acquitted Nadzri on grounds of insanity, but prosecutors appealed the ruling. In July police arrested a suspect accused of two temple vandalism cases in Penang State. Hindu leaders and NGOs said police ignored the potential religious or ethnic motivations for the crimes and called on authorities to increase protection for places of worship and to investigate the cases of vandalism for any elements of “terrorism and extremism.”

According to media reports, in March a mosque in Lutong, Sarawak State, said it would open its new parking lot to churchgoers of the neighboring Anglican church. The priest said it was an example of the “true spirit” of the country and the tolerance in Sarawak.

Several months after protesters forced the congregation of a small Christian church to take down the cross on its outside wall in 2015, the church replaced the cross without protests following community mediation efforts from the Department of National Unity and Integration.

U.S. and embassy officials engaged with a wide variety of federal and state government officials and civil society leaders on religious freedom issues throughout the year.

In November the U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom met with the federal minister for unity, the chair of the National Human Rights Commission, and with the mufti overseeing Islamic affairs in the country’s capital and Federal Territories. The Ambassador at Large discussed the difficulties reported by minority groups, including non-Muslim and non-Sunni Muslim groups. He urged the authorities to provide equal protection to all religious groups. In May the U.S. Special Representative to Muslim Communities promoted religious freedom during meetings with religious and civil society leaders. He met with the federal minister for youth and sports and discussed interfaith dialogue and religious freedom issues in the context of preventing violent extremism. During a February visit to Kuala Lumpur, a Deputy Assistant Secretary from the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor hosted a roundtable meeting with religious leaders and faith-based organizations. Among the topics discussed with the group, which included Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist representatives, were the negative effects of forbidding use of the word “Allah” to denote God for Christians worshipping in their native language, and the role of Islam in the courts’ inability to settle the limits of sharia in child custody and conversion cases. They also discussed the changing official view of Islam, which has led government religious authorities to limit the voices heard in mosques.

Embassy officials engaged with religious and civil society leaders throughout the year on topics of concern, including meetings to hear the concerns of Shia and Ahmadi Muslim groups deemed “deviant” by government religious authorities; the groups detailed the heavy restrictions on their worship activities. Embassy officials also met with a variety of non-Muslim groups who reported continued difficulties registering churches, building houses of worship, and facing societal discrimination. The embassy also engaged with groups of Sunni Muslims whose activities were limited by the government, such as the Islamic NGO Sisters in Islam (SIS). Embassy officers regularly attended the court proceedings in SIS’s civil case against JAIS and encouraged diplomats from other countries also to attend and provide support for the group.

The U.S. embassy promoted religious freedom issues through a variety of outreach programs around the country. In January embassy officers visited Islamic religious schools in rural Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Penang states to engage with influential religious leaders on various issues, including freedom of religion. In March a senior embassy official hosted an event for former participants of a U.S. government exchange program on their continued engagement in the country’s rural Muslim communities. In June the embassy hosted an iftar for Rohingya refugee children to showcase the U.S. commitment to religious minorities under threat. In August the embassy hosted a U.S.-based imam who spoke with a diverse set of audiences about issues faced by youth, life as a Muslim in the United States, and the positive role young people can play in developing a more tolerant society.

The U.S. embassy also inaugurated a months-long series of interfaith dialogues and forums in September with an emphasis on unity among Malaysians from different religious backgrounds.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 393,000 (July 2016 estimate), which includes approximately 110,000 foreign workers from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan. The Maldives government estimates there may be another 15,000 to 20,000 undocumented foreign workers in the country from South Asian countries. While officially, the religion of the indigenous population is Islam and the vast majority of citizens appear to follow Sunni practices, there are no reliable estimates of the citizenry’s actual religious affiliation. Foreign workers appear to be mostly Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and Christians.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the country is a republic based on the principles of Islam and designates the state religion as Islam, which it defines in terms of Sunni teachings. It states citizens have a “duty” to preserve and protect the state religion of Islam. According to the constitution, non-Muslims may not obtain citizenship.

The constitution states citizens are free to engage in activities “not expressly prohibited” by sharia, but it stipulates the Majlis may pass laws limiting rights and freedoms “to protect and maintain the tenets of Islam.” In making a decision about whether a limitation on a right or freedom is constitutional, the constitution states a court must take into account the extent to which the right or freedom “must be limited” to protect Islam.

The constitution makes no mention of the freedom of religion or belief. Although it contains a provision prohibiting discrimination “of any kind,” it does not list religion as a prohibited basis of discrimination. The constitution states individuals have a right to freedom of thought and expression, but in a manner “not contrary to tenets of Islam.”

The law prohibits the conversion of a Muslim to another religion and specifies a violation may result in the loss of the convert’s citizenship, although a judge may impose harsher punishment per sharia jurisprudence.

The law, in the provisions of the Religious Unity Act passed in 1994, states both the government and the people must protect religious unity. Any statement or action found to be contrary to this aim is subject to criminal penalty. Specific infractions include working to disrupt religious unity and discussions or acts promoting religious differences. The list of infractions also includes delivering religious sermons in a way infringing upon the independence and sovereignty of the country or limiting the rights of a specific section of society. According to the law, sentences for violators may include a fine of up to 20,000 rufiyaa ($1,322) or imprisonment from two to five years, or deportation for foreigners.

In August the parliament passed a new law entitled “Anti-Defamation and Freedom of Expression” which criminalizes speech breaking Islamic tenets, breaching social norms, or threatening national security. The new law states freedom of expression is a basic right “as long as it is in line with the tenets of Islam.” It states the expression of thoughts and opinion in writing, in speech, or through another medium is protected, except in cases where such an expression “makes a mockery of Islam,” questions the validity of Islam or one of its tenets, compromises the “religious homogeneity of Maldivians,” or causes “disunity and religious polarization.” The new law further states any religious preaching or efforts to teach Islam shall be in accordance with the standards set forth in the Religious Unity Act. It also states religious teaching in schools and universities shall be carried out in accordance with the Religious Unity Act and only by those authorized by the government to teach Islam.

The new law authorizes the government to cut off live feeds and/or suspend a station’s license if it broadcasts content that violates its provisions. Publications, including websites, carrying “defamatory” comments may also have their licenses revoked. The new law specifies fines for defamation and violating social norms ranging between 50,000 rufiyaa ($3,305) and 2 million rufiyaa ($132,000) and states a failure to pay the fine will result in a jail sentence of three to six months. Failure to pay the fine may also lead to the closure of newspapers and media offices. The verdicts may only be appealed after the fine is paid.

The new law states the penalty for “breaking the tenets of Islam” shall be the same as those specified under the existing penal code for “criticizing Islam,” which states a person commits an offense by engaging in religious oration or criticism of Islam in public or in a public medium with the intent to cause disregard for Islam; producing, selling, or distributing material criticizing Islam; producing, selling, distributing, importing, disseminating, or possessing “idols of worship;” and/or attempting to disrupt the religious unity of the citizenry or conversing or acting in a manner likely to cause “religious segregation.” Individuals convicted of these offenses are subject to imprisonment for up to one year.

By law, citizens may not deliver sermons or explain religious principles in public without obtaining a license to do so from the MIA. Imams may not prepare Friday sermons without government authorization. To obtain a license to preach, the law specifies an individual must be a Sunni Muslim, must have a degree in religious studies, and must not have been convicted of a crime in sharia court. The law also sets educational standards for imams to ensure they have theological qualifications the government considers adequate. Government regulations stipulate the requirements for preaching and contain general principles for the delivery of religious sermons. The regulations prohibit statements in sermons which may be interpreted as racial or gender discrimination; discourage access to education or health services in the name of Islam; or demean the character of, or create hatred towards, people of any other religion. The law provides for a punishment of two to five years in prison or house arrest for violations of these provisions. Anyone who assists in such a violation is subject to imprisonment or house arrest for two to four years and a fine between 5,000-20,000 rufiyaa ($330-$1,322). The law requires foreign scholars to shape their sermons in line with the country’s norms, traditions, culture, and social etiquette.

Propagation of any religion other than Islam is a criminal offense. Proselytizing to change denominations within Islam is illegal and punishable by two to five years in jail or house arrest, depending on the gravity of the offense. If the offender is a foreigner, his or her license to preach in the country will be revoked, and he or she will be deported. Proselytizing to Muslims by adherents of other religions is illegal, and the penalty is the same as for intra-Islamic proselytizing.

By law, prayer houses remain under the control of the MIA rather than the country’s island councils. The law prohibits the establishment of places of worship for non-Islamic religious groups.

The law prohibits noncitizens living in or visiting the country from conducting religious activities in public.

By law, a Maldivian woman may not marry a non-Muslim foreigner unless he converts to Islam first. A Maldivian man may marry a non-Muslim foreigner if the foreigner is Christian or Jewish; other foreigners must convert to Islam prior to marriage.

The law prohibits importation of any items deemed contrary to Islam by the MIA, including religious literature, religious statues, alcohol, pork products, and pornographic materials. Penalties for contravention of the law range from three months to three years imprisonment. It is against the law to offer alcohol to a citizen, although government regulations permit the sale of alcoholic beverages on resort islands. Individuals may request permission to import restricted goods from the Ministry of Economic Development.

The constitution states education shall strive to “inculcate obedience to Islam” and “instill love for Islam.” In accordance with the law, the MIA regulates Islamic instruction in schools, while the Ministry of Education funds salaries of religious instructors in schools. Islam is a compulsory subject for all primary and secondary school students. A new curriculum introduced in 2015 incorporates Islam into all subject areas at all levels of education, specifying eight core competencies that are underpinned by Islamic values, principles, and practices.

The constitution states Islam forms one basis of the law and “no law contrary to any tenet of Islam shall be enacted.” The constitution specifies judges must apply sharia in deciding matters not addressed by the constitution or by law.

The penal code prescribes flogging sentences for a small number of crimes, including fornication. Other sharia penalties are not specified, but the code grants judges the discretion to impose sharia penalties for hudood (serious crimes) listed in the Quran and qisas(retaliatory) offenses – including murder, apostasy, assault, theft, homosexual acts, drinking alcohol, and property damage – if proven to a standard of practical certainty.

The penal code requires all appeal processes be exhausted prior to the administration of sharia punishments specific to hudood and qisas offenses, including stoning, amputation of hands, and similar punishments.

In April and November the parliament passed amendments to the law creating a Supreme Council of Fatwa with the authority to issue fatwas or legal opinions on religious matters. The Supreme Council replaced the Fiqh Academy, the institution previously responsible for resolving differences of opinion and disputes on religious matters. The council will function under the MIA and comprise of five members appointed to five-year terms. The president names three members directly and chooses a fourth from the faculty of either the Maldives National University or the Islamic University of Maldives. The minister of Islamic affairs recommends the fifth member, but this appointment is still subject to approval by the president.

Antiterror legislation includes as a crime “unlawfully” promoting any religious, political, or other ideology.

The constitution stipulates the president, cabinet ministers, members of parliament, and judges must be Sunni Muslims.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) with a reservation stating the government’s application of the principles set out in ICCPR Article 18, which relates to religious freedom, shall be “without prejudice to the Constitution of the Republic of Maldives.”

Government Practices

Police reported they had preliminarily investigated 57 cases of suspected black magic during the year. Although there was no law defining or addressing the practice of black magic, the police included it in warrants as a basis for making arrests. Once the cases moved to the courts, observers said, the individuals arrested on this basis were prosecuted for “conspiracy to cause harm” or for “criticizing Islam.” The police forwarded 11 of the 57 cases to the prosecutor general’s office for further action.

Local media continued to describe such cases as arrests for black magic, reporting approximately a dozen individuals, including two top island council civil servants, had been arrested on suspicion of practicing black magic during the year. Local media reported police found and confiscated materials used for practicing black magic, including books written in Arabic, in the homes of the suspects. The arrests followed local media reports about President Abdulla Yameen’s reputed fear the main opposition had used black magic to curse him and the president’s own reputed use of black magic to assist him in winning the 2013 election.

Observers stated belief in black magic remained widespread throughout the country. In February the Maldives Broadcasting Commission ordered Raajje TV, a private station, to stop rebroadcasting any portion of an interview it had conducted with the president’s former “black magic practitioner,” and ordered all television stations to refrain from broadcasting any content involving black magic on the grounds that it encouraged people to use black magic. The Fiqh Academy warned the media not to disseminate any information that might promote black magic, saying it was a “grave sin” prohibited in Islam. The academy stated such programs might “lead the public astray from the clear path of Islam.”

During a January political rally held by the Progressive Party of Maldives, President Yameen stated, “We do not accept that there should be other religions in the Maldives….We do not want another faith in the Maldives.”

In January while speaking at an official ceremony to mark the day the country embraced Islam, Minister of Defense and National Security Adam Shareef Umar stated, “We all have to engineer ways to keep Maldives as a fully Islamic nation.” Referring to the educational standards introduced in 2015, he said teachers and parents should follow and implement the new education curriculum, saying the population needed to be “wary of secular ideals creeping into society.”

In September the government dismissed several Department of Immigration officers for failure to comply with the uniform code, which required beards to be kept shorter than two centimeters and prohibited trouser hems above the ankle. The officers had refused to comply on religious grounds, saying trimming their beards and lowering their trousers went against the Quran and the teachings and practices of Prophet Muhammad.

The MIA continued its control over all matters relating to religion and religious belief. It continued to require imams to use government-approved sermons in Friday prayers.

According to the MIA, foreign residents (such as teachers and laborers) and tourists, continued to be free to worship in private, but congregating in public for non-Islamic prayer remained illegal, as was encouraging local citizens to participate. The government continued to permit foreigners, including non-Muslims, to attend local Sunni mosques if they wished.

The MIA continued to conduct what it termed “awareness programs” through radio and television broadcasts in Male and on various islands to give citizens information on Islam, and it continued to provide assistance and counseling to foreigners seeking to convert to Islam. The ministry, in partnership with religious NGOs, continued to send imams to outer atolls to conduct workshops for students, youth, and other groups in schools and government buildings for the stated purpose of strengthening the islanders’ understanding and acceptance of Islam.

Customs officials reported 18 cases during the year involving the importation of religious idols and a Christian cross. Customs stated all the cases had been closed and letters of caution would be issued to those involved as first-time offenders. Customs officials reported they had issued a letter of caution to a work visa holder as a first-time offender involved in the importation of 207 prohibited religious books in 2015.

Customs authorities said the MIA continued to permit the importation of religious literature, such as Bibles, for personal use. The MIA also continued to allow some religious literature for scholarly research. The sale of religious items, such as Christmas cards, remained restricted by the ministry to the resort islands patronized by foreign tourists.

In September the MIA initiated a project to provide every citizen a copy of the Quran. The project was funded by NGOs, individual donations, and the Quran Care Society of Bahrain.

The Maldives Port Limited, a government-owned company operating the port facilities in Male, donated 4,765 religious books to the MIA to be used as “Islamic reference” and to assist those who “wished to convert to Islam.”

According to the MIA, the government continued to own and control all mosques, including maintaining and funding them. The government continued to permit private sources to fund mosques as well.

The National Institute of Education continued to implement a curriculum for public and private schools incorporating Islam in all subject areas. According to NGOs and other observers, passages in some of the new textbooks portrayed democracy as being anti-Islam, encouraged anti-Semitism and xenophobia, glorified jihad, and demonized the West. The MIA continued to permit foreign nationals to opt out of Islamic instruction as a standalone subject. The MIA also continued to permit foreigners to raise their children to follow any religious teaching they wished, but only in private.

NGOs reported widespread criticism of the lack of academic qualifications of one of the president’s appointees to the Supreme Council of Fatwa. Observers also criticized his appointment of Al Sheikh Adam Shameem because of Shameem’s membership in the religious NGO Jamiyyatul Salaf, a self-described antisecular advocate of a Wahhabi/Salafi school of Islam. They also criticized Shameem’s role as a founder of the NGO Al-Asr, which held workshops in the islands reportedly supporting an extremist interpretation of Islam and involved in efforts to recruit Maldivians for jihad in Syria.

The Communications Authority of Maldives (CAM) continued to maintain an unpublished blacklist of websites containing material it deemed un-Islamic or anti-Islamic. The CAM stated it did not proactively monitor internet content, but instead relied on requests from ministries and other government agencies to block websites violating laws against criticizing or defaming Islam. The Maldives Police Service reported it was investigating one case of online content against the tenets of Islam and one case of Islamic radicalization as of year’s end.

Following passage of the new law criminalizing speech breaking the tenets of Islam or social norms, the country’s first private TV station, DhiTV, abruptly closed. Observers concluded the closure was related to the new law. The government’s media-regulating agency, Maldives Broadcasting Commission, issued a warning to all broadcast companies to pay “special attention” to the law and take more care censoring coverage of live events and current affairs. Journalists stated the passage of the law set the stage for the criminalization of media reports for defaming religion and the potential imprisonment of journalists or anyone critical of the government.

In March the Maldivian Democratic Party condemned the government’s invitation to a visiting fundamentalist preacher, Assim al-Hakeem from Saudi Arabia, to deliver the Friday prayer at the Islamic Center in Male, the country’s largest mosque. In his sermon, the cleric said it was “un-Islamic” to disobey rulers even if they were “unjust,” “corrupt,” or perpetrated the use of torture. He further stated Muslims must hate non-Muslims and “outsiders” who tried to divide them from their ruler, and should kill anyone urging them to rebel against their ruler. NGOs said the government used fundamentalist preachers such as al-Hakeem to stifle democracy.

NGOs reported numerous instances of secularist bloggers receiving death threats, being cyberbullied, and being followed on the street by individuals with records as criminal gang members. Victims stated they felt vulnerable as a result of a lack of police responsiveness to their complaints and because similar events had preceded the 2014 disappearance of journalist Ahmed Rilwan, who had filed reports on reputed links between religious extremists and criminal gangs.

The 2012 stabbing of religious freedom advocate Ismail “Hilath” Rasheed by an unknown assailant remained unsolved. Observers stated the unsolved stabbing and Rasheed’s discontinuation of his blog in 2015 had created a chilling effect on other would-be advocates of religious freedom.

NGOs reported continued community pressure on women to wear a veil. They stated women who did not wear a veil continued to report harassment.

Jamiyyatul Salaf announced it was increasing its religious activities, including TV broadcasts and religious classes in mosques during Ramadan, as a result of an increase in resources and members.

NGOs said they continued to see a rise in religious radicalism and fundamentalism.

There is no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in the country, but the U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka is accredited to Maldives and the U.S. Embassy in Sri Lanka maintained an American Center in the country, set up as a partnership with the National Library of Maldives. All engagement with the government was conducted by visiting staff of the U.S. Embassy in Sri Lanka, who traveled to Maldives regularly, or through embassy interaction with Maldivian officials based in Colombo. In the wake of the passage of the new law on defamation, the embassy raised concern over the criminalization of speech contravening the tenets of Islam. In addition, in meetings throughout the year, the embassy continued to encourage the government to be more tolerant of religious traditions other than Sunni Islam, to reduce its restrictions preventing non-Sunni Muslims from practicing their religions freely, and to reduce its rhetoric and derogatory statements about other religious traditions in its continuing efforts to counter the rise of what it characterized as “radical” Islam. Embassy officers also expressed concern over the anti-Semitic and antidemocratic rhetoric in textbooks and over the societal victimization of secularist bloggers.

In August the Department of State Press Office issued a statement calling the Anti-Defamation and Freedom of Expression law criminalizing speech defaming Islam and deviating from social norms a “serious setback for freedom of expression in the country.”

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 17.5 million (July 2016 estimate). Muslims constitute an estimated 95 percent of the population. Nearly all Muslims are Sunni and most follow Sufism. Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Christians, of whom approximately two-thirds are Roman Catholic and one-third Protestant, groups with indigenous religious beliefs, and those with no religious affiliation. Groups adhering to indigenous religious beliefs reside throughout the country, but are mostly present in rural areas. Many Muslims and Christians also adhere to some aspects of indigenous beliefs. There are fewer than 1,000 individuals in Bamako and an unknown number outside of the capital associated with the Muslim group Dawa al-Tabligh.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as a secular state and provides for freedom of religion in conformity with the law.

According to the penal code, any act of discrimination based on religion or any act impeding the freedom of religious observance or worship is punishable with up to five years of imprisonment or 10 years’ banishment (prohibition from residing in the country). The penal code also states any religiously motivated persecution of a group of people constitutes a crime against humanity. There is no statute of limitations for such crimes, which may be tried in the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The law requires registration of all public associations, including religious groups, except for groups practicing indigenous religious beliefs; however, registration confers no tax preferences or other legal benefits and there is no penalty for failure to register. To register, applicants must submit copies of a declaration of intent to create an association, notarized copies of bylaws, copies of policies and regulations, notarized copies of a report of the first meeting of the association’s general assembly, and lists of the names of the leaders of the association with signature samples of three of the leaders. Upon review, the Ministry of Territorial Administration grants the certificate of registration.

The constitution prohibits public schools from offering religious instruction but private schools may do so. Religious schools, which are privately funded and known locally as medersas (a variant of madrassah), teach religion, but are required to adhere to the standard government curriculum. Informal schools, known locally as Quranic schools, which some students attend in lieu of attending public schools, do not follow a government curriculum and offer exclusively religious instruction.

The law defines marriage as secular. Couples who seek legal recognition must have a civil ceremony, which they may follow with a religious ceremony. Under the law, a man may choose between a monogamous or polygamous marriage. The law states that the religious customs of the deceased determine inheritance rights. Civil courts consider these customs when they adjudicate such cases; however, many cases are settled informally.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government collaborated with ICC investigators to prosecute individuals who committed crimes against the country’s religious and cultural heritage. On September 27, Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi, also known as Abu Tourab, was convicted by the ICC in The Hague and sentenced to nine years in prison for his involvement in the 2012 destruction of nine mausoleums and a mosque in Timbuktu. The case was part of an investigation the ICC launched in response to a July 2012 request by the local government.

At year’s end, the investigation into the alleged crimes of Houka ag al-Housseiny had not been completed and the case had not yet gone to trial, reportedly due to challenges collecting sufficient evidence. Domestic and international security forces stated they suspected ag al-Housseiny of having acted as a judge for al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) during the group’s occupation of Timbuktu, and of ordering floggings and amputations in that capacity. The government provisionally released him in August 2014. Similarly, authorities made no progress in the investigation into the crimes allegedly committed by Sidi Amar ould Daha, also known as Yoro, whom domestic and international security forces stated they suspected of ordering floggings and amputations while leading the police force of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa during its 2012-2013 occupation of Gao. Authorities released Yoro in 2014 and as of the end of the year he had become a leading member of a government-aligned militia.

By year’s end, the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission had not made substantial progress on its core functions or set up full-fledged operations on the ground. The commission stated it had established contact with victims of the country’s armed conflict, in addition to presenting its mission and services to affected communities, including victims of religious persecution.

The minister of religious affairs and traditions was responsible for promoting religious tolerance and coordinating national religious activities such as pilgrimages and religious holidays for followers of all religions. In January the minister held a prayer ceremony for Muslims and Christians in Banico calling for peace and reconciliation among religious groups and unity among all residents. In July the minister spoke during a Catholic Mass at the national cathedral in the presence of the Archbishop of Bamako.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Throughout the country, violent armed groups including Ansar al-Dine and its affiliate Macina Liberation Front (MLF), AQIM, and al-Mourabitoun continued to carry out targeted attacks against security forces, UN peacekeepers, civilians, and others they reportedly perceived as not adhering to their interpretation of Islam. Ansar al-Dine claimed responsibility for a July 19 attack on the military base in Nampala that killed 17 soldiers and wounded 35. On May 31, al-Mourabitoun attacked a UN peacekeeping base in Gao, killing one Chinese peacekeeper, two UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) employees, and a French national working with UNMAS. AQIM was suspected of having killed the son of the village chief of the town of Boni on February 8 after he reportedly refused to collaborate with extremist groups.

Muslim and non-Muslim religious leaders frequently and jointly condemned extremist interpretations of Islam.

In July Catholic and Muslim religious leaders spoke at the Eid al-Fitr ceremony hosted by President Keita and called for peace among the different faiths.

Members of religious groups commonly attended the religious ceremonies of other religious groups, especially baptisms, weddings, and funerals.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy representatives discussed religious freedom with government officials and highlighted the country’s potential to use its history of religious tolerance to promote peace in the region. In particular, the embassy encouraged government officials to take steps to prosecute individuals arrested for crimes linked to extremist activities. Embassy officers spoke with a wide range of influential religious leaders and human rights organizations. Embassy officials called on their interlocutors to advocate for tolerance and peace among religions, and organized a number of activities to emphasize the importance of religious tolerance and freedom. A number of prominent religious leaders associated with the country’s two chief Sufi and Salafist leaders participated in a U.S. government exchange programs to support themes related to religious diversity and tolerance.

Some of the U.S. embassy’s most widely shared social media postings during the year included messages from the Ambassador on the occasions of Ramadan, Easter, Eid al-Fitr, and especially Eid al-Adha. These messages highlighted the country’s role as a leader in the Muslim world, with regard to promoting a culture of tolerance and respect for diversity.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 415,000 (July 2016 estimate). A survey conducted by the newspaper Malta Today in March showed 89 percent of the 500 respondents identifying as Roman Catholic. Another 4.5 percent of respondents identified as atheist/agnostic, while 6 percent said they belonged to other religious groups. These other groups include an estimated 10,000, largely foreign, Muslims, according to the Islamic Call Society, most of whom are Sunni and Shia, but which also include Ahmadis. Smaller groups include Copts, Greek Orthodox, Baptists, evangelical Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Seventh-day Adventists, members of the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), Zen Buddhists, Bahais, and adherents of indigenous African religions. There are an estimated 120 Jews, according to Jewish community leaders.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates full freedom of conscience and religious worship, subject to restrictions in the interests of public safety, order, morality, or health, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It prohibits discriminatory treatment on the basis of creed. The constitution establishes Catholicism as the state religion and declares the Catholic Church has “the duty and the right to teach which principles are right and which are wrong.”

In July through an amendment to the criminal code, the government updated provisions on crimes against religion – including the decriminalization of the vilification of religion – and expanded the scope of the crime of incitement to racial hatred to include incitement of religious hatred. Those convicted of incitement to religious hatred are liable to imprisonment for a term of six to 18 months.

The government does not require religious groups to be registered or licensed. A religious group has the option of registering as a voluntary organization with the office of the commissioner for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). To qualify, the organization must be nonprofit, autonomous, and voluntary; provide a resolution letter signed by all its committee or board members requesting registration; provide its authenticated annual accounts and annual report; and pay a 40-euro ($42) registration fee. The law does not provide registered groups with tax reductions or exemptions, but allows them to make collections without obtaining any further authorization. It also allows them to receive grants, sponsorships, and financial aid from the government and the Voluntary Organizations Fund, an entity financed through the government and the European Union. The fund, whose governing council is appointed by the minister of education and made up of representatives from voluntary organizations and a government representative, supports enrolled voluntary organizations.

Religious groups not registered as voluntary organizations with the office of the commissioner for nongovernmental organizations do not receive funding from the government or the Voluntary Organizations Fund and require government approval – issued by the Commissioner of Police – to collect contributions from the public, but otherwise have the same legal rights as registered groups.

The criminal code prohibits individuals from wearing “masks or disguises” in public, unless explicitly allowed by law; there is no specific reference – or exception – to coverings worn for religious reasons.

All religious groups may own property, including buildings. Property used for a particular purpose including religious worship, must obtain a permit for that purpose from the Planning Authority. All religious groups may organize and run private religious schools; their religious leaders may perform marriages and other functions.

The constitution and law make Catholic education, which does not have to be taught by Catholic teachers, compulsory in public schools but allows students, with parental consent if the student is under the age of 16, to opt out of these classes and instead take an ethics course if one is available. If a school does not offer an ethics course, students may still opt out of the religion class.

Enrollment in private religious schools is permitted. The law does not regulate religious education in private schools. The law does not allow homeschooling for religious or other reasons except for physical or mental infirmity.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Parliament’s amendments to the criminal code decriminalizing the vilification of religion generated considerable controversy. An academic from the University of Malta and other critics stated the changes would make it harder to prosecute persons for inciting religious hatred. Justice Minister Owen Bonnici stated, “In a democratic country, people should be free to make fun of religions, while not inciting hatred.” On July 12, commenting on the change in the law, Catholic Archbishop Charles Scicluna, tweeted, “Demeaning God and man indeed go hand in hand. A sad day for Malta. Lord forgive them: they do not know what they do.”

The government did not enforce the legal ban on face coverings or disguises.

In January government authorities provided temporary premises “until a permanent solution was found” to a Muslim community that did not use the mosque in Paola, and that had been praying publicly after they experienced problems in obtaining permits for their makeshift prayer rooms. According to local media reports, the Planning Authority denied permits to the community to convert the use of a residence, a garage, and a shop in various parts of the country to be used as prayer rooms. By year’s end, there were no reports the Planning Authority had issued any permits for prayer rooms to the Muslim community.

The government continued to implement a pilot program to offer ethics education in state schools as an alternative to the 6 percent of students who reportedly did not attend Catholic religious classes. In December 2015, 40 teachers graduated from a specialized course to prepare them to teach the ethics classes. A total of 419 primary school students took ethics education classes during the 2015-16 school year. During the 2016-17 school year, the Ministry of Education extended the pilot project to nine more schools, expanding the program to a total of 1,073 students, or approximately three percent of all students.

In July the Ministry of Education launched a public consultation process on proposed changes to the education law, including the introduction of the option of homeschooling for parents. Public consultations ended in October.

In June the Forum for Equal Opportunities of the opposition Nationalist Party (PN) commemorated Ramadan with the Muslim community. At the event, PN Deputy Leader Beppe Fenech Adami discussed the importance of dialogue in the community and encouraged the social inclusion of all sectors in society.

In September and October respectively, members of the Soldiers of Odin, which the Anti-Defamation League, an NGO, and others have called a hate group, and the Maltese Patriots (Patrijotti Maltin), which registered as a political party with the electoral commission during the year, opposed attempts by the Muslim Council to obtain permits to legalize the use of a property as a prayer room. The Muslim Council represented Muslim worshippers who reportedly did not use the mosque at Paola. The Maltese Patriots organized a protest with approximately 100 participants at the site of the prayer room, with a handful of counter protesters gathering in response. The administration of St. Albert the Great’s College, belonging to the Dominican Friars, opened the school’s facilities to the Muslim community for religious purposes. The Muslim Council welcomed and accepted the offer.

In January the Maltese Patriots protested at the seafront where members of the Muslim community had gathered earlier in prayer. The Maltese Patriots handed out free pork sandwiches to passersby and protested against Muslims praying in public. In a statement to the press shortly afterwards, Archbishop Scicluna denounced the Maltese Patriots’ actions and stated, “One can never count other religions’ prayers as a threat if you are certain of yourself and know that others have the same rights as you have.… Our constitution guarantees the freedom of religious belief. The rights which I enjoy should be enjoyed by others.”

In August Imam Mohammed El Saadi accepted the invitation of the Bishop of Gozo, Mario Grech, to attend the liturgical celebrations at the Catholic Cathedral in Gozo in commemoration of the feast of Saint Mary, a day widely commemorated by Catholics in the country. In his reply accepting the invitation, the imam stated “Islam and Christianity are for tolerance, peace, and mutual respect” and said the Muslim community would continue to do the utmost to enhance these values. He also expressed condolences for the killing of a Catholic priest in France, Father Jacques Hamel, for which ISIS claimed responsibility.

To celebrate World Refugee Day in June, various religious denominations – including Catholics, Coptic Christians, and Muslims – conducted interfaith prayers for refugees and war victims at the Emigrants’ Commission, an NGO run by the Catholic Church that aims to support all those affected by migration.

The Ahmadiyya Muslim community held its annual peace symposium in collaboration with the University of Malta student council in March. Speakers included academics, students and guest Islamic scholars. A senior lecturer from the University of Malta emphasized the need and importance of understanding diversity and different religions and cultures.

The U.S. Ambassador and other embassy representatives met frequently with government officials, such as President Marie-Louise Coleiro Preca, Prime Minister Joseph Muscat, and the ministers for civil liberties, education, and home affairs to emphasize the shared values of religious freedom and tolerance. Embassy representatives engaged civil society leaders, such as leaders of Drachma (an LGBT support group with a religious orientation), Jesuit Refugee Services, and religious leaders representing all principal faiths in the country, such as Archbishop Scicluna and Imam El Saadi, to discuss respect for religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 73,000 (July 2016 estimate). Major religious groups, according to the last census that covered religious affiliation (1999), include the United Church of Christ (formerly Congregational), with 54.8 percent of the population; the Assemblies of God, 25.8 percent; the Roman Catholic Church, 8.4 percent; Bukot nan Jesus (also known as Assembly of God Part Two) 2.8 percent; and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), 2.1 percent. Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Full Gospel, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Bahais, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ), Jews, Ahmadi Muslims, Hindus, and atheists. Almost all those native to the country are Christian, according to government statistics. Many foreign-born residents and workers are also Christian, and the majority of non-Christians are foreign born.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief, as well as for free exercise of religion and equal protection under the law, regardless of religious beliefs. It also provides for “reasonable restrictions” imposed by law on the time, place, or manner of conduct – provided they are the least restrictive necessary for public peace, order, health, or security or the rights or freedoms of others, and they do not penalize conduct based on a disagreement with the ideas or beliefs expressed. The constitution states that no law or legal action shall discriminate against any person on the basis of religion.

The constitution allows the government to extend financial aid to religiously supported institutions to provide nonprofit educational, medical, or social services, on the condition that such services do not discriminate among religious groups.

There are no requirements for the registration of religious groups.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Governmental functions, by custom, often began and ended with an ordained minister or other church official delivering a Christian prayer. While there was no religious education in public schools, most extracurricular school events began and ended with an interdenominational Christian prayer delivered by a minister. According to local residents, prayers before and after events have been a longstanding cultural practice and part of the widely accepted tradition of the country.

The government provided funding to 15 private religious schools during the year totaling $495,000 through grants from the public school system. The Catholic Queen of Peace School in Ebeye received the largest increase in funding of any school from the previous year. The Assembly of God Ebeye Calvary School and the nondenominational Jabro Private School received considerably less funding than the previous year. Private religious schools in Majuro, Kwajalein, and Jaluit received government funding based largely on enrollment, but also school performance and accreditation, according to government officials.

Members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community reported that some prejudice against Muslims, while much lower than what was reported immediately after the 9/11 attacks, still contributed to government delays in approving certain humanitarian and social welfare projects sponsored by the community. Community representatives said politicians took no action on permit approvals for fear of reaction from their Christian constituents.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The Ambassador and embassy officials discussed religious freedom with the government and met with many local religious group leaders and foreign missionaries including the Ahmadiyya Muslim community, Protestant, Catholic, Mormon, and Iglesia ni Cristo Churches, as well as the Salvation Army. Topics of discussion included the government’s posture toward religious groups and how religious institutions could assist in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. In her October meeting with leaders of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community, the Ambassador discussed the community’s efforts to implement social welfare programs. Embassy officials continued to engage on the issue of stalled government approval for certain Ahmadi-sponsored projects.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.7 million (July 2016 estimate). Nearly all are Sunni Muslims. There are very small numbers of non-Muslims, mostly Christians and a small number of Jews, almost all of whom are foreigners.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as an Islamic republic and recognizes Islam as the sole religion of its citizens and the state. Only Muslims may be citizens. Persons who convert from Islam lose their citizenship.

The law and legal procedures are derived from a combination of French civil law and sharia. The judiciary consists of a single system of courts that uses principles of sharia in matters concerning the family and secular legal principles in all other matters.

The law prohibits apostasy. A Muslim convicted of apostasy who does not recant within three days may be sentenced to death and have his or her property confiscated. The government, however, has never applied capital punishment in this regard.

The government does not register Islamic religious groups, but all nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including humanitarian and development NGOs affiliated with religious groups, must register with the Ministry of Interior. NGOs must also agree to refrain from proselytizing or otherwise promoting any religion other than Islam. The law requires the Ministry of Interior to authorize all group meetings, including non-Islamic religious gatherings, in advance, even those held in private homes.

By law, the MIATE is responsible for enacting and disseminating fatwas, fighting “extremism,” promoting research in Islamic studies, organizing the Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages, and monitoring mosques. The government appoints the six imams of the High Council of Islam, who advise the government on conformity of legislation to Islamic precepts. The government also appoints the High Council for Fatwa and Administrative Appeals, which has sole authority to regulate fatwa issuance and resolve related disputes among citizens and between citizens and public agencies.

The law requires members of the Constitutional Council and the High Council of Magistrates to take an oath of office that includes a promise to God to uphold the law of the land in conformity with Islamic precepts.

A ministerial decree requires public schools and private secondary schools – but not international schools – to teach four hours of Islamic studies per week. Religious instruction in Arabic is required for students seeking the baccalaureate.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On November 15, the Supreme Court heard arguments in the case of blogger Mohamad Cheikh Ould Mohamad Ould Mkheytir, often known as MKheytir. MKheytir was convicted of apostasy and sentenced to death in December 2014. At the November hearing for MKheytir’s case, hundreds of individuals protested outside of the courthouse demanding his execution. One of MKheytir’s defense lawyers reported to the media that he received death threats for representing the accused. Several of the prosecuting lawyers threatened the justices in court if they failed to affirm the death sentence. The November hearing followed a ruling in April by the Regional Court of Appeals in Nouadhibou, which affirmed the death sentence for MKheytir, but determined that his recantation in the appellate court was proper and timely. In 2013, MKheytir published an online article, Religion and Religiousity and the Blacksmiths, that the government said criticized the Prophet Muhammad and implicitly blamed the nation’s religious establishment for the plight of the country’s forgeron (blacksmith) caste. This caste has traditionally suffered discrimination. The case was awaiting judgment from the Supreme Court at the end of the year.

On December 20, 2015, several local news outlets reported that the government closed 40 madrassahs in the Hodh El Garbi district in the southeast, 680 miles from Nouakchott. Local authorities stated they closed the madrassahs on the basis of their affiliation with Warsh, an unauthorized Islamic institute. The government reopened the schools on January 6, following demonstrations in many communities.

The MIATE continued to collaborate with independent Islamic religious groups to combat extremism, radicalization, and terrorism through a series of workshops in all 15 provinces.

Authorized churches were able to conduct services within their premises, but could not proselytize publicly. No public expression of religion except Islam was allowed.

An unofficial government requirement restricted non-Muslims worship to the few recognized Christian churches. There were Roman Catholic and other Christian churches in Nouakchott, Kaedi, Atar, Nouadhibou, and Rosso. Mauritanian citizens could not attend non-Islamic religious services, which remained restricted to foreigners. By the end of the year, the Ministry of Interior had not acted on a request by a group of foreign Protestants for authorization to build their own place of worship. The group first sought authorization to construct a place of worship in 2006, and then renewed the process in 2012, but was still awaiting approval as of the end of the year.

Although there remained no specific legal prohibition against non-Muslims proselytizing, in practice the government prohibited such activity through the broad interpretation of the constitution stating Islam shall be the religion of the people and of the state.

The possession of non-Islamic religious materials remained legal, although the government continued to prohibit their printing and distribution. The government maintained a Quranic television channel and a Quranic radio station. Both stations sponsored regular programming on themes of moderation in Islam.

The government continued to provide funding to mosques and Islamic schools under its control. The government paid monthly salaries of 50,000 ouguiyas ($152) to 200 imams who passed an examination conducted by a government-funded panel of imams and heads of mosques and Islamic schools. It also paid monthly salaries of 25,000-100,000 ouguiyas ($76-$303) to 30 members of the National Union of Mauritanian Imams, an authority established to regulate the relationship between the religious community and the MIATE.

Islamic classes remained part of the educational curriculum, but attendance at the classes was not mandatory. The results in the classes did not count significantly in the national exams that determine further placement. Additionally, many students reportedly did not attend these religious classes for various ethnolinguistic, religious, and personal reasons. Students were able to advance in school and graduate with diplomas despite missing these classes, provided they performed otherwise satisfactorily in other mandatory subjects. The Ministry of National Education and the MIATE continued to reaffirm the importance of the Islamic education program at the secondary level; the government reportedly considered religious education a tool to protect children and society against extremism and to promote Islamic culture.

During the annual Eid al-Adha observance, Imam Ahmedou Ould Lemrabott Ould Habibou Rahman, the Imam of the Grand Mosque of Nouakchott, warned of what he called the spread and growing threat of Shia Islam in the country. The imam also stated government authorities should sever ties with Iran in order to stop the spread of Iranian Shia Islam.

On March 30, the Mauritanian Bar Association, in collaboration with Muslim World Lawyers Organization, organized a one-day seminar in Nouakchott on the role of Islamic law in the fight against terrorism and religious extremism. The seminar provided presentations and lectures related to the role of Islamic law in maintaining peaceful coexistence and global security.

U.S. embassy representatives, including the Ambassador and senior visiting U.S. government officials, discussed religious tolerance with senior government officials, including the president and prime minister. Embassy officials raised the MKheytir apostasy case with authorities on multiple occasions. The Ambassador urged authorities to ensure that judicial proceedings were transparent.

The Ambassador met regularly with religious leaders to discuss religious tolerance. The Ambassador hosted an iftar in Kiffa, the capital city of the Assaba District on June 22, which was attended by the Governor of Assaba, the Mayor of Kiffa, journalists, traditional leaders, and civil society representatives. The Ambassador held a second iftar at his residence in Nouakchott the following evening, attended by the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of Islamic affairs, other senior government officials, journalists, and civil society leaders. A U.S.-based imam, visiting the country on a U.S. government-sponsored speaker program, spoke at both iftars about the necessity of involving religious leaders in encouraging freedom and equality among religious groups. The imam spoke about the necessity for the religious leaders to be involved and engaged in order to use the practice of tolerance in Islam to spread freedom, equality, and democratic practices. The Ambassador’s remarks at the iftars focused on the value of religious tolerance and the importance of interfaith dialogue based on mutual respect.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.3 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2010 local census, approximately 48 percent is Hindu, 26 percent Roman Catholic, 17 percent Muslim, and 6 percent other Christian religious groups including Seventh-day Adventists, Anglicans, Pentecostals, Presbyterians, evangelical Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and members of the Assemblies of God. The remaining 3 percent includes Buddhists, animists, individuals who reported no religious affiliation, and others. More than 95 percent of Muslims are Sunni.

On the main island, the population of Port Louis is primarily Muslim and Catholic, while the majority of the remainder of the island’s population is Hindu. The island of Rodrigues is approximately 90 percent Catholic.

There is a strong correlation between religious affiliation and ethnicity. Citizens of Indian ethnicity are primarily Hindu or Muslim. Those of Chinese ancestry generally practice Buddhism, Anglicanism, or Catholicism. Creoles and citizens of European descent are primarily Catholic.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits discrimination based on creed and provides for freedom of thought and religion including the right of individuals to change their religion or belief, and to manifest and propagate their religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and observance, alone or in community and in private or in public. These rights may be subject to limitations to protect public order, safety, morality, or health, or the rights of others. The constitution also bars oaths contrary to an individual’s religious belief and bars compulsory religious education or attendance at religious ceremonies in schools. It gives religious groups the right to establish schools and to provide religious instruction therein to members of that group; these institutions are open to the population in general as well. Citizens can file complaints of religious discrimination with the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), and the EOC can initiate investigations on its own if it believes a citizen’s rights may have been infringed. Legislative election candidates must identify themselves according to one of the four national communities cited in the constitution: Hindus, Muslims, Sino-Mauritians, or general population.

A parliamentary decree recognizes the six religious groups that were present prior to independence: Catholics, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Seventh-day Adventists, Hindus, and Muslims. These groups receive annual lump sum payments from the finance ministry based on the number of their adherents as determined by the voluntary self-identification of individuals in the 2010 census. The registrar of associations registers new religious groups, which must have a minimum of seven members with designated leadership responsibilities. The finance ministry grants these new groups tax-exempt privileges. Although registration of religious groups is required, the law does not prescribe penalties for unregistered groups.

Religious groups must obtain both a residence permit and a work permit for each foreign missionary. The prime minister’s office is the final authority on the issuance of these documents. While there are no explicit restrictions, there are unofficial limits on the overall number of missionaries per religious group who are issued the requisite visas and work permits. The government grants residence permits to missionaries for a maximum of three years with no extensions.

Religious education is allowed in public and private schools, at both the primary and high school levels. Students are permitted to opt out and civic education classes are provided for non-Catholic students attending Catholic schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Some Christians and Muslims continued to state that the predominance of Hindus in the civil service resulted in “interference” in the government promotion system, and prevented Christians and Muslims from reaching higher level positions in the civil service. More generally, non-Hindus often stated they were underrepresented in government. There were no reliable statistics available on the numbers of different religious groups represented in the civil service.

There continued to be tensions between Hindus and Muslims; however, unlike in previous years, there were no outbursts of interreligious violence reported.

On November 20, unknown individuals vandalized two mosques and a predominantly Muslim cemetery in the Savanne District. The individuals wrote graffiti translated from Creole to “Trump for them,” with the implication that (then-President-elect) Trump supported Hindus and was against Muslims. Also written was “Gabbar is BACK,” a reference to a famous Bollywood antagonist famed for murdering his enemies. A trident, a symbol frequently associated with Lord Shiva, the Destroyer, and the letters HSS were also written. According to speculation in the press, HSS was a reference to the Hindu Power Party (HSS), although the group’s leader reportedly denied involvement. The police investigation of the incident remained open at year’s end.

On December 30, police received a report that unknown individuals vandalized a Tamil temple. According to the president of the temple, the incidents took place between December 23 and December 30. Graffiti on the temple said that Mauritius represented the new ISIS chapter. The vandals also destroyed Deity figurines. Investigation of the incidents continued at year’s end, with no arrests made.

There were no developments in the September 2015 case in which two Muslim men vandalized a Hindu temple, which was followed by retaliation from five Hindu men who vandalized a mosque in the south of the island.

The Council of Religions, a local organization composed of representatives from 18 different faiths and denominations, hosted regular religious ceremonies and celebrations to foster mutual understanding and enhance interfaith collaboration among faith communities. In September the Council of Religions held a workshop on “Challenges on Interfaith Dialogue” to encourage different religious groups to engage in dialogue with each other.

Embassy representatives continued to pursue outreach and engage the government on religious freedom issues, advocating continued respect for religious diversity and tolerance. Embassy representatives met with law enforcement officials to better understand religious tensions related to recent incidents of vandalism. The Charge d’Affaires hosted an annual iftar with Muslim civil society and religious leaders to highlight religious tolerance and ways to continue to foster interreligious tolerance. Embassy representatives regularly attended religious ceremonies and celebrations of the Council of Religions and various religious groups to support religious diversity. The embassy provided funding for the Council of Religion’s project to produce 300 booklets entitled “Peace and Interfaith Dialogue”.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 123.2 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2010 census, approximately 83 percent identifies as Roman Catholic and 5 percent as evangelical Protestant. Religious groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Muslims. More than 2 percent of the population reports practicing a religion not otherwise specified, and nearly 5 percent report not practicing any religion. Some indigenous persons adhere to syncretic religions drawing from pre-Hispanic indigenous beliefs.

Official statistics sometimes differ from the membership figures provided by religious groups. Approximately 315,000 individuals identify themselves as Mormon in the 2010 census; Mormon officials, however, state their membership at approximately 1.3 million. There are large Protestant communities in the southern states of Chiapas and Tabasco. In Chiapas, evangelical Protestant leaders state nearly half of the state’s 2.4 million inhabitants are members of evangelical groups, but fewer than 5 percent of 2010 census respondents in Chiapas self-identified as evangelical.

According to the 2010 census, the Jewish community numbers approximately 67,500, some 42,000 of whom live in Mexico City and the state of Mexico. Jewish leaders said the total number of Jews in the country is approximately 45,000. Nearly half of the country’s approximately 4,000 Muslims are concentrated in Mexico City and the state of Mexico. An estimated half of the approximately 100,000 Mennonites are concentrated in the state of Chihuahua.

Legal Framework

The constitution states all persons are free to profess their chosen religious beliefs and to engage in ceremonies and acts of worship that do not constitute a crime or offense punishable by law. The congress may not enact laws that establish or prohibit any religion. The constitution provides for the separation of religion and state and defines the country as secular. It prohibits any form of discrimination, including on the basis of religion.

The constitution states acts of public worship are performed inside places of worship and any performed outside of places of worship are subject to the applicable regulations and laws. Active clergy are forbidden from holding public office, advocating partisan political views, supporting political candidates, or publicly opposing the laws or institutions of the state.

The law states religious groups may not own or administer radio or television stations. Government permission is required for commercial radio or television to transmit religious programming.

Religious groups are not required to register with the government in order to operate. Registration is required, however, to negotiate contracts, purchase or rent land, apply for official building permits, receive tax exemptions, or hold religious meetings outside customary places of worship. To establish a religious association, applicants must certify that the church or religious group observes, practices, propagates, or instructs a religious doctrine or body of religious beliefs; has conducted religious activities in the country for at least five years, thus becoming deeply rooted within the population; has established domicile in the country; and shows sufficient assets to achieve its purpose. Registered associations may freely organize their internal structures and adopt bylaws or rules pertaining to their governance and operations, including the training and appointment of their clergy. They may engage in religious public worship and celebrate acts for the fulfillment of the association’s purpose, lawfully and without profit. They may propagate their doctrine within applicable regulations and participate in the creation, management, maintenance, and operation of private welfare, educational, and health institutions, provided the institutions are not for profit.

Religious associations must notify the government of their intention to hold a religious meeting outside their licensed place of worship. Religious associations may not hold political meetings of any kind.

Religious groups must apply for permits to construct new buildings or to convert existing buildings into houses of worship. Any religious building constructed after 1992 is the property of the religious group that built it and is subject to the relevant taxes. All religious buildings erected before 1992 are classified as part of the national patrimony and owned by the state.

The constitution states public education must be secular and maintained entirely apart from any religious doctrine, but religious groups are permitted to operate private schools. To enter a secondary school, a student must have attended an accredited primary school. Homeschooling is allowed at the secondary level after completion of schooling at an accredited primary school.

The federal government coordinates religious affairs through the Interior Ministry (SEGOB). Within SEGOB, the General Directorate for Religious Associations (DGAR) promotes religious tolerance, conducts conflict mediation, and investigates cases of religious intolerance. The National Council to Prevent Discrimination (CONAPRED) is an autonomous federal agency responsible for ensuring the rights of nondiscrimination and equal opportunity, including for minority religious groups. If a party presents a dispute based on allegations of religious intolerance, the DGAR is charged with mediating a solution. If mediation fails, the parties may submit the issue to the DGAR for binding arbitration. If the parties do not agree to this procedure, one or the other may seek judicial redress.

Each of the 32 states has administrative offices with responsibility over religious affairs. The states of Chiapas, Guerrero, Yucatan, and Oaxaca have undersecretaries at the local interior ministries for religious affairs.

There are 8,737 religious associations registered by the DGAR. These include 8,698 Christian (an increase of 423 from 2015), 13 Buddhist, 10 Jewish, two Hindu, three Islamic, and two International Society for Krishna Consciousness groups.

According to the constitution, indigenous communities have the right to autonomy and may “decide their internal forms of coexistence” and have legal systems to “regulate and solve their internal conflicts.” These rights are subject to the general principles and fundamental rights provided by the constitution, including freedom of religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The country claims the following constitutional limitations to the ICCPR: a reservation (to Article 25) that religious ministers have neither a passive vote nor the right to form political associations; and a limitation (to Article 18) that religious acts must be performed in places of worship unless granted prior permission, and professional education for ministers is not officially recognized.

Government Practices

Some evangelical groups reported incidents of religious abuses and discrimination and said the government either did not respond or did not respond adequately. They said some Protestants in mainly rural and/or indigenous areas in Chiapas and Oaxaca were pressured to convert to Catholicism, were displaced, were arbitrarily detained by local authorities, or had their property destroyed by community leaders.

According to some legal experts and NGOs, the ambiguity of the relationship between the rights laid out in the constitution and the law allowing indigenous communities autonomy to exercise traditional law gave local authorities the ability to punish some members of minority religious groups or force them to follow the majority religion. NGOs and some religious organizations reported that a number of rural and indigenous communities expected inhabitants to adhere to the majority religion, including paying for and participating in community and religious gatherings. There were reports of those adhering to the minority religious group or those coming in from outside the community to proselytize being discriminated against by others within the community. Some members of minority religious groups in indigenous communities stated local authorities denied them public benefits and utilities service due to their religious affiliation.

Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) reported that in May, 86 families from three churches in Mitziton and San Cristobal de las Casas (state of Chiapas) were forcibly displaced from their communities after they refused to make financial contributions to a Catholic festival.

Luis Herrera, director of the NGO Coordination of Christian Organizations of Chiapas (COOC), reported that seven Protestants were forcibly displaced in January by non-Protestant residents from their community in Las Margaritas, Chiapas. The NGO Impulso 18 said these individuals were asked to present themselves during a village assembly on December 15, 2015 and sign a document confirming they had renounced their faith. Herrera said the individuals were imprisoned for two days and ordered to pay a fine for refusing to renounce their faith. Municipal, state, and federal officials were reportedly notified, but an investigation had not yet been opened as of the end of the year. According to Herrera, no agreement for their return was reached by year’s end.

According to the NGO Libertad y Dignidad (Liberty and Dignity), local authorities arbitrarily detained evangelical Christians Lauro Perez Nunez and Misael Perez for their religious beliefs on March 28 in La Chacalaca municipality in Oaxaca. The detention followed what they said was their expulsion from their community, with 10 other families, for refusing to renounce their beliefs. They were held for several hours without charge before being released.

Libertad y Dignidad reported 40 families were expelled by residents from the municipalities of Huixtan, La Trinitaria, Comitan, and Ococigo in Chiapas between January and June because they had converted to Protestantism.

According to Impulso 18, on January 26 local authorities forcibly displaced 50 individuals from 20 Protestant families from their homes in Tuxpan de Bolaos, Jalisco, after the families neither participated in nor contributed to the town’s Catholic holiday festivities. The individuals were given three hours to leave the village after a community assembly voted to have them removed and threatened to lynch them if they did not obey the order to leave. Impulso 18 stated the group was dropped off in nearby mountains and that state authorities, although contacted, did not intervene.

According to Libertad y Dignidad, evangelical Christians were required in some communities to pay for Catholic religious festivities even if they did not celebrate. The NGO reported eight evangelical Christian families in Ixcaquixtla, Puebla were evicted from their homes for declining to contribute 2,000 pesos ($97) to the town’s Catholic celebrations. Local indigenous authorities briefly detained three evangelical Christians for refusing to pay.

According to COOC, there was no progress on the return of 15 acres of land seized in 2015 from 30 Protestant families in Mariano Matamoros, Chiapas. In April local authorities said an agreement to return their land would be signed soon, but there was no agreement at year’s end.

CSW reported on February 23 that 27 Protestant families in Union Juarez, Chiapas had their access to water and electricity restored by local authorities. Access had been cut off since 2014 when the families refused to contribute money to or participate in Catholic festivals.

On February 5, the Hidalgo state Public Ministry oversaw an agreement with Chichiltepec village officials that allowed two Protestant men to return to their homes after they were displaced in March 2015 for refusing to renounce their faith.

On April 23, the municipal authority in Santa Catarina Yosonotu, Oaxaca prohibited the public ministry of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the municipality. DGAR was investigating as of the end of the year.

In some cases, DGAR worked closely with state and local officials on criminal investigations involving religious groups. As of the end of the year, DGAR investigated six cases related to religious freedom at the federal level, compared to 10 in 2015. According to DGAR, most incidents of religious discrimination were under the jurisdiction of the state government rather than the federal government. Municipal and state officials commonly mediated disputes among religious groups; however, evangelical groups reported that officials rarely pursued legal remedies against offending local leaders and were often unaware of the applicable laws. The groups stated there were few investigations and prosecutions related to crimes or abuses motivated by an individual’s belief or practice, stating that this was partially a result of the lack of resources devoted to federal and state agencies and organizations working on religious freedom.

On February 15, CSW reported that unknown assailants attacked the Fuente de Fe, Alabanza y Poder church in Zinacantan city, Chiapas. CSW indicated that the assailants broke into the church and burned the pulpit, curtains, chairs, and tables. Church officials said the attack was religiously motivated. DGAR stated it was an isolated incident perpetrated by common criminals and not motivated by religion.

According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, after townspeople of Tamazulapam, Oaxaca opposed the construction of a Kingdom Hall for worship in May, the municipal authority issued an order to stop construction. The Directorate of Religious Affairs of Oaxaca spoke with the opponents and the municipal authorities without success. The Jehovah’s Witnesses stated they were considering submitting a claim for legal protection.

In May the municipal authority of San Jorge Nuchita, Huajuapan, Oaxaca prohibited Jehovah’s Witnesses from proselytizing house to house. An investigation by the Directorate of Religious Affairs of Oaxaca was ongoing at the end of the year.

The federal government promoted dialogue with religious actors with the stated goal of ensuring the exercise of religious freedom and resolving conflicts arising from religious intolerance. CONAPRED conducted outreach efforts, facilitated training, and distributed publications designed to combat discrimination. According to CONAPRED, the majority of religious discrimination complaints it received were related to religious attire or to some hospitals declining to treat Jehovah’s Witnesses for their refusal to engage in blood transfusions. In some cases, CONAPRED assisted in conflict mediation related to these complaints.

According to NGOs and press reports, Catholic priests and other religious leaders continued to be targeted and were the victims of extortion attempts, death threats, and intimidation by organized criminal groups. The government stated many of these incidents were not a result of targeting for religious beliefs but rather incidents related to crime in the country as a whole.

The CMC reported the most dangerous states for priests were Veracruz, Mexico State, Michoacan, and Guerrero. The CMC stated in early December the number of priests killed during the year increased from two in 2015 to seven, and the number of priests who were victims of extortion increased by70 percent from 2015.

On September 19, the bodies of Fathers Alejo Nabor Jiménez and Jose Alfredo Suarez were found on the outskirts of Poza Rica, Veracruz. They were abducted the day before from their parish. Two individuals were arrested but not charged by year’s end.

On September 19, Catholic priest Alfredo Lopez Guillen was kidnapped from Puruandiro, Michoacan, and his body was found on September 24. According to news reports, the attorney general of Michoacan said two men admitted to having killed the priest and were arrested on October 3.

On October 1, four Catholic missionaries were kidnapped and shot in Michoacan by armed assailants. Their bodies were found on the side of the road near Apatzingan. The Michoacan state prosecutor’s office said on December 21 it arrested four individuals.

In November Catholic priest Jose Luis Sanchez Ruiz was kidnapped in Catemaco, Veracruz. He was found alive three days later with signs of torture. According to Church officials, the priest had received threats prior to the kidnapping because he defended human rights and spoke out on social causes, including criticizing corruption and crime in Catemaco.

According to CSW, on May 18, an assailant attacked Pastor Guillermo Favela, president of the Tijuana Ministerial Evangelical Alliance and pastor of the Rios de Agua Viva Church, near the church. The assailant demanded protection money from the church and threatened to cut the pastor’s fingers off for refusing. The assailant fled the scene after stabbing the pastor. CSW reported the assailant was captured by local authorities and later released.

News reports indicated that on January 4, armed Catholic villagers in Leyva Velazquez, Chiapas raided and destroyed the homes of Protestants in the village, causing them to flee to nearby mountains. According to Impulso 18, villagers blocked the entrances to the village to keep government and security officials from entering and assisting the displaced Protestant villagers.

According to a faith-based organization in Nogales, Sonora on September 14, individuals broke into and vandalized the group’s soup kitchen, including stealing a crucifix, defecating on crosses, and putting an image of the Virgin Mary into a black bag. The organization said it was targeted by organized criminal groups due to its humanitarian aid work in the community.

During a February trip to the country, Pope Francis met with bishops in the Mexico City Metropolitan Cathedral, citing narco-trafficking as a challenge to society and the Catholic Church. During Mass at the Basilica of Our Lady of Guadalupe, the pope spoke about the persecution of indigenous communities and their role in the Catholic Church, with his speech translated into several local indigenous languages.

Jewish community representatives reported being accepted and respected by the government and within society.

U.S. embassy and consulate representatives met with government officials responsible for religious and indigenous affairs at the federal and state levels, raising concerns regarding the deaths of Catholic priests and reported abuses against evangelical Christians.

During a trip to Mexico City and Pachuca, Hidalgo in August, the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom met with government officials, representatives of the Catholic Church and minority religious groups, and NGOs to discuss reports of religious discrimination. In July the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism met with members of the Mexico City Jewish community.

Embassy officers met with members of religious groups and religiously affiliated NGOs including Libertad y Dignidad, the Central Jewish Committee, Tribuna Israelita, the Catholic Multimedia Center, Impulso 18, and Coordination of Christian Organizations to discuss safety for priests working on humanitarian issues, to assess the status of religious freedom, and to express support for religious tolerance.

During the U.S.-Mexico Human Rights Dialogue on October 27, officials from the Department of State underscored the importance of protecting human rights defenders, which included religious leaders.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 3.5 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the most recent International Republican Institute survey conducted in September, the predominant religion is Orthodox Christianity, with 94 percent of the population belonging to one of the two Orthodox groups: approximately 85 percent to the MOC, which is subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church; and 9 percent to the Bessarabian Orthodox Church (BOC), under the Romanian Orthodox Church. The same survey shows that 5 percent of the population identifies as atheist and 1 percent belongs to other, non-Orthodox religious groups. According to a 2013 survey conducted by the local NGO Human Rights Information Center (CIDO), the largest non-Orthodox religious groups, accounting for 15,000 to 30,000 adherents each, are Roman Catholics, Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, Jews, evangelical Christians, and Muslims.

Smaller religious groups include Bahais, Molokans, Messianic Jews, Lutherans, Presbyterians, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), members of the Unification Church, other Christians, and followers of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness.

In the separatist Transnistria region, an estimated 80 percent of the population belongs to the MOC. Other religious groups in the region include Catholics, followers of Old Rite Orthodoxy, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, evangelical and charismatic Christians, Jews, Lutherans, Muslims, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates equal treatment for all citizens regardless of religion and guarantees freedom of conscience, manifested in “a spirit of tolerance and mutual respect,” and of religious worship. It states religious groups may organize and operate according to their own statutes, independent from the state. The constitution prohibits all actions instigating religious hatred and “any manifestation of discord” between religious groups. The constitution stipulates the state shall support religious worship, including facilitating religious assistance in the army, hospitals, penitentiaries, nursing homes, and orphanages.

The law states every person has the right to belong or not belong to a religion, to have or not have individual beliefs, to change religion or beliefs, and to practice religion or beliefs independently or as a group, in public or in private, through teaching, religious practices, or rituals. According to the law, religious freedom may be restricted only if necessary to ensure public order and security, to protect public health and morality, or to protect a person’s rights and freedoms. The law also prohibits discrimination based on religious affiliation.

The law stipulates that the state recognize the “exceptional importance and fundamental role” of Orthodox Christianity, particularly that of the MOC, in the life, history, and culture of the country.

The law allows religious groups to establish associations and foundations. It permits local religious groups to change their denominational affiliation or dissolve themselves. The law exempts registered religious groups from paying real estate and land taxes.

In July parliament adopted amendments to the law which allow individuals, but not companies or other legal entities, to redirect 2 percent of their income tax to NGOs or religious organizations. Religious groups wanting to benefit from the new provisions must register with the Ministry of Justice, and only use the amounts received for social, moral, cultural and/or charity activities. The law exempts religious organizations from paying tax on the income received as donation under the 2 percent law and from registration fees.

The law provides for a registration process in which a religious group must present to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) a declaration including its exact name, fundamental principles of belief, organizational structure, scope of activities, financing sources, and rights and obligations of membership. The law also requires a group to show it has at least 100 founding members. A religious group must present proof of having access to premises where it can conduct its religious activities, but the law does not specify that the group must own this property. The MOJ is required by law to register a religious group within 30 days if the registration request is made according to law. The applicant may request this term be extended if the government determines the documentation submitted is insufficient. At the request of the MOJ, a court may suspend the registered status of a religious group if it “carries out activities that harm the constitution or laws,” or “affects state security, public order, [or] the life and security of the people.” The law also provides for suspension or revocation of a religious group’s registration in case of violation of international agreements or for political activity.

The law does not require registration, but only registered religious groups possess status as legal entities allowing them to build churches, own land in cemeteries or other property, publish or import religious literature, open bank accounts, or employ staff. Registration also exempts them from land taxes and property taxes. Individual churches or branches of registered religious groups are not required to register with the MOJ as long as they do not carry out legal transactions and do not receive donations as local legal entities. The parent organization must exercise authority in those areas for unregistered local branches.

The law allows all religious groups to hold services at state facilities, including prisons, orphanages, hospitals, schools, and military and police institutions, at the request of individuals in such institutions, provided they obtain the approval of the institution’s administration.

The law bans religious entities from engaging in political activity and prohibits “abusive proselytism,” defined as the action of changing religious beliefs through coercion.

Although the law provides for restitution of property confiscated during the successive fascist and Soviet regimes to politically repressed or exiled persons, the provision does not apply to property confiscated from religious groups. Under previous agreements, the government transferred control of most confiscated churches and monasteries to the MOC or the BOC. The Ministry of Culture is responsible for the remaining churches and monasteries not under the control of the MOC or BOC. Local authorities working through the Ministry of Culture may arrange with local parishes to return or lease those churches or monasteries to religious groups.

The constitution provides for freedom of religious education and stipulates the state educational system “shall be of a lay nature.” According to the law, religion classes in state educational institutions are optional. Students submit a written request to the school’s administration to enroll in a religion class. Religion classes are offered in grades 1-9. No alternative classes are offered for those who choose not to enroll in religion classes. The religion curriculum offers two types of courses: one for Orthodox denominations and Roman Catholics, and the second for evangelical Christians and Seventh-day Adventists. The religious curriculum for Orthodox and Catholic groups derives from instructional manuals developed by the Ministry of Education with input from the MOC and includes teaching guidelines developed with the support of the BOC. Teachers and Orthodox priests teach these optional courses, which focus on Orthodox Christianity. Teachers and representatives of the Evangelical Christian Church teach the second course, which is based on translated religious manuals and literature from Romania, the United States, and Germany. Both courses teach religious doctrine as well as moral and spiritual values.

The law mandates immunization of all children and before they can enroll in kindergarten. It does not provide an exception for religious reasons.

The Anti-Discrimination Council, established by law, is an independent institution charged with reviewing complaints of discrimination, including discrimination of a religious character or based on religious affiliation. Parliament chooses members through a competitive process, appointing them to five-year terms. The council does not have sanctioning powers; however, it can determine if an act of discrimination took place, offer advice on how to remedy the situation, and send requests to prosecutors to initiate criminal proceedings. It can also suggest pertinent legislative amendments or participate in working groups authoring legislative initiatives.

According to the law, citizens aged 18 to 27 have the right to choose civilian over military service if the latter is counter to their religious beliefs. The standard duration of both alternative civilian and military service is 12 months; university graduates may choose six months of civilian service or three months of military training. Those who choose civilian service may complete it at public institutions or enterprises specializing in such areas as social assistance, healthcare, industrial engineering, urban planning, roads and road construction, environmental protection, agriculture or agricultural processing, town management, and fire rescue. There are no blanket exemptions for religious groups from the civilian service alternative, but higher-ranking clergy, monks, and theology students are exempted from alternative service. Refusal to enroll in civilian service is punishable by a fine up to 15,000 lei ($754) or between 100 and 150 hours of community service.

The law defines as “extremist” and makes illegal any document or information justifying war crimes or the complete or partial annihilation of a religious or other kind of societal group, as well as any document calling for or supporting activities in pursuit of those goals.

Foreign missionaries may submit work contracts or volunteer agreements to apply for a temporary residency permit, and may reside and work in a paid status or as unpaid volunteers. Only missionaries working with registered religious groups may apply for temporary residency permits. Foreign religious workers with these permits must register with the National Agency for the Occupation of the Workforce, the Bureau for Migration and Asylum, and the Ministry of Information Technology and Communications. They must present documents confirming the official status of the registered religious group for which they will work, papers confirming their temporary residence, and proof of valid local health insurance. Other foreign missionaries belonging to registered religious groups may remain for 90 days on a tourist visa.

In separatist Transnistria, Transnistrian “law” affirms the special role of the Orthodox Church in the region’s culture and spirituality. The de facto law “recognizes respect” for Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and other religious groups historically present in the region. All religious groups, whether registered or not, officially have freedom to worship, but the law permits restrictions on the right to freedom of conscience and religion “if necessary to protect the constitutional order, morality, health, citizens’ rights and interests, or state defense and security.” Foreign citizens also have the freedom to worship. The prosecutor’s office oversees implementation of the law on religious freedom.

The law provides for the registration of religious groups, but registration is not legally required. The region’s self-professed Ministry of Justice registers religious groups and monitors their adherence to the goals and activities set forth in their statutes. Registration provides a number of advantages to religious groups, including the ability to own and build places of worship, open religious schools, and publish literature.

To register, a local religious group must present proof of activity in the region for at least 10 years; a list comprising at least 10 members aged 18 years or older with permanent residence in one of the seven administrative-territorial units in the region and Transnistrian “citizenship;” a list of founders and governing members and their personal details; the group’s charter, statutes, and minutes of its constituent assembly; basic religious doctrine; contact details of its governing body; and a receipt indicating payment of the registration fee. Local religious groups may also register as part of a centralized religious organization, which must consist of at least three local religious groups, which have previously registered separately as legal entities. In that case, their application must include a copy of the registration papers of the centralized organizations. The central religious organizations must inform the registration authority on a yearly basis about intentions to extend their activities.

The de facto authorities must decide to register a religious group within 30 days of the application. If they decide to conduct a religious assessment, which is a law enforcement investigation of the group’s background and activities, registration may be postponed for up to six months or denied if the investigating authorities determine the group poses a threat to the security or morality of the region, or if foreign religious groups are involved in its activities.

Foreign religious groups may not register or undertake religious activities. Foreigners may only worship individually; they may not be founders or members of religious groups.

Religious groups disband on their own decision or upon a “court’s” decision. The “prosecutor’s office” or the region’s de facto executive, city, or district authorities can request the courts to disband or suspend a religious group on multiple grounds, including disturbing public order or violating public security; conducting extremist activities; coercing people into breaking up their families; infringing on citizens’ identity, rights, and freedoms; violating citizens’ morality, well-being, including the use of psychotropic substances, drugs, hypnosis, or perverse activities during religious activities; encouraging suicide or the refusal of medical treatment for religious reasons; obstructing compulsory education; using coercion for alienation of property to the benefit of the religious community; and encouraging the refusal to fulfil civic duties.

The law allows the use of private homes and apartments to hold religious services. It does not, however, allow religious groups to use homes and apartments as their officially registered addresses. The law also allows registered religious groups to hold religious services and rituals in public places such as hospitals, clinics, orphanages, geriatric homes, and prisons.

The authorities screen and may ban the import and export of religious printed materials, audio and video recordings, and other religious items.

According to the law, citizens have the right to choose alternative civilian service over military service if the latter contradicts an individual’s religion and beliefs. Alternative civilian service may be performed only at organizations under the Transnistrian authority or “other military forces,” and at institutions subordinate to the “executive bodies of the state or local administration.”

The de facto authorities do not allow religious groups to participate in elections or other political party activities or to support NGOs involved in elections.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On February 3, a court denied a prosecution appeal and upheld a decision to release into house arrest two leaders of the Unification Church in the country: Mihai Calestru and Oleg Savencov. On March 25, authorities released the two leaders from house arrest. Authorities had arrested them in 2015 on human trafficking charges, alleging they had recruited, transported, and harbored persons for labor exploitation. They also charged the Church was founded as an organized criminal group. In August a different prosecutor assumed responsibility for the case, which remained pending at year’s end. Human rights NGOs, including Human Rights without Frontiers and the Forum for Religious Freedom-Europe, said the charges against the two men were unfounded.

On December 21, the Supreme Court of Justice rejected the appeal filed by the country’s two Falun Gong organizations, Falun Gong Moldova and Falun Dafa. The two organizations filed the appeal in 2015 after the Supreme Court of Justice upheld a lower court decision that they should be dissolved because the Falun symbol, which incorporates five swastikas based on Buddhist and Chinese tradition, violated the law against extremist activity. The December 21 decision followed a December 7 Supreme Court of Justice ruling maintaining a court of appeals decision which had declared the Falun symbol extremist and ordered its inclusion into the register of symbols with extremist character. The two associations remained dissolved and exhausted all legal avenues at the national level. The Falun associations filed two complaints to the European Court of Human Rights in 2015 and these were pending at the ECHR at year’s end.

Jehovah’s Witnesses leaders reported police failed to prosecute individuals who physically assaulted, threatened, or verbally abused their members in rural localities. They reported police were often summoned to sites where violence occurred, but did not take any action or took only minimal action to stop the violence. In most cases, police said they found no basis to charge the perpetrators or downgraded the offenses and only issued administrative fines. For example, on March 5, the mayor and local councilor in Napadova village banned members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community from holding religious services. The mayor and the councilor also threatened Witnesses with physical violence if they did not leave the village. In response to a complaint, police stated they found no evidence of a crime regarding the mayor’s and local councilor’s actions. On May 22, the same local councilor with 10 others stopped four Jehovah’s Witnesses from manifesting their religious beliefs and threatened them with physical violence. The Witnesses filed a complaint with police that day. In response to the complaint, police stated the local councilor had not broken any laws. Jehovah’s Witnesses did not provide specific examples of incidents involving physical assault.

The MOJ registered 27 religious entities during the year, consisting of one new Orthodox denomination and 26 religious groups as component parts of existing religious denominations, including the Baptist Church, the Old Rite Church, the MOC, the BOC, the Evangelical Church, and the Union of Pentecostal Churches. It did not reject any registration applications.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported improved access to government permits to hold religious activities in detention facilities. According to community leaders, the Department of Penitentiary Institutions discontinued the practice of imposing additional bureaucratic impediments that had hindered the group’s access to prison inmates in the past and issued Jehovah’s Witnesses permits granting them unhindered access to detention facilities valid for six months.

Under a cooperation agreement between the MOJ and the MOC, MOC chaplains had free access to detention facilities for religious assistance without prior approval of the prison administration. A separate cooperation agreement between the MOC and the Ministry of Defense allowed MOC priests to preach to army units, bless military personnel prior to their deployment in peacekeeping missions, and distribute religious literature to libraries within the army. Through an earlier agreement with the Ministry of Labor, Social Protection, and Family, the MOC continued to develop a network of social assistance, including opening day care centers and temporary shelters within churches and monasteries.

In March the MOC signed a new memorandum of cooperation with the Ministry of Labor, Social Protection, and Family to boost joint efforts to support families and children in the country. Under the agreement, the MOC and state committed to promote and implement policies that would protect disadvantaged families, the elderly, orphans, and persons with disabilities. The government would not reimburse the MOC for the cost of these services.

The authorities also continued to grant greater freedom to the MOC to import religious materials and privileges pertaining to the restitution of church property compared to other religious groups. The government also continued to grant privileges, such as invitations to officiate at state-sponsored events, national holidays, and blessing ceremonies at schools, to MOC clergy it did not grant to other religious groups. Local NGOs, including CIDO and the Human Rights Resource Center (CREDO), as well as other minority religious groups criticized the law for failing to provide equal rights to all religious groups, and the government’s policy of granting a leading role to the Orthodox Church.

Despite the law banning political activity by religious groups, the MOC head Vladimir made statements during the presidential election campaign in October encouraging citizens to vote for a candidate who pledged to support Orthodox values. According to local NGO Promo-Lex, electoral campaigning in MOC churches was common, particularly in rural areas.

According to representatives of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostal Church, and Baptist Church, local authorities remained reluctant to allot land to minority religious groups in local cemeteries, which were often under the administration of Orthodox churches.

Minority religious groups, including Baptists, Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Muslims, reported local authorities were also often reluctant to allocate land for the construction of houses of worship.

Jehovah’s Witnesses stated in many instances local mayors or councilors were pressured by Orthodox priests to discriminate against Jehovah’s Witnesses, and local public officials and priests serving as local councilors refused to execute existing court orders allowing use of facilities by Jehovah’s Witnesses for worship.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported the mayor and local councilors in Olanesti village refused to issue a permit in March allowing the community to use its completed kingdom hall, even though it had completed all bureaucratic formalities and provided all necessary documentation. In one of the responses to Jehovah’s Witnesses summons to review its decision, the local administration said it based its decision on the vote of 1,629 residents who endorsed an earlier ruling of the council to reject the Jehovah’s Witnesses request.

The Union of Pentecostal Churches reported numerous cases of opposition from local public administrations in rural localities to church activities. Local mayors refused to change building permits to allow for a church, despite final court rulings. In one case, after five years of litigation with the local administration in Falesti, the Supreme Court issued a final ruling ordering the local mayor to change the designation of the building from a private home to a church. Local administration officials, however, refused to follow the court ruling.

On December 13, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Jewish community by dismissing the claim lodged by the Agency of Public Property and upholding the first instance court decision which rejected the Agency of Public Property’s claim on a synagogue and yeshiva. In 2010 the Jewish community had purchased the Rabbi Tsirilson Synagogue and Magen David Yeshiva ruins, later claimed by the Agency of Public Property.

Human rights NGOs, including CIDO, CREDO, and Promo-Lex, continued to criticize the Ministry of Education for allowing the optional religion course for Orthodox Christians and Catholics to cover only Orthodox Christian doctrine, to the exclusion of other religious teachings. The same NGOs stated there was a high level of Christian Orthodox influence in schools, through such means as the classes on Orthodox Christian faith; mandatory extracurricular religious activities for students, including attending Mass or ceremonies, for example at the start of the school year, officiated by Orthodox priests; the presence of religious symbols, such as crosses or icons, in school; and messages from teachers.

The Seventh-day Adventists Reform Movement reported problems enrolling children in kindergartens as a result of their refusal to have children immunized. In an appeal sent to the Ministry of Health in September, the minister of education stated that the refusal of mandatory immunization of children for religious reasons should not be an impediment for their enrollment in schools. According to the Ministry of Education, a health certificate should be sufficient to allow enrollment. The ministry created a working group tasked with ensuring access to educational facilities to children whose parents refused them immunization for religious or philosophical reasons.

Representatives of the Union of Pentecostal Churches reported continuous problems with the customs office over imports of humanitarian assistance. According to church leaders, imperfect legislation and artificial barriers imposed by customs officers seriously affected the community’s ability to import and distribute humanitarian assistance. Multiple requests sent to the prime minister to resolve this issue remained unanswered. Other importers reportedly faced similar problems.

The Jewish Community of Moldova reported state authorities failed to react to an increase in anti-Semitic acts, including vandalism and hate speech but did not provide specific examples. According to community leaders, police were reluctant to take action or allowed the perpetrators to escape prosecution. The community also stated certain political leaders glorified representatives of the Romanian WW II-era fascist regime through sponsoring or attending the inauguration of monuments erected in the memory of Iron Guard representatives or promoting anti-Semitic authors.

On July 22, parliament endorsed the Elie Wiesel Commission’s 2004 Report on the Holocaust through a political statement. The statement condemned the extermination and persecution of Jews by the Nazis and their Romanian collaborators in the country’s territory during WW II. It also condemned attempts to deny or ignore the Holocaust and paid homage to its victims and survivors.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Human rights experts, including representatives from Promo-Lex, continued to report minority religious groups in Transnistria not favored by the Russian Orthodox Church, including Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, and Pentecostals, were treated unequally as compared to the more “traditional” religious groups. Minority religious groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, continued to refrain from requesting registration or from engaging in any other activities due to the history of local authorities refusing to register these groups and preventing them from displaying or distributing religious literature. According to minority religious groups, local security forces continued monitoring their activities.

On June 30, three Jehovah’s Witnesses in Tiraspol filed complaints against Moldova (which had sovereignty, but not control, over Transnistria) and the Russian Federation to the United Nations Human Rights Committee for refusing to reregister the religious group.

On May 17, the “Supreme Court of Transnistria” refused to hear the appeal from a Jehovah’s Witness who was issued a citation for violating the administrative code for using a religious literature display cart in Bender in October 2015. On May 11, police issued a written warning to two Jehovah’s Witnesses for using a religious literature display cart in Bender. The warning stated that displaying religious literature in public was prohibited.

The Muslim community continued to run a cultural and an educational center in Transnistria but did not attempt to register as a religious community. The Muslim community said it avoided undertaking any overt religious activity because of previous attempts by the region’s authorities to intimidate it.

As of November, Jehovah’s Witnesses had reported 20 incidents of societal abuse, two of which involved physical assaults, against their members. Incidents consisted mainly of assaults, threats, verbal intimidation, and actions impeding religious activities

On July 30, two men stopped two Witnesses who were reciting Bible verses in the village of Carabetovca, threatened them, and struck one on the head. The victims filed a complaint with the police.

Jehovah’s Witnesses stated that, in a number of villages, local Orthodox priests instigated hatred against Jehovah’s Witnesses and obstructed efforts by the Witnesses to either build new houses of worship or change the designation of premises they purchased. They reported Orthodox priests assaulted or threatened to assault Jehovah’s Witnesses in Balti, Carabetovca, and Napadova villages. On July 10, an Orthodox priest threw a stone at a Jehovah’s Witness. The victim filed a complaint with the police, which found the priest’s actions amounted to hooliganism and fined him.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported in Olanesti village local residents led by the Orthodox priest obstructed the community on multiple occasions from holding its religious activities. Groups of 10 to 30 village residents bearing Orthodox flags and ritual objects assembled in front of the kingdom hall. They blocked the entrance to the premises and impeded the community’s religious activities for the entire day on at least 18 occasions between March and June. In other cases, the groups installed iron chain padlocks or wire on the gate. The groups carried banners reading “The village without Jehovah’s Witnesses” and “Out of the village. We do not want you here.” Jehovah’s Witnesses also reported seeing local public administration representatives among the protestors. The Witnesses said they alerted police, but they rarely took action. According to the Witnesses, the prosecutor’s office rejected all requests for criminal investigations.

On April 27, the MOC head Vladimir held a speech in parliament on the eve of the Orthodox Easter holidays stating “Moldova is a Christian country, and it would be abasement for the 98 percent of the Christians to be equal to the other 2 percent.”

In March the MOC announced it would enhance “its fight against unrecognized denominations and cults in the country.” To do this, it said it had created a special unit called the Synod Sector for Missionary, Anti-Sectarian, and Anti-Schismatic Activity. The new structure promoted the Christian Orthodox faith on its website, distributed religious materials, and encouraged people to join the Orthodox Church. The MOC said the new unit would “fight neo-Protestant” communities which “were able to recruit innocent souls due to some social packages or second hand clothes.” The unit met with Baptists and Pentecostals in several rural areas reportedly to convince them of the need to “return to the Christian Orthodox faith.”

According to the Islamic League, the largest, and the only registered, Muslim umbrella organization in the country, societal attitudes toward Muslims improved compared to previous years, but local media continued to exhibit a critical attitude and bias against Islam, portraying it in a negative light in news articles and broadcasts. The Islamic League also said when reporting on terrorist attacks or threats, the media continued to cite the Islamic League, implicitly linking it to violence or threats. The media did not ask for statements from the Islamic League regarding reported events and did not refute previous reports related to Islam even when the Islamic League requested them to do so.

Leaders of the Jewish community reported four major acts of vandalism, an increase from the previous year. They reported at least two acts of vandalism of the synagogue in Orhei. Unknown individuals broke into the synagogue on the nights of January 11 and February 23, threw Torah scrolls on the ground, ripped menorahs off the walls, and vandalized other religious objects. Leaders submitted a complaint to local police, which initiated an investigation. There were two instances of vandalism of Jewish cemeteries. In April unknown individuals damaged or destroyed 14 gravestones in a Jewish cemetery in Soroca. Prosecutors later identified the perpetrators but did not charge them because they were minors.

Representatives of the Union of Pentecostal Churches said media outlets reported for the first time about charity events and activities organized by its churches.

Embassy officials discussed respect for the rights of religious minorities and combating religious intolerance with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Anti-Discrimination Council.

Embassy officials met with leaders and representatives of the MOC, BOC, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslim groups, Baptist Church, Pentecostal Church, and Jewish community to discuss religious freedom, societal attitudes, and government actions or inaction with regard to religious groups. In a September meeting with the MOC head Vladimir, the Ambassador inquired about the level of cooperation between the majority and minority religious groups in the country, raised tolerance issues, and called for more interfaith dialogue. The Ambassador raised cooperation between Muslim communities, societal and media attitude towards Islam, and ways to overcome prejudice and stereotypes about minority religious groups in the country during a meeting in October with the leader of the Islamic League, Sergiu Sochirca.

Embassy representatives regularly met with leaders of the Jewish community to discuss respect for their rights and the challenges faced by the community, including the ongoing case of the Rabbi Tsirilson Synagogue and Magen David Yeshiva.

On January 27, the Ambassador announced the opening of a Holocaust photo exhibit sponsored by the embassy at the Free International University of Moldova. While on an embassy-sponsored visit to the country in February, a representative of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Ambassador toured the Jewish cemetery and other Jewish sites in Chisinau. During the visit, they spoke about religious tolerance and preservation of the Jewish faith and values. The director also gave an interview to Radio Free Europe about the Holocaust in Moldova.

According to U.S. government sources, the total population is 31,000 (July 2016 estimate), of whom 7,600 are citizens. The Catholic archdiocese estimates that 90 percent of citizens are Catholic, while 2 percent are Protestant. According to the archdiocese, most of the estimated 22,900 noncitizen residents are either Catholic or Protestant, approximately 1,000 are Jewish, and a smaller number are Muslim or adhere to other religious beliefs.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees individuals the freedom of religion and public worship and protects the freedom to express opinions on all issues, provided no crimes are committed in the exercise of those freedoms. No one may be compelled to participate in the rites or ceremonies of any religion or to observe its days of rest.

The constitution states Roman Catholicism is the state religion.

Any religious group wishing to construct a place of worship in a public space must register a request with the Ministry of Interior. There are several Catholic churches and synagogues, and one Protestant church.

Catholic religious instruction is available in schools as an option requiring parental authorization. Private schools may provide religious instruction for religions other than Catholicism.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Catholic ritual generally continued to play a role in state ceremonies, including annual national day celebrations.

While the government’s stated policy was to consider non-Catholic religious groups’ requests to build public places of worship on a case-by-case basis, the government reported it did not receive any requests for new sites.

Although there were no mosques and no groups had requested to build one, some Muslim residents worshipped in private prayer rooms built inside their own residences, a practice acceptable to the government, according to MFA officials.

The only private religious schools were Catholic. According to the MFA, there was insufficient demand for private schools offering instruction in other religions.

A representative from the U.S. Consulate General in Marseille and a U.S. Department of State official met with MFA officials late in the year and discussed religious freedom policies in the country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3 million (July 2016 estimate). In the last official census, conducted in 2010, 53 percent of individuals aged 15 and above self-identified as Buddhist, 3 percent as Muslim, 2.9 percent as Shamanist, and 2.1 percent as Christian. Another 38.6 percent stated they had no religious identity. Many individuals practice elements of Shamanism in combination with other religions, particularly Buddhism. The majority of Christians are Protestant; other Christians are members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the Roman Catholic Church, and the Russian Orthodox Church. Religious groups such as the Unification Church also have a presence.

The ethnic Kazakh community, located primarily in the northwest, is majority Muslim.

Legal Framework

The constitution lists “freedom of conscience and religion” among the enumerated rights and freedoms guaranteed to citizens. The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion, prohibits the state from engaging in religious activity, and prohibits religious institutions from pursuing political activities. The constitution specifies, “the relationship between the State and religious institutions shall be regulated by law.” The constitution provides that in exercising their rights, persons “shall not infringe on the national security, rights, and freedoms of others and violate public order.” The constitution says the state shall respect all religions, and religions shall honor the state. The religion law provides “the State shall respect the dominance of the Buddhist religion in the country, in order to uphold the solidarity and cultural and civilization [sic] heritage of the people. This will not hinder a citizen to practice another religion.”

Religious groups must register with local and provincial authorities, as well as with the General Authority for Intellectual Property and State Registration (General Authority), to function legally. National law provides little detail on registration procedures and does not stipulate the duration of registration, allowing local and provincial authorities to set their own rules. Religious groups must renew their registrations (in most cases annually) with multiple government institutions across local, provincial, and national levels.

A religious group must provide the following documentation to the General Authority when applying for registration: a letter requesting registration, a letter from the citizens’ representative assembly or other local authority granting approval to conduct religious services, a brief description of the group, the group’s charter, documentation on the group’s founding, a list of leaders, financial information, a declaration of assets (including any real estate owned), a lease or rental agreement (if applicable), brief biographic information of individuals wishing to conduct religious services, and the expected number of worshippers.

The renewal process requires a religious group to obtain a reference letter from the local administration to be submitted with the documents listed above (updated as necessary), to the Ulaanbaatar Citizens’ Representative Assembly (Ulaanbaatar Assembly) if the group is in Ulaanbaatar or to the relevant provincial assembly. The relevant assembly issues a resolution granting the religious institution permission to continue operations, and the organization sends a copy of the resolution to the General Authority, which enters the new validity dates on the religious institution’s original registration.

All private religious schools are entitled to state funding for their secular curricula. The government is prohibited from giving state funds to religious schools for religious education.

The education law prohibits educational institutions from conducting religious training, rituals, or activities that negatively affect society, civic interest, health, or safety. According to Ministry of Education, Culture, Science, and Sports officials, this prohibition applies to both public and private schools. A ministry directive bans religious instruction in public schools. The government may deny registration renewals for religious groups that violate the ban on religious instruction.

The law regulating civil and military service specifies that all male citizens between 18 and 25 must complete one year of compulsory military service; there is no expressed exception on religious grounds for conscientious objectors. There is, however, a provision for alternative service, available to all upon request, with the Border Forces, the National Emergency Management Agency, or a humanitarian organization. There is also a provision for, in lieu of service, paying the cost of one year’s training and upkeep for a soldier.

Under the labor law, all foreign organizations, including religious institutions, must hire a stipulated number of Mongolian nationals for every foreign employee hired. Groups not specified in the annual quota list (including most religious groups) must ensure 95 percent of employees are Mongolian nationals. Any unlisted group with fewer than 20 Mongolian national employees may employ one foreign worker.

The religion law forbids the spread of religious views by “force, pressure, material incentives, deception, or means that harm health or morals or are psychologically damaging.” It also prohibits the use of gifts for religious recruitment. Until September, the law on children’s rights prohibited children’s forced religious conversion or enrollment in religious institutions, as well as the use of deception to involve them in religious activities. The new law on children’s rights clarifies these provisions by providing children the freedom to practice their faith, but regulations for implementation have not yet been concluded.

The law regulating the legal status of foreign citizens prohibits foreigners from advertising, promoting, or practicing “inhumane” religions that could damage the national culture. The penalty for violating this provision is a fine three to six times the minimum monthly salary of 192,000 tugriks ($77). There have been no reports of any individual or organization penalized under this provision. The religion law includes a similar prohibition on religious institutions, both foreign and domestic, conducting “inhumane” or culturally damaging activities within the country.

Foreigners seeking to conduct religious activities must obtain religious visas. Only registered religious groups may sponsor foreigners for religious visas. Foreigners who enter on other classes of visas are not allowed to undertake activities that advertise or promote religion (as distinct from personal worship or other individual religious activity, which is permitted). Under the law, “engag[ing] in business other than one’s purpose for coming” constitutes grounds for deportation.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Reports indicated the liberty of interpretation given to provincial and local governments concerning the registration of religious groups led to inconsistently applied regulations to registered groups and reports of harassment by local officials of unregistered groups. People under the age of 16 were required in some provinces to provide written parental authorization to participate in religious services. The government did not block the Dalai Lama’s visit in November.

Registration and renewal procedures for religious institutions reportedly varied significantly across the country, largely depending upon the practices of local government officials. Some Christian and Muslim groups said the government inconsistently applied regulations, changing procedures frequently and without notice. Christian groups also said new officials sometimes interpreted regulations differently. Both foreign and local Christian groups stated the registration and renewal process was arbitrary in some instances, with no appeal mechanism for denials.

The length of the registration process reportedly varied from two weeks to three years, deterring some Christian religious groups wishing to register. Some groups reportedly did not try to register because they were unable to fulfill the legal requirements for registration due to insufficient size or lack of dedicated, regular worship sites.

Ulaanbaatar Assembly officials continued to say the registration and renewal process allowed the government to assess the activities of religious groups, to monitor the number of places of worship and clergy, and to know the ratio of foreigners to nationals conducting religious activities. They stated any applications for initial registration or renewal that ostensibly were “denied” were more accurately “postponed” because of incomplete documentation, poor physical conditions of the place of worship, instances of providing English language instruction in schools without an educational permit, or financial issues (e.g., failure to pay property tax or to declare financing from foreign sources). The authorities said in these cases, they instructed religious institutions to correct deficiencies and resubmit their applications. Religious leaders reported that as of October, the Ulaanbaatar Assembly had not granted any new registration requests or renewals since the assembly was elected in June. Assembly members said this was due to a lack of time following the new government’s formation. Leaders of one religious group reported some assembly inspection team members said there were “too many” churches, especially for “nontraditional” (i.e., non-Buddhist or non-Muslim) faiths.

The Ulaanbaatar Assembly limited registrations to one year, although local authorities in some other areas granted registrations valid for two or three years.

The Ulaanbaatar Assembly and other local assemblies continued to decline to recognize branch churches as affiliated with a single religious institution; instead, each individual church was required to register separately. According to Mormon leaders, the Ulaanbaatar Assembly’s position on branches, which had unclear status in the law, caused particular problems for Christian denominations seeking to operate multiple churches under a centralized administration, although such denominations were able to register their churches individually. Ulaanbaatar and other authorities preferred the no-branch system because it allowed the government to collect greater tax revenue, according to some religious groups.

Unregistered religious groups were often still able to function, although at times they experienced harassment in the form of frequent visits by local tax officers, police, and representatives from other agencies. The Mongolian Evangelical Alliance (MEA) expressed concern the unregistered status of many of its member churches left their pastors vulnerable to legal action and further investigation. Shamanist leaders expressed concerns the requirement for a registered place of worship placed limitations on their religion because of its nature-linked practices, although a few established registered places of worship. One Christian denomination also reported this requirement restricted its ability to hold worship services in members’ households. Unregistered churches lacked official documents establishing themselves as legal entities and as a result were unable to own or lease land, file tax returns, or formally interact with the government. Individual members of unregistered churches typically continued to own or lease property for church use in their personal capacity. Unregistered churches could not open bank accounts, leading pastors to open personal accounts through which they administered church funds. Some of these pastors received donations from foreign churches and foreign-owned businesses – sometimes in large amounts – in their personal accounts, leaving them potentially open to investigation for apparent money laundering.

Numerous religious leaders had previously reported the Tuv provincial legislature chief stated his opposition to registering places of worship. Some church leaders met with Tuv government representatives after receiving a report the provincial government was going to close all churches. According to these leaders, the government representatives listened to their concerns and refrained from closing churches. One Christian group reported that after having tried to register multiple times in Tuv without success, it relocated its community to Ulaanbaatar.

Religious groups reported continued difficulties in Darkhan-Uul Province, where authorities in late 2013 reportedly stated their intent not to register new religious institutions. According to the Mongolian Muslim Societies Federation, however, authorities registered two mosques after three years. Some churches reported local officials withheld reference letters required for renewal until the church performed a “project” benefiting the local community or government. One religious group reported a request from local authorities to fix a pedestrian walkway and road. Some churches continued to report delays of more than a year in renewing their registrations, although it was unclear whether the delays were linked to religious affiliation. Some religious organizations run by foreigners in the province reported receiving multiple audits from a variety of local authorities inspecting their membership, registration, building permits, and tax records.

The MEA reported barriers to registration in Khuvsgul Province, where at least two of 10 churches were awaiting registration as of October. The MEA reported one church in Dornogobi Province was registered after three years.

Some registered churches reported harassment by local authorities. They reported officials required, at times without clear legal justification, official documentation and rosters of church members and, in some cases, bribes to secure registration. As secular businesses and nonreligious groups reported similar treatment, it was not possible to determine whether this treatment was as a result of religious affiliation.

In some areas, local authorities reportedly placed restrictions on the participation of minors in church activities. According to representatives of multiple Christian groups, government officials continued to restrict unaccompanied minors’ participation in religious services due to fears services would be used to “brainwash” them. One Christian group reported the Ulaanbaatar Assembly did not extend the registration of one of its churches because the children of church members were accompanied to services by friends whose parents did not also attend. In Uvs and other provinces, minors under the age of 16 required written parental permission to participate in church activities.

Religious groups continued to experience periodic audits, usually by officers from tax, immigration, local government, intelligence, and other agencies. In some cases, Christian groups continued to report they received audits less frequently compared to previous years and experienced no unannounced audits. Other Christian groups continued to receive unannounced inspections, and one reported that inspections previously performed solely at the municipal level were now performed at the district level as well, which imposed increased administrative burdens on the groups.

Government officials received Buddhist leaders during the Lunar New Year.

The Dalai Lama visited from November 18-23 in response to a standing invitation from leaders of the Buddhist community. Previously, there were reports the government had not permitted the Dalai Lama to visit since 2011 due to pressure from the Chinese government. Before the visit, Chinese authorities warned the government of potential retaliatory consequences. After the visit, the Chinese government indefinitely postponed bilateral political and economic discussions with the country, including on a concessional loan for as much as $4 billion. In December the Mongolian foreign minister expressed the government’s regret the visit negatively affected the two countries’ relations and stated that the government would not allow further visits during its term.

Some foreign nationals faced difficulties obtaining religious visas, although some religious groups continued to report fewer difficulties compared to previous years, which they said was due to immigration officials viewing the groups’ social and charitable projects more favorably. Since most religious groups were bound by the 95 percent local-hire requirement, groups that could not afford to hire enough local employees could not sponsor additional religious visas. It was possible to pay a fee to exceed the quota restrictions, but most churches reported they could not afford this cost. Christian groups reported foreign missionaries seeking to enter the country often did nonreligious work and applied for the corresponding type of visa (such as student or business). As a result, the groups reported they could legally participate only in limited religious activities and were vulnerable to deportation because of inconsistent interpretations of the activities in which they could legally engage. In general, most visa problems were related to registration difficulties, but individual religious groups were reportedly reluctant to criticize local authorities publicly because of the need for local authorities’ approval for registration.

The government allocated funding for the restoration of several Buddhist sites that it said were important religious, historical, and cultural centers. The government did not provide similar subsidies to other religious groups.

The minister of justice established a task force on religious institutions in March to update statistics on religious institutions and identify issues related to religious activities. In local media interviews, task force representatives recommended the creation of a consolidated database of religious institutions and said police, intelligence, tax, and insurance officials should take additional steps to verify the sources of income and financing of religious institutions.

There were reports of local or social media-based harassment of Christians or members of other minority religious groups. In March journalist L. Munkhbayasgalan posted two videos on YouTube that detailed the activities of the Unification Church in the country. After the posting, Unification Church critic E. Tserendolgor asked the Independent Authority Against Corruption to investigate a department head at the Ministry of Education, Culture, Science, and Sports on the grounds she was brainwashing Mongolians and laundering money for the Unification Church’s benefit. Three days later, the department head submitted her resignation, reporting harassment through phone calls, Facebook, and Twitter, and asked the police to investigate. The department head later withdrew her resignation.

Some local authorities were reported to have sought out the services of Christian groups for prison counseling, the construction of wells, and other charitable works. Some Buddhist and Muslim leaders, however, expressed their concern over what they perceived to be the growing influence of Christianity in the country.

The Ambassador and other U.S. officials regularly discussed religious freedom with government officials at the local, provincial, and national levels, including in meetings with parliamentarians and high-level officials in the president’s office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ulaanbaatar Assembly, and the provinces. Embassy officials shared the U.S. government’s concerns about the uneven application of visa laws and the registration difficulties religious groups reported. Officials encouraged the Office of the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, parliamentarians, and provincial officials to enhance efforts to protect religious freedom and underscored the value of dialogue between the government and religious communities.

The Ambassador and other U.S. officials met frequently with religious leaders in Ulaanbaatar and across the country, including in Khovd and Bayan Ulgii provinces, to discuss registration and visa problems, as well as ways to combat religious discrimination and promote greater religious freedom. The Ambassador met with the Dalai Lama during a public event in the course of his visit. The embassy invited Buddhist, Christian, Shamanist, and Muslim leaders to embassy roundtables in February and October that focused on promoting respect for religious freedom, interreligious dialogue, and religious tolerance. The embassy encouraged the establishment of an interfaith council to address religious issues with the government. The embassy also published an op-ed on religious freedom in local media.

With support from a U.S. government visitor program, a U.S. Muslim scholar met in February with national and provincial government officials, religious leaders, civil society representatives, and Kazakh community representatives to stress the value of dialogue among faiths and between the government and religious communities. The scholar also urged houses of worship and religious schools to discuss the value of religious tolerance and interreligious dialogue.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 645,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, approximately 72 percent of the population is Orthodox, either SOC or MOC. Local media estimate the SOC accounts for approximately 70 percent of the Orthodox population, while the MOC makes up the remaining 30 percent. The census also reports 19.1 percent of the population is Muslim, 3.4 percent is Roman Catholic, and 1.2 percent is atheist. According to press estimates, the Jewish community numbers approximately 350.

There is a strong correlation between ethnicity and religion: ethnic Montenegrins and ethnic Serbs are generally associated with the MOC and the SOC respectively, ethnic Albanians with Islam or Catholicism, and ethnic Croats with the Catholic Church. Many Bosniaks (ethnic Bosnians who are Muslim) and other Muslims live along the eastern and northern borders with Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of religion as well as the right to change one’s religion. It states all persons are guaranteed the freedom to express their religion in public and private, alone or collectively, through prayer, preaching, custom, or rites, but the declaration of one’s beliefs is not obligatory. The constitution states the freedom to express religious beliefs may be restricted only if required to protect the life and health of the public, peace and order, or other rights guaranteed by the constitution. It specifies there is no state religion, and guarantees equality and freedom for all religious communities in religious activities and affairs.

The criminal code prescribes a fine between 200 euros ($211) and 16,000 euros ($16,860) or up to two years’ imprisonment for restricting an individual’s freedom to exercise a religious belief or membership in a religious group, or for preventing or obstructing the performance of religious rites. The code also provides for a fine between 600 euros ($632) to 8,000 euros ($8,430) or a maximum of one year in prison for coercing another person to declare his or her religious beliefs. Any government official found guilty of these crimes may receive a sentence of up to three years in prison.

The law provides for the recognition of religious groups through registration with local and federal authorities, although religious groups that existed before 1977 are not obligated to register in order to obtain recognition. New religious groups must register with local police within 15 days of their establishment to receive the status of a legal entity, although there is no penalty specified for failing to do so. The police must then file this registration with the Ministry of Interior, which maintains a list of all religious organizations in the country. To register, a religious group must provide its name and organizing documents, the names of its officials, and the addresses of the group’s headquarters, and of the locations where religious services will be performed. Registration entitles groups to own property, hold bank accounts in their own name, and receive a tax exemption for donations and sales of goods or services directly related to their religious activities, but registration or lack of registration does not affect a recognized group’s ability to conduct religious activities. An unregistered religious community may register as another type of organization in order to open a bank account, but may not receive the tax exemptions granted to registered religious groups.

There are 22 recognized religious groups in the country, including the SOC, the MOC, the Islamic Community of Montenegro (ICM), and the Roman Catholic Church. Other recognized religious communities include the Church of Christ’s Gospel, Catholic Mission Tuzi, Christian Adventist Church, Evangelistic Church, Army Order of Hospitable Believers of Saint Lazar of Jerusalem for Montenegro, Franciscan Mission for Malesija, Biblical Christian Community, Bahai Faith, Montenegrin Community, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Montenegrin Catholic Church, Montenegrin Protestants Church, Montenegrin Demochristian Church, and Montenegrin Adventist Church, as well as the Buddhist, Protestant, and Jewish Communities. All these groups are registered, except for the SOC, which remains unregistered.

The government has agreements with the Islamic and Jewish Communities and the Holy See further defining the legal status of the respective groups and regulating their relationship with the state. In the agreement with the Holy See, the government recognizes Catholic canon law as the Church’s legal framework and outlines the Church’s property rights. The agreements with the Islamic and Jewish Communities have similar provisions. The agreements establish commissions between each of the three religious communities and the government. There are no similar agreements with the SOC, MOC, or the other religious groups.

The Directorate for Relations with Religious Communities within the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights (MHMR) regulates relations between state agencies and religious groups, and is charged with protecting the free exercise of religion and advancing interfaith cooperation and understanding. The MHMR provides some funds to religious communities and is in charge of communication between the government and the religious communities. The ministry is also in charge of drafting new legislation defining the status and rights of religious organizations.

The law allows religious groups to conduct religious services and rites in churches, shrines, and other designated premises, but requires approval from municipal police authorities for such activities at any other public locations.

The law forbids “the abuse of religious communities or their religious sites for political purposes.”

The law provides prisoners with the right to conduct religious practices and have contact with clergy. Prisoners may request a diet conforming to their religious customs.

The constitution recognizes the right of members of minority national communities, individually or collectively, to exercise, protect, develop, and express “religious particularities” (i.e., religious customs unique to their minority community); to establish religious associations with the support of the state; and to establish and maintain contacts with people and organizations outside of the country who share the same religious beliefs.

By law religion is not taught in public primary or secondary schools.

The law prohibits discrimination, including on religious grounds. Offenses are punishable by a prison term from six months to five years.

The constitution exempts conscientious objectors from military service. Alternative service is not required.

The constitution prohibits the operation of organizations that instigate religious hatred and intolerance, and stipulates courts may block the dissemination of information and ideas via public media to prevent propagation of religious hatred or discrimination.

By law, it is a crime to cause and spread religious hatred, which includes the mockery of religious symbols or the desecration of monuments, memorial tablets, or tombs. Violators may receive prison sentences ranging from six months to 10 years. If the violation was committed through the misuse of an official position or authority or led to violence, or if the courts determine the consequences are detrimental to the coexistence of people, national minorities, or ethnic groups, the prison sentence ranges from two to 10 years.

The constitution states foreign nationals fearing persecution in their home countries on the grounds of religion have the right to request asylum.

The country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Basic Prosecutor’s Office in Kotor continued its investigation of misdemeanor charges filed against MOC Metropolitan Mihailo for an incident in 2015 in which he allegedly slapped an SOC supporter who had spit on him while blocking his entrance into city buildings. The metropolitan had intended to participate in a public discussion of the new draft law on freedom of religion. There was no resolution of the case as of year’s end.

Religious groups continued to complain the law regulating their legal status was outdated and inadequate because it was drafted for conditions existing during the time of the former Yugoslavia. The government continued to revise its draft of a new law on freedom of religion following input and comments in 2015 from various religious groups and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, but it had not completed its revisions as of the end of the year.

The interior minister from May until November, Goran Danilovic, a member of the opposition party Democratic Alliance (DEMOS), wrote a letter to the SOC supporting the SOC’s assertion it was not required to register because it had legal status before 1977 and was not a new religious group. The SOC continued to maintain its recognition through prior law, meaning its status was grandfathered in under current law, and the benefits of registration applied to it without it going through the process of registering again under current law.

According to the SOC, the government did not restrict SOC’s activities after the appointment of Minister of Interior Danilovic in May. The group reported Danilovic, in contrast to previous interior ministers, did not deny visas for SOC’s foreign priests.

On August 19, for the seventh year in a row, police, citing concerns over potential clashes, banned members of both the MOC and the SOC from celebrating the transfiguration of Christ at the Church of Christ the Transfiguration at Ivanova Korita near the historical capital of Cetinje.

The MHMR continued to provide funding to some religious groups for religious shrines, education and cultural projects, and also continued to assist with social and medical insurance for some clergy. Both registered and unregistered religious communities remained eligible to apply for this funding. In 2016, the MOC received 55,520 euros ($58,500), the ICM 53,310 euros ($56,170), the SOC 51,491 euros ($54,260), the Jewish community 17,500 euros ($18,440), and the Catholic Church 22,117 euros ($23,310). Religious communities also continued to receive in-kind assistance from other government ministries and from local governments, such as property on which to build houses of worship.

The dispute continued between the government and the SOC over the MOC’s request to use some of the churches and monasteries under the SOC’s control.

As of year’s end, no religious group had regained ownership of properties for which it had filed claims, nor did the government offer compensation for any properties. The government continued its policy of not providing restitution of religious properties expropriated by the communist Yugoslav government.

Disputes over the ownership of 750 Orthodox sites continued between the SOC and the MOC. Each group claimed it was the “true” Orthodox Church in the country and celebrated Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and Easter at separate locations. The police continued to provide protection around churches for events conducted by both groups. On January 6, SOC and MOC priests and followers again organized parallel, traditional Yule log lightings for Orthodox Christmas Eve: the SOC in Podgorica and the MOC in Cetinje. According to the media, the lightings were peaceful and no incidents occurred.

The president of the Jewish Community reported the Community was prospering, maintained good relations with the government, and planned to build a new synagogue.

The Ambassador and embassy officers continued to travel throughout the country to meet with government officials, including mayors, city administrators, and other local and national officials responsible for religious issues, to discuss relations between the government and religious groups.

On September 27, the Ambassador met with the MOC Metropolitan in Cetinje to discuss interreligious relations in the country. On September 13, the Ambassador met with SOC representatives in Podgorica to discuss the Church’s challenges in its relations with the government. During her July 28 visit to Bar, the Ambassador met with newly appointed Catholic Archbishop Rrok Gjonlleshaj to discuss the status of the Catholic Church in the country. On April 30, the Ambassador met with the president of the Jewish Community to discuss the status of the Community. The Ambassador also met with representatives of Islamic communities in various towns to discuss the issues they faced, including the potential rise of religious extremism.

On June 28, the Ambassador hosted an iftar at the Islamic Center in Bar for representatives of the religious, political, cultural, and business communities and civil society, in which participants engaged in discussions on interfaith tolerance and religious moderation.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 33.7 million (July 2016) and estimates more than 99 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim. Groups together constituting less than 1 percent of the population include Christians, Jews, Shia Muslims, and Bahais. According to Jewish community leaders, there are an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Jews, approximately 2,500 of whom reside in Casablanca. The Rabat and Marrakech Jewish communities each have approximately 75 members.

Moroccan and foreign-resident Christian leaders estimate there are between 2,000 to 6,000 Moroccan Christians distributed throughout the country, although some leaders state there may be as many as 50,000.

Foreign-resident Christian leaders estimate the foreign-resident Christian population numbers at least 30,000 Roman Catholics and 10,000 Protestants. The foreign-resident Protestant community includes the French Evangelical Church of Morocco (EEM), the Moroccan Association of Protestant Churches (AMEP), and Anglican Churches in Casablanca and Tangier. There is a small foreign-resident Russian Orthodox community in Rabat and a small foreign-resident Greek Orthodox community in Casablanca. Most foreign-resident Christians live in the Casablanca, Tangier, and Rabat urban areas, but small numbers of foreign Christians are present throughout the country. Many foreign-resident Christians are migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.

Shia Muslim leaders estimate there are tens of thousands of Shia, with the largest numbers in the north. In addition, there is an estimated 1,000-2,000 foreign-resident Shia from Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Leaders of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community estimate their numbers at 600 members. There are 350-400 Bahais throughout the country.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, the country is a sovereign Muslim state and Islam is the religion of the state. The constitution guarantees freedom of thought, expression, and assembly, and says the state “guarantees to all the free exercise of beliefs.” The constitution states the king holds the Islamic title of commander of the faithful, is the protector of Islam, and is the guarantor of freedom of worship in the country. The constitution prohibits the enactment of laws or constitutional amendments infringing upon its provisions relating to Islam.

The criminal code prohibits attempts by non-Muslims to “shake the faith” of citizens from Sunni Islam and punishes anyone who “employs enticements” to undermine the faith of a Muslim or to convert a Muslim to another religion with six months to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 200 to 500 dirhams ($20 to $49). It also provides the right to a court trial for anyone accused of such an offense. Voluntary conversion is not a crime under the criminal or civil codes.

The constitution and the law governing the media sector prohibit any citizen, including members of parliament normally immune from arrest, from criticizing Islam in public platforms, such as print or online media, or public speeches. Such expressions are punishable by imprisonment for two years and a fine of 200,000 dirhams ($19,700).

Sunni Muslims and Jews are the only religious groups recognized in the constitution as native to Morocco. The law does not require religious groups to register to worship privately. The law requires all religious groups to be registered as an association in order to conduct business on behalf of the group or to hold public gatherings.

Associations must register with local Ministry of Interior (MOI) officials in the jurisdiction of the association’s headquarters in order to conduct financial transactions, hold bank accounts, rent property, and address the government in the name of the group. Religious institutions that focus solely on foreign-resident populations may register as a branch of an international association. An individual representative of a religious group not registered as an association may be held liable for any of the group’s public gatherings, transactions, bank accounts, property rentals, and/or petitions to the government. The registration application must contain the name and purpose of the association; the name, nationality, age, profession, residence of its founders; and the address of the association’s headquarters. The constitution guarantees civil society associations and nongovernmental organizations the right to organize themselves and exercise their activities freely within the scope of the constitution. The law on associations prohibits organizations which pursue activities the government regards as “illegal, contrary to good morals, or aimed at undermining the Islamic religion, the integrity of the national territory, or the monarchical regime, or which call for discrimination.”

Foreign-resident Christian Churches are registered as associations. Registered foreign-resident churches include the Roman Catholic, Russian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Protestant, and Anglican Churches, which maintain different forms of official status. The Russian Orthodox and Anglican Churches are registered as branches of international associations through the Russian and United Kingdom embassies, respectively. The Protestant and Catholic Churches, whose existence as foreign-resident churches predates the country’s independence in 1956, maintain a special status recognized by the government since independence.

Legal provisions outlined in the general tax code provide tax benefits, land and building grants, subsidies, and customs exemptions for imports necessary for the religious activities of recognized religious groups (Sunni Muslims and Jews) and religious groups registered as associations.

By law, impeding or preventing one or more persons from worshipping or from attending worship services of any religion is punishable by six months to three years of imprisonment and a fine of 200 to 500 dirhams ($20 to $49).

The penal code states any person known to be Muslim who breaks the fast in public during the month of Ramadan without an exception granted by religious authorities is liable for punishment of six months in prison and a fine of 200 to 500 dirhams ($20 to $49).

The High Authority for Audiovisual Communications established by the constitution requires all eight television stations to dedicate 5 percent of their airtime to Islamic religious content. It requires all public channels to broadcast the Islamic call to prayer five times daily.

By law, all educational institutions must teach Sunni Islam in accordance with the teachings of the Maliki-Ashari school. The government’s annual education budget funds the teaching of Islam in all public schools.

Foreign-run schools, such as the American, French, and Spanish schools, have the choice of teaching Sunni Islam or of not including any religious instruction within the school’s curriculum. Private Jewish schools are able to teach Judaism.

According to the constitution, only the High Council of Ulema, a group headed and appointed by the king with representatives from all regions of the country, is authorized to issue fatwas, which become binding only through endorsement by the king in a royal decree.

A separate set of laws and special courts govern personal status matters for Jews, including functions such as marriage, inheritance, and other personal status matters. Rabbinical authorities, who are also court officials, administer Jewish family courts. Muslim judges trained in the country’s Malaki-Ashari Sunni interpretation of sharia administer the courts for personal status matters for all other religious groups.

According to the law, a Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim woman; a Muslim woman may not marry a non-Muslim man unless he converts to Islam.

Non-Muslims must formally convert to Islam and be permanent residents before they can become guardians of abandoned or orphaned children. Guardianship entails the caretaking of a child, which may last until the child reaches 18, but does not allow changing the child’s name or inheritance, and requires the child’s religion not be changed, according to orphanage directors.

According to the constitution, political parties may not be based on religion and may not seek to attack or denigrate Islam as one of their objectives.

The law permits the government to expel summarily any noncitizen resident it determines to be “a threat to public order,” even where other laws require due process first.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government reportedly arrested, detained, and questioned local Christians about their beliefs. The authorities arrested and sentenced several individuals for eating and smoking in public during Ramadan. In May police arrested Shia leader Abdou El Chakrani for alleged financial improprieties, although Shia leaders said Chakrani was targeted for his religious beliefs and his attempt to register an association affiliated with known Shia leaders. Some local Christians reported authorities pressured converts to renounce their faith. The government monitored, and in some cases restricted, religious activities of Muslims and non-Muslims. It continued to restrict the distribution of non-Islamic religious materials, as well as some Islamic materials it deemed inconsistent with the Maliki-Ashari school of Sunni Islam.

According to the National Federation of Amazigh Associations, an Amazigh (Berber) rights group, police officers from the Royal Gendarmerie arrested a local Christian on March 6 in Guelmim and a second on March 10 in Sale. The group stated the two were detained and interrogated about their beliefs. The individual in Guelmim stated he was held for five hours, and the individual in Sale stated police took him off a bus, announced his religion to the passengers on the bus, and then detained him for eight hours. During his detention, he said the police accused him of apostasy and said they would reconvert him to Islam. The two individuals submitted a complaint to the minister of justice on March 18; but as of the end of the year, the authorities had not opened an investigation.

The media reported authorities arrested two men in Zagora for drinking water in public during fasting hours in June. The men were sentenced to a two-month suspended jail sentence and a fine of 500 dirhams ($49). The media also reported during Ramadan at least three people were arrested in Rabat for smoking cigarettes in public.

In May police arrested Shia leader Abdou El Chakrani for financial improprieties at his place of work, but Shia leaders said Chakrani was targeted for his religious beliefs and his attempt to register an association affiliated with known Shia leaders. In April Chakrani tried to register an association in the city of Tetouan called Progressive Messengers, but his application was rejected. A spokesperson for the group said that the creation of the association would be a test of the authorities’ willingness to respect the constitution. The goal of the association was to defend the rights of religious minorities and to support religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity, as well as religious freedom.

Some local Christians reported authorities pressured Christian converts to renounce their faith by informing the converts’ friends, relatives, and employers of the individuals’ conversion.

The MEIA remained the principal government institution responsible for shaping the country’s religious sphere and promoting its interpretation of Sunni Islam. The MEIA continued to provide government-required training and direction to imams and to shape the content of Friday mosque sermons by providing approved topics. It also monitored Quranic schools to prevent what the ministry considered to be inflammatory or extremist rhetoric and to ensure teaching followed approved doctrine. The government continued to require mosques to close to the public shortly after daily prayer times to prevent use of the premises for what it termed unauthorized activity, such as gatherings intended to promote extremism. There continued to be no known Shia mosques.

The MEIA continued to employ more than 500 chief imams and more than 200 female Muslim spiritual guides (murshidat) in mosques or religious institutions throughout the country. The female guides taught religious subjects and provided counsel on a variety of matters, including women’s legal rights and family planning.

The government continued to allow the operation of registered foreign-resident churches, but continued to refuse requests by local Shia groups to register, which religious leaders and legal scholars said prevented those groups from legally gathering for religious ceremonies in public or forming associations under which they could operate legally. Local Christian and Bahai groups continued to report they had not attempted to register with authorities, believing their registration requests would be denied. Nonregistered religious groups received varying treatment by authorities. Some noted they had been able to practice their religion while others reported authorities shut down their gatherings or prevented them from occurring. A number of religious groups reported they continued cooperating with authorities and occasionally informed them of planned large gatherings, for which authorities sometimes provided security.

Local Christians and Shia Muslims continued to state fears of government harassment were part of the reason they refrained from public worship and instead met discreetly in members’ homes. Foreign-resident Christian church officials reported local Christians rarely attended their churches, and the officials did not encourage them to do so as to avoid accusations of proselytizing. Local Christians stated the authorities made phone or house calls several times a year to demonstrate they had lists of members of Christian networks and monitored Christian activities. Foreigners attended religious services without restriction at places of worship belonging to officially recognized Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant Churches.

In December the media reported local authorities in Casablanca prevented a group of local Christians from obtaining legal permission to hold a public religious gathering for Christmas. Authorities reportedly rejected the group’s request to gather by saying that only registered associations could legally obtain such permission. The group then tried to obtain permission by submitting a general proposal to authorities, which did not include their plans for religious practice, but the application was rejected when authorities discovered there were Christian religious elements to the group’s plans.

The king in February instructed the minister of endowments and Islamic affairs and the minister of education to review and rewrite religious textbooks and religious curricula used in public and private schools, with the stated goal of removing any extremist or intolerant references and promoting moderation, tolerance, and coexistence.

The government continued to restrict the distribution of non-Islamic religious materials, as well as some Islamic materials it deemed inconsistent with the Maliki-Ashari school of Sunni Islam. Its policy remained to control the sale of all books, videotapes, and DVDs it considered extremist.

The government continued to permit the display and sale of Bibles in French, English, and Spanish. A limited number of Arabic translations of the Bible were available for sale in a few bookshops for use in university religion courses. Authorities confiscated Bibles they believed were intended for use in proselytizing.

The construction of new mosques, including those constructed using private funds, continued to require authorization from the MEIA. The authorization of the MOI continued to be a requirement for the renovation or construction of churches.

In September local officials in Marrakech rejected the application for candidacy of a Salafist figure running for parliament, stating his past anti-Semitic statements against the Jewish community disqualified him as a candidate for office.

Jews and local Christians stated elementary and high school curricula still did not include mention of the historical legacy and current presence of their groups in the country.

The government continued to disseminate information about Islam over dedicated state-funded Quranic television and radio channels. The television channel Assadissa (Sixth) programming was strictly religious, consisting primarily of Quran and hadith (authoritative sayings and deeds ascribed to the Prophet Muhammad) readings and exegesis, highlighting the government’s interpretation of Islam.

Although the government continued to ban the Justice and Charity Organization (JCO), an Islamist social movement, because of its longstanding rejection of the preeminence of the king’s spiritual authority, the government reportedly tolerated some of its activities while suppressing others. The JCO continued to be able to participate in political demonstrations, hold small conferences, release press statements, and manage internet sites, although the government occasionally prevented the organization from meeting and restricted public distribution of the JCO’s published materials. Because religion and politics are closely linked, it is difficult to categorize these restrictions as being solely based on religious identity.

According to observers, the government tolerated social and charitable activities consistent with its view of Sunni Islam. For example, the Unity and Reform Movement, which shares some leadership with the ruling Party of Justice and Development, and is the country’s largest registered Islamist social organization, continued to operate without restrictions according to media reports.

The monarchy continued to support the restoration of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries throughout the country, efforts it stated it deemed necessary to preserve the country’s religious and cultural heritage and to serve as a symbol of tolerance.

The government continued to fund the study of Jewish culture and heritage at universities. At the University of Rabat, Hebrew and comparative religion were course offerings in the Department of Islamic Studies.

In June the king inaugurated a new royal institute in Fes, the Mohammed VI Foundation for African Islamic Scholars, with the stated aim of promoting religious tolerance and coexistence. The establishment of the foundation brought together 120 Muslim scholars recognized for their knowledge of Islamic law and theology from 31 countries in Africa.

The government hosted the Marrakech Declaration conference in January, which brought together religious scholars and government representatives from across the Islamic world. Under discussion was a statement rooted in Islamic texts on the need to protect religious minorities in Muslim-majority countries. Subsequent to the conference, a number of participants, including the government, publicly stated their support for the declaration.

In June during Ramadan, a group of young men attacked a man in Marrakech and another group attacked a man in Rabat for smoking cigarettes during public fasting hours.

In June a woman posted a video online in which she identified herself as a practicing Christian and explained that, despite not sharing the Muslim faith of her fellow citizens, she was no less Moroccan. The video sparked an online and media debate on the status of local Christians. Many praised the video and media outlets noted it was not an attempt at proselytization, while many online reactions were negative, with commenters calling for the woman to leave the country.

On June 25, protestors gathered in front of parliament to demand the repeal of an article of the penal code, which sets jail time and fines for breaking the fast in public during Ramadan.

Local Christians reported pressure to convert to Islam or renounce their Christian faith from non-Christian family and friends. Local Christian leaders said young Christians who still lived with their Muslim families did not reveal their faith to them because they believed they might be expelled from their homes unless they renounced Christianity. They also reported the government did not respond to complaints about frequent societal harassment.

Members of nonrecognized religious minorities said fear of societal harassment, including ostracism by converts’ families, social ridicule, employment discrimination, and potential violence against them by “extremists” were the main reason for continuing to practice their faiths discreetly. Members of the Bahai Faith said they were open about their faith with family, friends, and neighbors, but feared extremist elements in society would try to do them harm, leading them to ask local police for protection at their gatherings. Shia Muslims said in some areas, particularly in large cities in the north, they did not hide their faith from family, friends, or neighbors, but many continued to avoid disclosing their religious affiliation in areas where their numbers were smaller.

The media continued to report women had difficulties in finding employment in the private sector, or with the army or police, if they wore a hijab. When they did obtain employment in those sectors, the women reported employers either encouraged or required them to remove their headscarves during working hours.

In June the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication issued a warning to the private Aswat radio station for a December broadcast that included anti-Semitic content. During the program, the radio anchor reportedly asked listeners: “Who are the people most hostile to Muslims?” which elicited several unfavorable responses about Jews and Christians. The radio host agreed with the statements made about Jews.

Jewish citizens said they continued to live and attend services at synagogues in safety. They said they continued to visit religious sites regularly and to hold annual commemorations.

Christian leaders estimated that out of the total number of local Christians, there were 1,000 to 3,000 who regularly attended “house” churches.

Muslim citizens continued to study at private Christian and private Jewish schools, in part because these schools maintained the reputation of superior education. According to school administrators, Muslim students constituted a significant portion of the students at Jewish schools in Casablanca.

The U.S. Ambassador, embassy and consulate general officers, and visiting U.S. government officials met with senior government officials, including the minister of interior and the minister of endowments and Islamic affairs, to promote religious freedom and tolerance of religion. In January embassy officials and visiting U.S. government officials, including the U.S. Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South and Central Asia, participated in the Marrakech Declaration conference on the rights of religious minorities in Muslim-majority countries and met with senior government officials to underscore U.S. support for tolerance of religious minority communities. In February the visiting U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom met with members of religious minority groups and senior government officials to discuss the state of religious freedom in the country and encourage the government to take steps to protect religious minorities and encourage their acceptance in society. In May the visiting U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism met with Jewish groups and government officials and commended the country’s protection of its Jewish community and encouraged them to share their expertise in combatting anti-Semitism with other Arab countries.

The Ambassador and embassy officers met with Muslim religious scholars to discuss religious tolerance, and with leaders of the Jewish community, Christian foreign residents, and leaders of registered and unregistered Christian, Shia, and Bahai groups, as well as other local religious groups, to discuss issues facing the various groups. The Ambassador spoke at a conference focused on the Moroccan Jewish diaspora’s role in the country and reaffirmed U.S. support for religious diversity and tolerance. The embassy fostered programs designed to highlight religious tolerance and counter violent extremism.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 25.9 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the U.S. government, 28 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 16 percent Zionist Christian, 12 percent Protestant, 18 percent Muslim (mostly Sunni), and 8 percent other religious groups including the Bahai Faith, Judaism, and Hinduism. Approximately 18 percent does not profess any religion or belief. According to Christian and Muslim religious leaders, a significant portion of the population adheres to syncretic indigenous religious beliefs, characterized by a combination of African traditional practices and aspects of either Christianity or Islam, a category not included in government estimates. Muslim leaders state their community accounts for 25-30 percent of the total population, a statistic frequently reported in the press.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as a secular state. It prohibits religious discrimination, provides for the right of citizens to practice or not practice a religion, and stipulates that no individuals may be deprived of their rights because of religious faith or practice. Political parties are constitutionally prohibited from using names or symbols associated with religious groups. The constitution protects places of worship and the right of religious groups to organize, worship, and pursue their religious objectives freely and to acquire assets in pursuit of those objectives. It recognizes the right of conscientious objection to military service for religious reasons. These and other rights may only temporarily be suspended or restricted in the event of a declaration of a state of war, siege, or emergency, in accordance with the terms of the constitution.

The law requires all nongovernmental organizations to register with the Ministry of Justice, Constitutional, and Religious Affairs (MOJ). Under the law, “religious organizations” are charities or humanitarian organizations, whereas “religious groups” refer to particular denominations. Religious groups register at the denominational level or at the congregational level if they are unaffiliated. Religious groups and organizations register by submitting an application, providing identity documents of the local leaders, and submitting documentation of declared ties to any international religious group or organization. There are no penalties for failure to register; however, religious groups and organizations must show evidence of registration to open bank accounts, file for exemption of customs duties for imported goods, or submit visa applications for visiting foreign members.

A 2012 accord between the national government and the Holy See governs the Catholic Church’s rights and responsibilities in the country. The agreement recognizes the Catholic Church as a “legal personality” and recognizes the Church’s exclusive right “to regulate ecclesiastical life and to nominate people for ecclesiastical posts.” The agreement requires Catholic Church representatives to register with the government to benefit from the Church’s status. The accord also gives the Catholic Church the exclusive right to create, modify, or eliminate ecclesiastical boundaries; however, it stipulates that ecclesiastical territories must report to a Church authority in the country.

The law permits religious organizations to own and operate schools. The law forbids religious instruction in public schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The MOJ registered 19 new religious groups and three new religious organizations between January and August. There were a total of 859 religious groups and 219 religious organizations registered.

A Catholic Church representative said that provincial authorities in certain provinces violated the 2012 accord with the Holy See by requiring local dioceses to register with local authorities separately or present some form of proof of previous registration. The Catholic Church continued to pursue the return of property the government seized following independence. A Catholic Church representative reconfirmed that the government had returned approximately 60 percent of property seized from the Church after independence as of August and that the Church continued negotiations regarding the remaining 40 percent.

The Greek Orthodox Church continued to seek the return of the Ateneu (Athenaeum), a church property in central Maputo seized by the government after independence and renamed the Palacio dos Casamentos (Wedding Palace).

In February four unidentified men fatally shot Apostolic Faith Mission Pastor Joao Jofrisse during a church service in his home in the central city of Chimoio. Jofrisse’s widow, Eugenia Chinhamandoa, said he may have been killed because of competition for members with other churches.

The U.S. Ambassador and other embassy officials discussed the importance of religious freedom and the return of seized property with the justice minister and the national director of religious affairs. The Ambassador and embassy representatives discussed the importance of political and religious tolerance to promote peace and security with Catholic Church representatives who participated in international mediation between the government and the main opposition party. Embassy officers also discussed the status of religious freedom and expressed U.S. government support for this fundamental right with religious leaders in Nampula.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.4 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, approximately 97 percent of the population identifies as Christian. According to church statistics and the government’s 2013 Demographic and Health Survey, approximately 50 percent identify as Lutheran and 20 percent as Catholic. Other groups, including Anglican, various Reformed denominations, Adventist, Baptist, Methodist, Pentecostal, evangelicals, charismatics, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), make up the remaining 27 percent of the population that is Christian. The number of Pentecostal and charismatic churches is growing. Some Zionist churches combine Christianity and traditional African beliefs. Muslims, Bahais, Jews, Buddhists, atheists, and other non-Christians together constitute approximately 3 percent of the population and reside primarily in urban areas.

Many members of the Himba and San ethnic groups combine indigenous religious beliefs with Christianity. Muslims are mostly Sunni and are predominantly immigrants from elsewhere in Africa, South Asia, or recent converts.

Legal Framework

The constitution specifies the country is a secular state, prohibits religious discrimination, and provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief, as well as the right to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain, and promote any religion. These rights may be subject to “reasonable restrictions” justified by interests such as “the sovereignty and integrity of Namibia, national security, public order, decency or morality.”

The law allows recognition of any religious group as a voluntary association, without the need to register with the government. A voluntary association is required to have a written constitution stating its purpose, be membership-based, be a legal person, and have a plan for disposing of its assets if it ceases operation. Religious groups may also register as nonprofit organizations (an “association without gain”) with the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Under the law, a nonprofit organization must have a minimum of seven members and two directors, an auditor, and a registered address in the country, and must comply with all regulations of domestic corporate law. Both religious groups registered as nonprofit organizations and religious groups formed as voluntary associations are exempt from paying taxes. Other faith-based organizations may also register as welfare organizations with the Ministry of Health and Social Services (MoHSS). Under MoHSS regulations, a welfare organization must have a minimum of seven members, an auditor, and a constitution. If the group meets the objectives of a welfare organization, the MoHSS will issue a letter of certification. There is no difference in the application process between religious and nonreligious groups. A welfare organization may apply to the Department of Inland Revenue to receive tax-exempt status. Once registered as a welfare organization, a religious group may seek to obtain communal land at a reduced rate, which is at the discretion of traditional authorities or town councils, based on whether they believe the organization’s use of the land will benefit the community.

The constitution permits religious groups to establish private schools provided no student is denied admission based on creed. The government school curriculum contains a nonsectarian “religious and moral education” component that includes education on moral principles and human rights and introduces students to a variety of African traditions and religions, as well as world religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, the Bahai Faith, and Rastafarianism.

Similar to other foreigners seeking to work in the country, religious workers must obtain an appropriate visa. Work visa requirements include proof of educational qualifications, police clearance certificate from country of origin, and – for visas over three months – proof of a contract.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In July the government deported nine South African Muslims from the southern part of the country for allegedly engaging in “religious work” without a proper visa. The individuals entered the country with tourist visas, but the government stated they intended to engage in proselytizing and religious work among Namibian Muslim groups; they were reportedly performing daily prayers at a mosque in the Keetmanshoop area when they were arrested. According to media sources, NIJC head Sheikh Desmond Dawid Tjipanga said he suspected the group was placed under surveillance by police and officials from the Department of Immigration when the individuals entered the country. The Keetmanshoop area of the Immigration Directorate confirmed to media that the South Africans were deported but did not give a reason. Tjipanga opposed the deportation stating that it was an act of discrimination against Muslims.

Some religious groups complained about difficulty in obtaining work visas for foreign coreligionists and religious workers to enter the country to engage in religious activities. The government, however, also strictly enforced work visa requirements for nonreligious, nontourist foreign visitors.

The government periodically included religious leaders in discussions regarding issues affecting the country and in national events. President Hage Geingob held consultations with leaders from major religious groups in the country, including from various Christian denominations and from the Muslim community, to discuss opportunities for collaboration in fighting poverty.

The University of Namibia and the Namibia University of Science and Technology in Windhoek, both government-supported institutions, provided rooms to religious groups and students to use for prayer and meetings.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy representatives met with religious leaders from the Christian, Bahai, and Muslim communities to better understand the country’s religious landscape and any potential issues of discrimination such as difficulties in obtaining visas.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 9,600 (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 national census, approximately 95 percent of the population is Christian. The Nauru Congregational Church (which includes the Nauru Protestant Church) is the largest Christian group constituting 36 percent of the population, followed by the Roman Catholic Church at 33 percent, the Nauru Independent Assembly of God at 13 percent, and the Nauru Independent Church at 10 percent. Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, Baptists, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) each constitute less than 1 percent of the population. Two percent of the population reported no religious affiliation. Ethnic Chinese residents, estimated to constitute 5 percent of the population, are Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist, Christian, or nonreligious. As of November 30, the Australian government houses approximately 383 asylum seekers in the country, many of whom are Muslim.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the freedom of conscience, expression, assembly, and association. These rights may be restricted by any law which is “reasonably required” in the interests of defense or public safety, order, morality, or health.

Under the law, religious groups must register with the government to operate in an official capacity, which includes proselytizing, building houses of worship, holding religious services, and officiating at marriages. A 2014 cabinet memorandum sets out requirements for registration of religious groups, including having at least 750 enrolled members, land and a building in the country, and leadership by a Nauruan member of the clergy, who must reside in the country. The Catholic Church, the Nauru Congregational Church, the Assemblies of God, and the Nauru Independent Church are officially registered.

Religious groups may operate private schools and a number do so. In public schools the government allows religious groups to have a weekly religious education program with students during school hours, but does not require schools to offer such education. In schools where religious education is provided, students are required to attend the program led by the representative of their respective religious group. Students whose faith is not represented are required to undertake a period of independent study during the class time devoted to religious education.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Although the law requires registration for religious groups to conduct a full range of activities, local religious leaders stated the government required such recognition only if a denomination’s clergy wished to officiate at marriages. Representatives of the Baptists and Seventh-day Adventists reported that although they had not registered, they had not experienced problems with the government granting visas to their missionaries. There were no reports the government discriminated in the registration process, although leaders of churches with smaller congregations expressed concerns that the 750-person requirement implemented in 2014 was difficult to meet. Representatives of a Baptist church, which does not have 750 members, applied for registration and their application was pending at the end of the year.

As of August authorities had granted 10-year residency visas to 894 former asylum seekers, many of whom were Muslim.

Protestant and Catholic clergy continued to communicate a message of tolerance toward refugees through sermons conducted during visits to the refugee centers. Muslim women wore headscarves in public. Some refugees belonging to religious minorities established small businesses, while some found employment in the local economy.

Missionaries representing several Christian groups were active and stated they operated freely.

The U.S. Ambassador to Fiji is accredited to the government; the U.S. government does not maintain an embassy in the country. The Ambassador traveled to Nauru to discuss the country’s efforts to promote religious tolerance with the secretary of multicultural affairs and deputy secretary for justice and border control. Other officials from the U.S. Embassy in Fiji also discussed the importance of religious freedom as a core value and universal human right with officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Education, and local church leaders.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 29 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, the most recent taken, Hindus constitute 81.3 percent of the population, Buddhists 9 percent, Muslims (the vast majority of whom are Sunni) 4.4 percent, and Christians (the vast majority of whom are Protestant) 1.4 percent. Other groups, which together constitute less than 5 percent of the population, include Kirats (an indigenous religion with Hindu influence), animists, adherents of Bon (a Tibetan religious tradition), Jains, Bahais, and Sikhs. According to some Muslim leaders, Muslims constitute at least 5.5 percent of the population, mostly concentrated in the south of the country. According to some Christian groups, Christians constitute 3 to 7 percent of the population. Many individuals adhere to a syncretic faith encompassing elements of Hinduism, Buddhism, and traditional folk practices, according to scholars.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Nepal to be a secular state, and defines secularism as “protection of the age-old religion and culture and religious and cultural freedom.” The constitution stipulates every person has the right to profess, practice, and protect his or her religion. While exercising this right, the constitution bans individuals from engaging in any acts “contrary to public health, decency, and morality” or which “disturb the public law and order situation.” It also prohibits persons from converting other persons from one religion to another or disturbing the religion of others, and states violations are punishable by law.

The punishments stipulated by the law are six years’ imprisonment for “causing another person to convert” or for propagating any religion in a manner undermining another religion, and three years’ imprisonment for attempts to perform such acts. The law also subjects foreign nationals convicted of these crimes to deportation.

The law does not provide for registration or official recognition of religious organizations as religious institutions, except for Buddhist monasteries. It is not mandatory for Buddhist monasteries to register with the government, but they must do so in order to receive government funding for physical maintenance of facilities as well as skill training for monks and trip expenses for study tours. A monastery development committee under the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development oversees the registration process. Requirements for registration include furnishing a recommendation from a local government body, information about the members of the monastery’s own management committee, a land ownership certificate, and photos of the premises.

Aside from Buddhist monasteries, all other religious groups may only register as NGOs or nonprofit organizations in order to own land, operate legally as institutions, or gain eligibility for public service-related government grants and partnerships. Religious organizations follow the same registration process as other NGOs and nonprofits, which include preparing a constitution and furnishing information on the organization’s objectives as well as details on its executive committee members. To renew registration, organizations must submit annual financial audit reports and activity progress reports.

The law prohibits the killing, attempted killing, and instigation of killing of both female and male cattle. Violations are subject to 12 years in prison for killing, and six years for attempted killing or instigation.

A 2011 ruling by the Supreme Court stipulates the government must provide protection for Christian groups carrying out funeral rites in the exercise of their constitutional right to practice their religion, but also states the government is not obligated to provide land grants for this purpose. There is no law specifically addressing the funeral practices of religious groups.

The constitution establishes the government’s authority to “make law to operate and protect a religious place or religious trust and to manage trust property and regulate land management.”

The law does not require religiously affiliated schools to register, but Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim religious schools must register as religious educational institutions with local district education offices (part of the Ministry of Education) and supply information about their funding sources in order to receive funding at the same levels as nonreligious public/community schools. Religious public/community schools follow the same registration procedure as nonreligious public/community schools. Catholic and Protestant groups must register as NGOs to operate private schools. Christian schools are not able to register as public/community schools and are not eligible for government funding. Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim groups may also register as NGOs to operate private schools, but are not eligible for funding in that case.

The law criminalizes acts of caste‑based discrimination in places of worship. Penalties for violations are three months to three years’ imprisonment, a fine of 1,000-25,000 Nepali rupees (NRs) ($9-$230), or both.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On June 9, police arrested seven people – two school principals and five staff members of a Christian NGO – for distributing books about Christianity to the students of two Christian schools in the Dolakha District headquarters of Charikot. Several days later, police arrested a Christian pastor who had introduced the NGO staff to the local schools. All eight individuals were charged under the criminal and civil code with attempted conversion. On December 6, the Dolakha District Court acquitted the accused of all charges. Christian groups stated the arrest was the first reported instance of attempted enforcement of the constitutional ban on conversion and represented a test case for its enforcement. Human rights lawyers, Christian groups, and leaders of other religious minorities all said the case increased their concerns the constitution’s ban on conversion could make religious minorities subject to legal prosecution for actions carried out in the normal course of their religious practices, and also vulnerable to societal persecution for preaching, public displays of faith, or distribution of religious materials. After the court announced its decisions on December 6, Christian leaders expressed relief and said it increased their belief in justice and the rule of law in the country.

In August the media reported police in Jhapa District arrested a foreign Christian for proselytizing after community members protested his activities in their area. The Department of Immigration deported the individual approximately a week later for being in the country without a visa.

According to an NGO supporting indigenous people’s rights, in September four people were arrested in Panchthar District and subsequently charged with slaughtering a cow. They were released on their own recognizance one week later. As of the end of the year, the case remained pending in the district court.

In July police in Kathmandu detained approximately 30 Tibetans during a celebration of the Dalai Lama’s 81st birthday, but released them without charge several hours later. The police provided no reason for the detention. Human rights groups reported police had refused some individuals entry into the celebration and did not allow people to enter or exit Jawalakhel Tibetan Settlement for several hours. No further information about the incident was available.

According to the Jhapa District attorney’s office, the criminal case continued against four suspects for the detonation of small homemade explosive devices at three churches in Jhapa District in September 2015. All four suspects had been released on bail and remained free while the criminal case remained pending at year’s end. Police continued to search for three additional suspects, and there were no additional arrests made as of the end of the year.

Throughout the year, members of the parliament and the ruling coalition, including senior members of the Rastriya Prajatantra Party-Nepal (RPP-N), the country’s fourth largest political party, made speeches calling for the re-establishment of the country as a Hindu state, and saying they would “drive out” Christians who sought to convert Hindus. On September 13, the media reported former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamal Thapa, the leader of RPP-N, called conversions an “epidemic” which had to be stopped.

Provisions regarding conversion in a draft new criminal and civil code under consideration by the parliament were subject to statements of concern by minority religious groups and human rights lawyers. They said the draft provisions constituted an expansion of the existing ban on conversion and could make religious minorities even more vulnerable to criminal penalties for proselytizing, as well as for preaching and other public expressions of faith.

According to legal experts and leaders of religious minority groups, the constitutional stipulation to protect the “age-old religion” and the prohibition on conversion were intended by the drafters of the constitution to mandate the protection of Hinduism.

Some Muslim leaders continued not to accept converts to Islam, saying it would violate the law according to their interpretation. Instead, they continued to recommend individuals seeking to convert to travel to India to do so.

In June the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development issued a directive to all District Development Committees to deny the registration of any NGOs preaching or promoting religious conversion. Christian groups reported encountering difficulties in registering as NGOs or nonprofits since June. Christian groups said District Development Committees occasionally asked organizations to remove religious words from their entity names and advised religious leaders registering organizations to remove their religious titles (e.g. Father, Reverend) from registration documentation in order to secure registration. Christian leaders expressed fears the new guidelines could potentially limit the establishment of churches.

In March the government led by then-Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Oli announced it would no longer recognize Christmas as a public holiday. The government said the decision was part of an effort to reduce the large number of public holidays. Christian groups stated the decision was a reflection of growing anti-Christian sentiment in the country, in view of the government’s continued recognition of dozens of Hindu holidays and some Muslim and Buddhist holidays. Following a change in government in August, Christian groups reportedly met several times with senior government officials, including a meeting on December 23 with new Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal, to urge reinstatement of Christmas as a public holiday. On December 24, the government made an announcement restoring recognition of Christmas for the current year. Both the prime minister and President Bidya Devi Bhandari made public statements to commemorate celebration of the holiday.

Despite the brief detention of Tibetans during the celebration of the Dalai Lama’s birthday in July, Tibetan community leaders said government authorities generally continued to permit the resident Tibetan community to celebrate Buddhist holidays and to conduct other private ceremonies with cultural/religious significance, such as Losar, the Tibetan New Year. Tibetan leaders said they continued to mark certain anniversaries considered more politically sensitive, such as Tibetan Uprising Day, with small, quiet prayer ceremonies within Tibetan settlements. Abbots of Buddhist monasteries reported monasteries and their related social welfare projects generally continued to operate without government interference.

Muslim group leaders said Muslims continued to be able to participate in the Hajj. A Central Hajj Committee, made up of representatives of political parties, mosques, and civil society, under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, continued to coordinate and facilitate logistics for the Hajj for all Muslims. The government paid for 10 committee members, compared to nine in the previous years, to travel to Saudi Arabia to carry out their work.

Christian leaders said the government-funded Pashupati Area Development Trust continued its restrictions preventing Christian burials in a common cemetery behind the Pashupati Hindu Temple in Kathmandu, while allowing burials of individuals from non-Hindu indigenous faiths. According to Christian leaders, the government continued its inconsistent enforcement of the court ruling requiring protection of congregations carrying out burials. Reportedly, in Parbat District community authorities refused to allow Christians to bury one of their deceased. In response to a complaint filed by the Christian community, the Ministry of Home Affairs instructed the chief district officer and district police to allow the burial to take place. Protestant churches continued to report difficulties gaining access to land they had bought five years prior for burials in the Kathmandu Valley in the names of individual parishioners. They stated local communities tended to oppose burial by groups perceived to be outsiders, but were more open to burials conducted by Christian members of their own communities. As a result, they reported, some Protestants in the Kathmandu Valley continued to travel to the countryside to conduct burials in unpopulated areas.

Catholic leaders reported almost all Catholic parishioners chose cremation due to past difficulties with burials. Many Christian communities outside of the Kathmandu Valley said they continued to be able to buy land for cemeteries, conduct burials in public forests, or use land belonging to indigenous communities for burials. They also said they continued to be able to use public land for this purpose.

Muslim groups stated individuals in the Kathmandu Valley continued to be able to buy land for cemeteries, but local Hindus sometimes refused to sell land to them. In the southern Terai region, where there were many Muslim-majority communities, Muslim groups said they continued not to encounter such problems.

Following the promulgation of the new constitution in 2015, Christian leaders said they had been hopeful the government would pass legislation allowing a church to register as a church and own property in the name of the church, rather than the current situation in which a church registered and owned property either as an NGO or in the name of an individual. As of the end of the year, however, they said the government had not taken any steps to pass such legislation.

According to Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim groups, the government continued to permit them to establish and operate their own community schools. The government continued to provide the same level of funding for registered religious schools as for public schools. Private Christian schools continued not to receive government funding. Although religious education continued not to be part of the curriculum in public schools, some public schools displayed a statue of Saraswati, the Hindu goddess of learning, on their grounds.

According to the Department of Education, the executive office within the Ministry of Education, 765 madrassahs were registered with district education offices, an increase of 20 from the previous year. There were also 82 gumbas (Buddhist centers of learning) and 83 gurukhuls (Hindu centers of learning) registered with the Department of Education.

Some Muslim leaders stated there continued to be as many as 2,500 to 3,000 unregistered madrassahs. According to religious leaders, the reason there continued to be such a large number of unregistered madrassahs, as well as unregistered Buddhist and Hindu schools, was the desire of school operators to avoid government auditing and to follow their own curriculum rather than the curriculum set by the Department of Education for registered schools. They said some school operators also wished to avoid the registration process, which they characterized as cumbersome.

Christian leaders said missionary hospitals, welfare organizations, and schools continued to operate without government interference. They said the government usually did not expel foreign workers for proselytizing, but missionaries reported they attempted to keep their activities discreet. Many foreign Christian organizations had direct ties to local churches and continued to sponsor clergy for religious training abroad.

Muslim community leaders reported two Muslims were killed and several others injured by Hindus on December 12 in the village of Matehia in Banke District following a confrontation between a group of Muslims and a Hindu shop owner who reportedly had made derogatory comments about a procession celebrating the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday. After he was confronted by the Muslims, the Hindu shop owner reportedly assaulted and injured one boy with a knife, to which the Muslims responded by vandalizing the shop. Several Muslim elders then attempted to mediate the conflict, but were attacked by a group of Hindus armed with knives and sticks. One Muslim died on the scene, one died while being treated in Kathmandu, and five others were seriously injured. According to the Muslim leaders, the police and community leaders helped defuse tensions after the attack. As of the end of the year, police had arrested five of the 18 Hindus accused of the attack.

Some media outlets reported Christian groups allegedly were engaging in “forced” conversion by making promises of material gain or through trickery. There were also media reports of childcare homes allegedly converting children in the name of social work. On July 8, the media reported a statement by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Women, Children, and Social Development Chandra Prakash Mainali vowing to take action against childcare homes engaged in this practice.

Christian leaders privately expressed concern over the “inflammatory language” on the part of politicians advocating the re-establishment of the country as a Hindu state and portraying “foreign” religions as a threat to Hinduism in the country. They said it had negatively impacted public perception of Christians and Christianity.

While expressing their concern, some leaders of religious minority groups stated some converts to other religions, including Hindus who had converted to Christianity, remained willing and able to state publicly their new religious affiliation. At the same time, Christian leaders reported a number of converts to Christianity tried to conceal their faith from their families and local communities, mainly in rural areas.

According to NGOs, Hindu priests and local high-caste residents continued to prevent Dalits, as members of a lower caste, from entering temples, and sometimes prevented them from performing religious rites and participating in religious festivals.

Both following the arrest of the eight individuals accused of attempted conversion in Dolakha District and during their trial, U.S. embassy officers met with senior government officials to urge them to respect the right of people to practice their religion freely. Embassy officers emphasized the arrest of Christians for distributing religious literature was an example of how the language in the constitution and existing criminal and civil codes could result in broad restrictions on the freedom of religion.

Throughout the year, the U.S. Ambassador and embassy officers as well as visiting senior U.S. government officials expressed concern to senior government officials and political leaders over restrictions on freedom of religion, including the rights to convert and to proselytize, posed by provisions in the constitution and the draft civil and criminal code. The Ambassador and embassy officers urged political and government leaders to ensure the final version of the criminal and civil code guaranteed religious freedom, including the right to choose one’s own religion without the prospect of criminal sanction. Embassy officers also met with political leaders from major parties to reiterate this message. In November the Department of State Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South and Central Asia met with government leaders and parliamentarians to promote religious tolerance and encourage the government to decriminalize religious conversion.

The Special Advisor also met with religious leaders to discuss restrictions on the rights of religious minorities to engage in their religious practices. Embassy officers met with Christian groups to discuss concerns about the enforcement of the prohibition against conversion and the verbal attacks on Christian communities by Hindu politicians. Embassy officers also continued to meet regularly with local representatives of religious minorities in Kathmandu and throughout the country to discuss accusations that Christians had engaged in forcible conversion, and difficulties both Christians and Muslims continued to encounter in acquiring land for religious burials. Embassy officers met with Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian leaders to discuss their views on the draft civil and criminal code and on the implementation of the constitutional provision banning conversion.

Embassy officers continued to address religious diversity and tolerance in speaking engagements with the general public and with students in particular, including for example at a meeting with a student group in Pokhara in March. The embassy also continued to provide financial assistance for the preservation and restoration of religious sites, including three Buddhist chhortens and several Hindu temples. The embassy continued to sponsor the participation of NGO leaders in U.S.-based programs promoting interfaith dialogue and religious diversity. The embassy also continued to promote religious tolerance in a program for underprivileged youth, including Muslims and Tibetan refugees.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 17 million (July 2016 estimate).

In a 2014 survey by government bureau Statistics Netherlands, 49 percent of the population declared no church affiliation, 24 percent self-identified as Roman Catholic, 7 percent as Reformed, 6 percent as Calvinist, 3 percent as other Protestant denominations, 5 percent as Muslim, and 6 percent as “other,” including Hindu, Jewish, and Buddhist.

Most Muslims live in urban areas and are of Turkish, Moroccan, or Surinamese background. The Muslim population also includes immigrants and asylum seekers from other countries including Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tel Aviv University’s Stephen Roth Institute, a research institute, and the Council of Europe estimate the Jewish population at approximately 30,000. A 2008 report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy identified a Hindu population of between 100,000 and 215,000, of whom approximately 85 percent are of Surinamese descent and 10 percent of Indian descent. The Buddhist community has approximately 17,000 members, according to a 2007 report by the governmental Netherlands Institute for Social Research, the latest estimate available.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits discrimination on religious grounds and provides for the freedom of individuals to profess their religion or belief, individually or in community with others, without affecting their responsibilities under the law. The constitution allows the government to restrict the exercise of religious beliefs outside of buildings or enclosed spaces to protect health, for traffic safety, or to prevent disorder.

The law makes it a crime to engage in public speech that incites religious hatred, and provides a penalty of imprisonment for up to two years, a fine of up to 8,100 euros ($8,500), or both. In order to qualify as hate speech, the statements must be directed at a group of people; the law does not consider statements targeted at a philosophy or religion, such as “Islam” as opposed to “Muslims,” as criminal hate speech.

The law permits employees to refuse to work on Sundays for religious reasons, but employers may deny employees such an exception depending on the nature of the work, such as employment in the health sector. Members of religious communities for whom the Sabbath is not Sunday may request similar exemptions.

The law does not require religious groups to register with the government, but the government recognizes religious groups and grants them exemptions from all taxes, including income, value added, and property taxes, if the tax authorities determine they meet specific criteria. Under the tax law, institutions must be “of a philosophical or religious nature,” contribute to the general welfare of society, and be non-profit and non-violent to qualify for tax exemptions.

A number of federal government institutions, including the Council of State and the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR), are responsible for reviewing complaints of religious discrimination. The NIHR is also charged with providing advice to the government on issues involving religious discrimination.

Local governments appoint antidiscrimination boards that work independently under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. These local boards provide information on how to register and report complaints and mediate disputes to the interior ministry, including those pertaining to discrimination based on religion. Acceptance of mediation decisions by parties involved in disputes is voluntary.

The government provides funding to religious schools, other religious educational institutions, and religious healthcare facilities. To qualify for funding, institutions have to meet government educational standards as well as minimum class size and healthcare requirements. The constitution stipulates standards required of religious or ideology-based (termed “special”) schools, financed either in part or fully by the government, are regulated by law with due regard for the freedom of these schools to provide education according to their religion or ideology.

The constitution stipulates public education shall pay due respect to the individual’s religion or belief, and the law permits religious education in public schools. All schools are obligated to familiarize students with various spiritual movements in society regardless of the religious affiliation of the school. Religion-based schools are free to shape religious education, as long as the education inspectorate sees that such education does not incite criminal offenses.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The NIHR and municipal antidiscrimination boards continued to address individual complaints, such as the denial of internships to female Muslim students because they refused to remove their headscarves. The rulings generally held that any restriction on wearing headscarves should be limited and based on security or other carefully delineated grounds pertaining to the nature of the work. In practice, headscarves were permitted almost everywhere, including in schools.

On November 29, the lower house of parliament approved legislation proposed by the cabinet in 2015 that would ban face covering clothing, including burqas, in certain public places where it said identification was essential, including in government buildings, schools, hospitals, and on public transportation. The proposed legislation generated considerable societal debate. Muslim organizations, for example, SPIOR, the umbrella organization of Islamic organizations in the Rotterdam region, said the legislation would stigmatize Muslims, and targeted only approximately100 to 150 persons in the country who wear the burqa. Geert Wilders, leader of the anti-immigrant populist Freedom Party (PVV), argued for a burqa ban in all public spaces. Other political parties who voted in favor of the ban viewed it as part of integration efforts. These parties argued that an open society requires open communication, unhindered by a burqa. Religious freedom was not part of the debate. The senate had not voted on the legislation at year’s end.

On March 9, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals acquitted a man of hate speech after he used offensive language about Muslims in a television interview. The court found he had made his inflammatory statements in the context of a political debate, where such statements might offend, shock, or disturb, and therefore did not rise to the level of insulting a religion.

On January 5, the prosecutor’s office fined a police instructor 350 euros ($370) for a Facebook post in which he wrote: “I hate Muslims, period. I have had it with Muslims. I hope that they will quickly all die a slow death. Death to Islam.” The prosecutor considered the latter comment about Islam permissible under the law because it criticized a religion rather than its followers.

Parliament passed a motion in December 2015 calling on the cabinet to consider banning Salafist organizations because the country’s security services reportedly considered them a “breeding ground for jihadism.” In February the cabinet rejected the ban after debating eight non-binding resolutions related to the practice of Salafism in the country, including a proposal to limit the exemption of religious groups against criminal prosecution, and a call to ban foreign financing of Salafist mosques. One resolution, sponsored by Ahmed Marcouch, a member of the Labor Party, again called upon the government to investigate the possibility of banning all Salafist organizations. Marcouch stated in his resolution “it is not about religious freedom because Salafism is an anti-democratic and intolerant ideology, not a religion, and its proponents believe in their supremacy over others.” The government repeatedly ruled out a ban on Salafism, stating it would violate freedom of religion, and was considering, at year’s end, ways of improving transparency of foreign funding for all religious organizations.

Government ministers frequently spoke out against anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim sentiment, and general discrimination in speeches. On November 2, Justice and Security Minister Ard van der Steur stated, “Persons in the Netherlands must be free to exercise their religious beliefs. Violence against Muslims and mosques is unacceptable. The police and prosecutor’s office must take firm action.” On March 1, Dutch First Vice President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans stated on Facebook, “The Netherlands must remain a country where people can profess their religion and conviction in freedom and without fear. Nobody should be afraid to be openly who he is…Muslim, Jew, Christian, nonbeliever or whatever.” Commenting on the rise of anti-Muslim incidents, Rotterdam Mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb, a Muslim, stated May 25, “The debate on the excesses of Islam and Muslims in relation to terrorism has become a license to offend and discriminate against people. That’s unacceptable.” In September Minister of Education Jet Bussemaker spoke out against religious discrimination in awarding vocational internships. The minister launched programs for vocational students and teachers in the country’s five largest cities to train them to recognize discrimination, including religious discrimination.

On August 25, PVV leader and opposition parliamentarian Geert Wilders presented an election platform for the March 2017 parliamentary elections calling for the “de-Islamization” of the country through refusing all asylum seekers and immigrants from Islamic countries, prohibiting headscarves in public, closing all mosques and Islamic schools, banning the Quran, and prohibiting any Islamic expression that violated public order.

In December a court convicted Wilders of inciting discrimination and insulting a racial group following remarks he made about Moroccans at a rally in 2014, but did not prescribe any punishment. The court acquitted Wilders of inciting hatred.

The government used newspaper advertisements, internet outreach, and public service announcements to encourage victims to report discrimination, including on religious grounds. On September 2, Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Ronald Plasterk launched a new national campaign “to knock down” discrimination, including religious discrimination. The campaign included posters, television commercials, and outreach activities by well-known personalities.

The government updated its national action plan to counter discrimination, which included specific measures to counter anti-Semitism, including efforts to stimulate dialogue between key figures in the Jewish and Muslim communities and to promote debate among Muslim youth to advance diversity and tolerance. The government signed agreements with major social media organizations such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to counter discrimination on the internet by addressing or removing discriminatory language. The government consulted stakeholders, including the Royal Netherlands Soccer Association (KNVB), local authorities, police officials, the prosecutor’s office, and soccer clubs, to counter discrimination and anti-Semitic chanting and salutes during soccer matches. Participants agreed on measures to prosecute offenders or ban them from stadiums.

Deputy Prime Minister Lodewijk Asscher and Security and Justice Minister Van der Steur met with key figures from the Jewish and Muslim communities on March 15 to discuss the increase in anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim incidents. They discussed how to build bridges between these communities and best ways to counter these trends. In February Asscher said he had stopped reacting on social media to spiteful comments made against him because of his Jewish background.

The national government placed high-level attention on mosque security. It established a special working group to discuss security questions, which included representatives of the Muslim community, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NTCV), the police, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

Local governments continued to provide all Jewish institutions with security, and to provide security to Muslim institutions at their request. Local governments based their security on a threat-and-risk analysis.

The government commissioned research into the causes and trigger factors of Muslim discrimination among youth in order to determine how to design policies to address such behavior. Results were expected in early 2017.

The government required asylum seekers to sign a statement of participation in civic integration in order to obtain a residence permit. The statement informed immigrants of their rights and obligations and of fundamental values, including freedom of religion.

According to CIDI, Jewish community leaders stated there was insufficient coverage of the Holocaust in the school curriculum.

In September King Willem-Alexander advocated freedom of religion and belief during his speech opening the parliamentary year.

The government continued to require imams and other spiritual leaders recruited in Islamic countries to complete an integration course before practicing. This requirement did not apply to Turkish nationals, including approximately 140 imams appointed by that country’s religious affairs directorate, the Diyanet, in accordance with an association agreement between the European Union and Turkey.

The government sponsored leadership courses with the intention of facilitating imam training in the Dutch language without foreign interference.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

There were reports of violence, threats, discrimination, verbal abuse, and vandalism against Muslims and Jews. Agencies collecting data on such incidents stated many occurrences were never reported. The police and various monitoring bodies, including anti-discrimination boards, reported a sharp increase of incidents of discrimination against Muslims after terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015. In 2015, the most recent year for which figures were available, the police registered 439 incidents, including of violence, harassment, and verbal abuse, against Muslims, compared to 206 in 2014, and the antidiscrimination boards registered 240 incidents, compared with 165 in 2014. SPIOR registered 231 reports of incidents of violence and discrimination in the Rotterdam area between January 2015 and March 2016. Over the same period, Rotterdam police only received reports of 41 incidents against Muslims. The Complaints Bureau for Discrimination on the Internet (MDI), an NGO, recorded 330 expressions against Muslims on the internet in 2015, compared to 219 in 2014, while the government’s internet discrimination hotline (MIND) recorded 142 expressions against Muslims in 2015, compared to 20 in 2014.

The police registered 428 complaints of discrimination against Jews in 2015, compared to 358 in 2014. CIDI, which tracked anti-Semitic incidents, except for those occurring online, reported 126 incidents in 2015 compared with 171 in 2014, but qualified the 2015 figure as “still higher than the normal level in a year without military intervention in Israel.” There were five incidents of physical violence, which CIDI said was relatively high, and fewer incidents of harassment in the street and through email. In one incident, a non-Jewish woman married to a Moroccan Jew was confronted by the parents of her daughter’s classmates at school over her relationship. A man grabbed the woman by the throat, called her a “Jew’s whore,” and threatened to shoot her. There were 18 incidents of vandalism. CIDI also reported 16 incidents at schools, the highest number of such incidents it recorded in a decade. There were twice as many incidents (10) of anti-Semitic chanting during soccer matches than in 2014. According to CIDI, those who were recognizable as Jewish because of dress or outward appearance, for instance wearing a yarmulke, were sometimes targets of direct confrontations.

MDI received 142 reports of online expressions of anti-Semitism and/or Holocaust denial in 2015, compared to 328 in 2014; and MIND received 46, compared to 31 in 2014.

In their annual report on racism, anti-Semitism, and extreme violence in the country in 2015, the Verwey Jonker Institute and Anne Frank Foundation reported 57 incidents of anti-Semitism, compared to 76 in 2014, and 424 incidents of anti-Semitic shouting, compared to 710 in 2014. Incidents of anti-Semitism included 18 incidents of insults, 12 cases of threats, two cases of bullying, and five cases of physical abuse. In one incident, three boys threw a brick at two men on the way to a synagogue; the brick missed its target. In another, a man yelled at a Jewish man in an elevator of an apartment building, leading to a fight.

On April 29, half a dozen men assaulted a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf on a tram in Rotterdam. The perpetrators poured beer over her and tore off her headscarf. SPIOR Director Marianne Vorthoren said women and children were often victims of anti-Muslim discrimination. She also said that the physical and verbal abuse often went unreported due to fear of retaliation from the perpetrators. She added that bystanders rarely intervened or reported incidents to the police, leaving perpetrators free to engage in harassment without fear of consequences.

Christians complained about intimidation by Muslims in asylum centers. According to managers of refugee centers, there were instances of scuffles or fights between individual refugees, often of different religions, but there were no riots or incidents of mass violence.

In April Ynetnews, an Israeli news site, reported an upsurge in anti-Semitic incidents in the country. The article quoted the country’s Chief Rabbi, Benjamin Jacobs, as saying, “People are debating removing the mezuzahs from their doorposts, since they identify them as Jews.”

The Ministry of Education commissioned a report on discrimination in education, which commented extensively on deep-rooted anti-Semitism in classrooms in certain schools with a high percentage of migrant Muslim students and how teachers felt helpless combatting these sometimes violent sentiments. The report cited one Amsterdam high school teacher, who recalled an incident in which a female student of Moroccan descent stood up and pronounced, “If I had a Kalashnikov [automatic rifle], I’d gun down all the Jews.”

Platform Integration & Society (KIS), an NGO, reported March 21 that girls wearing headscarves had more difficulty finding an internship required for college graduation than other students.

In June a man sustained anti-Semitic verbal abuse from several motorists after hanging his son’s schoolbag from the pole of an Israeli flag in celebration of his son’s high school graduation. Passers-by yelled “rotten Jews,” “we’re going to get you, cancer Zionists,” and “rotten Zionists.”

On June 13, a court convicted a man of hate speech and sentenced him to two weeks in prison for posting signs with swastikas on his windows reading “Turks go away” and “Gas Jews.”

In May CIDI filed complaints with the police against soccer fans chanting “My father is with the commandos and my mother with the SS. Together they burn Jews because Jews burn the best.” The police responded that they were “looking into” the incident.

Other anti-Semitic incidents took place over email, social media, and other online venues. For example, there were reports a Jewish man tweeting about developments in Turkey received messages such as “Hey, Jew, the best thing that ever happened to you is that Hitler, the best man, has existed.” In another case, a Jewish teacher reportedly received an online message from students calling her “Cancer Jew.”

Professor Ineke van der Valk of the University of Amsterdam, researcher of anti-Muslim sentiment and discrimination, stated mosques often did not report incidents in order to avoid publicity or increased attention. She recorded 18 incidents against mosques in the first two months of 2016, including vandalism, attempted arson, threatening letters, and the hanging of pigs’ heads.

On February 27, individuals threw Molotov cocktails at a mosque in Enschede, causing a minor fire. Authorities arrested five men and tried and convicted them on October 27 of attempted arson with terrorist intent. The court sentenced the men to four years’ imprisonment, of which one year was suspended.

In January a pig’s head was found outside of the Turkish Hakyol mosque in Mijdrecht.

In February, 10 mosques received threatening letters containing swastikas and texts with messages such as, “You will soon receive important visitors, pigs,” and “Islam is the devil’s religion.”

Individuals left dead pigs and pigs’ heads at refugee centers, where many refugees were Muslim. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity. In January the police removed two dead pigs from a proposed center for 500 refugees in the Brabant village of Heesch. Signs nearby read “the people say no to the AZC (asylum center) and 500 is too many.” In February media reported two dead pigs were found at a potential site for a refugee center in the city of Ede. A day earlier in Ede, PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West), a European nationalist group founded in Germany, had protested against an inflow of refugees into the city. During the protest, PEGIDA’s leader in the country, Edwin Wagensveld, was arrested for refusing to remove a hat shaped like a pig.

On August 15, slogans were spray-painted on an elementary school building and on twenty houses in the town of Voorburg, including “ISIS” and “Kill all Jews.”

CIDI continued to conduct programs to counter prejudice against Jews and other minorities in schools. CIDI again invited 25 teachers to visit the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem for a seminar on Holocaust education. CIDI led workshops for the police and prosecutors at the police academy to help them recognize anti-Semitism.

The Liberal Jewish Community of Amsterdam continued to reach out to youth in the Get to Know Your Neighbors project, which invited students into its synagogue to introduce them to a temple and explain Jewish practices.

Multiple groups continued to organize initiatives to bring Muslims and Jews together. For example, the Salaam-Shalom NGO in Amsterdam and the “Mo&Moos” initiative (short for Mohammed and Moshe) brought together young Muslim and Jewish professionals in Amsterdam to encourage leadership on interfaith issues. In Rotterdam SPIOR organized similar activities. The INS Platform, an NGO, created a website where citizens could meet “ordinary” Muslims in an effort to overcome prejudice.

Jewish groups welcomed the Protestant Church’s official condemnation in April of anti-Jewish statements made by Martin Luther 500 years earlier.

The U.S. embassy emphasized in conversations with government officials, including the mayor of Rotterdam, the national police, parliamentarians, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, members of the Amsterdam City Council, and the president of the national platform on dealing with youth crime, the importance of religious freedom and tolerance. The embassy and the consulate general in Amsterdam highlighted the need for religious tolerance and interfaith understanding in outreach to youth, academics, and women.

The Ambassador met with Muslim refugees and visited several refugee centers to discuss religious freedom, discrimination against Muslims and integration issues, and made efforts to bring communities closer together. The consul general in Amsterdam hosted a Thanksgiving service where city government officials, civil society activists, and leaders in various faith communities discussed interfaith tolerance and dialogue. The embassy continued to work with groups active in anti-discrimination work in the country, including the Anne Frank House. The embassy continued to connect the Anne Frank House with individuals in several Muslim countries to facilitate exchange programs teaching the book The Diary of Anne Frank and religious tolerance.

Representatives from the embassy and consulate general met with a wide range of religious leaders, including the Liberal Jewish Community and Muslim community throughout the year to highlight U.S. support for religious freedom. They attended iftars led by local political parties and the national police during Ramadan, and a seder organized by the Liberal Jewish Community. These iftars and seders included discussions with Jewish, Muslim, and Christian leaders about their perceptions of religious freedom within the country and issues of religious discrimination and possible solutions, including efforts to learn more about others who practice different faiths. The meetings included representatives from different religious groups within the three faiths. Embassy staff frequently met with mosques and SPIOR to discuss diversity, faith, integration, and violent extremism.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 4.5 million (July 2016 estimate). According to 2013 census data, 12.6 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 11.8 percent of the population is Anglican, 8.1 percent Presbyterian, 7.5 percent other Protestant denominations, 5.5 percent Christian with no affiliation specified, 2.6 percent Methodist, 2.3 percent Hindu, 1.5 percent Buddhist, 1.4 percent Maori religion, 1.2 percent Muslim, and 0.2 percent Jewish. Since 2006, the number of Muslims and Hindus has increased by 28 and 40 percent, respectively. More than 90 additional religious groups together constitute less than 1 percent of the population. The number of people stating they had no religion affiliation increased by 26 percent compared with the 2006 data, from 34 percent of respondents to 42 percent; 4.4 percent of the respondents to the census question on religion stated they objected to the question.

According to 2013 census data, of the indigenous Maori, who make up approximately 15 percent of the population, 11.2 percent are Catholic, 10.8 percent are Anglican, and 8.4 percent belong to syncretic Maori Christian groups such as Ratana and Ringatu. Forty-six percent stated no religious affiliation while 6.5 percent did not respond regarding religion.

Legal Framework

The constitution, which is comprised of several basic laws, states that religious expression is “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” According to the law, religious practices may not breach the peace.

The government does not require the licensing or registration of religious groups; however, if a religious group desires to collect money for any charitable purpose, including the advancement of its religion, and obtain tax benefits, it must register with Department of Internal Affairs as a charitable trust. The registration must provide the rules of the organization showing it is a nonprofit organization and a list of officers free from conflict of interest who will not put their own interests above the organization. There is no fee for this registration.

The law provides teaching within public primary schools “shall be entirely of a secular character.” It permits, however, religious instruction and observances in public primary schools within certain parameters. A public primary school may close for up to one hour a week up to a total of 20 hours a year to devote to religious instruction or religious observance, to be conducted in a manner approved by the school’s Board of Trustees in consultation with the principal or head teacher. Attendance at religious instruction or observances is not compulsory. According to the Ministry of Education, public secondary schools may also permit religious instruction at the discretion of individual school boards. Religious instruction, if provided, usually takes place after normal school hours.

Citizens may file complaints of unlawful discrimination, including on the basis of religious belief, to the government-funded HRC. The HRC’s mandate includes assuring equal treatment of all religious groups under the law; protecting the right to safety for religious individuals and communities; promoting freedom of religious expression, automatic legal sanctioning of religious groups, and reasonable accommodation for religious groups; and the promotion of religious tolerance in education. In the event a complaint is not resolved satisfactorily with the assistance of HRC mediation, the complainant may proceed to the Human Rights Review Tribunal. The tribunal has the authority to issue restraining orders, award monetary damages, or declare a breach of the Human Rights Act, which is reported to parliament. Conduct prohibited by the Human Rights Act (e.g. workplace discrimination) may also be prosecuted under other applicable laws. In addition to the HRC dispute resolution mechanism, a complainant may initiate proceedings in the court system.

The law does not prevent the registration of political parties based on religion. The country has two registered Christian-associated political parties.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In November the Auckland High Court denied refugee status for an Indian Christian evangelist who said he faced death threats from “Hindu extremists” in his home in India. According to news reports, the court believed his risk of danger would be low if he returned to India, but said the situation of Christians had “deteriorated” under the current Indian government. Hindu and Christian leaders in Auckland’s ethnic Indian community dismissed the man’s reports. The man’s lawyer said his client’s claim of threat was valid because of the work he did converting Indians to Christianity. The man had been arrested for the first time in 2012 for overstaying his visa. At the end of the year, he continued to fight the court’s deportation order.

In June New Zealand First Party leader Winston Peters said certain countries “treat their women like cattle” and every immigrant should be interviewed to screen their attitude before entering the country. Peters said he was not referring to Muslim countries specifically, although some press reports said he did refer to them. Other members of parliament denounced Peters’ comments, calling them “shameful” and “disgraceful.”

The government did not specifically promote any religion; however, every parliamentary session began with a Christian prayer.

On August 29, the government enacted a law enabling local authorities to allow shopping in defined areas on Easter Sunday. National law still restricted businesses from operating on Good Friday, Christmas, and Australia New Zealand Army Corps Day. Businesses could be fined up to 1,000 New Zealand dollars ($696) if they opened on official holidays, although the government rarely enforced fines.

Also in August the country’s tourism board released a halal food guide listing halal outlets certified by the FIANZ, Muslim-owned halal restaurants, and eateries that served vegetarian dishes.

The HRC received 82 complaints of unlawful discrimination on the grounds of religious belief or lack of religious belief during 2015-2016 compared to 49 complaints during 2013-2014.

In July the manager of a jewelry store reportedly told a Muslim woman not to apply for a job if she wore a headscarf. This reportedly was the second such instance of employment discrimination by the parent company of the jewelry store in nine months against women who wore the hijab. The chief financial officer later apologized and offered the woman an interview. He said the company would remind employees such discrimination is against company policy.

In September the Whanganui branch of the Right Wing Resistance circulated anti-Muslim pamphlets in the Whanganui region. The pamphlet said Muslim refugees entering the country intend to change the “laws, culture, and daily life to suit Muslims” and “kill anyone” who does not believe in Allah. The Multicultural Council of Rangitikei/Whanganui condemned the flyer. In previous instances of inflammatory remarks by the Right Wing Resistance, authorities said noted such speech was protected by law.

Auckland Imam Mohammad Anwar Sahib, a FIANZ religious advisor, made what appeared to be anti-Semitic remarks during a speech in November in which he reportedly said, “Christians are using the Jews and the Jews are using everybody because they think their protocol is to rule the entire world.” The speech emerged in edited video footage and received a wide audience, sparking condemnation and debate throughout the country. Sahib said the “cut and paste” video was a misrepresentation of his views. The HRC said it had received 17 complaints about Sahib and was investigating. Race Relations Commissioner Susan Devoy said both the Jewish Council and FIANZ had told her they were deeply concerned about the speeches. FIANZ said publically they did not agree with comments by Sahib.

According to news reports, in August parents of students at Kapiti College secondary school in Raumati voiced anger at an American pastor’s motivational speech that they said was “stealth evangelism.” A dissemination of flyers advertising the Arise Pentecostal Church’s convention featuring the pastor followed the speech. The school’s principal said the speech’s content was motivational and he instructed the speaker not to preach. Parents also criticized the pastor’s speeches at Victoria schools in May.

Embassy officers regularly met with government officials in the HRC and Foreign Ministry to discuss promoting religious freedom and actions to encourage tolerance.

The Ambassador and Consul General hosted an interfaith dinner to bring together leaders of diverse religious communities to discuss shared opportunities, challenges, and areas for collaboration. The Consul General and consulate staff attended the National Interfaith Forum to learn about religious issues in the country and gave a presentation about U.S. efforts to promote religious tolerance as well as its associated challenges. The Ambassador and Consul General also engaged in a series of meetings with resettled refugees from diverse religious backgrounds to learn about the successes and challenges of integrating into the country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 6 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2005 census (the most recent available) conducted by the Nicaraguan Institute of Statistics and Census, 59 percent of the population is Catholic and 22 percent evangelical Protestant, which includes Pentecostals, Mennonites, Moravian Lutherans, and Baptists. A public opinion survey conducted during the year by M&R Consultants estimates Catholics at 47 percent of the population, evangelicals at 32 percent, and religious believers without affiliation at 19 percent. Groups that together constitute less than 3 percent of the population include Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the Moravian Lutheran Church, Jews, Muslims, and nonbelievers.

The Moravian Lutheran Church is largely concentrated in the country’s North and South Caribbean Autonomous Regions. A majority of its members are of indigenous or Afro‑Caribbean descent.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion. It provides for freedom of belief, religion, and worship, and states no one “shall be obligated by coercive measures to declare his or her ideology or beliefs.” The constitution states there is no official religion, but the law entrusts government-controlled, community-level action groups known as Family Committees with the responsibility for promoting “Christian values” at the community level.

The requirements for legal recognition of religious groups are similar to those for other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Registration requires an application, articles of association, and designation of officers. The National Assembly must approve a group’s application for legal standing. Following approval, the group must register with the Ministry of Government as an association or foundation. Groups must register to incur legal obligations, enter into contracts, or benefit from tax and customs exemptions.

Missionaries must obtain religious worker visas; a policy change in August requires provision of information regarding the nature of their missionary work before being authorized entry into the country by the Ministry of Interior. This process must be completed before arrival and is generally completed within a few weeks, but can take up to several months.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The additional entry requirements implemented in August for individuals who planned to travel to the country for religious purposes applied to religious travel from any country, but affected the country’s free travel obligations under the Central American 4 Border Control Agreement (CA-4 Agreement). The agreement has been in place for more than 10 years and its signatory countries comprise El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Ministry of Government officials said an increase in evangelical Protestant groups travelling from El Salvador raised suspicion in an area they said was already known for illicit transnational activity. Representatives from the Ministries of Interior and of Foreign Affairs stated authorities’ concerns that criminals and narcotraffickers could use missionary groups as cover to facilitate illicit transnational activities and threaten national sovereignty and security. Religious groups said the restrictions impeded the legal right of citizens of signatory countries to the CA-4 Agreement to cross borders without visas or other permissions. The change restricted religious workers from exercising elements fundamental to their religious practices such as pilgrimage, charity, and missionary work.

In response to the travel restrictions, Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders sought meetings with representatives of the Ministries of Government and Foreign Affairs to establish a dialogue on the policy change. After immigration officials denied entry to several missionaries in early August before the travel requirements were officially circulated, government officials circulated a written explanation of the new requirements.

Many regional and international missionary groups said they cancelled travel plans to the country because they feared they would be unable to obtain permission from the government or would be denied entry upon arrival.

Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders stated there was selective application of the new travel restrictions and customs processing based on political affiliation and favoritism by ruling party officials. Both groups stated religious leaders received undue scrutiny and faced retaliatory application of laws if they had not pledged their support to the ruling political party in the year’s presidential elections. One evangelical leader also reported that since enactment of the new regulation, his organization stopped all politically sensitive commentary, which he stated had led to quicker travel approvals.

Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders reported cases in which government customs agents retaliated against religious groups for perceived criticism of the ruling party. The leaders reported incidents of customs seizures of imported equipment, delayed import clearance for donated goods, and delayed tax exemptions applicable to religious organizations. Catholic and evangelical leaders stated pro-government religious groups did not experience similar retaliation. They said, however, that there was an overall decrease in such retaliatory practices over the past year, which they attributed to the central government’s unwillingness to further alienate sectors of society during an election year.

Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders stated the government provided or withheld financial support, tax, and utility subsidies for individual churches based on the political affiliation of the church’s clergy. Church leaders reported cases in which church tax exemptions were not honored or were delayed based on political statements made by clergy. They stated that exceptions on imported donations were routinely delayed, sometimes leading to donated perishables reaching their expiration dates and becoming unusable. Other cases included arbitrary denial of tax exemptions for vehicles purchased by or donated to religious organizations.

Government policy continued to require religious education through civics classes and participation in state-sponsored events such as processions to commemorate religious events, such as Catholic festivals. High school students were primarily chosen for participation in these events, and government political signs with the slogan of “Christian, Socialist, and in Solidarity” were often posted around public schools. Teachers and families who opposed this policy were reportedly classified as political opponents and sometimes excluded from government assistance programs.

Catholic and evangelical Protestant leaders continued to criticize the government’s use of Catholic language, tradition, and symbols to promote its political agenda, which they said undermined their religious integrity and threatened freedom of religion. The government continued to require community participation in government-hosted religious festivities. The government replicated Catholic celebrations and festivals, despite Catholic Church disapproval of this practice. The government required attendance by government workers to staff the events, leaving them unable to attend the official Catholic Church celebrations. For the Feast of the Immaculate Conception, government institutions set up altars in the city streets and distributed free goods. Senior Catholic and evangelical leaders continued to express concern about what they said was the government’s use of retired Catholic clergy and Christian religious statements and symbols to promote its ideological and political agenda and officiate at government-sponsored politico-religious events. In the national election campaign, the government used religious language in daily press conferences in connection with official issues; government-sponsored billboards throughout the country and posters in government offices portrayed images of the president with the slogan “Christian, Socialist, and in Solidarity.”

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy officers met with leaders of the government to emphasize religious freedom as a universal human right. Embassy officers also discussed the effects of the new travel approval requirements on religious groups.

Embassy representatives met regularly with a wide variety of religious groups, including Catholic leaders, officials from a diverse selection of evangelical Christian groups, officials of the Moravian Lutheran Church, and officials of the Nicaraguan Islamic Association to discuss their concerns about the politicization of religion and governmental retaliation against politically active religious groups. Embassy officials also spoke with religious leaders regarding the new entry requirements for religious travelers.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 18.6 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the MOI, more than 98 percent of the population is Muslim. Approximately 95 percent of Muslims are Sunni and 5 percent Shia. Roman Catholic and Protestant groups account for less than 2 percent of the population. There are a few thousand Bahais, who reside primarily in Niamey and in communities on the west side of the Niger River. A very small percentage of the population adheres primarily to indigenous religious beliefs. Some individuals adhere to syncretic religious beliefs that combine traditional indigenous practices with Islam.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination, specifies separation of religion and state as an unalterable principle, and stipulates equality under the law for all regardless of religion. It provides for freedom of conscience, religion, and worship and expression of faith consistent with public order, social peace, and national unity. The constitution also states no religion or faith shall claim political power or interfere in state affairs and bans political parties based on religious affiliation.

Nongovernmental organizations, including religious organizations, must register with the MOI. Registration approval is based on submission of required legal documents, such as the group’s charter, and vetting of the organization’s leaders. Although some unregistered religious organizations reportedly operate without authorization in remote areas, only registered organizations are legally recognized entities. The MOI requires clerics speaking to a large national gathering either to belong to a registered religious organization or to obtain a special permit. Nonregistered groups are not legal entities and are not permitted to operate.

Registered religious groups wishing to obtain permanent legal status must undergo a three-year review and probationary period before the Office of Religious Affairs, which is under the MOI, grants a change in legal status from probationary to permanent.

The constitution specifies the president, the prime minister, and the president of the national assembly must take an oath on the holy book of his or her religion. By law, other senior government officials are also required to take religious oaths upon entering office.

The government prohibits full-face veils in Diffa Region under state of emergency provisions to prevent concealment of bombs and weapons.

The government prohibits open-air, public proselytization events for all religious groups due to expressed safety concerns. There is no restriction on private peaceful proselytization or conversion of an individual’s personal religious beliefs from one religious faith to another, as long as the group espousing the transition is registered with the government.

The establishment of any religious school must receive the concurrence of both the MOI and the relevant Ministry of Education. Private Quranic schools are unregulated. There is no religious education in public schools.

There are no restrictions on the issuance of visas for visiting religious leaders; however, permanent residency of foreign religious leaders must be approved by the MOI.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to media sources, President Issoufou, during his reelection campaign in February, said he would regulate the expansion of Wahhabism in the country but took no action as of year’s end. Then-Interior Minister Hassoumi Massaoudou stated during the presidential campaign that there was a need to organize and regulate the construction of Wahhabi mosques in the country.

Media sources reported campaigns for the presidential and parliamentary elections in February often opened with the Fatiha, the proclamation of faith at the beginning of the Quran.

The Commission for the Organization of the Hajj and Umrah attempted to redress the poor organization of the Hajj by local travel agencies by facilitating travel to Saudi Arabia. Some pilgrims reported the commission made the Hajj less burdensome; however, others said they were delayed in their departure to or from Saudi Arabia due to logistical challenges. Several pilgrims reported they were left stranded at an airport in Niamey after the Commission for the Organization of the Hajj and Umrah failed to pay the contracted air carrier. In October the commissioner was subsequently dismissed.

According to religious leaders, cooperation between Christian and Muslim communities continued to improve in the wake of the violent and deadly January 2015 protests in the cities of Niamey and Zinder. The unrest was sparked by President Issoufou’s public statement “We are all Charlie” at an event in Paris commemorating the Charlie Hebdo killings.

While the majority of the population adheres to the Maliki interpretation of Sunni Islam, Muslim leaders reported Wahhabism grew in size and influence during the year. Media sources reported thousands of Wahhabi mosques and madrasas were built over the past few years.

The head of the Islamic Association of Niger and the Archbishop of Niamey urged mutual cooperation on National Cleanup Day in October, highlighting the importance of cleanliness and equating clean communities with faith.

The Muslim-Christian Interfaith Forum remained active in all regions of the country. The forum promoted cooperation among religious leaders from a range of religious groups, and members of the forum met regularly to discuss community peace and other matters of mutual concern.

Muslims and Christians commonly attended one another’s festivities during their respective holidays. Bibles in Arabic and the major local languages were available for sale in the local markets.

In July the U.S. Second Lady visited Niamey and met with officials from the MOI, as well as leaders from a variety of religious groups, to discuss the importance of religious tolerance, diversity, and respect in combating extremism and volatility in the region.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy representatives continued to advocate for religious freedom and tolerance through meetings with Muslim leaders and support of inter- and intrafaith dialogues throughout the country. The Ambassador hosted an iftar, which included Muslim, Christian, and Bahai leaders, government officials, and members of civil society, where she delivered remarks emphasizing the importance of interfaith tolerance. The embassy continued to engage with an interreligious council composed of Muslim and Christian leaders.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 186 million (July 2016 estimate). The Nigerian government does not track religion in census data, but a 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life estimated the population to be 49.3 percent Christian and 48.8 percent Muslim, while the remaining 2 percent belong to other or no religions. Many individuals combine indigenous beliefs and practices with Islam or Christianity. A 2010 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life report found 38 percent of the Muslim population self-identified as Sunni and 12 percent as Shia, with the remainder declining to answer or identifying as “something else” (5 percent) or “Just a Muslim” (42 percent). Included among the Sunnis are several Sufi groups, including Tijaniyah and Qadiriyyah. There are also Izala (Salafist) minorities and small numbers of Ahmadi Muslims. Christian groups include evangelicals, Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Other groups include Jews, Bahais, and individuals who do not follow any religion.

The Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri ethnic groups are most prevalent in the predominantly Muslim northern states. Significant numbers of Christians, including some Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri, also reside in the north, and Christians and Muslims reside in approximately equal numbers in central Nigeria and in the southwestern states, including Lagos, where the Yoruba ethnic group, whose members include both Muslims and Christians, predominates. In the southeastern states, where the Igbo ethnic group is dominant, Christian groups, including Catholics, Anglicans, and Methodists, constitute the majority. In the Niger Delta region, where the Ogoni and Ijaw ethnic groups predominate, Christians form a substantial majority, and a very small minority of the population is Muslim. Evangelical Christian denominations are growing rapidly in the central and southern regions. Ahmadi Muslims maintain a small presence in several cities, including Lagos and Abuja.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates neither the federal nor the state governments shall establish a state religion and prohibits discrimination on religious grounds. It provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the freedom to change religion and to manifest and propagate religion “in worship, teaching, practice, and observance,” provided these rights are consistent with the interests of defense, public safety, order, morality, or health, and protecting the rights of others. The constitution also states it shall be the duty of the state to encourage interfaith marriages and to promote the formation of associations that cut across religious lines and promote “national integration.” It prohibits political parties that limit membership on the basis of religion or with names that have a religious connotation.

The constitution provides for state-level courts based on common or customary law systems, which have operated in the region for centuries. It specifically recognizes sharia courts of appeal in any states that require it, with jurisdiction over civil proceedings such as marriage, inheritance, and other family matters, where all the parties are Muslims. Sharia courts hear criminal cases in 12 northern states. State laws on sharia criminal courts vary, but at least one state, Zamfara, requires that criminal cases in which all litigants are Muslim be heard in sharia courts. According to state laws, sharia courts may pass sentences based on the sharia penal code, including hudood offenses (serious criminal offenses with punishments prescribed in the Quran) and prescribe punishments, such as caning, amputation, and death by stoning. State laws dictate non-Muslims have the option to try their cases in sharia courts if involved in civil or criminal disputes with Muslims. Common law courts hear the cases of non-Muslims and Muslims (in states where they have the option) who choose not to use sharia courts. Sharia courts do not have the authority to compel participation by non-Muslims. Aggrieved parties can appeal sharia court judgments to three levels of sharia appellate courts. According to the constitution, decisions by the state sharia courts of appeal (the highest level of the sharia courts) theoretically can be appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court, although none has been.

Kano and Zamfara’s state-sanctioned Hisbah Boards regulate Islamic religious affairs and preaching, distribute licenses to imams, and attempt to resolve religious disputes between Muslims in those states. The states of Bauchi, Borno, Katsina, and Yobe maintain state-level Christian and Muslim religious affairs ministries or bureaus with varying mandates and authorities, while many other state governors appoint interfaith special advisers on religious affairs.

Registration of religious groups is required for groups to build places of worship, open bank accounts, receive tax exemptions, or sign contracts. Religious groups planning to build places of worship must register with the Corporate Affairs Commission as an incorporated trustee, which involves submitting an application form, proof of public notice, a copy of the organization’s constitution, a list of trustees, and a fee of 20,000 naira ($66).

Both federal and state governments have the authority to regulate mandatory religious instruction in public schools. The constitution states schools may not require students to receive religious instruction or to participate in or attend any religious ceremony or observance pertaining to any religion other than their own. State officials and many religious leaders have stated students have the right to request a teacher of their own religious beliefs to provide an alternative to any instruction offered in a religion other than their own. The constitution also says no religious community will be prevented from providing religious instruction to students of that community in any place maintained wholly by that community.

Several states have laws requiring licenses for preachers, places of worship, and religious schools of registered religious groups. A Katsina State law establishes a board with the authority to regulate Islamic schools, preachers, and mosques, including issuing permits, suspending operations, and imprisoning or fining violators. The Katsina law stipulates a punishment of one to five years in prison and/or a fine of up to 500,000 naira ($1,600) for operating without a license.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Clashes between police and IMN members resulted in the death of at least nine civilians. According to a Kaduna State report, a late 2015 clash between the army and IMN members resulted in at least 348 IMN members and one soldier dead. The government did not file charges against any soldiers after the incident; approximately 200 IMN members were awaiting trial for conspiracy and homicide. Sharia courts in Kano State confirmed the death sentences of an imam and eight others for blasphemy and sentenced a Tijaniyah Sufi Muslim cleric and five others to death after convicting them of blasphemy. Both cases were on appeal. Human rights groups and religious authorities accused the security forces of abuses and religious suppression when dealing with minority religious groups. Some Christian groups reported a lack of protection by government authorities for churches and Christian communities, especially in the central and northern regions. They reported discrimination in acquiring land permits to build churches and in admission to universities in the north. Muslims living in predominantly Christian states reported discrimination by state governments against such practices as women wearing the hijab. There were continued conflicts between displaced ethnic groups, known as settlers, and longstanding residents or indigenes, which the groups accused the federal government of ignoring. The differences between the two groups were frequently religious as well as ethnic and economic. State governments often granted preferential treatment, for example in access to education and jobs, to indigenes over settlers.

On November 14, Nigerian security forces clashed with members of the IMN who were marching from Kano city to Zaria, resulting in an indeterminate number of deaths and injuries. According to the police, nine people died, including members of the police, while the IMN said 100 of its members were killed and 87 detained. Other reports estimated several dozen dead and well over 100 injured as a result of the violence. Members of the Shia group were embarking on their annual symbolic pilgrimage to Zaria, Kaduna State, to mark the end of the 40-day period of remembrance of the death of Imam Hussein. The violence began after an argument between the police and IMN members. The police stated an IMN member took an officer’s gun, which resulted in other officers opening fire, while the IMN stated the police opened fire without provocation.

On October 7 the government of Kaduna issued an order declaring the IMN unlawful in Kaduna and stating that any IMN member would be prosecuted. According to the text of the order, Governor Nasir el-Rufai reached the decision in the exercise of his constitutional powers to protect “public safety, public order, public morality… [and] the rights and freedoms of all persons” in his state. The order cited the report of the state’s judicial commission of inquiry el-Rufai appointed to investigate the deadly December 2015 confrontation between the Nigerian Army and the IMN in Zaria, Kaduna. In particular, the order referenced the commission’s findings and recommendations that the IMN was not registered and should be “proscribed;” had a history of violence and aggression that culminated in the December 2015 incident; operated like a parallel government in disregard of Nigerian law; continued to hold unauthorized gatherings and processions in public spaces; and constituted “danger to the peace, tranquility, harmonious coexistence and good governance of Kaduna State.”

The commission had issued its report on July 15, which concluded at least 348 IMN members and one soldier died during the December 2015 clash, which began with a roadblock by the IMN. The report also found that the army quickly buried hundreds of IMN members in a mass grave following the attacks. The IMN released a list in January of members it said went missing following the violence. The list included more than 700 people. The commission report found the army used “excessive and disproportionate” force, and recommended the military or the federal government attorney general conduct an independent investigation and prosecute anyone found to have acted unlawfully.

Katsina, Kebbi, Kano, and Jigawa States banned religious processions just prior to the annual Ashura processions, performed by Shia Muslims worldwide in remembrance of the death of Imam Hussein. On October 12, mobs and security forces in a number of northern states attacked Shia participating in the processions, killing at least 15 people. Authorities subsequently arrested hundreds of Shia and charged them with disturbing the peace. The Islamic Human Rights Commission said it echoed the IMN’s statement that the arrests and charges were “an embarrassment to the nation” and called on authorities to release those detained, among whom were women and children, describing them as “prisoners of conscience.”

On December 5, the government of Kaduna State released its White Paper on the Zaria incident of the previous year. The White Paper accepted many of the recommendations of the commission report, including that of proscribing the IMN and investigating and prosecuting army personnel found to have acted unlawfully. The paper also accepted the commission’s position that IMN leader Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky be held responsible for the actions of IMN members during the incident and for any illegal acts committed by IMN members during the preceding 30 years. The paper declared the IMN “an insurgent group” that challenged state authority and that it should be treated as a threat to the government.

IMN leader Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky and his wife remained in custody without charges at year’s end, although a federal High Court in Abuja ruled on December 2 that the federal government must release both within 45 days. More than 200 imprisoned IMN members awaited trial on charges of conspiracy and culpable homicide. At year’s end, the government had not arrested or charged any soldiers as a result of the incident. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), a semi-independent agency of the federal government, also investigated the incident and recommended the speedy prosecution of IMN members as well as soldiers found culpable of abuses. In its report released on September 21, the NHRC stated the killings by soldiers of IMN members appeared to be wholly unjustified.

In January a Kano State sharia court convicted Tijaniyah Sufi Muslim cleric Abdul Nyass and five others of blasphemy for derogatory remarks against the Prophet Muhammad and sentenced them to death. Four other followers of the cleric were acquitted. All who were sentenced filed appeals. On January 4, a Kano State Upper Sharia Court sentenced cleric Abdulaziz Dauda and nine followers to death for making blasphemous statements against the Prophet Muhammad; the case was on appeal at year’s end. Dauda allegedly said on May 15, 2015 that Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse, a 20th century Islamic scholar of the Tijaniyah Sufi order, had a larger following than did the Prophet Muhammad. The statement led to the burning of a sharia court in Kano the following week, as angry youths protested and called for the execution of Dauda. The case was ongoing at year’s end.

The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) said the government rarely investigated cases of violence or other abuses against religious freedom or prosecuted or punished perpetrators. It cited as an example the November 3 release of five Muslim men suspected of responsibility for the mob attack and killing of a 74-year-old Christian woman in Kano. The five men charged were released in November after the Kano attorney general said his review of the case indicated that there was no evidence against the five accused men. The CAN said this reflected a pattern of impunity throughout the country.

Both Muslim and Christian groups reported a lack of protection by federal, state, and local authorities, especially in central regions, where there were longstanding, violent disputes between Hausa Muslims and Christian ethnic groups. In April the Movement Against Fulani Occupation (MAFO), an NGO, filed a suit against the government with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice for what the NGO said was a failure to protect indigenous Christian groups against attacks by Fulani herdsmen. According to MAFO, more than 1,000 people were killed in three years. Additionally, in November the ECOWAS Court of Justice heard a case filed by the Jama’a Foundation, a Muslim association in southern Kaduna, against the government for alleged failure to protect Muslims in attacks after the 2011 presidential election, when Human Rights Watch reported more than 500 people were killed, mainly Muslims. Additionally, Fulani Muslim herdsmen and Christian farmers complained of a lack of accountability in conflicts over land use. The Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeder’s Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) stated that authorities consistently failed to bring to justice Christian farmers who killed their members and their cattle, while Christian farmers stated that previous cases of attacks against them remained unresolved with either no arrests or arrests without further judicial progress. MACBAN and World Watch Monitor stated the government made no attempt to address key issues, including accountability of the perpetrators for crimes committed, prosecution of perpetrators, or security.

A pending bill in Kaduna State would require all preachers to obtain preaching licenses or risk fines and/or imprisonment for up to two years. Deputy Governor of Kaduna State Barnabas Bala said the bill was proposed to protect the state from religious extremism and hate speech. The bill would also restrict playing religious recordings at certain times and places as well as prohibit “abusive” religious speech, which it did not define further. The draft bill generated widespread opposition from both Muslim and Christian groups, who cited fears that such steps would lead to broader government restrictions on religious organizations and general religious activity.

Muslim groups said public school uniforms, particularly in the south, were too revealing and thus discriminated against their standards. According to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), in Osun and Lagos States, public school authorities prevented girls from wearing the hijab at school as part of their uniform. On June 3, the Osun State High Court ruled in favor of the Muslim community’s suit against the state government, which banned the hijab in 2013. The ruling decreed female students could wear the hijab in government primary and secondary schools. On July 21, a court of appeals in Lagos State lifted a 2013 ban on wearing the hijab in government schools. The judges said the ban violated the religious rights of Muslim girls.

Christian groups reported authorities in northern states continued to deny building permits to minority religious communities for the construction of new places of worship, expansion, and renovation of existing facilities, or reconstruction of buildings that had been demolished. The Christian Association of Nigeria reported that local community leaders, traditional rulers, and government officials in predominantly Muslim northern states used regulations on zoning and title registrations to stop or slow the establishment of new churches. Church leaders said they were able to evade such restrictions by purchasing and developing land in the name of an individual member of their congregation or simply by building churches without permits, but this practice left them in a tenuous legal position.

Unlike in previous years, there were no reports by Christian groups of non-Muslims in northern states appearing in sharia courts against their will. According to these groups, most Christians in northern states had learned that they had the right to refuse to appear in a sharia court and exercised that right if they did not wish to use such courts.

State governments in Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Niger, and Zamfara funded sharia law enforcement groups called the Hisbah, which Christian groups said enforced sharia inconsistently and sporadically, sometimes targeting Christians or residents of other states. While residents in areas traditionally set aside for Christians reportedly felt that Hisbah groups were generally more lenient in those areas, visitors or residents of other states and homes and businesses in predominantly Christian neighborhoods were sometimes raided as well. The Kano State Hisbah continued to arrest residents for alcohol consumption, begging, prostitution, and other purported violations of sharia. According to the NGO Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), a 15-year-old Christian girl was returned to her family in March after an investigation by the Sokoto State government Human Rights Commission. Two neighbors aided by the Hisbah in Sokoto State reportedly abducted the girl in August 2015 and took her to Bauchi State, where she was forced to convert to Islam and marry. Police arrested three people in connection with the abduction.

Christian and Muslim groups reported individual administrators of government-run universities and technical schools in several states refused to admit them or delayed the issuance of their degrees and licenses because of their religion or ethnicity. For example, in Borno State, Christians stated that they had been marginalized due to their faith and that Kanuri Muslims had been given preferential treatment for government jobs and admission to higher education. Mail & Guardian Africa, an African news website, reported that in Plateau State, Hausa Muslims stated they had been marginalized while predominantly Christian ethnic groups received preferential treatment. According to Christian and Muslim groups and NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, the issue was part of the country’s settler-indigene conflict, whereby state governments granted benefits to ethnic groups considered to be indigenous to a particular state and distinguished them from ethnic groups considered to be settlers, even if their families had lived in the state for generations. In certain states, especially in the Middle Belt, the divide was religious as well as ethnic and economic, between Christian indigenes and Muslim settlers.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

The U.S.-designated terrorist organization Boko Haram split into two factions during the year, one pledging allegiance to ISIS and calling itself the Islamic State of West Africa (ISIS-WA), headed by Abu Musab al Barnawi, and another headed by Abubakr Shekau and retaining the traditional Boko Haram name, the Jama’atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad (JASDJ). Most residents referred to both groups collectively as Boko Haram.

Boko Haram continued to commit acts of mass violence in its stated quest to impose its religious and political beliefs in the northeast. Boko Haram perpetrated numerous attacks, including mass killings, often directly targeting civilians. According to estimates from the NGO Nigeria Watch, 2,900 people, including Boko Haram members, died as a result of the group’s activities during the year, compared with a press estimate of 4,780 killed in 2015. On January 30, Boko Haram raided the village of Dalori, three miles outside of Borno State capital Maiduguri, killing 122 people and abducting a number of children. In some cases, the group employed women and children as suicide bombers, such as in the October 29 suicide attack in Maiduguri that killed nine.

Boko Haram killed two Christians, burned houses, and vandalized shops in incidents in Kuburumbula and Boftari, Borno State in September. The group also burned seven houses and vandalized shops. Boko Haram tied up and killed one of the men in front of his family. On September 18, Boko Haram shot and killed eight Christians as they left a Sunday church service in Kwamjilari village in Borno State.

Most captives of past Boko Haram kidnappings of women and girls for purposes of forced marriage or sexual exploitation remained unaccounted for. In August Boko Haram released a video showing at least 50 of the 200 girls kidnapped from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State in 2014; the group demanded the release of captured Boko Haram fighters in exchange for the kidnapped girls, some of whom it said had been killed in airstrikes and 40 of whom had been married. The New York Times reported in October that the government secured the release of 21 of the girls and quoted a government official who denied Boko Haram fighters were released in exchange for the girls.

Tens of thousands of refugees remained in neighboring countries after having fled the violence in the northeast, and more than 1.7 million people remained internally displaced.

There were incidents of killings and other religiously motivated violence, including between Christian farmers and Fulani Muslim herdsmen. Churches and mosques hired private security or took additional security measures in response to attacks and bombings. Religious leaders generally spoke out against violence and urged their followers to live peaceably. Muslim and Christian leaders reported a lack of trust between Muslims and Christians.

Between February 22 and 29, Fulani Muslim herdsmen attacked the predominantly Christian Agatu community in Benue, killing over 300 people and burning churches and mosques in the villages. The Fulani said the attacks were retaliation for the killing of 10,000 of their cattle. There were no arrests. After negotiations between the Agatu and Fulani leaders in March, the Fulani left the area.

In October media reported gunmen believed to be Fulani herdsmen killed 40 people in Godogodo, Kaduna State. In retaliation, media reported Christians stopped two buses traveling from Plateau State to Kaduna State, removed the Fulani herdsmen passengers, and killed 14 of them, burning the bodies. According to MACBAN, the attacks in Godogodo began with a clash between two Fulani herdsmen and a Christian farmer. MACBAN said the herdsmen’s cattle destroyed the farmer’s crops, which the herdsmen said were on a cattle-grazing route. After the fight, the farmer was hospitalized after receiving a nonfatal machete blow to the head. Upon hearing the news, local Christian youth attacked the Fulani settlement and burned several homes. The leader of the Fulani settlement, on his way to request assistance from local authorities, was killed and his body burned.

In a raid that lasted several hours on November 15, suspected armed Fulani herdsmen killed 42 persons and burned down 49 houses in several villages in Kaura, Kaduna State. The attack was purportedly in response to the killing of 19 head of cattle a few weeks earlier. The Southern Kaduna People’s Union reported an attack by Fulani herdsmen just outside of Kafanchan, Kaduna on December 24 and 25, resulting in 16 deaths. The herdsmen carried out the attack during a 24-hour curfew imposed by the Kaduna State Government after Christians took to the streets to protest the lack of security in the region. The police and army significantly increased their presence in the region in response to the attacks.

NGOs cited a number of contributing factors for the increase of clashes between Muslim Fulani herders and Christian farmers, namely the shrinking of formerly shared resources caused by desertification and soil erosion, population growth, and banditry and violence in the north that caused herders to move further south into lands predominantly populated by Christians. Because of the close links among religion, ethnicity, and political and economic interests, it was difficult to categorize many of these incidents as based solely on religious identity.

There were several incidents of mob violence related to allegations of blasphemy. On May 29, a mob in Pandogari, Niger State killed a Christian man for allegedly posting blasphemous statements against Islam on a social media network. After the incident, riots broke out in the area, resulting in three other deaths, a number of injuries, and the destruction of a church. The military and police intervened to reestablish order and arrested 32 individuals. On June 2, assailants killed a Christian vendor originally from southeast Nigeria in Kofar Wambai Market in Kano City after she attempted to prevent a Muslim from performing Wudu, ritual cleansing before prayer, in front of her shop. The killing was condemned by President Buhari, the country’s senate, the chairman of the CAN, and the Sultan of Sokoto. Five individuals were arrested, but, on November 3, a magistrate court dismissed the case and released them after State Attorney General Haruna Falali announced the state had no case. He declared the men innocent and instructed the court to release them.

On August 22, a group of Muslim students at Abdu Gusau Polytechnic in Zamfara State reportedly burned down the home of a Muslim student, killing eight Muslims trapped inside. The group accused the Muslim student of assisting a Christian student whom the group had beaten for allegedly insulting the Prophet Muhammad. The NGO International Christian Concern reported that the Christian student was hospitalized after his beating and that the group of Muslim students also vandalized various Christian establishments on campus and several churches. There were no reports of arrests.

In Benue State, according to the NGO Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), unknown assailants abducted three Catholic clergymen and held them for ransom. One of the priests, Father John Adeyi, was found dead in June behind the Otukpa secretariat building after his kidnapping in April. CSW stated he might have died because he could not access his asthma medication. His death came after his family paid 2 million naira ($6,600) for his release. CSW reported the remains of another priest, the Reverend Iliya Anto, were found in Kaduna State, nine days after he and the two other clergymen had been abducted. In November an Islamic cleric was kidnapped in Kaduna and released after two days. It was not known whether the requested 60 million naira ($198,000) ransom was paid. Kidnapping for ransom was common throughout the country, and there was no evidence the religion of the victims was a factor in these cases.

On June 7, Muslim youths stabbed a Christian man in Kaduna for eating during Ramadan. The man survived. There were no reported arrests.

Many religious leaders publicly supported tolerance and interfaith methods of conflict resolution. For example, on August 19, Muslim and Christian religious leaders inaugurated the International Center for Interfaith Peace and Harmony in Kaduna. The center was to serve as an interfaith platform to discuss and advocate for policies that would promote peace between the two faiths.

Muslim leaders regularly publicly condemned the activities of Boko Haram as un-Islamic and disassociated themselves from the ideology and actions of the group. According to local press, Sultan of Sokoto and President-General of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs Sa’ad Abubakar III warned against violence and forced conversion to Islam, stating, “We do not force anybody to join Islam. Those who do not want to come as Muslims are free to stay with us and continue working with us to make this country a much better place.”

U.S. embassy staff promoted religious freedom and tolerance in discussions throughout the year with government officials, such as the national security advisor, chief of army staff, and minister of foreign relations. After the November clashes in Kano State between security forces and the IMN in which an indeterminate number of IMN members died, a senior embassy official met with the governor of Kaduna and the inspector general of police to encourage restraint by security forces. Embassy representatives met with civil society and religious leaders, such as the Sultan of Sokoto, the president of CAN, and the Archbishop of Abuja, to understand their concerns and to stress the importance of interfaith dialogue, religious tolerance, and promoting religious freedom. The embassy also cosponsored anticorruption workshops in Lagos and Kano for Muslim and Christian religious leaders, where it highlighted the importance of working across faiths and respecting the freedom of religion in order to effectively fight corruption.

During his August 23-24 visit, the U.S. Secretary of State met with the Sultan of Sokoto and Anglican Bishop Augustine Omole, as well as other Christian and Muslim leaders, to encourage interfaith dialogue to address shared challenges and efforts to counter violent extremism. On October 17-19, the U.S. Special Representative to Muslim Communities visited Abuja and Kano and gave press interviews across multiple platforms to highlight the importance of religious freedom in religiously diverse democracies like Nigeria.

In a May visit to Abuja for a regional security summit, the Deputy Secretary of State met with Nigerian political leaders to discuss human rights concerns, and reiterated the United States’ commitment to support the fight against Boko Haram and called for a sustained and comprehensive approach to address its root causes.

In an April visit, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN and the Ambassador met with President Buhari and with political, humanitarian, and religious leaders to discuss efforts to combat Boko Haram and deal with the impact of the group’s abuses, reaffirming U.S. support for those efforts. In meetings with Christian and Muslim religious leaders, they discussed ways of rebuilding and strengthening trust between the two religious groups and of combating radicalization and extremism.

In a visit to Abuja and Jos in February, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom engaged a wide spectrum of religious leaders, identifying issues for embassy advocacy and reiterating U.S. government support for religious freedom. He reiterated to government officials the importance of holding perpetrators of violence responsible, addressing security concerns of religious communities, and eliminating religiously motivated discrimination and abuses. In Plateau State, the Ambassador advocated for the importance of religious freedom and the need for officials to address the drivers of religious conflict in the state. He also met with community leaders and NGOs working on conflict resolution to discuss the successes in alleviating tensions between different ethnic and religious groups.

The U.S. Consul General in Lagos continued to discuss religious tolerance and interfaith relationship building with religious leaders from all faiths in the country. The consulate general also cosponsored an event to reinforce countering violent extremism messaging from academic, religious, and humanitarian perspectives.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.2 million (July 2016 estimate). The National Statistics Bureau estimates 72.9 percent of the population belongs to the Church of Norway.

The National Statistics Bureau reports Christian denominations other than the Church of Norway have 349,000 registered members, 6.7 percent of the population. The Roman Catholic Church is the largest of these other Christian groups, with 145,000 registered members. Pentecostal congregations have approximately 39,000 registered members. Membership in Muslim congregations is 2.8 percent of the population or 149,000. Muslims are located throughout the country, but the population is concentrated in the Oslo region. Jewish congregations have approximately 770 registered members. There are two official Jewish congregations, one in Oslo and one in Trondheim. Buddhists, Sikhs, and Hindus together constitute 5 percent of registered members of religious groups.

The Norwegian Humanist Association is the largest life-stance organization. It has a registered membership of 87,000, which accounts for nearly all those registered with life-stance organizations.

Immigrants make up the majority of members of religious groups outside the Church of Norway. Immigrants from Poland and the Philippines have increased Roman Catholic Church membership. Immigrants from Muslim countries, including Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia, have increased the size of the Muslim community. All of these groups have greater representation in cities than in rural areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution states all individuals shall have the right to free exercise of their religion, and all religious and philosophical communities should be supported on equal terms. The constitution also states “the King shall at all times profess the Evangelical-Lutheran religion,” and that national values shall remain anchored in the country’s Christian and humanistic heritage. The law further specifies the right of individuals to choose or change their religion. Any person over the age of 15 years has the right to join or leave a religious community. Parents have the right to decide their child’s religion before age 15, but must take into consideration the views of children once they reach the age of seven, and must give their views priority once they reach the age of 12.

A constitutional amendment separates the Church of Norway from the state, although the state continues to provide direct financial support for the Church in its budget. The government does not appoint bishops, priests, or clerks of the Church, but laws regulate clerical salaries, and the government covers the cost of salaries, benefits, and pension plans of Church employees. Church of Norway staff remain public employees until January 1, 2017.

The penal code specifies penalties for discrimination on the basis of religion and for expressions of disrespect for religious beliefs or members of religious groups. In practice, penalties for disrespect for religious beliefs are only applied in cases of incitement to violence. The penalties may include a fine or imprisonment of up to six months.

The government provides financial support to all registered religious and life-stance organizations (currently nearly 800 organizations) based on the number of members reported to the government. In order to register, a faith or life-stance organization must notify the county governor and provide its creed and doctrine, activities, names of board members, names and responsibilities of group leaders, operating rules – including who may become a member – voting rights, the process for amending statutes, and the process for dissolution. A group registers only once in one county but reports its national tally of members. If a religious group does not register, it will not receive financial support from the government, but there are no restrictions on the organization’s activity.

The ombudsman for equality and antidiscrimination is charged with reviewing cases of religious discrimination. Anyone may file a complaint with the ombudsman. The ombudsman publishes non-binding findings, which provide the basis for legal investigations and follow-up, in response to complaints that a person or organization has violated a law or regulation within the ombudsman’s mandate. The ombudsman also provides advice and guidance on antidiscrimination law.

Public schools include a mandatory course on Christian Knowledge and Religious and Ethical Information (CKREE) for grades one through 10 (generally ages six to 16). CKREE is taught by teachers employed by the state and covers world religions and philosophies while promoting tolerance and respect for all religious beliefs, as well as for atheism. Up to 50 percent of the CKREE course content is devoted to Christianity. Students may not opt out of this course. Religious ceremonies are not permitted in schools, but schools may organize religious outings, such as attending Christmas services. Parents may request their children be exempted from participating in or performing specific religious acts, such as a class trip to a church. The parents need not give a reason for requesting an exemption.

Individuals may apply for a full exemption for religious reasons from the required registration for a year of military service.

According to the law, the slaughter of an animal must be preceded by stunning or administering anesthetics, making traditional kosher and halal slaughter practices illegal. Halal and kosher meat may be imported. The Islamic Council in Norway certifies some locally produced meat as halal upon review of applications and procedures submitted by producers or distributors that demonstrate that the stunned animal’s heart is still beating when slaughtered.

Foreign religious workers are subject to the same visa and work permit requirements as other foreign workers.

This country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In June the government returned to their parents the five children of Pentecostal Christians Marius and Ruth Bodnariu whom the Child Welfare Service (Barnevernet) had taken custody of in November 2015 on abuse charges for spanking, which is illegal. According to the family’s attorney, the Bodnarius admitted to spanking their children, but said the seizure was based on the anti-religious bias of the Barnevernet, which they said characterized their “Bible-based parenting style” as inhibiting their children’s development. After the children were returned to the parents, the abuse case remained pending, but the family left the country for Romania before it came up for trial.

On October 2, the government released an 11-point action plan to counter anti-Semitism in society. Representatives from a wide range of government ministries, the DMT, non-Jewish religious groups, and the Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities (HC) participated in the working group to develop the plan. The plan emphasized training and education programs, research on anti-Semitism and Jewish life in the country, and efforts to safeguard Jewish culture. The HC and the DMT were generally positive about the plan, highlighting as particularly important the inclusion of anti-Semitism as a separate category of hate crime in police statistics and institutionalization of a survey of anti-Semitic attitudes in the country to be conducted every five years (next in 2017).

The Ministry of Local Government and Modernization continued to provide one million Norwegian kroner (NOK) ($116,000) for security at the DMT facility and synagogue in Oslo, based on incidents in prior years. The DMT continued to maintain a dialogue with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the police aimed at ensuring the DMT’s facilities were properly safeguarded.

The Church of Norway received approximately 2 billion NOK ($232 million) in funding from the government. The government and the Church were reviewing the future status of Church employees, who would no longer be employees of the state after 2016, with regard to pensions and benefits. The government, however, planned to continue providing a large annual grant to the Church. The MOC stated the grant to the Church would initially increase after its employees were removed from the state payroll. Other registered religious and life-stance organizations would also continue to receive state grants totaling approximately 322 million NOK ($37 million). Some representatives from these other groups, including the Norwegian Humanist Association, stated the size of the grant to the Church of Norway was not based solely on the size of membership and signaled the Church’s privileged relationship with the state would last beyond the January 1, 2017 legal separation. In April the MOC began preparing a white paper on religion and life-stance policies, which remained under development at year’s end.

In November the Oslo District Court fined the Catholic Diocese of Oslo 1 million NOK ($116,000) and ordered it to begin repaying approximately 40 million NOK ($4.63 million) in excess government subsidies. It also found the diocese’s chief administrative officer guilty of fraud for inflating diocese membership numbers in order to receive extra subsidies. The diocese filed a civil suit against the government for unfair treatment in May, which remained pending at year’s end. According to the diocese, it received subsidies for 80,000 Catholics in 2015, while it actually had 136,000 members.

The national police unit for combating organized and other serious crimes continued to maintain a web page for the public to contact police regarding hate crimes and hate speech, including religiously motivated incidents. According to police and NGO reports and observation, religiously motivated hate speech, particularly online, continued to be a significant problem. A new national strategy against hate speech, released in November, emphasized improving national statistics on hate speech, including religiously-motivated speech, and associated crimes, and promoting education and research on such crimes and speech on the internet.

The government continued to ban the wearing of religious symbols, including headgear, with police uniforms.

The government continued to permit individual schools to decide whether to implement bans on religious clothing such as burqas or niqabs. Two university colleges, University College of Southeast Norway and Ostfold University College, maintained bans. In October some politicians, including the minister of education and research, expressed support in the media for a national ban on students wearing the burqa or niqab in school.

Many non-Christian religious organizations, such as the Norwegian Humanist Association, continued their objections to the specific reference to “Christian Knowledge” in the title of the mandatory school course on religion, stating it promoted Christianity over other religions.

The Ministry of Education continued grants for school programs raising awareness about anti-Semitism. Schools nationwide continued to observe Holocaust Memorial Day on January 27. High school curricula included material on the deportation and extermination of Jewish citizens from 1942 to 1945. The DMT received grants for a program where young Jews talked to high school students about Judaism and being a Jew in the country. The government indicated it planned to expand the program through the national action plan to counter anti-Semitism.

The government continued to support an extracurricular program that took some secondary school students to the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp in Poland and to other Nazi concentration camps to educate them about the Holocaust.

In response to the effective ban on the production of kosher and halal meat in the country by the law on animal slaughter, the Ministry of Agriculture continued to waive import duties and provide guidance on import procedures to both the Jewish and Muslim communities.

The government continued to conduct workshops and other intervention programs targeting groups at risk for radicalization and to explore strategies to increase racial and religious tolerance. In September the government sponsored a national conference against radicalization, which included extensive participation by civil society and highlighted the country’s national plan to counter violent extremism, launched in 2014. In November the ombudsman for equality and antidiscrimination sponsored a conference on combating racial discrimination and intolerance. The discussion on hate speech (which disproportionately affected religious minorities) at the conference included active participation from representatives of faith-based and religious umbrella organizations.

Consistent with previous years, the MOC provided 12 million NOK ($1.4 million) to religious umbrella organizations such as the Islamic Council Norway, Christian Council of Norway, and the Council for Religious and Life Stance Communities (STL), among others, to promote dialogue and tolerance among religious and life-stance organizations. Groups outside these religious umbrella organizations also applied to the ministry for funding for specific programming.

To support government efforts to promote religious freedom outside of the country, the government appointed a new Special Envoy for freedom of religion and belief at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September.

The government is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

In 2015, the latest year for which data were available, police reported 79 religiously-motivated hate crimes throughout the country, up from 28 reported in 2014. The police attributed the sharp increase in the number of hate crime reports in 2015 to several factors, including increased attention to the subject, a better understanding of hate crimes by the population, and prioritization by police in the field to identify hate crimes. Religiously-motivated hate crimes in the Oslo Police District accounted for over half of such crimes nationally. Police officials reported that 88 percent of the 40 religiously-motivated hate crimes in 2015 in the Oslo District were targeted at Muslims. Most religiously-motivated hate crimes throughout the country consisted of assault and hate speech. Police statistics did not cite specific examples of these crimes.

The equality and discrimination ombudsman, as well as NGOs, encouraged the government to improve consistency of data collection and reporting of hate crimes, including religiously-motivated hate crimes, for police districts outside of Oslo. The Oslo Police District’s hate crime unit, which was the only such unit in the country, was held as the model for hate crime monitoring and reporting.

In 2015, there were a total of three reports of religious discrimination made to the equality and antidiscrimination ombudsman.

The NGO Antiracism Center and Organization against Public Discrimination reported ethnic minorities (many of whom were Muslim) experienced discrimination. The secretary general from the Islamic Council of Norway urged Norwegian Muslims in a media statement in November to report incidents of harassment or hatred toward them to raise awareness of discrimination. According to media reports, in September a hairdresser in Rogaland was charged with religious discrimination after denying service to a Muslim woman wearing a hijab. The hairdresser was convicted and fined 10,000 NOK ($1,200).

The DMT expressed concern about what it viewed as a continued tolerance for anti-Semitic expression, primarily online and on social media. It stated, however, there was no evidence that anti-Semitism was increasing in the media, rather that people were simply using different platforms to express it.

The HC conducted programs against anti-Semitism with financial support from the government. The HC used instructional materials it developed in high schools nationwide to promote tolerance for religious diversity. It also screened materials used in public schools for anti-Semitic content.

U.S. embassy staff met with officials from the MOC who worked on religious issues. The discussions centered on the public financing mechanism for faith and life-stance organizations, including alleged financial preferences for the Church of Norway. Staff discussed the continuing processes and issues involved in fully separating the Church of Norway from the government, including the Church’s employees and infrastructure. Embassy staff also discussed the ministry’s role in supporting religious umbrella organizations and activities to promote interreligious dialogue. Embassy staff discussed efforts to promote religious freedom with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Special Envoy for religious freedom and belief.

The embassy hosted an Eid al-Fitr celebration with members of different faith communities, government officials, and NGOs to promote religious tolerance. In his remarks, the U.S. Ambassador stressed the importance of religious tolerance and echoed remarks by President Obama that shared values can help bring communities together. The event served as a platform to encourage interfaith conversations with Muslim leaders and strengthen the embassy’s relationship with minority religious groups.

The Ambassador visited a mosque in Oslo to engage in a discussion with Muslim community representatives on religious tolerance and interreligious dialogue.

Embassy staff engaged civil society, including NGOs such as the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and religious umbrella organizations such as the STL, throughout the year to discuss their efforts to promote religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.6 million (July 2016 estimate). Figures for the percentage of citizens among the total population range up to 55 percent depending upon the source of the data; according to the UN, citizens constitute 30 percent of the population. Estimates on religious adherence also vary, with the percentage of citizens who are Ibadhi Muslims (Ibadhi Islam is the historically dominant religious group in the country and distinct from Shia and Sunni Islam) put at 45 percent by many sources and at 75 percent according to government estimates. Academic sources estimate Shia Muslims comprise approximately 5 percent of citizens and live mainly in the capital area and along the northern coast, while another 5 percent are Hindus and Christians, mainly extended families of naturalized citizens of South Asian origin. According to academic sources, the remainder of the citizen population is Sunni Muslim.

According to academic sources, the majority of non-Muslims are foreign workers from South Asia. Noncitizen religious groups include Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Bahais, and Christians. Christians are centered in the major urban areas of Muscat, Sohar, and Salalah and include Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestants.

Legal Framework

The Basic Law declares Islam to be the state religion. It protects the right of individuals to practice other religions as long as doing so does not “disrupt public order or contradict morals.” The Basic Law prohibits discrimination based on religion. According to the Basic Law, the sultan must be a Muslim.

The law prohibits a father who converts from Islam from retaining paternal rights over his children. There is no provision of the law specifically addressing apostasy, conversion, or renunciation of religious belief.

It is a criminal offense to “defame” any faith. The law provides for a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment for inciting religious or sectarian strife. The law prescribes a maximum three-year sentence and fine of 500 rials ($1,300) for anyone who “publicly blasphemes God or His prophets,” commits an affront to religious groups by spoken or written word, or breaches the peace of a lawful religious gathering. Using the internet in a way that “might prejudice public order or religious values” is also a crime, with a penalty of between one month and a year in prison, and fines of not less than 1,000 rials ($2,600).

All religious organizations must register with the government. The law does not specify rules, regulations, or criteria for ministerial approval. Groups seeking registration must request meeting and worship space from one of the sponsor organizations recognized by the MERA. New non-Muslim religious groups unaffiliated with a previously recognized sponsor must gain approval from the MERA before registering. Muslim groups must register, but the government – as benefactor of the country’s mosques – serves as their sponsor. For non-Muslim groups, the ministry recognizes the Protestant Church of Oman, the Catholic Diocese of Oman, the Al Amana Center (interdenominational Christian), the Hindu Mahajan Temple, and the Anwar al-Ghubaira Trading Company in Muscat (Sikh) as official sponsors. The sponsors are responsible for recording and submitting to the ministry the group’s religious beliefs and the names of its leaders. The MERA must also grant its approval for new Muslim groups to form.

All individuals who deliver sermons in recognized religious groups must register with the MERA. The licensing process for imams prohibits unlicensed lay members from preaching sermons in mosques, and licensed imams must follow government-approved sermons. Lay members of non-Muslim groups may lead prayers if they are specified as leaders in their group’s registration application.

The law restricts collective worship by non-Muslim groups to land specifically donated by the sultan for the purpose of collective worship.

The law prohibits public proselytizing by all religious groups, although the government tolerates private proselytizing within legally registered houses of worship and “Islamic propagation centers.”

The law states the government must approve construction and/or leasing of buildings by religious groups. In addition, new mosques must be built at least one kilometer (0.6 mile) apart from each other.

Islamic studies are mandatory for Muslim students in public schools from kindergarten through 12th grade. Non-Muslim students are exempt from this requirement if they notify school administrators they do not wish to attend such instruction. The classes take a historical perspective in comparing the evolution of Islamic religious thinking, and teachers are prohibited from proselytizing or favoring one Islamic group over another. Many private schools provide alternative religious studies courses.

Civil courts adjudicate cases according to the nonsectarian civil code. The law states Shia Muslims may resolve family and personal status cases according to Shia jurisprudence outside the courts, and retain the right to transfer their cases to civil courts if they cannot find a resolution within the Shia religious tradition. The law allows non-Muslims to seek adjudication of matters pertaining to family or personal status under the religious laws of their faith or under civil law.

Citizens may sue the government for violations of their right to practice religious rites that do not disrupt public order; there are no known cases of anyone pursuing this course in court.

Birth certificates issued by the government record an individual’s religion. Other official identity documents do not do so.

Foreigners on tourist visas may not preach, teach, or lead worship. Visa regulations permit foreign clergy to enter the country to teach or lead worship under the sponsorship of registered religious groups, which must apply to the MERA for approval before the visiting clergy member’s entry.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In February the Court of First Instance in Sohar convicted Hassan al Basham, a former diplomat, on charges of blasphemy and disturbing religious values related to his comments on social media. It sentenced him to three years in prison, and the Court of Appeal in Sohar upheld the sentence in June.

While no published rules, regulations, or criteria existed for the registration of a new religious group, the MERA reportedly considered the group’s size, theology, belief system, and availability of other worship opportunities before granting registration, and reportedly employed the same criteria whether the group was Muslim or non-Muslim. Sources said the precise process remained vague, although there were reports of the MERA consulting with existing religious communities before ruling on the application of a new religious group. Sources also said the MERA sometimes would not reject an application, but just not issue a ruling. According to the MERA, there was no limit on the number of religious groups it could register. The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints had reportedly not received approval for registration from the MERA because it had not identified a sponsor in the Christian community.

The MERA continued to monitor sermons at mosques to ensure imams did not discuss political topics. All imams were required to preach sermons within politically and socially acceptable parameters the government distributed monthly, with outlines of acceptable topics along with approved Friday sermons. The government continued to fund the salaries of some Ibadhi and Sunni imams, but not of Shia or non-Muslim religious leaders. The grand mufti remained the only imam able to speak publicly outside of the designated government parameters.

In December the public prosecutor issued a press statement warning of legal action against anyone inciting sectarian and religious strife, including through the internet.

Non-Muslims who worshipped in private homes continued to say Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, and other religious groups experienced no interference from the government in their regular private worship services despite continuing legal prohibitions on worship outside of government-approved locations. Space limitations caused overcrowding at some private homes used for non-Islamic worship.

Sources stated the government did not punish unregistered Muslim groups, such as Sufi prayer groups, who convened without authorization from the government to conduct worship. The sources said the groups were more likely to face government scrutiny for activities not related to religion and could face prosecution for unlicensed financial arrangements.

Consistent with the government’s censorship policy mandating prior review of any published material, religious groups needed to obtain approval from the MERA before publishing texts within the country or disseminating religious publications outside their membership. The government also continued to require religious groups to notify the MERA before importing religious materials and submit a copy to the MERA. The ministry did not review all imported religious material for approval. Sources said non-Muslims were often able to import literature without scrutiny.

Although the Basic Law states sharia is the basis for legislation, in practice the civil code continued to precede sharia, consistent with the replacement of sharia courts by civil courts in 1999. The judicial outcomes reached under sharia jurisprudence could not contradict civil statutes.

The government, through the MERA, continued to publish Al-Tasamoh, a quarterly periodical whose purpose, according to the government, was to broaden dialogue within Islam and promote respectful discussion with other faiths.

The government continued to bring scholars of different faiths, including Christianity and Judaism, to speak on tolerance and interfaith understanding at the Grand Mosque. In June the Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs organized an event in A’Seeb to introduce Islam to non-Muslims, according to a news release. The government continued to promote an advocacy campaign entitled “Islam in Oman” which it said was designed to encourage tolerant, inclusive Islamic practices. The government said the project highlighted the commonalities between Islam’s branches and between Islam and other religions. An annual MERA program titled “Tolerance, Understanding, Coexistence – Oman’s Message of Islam” was part of the government’s effort to enhance interfaith dialogue.

Conversion from Islam was reportedly viewed extremely negatively within the Muslim community

The interfaith Al Amana Center, run by a Protestant denomination, continued to sponsor programs with a goal of interreligious dialogue and understanding between Christians and Muslims. They hosted two ten-day immersion courses in conjunction with the Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs to introduce Islam to 23 Protestant seminary students from different denominations. The center also worked closely with the MERA to promote interfaith dialogue.

U.S. embassy officers met with MERA officials to encourage the government to continue its outreach efforts promoting religious tolerance, and discussed its efforts to counter violent extremism related to religion. Embassy officers met with minority religious groups and supported efforts to promote interfaith understanding across all religious groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 201.2 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the most recent census conducted in 1998, 95 percent of the population is Muslim (75 percent of the Muslim population is listed officially as Sunni and 25 percent as Shia). Per government figures, the remaining 5 percent includes Ahmadi Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Parsis/Zoroastrians, Bahais, Sikhs, Buddhists, Kalasha, Kihals, and Jains.

Unofficial estimates vary widely with regard to the size of minority religious groups. According to 2014 media accounts, although there are 2.9 million non-Muslims registered with the National Database and Registration Authority, estimates of the actual number exceed 3.5 million. Religious community representatives estimate minorities constitute 3 to 5 percent of the population, approximately six to 10 million citizens.

According to the 2014 government registration documents cited by the press, there are approximately 1.4 million Hindus, 1.3 million Christians, 126,000 Ahmadis, 34,000 Bahais, 6,000 Sikhs, and 4,000 Parsis. Taking account of the Ahmadi boycott of the official census, however, community sources put the number of Ahmadi Muslims at approximately 500,000-600,000. There are also estimates of a Zikri Muslim community, which is mainly located in Balochistan, ranging between 500,000 and 800,000 individuals. Most of the historic Jewish community has emigrated.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes Islam as the state religion but states “subject to law, public order, and morality, every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice, and propagate his religion.”

According to the constitution, every citizen also shall have the right to freedom of speech, subject to “reasonable restrictions in the interest of the glory of Islam,” as stipulated in the penal code. According to the penal code, the punishments for persons convicted of blasphemy include the death sentence for “defiling Prophet Muhammad,” life imprisonment for “defiling, damaging, or desecrating the Quran,” and 10 years’ imprisonment for “insulting another’s religious feelings.” Speech or action intended to incite religious hatred is punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment.

The constitution defines “Muslim” as a person who “believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad…the last of the prophets, and does not believe in, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet after Muhammad….” It also states “a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, or Parsi community, a person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis), or a Bahai, and a person belonging to any of the scheduled castes” is a “non-Muslim.”

According to the constitution and the penal code, Ahmadis are not Muslims and may not call themselves Muslims or assert they are adherents of Islam. The penal code bans them from preaching or propagating their religious beliefs, proselytizing, or “insulting the religious feelings of Muslims.” The punishment for violation of these provisions is imprisonment for up to three years and a fine.

The penal code criminalizes “deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs” and provides for a sentence of up to ten years in prison.

From January 2015 until the end of the year, a constitutional amendment allowed military courts to try civilians for terrorism, sectarian violence, and other charges. The government may also use special civilian terrorism courts to try cases involving violent crimes, terrorist activities, and acts or speech deemed by the government to foment religious hatred, including blasphemy.

The constitution states no person shall be required to take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship relating to a religion other than the person’s own.

The constitution provides for “freedom to manage religious institutions.” It states every religious denomination shall have the right to establish and maintain its own institutions. The constitution states no person shall be compelled to pay any special tax on the propagation or maintenance of a religion other than the person’s own. The government collects a 2.5 percent zakat (tax) from Sunni Muslims and distributes the funds to Sunni mosques, madrassas, and charities.

The constitution mandates the government take steps to enable Muslims, individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and to promote the observance of Islamic moral standards. It directs the state to endeavor to secure the proper organization of Muslim tithes, religious foundations, and places of worship.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony is responsible for organizing participation in the Hajj and other Islamic religious pilgrimages. Authorities also consult the ministry on matters such as blasphemy and Islamic education. The ministry’s budget covers assistance to indigent minorities, repair of minority places of worship, establishment of minority-run small development projects, celebration of minority religious festivals, and provision of scholarships for religious minority students.

On November 17, the Sindh Provincial Assembly passed a law to establish a Minorities Commission for Sindh province. The law states the 11-member commission will examine government policy and laws and make recommendations to protect better the rights of minorities in Sindh; the commission will also have inquiry powers of a civil court, including summoning witnesses and receiving evidence on affidavits.

The law prohibits publishing any criticism of Islam, or its prophets, or insults to others’ religious beliefs. The law bans the sale of Ahmadiyya religious literature.

The provincial and federal governments have legal responsibility for certain minority religious properties abandoned during the 1947 partition of British India.

The constitution states no person attending any educational institution shall be required to attend classes in religious instruction or take part in any religious ceremony relating to a religion other than the person’s own. It also states no religious denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of its denomination in an educational institution maintained by the denomination.

The constitution states the government shall make Islamic studies compulsory for all Muslim students in state-run schools. Although students of other religious groups are not legally required to study Islam, their schools may not offer parallel studies in their own religious beliefs and the students may have no other option. In some schools, however, non-Muslim students may study ethics. Parents may send children to private schools, including religious schools, at the family’s expense. Private schools are free to teach or not teach religious studies.

By law, madrassas are prohibited from teaching or encouraging sectarian or religious hatred or violence. The law requires all madrassas to register with one of five wafaqs (independent boards) or directly with the government, to account for their sources of financing, and to accept foreign students only with valid student visas, a background check, and the consent of their governments. Security analysts and madrassa reform proponents have observed, however, that many madrassas fail to enforce such documentation requirements.

The constitution states “all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.” It further states no law shall be enacted which is “repugnant” to Islam. The constitution states this requirement shall not affect the “personal laws of non-Muslim citizens” or their status as citizens. Personal laws regulating marriage, divorce, and inheritance for minority communities date from prepartition British legislation.

The constitution establishes a Federal Shariat Court (FSC) composed of Muslim judges to examine and decide whether any law or provision is “repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.” The constitution gives the court the power to examine a law of its own accord or at the request of the government or a private citizen. The constitution requires the government to amend the law as directed by the court. The constitution empowers the court to review criminal cases relating to certain crimes, including rape, and those linked to Islamic morality, such as extramarital sex, alcohol use, and gambling. The court may suspend or increase the sentence given by a criminal court in these cases. The court exercises “revisional jurisdiction” (the power to review of its own accord) in such cases in lower courts, a power which applies whether the cases involve Muslims or non-Muslims. Non-Muslims may consult the FSC in other matters which affect them or violate their rights if they so choose. Decisions of the court may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

The constitution establishes a Council of Islamic Ideology to make recommendations, at the request of the parliament and provincial assemblies, as to “the ways and means of enabling and encouraging Muslims to order their lives in accordance with the principles of Islam.” The constitution further empowers the council to advise the legislative and executive branches when they choose to refer a question to the council, as to whether a proposed law is or is not “repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.”

In the absence of specific language in the law authorizing civil or common law marriage, marriage certificates are signed by religious authorities and registered with the local marriage registrar. In February the Sindh Provincial Assembly passed a law providing a formal process for registration of marriages for Hindus in Sindh as long as both parties are 18 or older, give consent to the marriage, and are not within a degree of familial relationship prohibited by Hindu custom.

The marriages of non-Muslim men remain legal upon conversion to Islam. If a non-Muslim woman converts to Islam and her marriage was performed according to her previous religious beliefs, the government considers the marriage dissolved. Children born to non-Muslim women who convert to Islam after marriage to a non-Muslim man are considered illegitimate, and ineligible for inheritance. The only way to legitimize the marriage, and the children, is for the husband also to convert to Islam. The children of a Muslim man and a Muslim woman who both convert to another religious group are considered illegitimate, and by law the government may take custody of the children.

The constitution directs the state to “safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities,” to secure the well-being of the people irrespective of creed, and to discourage sectarian prejudices. It forbids discrimination against any religious community in the taxation of religious institutions.

According to the constitution, there shall be no discrimination on the basis of religion in appointing individuals to government service, provided they are otherwise qualified.

The constitution prohibits discriminatory admission to any governmental educational institution based on religious affiliation. According to regulations, the only factors affecting admission to government schools are students’ grades and home provinces; however, students must declare their religious affiliation on application forms. This declaration is also required for private educational institutions, including universities. Students who identify themselves as Muslims must declare in writing they believe the Prophet Muhammad is the final prophet. Non-Muslims are required to have the head of their local religious communities verify their religious affiliation.

The government designates religious affiliation on passports and requests religious information in national identity card applications. Those wishing to be listed as Muslims must swear they believe the Prophet Muhammad is the final prophet, and must denounce the Ahmadiyya movement’s founder as a false prophet and his followers as non-Muslim.

The constitution requires the president and prime minister to be Muslims. All senior officials, including members of parliament, must swear an oath to protect the country’s Islamic identity.

There are reserved seats for religious minority members in both the national and provincial assemblies. The 342-seat National Assembly has 10 seats for religious minorities. The 104-seat Senate has four reserved seats for religious minorities, one from each province. In the provincial assemblies, there are three such reserved seats in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP); eight in Punjab; nine in Sindh; and three in Balochistan. Political parties elected by the general electorate choose the minority individuals who hold these seats; they are not elected by the minority constituencies they represent.

The country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and maintains two reservations: that ICCPR Article 3 regarding equal rights of men and women would be “applied as to be in conformity with Personal Law of the citizens and Qanoon-e-Shahadat (Law of Evidence),” and that ICCPR Article 25, of the equal right for citizens to take part in public service, would be subject to articles of the constitution mandating that the president and prime minister be Muslims.

Government Practices

The state carried out the death sentence for an individual, Mumtaz Qadri, convicted of assassinating an official over his comments criticizing the blasphemy law. Lower courts acquitted at least five persons charged with blasphemy, while other blasphemy cases continued without resolution. A court hearing for the appeal of Asia Bibi, a Christian woman sentenced to death for blasphemy, was postponed and the appeal put on hold indefinitely. According to civil society reports, there were at least 45 individuals imprisoned on blasphemy charges in the country, with at least 17 having received death sentences. Police registered more cases under blasphemy laws than the previous year, and arrested several individuals on charges of blasphemy. The government continued to prosecute counterterrorism actions under the NAP, which included an explicit goal of countering sectarian hate speech and extremism. Civil society groups expressed concern that authorities often failed to intervene in instances of societal violence against religious minorities, and police failed to arrest perpetrators of such abuses. NGOs and media outlets, however, reported that police intervention helped to prevent religiously based violence on some occasions. Several sources reported the continued practice of initiating blasphemy complaints against neighbors, peers, or business associates to intimidate them or to settle personal grievances. According to Ahmadiyya community leaders, the targeting and harassment of Ahmadi Muslims for blasphemy and other purported violations of law persisted. Legal observers said the authorities took steps to protect some individuals from unfounded accusations of blasphemy, although lower courts continued to fail to adhere to basic evidentiary standards in blasphemy cases. Members of religious minority communities stated the government was inconsistent in safeguarding minority rights, and official discrimination against Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and Ahmadis persisted.

On February 29, authorities executed Mumtaz Qadri, who was convicted of killing the then-governor of Punjab Province Salman Taseer, after Taseer publicly criticized the country’s blasphemy laws. In its 2015 verdict confirming Qadri’s death sentence, the court stated that criticism of the blasphemy laws was not blasphemy itself and did not justify vigilante violence. The court also stated malicious persons had misused the blasphemy law. After the execution, across the country there were protests that voiced support for Qadri and demanded continued enforcement of blasphemy laws, including large demonstrations in Rawalpindi and Islamabad that continued until March 30.

Government authorities took some steps to quell further violence following a blasphemy-related killing. According to media reports, in July a Hindu man, Amar Lal, was accused of burning pages of the Quran in Sindh’s Ghotki District. Riots broke out in the district because of the accusations, during which unidentified gunmen shot two other Hindu men, killing one. Sindh’s then-Minister for Religious Affairs Dr. Abdul Qayoom Soomro and other local officials negotiated with local religious leaders to end the riots. Media outlets reported that the Sindh home minister and inspector general directed the Ghotki District government to hold rallies on July 28 where police, district government members, and Hindu religious leaders tried to ease religious tensions.

On December 28, Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Bajwa confirmed death sentences for eight men convicted under the military court system on a variety of terrorism-related charges. Four of the men were convicted of committing the May 2015 attacks on members of the Ismaili community traveling in a bus in Karachi, which resulted in the deaths of 45 passengers and injury to six others.

On November 23, the Lahore Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) sentenced to death five men for their role in the November 2014 lynching of a Christian man and his pregnant wife in Kot Radha Kishan. The couple had been accused of blasphemy for desecrating the Quran. The five men were charged with inciting violence over mosque loudspeakers, leading to a large mob that lynched the couple. The court sentenced eight other men to two years in prison for their participation in the lynching.

On October 13, one of the three Supreme Court justices assigned to hear the final appeal of the Asia Bibi case unexpectedly recused himself, resulting in an indefinite postponement of the hearing. Bibi, a Christian, was arrested in June 2009 after a group of Muslim women with whom she was arguing accused her of blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad. She was convicted and sentenced to death in November 2010.

On December 5, Punjab Counter-Terrorism Division police raided the publications department of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community headquarters in Rabwah. Police arrested four individuals, and charged a total of nine Ahmadis with offenses related to publishing an Ahmadi magazine that the Punjab government banned in 2014. The Ahmadi representatives said a court order allowed them to keep publishing. Ahmadi representatives stated those arrested were tortured while in police custody. The charges carry a maximum penalty of seven years’ jail time; the four arrested individuals remained in jail with their trial pending.

According to data provided by CSOs, police registered new cases against 18 individuals under blasphemy laws during the year, compared with three new cases in 2015. There were continued reports of individuals initiating blasphemy complaints against neighbors, peers, or business associates to resolve personal disputes or to intimidate vulnerable people. While the law requires a senior police official to investigate any blasphemy charge before a complaint can be filed, human rights activists said the police did not uniformly follow this procedure.

On December 30, at the urging of the Sunni Tehreek organization, Punjab police registered a blasphemy case against an “unnamed man” for issuing a video wishing all Pakistanis a Merry Christmas and asking for prayers for those victimized by the country’s blasphemy laws. The man identified himself in the video as Shaan Taseer, an activist and son of the late Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer, who was assassinated in January 2011 by Mumtaz Qadri after speaking out against the country’s blasphemy laws. Sunni Tehreek issued a fatwa calling Taseer “liable to death” for the video message.

According to media reports, in October a nine-year-old Christian boy and his mother were detained and interrogated by police in Quetta after being accused of burning pages of the Quran. Local civil society activists engaged with police to review the case; police confirmed no evidence of Quran desecration was found and released the boy and his mother.

On September 18, Kasur District police arrested Nabeel (Masih) Amanat, a 16-year-old Christian, on charges of blasphemy for sharing a picture of the Kaaba in Mecca on Facebook. He faced up to ten years’ imprisonment if convicted, and remained in custody at year’s end.

In July a Muslim man filed a complaint against Nadeem James, a Christian, for sending him “a derogatory poem about Islamic holy figures” on WhatsApp. James was charged with blasphemy and the police took his relatives into “protective custody” until he surrendered himself. James remained in prison and his case remained pending before a trial court in Gujrat.

On June 28, the Gujranwala ATC sentenced three individuals, two Christians (Anjum Naz and Javed Naz) and one Muslim (Jaffar Ali), to death over blasphemy and extortion charges. Anjum Naz had reported to police that Javed and Jaffar were trying to extort money from him over what his family alleged was a fraudulent mobile phone recording of blasphemous speech. All three defendants appealed their sentences, and their cases remain pending.

On June 20, the Gujranwala ATC sentenced two Christians to six years imprisonment under blasphemy and terrorism charges, and acquitted five Christians who were also accused. They were part of a group of 16 individuals against whom local police near Gujranwala had filed charges for publishing offensive material and who had been detained since August 2015. The remaining nine defendants were subsequently released on bail and their cases remained pending at year’s end.

On June 19, police in Tando Adam, Sindh, arrested Muslim shopkeeper Jahanzaib Khaskheli on blasphemy charges after accusations he was selling shoes with a Hindu symbol on the sole. Hindu community leaders had called for Khashkeli’s arrest and his case remained pending before a trial court at year’s end.

On May 24, police in Sheikhupura, Punjab, arrested a local Christian man, Usman Liaqat, on blasphemy charges. Local activists reported that a group of Muslim and Christian men alleged Liaqat had posted blasphemous text on social media, after a quarrel between Liaqat and the group. He faces the death penalty if convicted. His case remained pending before a trial court at year’s end.

According to media reports, individuals convicted in well-publicized blasphemy cases from previous years, including Sawan Masih, Shafqat Emmanuel, Shagufta Kausar, Sajjad Masih Gill, and Liaquat Ali, remained in jail and continued to await appeal.

On September 30, the Lahore ATC indicted on murder and terrorism charges 42 Christians who had been arrested in the lynching case of two Muslim men in the Youhanabad district. A large mob had burned the two men alive following bombings of two Christian churches in the area in March 2015.

According to Ahmadiyya Community leaders, authorities charged 14 Ahmadis in religion-related cases during the year. As of the end of the year, 14 Ahmadis remained in prison on religion-related charges, including 80-year-old Abdul Skahoor, who was arrested in December 2015 for selling Ahmadi religious books. On January 2, he was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for propagating the Ahmadiyya Muslim faith and to an additional three years under the Anti-Terrorism Act for stirring up “religious hatred” and “sectarianism,” with sentences to run concurrently.

According to CSOs and media reports, in April a mob attempted to burn houses in the Christian community of Chak 44 in northern Punjab in response to reports a Christian man had blasphemous videos on his phone. Ten Christian families fled out of fear of attack; however, rapid deployment of an additional 70 police officers and the coordinated messaging of a local “peace committee” of Christians and Muslims helped to disperse the mob and diffuse tensions, according to media and NGO reports.

In May Christians near Gujrat used an emergency police hotline when a mob formed after local cleric tried to file blasphemy charges against a young Christian woman. The police and community members worked to diffuse the situation and ultimately the cleric withdrew the complaint.

In November several groups in Karachi protested after the police arrested Allama Mirza Yousuf Hussain, a prominent Shia cleric, and Faisal Raza Abidi, a Shia and former senator. Hussain was arrested under a law meant to curb the misuse of loudspeakers for hate speech for allegedly instigating violence during a speech in May at the funeral of rights activist Khurram Zaki. Hussain was released on bail a few days later. Media reported police arrested Abidi in connection with the killing of two men who belonged to the Tableeghi Jamaat (a pro-Sunni group) and for possession of an illicit weapon, but the Sindh chief minister later told reporters Abidi was arrested solely on charges of possession of an illicit weapon. Shia representatives reported the government was targeting Shia activists under the pretense of law enforcement actions. The chief minister denied these allegations.

On November 24, the Sindh Assembly passed legislation criminalizing forced conversions. The bill mandates a 21-day waiting period and a minimum age of 18 for any person wishing to convert, and establishes a minimum sentence of five years for those convicted of forcing others to convert. In December the Sindh Assembly decided to review the bill after some Muslim scholars objected to some of the bill’s clauses; the bill remained pending at year’s end.

On September 26, the Islamabad Capital Territory Administration (ICTA) banned 11 clerics from delivering sermons and addressing the public in Islamabad out of fears of inciting sectarian violence. The ICTA also forbade 16 clerics branded as “sectarian agitators” from entering the capital for a period of two months, covering the Islamic month of Muharram. Provincial governments also announced the deployment of hundreds of thousands of police and security personnel to protect Shia religious ceremonies across the country during the commemoration of Ashura.

In October a Rawalpindi ATC acquitted 12 men charged with attacking a Shia mosque in Rawalpindi during a 2013 riot following Ashura, ruling the police had failed to provide sufficient evidence.

According to Ahmadiyya Muslim Community leaders, authorities continued to target and harass Ahmadi Muslims for blasphemy, violations of “anti-Ahmadi laws,” and other crimes. Ahmiadiyya leaders stated the ambiguous wording of the legal provision forbidding Ahmadis from directly or indirectly identifying themselves as Muslims enabled officials to bring charges against members of the community for using the standard Islamic greeting or for naming their children Muhammad. Representatives also stated that provincial authorities prevented Ahmadis from purchasing land near the community’s headquarters in Rabwah.

According to religious organizations and human rights NGOs, religious minorities continued to be disproportionately accused of blasphemy relative to their small percentage of the population. They also stated the police continued not to file charges against many individuals who made false blasphemy accusations and if charges were filed, courts most often acquitted those accused.

In December the Senate Human Rights Committee began debate on possible procedural reforms to discourage misuse of the country’s blasphemy laws. Media reported the committee would review other countries’ legal frameworks for blasphemy as potential models, and reforms could require greater federal supervision of blasphemy investigations and include provisions for defendants to repent alleged blasphemy.

Legal observers continued to raise concerns regarding the failure of lower courts to adhere to basic evidentiary standards in blasphemy cases, which led to some convicted persons spending years in jail before higher courts overturned their convictions and freed them for lack of evidence. Lower courts reportedly continued to conduct proceedings in an intimidating atmosphere with members of groups labelled extremist by the government, such as the Khatm-e-Nubuwatt group, often filling courtrooms with large numbers of supporters and threatening the defendant’s attorneys, family members, and supporters. According to observers, lower courts’ general refusal to free defendants on bail or acquit them remained ongoing out of fear of reprisal and vigilantism. Legal observers reported judges and magistrates often delayed and continued trials indefinitely in an effort to avoid confrontation with, or violence from, groups labeled by the government as extremist.

Ahmadi representatives stated the government failed to restrict advertisements or speeches inciting anti-Ahmadi violence in television and print media despite a promise to do so in the 2014 NAP against terrorism. In September Mufti Muneeb-ur-Rehman, chairman of the country’s Ruet-e-Hilal Committee (a government entity responsible for announcing the sighting of the new moon), urged the government to execute Ahmadis.

The government continued efforts to enforce its previous bans on the activities of, and membership in, some religiously oriented groups it judged to be extremist or terrorist. The Ministry of Interior declared militant groups Jamaat ul-Ahrar and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al Alami to be banned in November. In December, however, a cleric unofficially affiliated with banned extremist group Ahle Sunnat Wal Jammat (AWSJ) won a seat in the Punjab Assembly.

The government continued to fund and facilitate Hajj travel for most Muslims, but Ahmadis were unable to participate in the Hajj, community leaders said, because of passport application requirements to list religious affiliation and denounce the Ahmadiyya prophet.

According to representatives of minority religious groups, the government continued to allow organized religious groups to establish places of worship and train members of the clergy. Although there continued to be no official restriction on the construction of Ahmadiyya places of worship, however, local authorities regularly denied requisite construction permits and Ahmadis remained forbidden to call them mosques.

According to civil society activists and monitoring organizations, some public school textbooks continued to include derogatory statements about minority religious groups, including Ahmadi Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and Christians. Civil society leaders said the teaching of religious intolerance remained widespread and although multiple groups had presented recommendations for the removal of discriminatory content, the federal government had not taken the initiative to support the recommended changes. Monitoring groups said textbooks used in all four provinces for grades one to 10 continued to contain religiously intolerant and biased material against Hindus, Christians, and other religious minorities. These groups reported some provincial authorities moved to remove some discriminatory material and promote tolerance through the textbooks, such as the Punjab Curriculum and Textbook Board incorporating short stories promoting peace and harmony into Urdu textbooks. Authorities in KP reportedly abandoned plans to review the content of Islamic, Urdu, and social studies textbooks as a result of pressure from religious political parties. While private schools remained free to choose whether or not to offer religious instruction, they were reportedly under government pressure to teach Islamic studies. In a parliamentary hearing in November, a government secretary for education said in response to parliamentarians’ questions that no Ahmadis would be allowed to teach Islamic studies.

There were reports some madrassas taught violent extremist doctrine. Increasing government supervision of madrassas remained a component of the NAP, and there was evidence of government efforts to increase regulation of the sector. According to press reports, provincial authorities continued campaigns to geotag madrassas, with Punjab authorities tagging approximately 14,000 madrassas and Sindh authorities tagging more than 7,700. Press reports also indicated provincial authorities also began shutting down madrassas with connections to terrorism, closing two in Punjab, 13 in KP, and 167 in Sindh. Media reports also stated that under the NAP, law enforcement agencies had filed almost 15,000 cases against clerics, religious teachers, and prayer leaders for hate speech and spreading sectarian material. The authorities subsequently prosecuted cases involving sectarian hate speech and restricted the movement and public sermons of some clerics accused of spreading sectarian hatred.

Members of religious minority communities said there continued to be inconsistent application of laws safeguarding minority rights and enforcement of protections of religious minorities at both the federal and provincial levels by the federal Ministry of Law, Justice, and Human Rights and its provincial counterparts. Religious minorities said they remained concerned that government action to address coerced conversions of religious minorities to Islam was inadequate. Religious minority activists, however, stated they believed the Sindh Assembly’s new law criminalizing forced conversions, which passed in November but was under review by the Sindh Assembly at year’s end, would be a step to restrict the practice and better protect minors belonging to religious minorities.

The National Commission for Minorities, a government committee created in 2014 with Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh representatives, met sporadically to develop a national policy for minorities. Minority activists stated the Commission’s lack of a regular budget allocation and lack of an independent chairperson has inhibited its development.

In February the Ministry of Human Rights released its Action Plan for Human Rights that included nine provisions for the protection of the rights of minorities, among them enforcement of laws criminalizing incitement to religious hatred and protection for places of worship for minority religious groups.

Human rights activists reported neither the federal nor the provincial governments had made substantial progress in implementing the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision directing the government to take measures to protect members of minority religious groups.

Religious minority community leaders continued to state that the government failed to take adequate action to protect minorities from bonded labor in the brick-making and agricultural sectors, an illegal practice in which victims were disproportionately Christians and Hindus. Such families, particularly on agricultural lands in Sindh Province, often lived without basic facilities and were prevented from leaving without the permission of farm landlords. On August 29, the Punjab Provincial Assembly passed a law prohibiting the use of child labor in the brick industry. Under the law, the owner of a brick kiln who employs or permits a child to work at a brick kiln faces imprisonment for up to six months and a criminal fine.

According to Hindu and Sikh leaders, the legal uncertainty surrounding the process of registering marriages for their communities continued to create difficulties for Hindu and Sikh women in obtaining their inheritances, accessing health services, voting, obtaining a passport, and buying or selling property. Most Hindu civil society activists, however, stated they welcomed passage of marriage bills in both Sindh and the National Assembly, with the prospect that they will help regularize marriage registration and reduce forced conversions of minors in the community. The media reported some expressed concern that a provision of the national bill permitting annulment of Hindu marriages could be used to legitimize forced conversions of Hindu women. Some local administrative bodies continued to deny Christian and Ahmadi marriage registrations; advocates called for a new law governing Christian marriages, as the existing regulation dates to 1872.

The Ministry for Human Rights, reconstituted in November 2015, is responsible for “protection and promotion of human rights” as enshrined in the constitution and various international treaty obligations. In practice the Ministry took over primary responsibility for the protection of the rights of religious minorities. The Ministry of Law and Justice, from which the Ministry of Human Rights was separated, was responsible for administration of law and justice, including ensuring the legal rights of all citizens. Because the country’s 18th amendment to the constitution devolved certain authorities and responsibilities for the protection of human rights and rights of religious minorities to provincial governments, legal experts and NGO representatives said reporting structures and the full legal framework for minority rights remained unclear.

Minority religious leaders stated discrimination against Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and Ahmadis in admission to higher education institutions persisted. They reported their communities continued to face restrictions in securing admissions into colleges and universities.

Ahmadi representatives said the wording of the declaration students needed to sign on their applications for admission to university continued to prevent Ahmadis from declaring themselves as Muslims. Their refusal to sign the statement meant they were automatically disqualified from fulfilling the admissions requirements. The government maintained Ahmadis could qualify for admission as long as they did not claim to be Muslims. Ahmadi community leaders reported multiple Ahmadi students had been expelled from public universities after not disclosing their religious affiliation at initial admission.

Religious minority community members stated that Muslim students in public schools were afforded bonus grade points for memorizing the Quran, but no analogous opportunities for academic credit were available for religious minority students.

Most religious minority groups continued to complain of discrimination in government hiring and admission to public colleges and universities. While there remained a 5 percent quota for hiring religious minorities at the federal level, minority organizations said government employers did not enforce it. According to religious minority members and media reports, provincial governments in Punjab, Sindh, and KP also failed to meet such quotas for hiring of religious minorities into the civil service.

Representatives of religious minorities said a “glass ceiling” continued to prevent their promotion to senior government positions. Although there were no official obstacles to advancement of minority religious group members in the military service, they said in practice non-Muslims rarely rose above the rank of colonel and were not assigned to senior positions.

Ahmadi leaders continued to report the government inhibited Ahmadis from obtaining legal documents, and pressured community members to deny their beliefs by requiring individuals wishing to be listed as Muslim on identity cards and passports to swear the Prophet Muhammad was the final prophet of Islam and the Ahmadiyya movement’s founder was a false prophet. Ahmadi community representatives reported the word “Ahmadi” was written on their passports if they identified themselves as such. Ahmadi community representatives reported voters who registered as Ahmadi were kept on a separate voter list and were physically intimidated while trying to vote.

In September a TV host labeled Ahmadiyya community members as “blasphemers” and “traitors,” prompting the community to file a complaint with the Pakistan Electronic Media Authority (PEMRA). According to media reports, however, the commentator and a large mob entered the PEMRA building on the day of the complaint hearing, shouting threatening slogans; PEMRA subsequently dismissed the community’s complaint.

Religious minority leaders stated the current system of selecting minority parliamentarians through the internal deliberations of mainstream parties resulted in the appointment of party stalwarts or those who could afford to “buy the seats” rather than legislators who genuinely represented minority communities. They also stated the current system effectively precluded the election of minority women, who were rarely in a position of sufficient influence with the major political parties to contend for a seat.

According to Ahmadiyya community members, authorities continued to seal or demolish Ahmadi mosques, barred construction of new mosques, and took no action to prevent or punish assailants who demolished, damaged, forcibly occupied, or set Ahmadi mosques on fire. Ahmadi leaders reported authorities have sealed 33 of the community’s mosques to date, and that in March police in Punjab allowed anti-Ahmadi activists to occupy an Ahmadi mosque authorities had previously sealed. Ahmadi leaders reported the police ignored their request for police protection for their mosque in Chakwal on December 12, the date of a planned procession to honor the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday. On December 12, a mob of more than 1,000 attacked the mosque, resulting in the death of one Ahmadi from a heart attack and in the death of one of the attackers. The police arrested several participants in the mob, as well as four members of the Ahmadi community for allegedly killing the attacker.

The government continued not to allow citizens, regardless of religious affiliation, to travel to Israel. Representatives of the Bahai community said this policy particularly affected them because of the location of the Bahai World Center – the spiritual and administrative center of the community – in Israel.

The government continued to permit non-Muslim missionary activity and to allow missionaries to proselytize as long as they did not preach against Islam and they acknowledged they were not Muslim. The government stated on its immigration website that it continued to grant visas to foreign missionaries valid from two to five years and allowed two entries into the country per year, although only “replacement” visas for those taking the place of departing missionaries were available for missionaries seeking to enter the country for the first time. Non-Muslim missionaries, some of whom had been working in the country for many years, however, were either denied visas, only given four-month extensions, or received no response from immigration authorities before their visas expired. Others were allowed to remain in country while appeals of their denials were pending.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

There continued to be violence and abuses committed by armed sectarian groups connected to organizations banned by the government, including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (previously referred to as Sipah-e-Sahaba), as well as abuses by individuals and groups designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. and other governments, such as ISIL-K.

Terrorist groups continued to target Christian places of worship. On March 27, Easter Sunday, a suicide bomber in Lahore’s Gulshan-e-Iqbal park killed 78 people, including 29 children, and injured more than 350; the victims included members of Christian families who had gathered in the park for the religious holiday. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar claimed responsibility for the bombing. The majority of the victims were Muslim. Authorities subsequently arrested more than 200 suspected militants in a crackdown throughout Punjab Province.

On November 12, ISIL-K claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on the Sufi shrine of Saint Shah Bilal Noorani in Balochistan that killed 52 people and injured more than 100. Media reported a suicide bomber carried out the attack during a religious activity.

Sectarian violent extremist groups targeted Shia houses of worship, religious gatherings, religious leaders, and other individuals in attacks resulting in 25 people killed and 19 others injured in 16 separate attacks throughout the country, according to a public database of attacks.

Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), a Sunni splinter faction of the TTP, claimed responsibility for two attacks in Shikarpur that injured 13 people at a Shia mosque and congregation hall on September 13. Media reported that two men on a motorbike threw a homemade explosive device at a Shia congregation hall in Karachi on October 17, killing one child and injuring 20 others. Lashkar-e-Jhanvgi al-Alami, a cell of the Sunni LeJ, claimed responsibility for the attack. On October 29, unidentified gunmen opened fire on a Shia gathering in Karachi’s Nazimabad area, killing five and injuring six. Lashkar-e-Jhanvgi al-Alami claimed responsibility for the attack.

Terrorist groups also continued to target the predominantly Shia Hazara community. Suspected militants shot and killed a Hazara man in Quetta on December 8. Gunmen in Quetta killed two Hazara Shia men on August 1, with JuA claiming responsibility for the attack.

On September 2, militants attacked a Christian neighborhood in Peshawar, killing one security guard. JuA claimed responsibility for the attack.

In June Amjad Sabri, a singer of Sufi devotional music, was killed by an unknown assailant. The Pakistani Taliban claimed credit for the killing and declared Sabri a blasphemer. In November the police arrested two individuals in connection with the killing, who according to local media said they killed Sabri because he had committed blasphemy.

On October 5, unknown assailants shot and killed Zikri community spiritual leader Syed Akhtar Mullai in Turbat, Balochistan. The Baloch Liberation Front later claimed responsibility.

Throughout the year, unidentified attackers targeted and killed Shias, Hazaras, and Ahmadis in attacks believed to be religiously motivated, including multiple attacks during the Islamic month of Muharram. On November 11, three Shia students were shot by unknown gunmen on a motorbike; one of the students died from his wounds. On October 7, gunmen shot four Shia men in two separate incidents in Karachi, killing one. Prominent Shia civil society activist Syed Khurram Zaki was shot and killed in Karachi on May 7 in an apparent targeted killing. Four Shia were killed in two separate incidents on May 5 in Dera Ismail Khan in KP, prompting protests in the area. On April 8, unidentified gunmen in Karachi killed three men outside a Shia mosque in Karachi.

Unidentified assailants regularly targeted the predominantly Shia Hazara community. On November 30, unidentified assailants killed a Hazara woman in Quetta. On October 4, gunmen boarded a bus in Quetta and shot five Hazara Shia women, killing four.

There were multiple instances of what appeared to be targeted killings of Ahmadi community members. On November 27, gunmen on a motorbike killed an Ahmadi man in Karachi. On June 4, unidentified gunmen killed an Ahmadi pharmacy owner in the city of Attock in Punjab. On March 1, unidentified assailants stabbed an Ahmadi man to death near Punjab’s Sheikhupura District. Assailants on motorbikes shot and killed an Ahmadi man on May 25, and an Ahmadi doctor was shot in his clinic on June 20, with no witnesses; both killings occurred in Ahmadi community neighborhoods in Karachi.

Ahmadi representatives reported extremists, including a representative from religious political party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and a Punjab assembly member from the Pakistani Muslim League (PML-N), held a rally in Rabwah, Punjab, the Ahmadiyya community’s center in Pakistan, calling for killing of Ahmadis and claiming the group was anti-Islamic and anti-Pakistan. The rally was held on September 7, which commemorated the passage of the 2nd Amendment to the constitution declaring Ahmadis were not Muslims. Various groups have held similar rallies and conferences yearly on September 7. According to media reports, members of the Ahmadiyya community who fled after the December 12 attack faced threats and a “social boycott” imposed by locals after returning to their homes in Chakwal’s Dulmial area.

Reports continued of attempts to coerce religious minorities to convert to Islam. Rights activists reported victims of forced marriage and conversion were pressured and threatened into saying publicly they had entered into the marriage of their own free will. In April, according to Christian activist organizations, two armed men abducted a 23-year-old Christian woman from her family’s home in Punjab’s Kasur district. When her father attempted to press charges, the police responded the woman had willingly converted to Islam and married one of the abductors. In July a Hindu woman held a press conference in Thatta, Sindh, detailing a years-long ordeal prior to her escape during which she was kidnapped, raped, coerced into marrying a Muslim man in Nawabshah, and then forced into prostitution by her husband.

Christian and Hindu organizations stated that girls from their communities were particularly vulnerable to forced conversions. According to press reports, Wadia Bai Meghwar, a Hindu woman who was already married, was kidnapped and forcibly remarried in May to a Muslim man in the Thar district of Sindh. Days later, media reported that the police officer investigating Meghwar’s case said she was not previously married and had married her new husband freely.

Christian activists continued to report widespread discrimination against Christians in private employment. They said Christians had difficulty finding jobs other than those involving menial labor.

Observers reported that some coverage in the English-language media of issues facing religious minorities had improved, including a major daily newspaper hiring a full-time reporter on minority faith issues. Observers reported, however, that Urdu-language media continued to show bias in reporting on minority faith issues, including multiple instances where media used inflammatory language or made inappropriate references to minorities. In separate occasions in June and September, television commentators stated Ahmadis were “deserving of death.” Throughout the year editorials in certain Urdu language newspapers referred to Ahmadis as “enemies of Pakistan” and “blasphemers.”

Human rights and religious freedom activists and members of minority religious groups reported they continued to be hesitant to speak in favor of religious tolerance because of the societal climate of intolerance and fear. Some activists reported receiving death threats because of their work. Police reported no further developments in the investigation into the 2014 assassination of attorney Rashid Rehman, who was defending an individual charged with blasphemy.

There continued to be reports of attacks on religious minorities’ holy places, cemeteries, and religious symbols, which police failed to prevent. Human rights activists and religious leaders reported an Apostolic church in Multan was set on fire on January 7 but no arrests were made. On June 4, unidentified gunmen opened fire on a Catholic church in Lahore. No casualties were reported in either attack.

In October the Islamic Solidarity Council, a group comprising various Muslim groups, issued a statement condemning sectarianism, fundamentalism, and religiously inspired violence, and emphasizing the importance of permitting the courts independently to decide on the case of Asia Bibi without pressure or threats.

The Ambassador, consuls general, embassy officers, and visiting senior U.S. officials met with government officials, including from the Prime Minister’s Office and Ministries of Human Rights and Law and Justice, to discuss blasphemy law reform, curriculum reform in the public and madrassa education systems, the need for better protection of Shia, Ahmadi, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, and other religious minority communities, pending legislation, interfaith dialogue, sectarian relations, and religious tolerance.

In March the White House and the Department of State both condemned the Easter Sunday bombing in Lahore and extended condolences to the victims and their families. During a press briefing in November, the U.S. Department of State condemned the attack on the Sufi Shrine in Balochistan and extended condolences to the victims and their families. The embassy condemned both attacks, as well as a September 16 bombing of a mosque in the Mohmand Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas during Friday prayers. During a press briefing in December, the U.S. Department of State expressed concern about the police raid on Ahmadiyya Muslim Community headquarters, emphasizing that such actions were inconsistent with Pakistan’s international human rights commitments.

In February the U.S. Special Representative for Muslim Communities visited Islamabad and Karachi to meet with madrassa educational board leaders and members of the NACTA to discuss plans for madrassa reform and the evolving role of government oversight for madrassas.

In February and March the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South and Central Asia visited Islamabad and Karachi and met with minority community representatives, parliamentarians, and members of the Prime Minister’s Office, and human rights attorneys. The Special Advisor highlighted concerns over attacks by violent extremists against members of religious minorities, the application of blasphemy laws, and other forms of discrimination on the basis of religion.

The Ambassador met with local religious leaders, including from prominent Sufi shrines, to discuss religious pluralism and efforts to promote interfaith harmony. The Ambassador and embassy officers convened groups of civil society and legal experts to discuss the impact of the country’s blasphemy laws on both minority and Muslim communities, and avenues for engagement by U.S. government representatives. Embassy officers met with civil society leaders, experts, and journalists to stress the need to end sectarian violence and protect the rights of religious minorities. They also met with leaders of religious communities, NGOs, and legal experts working on religious freedom issues to discuss ways to increase religious tolerance and dialogue. U.S. Department of State programs on religious freedom helped to promote peacebuilding among religious and community leaders, enhance protections for the legal rights of religious minorities, develop more pluralistic educational materials, and counter sectarianism.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 21,000. According to the 2015 national census, approximately 45 percent is Roman Catholic. Other religious groups include the Evangelical Church, which makes up approximately 26 percent of the population, and Seventh-day Adventists, constituting 7 percent. Mormons make up more than 2 percent. Modekngei, an indigenous religious group that embraces both animist and Christian beliefs, is approximately 6 percent of the population. Muslims make up approximately 3 percent, Baptists 1 percent, and members of the Assembly of God 1 percent. Other religious groups make up approximately 10 percent combined. There is an active community of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Within the foreign community of more than 4,000 individuals, the majority is Filipino Catholic. There are also small groups of foreign Baptists and Bangladeshi Muslims.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and prohibits the government from taking any action to compel, prohibit, or hinder the exercise of religion. It stipulates there will be no state religion but allows the state to fund “private or parochial” schools on a fair and equitable basis and for nonreligious purposes.

The law requires religious groups to obtain charters as nonprofit organizations from the Office of the Attorney General. As nonprofit organizations, religious groups and mission agencies are exempt from paying taxes. To obtain a charter of incorporation, an applicant submits a written petition to the registrar requesting a charter of incorporation along with a filing fee of $250. The Office of the Attorney General reviews the application for statutory compliance and forwards the completed application to the Office of the President for final authorization. The attorney general’s office reports it does not deny applications that conform to the corporate registry regulations. Foreign missionaries are required under law to obtain missionary permits at the Bureau of Immigration and Labor.

The law prohibits religious instruction in public schools. Representatives of any religious group, however, may request government financial support for nonpublic religious schools.

The country is not a party to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Christian prayers from various denominations were offered at government-sponsored events.

The government provided funding to all 10 of the nonpublic schools run by religious groups in the country.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy officials met with the government and various religious groups throughout the year to discuss religious freedom and the relationship among the various religious groups. The embassy interacted with members of the Palau Baptist Church, the Palau Catholic Mission, the Palau Seventh-day Adventist Mission, the Mormons, and a representative of the Muslim community.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.7 million (July 2016 estimate). The Ministry of Health estimates 69.7 percent of the population is Catholic and 18 percent evangelical Protestant. Episcopalian and Methodist bishops state their communities have 11,000 and 1,500 members, respectively, and the Lutheran Church states there are 1,000 Lutherans. Smaller religious groups, found primarily in Panama City or other larger urban areas, include Seventh-day Adventists, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hindus, Buddhists, Bahais, Pentecostals, and Rastafarians. Baptists and Methodists derive their membership in large part from the African Antillean and expatriate communities.

Jewish leaders estimate their community at approximately 15,000 members, centered largely in Panama City. The Muslim community, largely comprised of Arab- and Pakistani-origin individuals, numbers approximately 14,000 and is centered primarily in Panama City, Colon City, and Penonome. There are approximately 850 Rastafarians, most of who live in Colon City and La Chorrera, Panama Oeste. Indigenous religious groups, including Ibeorgun (prevalent among the Guna community), Mama Tata and Mama Chi (prevalent among the Ngobe Bugle community), and Embera (prevalent among the Embera community), are found in their respective indigenous communities located throughout the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religious practices and provides for freedom of religion and worship, provided that “Christian morality and public order” are respected. It recognizes Catholicism as the religion of the majority of citizens but does not designate it as the state religion. It limits the public offices religious ministers and members of religious orders may hold to those related to social assistance, education, and scientific research. It forbids the formation of political parties based on religion. The constitution prohibits discrimination toward public servants based on their religious practices or beliefs.

The constitution grants legal status to religious associations so they may manage and administer their property within the limits prescribed by law. To register, the group must submit to the Ministry of Government (MOG) a power of attorney, charter, names of the board members (if applicable), copy of the internal bylaws (if applicable), and payment of four balboas ($4) for processing. Once the MOG approves the registration, the religious association must then register the MOG’s resolution in the Public Registry. Registered religious associations must apply to the Directorate of Internal Revenue of the Ministry of Economy and Finance in order to receive clearance for duty-free imports. The government may donate government properties to registered religious associations, upon approval by the Legislative Tax Committee and the cabinet. The law states income from religious activities is tax exempt as long as it is collected through such activities as church and burial services and charitable events.

The constitution requires public schools to provide instruction on Catholic teachings. Parents have the right to exempt their children from religious education. The constitution allows for the establishment of private religious schools.

Immigration law grants foreign religious workers temporary missionary worker visas that must be renewed every two years, for up to a total of six years. Catholic and Orthodox Christian priests and nuns are exempt from the renewal requirement and are issued a six-year visa. Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim clergy and other religious workers are also eligible for the special, automatic six-year visa, but must submit extra legal documents with their applications. These additional requirements include a copy of the organization’s bylaws, the MOG-issued registration certificate, and a letter from the organization’s leader in the country certifying the religious worker will be employed at its place of worship. The application fee is 250 balboas ($250) for all religious denominations.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to a Rastafarian leader, the government did not consider Rastafarians a religious organization as the community had chosen not to participate in the registration process. The Ministry of Government previously issued the Rastafarian Alliance of Panama a permit to function as an NGO.

The government continued to rely primarily on Catholic clergy to conduct religious invocations at government events. Many official celebrations included participation of the highest-ranking officials at Catholic masses. During the June Panama Canal expansion ceremony, leaders from five different religious groups delivered invocations. Catholic and Episcopal priests delivered an ecumenical religious invocation at a ceremony marking the conclusion of national judicial reforms. Muslims and Jews continued to serve in the cabinet of President Juan Carlos Varela.

Muslim women, Catholic nuns, and Rastafarians were required to pull back their head covering to show their ears in pictures taken by immigration officials upon their arrival in the country. Civil registry and customs authorities, however, agreed to take the photographs and carry out the searches in private if Rastafarians so requested.

Some non-Catholic religious leaders expressed concern the government gave preferential treatment to Catholic schools when allocating subsidies for salaries and operational expenses for religious schools. According to the Ministry of Education, 24 private schools were allocated approximately 325,000 balboas ($325,000) in subsidies in 2015 and 2016, including Catholic, evangelical Protestant, and Episcopalian schools; the ministry did not provide a proportional breakdown among the religious groups.

The government awarded 12.1 million balboas ($12.1 million) to restore five Catholic Churches and the National Theater located in the San Felipe district, a UNESCO World Cultural and Natural Heritage-designated area. The government also awarded the Evangelical Church of Arraijan approximately 30,000 balboas ($30,000 dollars) to produce religious music.

Some Muslims stated they failed to receive employment offers when job interviewers, particularly evangelical Protestant interviewers, assessed them based on their dress and appearance rather than their qualifications.

The Inter-Religious Committee of Panama, an interfaith committee made up of representatives of the Catholic, Episcopal, Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Methodist, evangelical Protestant, and Lutheran churches, the Salvation Army, the Colon Islamic Congregation, and the Kol Shearith Jewish Congregation, met several times during the year and held several joint public events. The committee provided a coordination mechanism for interfaith activities and promoted mutual respect and appreciation among the various religious groups.

In September members of the Kol Shearith Jewish congregation, the Colon Muslim congregation, the Episcopal, Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Ngabe Mama Tata communities held an interfaith event to celebrate the World Day of Prayer for the Care of Creation, a joint initiative of Pope Francis and Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew. Government representatives from the Ministry of the Environment, the Aquatic Resources Authority of Panama, and the Panama City mayor’s office attended.

The Ambassador and other embassy officials met with religious leaders, members of religious groups, and community organizations to discuss issues related to religious freedom, including societal perceptions and the treatment of members of religious groups. The Ambassador and embassy staff members met several times with the principal leaders of the country’s largest religious groups, including Catholic Archbishop Jose Domingo Ulloa, Jewish Kol Shearith Congregation President Moises Abadi and Rabbi Gustavo Kraselnik of the congregation, Episcopal Bishop Julio Murray, and Colon Islamic leader Luis Ibrahim, among others. In September the Ambassador hosted nine religious leaders for a roundtable discussion on freedom of religion. The group shared respect and tolerance principles that united them as members of society; they also spoke about their joint religious activities. During the year, embassy officers met with Muslim leaders and leaders of religious organizations assisting migrants at the Paso Canoas border.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 6.8 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2000 census (the most recent available), 98 percent of citizens identified themselves as Christian. Approximately 27 percent of the population is Roman Catholic; 20 percent, Evangelical Lutheran; 12 percent, United Church (an offspring of the London Missionary Society, Australian Methodist Church, and the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand); 10 percent, Seventh-day Adventist; 9 percent, Pentecostal; 5 percent, Evangelical Alliance; 3 percent, Anglican; and 3 percent, Baptist. Other Christian groups, including The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Salvation Army, together constitute 9 percent. Bahais make up less than 1 percent of the population, and 2 percent hold indigenous or other beliefs. Many citizens integrate Christian faith with indigenous beliefs and practices. The Muslim community numbers approximately 5,000 and includes local converts and expatriate workers primarily centered in Port Moresby.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides the individual the right to “freedom of conscience, thought and religion and the practice of his religion and beliefs, including freedom to manifest and propagate his religion and beliefs” except where that practice infringes on another person’s rights or where it violates a public interest in “defence, public safety, public order, public welfare, public health, the protection of children and persons under disability, or the development of under-privileged or less advanced groups or areas.” The predominance of Christianity is recognized in the preamble of the constitution, which refers to “our noble traditions and the Christian principles that are ours.” There is, however, no state religion.

Religious groups are required to register with the government in order to hold a bank account, own properties in the religious group’s name, have limited individual liability, and apply to the Internal Revenue Commission for exemption on income tax and to the Department of Treasury for exemption of import duty. In order to register, groups must provide documentation including a list of board or executive committee members and a constitution. There were no reports of groups being denied registration.

Foreign missionary groups are permitted to proselytize and engage in other missionary activities. Religious workers receive a three-year special exemption visa from the government. Applications for the visa require a sponsor letter from a religious group in the country, an approved work permit from the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, and 100 Kina ($32) fee, which is less than for other visa categories. The government routinely approved religious worker applications.

The country is a party in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In June the Constitutional Review Commission shelved a parliamentary proposal to “prohibit the worship of non-Christian faiths” on the grounds that the proposed ban would be a violation of religious freedom. The proposal never moved forward to parliament as a bill and a nationwide consultation did not take place as previously planned.

In June the Supreme Court ordered the speaker of parliament to re-install indigenous cultural artifacts that he had ordered removed from the parliament house in 2013. The speaker had removed or in many cases destroyed these artifacts, saying they were demonic and “ungodly images and idols.” His plan to replace them with Christian symbols was never implemented. The plaintiffs in the case were former Prime Minister and current Member of Parliament Sir Michael Somare and the director of the National Museum. Many Christian groups supported of the court’s decision, saying that the speaker’s actions were divisive. When delivering the ruling, Justice David Canning said that the removal of the artifacts infringed on the constitutionally-guaranteed right of individuals to practice any religion of their choice. He said that the speaker’s actions were an attempt to impose his religious beliefs on others.

The King James Bible that was purchased in the United States in 2015 continued to be on display in parliament. The purchase was criticized because the trip was government funded. Parliament sessions and most official government meetings began and ended with Christian prayers.

Churches continued to operate approximately half of schools and health services in the country, and the government provided financial support for these institutions. The government subsidized their operation on a per-pupil or per-patient basis. In addition, the government continued to pay the salary and provide benefits for the majority of teachers and health staff (generally members of the civil service) who worked at these church-administered institutions, as it did for teachers and health staff of national institutions. Services were provided to the general population irrespective of their religious beliefs and operations were not religious in nature. The education and health sectors continued to rely heavily on church-run institutions.

Many faith-based organizations complained about government funding cuts to education and health services they provided, but the minister for national planning stated that the cuts were implemented equitably and not directed against religiously based organizations.

The Department of Education continued to set aside one hour per week for religious instruction in public schools. This instruction was not compulsory legally but was attended by almost all students. Representatives of Christian churches taught the lessons, and students attended the class operated by the church of their parents’ choice. Children whose parents did not wish them to attend the classes were excused. Members of non-Christian groups used family and group gatherings before and after school for religious lessons.

The resettlement of Muslim refugees from the Australian-funded Manus Island Regional Detention Center was accompanied by anti-Muslim sentiment among some religious and community leaders. As restrictions on movement were eased, there were increased tensions between refugees and local inhabitants. In August residents of Manus Island attacked and beat two Muslim refugees, and in October an assailant hit a Muslim refugee in the head with a rock. Many Muslim refugees told the press that they feared resettling in Papua New Guinea, partly because they are a religious minority.

The Council of Churches continued its efforts at interfaith dialogue among its members. The council members included the Anglican, Gutnius Lutheran, Baptist Union, Roman Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran, and United Churches, and the Salvation Army, but not Seventh-day Adventists or Pentecostals. In addition, 16 church-affiliated organizations, including the Young Women’s Christian Association, participated in its activities. The council concentrated primarily on cooperation among Christian groups on social welfare projects. There were reports that established churches, either through the Council of Churches or on their own, continued to criticize new missionary movements and new Christian groups, for what established churches perceived as the increasingly important role they play in society.

The U.S. Ambassador met with the minister for religion, youth, and community development on a number of occasions and discussed religious freedom in the country and the equity of funding received by various religious groups from the national government for educational and health services. Other embassy officials also discussed religious freedom with the government. The Ambassador and embassy officers discussed these issues in regular meetings with local religious leaders, as well as U.S. citizen missionaries of many denominations. Embassy officials also met with members of the Muslim community to discuss their ability to practice freely and to review the growth of Islam in the country.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 6.9 million (July 2016). According to the 2002 national census, the most recent survey reporting religious affiliation, 90 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 6 percent evangelical Protestant. Groups that together constitute 4 percent of the population include Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Muslims, Buddhists, Mennonites, the Unification Church, and adherents of indigenous tribal beliefs. Recent surveys by market research agencies indicate the percentage of non-Catholic religious groups, especially evangelical Protestants, has increased significantly since 2002.

Members of the Mennonite Church, estimated between 135,000 and 150,000, are prominent in the remote areas of the central Chaco and some regions of the eastern part of the country. Members of evangelical Protestant churches are numerous in major urban areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides individuals the right to choose, change, and freely practice their religion. The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and specifically recognizes the right of indigenous communities to express their religion freely.

According to the constitution, relations between the state and the Catholic Church are based on “independence, cooperation, and autonomy.” The Catholic Church, however, must comply with all regulations the state imposes on other churches. The law allows political parties based on a specific faith, but the constitution prohibits members of the clergy from running for public office.

The government requires all religious groups to register with the VMW. Among other requirements, religious groups must demonstrate legal status as a nonprofit organization and agree to annual recertification, and religious leaders must submit to financial and criminal background checks. According to the VMW, 487 religious groups are currently registered. There are no penalties or monetary sanctions if religious groups do not register, but registration offers exemption from value added taxes and other government fees.

Religious instruction in public schools is prohibited. The constitution provides private schools the right to offer religious education with the only requirements for staff being merit and ethical integrity. Registration for private religious schools is not mandatory, but the MEC recognizes only degrees granted by registered institutions and only registered schools with nonprofit status may receive subsidies for teachers’ salaries.

The constitution and laws provide for conscientious objection to military service based on religious beliefs.

Foreign missionaries who are members of registered religious groups are eligible for no-cost residency visas from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They must also register with the VMW. Missionaries who choose not to register may enter the country on tourist visas.

The government supports chaplaincy programs in the armed forces, which are open to all religious groups. These programs train clergy to provide services to members of the armed forces deployed either in combat zones or on peacekeeping missions. The government also allows religious groups to operate and provide different types of religious services within prisons for adults, women, and youth; only Christian churches participate in this program, although there are no reports suggesting that the government has limited other groups from participating.

The Anti-Money Laundering National Secretariat (SEPRELAD) requires that all churches register as nonfinancial agents.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On June 28, media outlets reported the VMW refused to register the Catholic Christian Apostolic National Church of Paraguay (ICCAN). Founded in 1815, the church served as the country’s Catholic Church when diplomatic relations with the Vatican were severed after independence in 1811. The church ceased to operate in 1840, but was reestablished in 1992. ICCAN leaders said that even though the church had been legally registered with the Ministry of Interior, it was unable to secure registration from the VMW. ICCAN said that the VMW refused to recognize ICCAN because of pressure from Catholic Church authorities. The VMW said the ICCAN had not obtained certification as a legal entity from the Ministry of Interior.

The VMW reported no complaints of violations of religious freedom during the year.

The MEC continued to pay the salaries of hundreds of teachers in registered private schools operated by religious groups, most of them Catholic. Some non-Catholic religious groups stated the government disproportionately supported Catholic schools and did not pay a commensurate number of teachers in registered, non-Catholic religious schools. The VMW stated the government lacked sufficient funding to pay teacher salaries for all registered, non-Catholic religious schools, and expressed concerns that some registered religious schools were not conforming to the nonprofit nature of their mandates. Some non-Catholic religious groups said the MEC should review its methodology for awarding teacher subsidies.

Observers stated that the Catholic Church maintained an influential role within society and government, often issuing political statements. In the lead-up to the Virgin of Caacupe celebrations on December 8, for example, church leaders gave several sermons that touched on political topics. Bishop of San Juan Bautista de las Misiones Mario Melanio Medina called upon the youth of the country to fight against public corruption and other abuses of government in a highly publicized public sermon on December 3. The Catholic Church also continued to seek to influence public policy, including government positions on human rights in the United Nations and other international forums, and domestic antidiscrimination legislation. Some Protestant groups said there was government favoritism towards the Catholic Church. Many government offices continued to have Catholic shrines or prayer rooms, though there were no reports that the government rejected requests for shrines from other religious groups. The Catholic Virgin of Caacupe holiday was also a government holiday.

The head of the VMW, Vice Minister (VM) of Worship Dr. Herminio Lobos, underscored the importance of a “values‑based” educational agenda not specifically associated with one specific religious group, stating this contributed to freedom of religion. The Inter-Religious Forum, run by religious leaders from various faiths, worked with the VMW on implementing a values-based educational curriculum within the Ministry of Education. VM Lobos stated that the government must enforce constitutional protections and registration of religious groups and missionaries.

Evangelical Protestant groups stated the paperwork required by SEPRELAD to register as a nonfinancial agent was cumbersome for smaller churches lacking the administrative capacity to respond to lengthy data requests.

The VMW reported that 365 missionaries registered during the year, most of them Mormons. Of the total, 208 were foreign nationals.

Labor unions and human rights organizations continued to report favoritism by Mennonite employers in hiring indigenous laborers who had converted to the Mennonite faith over those who had not. Mennonites in remote areas of the Chaco region often remained the predominant source of employment. Graciela Congo, leader of the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores labor union, and human rights activists reported indigenous laborers were not able to file labor discrimination complaints based on religious affiliation because there were few government offices in the Chaco region outside of the major towns, which were difficult for many in the region to access. Additionally, many indigenous citizens did not understand their right to file such discrimination complaints and feared discrimination and retaliation from current or future employers if they filed a complaint. Human rights organizations stated that Mennonite employers did not respect indigenous religious holidays.

The Inter-Religious Forum continued to facilitate dialogue among the various faiths through periodic meetings among religious leaders. Its members met several times throughout the year among themselves and with the MEC. On September 21, several leaders from different religious groups met in the Metropolitan Cathedral to hold a simultaneous prayer in conjunction with the World Day of Prayer for Peace in Assisi, Italy.

Embassy officials met frequently with VM Lobos at the VMW to discuss reported employment discrimination based on religious preference and provision of state funding to the Catholic Church for education. Embassy officials also raised employment discrimination in the Chaco Region and the ICCAN Church. In addition, embassy officials inquired about the VMW’s efforts to remove nonprofit status from churches that broke the law, as well as SEPRALAD’s requirement that churches register as nonfinancial agents.

Embassy officials met with Catholic, evangelical Protestant, Buddhist, and Jewish groups to discuss religious freedom and solicit their opinions about religious discrimination. Embassy officials also met with Muslim leaders in Asuncion and Ciudad del Este, the two largest communities, to hear about their experiences regarding religious freedom. The embassy created a holiday video for social media publication in December that promoted tolerance during the various religious celebrations.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 30.7 million (July 2016 estimate). The most recent national census in 2007 reported the population to be 81 percent Roman Catholic and 13 percent Protestant (mainly evangelical). A 2014 Pew Research Center study estimated 76 percent of the population is Catholic, 17 percent is Protestant, 3 percent follow other faiths, and 4 percent are atheist or agnostic.

Religious groups together constituting less than 3 percent of the population include Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Israelites of the New Universal Pact Baptists, Anglicans, Assemblies of God, Jews, Bahais, Buddhists, International Society of Krishna Consciousness, and Muslims. According to the Israel Information Center for Latin America, 3,000 Jews reside in the country, primarily in Lima, Cusco, and Iquitos. There are approximately 2,000 Muslims in Lima and 600 in the Tacna region. Lima’s Muslim community is approximately half Arab and half local converts. Most Muslims are Sunnis.

Some indigenous peoples in the far eastern Amazonian jungles practice traditional faiths. Many indigenous communities, particularly Catholics in the Andean highlands, practice a syncretic faith blending Christian and pre-Columbian beliefs.

Legal Framework

The constitution bars discrimination based on religious affiliation or belief and provides for freedom of religion, either individually or in association with others. It states every person has the right to privacy of religious conviction. The constitution bars persecution on the basis of ideas or beliefs. It establishes the separation of church and state, but recognizes the Catholic Church’s role as “an important element in the historical, cultural, and moral development” of the country. The government is permitted to work with non-Catholic religious groups.

An agreement with the Holy See gives the Catholic Church preferential treatment in education, taxation, immigration of religious workers, and other areas. The law exempts Catholic Church buildings, houses, and other real estate holdings from property taxes. Other religious groups, depending on the municipal jurisdiction, must pay property taxes on schools and clergy residences. Non-Catholic religious groups may only buy land in commercially zoned areas while the Catholic Church may establish locations in either residential or commercially zoned areas. The law exempts Catholic religious workers from taxes on international travel. All work-related earnings of Catholic priests and bishops are exempt from income taxes. By law, the military may only employ Catholic clergy as chaplains.

Following consultations with religious communities, the government in July adopted revised implementing regulations to the religious freedom law. The regulations continue to provide for optional registration with the Ministry of Justice for religious groups. The government stated that the aim of voluntarily registering was to prevent fraud and facilitate a relationship with the government. New regulations allow all religious groups to apply directly to the National Customs and Tax Administration for tax exemptions and to the Ministry of the Interior’s General Directorate of Immigration and Naturalization for worker or resident visas for foreign religious workers without first having to register with the Ministry of Justice.

If a religious group wishes to register with the Ministry of Justice, the revised implementing regulations require groups to have 500 adult members, replacing the former requirement of 10,000 adult members. The new regulations exempt all “historically established” religious groups from the requirement to submit a membership list. An explanatory statement accompanying the revised regulations contains a list of such groups now considered “historically established,” naming the Orthodox, Lutheran, Methodist, evangelical, and all other Protestant churches, as well as the Jewish and Muslim communities.

The law mandates that all schools, public and private, provide religious education through the primary and secondary levels, “without violating the freedom of conscience of the student, parents, or teachers.” The law only permits the teaching of Catholicism in public schools and the Ministry of Education requires the presiding Catholic bishop of an area to approve the public schools’ religious education teachers. Parents may request the school principal to exempt their children from mandatory religion classes. The government may grant exemptions to secular private schools and non-Catholic religious schools from the religious education requirement. The law states students who seek exemptions from Catholic education classes are not to be disadvantaged academically in both private and public schools.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Religious minority groups and some Catholic Church members continued to criticize the religious freedom law, stating it maintained a preferential status for the Catholic Church and did not address the government’s unequal provision of benefits, specifically the stipends paid to Catholic clergy. They stated, however, that the revised implementing regulations, including the removal of the registration requirements, represented an improvement. As of the end of the year, no religious minority groups had registered with the Ministry of Justice under the revised regulations, as groups continued to weigh whether registering with the government was necessary since registering became voluntary and the majority of religious groups were considered “historically established.”

The executive branch formally interacted with religious communities on matters of religious freedom through the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice implemented laws and interacted with the public through the Office of Catholic Affairs and through the Office of Interfaith Affairs for non-Catholic religious groups.

Some religious leaders stated that larger religious groups were better equipped to maneuver through the country’s bureaucracy to obtain tax benefits. Many smaller religious groups by comparison often lacked the resources to navigate through the requirements and paperwork, and thus did not obtain tax benefits. According to religious leaders, some smaller churches operated informally in unregistered houses, for example, and did not pay any taxes. A religious leader reported some evangelical Protestant churches registered with the government as NGOs to receive tax benefits.

According to the Ministry of Justice’s Office of Catholic Affairs, the government paid stipends to the Catholic cardinal, six archbishops, and other Catholic Church officials, totaling approximately 2.6 million soles ($774,500) annually. Some Catholic clergy and laypersons employed by the Church received remuneration from the government in addition to Church stipends, including 44 active bishops, four auxiliary bishops, and some priests. These individuals represented approximately one-eighth of the Catholic clergy and pastoral agents. In addition, the government provided each Catholic diocese with a monthly institutional subsidy. Similar stipends were not available to other religious groups.

Religious minority group members reported no problems receiving exemptions from attending Catholic religious courses at schools and no academic disadvantage stemming from the exemptions.

Some Protestant soldiers reported difficulty finding and attending non-Catholic religious services because of the absence of non-Catholic chaplains in the military.

Some religious leaders said larger Protestant groups were previously more successful in receiving visas for foreign religious workers because of their greater experience in working with the government. Since the release of the new regulations, however, no religious minority groups reported seeking religious worker visas.

The Movimiento Nacional Socialista Andino del Peru (Andean National Socialist Movement of Peru), a group of fewer than 50 members, continued to engage in Holocaust denial, sell anti-Semitic books and DVDs, and call for the expulsion of the Jewish community. Ministry of Justice officials closely monitored this group and reported no increase in anti-Semitic activity.

Muslim leaders said that when the media reported concerns about terrorism, the public commented negatively about Islam. Muslim and Jewish community members stated public and private schools and employers did not allow their members time off for non-Catholic religious holidays such as Eid al-Fitr and Yom Kippur. Jewish leaders and community members reported some instances of conspiracy theories regarding Jews.

The Inter-Religious Council of Peru, an umbrella group of representatives from a broad spectrum of religious groups, maintained an ongoing dialogue among religious entities. It lobbied for changes to the religious freedom law, changes to its implementing regulations, and equal access to government benefits for all religious groups, and it initiated discussions with religious communities about the effect of the revised religious freedom regulations.

U.S. embassy officials continued to encourage the government to revise religious laws and regulations so that religious minority groups had the same benefits as those available to the Catholic Church. The government included many of the changes advocated by the embassy in the new regulations issued in July. Following the adoption of revised regulations, the embassy discussed with the government how these regulations would be implemented and continued to advocate for further changes to promote religious freedom and the equal treatment of all religious groups.

Embassy officials met with representatives of the Inter-Religious Council, the Catholic Church, Protestant groups, and the Mormon, Jewish, Bahai, and Muslim communities to discuss the state of religious freedom, preferential treatment for the Catholic Church, anti-Semitism, and concerns about the government’s registration requirements.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 102.6 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2010 census conducted by the National Statistics Office, approximately 81 percent of the population is Roman Catholic. Approximately 9 percent belong to other Christian groups, including the following internationally based denominations: the Seventh-day Adventists, United Church of Christ, United Methodists, Episcopal Church in the Philippines, Bible Baptist Church, other Protestant churches, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons); and the following domestically established churches: Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ), Philippine Independent Church (Aglipayan), Members Church of God International, the Kingdom of Jesus Christ, and the Name Above Every Name. Approximately 6 percent of the population is Muslim and the remaining 4 percent did not report a religious affiliation or belong to other groups, such as the various animistic and syncretic religions of some of the Lumad, or indigenous tribes.

A more recent estimate, made in 2012 by the NCMF, indicates that approximately 10-12 percent of the total population is Muslim. Most Muslims are members of various ethnic minority groups. The majority of Muslims reside in Mindanao and nearby islands in the south. Although most are Sunni, a small number of Shia live in the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Zamboanga del Sur on Mindanao. An increasing number of Muslims are migrating to the urban centers of Manila and Cebu.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the free exercise of religious profession and religious worship and prohibits the establishment of a state religion by law. No religious test is required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The constitution provides for the separation of religion and state. The law treats intentional attacks directed against buildings dedicated to religion as war crimes or crimes against international humanitarian law.

The law requires organized religious groups to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to establish tax-exempt status. Religious groups must submit their articles of faith and existing bylaws for SEC registration as religious corporations. The SEC requires existing religious corporations to submit annual financial statements. The law does not specify penalties for failure to register with the SEC. To be registered as a nonstock, nonprofit organization, religious groups must meet the basic requirements for corporate registration with the BIR and must request tax exemption from the BIR. The basic requirements for registration include a name verification of the religious corporation, articles of incorporation and bylaws, the name of a director, list of members, and a list of financial contributors. The BIR provides tax exemptions to newly established religious corporations that are then reviewed for renewal every three years. Established religious corporations may be fined for late filing of registrations with the BIR or failing to submit of registration datasheets and financial statements. There is no nontax penalty for failing to register, and some groups do not register.

The government permits religious instruction in public schools with written parental consent, provided there is no cost to the government. Based on a traditional policy of promoting moral education, local public schools give religious groups the opportunity to teach moral values during school hours. Attendance is not mandatory, parents must express in writing a desire for their child to attend religious instruction for a specific denomination, and the various groups share classroom space. Students who do not attend religious instruction, whether because no class was offered in their denomination or because their parents did not express a desire, receive normal supervised class time. The government also allows groups to distribute religious literature in public schools. In July congress passed a new law mandating that government agencies address religious issues and consult recognized experts on Filipino Muslims’ and the history, culture, and identity of indigenous peoples in the formulation of the curriculum on Filipino history.

By law, public schools must ensure the religious rights of students are protected. Muslim girls may wear the hijab and are not required to wear shorts during physical education classes.

The government recognizes sharia in all parts of the country through a presidential decree. Sharia courts are organized into five sharia districts all located in the south of the country; Muslims residing in other areas must travel to these districts to pursue an action in a sharia court. Sharia courts only handle cases relating to personal laws on family relations and property. Sharia does not apply in criminal matters and applies only to Muslims. The state court system hears cases involving Muslims and non-Muslims, and national laws apply in those cases.