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Brazil

Executive Summary

Brazil is the second largest economy in the Western Hemisphere behind the United States, and the eighth largest economy in the world, according to the World Bank.  The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) named Brazil the fourth largest destination for global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows in 2017.  In recent years, Brazil received more than half of South America’s total incoming FDI, and the United States is a major foreign investor in Brazil. The Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) reported the United States had the largest single-country stock of FDI by final ownership, representing 22 percent of all FDI in Brazil (USD 118.7 billion) in 2017, the latest year with available data.  The Government of Brazil (GoB) prioritized attracting private investment in infrastructure during 2017 and 2018.

The current economic recovery, which started in the first quarter of 2017, ended the deepest and longest recession in Brazil’s modern history.  The country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) expanded by 1.1 percent in 2018, below most initial market analysts’ projections of 3 percent growth in 2018.  Analysts forecast a 2 percent growth rate for 2019. The unemployment rate reached 11.6 percent at the end of 2018. Brazil was the world’s fourth largest destination for FDI in 2017, with inflows of USD 62.7 billion, according to UNCTAD.  The nominal budget deficit stood at 7.1 percent of GDP (USD132.5 billion) in 2018 and is projected to end 2019 at around 6.5 percent of GDP (USD 148.5 billion). Brazil’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached 76.7 percent in 2018 with projections to reach 83 percent by the end of 2019.  The BCB has maintained its target for the benchmark Selic interest rate at 6.5 percent since March 2018 (from a high of 13.75 percent at the end of 2016).

President Bolsonaro took office on January 1, 2019, following the interim presidency by President Michel Temer, who had assumed office after the impeachment of former President Dilma Rousseff in August 2016.  Temer’s administration pursued corrective macroeconomic policies to stabilize the economy, such as a landmark federal spending cap in December 2016 and a package of labor market reforms in 2017. President Bolsonaro’s economic team pledged to continue pushing reforms needed to help control costs of Brazil’s pension system, and has made that issue its top economic priority.  Further reforms are also planned to simplify Brazil’s complex tax system. In addition to current economic difficulties, since 2014, Brazil’s anti-corruption oversight bodies have been investigating allegations of widespread corruption that have moved beyond state-owned energy firm Petrobras and a number of private construction companies to include companies in other economic sectors.  

Brazil’s official investment promotion strategy prioritizes the automobile manufacturing, renewable energy, life sciences, oil and gas, and infrastructure sectors.  Foreign investors in Brazil receive the same legal treatment as local investors in most economic sectors; however, there are restrictions in the health, mass media, telecommunications, aerospace, rural property, maritime, and air transport sectors.  The Brazilian Congress is considering legislation to liberalize restrictions on foreign ownership of rural property and air carriers.

Analysts contend that high transportation and labor costs, low domestic productivity, and ongoing political uncertainties hamper investment in Brazil.  Foreign investors also cite concerns over poor existing infrastructure, still relatively rigid labor laws, and complex tax, local content, and regulatory requirements; all part of the extra costs of doing business in Brazil.  

 

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings

Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2019 109 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings
Global Innovation Index 2018 64 of 126 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical-cost basis) 2017 $68,272 http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2017 $8,600 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

Brazil was the world’s fourth largest destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2017, with inflows of USD 62.7 billion, according to UNCTAD.  The GoB actively encourages FDI – particularly in the automobile, renewable energy, life sciences, oil and gas, and transportation infrastructure sectors – to introduce greater innovation into Brazil’s economy and to generate economic growth.  GoB investment incentives include tax exemptions and low-cost financing with no distinction made between domestic and foreign investors. Foreign investment is restricted in the health, mass media, telecommunications, aerospace, rural property, maritime, insurance, and air transport sectors.  

The Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX) plays a leading role in attracting FDI to Brazil by working to identify business opportunities, promoting strategic events, and lending support to foreign investors willing to allocate resources to Brazil.  APEX is not a one-stop-shop for foreign investors, but the agency can assist in all steps of the investor’s decision-making process, to include identifying and contacting potential industry segments, sector and market analyses, and general guidelines on legal and fiscal issues.  Their services are free of charge. The website for APEX is: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/en  .

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

A 1995 constitutional amendment (EC 6/1995) eliminated distinctions between foreign and local capital, ending favorable treatment (e.g. tax incentives, preference for winning bids) for companies using only local capital.  However, constitutional law restricts foreign investment in the healthcare (Law 13097/2015), mass media (Law 10610/2002), telecommunications (Law 12485/2011), aerospace (Law 7565/1986 a, Decree 6834/2009, updated by Law 12970/2014, Law 13133/2015, and Law 13319/2016), rural property (Law 5709/1971), maritime (Law 9432/1997, Decree 2256/1997), insurance (Law 11371/2006), and air transport sectors (Law 13319/2016).  

Screening of FDI

Foreigners investing in Brazil must electronically register their investment with the BCB within 30 days of the inflow of resources to Brazil.  In cases of investments involving royalties and technology transfer, investors must register with Brazil’s patent office, the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI).  Investors must also have a local representative in Brazil. Portfolio investors must have a Brazilian financial administrator and register with the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission (CVM).  

To enter Brazil’s insurance and reinsurance market, U.S. companies must establish a subsidiary, enter into a joint venture, acquire a local firm, or enter into a partnership with a local company.  The BCB reviews banking license applications on a case-by-case basis. Foreign interests own or control 20 of the top 50 banks in Brazil. Santander is the only major wholly foreign-owned retail bank remaining in Brazil.  Brazil’s anti-trust authorities (CADE) approved Itau bank’s purchase of Citibank’s Brazilian retail banking operation in August 2017. In June 2016, CADE approved Bradesco bank’s purchase of HSBC’s Brazilian retail banking operation.  

Currently, foreign ownership of airlines is limited to 20 percent.  Congressman Carlos Cadoca (PCdoB-PE) presented a bill to Brazilian Congress in August of 2015 to allow for 100 percent foreign ownership of Brazilian airlines (PL 2724/2015).  The bill was approved by the lower house, and since March 2019, it is pending a Senate vote. In 2011, the United States and Brazil signed an Air Transport Agreement as a step towards an Open Skies relationship that would eliminate numerical limits on passenger and cargo flights between the two countries.  Brazil’s lower house approved the agreement in December 2017, and the Senate ratified it in March 2018. The Open Skies agreement has now entered into force.

In July 2015, under National Council on Private Insurance (CNSP) Resolution 325, the Brazilian government announced a significant relaxation of some restrictions on foreign insurers’ participation in the Brazilian market, and in December 2017, the government eliminated restrictions on risk transfer operations involving companies under the same financial group.  The new rules revoked the requirement to purchase a minimum percentage of reinsurance and eliminated a limitation or threshold for intra-group cession of reinsurance to companies headquartered abroad that are part of the same economic group. Rules on preferential offers to local reinsurers, which are set to decrease in increments from 40 percent in 2016 to 15 percent in 2020, remain unchanged.  Foreign reinsurance firms must have a representation office in Brazil to qualify as an admitted reinsurer. Insurance and reinsurance companies must maintain an active registration with Brazil’s insurance regulator, the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP) and maintaining a minimum solvency classification issued by a risk classification agency equal to Standard & Poor’s or Fitch ratings of at least BBB-.

In September 2011, Law 12485/2011 removed a 49 percent limit on foreign ownership of cable TV companies, and allowed telecom companies to offer television packages with their service.  Content quotas require every channel to air at least three and a half hours per week of Brazilian programming during primetime. Additionally, one-third of all channels included in any TV package have to be Brazilian.  

The National Land Reform and Settlement Institute administers the purchase and lease of Brazilian agricultural land by foreigners.  Under the applicable rules, the area of agricultural land bought or leased by foreigners cannot account for more than 25 percent of the overall land area in a given municipal district.  Additionally, no more than 10 percent of agricultural land in any given municipal district may be owned or leased by foreign nationals from the same country. The law also states that prior consent is needed for purchase of land in areas considered indispensable to national security and for land along the border.  The rules also make it necessary to obtain congressional approval before large plots of agricultural land can be purchased by foreign nationals, foreign companies, or Brazilian companies with majority foreign shareholding. Draft Law 4059/2012, which would lift the limits on foreign ownership of agricultural land,

has been awaiting a vote in the Brazilian Congress since 2015.

Brazil is not a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), but became an observer in October 2017.  By statute, a Brazilian state enterprise may subcontract services to a foreign firm only if domestic expertise is unavailable. Additionally, U.S. and other foreign firms may only bid to provide technical services when there are no qualified Brazilian firms.  U.S. companies need to enter into partnerships with local firms or have operations in Brazil in order to be eligible for “margins of preference” offered to domestic firms to participate in Brazil’s public sector procurement to help these firms win government tenders.  Foreign companies are often successful in obtaining subcontracting opportunities with large Brazilian firms that win government contracts. Under trade bloc Mercosul’s Government Procurement Protocol, member nations Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay are entitled to non-discriminatory treatment of government-procured goods, services, and public works originating from each other’s suppliers and providers.  However, only Argentina has ratified the protocol, and per the Brazilian Ministry of Economy website, this protocol has been in revision since 2010, so it has not yet entered into force.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 2018 Brazil Economic Survey of Brazil highlights Brazil as a leading global economy.  However, it notes that high commodity prices and labor force growth will no longer be able to sustain Brazil’s economic growth without deep structural reforms.  While praising the Temer government for its reform plans, the OECD urged Brazil to pass all needed reforms to realize their full benefit. The OECD cautions about low investment rates in Brazil, and cites a World Economic Forum survey that ranks Brazil 116 out of 138 countries on infrastructure as an area in which Brazil must improve to maintain competitiveness.  

The OECD’s March 15, 2019 Enlarged Investment Committee Report BRAZIL: Position Under the OECD Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and of Current Invisible Operations noted several areas in which Brazil needs to improve.  These observations include, but are not limited to: restrictions to FDI requiring investors to incorporate or acquire residency in order to invest; lack of generalized screening or approval mechanisms for new investments in Brazil; sectoral restrictions on foreign ownership in media, private security and surveillance, air transport, mining, telecommunication services; and, restrictions for non-residents to own Brazilian flag vessels.  The report did highlight several areas of improvement and the GoB’s pledge to ameliorate several ongoing irritants as well.

The IMF’s 2018 Country Report No. 18/253 on Brazil highlights that a mild recovery supported by accommodative monetary and fiscal policies is currently underway.  But the economy is underperforming relative to its potential, public debt is high and increasing, and, more importantly, medium-term growth prospects remain uninspiring, absent further reforms.  The IMF advises that against the backdrop of tightening global financial conditions, placing Brazil on a path of strong, balanced, and durable growth requires a committed pursuit of fiscal consolidation, ambitious structural reforms, and a strengthening of the financial sector architecture.  The WTO’s 2017 Trade Policy Review of Brazil notes the country’s open stance towards foreign investment, but also points to the many sector-specific limitations (see above). All three reports highlight the uncertainty regarding reform plans as the most significant political risk to the economy.  These reports are located at the following links:

http://www.oecd.org/brazil/economic-survey-brazil.htm  ,

https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Code-capital-movements-EN.pdf ,

https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr17216.ashx  , and https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp458_e.htm  .

Business Facilitation

A company must register with the National Revenue Service (Receita) to obtain a business license and be placed on the National Registry of Legal Entities (CNPJ).  Brazil’s Export Promotion and Investment Agency (APEX) has a mandate to facilitate foreign investment. The agency’s services are available to all investors, foreign and domestic.  Foreign companies interested in investing in Brazil have access to many benefits and tax incentives granted by the Brazilian government at the municipal, state, and federal levels. Most incentives target specific sectors, amounts invested, and job generation.  Brazil’s business registration website can be found at http://receita.economia.gov.br/orientacao/tributaria/cadastros/cadastro-nacional-de-pessoas-juridicas-cnpj  .  

Outward Investment

Brazil does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad, and APEX-Brasil supports Brazilian companies’ efforts to invest abroad under its “internationalization program”: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/como-a-apex-brasil-pode-ajudar-na-internacionalizacao-de-sua-empresa  .  Apex-Brasil frequently highlights the United States as an excellent destination for outbound investment.  Apex-Brasil and SelectUSA (the U.S. government’s investment promotion office at the U.S. Department of Commerce) signed a memorandum of cooperation to promote bilateral investment in February 2014.

2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties

Brazil does not have a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States.  In the 1990s, Brazil signed BITs with Belgium, Luxembourg, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela.  The Brazilian Congress has not ratified any of these agreements. In 2002, the Executive branch withdrew the agreements from Congress after determining that treaty provisions on international Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) were unconstitutional.  

In 2015, Brazil developed a state-to-state Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (CFIA) which, unlike traditional BITs, does not provide for an ISDS mechanism.  CFIAs instead outline progressive steps for the settlement of “issue[s] of interest to an investor,” including: 1) an ombudsmen and a Joint Committee appointed by the two governments will act as mediators to amicably settle any dispute; 2) if amicable settlement fails, either of the two governments may bring the dispute to the attention of the Joint Committee; 3) if the dispute is not settled within the Joint Committee, the two governments may resort to interstate arbitration mechanisms.”  The GOB has signed several CFIAs since 2015 with: Mozambique (April 2015), Angola (May 2015), Mexico (May 2015), Malawi (October 2015), Colombia (October 2015), Peru (October 2015), Chile (November 2015), Iran (November 2016), Azerbaijan (December 2016), Armenia (November 2017), Ethiopia (April 2018), Suriname (May 2018), Guyana (December 2018), and the United Arab Emirates (March 2019). The following CFIAs are in force: Mexico, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Peru. A few CFIAs have received Congressional ratification in Brazil and are pending ratification by the other country: Mozambique, Malawi, and Colombia (https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/ ).  Brazil also negotiated an intra-Mercosul protocol similar to the CFIA in April 2017, which was ratified on December 21, 2018.  (See sections on responsible business conduct and dispute settlement.)

Brazil does not have a double taxation treaty with the United States, but it does have such treaties with 34 other countries, including: Japan, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Spain, Portugal, and Argentina.  Brazil signed a Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) with the United States in March 2007, which entered into force on May 15, 2013. In September 2014, Brazil and the United States signed an intergovernmental agreement to improve international tax compliance and to implement the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).  This agreement went into effect in August 2015.

3. Legal Regime

Transparency of the Regulatory System

In the 2019 World Bank Doing Business report, Brazil ranked 109th out of 190 countries in terms of overall ease of doing business in 2018, an improvement of 16 positions compared to the 2018 report.  According to the World Bank, it takes approximately 20.5 days to start a business in Brazil. Brazil is seeking to streamline the process and decrease the amount to time it takes to open a small or medium enterprise (SME) to five days through its RedeSimples Program.  Similarly, the government has reduced regulatory compliance burdens for SMEs through the continued use of the SIMPLES program, which simplifies the collection of up to eight federal, state, and municipal-level taxes into one single payment.  

The 2019 World Bank study noted that the annual administrative burden for a medium-size business to comply with Brazilian tax codes is an average of 1,958 hours versus 160.7 hours in OECD high-income economies.  The total tax rate for a medium-sized business in Rio de Janeiro is 69 percent of profits, compared to the average of 40.1 percent in the OECD high-income economies. Business managers often complain of not being able to understand complex, and sometimes contradictory, tax regulations, despite their housing large local tax and accounting departments in their companies.  

Tax regulations, while burdensome and numerous, do not generally differentiate between foreign and domestic firms.  However, some investors complain that in certain instances the value-added tax collected by individual states (ICMS) favors locally-based companies that export their goods.  Exporters in many states report difficulty receiving their ICMS rebates when their goods are exported. Taxes on commercial and financial transactions are particularly burdensome, and businesses complain that these taxes hinder the international competitiveness of Brazilian-made products.  

Of Brazil’s ten federal regulatory agencies, the most prominent include:

  • ANVISA, the Brazilian counterpart to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, which has regulatory authority over the production and marketing of food, drugs, and medical devices;
  • ANATEL, the country’s telecommunications agency, which handles telecommunications, and licensing and assigning of radio spectrum bandwidth;
  • ANP, the National Petroleum Agency, which regulates oil and gas contracts and oversees auctions for oil and natural gas exploration and production, including for offshore pre-salt oil and natural gas;
  • ANAC, Brazil’s civil aviation agency;
  • IBAMA, Brazil’s environmental licensing and enforcement agency; and
  • ANEEL, Brazil’s electric energy regulator that regulates Brazil’s power electricity sector and oversees auctions for electricity transmission, generation, and distribution contracts.

In addition to these federal regulatory agencies, Brazil has at least 27 state-level regulatory agencies and 17 municipal-level regulatory agencies.  

The Office of the Presidency’s Program for the Strengthening of Institutional Capacity for Management in Regulation (PRO-REG) has introduced a broad program for improving Brazil’s regulatory framework.  PRO-REG and the U.S. White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) are collaborating to exchange best practices in developing high quality regulations that mandate the least burdensome approach to address policy implementation.  

Regulatory agencies complete Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) on a voluntary basis.  The Senate has approved a bill on Governance and Accountability for Federal Regulatory Agencies (PLS 52/2013 in the Senate, and PL 6621/2016 in the Chamber) that is pending Senate Transparency and Governance Committee approval after the Lower House proposed changes to the text in December 2018.  Among other provisions, the bill would make RIAs mandatory for regulations that affect “the general interest.” PRO-REG is drafting enabling legislation to implement this provision. While the legislation is pending, PRO-REG has been working with regulators to voluntarily make RIAs part of their internal procedures, with some success.  

The Chamber of Deputies, Federal Senate, and the Office of the Presidency maintain websites providing public access to both approved and proposed federal legislation.  Brazil is seeking to improve its public comment and stakeholder input process. In 2004, the GoB instituted a Transparency Portal, a website with data on funds transferred to and from the federal, state and city governments, as well as to and from foreign countries.  It also includes information on civil servant salaries.

In 2018, the Department of State found Brazil to have met its minimum fiscal transparency requirements in its annual Fiscal Transparency Report.  The Open Budget Index ranked Brazil on par with the United States in terms of budget transparency in its most recent (2017) index. The Brazilian government demonstrates adequate fiscal transparency in managing its federal accounts, although there is room for improvement in terms of completeness of federal budget documentation.  Brazil’s budget documents are publically available, widely accessible, and sufficiently detailed. They provide a relatively full picture of the GoB’s planned expenditures and revenue streams. The information in publicly available budget documents is considered credible and reasonably accurate.

International Regulatory Considerations

Brazil is a member of Mercosul – a South American trade bloc whose full members include Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay – and routinely implements Mercosul common regulations, but still adheres to Brazilian regulations.

Brazil is a member of the WTO, and the government regularly notifies draft technical regulations, such as agricultural potential barriers, to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).  

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Brazil has a civil legal system structured around courts at the state and federal level.  Investors can seek to enforce contracts through the court system or via mediation, although both processes can be lengthy.  The Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (STJ) must accept foreign contract enforcement judgments for the judgments to be considered valid in Brazil.  Among other considerations, the foreign judgement must not contradict any prior decisions by a Brazilian court in the same dispute. The Brazilian Civil Code, enacted in 2002, regulates commercial disputes, although commercial cases involving maritime law follow an older, largely superseded Commercial Code.  Federal judges hear most disputes in which one of the parties is the Brazilian State, and also rule on lawsuits between a foreign state or international organization and a municipality or a person residing in Brazil.

The judicial system is generally independent.  The Supreme Federal Court (STF), charged with constitutional cases, frequently rules on politically sensitive issues.  State court judges and federal level judges below the STF are career officials selected through a meritocratic examination process.  The judicial system is backlogged, however, and disputes or trials of any sort frequently require years to arrive at a final resolution, including all available appeals.  Regulations and enforcement actions can be litigated in the court system, which contains mechanisms for appeal depending upon the level at which the case is filed. The STF is the ultimate court of appeal on constitutional grounds; the STJ is the ultimate court of appeal for cases not involving constitutional issues.  

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

Foreigners investing in Brazil must electronically register their investment with the BCB within 30 days of the inflow of resources to Brazil.  Investors must register investments involving royalties and technology transfer with Brazil’s patent office, the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI).  Investors must also have a local representative in Brazil. Portfolio investors must have a Brazilian financial administrator and register with the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission (CVM).  

Brazil does not offer a “one-stop-shop” for international investors.  There have been plans to do so for several years, but nothing has been officially created to facilitate foreign investment in Brazil.  The BCB website offers some useful information, but is not a catchall for those seeking guidance on necessary procedures and requirements.  The BCB’s website in English is: https://www.bcb.gov.br/en#!/home .

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), which falls under the purview of the Ministry of Justice, is responsible for enforcing competition laws, consumer protection, and carrying out regulatory reviews of mergers and acquisitions.  Law 12529 from 2011 established CADE in an effort to modernize Brazil’s antitrust review process and to combine the antitrust functions of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance into CADE. The law brought Brazil in line with U.S. and European merger review practices and allows CADE to perform pre-merger reviews, in contrast to the prior legal regime that had the government review mergers after the fact.  In October 2012, CADE performed Brazil’s first pre-merger review.

In 2018, CADE conducted 74 formal investigations of cases that allegedly challenged the promotion of the free market.  It also approved 390 merger and/or acquisition requests and rejected an additional 14 requests.

Expropriation and Compensation

Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution assures property rights of both Brazilians and foreigners that live in Brazil.  The Constitution does not address nationalization or expropriation. Decree-Law 3365 allows the government to exercise eminent domain under certain criteria that include, but are not limited to, national security, public transportation, safety, health, and urbanization projects.  In cases of eminent domain, the government compensates owners in cash.

There are no signs that the current federal government is contemplating expropriation actions in Brazil against foreign interests.  Brazilian courts have decided some claims regarding state-level land expropriations in U.S. citizens’ favor. However, as states have filed appeals to these decisions, the compensation process can be lengthy and have uncertain outcomes.  

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

In 2002, Brazil ratified the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards.  Brazil is not a member of the World Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  Brazil joined the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 2010, and its membership will expire in 2022.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Article 34 of the 1996 Brazilian Arbitration Act (Law 9307) defines a foreign arbitration judgment as any judgment rendered outside the national territory.  The law established that the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) must ratify foreign arbitration awards. Law 9307, updated by Law 13129/2015, also stipulates that a foreign arbitration award will be recognized or executed in Brazil in conformity with the international agreements ratified by the country and, in their absence, with domestic law.  A 2001 Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (STF) ruling established that the 1996 Brazilian Arbitration Act, permitting international arbitration subject to STJ Court ratification of arbitration decisions, does not violate the Federal Constitution’s provision that “the law shall not exclude any injury or threat to a right from the consideration of the Judicial Power.”

Contract disputes in Brazil can be lengthy and complex.  Brazil has both a federal and a state court system, and jurisprudence is based on civil code and contract law.  Federal judges hear most disputes in which one of the parties is the State, and rule on lawsuits between a foreign State or international organization and a municipality or a person residing in Brazil.  Five regional federal courts hear appeals of federal judges’ decisions. The 2019 World Bank Doing Business report found that on average it takes 12.5 procedures and 731 days to litigate a breach of contract.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Brazil ratified the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention) and the 1979 Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitration Awards (Montevideo Convention).  Law 9307/1996 provides advanced legislation on arbitration, and provides guidance on governing principles and rights of participating parties. Brazil developed a new Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (CFIA) model in 2015 (https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/ ), but it does not include ISDS mechanisms.  (See sections on bilateral investment agreements and responsible business conduct.)

Bankruptcy Regulations

Brazil’s commercial code governs most aspects of commercial association, while the civil code governs professional services corporations.  In 2005, bankruptcy legislation (Law 11101) went into effect creating a system modeled on Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code. Critics of Law 11101 argue it grants equity holders too much power in the restructuring process to detriment of debtholders.  Brazil is drafting an update to the bankruptcy law aimed at increasing creditor rights, but it has not yet been presented in Congress. The World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Report ranks Brazil 77th out of 190 countries for ease of “resolving insolvency.”

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives

The GoB extends tax benefits for investments in less developed parts of the country, including the Northeast and the Amazon regions, with equal application to foreign and domestic investors.  These incentives were successful in attracting major foreign plants to areas like the Manaus Free Trade Zone in Amazonas State, but most foreign investment remains concentrated in the more industrialized southern states in Brazil.  

Individual states seek to attract private investment by offering tax benefits and infrastructure support to companies, negotiated on a case-by-case basis.  Competition among states to attract employment-generating investment leads some states to challenge such tax benefits as beggar-thy-neighbor fiscal competition.  

While local private sector banks are beginning to offer longer credit terms, the state-owned Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) is the traditional Brazilian source of long-term credit as well as export credits.  BNDES provides foreign- and domestically-owned companies operating in Brazil financing for the manufacturing and marketing of capital goods and primary infrastructure projects. BNDES provides much of its financing at subsidized interest rates.  As part of its package of fiscal tightening, in December 2014, the GoB announced its intention to scale back the expansionary activities of BNDES and ended direct Treasury support to the bank. Law 13483, from September 2017, created a new Long-Term Lending Rate (TLP) for BNDES, which will be phased-in to replace the prior subsidized loans starting on January 1, 2018.  After a five-year phase in period, the TLP will float with the market and reflect a premium over Brazil’s five-year bond yield (a rate that incorporates inflation). The GoB plans to reduce BNDES’s role further as it continues to promote the development of long-term private capital markets.

In January 2015, the GoB eliminated the industrial products tax (IPI) exemptions on vehicles, while keeping all other tax incentives provided by the October 2012 Inovar-Auto program.  Through Inovar-Auto, auto manufacturers were able to apply for tax credits based on their ability to meet certain criteria promoting research and development and local content. Following successful WTO challenges against the trade-restrictive impacts of some of its tax benefits, the government allowed Inovar-Auto program to expire on December 31, 2017.  Although the government has announced a new package of investment incentives for the auto sector, Rota 2030, it remains at the proposal stage, with no scheduled date for a vote or implementation.

On February 27, 2015, Decree 8415 reduced tax incentives for exports, known as the Special Regime for the Reinstatement of Taxes for Exporters, or Reintegra Program.  Decree 8415 reduced the previous three percent subsidy on the value of the exports to one percent for 2015, to 0.1 percent for 2016, and two percent for 2017 and 2018.

Brazil provides tax reductions and exemptions on many domestically-produced information and communication technology (ICT) and digital goods that qualify for status under the Basic Production Process (PPB).  The PPB is product-specific and stipulates which stages of the manufacturing process must be carried out in Brazil in order for an ICT product to be considered produced in Brazil. The major fiscal benefits of the National Broadband Plan (PNBL) and supporting implementation plan (REPNBL-Redes) have either expired or been revoked.  In 2017, Brazil held a public consultation on a National Connectivity Plan to replace the PNBL, but has not yet published a final version.

Under Law 12598/2013, Brazil offers tax incentives ranging from 13 percent to 18 percent to officially classified “Strategic Defense Firms” (must have Brazilian control of voting shares) as well as to “Defense Firms” (can be foreign-owned) that produce identified strategic defense goods.  The tax incentives for strategic firms can apply to their entire supply chain, including foreign suppliers. The law is currently undergoing a revision, expected to be complete in 2018.

Industrial Promotion

The InovAtiva Brasil and Startup Brasil programs support start-ups in the country.  The GoB also uses free trade zones to incentivize industrial production. A complete description of the scope and scale of Brazil’s investment promotion programs and regimes can be found at: http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/en/home  .  

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

The federal government grants tax benefits to certain free trade zones.  Most of these free trade zones aim to attract investment to the country’s relatively underdeveloped North and Northeast regions.  The most prominent of these is the Manaus Free Trade Zone, in Amazonas State, which has attracted significant foreign investment, including from U.S. companies.  Constitutional amendment 83/2014 came into force in August 2014 and extended the status of Manaus Free Trade Zone until the year 2073.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Government Procurement Preferences:  The GoB maintains a variety of localization barriers to trade in response to the weak competitiveness of its domestic tech industry.

  1. Tax incentives for locally sourced information and communication technology (ICT) goods and equipment (Basic Production Process (PPB), Law 8248/91, and Portaria 87/2013);
  2. Government procurement preferences for local ICT hardware and software (2014 Decrees 8184, 8185, 8186, 8194, and 2013 Decree 7903); and the CERTICS Decree (8186), which aims to certify that software programs are the result of development and technological innovation in Brazil.

Presidential Decree 8135/2013 (Decree 8135) regulated the use of IT services provided to the Federal government by privately and state-owned companies, including the provision that Federal IT communications be hosted by Federal IT agencies. In 2015, the Ministry of Planning developed regulations to implement Decree 8135, which included the requirement to disclose source code if requested.  On December 26, 2018, President Michel Temer approved and signed the Decree 9.637/2018, which revoked Decree 8.135/2013 and eliminated the source code disclosure requirements.

The Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) mandated the localization of all government data stored on the cloud during a review of cloud computing services contracted by the Brazilian government in Ordinance No. 9 (previously NC 14), this was made official in March 2018.  While it does provide for the use of cloud computing for non-classified information, it imposes a data localization requirement on all use of cloud computing by the Brazil government.

Investors in certain sectors in Brazil must adhere to the country’s regulated prices, which fall into one of two groups: those regulated at the federal level by a federal company or agency, and those set by sub-national governments (states or municipalities).  Regulated prices managed at the federal level include telephone services, certain refined oil and gas products (such as bottled cooking gas), electricity, and healthcare plans. Regulated prices controlled by sub-national governments include water and sewage fees, vehicle registration fees, and most fees for public transportation, such as local bus and rail services.  As part of its fiscal adjustment strategy, Brazil sharply increased regulated prices in January 2015.

For firms employing three or more persons, Brazilian nationals must constitute at least two-thirds of all employees and receive at least two-thirds of total payroll, according to Brazilian Labor Law Articles 352 to 354.  This calculation excludes foreign specialists in fields where Brazilians are unavailable.

Decree 7174 from 2010, which regulates the procurement of information technology goods and services, requires federal agencies and parastatal entities to give preferential treatment to domestically produced computer products and goods or services with technology developed in Brazil based on a complicated price/technology matrix.  

Brazil’s Marco Civil, an Internet law that determines user rights and company responsibilities, states that data collected or processed in Brazil must respect Brazilian law, even if the data is subsequently stored outside the country.  Penalties for non-compliance could include fines of up to 10 percent of gross Brazilian revenues and/or suspension or prohibition of related operations. Under the law, Internet connection and application providers must retain access logs for specified periods or face sanctions.  While the Marco Civil does not require data to be stored in Brazil, any company investing in Brazil should closely track its provisions – as well provisions of other legislation and regulations, including a data privacy bill passed in August 2018 and cloud computing regulations.

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property

Brazil has a system in place for mortgage registration, but implementation is uneven and there is no standardized contract.  Foreign individuals or foreign-owned companies can purchase real property in Brazil. Foreign buyers frequently arrange alternative financing in their own countries, where rates may be more attractive.  Law 9514 from 1997 helped spur the mortgage industry by establishing a legal framework for a secondary market in mortgages and streamlining the foreclosure process, but the mortgage market in Brazil is still underdeveloped, and foreigners may have difficulty obtaining mortgage financing.  Large U.S. real estate firms, nonetheless, are expanding their portfolios in Brazil.

Intellectual Property Rights

The last year brought increased attention to IP in Brazil, but rights holders still face significant challenges.  Brazil’s National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) streamlined procedures for review processes to increase examiner productivity for patent and trademark decisions.  Nevertheless, the wait period for a patent remains nine years and the market is flooded with counterfeits. Brazil’s IP enforcement regime is constrained by limited resources.  Brazil has remained on the “Watch List” of the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 report since 2007. For more information, please see: https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/intellectual-property/Special-301 .

Brazil has no physical markets listed on USTR’s 2017 Review of Notorious Markets, though the report does acknowledge a file sharing site popular among Brazilians that is known for pirated digital media.  For more information, please see: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2017 percent20Notorious percent20Markets percent20List percent201.11.18.pdf .

For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)’s country profiles: http://www.wipo.int/directory/en 

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) embarked in October 2016 on a sustained monetary easing cycle, lowering the Special Settlement and Custody System (Selic) baseline reference rate from a high of 14 percent in October 2016 to 6.5 percent in December 2018.  Inflation for 2018 was 3.67 percent, within the 1.5 percent plus/minus of the 4 percent target. In June 2018, the National Monetary Council (CMN) set the BCB’s inflation target to 4.25 percent in 2019, 4.5 percent in 2020, and 3.75 percent for 2021. Because of a heavy public debt burden and other structural factors, most analysts expect the “neutral policy rate will remain higher than target rates in Brazil’s emerging-market peers (around five percent) over the forecast period.  

After a boom in 2004-2012 that more than doubled the lending/GDP ratio (to 55 percent of GDP), the recession and higher interest rates significantly decreased lending.  In fact, the lending/GDP ratio remained below 55 percent at year-end 2017. Financial analysts contend that credit will pick up again in the medium term, owing to interest rate easing and economic recovery.  

The role of the state in credit markets grew steadily beginning in 2008, with public banks now accounting for over 55 percent of total loans to the private sector (up from 35 percent).  Directed lending (that is, to meet mandated sectoral targets) also rose and accounts for almost half of total lending. Brazil is paring back public bank lending and trying to expand a market for long-term private capital.  

While local private sector banks are beginning to offer longer credit terms, state-owned development bank BNDES is a traditional Brazilian source of long-term credit.  BNDES also offers export financing. Approvals of new financing by BNDES increased 27 percent year-over-year, with the infrastructure sector receiving the majority of new capital.

The Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA) is the sole stock market in Brazil, while trading of public securities takes place at the Rio de Janeiro market.  In 2008, the Brazilian Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&F) merged with the BOVESPA to form what is now the fourth largest exchange in the Western Hemisphere, after the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Canadian TSX Group exchanges.  As of April 2019, there were 430 companies traded on the BM&F/BOVESPA. The BOVESPA index increased 15.03 percent in valuation during 2018. Foreign investors, both institutions and individuals, can directly invest in equities, securities, and derivatives.  Foreign investors are limited to trading derivatives and stocks of publicly held companies on established markets.

Wholly owned subsidiaries of multinational accounting firms, including the major U.S. firms, are present in Brazil.  Auditors are personally liable for the accuracy of accounting statements prepared for banks.

Money and Banking System

The Brazilian financial sector is large and sophisticated.  Banks lend at market rates that remain relatively high compared to other emerging economies.  Reasons cited by industry observers include high taxation, repayment risk, and concern over inconsistent judicial enforcement of contracts, high mandatory reserve requirements, and administrative overhead, as well as persistently high real (net of inflation) interest rates.  According to BCB data collected from 2011 through the first quarter of 2019, the average rate offered by Brazilian banks was 9.22 percent, with an average monthly high of 11.34 percent in July 2016, and an average monthly rate of 7.7 percent for March 2019.

The financial sector is concentrated, with BCB data indicating that the four largest commercial banks (excluding brokerages) account for approximately 70 percent of the commercial banking sector assets, totaling USD 1.59 trillion as of Q1, 2019.  Three of the five largest banks (by assets) in the country – Banco do Brasil, Caixa Economica Federal, and BNDES – are partially or completely federally owned. Large private banking institutions focus their lending on Brazil’s largest firms, while small- and medium-sized banks primarily serve small- and medium-sized companies.  Citibank sold its consumer business to Itau Bank in 2016, but maintains its commercial banking interests in Brazil. It is currently the sole U.S. bank operating in the country.

In recent years, the BCB has strengthened bank audits, implemented more stringent internal control requirements, and tightened capital adequacy rules to reflect risk more accurately.  It also established loan classification and provisioning requirements. These measures apply to private and publicly owned banks alike. In April 2018, Moody’s upgraded a collection of 20 Brazilian banks and their affiliates to stable from negative.  The Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) independently regulates the stock exchanges, brokers, distributors, pension funds, mutual funds, and leasing companies with penalties against insider trading.

Foreigners may find it difficult to open an account with a Brazilian bank.  The individual must present a permanent or temporary resident visa, a national tax identification number issued by the Brazilian government (CPF), either a valid passport or identity card for foreigners (CIE), proof of domicile, and proof of income.  On average, this process from application to account opening lasts more than three months

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

Brazil’s foreign exchange market remains small, despite recent growth.  The latest Triennial Survey by the Bank for International Settlements, conducted in December 2016, showed that the net daily turnover on Brazil’s market for OTC foreign exchange transactions (spot transactions, outright forwards, foreign-exchange swaps, currency swaps and currency options) was USD 19.7 billion, up from USD 17.2 billion in 2013.  This was equivalent to around 0.3 percent of the global market in both years.

Brazil’s banking system has adequate capitalization and has traditionally been highly profitable, reflecting high interest rates and fees.  Per an April 2018 Central Bank Financial Stability Report, all banks exceeded required solvency ratios, and stress testing demonstrated the banking system has adequate loss absorption capacity in all simulated scenarios.  Furthermore, the report noted 99.9 percent of banks already met Basel III requirements, and possess a projected Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio above the minimum 7 percent required at the beginning of 2019.

There are few restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with a foreign investment in Brazil.  Foreign investors may freely convert Brazilian currency in the unified foreign exchange market where buy-sell rates are determined by market forces.  All foreign exchange transactions, including identifying data, must be reported to the BCB. Foreign exchange transactions on the current account are fully liberalized.

The BCB must approve all incoming foreign loans.  In most cases, loans are automatically approved unless loan costs are determined to be “incompatible with normal market conditions and practices.”  In such cases, the BCB may request additional information regarding the transaction. Loans obtained abroad do not require advance approval by the BCB, provided the Brazilian recipient is not a government entity.  Loans to government entities require prior approval from the Brazilian Senate as well as from the Economic Ministry’s Treasury Secretariat, and must be registered with the BCB.

Interest and amortization payments specified in a loan contract can be made without additional approval from the BCB.  Early payments can also be made without additional approvals, if the contract includes a provision for them. Otherwise, early payment requires notification to the BCB to ensure accurate records of Brazil’s stock of debt.

In March 2014, Brazil’s Federal Revenue Service consolidated the regulations on withholding taxes (IRRF) applicable to earnings and capital gains realized by individuals and legal entities resident or domiciled outside Brazil.  The regulation states that the cost of acquisition must be calculated in Brazilian currency (reais). Also, the definition of “technical services” was broadened to include administrative support and consulting services rendered by individuals (employees or not) or resulting from automated structures having clear technological content.

Upon registering investments with the BCB, foreign investors are able to remit dividends, capital (including capital gains), and, if applicable, royalties.  Investors must register remittances with the BCB. Dividends cannot exceed corporate profits. Investors may carry out remittance transactions at any bank by documenting the source of the transaction (evidence of profit or sale of assets) and showing payment of applicable taxes.

Remittance Policies

Under Law 13259/2016 passed in March 2016, capital gain remittances are subject to a 15 to 22.5 percent income withholding tax, with the exception of capital gains and interest payments on tax-exempt domestically issued Brazilian bonds.  The capital gains marginal tax rates are: 15 percent up to USD 1.5 million in gains; 17.5 percent for USD 1.5 million to USD 2.9 million in gains; 20 percent for USD 2.9 million to USD 8.9 million in gains; and 22.5 percent for more than USD 8.9 million in gains.

Repatriation of a foreign investor’s initial investment is also exempt from income tax under Law 4131/1962.  Lease payments are assessed a 15 percent withholding tax. Remittances related to technology transfers are not subject to the tax on credit, foreign exchange, and insurance, although they are subject to a 15 percent withholding tax and an extra 10 percent Contribution for Intervening in Economic Domain (CIDE) tax.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Law 11887 established the Sovereign Fund of Brazil (FSB) in 2008.  It was a non-commodity fund with a mandate to support national companies in their export activities and to offset counter-cyclical development, promoting investment in projects of strategic interest to Brazil both domestically and abroad.  The GoB also had the authority to use money from this fund to help meet its fiscal targets when annual revenues were lower than expected, and to invest in state-owned companies. In May 2018, then-President Temer signed an executive order abolishing the fund.  The money in the fund was earmarked for repayment of foreign debt.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

The GoB maintains ownership interests in a variety of enterprises at both the federal and state levels.  Typically, boards responsible for state-owned enterprise (SOE) corporate governance are comprised of directors elected by the state or federal government with additional directors elected by any non-government shareholders.  Although Brazil, a non-OECD member, has participated in many OECD working groups, it does not follow the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs. Brazilian SOEs are concentrated in the oil and gas, electricity generation and distribution, transportation, and banking sectors.  A number of these firms also see a portion of their shares publically traded on the Brazilian and other stock exchanges.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the GoB privatized many state-owned enterprises across a broad spectrum of industries, including mining, steel, aeronautics, banking, and electricity generation and distribution.  While the GoB divested itself from many of its SOEs, it maintained partial control (at both the federal and state level) of some previously wholly state-owned enterprises. This control can include a “golden share” whereby the government can exercise veto power over proposed mergers or acquisitions.  

Notable examples of majority government owned and controlled firms include national oil and gas giant Petrobras and power conglomerate Eletrobras.  Both Petrobras and Eletrobras include non-government shareholders, are listed on both the Brazilian and NYSE stock exchanges, and are subject to the same accounting and audit regulations as all publicly-traded Brazilian companies.  Brazil previously restricted foreign investment in offshore oil and gas development through 2010 legislation that obligated Petrobras to serve as the sole operator and minimum 30 percent investor in any oil and gas exploration and production in Brazil’s prolific offshore pre-salt fields.  As a result of the GoB’s desire to increase foreign investment in Brazil’s hydrocarbon sector, in October 2016 the Brazilian Congress granted foreign companies the right to serve as sole operators in pre-salt exploration and production activities and eliminated Petrobras’ obligation to serve as a minority equity holder in pre-salt oil and gas operations.  Nevertheless, the 2016 law still gives Petrobras right-of-first refusal in developing pre-salt offshore fields before those areas are available for public auction.  Industry estimates project bonuses of USD 26.3 billion by opening the Brazilian oil and gas market to foreign investment.

Privatization Program

Given limited public investment funding, the GoB has focused on privatizing state–owned energy, airport, road, railway, and port assets through long-term (up to 30 year) infrastructure concession agreements.  Eletrobras successfully sold its six principal, highly-indebted power distributors. The SOE is currently working to begin a capitalization process to reduce the GoB’s share holdings in the company to less than 50 percent.  The process cannot move forward, however, until Congress passes a bill authorizing the reduction. In 2018, Petrobras faced criticism over its daily fuel adjustment policy and a major 12-day truckers strike hit Brazil and forced the resignation of Petrobras’ CEO Pedro Parente.  To end the strike, the GoB eliminated the collection of the CIDE tax over diesel and gave a USD 3 billion subsidy to diesel producers (mainly Petrobras) to reduce the prices to consumers (primarily truckers).

In 2016, Brazil launched its newest version of these efforts to promote privatization of primary infrastructure.  The Temer administration created the Investment Partnership Program (PPI) to expand and accelerate the concession of public works projects to private enterprise and the privatization of some state entities.  PPI covers federal concessions in road, rail, ports, airports, municipal water treatment, electricity transmission and distribution, and oil and gas exploration and production contracts. Between 2016 and 2018, PPI auctioned off 124 projects and collected USD 62.5 billion in investments.  The full list of PPI projects is located at: https://www.ppi.gov.br/schedule-of-projects 

While some subsidized financing through BNDES will be available, PPI emphasizes the use of private financing and debentures for projects.  All federal and state-level infrastructure concessions are open to foreign companies with no requirement to work with Brazilian partners. In 2017, Brazil launched the Agora é Avançar initiative for promoting investments in primary infrastructure, and this has supported several projects.  Details can be found at: www.avancar.gov.br .The latest information available about Avançar Parcerias is from September 30, 2018.  From over 7,000 projects, the program has completed 36.5 percent and 92.2 percent are in progress.

In 2008, the Ministry of Health initiated the use of Production Development Partnerships (PDPs) to reduce the increasing dependence of Brazil’s healthcare sector on international drug production and the need to control costs in the public healthcare system, services that are an entitlement enumerated in the constitution.  The healthcare sector accounts for 9 percent of GDP, 10 percent of skilled jobs, and more than 25 percent of research and development nationally. These agreements provide a framework for technology transfer and development of local production by leveraging the volume purchasing power of the Ministry of Health. In the current administration, there is increasing interest in PDPs as a cost saving measure.  U.S. companies have both competed for these procurements and at times raised concerns about the potential for PDPs to be used to subvert intellectual property protections under the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).

8. Responsible Business Conduct

Most state-owned and private sector corporations of any significant size in Brazil pursue corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities.  Brazil’s new CFIAs (see sections on bilateral investment agreements and dispute settlement) contain CSR provisions. Some corporations use CSR programs to meet local content requirements, particularly in information technology manufacturing.  Many corporations support local education, health and other programs in the communities where they have a presence. Brazilian consumers, especially the local residents where a corporation has or is planning a local presence, expect CSR activity.  Corporate officials frequently meet with community members prior to building a new facility to review the types of local services the corporation will commit to providing. Foreign and local enterprises in Brazil often advance United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as part of their CSR activity, and will cite their local contributions to MDGs, such as universal primary education and environmental sustainability.  Brazilian prosecutors and civil society can be very proactive in bringing cases against companies for failure to implement the requirements of the environmental licenses for their investments and operations. National and international nongovernmental organizations monitor corporate activities for perceived threats to Brazil’s biodiversity and tropical forests and can mount strong campaigns against alleged misdeeds.

The U.S. diplomatic mission in Brazil supports U.S. business CSR activities through the +Unidos Group (Mais Unidos), a group of more than 100 U.S. companies established in Brazil.  Additional information on how the partnership supports public and private alliances in Brazil can be found at: www.maisunidos.org 

9. Corruption

Brazil has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption, but their effectiveness is inconsistent.  Several bills to revise the country’s regulation of the lobbying/government relations industry have been pending before Congress for years.  Bribery is illegal, and a bribe by a local company to a foreign official can result in criminal penalties for individuals and administrative penalties for companies, including fines and potential disqualification from government contracts.  A company cannot deduct a bribe to a foreign official from its taxes. While federal government authorities generally investigate allegations of corruption, there are inconsistencies in the level of enforcement among individual states. Corruption is problematic in business dealings with some authorities, particularly at the municipal level.  U.S. companies operating in Brazil are subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

Brazil signed the UN Convention against Corruption in 2003, and ratified it in 2005.  Brazil is a signatory to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and a participating member of the OECD Working Group on bribery.  It was one of the founders, along with the United States, of the intergovernmental Open Government Partnership, which seeks to help governments increase transparency.  

In 2018, Brazil ranked 105th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.  The full report can be found at: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 

Since 2014, the federal criminal investigation known as Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash) has uncovered a complex web of public sector corruption, contract fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion stemming from systematic overcharging for government contracts, particularly at parastatal oil company Petrobras.  The ongoing investigation led to the arrests of Petrobras executives, oil industry suppliers including executives from Brazil’s largest construction companies, money launderers, former politicians, and political party operatives. Many sitting Brazilian politicians are currently under investigation.  In July 2017, former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (Lula) was convicted of corruption and money laundering charges stemming from the Lava Jato investigation.  The Brazilian authorities jailed Lula in April 2018, and the courts sentenced him in February 2019 to begin serving an almost 13-year prison sentence.  In March 2019, authorities arrested former President Michel Temer on charges of corruption.

In December 2016, Brazilian construction conglomerate Odebrecht and its chemical manufacturing arm Braskem agreed to pay the largest FCPA penalty in U.S. history and plead guilty to charges filed in the United States, Brazil, and Switzerland that alleged the companies paid hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes to government officials around the world.  The U.S. Department of Justice case stemmed directly from theLava Jatoinvestigation and focused on violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.  Details on the case can be found at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskem-plead-guilty-and-agree-pay-least-35-billion-global-penalties-resolve 

In January 2018, Petrobras settled a class-action lawsuit with investors in U.S. federal court for USD 3 billion, which was one of the largest securities class action settlements in U.S. history.  The investors alleged that Petrobras officials accepted bribes and made decisions that had a negative impact on Petrobras’ share value. In September 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that Petrobras would pay a fine of USD 853.2 million to settle charges that former executives and directors violated the FCPA through fraudulent accounting used to conceal bribe payments from investors and regulators.

In 2015, GoB prosecutors announced Operacão Zelotes (Operation Zealots), in which both domestic and foreign firms were alleged to have bribed tax officials to reduce their assessments.  The operation resulted in a complete closure and overhaul of Brazilian tax courts, including a reduction in the number of courts and judges as well as more subsequent rulings in favor of tax authorities.  

Resources to Report Corruption

Petalla Brandao Timo Rodrigues
International Relations Chief Advisor
Brazilian Federal Public Ministry
contatolavajato@mpf.mp.br

Transparencia Brasil
Bela Cintra, 409; Sao Paulo, Brasil
+55 (11) 3259-6986
http://www.transparencia.org.br/contato 

10. Political and Security Environment

Strikes and demonstrations occasionally occur in urban areas and may cause temporary disruption to public transportation.  Occasional port strikes continue to have an impact on commerce. Brazil has over 60,000 murders annually, with low rates of success in murder investigations and even lower conviction rates.  Brazil announced emergency measures in 2017 to counter a rise in violence in Rio de Janeiro state, and approximately 8,500 military personnel deployed to the state to assist state law enforcement.  In February, 2018, then-President Temer signed a federal intervention decree giving the federal government control of the state’s entire public security apparatus under the command of an Army general.  The federal intervention ended on December 31, 2018, with the withdrawal of the military. Shorter-term and less expansive deployments of the military in support of police forces also occurred in other states in 2017, including Rio Grande do Norte and Roraima.  The military also supported police forces in 11 states and nearly 500 cities for the 2018 general elections.

In 2016, millions peacefully demonstrated to call for and against then-President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment and protest against corruption, which was one of the largest public protests in Brazil’s history.  Non-violent pro- and anti-government demonstrations have occurred regularly in recent years.

Although U.S. citizens are usually not targeted during such events, U.S. citizens traveling or residing in Brazil are advised to take common-sense precautions and avoid any large gatherings or any other event where crowds have congregated to demonstrate or protest.  For the latest U.S. State Department guidance on travel in Brazil, please consult www.travel.state.gov

11. Labor Policies and Practices

The Brazilian labor market is composed of approximately 124 million workers of whom 32.9 million (26.5 percent) work in the informal sector.  Brazil had an unemployment rate of 12 percent as of March 2019, although that percentage was nearly double (22.6 percent) for young workers ages 18-29.  Foreign workers made up less than one percent of the overall labor force, but the arrival of 160,000 economic migrants and refugees from Venezuela since 2016 has led to large local concentrations of foreign workers in the border state of Roraima and the city of Manaus.  Migrant workers from within Brazil play a significant role in the agricultural sector. There are no government policies requiring the hiring of Brazilian nationals.

Low-skilled employment dominates Brazil’s labor market.  During the country’s economic recession (2014-2016), eight low-skilled occupations – such as market attendants and janitors – accounted for half of the roughly 900,000 job openings added to the market.  The number of professionals working as biomedical and information analysts – however small – also increased, while that of bill collectors, cashier supervisors, and welders saw declines. Sectors such as information technology services stood out among those that generated job vacancies between 2011 and 2016.

Workers in the formal sector contribute to the Time of Service Guarantee Fund (FGTS) that equates to one month’s salary over the course of a year.  If a company terminates an employee, the employee can access the full amount of their FGTS contributions or 20 percent in the event they leave voluntarily.  Brazil’s labor code guarantees formal sector workers 30 days of annual leave and severance pay in the case of dismissal without cause. Unemployment insurance also exists for laid off workers equal to the country’s minimum salary (or more depending on previous income levels) for six months.  A labor law that went into effect in November 2017 modified 121 sections of the national labor code (CLT). The law introduced flexible working hours, eased restrictions on part-time work, relaxed how workers can divide their holidays and cut the statutory lunch hour to 30 minutes. The government does not waive labor laws to attract investment; they apply uniformly across the country.  

Collective bargaining is common, and there were 11,587 labor unions operating in Brazil in 2018.  Labor unions, especially in sectors such as metalworking and banking, are well organized in advocating for wages and working conditions, and account for approximately 19 percent of the official workforce according to the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA).  Unions in various sectors engage in collective bargaining negotiations, often across an entire industry when mandated by federal regulation. The November 2017 labor law ended mandatory union contributions, which has reduced union finances by as much as 90 percent according to the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies (DIESSE).  DIESSE reported a significant decline in the number of collective bargaining agreements reached in 2018 (3,269) compared to 2017 (4,378).

Employer federations also play a significant role in both public policy and labor relations.  Each state has its own federation, which reports to the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), headquartered in Brasilia, and the National Confederation of Commerce (CNC), headquartered in Rio de Janeiro.  

Brazil has a dedicated system of labor courts that are charged with resolving routine cases involving unfair dismissal, working conditions, salary disputes, and other grievances.  Labor courts have the power to impose an agreement on employers and unions if negotiations break down and either side appeals to the court system. As a result, labor courts routinely are called upon to determine wages and working conditions in industries across the country.  The labor courts system has millions of pending legal cases on its docket, although the number of new filings has decreased since the November 2017 labor law went into effect. Nevertheless, pending legal challenges to the 2017 labor law have resulted in considerable legal uncertainty for both employers and employees.

Strikes occur periodically, particularly among public sector unions.  A strike organized by truckers unions protesting increased fuel prices paralyzed the Brazilian economy in May 2018, and led to billions of dollars in losses to the economy.

Brazil has ratified 97 International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions.  Furthermore, Brazil is party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and major ILO conventions concerning the prohibition of child labor, forced labor, and discrimination.  For the past eight years (2010-2018), the Department of Labor, in its annual publication Findings on the Worst forms of Child Labor, has recognized Brazil for its significant advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.  The Ministry of Labor (MTE), in 2018, inspected 231 properties, resulting in the rescue of 1,133 victims of forced labor. Additionally, MTE rescued 1,409 children working in violation of child labor laws.

On January 1, 2019, newly elected President Jair Bolsonaro extinguished MTE and divided its responsibilities between the Ministries of Economy, Justice and Social Development.  

12. OPIC and Other Investment Insurance Programs

Programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) are fully available.  Brazil has been a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) since 1992.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($ USD) 2017 $2,053 trillion 2017 $2.056 trillion www.worldbank.org/en/country  
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions)

BCB data, year-end.

2017 $95,100 2017 $68,300 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data  

*U.S. is historical-cost basis

Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $16,070 2017 ($2,030) BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data  

*U.S. is historical-cost basis

Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2017 26.29% 2017 36.4% UNCTAD data available at

https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx    

* IBGE and BCB data, year-end.


Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, billions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward 635.12 100% Total Outward 254.23 100%
Netherlands 158.42 24.9% Cayman Islands 72.58 28.5%
United States 109.61 17.3% British Virgin Islands 46.73 18.4%
Luxembourg 60.12 6.5% Bahamas 37.21 14.6%
Spain 57.98 9.1% Austria 32.14 12.6%
France 33.30 5.2% United States 14.92 5.9%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.


Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Portfolio Investment Assets
Top Five Partners (billions, US Dollars)
Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities
All Countries 40.13 100% All Countries 31.11 100% All Countries 9.02 100%
United States 13.84 34.5% United States 10.37 33.3% United States 3.47 38.5%
Bahamas 6.80 16.9% Bahamas 6.76 21.7% Spain 2.64 29.3%
Cayman Islands 4.25 10.6% Cayman Islands 3.93 12.6% Korea, South 0.50 5.5%
Spain 3.72 9.3% Switzerland 2.01 6.5% Switzerland 0.41 4.5%
Switzerland 2.42 6.0% Luxembourg 1.69 5.4% Denmark 0.38 4.2%

 

14. Contact for More Information

Economic Section
U.S.  Embassy Brasilia
BrasiliaECON2@State.gov
+55-61-3312-7000

Uruguay

Executive Summary

The Government of Uruguay (GoU) recognizes the important role foreign investment plays in economic development and continues to maintain a favorable investment climate that does not discriminate against foreign investors.  Uruguay has a stable legal system in which foreign and national investments are treated alike, most investments are allowed without prior authorization, and investors can freely transfer the capital and profits from their investments abroad.  International investors can choose between arbitration and the judicial system to settle disputes. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards.

The World Bank’s 2019 “Doing Business” Index placed Uruguay fifth out of twelve countries in South America (and 95th out of 190 worldwide).  Even with some tax incentives for investors, foreign direct investment (FDI) remains low compared to the period before 2015.  Domestic and FDI dropped significantly between 2015 and 2018. 

About 120 U.S. firms operate locally and distribute their investments among a wide array of sectors, including forestry, tourism and hotels, services, and telecommunications.  U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to investment. In 2018, Transparency International ranked Uruguay as the most transparent country in Latin America and the Caribbean.  Uruguay is a stable democracy. Political risk is low, and there have been no recent cases of expropriation.

Uruguay has strengthened bilateral trade, investment, and political ties with China, its principal trading partner.  In August 2018, Uruguay was the first country in the Southern Cone to join the Chinese One Belt One Road initiative. Since 2016, Uruguay and China have held numerous meetings concerning trade issues, but no comprehensive bilateral free trade agreement has been advanced despite both sides’ stated aims to do so.

Uruguay has bilateral investment treaties with over 30 countries, including the United States.  The United States does not have a double-taxation treaty with Uruguay. Both countries have a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in place, and have signed agreements on open skies, trade facilitation, customs mutual assistance, promotion of small and medium enterprises, and social security totalization.

A 2018 survey by Uruguay’s export and investment promotion agency and the Ministry of Economy shows that about half of foreign investors are satisfied or very satisfied with Uruguay´s investment climate, principally its rule of law, macroeconomic stability, strategic location, and investment incentives.  Almost all investors were satisfied or highly satisfied with Uruguay´s free trade zones and free ports. On the other hand, roughly one-fourth of investors were dissatisfied with at least one aspect of doing business locally, and expressed concerns about high labor costs and taxes, as well as unions and labor conflicts.

Labor unions are vocal and labor conflicts can escalate fast, with strikes affecting overall productivity.  The World Economic Forum’s 2018 Global Competitiveness Index ranked Uruguay 53rd out of 140 countries surveyed, and 138th in labor relations.  Many U.S. and regional investors have voiced concerns that Uruguayan labor unions can legally occupy work spaces and in that way shut down operations with few repercussions.  Private sector representatives have also pointed out that labor unions’ close relationships with the current government mean that the tripartite salary councils often increase salaries without sufficient regard for companies’ ability to absorb the increased costs.

Uruguay is a founding member of MERCOSUR, the Southern Cone Common Market composed of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Venezuela.  [Note: Venezuela was suspended from MERCOSUR in December 2016 for failing to adopt the bloc’s democratic principles. End Note.] Uruguay has separate trade agreements with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, all of which are also MERCOSUR associate members.  Montevideo is the headquarters of the MERCOSUR Secretariat and MERCOSUR’s parliamentary institution PARLASUR. In 2004, Uruguay and Mexico deepened a 1999 agreement, which resulted in Uruguay’s first comprehensive trade agreement with a non-MERCOSUR country. In October 2016, Uruguay signed an agreement with Chile to extend and augment the existing free trade agreement to increase trade in goods and services.  The agreement was ratified in mid-2018 after a major internal debate within the ruling Frente Amplio ruling coalition.

Uruguay’s strategic location (in the center of MERCOSUR´s wealthiest and most populated area), and its special import regimes (such as free zones and free ports) make it a well-situated distribution center for U.S. goods into the region.  Several U.S. firms warehouse their products in Uruguay’s tax-free areas and service their regional clients effectively. With a small market of high-income consumers, Uruguay can also be a good test market for U.S. products.

In 2012, Uruguay regained the international credit ratings agencies’ investment grade status it had enjoyed from 1998 through 2002, when the country was struck by a major economic and financial crisis.  While its budget deficit and public debt ratios are relatively high compared to its rating peer group, as of April 2019, Standard&Poor’s and Moody’s rate Uruguay two steps above the investment grade threshold with a stable outlook.

Table 1: International Rankings and Statistics 

Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 23 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
World Bank’s Doing Business Report “Ease of Doing Business” 2019 95 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings 
Global Innovation Index 2018 62 of 126 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator%20Global%20Innovation%20Index
U.S. FDI in Partner Country ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $1,556 https://bea.gov/international/factsheet
World Bank GNI per capita 2017 $15,250 http://www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

Policies towards Foreign Direct Investment

The GoU has traditionally recognized the important role that foreign and local investment plays in economic and social development and works to maintain a favorable investment climate.  Uruguay has a stable legal system in which foreign and national investments are treated alike, most investments are allowed without prior authorization, and investors may freely transfer the capital and profits from their investments abroad.  Investors can choose between arbitration and the judicial system to settle disputes. The judiciary is independent and professional.

Foreign investors are not required to meet any specific performance requirements.  Moreover, foreign investors are not subject to discriminatory or excessively onerous visa, residence, or work permit requirements.  The government does not require that nationals own shares or that the share of foreign equity be reduced over time, and does not impose conditions on investment permits.  Uruguay normally treats foreign investors as nationals in public sector tenders. Uruguayan law permits investors to participate in any stage of the tender process.

Uruguay’s export and investment promotion agency, Uruguay XXI (http://www.uruguayxxi.gub.uy  ), provides information on Uruguay’s business climate and investment incentives, at both a national and a sectoral level.  The agency also has several programs to promote the internationalization of local firms and regularly participates in trade missions.

There is no formal business roundtable or ombudsman responsible for regular dialogue between government officials and investors.  Some private business associations have suggested that formal, regular dialogue could ease concerns regarding perceived or actual government biases towards labor unions and against the private sector.

In 2017, Uruguay started taxing digital services with value-added and non-resident income taxes.  Tax rates vary depending on whether the company provides audiovisual transmissions or intermediation services, and on the geographical locations of the company and of the consumers of the service.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Aside from a few limited sectors involving national security and limited legal government monopolies in which foreign investment is not permitted, Uruguay practices neither de jure nor de facto discrimination toward investment by source or origin, with national and foreign investors treated equally.

In general, the GoU does not require specific authorization for firms to set up operations, import and export, make deposits and banking transactions in any particular currency, or obtain credit.  Screening mechanisms do not apply to foreign or national investments, and investors do not need special government authorization for access to capital markets or to foreign exchange.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

Uruguay is a member of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), but the organization has not yet conducted an Investment Policy Review on the country.

Uruguay is not a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), but even so, it has gradually endorsed several principles and joined some of its institutions.  Uruguay is a member of the OECD Development Center and its Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, and it participates in its Program for International Student Assessment (PISA).  In 2018, high-level Uruguayan government officials expressed interest in joining the OECD’s Investment Committee.

The World Trade Organization published its Trade Policy Review of Uruguay, which included a detailed description of the country’s trade and investment regimes in 2018 and is available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp474_e.htm  .

Business Facilitation

Uruguay is ranked 65st in the World Bank’s “starting a business” sub-indicator, well ahead of its overall aggregate ranking of 95th for the ease of doing business.  Domestic and foreign businesses can register operations in approximately seven days without a notary at http://empresas.gub.uy  .

Uruguay receives high marks in electronic government.  The UN’s 2018 Electronic Government Development and Electronic Participation indexes ranked Uruguay third in the entire Western Hemisphere (after the United States and Canada).

Recently, industrial small to medium-sized U.S. enterprises (SMEs) describe the Uruguayan market as difficult to enter in some sectors of the economy.  Those SMEs pointed to legacy business relationships and loyalties, along with a cultural resistance by distributors and clients to trusting new producers.  Local law firms working with U.S. companies said that industrial production companies entering the Uruguayan market might have to operate for two years to establish a client base and a revenue stream.  U.S. company representatives said they filed a complaint with Uruguay’s Commission for the Defense of Competition regarding monopolistic business practices in Uruguay’s chemical production market.

Outward Investment

The government does not promote nor restrict domestic investment abroad.

2. Bilateral Investment Agreements and Taxation Treaties

In November 2005, Uruguay and the United States signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) to promote and protect reciprocal investments.  The BIT, which entered into force on November 1, 2006, grants national and most-favored-nation treatment to investments and investors sourced in each country.  The agreement also includes detailed provisions on compensation for expropriation, and a precise procedure for settling bilateral investment disputes. The annexes include sector-specific measures not covered by the agreement and specific sectors or activities that governments may restrict further.  The BIT is available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties/bit-documents  .

Besides the United States, Uruguay has Bilateral Investment Agreements in force with 30 countries from different regions.  The full list is available at https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/  .

Uruguay and the United States do not have double taxation or tax information agreements in place.

Over the past decade, the GoU has endorsed OECD standards on transparency and exchange of information and upgraded several regulations prompted by the OECD including Uruguay in its 2009 grey list of jurisdictions that had not “committed to implement the internationally agreed tax standard.”  In 2012, the OECD acknowledged the GoU’s progress and allowed Uruguay to move on to the second phase of the review process, consisting of a survey of the practical implementation of the standards. In 2016, the GoU passed a fiscal transparency law. In 2017, it began implementing an automatic exchange of tax information with the countries with which it has established Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs).  In November 2018, Uruguay hosted the annual meeting of the OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, which marked the worldwide rollout of automatic exchange of financial account information between countries that have TIEAs.

The OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes indicates that Uruguay has exchange-of-information relationships with 35 jurisdictions through 21 double-taxation agreements and 16 Tax Information Exchange Agreements.  The full list is available at http://www.eoi-tax.org/jurisdictions/UY#agreements  .

A social security totalization agreement with the United States was signed in December 2017, and took effect in November 2018.  The agreement eliminates dual social security taxation and helps workers who have split their careers between the United States and Uruguay to meet the minimum eligibility requirements (years worked) more quickly by adding together years worked in both countries to qualify for benefits  (https://www.ssa.gov/international/Agreement_Texts/uruguay.html  )

3. Legal Regime

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Transparent and streamlined procedures regulate local and foreign investment in Uruguay. Uruguay has state and national regulations.  The Constitution does not provide for supra-national regulations. Most draft laws, except those having an impact on public finances, can start either in the executive branch or in the parliament.  The President needs the agreement of all ministries with competency on the regulated matter to issue decrees. Ministers may also issue resolutions. All regulatory actions—including bills, laws, decrees, and resolutions—are publicly available at https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/normativa  .

The U.S. governemnt’s Fiscal Transparency Report labels Uruguay as a fiscally transparent country.  Accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent and consistent with international norms.  The government only occasionally proposes laws and regulations in draft form for public comment. Parliamentary commissions typically engage stakeholders while discussing a bill.  Non-governmental organizations or private sector associations do not manage any informal regulatory processes.

Article 10 of the U.S.–Uruguay BIT mandates that both countries publish promptly or make public any law, regulation, procedure, or adjudicatory decision related to investments.  Article 11 sets transparency procedures that govern the accord.

International Regulatory Considerations

Uruguay is a member of several regional economic blocs, including MERCOSUR and the Latin American Integration Association, neither of which have supranational legislation.  In order to create local law Uruguay’s parliament must ratify these blocs’ decisions.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

The legal system in Uruguay follows civil law based on the Spanish civil code.  The highest court in the country is the Supreme Court of Uruguay, which has five judges.  The executive branch nominates judges and the Parliament’s General Assembly appoints them.  Judges serve a ten-year term and can be reelected after a lapse of five years following the previous term.  Other subordinate courts include the court of appeal, district courts, peace courts, and rural courts.

In 2017, Uruguay enacted a new criminal procedural code, expressed in Law No. 19.293.  The law passed in December 2014, but because the changes it made were very significant it took three years for the authorities to bring it into force.  The process for criminal cases is now accusatory instead of inquisitorial. Uruguay is implementing changes to improve criminal procedures carried out by police, prosecutors, and judges.  Judges will not be involved at the start of an investigation or arrest, and prosecutors will take on a prominent role in leading the investigations. Other fundamental changes include the right to bail, instead of the courts’ remanding individuals into custody to await trial, and opening up hearings to the public.

The judiciary remains independent of the executive branch.  Critics of the court system complain that its civil sector can be slow.  The executive branch rarely interferes directly in judicial matters, but at times voices its dissatisfaction with court rulings.  Investors can appeal regulations, enforcement actions, and legislation. International investors may choose between arbitration and the judicial system to settle disputes. 

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

Uruguayan law treats foreign and domestic investment alike.  Law 16,906 (passed in 1998) declares that promotion and protection of investments made by both national and foreign investors are in the nation’s interest, and allows investments without prior authorization or registration.  The law also provides that investors can freely transfer their capital and profits abroad and that the government will not prevent the establishment of investments in the country.

Prompted by a fall in domestic and foreign investment since 2015, in May 2018 the GoU amended Decree 002/12 (with Decree 143/018) to strengthen incentives for investment further and advance a number of the GoU´s strategic goals, such as creating jobs, fostering research and development, and developing clean production.

Government tenders favor local products or services, provided that they are of comparable quality and any cost increase is no more than 10 percent.  U.S. and other foreign firms are able to participate in local or national government financed or subsidized research and development programs.

Uruguay’s export and investment promotion agency, Uruguay XXI  , helps potential investors navigate Uruguayan laws and rules.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

Uruguay has transparent legislation established by the Commission for the Promotion and Defense of Competition at the Ministry of Economy to foster competition.  The main legal pillars (Law No. 18,159 and decree 404, both passed in 2007) are available at the commission’s site: https://www.mef.gub.uy/578/5/areas/defensa-de-la- percent20competencia—uruguay.html  .

A 2017 peer review of Uruguay´s competition law and policy is available at https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1640  .

In 2001, the GoU created regulatory and controlling agencies for telecommunications (URSEC) and water and energy.  Notwithstanding, in 2010, the executive branch transferred URSEC’s policy-design capacity to the National Telecommunications Directorate , leaving URSEC with only regulatory control attributes.

The GoU passed an Audiovisual Communications Law (No 19,307) in December 2014.  Also known as the media law, it includes provisions on market caps for cable TV providers that could limit competition.  In April 2016, Uruguay’s Supreme Court ruled that these market caps and some local content requirements were unconstitutional.  In late 2017, the Executive Branch presented a draft regulation that, as of April 2019, was pending approval. 

Expropriation and Compensation

Uruguay’s constitution declares property rights an “inviolable right” subject to legal determinations that may be taken for general interest purposes and states that no individuals can be deprived of this right—except in case of public need and with fair compensation.

Article 6 of the U.S.–Uruguay BIT rules out direct and indirect expropriation or nationalization of private property except under specific circumstances.  The article also contains detailed provisions on how to compensate investors, should expropriation take place. There have been no cases of expropriation of investment from the United States or other countries in the past five years.

Dispute Settlement

International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention and New York Convention

Uruguay became a member of the ICSID in September 2000 and is a signatory of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

Investor–State Dispute Settlement

Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards issued against the government.  The U.S.–Uruguay BIT devotes over ten pages to establishing detailed and expedited dispute settlement procedures.

Over the past decade, two U.S. companies have sued the GoU before the World Bank´s ICSID.  In 2010, the tobacco company Philip Morris International sued the GoU, arguing that new health measures involving cigarette packaging amounted to unfair treatment of the firm.  They filed the case under the Uruguay–Switzerland Bilateral Investment Treaty, and in 2016 the ICSID ruled in the GoU’s favor. In 2015, U.S. telecom company Italba also sued the GoU before ICSID, which in March 2019 ruled in the GoU’s favor.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Commercial contracts frequently contain mediation and arbitration clauses and local courts recognize them.  Investors may choose between arbitration and the judicial system to settle disputes. Local courts recognize and enforce foreign courts’ arbitral awards.

Duration of Dispute Resolution

Uruguay’s judiciary is independent.  The average time to resolve a dispute, counted from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit in court until payment, is about two years, according to contacts in local law firms.  The courts’ decisions are legally enforced and Uruguayan law respects international arbitration awards.

Bankruptcy Regulations

The Bankruptcy Law passed in 2008 (No. 18,387) expedites bankruptcy procedures, encourages arrangements with creditors before a firm may go bankrupt, and provides the possibility of selling the firm as a single unit.  Bankruptcy has criminal and civil implications with intentional or deliberate bankruptcy deemed a crime. The law protects the rights of creditors according to the nature of the credit, and workers have privileges over other creditors.

The World Bank’s 2018 Doing Business Report ranks Uruguay third out of twelve countries in South America for its ease of “resolving insolvency.”  Uruguay ranks 70th globally in this sub-index, well ahead of its overall aggregate global ranking of 95th for ease of doing business.

4. Industrial Policies

Investment Incentives

The investment promotion regime, regulated by Law 16,906 (passed in 1998), grants automatic tax incentives of up to 40 percent of corporate income tax to several activities, including personnel training; research, scientific and technological development, reinvestment of profits, and investments in industrial machinery and equipment.  The GoU provides other benefits to industrial and agricultural firms by regulatory decree.

In addition to the automatic tax exemptions, Uruguay has several other incentives for greenfield and brownfield investments that help achieve some of the government´s strategic goals, including creating jobs, contributing to geographical decentralization away from the capital, increasing exports, promoting research and development, and fostering the use of clean technologies.  The principal incentive consists of the deduction from corporate income tax of a share of total investment over a pre-defined period. Other incentives include the exemption from tariffs and taxes on imports of capital goods and the refunding of the Value Added Tax paid on domestic purchases of certain goods.

There are also special regimes to promote specific sectors.  Certain activities—such as the purchasing of land, real estate, or private vehicles—are not eligible for the benefits.  Please refer to a detailed document on incentives to investment, available in English at http://www.uruguayxxi.gub.uy/guide/schemes.html  .

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

The GoU has increasingly promoted Uruguay as a regional, world-class logistics and distribution hub.  In 2010, the GoU created the National Logistics Institute (INALOG by its Spanish acronym), a public-private sector institution that seeks to coordinate efforts towards establishing Uruguay as the leading MERCOSUR distribution hub.  INALOG and Uruguay XXI have issued several reports on Uruguay’s role and advantages as a logistics hub.

The GoU established free trade zones (FTZs) in 1987 (Law 15,921) and in 2017 passed new legislation (Law 19,566).  The new law provides for minor changes in tax benefits, streamlines the requirements and activities that companies must accomplish in order to be able to operate inside a FTZ, and improves international cooperation related to the prevention of international tax evasion.  Full legislation and regulations are available at http://zonasfrancas.mef.gub.uy/  .  Almost all foreign investors surveyed in 2018 were satisfied or highly satisfied with Uruguay´s free trade zones and free ports.

There are 11 FTZs located throughout the country.  Most FTZs host a wide variety of tenants performing various services, including, financial, software development, call centers, warehousing, and logistics.  One FTZ is dedicated exclusively to the development of pharmaceuticals, and two to the production of paper pulp. MERCOSUR regulations treat products manufactured in most member states’ FTZs, with the exception of Tierra del Fuego, Argentina and Manaus, Brazil, as extra-territorial and charge them the common external tariff upon entering any member country.  As a result, industrial production in local FTZs is usually destined for non-MERCOSUR countries.

Firms may bring foreign and Uruguayan origin goods, services, products, and raw materials into the FTZs.  Firms may hold, process, and re-export the goods without payment of Uruguayan customs duties or import taxes.  Uruguay exempts firms operating in FTZs from national taxes. Laws governing legal monopolies do not apply within the FTZs.  Additionally, the employer does not pay social security taxes for non-Uruguayan employees who have waived coverage under the Uruguayan social security system.  Uruguay treats goods of Uruguayan origin entering FTZs as Uruguayan exports for tax and other legal purposes.

Uruguay has other special import regimes in place called “temporary admission,” “bonded warehouse,” and “free port.”  The temporary admission regime allows manufacturers to import duty-free raw materials, supplies, parts, and intermediate products they will use in manufacturing products for export.  However, the regime requires government authorization, and firms must export all finished products within 18 months. Firms do not have to be in a specific location to benefit from temporary admission.  Free ports and bonded warehouses are special areas where goods that remain on the premises are exempted from all import-related duties and tariffs.  The two main differences between free ports and bonded warehouses are that goods can stay for an unlimited amount of time in free ports and up to one year in bonded warehouses, and that firms may not significantly modify goods in free ports.  Firms may engage in “industrialization” in bonded warehouses. Firms operating in both premises may re-label and re-package merchandise.

Law 17,547 passed in August 2002 allows for the establishment of industrial parks.  Several additional decrees signed since 2007 allow for the establishment of sector-specific industrial parks.  Industrial park advantages include tax exemptions and benefits, and private sector, national, or local governments may establish them.  There are three industrial parks that operate under Law 17,547, and eleven that operate under state’s regulations.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Foreign investors are not required to meet any specific performance requirements, and have not reported impediments or onerous visa, residence, or work permit requirements.  The government does not require that nationals own shares or that the share of foreign equity be reduced over time, and does not impose conditions on the number of foreign workers or on investment permits.  A labor-related requirement is that tenants of free trade zones employ at least 50 percent Uruguayan workers.

Article 8 of the U.S.–Uruguay BIT bans both countries from imposing performance requirements on new investments, or tying the granting of existing or new advantages to performance requirements.

Uruguay does not require foreign investors to use local content in goods or technology in order to invest.  However, local content may be required in some sectors in order to become eligible for special tax treatment or government procurements.  For instance, in 2016 the state-owned electric utility (UTE) offered a number of long-term purchase agreements for wind and solar generated electricity that included 20 percent local content requirements.

Uruguay does not require foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access for surveillance.  Companies can freely transmit customer or business-related data across borders. Banks can transmit information out of Uruguay on their loan portfolios but not on their depositor base.  Banks are obliged to provide information once a year to the local tax authority on their depositors. This information is exchanged with tax authorities from countries that enjoy Tax Information Exchange Agreements with Uruguay (Uruguay does not have a TIEA with the United States).  Legislation governs the central government’s computer system security requiring all assets to remain in Uruguay, except those that do not constitute a risk for the government. The GoU’s Agency for e-Government and Information Society is in charge of enforcing this regulation. In 2016, the state-owned telecommunications company ANTEL inaugurated a USD 50 million, tier III data center, at the time one of five such facilities in Latin America.  In 2017, ANTEL teamed with Google to extend an underwater fiberoptic line to Uruguay, connecting Uruguay directly with the U.S. network.

5. Protection of Property Rights

Real Property

The GoU recognizes and enforces secured interests in property and contracts.  Mortgages exist, and Uruguay has a recognized and reliable system of recording such securities.  Uruguay’s legal system protects the acquisition and disposition of all property, including land, buildings, and mortgages.

Law 19,283, passed in 2014, prevents foreign governments from buying land, either directly or in association with private companies.  Traditional use rights are not applicable as there is no applicable indigenous community in Uruguay. The vast majority of land has clear property titles.

The three administrations that have ruled since 2005 have supported the unions’ position that sit-ins or occupation of workplaces are an extension of workers’ right to strike, thus enabling workers to lawfully occupy workplaces.  Business chambers have opposed extending the definition of the right to strike to include the physical occupation of a workplace. The chambers have filed cases before the International Labor Organization (ILO) objecting to workplace occupations (see Labor Section for further information).

Intellectual Property Rights

Uruguay is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and a party to the Bern and Universal Copyright Conventions, as well as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.  In March 2017, Uruguay’s Office of the President sent a bill to the Uruguayan parliament for approval and to adhere to WIPO’s Patent and Cooperation Treaty. As of April 2019, the bill remained before the Senate’s International Affairs Commission.

The quality of intellectual-property (IP) protection and level of enforcement has improved over time.  The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) removed Uruguay from its Special 301 Watch List in 2006 in response to Uruguay’s progress in enforcing intellectual property rights, especially with respect to copyright enforcement.  As of April 2018, Uruguay remains off the USTR Watch List.

Uruguay was included in USTR’s 2014 Notorious Markets Report (for an increase in reports of counterfeiting and piracy from its free trade zones), and was removed from the Report in 2015 (due to the passage of a decree that imposed stricter customs controls on free zones).  The 2015 decree gave Customs officials the authority to operate inside free trade zones, control the flow of incoming and outgoing goods, and fine both the owners of counterfeit goods and the storage providers that facilitate distribution of counterfeits. Since 2016, Uruguay has not been included in the Notorious Markets Report.

Some industry groups criticize the slowness of the patent-granting process, as well as the lack of data protection for proprietary research submitted as part of the grant process.  They also criticize an amendment to the Patent Law (passed in a 2013 omnibus law) that eliminated provisional protection for patents during patent pendency, which removed the ability of patent right holders to claim damages for infringement of their rights from the date of the patent application filing up to its granting date.

While enforcement of trademark rights has improved in recent years, local citizens have sometimes managed to register trademarks without owners’ prior consent.

Customs officers have border measures authority for trademark protection.  After temporarily freezing a shipment of suspicious goods, Customs has to communicate with the local representatives of the trademarks’ right-holders to determine the legality of the goods and seek cooperation.  Customs is responsible for paying for the storage and the local representatives are responsible for paying for the destruction of any counterfeit goods.

Uruguay tracks and reports on Custom’s seizures of goods, some of which are counterfeit.  Information can be found at https://www.aduanas.gub.uy/innovaportal/v/10500/1/innova.front/incautacion-de-mercaderias.html  .  However, there is no centralized dedicated reporting system for seizures of counterfeit goods.

Resources for Rights Holders

Post’s Economic Officer covering IP issues is:

Ms. Salina Rico, Economic Unit
Lauro Muller 1776
Tel: (5982) 1770-2449
E-mail: RicoS@state.gov

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/.  

For questions concerning completion of this section or anything related to IP, please contact EB/TPP/IPE Charles Randolph at RandolphC@state.gov or EEB-A-IPE-DL@state.gov.

6. Financial Sector

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Uruguay passed a capital markets law (No. 18,627) in 2009 to jumpstart the local capital market.  However, despite some very successful bond issuances by public firms, the local capital market remains underdeveloped and highly concentrated in sovereign debt.  Such under-development makes it very difficult to finance business ventures through the local equity market, and restricts the flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets.  Due to its underdevelopment and lack of sufficient liquidity, Uruguay typically receives only “active” investments oriented to establishing new firms or gaining control over existing ones and lacks “passive investments” from major investment funds.

The government maintains an open attitude towards foreign portfolio investment; there is no effective regulatory system to encourage or facilitate it.  Uruguay does not impose any restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

Uruguay allocates credit on market terms, but long-term banking credit has traditionally been difficult to obtain.  Foreign investors can access credit on the same market terms as nationals.

As part of the process of complying with OECD requirements (see Bilateral Investment Agreements section), the GoU banned “bearer shares” in 2012, which had been widely used.   Private firms do not use “cross shareholding” or “stable shareholder” arrangements to restrict foreign investment, nor do they restrict participation in or control of domestic enterprises.

Money and Banking System

Uruguay established The Central Bank of the Uruguay (BCU) in 1967 as an autonomous state entity.  Prior to the creation of the BCU, the issuing of currency and managing and supervising of the banking system was handled by the department of the Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay (BROU).  In 1995, Parliament passed a bank charter law that expanded the BCU’s responsibilities and set out the management structure as well as the functions and responsibilities of the bank. With over 40 percent of the market, the government-owned BROU is the nation’s largest bank.  The rest of the banking system is comprised of another government-owned mortgage bank and nine international commercial banks. The BCU’s Superintendent of Financial Services regulates and supervises foreign banks or branches.

Mostly related to the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act provisions, there have been some cases of U.S. citizens having difficulties establishing a first-time bank account.  The U.S. Department of State’s 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report classified Uruguay a “Jurisdiction of Primary Concern” for money laundering.

The GoU started developing a financial inclusion program in 2011, with a view to granting universal access to basic financial services and modernizing the domestic payment system.  Since then, and especially after the passage of a financial inclusion law in 2014 (No. 19,210), the use of debit cards, credit cards, and account holders has increased significantly.  The GoU has authorized a number of private sector firms to issue electronic currency. In 2018, the BCU and the BROU developed a pilot program to assess the possibility of implementing an electronic currency, the e-peso.

In December 2017 the GoU relaxed several aspects of the 2014 law, such as enabling citizens to withdraw their entire wages from financial institutions.  More information, in Spanish, on the GoU´s financial inclusion program is available at http://inclusionfinanciera.mef.gub.uy/  .

Fintech represents technological innovation in the financial sector, including innovations in financial literacy and education, retail banking, investment, and crypto-currencies.  The first Fintech Forum held in Montevideo in mid-2017 led to the creation of the Fintech Ibero-American Alliance. The Alliance is composed of Fintech associations from Central America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Spain, Mexico, Panama, Portugal, Peru, and Uruguay.  While some local firms have developed domestic and international electronic payment systems, emerging technologies like blockchain and crypto currencies remain underdeveloped.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

Uruguay maintains a long tradition of not restricting the purchase of foreign currency or the remittance of profits abroad.  Free purchases of any foreign currency and free remittances were preserved even during the severe 2002 banking and financial crisis.

Uruguay does not engage in currency manipulation to gain competitive advantage.  Since 2002, the peso has floated relatively freely, albeit with intervention from the Central Bank aimed at reducing the volatility of the price of the dollar.  Foreign exchange can be obtained at market rates and there is no black market for currency exchange. The U.S. Embassy uses official rates when purchasing local currency.

Remittance Policies

Uruguay maintains a long tradition of not restricting remittance of profits abroad.

Article 7 of the U.S.– Uruguay BIT provides that both countries “shall permit all transfers relating to investments to be made freely and without delay into and out of its territory.”  The agreement also establishes that both countries will permit transfers “to be made in a freely usable currency at the market rate of exchange prevailing at the time of the transfer.”

Sovereign Wealth Funds

There are no Sovereign Wealth Funds in Uruguay.

7. State-Owned Enterprises

There is no consolidated published list of State-Owned Enterprises.  The State still plays a dominant role in the economy and Uruguay maintains government monopolies or oligopolies in certain areas, including the importing and refining of oil, workers’ compensation insurance, and basic telecommunications (landline phones).

Uruguay’s largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs) include the petroleum, cement, and alcohol company ANCAP, telecommunications company ANTEL, electric utility UTE, water utility OSE, and Uruguay’s largest bank BROU.  While deemed autonomous, in practice these enterprises coordinate in several areas—mainly on tariffs—with their respective ministries and the executive branch. Their boards are appointed by the executive branch, require parliamentary ratification, and remain in office for the same term as the executive branch.  Uruguayan law requires SOEs to publish an annual report, and independent firms audit their balances.

Some traditionally government-run monopolies are open to private-sector competition.  Cellular and international long-distance services, insurance, and media services are open to local and foreign competitors.  The GoU permits private-sector generation of power and private interests dominate renewable energy production, but the state-owned power company UTE holds a monopoly on the transfer of electrical power through transmission and distribution lines from one utility’s service area to another’s, otherwise known as wheeling rights.  State-owned companies tend to have the largest market share even in sectors open to competition. Potential cross-subsidies likely give SOEs an advantage over their private sector competitors.

Uruguay does not adhere to the OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises.  A parliamentary commission investigated the multi-million dollar losses of the government-owned oil company ANCAP in 2015, which triggered a debate about the need to reform the corporate governance of SOEs.  The World Bank has assisted the GoU in strengthening the management of SOEs with no notable policy change.

Privatization Program

Uruguay has not undertaken a major privatization program in recent decades.  While Uruguay opened some previously government-run monopolies to private-sector competition, the government continues to maintain a monopoly in the import and refining of petroleum as well as basic telecommunications (land line services). 

Parliament passed a public-private partnership (PPP) law by consensus in July 2011 and created regulations with decree 007/12.  The law allows various kinds of contracts that enable private sector companies to design, build, finance, operate, and maintain certain infrastructures, including brownfield projects.  With some exceptions (such as medical services in hospitals or educational services in schools), PPPs can also be applied to social infrastructure. The return for the private sector company may come in the form of user payments, government payments, or a combination of both.

Historically, the GoU had been unsuccessful in attracting private sector participation in major infrastructure projects via PPPs.  In 2015, the GoU passed new regulations (Decree 251/15) to simplify the procedures and expedite the PPP process. To date, Uruguay has constructed a USD 100 million prison under a PPP, and there is a USD 1.9 billion pipeline.  The largest project in the pipeline is a 170-miles long railroad (USD 839 million), and there are twelve other projects, in different stages of development, related to roads, education, and health projects.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

The concept of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is relatively new to producers, consumers, and the government, and does not have a high-profile plan to encourage its application.  Many companies do abide by the principles of RBC as a matter of course. Many multinational companies develop RBC strategies and make significant contributions in promoting safety awareness, better regulation, a positive work environment, and sustainable environmental practices.  U.S. companies have proven to be leaders in promoting a greater awareness of and appreciation for RBC in Uruguay. In 2015, the U.S. Department of State awarded a U.S. company the Secretary of State’s Award for Corporate Excellence for its work on environmental sustainability.

Consumers tend to pay attention to the RBC image of companies, especially as it relates to a firm’s work with local charities or community causes.  The Catholic University (Universidad Catolica) has a program in place to monitor RBC matters (http://www.ucu.edu.uy/es/rse  ).  In the late 1990s, the Catholic University also founded DERES  , a non-profit business organization to promote corporate social responsibility, which currently has over 120 member companies.

9. Corruption

Transparency International ranked Uruguay as having the lowest levels of perceived corruption in Latin America and the Caribbean in its 2018 edition of the Corruption Perception Index.  Overall, U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an obstacle to investment.

Uruguay has laws to prevent bribery and other corrupt practices.  The GoU approved a law against corruption in the public sector in 1998, and the acceptance of a bribe is a felony under Uruguay’s penal code.  The government prosecuted some high-level Uruguayan officials from the executive, parliamentary, and judiciary branches for corruption in recent years.  The government neither encourages nor discourages private companies to establish internal codes of conduct.

The Transparency and Public Ethics Board (JUTEP by its Spanish acronym, http://www.jutep.gub.uy/  ) is the government office responsible for dealing with public sector corruption.  Traditionally a low-profile office and still with a limited scope, it gained relevance in face of a case that ended in the resignation of Uruguay´s Vice-President in 2017.  Since then JUTEP has played a role in denouncing alleged nepotism in the public sector. There are no major NGOs involved in investigating corruption.

A 2017 law (No. 19,574) sets an integral framework against money laundering and terrorism finance, brings Uruguay into compliance with OECD and UN norms, and includes corruption as a predicate crime.

Conventions Against Corruption

Uruguay signed and ratified the UN’s Anticorruption Convention.  It is not a member of the OECD and therefore not party to the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery.

Resources to Report Corruption

Government agency responsible for combating corruption:

Ricardo Gil, President
Junta de Transparencia y Ética Publica
Address: Rincon 528, 8th floor, ZC 11000
Tel: (598) 2917 0407
E-mail: secretaria@jutep.gub.uy 

The local branch of Transparency International is http://www.uruguaytransparente.uy  

10. Political and Security Environment

Uruguay is a stable democracy in which respect for the rule of law and transparent national debates to resolve political differences are the norm.  The majority of the population is committed to non-violence. In 2017, the Economist magazine ranked Uruguay as the only “full democracy” in Latin America, and one of only two in the world “outside of the rich western countries of Europe, North America, and Australasia.”  There have been no cases of political violence or damage to projects or installations over the past decade.

Violent crime is on the rise in Uruguay.  Rising homicide rates have alarmed business owners.  Uruguay’s police forces have complained that they do not receive sufficient backing from the central government and therefore do not take aggressive action against criminal bands.  The issue of reduced citizen security is a central issue in the October 2019 presidential elections.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

Tracking strong economic growth, Uruguay’s labor market operated at virtually full employment with rising labor costs until 2014.  The economy has cooled since 2015 and the unemployment rate has risen. Uruguay’s National Statistics Institute estimates the total working-age population to be 1.8 million.  Uruguay’s unemployment rate increased in 2018 to 8.4 percent (or 151,200 working-age people), up from 7.9 percent in 2017, its highest rate since 2007. Unemployment is structurally higher among the youth, especially young women.  In recent years, there has been a significant increase in migrant workers, especially from Venezuela, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.

Uruguay’s labor system is compliant in law and practice with most international labor standards.  The Uruguayan Constitution guarantees workers the right to organize and the law against dismissal for union activities protects the right to strike and union members.  Uruguay has ratified numerous International Labor Organization conventions that protect worker rights, and generally adheres to their provisions. Reports by the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean indicate that the percentage of informal workers has dropped significantly over the past decade.

The World Economic Forum’s 2018 Global Competitiveness Index ranked Uruguay 53rd of 140 countries surveyed.  However, echoing private sector concerns with Uruguayan labor unions and rigid labor laws, Uruguay ranked 138 of 140 countries in the labor relations category.  Several of the labor unions espouse strongly leftist-ideological, “anti-imperialist,” and anti-capitalist positions.  

Business owners, managers, and government employees often describe local labor laws as rigid and very burdensome.  Arguing that unions are particularly aggressive and that labor conflicts escalate quickly, private sector representatives have called for the creation of a labor-dispute process that would define the necessary steps needed before workers may strike or occupy a workplace.  Many foreign investors report high absentee rates by employees and resulting lower-than-average productivity rates. Productivity is not included in the negotiations that take place in the Salary Councils.

Labor-intensive businesses are increasingly under stress, and new business creation in Uruguay is not replacing the better-paying jobs lost from exiting private sector enterprises.  While global workforces are under stress from increased efficiencies driven by automation and business consolidations, in Uruguay the overbearing labor movement, high taxes, and low corporate profit margins further exacerbate Uruguay’s labor situation.

Labor unions are nominally independent from the government, but in practice have a close relationship with the ruling Frente Amplio coalition and key Ministries.  For years, Communist Party leaders have occupied leading positions in the unions and inside the Ministry of Labor. Unionization quadrupled from about 110,000 in 2003 to over 400,000 in 2018 (almost one-fourth of employed workers), and is particularly high in the public sector and some private sectors, such as construction, the metal industry, and banking.

Since 2005, the government has passed over 30 labor laws.  Some of these laws promote and protect labor unions, reinstate collective bargaining, regulate outsourcing activities, regulate work times in rural activities, extend the term to claim worker’s rights, relate to the eviction of employees who occupy workplaces, and impose criminal sanctions on employers who fail to adopt safety standards in their firms.  In labor trials, the judiciary tends to rule in favor of the worker, assuming the worker to be the disadvantaged party.

Collective bargaining is the rule.  Salary Councils are responsible for assessing wage increases annually at a sectoral level.  The Councils then apply agreed-upon wage increases to all individual firms in the sector, irrespective of their size or geographical location.  Councils consist of a three-party board, which includes representatives from unions, employers, and the government. If unions and employers fail to reach an agreement to determine the wage increase, the government makes the final decision.

Labor provisions apply across the board, and the government does not normally issue waivers to attract or retain investment.  Except in the construction sector, social security payments are approximately 13 percent of workers’ basic salary. Including health care insurance, social security, and other charges, employers pay approximately 40 percent of a worker’s basic total salary to the government.  In addition, there is a mandatory annual bonus and vacation pay, which result in employers paying the equivalent of 14 months of salary per employee each year. Labor laws do not differentiate between layoffs and firing. Employers must pay dismissed workers one month for each year of work with a cap of six months, except in cases of “for cause” firings.  Laws prohibit private sector employers from firing workers for discriminatory or anti-union reasons. Dismissals often result in labor conflicts, even if dismissals are required to adjust employment to fluctuating market conditions. Unemployment insurance pays workers a percentage of their salary for up to six months. In the past, the government has extended the term of the unemployment insurance for select groups of laid-off workers.

Historically, Uruguay took pride in a high literacy rate and tradition of quality public education.  However, Uruguay is experiencing a crisis in its public education system. Dropout rates at the high school level are very high, and Uruguayan students have performed poorly in the OECD’s PISA tests.  These challenges may limit the number of qualified workers available over the mid- to long-term. In 2008, the government launched a special institute, National Employment and Training Institute (INEFOP), to bolster workforce development.  There is a structural shortage of workers in the IT sector and other specialized technical industries as well.

12. OPIC and Other Investment Insurance Programs

OPIC programs are active in Uruguay, though few U.S. companies or projects request their services due to Uruguay’s stability and access to foreign currency.  The GoU signed an investment insurance agreement with OPIC in December 1982.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2:  Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2018 $59,630    2017 $56,157 http://www.bcu.gub.uy/Estadistics e Indicadores/Paginas/Default.aspx  

www.worldbank.org/en/country    

Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical Source* USG or International Statistical Source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2017 $1,415 2017 $1,556 BCU estadisticas e indicadores.

http://bea.gov/international/direct_investment_multinational_companies_comprehensive_data.htm  

Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) N/A N/A 2017 $82 https://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet  .
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2017 50% 2017 51.22% UNCTAD data available at

https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Country-Fact-Sheets.aspx  

* http://www.bcu.gub.uy/Estadisticas-e-Indicadores/Paginas/Default.aspx


Table 3:  Sources and Destination of FDI

Uruguay’s Central Bank reports that, excluding intra-firms’ loans, the U.S. was the fourth largest foreign investor in Uruguay 2013-2017.  In 2017, the U.S. held the sixth largest stock of foreign direct investment, after Argentina, Spain, Switzerland, Panama, and Chile. U.S. investment is distributed among a wide array of sectors, including forestry, tourism and hotels, services (e.g., call centers or back office), and telecommunications.

Direct Investment From/in Counterpart Economy Data
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward $19,955 100% N/A N/A N/A
Argentina $5,126 29% N/A N/A N/A
Spain $5,043 28% N/A N/A N/A
Switzerland $3,099 17% N/A N/A N/A
Panama $3,033 17% N/A N/A N/A
Chile $1,634 9% N/A N/A N/A
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.

Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey


Table 4:  Sources of Portfolio Investment

Portfolio Investment Assets
Top Five Partners (Millions, US Dollars)
Total Equity Securities Total Debt Securities
All Countries $10,211 100% All Countries $232 100% All Countries $10,131 100%
United States $5,578 55% Chile $136 59% United States $5,578 55%
Luxembourg $1,755 17% Brazil $51 22% Luxembourg $1,741 17%
Germany $1,577 16% Canada $24 10% Germany $1,577 16%
Ireland $677 7% Luxembourg $14 6% Ireland $677 7%
Japan $558 6% U.K. $7 3% Japan $558 6%

14. Contact for More Information

Ms. Salina Rico, Economic Unit
Lauro Muller 1776
Tel: (5982) 1770-2449
E-mail: RicoS@state.gov

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