7. State-Owned Enterprises
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) comprise more than half of the formal Algerian economy. SOEs are amalgamated into a single line of the state budget and are listed in the official business registry. To be defined as an SOE, a company must be at least 51 percent owned by the state.
Algerian SOEs are bureaucratic and may be subject to political influence. There are competing lines of authority at the mid-levels, and contacts report mid- and upper-level managers are reluctant to make decisions because internal accusations of favoritism or corruption are often used to settle political and personal scores. Senior management teams at SOEs report to their relevant ministry; CEOs of the larger companies such as national hydrocarbons company Sonatrach, national electric utility Sonelgaz, and airline Air Algerie report directly to ministers. Boards of directors are appointed by the state, and the allocation of these seats is considered political. SOEs are not known to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance.
Legally, public and private companies compete under the same terms with respect to market share, products and services, and incentives. In reality, private enterprises assert that public companies sometimes receive more favorable treatment. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, but they work with private banks and they are less bureaucratic than their public counterparts. Public companies generally refrain from doing business with private banks and a 2008 government directive ordered public companies to work only with public banks. The directive was later officially rescinded, but public companies continued the practice. However, the heads of Algeria’s two largest state enterprises, Sonatrach and Sonelgaz, both indicated in 2020 that given current budget pressures they are investigating recourse to foreign financing, including from private banks. SOEs are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors, but business contacts report that the government favors SOEs over private sector companies in terms of access to land.
SOEs are subject to budget constraints. Audits of public companies can be conducted by the Court of Auditors, a financially autonomous institution. The constitution explicitly charges it with “ex post inspection of the finances of the state, collectivities, public services, and commercial capital of the state,” as well as preparing and submitting an annual report to the President, heads of both chambers of Parliament, and Prime Minister. The Court makes its audits public on its website, for free, but with a time delay, which does not conform to international norms.
The Court conducts audits simultaneously but independently from the Ministry of Finance’s year-end reports. The Court makes its reports available online once finalized and delivered to the Parliament, whereas the Ministry withholds publishing year-end reports until after the Parliament and President have approved them. The Court’s audit reports cover the entire implemented national budget by fiscal year and examine each annual planning budget that is passed by Parliament.
The General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF), the public auditing body under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance, can conduct “no-notice” audits of public companies. The results of these audits are sent directly to the Minister of Finance, and the offices of the President and Prime Minister. They are not made available publicly. The Court of Auditors and IGF previously had joint responsibility for auditing certain accounts, but they are in the process of eliminating this redundancy. Further legislation clarifying whether the delineation of responsibility for particular accounts which could rest with the Court of Auditors or the Ministry of Finance’s General Inspection of Finance (IGF) unit has yet to be issued.
There has been limited privatization of certain projects previously managed by SOEs, and so far restricted to the water sector and possibly a few other sectors. However, the privatization of SOEs remains publicly sensitive and has been largely halted.
The current anti-corruption law dates to 2006. In 2013, the Algerian government created the Central Office for the Suppression of Corruption (OCRC) to investigate and prosecute any form of bribery in Algeria. The number of cases currently being investigated by the OCRC is not available. In 2010, the government created the National Organization for the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption (ONPLC) as stipulated in the 2006 anti-corruption law. The Chairman and members of this commission are appointed by a presidential decree. The commission studies financial holdings of public officials, though not their relatives, and carries out studies. Since 2013, the Financial Intelligence Unit has been strengthened by new regulations that have given the unit more authority to address illegal monetary transactions and terrorism funding. In 2016, the government updated its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance legislation to bolster the authority of the financial intelligence unit to monitor suspicious financial transactions and refer violations of the law to prosecutorial magistrates. Algeria signed the UN Convention Against Corruption in 2003.
The new Algerian constitution, which the President approved in December 2020, includes provisions that strengthen the role and capacity of anti-corruption bodies, particularly through the creation of the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention, and Fight against Corruption. This body is tasked with developing and enabling the implementation of a national strategy for transparency and preventing and combatting corruption.
The Algerian government does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials. The use of internal controls against bribery of government officials varies by company, with some upholding those standards and others rumored to offer bribes. Algeria is not a participant in regional or international anti-corruption initiatives. Algeria does not provide protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. While whistleblower protections for Algerian citizens who report corruption exist, members of Algeria’s anti-corruption bodies believe they need to be strengthened to be effective.
International and Algerian economic operators have identified corruption as a challenge for FDI. They indicate that foreign companies with strict compliance standards cannot effectively compete against companies which can offer special incentives to those making decisions about contract awards. Economic operators have also indicated that complex bureaucratic procedures are sometimes manipulated by political actors to ensure economic benefits accrue to favored individuals in a non-transparent way. Anti-corruption efforts have so far focused more on prosecuting previous acts of corruption rather than on institutional reforms to reduce the incentives and opportunities for corruption. In October 2019, the government adopted legislation which allowed police to launch anti-corruption investigations without first receiving a formal complaint against the entity in question. Proponents argued the measure is necessary given Algeria’s weak whistle blower protections.
Currently the government is working with international partners to update legal mechanisms to deal with corruption issues. The government also created a new institution to target and deter the practice of overbilling on invoices, which has been used to unlawfully transfer foreign currency out of the country.
The government imprisoned numerous prominent economic and political figures in 2019 and 2020 as part of an anti-corruption campaign. Some operators report that fear of being accused of corruption has made some officials less willing to make decisions, delaying some investment approvals. Corruption cases that have reached trial deal largely with state investment in the automotive, public works sectors, and hydrocarbons, though other cases are reportedly under investigation.
Resources to Report Corruption
Central Office for the Suppression of Corruption (OCRC)
Mokhtar Lakhdari, General Director
Placette el Qods, Hydra, Algiers +213 21 68 63 12
no email address publicly available
National Organization for the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption (ONPLC)
Tarek Kour, President
14 Rue Souidani Boudjemaa, El Mouradia, Algiers +213 21 23 94 76
13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics
Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
* Source for Host Country Data: No Host Country data available.
Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
|Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data|
|From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)|
|Inward Direct Investment||Outward Direct Investment|
|Total Inward||20,743||100%||Total Outward||2,511||100%|
|“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.|
The latest data available for Algeria is from 2019.
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information