State-owned enterprises (SOEs) comprise more than half of the formal Algerian economy. SOEs are amalgamated into a single line of the state budget and are listed in the official business registry. To be defined as an SOE, a company must be at least 51 percent owned by the state.

Algerian SOEs are bureaucratic and may be subject to political influence. There are competing lines of authority at the mid-levels, and contacts report mid- and upper-level managers are reluctant to make decisions because internal accusations of favoritism or corruption are often used to settle political and personal scores. Senior management teams at SOEs report to their relevant ministry; CEOs of the larger companies such as national hydrocarbons company Sonatrach, national electric utility Sonelgaz, and airline Air Algerie report directly to ministers. Boards of directors are appointed by the state, and the allocation of these seats is considered political. SOEs are not known to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance.

Legally, public and private companies compete under the same terms with respect to market share, products and services, and incentives. In reality, private enterprises assert that public companies sometimes receive more favorable treatment. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, but they work with private banks and they are less bureaucratic than their public counterparts. Public companies generally refrain from doing business with private banks and a 2008 government directive ordered public companies to work only with public banks. The directive was later officially rescinded, but public companies continued the practice. However, the heads of Algeria’s two largest state enterprises, Sonatrach and Sonelgaz, both indicated in 2020 that given current budget pressures they are investigating recourse to foreign financing, including from private banks. SOEs are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors, but business contacts report that the government favors SOEs over private sector companies in terms of access to land.

SOEs are subject to budget constraints. Audits of public companies can be conducted by the Court of Auditors, a financially autonomous institution. The constitution explicitly charges it with “ex post inspection of the finances of the state, collectivities, public services, and commercial capital of the state,” as well as preparing and submitting an annual report to the President, heads of both chambers of Parliament, and Prime Minister. The Court makes its audits public on its website, for free, but with a time delay, which does not conform to international norms.

The Court conducts audits simultaneously but independently from the Ministry of Finance’s year-end reports. The Court makes its reports available online once finalized and delivered to the Parliament, whereas the Ministry withholds publishing year-end reports until after the Parliament and President have approved them. The Court’s audit reports cover the entire implemented national budget by fiscal year and examine each annual planning budget that is passed by Parliament.

The General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF), the public auditing body under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance, can conduct “no-notice” audits of public companies. The results of these audits are sent directly to the Minister of Finance, and the offices of the President and Prime Minister. They are not made available publicly. The Court of Auditors and IGF previously had joint responsibility for auditing certain accounts, but they are in the process of eliminating this redundancy. Further legislation clarifying whether the delineation of responsibility for particular accounts which could rest with the Court of Auditors or the Ministry of Finance’s General Inspection of Finance (IGF) unit has yet to be issued.

Privatization Program

There has been limited privatization of certain projects previously managed by SOEs, and so far restricted to the water sector and possibly a few other sectors. However, the privatization of SOEs remains publicly sensitive and has been largely halted.

The current anti-corruption law dates to 2006. In 2013, the Algerian government created the Central Office for the Suppression of Corruption (OCRC) to investigate and prosecute any form of bribery in Algeria. The number of cases currently being investigated by the OCRC is not available. In 2010, the government created the National Organization for the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption (ONPLC) as stipulated in the 2006 anti-corruption law. The Chairman and members of this commission are appointed by a presidential decree. The commission studies financial holdings of public officials, though not their relatives, and carries out studies. Since 2013, the Financial Intelligence Unit has been strengthened by new regulations that have given the unit more authority to address illegal monetary transactions and terrorism funding. In 2016, the government updated its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance legislation to bolster the authority of the financial intelligence unit to monitor suspicious financial transactions and refer violations of the law to prosecutorial magistrates. Algeria signed the UN Convention Against Corruption in 2003.

The new Algerian constitution, which the President approved in December 2020, includes provisions that strengthen the role and capacity of anti-corruption bodies, particularly through the creation of the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention, and Fight against Corruption. This body is tasked with developing and enabling the implementation of a national strategy for transparency and preventing and combatting corruption.

The Algerian government does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials. The use of internal controls against bribery of government officials varies by company, with some upholding those standards and others rumored to offer bribes. Algeria is not a participant in regional or international anti-corruption initiatives. Algeria does not provide protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. While whistleblower protections for Algerian citizens who report corruption exist, members of Algeria’s anti-corruption bodies believe they need to be strengthened to be effective.

International and Algerian economic operators have identified corruption as a challenge for FDI. They indicate that foreign companies with strict compliance standards cannot effectively compete against companies which can offer special incentives to those making decisions about contract awards. Economic operators have also indicated that complex bureaucratic procedures are sometimes manipulated by political actors to ensure economic benefits accrue to favored individuals in a non-transparent way. Anti-corruption efforts have so far focused more on prosecuting previous acts of corruption rather than on institutional reforms to reduce the incentives and opportunities for corruption. In October 2019, the government adopted legislation which allowed police to launch anti-corruption investigations without first receiving a formal complaint against the entity in question. Proponents argued the measure is necessary given Algeria’s weak whistle blower protections.

Currently the government is working with international partners to update legal mechanisms to deal with corruption issues. The government also created a new institution to target and deter the practice of overbilling on invoices, which has been used to unlawfully transfer foreign currency out of the country.

The government imprisoned numerous prominent economic and political figures in 2019 and 2020 as part of an anti-corruption campaign. Some operators report that fear of being accused of corruption has made some officials less willing to make decisions, delaying some investment approvals. Corruption cases that have reached trial deal largely with state investment in the automotive, public works sectors, and hydrocarbons, though other cases are reportedly under investigation.

Resources to Report Corruption

Central Office for the Suppression of Corruption (OCRC)

Mokhtar Lakhdari, General Director

Placette el Qods, Hydra, Algiers +213 21 68 63 12

+213 21 68 63 12 www.facebook.com/263685900503591/ 

www.facebook.com/263685900503591/  no email address publicly available

no email address publicly available

National Organization for the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption (ONPLC)

Tarek Kour, President

14 Rue Souidani Boudjemaa, El Mouradia, Algiers +213 21 23 94 76

+213 21 23 94 76 www.onplc.org.dz/index.php/ 

www.onplc.org.dz/index.php/  contact@onplc.org.dz 

contact@onplc.org.dz 

Watchdog organization:

Djilali Hadjadj

President

Algerian Association Against Corruption (AACC) www.facebook.com/215181501888412/ 

www.facebook.com/215181501888412/  +213 07 71 43 97 08

+213 07 71 43 97 08 aaccalgerie@yahoo.fr 

aaccalgerie@yahoo.fr  10. Political and Security Environment

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

* Source for Host Country Data: No Host Country data available.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

The latest data available for Algeria is from 2019.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Data not available. 14. Contact for More Information

In Angola, certain SOEs exercise delegated governmental powers, especially in the mining sector where the government is the sole concessionaire. Foreign investors may sometimes find demands made by SOEs excessive, and under such conditions, SOEs have easier access to credit and government contracts. There is no law mandating preferential treatment to SOEs, but in practice they have access to inside information and credit. Currently, SOEs are not subject to budgetary constraints and quite often exceed their capital limits.

SOEs, often benefitting from a government mandate, operate mostly in the extractive; transportation; commerce; banking; and construction, building, and heavy equipment sectors. All SOEs in Angola are required to have boards of directors, and most board members are affiliated with the government. SOEs are not explicitly required to consult with government officials before making decisions. By law, SOEs must publish annual financial reports for the previous year in the national daily newspaper Jornal de Angola by April 1. Such reports are not always subject to publicly released external audits (though the audit of state oil firm Sonangol is publicly released). The standards used are often questioned. Not all SOEs fulfill their legal obligations, and few are sanctioned.

Angola’s supreme audit institution, Tribunal de Contas, is responsible for auditing SOEs. However, reports from the Tribunal de Contas are only made public after a few years. The most recently published report, for 2017, was published in 2019. Angola’s fiscal transparency would be improved by ensuring its supreme audit institution’s audits of SOEs and the government’s annual financial accounts are made public within a reasonable period. Publicly available audit reports would also improve the transparency of contracts between private companies and SOEs.

In November 2016, the Angolan Government revised Law 1/14 “Legal Regime on Issuance and Management of Direct and Indirect Debt,” which now differentiates between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ public debt. The GRA considers SOE debt as indirect public debt, and only accounts in its state budget for direct government debt, thus effectively not reflecting some substantial obligations in fact owed by the government. President Lourenço has launched various reforms to improve financial sector transparency, enhance efficiency in the country’s SOEs as part of the National Development plan 2018-2022 and Macroeconomic Stability Plan. The strategy included the prospective privatization of 195 SOE assets that are deemed not profitable to the state. The privatization will possibly include the restructuring of the national air carrier TAAG, as well as Sonangol and its subsidiaries. The latter intends to sell off its non-core businesses as part of its restructuring strategy to make the parastatal more efficient.

Angola is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Angola does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate governance for SOEs.

Privatization Program

In 2020 the GRA increased the number of assets to be privatized by 2022 from 90 to 195 through the Angola Debt and Securities Exchange market (BODIVA) and under the supervision of the Institute of Management of Assets and State Holdings (IGAPE). The privatization program “PROPRIV,” implements the Government’s Interim Macroeconomic Stabilization Program (PEM), which aims to rid the government of unprofitable public institutions. The GRA plans to privatize part of state-owned Angola Telecommunications Company, companies in the oil and energy sector, as well as several textile and beverages industries. The GRA has stated that the privatization process will be open to interested foreign investors and has guaranteed a transparent bidding process. The tenders are open to local and foreign investors. In 2020 PROPRIV helped the government raise over USD 500 million through the privatization of 33 assets following public tenders.

The oil company Sonangol, the State’s largest SOE, sold 14 of the 20 companies it planned to privatize in 2019. It also sold 19 out of 26 planned to be sold in 2020. The Covid-19 pandemic has slowed privatization efforts, and the rest of the total 70 assets to be privatized will likely be sold in 2021 and 2022. The list includes divestments in the subsidiaries and assets of Sonangol Cabo Verde – Sociedade e Investimentos and Óleos de São Tomé and Príncipe, as well as stakes in Founton (Gibraltar), Sonatide Marine (Cayman Islands), Solo Properties Knightbridge (United Kingdom), Societé Ivoiriense de Raffinage (Cote d’Ivoire), Puma Energy Holdings (Singapore) and Sonandiets Services (Panama), by 2021.

Sonangol will sell its stake in WTA-Houston Express and French company WTA, as well as assets in Portuguese real estate companies Puaça, Diraniproject III and Diraniproject V, in Sonacergy – Serviços e Construções, Sonafurt International Shipping and Atlantis Viagens e Turismo. Sonangol also holds assets to be privatized in Angolan companies in the Health, Education, Transport, Telecommunications, Energy, Civil Construction, Mineral Resources and Oil and Banking sectors.

The sale of more than 60 non-core assets will make the company “financially more robust,” and allow it to focus on its core business.

The GRA created a privatization commission on February 27, 2018 and a website https://igape.minfin.gov.ao/PortalIGAPE/#!/sala-de-imprensa/noticias/5413/anuncio-de-concurso-tender-announcement   for submission of tenders. Full tender documents can be obtained by visiting the below link: http://www.ucm.minfin.gov.ao/cs/groups/public/documents/document/zmlu/mdu4/~edisp/minfin058842.zip

Alternatively, contact igape@minfin.gov.ao .

Angola occupies the 142nd place out of 180 in the Corruption perception index  of the organization Transparency International, in clear progress since the last report (+19 places).

Corruption remains a strong impediment to doing business in Angola and has had a corrosive impact on international market investment opportunities and on the broader business climate. Angola has a comprehensive anti-corruption legal framework, but implementation remains a severe challenge.

In January 2020, the government issued a general conduct guide mostly for the National Public Procurement Service, the regulatory and supervisory body of public procurement in Angola, outlining whistleblowing responsibilities for corruption and related offences in public procurement. Since coming into office on an anti-corruption platform, President Lourenco has led a concerted effort to restore investor confidence by prioritizing anti-corruption and the fight against nepotism. Following approval in October 2019, a new law on anti-money laundering, combating the Financing of Terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction came into force in January 2020, superseding Law No. 34/11, of 12 December 2011. The new law incorporates several IMF and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations. Importantly, it now recognizes and politically exposed persons as any national or foreign person that holds or has held a public office in Angola, or in any other country or jurisdiction, or in any international organization, and subjects them to greater scrutiny by the financial sector. Other significant improvements in the new law include:

• The definition of “ultimate beneficial owner” was expanded to encompass, notably, all persons that hold, directly or indirectly, a controlling interest in a company, including the control of the share capital, voting rights or a significant influence in the company. There is no longer a minimum threshold to determine the existence of control.
• Identification and diligence duties are now applicable to occasional transactions executed via wire transfers in an amount of more than USD 1,000, in national or foreign currency.
• The scope of the duty to communicate suspicious transactions in cash or wire transfers has been amended and is now applicable to transactions between USD 5,000 and USD 15,000, depending on the underlying operation.
• Payment service providers that control the ordering and reception of a wire transfer must consider the information received from the sender and the beneficiary to determine whether there is a duty to report.
• The Tax Authorities now have a duty to report suspicious cross-border payments.

The president approved a set of amendments to the Public Contracts Law on November 16, 2018, which imposed further requirements for the declaration of assets and income, interests, impartiality, confidentiality, and independence in the formation and execution of public contracts. In December 2018, the Government of Angola rolled out a national anti-corruption strategy (NACS) billed under the motto, “Corruption – A fight for all and by all.” The five-year strategy, developed in concert with the UNDP, is designed to improve government transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to citizen needs. The NACS focuses on three pillars in the fight against corruption – prevention, prosecution, and institutional capacity building.

Crimes linked to corruption are enforced through the Public Probity Law of 2010. President Lourenco’s mandate for senior government officials requires all public officials to disclose their assets and income once every two years, and it prohibits public servants from receiving money or gifts from private business deals. The Attorney General’s Office has indicted two members of Parliament on corruption charges since the publication of the country’s anti-corruption strategy in 2018. The Penal Code makes it a criminal offense for private enterprises to engage in business transactions with public officials.

Angola has incorporated regional anti-corruption guidelines and into their domestic legislation, including: the SADC “Protocol Against Corruption,” the African Union’s “Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption,” and the United Nation’s “Convention against Corruption.” Angola does not have an independent body to investigate and prosecute corruption cases, and enforcement of existing laws is generally weak or non-existent. However, the Attorney General’s office has a department focused on investigating of corruption crimes and recovering Assets. Three institutions – the Audit Court, the Inspector General of Finance, and the Office of the Attorney General – perform many of the anti-corruption duties in Angola. http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/sub-saharan-africa/angola/initiatives/public-anti-corruption-initiatives.aspx  

The government also passed the Law on the Repatriation of Financial Resources in June 2018, which established the terms and conditions for the repatriation of financial resources held abroad by resident individuals and legal entities with registered offices in Angola. The law exempted individuals and legal entities, who voluntarily repatriated their financial resources within a period of 180 days following the date of entry into force of the Law, by transferring the funds to an Angolan bank account, from any obligation or liability of tax, foreign exchange and criminal charge. Upon expiry of the grace period for repatriation, the law allowed for the possibility of forced repatriation by the government. The government estimates that USD 30 billion of Angolan assets are sheltered overseas though some estimates point to as much as USD 100 billion. In early 2019, the government established the National Asset Recovery Service (SNRA), an institution linked to the Attorney General’s Office (PGR), in charge of ensuring compliance with the repatriation law. Attorney General Helder Pita Groz announced in December 2020 that since the establishment of the SRNA, Angola had recovered more than USD 5 billion in assets and cash. Also, in January 2019, the National Assembly approved the new Penal Code, which includes harsher punishment for active and passive corruption. While a substantial proportion of Angolans (44%) see corruption as declining, a majority (54%) say the GRA is doing a poor job in fighting corruption. The perception persists that the GRA is using the fight against corruption as a tool to crack down on political opponents within the ruling MPLA party. More than half (55%) believe that people who report corruption to the authorities risk retaliation or other negative consequences. The national police are widely perceived as more corrupt than any other public officials with whom citizens regularly interact.

Private sector companies have individual internal controls for ethics, compliance and tracking fraudulent activities. However, they do not have a mechanism to detect and report irregularities related to dealings with public officials. It is important for U.S. companies, regardless of their size, to assess the business climate in the sector in which they will be operating or investing, and to have an effective compliance program or measures to prevent and detect corruption, including foreign bribery. U.S. individuals and firms operating or investing in Angola, should take the time to become familiar with the relevant anticorruption laws of both Angola and the United States in order to properly comply with them, and where appropriate, to seek legal counsel.

Angola is not a member state to the UN Anticorruption Convention or the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. On March 26, 2018 it ratified and published in the national gazette the African Union Convention on the Prevention and Fight against Corruption and now takes legislative measures against illicit enrichment (Article 8), confiscation and seizure of proceeds and means of corruption (Article 16), and international cooperation in matters of corruption and money laundering (Article 20).

Resources to Report Corruption

Hélder Pitta Grós
Procurador Geral da Republica (Attorney General of the Republic)
Procurador Geral da Republica (Attorney General’s Office)
Travessa Antonio Marques Monteiro 22, Maianga
Telephone: 244-222-333172

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

There are several wholly owned SOEs operating in the country, including public utilities, fixed and mobile telecommunications, postal services, port and airport management, gas distribution, pension funds, agricultural production, and hotel and convention center management. There is also a number of partially owned SOEs in Benin. Some of these receive subsidies and assistance from the government. There are no available statistics regarding the number of individuals employed by SOEs.

With the exception of public utilities, pension funds, and landline telephone service for which the public telephone company retains a monopoly, many private enterprises compete with public enterprises on equal terms.

SOE senior management may report directly to a government ministry, a parent agency, or a board of directors comprised of senior government officials along with representatives of civil society and other parastatal constituencies. SOEs are required by law to publish annual reports and hold regular meetings of their boards of directors. Financial statements of SOEs are reviewed by certified accountants, private auditors, and the government’s Bureau of Analysis and Investigation (BAI). The government audits SOEs, though it does not make available information on financial transfers to and from SOEs.

SOEs are established pursuant to presidential decrees, which define their mission and responsibilities. The government appoints senior management and members of the Board of Directors. SOEs are generally run like private entities and are subject to the same tax policies as the private sector. The courts process disputes between SOEs and private companies or organizations.

Privatization Program

Foreign investors may participate in privatization programs. The Talon administration has targeted divestiture programs rather than total privatization of state-owned enterprises.  The state-owned telecommunications company, Benin Telecom Infrastructure, is targeted for either a divestiture program or dissolution by 2021.  With support from MCC, SBEE is managed privately through a management contract through 2023, even though the government retains full ownership.  The government is pursuing major transactions to attract private investment into thermal and solar power generation, as well as natural gas supply for power generation. In 2017, the government signed a three-year renewable management contract for the Port of Cotonou with the Belgian firm Port of Antwerp International (PAI).  PAI took over management of the port in May 2018. The move was intended to improve port management and attract foreign investors to fund a planned project to modernize and expand the port.

Benin has laws aimed at combatting corruption, though corruption remains a recurring problem in areas including public administration, government procurement, customs and taxation, and the judiciary. The new HCPC is the lead government entity on corruption issues and has the authority to refer corruption cases to court. The HCPC has the authority to combat money laundering, electoral fraud, and economic fraud in the public and private sectors. Benin’s State Audit Office is also responsible for identifying and acting against corruption in the public sector. The CRIET processes cases related to economic crimes, which can include corruption. In 2018, the National Assembly approved the lifting of parliamentary immunity of a small number of opposition parliamentarians accused of corruption or embezzlement during their past positions in former governments.

Bribery is illegal and subject to up to 10 years’ imprisonment, but enforcement is uneven. Private companies often establish their own codes of conduct.

Beninese procurement law allows for open and closed bid processes. Contracts are often awarded based on government solicitations to short-listed companies with industry-specific expertise, often identified based on companies’ commercial activities conducted in other overseas markets. The government often uses sole sourcing for projects, including for PAG implementation, and in these cases does not publish procurement requests before selecting a vendor. Foreign companies have expressed concerns about unfair treatment, biased consideration, and improper practices specific to the process of selecting short-listed companies.

Benin is a signatory of the UN Anticorruption Convention and the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

Resources to Report Corruption

Government of Benin Haut-Commissariat a la Prevention de la Corruption (HCPC)
Haut-Commissariat a la Prevention de la Corruption (HCPC)
01 BP 7060 Cotonou, Benin
+229 21 308 686
anlc.benin@yahoo.fr

Ms. Blanche Sonon
President
Social Watch Benin
02 BP 937, Cotonou, Benin
+229 21042012 – 229 95961644
swbenin@socialwatch-benin.org

* Source for Host Country Data:  Recent GOB data not available

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs), known as “parastatals,” are majority or 100 percent owned by the GoB. There is a published list of SOEs at the GoB portal ( www.gov.bw ) with profiles of financial and development SOEs. Some SOEs are state-sanctioned monopolies, including the Botswana Meat Commission, the Water Utilities Corporation, Botswana Railways, and the Botswana Power Corporation.

The same business registration and licensing laws govern private and government-owned enterprises. No law or regulation prohibits or restricts private enterprises from competing with SOEs. Botswana law requires SOEs to publish annual reports, and private sector accountants or the Auditor General audits SOEs depending on how they are constituted. GoB ministries together with their respective SOEs are compelled on an annual basis to appear before the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee to provide reports and answer questions regarding their performance. Some SOEs are not performing well and have been embroiled in scandals involving alleged fraud and mismanagement. Botswana is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO.

Privatization Program

The GOB has committed to privatization on paper. It established a task force in 1997 to privatize all of its state-owned companies and formed a Public Enterprises Evaluation and Privatization Agency (PEEPA) to oversee this process. Implementation of its privatization commitments has been limited to the January 2016 sale offer of 49 percent of the stock of the state-owned Botswana Telecommunications Corporation to Botswana citizens only. In February 2017, the GoB issued an Expressions of Interest for the privatization of its national airline, but progress stopped due to the decision to re-fleet the airline before privatization. In early 2019, President Masisi announced the Botswana Meat Commission was being placed in the hands of a private management company prior to privatization. Conversely, the GoB has created new SOEs such as the Okavango Diamond Company, the Mineral Development Company, and Botswana Oil Limited in recent years. A Rationalization Strategy covering all parastatals has been developed and its implementation will address issues such as duplication of activities, overlapping mandates, and issues of corporate governance. This may finally result in some SOEs being privatized or merged while some may be closed.

Botswana has a reputation for relatively low corruption levels and a willingness to prosecute corrupt officials. Transparency International ranks Botswana as the least corrupt country in Africa (35th worldwide). Investors with experience in other developing nations describe the relative lack of obstruction or interference by law enforcement or other government agents as among the country’s most important assets. Nevertheless, private sector representatives note rising corruption levels in government tender procurements.

The major corruption investigation body is the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC). Anecdotal reports on the DCEC’s effectiveness vary. The DCEC has embarked on an education campaign to raise public awareness about the cost of corruption and is also working with GoB departments to reform their accountability procedures. Corruption is punishable by a prison term of up to 10 years, a fine of USD 50,000, or both. The GoB has prosecuted high-level officials. Corruption allegations have surfaced recently around pension fund management and government procurement procedures and are still under investigation.

The 2000 Proceeds of Serious Crime Act expanded the DCEC’s mandate to include combatting money laundering. The 2009 Financial Intelligence Act provides a comprehensive legal framework to address money laundering and establishes a financial intelligence agency (FIA). The FIA, which operates under the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, cooperates with various institutions, such as Directorate of Public Prosecutions, Botswana Police Service, Bank of Botswana, the Non-Banking Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority, the DCEC, and foreign FIAs to uncover and investigate suspicious financial transactions. Botswana is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a regional standards-setting body for ensuring appropriate laws, policies, and practices to fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism. In October 2018, Botswana was “grey-listed” by the Financial Action Task Force and is currently implementing an action plan to address shortcomings that led to the listing.

UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery

Botswana is not a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, but it is a party to the 2005 United Nations Convention against Corruption.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contacts for agencies responsible for combating corruption:

Mr. Tymon Katlholo
Director General
Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime
Madirelo Extension 6, Gaborone, Botswana
+267 3914002/+267 3604200
dcec@gov.bw 

Mr. Kgakgamalo Ketshajwang (Acting)
Executive Director
Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board
Private Bag 0058, Gaborone, Botswana
+267 3602000
webmaster@ppadb.co.bw 

Dr. Abraham Sethibe
Director
Financial Intelligence Agency
Private Bag 0190, Gaborone, Botswana
+267 3998400
asethibe@gov.bw 

Complainants can also reach out to ministers of the relevant ministries for a particular tender and provide a copy of the complaint to the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) Executive Chairperson.

* Source for Host Country Data: Bank of Botswana 2019 Annual Report

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

According to the Bank of Botswana, investment in Botswana totaled 86.3 billion Pula in 2018, of which 30.8 billion Pula were non-FDI investments. Africa (36 percent) and Europe (54 percent) accounted for most of the 55.5 billion Pula influx of FDI. Within these regions, South Africa and the United Kingdom were the predominant players, accounting for 10.9 and 27.4 billion Pula respectively. Little data on FDI sources is available for countries and regions with limited investments in Botswana. Mining accounted for 38.6 percent of Foreign Investment inflows in 2018.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey data are not available for Botswana. 2019 estimates for Botswana’s net international investments increased by 9.1 percent from 57.8 billion Pula in 2018 to 62.6 billion Pula in 2019. On the assets side, direct investments, portfolio investments increased by 9.3 percent, 20.7 percent respectively, while foreign exchange reserves and other investments decreased by 8.7 percent and 4.5 percent respectively. Portfolio investment increased due to the rise in equity and debt securities invested abroad.

There are five SOEs in Burundi with 100 percent government ownership: REGIDESO (public utility company), ONATEL (telecom), SOSUMO (sugar), OTB (tea), COGERCO (cotton) and ODECA (Coffee). No statistics on assets are available for these companies as their reports are not available to the public. Board members for SOEs are appointed by the GoB and report to its ministries. The GoB has a minority (40 percent) share in Brarudi, a branch of the Heineken Group, and in three banking companies.

There is no published list of SOEs.

SOEs have no market-based advantages and compete with other investors under the same terms and conditions; however, Burundi does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate governance for SOEs.

Privatization Program

In 2002, Burundi entered an active phase of political stabilization, national reconciliation and economic reform. In 2004, it received an emergency post-conflict program from the IMF and the World Bank, paving the way for the development of the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Alleviation (PRSP). After the 2005 elections, the GoB made the decision to open several state-owned enterprises in different sectors of the economy to private investment, including foreign investment. The Burundian government, considering coffee a strategic sector of its economy, decided to opt for the privatization of the coffee sector first in an effort to modernize it. However, following the crisis of 2015, the GoB decided to suspend immediately the privatization program. At that time, it had not yet privatized other sectors such as tea or sugar. In late 2019, the GoB regained control of the coffee sector, citing as its rationale perceived mismanagement on the part of the privatized companies during the 2015-2019. It is unclear if or when the privatization program will continue.

The privatization program was open to all potential buyers, including foreigners, and there was no explicit discrimination against foreign investors at any stage of the investment process. Public bidding was mandatory. The process is transparent and non-discriminatory. When the government intends to sell a business or shares in a business, offers are published in local newspapers.

The government has an anti-corruption law and an enforcement organization, the Anti-Corruption Brigade, responsible for enforcing this legislation. Cabinet members, parliamentarians, and officials appointed by presidential decree have immunity from prosecution on corruption charges, insulating them from accountability. Laws designed to combat corruption do not extend to family members of officials or to political parties.

Article 60 of the April 2016 law “Bearing Measures for the Prevention and Punishment of Corruption and Related Offenses” regulates conflicts of interest, including in awarding government procurement. Burundian legislation criminalizes bribery of public officials, but there is no specific requirement for private companies to establish internal codes of conduct.

Burundi is a signatory to the UN Anti-Corruption Convention and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. Burundi has also been a member of the East African Anti-Corruption Authority since joining the EAC in 2007. The country does not provide protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption.

A number of U.S. firms have specifically noted corruption as an obstacle to direct investment in Burundi. Corruption is most pervasive in the award of licenses and concessions, which takes place in a non-transparent environment with frequent allegations of bribery and cronyism. Many customs officials are also reportedly corrupt, regularly extorting bribes from exporters and importers.

President Ndayishimiye has prioritized anti-corruption and efficiency efforts, particularly in state-owned enterprises, firing 40 director-level public employees and promising more punitive actions against corrupt or underperforming employees.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption:

Name: Roger Ndikumana
Title: Commissaire Général
Organization: Anti-Corruption Brigade
Address: PO Box 890 Bujumbura
Telephone Number: (+257) 22 25 62 37
Email Address: brigadeanticorruption@yahoo.fr 

Contact at a “watchdog” organization (international, regional, local, or nongovernmental organization operating in the country/economy that monitors corruption, such as Transparency International):

Name: Gabriel Rufyiri
Title: President
Organization: OLUCOME
Address: 47, Chaussée Prince Louis Rwagasore, n°47, 1st Floor
Telephone Number: (+257) 79 30 82 97
Email Address: rufyirig@gmail.com  / olucome2003@gmail.com 

Starting in the mid-1990s, Cabo Verde implemented a series of reforms that have transformed a centrally planned economy into a market-oriented economy.  Since then, the number of major enterprises of which the state is a majority owner has decreased from 40 to six.  State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are most active in the transportation sector.  They are generally managed by a board of directors nominated by the minister in charge of the respective sector.  These boards of directors have between three and five members.  SOEs are generally evaluated based on their economic or financial performance.  All SOEs are required to produce annual reports and must submit their books to independent auditors.  Even though not all directors are politically appointed, they must maintain the confidence and support of the government.

Cabo Verde is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO.  In principle, it tries to adhere to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on Corporate Governance.

Privatization Program

The government continues to look at privatizations and concessions as tools to bring new dynamics to the economy, through new business and investment opportunities for the domestic and international private sectors. 

 Both foreign and domestic investors can participate in the public bidding process, which is transparent and non-discriminatory.  On hold due to the COVID-19 crisis are the privatizations or concessions for the management of the national port and airport authorities (ENAPOR and ASA, respectively), the pharmaceutical company (EMPROFAC), and the electric and water utility (Electra).

Cabo Verde has signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption.  Under Cabo Verdean law, giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal act punishable by up to eight years in prison.  To combat corruption effectively, the Cabo Verdean government established the High Authority against Corruption, and the National Assembly has added three additional prosecutors to enforce the law in this area.  Other institutions active in combating corruption include the Judicial Police, the Prosecuting Counsel, and the courts.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption:
Luis Jose Tavares Landim
Attorney General (Procuradoria Geral da Republica)
CP 268 Praia – Cabo Verde
Phone +238 261 1665

Contact at international organizations:
Cristina Andrade
Senior National Coordinator
UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Av OUA, ASA
Praia – Cabo Verde

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

* Source for Host Country Data: National Statistics Institute (INE) and Cabo Verde Central Bank (BCV)

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Data not available.

Cameroon has at least 200 SOEs. Roughly 70 percent of SOEs are profit-oriented, though most are a net negative on government finances. Some provide public services. Many SOEs are so dominant in their markets that they act as de facto regulators, specifically in telecommunications and media. The Government of Cameroon has over 130 state-owned companies in which it has majority ownership, and which operate in key sectors of the economy including agribusiness, energy, and mining. SOEs are also present in real estate, transportation, services, information and communication technology, finance, and travel.

In 2017, the National Assembly voted into law a new regulation to govern SOEs. The stated objective is to improve the services offered and the competitiveness of public companies, in line with the country’s development objectives. Some of the innovations of this law include the diversification of the investment universe of SOEs, modern control through reporting requirements, and compliance with modern governance principles. As of 2021, it does not appear that any of these objectives have been completed.  SOEs competing in the domestic market receive non-market-based advantages from the Cameroonian government. They receive taxpayer subsidies, and in many markets, serve as de facto regulators. They also have a history of accumulating unpaid tax arrears while at the same time benefitting from preferential access to land and to public funds through state interventions.

The Supreme Audit Chamber of Cameroon indicates in its yearly reports that SOEs are not financially transparent. Only about 22 percent of these companies publish financial accounts. Other reports have highlighted corruption cases involving managers of SOEs, inefficiencies, severe dysfunctions, and opacity in the management of SOEs. These problems are exacerbated by the government’s failure to impose any performance targets, productivity requirements, and quality of service standards nor any significant budget constraints on SOEs. The governing boards and senior executive teams are political appointees and connected individuals.  The SOEs have means to avoid tax burdens levied on private enterprises, receive specialized consideration for subsidies and enhanced operating budgets, and obtain generally preferential treatment from the government (including courts).

Privatization Program

In general, privatization appears to be on hold. The government favors Public-Private Partnerships or some variations of outsourcing of contractual management, with the state retaining some ownership of assets or of the business, rather than outright privatization. In some cases, the state also prefers to participate in ventures, such as mining companies, rather than creating a state-owned company. Yet, in at least one case, the government has appeared to be reversing privatization.  This is the case for the country’s utility sectors, such as water and electricity, where the government has outsourced distribution to private operators. The state retains control of infrastructure, and there are no indications that this situation will change soon. There has been call for the government to list part of its stakes in state-owned companies on the Central African Stock Exchange (CASE).

Foreign investors can and do participate in the privatization programs. According to some analysts, of the 30 state-owned companies that were privatized before 2004, foreign bidders won the majority (22). For example, a British private equity firm owns the controlling share in ENEO, the country’s electricity monopoly. The public bidding on tender offers is transparent. They are advertised in the media, but the actual process of awarding contracts may still be tainted by corruption, particularly on large projects. The listing of public tenders in the Cameroon Tribune newspaper – the government-owned paper of record –and publication of which firms received the contract do not guarantee a fully transparent process of awards.

Resources to Report Corruption

Corruption is punishable under sections 134 and 134 (a) of the Pena1 Code of Cameroon. Despite these rules, corruption remains endemic in the country. In 2020, Cameroon ranked 149 of 180 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. Anti-corruption laws are applicable to all citizens and institutions throughout the national territory. Article 66 of the constitution requires civil servants and elected officials to declare their assets and property at the beginning and at the end of their tenure of office, but it has never been implemented. Similarly, the Civil Service Statute contains provisions and the procedures to be followed in the event of a conflict of interest. These provisions are enshrined in Law No. 003/2006 of 25 April 2006, which also created the Commission for the declaration of property and assets. Other codes of conduct in different public institutions have created gift registers to prevent bribes, but they are not implemented. In terms of public contracts, Decree N° 2018/0001/PM of January 5, 2018 created a portal called Cameroon Online E-procurement System (Coleps) for the digitalization, including application processing, award, and monitoring and evaluation of all tenders. Since the launch of the portal, technical issues and disregard by civil servants have curbed its effectiveness, leading to the parallel continuation of the bribe-prone paper-based procurement system. U.S. firms indicate that corruption is most pervasive in government procurement, award of licenses or concessions, transfers, performance requirements, dispute settlement, regulatory system, customs, and taxation.

Since its inception in 2006 (Presidential Decree No. 2006/088 of 11 March 2006), the National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) has encouraged private companies to establish internal codes of conduct and ethics committees to review practices. Post is unaware of how many companies have instituted either program. Bribery of government officials remains common. While some companies use internal controls to detect and prevent such bribery, Post is unaware of how widespread these internal controls are.

Cameroon is signatory to the United Nations and the African Union anti-corruption initiatives, but the international initiatives have practical limited effects on the enforcement of laws in the country. Post is unaware of any NGO’s involvement in investigating corruption. The government prefers the National Anti-Corruption Commission (CONAC) to investigate potential cases.  U.S. firms indicate that corruption is most pervasive in government procurement, award of licenses or concessions, transfers, performance requirements, dispute settlement, regulatory system, customs, and taxation.

Resources to Report Corruption

Rev. Dieudonné MASSI GAMS
Chairman
National Anti-Corruption Commission
B.P. 33200 Yaoundé Cameroon
(+237) 22 20 37 32
www.conac-cameroun.net   infos@conac-cameroun.net 

Barrister Charles NGUINI
Country Representative
Transparency International Cameroon
Nouvelle route Bastos, rue 1.839,  BP : 4562 Yaoundé
(+237) 33 15 63 78
transparency@ti-cameroon.org 

* Source for Host Country Data: 2021 Cameroon Finance Bill, page 13 (converted at $1=563 Central African Francs as of March 16, 2021)    

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

All Chadian SOEs operate under the umbrella of government ministries. SOE senior management reports to the minister responsible for the relevant sector, as well as a board of directors and an executive board. The President of the Republic appoints SOE boards of directors, executive boards, and CEOs. The boards of directors give general directives over the year, while the executive boards manage general guidelines set by the boards of directors. Some executive directors consult with their respective ministries before making business decisions.

The GOC operates SOEs in several sectors, including Energy and Environmental Industries; Agribusiness; Construction, Building and Heavy Equipment; and Information and Communication. The percentage SOEs allocate to research and development (R&D) is unknown.

There were no reports of discriminatory action taken by SOEs against the interests of foreign investors in 2020, and some foreign companies operated in direct competition with SOEs. Chad’s Public Tender Code (PTC) provides preferential treatment for domestic competitors, including SOEs.

SOEs are not subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors and are often afforded material advantages such as preferential access to land and raw materials. SOEs receive government subsidies under the national budget; however, in practice they do not respect the budget. State and company funds are often commingled.

Chad is not a party to the Agreement on Government Procurement within the framework of the WTO. Chadian practices are not consistent with the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs.

Privatization Program

Foreign investors are permitted and encouraged to participate in the privatization process. There is a public, non-discriminatory bidding process. Having a local contact in Chad to assist with the bidding process is important. To combat corruption, the GOC has recently hired private international companies to oversee the bidding process for government tenders. Despite the GOC’s willingness to privatize loss-making SOEs, there remain several obstacles to privatization.

The Chamber of Commerce submitted a ‘white paper’ (livre blanc) in 2018 with recommendations for the GOC to facilitate and simplify private sector operations, including establishing a Business Observatory and a Presidential Council, which would implement over 70 recommendations to improve the investment climate in Chad. The Presidential Council became operational in January 2021.

Chad is considering privatization in the following sectors:

• Information & Communication (SOTEL Tchad)
• Food Processing & Packaging (the Société Tchadienne de Jus de Fruit (STJF), which produces fruit juice in Doba; and the Société Moderne de Abbatoires (SMA), a slaughterhouse and meat packaging company in Farcha)

Foreign investors should be aware that corruption remains common in Chad and constitutes a significant deterrent to U.S. investment. Corruption is most pervasive in government procurement, award of licenses or concessions, dispute settlement, regulation enforcement, customs, and taxation.

Chad is not a signatory country of the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Chad is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention”).

There is an independent Court of Auditors (Cour des Comptes), equivalent to a supreme audit institution (SAI), to enhance independent oversight of government decisions, although its members are nominated by presidential decree. Concurrently, the GOC created a General Inspectorate for State Control within the Presidency to oversee government accountability. No reports have been published, however. In addition to these bodies, the National Assembly’s Finance Committee carries out verifications of the GOC’s annual financial statement. No audits have been made publicly available during the reporting period.

A February 2000 anti-corruption law stipulates penalties for corrupt practices. The law does not single out family members and political parties. As in other developing countries, low salaries for most civil servants, judicial employees, and law enforcement officials, coupled with a weak state system and a culture of rent seeking, have contributed to corruption.

The Ministry of Finance and Budget set up a toll-free number (700) to fight corruption and embezzlement. According to the Minister of Finance and Budget, the toll-free number 700 allows each economic operator or any other individual to alert the Inspectorate General of Finance to denounce any unscrupulous agent who seeks to be corrupted in the context of the issue of administrative paper or the payment of a tax. There are no specific laws to counter conflict of interest. The GOC does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials.

Local NGO Center for Studies and Research on Governance, Extractive Industries, and Sustainable Development (CERGIED), formerly GRAMP-TC (Groupe Alternatif de Recherche et de Monitoring de Petrole – Tchad), tracks government expenditures of oil revenue. There are no indications that anti-corruption laws are enforced differently on foreign investors than on Chadian citizens. There is no specific protection for NGOs involved in investigating corruption.

Resources to Report Corruption

Government agency contact responsible for combating corruption:

Inspection Generale d’Etat

Ministry of Finance and Budget toll free number 700 (inside Chad)

Presidence de la Republique

Ndjamena, Chad +235 22 51 51 39 / 22 51 44 37

+235 22 51 51 39 / 22 51 44 37

Contact at watchdog organizations:

Gilbert Maoundonodji

Coordinator

CERGIED (formerly GRAMP –TC)

BP 4021, N’Djamena, Chad
+235 6058 2016 / 9317 7678

+235 6058 2016 / 9317 7678

infos@cergied.org  / secretariat@cergied.org  / https://cergied.org/ 

infos@cergied.org  / secretariat@cergied.org  / https://cergied.org/ 

Please note that the following tables include FDI statistics from three different sources, and therefore will not be identical. Table 2 uses BEA data when available, which measures the stock of FDI by the market value of the investment in the year the investment was made (often referred to as historical value). This approach tends to undervalue the present value of FDI stock because it does not account for inflation. BEA data is not available for all countries, particularly if only a few US firms have direct investments in a country. In such cases, Table 2 uses other sources that typically measure FDI stock in current value (or, historical values adjusted for inflation). Even when Table 2 uses BEA data, Table 3 uses the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) to determine the top five sources of FDI in the country. The CDIS measures FDI stock in current value, which means that if the U.S. is one of the top five sources of inward investment, U.S. FDI into the country will be listed in this table. That value will come from the CDIS and therefore will not match the BEA data.

* Source for Host Country Data: N/A.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Companies owned or controlled by the state are subject to national laws and the tax code. The Ivoirian government still holds substantial interests in many firms, including the refinery SIR (49 percent), the public transport firm (60 percent), the national television station RTI (98 percent), the national lottery (80 percent), the national airline Air Côte d’Ivoire (58 percent), and the land management agency Agence de Gestion Foncière AGEF (35 percent). Total assets of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were USD 796 million and total net income of SOEs was USD 116 million in 2018 (latest figures). Of the 82 SOEs, 28 are wholly government-owned, 12 are majority government-owned, in seven the government has a blocking minority, and in 35 the government has a minority of shares. Each SOE has an independent board. The government has begun the process of divestiture for some SOEs (see next section). There are active SOEs in the banking, agri-business, mining, and telecom industries.

The published list of SOEs is available at https://dgpe.gouv.ci/ind ex.php?p=portefeuille_etat 

SOEs competing in the domestic market do not receive non-market-based advantages from the government. They are subject to the same tax burdens and policies as private companies.

Côte d’Ivoire does not adhere to OECD guidelines for SOE corporate governance (it is not a member of OECD).

Privatization Program

The government has been pursuing SOE privatization for decades. Most recently, in 2017, the government sold 90 percent of its shareholdings in the Ivoirian Textile Development Company (Compagnie Ivoirienne du Développement du Textile; CIDT) as well as in the Ity Mining Company (Société des mines d’Ity; SMI). In 2018, the government sold 51 percent of the Housing Bank of Côte d’Ivoire (Banque d’Habitat de Côte d’Ivoire; BHCI).

Contracts for participation in SOE privatization are competed through a French-language public tendering process, for which foreign investors are encouraged to submit bids. The Privatization Committee, which reports to the Prime Minister, maintains a website at: http://privatisation.gouv.ci .

Corruption is a concern for businesses. In 2013, the Ivoirian government issued Executive Order number 2013-660 related to preventing and fighting against corruption. The High Authority for Good Governance serves as the government’s anti-corruption authority. Its mandate includes raising awareness about corruption, investigating corruption in the public and private sectors, and collecting mandated asset disclosures from certain public officials (e.g., the president, ministers, and mayors) upon their entry and exit from office. The High Authority, however, does not have a mandate to prosecute; it must refer cases to the Attorney General who decides whether or not to take up those cases. The country’s financial intelligence office, CENTIF, has broad authority to investigate suspicious financial transactions, including those of government officials. Despite the establishment of these bodies and credible allegations of widespread corruption, there have been few charges filed, and few prosecutions and judgments against prominent people for corruption. The domestic business community generally assesses that these watchdog agencies lack the power and/or will to combat corruption effectively. In April 2021, the government formally added Good Governance and Anti-Corruption to the title and portfolio of the Ministry of Capacity Building.

Anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials and to political parties.

The country’s Code of Public Procurement No. 259 and the associated WAEMU directives cover conflicts-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement.

Under the Ivoirian Penal Code, a bribe by a local company to a foreign official is a criminal act.

Some private companies use compliance programs or measures to prevent bribery of government officials. U.S. firms underscore to their Ivoirian counterparts that they are subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

Côte d’Ivoire ratified the UN Anti-Corruption Convention, but the country is not a signatory to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (which is open to non-OECD members). In 2016, Côte d’Ivoire joined the Partnership on Illicit Finance, which obliges it to develop an action plan to combat corruption.

There are no special protections for NGOs involved in investigating corruption.

Corruption in many forms is deeply ingrained in public- and private-sector practices and remains a serious impediment to investment and economic growth in Côte d’Ivoire. Many companies cite corruption as the most significant obstacle to investment in Côte d’Ivoire. It has the greatest impact on judicial proceedings, contract awards, customs, and tax issues. Lack of transparency and failure to follow the government’s own tendering procedures in the awarding of contracts lead businesses to conclude bribery was involved. Businesses have reported encountering corruption at every level of the civil service, with some judges appearing to base their decisions on bribes. Clearance of goods at the ports often requires substantial “commissions,” and the Embassy has heard anecdotal accounts of customs agents rescinding valuations that were declared by other customs colleagues in an effort to extract bribes from customers. The demand for bribes can mean that containers stay at the Port of Abidjan for months, incurring substantial demurrage charges, despite companies having the proper paperwork in order.

No local industry or non-profit groups offer services for vetting potential local investment partners.

Resources to Report Corruption

Inspector General of Finance
(Brigade de Lutte Contre la Corruption)
Lassina Sylla
Inspector General
TELEPHONE: +225 20212000/2252 9797
FAX: +225 20211082/2252 9798
HOTLINE: +225 8000 0380
http://www.igf.finances.gouv.ci/ 
info@igf.finances.gouv.ci 

High Authority for Good Governance

(Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance)
N’Golo Coulibaly
President
TELEPHONE: +225 272 2479 5000
FAX: +225 2247 8261

Police Anti-Racketeering Unit
(Unité de Lutte Contre le Racket –ULCR)
Alain Oura
Unit Commander
TELEPHONE: +225 272 244 9256
info@ulcr.ci 

Social Justice
(Initiative pour la Justice Sociale, la Transparence et la Bonne Gouvernance en Côte d’Ivoire)
Ananeraie face pharmacie Mamie Adjoua
Abidjan
TELEPHONE: +225 272 177 6373
socialjustice.ci@gmail.com 

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

There are 20 DRC state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in the mining, transportation, energy, telecommunications, finance, and hospitality sectors.  In the past, Congolese SOEs have stifled competition and have been unable to provide reliable electricity, transportation, and other important services over which they have monopolies.  Some SOEs and other Congolese parastatal organizations are in poor financial and operational state due to indebtedness and the mismanagement of resources and employees.  The list of SOEs can be found at: http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Public/EPub/d.09.12.24.04.09.htm

There is limited reporting on the assets of SOEs and other parastatal enterprises, making valuation difficult.  DRC law does not grant SOEs an advantage over private companies in bidding for government contracts or obtaining preferential access to land and raw materials.  The government is often accused of favoring SOEs over private companies in contracting and bidding.

The DRC is not a party to the WTO’s procurement agreement (GPA), but nominally adheres to the OECD guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. The DRC is a Participating Country in the Southern Africa SOE network, with the Ministry of Portfolio and the Steering Committee for SOE reforms designated as Regularly Participating Institutions.

Privatization Program

The DRC has no official privatization program.

The Tshisekedi government has used public prosecutions of high-level officials and the creation of an anti-corruption unit to improve the DRC’s reputation on corruption.  DRC’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index score—170th out of 180—underlines the deep roots of corruption in the country.  The DRC constitution includes laws intended to fight corruption and bribery by all citizens, including public officials.  Anti-corruption laws extend to family members and political parties.  Private companies have applied their own controls to limit corruption and have in the past been more effective at controlling it.

In March 2020, President Tshisekedi created the National Agency for the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption.  Currently corruption investigations are ongoing for three Managing Directors of SOEs.  In June 2020, the court convicted Tshisekedi’s former Chief of Staff Vital Kamerhe of embezzlement and public corruption and sentenced him to 20 years in prison.  Accused of having embezzled funds allocated to Primary, Secondary and Technical Education (EPST), the General Inspector of EPST and General Director of the Service for Control and Payment of Teachers (SECOPE) were sentenced in March 2021 to 20 years of hard labor by the Court of Appeal of Kinshasa/Gombe.

The DRC is a signatory to both the UN Anticorruption Convention and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption but has not fully ratified the latter.  The DRC is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.  The DRC ratified a protocol agreement with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on fighting corruption.  NGOs such as the consortium “The Congo is Not for Sale,” have an important role in revealing corrupt practices, and the law protects NGOs in a whistleblower role.

U.S. firms see corruption and harassment by local security forces as one of the main hurdles to investment in the DRC, particularly in the awarding of concessions, government procurement, and taxation treatment.

Resources to Report Corruption

Official government agency:

Agence de Prévention et de Lutte contre la Corruption (APLC)
Tel: +243 893 302 819

Nongovernmental organization:

Transparency International
Ligue Congolaise de Lutte contre la Corruption (LICOCO)
Avenue Luango No14, Quartier 1, N’djili
Kinshasa
+243 81 60 49 837
licocordc@gmail.com
http://www.licocordc.org

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Wholly owned SOEs control telecommunications, water, and electricity distribution in Djibouti. Major print, television, and radio outlets are also state-run. Additionally, Djibouti’s ports, airport, and free zones are managed by an SOE. There is a state-owned national airline that is wholly managed by the ports and free zones authority. SOEs are required by law to publish an annual report. The Court of Auditors is charged with auditing SOEs, but they have not yet released assets, income, employment, or other details about the SOEs. There is no publicly available list of SOEs.

State-run services, such as municipal garbage collection and real estate, do not hold legal monopolies, but are afforded material advantages by the government, e.g., government-backed loan guarantees for the real estate sector. Djibouti is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

In order to exercise ownership in SOEs, the government uses several laws and decrees, most of which were promulgated in the 1990s. The established practices are not consistent with OECD guidelines. No centralized ownership entity exists. SOE senior management reports directly to the relevant line ministry. There is also an independent board of directors whose members are chosen from other ministries

Privatization Program

A few SOEs have been privatized, such as a milk factory several years ago and a water bottling plant in 2015. No particular sector is targeted. The bidding process is not clear and transparent, which makes the participation of foreign investors difficult.

Resources to Report Corruption

Djibouti has several laws to combat corruption by public officials. These laws were either passed by the government or contained in the Penal Code. However, there have been no records of cases to combat corruption by public officials. Corruption laws are extended to all family members of officials and across political parties, but they have not been applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Djibouti does not have laws or regulations to counter conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement.

Djibouti is a party to the UN Convention against Corruption. There are two government entities responsible for investigating corruption and enforcing the regulations. The State General Inspection (SGI) is tasked with ensuring human and material resources in the public sector are properly utilized. The Court of Auditors is mandated to verify and audit all public establishments for transparency and accountability, and to implement necessary legal sanctions. Both institutions are mandated to produce annual corruption reports. Despite the legal mandates, both institutions lack the authority to push for meaningful reform. The National Commission for Anti-Corruption is also mandated to enforce the laws on combatting corruption and provide safe haven for whistleblowers. This Commission launched a program in March 2018 to urge high-ranking government officials to publicly declare all of their assets. However, its effectiveness has not been proven so far. The contracting code and other laws passed by Djibouti contain provisions to counter conflict-of-interest contracts or government procurement.

According to a law passed in 2013, the government requires private and public companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prevent and prohibit bribery of public officials. However, these codes have not been implemented. Likewise, the government requirement that private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance to detect and prevent bribery of government officials is not enforced. Djibouti is not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Djibouti is a signatory country of the UN Convention against Corruption. Djibouti ranked 147 out of 180 countries in the 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International.

U.S. firms have not specifically noted corruption as an obstacle to foreign direct investment in Djibouti, but there were allegations of foreign companies having to meet requirements such as renting houses owned by senior officials or hiring certain employees as a condition of receiving government procurement contracts. In addition, one company reported harassment of employees by local competitors. Prosecution and punishment for corruption is rare.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption is listed below:

Fatouma Mahamoud Abdillahi
President
Commission Nationale Independante pour la Prevention et de Lutte Contre la Corruption
Plateau du Serpent
+253 21 35 16 03
anticorruption@intnet.d j

No “watchdog” organization is present in Djibouti.

* Ministry of Finance and Economy

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

State and military-owned companies compete directly with private companies in many sectors of the Egyptian economy. Although Public Sector Law 203/1991 states that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should not receive preferential treatment from the government or be accorded exemptions from legal requirements applicable to private companies, in practice SOEs and military-owned companies enjoy significant advantages, including relief from regulatory requirements. Forty percent of the banking sector’s assets are controlled by three state-owned banks (Banque Misr, Banque du Caire, and National Bank of Egypt).  SOEs and other state-controlled “economic entities” in Egypt subject to Law 203/1991 are affiliated with 10 ministries and employ 450,000 workers.  The Ministry of Public Business Sector controls 90 SOEs operating under eight holding companies that employ 209,000 workers. The most profitable sectors include tourism, real estate, and transportation. The ministry publishes a list of SOEs and holding companies on its website, http://www.mpbs.gov.eg/Arabic/Affiliates/HoldingCompanies/Pages/default.aspx and http://www.mpbs.gov.eg/Arabic/Affiliates/AffiliateCompanies/Pages/default.aspx.   In an attempt to encourage growth of the private sector, privatization of state-owned enterprises and state-owned banks accelerated under an economic reform program that took place from 1991 to 2008. Following the 2011 revolution, third parties have brought cases in court to reverse privatization deals, and in a number of these cases, Egyptian courts have ruled to reverse the privatization of several former public companies. Most of these cases are still under appeal.

In an attempt to encourage growth of the private sector, privatization of state-owned enterprises and state-owned banks accelerated under an economic reform program that took place from 1991 to 2008. Following the 2011 revolution, third parties have brought cases in court to reverse privatization deals, and in a number of these cases, Egyptian courts have ruled to reverse the privatization of several former public companies. Most of these cases are still under appeal.

The state-owned telephone company, Telecom Egypt, lost its legal monopoly on the local, long-distance, and international telecommunication sectors in 2005, but held a de facto monopoly until late 2016, when the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) implemented a unified license regime that allows companies to offer both fixed line and mobile networks. The agreement allowed Telecom Egypt to enter the mobile market and the three existing mobile companies to enter the fixed-line market.  

OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs 

SOEs in Egypt are structured as individual companies controlled by boards of directors and grouped under government holding companies that are arranged by industry, including Petroleum Products & Gas, Spinning & Weaving; Metallurgical Industries; Chemical Industries; Pharmaceuticals; Food Industries; Building & Construction; Tourism, Hotels, & Cinema; Maritime & Inland Transport; Aviation; and Insurance. The holding companies are headed by boards of directors appointed by the Prime Minister with input from the relevant Minister.

Privatization Program

The Egyptian government last attempted to privatize stakes in SOEs in March 2018 with the successful public offering of a minority stake in the Eastern Tobacco Company. The government has indefinitely delayed plans for privatizing stakes in 22 other SOEs, including up to 30 percent of the shares of Banque du Caire, due to adverse market conditions and increased global volatility. Egypt’s privatization program is based on Public Enterprise Law 203/1991, which permits the sale of SOEs to foreign entities.

Law 32/2014 limits the ability of third parties to challenge privatization contracts between the Egyptian government and investors. The law was intended to reassure investors concerned by legal challenges brought against privatization deals and land sales dating back to the pre-2008 period. Court cases at the time Parliament passed the law had put many of these now-private firms, many of which are foreign-owned, in legal limbo over concerns that they may be returned to state ownership.

Egypt has a set of laws to combat corruption by public officials, including an Anti-Bribery Law (articles 103 through 111 of Egypt’s Penal Code), an Illicit Gains Law (Law 62/1975 and subsequent amendments in Law 97/2015), and a Governmental Accounting Law (Law 27/1981), among others.  Countering corruption remains a long-term focus. However, corruption laws have not been consistently enforced.  Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Egypt 106 out of 198 in its 2019 survey.  Transparency International also found that approximately 50 percent of Egyptians reported paying a bribe in order to obtain a public service.

Some private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. There is no government requirement for private companies to establish internal codes of conduct to prohibit bribery.

Egypt ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2005.  It has not acceded to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery or any other regional anti-corruption conventions.

While NGOs are active in encouraging anti-corruption activities, dialogue between the government and civil society on this issue is almost non-existent, the OECD found in 2009 in a trend that continues to this day.  While government officials publicly asserted they shared civil society organizations’ goals, they rarely cooperated with NGOs, and applied relevant laws in a highly restrictive manner against NGOs critical of government practices.  Media was also limited in its ability to report on corruption, with Article 188 of the Penal Code mandating heavy fines and penalties for unsubstantiated corruption allegations.

U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI in Egypt. Companies might encounter corruption in the public sector in the form of requests for bribes, using bribes to facilitate required government approvals or licenses, embezzlement, and tampering with official documents.  Corruption and bribery are reported in dealing with public services, customs (import license and import duties), public utilities (water and electrical connection), construction permits, and procurement, as well as in the private sector.  Businesses have described a dual system of payment for services, with one formal payment and a secondary, unofficial payment required for services to be rendered.

Resources to Report Corruption

Several agencies within the Egyptian government share responsibility for addressing corruption.  Egypt’s primary anticorruption body is the Administrative Control Authority (ACA), which has jurisdiction over state administrative bodies, state-owned enterprises, public associations and institutions, private companies undertaking public work, and organizations to which the state contributes in any form.  2017 amendments to the ACA law grant the organization full technical, financial, and administrative authority to investigate corruption within the public sector (with the exception of military personnel/entities).  The ACA appears well funded and well trained when compared with other Egyptian law enforcement organizations.  Strong funding and the current ACA leadership’s close relationship with President Sisi reflect the importance of this organization and its mission.  However, it is small (roughly 300 agents) and is often tasked with work that would not normally be conducted by a law enforcement agency.

The ACA periodically engages with civil society.  For example, it has met with the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt and other organizations to encourage them to seek it out when corruption issues arise.

In addition to the ACA, the Central Auditing Authority (CAA) acts as an anti-corruption body, stationing monitors at state-owned companies to report corrupt practices. The Ministry of Justice’s Illicit Gains Authority is charged with referring cases in which public officials have used their office for private gain.  The Public Prosecution Office’s Public Funds Prosecution Department and the Ministry of Interior’s Public Funds Investigations Office likewise share responsibility for addressing corruption in public expenditures.

Resources to Report Corruption

Minister of Interior

General Directorate of Investigation of Public Funds

Telephone: 02-2792-1395 / 02-2792 1396

Fax: 02-2792-2389

* Sources for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Egypt; CAPMAS; GAFI

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

The Republic of Guinea Equatorial has at least eight state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the energy, housing, fishing, aerospace and defense, and information and communication sectors. Sonagas is the national natural gas company and GEPetrol is the national oil company. The energy SOEs report to the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons and hold monopolies in their respective sectors. SEGESA is the national electricity company. GECOMSA and GETESA are the national telecommunication service providers. SONAPESCA focusses on the promotion of fishing and reports to the Minister of Fisheries and Water Resources. ENPIGE is the SOE that oversees the government’s affordable housing program. Ceiba Intercontinental is the main airline and is currently near bankruptcy, facing internal structural crisis, after the termination of a joint venture with Ethiopian Airlines in 2020. The budget includes allocations to and earnings from SOEs. Large SOEs lacked publicly available audits. According to some companies, there is little evidence of oversight of SOEs. A requirement of the IMF’s 2018 staff monitored program, however, is that the government contract an internationally reputable firm to audit the accounts of the state-owned oil (GEPetrol) and gas (Sonagas) companies, which the government hired at the start of 2019. (The audits were still ongoing in mid-2020, with no report of completion.) All oil and gas projects must include a partnership with state-owned companies GEPetrol or Sonagas.

Equatorial Guinea’s oil and gas sector scored 22 of 100 points in the 2017 Resource Governance Index (RGI), ranking 85th among 89 assessments. Its overall failing performance can be attributed to the enabling environment component, which scores 17 of 100 points and ranks 79th among 89 assessments, along with an equally low score for revenue management. For more information, see https://resourcegovernance.org/ .

Privatization Program

The Ministry of Finance, the Economy, and Planning discussed plans to involve the private sector in the management of state-owned assets, including through privatization. The initiative was a recommendation from the Third National Economic Conference (April-May 2019), which included discussion of options to improve management of state assets. The government envisages three paths: (i) restructuring autonomous agencies and state-owned enterprises; (ii) concession of assets to the private sector; and (iii) sale of public assets to private operators (privatization). The authorities also plan to open to competition sectors where public enterprises operate, with the aim of limiting monopolistic practices and passing on efficiency gains to the rest of the economy. The Ministry will present a substantive list of state assets to be privatized, as well as a list of entities that will be restructured or placed under a concession regime with the private sector for the approval of the Council of Ministers (structural benchmark, end of June 2020). Once the Council of Ministers approves this plan, the authorities will present an action program for privatization (planned for the second half of 2020). To generate revenue, they plan to prioritize privatization, with the proceeds going to pay down validated domestic arrears and rebuild EG’s foreign currency reserves at the BEAC. Sales and concessions will be carried out through open, international tenders. The sale of the listed assets may be delayed so that their prices are not negatively affected by the current global slowdown. Information is likely to be announced on the Ministry’s website:    https://minhacienda-gob.com/.

There is no publicly designated contact at a government agency responsible for combating corruption. Various ministries, including the office of the Prime Minister, nominally have responsibility for combatting corruption either within their own ministry or in the government at large. A commission to combat corruption was formed in 2019 and worked with the legislature to pass a new law on corruption in April 2021. There are no “watchdog” organizations operating in country.The Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea has laws and regulations against corruption, but many businesses have complained that they are not often enforced, and as a result, corruption is very common. There are no specific laws about conflict of interest or nepotism. Numerous foreign investigations continued into high-level official corruption.

In December 2020, the International Court of Justice ruled that a Paris mansion at the center of a dispute between France and Equatorial Guinea could not be unilaterally designated a diplomatic outpost. French authorities seized the building on Paris’ Avenue Foch in 2012 as they investigated Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, the Vice President of Equatorial Guinea, for misuse of public funds and money laundering. In 2017 Vice President Mangue was tried in absentia in a French court for allegedly embezzling public funds. He was given a three-year suspended sentence and fined $32 million. The International Court of Justice found that France did not violate the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations when it raided the building because the Parisian mansion was not a diplomatic residence for Equatorial Guinea and thus France had a right to seize it.

Obiang Mangue has publicly committed to eradicate corruption and promote fiscal transparency. In September 2020, the government established an anti-corruption audit commission, for which the port administrations of Bata and Malabo became the primary focus. The commission seized significant amounts of money allegedly siphoned off through those ports. As a result, the Director General for Customs was dismissed after more than twenty years on the job, though he was not charged. During 2020 and 2021, executives of state-owned enterprises have faced prosecution on embezzlement charges following surprise government audits as part of the anticorruption strategy. Those under investigation included the deputy director of the national power company (SEGESA) and the regional director of the National Institute of Social Security (INSESO).

U.S. companies operating in Equatorial Guinea are required to adhere to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Some U.S. firms report concern about corruption in government procurement, the award of licenses and concessions, the customs process, and dispute settlement. Major U.S. firms have internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of foreign officials. It is unclear what controls exist at smaller companies and other foreign and domestic firms.

The country’s greatest concerns in terms of money laundering and terrorism financing are cross-border currency transactions and the illegal international transfer of money by companies or corrupt individuals. Some report that widespread corruption, at times involving members of the government, is a primary catalyst for money laundering and other financial crimes. Certain businesses have noted that diversion of public funds and corruption are widespread in both commerce and government, particularly as regards the use of proceeds from the extractive industries, including oil, gas, and timber, and infrastructure projects.

Equatorial Guinea became a signatory to the United Nations Convention against Corruption on May 30, 2018. Equatorial Guinea is a member of the Task Force against Money Laundering in Central Africa, an entity in the process of becoming a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. The country is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

On July 13, 2020, President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo approved Decree-Law No. 1/2020 on the prevention and fight against corruption in Equatorial Guinea as an interim measure pending approval of anti-corruption legislation in Parliament. The legislation passed in April 2021.

Resources to Report Corruption

Decree-Law No. 1/2020 stablished the National Commission for Prevention and Fight against Corruption as the primary source to report corruption. However, this Legal Entity of Public Law is not yet operational.

The few large enterprises that operate in the economy are owned and operated by the GSE, the PFDJ, or are jointly operated with the GSE under an agreement with a foreign country or company.  There is no official list of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but they dominate all sectors, especially agribusiness, construction, import/export, and financing.  The mining sector is dominated by joint ventures between foreign companies and the state-owned ENAMCO.

SOEs operating in the domestic market receive non-market-based advantages from the GSE, such as the right to import and export through the PFDJ-controlled import/export entity, and preferential access to goods imported by other SOEs and government offices.

Privatization Program

The government has often expressed its interest in privatizing the economy but has made no efforts yet to do so and is generally believed to be suspicious of private enterprise.

Eritrean laws criminalize corruption by public officials and by any who claim influence over public officials, which would include family members and political parties.  The 2015 penal code also includes provisions requiring government officials to explain any unexplained wealth or income.  Due to limited transparency within the government, it is unclear the extent to which the GSE applies these laws, though evidence suggests little corruption among government officials.

There are no specific provisions concerning conflicts of interest.

There is no available information to suggest that the GSE requires private companies to establish internal codes that prohibit bribery of public officials, and it is unlikely that the government does so.  It is likely that some, but not all, of the large foreign private companies use internal controls, ethics or compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery.

Eritrea is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption or any other international anti-corruption initiatives.  There are no independent NGOs in Eritrea, including those that investigate corruption.  There are no U.S. firms in Eritrea to provide an opinion on corruption as an impediment to FDI, but it is unlikely to be a serious impediment.

Resources to Report Corruption

There are no government agencies that operate independently of the Office of the President and the PFDJ to whom one can report corruption. There are also no independent “watchdog” organizations working within Eritrea.

* Source for Host Country Data: Eritrea does not provide economic data.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Eswatini has over 30 SOEs, which are active in agribusiness, information and communication, energy, automotive and ground transportation, health, housing, travel and tourism, building education, business development, finance, environment, and publishing, media, and entertainment .

The Swati government defines SOEs as private enterprises, separated into two categories. Category A represents SOEs that are wholly owned by government. Category B represents SOEs in which government has a minority interest, or which monitor other financial institutions or a local government authority. These categories are further broken down into profit-making SOEs with a social responsibility focus, those that are profit-making and developmental, those that are regulatory, and those that are regulatory but developmental. SOEs purchase and supply goods and services to and from the private sector including foreign firms. Those in which government is a minority shareholder are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as the private sector. The Public Enterprise Act governs SOEs. The Boards of the respective SOEs review their budgets before tabling them to the relevant line ministry, which, in turn, tables them to Parliament for scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee. The Ministry of Finance’s Public Enterprise Unit (PEU) maintains a published list of SOEs, available on request from the PEU. SOEs do not receive non-market-based advantages from government.

Eswatini SOEs generally conform to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. Senior managers of SOEs report to the board and, in turn, the board reports to a line minister. The minister then works with the Standing Committee on Public Enterprise (SCOPE), which is composed of cabinet ministers. SOEs are governed by the Public Enterprises Act, which requires audits of the SOEs and public annual reports. Government is not involved in the day-to-day management of SOEs. Boards of SOEs exercise their independence and responsibility. The Public Enterprise Unit provides regular monitoring of SOEs. The line minister of the SOE appoints the board and, in some cases, the appointments are politically motivated. In some cases, the king appoints his own representative as well. Generally, court processes are nondiscriminatory in relation to SOEs.

A published list of SOEs can be found on: http://www.gov.sz/index.php/component/content/article/141-test/1995-swaziland-enterprise-parastatals?Itemid=799 

Eswatini SOEs operate primarily in the domestic market.

Privatization Program

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has long advised the Eswatini government to privatize SOEs, particularly in the telecommunications sector and the electricity sector. In response, the government has passed several laws, and privatization efforts have begun to advance. Recent years have seen the launch of several private telecommunications companies such as Swazi Mobile, which has lowered prices and improved mobile and data offerings in the country.

Sectors and timelines have not been prioritized for future privatization, although it is likely that some SOEs following the public launch of the Revised National Development Strategy.

The government is working to reduce the country’s dependence on foreign electricity by promoting renewable energy production. Eswatini imports the bulk of its electricity from South Africa and Mozambique, reaching 100 percent importation during a recent drought, since domestic production comes predominantly from hydropower. With assistance from USAID’s Southern Africa Energy Program (SAEP), the government has developed a National Grid Code and a Renewable Energy and Independent Power Producer (RE&IPP) Policy to provide a framework for the sector and incentivize investors. SAEP is provided technical assistance on a 10-megawatt photovoltaic project that was integrated into the grid in February 2021.

The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government does not implement the law effectively. Officials are reported to engage in corrupt practices with impunity. Corruption continues to be a problem, most often involving personal relationships and bribes being used to secure government contracts on large capital projects.

The Prevention of Corruption Act and the Swaziland Public Procurement Act are the two laws that combat corruption by all persons, including public officials. The Public Procurement Act prohibits public sector workers and politicians from supplying the government with goods or services; however, this prohibition does not extend to family members of officials. The Eswatini Public Procurement Agency (ESPPRA) conducted capacity building exercises nationwide with both public and private companies to increase knowledge and encourage adoption of universally practiced purchasing systems. According to Section 27 of the Public Procurement Regulations, suppliers are prohibited from offering gifts or hospitality, directly or indirectly, to staff of a procuring entity, members of the tender board, and members of the ESPPRA. While avoiding conflict of interest and establishing codes of conduct are policies that are encouraged, they are not effectively enforced. Some companies use internal controls and audit compliance programs to try to track and prevent bribery.

Eswatini is a signatory to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related Offenses and the SADC Protocol against Corruption. Eswatini has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention, but it is not party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is legally allowed to investigate corruption, and does so. The ACC does not provide protection to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. Given the Commission’s current capacity, “government procurement” is the most likely area to find corruption in Eswatini. The global competitiveness report ranks Eswatini 79 of 140 countries on incidence of corruption. Transparency International reports Eswatini as the 14th least corrupt country in Africa

Though no U.S. firms have cited corruption, the 2019 Africa Competitiveness report found that 12.8 percent of business owners saw corruption as a hurdle to doing business in Eswatini, impacting profits, contracts, and investment decisions for their companies. There is a public perception of corruption in the executive and legislative branches of government and a consensus that the government does little to combat it, according to the Corruptions Perceptions Index. There have been credible reports that a person’s relationship with government officials influenced the awarding of government contracts; the appointment, employment, and promotion of officials; recruitment into the security services; and school admissions. Authorities rarely took action on reported incidents of nepotism.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption:

Dan Dlamini
Commissioner
Eswatini Anti-Corruption Commission
3rd Floor, Mbandzeni House, Mbabane
+268-2404-3179/0761
anticorruption@realnet.co.sz 

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
No detailed information is available on the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) website and no information is available on outward direct investment from Eswatini.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
No detailed information is available on the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) website and no information is available on outward direct investment from Eswatini.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate major sectors of the economy. There is a state monopoly or state dominance in telecommunications, power, banking, insurance, air transport, shipping, railway, industrial parks, and petroleum importing. State-owned enterprises have considerable advantages over private firms, including priority access to credit and customs clearances. While there are no conclusive reports of credit preference for these entities, there are indications that they receive incentives, such as priority foreign exchange allocation, preferences in government tenders, and marketing assistance. Ethiopia does not publish financial data for most state-owned enterprises, but Ethiopian Airlines and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia have transparent accounts.

Ethiopia is not a member to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and does not adhere to the guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs. Corporate governance of SOEs is structured and monitored by a board of directors composed of senior government officials and politically affiliated individuals, but there is a lack of transparency in the structure of SOEs.

Privatization Program

In July of 2018 the government announced its intention to privatize a minority share of EthioTelecom, Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Service Enterprise, and power generation projects, and to fully privatize sugar projects, railways, and industrial parks. The privatization program will be implemented through public tenders and will be open to local and foreign investors. The government has prioritized privatizations in the telecommunications and sugar sectors, and in those sectors has begun asset valuations of the enterprises, standardization of the financial reports, and establishment of modernized legal and regulatory frameworks. The GOE has also reached out to potential investors and has begun creating tender and bidding documents that will guide the privatizations. To broaden the role and participation of the private sector in the economy, and to implement the privatization program in an open and transparent manner, Ethiopia enacted a new privatization bill in June of 2020. The bill gives the Public Enterprise Holding and Administration Agency majority control over future privatization processes, with the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) as key stakeholders.

The government has sold more than 370 public enterprises since 1995, mainly small companies in the trade and service sectors, most of which were nationalized by the Derg military regime in the 1970s. Currently, twenty-three SOEs are under the Public Enterprises Holding and Administration Agency.

The Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) is charged with preventing corruption and is accountable to the Office of the Prime Minister. The Commission provides ethics training and education to prevent corruption. The Federal Police Commission is responsible for investigating corruption crimes and the Federal Attorney General handles corruption prosecutions.

The Attorney General’s Office has opened a new and consolidated Anti-Corruption Directorate to recover stolen assets and fight corruption. The Directorate is empowered to enter into mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT’s) and otherwise coordinate with foreign nations to fight corruption.

The Federal Police is mandated with investigating corruption crimes committed by public officials as well as “Public Organizations.” The latter are defined as any organ in the private sector that administers money, property, or any other resources for public purposes. Examples of such organizations include share companies, real estate agencies, banks, insurance companies, cooperatives, labor unions, professional associations, and others.

Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures perceived levels of public sector corruption, rated Ethiopia’s corruption at 38 (the score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of zero to 100, with the former indicating highly corrupt and the latter indicating very clean). Its comparative rank in 2020 was 94 out of 180 countries, a two-point improvement from its 2019 rank. The American Chamber of Commerce in Ethiopia recently polled its members and asked what the leading business climate challenges were; transparency and governance ranked as the 4th leading business climate challenge, ahead of licensing and registration and public procurement.

Ethiopian and foreign businesses routinely encounter corruption in tax collection, customs clearance, and land administration. Many past procurement deals for major government contracts, especially in the power generation, telecommunications, and construction sectors were widely viewed as corrupt.

Ethiopia is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Ethiopia is a signatory to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Ethiopia is also member of the East African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities. Ethiopia signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2003, which was eventually ratified in November 2007. It is a criminal offense to give or receive bribes, and bribes are not tax deductible.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contacts at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:

Federal Police Commission
Addis Ababa
+251 11 861-9595

Advocacy and Legal Advice Center in Ethiopia
Hayahulem Mazoria, Addis Ababa
+251-11-551-0738 / +251-11-655-5508
https://www.transparencyethiopia.org 

*National Bank of Ethiopia and Ethiopian Investment Commission

**Ethiopian Fiscal Year 2019/2020, which begins on July 8, 2020.

Data regarding inward direct investment are not available for Ethiopia via the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) site (http://data.imf.org/CDIS); we have instead used data from the Ethiopian Investment Commission.

*The yearly average exchange rate is used for each year from 1992 – 2020 in order to convert the amount of FDI from domestic currency into U.S. dollars.

*** Total Outward investment data are not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data regarding the equity/debt breakdown of portfolio investment assets are not available for Ethiopia via the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) and are not available for external publication from the Government of Ethiopia.

Government-appointed civil servants manage Gabonese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which operate primarily in energy, extractive industries, and public utilities. SOEs generally follow OECD guidelines on corporate governance, which usually consists of a board of directors under the authority of the related ministry. That ministry chooses the board members, who may be government officials or members of the general public. The SOEs often consult with their ministry before undertaking any important business decisions. The corresponding ministry in each sector prepares and submits the budget of each SOE each year. Independent auditors examine the SOEs’ activities each year, conducting audits according to international standards. Auditors do not publish their reports, but rather submit them to the relevant ministry.

There is no published list of SOEs.

There are no specific laws or rules that offer preferential treatment to SOEs. However, although private enterprises may compete with public enterprises under open market access conditions, SOEs often have a competitive advantage in the industries in which they operate.

Privatization Program

Gabon does not have an active privatization program. However, when there is a privatization program foreign investors are usually invited to participate. The bidding process for these programs are easy to understand, non-discriminatory, and transparent. No links are available, as there are currently no active privatization programs.

The Gabonese Penal Code criminalizes abuse of office, embezzlement, passive and active bribery, trading in influence, extortion, offering or accepting gifts, and other undue advantages in the public sector, yet enforcement remains limited and official impunity is a problem. Private sector corruption is criminalized whenever a given company is related to a public entity. Punishments for public officials found guilty of soliciting or accepting bribes include prison sentences ranging from two to 10 years, and a fine of CFA 5 million (USD 8,572). Corruption is rarely prosecuted in Gabon, except in limited high-profile cases. In 2020, Transparency International listed Gabon at 129 of 179 countries.

The government established the Commission to Combat Illicit Enrichment (CNLCEI) in 2004; however, in the summer of 2018, the CNLCEI’s five year mandate was not renewed. Its regulations did not extend to the family members of civil servants or to political parties.

There are no known laws or regulations to counter conflicts of interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. There is no information about any action on the part of the government to encourage or require private companies to establish codes of conduct that prohibit the bribery of public officials. Some private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials.

Gabon is a signatory to the United Nations Convention against Corruption and is a member of the Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (Groupe d’action contre le blanchiment d’argent en Afrique Centrale, or GABAC). However, no international or regional watchdog organizations operate in Gabon. Local civil society lacks the capacity to play a significant role in highlighting cases of corruption.

Companies contend with a high risk of corruption when dealing with the Gabonese extractive industries. Gabon has vast oil, manganese, and timber resources; however, contracting and licensing processes lack transparency.

Resources to Report Corruption

National Financial Investigations Agency
Tel : +241 01176 1773
Agence Nationale d’Investigation Financière
Immeuble Arambo, Boulevard Triomphal
BP :189
Libreville, Gabon contact@anif.ga 

* Source for Host Country Data:  Gabon 2021 budget; the World Bank 2019-2020 report; the IMF country report; the website for the Gabonese Ministry of Economy.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

The Gambia has majority ownership in 13 State-Owned Enterprises that operate in key economic sectors such as agriculture, power generation, energy, and gas. SOEs can also be found in the information and telecommunications, aviation, and finance industries. SOE revenues are not projected in budget documents. Audits of the public sector and SOEs are conducted by the Gambia’s Supreme Audit Institution. The following is a list of 13 SOEs.

• Assets Management & Recovery Corporation (AMRC)
• Gambia Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA)
• Gambia Groundnut Corporation (GCC)
• Gambia International Airlines (GIA)
• Gambia National Petroleum Company (GNPC)
• Gambia Ports Authority (GPA)
• Gambia Postal Services (GAMPOSTS)
• Gambia Public Printing Cooperation (GPPC)
• Gambia Radio & Television Services (GRTS)
• Gambia Telecommunication Cellular Company (GAMCEL)
• Gambia Telecommunication Company (GAMTEL)
• National Water and Electricity Corporation (NAWEC)
• Social Security Housing & Finance Corporation (SSHFC)

The Gambia’s government imposed an embargo on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) borrowing from each other in June 2020, according to the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs during a National Assembly session. SOEs in the past had defaulted in their payments to Social Security.

Private enterprises can compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies. Foreign telecommunications companies are subject to GAMTEL regulations, which inherently favor the government entity. There is a published list  of SOEs on The Ministry of Finance website. The Public Private Partnership Unit at the Ministry of Finance monitors the SOEs.

Privatization Program

The Government of The Gambia is currently not engaged in any forms of privatization programs.

There are laws in place to combat corruption by public officials in The Gambia. These laws are ineffective because the committees, which are commissioned to enforce them, are yet to be fully established. In cases when trials are conducted, they are conducted in a non-discriminatory manner. The anti-corruption laws of The Gambia extend to family members of officials and political parties alike. The anti-corruption laws of The Gambia contain laws or regulations that counter conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. Low-level corruption is prevalent, and high-level corruption is likely common but remains underreported. Companies importing goods through Banjul Port report regularly being solicited for bribes.

The Gambian Government encourages private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials. The constitution of The Gambia calls for internal codes of conduct (Section 222), as do the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance to which The Gambia is a signatory. Private companies use internal controls and other programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Private companies use internal controls and other programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials.

The Gambia has signed and ratified the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related Offences but has not ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In May 2014, The Gambia ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention. During former President Jammeh’s rule, the GOTG did not provide protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. However, such protections are likely to be part of the new administration’s pledge to act regarding the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption.

Post has received reports that foreign companies from certain countries routinely use inducements equating to bribery to secure Gambian government and para-statal contracts

President Barrow pledged to introduce a bill in the National Assembly by December 2019 to create an anti-corruption commission, but no progress has been made. Since President Barrow took office in 2017, the government has turned a blind eye to corruption and no one has been convicted of corruption. President Barrow promised during his presidential campaign that his government would be transparent and accountable to the Gambian people, and that cabinet ministers would publicly declare their assets. However, after taking office, he backtracked on his promise. Cabinet ministers will only have to disclose their assets to the Ombudsman’s Office. Some ministers have yet to declare their assets, according to the report, but have declined to reveal their identities. Such declarations also do not include assets belonging to spouses and other immediate family members.

No international, regional, or local NGO operating as “watchdog” organizations monitoring corruption are known to exist in the country.

Resources to Report Corruption

Commanding Officer, Fraud & Commercial Crime Unit
Gambia Police Force
Police Headquarters,
ECOWAS Avenue,
Banjul,
The Gambia (+220) 4223015 / 4222307

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Ghana has 86 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 45 of which are wholly owned, while 41 are partially owned. Thirty-six of the wholly owned SOEs are commercial and operate more independently from government, while nine are public corporations or institutions, some providing regulatory functions. While the president appoints the CEO and full boards of most of the wholly owned SOEs, they are under the supervision of line ministries. Most of the partially owned investments are in the financial, mining, and oil and gas sectors. To improve the efficiency of SOEs and reduce fiscal risks they pose to the budget, in 2019 the government embarked on an exercise to tackle weak corporate governance in the SOEs as well as created the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA), a single institution, to monitor all SOEs, replacing both the State Enterprises Commission and the Divestiture Implementation Committee.

As of April 2021, only a handful of large SOEs remain, mainly in the transportation, power, and extractive sectors. The largest SOEs are Ghana Ports and Harbor Authority (GPHA), Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), Volta River Authority (VRA), Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), Tema Oil Refinery (TOR), Ghana Airport Company Limited (GACL), Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), Ghana National Gas Company Limited, and Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). Many of these receive subsidies and assistance from the government. The list of SOEs can be found at: https://siga.gov.gh/state-interest/ .

While the Government of Ghana does not actively promote adherence to the OECD Guidelines, SIGA oversees corporate governance of SOEs and encourages them to be managed like Limited Liability Companies so as to be profit-making. In addition, beginning in 2014, most SOEs were required to contract and service direct and government-guaranteed loans on their own balance sheet. The government’s goal is to stop adding these loans to “pure public” debt, paid by taxpayers directly through the budget.

Privatization Program

Ghana has no formal privatization program. The government has announced its intention, however, to prioritize the creation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to restructure and privatize non-performing SOEs, although progress to implement this goal has been slow. Procuring PPPs is allowed under the National Policy on Public Private Partnerships in Ghana, which was adopted in June 2011. A PPP law is being drafted.

Corruption in Ghana is comparatively less prevalent than in most other countries in the region, according to Transparency International’s Perception of Corruption Index, but remains a serious problem, scoring 45 on a scale of 100 and ranking 75 out of 180 countries in 2020. The government has a relatively strong anti-corruption legal framework in place, but enforcement of existing laws is rare and inconsistent. Corruption in government institutions is pervasive. The Government of Ghana has vowed to combat corruption and has taken some steps to promote better transparency and accountability. These include establishing an Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) in 2017 to investigate and prosecute corruption cases and passing a Right to Information Act, 2019 (Act 989) (similar to the U.S. Freedom of Information Act) to increase transparency. The OSP has been without a Special Prosecutor since late 2020 and has still not prosecuted a significant anti-corruption case. In addition, the Auditor-General was placed on accrued annual leave in mid-2020 and then removed from office in March 2021 after a controversy related to his date of birth and mandatory retirement age.

Businesses have noted that bribery is most pervasive in the judicial system and across public services. Companies report that bribes are often exchanged in return for favorable judicial decisions. Large corruption cases are prosecuted, but proceedings are lengthy and convictions are slow. A 2015 exposé captured video of judges and other judicial officials extorting bribes from litigants to manipulate the justice system. Thirty-four judges were implicated, and 25 were dismissed following the revelations, though none have been criminally prosecuted.

The Public Procurement (Amendment) Act, 2016 (Act 914) was passed to address the shortcomings identified over a decade of implementation of the original 2003 law aimed at harmonizing the many public procurement guidelines used in the country and to bring public procurement into conformity with WTO standards. Nevertheless, complete transparency is lacking in locally funded contracts. There continue to be allegations of corruption in the tender process, and the government has in the past set aside international tender awards in the name of alleged national interest. The Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921) provided for stiffer sanctions and penalties for breaches, but its effectiveness in stemming corruption has yet to be demonstrated. In 2016, Ghana amended the company registration law (which has been retained in the new Companies Act, 2019 (Act 992)) to include the disclosure of beneficial owners. In September 2020, Ghana deployed a Central Beneficial Ownership Register to collect and maintain a national database on beneficial owners for all companies operating in Ghana. The law requires each person who creates a company in Ghana to report the identities of the company’s beneficial owners on the Beneficial Ownership Declaration form at the Registrar-General’s Department (RGD). Existing companies are also required to provide this information by the end of June 2021. There are different types of thresholds for reporting beneficial owners, depending on the sector the company belongs to and the type of person the beneficial owner is. For the general threshold, a person who has direct or indirect interest of 10 percent or more in a company must be registered as a beneficial owner. A Politically Exposed Person (PEP) in Ghana who has any shares or any form of control over a company in any sector must be registered as a beneficial owner, while for a foreign PEP, shares must be five percent or more. For companies in the extractive industry, financial institutions, and businesses operating in sectors listed as high risk by the RGD, the threshold for reporting beneficial owners is five percent. Failure to comply with the requirements may attract a fine of up to 6,000 cedis (USD 1,050) or two years in prison, or both.

The 1992 Constitution established the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ). Among other things, the Commission is charged with investigating alleged and suspected corruption and the misappropriation of public funds by officials. The Commission is also authorized to take appropriate steps, including providing reports to the Attorney General and the Auditor-General in response to such investigations. The effectiveness of the Commission, however, is hampered by a lack of resources, as it conducts few investigations leading to prosecutions. CHRAJ issued guidelines on conflict of interest to public sector workers in 2006, and issued a new Code of Conduct for Public Officers in Ghana with guidelines on conflicts of interest in 2009. CHRAJ also developed a National Anti-Corruption Action Plan that Parliament approved in July 2014, but many of its provisions have not been implemented due to lack of resources. In November 2015, then-President John Mahama fired the CHRAJ Commissioner after she was investigated for misappropriating public funds.

In 1998, the Government of Ghana also established an anti-corruption institution, called the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), to investigate corrupt practices involving both private and public institutions. The SFO’s name was changed to the Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) in 2010, and its functions were expanded to include crimes such as money laundering and other organized crimes. EOCO is empowered to initiate prosecutions and to recover proceeds from criminal activities. The government passed a “Whistle Blower” law in July 2006, intended to encourage Ghanaian citizens to volunteer information on corrupt practices to appropriate government agencies.

Like most other African countries, Ghana is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.

The most common commercial fraud scams are procurement offers tied to alleged Ghanaian government or, more frequently, ECOWAS programs. U.S. companies frequently report being contacted by an unknown Ghanaian firm claiming to be an authorized agent of an official government procurement agency. Foreign firms that express an interest in being included in potential procurements are lured into paying a series of fees to have their companies registered or products qualified for sale in Ghana or the West Africa region. U.S. companies receiving offers from West Africa from unknown sources should contact the U.S. Commercial Service in Ghana ( https://www.trade.gov/ghana ), use extreme caution, and conduct significant due diligence prior to pursuing these offers. American firms can request background checks on companies with whom they wish to do business by purchasing the U.S. Commercial Service’s International Company Profile (ICP). Requests for ICPs should be made through the nearest United States Export Assistance Center (USEAC), which can be found at https://www.trade.gov. For more information about the U. S. Commercial Service office at the U.S. Embassy in Ghana, visit www.export.gov/ghana .

Resources to Report Corruption

Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ)
Old Parliament House, High Street, Accra
Postal Address: Box AC 489, Accra
Omit the (0) after the area code when dialing from abroad: Phone: +233 (0) 242 211 534
Email: info@chraj.gov.gh
Website: http://www.chraj.gov.gh 

Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO)
Behind Old Parliament House, Accra
Omit the (0) after the area code when dialing from abroad:
Tel +233 (0) 302 665559, +233 (0) 302 634 363
Email: eoco@eoco.org.gh
Website: www.eoco.org.gh

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

While all Guinea’s public utilities (water and electricity) are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the Conde administration has proposed permitting private enterprises to operate in this sphere. In 2015, the French firm Veolia was contracted to manage the state-owned electric utility Electricité de Guinée (EDG) – a contract which ended in October 2019. Several private projects aimed at harnessing Guinea’s solar energy potential and gas-powered thermal plants are being implemented with the goal of producing and selling energy throughout Guinea and possibly to neighboring countries. Other SOEs are found in the telecommunications, road construction, lottery, and transportation sectors. There are several other mixed companies where the state owns a significant or majority share, that are typically related to the extractives industry.

The hydroelectricity sector could support Guinea’s modernization, and possibly even supply regional markets. Guinea’s hydropower potential is estimated at over 6,000MW, making it a potential exporter of power to neighboring countries. In 2015, Guinea built the 240MW Kaleta Dam, doubling the country’s electricity generating capacity and providing Conakry with a more reliable source of power for most of the year. The government is now pushing forward with the more ambitious 450MW Souapiti Dam and other power generation plans, for which EDG would be the primary off-taker. The country currently uses and produces about 450MW, so the Souapiti project could create reserves for export. Plans for improving the distribution network to enable electricity export are in process with the development of the Gambia River Basin Development (OMVG) (Organization pour la Mise en Oeuvre de Fleuve Gambie, in French) transmission project connecting Guinea, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, and The Gambia. The OMVG project involves the construction of 1,677 kilometers of 225-volt transmission network capable of handling 800MW to provide electricity for over two million people. At the same time, Guinea is moving forward with the Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, (CLSG) transmission interconnector project, which will integrate Guinea into the West African Power Pool (WAPP) and allow for energy import-export across the region. While the government does not publish significant information concerning the financial stability of its SOEs, EDG’s balance sheet is understood to be in the red. The IMF reported that as recently as 2017, up to 28 percent of Guinea’s budget went towards subsidizing electricity, and the IMF demanded that EDG improve tariff collection since large numbers of its users do not pay. The Prime Minister announced in mid-March that EDG subsidies cost USD 350 million annually.

The amount of research and development (R&D) expenditures is not known, but it would be highly unlikely that any of Guinea’s SOEs would devote significant funding to R&D. Guinean SOEs are entitled to subsidized fuel, which EDG uses to run thermal generator stations in Conakry. Guinea is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement.

Corporate governance of SOEs is determined by the government. Guinean SOEs do not adhere to the OECD guidelines. SOEs are supposed to report to the Office of the President, however, typically they report to a ministry. Seats on the board of governance for SOEs are usually allocated by presidential decree.

Privatization Program

The Guinean government is actively working on privatization in the energy sector. In April 2015, the government tendered a management contract to run the state-owned electrical utility EDG. French company Veolia won the tender and attempted to manage and rehabilitate the insolvent utility until the end of 2019. As of February 2020, EDG became a public limited company with its own board of directors. The new directors were appointed by the President through decree. Bidding processes are clearly spelled out for potential bidders; however, Guinea gives weight to competence in the French language and experience working on similar projects in West Africa. In spring 2015, a U.S. company lost a fiber optics tender largely due to its lack of native French speakers on the project and lack of regional experience.

In its 2020 Ease of Doing Business index, the World Bank ranked Guinea 156th of 190 countries worldwide, down four places from 2019. According to Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index, Guinea lost seven points and was ranked 137 out of 180 countries listed.

Guinea passed an Anti-Corruption Law in 2017, and in April 2019, a former director of the Guinean Office of Advertising was sentenced to five years in prison for embezzling GNF 39 billion (approximately USD four million); however, in June 2019 he was acquitted by the Appeals Court and was elected a member of the National Assembly in March 2020. It is not clear whether the Anti-Corruption Law was used to prosecute the case. According to a 2019 Afrobarometer survey, at least 40 percent of Guineans reported having given a government official a bribe, while a 2016 World Bank Enterprise Survey reported that of 150 firms surveyed, 48.7 percent reported that they were expected to give “gifts” to public officials to get things done, but only 7.9 percent reported having paid a bribe. http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploreeconomies/2016/guinea#corruption 

http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploreeconomies/2016/guinea#corruption 

The business and political culture, coupled with low salaries, have historically combined to promote and encourage corruption. Requests for bribes are a common occurrence. Though it is illegal to pay bribes in Guinea, there is little enforcement of these laws. In practice, it is difficult and time-consuming to conduct business without giving “gifts” in Guinea, leaving U.S. companies, who must comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, at a disadvantage.

Although the law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the law does not extend to family members. It does include provisions for political parties. According to the World Bank’s 2018 Worldwide Governance Indicators, corruption continues to remain a severe problem, and Guinea is in the 13th percentile, down from being in the 15th percentile in 2012. Public funds have been diverted for private use or for illegitimate public uses, such as buying vehicles for government workers. Land sales and business contracts generally lack transparency. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports 

Guinea’s Anti-Corruption Agency (ANLC) is an autonomous agency established by presidential decree in 2004. The ANLC reports directly to the President and is currently the only state agency focused solely on fighting corruption. However, it has been largely ineffective in its role, with no successful convictions. The ANLC’s Bureau of Complaint Reception fields anonymous tips forwarded to the ANLC. Investigations and cases must then be prosecuted through criminal courts. According to the ANLC, during the past year there were no prosecutions as a result of tips. The agency is underfunded, understaffed, and lacks computers and vehicles. The ANLC is comprised of 52 employees in seven field offices, with a budget of USD 1.1 million in 2018.

The Conde administration has named corruption in both the governmental and commercial spheres as one of its top agenda items. In November 2019, Ibrahim Magu, the acting Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria, and President Alpha Conde reached an agreement through which the Commission will assist Guinea to establish a anti-corruption agency, however, it is not clear if that means reforming the existing anti-corruption agency or establishing a new anti-corruption agency.

In January 2021, Beny Steinmetz, an Israeli businessman and billionaire was sentenced to five years in jail in Geneva for bribing the wife of Guinea’s late President Lansana Conté in order to gain the rights to one of the world’s richest iron-ore deposits. He was also ordered to pay a 50 million Swiss franc (USD 56 million) fine. Steinmetz has long claimed to be a victim of a vast international conspiracy to deprive him of the rights to the Simandou project. He plans to appeal his case.

A 2016 survey by the ANLC, the Open Society Initiative-West Africa (OSIWA), and Transparency International found that among private households, 61 percent of the respondents stated they were asked to pay a bribe for national services and 24 percent for local services. Furthermore, 24 percent claimed to have paid traffic-related bribes to police, 24 percent for better medical treatment, 19 percent for better water or electricity services, and 8 percent for better judicial treatment.

Guinea is a party to the UN Anticorruption Convention. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html 

Guinea is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm 

Since 2012, Guinea has had a Code for Public Procurement (Code de Marches Publics et Delegations de Service Public) that provides regulations for countering conflicts of interest in awarding contracts or in government procurements. In 2016, the government issued a Transparency and Ethics chart for public procurement that provides the main do’s and don’ts in public procurement, highlighting avoidance of conflict of interest as a priority. The chart also includes a template letter that companies have to sign when bidding for public contracts stating that they will comply with local legislation and public procurement provisions, including practices to prevent corruption.

Starting from April 2020, Government of Guinea officials and family must complete the asset declaration form which is available on the Court of Audit website.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:

Sekou Mohamed Sylla
Deputy Executive Director
Agence Nationale de Lutte Contre la Corruption et la Promotion de la Bonne Gouvernance (ANLC – National Agency Against Corruption)
Cite des Nations, Conakry, Guinea
+224- 669 22 82 51
EMAIL ADDRESS: tourealnc@gmail.com

Transparency International
Dakar, Senegal
+221-33-842-40-44
forumcivil@orange.sn

In 2013, the Presidential Task Force on Parastatal Reforms (PTFPR) published a list of all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and recommended proposals to reduce the number of State Corporations from 262 to 187 to eliminate redundant functions between parastatals; close or dispose of non-performing organizations; consolidate functions wherever possible; and reduce the workforce — however, progress is slow ( https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BytnSZLruS3GQmxHc1VtZkhVVW8/edit ). SOEs’ boards are independently appointed and published in Kenya Gazette notices by the Cabinet Secretary of the ministry responsible for the respective SOE. The State Corporations Act (2015) mandated the State Corporations Advisory Committee to advise the GOK on matters related to SOEs. Despite being public entities, only SOEs listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange publish their financial positions, as required by Capital Markets Authority guidelines. SOEs’ corporate governance is guided by the constitution’s chapter 6 on Leadership and Integrity, the Leadership and Integrity Act (2012) (L&I) and the Public Officer Ethics Act (2003), which establish integrity and ethics requirements governing the conduct of public officials.

In general, competitive equality is the standard applied to private enterprises in competition with public enterprises. Certain parastatals, however, have enjoyed preferential access to markets. Examples include Kenya Reinsurance, which enjoys a guaranteed market share; Kenya Seed Company, which has fewer marketing barriers than its foreign competitors; and the National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK), which benefits from retail market outlets developed with government funds. Some state corporations have also benefited from easier access to government guarantees, subsidies, or credit at favorable interest rates. In addition, “partial listings” on the Nairobi Securities Exchange offer parastatals the benefit of accessing equity financing and GOK loans (or guarantees) without being completely privatized.

In August 2020, the executive reorganized the management of SOEs in the cargo transportation sector and mandated the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) to oversee rail, pipeline and port operations through a holding company called Kenya Transport and Logistics Network (KTLN). ICDC assumes a coordinating role over the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC), and Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC). KTLN focuses on lowering the cost of doing business in the country through the provision of cost effective and efficient transportation and logistics infrastructure.

SOE procurement from the private sector is guided by the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (2015) and the published Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulations (2020) which introduced exemptions from the Act for procurement on bilateral or multilateral basis, commonly referred to as government-to-government procurement; introduced E-procurement procedures; and preferences and reservations, which gives preferences to the “Buy Kenya Build Kenya” strategy ( http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/LegalNotices/2020/LN69_2020.pdf ).

Kenya is neither party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) nor an Observer Government.

Privatization Program

The Privatization Act (2003) establishes the Privatization Commission (PC) that is mandated to formulate, manage, and implement Kenya’s Privatization Program. GOK has been committed to implementing a comprehensive public enterprises reform program to increase private sector participation in the economy. The privatization commission ( https://www.pc.go.ke/ ) is fully constituted with a board responsible for the privatization program. The PC has 26 approved privatization programs ( https://www.pc.go.ke/sites/default/files/2019-06/APPROVED%20PRIVATIZATION%20PROGRAMME.pdf ). In 2020, the GOK began the process of privatizing some state-owned sugar firms through a public bidding process, including foreign investors.

Corruption is pervasive and entrenched in Kenya. Transparency International’s (TI) 2020 Global Corruption Perception Index ranked Kenya 137 out of 180 countries, an improvement of 13 places compared to 2019. However, Kenya’s score of (28 remained below the sub-Saharan Africa average of 32. TI cited lack of political will, limited progress in prosecuting corruption cases, and the slow pace of reform in key sectors as the primary drivers of Kenya’s relatively low ranking. Corruption has been an impediment to FDI, with local media reporting allegations of high-level corruption related to health, energy, ICT, and infrastructure contracts. Numerous reports have alleged that corruption influenced the outcome of government tenders, and some U.S. firms assert that compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act significantly undermines their chances of winning public procurements.

In 2018, President Kenyatta began a public campaign against corruption. While GOK agencies mandated to fight corruption have been inconsistent in coordinating activities, particularly regarding cases against senior officials, cabinet and other senior-level arrests in 2019 and 2020 suggested a renewed commitment by the GOK to fight corruption. In 2020, the judiciary convicted a member of parliament to 67 years in jail or a fine of KES 707 million (approximately USD 7 million) for defrauding the government of KES 297 million (approximately USD 2.9 million). The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), in 2019, secured 44 corruption-related convictions, the highest number of convictions in a single year in Kenya’s history. The EACC also recovered assets totaling more than USD 28 million in 2019 – more than the previous five years combined. Despite these efforts, much work remains to battle corruption in Kenya.

Relevant legislation and regulations include the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (2003), the Public Officers Ethics Act (2003), the Code of Ethics Act for Public Servants (2004), the Public Procurement and Disposal Act (2010), the Leadership and Integrity Act (2012), and the Bribery Act (2016). The Access to Information Act (2016) also provides mechanisms through which private citizens can obtain information on government activities; however, government agencies’ compliance with this act remains inconsistent. The EACC monitors and enforces compliance with the above legislation.

The Leadership and Integrity Act (2012) requires public officers to register potential conflicts of interest with the relevant commissions. The law identifies interests that public officials must register, including directorships in public or private companies, remunerated employment, securities holdings, and contracts for supply of goods or services, among others. The law requires candidates seeking appointment to non-elective public offices to declare their wealth, political affiliations, and relationships with other senior public officers. This requirement is in addition to background screening on education, tax compliance, leadership, and integrity.

The law requires that all public officials, and their spouses and dependent children under age 18, declare their income, assets, and liabilities every two years. Information contained in these declarations is not publicly available, and requests to obtain and publish this information must be approved by the relevant commission. Any person who publishes or makes public information contained in a public officer’s declarations without permission may be subject to fine or imprisonment.

The Access to Information Act (2016) requires government entities, and private entities doing business with the government, to proactively disclose certain information, such as government contracts, and comply with citizens’ requests for government information. The act also provides a mechanism to request a review of the government’s failure to disclose requested information, along with penalties for failures to disclose. The act exempts certain information from disclosure on grounds of national security. However, the GOK has yet to issue the act’s implementing regulations and compliance remains inconsistent.

The private sector-supported Bribery Act (2016) stiffened penalties for corruption in public tendering and requires private firms participating in such tenders to sign a code of ethics and develop measures to prevent bribery. Both the constitution and the Access to Information Act (2016) provide protections to NGOs, investigative journalism, and individuals involved in investigating corruption. The Witness Protection Act (2006) establishes protections for witnesses in criminal cases and created an independent Witness Protection Agency. A draft Whistleblowers Protection Bill has been stalled in Parliament since 2016.

President Kenyatta directed government ministries, departments, and agencies to publish all information related to government procurement to enhance transparency and combat corruption. While compliance is improving, it is not yet universal. The information is published on ( https://tenders.go.ke/website/contracts/Index ) website.

Kenya is a signatory to the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and in 2016 published the results of a peer review process on UNCAC compliance: ( https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalReports/2015_09_28_Kenya_Final_Country_Report.pdf ). Kenya is also a signatory to the UN Anticorruption Convention and the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery, and a member of the Open Government Partnership. Kenya is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Kenya is also a signatory to the East African Community’s Protocol on Preventing and Combating Corruption.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:

Rev. Eliud Wabukala (Ret.)
Chairperson and Commissioner
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
P.O. Box 61130 00200 Nairobi, Kenya
Phones: +254 (0)20-271-7318, (0)20-310-722, (0)729-888-881/2/3

Report corruption online: https://eacc.go.ke/default/report-corruption/ 

Contact at “watchdog” organization:

Sheila Masinde
Executive Director
Transparency International Kenya
Phone: +254 (0)722-296-589
Report corruption online: https://www.tikenya.org/ 

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Lesotho privatized most state-owned enterprises (SOEs) following the adoption of the Privatization Act of 1995, including telecommunications, banks, and the government vehicle fleet.  The government did not privatize the electricity and water utility companies, which enjoy monopolies in their respective sectors.  In 2004, the government established the Lesotho Post Bank, which is mandated to provide Basotho greater access to financial services. The government has stakes in private companies in utilities and the telecommunications, mining, and manufacturing sectors.  There is a significant level of competition within these sectors—SOEs do not play a leading role.  There are no laws that seek to ensure a primary or leading role for SOEs in certain sectors/industries.  SOEs operate under the same tax law, value-added tax (VAT) rebate policies, regulatory, and policy environment as other private business, including foreign businesses.  Private enterprises compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies.  Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs and on the same terms as SOEs, including access to finance from commercial banks and government credit guarantee schemes.

Privatization Program

There is no ongoing privatization program in Lesotho.

Lesotho’s Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offences (DCEO) is mandated to prevent and to combat corruption.  The country has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption of public officials.  Parliament passed anticorruption legislation in 1999 that provides criminal penalties for official corruption.  The DCEO is the primary anticorruption organ and investigates corruption complaints against public sector officials.  The Amendment of Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act of 2006 enacted the first financial disclosure laws for public officials.  On February 5, 2016, the government issued regulations to initiate implementation of the financial disclosure laws for public officials who must file their declarations annually by April 30.  The law may also be applied to private citizens if deemed necessary by the DCEO.  The law prohibits direct or indirect bribery of public officials, including payments to family members of officials and political parties.  On June 25, 2020, the parliament passed the amendment on Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act of 2006, which will allow the DCEO to investigate money laundering issues beyond national boundaries. This amendment provides the DCEO with the power to work together with similar institutions from other countries in combating corruption.

The Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act of 2008 (amended in 2017) and Public Financial Management and Accountability Act of 2011 serve as additional anti-corruption laws.  The Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act (section 14 (1)) and Public Procurement Regulations of 2007 have provisions that address conflicts-of-interest in awarding government procurement contracts.  Section 6 (g) (h) (i) of the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act of 1999 encourages private companies to develop internal controls to prevent corruption.  Corruption is most pervasive in government procurement, awarding licenses, and customs fraud.

While the GOL has made significant efforts to implement its laws, many officials continue to engage in corruption with impunity.  The DCEO claims it cannot effectively undertake its mission because it lacks adequate resources. The country does not have instruments to protect NGOs investigating corruption. Corruption is pervasive in government procurement, provision of licenses, work permits and residence permits.

To prevent corruption and economic offences, the DCEO encourages companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials.  Many companies have effective internal controls, ethics, and programs to detect and prevent bribery.

No U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to foreign direct investment in Lesotho.  Giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal act under the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act of 2006, the penalty for which is a minimum of 10,000 maloti (USD 667) or 10 years imprisonment.  Local companies cannot deduct a bribe to a foreign official from taxes.

UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery

Lesotho acceded to the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2005, but it is not yet a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.  Lesotho acceded to the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 2003.  The country is also a member of the Southern African Development Community Protocol against corruption, the Southern African Forum against corruption, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).

Resources to Report Corruption  

Contacts at government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption:

Sefako Seema
Prosecutor
DCEO

or

Mamello Mafelesi
Prosecutor
DCEO
P.O.  Box 16060, Maseru, 100 Lesotho +266 2231-3713
info@dceo.org.ls 

* Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Lesotho

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.
Table 4
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

The country has approximately 20 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which are governed by boards of directors with oversight provided by sector ministries. The President of Liberia appoints members of the boards to govern wholly-government-owned and semi-autonomous state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  The Public Financial Management (PFM) Act SOE requirements, but few SOE statements are made public.

SOEs employ more than 10,000 people in sea and airport services, electricity supply, oil and gas, water and sewage, agriculture, forestry, maritime, petroleum importation and storage, and information and communication technology services. Not all SOEs are profitable. Some SOEs maintain their own websites. Liberia does not have a clearly defined corporate code for its SOEs. Reportedly, high level officials, including some who sit on SOE boards, influence those enterprises to conduct their business and revenue disbursements in ways not consistent with standard corporate governance.

Privatization Program

The Government of Liberia does not have a privatization program or policy.

Liberia has laws against economic sabotage, mismanagement of funds, bribery, and other corruption-related acts, including conflicts of interest. However, Liberia suffers from corruption in both the public and private sectors. The government does not implement its laws effectively and consistently, and there have been numerous reports of corruption by public officials, including some who engage in corrupt practices with impunity. On December 9, 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned prominent Liberian lawyer, senator, and Chair of the Liberian Senate Judiciary Committee Varney Sherman for offering bribes to multiple judges, including in a case against him regarding a 2010 bribery scheme. He continues to serve in those same official capacities. In 2020, Liberia ranked 137 out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index – a decline from its already low 120th ranking. See http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview.

The  Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission     (LACC) currently cannot directly prosecute corruption cases without first referring cases to the  Ministry of Justice     (MOJ) for prosecution. If the MOJ does not prosecute within 90 days, the LACC may then take those cases to court, although it has not exercised this right to date. The LACC continues to seek public support for the establishment of a specialized court to exclusively try corruption cases. In September 2020, integrity institutions including the LACC developed an anti-corruption roadmap that requires significant amendments in the LACC Act. The draft amendments to the law would empower LACC to directly prosecute cases without awaiting MOJ investigations and recommends the passage into law of the Whistleblowers and Witness Protection Bill. It also would mandate the LACC to administer the Asset Declaration requirement for appointed officials and ensure compliance across the three branches of government, and not just the executive branch.

Foreign investors generally report that corruption is most pervasive in government procurement, contract and concession awards, customs and taxation systems, regulatory systems, performance requirements, and government payments systems.  Multinational firms often report paying fees not stipulated in investment agreements. Private companies do not have generally agreed and structured internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of public officials. No laws explicitly protect NGOs that investigate corruption. Liberia is signatory to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on the Fight against Corruption, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), and the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agencies responsible for combating corruption:

Baba Borkai, Chief Investigator
Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC), Monrovia,
http://lacc.gov.lr/  
bborkai@lacc.gov.lr 
Tel: (+231) 777-313131
Email:  bborkai@lacc.gov.lr 

Contact at a “watchdog” organization (local or nongovernmental organization operating in Liberia that monitors corruption):

Anderson Miamen, Executive Director
Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia (CENTAL)
Tel: (+231) 886-818855
Email:  admiamen@gmail.com 

* Source for Liberia Data: Central Bank of Liberia, Annual Report 2019 covering January 1 to December 31, 2019, Published January 27, 2020.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

The PIB Is responsible for matters related to privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). All enterprises in Libya were previously state-owned. Except for the upstream oil and gas sector, no state-owned enterprise is considered to be efficient. The state is deeply involved in utilities, oil and gas, agriculture, construction, real estate development and manufacturing, and the corporate economy.

Privatization Program

Libya has gone through three previous phases of privatization, the latest between 2003 and 2008 during which 360 SOEs ranging from small to large in various sectors were either fully or partially privatized or brought in private partners through public-private partnerships. However, restrictions to individual shares and foreign ownership – individual investors’ share of the capital was restricted to 15 percent and local ownership had to be 30 percent – limited interest in the privatization program. Accusations of fraud further discouraged investments. Nonetheless, the food industry, healthcare, construction materials, downstream oil and gas, and education sectors are now partially or fully privatized. Fragile governments and lack of security since 2011 have impeded implementation of further privatization programs.

Foreign firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI; corruption is pervasive in virtually all sectors of the economy, especially in government procurement. Officials frequently engage with impunity in corrupt practices such as graft, bribery, nepotism, money laundering, human smuggling, and other criminal activities. Although Libyan law provides some criminal penalties for corruption by officials, the government does not enforce the law effectively. Internal conflict and the weakness of public institutions further undermine enforcement. No financial disclosure laws, regulations, or codes of conduct require income and asset disclosure by appointed or elected officials.

The Libyan Audit Bureau, the highest financial regulatory authority in the country, has made minimal efforts to improve transparency. The Audit Bureau has investigated mismanagement at the General Electricity Company of Libya that had lowered production and led to acute power cuts. Other economic institutions such as the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank published some economic data during the year.

Libya has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention. It is not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

Resources to Report Corruption

Akram Bannur
General Secretary
National Anti-Corruption Commission of Libya
+218 91 335 8583
Bannurakram@outlook.com 

Contact at a “watchdog” organization (international, regional, local or nongovernmental organization operating in the country/economy that monitors corruption, such as Transparency International):

Ibrahim Ali
Chairman
Libyan Transparency International
+218916344442
info@transparency-libya.org 

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

The government has shares in 55 public establishments of an industrial and commercial nature, with a majority stake in 27 enterprises; in 11 cases, the government owns over 95 percent of the entity. A list of operating state-owned enterprises can be found here . Detailed information about state-owned companies (SOEs) is not easy to come by but they operate in many key sectors such as aviation, public utility (running water and electricity), ports, hotels, insurance, finance, woodworking, mining, maintenance and construction of ships, and real estate. The government has minority shares in three major banks, the beverage industry, oil distribution, and mining activities. The two most well-known SOEs are JIRAMA (100 percent state-owned), the water and electricity utility, and Air Madagascar whose equity tie-up with France’s Air Austral has now ended. The GOM has spent substantial amounts subsidizing the operations of both of these entities. Improvement in the governance and a return to profitability of SOEs is a long-standing condition for assistance by multilateral donor institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.

In theory, private enterprises are, on the whole, allowed to compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions for market access, credit, and other business operations. The reality is somewhat different. State-owned enterprises dominate the sectors in which they operate. Any investor seeking to compete with an SOE in Madagascar should consider not only market-entry difficulties, but also its ability to compete for scarce resources and permits.

Privatization Program

The 2004 law on privatization prohibits the Government from owning more than 50 percent of a privatized company. The fledgling privatization program initiated before 2009 has given way to more government control as reflected by the GOM’s recent moves to increase what it calls “the production share of the government” in the mining sector.

In the past, foreign investors participated actively in these privatization programs. Almost all state-owned banks were purchased by foreign investors including foreign state-owned banks.

Currently, the GOM does not have a privatization program on its agenda.

While giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal act and is subject to trial by court, corruption is an ongoing issue at all levels in Madagascar.  No sector is immune, but it is most pervasive when dealing with the judiciary, police, tax, customs, land, and the mining industry.

Madagascar’s anti-corruption legislation, updated in 2016, mandated the establishment of the Independent Anticorruption Office (BIANCO) and the Committee for Safeguarding Integrity (CSI).  BIANCO enforces the anti-corruption law while CSI monitors the implementation of the national anticorruption strategy.  The anti-corruption courts (PAC) were established in 2018 to hear all corruption-related cases – including economic and financial crimes – after an investigation by BIANCO or the gendarmerie.  There are supposed to be PACs throughout the country; the first PAC was set up in the capital and the second became operational in Mahajanga in October 2020; the set-up of the third PAC in Fianarantsoa is underway.  Madagascar also has a Financial Intelligence Unit (SAMIFIN) to carry out research and financial analysis related to money laundering.  Transparency International Initiative Madagascar (TI-IM) has an office in the country working here since 2002.  TI-IM, BIANCO, SAMIFIN, Police and Gendarmerie collaborate closely to bring cases to the courts.

The Rajoelina administration has prosecuted some major corruption cases. In 2019, 5461 cases were charged, 1441 individuals investigated, 639 arrested, and 155 jailed for pre-trial detention.

The long-awaited Illicit Asset Recovery law was passed by ordinance in 2019.  Subsequently, the CSI, BIANCO, and SAMIFIN initiated the development of the draft implementing decree, specifically on the establishment of the Agency for the Recovery of Illicit Assets.  This ordinance will allow the country to properly manage confiscated assets at both the national and international level.  However, in 2020 members of parliament introduced legislation that would weaken the anti-corruption system by limiting the mandates of PAC judges, reducing areas of jurisdiction for the PAC, and repealing the illicit asset seizure decree. The legislation remains pending before the Senate.

There is no requirement for companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials.  Both the anti-corruption law and the penal code prohibit any individual/enterprise from giving money, presents, or other gifts to public officials to obtain advantages they are not entitled to.  The law also provides that any private enterprise that commits corrupt practices to obtain a permit, license or authorization is excluded from government procurement.  Furthermore, according to the law, any license, authorization, or permit issued illegally through corruption is void.

Both Article 31 of the 2016 anti-corruption law and Article 182 of the penal code require that any conflicts of interest concerning a public official should be declared to the supervising authority.  Failure to do so can lead to between six months to two years of imprisonment, a fine varying from MGA 1,000,000 (eq. USD 270) to MGA 50,000,000 (eq. USD 13,500) or both.  There is limited information on companies using internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials.  However, some foreign companies have begun to orient their internal control, ethics, and compliance programs to prevent bribery, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits U.S. firms from engaging in such behavior.

Madagascar ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption, as well as the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, in 2004.  Madagascar also joined the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol against corruption in 2007 but has not yet signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction.

NGOs and associations are involved in governance and anti-corruption projects.  The law does not have any explicit provisions protecting NGOs and associations.  A Transparency International report states that although many associations and NGOs exist on paper, their actions are limited in terms of impact, especially in terms of playing a watchdog or advocacy role concerning government institutions.  Environmental activists have been harassed and threatened by various means.  The government, however, does not target them directly.

In general, the private sector identifies corruption as an obstacle to investment.  The IMF country report on Madagascar published in 2017 indicates that corruption affects the business climate in Madagascar.  Forty percent of those surveyed expected to give gifts “to get things done”, or to get an operating license, or to secure a government contract.  Moreover, 30 percent of the surveyed firms expected to give gifts in meeting tax officials and were required to make an informal payment or experienced a bribe payment request.  Similarly, more than 75% of Malagasy stated that corruption had increased in Madagascar over the past year, according to the 2019 Afro barometer Survey, with 44% of Malagasy believing that police and gendarmes are involved in corruption and 39% believing the same of judges and magistrates.  BIANCO fared better with respect to the public’s trust, with 87% believing it is somewhat or very probable that BIANCO will take action if they report an act of corruption.  Nevertheless, of these respondents, 70% believe that regular citizens are at risk of retaliation if they report this. For exporters, many products require documentation linked to regulatory controls and this process can require a significant amount of time, costs, and possibly bribes.  Aside from the routine demands for a quid pro quo, close ties between business and political elites also present barriers to entry for newcomers to the field.

BIANCO has set up a secure platform to allow whistleblowers to remain anonymous and to submit sensitive information securely, using encryption and respecting data transmission and processing.  The government plans to roll out a communication campaign to introduce this online tool which allows citizens to provide authorities with information about corruption.

Despite the measures introduced to combat corruption and smuggling, Madagascar’s vulnerabilities in this regard were exposed in early January 2021 when South African authorities arrested three Madagascar nationals with 73.5 kg of gold at Johannesburg airport.  The men were enroute from Antananarivo to Dubai; so far, the GOM has had no success in persuading the South African government to extradite either the gold or the detainees to Madagascar.

Resources to Report Corruption

Bureau Indépendant Anti-Corruption (Bianco)
Name: Mr. Laza Eric Donat Andrianirina
Title: General Manager
Organisation: Independent Bureau Anti-Corruption (Bianco)
Address: Villa “La Piscine”, Ambohibao, Antananarivo, Madagascar, Po Box 399
Telephone Number: +261 20 22 489 79 / +261 20 22 489 93 / +261 33 02 002 99
Email Address: Bianco.Dg@Moov.Mg; Contact@Bianco-Mg.Mg;
Www.Bianco-Mg.Org 

Transparency International-Initiative Madagascar (Ti-Im)
Name: Mr. Solofo Rakotoseheno
Title: Chairperson Of Ti-Im
Organisation: Transparency International Initiative, Madagascar (Ti-Im)
Address: Villa Huguette (Rdc), Lot Ii U86 Cite Planton, Ampahibe, Antananarivo, Madagascar
Telephone Number: +261 20 22 288 73; +261 34 96 418 79
Email Address: Contact@Transparency.Mg; Communication@Transparency.Mg
Www.Bianco-Mg.Org

Sehatra Fanaraha-Maso Ny Fiainam-Pirenena (Sefafi) – Observatory Of Public Life
Name: Mrs. Sahondra Rabenarivo
Title: Chairperson
Organization: Sehatra Fanaraha-Maso Ny Fiainam-Pirenena (Sefafi)
Address: Lot Iiim33k, Andrefan’ambohijanahary, Antananarivo, Madagascar
Telephone Number: +261 32 59 761 62
Email Address: Sefafi@Gmail.Com;

Afrobarometer
Name: Desire Razafindrazaka
Title: Team Leader
Organization: Afrobarometer, Madagascar Office C/O Coef Resources
Address: Po Box 4075, Antananarivo, Madagascar
Telephone Number: +261 20 22 283 82
Email Address: Coef-Re@Moov.Mg;
Http://Afrobarometer.Org/Countries/Madagascar-0

*Madagascar is not listed in the IMF data on CDIS. The table above shows data from the Central Bank of Madagascar and Institut National de la Statistique de Madagascar (FY2015).

Source: Central Bank of Madagascar

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Madagascar does not have a database on equity and debt securities. There is no stock market and corporates rarely offer their equity shares to the public. In addition, only companies and individuals with legal and permanent resident status can purchase Treasury bonds. Therefore, a breakdown per country on issued bonds is unavailable.

Malawi has 67 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) scattered across many industries/sectors. A list of these SOEs is available on request from the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC), but the GOM does not usually publish the list in the media or online except when releasing comprehensive list of board members of SOEs. The GOM has been known to bail out commercially-run SOEs when they have incurred heavy losses. Despite the significant role SOEs play in the Malawi economy, finances are opaque and overall statistics are not readily available.

Private and public enterprises generally compete on the same terms and conditions for access to markets, credit, and other business opportunities, although in practice personal relationships can influence decisions heavily. There are exceptions for some public works assignments where public enterprises tend to be given special preference by government. SOEs in the agriculture, education, and health sectors spend more on research and development than local private sector players and they are doing so for the public good rather than for profit. Because local firms tend to be capital-constrained and highly skilled labor is scarce, there is not a strong tradition of private sector-led research and development in Malawi.

Malawi’s SOEs are not required to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs. Corporate governance for most SOEs follows the terms of the relevant Malawi law that established the entity. All SOEs report to a line ministry and to the Department of Statutory Corporations in the OPC but also have a Chairperson and Board of Directors. The president through the OPC appoints board of directors who usually range from politicians, religious & traditional leaders, and professionals. Boards also have senior GOM officials as ex-officio/non-voting members. The participation of members of the government as ex-officio/non-voting members, and of politicians as directors, creates a perceived and/or real conflict of interest.

Privatization Program

The government does not have any immediate plans for privatization, but in such cases all investors, irrespective of ethnic group or source of capital (foreign or local) may participate in privatization bids. However, the government may offer domestic investors a discount on shares. Privatization efforts currently focus on public-private partnerships and attracting strategic investors rather than outright privatization. These are handled by the Public Private Partnership Commission .

Public sector corruption, including bribery of public officials and conflicts of interest, are a major challenge for firms operating in Malawi. Giving or receiving a bribe, whether to or from a Malawian or foreign official, is a crime under Malawi’s penal code. However, enforcement is insufficient, slow, and selective. The Corrupt Practices Act establishes the independent Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) which works with other anti-corruption bureaus in the region but is consistently under-staffed and under-resourced. The Act widened the definition of corruption to include, among other things, offences for abuse of office and possession of unexplained wealth. The Act also provides for the investigation of other offences uncovered during investigating corruption and provides protection for whistleblowers.

Malawian law requires 48 categories of public officers, including all levels of officials from the president and members of parliament, down to specific categories of civil servants, including traffic police and immigration officers, to declare their assets and business interests. The paper declarations are accessible to the public upon request. The law does not extend to family members or to political parties. However, where evidence implicates family members or members of a political party in corruption, the ACB has the power to build a case against the accomplices and bring them to court. In addition, all public officials are required to disclose any conflict of interest and to recuse themselves from any deliberation or decision-making process in relation to the conflict. However, there is no clear definition of what constitutes conflict of interest and these laws are not regularly enforced.

The ACB encourages private sector companies and institutions to develop and implement corruption prevention policies as a way of mainstreaming anti-corruption initiatives into their operations. At times, the business sector joins forces to collectively engage in the fight against corruption, but no formal mechanism exists. Internal controls by companies exist but have failed to produce evidence in any high-profile cases.

Malawi is party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. According to Malawian law, citizens have a right to form NGOs focused on anti-corruption or good governance and these NGOs are free to accept funding from any domestic or foreign sources. Malawi’s civil society and the media play an important and visible role in fighting corruption, investigating, and uncovering many cases of corruption. Specific firms with U.S. affiliations have noted irregularities in tender processes and mining licensing but have nonetheless continued to pursue business opportunities in Malawi. Although progress has been made, corruption continues to a major obstacle to doing business in Malawi.

Resources to Report Corruption

Director General
Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB)
Mulanje House, P.O Box 2437, Lilongwe, Malawi
Tel: +(265) 1 772 107
E-mail: reportcentre-ll@acbmw.org
Website: https://acbmw.org/ 

National Coordinator
National Integrity Platform
C/O African Institute of Corporate Citizenship (AICC)
Bwanje Street, Area 47, Private Bag 382, Lilongwe, Malawi
Telephone: +(265) 1 775 787 / 691
Email: jeff@aiccafrica.org 
Website: http://mail.aiccafrica.org/ 

* Source for Host Country Data: RBM Malawi . Note that Malawi Government rebased GDP in 2020 which resulted into upward adjustment of GDP figures ( GDP Rebasing Malawi ) .

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Mali has privatized or reduced government involvement in a number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, there are still 45 state-owned or partially state-owned companies in Mali, including 12 mining companies, five banks, the national electricity company (EDM), a telecommunications entity (SOTELMA), a cotton ginning company (CMDT), a cigarette company (SONATAM), sugar companies (SUKALA and N-SUKALA), and the Bamako-Senou Airport. The government no longer has shares in two banks, BSIC-Mali, Coris Bank International-Mali, in which it had respectively 25 and 10 percent shares as of December 2017. The government reduced its shares in the Malian Development Bank (BDM) and Malian Solidarity Bank (BMS) while it maintained its share in the Banque Nationale de Developpement Agricole (BNDA) which increased its total capital stock by 21.5 percent in 2019 compared with 2018. More details on SOEs are available here .

Private and public enterprises compete under the same terms and conditions. No preferential treatment is given to SOEs, although they can be at a competitive disadvantage due to the limited flexibility they have in their management decision-making process. Malian law guarantees equal treatment for financing, land access, tax burden, tax rebate, and access to raw materials for private firms and SOEs.

The government is active in the agricultural sector. The parastatal Niger River Authority (Office du Niger) controls much of the irrigated rice fields and vegetable production in the Niger River inland delta, although some private operators have been granted plots of land to develop. The Office du Niger encourages both national and foreign private investment to develop the farmlands it manages. Under an MCC-funded irrigation project, Mali granted titles to small private farmers; an adjacent tranche developed with MCC was to have been open to large-scale private investment through a public tender process. However, all MCC projects were suspended as a result of the coup d’état of March 2012 and discontinued when the projects reached the end of their implementation deadline. The national cotton production company, CMDT, which is yet to be privatized, provides financing for fertilizers and inputs to cotton farmers, sets cotton prices, purchases cotton from producers, and exports cotton fiber via ports in neighboring countries.

The government also remains active in the banking sector. The state owns shares in five of the 14 banks in Mali: BDM (19.5 percent share), BIM (10.5 percent), BNDA (36.5 percent), BMS (13.8 percent), and BCS (3.3 percent). While the government no longer has a majority stake in BDM, it has significant influence over its management, including the privilege to appoint the head of the Board of Directors.

Senior government officials from different ministries make up the boards of SOEs. Major procurement decisions or equity raising decisions are referred to the Council of Ministers. Government powers remain in the hands of ministries or government agencies reporting to the ministries. No SOE has delegated powers from the government.

SOEs are required by law to publish an annual report. They hold a mandatory annual board of directors meeting to discuss financial statements prepared by a certified accountant and certified by an outside auditor in accordance with domestic standards (which are comparable to international financial reporting standards). Mali’s independent Auditor General conducts an annual review of public spending, which may result in the prosecution of cases of corruption. Audits of several state-owned mining companies have revealed significant irregularities.

Privatization Program

The government’s privatization program for state enterprises provides investment opportunities through a process of open international bidding. Foreign companies have responded successfully to calls for bids in several cases. The government publishes announcements for bids in the government-owned daily newspaper, L’Essor. The process is non-discriminatory in principle; however, there have been many allegations of corruption in public procurement.

Many companies claim that corruption is the most significant obstacle to foreign investment and economic development in Mali. While corruption is a crime punishable under the penal code, bribery is frequently reported in many large contracts and investment projects. Some investors report that government officials often solicit bribes in order to complete otherwise routine procedures. The transition government has pledged to prioritize anti-corruption efforts. In 2020, Transparency International’s global corruption ranking for Mali slightly improved to 129th of 180 ranked countries (from 130th of 180 in 2019). Mali’s perceived public corruption score from Transparency International was 30 out of 100 in 2020 (with 0 being “highly corrupt” and 100 being “very clean”). Relative to other developing countries, Mali was rated at the 67th percentile for control of corruption on the FY2020 MCC Scorecard (based on World Bank and Brookings Worldwide Governance Indicators reports).

Corruption is reportedly common in government procurement and dispute settlement. The government has addressed this issue by requiring procurement contracts to be inspected by the Directorate General for Public Procurement, which determines whether the procedure meets fairness, price competitiveness, and quality standards. However, there are allegations of significant political interference in procurement. In addition, both foreign and domestic companies complain about harassment and requests for bribes from officials involved in tax collection. Mali’s international donor community has been working with the government to reduce corruption.

Investors have found the judicial sector to be neither independent nor transparent. Questionable judgments in commercial cases have occasionally been successfully overturned at the supreme court. However, there is a general perception among the populace that while prosecution of minor economic crimes is routine, official corruption, particularly at the higher levels, goes largely unpunished.

In 2004, then-president of Mali Amadou Toumani Touré created the Office of the Auditor General (Bureau du Verificateur General or BVG) as an independent agency tasked with auditing public spending. Since its inception, the BVG has uncovered several significant cases of corruption, including in the customs directorate. However, few findings of corruption have resulted in prosecutions.

Growing pressure from international donors for more transparency in public resource management led to changing the appointment process of the Directors of Finance and Equipment. As a result, in March 2017, the Minister of Economy and Finances dismissed 15 Directors of Finance and Equipment. Eighteen others were moved to other ministries. The government opened a new office in 2017, the Office to Combat Illicit Enrichment (Office central de Lutte contre l’Enrichissement illicite or OCLEI), to combat illicit enrichment by government officials. The OCLEI has the authority to collect asset declarations from public servants, to conduct investigations of government officials suspected of corruption, and to refer cases for prosecution if sufficient evidence is gathered against the defendant. However, the OCLEI’s operations were temporarily suspended following civil servants’ union protests against asset declaration requirements. Negotiations between the unions, the government, and donors eventually yielded a satisfactory solution that enabled the office to resume operations, and the office has begun registering asset declarations for certain categories of civil servants. According to its 2017-2018 report, the OCLEI received asset declarations from approximately 1,000 civil servants (nearly 70 percent of all civil servants in Mali are subject to assets declaration) over 2017-2018 and referred three suspected cases of corruption to the justice system. However, the OCLEI came under significant pressure in 2020 when Mali’s main workers union requested that the government close OCLEI.

Following a cabinet reshuffle in 2019, the newly appointed Minister of Justice took measures to address corruption by appointing a new prosecutor in the Economic and Financial Specialized Judicial Office of Bamako, a court in charge of prosecution of corruption. Since these changes, many high-profile business and political leaders have been arrested due to corruption allegations. Mali’s Auditor General also increased the pace of its reporting in 2019 and 2020, releasing 11 financial audit reports, four performance audit reports, four reports of conformity, and seven reports on the level of implementation of recommendations it made in previous audit reports. The Auditor General refers cases of fraud or other unlawful practices to the Economic and Financial Specialized Judicial Office of Bamako.

Resources to Report Corruption

Mamoudou Kassogue

Head Prosecutor

Economic and Financial Specialized Judicial Office (Pole Economique et Financier de Bamako)
Tel. (+223) 20 29 71 34

Samba Alhamdou Baby
Chief Auditor
Office of the Auditor General (Bureau du Verificateur General)
Tel. (+223) 20 29 70 25

Mama Sininta
Chief Prosecutor
Accounts Chamber of the Supreme Court (Section des Comptes de la Cour Supreme)
Tel. (+223) 20 22 15 02

Konate Salimata Diakite
Comptroller
Comptroller of Public Services (Controleur General des Services Publics)
Tel. (+223) 20 22 58 15

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

* Source for Host Country Data: BCEAO (rate: USD $1 = 542 FCFA)

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Table 4: Portfolio Investment 

Data not available.

SOEs and the parastatal sector in Mauritania represent important drivers of the economy. They have an impact on employment, service delivery, and most importantly fiscal reserves given their importance to the economy and the state budget. In 2020 parastatal companies and SOEs experienced significant business and financial problems in the form of increasing levels of debt, operational losses, and payment delays because of the COVID pandemic. This increase in fiscal reserve risk led the government to provide subsidies to SOEs.

Hard budget constraints for SOEs are written into the Public Procurement Code but are not enforced. SOMELEC, the state-owned electricity company, has been operating in a precarious financial situation for many years. The majority of larger, wholly government-owned enterprises operated, in principle, on a commercial basis. But, many have operated at a loss since the 1970s and failed to provide the services for which they were responsible.

Most state-owned enterprises in Mauritania have independent boards of directors. The directors are usually appointed based on political affiliations.

There are about 120 SOEs and parastatal companies active in a wide range of sectors including energy, network utilities, mining, petroleum, telecommunications, transportation, commerce, and fisheries. Parastatal and wholly owned SOEs remain the major employers in the country. This includes the National Mining Company, SNIM, which is by far the largest Mauritanian enterprise and the second largest employer in the country after the government.

The publicly available financial information on parastatal and wholly owned SOEs is incomplete and outdated, with the exception of budget transfers. There is no publication of the expenditures SOEs allocate to research and development. In addition, they execute the largest portion of government contracts, receiving preference over the private sector. According to the Public Procurement Code, there are no formal barriers to competition with SOEs. However, informal barriers such as denial of access to credit and/or land exist.

Privatization Program

Post is not aware of any privatization programs during the reporting period.

Since taking office in August 2019, President Ghazouani has made fighting corruption one of the cornerstones of his administration. In October 2019, the Court of Accounts published a ten-year audit report covering fiscal years 2007 through 2017. The report highlighted lack of transparency in government tenders, weakness in public finances management and provided credible recommendations. Based on the audit report findings, a parliamentary committee was set up to further investigate four major government infrastructure and fisheries projects that were awarded to Chinese companies. The judiciary system moved forward with investigations during the reporting period. On March 9, 2021 the government concluded its Corruption Investigation File by detaining 29 public officials, including ex-president Aziz. The state prosecutor indicted 13 of them on bribery, money laundering, embezzlement, and obstruction of justice charges.

Tax evasion and corruption have deprived the government of a significant source of revenue, weakening its capacity to provide necessary services. In 2009, the government passed a law requiring all high-ranking government employees to publicly declare their assets, although this law is not enforced.

Corruption is an obstacle to foreign direct investment in Mauritania, but firms generally rate access to credit, an underdeveloped infrastructure, and a lack of skilled labor as even greater impediments. Corruption is most pervasive in government procurement, bank loans, fishing license attribution, land distribution, access to port facilities and tax payments. Giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal act punishable by two to 10 years imprisonment and fines up to USD 700, but there is little application of this law. Firms commonly pay bribes to obtain telephone, electricity, and water connections, and construction permits more quickly.

There are several organizations that track corruption within Mauritania. Transparency International has a representative who reports on local corruption policies and events.

In practice, annual auditing of government accounts is not enforced and therefore rarely conducted. However, the government rectified previously misreported financial data in an effort to be more transparent; this included publishing quarterly financial statements on a government treasury website: www.tresor.mr.

In April 2016, a new anti-corruption bill was introduced to address the provisions of the UN Convention against Corruption and to provide protection to NGOs involved in investigating corruptions cases.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:

Cour Des Comptes Mauritanie
Email ccomptes@cc.gov.mr
Telephone: +222 4525 34 04
Fax: +222 4525 49 64

Contact at “watchdog” organization:

“Publiez ce que vous payez” (Publish What You Pay)
Executive Office
+222 4525-0455
+222 4641-7702

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

The government’s stated policy is to act as a facilitator to business, leaving production to the private sector.  The government, however, still controls key services directly or through parastatal companies in the power and water, television broadcasting, and postal service sectors.

The government also holds controlling shares in the State Bank of Mauritius, Air Mauritius (the national airline), and Mauritius Telecom.  These state-controlled companies have Boards of Directors on which seats are allocated to senior government officials.  The government nominates the chairperson and CEO of each of these companies.  In April 2020, Air Mauritius requested voluntary administration, similar to Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States, because it could not comply with financial obligations.

The government also invests in a wide variety of Mauritian businesses through its investment arm, the State Investment Corporation.  The government is also the owner of Maubank and the National Insurance Company.

Two parastatal entities are involved in the importation of agricultural products: the Agricultural Marketing Board (AMB) and the State Trading Corporation (STC).  The AMB’s role is to ensure that the supply of certain basic food products is constant, and their prices remain affordable.  The STC is the only authorized importer of petroleum products, liquefied petroleum gas, and flour.  SOEs purchase from or supply goods and services to private sector and foreign firms through tenders.

Audited accounts of SOEs are published in their annual reports.  Mauritius is part of the OECD network on corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in southern Africa.

Privatization Program 

The government has no specific privatization program.  In 2017, however, as part of its broader water reform efforts, the government agreed to a World Bank recommendation to appoint a private operator to maintain and operate the country’s potable water distribution system.  Under the World Bank’s proposed public-private partnership, the Central Water Authority (CWA) would continue to own distribution and supply assets, and will be responsible for business planning, setting tariffs, capital expenditure, and monitoring and enforcing the private operator’s performance.

In March 2018, despite protest by trade unions and consumer associations, the Minister of Energy and Public Utilities reiterated his intention to engage by the end of the year a private operator as a strategic partner to take over the water distribution services of the CWA.  To date, this has not materialized.  The government has said for years it planned to sell control of Maubank, into which it has injected about 173 million USD since it nationalized the bank in 2015.  In the 2019-2020 budget speech, the prime minister said the government would sell non-strategic assets to reduce government debt.  His office never identified a list of assets, but in parliament the prime minister has mentioned Maubank, the National Insurance Company, and Casinos of Mauritius as possible divestments.

The prevalence of corruption in Mauritius is low by regional standards, but graft and nepotism nevertheless remain concerns and are increasingly a source of public frustration. Several high-profile cases involving corruption have reinforced the perception that corruption exists at the highest political levels, despite the fact that Mauritian law provides for criminal penalties for corruption by officials.  According to Transparency Mauritius, the absence of a law regulating the financing of political parties fuels corruption.  A former prime minister was arrested in 2015 on allegations of money laundering, though courts have since dismissed all charges.  The state prosecutors appealed the last dismissal in late 2019 and the appeal is pending.  A minister in the previous government stepped down in 2016 after allegations of bribery.  In March 2017, allegations surfaced concerning possible political interference in the Financial Services Commission’s issuance of an investment banking license to Angolan billionaire Alvaro Sobrinho, who is being investigated for alleged corruption in Portugal.  In March 2018, the president of Mauritius resigned after press reported that she bought apparel, jewelry, and a laptop computer with a credit card provided by an NGO financed by the same Angolan businessman.    In June 2020, the prime minister dismissed his deputy prime minister following allegations of bribery and corruption in a public energy contract.  In February 2021, the minister of commerce stepped down amid allegations of corruption and abuse of power.

Investors should know that while the constitution and law require arrest warrants to be based on sufficient evidence and issued by a magistrate, police may detain an individual for up to 21 days under a “provisional charge” based on a reasonable suspicion, with the concurrence of a magistrate.  Two French businessmen claimed that in February 2015 authorities held them against their will.  A U.S. investor has been unable to leave Mauritius since February 1, 2020, without charges filed against him.

In 2002, the government adopted the Prevention of Corruption Act, which led to the establishment of an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).  ICAC has the power to investigate corruption and money laundering offenses and can also seize the proceeds of corruption and money laundering.  The Director of ICAC is nominated by the prime minister.  The Good Governance and Integrity Reporting Act of 2015 was announced as a measure to recover “unexplained wealth” and came into force in early 2016.  Critics of the act dislike its presumption of guilt, requiring the accused to demonstrate a lawful source of questionable assets, as well as the application of the law retroactively for seven years. The 2018 Declaration of Assets Act (DoA) entered into force in June 2019 and defines which public officials are required to declare assets and liabilities to the ICAC.  These public officials include members of the National Assembly, mayors, chairpersons and chief executive officers of state-owned enterprises and statutory bodies, among others.

Mauritius is the 52nd least-corrupt nation out of 175 countries, according to the 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index reported by Transparency International, up from 51st in 2018 and down from 54th in 2017.  However, Mauritius retained its first rank in overall governance in Africa for the 12th consecutive year, according to the 2018 Ibrahim Index of African Governance.

U.S. investors, in conversations with embassy personnel, have not identified corruption as an obstacle to investment in the country.  They have, however, encountered attempts for bribery.

Although the country lacks laws on political party financing, Mauritius has legislation to combat corruption by public officials. These include laws dealing with declaration of assets, asset recovery, prevention of corruption, anti-money laundering, and criminal offences related to abuse of office by public officials.

However, legal loopholes exist and enforcement is weak.  Allegations of corruption and misallocation of government contracts by public entities occurred in 2020, namely the use of emergency procurement procedures during the pandemic to allegedly enrich friends and family of those in power.

According to Transparency Mauritius, more companies have introduced control and risk management protocols, as well as adopting code of ethics and good business conduct, even if these do no target government officials.  The Prevention of Corruption Act targets mainly the public sector, but there is no whistleblower protection law.

Mauritius has ratified the UNCAC, but it has not yet adopted all the recommendations, for instance, the criminalization of corruption in the private sector.  According to Transparency Mauritius, NGOs involved in fighting corruption are not given enough protection and funding.

Resources to Report Corruption 

Navin Beekharry
Director-General
Independent Commission Against Corruption
Reduit Triangle, Moka, Mauritius
+230 402 6600
icacoffice@intnet.mu

Rajen Bablee
Director
Transparency Mauritius
4th Floor, Fon Sing Building, 12 Edith Cavell Street, Port Louis, Mauritius
+ 230 213 0796
transparency.mauritius@gmail.com

* Source for Host Country Data: Bank of Mauritius. The data provided includes the stock positions of global business companies.

Boards of directors (in single-tier boards) or supervisory boards (in dual-tier boards) oversee Moroccan SOEs. The Financial Control Act and the Limited Liability Companies Act govern these bodies. The Ministry of Economy and Finance’s Department of Public Enterprises and Privatization monitors SOE governance. Pursuant to Law No. 69-00, SOE annual accounts are publicly available. Under Law No. 62-99, or the Financial Jurisdictions Code, the Court of Accounts and the Regional Courts of Accounts audit the management of a number of public enterprises. As of March 2021, the Moroccan Treasury held a direct share in 225 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 43 companies. A list of SOEs is available on the Ministry of Finance’s website .

Several sectors remain under public monopoly, managed either directly by public institutions (rail transport, some postal services, and airport services) or by municipalities (wholesale distribution of fruit and vegetables, fish, and slaughterhouses). The Office Cherifien des Phosphates (OCP), a public limited company that is 95 percent held by the Moroccan government, is a world-leading exporter of phosphate and derived products. Morocco has opened several traditional government activities using delegated-management or concession arrangements to private domestic or foreign operators, which are generally subject to tendering procedures. Examples include water and electricity distribution, construction and operation of motorways, and the management of non-hazardous wastes. In some cases, SOEs continue to control the infrastructure while allowing private-sector competition through concessions. SOEs benefit from budgetary transfers from the state treasury for investment expenditures.

Morocco established the Moroccan National Commission on Corporate Governance in 2007. It prepared the first Moroccan Code of Good Corporate Governance Practices in 2008. In 2011, the Commission drafted a code dedicated to SOEs, drawing on the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs. The code, which came into effect in 2012, aims to enhance SOEs’ overall performance. It requires greater use of standardized public procurement and accounting rules, outside audits, the inclusion of independent directors, board evaluations, greater transparency, and better disclosure. The Moroccan government prioritizes a number of governance-related initiatives including an initiative to help SOEs contribute to the emergence of regional development clusters. The government is also attempting to improve the use of multi-year contracts with major SOEs as a tool to enhance performance and transparency.

Privatization Program

The government relaunched Morocco’s privatization program in the 2019 budget. Parliament enacted the updated annex to Law 38-89 (which authorizes the transfer of publicly held shares to the private sector) in February 2019 through publication in the official bulletin, including the list of entities to be privatized. The state still holds significant shares in the main telecommunications companies, banks, and insurance companies, as well as railway and air transport companies. In 2020, King Mohamed VI called for a sweeping reform to address the structural deficiencies of SOEs, after which the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Administration Reform announced plans to consolidate SOEs with overlapping missions, dissolve unproductive SOEs, and reorganize others to increase efficiencies. The government also authorized the establishment of the Mohammed VI Investment Fund, a public-limited company with initial capital of $4.7 billion to fund growth-generating projects through PPPs. The fund will contribute capital directly to large public and private companies operating in areas considered priorities. Public and private institutions will be able to collectively hold up to 49 percent of the Fund’s shares once the fund is fully operational.

In Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index , Morocco maintained the same score of 40 but moved down six spots in the rankings (from 80th to 86th out of 180 countries). According to the State Department’s 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Moroccan law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government generally did not implement the law effectively. Officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were reports of government corruption in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches during the year.

According to the Global Corruption Barometer Africa 2019 report published in July 2019, 53 percent of Moroccans surveyed think corruption increased in the previous 12 months, 31 percent of public services users paid a bribe in the previous 12 months, and 74 percent believe the government is doing a bad job in tackling corruption.

The 2011 constitution mandated the creation of a national anti-corruption entity. Morocco formally established the National Authority for Probity, Prevention, and Fighting Corruption (INPLCC) but did not become it operational until 2018 when its board was appointed by the king. The INPLCC is tasked with initiating, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of policies for the prevention and fight against corruption, as well as gathering and disseminating information on the issue. Additionally, Morocco’s anti-corruption efforts include enhancing the transparency of public tenders and implementation of a requirement that senior government officials submit financial disclosure statements at the start and end of their government service, although their family members are not required to make such disclosures. Few public officials submitted such disclosures, and there are no effective penalties for failing to comply. Morocco does not have conflict of interest legislation. In 2018, thanks to the passage of an Access to Information (AI) law, Morocco joined the Open Government Partnership, a multilateral effort to make governments more transparent.

Although the Moroccan government does not require that private companies establish internal codes of conduct, the Moroccan Institute of Directors (IMA) was established in June 2009 with the goal of bringing together individuals, companies, and institutions willing to promote corporate governance and conduct. IMA published the four Moroccan Codes of Good Corporate Governance Practices. Some private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Morocco signed the UN Convention against Corruption in 2007 and hosted the States Parties to the Convention’s Fourth Session in 2011. However, Morocco does not provide any formal protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption. Although the U.S. Mission is not aware of cases involving corruption regarding customs or taxation issues, American businesses report encountering unexpected delays and requests for documentation that is not required under the FTA or standardized shipping norms.

Resources to Report Corruption

National Authority for Probity, Prevention, and Fighting Corruption 
Avenue Annakhil, Immeuble High Tech, Hall B, 3eme etage, Hay Ryad-Rabat
+212-5 37 57 86 60
inpplc@inpplc.ma

Transparency International National Chapter 
24 Boulevard de Khouribga, Casablanca 20250
Telephone number: +212-22-542 699
transparency@menara.ma

* Source for Host Country Data: Moroccan GDP data from Bank Al-Maghrib, all other statistics from the Moroccan Exchange Office.  Conflicts in host country and international statistics are likely due to methodological differences

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Mozambique’s SOEs have their origin in the Marxist-Leninist government established after independence in 1975, with a variety of SOEs competing with the private sector in the Mozambican economy.  Government participation varies depending on the company and sector. SOEs are managed by the Institute for the Management of State Participation (Instituto de Gestão das Participações do Estado, IGEPE).  According IGEPE’s 2019 annual report, IGEPE manages 12 public SOEs, 16 wholly or majority state-owned enterprises, and 23 other enterprises which are partially state-owned.  IGEPE’s holdings are partially detailed on its website:  http://www.igepe.org.mz/ 

Some of the largest SOEs, such as Airports of Mozambique (Aeroportos de Moçambique) and Electricity of Mozambique (Electricidade de Moçambique) have monopolies in their respective industries.  In some cases, SOEs enter into joint ventures with private firms to deliver certain services.  For example, Ports and Railways of Mozambique (CFM, Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique) offers concessions for some of its ports and railways. Many SOEs benefit from state subsidies.  In some instances, SOEs have benefited from non-compete contracts that should have been competitively tendered.  SOE accounts are generally not transparent and not thoroughly audited by the Supreme Audit Institution.  SOE debt represents a potentially significant liability for the GRM.  SOEs were also at the heart of the hidden debt scandal revealed in 2016.

In 2018, the Parliament passed a Law No. 3/2018, which broadens the definition of SOEs to include all public enterprises and shareholding companies.  The law seeks to unify SOE oversight and harmonize the corporate governance structure, placing additional financial controls, borrowing limits, and financial analysis and evaluation requirements for borrowing by SOEs.  The law requires the oversight authority to publish a consolidated annual report on SOEs, with additional reporting requirements for individual SOEs.  The Council of Ministers approved regulations for the SOE law in early 2019, and in 2020 the Ministry of Economy and Finance published limited information on SOE debt.

Privatization Program

Mozambique’s privatization program has been relatively transparent, with tendering procedures that are generally open and competitive.  Most remaining parastatals operate as state-owned public utilities, with government oversight and control, making their privatization more politically sensitive.  While the government has indicated an intention to include private partners in most of these utility industries, progress has been slow.

Corruption is a major concern in Mozambique.  Though Mozambique has made progress developing the legal framework to combat corruption, the policies and leadership necessary to ensure effective implementation have been insufficient.  While the 2016 hidden debt scandal involving a cadre of former government officials is the most infamous example of government corruption, it is not the only case.

In a February 2021 interview, the spokesperson for Mozambique’s Central Office for Combatting Corruption (Gabinete Central de Combate à Corrupção, GCC) called the cost of corruption in Mozambique “violent.” According to GCC estimates, corruption led to the loss of over USD 15 million in state revenue in 2020. Mozambique fell three places on Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index and now ranks 149 out of 180 countries. In releasing the 2020 report, Transparency International highlighted concerns about the alleged role of senior government officials in controlling lucrative business deals, reports of rushed public procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic that did not follow guidelines, and persistent rumors surrounding the role of police in a recent string of kidnappings of business people in Mozambique. In 2019, the government in cooperation with the IMF, also released a Diagnostic Report on Transparency, Governance and Corruption outlining 29 measures to fight corruption and improve transparency.  The full report is available online at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/08/23/Republic-of-Mozambique-Diagnostic-Report-on-Transparency-Governance-and-Corruption-48613 .

Mozambique’s civil society and journalists remain vocal on corruption-related issues.  Action related to the hidden debt scandal is being led by a civil society umbrella organization known as the Budget Monitoring Forum (Forum de Monitoria de Orcamento, FMO) that brings together around 20 different organizations for collective action on transparency and corruption related issues.  A civil society organization that participates in the FMO, the Center for Public Integrity (Centro de Integridade Publica, CIP), also continues to publicly pressure the government to act against corrupt practices.  CIP finds that many local businesses are closely linked to the government and have little incentive to promote transparency.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies responsible for combating corruption:

Ana Maria Gemo
Central Anti-Corruption Office (Gabinete Central de Combate a Corrupcao)
Avenida 10 de Novembro, 193
+258 82 3034576
gabinetecorrupção@yahoo.com.br

Contact at “watchdog” organization:

Borges Nhamirre
Project Coordinator Extractive Industries
Center for Public Integrity (CIP, Centro de Integridade Publica)
Rua Fernão Melo e Castro, 124
+258 84 8866440
borgesfaduco@gmail.com 

* Source for Host Country Data: National Statistical Institute (INE, Instituto National de Estatistica), 2019 Annual Statistics published November 2020. http://www.ine.gov.mz/estatisticas/estatisticas-economicas/contas-nacionais/anuais-1 ; APIEX

The IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey results for 2019 track loosely with the FDI reported by APIEX—with both sources listing South Africa, Mauritius, Portugal, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) among Mozambique’s top five foreign investors. However, local data from APIEX diverges significantly in terms of the value of FDI as well as the relative share of each country. According to APIEX, in 2019 FDI in Mozambique totaled USD 637 million, with South Africa accounting for 58 percent of total foreign investment in Mozambique, followed by China, Mauritius, Portugal, and the UAE.

The large share of investment listed from UAE and Mauritius likely is linked to the fact that the Exxon Mobil/ENI and Total led natural gas projects have set up special purpose vehicles for their natural gas projects in these countries.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

While Namibian companies are generally open to foreign investment, government-owned enterprises have generally been closed to all investors (Namibian and foreign), with the exception of joint ventures discussed below. More than 90 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs, also known as parastatals) include a wide variety of commercial companies, financial institutions, regulatory bodies, educational institutions, boards, and agencies. Generally, employment at SOEs is highly sought after because their remuneration packages are not bound by public service constraints. Parastatals provide most essential services, such as telecommunications, transport, water, and electricity. A list of SOEs can be found on the Ministry of Public Enterprises’ website: www.mpe.gov.na . The following are the most prominent SOEs:

• Namibia Airports Company (airport management company)
• Namibia Institute of Pathology (medical laboratories)
• Namibia Wildlife Resorts (tourism)
• Namport (maritime port authority)
• Nampost (postal and courier services)
• Namwater (water sanitation and provisioning)
• Roads Contractor Company
• Telecom Namibia (primarily fixed-line) and MTC (mobile communications)
• TransNamib (rail company)
• NamPower (electricity generation and transmission)
• Namcor (national petroleum company)
• Epangelo (mining)

The government owns numerous other enterprises, from media ventures to a fishing company. Parastatals own assets worth approximately 40 percent of GDP and most receive subsidies from the government. Most SOEs are perennially unprofitable and have only managed to stay solvent with government subsidies. In industries where private companies compete with SOEs (e.g., tourism and fishing), SOEs are sometimes perceived to receive favorable concessions from the government. Foreign investors have participated in joint ventures with the government in a number of sectors, including mobile telecommunications and mining. In 2015, the Namibian President created a new Ministry of Public Enterprises intended to improve the management and performance of SOEs. Legislation to shift oversight of commercial SOEs from line ministries to the Ministry of Public Enterprises was passed by Parliament in 2019.

In 2021, the government liquidated the state-owned airline, Air Namibia, which had become a financial burden. When the Minister of Finance tabled the budget in March 2021, he announced that the Namibian government will reduce its stake in state-owned enterprises as a way of raising capital, unburdening the government from the budgetary drain of perpetual SOE-bailouts, and giving room for the private sector to play a more prominent role in the economy.  The government is looking to reduce its stake or completely divest in certain SOEs, but has not yet made concrete announcements.

Privatization Program

Namibia does not have a privatization program, but discussions have begun within the government to consider privatizing certain SOEs. The Minister of Finance has announced that in 2021 the government intends to sell its shares in Namibia’s biggest telecommunications company, Mobile Telecommunications Company (MTC), and use the proceeds to reduce the government’s debt.

The Anti-Corruption Act of 2003 created an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), which began operations in 2006. The ACC attempts to complement civil society’s anti-corruption programs and support existing institutions such as the Ombudsman’s Office and the Office of the Attorney

General. Anti-corruption legislation is in place to combat public corruption. In a nationwide survey commissioned by the ACC and released in 2016, corruption was listed at the third-most important development challenge facing Namibia (6 percent, after unemployment at 37 percent and poverty at 30 percent). 78 percent of survey respondents rated corruption as “very high” in Namibia. The highest result comes from those in rural areas.

In 2019, Namibia was embroiled in a fishing industry corruption scandal in which government ministers and business leaders were charged and imprisoned for allegedly co-opting the national fishing quota system for personal gain. The scandal allegedly cost Namibia billions of U.S. dollars and has tarnished the reputation of the ruling political party. The accused are in prison awaiting trial. The scandal has resulted in Namibia and its ACC taking a closer look at other industries susceptible to corruption.

Namibia has signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption and the African Union’s African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Namibia has also signed the Southern African Development Community’s Protocol against Corruption.

Resources to Report Corruption

Paulus Noa
Director
Namibia Anti-Corruption Commission
Corner of Montblanc & Groot Tiras Street, Windhoek +264-61-370-600
+264-61-370-600
anticorruption@accnamibia.org 

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Niger are defined as companies in which the GoN is the majority stakeholder. They play a major role in Niger’s economy and dominate or heavily influence a number of key sectors, including energy (NIGELEC), telecommunications (Niger Telecom), and water resources (SEEN and SPEN), construction and retail markets (SOCOGEM); petroleum products distribution (SONIDEP); mining (SOPAMIN, SOMAIR, COMINAK, SONICHAR); oil refinery (SORAZ), textile (SOTEX) and hotels (SPEG).

SOEs do not receive non-market based advantages from the host government. According to the 2016 Public Expenditures and Financial Accountability (PEFA) draft document, there are eight wholly-owned SOEs, and six SOEs majority-owned by the state. State-Owned enterprises are answerable to their supervisory ministry and send certified accounting records to the supervisory ministries and to the Public Enterprises and State Portfolio Directorate (DEP/ PE). SOE record-keeping is expected to comply with SYSCOHADA accounting system standards.

There are no laws or rules that offer preferential treatment to SOEs. They are subject to the same tax rules and burdens (although many remain in tax arrears) as the private sector and are subject to budget constraints. Niger is not a member of the OECD and does not adhere to its guidelines.

Privatization Program

Most sectors of the economy, with the exception of SOEs, have been privatized. The state-owned oil-distribution company (SONIDEP) no longer has a monopoly over oil exportation; exportation authority is now equally shared between SONIDEP and the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Likewise, although the national electricity company (NIGELEC) continues to hold a virtual monopoly on electricity distribution, steps were taken in 2016 to allow third party access to the country’s electricity grid. This should pave the way for future privatization. Competition in the mobile telecommunication sector forced the GoN to combine state-owned fixed line telecommunications provider SONITEL with the state-owned mobile provider Sahelcom to form a new parastatal, known as Niger Telecom. Although the state continues to hold a monopoly on fixed-line telephony, mobile communications is open to competition, with several foreign competitors in the market.

Foreign investors are welcome to participate in the country’s privatization program. Privatization operations are conducted under the technical direction of the ministry that currently controls the company. After a detailed analysis of business operations conducted by an internationally known independent audit firm, the government issues a call for bids.

When privatization occurs, there is a process for public bidding. Depending on the ministry responsible, there may be no electronic bidding. Rather tenders may be announced only in local media.

The constitution, adopted in 2010, contains provisions for greater transparency in government reporting of revenues from the extractive industries, as well as the declaration of personal assets by government officials, including the President. Since his re-election in February 2016, President Issoufou has made combatting corruption within the GoN one of the focus points of his presidency.

The High Authority for the Fight against Corruption and Related Offenses (HALCIA) has the authority to investigate corruption charges within all government agencies. HALCIA is limited by a lack of resources and a regulatory process that is still developing. Despite the limitations, HALCIA was able to conduct a number of successful investigations during 2020.

Laws related to anti-corruption measures are in place and apply to government officials, their family members, and all political parties.

Legislation on Prevention and Repression of Corruption was passed into law in January 2018; a strategy for implementation was still pending at year’s end.

Niger has laws in place designed to counter conflict of interest in awarding contracts and/or government procurements. Bribery of public officials by private companies is officially illegal, but occurs regularly despite GoN denunciations of such conduct.

Law number 2017-10 of March 31, 2017, prohibits bribery of public officials, international administrators, and foreign agents, bribes within the private sector, illicit enrichment and abuse of function by public authorities. The High Authority Against Corruption and Relating Crimes (HALCIA) is further tasked with working with private companies on internal anti-corruption efforts.

Bribery of public officials occurs on a regular basis. Though most companies officially discourage such behavior, internal controls are rare except among the largest (mostly foreign) enterprises.

The government/authority encourages or requires private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. Some private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials.

The government does not provide any additional protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption.

The government/authority encourages or requires private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. Some private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials.

Niger has joined several international and regional anti-corruption initiatives including the UN Convention against Corruption in 2008, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 2005, and the Protocol on Combating Corruption of the economic community of the states of West Africa (ECOWAS) in 2006. Niger is also member state of the GIABA, which is an institution of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responsible for facilitating the adoption and implementation of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) in West Africa.

The government does not provide any additional protections to NGOs involved in investigating corruption.

As of April 2020, there is only one U.S. firm invested in Niger which gained its assets through acquisition of a U.K. company. This low number is due to reasons that include – but are not limited to – the perception of corruption. Cases of suspected corruption occasionally appear in media reports concerning GoN procurement, the award of licenses and concessions and customs.

Resources to Report Corruption

Gousmane Abdourahamane
President
High Authority to Combat Corruption and Related Infractions (HALCIA)
BP 550 Niamey – Niger (227) 20 35 20 96
(227) 20 35 20 96
Email: issoufbour@gmail.com  

Wada Maman
President
Transparency International Niger (TI-N)
BP 10423, Niamey – Niger (227) 20 32 00 96 / 96 28 79 69
Email: anlcti@yahoo.fr 

* Source for Host Country Data: https://data.worldbank.org/country/niger

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

The government does not have an established practice consistent with the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but SOEs do have enabling legislation that governs their ownership. To legalize the existence of state-owned enterprises, provisions have been made in the Nigerian constitution under socio-economic development in section 16 (1) of the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions respectively. The government has privatized many former SOEs to encourage more efficient operations, such as state-owned telecommunications company Nigerian Telecommunications and mobile subsidiary Mobile Telecommunications in 2014.

Nigeria does not operate a centralized ownership system for its state-owned enterprises. The enabling legislation for each SOE stipulates its ownership and governance structure. The boards of directors are usually appointed by the president on the recommendation of the relevant minister. The boards operate and are appointed in line with the enabling legislation which usually stipulates the criteria for appointing board members. Directors are appointed by the board within the relevant sector. In a few cases, however, appointments have been viewed as a reward to political affiliates.

NNPC is Nigeria’s most prominent state-owned enterprise. NNPC Board appointments are made by the presidency, but day-to-day management is overseen by the Group Managing Director (GMD). The GMD reports to the Minister of Petroleum Resources. In the current administration, the President has retained that ministerial role for himself, and the appointed Minister of State for Petroleum Resources acts as the de facto Minister of Petroleum in the president’s stead with certain limitations.

NNPC is Nigeria’s biggest and arguably most important state-owned enterprise and is involved in exploration, refining, petrochemicals, products transportation, and marketing. It owns and operates Nigeria’s four refineries (one each in Warri and Kaduna and two in Port Harcourt), all of which are currently largely inoperable. Nigeria’s tax agency receives taxes on petroleum profits, while the Department of Petroleum Resources under the Ministry of Petroleum Resources collects rents, royalties, license fees, bonuses, and other payments. In an effort to provide greater transparency in the collection of revenues that accrue to the government, the Buhari administration requires these revenues, including some from the NNPC, to be deposited in the Treasury Single Account. NNPC began publishing audited financial statements in 2020 for the three prior fiscal years, a significant step toward improving transparency of NNPC operations.

Another key state-owned enterprise is the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN), responsible for the operation of Nigeria’s national electrical grid. Private power generation and distribution companies have accused the TCN grid of significant inefficiency and inadequate technology which greatly hinders the nation’s electricity output and supply. TCN emerged from the defunct National Electric Power Authority as an incorporated entity in 2005. It is the only major component of Nigeria’s electric power sector which was not privatized in 2013.

Privatization Program

The Privatization and Commercialization Act of 1999 established the National Council on Privatization, the policy-making body overseeing the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), the implementing agency for designated privatizations. The BPE has focused on the privatization of key sectors, including telecommunications and power, and calls for core investors to acquire controlling shares in formerly state-owned enterprises.

The BPE has privatized and concessioned more than 140 enterprises since 1999, including an aluminum complex, a steel complex, cement manufacturing firms, hotels, a petrochemical plant, aviation cargo handling companies, vehicle assembly plants, and electricity generation and distribution companies. The electricity transmission company remains state-owned. Foreign investors can and do participate in BPE’s privatization process. The government also retains partial ownership in some of the privatized companies. The federal government and several state governments hold a 40% stake, managed by BPE, in the power distribution companies.

The National Assembly has questioned the propriety of some of these privatizations, with one ongoing case related to an aluminum complex privatization the subject of a Supreme Court ruling on ownership. In addition, the failure of the 2013 power sector privatization to restore financial viability to the sector has raised criticism of the privatized power generation and distribution companies. Nevertheless, the government’s long-delayed sale in 2014 of state-owned Nigerian Telecommunications and Mobile Telecommunications shows a continued commitment to the privatization model.

The federal government intends to raise about 205 billion naira ($541 million) from privatization proceeds in 2021. BPE held an International Investors’ webinar in February 2021 to showcase investment opportunities in the two trade fair complexes in Lagos state slated for concession in 2021.

Domestic and foreign observers identify corruption as a serious obstacle to economic growth and poverty reduction. Nigeria ranked 149 out of 175 countries in Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Establishment Act of 2004 established the EFCC to prosecute individuals involved in financial crimes and other acts of economic “sabotage.” Traditionally, the EFCC has achieved the most success in prosecuting low-level Internet scam operators. A relatively few high-profile convictions have taken place, such as a former governor of Adamawa State, a former governor of Bayelsa State, a former Inspector General of Police, and a former Chair of the Board of the Nigerian Ports Authority.

Businesses report that bribery of customs and port officials remains common and often necessary to avoid extended delays in the port clearance process, and that smuggled goods routinely enter Nigeria’s seaports and cross its land borders.

Since taking office in 2015, President Buhari has focused on implementing a campaign pledge to address corruption, though his critics contend his anti-corruption efforts often target political rivals. Since then, the EFCC arrested a former National Security Advisor (NSA), a former Minister of State for Finance, a former NSA Director of Finance and Administration, and others on charges related to diversion of funds intended for government arms procurement.

The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act of 2001 established an Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) to prosecute individuals, government officials, and businesses for corruption. The Corrupt Practices Act punishes over 19 offenses, including accepting or giving bribes, fraudulent acquisition of property, and concealment of fraud. Nigerian law stipulates that giving and receiving bribes constitute criminal offences and, as such, are not tax deductible. Since its inauguration, the ICPC has secured convictions in 71 cases (through 2015, latest data available) with nearly 300 cases still open and pending as of July 2018. In 2014, a presidential committee set up to review Nigeria’s ministries, departments, and agencies recommended that the EFCC, the ICPC, and the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) be merged into one organization. The federal government, however, rejected this proposal to consolidate the work of these three anti-graft agencies.

In 2016, Nigeria announced its participation in the Open Government Partnership, a significant step forward on public financial management and fiscal transparency.  The Ministry of Justice presented Nigeria’s National Action Plan for the Open Government Partnership. Implementation of its 14 commitments has made some progress, particularly on the issues such as tax transparency, ease of doing business, and asset recovery. The National Action Plan, which ran through 2019, covered five major themes: ensuring citizens’ participation in the budget cycle, implementing open contracting and adoption of open contracting data standards, increasing transparency in the extractive sectors, adopting common reporting standards like the Addis Tax initiative, and improving the ease of doing business.  Full implementation of the National Action Plan would be a significant step forward for Nigeria’s fiscal transparency, although Nigeria has not fully completed any commitment to date.

The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Act of 2007 provided for the establishment of the NEITI organization, charged with developing a framework for transparency and accountability in the reporting and disclosure by all extractive industry companies of revenue due to or paid to the Nigerian government. NEITI serves as a member of the international Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which provides a global standard for revenue transparency for extractive industries like oil and gas and mining. Nigeria is party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Nigeria is not a member of the OECD and not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.

Foreign companies, whether incorporated in Nigeria or not, may bid on government projects and generally receive national treatment in government procurement, but may also be subject to a local content vehicle (e.g., partnership with a local partner firm or the inclusion of one in a consortium) or other prerequisites which are likely to vary from tender to tender. Corruption and lack of transparency in tender processes have been a far greater concern to U.S. companies than discriminatory policies based on foreign status. Government tenders are published in local newspapers, a “tenders” journal sold at local newspaper outlets, and occasionally in foreign journals and magazines. The Nigerian government has made modest progress on its pledge to conduct open and competitive bidding processes for government procurement with the introduction of the Nigeria Open Contracting Portal in 2017 under the Bureau of Public Procurement.

The Public Procurement Law of 2007 established the Bureau of Public Procurement as the successor agency to the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit. It acts as a clearinghouse for government contracts and procurement and monitors the implementation of projects to ensure compliance with contract terms and budgetary restrictions. Procurements above 100 million naira (approximately $264,000) reportedly undergo full “due process,” but government agencies routinely flout public procurement requirements. Some of the 36 states of the federation have also passed public procurement legislation.

The reforms have also improved transparency in procurement by the state-owned NNPC. Although U.S. companies have won contracts in numerous sectors, difficulties in receiving payment are not uncommon and can deter firms from bidding. Supplier or foreign government subsidized financing arrangements appear in some cases to be a crucial factor in the award of government procurements. Nigeria is not a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.

Resources to Report Corruption

Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
Headquarters: No. 5, Fomella Street, Off Adetokunbo Ademola Crescent, Wuse II, Abuja, Nigeria. Branch offices in Ikoyi, Lagos State; Port Harcourt, Rivers State; Independence Layout, Enugu State; Kano, Kano State; Gombe, Gombe State.
Hotline: +234 9 9044752 or +234 9 9044753

Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission:
Abuja Office – Headquarters
Plot 802 Constitution Avenue, Central District, PMB 535, Garki Abuja
Phone/Fax: 234 9 523 8810
Email: info@icpc.gov.ng 

* Source for Host Country Data: Nigerian Bureau of Statistics

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

As a former people’s republic, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominated the Congolese economy of the 1970s and 1980s. The number of SOEs remains comparatively small following a wave of privatization in the 1990s. The national oil company (SNPC), electricity company (E2C), and water supply company (LCDE) constitute the largest remaining SOEs. SOEs report to their respective ministries.

Constraints on SOEs operating in the non-oil sector appear sufficiently monitored and subject to civil society and media scrutiny. The operations of SNPC, however, continue to present transparency concerns. SOEs must publish annual reports subject to examination by the government’s supreme audit institution. In practice, these examinations do not always occur.

The government publishes no official list of SOEs.

Private companies may compete with public companies and have in some cases won contracts sought by SOEs. Government budget constraints limit SOE’s operations.

Privatization Program

ROC has no known privatization programs.

ROC adopted a law against corruption by public officials, “Code de Transparence dans les Finances Publiques,” on March 9, 2017. The ROC government inconsistently enforces the law.

The corruption law applies to elected and appointed officials. It does not extend to family members of officials or to political parties.

No specific laws or regulations address conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement.

ROC does not encourage or require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials.

Some private companies, multinationals in particular, use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials.

ROC serves as a party to the UN Anticorruption Convention.

ROC does not provide protection to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to include NGOs investigating corruption.

U.S. companies routinely cite corruption as an impediment to investment, particularly in the petroleum sector.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption:

Emmanuel Ollita Ondongo
Président
Haute Autorité de Lutte contre la Corruption (HALC)
Centre Ville, Brazzaville, République du Congo +242 06 944 6165 or +242 05 551 2229
+242 06 944 6165 or +242 05 551 2229 emmallita2007@yahoo.fr
emmallita2007@yahoo.fr

Contact at a “watchdog” organization (local or nongovernmental organization operating in the country/economy that monitors corruption):

Christian Mounzeo

Président

Rencontre pour la Paix et les Droits de l’Homme (RPDH, the local chapter of “Publish What You Pay” – Publiez Ce Que Vous Payez)
B.P. 939 Pointe-Noire, République du Congo +242 05 019 8501 or +242 05 358 3577
+242 05 019 8501 or +242 05 358 3577 http://www.rpdh-cg.org/

Accueil

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

* Source for Host Country Data: Institut National de la Statistique (National Institute of Statistics)

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Data not available.

Rwandan law allows private enterprises to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. Since 2006, the GOR has made efforts to privatize SOEs; reduce the government’s non-controlling shares in private enterprises; and attract FDI, especially in the ICT, tourism, banking, and agriculture sectors, but progress has been slow. Current SOEs include water and electricity utilities, as well as companies in construction, ICT, aviation, mining, insurance, agriculture, finance, and other sectors. Some investors complain about competition from state-owned and ruling party-aligned businesses. SOEs and utilities appear in the national budget, but the financial performance of most SOEs is only detailed in an annex that is not publicly available. The most recent state finances audit report of the OAG also covers SOEs and has sections criticizing the management of some of the organizations. SOEs are governed by boards with most members having other government positions.

State-owned non-financial corporations include Ngali Holdings, Horizon Group Ltd, Rwanda Energy Group, Water and Sanitation Corporation, RwandAir, National Post Office, Rwanda Printery Company Ltd, King Faisal Hospital, Muhabura Multichoice Ltd, Prime Holdings, Rwanda Grain and Cereals Corporation, Kinazi Cassava Plant, and the Rwanda Inter-Link Transport Company. State-owned financial corporations include the National Bank of Rwanda, Development Bank of Rwanda, Special Guarantee Fund, Rwanda National Investment Trust Ltd, Agaciro Development Fund, BDF and the Rwanda Social Security Board. The GOR has interests in the BoK, Ultimate Concepts Limited (UCL), New Horizon Limited, Rwanda Convention Bureau, BSC, CIMERWA, Gasabo 3D Ltd, AoS, Korea Telecom Rwanda Network, Dubai World, Nyungwe Lodge, and Akagera Management Company, among others.

Privatization Program

Rwanda continues to carry out a privatization program that has attracted foreign investors in strategic areas ranging from telecommunications and banking to tea production and tourism. As of 2017 (the latest data available), 56 companies have been fully privatized, seven were liquidated, and 20 more were in the process of privatization. RDB’s Strategic Investment Department is responsible for implementing and monitoring the privatization program. Some observers have questioned the transparency of certain transactions, as a number of transactions were undertaken not through public offerings but through mutual agreements directly between the government and the private investor, some of whom have personal relationships with senior government officials.

Rwanda is ranked among the least corrupt countries in Africa, with Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index putting the country among Africa’s four least corrupt nations and 49th in the world. The GOR maintains a high-profile anti-corruption effort, and senior leaders articulate a consistent message emphasizing that combating corruption is a key national goal. The government investigates corruption allegations and generally punishes those found guilty. High-ranking officials accused of corruption often resign during the investigation period, and the GOR has prosecuted many of them. Rwanda has ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention, is a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery and is a signatory to the African Union Anticorruption Convention. U.S. firms have identified the perceived lack of government corruption in Rwanda as a key incentive for investing in the country. There are no local industry or non-profit groups offering services for vetting potential local investment partners, but the Ministry of Justice keeps judgments online, maintaining a source of information on companies and individuals in Rwanda at www.judiciary.gov.rw/home/ . The Rwanda National Public Prosecution Authority issues criminal records on demand to applicants at www.nppa.gov.rw .

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:

Ms. Madeleine Nirere, Chief Ombudsman , Ombudsman (Umuvunyi)
P.O Box 6269, Kigali, Rwanda
Telephone: +250 252587308
omb1@ombudsman.gov.rw  / sec.permanent@ombudsman.gov.rw 

Mr. Felicien Mwumvaneza, Commissioner for Quality Assurance Department (Anti-Corruption Unit) Rwanda Revenue Authority
Avenue du Lac Muhazi, P.O. Box 3987, Kigali, Rwanda
Telephone: +250 252595504 or +250 788309563
mwumvaneza@rra.gov.rw / commissioner.quality@rra.gov.rw

Mr. Obadiah Biraro, Auditor General, Office of the Auditor General
Avenue du Lac Muhazi, P.O. Box 1020, Kigali, Rwanda
Telephone: +250 78818980 , oag@oag.gov.rw

Contact at “watchdog” organization

Mr. Apollinaire Mupiganyi , Executive Director , Transparency International Rwanda
P.O: Box 6252 Kigali, Rwanda
Telephone: +250 788309563, amupiganyi@transparencyrwanda.org / mupiganyi@yahoo.fr

Inward Direct Investment according to IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (http://data.imf.org/CDIS). Data on Rwandan outward FDI is not available.

Data on Rwanda equity security holdings by nationality is not available.  According to a 2019 BNR report, portfolio investment remains the lowest component of foreign investment in Rwanda mainly due to the low level of financial market development.  Portfolio investment stock amounted to $109.3 million in 2018, a 5 percent increase from 2017 levels.  In 2018, Rwanda recorded foreign portfolio inflows of $5.9 million compared to $0.3 million in 2017.

When STP’s cocoa plantations were shut down in the late 1980s, most SOE’s closed. EMAE (Water and Power Supply Company), ENAPORT (Port Authority Company), ENASA (National Company for Airports and Air Safety), and Empresa dos Correios (Post Office) are 100 percent state-owned, though they have some financial autonomy. Under a joint venture, the government holds 49 percent of CST (Santomean Telecommunication Company), while the largest Brazilian telecommunication company, OI, owns 51 percent. The government has a 48 percent stake in BISTP, while the Portuguese Caixa Geral de Depositos holds 27 percent and the African Investment Bank holds 25 percent. All four fully owned state enterprises are unprofitable and are annually audited by the Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Blue Economy and biennially by the Court of Audit. They have financial autonomy, but largely depend on funds from the state budget. EMAE, ENAPORT, and ENASA have no competitors. Regarding telecommunication and banking, traditionally government is the largest client of CST and BISTP.

Privatization Program

STP does not have an active privatization program. However, thorough its periodical reports, the IMF has been recommending the privatization of the SOEs, especially EMAE. On occasion, there are concession opportunities. They are normally advertised under a non-discriminatory public bidding process.

Ministry of Planning, Finance and Blue Economy: https://financas.gov.st/ 

BCSTP’s website: https://bcstp.st/

STP has an overall positive trajectory in combatting corruption due to reforms the government has undertaken in recent years. STP ranked 63 out 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2019 Corruption Perception Index, climbing one position compared to the previous year. The government passed an anti-corruption law in 2012 that required all payments to government entities over $5 be made directly at the BCSTP and all salary payments to civil servants be paid directly to the employee’s bank account. The government has also taken steps to review and update existing contracts with some foreign companies to support liberalization and free market competition. The government has denounced corruption and pledged to take necessary steps to prevent and combat it.

Although corruption in customs was historically an issue for foreign investors, the MCC Threshold Program resulted in a modern customs code and related decrees by introducing modern customs tracking software and eliminating manual procedures, with customs agents handling payments for the importer. As a result, customs revenues have increased significantly while incidents of corruption have reportedly declined.

In 2013, the parliament adopted an amended anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) law that complies with international standards. It designates the Financial Information Unit (Unidade de Informação Financeira) as the central agency in STP with responsibility for investigating suspect transactions. STP is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a FATF-style regional body.

According to the 2016 Investment Code, all investment proposals must be submitted to the APCI, which is responsible for carrying out all legal inter-institutional coordination with different sectors involved in the analysis and approval of the investment project. The law limits contacts between investment proponents and officials involved in the investment approval process.

STP signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention. It is not party to the Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

STP does not have a designated agency responsible for combatting corruption.

Resources to Report Corruption

“Watchdog” organization:

Deodato Capela
President
Centro de Integridade Pública de São Tomé e Príncipe (STP Public Integrity Center) – Anticorruption, Transparency and Integrity -NGO
P.C: 330, Almeirim-São Tomé; São Tomé e Príncipe
+ 239 991 1116
cipstp.org@gmail.com 
http://cipstp.st/ 

* Source for Host Country Data: Ministry of Planning, Finance and Blue Economy, 2019. 

Seychelles is one of 15 countries participating in the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) Network for Southern Africa, which was launched in 2007 to support, in collaboration with the OECD, southern African countries in their efforts to improve the performance of SOEs.

According to the Public Enterprise Monitoring Commission Regulations 2019, there are currently 32 state-owned enterprises, which have either been established using public financial resources, or in which the government has a significant shareholding. These government-owned organizations are responsible for the delivery of both commercial and social objectives. They offer a range of essential services, including electricity, water, roads, seaports, fuel supply, import/export, retail, transport, civil aviation, housing, and tourism. At the end of 2019, total assets of SOEs amounted to $2.3 billion, representing 139 percent of total GDP while the total net income was $61.7 million, equivalent to 4 percent of GDP.

SOEs are generally free to purchase and/or supply goods and services from private sector and foreign firms. However, there is growing concern in the business community that SOEs such as the Seychelles Trading Company (STC) have been allowed to exceed their explicit mandate and compete unfairly. For example, the STC expanded its operations in the retail business with the opening of a hypermarket, a hardware store, and a luxury goods department selling perfumes and designer bags. Most SOEs and parastatal bodies maintain a board of directors and make regular reports to the corresponding ministry. The president and the responsible minister have authority over the size and composition of the boards of SOEs. The Public Enterprise Monitoring Commission (PEMC), set up in 2013 through the PEMC Act, is an independent institution responsible for monitoring financial, governance, and transparency issues related to public enterprises. Governance and operational assessments of six major SOEs were conducted in 2016 with World Bank assistance. On this basis, an implementation plan for governance and operational review of public enterprises for the period 2017-2019 was prepared and approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. In the 2021 State of the Nation address, President Wavel Ramkalawan announced that several public enterprises and/or their boards would be dismantled.

Audited financial statements of SOEs are published annually on the PEMC website ( https://www.pemc.sc/reports  ). The government has published a Code of Governance for Public Entities to provide guidelines to improve the governance, monitoring and control of public entities in Seychelles. The Code, which was developed by the PEMC along with other stakeholders, entered into force in April 2019 and can be accessed on its website: https://www.pemc.sc/resource-centre .

Privatization Program

The government has announced privatization plans several times, but progress has been slow. The embassy is not aware of any other formal legal barriers to foreign investors participating in privatization.

Ruling with transparency and accountability are stated priorities of the current government. In 2016, the government established the Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles (ACCS) under the Anti-Corruption Act, which gives it authority to investigate, detect, and prevent corrupt practices. Seychelles Transparency Initiative (TI), a Transparency International chapter in formation, was set up in 2017. TI’s focus is currently on increasing transparency in tourism, fisheries, finance, and construction. There is currently no legislation protecting NGOs involved in investigating corruption.

The Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Bill ( https://seylii.org/sc/legislation/bill/2020/4 ) was voted on by the National Assembly in 2019 giving the ACCS investigative and arresting powers similar to that of the police. The ACCS has received significant criticism for having only achieved one conviction: that of an ACCS employee who was convicted of extortion, corruption, and unlawful disclosure of ACCS information in 2018 when he demanded money in exchange for providing the ACCS’ evidence to an individual under investigation by the ACCS. In the January 2021 State of the Nation address, the president announced that the board which directs the ACCS would be dissolved and the entity would be restructured through legislative amendments. In March 2021, the ACCS signed cooperation agreements with the Seychelles Revenue Authority, the Central Bank of Seychelles, and the Registrar General’s Office to better facilitate the exchange of information and assist the ACCS’ investigations.

Seychelles signed the UN Convention against Corruption in February 2004 and ratified it in March 2006. Seychelles is not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

In 2003, the government published the Public Service Code of Ethics and Conduct, the stated purpose of which is to provide guidance to public sector employees on the standards of behavior required of them. The Public Officer’s Ethics Act of 2008 prohibits personal enrichment through public office, defines and outlaws bribery, provides guidelines for avoiding conflict of interest, and mandates declaration of financial assets for public officials including members of the National Assembly. In March 2021, Cabinet approved amendments to the Anti-Corruption Act and the Public Officers’ Ethics Act. The government does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct.

Resources to Report Corruption

Anti-Corruption Commission
May De Silva
Chief Executive Officer
Victoria House,
State House Avenue
Victoria, Mahe

Office of the Ombudsperson
Nicole Tirant-Gherardi
Ombudsperson
Room 306, Aarti Chambers, Mont Fleuri, Mahe
+248 225147
ombuds@seychelles.net

* Source for Host Country Data: Seychelles in Figures 2020, Seychelles National Bureau of Statistics

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Sierra Leone has more than 20 state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These entities are active in the utilities, transport, and financial sectors. There is no official or comprehensive government-maintained list of SOEs. However, notable examples include the Guma Valley Water Company, the Sierra Leone Telecommunication Company, the Electricity Distribution and Supply Authority, the Electricity Generation and Transmission Company, the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation, the Rokel Commercial Bank, the Sierra Leone Commercial Bank, the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Company, to name but a few.

Sierra Leone is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the WTO Framework. SOEs may engage in commerce with the private sector, but they do not compete on the same terms as private enterprises, and they often have access to government subsidies and other benefits. SOEs in Sierra Leone do not play a significant role in funding or sponsoring research and development.

Privatization Program

The National Commission for Privatization was established in 2002 to facilitate the privatization of various SOEs. With support from the World Bank, the commission has focused on the privatization of the country’s port operations, and currently seeks investments in public-private partnerships (PPPs) for port security, telecommunications, and other infrastructure projects. Privatization processes are open to foreign investors and could be integrated into plans for better capitalizing the stock exchange in Freetown via new equity listings.

Corruption poses a major challenge in Sierra Leone and is particularly endemic in government procurement, the award of licenses and concessions, regulatory enforcement, customs clearance, and dispute resolution. Sierra Leone signed the UN Convention against Corruption in 2003 and ratified it in 2004. The country is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), established in 2000, has the authority to investigate and prosecute acts of corruption by individuals and companies. The Anti-Corruption Act of 2008 makes it criminal to offer, solicit, or receive a bribe, and this law applies to all appointed and elected officials, close family members, and all companies whether foreign or domestic. The Commission launched a “Pay No Bribe” campaign in 2016, which encouraged citizens to report corruption in the public sector.

In its efforts at tackling corruption, the country progressed 10 places up in its Transparency International Corruption ranking from 129/180 in 2018 to 119/180 in 2019, and further up 2 places (117/180) in 2020. Sierra Leone passed the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s indicator on the control of corruption scoring 71 percent in 2019, 79 percent in 2020, and 81 percent in 2021, though it failed in 2018 (49 percent). Sierra Leone ranked third out of 35 African countries surveyed on government’s effectiveness in the fight against corruption. Corruption declined from 70 percent in 2015 to 40 percent in 2020 according to the Afro Barometer report, and 92 percent of respondents say the fight is on the right course according to a national perception survey conducted by the Center for Accountability and Rule of Law in 2020.

In April 2018, President Bio established a 12-member Governance Transition Team to conduct a stocktaking of the government of former President Ernest Koroma. The report documented a high level of fiscal indiscipline and alleged corruption and recommended a commission of inquiry of all MDAs, and for the supreme audit authority to carry out forensic audits of specific sectors. These sectors included agencies relating to energy, telecommunications, the National Social Security and Insurance Trust, and roads. A white paper to implement the recommendations of the reports of the Commission of Inquiry is currently being implemented by the Ministry of Justice. It is hoped that the outcome of the implementation will make corrupt practices very unattractive for would-be perpetrators.

In 2019, the GoSL passed an Anti-Corruption Amendment Act which increased the powers of the ACC in the fight against graft. It protects witnesses and whistleblowers, provides sanctions for failing to submit asset declaration on time or with falsified, inaccurate, or misleading information. It empowers the Commissioner to prevent contracts that are not of national interest and increased penalties for offenses under the Act. Since then, the ACC has steadily pursued arrests, repayments, and convictions in both the private and public sectors. As of April 2020, the ACC had recovered millions of dollars in misappropriated funds, and prosecuted corruption cases leading to convictions of present and former public officials and private citizens. The Chief Justice established a Special Court to adjudicate corruption cases while the ACC has signed several information-sharing agreements with key government institutions, including the Audit Service Sierra Leone and the FIU.

Resources to Report Corruption:

Francis Ben Kelfala, Commissioner
Anti-Corruption Commission
Cathedral House
3 Gloucester Street, Freetown
+232 78 321 321
info@anticorruption.gov.sl
http://anticorruption.gov.sl/ 

Lavina Banduah (lbanduah@tisierraleone.org)
Executive Director
Transparency International Sierra Leone
20 Dundas Street, Freetown
+232 79 060 985 & +232 76 618 348
http://www.tisierraleone.org/  

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.
Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Somalia has no fully or partially state-owned enterprises.

Privatization Program

Since the government does not own any business entities, there are no entities to privatize.  The World Bank has supported the development of a public-private partnership law, but parliament has not yet acted on it.

The provisional constitution criminalizes several forms of corruption such as abuse of office, embezzlement of funds, and bribery.  The FGS enacted an anti-corruption bill in September 2019 that provides for the formation of an independent anti-corruption commission at both federal and state levels.  Somalia’s procurement laws have provisions to address potential conflicts of interest in awarding government contracts, but enforcement is lax.  Corruption is rampant in all sectors of government, particularly government procurement.  Transparency International ranked Somalia 179 (tied) of 180 countries in its 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index.

For the past several years, the FGS has waged a campaign against public corruption and graft, resulting in several high-profile dismissals and arrests.  For example, in August 2020 a court convicted four senior Ministry of Health officials of embezzling funds intended to address the COVID-19 pandemic.  However, without a robust asset declaration mechanism, an updated penal code, and a functioning criminal justice system, anti-corruption efforts remain ad hoc, and there is little deterrence.

Procurement laws require all government contracts to go through an open tender process unless they meet specified conditions for limited competition.  However, the FGS has not put the relevant procedures in place, and in practice the FGS still awards lucrative contracts based on close relationships and favors.  Moreover, the FGS has not yet established a procurement board as required by law, which further stifles attempts to ensure transparency and accountability in government procurement activities.  An interim procurement board exists, but it meets irregularly.

Resources to Report Corruption

There is no central agency or office for whistleblowers to report corruption, and there is no legal framework to protect whistleblowers.  The FGS has not established an Office of the Ombudsman, as required by the provisional constitution.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a significant role in the South African economy in key sectors such as electricity, transport (air, rail, freight, and pipelines), and telecommunications. Limited competition is allowed in some sectors (e.g., telecommunications and air). The government’s interest in these sectors often competes with and discourages foreign investment.

The Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) oversees in full or in part for seven of the approximately 700 SOEs at the national, provincial, and local levels. These include: Alexkor (diamonds); Denel (military equipment); Eskom (electricity generation, transmission, and distribution); South African Express and Mango (budget airlines); South African Airways (national carrier); South African Forestry Company (SAFCOL); and Transnet (transportation). The seven SOEs employ approximately 105,000 people. For other national-level SOEs, the appropriate cabinet minister acts as shareholder on behalf of the state. The Department of Transport, for example, oversees South African’s National Roads Agency (SANRAL), Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), and Airports Company South Africa (ACSA), which operates nine of South Africa’s airports. The Department of Communications oversees the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC).

SOEs under DPE’s authority posted a combined loss of R13.9 billion (USD 0.9 billion) in 2019. Many are plagued by mismanagement and corruption, and repeated government bailouts have exposed the public sector’s balance sheet to sizable contingent liabilities. The debt of Eskom alone represents about 10 percent of GDP of which two-thirds is guaranteed by government, and the company’s direct cost to the budget has exceeded 9 percent of GDP since 2008/9.

Eskom, provides generation, transmission, and distribution for over 90 percent of South Africa’s electricity of which 80 percent comes from 15 coal-fired power plants. Eskom’s coal plants are an average of 39 years old, and a lack of maintenance has caused unplanned breakdowns and rolling blackouts, known locally as “load shedding,” as old coal plants struggle to keep up with demand. Load shedding reached a record 859 hours in 2020 costing the economy an estimated $7 billion and is expected to continue for the next several years until the South African Government can increase generating capacity and increase its Energy Availability Factor (EAF). In October 2019 the DMRE finalized its Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for Electricity, which outlines South Africa’s policy roadmap for new power generation until 2030, which includes replacing 10,000 Mega Watts (MW) of coal-fired generation by 2030 with a mix of technologies, including renewables, gas and coal. The IRP also leaves the possibility open for procurement of nuclear technology at a “scale and pace that flexibly responds to the economy and associated electricity demand” and DMRE issued a Request for Information on new nuclear build in 2020. In accordance with the IRP, the South African government recently approved almost 14,000 Mega Watts (MW) of power to address chronic electricity shortages. The government announced the long-awaited Bid Window 5 (BW5) of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Procurement Program (REIPPP) in September 2020, the primary method by which renewable energy has been introduced into South Africa. The REIPP relies primarily on private capital and since the program launched in 2011 it has already attracted approx. ZAR 210 billion (USD 14 billion) of investment into the country. All three major credit ratings agencies have downgraded Eskom’s debt following Moody’s downgrade of South Africa’s sovereign debt rating in March 2020, which could impact investors’ ability to finance energy projects.

Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA), the monopoly responsible for South Africa’s ports, charges some of the highest shipping fees in the world. High tariffs on containers subsidize bulk shipments of coal and iron. According to the South African Ports Regulator, raw materials exporters paid as much as one quarter less than exporters of finished products. TNPA is a division of Transnet, a state-owned company that manages the country’s port, rail, and pipeline networks. In April 2012, Transnet launched its Market Driven Strategy (MDS), a R336 billion (USD 28 billion) investment program to modernize its port and rail infrastructure. In March 2014, Transnet announced an average overall tariff increase of 8.5 percent at its ports to finance a USD 240 million modernization effort. In 2016, Transnet reported it had invested R124 billion (USD 10.3 billion) in the previous four years in rail, ports, and pipeline infrastructure. In May 2020 S&P downgraded Transnet’s local currency rating from BB to BB- based on a generally negative outlook for South Africa’s economy rather than Transnet’s outlook specifically.

Direct aviation links between the United States and South Africa have been sharply curtailed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The emergence of a more contagious South African strain of COVID-19 in December 2020 spurred a deadly spike in infections and led the United States and many African countries to restrict entry of persons traveling from South Africa. Consequently, many airlines suspended transcontinental flights between South Africa and Europe, as well as the United States. United Airlines and Delta Air Lines provided regular service between Atlanta (Delta) and Newark (United) to Johannesburg and Cape Town before the pandemic, but both airlines have suspended service indefinitely pending resumption of sufficient demand. The state-owned carrier, South African Airways (SAA), entered business rescue in December 2019 and suspended all operations indefinitely in September 2020. The pandemic exacerbated SAA’s already dire financial straits and complicated its attempts to find a strategic equity partner to help it resume operations. Industry experts doubt the airline will be able to resume operations.

The telecommunications sector, while advanced for the continent, is hampered by regulatory uncertainty and poor implementation of the digital migration, both of which contribute to the high cost of data. In 2006, South Africa agreed to meet an International Telecommunication Union deadline to achieve analogue-to-digital migration by June 1, 2015. As of March 2021, South Africa has initiated but not completed the migration due to legal delays. Until this process is finalized, South Africa will not be able to effectively allocate the resulting additional spectrum. The independent communications regulator initiated a spectrum auction in September 2020, which was enjoined by court action in February 2021 following suits by two of the three biggest South African telecommunications companies. The regulator temporarily released high-demand spectrum to mobile network operators in June 2020 and extended the temporary release in March 2021.

Privatization Program

The government has not taken any concrete action to privatize SOEs. Candidates for unbundling are Eskom and defense contractor Denel.

South Africa has a robust anti-corruption framework, but laws are inadequately enforced, and public sector accountability is low. High-level political interference has undermined the country’s National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). “State capture”, a term used to describe systemic corruption of the state’s decision-making processes by private interests, is synonymous with the administration of former president Jacob Zuma. In response to widespread calls for accountability, President Ramaphosa launched four separate judicial commissions of inquiry to investigate corruption, fraud, and maladministration, including in the Public Investment Corporation, South African Revenue Service, and the NPA which have revealed pervasive networks of corruption across all levels of government.

The Department of Public Service and Administration coordinates government initiatives against corruption, and South Africa’s Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations focuses on organized crime, economic crimes, and corruption. The Office of the Public Protector, a constitutionally mandated body, investigates government abuse and mismanagement. The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PCCA) officially criminalizes corruption in public and private sectors and codifies specific offenses (such as extortion and money laundering), making it easier for courts to enforce the legislation. Applying to both domestic and foreign organizations doing business in the country, the PCCA covers receiving or offering bribes, influencing witnesses and tampering with evidence in ongoing investigations, obstruction of justice, contracts, procuring and withdrawal of tenders, and conflict of interests, among other areas. Inconsistently implemented, the PCCA lacks whistleblower protections. The Promotion of Access to Information Act and the Public Finance Management Act call for increased access to public information and review of government expenditures.

UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery

South Africa is a signatory to the Anticorruption Convention and the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. South Africa is also a party to the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, which seeks to facilitate and regulate cooperation in matters of corruption amongst Member States and foster development and harmonization of policies and domestic legislation related to corruption. The Protocol defines ‘acts of corruption,’ preventative measures, jurisdiction of Member States, as well as extradition. http://www.sadc.int/files/7913/5292/8361/Protocol_Against_Corruption2001.pdf

Resources to Report Corruption

To report corruption to the government:

Advocate Busisiwe Mkhwebane
Public Protector
Office of the Public Protector, South Africa
175 Lunnon Street, Hillcrest Office Park, Pretoria 0083
Anti-Corruption Hotline: +27 80 011 2040 or +27 12 366 7000
http://www.pprotect.org  or customerservice@pprotect.org 

Or for a non-government agency:

David Lewis
Executive Director
Corruption Watch
87 De Korte Street, Braamfontein/Johannesburg 2001 +27 80 002 3456 or +27 11 242 3900
+27 80 002 3456 or +27 11 242 3900
http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/content/make-your-complaint 
info@corruptionwatch.org.za 

* Source for Host Country Data: N/A

The national oil company – Nile Petroleum Corporation, or Nilepet – remains the primary fully State-owned enterprise (SOE) in South Sudan. The government owns stakes in construction and trade companies and in several banks. Limited data are available on number, total income, and employment figures of SOEs. There is no published list of SOEs.

Nilepet, created by statute, is the technical and operational branch of the Ministry of Petroleum. Nilepet took over Sudan’s national oil company’s shares in six exploration and petroleum sharing agreements in South Sudan at the time of the country’s independence in 2011. Nilepet also distributes petroleum products in South Sudan. The government, through Nilepet, holds minority stakes in other oil producing joint ventures operating in South Sudan.

The Petroleum Revenue Management Bill, which governs how Nilepet’s profits are invested, was enacted into law in 2013; however, the company has yet to release any information on its activities, even though the law states that comprehensive, audited reports on the company’s finances must be made publicly available.

The government is not transparent about how it exercises ownership or control of Nilepet. Its director reports to the Minister of Petroleum. Nilepet’s revenues and expenditures are not disclosed in the central government budget. No audited accounts of Nilepet are publicly available. After the January 2012 oil production shutdown, oil production recovered to more than 235,000 barrels per day at end of 2013, only to fall to about 160,000 barrels per day in early 2014 as a result of the conflict that started in December 2013. As of January 2021, the Undersecretary at the Ministry of Petroleum reported that oil production dropped to 165,000-170,000 barrels per day from the 178,000 barrels per day in early 2020.

In March 2018, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add Nilepet and several related companies to the Entity List, along with the Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Mining, due to their role in worsening the conflict in South Sudan. The Entity List identifies entities, including corporations, private or government organizations, and natural persons, and other persons reasonably believed to be involved, or to pose a significant risk of being or becoming involved, in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.

The U.S. Government assesses the 15 entities BIS added to the Entity List as contributing to the ongoing crisis in South Sudan because they are a source of substantial revenue that, through public corruption, is used to fund the purchase of weapons and other material that undermine the peace, security, and stability of South Sudan rather than support the welfare of the South Sudanese people. Adding these entities to the Entity List is intended to ensure that items subject to the EAR are not used to generate revenue to finance the continuing violence in South Sudan. The following 15 entities are the first South Sudanese entities added to the Entity List: Ascom Sudd Operating Company; Dar Petroleum Operating Company; DietsmannNile; Greater Pioneer Operating Co. Ltd; Juba Petrotech Technical Services Ltd; Nile Delta Petroleum Company; Nile Drilling and Services Company; Nile Petroleum Corporation; Nyakek and Sons; Oranto Petroleum; Safinat Group; SIPET Engineering and Consultancy Services; South Sudan Ministry of Mining; South Sudan Ministry of Petroleum; and Sudd Petroleum Operating Co.

These 15 entities are subject to a license requirement for all exports and reexports destined for any of the entities and transfers (in-country) to them of all items subject to the EAR with a licensing review policy of a presumption of denial. This license requirement also applies to any transaction involving any of these entities in which such entities act as a purchaser, intermediate consignee, ultimate consignee, or end-user. Additionally, no license exceptions are available to these entities.

If any person participates in a transaction described above involving any of these 15 entities without first obtaining the required license from BIS, that person would be in violation of the EAR and could be subject to civil or criminal enforcement proceedings. Civil enforcement could result in the imposition of monetary penalties or the denial of the person’s export privileges. Additionally, a person’s supplying or procuring items subject to the EAR or engaging in other activity involving an entity on the Entity List could result in a determination to add that person to the Entity List consistent with the procedures set forth in the EAR.

The regulation can be viewed on the Federal Register at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2018-03-22/pdf/2018-05789.pdf .

The country does not adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs.

Privatization Program

South Sudan does not have a privatization program. So far, the government has no plans for privatization, and there are few government-owned entities that provide services to individuals.

South Sudan has laws, regulations, and penalties to combat corruption, but there is a near total lack of enforcement and considerable gaps exist in legislation. As a result, corruption is pervasive.

Companies are reportedly asked to pay extralegal taxes and fees. Security officials have been reported to impose business conditions including payment of fees, salaries, and logistical support to their operations. In practice, politically connected people are immune to prosecution. There are no laws that prevent conflict of interest in government procurement.

The government does not encourage or require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. There is no indication that private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials.

The South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC) was established in accordance with the 2005 Constitution and the 2009 SSACC Act. The five commission members and chairperson are appointed by the President with approval by a simple majority in the parliament. The commission is tasked with protecting public property, investigating corruption, and submitting evidence to the Ministry of Justice for necessary action. In addition, the commission is tasked with combatting administrative malpractice in public institutions, such as nepotism, favoritism, tribalism, sectionalism, gender discrimination, bribery, embezzlement, and sexual harassment.

In reality, the SSACC lacks the resources or political support to investigate corruption. It has no independent arrest or prosecution authority or capacity to address state corruption; it can only relay its findings to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution. There were no significant anti-corruption cases investigated or prosecuted in 2020.

South Sudan acceded to the United Nations Convention against Corruption on January 23, 2015 but has not yet ratified it. The country is not a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and is not reported to be a participant in regional anti-corruption initiatives.

The country provides no protection to NGOs or journalists involved in investigating corruption. NGOs and journalists of all types are routinely subject to government harassment.

All major sectors including the extractive sector, hotels, airlines, banking, and security sectors are subject to interference from the security sector including recruitment and demand for payments of fees and salaries.

Resources to Report Corruption
National Audit Chamber
P.O. Box 210
Juba, South Sudan
Tel: +211(0)955481021
 info@auditchamber-ss.org 

Honorable Ngor Kulong Ngor
Chairperson
South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission
P.O Box 312

Juba, South Sudan
anticorruptioncommission@yahoo.co.uk ; sssaccchair@gmail.com 

+211(0) 927117414; +211(0)0929201028

Akuei Deng
Executive Secretary
South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission
P.O Box 312

Juba,
South Sudan
anticorruptioncommission@yahoo.co.uk
+211912979575

Contact at “watchdog” organizations:

UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan
Mr. David Biggs (Senior Committee Secretary)
Tel: +1(212)9635598
sc-2206-committee@un.org

Transparency International
Alt-Moabit 96
10559 Berlin Germany
Telephone: +49 30 3438 200
Fax: +49 30 3470 3912 ti@transparency.org

The Sentry c/o The Enough Project
c/o The Enough Project
1420 K Street, NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20005 info@thesentry.org 

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Public enterprises do not compete under the same terms and conditions as private enterprises because they have access to government subsidies and other benefits. SOEs are active in the power, communications, rail, telecommunications, insurance, aviation, and port sectors. SOEs generally report to ministries and are led by a board. Typically, a presidential appointee chairs the board, which usually includes private sector representatives. SOEs are not subjected to hard budget constraints. SOEs do not discriminate against or unfairly burden foreigners, though they do have access to sovereign credit guarantees.

Specific details on SOE financials and employment figures are not publicly available.

As of June 2019, the GoT’s Treasury Registrar reported shares and interests in 266 public parastatals, companies and statutory corporations. (See the Treasury Registrar financial statements for the year ending June 2019 – https://www.tro.go.tz/ripoti-za-fedha/ )

Privatization Program

The government retains a strong presence in energy, mining, telecommunication services, and transportation. The government is increasingly empowering the state-owned Tanzania Telecommunications Corporation Limited (TTCL) with the objective of safeguarding the national security, promoting socio-economic development, and managing strategic communications infrastructure. The government also acquired 51 percent of Airtel Telecommunication Company Limited and became the majority shareholder. In the past, the GoT has sought foreign investors to manage formerly state-run companies in public-private partnerships, but successful privatizations have been rare. Though there have been attempts to privatize certain companies, the process is not always clear and transparent. The GoT currently has 20 companies/assets awaiting privatization.

Tanzania has laws and institutions designed to combat corruption and illicit practices. It is a party to the UN Convention against Corruption, but it is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. Although corruption is still viewed as a major problem, former President Magufuli’s focus on anti-corruption translated into an increased judiciary budget, new corruption cases, and a decline in perceived corruption, especially low-level corruption. This improvement is partly attributed to instituting electronic services which reduce the opportunity for corruption through human interactions at agencies such as the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA), the Business Registration and Licensing Authority (BRELA), and the Port Authority.

Tanzania has three institutions specifically focused on anti-corruption. The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) prevents corruption, educates the public, and enforces the law against corruption. The Ethics Secretariat and its associated Ethics Tribunal under the President’s office enforces compliance with ethical standards defined in the Public Leadership Codes of Ethics Act 1995.

Companies and individuals seeking government tenders are required to submit a written commitment to uphold anti-bribery policies and abide by a compliance program. These steps are designed to ensure that company management complies with anti-bribery polices.

The GoT is currently implementing its National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan Phase III (2017-2022) (NACSAP III) which is a decentralized approach focused on broad government participation. NACSAP III has been prepared to involve a broader domain of key stakeholders including GoT local officials, development partners, civil society organization (CSOs), and the private sector. The strategy puts more emphasis on areas that historically have been more prone to corruption in Tanzania such as oil, gas, and other natural resources. Despite the outlined role of the GoT, CSOs, NGOs and media find it increasingly difficult to investigate corruption in the current political environment.

The GoT’s anti-corruption campaign affected public discourse about the prevailing climate of impunity, and some officials are reluctant to engage openly in corruption. Some critics, however, question how effective the initiative will be in tackling deeper structural issues that have allowed corruption to thrive.

Transparency International (TI), which ranks perception of corruption in public sector, gave Tanzania a score of 38 points out of 100 for 2020 and 37 points for 2019. The Afrobarometer report estimates that between 2015 and 2019 the corruption increase in the previous 12 months was only 10% in Tanzania, the lowest in Africa. While for the same period, 23% of the respondents voted that Tanzania is doing a bad job of fighting corruption, again the lowest in Africa. 32 percent of the respondents also noted that business executives are corrupt, up from 31 percent in 2015.

Resources to Report Corruption

The Director General
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau
P.O. Box 4865, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Tel: +255 22 2150043
Email:  dgeneral@pccb.go.tz 

Executive Director
Legal and Human Rights Centre
P.O. Box 75254, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Tel: +255 22 2773038/48
Email: lhrc@humanrights.or.tz 

* Source for Host Country Data: host country data not publicly available.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
There is no data for Tanzania in the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS).

According to the Bank of Tanzania, the top sources for inward foreign investment into Tanzania are South Africa, Canada, Nigeria, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Mauritius, Kenya, United States, Vietnam, and France.

Data on outward direct investment is not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
There is no data for Tanzania in the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS).

The government published a list of 16 State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the shareholding of twenty-six (26) other semi-public companies in December 2019. These SOEs may enjoy non-market based advantages received from the host government, such as the government delaying private enterprise investment in infrastructure that could disadvantage the market share of the SOE.

All SOEs have a Board of Directors and Supervisory Board, although the Togolese government has not specified how it exercises ownership in the form of an ownership policy or governance code. The SOEs also have auditors who certify their accounts. Once certified by these auditors, the accounts of these companies are sent to the Court of Auditors, Togo’s supreme audit institution, which verifies and passes judgment on these financial statements and reports to the National Assembly. The Court publishes the results of its audits annually, including at http://courdescomptestogo.org .

SOEs control or compete in the fuel, cotton, telecommunications, banking, utilities, phosphate, and grain-purchasing markets. The government wants to revitalize the phosphate sector and become a leading global player via the state-owned New Phosphate Company of Togo (SNPT).

In June 2020, the New Cotton Company of Togo (NSCT) which produces cotton domestically was sold to the Singaporean Company OLAM Group (51%) with 40% to Cotton Producers Consortium (FNGPC) (40%), while the Government of Togo maintained a 9% stake. Through this privatization, the Government hopes to further develop the textile industry. Before this privatization, NSCT was 60% state-controlled after the bankruptcy and dissolution of the 100% state-owned Togolese Cotton Company (SOTOCO) in 2009.

In September 2012, Togo sold the formerly state-owned Togolese Development Bank to Orabank Group, which has some U.S. investors. Likewise, in March 2013, Togo sold the formerly state-owned Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique au Togo to the Attijariwafa Bank Group of Morocco.

Following these sales, Union Togolaise de Banque (UTB) and Banque Togolaise pour le Commerce et l’Industrie (BTCI) are now the only two state-owned banks. Togo’s first call for tenders for these two banks, completed in 2011, was unsuccessful. Togolese authorities are working in consultation with the IMF to either merge the two banks into a single entity, or try to privatize one or both. These two remaining state-owned banks hold weak loan portfolios characterized by high exposure (about one-third of total bank credit) to the government, as well as to the cotton and phosphate industries.

In the telecommunications sector, the government combined in 2017 the two state-owned entities Togo Telecom and TogoCell into a holding company, TogoCom. In November 2019, Agou Holding consortium, made up of the Madagascan conglomerate Axian (majority) and the capital-investor Emerging Capital Partners (ECP) bought a 51% stake in TogoCom. The Togolese Government maintains a 49% stake. Agou Holding plans to invest $271 million in TogoCom over seven years to improve international connectivity and expand its high-speed fiber-optic and mobile networks. However, such investment is not yet apparent, with 4G restricted to a small area in Lomé. Nonetheless, Togocom announced in March 2021 that it is launching 5G service at the Port of Lome, the main government administrative area, and the Adetikope Industrial Platform (PIA), using Nokia equipment.

The new entity stills directly competes with a private cell phone company, Moov Togo. Atlantique Telecom, a subsidiary of Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat), owns and controls Moov Togo. The Government of Togo has licensed Togocom and Moov for 4G. Private company CAFÉ Informatique also offers satellite-based internet access and other services, mainly to the business sector. Two new internet service providers, Teolis and Vivendi Africa Group (GVA-Togo), entered the market in 2018 and the government is installing new fiber optic cable in the country.

Public utilities such as the Post Office, Lomé Port Authority, Togo Water, and the Togolese Electric Energy Company (CEET) hold monopolies in their sectors.

The National Agency for Food Security (ANSAT) is a government agency that purchases cereals on the market during the harvest for storage. When cereal prices increase during the dry season, it is ANSAT’s task to release cereals into the markets to maintain affordable cereal prices. When supplies permit, ANSAT also sells cereals on international markets, including Ghana, Niger, and Gabon.

Togo does not adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs (link to guidelines at www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecdguidelinesoncorporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises.htm 

Privatization Program

Previous privatization in Togo covered many sectors, such as hotels, banking, and mining. Foreign investors are encouraged to compete in new privatization programs via a public bidding processes. The government publishes all notifications in the French language, but unfortunately, a relevant government website is not available.

The Togolese government has established several important institutions designed in part to reduce corruption by eliminating opportunities for bribery and fraud: the Togolese Revenue Authority (OTR), the One-Stop Shop to create new businesses (CFE), and the Single Window for import/export formalities.

In 2015, the Togolese government created the High Authority for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption and Related Offenses (HAPLUCIA), which the government designed to be an independent institution dedicated to fighting corruption. The government appointed members in 2017. HAPLUCIA encourages private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. HAPLUCIA presented on February 7, 2019 its strategic plan for the period 2019-2023; it set up a toll-free number, the “8277” to receive complaints and denunciations.

Anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials, and to political parties and the government does not interfere in the work of anti-corruption NGOs.

In 2011, the government effectively implemented procurement reforms to increase transparency and reduce corruption. The government announces procurements weekly in a government publication. Once contracts are awarded, all bids and the winner are published in the weekly government procurement publication. Other measurable steps toward controlling corruption include joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and establishing public finance control structures and a National Financial Information Processing Unit.

Togo signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2003 and ratified it on July 6, 2005.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption:

Essohana Wiyao
President of HAPLUCIA, the High Authority for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption and Related Offenses
Tel. +228 90 21 28 46 / 90 25 77 40
Email: essohanawiyao@yahoo.fr 
Lomé, Togo

Directeur, Anti-Corruption
Office Togolais des Recettes (OTR)
41 Rue des Impôts
02 BP 20823
Lomé, Togo
+228 – 22 53 14 00
otr@otr.tg 

Contact at a “watchdog” organization:

Samuel Kaninda
Regional Coordinator, West Africa
Transparency International
Alt-Moabit 96
10559 Berlin
Germany
+49 30 3438 20 773
skaninda@transparency.org 

Note: U.S. based ContourGlobal built a 100 megawatt power plant in Togo in 2010. This FDI is not recorded in official U.S. government statistics.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

There are 110 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public institutions in Tunisia per the Ministry of Finance’s most recent (May 2020) report on public enterprises. SOEs are still prominent throughout the economy but are heavily indebted. Per the February 2021 IMF Article IV report, the debt of Tunisia’s 30 major SOEs was about 40 percent of GDP in 2019, and debt equivalent to about 15 percent of GDP was covered by government guarantees as of mid-2020. Annual budgetary transfers amounted to 7-8 percent of GDP in mid-2020, with 40 percent of transfers directed to three SOEs in the form of subsidies for cereals, fuel, and electricity.

Many SOEs compete with the private sector, in industries such as telecommunications, banking, and insurance, while others hold monopolies in sectors considered sensitive by the government, such as railroad, transportation, water and electricity distribution, and port logistics. Importation of basic food staples and strategic items such as cereals, rice, sugar, and edible oil also remains under SOE control.

The GOT appoints senior management officials to SOEs, who report directly to the ministries responsible for the companies’ sector of operation. SOE boards of directors include representatives from various ministries and personnel from the company itself. Similar to private companies, the law requires SOEs to publish independently audited annual reports, regardless of whether corporate capital is publicly traded on the stock market.

The GOT encourages SOEs to adhere to OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance, but adherence is not enforced. Investment banks and credit agencies tend to associate SOEs with the government and consider them as having the same risk profile for lending purposes.

Privatization Program

The GOT allows foreign participation in its privatization program. A significant share of Tunisia’s FDI in recent years has come from the privatization of state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. Privatization has occurred in many sectors, such as telecommunications, banking, insurance, manufacturing, and fuel distribution, among others.

In 2011, the GOT confiscated the assets of the former regime. The list of assets involved every major economic sector. According to the Commission to Investigate Corruption and Malfeasance, a court order is required to determine the ultimate handling of frozen assets.

Because court actions frequently take years –and with the government facing immediate budgetary needs – the GOT allowed privatization bids for shares in Ooredoo (a foreign telecommunications company of which 30 percent of shares were confiscated from the previous regime), Ennakl, Alpha Ford), and City Cars (car distribution), Goulette Shipping Cruise (cruise terminal management), Airport VIP Service (business lounge management), and Banque de Tunisie and Zitouna Bank (banking). The government is expected to sell some of its stakes in state-owned banks; however, no clear plan has been adopted or communicated so far due to fierce opposition by labor unions.

Most U.S. firms involved in the Tunisian market do not identify corruption as a primary obstacle to foreign direct investment. However, some have reported that routine procedures for doing business (customs, transportation, and some bureaucratic paperwork) are sometimes tainted by corrupt practices. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 gave Tunisia a score of 44 out of 100 and a rank of 69 among 180 countries marking a slight improvement compared to a score of 43 and a rank of 74 in 2019. Regionally, Tunisia is ranked 7 for transparency among MENA countries and first in North Africa, ahead of Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya. Transparency International expressed concern that Tunisia’s score has not improved in recent years despite advances in anti-corruption legislation, including laws to protect whistleblowers, improve access to information, and encourage asset declarations by public officials or individuals with public trust roles.

Recent government efforts to combat corruption include: the seizure and privatization of assets belonging to Ben Ali’s family members; assurances that price controls on food products, and gasoline are respected; enhancement of commercial competition in the domestic market; establishment of a Minister in Charge of Public Service, Good Governance, Anti-corruption; arrests of corrupt businessmen and officials; and harmonization of Tunisian corruption laws with those of the European Union.

The constitution requires those holding high government offices to declare assets “as provided by law.” In 2018, Parliament adopted the Assets Declaration Law, identifying 35 categories of public officials required to declare their assets upon being elected or appointed and upon leaving office. By law, the National Authority for the Combat Against Corruption (INLUCC) is then responsible for publishing the lists of assets of these individuals on its website. In addition, the law requires other individuals in specified professions that have a public role to declare their assets to the INLUCC, although this information is not made public. This provision applies to journalists, media figures, civil society leaders, political party leaders, and union officials. The law also enumerates a “gift” policy, defines measures to avoid conflicts of interest, and stipulates the sanctions that apply in cases of illicit enrichment. In 2019, Tunisia’s newly elected government officials declared their assets, including the 217 Members of Parliament. The declaration of assets was also made in September 2020 when a new government was formed.

In February 2017, Parliament passed law no. 2017-10 on corruption reporting and whistleblower protection. The legislation was a significant step in the fight against corruption, as it establishes the mechanisms, conditions, and procedures for denouncing corruption. Article 17 of the law provides protection for whistleblowers, and any act of reprisal against them is considered a punishable crime. For public servants, the law also guarantees the protection of whistleblowers against possible retaliation from their superiors. In September 2017, the GOT established the Independent Access to Information Commission.  This authority was prescribed in the 2016 Access to Information Law to proactively encourage government agencies to comply with the new law and to adjudicate complaints against the government for failing to comply with the law. Following the passage of the access to information and whistleblower protection laws, the government initiated an anti-corruption campaign led by then prime minister Youssef Chahed.  A series of arrests and investigations targeted well-known businesspersons, politicians, journalists, police officers, and customs officials.  Preliminary charges included embezzlement, fraud, and taking bribes.

Tunisia’s penal code devotes 11 articles to defining and classifying corruption and assigns corresponding penalties (including fines and imprisonment). Several other regulations also address broader concepts of corruption. Detailed information on the application of these laws and their effectiveness in combating corruption is not publicly available, and there are no GOT statistics specific to corruption. The Independent Commission to Investigate Corruption handled corruption complaints from 1987 to 2011. The commission referred 5 percent of cases to the Ministry of Justice. In 2012, the commission was replaced by the National Authority to Combat Corruption (INLUCC), which has the authority to forward corruption cases to the Ministry of Justice, give opinions on legislative and regulatory anti-corruption efforts, propose policies and collect data on corruption, and facilitate contact between anti-corruption efforts in the government and civil society. Tunisia’s constitution stipulates that INLUCC is a temporary institution, and that Parliament must appoint members to a permanent Institute for Good Governance and Anticorruption.  Parliament has not announced a timeline for establishing this permanent institution. Prime Minister Fakhfakh resigned on July 15, 2020, following allegations of a conflict of interest involving his partial ownership of companies that received government contracts.  In apparent retaliation for his ouster, Fakhfakh dismissed then INLUCC president Chawki Tabib, replacing him with Imed Boukhris, a former judge.

During a March 16, 2019 press conference, INLUCC president Chawki Tabib said that it takes 7-10 years on average for corruption cases to be processed in the judicial system. In 2018, the Tunisian Financial Analysis Committee, which operates under the auspices of the Central Bank as a financial intelligence unit, announced that it froze approximately 200 million dinars ($70 million) linked to suspected money-laundering transactions. The committee received approximately 600 reports of suspicious transactions related to corruption and illicit financial flows during the year.

Since 1989, a comprehensive law designed to regulate each phase of public procurement has governed the public sector. The GOT also established the Higher Commission on Public Procurement (HAICOP) to supervise the tender and award process for major government contracts. The government publicly supports a policy of transparency. Public tenders require bidders to provide a sworn statement that they have not and will not, either by themselves or through a third party, make any promises or give gifts with a view to influencing the outcome of the tender and realization of the project. Starting September 2018, the government imposed by decree that all public procurement operations be conducted electronically via a bidding platform called Tunisia Online E-Procurement System (TUNEPS). Despite the law, competition on government tenders appears susceptible to corrupt behavior. Pursuant to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the U.S. Government requires that American companies requesting U.S. Government advocacy certify that they do not participate in corrupt practices.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contacts at agencies responsible for combating corruption:

Imed Boukhris
President
The National Anti-Corruption Authority (Instance Nationale de Lutte Contre la Corruption – INLUCC)
http://www.inlucc.tn 
71 Avenue Taieb Mhiri, 1002 Tunis Belvédère – Tunisia
+216 71 840 401 / Toll Free: 80 10 22 22
contact@inlucc.tn 

“Watchdog” organization

Achraf Aouadi
President
I WATCH Tunisia
14 Rue d’Irak 1002 Lafayette, Tunisia
+ 216 71 844 226
contact@iwatch.tn 

*Source: Tunisia’s Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) year-end December 2019 data, published in July 2020.

FIPA, which is the host country statistical source for FDI stock, does not track the stock of foreign investment in energy and uses statistics that have been constant since 2010.

*Source: Tunisia’s Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) year-end December 2020 data, published in February 2021 and Tunisia Central Bank data published in March 2021.

Tunisia was not covered by the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS).

*Source: Tunisia’s Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) year-end December 2020 data, published in February 2021. (Tunisia was not covered by the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS)). 14. Contact for More Information

Uganda has thirty State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). However, the Ugandan government does not publish a list of its SOEs, and the public is unable to access detailed information on SOE ownership, total assets, total net income, or number of people employed. Uganda Airlines, the national carrier, began service in late 2019 with regional service. Despite the woes associated with the travel industry due to COVID-19, it has since expanded its fleet to six planes including two Airbus A330-800neos, and has plans to service Europe, the Middle East, and China. While there is insufficient information to assess the SOEs’ adherence to the OECD Guidelines of Corporate Governance, the Ugandan government’s 2020 Office of Auditor General report noted corporate governance issues in 18 SOEs. In February 2021, the Ugandan government embarked on a plan to merge some of the SOEs to reduce duplication of roles and costs of administration. SOEs do not get special financing terms and are subject to hard budget constraints. According to the Ugandan Revenue Authority Act, they have the same tax burden as the private sector. According to the Land Act, private enterprises have the same access to land as SOEs. One notable exception is the Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC), which receives proprietary exploration data on new oil discoveries in Uganda. UNOC can then sell this information to the highest bidder in the private sector to generate income for its operations.

Privatization Program

The government privatized many SOEs in the 1990s. Uganda does not currently have a privatization program.

Uganda has generally adequate laws to combat corruption, and an interlocking web of anti-corruption institutions. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority Act’s Code of Ethical Standards (Code) requires bidders and contractors to disclose any possible conflict of interest when applying for government contracts. However, endemic corruption remains a serious problem and a major obstacle to investment. Transparency International ranked Uganda 142 out of 180 countries in its 2020 Corruption Perception Index, dropping five places from 2019. While anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials and political parties, in practice many well-connected individuals enjoy de facto immunity for corrupt acts and are rarely prosecuted in court.

The government does not require companies to adopt specific internal procedures to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Larger private companies implement internal control policies; however, with 80% of the workforce in the informal sector, much of the private sector operates without such systems. While Uganda has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention, it is not yet party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and does not protect non–governmental organizations investigating corruption. Some corruption watchdog organizations allege government harassment.

U.S. firms consistently identify corruption as a major hurdle to business and investment. Corruption in government procurement processes remains particularly problematic for foreign companies seeking to bid on Ugandan government contracts.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contacts at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:

Justice George Bamugemereire
Inspector General of Government
Inspectorate of Government
Jubilee Insurance Centre, Plot 14, Parliament Avenue, Kampala
Telephone: +256-414-344-219
Website: www.igg.go.ug 

Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA)
UEDCL Towers Plot 39 Nakasero Road
P.O. Box 3925, Kampala Uganda
Telephone: +256-414-311100.
Email: info@ppda.go.ug 
Website: https://www.ppda.go.ug/ 

Contact at “watchdog” organization:

Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda
Cissy Kagaba
Telephone: +256-414-535-659
Email: kagabac@accu.or.ug 
Website: http://accu.or.ug 

The UBOS does not publish specific country sources of inward investment so there is no effective comparison with the IMF data. The IMF data above, however, indicates that two tax havens, The Netherlands and Mauritius, are among the top five sources of inward investment in Uganda.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

There are currently 34 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in different sectors in Zambia including agriculture, education, energy, financial services, infrastructure, manufacturing, medical, mining, real estate, technology, media and communication, tourism, and transportation and logistics. Most SOEs are wholly owned or majority owned by the government under the IDC established in 2015. Zambia has two categories of SOEs: those incorporated under the Companies Act and those established by particular statutes, referred to as statutory corporations. There is a published list of SOEs in the Auditor General’s annual reports; SOE expenditure on research and development is not detailed. There is no exhaustive list or online location of SOEs’ data for assets, net income, or number of employees. Consequently, inaccurate information is scattered throughout different government agencies/ministries. The majority of SOEs have serious operational and management challenges.

In theory, SOEs do not enjoy preferential treatment by virtue of government ownership, however, they may obtain protection when they are not able to compete or face adverse market conditions. The Zambia Information Communications Authority Act has a provision restricting the private sector from undertaking postal services that would directly compete with the Zambia Postal Services Corporation. Zambia is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO, however private enterprises are allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations such as licenses and supplies.

SOEs in Zambia are governed by Boards of Directors appointed by government in consultation with and including members from the private sector. The chief executive of the SOE reports to the board chairperson. In the event that the SOE declares dividends, these are paid to the Ministry of Finance. The board chair is informally obliged to consult with government officials before making decisions. The line minister appoints members of the Board of Directors from within public service, the private sector, and civil society. The independence of the board, however, is limited since most boards are comprised of a majority of government officials, while board members from the private sector or civil society that are appointed by the line minister can be removed.

SOEs can and do purchase goods or services from the private sector, including foreign firms. SOEs are not bound by the GPA and can procure their own goods, works, and services. SOEs are subject to the same tax policies as their private sector competitors and are generally not afforded material advantages such as preferential access to land and raw materials. SOEs are audited by the Auditor General’s Office, using international reporting standards. Audits are carried out annually, but delays in finalizing and publishing results are common. Controlling officers appear before a Parliamentary Committee for Public Accounts to answer audit queries. Audited reports are submitted to the president for tabling with the National Assembly, in accordance with Article 121 of the Constitution and the Public Audit Act, Chapter 378.

In 2015, the government transferred most SOEs from the Ministry of Finance to the revived Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). The move, according to the government, was to allow line ministries to focus on policy making thereby giving the IDC direct mandate and authorization to oversee SOE performance and accountability on behalf of the government. In 2016, the government stated its intent to review state owned enterprises in order to improve their performance and contribution to the treasury and directed the IDC to conduct a situational analysis of all the SOEs under its portfolio with a view to recapitalize successful businesses while hiving off ones that are no longer viable; these reviews are ongoing. The IDC’s oversight responsibilities include all aspects of governance, commercial, financing, operational, and all matters incidental to the interests of the state as shareholder. Zambia strives to adhere to OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance to ensure a level playing field between SOEs and private sector enterprises.

Privatization Program

There were no sectors or companies targeted for privatization in 2020. The privatization of parastatals began in 1991, with the last one occurring in 2007. The divestiture of state enterprises mostly rests with the IDC, as the mandated SOE holding company. The Privatization Act includes the provision for the privatization and commercialization of SOEs; most of the privatization bidding process is advertised via printed media and the IDC’s website ( www.idc.co.zm ). There is no known policy that forbids foreign investors from participating in the country’s privatization programs.

Zambia’s anti-corruption activities are governed by the Anti-Corruption Act of 2012 and the National Anti-Corruption Policy of 2009, which stipulate penalties for different offenses. While legislation and stated policies on anti-corruption are adequate, implementation sometimes falls short. The Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act of 2010 provides for the disclosure of conduct adverse to the public interest in the public and private sectors; however, like with other laws and policies, enforcement is weak. Zambia lacks adequate laws on asset disclosure, evidence, and freedom of information. In March 2019 Cabinet approved the Access to Information Bill (ATI), but the draft bill has not been made public or presented to Parliament as of April 2021. The bill aims to ensure the government is proactive and organized in disseminating information to the public. Versions of the ATI Bill have been pending since 2002.

Zambia has made some progress in the fight against corruption over the past decade, as reflected by improvements recorded in several governance indicators. However, recent years have also seen the persistent perception that corruption has increased, and it remains a primary impediment to governance and development programs. In the 2020 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) report, Zambia ranked 117 out of 180 countries, which is a drop from 113 in the 2019 report. The legal and institutional frameworks against corruption have been strengthened, and efforts have been made to reduce red tape and streamline bureaucratic procedures, as well as to investigate and prosecute corruption cases, including those involving high-ranking officials. Most of these cases, however, remain on the shelves waiting to be tried while officials remain free, sometimes still occupying the positions through which the alleged corruption took place. In March 2018, Parliament passed the Public Finance Management Bill, which allows the government to prosecute public officials for misappropriating funds, something previous legislation lacked. The government published the implementing regulations in November 2020. Despite progress made, corruption remains a serious issue in Zambia, affecting the lives of ordinary citizens and their access to public services. Corruption in the police service has emerged as an area of particular concern (with frequency of bribery well above that found in any other sector), followed by corruption in the Road Transport and Safety Agency. The government has cited corruption in public procurements and contracting procedures as major areas of concern.

The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is the agency mandated to spearhead the fight against corruption in Zambia. The Anti-Money Laundering Unit of the Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) also assists with investigation of allegations of misconduct. An independent Financial Intelligence Center (FIC) was established in 2010, but does not have the authority to prosecute financial crimes. Zambia’s anti-corruption agencies generally do not discriminate between local and foreign investors. Transparency International has an active Zambian chapter.

The government encourages private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials. Most large private companies have internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery. The Integrity Committees (ICs) Initiative is one of the strategies of the National Anti-Corruption Policy (NACP), which is aimed at institutionalizing the prevention of corruption. The NACP received the Cabinet’s approval in March 2009 and the Anti-Corruption Commission spearheads its implementation. The NACP targets eight institutions, including the Zambia Revenue Authority, Immigration Department, and Ministry of Lands. The government has taken measures to enhance protection of whistleblowers and witnesses with the enactment of the Public Disclosure Act, as well as to strengthen protection of citizens against false reports, in line with Article 32 of the UN Convention.

U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to foreign direct investment. Corruption is most pervasive in government procurement and dispute settlement. Giving or accepting a bribe by a private, public, or foreign official is a criminal act, and a person convicted of doing so is liable to a fine or a prison term not exceeding five years. A bribe by a local company or individual to a foreign official is a criminal act and punishable under the laws of Zambia. A local company cannot deduct a bribe to a foreign official from taxes. Many businesses have complained that bribery and kickbacks, however, remain rampant and difficult to police, as some companies have noted government officials’ complicity in and/or benefitting from corrupt deals.

Zambia signed and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in December 2007. Other regional anti-corruption initiatives are the SADC Protocol against Corruption, ratified in 2003, and the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, ratified in 2007. Zambia is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, but is a party to the Anticorruption Convention. Currently, there are no local industries or non-profit groups that offer services for vetting potential local investment partners. Normally, the U.S. Embassy provides limited vetting of potential local investment partners for U.S. businesses, when contracted as a commercial service.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:

Mrs. Rosemary Nkonde Khuzwayo
Acting Director General, Anti-Corruption Commission
Kulima House, Cha Cha Cha Road, P.O. Box 50486, Lusaka
+260 211 237914
e-mail: rkhuzwayo@acc.gov.zm 

Contact at “watchdog” organization:

Mr. Maurice Nyambe
Executive Director, Transparency International Zambia
3880 Kwacha Road, Olympia Park, P.O. Box 37475, Lusaka
+260 211 290080
e-mail: MNyambe@tizambia.org.zm 

* Host country statistical data released is almost non-existent.  If it exists, there is not a central source for retrieving the data, and at most times it does not match international sources.

**Results published 03/2020

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.