Policies Toward Foreign Direct Investment

Burma recognizes the value of investment to boost economic growth and development, and it is open to foreign investors.  That said, implementation of liberal investment laws and policies are often slowed and sometimes blocked by local rent-seeking economic actors who benefit from the status quo.  In 2016, Burma passed the Myanmar Investment Law (MIL) to attract more investment from both foreign and domestic businesses. The MIL simplified the rules and regulations for investment to bring Burma more in line with international standards.  The MIL includes a “negative list” of prohibited, restricted, and special sectors. Burma also has three Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Thilawa, Dawei, and Kyauk Phyu with preferential policies for businesses that locate there, including one-stop-shop service.

The new Companies Law went into effect on August 1, 2018.  Under the new law, foreign investment of up to 35 percent is allowed in domestic companies— which also opens the stock exchange to limited foreign participation.  It also updates and streamlines business regulations.  In tandem with the Companies Law’s entry into force, the government instituted online company registration through “MyCo” (https://www.myco.dica.gov.mm  ).  MyCo also includes a searchable company registry, which should improve transparency on corporate data and ease due diligence research.  The Companies Law makes it easier to start and operate small businesses, and provides the government with tools to enforce corporate governance rules and regulations.

In April 2019, the government awarded licenses to five international insurance firms to offer wholly-foreign-owned life insurance options in the country.

In November 2018, the government created the Ministry for Foreign Investment and Economic Relations (MIFER) to facilitate investment.  The Directorate for Investment and Company Administration (DICA), Burma’s investment promotion agency, was moved from the Ministry of Planning and Finance to MIFER.  One of DICA’s roles is to encourage and facilitate both foreign and local investment by providing information, fostering coordination and networks between investors and continually exploring new opportunities in Burma that would benefit both the nation and the business community.  In addition to DICA, MIFER also oversees the Foreign Economic Relations Department (FERD), which was transferred to MIFER from the Ministry of Planning and Finance.

In May 2018, the Ministry of Commerce issued Notification 25/2018, which opened up the wholesale and retail sector to direct foreign investment.

There is no evidence that the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) discriminates against foreign investors.  In June 2017, the MIC announced ten prioritized sectors for foreign and Burmese investors: agriculture and livestock, power, education, health care, logistics, construction for affordable housing, export promotion industries, import substitution industries, aircraft and airports, and establishment of industrial estates and urban areas.

The government engages with chambers of commerce and foreign companies on investment.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

The Myanmar Investment Law (MIL) went into effect in April 2017 and applies to all investment in Burma, both domestic and foreign.  According to the MIL, some investments require a permit while others do not. The MIL also lists specific sectors where tax incentives are available.  Under the MIL, foreign investors are now able to enter into long-term leases. The MIL revised restrictions on investment to liberalize investment. Section 42 of the MIL lists types of investment activities that only the Union government can undertake; that are not permitted for foreign investors; that are permitted only as a joint-venture with resident citizens or citizen-owned entities; and that are subject to specifically prescribed conditions (e.g. approval from relevant ministries).

When forming or registering a business in Burma, generally two options exist: (i) registration under the new Companies Law or (ii) registration as an MIC-company under the MIL (with registration under the 2014 Special Economic Zone Law for businesses located in a Special Economic Zone as a third option).  Under the MIL, investors involved in the following businesses must still submit a proposal to the MIC and apply for a permit: businesses/investment activities that are strategic for the Union; large, capital-intensive investment projects; projects which have large potential impacts on the environment and local communities; businesses/investment activities that use state-owned land and buildings; and/or businesses/investment activities that the government designates as requiring the submission of a proposal to the MIC.

The State-Owned Economic Enterprises Law, enacted in March 1989, is still in effect today.  It regulates certain investments and economic activities. While the 1989 law stipulated that state-owned enterprises (SOE) have the sole right to carry out a range of economic activities, including teak extraction, oil and gas, banking and insurance, and electricity generation, in practice many of these areas are now open to private sector investment.  For instance, the 2016 Rail Transportation Enterprise Law allows foreign and local businesses to make certain investments in railways, including in the form of public-private partnerships.

More broadly, the MIC, “in the interest of the State,” can make exceptions to the State-Owned Economic Enterprise Law.  The MIC has routinely granted numerous exceptions including through joint ventures or special licenses in the areas of insurance, banking (for domestic investors only), mining, petroleum and natural gas extraction, telecommunications, radio and television broadcasting, and air transport services.

The Burmese military is associated with the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, Ltd. (UMEHL) and runs the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), two large conglomerates with many commercial interests. 

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The World Bank’s Doing Business 2019 report includes an analysis of Burma’s investment sectors and business environment, and can be found at:  http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/myanmar/  

The World Bank also conducted an enterprise survey of Burma in 2016, the results of which can be found at: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploreeconomies/2016/myanmar  

The OECD conducted an investment policy review of Burma in March 2014.  The entire report can be found at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Myanmar-IPR-2014.pdf .

The World Trade Organization (WTO) conducted a trade policy review of Burma in March 2014.  The entire report can be found at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp393_e.htm  .

Business Facilitation

The Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA) website (http://www.dica.gov.mm/  ) provides information on how to register a business in Burma, which can be done online as of August 2018, or in person at DICA’s offices.  Registration is the first step a businessperson must take before incorporating a company or making an investment in Burma, whether that person is a citizen of Burma or a foreigner.  In accordance with the Companies Law and the Special Companies Act of 1950, a company may register in one of the following forms: as a private or public company by Burmese citizens, as a foreign company or branch of a foreign company, as a joint venture company, or as an association/nonprofit organization.  First steps include checking availability of the company name at DICA or on the online registry, obtaining company registration forms in person or online from DICA, submitting the forms, and paying a company registration fee. The new Companies Law eliminated the need for companies to get a “permit to trade,” removing an obstacle to businesses under the previous version of the law.

The Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) is responsible for verifying and approving certain investment proposals and regularly issues notifications about sector-specific developments.  The MIC is comprised of representatives and experts from government ministries, departments and governmental and non-governmental bodies. Companies can use the DICA website to retrieve information on requirements for MIC permit applications and submit a proposal to the MIC.  If the proposal meets the criteria, it will be accepted within 15 days. If accepted, the MIC will review the proposal and reach a decision within 90 days. The MIC issued a March 2016 statement granting authority to state and regional investment committees to approve any investment with capital of under USD 5 million.  Such investments no longer require approval from the MIC.

To attract foreign and domestic investors, the MIC has released lists of townships that fall under three different zones: underdeveloped, moderately developed, and adequately developed.  Investors will receive a tax break of seven years, five years, or three years when they make investments in these respective zones. A total of 166 townships fall under the least-developed-zone category.  In 2017, DICA expanded its presence throughout Burma to support companies and promote investment in of all the country’s states and regions.

Outward Investment

Burma does not promote outward investment, but it does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.

Real Property

The MIL provides that any foreign investor may enter into long-term leases with private landlords or – in the case of state-owned land – the relevant government departments or government organizations, if the investor has obtained a Permit or Endorsement issued by the MIC.  Upon issuance of a Permit or an Endorsement, a foreign investor may enter into leases with an initial term of up to 50 years (with the possibility to extend for two additional terms of ten years each). Longer periods of land utilization or land leases may be allowed by the MIC to promote the development of difficult-to-access regions with lower development.

In September 2018, Burma amended the Vacant, Fallow, and Virgin Lands Management Law and required occupants of land considered vacant, fallow or virgin to go to the nearest land records office and register within a six-month period.  The six-month deadline was intended to offer clear title to lands for investment and infrastructure construction. However, controversy exists over which lands were designated as vacant, fallow or virgin and whether the notification or registration period was sufficient.

In January 2016, the government published the approved National Land Use Policy.  The policy includes provisions on ensuring the use of effective environmental and social safeguard mechanisms; improving public participation in decision-making processes related to land use planning; improving public access to accurate information related to land use management; and developing independent dispute resolution mechanisms.  The policy is to be updated every five years as necessary and stipulates that a new national land law will be drafted and enacted using this policy.  The policy also establishes the National Land Use Council. Chaired by the Vice President, the council constitutes the highest authority within the government presiding over land issues, and is intended to ensure the policy and new national land law are implemented and used as a guide for the harmonization of all existing laws relating to land in the country.

A continuing area of concern for foreigners involves investment in large-scale land projects.  Property rights for large plots of land for investment commonly are disputed because ownership is not well established, particularly following a half-century of military expropriations.  It is not uncommon for foreign firms to face complaints from local communities about inadequate consultation and compensation regarding land.

Burma’s parliament passed the Condominium Law in 2016.  The law states that up to 40 percent of condominium units of “saleable floor area” can be sold to foreign buyers.  Condominium owners shall also have the shared ownership of both the land and apartment.  In 2017 the Ministry of Construction pasted the Condominium Rules, implementing and clarifying provisions of the Condominium law.  One clarification per the rules is that state-owned land may be registered as condominium land (Rules 20 and 21).

In accordance with the Transfer of Immovable Property Restriction Law of 1987, mortgages of immovable property are prohibited if the mortgage holder is a foreigner, foreign company or foreign bank.

Intellectual Property Rights

Burma improved its intellectual property rights protection in 2019 by enacting three laws on intellectual property: the Trademark Law, the Industrial Design Law, and the Patent Law.  A fourth law on copyrights has been passed by Parliament but has not yet been signed by the President. The laws improve protections for intellectual property owners by offering legal protections and implementing fines or legal actions in case of infringement.

The Trademark Law introduces a “first-to-file” system from the previous “first-to-use” system.  Trademark holders who previously registered their trademark will need to re-register their marks.  The new law also includes protections for “well-known” trademarks. Geographical indications will also be protected through registration.  In anticipation of passage of the trademark bill, Burma established a single national Intellectual Property Office that will monitor compliance with intellectual property laws and be responsible for developing IPR policy rules and regulations.  In addition, the WTO has delayed required implementation of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) Agreement for Least Developed Nations – including Burma – until 2021.

For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/  .

Resources for Rights Holders

For Intellectual Property Rights issues in Burma, please contact:

Kitisri Sukhapinda, Regional IP Attache
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
American Embassy Bangkok, Thailand
Tel: (662) 205-5913
Email: kitisri.sukhapinda@trade.gov

Information on the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) Burma Chapter can be found at: http://www.amchammyanmar.com/  

Information on legal service providers available in Burma can be found at: https://mm.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Burma has very small publicly traded equity and debt markets.  Banks have been the primary buyers of government bonds issued by Burma’s Central Bank, which has established a nascent bond market auction system.  The Central Bank issues government treasury bonds with maturities of two, three, and five years.

The Burmese government opened the Yangon Stock Exchange in 2015, and the first company was listed on March 25, 2016.  As of April 2018, five companies are listed on the exchange. Japan Exchange Group and Japan-based Daiwa Securities Group helped launched the stock exchange, owning a combined 49 percent of the stock exchange, with the remaining 51 percent owned by state-owned Myanma Economic Bank.  In 2013, the Securities Exchange Law came into effect, establishing a securities and exchange commission and helping clarify licensing for securities businesses (such as dealing, brokerage, underwriting, investment advisory and company representation). The Companies Law allows foreign investment of up to 35 percent in domestic companies and allows foreign investment in the stock market.

Money and Banking System

In October 2014, the government awarded limited banking licenses to nine foreign banks – all from the Asia-Pacific region – allowing each bank to set up one branch and provide loans to foreign companies.  All nine banks began operations by the end of October 2015. In mid-December 2015, the Burmese government announced a second round of foreign bank licensing, designed to increase the presence of banks headquartered in a wider variety of countries, and in early March 2016 the Central Bank granted new licenses to banks headquartered in India, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam.  In November 2018, the Central Bank published new guidelines that permit locally licensed foreign banks to offer “any financing services and other banking services” to local corporations. Previously, the thirteen foreign banks in Burma were only allowed to offer export financing and related banking services to foreign corporations. No domestic banks currently have a correspondent bank account with a U.S.-based bank.

The Financial Institution Law was enacted in January 2016 and in July 2017 the Central Bank issued four regulations on capital adequacy ratio, asset classification and provisioning, large exposures and liquidity ratio requirements, aiming to align Burma’s banking standards with international Basel II standards.  Since then Burmese banks have pushed back against the timeline of implementation of these regulations, arguing that special circumstances in Burma’s banking industry warrant special treatment.

Insufficient access to formal sources of credit is one of the most frequently identified obstacles to doing business in Burma, according to numerous business surveys.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

The Burmese kyat has a free-floating exchange rate.  Starting from February 5, 2019, the Central Bank calculates a market-based reference exchange rate from the volume-weighted average exchange rate of interbank and bank-customer deals during the day.

Remittance Policies

According to the MIL, foreign investors have the right of remittance of foreign currency.  Foreign investors are allowed to remit foreign currency overseas through banks authorized to conduct foreign banking business at the prevailing exchange rate.  Banks began introducing remittance services during 2012 and the volume of such formal transfer is low but growing, according to local bank managers.

Nevertheless, in practice, the transfer of money in or out of Burma has been difficult, as many international banks have been slow to update their internal prohibitions on conducting business in Burma, given the long history of U.S. and European sanctions that had isolated the country.  The majority of foreign currency transactions are conducted through banks in Singapore.

The difficulties presented by the formal banking system are reflected in the continued use of informal sources of finance for loans and remittances by both the public and businesses.  Although these informal sources tend to have higher interest charges, they offer an alternative to the limited loan services offered by banks, which generally provide only short-term credit for trade on a limited basis and require collateral.  Remittances are also often made through a well-developed informal financial network (commonly known as the “Hundi system”).

Burma is a “country of primary money laundering concern” according to the 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.  According to the report, Burma is not a regional or offshore financial center, and its historically isolated banking sector is just beginning to reconnect to the international financial system.  However, the report notes that Burma’s prolific drug production and lack of financial transparency make it attractive for money laundering. Burma enacted anti-money-laundering laws in 2014 and issued relevant rules in 2015.  Burma’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is the agency responsible for undertaking investigation and legal action. The FIU is now a part of Burma’s police force under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The FIU is building its capacity to become an independent unit in line with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force.  In July 2016, Burma was delisted from the Financial Action Task Force list. While Burma is still designated as a jurisdiction of “primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued an administrative exception to this finding in October 2016, similar to waivers issued for certain banks since 2012, thereby allowing corresponding banking relationships with the United States.  For more information on the Department of Treasury exception, please see: https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-exception-prohibition-imposed-section-311-action-against-burma  

Burma does not engage in currency manipulation tactics.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Burma does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

Revenue from SOEs contributes about 42 percent of the total revenue of Burma, while SOEs costs amount to 36 percent of expenditures.  In July 2016, the NLD announced 12 economic policies including to reform SOEs and privatize SOEs to enable the private sector to create employment opportunities.  The disaggregate figures of each SOE under the respective ministries are made public in the Burmese language.

Starting in 2012, the government of Burma began taking steps to reduce SOEs’ reliance on government support and to make them more competitive through joint ventures.  This included reducing budget subsidies for financing the raw material requirements of SOEs. The government of Burma has moved in the direction of public private partnerships, corporatization, and privatization.  Burma is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO.

SOEs can secure loans at four percent interest rates from state-owned banks, with approval from the cabinet.  Private enterprises, unlike SOEs, are forced to provide land or other real estate as collateral in order to be considered for a loan.  However, SOEs are now subject to stricter financial discipline, as the government has sharply cut direct subsidies to the SOEs while opening markets for competition with the private sector.  Furthermore, the government is removing the easy credit from state banks. SOEs historically had an advantage over private entities in terms of land access since, according to the Constitution, the State owns all the land.

Privatization Program

According to the government of Burma, the private sector accounts for a majority of the country’s GDP, with the State participating in telecommunication services, social and public administration, energy, forestry, construction, and electricity.  The activities of the two military-owned conglomerates of MEHL and MEC are not included in the budget data; while a common sense understanding of “state-owned” would likely include them, these companies are not considered SOEs under Burmese law.

The NLD government has prioritized the privatization of SOEs, largely because many of these entities cost the government money.  In May 2016, the NLD appointed the new members of the Privatization Commission headed by a Vice-President. The Minister of Planning and Finance is the secretary of the commission.  Privatization can take the form of system-sharing, public-private partnership, private-private partnership, franchise, joint-venture, and sales of assets in line with international standards.

Burma’s awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is growing.  However, many local companies (and some international firms) still equate CSR with in-kind donations or charitable contributions.  In recent years the Union of Myanmar Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI), Burma’s largest private sector association, has been promoting the United Nations Global Compact and CSR principles in general.

Burma has implemented the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

The elected government has continued to prioritize fighting corruption, and resources have been allocated to facilitate the growth of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) into an institution vested with the authority to lead that fight.  In 2018, the government amended its anti-corruption law to give the ACC greater authority to scrutinize government procurements, and the ACC has used that authority to initiate criminal cases against a few high-ranking and some mid-ranking officials for financial impropriety and abuse of office.  The ACC opened a branch office in Yangon in April 2019, and intends to open a branch in Mandalay in May 2019, as it continues to increase its investigative capacity.

The country, however, still lacks a framework that would effectively support a sustained and systematic fight against corruption.  While there have been efforts to reduce some opportunities for higher-level corruption, the lack of transparency regarding military budgets and expenditures remains a substantial impediment to reforms.  In addition, a large swath of the economy is engaged in illegal activities beyond the control of the government. These include the production, transportation and distribution of narcotics, and the smuggling of jade, gemstones, timber, wildlife, and wildlife products.  There are efforts to promote accountability for government officials, but lack of resources for key government functions, including law enforcement, remains a driver for low-level corruption. In its 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International rated Burma 132 out of 180 countries, a slight decline in ranking from the previous year.  Investors might face corruption when seeking investment permits, during the taxation process, when applying for import and export licenses, and when negotiating land and real estate leases.

The Government of Burma, however, recognizes the importance of fighting corruption as a quintessential part of efforts to improve democratic governance.

Resources to Report Corruption

UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery

Burma signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2005, and ratified it December 20, 2012.

Burma is not party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

Resources to Report Corruption

Anti Corruption Commission
Cluster (1), Sports’ Village, Wunna Theikdi Ward
Nay Pyi Taw
Phone : + 95 67 810 334 7
Email : myanmaracc2014@gmail.com
http://www.accm.gov.mm/acc/index.php?route=common/home  

The government is sensitive to the threat of terrorism and is engaged with international partners on this issue.  There is no evidence to suggest that international terrorist organizations have operational capacity in Burma or are actively targeting Western interests.  Although both Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and ISIS in the Philippines (ISIS-P) have called for attacks in Burma as a result of the Rakhine crisis involving the Rohingya people, these calls are so far largely seen as aspirational in nature.  Additionally, crime in Burma is low compared to other countries within the region. While violence or demonstrations rarely target U.S. or other Western interests in Burma, several ethnic armed groups are engaged in ongoing civil conflict with the government of Burma, which occurs almost exclusively in the ethnic states.  On October 15, 2015, the government of Burma and eight ethnic armed groups (EAGs) signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA).  Two additional armed ethnic groups joined the NCA in February 2018. However, several ethnic armed groups, including the most powerful ones, have not signed the NCA and some signatories continue to fight with the military and other EAGs.

While most of the major cities are quite safe, several areas of the country, particularly the ethnic states, routinely see conflict between the government and EAGs, as well as inter-ethnic violence between EAGs.  One of the ways these conflicts manifest is in the use of landmines and attacks involving improvised explosive devices. These incidents generally target government security forces, but there have been collateral casualties among the civilian population.  The continued use of landmines by the Burmese military and EAGs in the north, northeast, and southeast continue to routinely result in civilian casualties. Civilians have also been killed as a result of clashes between the military and the EAGs, as well as inter-ethnic conflicts.

On August 25, 2017, a Rohingya insurgent group attacked about 30 security outposts in northern Rakhine State.  The government characterized this event as a terrorist attack, and Burmese security forces launched clearance operations throughout northern Rakhine State.  Hundreds of Rohingya villages were burned, and there were widespread, credible allegations of abuses by security forces. An estimated 730,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, and tens of thousands of non-Rohingya are displaced inside Rakhine State.  In November 2017, the U.S. Secretary of State determined that the situation constituted ethnic cleansing. Violence has not spread to other areas of Burma as a result of the crisis in Rakhine State although, as noted above, certain states in Burma continue to experience ethnic or religious violence.  Burma has a minority Muslim population, and violence between Buddhists and Muslims did occur in other parts of the country in 2013 and 2014 following intercommunal violence in Rakhine State in 2012. Since late 2018, there has been a marked increase in violence as a result of the ongoing conflict between the Burmese security forces and fighters from the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic Rakhine, largely Buddhist, EAG.  A number of townships in northern Rakhine and southern Chin are currently off limits for U.S. government travel due to the violence from this conflict.

In October 2011, the Government of Burma passed the Labor Organization Law, which legalized the formation of trade unions and allows workers to strike.  As of April 2019 roughly 2,900 enterprise level unions had been formed in a variety of industries ranging from garments and textiles to agriculture to heavy industry.  The passage of the Labor Organization Law has engendered a nascent labor movement in Burma, and there is a low, yet increasing, level of awareness of labor issues among workers, employers, and even government officials.

Burma’s labor costs are low, even when compared to most of its Southeast Asian neighbors.  Skilled labor and managerial staff are in high demand and short supply, leading to high turnover.  The military’s nationalization of schools in 1964, its discouragement of English language classes in favor of Burmese, the lack of investment in education by the previous governments of Burma, and the repeated closing of Burmese universities from 1988 to the mid-2000’s have taken a toll on the country’s work force.  Most people in the 15-39-year-old demographic group lack technical skills and English proficiency. In order to address this gap, the government of Burma’s Employment and Skill Development Law entered into effect in December 2013 and is being revised. The law provides for compulsory contributions on the part of employers to a “skill development fund,” although this provision has not been implemented.  According to the government, 70 percent of Burma’s population is employed in agriculture.

According to the World Bank’s 2014 “Ending Poverty and Boosting Prosperity in a Time of Transition” report on Burma, 73 percent of the total labor force in Burma was employed in the informal sector in 2010, or 57 percent excluding agricultural workers.  Casual laborers represented another 18 percent, mainly from the rural areas. Unpaid family workers represent another 15 percent. According to the government’s labor force survey, the informal sector accounts for 75.6 percent.

A new national minimum wage went into effect in May 2018, raising the minimum daily wage from 3,600 kyat (USD 2.40) to 4,800 kyat (USD 3.20).  The minimum wage covers a standard eight-hour work day across all sectors and industries, and applies to all workers except for those in businesses with less than 15 employees.  While the previous minimum wage has been widely implemented, compensation for overtime work is still unclear.

The Burmese government, in an effort to align Burma’s labor regulations with international standards and increase trade and investment in the country, set out to abolish all antiquated labor laws and to introduce new labor laws and regulations.  The government passed a number of labor reforms and amended a range of labor-related laws, such as the 2016 Shops and Establishment Law and the Payment of Wages Law. Parliament passed a new Occupational Safety and Health Law in March 2019 and a Settlement of Labor Disputes Law in May 2019.

In November 2016, the U.S. government reinstated Burma’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) trade benefit in recognition of the progress that the government had made in protecting workers’ rights.  The U.S. government reauthorized the GSP program globally in March 2018 through December 31, 2020.

In September 2016, a National Tripartite Dialogue Forum (NTDF) was created to provide a venue for the Ministry of Labor, Immigration and Population to engage with employers and workers, especially in drafting legislation.  The NTDF meets regularly and is currently reviewing a draft of the Labor Organization Law as well as the Employment and Skill Development Law.

In November 2014, the governments of the United States, Burma, Japan, Denmark, and the ILO formally launched the Initiative to Promote Fundamental Labor Rights and Practices in Myanmar (Initiative) and held the third Stakeholder’s Forum in January 2018.  The overarching goal of the Initiative is to promote a culture of compliance with fundamental labor rights. The Initiative is intended to cultivate relationships between business, labor, and civil society stakeholders and the government of Burma.

As mentioned above, Cambodia has an open and liberal foreign investment regime and actively courts FDI. The primary law governing investment is the 1994 Law on Investment. The government permits 100 percent foreign ownership of companies in most sectors. In a few sectors, such as cigarette manufacturing, movie production, rice milling, gemstone mining and processing, publishing and printing, radio and television, wood and stone carving production, and silk weaving, foreign investment is subject to local equity participation or prior authorization from authorities. There is little or no official discrimination against foreign investors either at the time of initial investment or after investment. Some foreign businesses, however, have reported that they are at disadvantaged vis-a-vis Cambodian or other foreign rivals that engage in acts of corruption or tax evasion or take advantage of Cambodia’s poor regulatory enforcement.

The Council for the Development of Cambodia’s (CDC) is the lead investment promotion agency in Cambodia and is the principal government agency responsible for providing incentives to stimulate investment. Investors are required to submit an investment proposal to either the CDC or the Provincial-Municipal Investment Sub-committee to obtain a Qualified Investment Project (QIP) status depending on capital level and location of the investment question. This agency also facilitates public-private consultation mechanism that is considered to improve investment climate in Cambodia.  The forum acts as a platform for the private sector to raise concerns for the government to solve. More information about investment and investment incentives in Cambodia may be found on the website at: www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh  .

To facilitate foreign investment, Cambodia has created special economic zones (SEZs). These zones provide companies with ready access to land, infrastructure, and services to facilitate the set-up and operation of businesses. Services provided include utilities, tax services, customs facilitation, and other administrative services designed to support import-export processes. Projects within the SEZs are also offered with incentives such as tax holidays; zero rate value-added tax; and import duty exemption for raw materials, machinery and equipment. The primary authority responsible for SEZs is the Cambodia Special Economic Zone Board (CSEZB).  The largest of these SEZs is located in Sihanoukville and hosts primarily Chinese companies.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

There are few limitations on foreign control and ownership in Cambodia. Foreign investors may own 100 percent of their investment projects except in the sectors mentioned above. According to Cambodia’s 2003 Amended Law on Investment and related sub-decrees, there are no limitations based on shareholder nationality or discrimination against foreign investors, except in relation to investments in real property or state-owned enterprises. Both the Law on Investment and the Amended Law on Investment state that the majority of interest in land, however, must be held by one or more Cambodian citizens. Pursuant to the Law on Public Enterprise, the Cambodian government must directly or indirectly hold more than 51 percent of the capital or the right to vote in state-owned enterprises. In addition, the Cambodian Bar has periodically taken actions to restrict or impede the work of foreign lawyers or foreign law firms.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

In compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements, Cambodia conducted its first review of trade policies and practices in November 2011. The second review was conducted on November 21-23, 2017. Cambodia’s full trade policy review report can be found on the WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp464_e.htm  . Cambodia also conducted an Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development investment policy review in 2017.

In response to the WTO trade policy review recommendations, Cambodia completed the following reforms:

• Elimination of the Certificate of Origin requirement for exports to countries where a certificate is not required;
• Implementation of online business registration;
• Adoption of a competitive hiring process for Ministry of Commerce staff;
• Implementation of risk evaluation measures for the Cambodia Import-Export Inspection and Fraud Repression Directorate General (CamControl) and creation of a CamControl risk management unit;
• Enactment of the Law on Public Procurement;
• Enactment of three judicial system laws: the Law on Court Structures, the Law on the Duties and Discipline of Judges and Prosecutors, and the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Supreme Council of Magistracy;
• Creation of the Commercial Court as a specialized Court of First Instance;
• The creation of a credit bureau;
• Establishment of a Telecom Regulator of Cambodia (TRC); in 2012, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication transferred its regulatory role to the TRC;
• Enactment of the Law on Telecommunications in December 2015; and
• Enactment of the Law on Animal Health and Production in February 2016.

Areas of ongoing or planned reforms include a law on Special Economic Zones, amending the Standards Law, and enacting laws on competition, cyber security, food safety, and e-commerce.

Business Facilitation

All businesses are required to register with the Ministry of Commerce (MoC) and the General Department of Taxation (GDT). In January 2016, the Ministry of Commerce launched an online business registration portal that allows all existing and new businesses to register their companies at www.businessregistration.moc.gov.kh  . The link also provides sources of information for various types of business registration documents. Depending on the types of business activities, new businesses are also required to register with other relevant ministries. In addition to registering with the MoC and the GDT, for example, travel agencies must register with the Ministry of Tourism, and private universities must register with the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport. The GDT also established their E-tax registration that can be found at owp.tax.gov.kh:50005/epaymentowpweb  . The World Bank’s 2019 Ease of Doing Business Report ranks Cambodia 138 of 190 countries globally for the ease of starting a business. The report notes that it includes nine separate procedures and can take up to three months to complete all business, tax, and employment registration processes.

Cambodia’s 1994 Law on Investment created an investment licensing system to regulate the approval process for foreign direct investment and provide incentives to potential investors. The website of the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC) provides a list of laws, rules, procedures and regulations, which could be useful for foreign investors. CDC’s website is found here: www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh  .

Outward Investment

There are no restrictions on domestic citizens investing abroad. A number of local companies have already invested in neighboring countries, particularly Laos and Myanmar, in various sectors including banking, IT services, legal and consulting services, and the entertainment industry.

Real Property

Mortgages exist in Cambodia, and Cambodian banks often require certificates of property ownership as collateral before approving loans. The mortgages recording system, which is handled by private banks, is generally considered reliable.

Cambodia’s 2001 Land Law provides a framework for real property security and a system for recording titles and ownership. Land titles issued prior to the end of the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-79) are not recognized due to the severe dislocations that occurred during that time period. The government is making efforts to accelerate the issuance of land titles, but in practice, the titling system is reported to be cumbersome, expensive, and subject to corruption. The majority of property owners lack documentation proving ownership. Even where title records exist, recognition of legal titles to land has not been uniform, and there are reports of court cases in which judges have sought additional proof of ownership.

Foreigners are constitutionally forbidden to own land in Cambodia; however, the 2001 Land Law allows long and short-term leases to foreigners. Cambodia also allows foreign ownership in multi-story buildings, such as condominiums, from the second floor up. 

Cambodia was ranked 124 out of 190 economies for ease of registering property in the 2019 World Bank Doing Business Report.

Intellectual Property Rights

Infringement of IPR is prevalent in Cambodia. Counterfeit and pirated goods are readily available in local markets and stores, and the enforcement  is weak. IP-infringing goods include counterfeit apparel, footwear, cigarettes, alcohol, pharmaceuticals, consumer goods, and pirated media such as software, music, and books. Although Cambodia is not a major center for the production and export of counterfeit or pirated materials, local businesses report that the problem is growing because of the lack of enforcement. To date, however, Cambodia has not been listed by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in its annual Special 301 Report, which identifies trading partners that do not adequately protect and enforce IPR.

Cambodia has enacted several laws pursuant to its WTO commitments on intellectual property. Its key IP laws include the Law on Marks, Trade Names and Acts of Unfair Competition (2002), the Law on Copyrights and Related Rights (2003), the Law on Patents, Utility Models and Industrial Designs (2003), the Law on Management of Seed and Plant Breeder’s Rights (2008), the Law on Geographical Indications (2014), and the Law on Compulsory Licensing for Public Health (2018).Cambodia joined WIPO in 1995 and has acceded to a number of international IPR protocols, including the Paris Convention (1998), the Madrid Protocol (2015), the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty (2016), The Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Design (2017), and the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications (2018). Despite this, many of the commitments included in these treaties remain unfulfilled due to Cambodia’s lack of institutional capacity.

To combat the trade in counterfeit goods, the Cambodian Counter Counterfeit Committee (CCCC) was established in 2014 under the Ministry of Interior to investigate claims, seize illegal goods, and prosecute counterfeiters. The Economic Police, Customs, the Cambodia Import-Export Inspection and Fraud Repression Directorate General, and the Ministry of Commerce also have IPR enforcement responsibilities; however, the division of responsibility among each agency is not clearly defined. This causes confusion to rights owners and muddles the overall IPR environment. Although in recent years seizure of counterfeit goods has increased, seizure usually does not occur unless a formal complaint has been made.

For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization’s country profiles at www.wipo.int/directory/en/details.jsp?country_code=KH  

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

In a move designed to address the need for capital markets in Cambodia, the Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX) was founded in 2011 and started trading in 2012. Though the CSX is one of the world’s smallest securities markets, it has taken steps to increase the number of listed companies, including attracting SMEs. It currently has five listed companies, including the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority, the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port, and Taiwanese garment manufacturer Grand Twins International.

In September 2017, the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) adopted a Prakas on Conditions for Banking and Financial Institutions to be listed on the Cambodia Securities Exchange. The Prakas sets additional requirements for banks and financial institutions that intend to issue securities to the public. This includes prior approval from the NBC and minimum equity of KHR 60 billion (approximately USD 15 million).

Cambodia’s bond market is at the beginning stages of development. The regulatory framework for corporate bonds was bolstered in 2017 through the publication of the Prakas on Public Offering of Debt Securities, the Prakas on Accreditation of Bondholders Representative, and the Prakas on Accreditation of Credit Rating Agency.  The country’s first corporate bond was issued in 2018, and a second is expected in 2019. There is currently no sovereign bond market, but the government has stated its intention of making government securities available to investors by 2022.

Money and Banking System

The National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) regulates the operations of banking systems in Cambodia. Foreign banks and branches are freely allowed to register and operate in the country. There are 39 commercial banks, 15 specialized banks (set up to finance specific turn-key projects such as real estate development), 54 licensed microfinance institutions, and seven licensed microfinance deposit taking institutions in Cambodia. NBC has also granted licenses to 11 financial leasing companies and one credit bureau company to improve transparency and credit risk management and encourage more lending to small-and medium-sized enterprise customers.

In November 2018, Moody’s Investor Services affirmed Cambodia’s issuer rating at B2 with a stable outlook. The overall B2 rating was based on Cambodia’s robust GDP growth prospects, macroeconomic stability, and efforts to strengthen government revenue. However, Moody’s cited several potential threats such as a weak institutional framework, low incomes, and the high dollarization of loans and deposits that make Cambodia vulnerable to negative shocks.

Cambodia’s banking sector continues to experience strong growth. The banking sector’s assets, including those of micro-finance institutions (MFIs), rose 20.2 percent year-over-year in 2017 to 135.1 trillion riel (USD 33.8 billion), while capital grew 23.6 percent to 25.7 trillion riel (USD 6.4 billion). Loans and deposits grew 18.3 percent and 24.5 percent respectively, which resulted in a decrease of the loan-to-deposit ration from 114 percent to 110 percent.  The ratio of non-performing loans remained steady at 2.4 percent in 2017.

The government does not use the regulation of capital markets to restrict foreign investment. Banks have been free to set their own interest rates since 1995, and increased competition between local institutions has led to a gradual lowering of interest rates from year to year. However, in April 2017, at the direction of Prime Minister Hun Sen, the NBC capped interest rates on loans offered by MFIs at 18 percent per annum. The move was designed to protect borrowers, many of whom are poor and uneducated, from excessive interest rates.

In March 2016, the NBC doubled the minimum capital reserve requirement for banks to USD 75 million for commercial banks and USD 15 million for specialized banks. Based on the new regulations, deposit-taking microfinance institutions now have a USD 30 million reserve requirement, while traditional microfinance institutions have a USD 1.5 million reserve requirement.

The Cambodian banking system is gradually shifting from a cash-based economy to an electronic payment culture as more financial institutions launch internet or mobile banking and expand their ATM networks. Evidence of the maturation of the financial sector includes the greater number of financial products and services offered, as well as the numbers of people of use them. In 2017, the National Bank of Cambodia measured financial inclusion at 55 percent. In addition, it said the number of depositors increased by 15 percent to 3.5 million, 42 percent of which are female, and the number of borrowers rose 1 percent to 755,000.

In February 2019, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental organization whose purpose is to develop policies to combat money laundering, cited Cambodia for being “deficient”  with regard to its anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) controls and policies. The government has committed to working with FATF to address these deficiencies through a jointly-developed action plan.  Should Cambodia not address the deficiencies, it could risk landing on the FATF “black list,” something that could negatively impact the banking sector and the country’s ability to access the international capital markets.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

Though Cambodia has its own currency, the riel (denoted as KHR), U.S. dollars are widely in circulation in Cambodia and remain the primary currency for most large transactions. There are no restrictions on the conversion of capital for investors.

Cambodia’s 1997 Law on Foreign Exchange states that there shall be no restrictions on foreign exchange operations through authorized banks. Authorized banks are required, however, to report the amount of any transfer equaling or exceeding USD 100,000 to the NBC on a regular basis.

Loans and borrowings, including trade credits, are freely contracted between residents and nonresidents, provided that loan disbursements and repayments are made through an authorized intermediary. There are no restrictions on the establishment of foreign currency bank accounts in Cambodia for residents.

The exchange rate between the riel and U.S. dollar is governed by a managed float and has been stable at around one USD to KHR 4,000. Daily fluctuations of the exchange rate are low, typically under three percent. The Embassy is not aware of any cases in which investors have encountered obstacles in converting local currency to foreign currency or in sending capital out of the country. In the past several years, the Cambodian government has taken steps to increase general usage of the riel but, as noted above, the country’s economy remains largely dollarized.

Remittance Policies

Article 11 of the Law on the Amendment to the Law on Investment of 2003 states that QIPs can freely remit abroad foreign currencies purchased through authorized banks for the discharge of financial obligations incurred in connection with investments. These financial obligations include:

• Payment for imports and repayment of principal and interest on international loans;
• Payment of royalties and management fees;
• Remittance of profits; and
• Repatriation of invested capital in case of dissolution.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Cambodia does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund.

Cambodia currently has 15 state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Cambodian SOEs include Electricite du Cambodge, Sihanoukville Autonomous Port, Telecom Cambodia, Cambodia Shipping Agency, Cambodia Postal Services, Rural Development Bank, Green Trade Company, Printing House, Siem Reap Water Supply Authority, Construction and Public Work Lab, Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority, Phnom Penh Autonomous Port, Kampcheary Insurance, Cambodia Life Insurance, Cambodia Securities Exchange.

In accordance with the Law on General Stature of Public Enterprises, there are two types of commercial SOEs in Cambodia. One type is that the state company’s capital is 100 percent owned by the Government, and another type is a joint-venture in which a majority of capital is owned by the state and a minority by private investors.

Each SOE is under the supervision of a line ministry or government institution and is overseen by a board of directors drawn from among senior government officials. Private enterprises are generally allowed to compete with state-owned enterprises under equal terms and conditions. These entities are also subject to the same taxes and value-added tax rebate policies as private-sector enterprises. SOEs are covered under the law on public procurement, which was promulgated in January 2012, and their financial reports are audited by the appropriate line ministry, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the National Audit Authority.

Privatization Program

There are no ongoing privatization programs, nor has the government announced any plans to privatize existing SOEs.

The government does not have policies to promote responsible business conduct (RBC) or corporate social responsibility (CSR). However, there is strong awareness of RBC among larger and multinational companies in the country. U.S. companies, for example, have implemented a wide range of CSR activities to promote skills training, the environment, general health and well-being, and financial education. These programs have been warmly received by both the general public and the government.

A number of economic land concessions in Cambodia have led to high profile land rights cases. The Cambodian government has recognized the problem, but in general, has not effectively and fairly resolved land rights claims. The Cambodian government does not have a national contact point for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) multinational enterprises guidelines and does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

Corruption remains a significant issue in Cambodia for investors.  An increase in foreign investment from investors willing to engage in corrupt practices, combined with sometimes opaque official and unofficial investment processes, has served to facilitate an overall rise in corruption, which is reported to already be at high levels.  In its Global Competitiveness Report 2018, the World Economic Forum ranked Cambodia 134th out of 140 countries for incidence of corruption.  Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perception index ranked Cambodia 161 of 180 countries globally, the lowest ranking of all ten ASEAN member states.

Those engaged in business have identified corruption, particularly within the judiciary, customs services, and tax authorities, as one of the greatest deterrents to investment in Cambodia. Foreign investors from countries that overlook or encourage bribery have significant advantages over foreign investors from countries that criminalize such activity.

Cambodia adopted an Anti-Corruption Law in 2010 to combat corruption by criminalizing bribery, abuse of office, extortion, facilitation payments, and accepting bribes in the form of donations or promises. Under the law, all civil servants must also declare their financial assets to the government every two years. Cambodia’s Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), established the same year, has investigative powers and a mandate to provide education and training to government institutions and the public on anti-corruption compliance. Since its formation, the ACU has launched a few high-profile prosecutions against public officials, including members of the police and judiciary. The ACU has also tackled the issue of ghost workers in the government, in which non-existent employees collect salaries. 

The ACU, in collaboration with the private sector, has also established guidelines encouraging companies to create internal codes of conduct prohibiting bribery and corrupt practices. Companies can sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the ACU pledging to operate corruption-free and to cooperate on anti-corruption efforts. Since the program started in 2015, more than 80 private companies have signed a MOU with the ACU. In 2018, the ACU completed a first draft of a code of conduct for public officials, which has not yet been finalized.

Despite the passage of the Anti-Corruption Law and the creation of the ACU, enforcement remains weak. Local and foreign businesses report that they must often make informal payments to expedite business transactions. Since 2013, Cambodia has published the official fees for public services, but the practice of paying additional fees remains common. Despite a pay raise in 2016, the minimum salary for administrative civil servants remain below the level required to maintain a suitable quality of life in Cambodia, so public employees remain susceptible to bribes. Furthermore, the process for awarding government contracts is not transparent and is susceptible to corruption.

UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery

Cambodia ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in 2007 and endorsed the Action Plan of the Asian Development Bank / OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific in 2003. Cambodia is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.

Resources to Report Corruption

Om Yentieng
President, Anti-Corruption Unit
No. 54, Preah Norodom Blvd, Sangkat Phsar Thmey 3, Khan Daun Penh, Phnom Penh
Telephone: +855-23-223-954
Email: info@acu.gov.kh

Preap Kol
Executive Director, Transparency International Cambodia
#13 Street 554, Phnom Penh
Telephone: +855-23-214430
Email: info@ticambodia.org

Foreign companies have been the targets of violent protests in the past, such as the 2003 anti-Thai riots against the Embassy of Thailand and Thai-owned commercial establishments. More recently, there were reports that Vietnamese-owned establishments were looted during a January 2014 labor protest. Authorities have also used force, including truncheons, electric cattle prods, fire hoses, and even gunfire, to disperse protestors. Incidents of violence directed at businesses, however, are rare. The Embassy is unaware of any incidents of political violence directed at U.S. or other non-regional interests.

Nevertheless, political tensions remain. After relatively competitive communal elections in June 2017, where Cambodia’s opposition party won nearly 50 percent of available seats, the government took steps to strengthen its grip on power and eliminated meaningful political activity.  In September 2017, the head of the country’s leading opposition party was arrested and charged with treason, and in November 2017, the same opposition party was banned. In July 2018, Prime Minister Hun Sen won a landslide victory, and his ruling party swept all 125 parliamentary seats, in a national election that was criticized by the United States as being neither free nor fair. The government has also taken steps to limit free speech and stifle independent media, including forcing independent news outlets and radio stations to cease operations. While there are few overt signs the country is growing less secure today, the possibility for insecurity exists going forward, particularly if a large percentage of the population remains disenfranchised.

Cambodia’s economy is primarily focused on four sectors: agriculture, garment production, tourism, and construction. The agricultural sector employees some 60 to 65 percent of the labor force. There are over one million people working in the garment and footwear sector, the majority of whom are women; around 620,000 are employed in the tourism sector; and a further 200,000 people in construction according to Government of Cambodia statistics. Around 1.5 to 2 million Cambodians work abroad – the official statistic is 1.2 million, but most experts estimate the figure far higher. Around 55 percent of the population is under the age of 25. The United Nations has estimated that around 300,000 new job seekers enter the labor market each year.

Given the severe disruption to the Cambodian education system and loss of skilled Cambodians during the 1975-1979 Khmer Rouge period, workers with higher education or specialized skills are few and in high demand. The Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey conducted in 2014 (the latest report available) found that about 36 percent of the labor force had completed a primary education. Only seven percent of the labor force had completed secondary education. The 2015-2016 Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF) identified an inadequately educated workforce as one of the most serious problems to doing business in Cambodia. Cambodia ranked 48 out of 137 on labor market efficiency of the WEF 2017-2018. Many middle management positions in the formal garment sector are filled by foreign nationals.

Cambodia’s 2016 Trade Union Law (TUL) erects barriers to the right of association and the rights to organize and bargain freely. The ILO has stated publicly that the law could hinder Cambodia’s obligations to international labor conventions 87 and 98, and has suggested substantial revisions to the law both during the 2017 meeting of the Committee on Application of Standards, and through a Direct Mission sent by the ILO to investigate the law’s implementation. The government has not made any public commitment to amend the law.

Unresolved labor disputes are mediated first on the shop-room floor, after which they are brought to the MOLVT for conciliation. If conciliation fails, then the cases may be brought to the Arbitration Council (AC), an independent state body that interprets labor regulations in collective disputes, such as when multiple employees are dismissed. Since the TUL went into force, AC cases have decreased from over 30 per month to fewer than five, although that number began to increase again in 2019 due to regulatory changes.

The labor code prohibits forced or compulsory labor; establishes 15 as the minimum allowable age for paid work; and sets 18 as the minimum age for anyone engaged in work that is hazardous, unhealthy, or unsafe. The statute also guarantees an eight-hour workday and 48-hour workweek and provides for time-and-a-half pay for overtime or work on an employee’s day off. Enforcement of all labor laws, however, is lax. The labor inspectorate focuses primarily on export-oriented factories in the garment and footwear sector. 

In 2018, Cambodia amended its Labor Law to eliminate severance packages in favor of a “seniority” bonus paid to workers every six months. The amendment was intended to solve the problem of foreign factory owners absconding, leaving behind unpaid salaries and severances. The law and its implementing regulation did not, however, provide clear guidance on how to compensate workers for seniority they had already accrued prior to amendment’s passage.  This remains a point of dispute between workers and company owners, and the precise legal requirements for the timing of seniority payments on back wages remains unclear. 

Cambodia maintains a minimum wage for workers in the garment and footwear sector. The minimum wage for garment workers was set at USD 182 per month in 2019 by the Labor Advisory Committee (LAC), a tripartite group comprised of representatives from the government, labor, and manufacturers. Since 2010, the wage rate for workers in the sector has increased from USD 61 to USD 182. In 2018, the government passed a new Minimum Wage Law, which will for the first time allow minimum wages outside of the garment and footwear sector.  The law has not yet been put into effect.

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

China continues to be one of the largest recipients of global FDI due to a relatively high economic growth rate, growing middle class, and an expanding consumer base that demands diverse, high quality products.  FDI has historically played an essential role in China’s economic development. In recent years, due to stagnant FDI growth and gaps in China’s domestic technology and labor capabilities, Chinese government officials have prioritized promoting relatively friendly FDI policies promising market access expansion and national treatment for foreign enterprises through general improvements to the business environment. They also have made efforts to strengthen China’s legal and regulatory framework to enhance broader market-based competition.  Despite these efforts, the on-the-ground reality for foreign investors in China is that the operating environment still remains closed to many foreign investments across a wide range of industries.

In 2018, China issued the nationwide negative list that opened up a few new sectors to foreign investment and promised future improvements to the investment climate, such as leveling the playing field and providing equal treatment to foreign enterprises.  However, despite these reforms, FDI to China has remained relatively stagnant in the past few years. According to MOFCOM, total FDI flows to China slightly increased from about USD126 billion in 2017 to just over USD135 billion in 2018, signaling that modest market openings have been insufficient to generate significant foreign investor interest in the market.  Rather, foreign investors have continued to perceive that the playing field is tilted towards domestic companies. Foreign investors have continued to express frustration that China, despite continued promises of providing national treatment for foreign investors, has continued to selectively apply administrative approvals and licenses and broadly employ industrial policies to protect domestic firms through subsidies, preferential financing, and selective legal and regulatory enforcement.  They also have continued to express frustration over China’s weak protection and enforcement of IPR; corruption; discriminatory and non-transparent anti-monopoly enforcement that forces foreign companies to license technology at below-market prices; excessive cybersecurity and personal data-related requirements; increased emphasis on requirements to include CCP cells in foreign enterprises; and an unreliable legal system lacking in both transparency and rule of law.

China seeks to support inbound FDI through the MOFCOM “Invest in China” website (www.fdi.gov.cn  ).  MOFCOM publishes on this site laws and regulations, economic statistics, investment projects, news articles, and other relevant information about investing in China.  In addition, each province has a provincial-level investment promotion agency that operates under the guidance of local-level commerce departments.

• American Chamber of Commerce China 2019 American Business in China White Paper: https://www.amchamchina.org/policy-advocacy/white-paper/  
• American Chamber of Commerce China 2019 Business Climate Survey: https://www.amchamchina.org/policy-advocacy/business-climate-survey/  
• U.S.-China Business Council’s 2018 China Business Environment Member Survey: https://www.uschina.org/reports/uscbc-2018-member-survey  
• EU Chamber’s 2018 Business Confidence Survey: http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/publications-business-confidence-survey  .
• MOFCOM’s Investment Promotion Website: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_10000161_8.html  

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

In June 2018, the Chinese government issued the nationwide negative list for foreign investment that replaced the Foreign Investment Catalogue.  The negative list identifies industries and economic sectors restricted or prohibited to foreign investment. Unlike the previous catalogue that used a “positive list” approach for foreign investment, the negative list removed “encouraged” investment categories and restructured the document to group restrictions and prohibitions by industry and economic sector.  Foreign investors wanting to invest in industries not on the negative list are no longer required to obtain pre-approval from MOFCOM and only need to register their investment.

The 2018 foreign investment negative list made minor modifications to some industries, reducing the number of restrictions and prohibitions from 63 to 48 sectors.  Changes included: some openings in automobile manufacturing and financial services; removal of restrictions on seed production (except for wheat and corn) and wholesale merchandizing of rice, wheat, and corn; removal of Chinese control requirements for power grids, building rail trunk lines, and operating passenger rail services; removal of joint venture requirements for rare earth processing and international shipping; removal of control requirements for international shipping agencies and surveying firms; and removal of the prohibition on internet cafés.  While market openings are always welcomed by U.S. businesses, many foreign investors remain underwhelmed and disappointed by Chinese government’s lack of ambition and refusal to provide more significant liberalization. Foreign investors continue to point out these openings should have happened years ago and now have occurred mainly in industries that domestic Chinese companies already dominate.

The Chinese language version of the 2018 Nationwide Negative List: http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/201806/W020180628640822720353.pdf .

Ownership Restrictions

The foreign investment negative list restricts investments in certain industries by requiring foreign companies enter into joint ventures with a Chinese partner, imposing control requirements to ensure control is maintained by a Chinese national, and applying specific equity caps.  Below are just a few examples of these investment restrictions:

Examples of foreign investments that require an equity joint venture or cooperative joint venture for foreign investment include:

• Exploration and development of oil and natural gas;
• Printing publications;
• Foreign invested automobile companies are limited to two or fewer JVs for the same type of vehicle;
• Market research;
• Preschool, general high school, and higher education institutes (which are also required to be led by a Chinese partner);
• General Aviation;
• Companies for forestry, agriculture, and fisheries;
• Establishment of medical institutions; and
• Commercial and passenger vehicle manufacturing.

Examples of foreign investments requiring Chinese control include:

• Selective breeding and seed production for new varieties of wheat and corn;
• Construction and operation of nuclear power plants;
• The construction and operation of the city gas, heat, and water supply and drainage pipe networks in cities with a population of more than 500,000;
• Water transport companies (domestic);
• Domestic shipping agencies;
• General aviation companies;
• The construction and operation of civilian airports;
• The establishment and operation of cinemas;
• Basic telecommunication services;
• Radio and television listenership and viewership market research; and
• Performance agencies.

Examples of foreign investment equity caps include:

• 50 percent in automobile manufacturing (except special and new energy vehicles);
• 50 percent in value-added telecom services (excepting e-commerce);
• 51 percent in life insurance firms;
• 51 percent in securities companies;
• 51 percent futures companies;
• 51 percent in security investment fund management companies; and
• 50 percent in manufacturing of commercial and passenger vehicles.

Investment restrictions that require Chinese control or force a U.S. company to form a joint venture partnership with a Chinese counterpart are often used as a pretext to compel foreign investors to transfer technology against the threat of forfeiting the opportunity to participate in China’s market.  Foreign companies have reported these dictates and decisions often are not made in writing but rather behind closed doors and are thus difficult to attribute as official Chinese government policy. Establishing a foreign investment requires passing through an extensive and non-transparent approval process to gain licensing and other necessary approvals, which gives broad discretion to Chinese authorities to impose deal-specific conditions beyond written legal requirements in a blatant effort to support industrial policy goals that bolster the technological capabilities of local competitors.  Foreign investors are also often deterred from publicly raising instances of technology coercion for fear of retaliation by the Chinese government.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

China is not a member of the OECD.  The OECD Council decided to establish a country program of dialogue and co-operation with China in October 1995.  The most recent OECD Investment Policy Review for China was completed in 2008 and a new review is currently underway.

OECD 2008 report: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/oecdinvestmentpolicyreviews-china2008encouragingresponsiblebusinessconduct.htm  .

In 2013, the OECD published a working paper entitled “China Investment Policy: An Update,” which provided updates on China’s investment policy since the publication of the 2008 Investment Policy Review.

• OECD 2013 Update: http://www.oecd.org/china/WP-2013_1.pdf 
• OECD Regulatory Restrictiveness Survey: http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm  

World Trade Organization (WTO)

China became a member of the WTO in 2001.  WTO membership boosted China’s economic growth and advanced its legal and governmental reforms.  The sixth and most recent WTO Investment Trade Review for China was completed in 2018. The report highlighted that China continues to be one of the largest destinations for FDI with inflows mainly in manufacturing, real-estate, leasing and business services, and wholesale and retail trade.  The report noted changes to China’s foreign investment regime that now relies on the nationwide negative list and also noted that pilot FTZs use a less restrictive negative list as a testbed for reform and opening.

• WTO Investment Trade Review for China: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp475_e.htm  
• International Monetary Fund (IMF) information on China: http://www.imf.org/external/country/Chn/  
• FDI Statistics from MOFCOM: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_10000177_8.html  

Business Facilitation

China made progress in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Survey by moving from 78th in 2017 up to 46th place in 2018 out of 190 economies.  This was accomplished through regulatory reforms that helped streamline some business processes including improvements related to cross-border trading, setting up electricity, electronic tax payments, and land registration.  This ranking, while highlighting business registration improvements that benefit both domestic and foreign companies, does not account for major challenges U.S. businesses face in China like IPR protection and forced technology transfer.

• World Bank Ease of Doing Business: http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings  
• World Bank Investing Across Borders: http://iab.worldbank.org/data/exploreeconomies/china  

The Government Enterprise Registration (GER), an initiative of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), gave China a low score of 1.5 out of 10 on its website for registering and obtaining a business license.  In previous years, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) was responsible for business license approval. In March 2018, the Chinese government announced a major restructuring of government agencies and created the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) that is now responsible for business registration processes.  According to GER, SAMR’s Chinese website lacks even basic information, such as what registrations are required and how they are to be conducted.

• UNCTAD GER: https://ger.co/  
• SAMR Business Registration Information: http://www.saic.gov.cn/  

The State Council, which is China’s chief administrative authority, in recent years has reduced red tape by eliminating hundreds of administrative licenses and delegating administrative approval power across a range of sectors.  The number of investment projects subject to central government approval has reportedly dropped significantly. The State Council also has set up a website in English, which is more user-friendly than SAMR’s website, to help foreign investors looking to do business in China.

The State Council Information on Doing Business in China: http://english.gov.cn/services/doingbusiness  

The Department of Foreign Investment Administration within MOFCOM is responsible for foreign investment promotion in China, including promotion activities, coordinating with investment promotion agencies at the provincial and municipal levels, engaging with international economic organizations and business associations, and conducting research related to FDI into China.  MOFCOM also maintains the “Invest in China” website.

MOFCOM “Invest in China” Information: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_10000041_8.html  

Despite recent efforts by the Chinese government to streamline business registration procedures, foreign companies still complain about the challenges they face when setting up a business.  In addition, U.S. companies complain they are treated differently from domestic companies when setting up an investment, which is an added market access barrier for U.S. companies. Numerous companies offer consulting, legal, and accounting services for establishing wholly foreign-owned enterprises, partnership enterprises, joint ventures, and representative offices in China.  The differences among these corporate entities are significant, and investors should review their options carefully with an experienced advisor before choosing a particular Chinese corporate entity or investment vehicle.

Outward Investment

Since 2001, China has initiated a “going-out” investment policy that has evolved over the past two decades.  At first, the Chinese government mainly encouraged SOEs to go abroad and acquire primarily energy investments to facilitate greater market access for Chinese exports in certain foreign markets.  As Chinese investors gained experience, and as China’s economy grew and diversified, China’s investments also have diversified with both state and private enterprise investments in all industries and economic sectors.  While China’s outbound investment levels in 2018 were significantly less than the record-setting investments levels in 2016, China was still one of the largest global outbound investors in the world. According to MOFCOM outbound investment data, 2018 total outbound direct investment (ODI) increased less than one percent compared to 2017 figures.  There was a significant drop in Chinese outbound investment to the United States and other North American countries that traditionally have accounted for a significant portion of China’s ODI. In some European countries, especially the United Kingdom, ODI generally increased. In One Belt, One Road (OBOR) countries, there has been a general increase in investment activity; however, OBOR investment deals were generally relatively small dollar amounts and constituted only a small percentage of overall Chinese ODI.

In August 2017, in reaction to concerns about capital outflows and exchange rate volatility, the Chinese government issued guidance to curb what it deemed to be “irrational” outbound investments and created “encouraged,” “restricted,” and “prohibited” outbound investment categories to guide Chinese investors.  The guidelines restricted Chinese outbound investment in sectors like property, hotels, cinemas, entertainment, sports teams, and “financial investments that create funds that are not tied to specific investment projects.” The guidance encouraged outbound investment in sectors that supported Chinese industrial policy, such as Strategic Emerging Industries (SEI) and MIC 2025, by acquiring advanced manufacturing and high-technology assets.  MIC 2025’s main aim is to transform China into an innovation-based economy that can better compete against – and eventually outperform – advanced economies in 10 key high-tech sectors, including: new energy vehicles, next-generation IT, biotechnology, new materials, aerospace, oceans engineering and ships, railway, robotics, power equipment, and agriculture machinery. Chinese firms in MIC 2025 industries often receive preferential treatment in the form of preferred financing, subsidies, and access to an opaque network of investors to promote and provide incentives for outbound investment in key sectors.  The outbound investment guidance also encourages investments that promote China’s OBOR development strategy, which seeks to create connectivity and cooperation agreements between China and countries along the Chinese-designated “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road” through an expansion of infrastructure investment, construction materials, real estate, power grids, etc.

Real Property

Foreign companies have long complained that the Chinese legal system, responsible for mediating acquisition and disposition of property, has inconsistently protected the legal real property rights of foreigners.

Urban land is entirely owned by the State.  The State can issue long-term land leases to individuals and companies, including foreigners, subject to many restrictions.  China’s Property Law stipulates that residential property rights will renew automatically, while commercial and industrial grants shall be renewed if the renewal does not conflict with other public interest claims.  A number of foreign investors have reported that their land use rights were revoked and given to developers to build neighborhoods designated for building projects by government officials. Investors often complain that compensation in these cases has been nominal.

In rural China, collectively-owned land use rights are more complicated.  The registration system chronically suffers from unclear ownership lines and disputed border claims, often at the expense of local farmers who are excluded from the process by village leaders making “handshake deals” with commercial interests.  The central government announced in 2016, and reiterated in 2017 and 2018, plans to reform the rural land registration system so as to put more control in the hands of farmers, but some experts remain skeptical that changes will be properly implemented and enforced.

China’s Securities Law defines debtor and guarantor rights, including rights to mortgage certain types of property and other tangible assets, including long-term leases.  Chinese law does not prohibit foreigners from buying non-performing debt, which can only be acquired through state-owned asset management firms. However, in practice, Chinese official often use bureaucratic hurdles that limit foreigners’ ability to liquidate assets, further discouraging foreign purchase of non-performing debt.

Intellectual Property Rights

Following WTO accession, China updated many laws and regulations to comply with the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and other international agreements.  However, despite the changes to China’s legal and regulatory regime, some aspects of China’s IP protection regime fall short of international best practices.  In addition, enforcement ineffectiveness of Chinese laws and regulations remains a significant challenge for foreign investors trying to protect their IPR.

Major impediments to effective IP enforcement include the unavailability of deterrent-level penalties for infringement, a lack of transparency, unclear standards for establishing criminal investigations, the absence of evidence production methods to compel evidence from infringers, and local protectionism, among others.  Chinese government officials tout the success of China’s specialized IP courts – including the establishment of a new appellate tribunal within the SPC – as evidence of its commitment to IP protection; however, while this shows a growing awareness of IPR in China’s legal system, civil litigation against IP infringement will remain an option with limited effect until there is an increase in the amount of damages an infringer pays for IP violations.

Chinese-based companies remain the largest IP infringers of U.S. products.  Goods shipped from China (including those transshipped through Hong Kong) accounted for an estimated 87 percent of IPR-infringing goods seized at U.S. borders.  (Note: This U.S.  Customs statistic does not specify where the fake goods were made.)  China imposes requirements that U.S. firms develop their IP in China or transfer their IP to Chinese entities as a condition to accessing the Chinese market, or to obtain tax and other preferential benefits available to domestic companies.  Chinese policies can effectively require U.S. firms to localize research and development activities, practices documented in the March 2018 Section 301 Report released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).  China remained on the Priority Watch List in the 2019 USTR Special 301 Report, and several Chinese physical and online markets were included in the 2018 USTR Notorious Markets Report.  For detailed information on China’s environment for IPR protection and enforcement, please see the following reports:

• USTR Section 301 Report on China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section percent20301 percent20FINAL.PDF 
• USTR Update Concerning China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/301 percent20Report percent20Update.pdf  
• USTR 2019 Special 301 Report (see section on China): https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-publications/2019/2019-special-301-report  
• USTR’s 2018 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers in China (see section on China): https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018 percent20National percent20Trade percent20Estimate percent20Report.pdf 
• USTR’s 2018 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018-USTR-Report-to-Congress-on-China percent27s-WTO-Compliance.pdf 
• USTR’s 2018 Notorious Market Report (see China): https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018_Notorious_Markets_List.pdf 

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local intellectual property offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en  

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

China’s leadership has stated that it seeks to build a modern, highly developed, and multi-tiered capital market.  Bank loans continue to provide the majority of credit options (reportedly around 81.4 percent in 2018) for Chinese companies, although other sources of capital, such as corporate bonds, equity financing, and private equity are quickly expanding their scope, reach, and sophistication in China.  In the past three years, Chinese regulators have taken measures to rein in the rapid growth of China’s “shadow banking” sector, which includes vehicles such as wealth management and trust products.  The measures have achieved positive results. The share of trust loans, entrust loans and undiscounted bankers’ acceptances dropped a total of 15.2 percent in total social financing (TSF) – a broad measure of available credit in China, most of which was comprised of corporate bonds. TSF’s share of corporate bonds jumped from a negative 2.31 percent in 2017 to 12.9 percent in 2018. Chinese regulators regularly use administrative methods to control credit growth, although market-based tools such as interest rate policy and adjusting the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) play an increasingly important role.

The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), China’s central bank, has gradually increased flexibility for banks in setting interest rates, formally removing the floor on the lending rate in 2013 and the deposit rate cap in 2015 – but is understood to still influence bank’s interest rates through “window guidance.”  Favored borrowers, particularly SOEs, benefit from greater access to capital and lower financing costs, as they can use political influence to secure bank loans, and lenders perceive these entities to have an implicit government guarantee.  Small- and medium-sized enterprises, by contrast, have the most difficulty obtaining financing, often forced to rely on retained earnings or informal investment channels.

In 2018, Chinese regulators have taken measures to improve financing for the private sector, particularly small, medium and micro-sized enterprises (SMEs).  On November 1, 2018, Xi Jinping held an unprecedented meeting with private companies on how to support the development of private enterprises. Xi emphasized to the importance of resolving difficult and expensive financing problems for private firms and pledged to create a fair and competitive business environment.  He encouraged banks to lend more to private firms, as well as urged local governments to provide more financial support for credit-worthy private companies. Provincial and municipal governments could raise funds to bailout private enterprises if needed. The PBOC increased the relending and rediscount quota of RMB 300 billion for SMEs and private enterprises at the end of 2018.  The government also introduced bond financing supportive instruments for private enterprises, and the PBOC began promoting qualified PE funds, securities firms, and financial asset management companies to provide financing for private companies. The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission’s (CBIRC) Chairman said in an interview that one-third of new corporate loans issued by big banks and two-thirds of new corporate loans issued by small and medium-sized banks should be granted to private enterprises, and that 50 percent of new corporate loans shall be issued to private enterprises in the next three years.  At the end of 2018, loans issued to SMEs accounted for 24.6 percent of total RMB loan issuance. The share dropped 1 percent from 25.6 percent in 2017. Interest rates on loans issued by the six big state-owned banks – Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China (BOC), Agriculture Bank of China (ABC), Bank of Communications and China Postal Savings Bank – to SMEs averaged 4.8 percent, in the fourth quarter of 2018, down from 6 percent in the first quarter of 2018.

Direct financing has expanded over the last few years, including through public listings on stock exchanges, both inside and outside of China, and issuing more corporate and local government bonds.  The majority of foreign portfolio investment in Chinese companies occurs on foreign exchanges, primarily in the United States and Hong Kong.  In addition, China has significantly expanded quotas for certain foreign institutional investors to invest in domestic stock markets; opened up direct access for foreign investors into China’s interbank bond market; and approved a two-way, cross-border equity direct investment scheme between Shanghai and Hong Kong and Shenzhen and Hong Kong that allows Chinese investors to trade designated Hong Kong-listed stocks through the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges, and vice versa.  Direct investment by private equity and venture capital firms is also rising, although from a small base, and has faced setbacks due to China’s capital controls that complicate the repatriation of returns

Money and Banking System

After several years of rapid credit growth, China’s banking sector faces asset quality concerns.  For 2018, the China Banking Regulatory Commission reported a non-performing loans (NPL) ratio of 1.83 percent, higher than the 1.74 percent of NPL ratio reported the last quarter of 2017.  The outstanding balance of commercial bank NPLs in 2018 reached 2.03 trillion RMB (approximately USD295.1 billion).  China’s total banking assets surpassed 268 trillion RMB (approximately USD39.1 trillion) in December 2018, a 6.27 percent year-on-year increase.  Experts estimate Chinese banking assets account for over 20 percent of global banking assets.  In 2018, China’s credit and broad money supply slowed to 8.1 percent growth, the lowest published rate since the PBOC first started publishing M2 money supply data in 1986.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange Policies

While the central bank’s official position is that companies with proper documentation should be able to freely conduct business, in practice, companies have reported challenges and delays in getting foreign currency transactions approved by sub-national regulatory branches.  In 2017, several foreign companies complained about administrative delays in remitting large sums of money from China, even after completing all of the documentation requirements.  Such incidents come amid announcements that the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) had issued guidance to tighten scrutiny of foreign currency outflows due to China’s rapidly decreasing foreign currency exchange.  China has since announced that it will gradually reduce those controls, but market analysts expect they would be re-imposed if capital outflows accelerate again.

Under Chinese law, FIEs do not need pre-approval to open foreign exchange accounts and are allowed to retain income as foreign exchange or to convert it into RMB without quota requirements.  Foreign exchange transactions related to China’s capital account activities do not require review by SAFE, but designated foreign exchange banks review and directly conduct foreign exchange settlements.  Chinese officials register all commercial foreign debt and will limit foreign firms’ accumulated medium- and long-term debt from abroad to the difference between total investment and registered capital.  China issued guidelines in February 2015 that allow, on a pilot basis, a more flexible approach to foreign debt within several specific geographic areas, including the Shanghai Pilot FTZ.  The main change under this new approach is to allow FIEs to expand their foreign debt above the difference between total investment and registered capital, so long as they have sufficient net assets.

Chinese foreign exchange rules cap the maximum amount of RMB individuals are allowed to convert into other currencies at approximately USD50,000 each year and restrict them from directly transferring RMB abroad without prior approval from SAFE.  In 2017, authorities further restricted overseas currency withdrawals by banning sales of life insurance products and capping credit card withdrawals at USD5,000 per transaction.  SAFE has not reduced this quota, but during periods of higher than normal capital outflows, banks are reportedly instructed by SAFE to increase scrutiny over individuals’ requests for foreign currency and to require additional paperwork clarifying the intended use of the funds, with the express intent of slowing capital outflows.

China’s exchange rate regime is managed within a band that allows the currency to rise or fall by 2 percent per day from the “reference rate” set each morning.  In August 2015, China announced that the reference rate would more closely reflect the previous day’s closing spot rate.  Since that change, daily volatility of the RMB has at times been higher than in recent years, but for the most part, remains below what is typical for other currencies.  In 2017, the PBOC took additional measures to reduce volatility, introducing a “countercyclical factor” into its daily RMB exchange rate calculation.  Although the PBOC reportedly suspended the countercyclical factor in January 2018, the tool remains available to policymakers if volatility re-emerges.

Remittance Policies

The remittance of profits and dividends by FIEs is not subject to time limitations, but FIEs need to submit a series of documents to designated banks for review and approval.  The review period is not fixed, and is frequently completed within one or two working days of the submission of complete documents.  In the past year, this period has lengthened during periods of higher than normal capital outflows, when the government strengthens capital controls.

Remittance policies have not changed substantially since SAFE simplified some regulations in January 2014, devolving many review and approval procedures to banks.  Firms that remit profits at or below USD50,000 dollars can do so without submitting documents to the banks for review.

For remittances above USD50,000, the firm must submit tax documents, as well as the formal decision by its management to distribute profits.

For remittance of interest and principle on private foreign debt, firms must submit an application form, a foreign debt agreement, and the notice on repayment of the principle and interest.  Banks will then check if the repayment volume is within the repayable principle.

The remittance of financial lease payments falls under foreign debt management rules.  There are no specific rules on the remittance of royalties and management fees.  In August 2018, SAFE raised the reserve requirement for foreign currency transactions from zero to 20 percent, significantly increasing the cost of foreign currency transactions.  The reserve ratio was introduced in October 2015 at 20 percent, which was lowered to zero in September 2017.

The Financial Action Task Force has identified China as a country of primary concern.  Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimates that over S1 trillion of illicit money left China between 2003 and 2012, making China the world leader in illicit capital flows.  In 2013, GFI estimated that another USD260 billion left the country.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

China officially has only one sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the China Investment Corporation (CIC).  Established in 2007, CIC manages over USD941.4 billion in assets (as of 2017) and invests on a 10-year time horizon.  China’s sovereign wealth is also invested by a subsidiary of SAFE, the government agency that manages China’s foreign currency reserves, and reports directly to the PBOC.  The SAFE Administrator also serves concurrently as a PBOC Deputy Governor.

CIC publishes an annual report containing information on its structure, investments, and returns.  CIC invests in diverse sectors like financial, consumer products, information technology, high-end manufacturing, healthcare, energy, telecommunication services, and utilities.

China also operates other funds that function in part like sovereign wealth funds, including: China’s National Social Security Fund, with an estimate USD341.4 billion in assets; the China-Africa Development Fund (solely funded by the China Development Bank), with an estimated USD5 billion; the SAFE Investment Company, with an estimated USD439.8 billion; and China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund, established in December 2014 with USD40 billion to foster investment in OBOR partner countries.  Chinese SWFs do not report the percentage of their assets that are invested domestically.

Chinese SWFs follow the voluntary code of good practices known as the Santiago Principles and participate in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs.  The Chinese government does not have any formal policies specifying that CIC invest funds consistent with industrial policies or in government-designated projects, although CIC is expected to pursue government objectives.  The SWF generally adopts a “passive” role as a portfolio investor.

China has approximately 150,000 SOEs which are wholly owned by the state.  Around 50,000 (33 percent) are owned by the central government and the remainder by local governments.  The central government directly controls and manages 96 strategic SOEs through the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), of which around 60 are listed on stock exchanges domestically and/or internationally.  SOEs, both central and local, account for 30 to 40 percent of total GDP and about 20 percent of China’s total employment.  SOEs can be found in all sectors of the economy, from tourism to heavy industries.

SASAC regulated SOEs: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588035/n2641579/n2641645/c4451749/content.html  .

China’s leading SOEs benefit from preferential government policies aimed at developing bigger and stronger “national champions.”  SOEs enjoy favored access to essential economic inputs (land, hydrocarbons, finance, telecoms, and electricity) and exercise considerable power in markets like steel and minerals.  SOEs have long enjoyed preferential access to credit and the ability to issue publicly traded equity and debt.

During the November 2013 Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress – a hallmark session that announced economic reforms, including calling for the market to play a more decisive role in the allocation of resources – President Xi Jinping called for broad SOE reforms.  Cautioning that SOEs still will remain a key part of China’s economic system, Xi emphasized improved SOE operational transparency and legal reforms that would subject SOEs to greater competition by opening up more industry sectors to domestic and foreign competitors and by reducing provincial and central government preferential treatment of SOEs.  The Third Plenum also called for “mixed ownership” economic structures, providing greater economic balance between private and state-owned businesses in certain industries, including equal access to factors of production, competition on a level playing field, and equal legal protection.

At the 2018 Central Economic Work Conference, Chinese leaders said in 2019 they will promote a greater role for the market, as well as renewed efforts on reforming SOEs – to include mixed ownership reform.  In delivering the 2019 Government Work Report, Premier Li Keqiang pledged to improve corporate governance, including allowing SOE company boards, rather than SASAC, to appoint senior leadership. 

OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance

SASAC participates in the OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatization Practices (WPSOPP).  Chinese officials have indicated China intends to utilize OECD SOE guidelines to improve the professionalism and independence of SOEs, including relying on Boards of Directors that are independent from political influence.  However, despite China’s Third Plenum commitments in 2013 (i.e., to foster “market-oriented” reforms in China’s state sectors), Chinese officials and SASAC have made minimal progress in fundamentally changing the regulation and business conduct of SOEs.  China has also committed to implement the G-20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which apply to all publicly-listed companies, including listed SOEs.

Chinese law lacks unified guidelines or a governance code for SOEs, especially among provincial or locally-controlled SOEs.  Among central SOEs managed by SASAC, senior management positions are mainly filled by senior CCP members who report directly to the CCP, and double as the company’s Party secretary

The lack of management independence and the controlling ownership interest of the State make SOEs de facto arms of the government, subject to government direction and interference.  SOEs are rarely the defendant in legal disputes, and when they are, they almost always prevail, presumably due to the close relationship with the CCP.  U.S. companies often complain about the lack of transparency and objectivity in commercial disputes with SOEs.  In addition, SOEs enjoy preferential access to a disproportionate share of available capital, whether in the form of loans or equity.

In its September 2015 Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, the State Council instituted a system for classifying SOEs as “public service” or “commercial enterprises.”  Some commercial enterprise SOEs were further sub-classified into “strategic” or “critically important” sectors (i.e., with strong national economic or security importance).  SASAC has said the new classification system would allow the government to reduce support for commercial enterprises competing with private firms and instead channel resources toward public service SOEs.

Other recent reforms have included salary caps, limits on employee benefits, and attempts to create stock incentive programs for managers that have produced mixed results.  However, analysts believe minor reforms will be ineffective as long as SOE administration and government policy are intertwined.

A major stumbling block to SOE reform is that SOE regulators are outranked in the CCP party structure by SOE executives, which minimizes SASAC and other government regulators’ effectiveness at implementing reforms.  In addition, SOE executives are often promoted to high-ranking positions in the CCP or local government, further complicating the work of regulators.

During the Third Plenum of the CCP’s 18th Central Committee, in 2013, the CCP leadership announced that the market would play a “decisive role” in economic decision making and emphasized that SOEs needed to focus resources in areas that “serve state strategic objectives.”  However, experts point out that despite these new SOE distinctions, SOEs continue to hold dominant shares in their respective industries, regardless of whether they are strategic, which may further restrain private investment in the economy.  Moreover, the application of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, together with other industrial policies and practices that are selectively enforced by the authorities, protects SOEs from private sector competition.

China is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO, although Hong Kong is listed.  During China’s WTO accession negotiations, Beijing signaled its intention to join GPA.  And, in April 2018, President Xi announced his intent to join GPA, but no timeline has been given for accession.

Investment Restrictions in “Vital Industries and Key Fields”

The intended purpose of China’s State Assets Law is to safeguard and protect China’s economic system, promoting “socialist market economy” principles that fortify and develop a strong, state-owned economy.  A key component of the State Assets Law is enabling SOEs to play the leading role in China’s economic development, especially in “vital industries and key fields.”  To accomplish this, the law encourages Chinese regulators to adopt policies that consolidate SOE concentrations to ensure dominance in industries deemed vital to “national security” and “national economic security.” This principle is further reinforced by the December 2006 State Council announcement of the Guiding Opinions Concerning the Advancement of Adjustments of State Capital and the Restructuring of State-Owned Enterprises, which called for more SOE consolidation to advance the development of the state-owned economy, including enhancing and expanding the role of the State in controlling and influencing “vital industries and key fields relating to national security and national economic lifelines.”  These guidelines defined “vital industries and key fields” as “industries concerning national security, major infrastructure and important mineral resources, industries that provide essential public goods and services, and key enterprises in pillar industries and high-tech industries.”

Around the time the guidelines were published, the SASAC Chairman also listed industries where the State should maintain “absolute control” (e.g., aviation, coal, defense, electric power and the state grid, oil and petrochemicals, shipping, and telecommunications) and “relative control” (e.g., automotive, chemical, construction, exploration and design, electronic information, equipment manufacturing, iron and steel, nonferrous metal, and science and technology).  China has said these lists do not reflect its official policy on SOEs.  In fact, in some cases, regulators have allowed for more than 50 percent private ownership in some of the listed industries on a case-by-case basis, especially in industries where Chinese firms lack expertise and capabilities in a given technology Chinese officials deemed important at the time.

Parts of the agricultural sector have traditionally been dominated by SOEs.  Current agriculture trade rules, regulations, and limitations placed on foreign investment severely restrict the contributions of U.S. agricultural companies, depriving China’s consumers of the many potential benefits additional foreign investment could provide.  These investment restrictions in the agricultural sectors are at odds with China’s objective of shifting more resources to agriculture and food production in order to improve Chinese lives, food security, and food safety.

Privatization Program

At the November 2013 Third Plenum, the Chinese government announced reforms to SOEs that included selling shares of SOEs to outside investors.  This approach is an effort to improve SOE management structures, emphasize the use of financial benchmarks, and gradually take steps that will bring private capital into some sectors traditionally monopolized by SOEs like energy, telecommunications, and finance.  In practice, these reforms have been gradual, as the Chinese government has struggled to implement its SOE reform vision and often opted to utilize a preferred SOE consolidation approach. In the past few years, the Chinese government has listed several large SOEs and their assets on the Hong Kong stock exchange, subjecting SOEs to greater transparency requirements and heightened regulatory scrutiny.  This approach is a possible mechanism to improve SOE corporate governance and transparency. Starting in 2017, the government began pushing the mixed ownership model, in which private companies invest in SOEs and outside managers are hired, as a possible solution, although analysts note that ultimately the government (and therefore the CCP) remains in full control regardless of the private share percentage.  Over the last year, President Xi and other senior leaders have increasingly focused reform efforts on strengthening the role of the State as an investor or owner of capital, instead of the old SOE model in which the state was more directly involved in managing operations.

General awareness of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) standards (including environmental, social, and governance issues) is a relatively new concept to most Chinese companies, especially companies that exclusively operate in China’s domestic market.  Chinese laws that regulate business conduct use voluntary compliance, are often limited in scope and are frequently cast aside when RBC priorities are superseded by other economic priorities. In addition, China lacks mature and independent NGOs, investment funds, worker unions, worker organizations, and other business associations that promote RBC, further contributing to the general lack of awareness in Chinese business practices.

The Foreign NGO Law remains a concern for U.S. organizations due to the restrictions on many NGO activities, including promotion of RBC and corporate social responsibility (CSR) best practices.  For U.S. investors looking to partner with a Chinese company or to expand operations by bringing in Chinese suppliers, finding partners that meet internationally recognized standards in areas like labor, environmental protection, worker safety, and manufacturing best practices can be a challenge.  However, the Chinese government has placed greater emphasis on protecting the environment and elevating sustainability as a key priority, resulting in more Chinese companies adding environmental concerns to their CSR initiatives.

In 2014, China signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the OECD to cooperate on RBC initiatives.  This MOU, however, does not require or necessarily mean that Chinese companies will adhere to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.  Industry leaders have pushed for China to comply with OECD guidelines and establish a national contact point or RBC center.  As a result, MOFCOM in 2016 launched the RBC Platform, which serves as the national contact point on RBC issues and supplies information to companies about RBC best practices in China.

In 2014, China participated in the OECD’s RBC Global Forum, including hosting a workshop in Beijing in May 2015.  Policy developments from the workshops included incorporation of human rights into social responsibility guidelines for the electronics industry; referencing the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; mandating social impact assessments for large footprint projects; and agreeing to draft a new law on public participation in environmental protection and impact assessments.

The MOFCOM-affiliated Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals, and Chemical Importers and Exporters (CCCMC) also signed a separate MOU with the OECD in October 2014, to help Chinese companies implement RBC policies in global mineral supply chains.  In December 2015, CCCMC released Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains, which draw heavily from the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines.  China is currently drafting legislation to regulate the sourcing of minerals, including tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold, from conflict areas.  China is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), but Chinese investors participate in EITI schemes where these are mandated by the host country.

Corruption remains endemic in China.  The lack of an independent press, along with the lack of independence of corruption investigators, who answer to and are managed by the CCP, all hamper the transparent and consistent application of anti-corruption efforts.

Chinese anti-corruption laws have strict penalties for bribes, including accepting a bribe, which is a criminal offense punishable up to life imprisonment or death in “especially serious” circumstances.  Offering a bribe carries a maximum punishment of up to five years in prison, except in cases with “especially serious” circumstances, when punishment can extend up to life in prison.

In August 2015, the NPC amended several corruption-related parts of China’s Criminal Law.  For instance, bribing civil servants’ relatives or other close relationships is a crime with monetary fines imposed on both the bribe-givers and the bribe-takers; bribe-givers, mainly in minor cases, who aid authorities can be given more lenient punishments; and instead of basing punishments solely on the specific amount of money involved in a bribe, authorities now have more discretion to impose punishments based on other factors.

In February 2011, an amendment was made to the Criminal Law, criminalizing the bribing of foreign officials or officials of international organizations.  However, to date, there have not been any known cases in which someone was successfully prosecuted for offering this type of bribe.

In March 2018, the NPC approved the creation of the National Supervisory Commission (NSC), a new government anti-corruption agency that resulted from the merger of the Ministry of Supervision and the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI).  The NSC absorbed the anti-corruption units of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and those of the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention.  In addition to China’s 89 million CCP members, the new commission has jurisdiction over all civil servants and employees of state enterprises, as well as managers in public schools, hospitals, research institutes, and other public service institutions.  Lower-level supervisory commissions have been set up in all provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.  The NPC also passed the State Supervision Law, which provides the NSC with its legal authorities to investigate, detain, and punish public servants.

The CCDI remains the primary body for enforcing ethics guidelines and party discipline, and refers criminal corruption cases to the NSC for further investigation.

President Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Efforts

Since President Xi’s rise to power in 2012, China has undergone an intensive and large-scale anti-corruption campaign, with investigations reaching into all sectors of the government, military, and economy.  President Xi labeled endemic corruption as an “existential threat” to the very survival of the CCP that must be addressed.  Since then, each CCP annual plenum has touched on judicial, administrative, and CCP discipline reforms needed to thoroughly root out corruption.  Judicial reforms are viewed as necessary to institutionalize the fight against corruption and reduce the arbitrary power of CCP investigators, but concrete measures have emerged slowly.  To enhance regional anti-corruption cooperation, the 26th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministers Meeting adopted the Beijing Declaration on Fighting Corruption in November 2014.

According to official statistics, from 2012 to 2018 the CCDI investigated 2.17 million cases – more than the total of the preceding ten years.  In 2018 alone, the CCP disciplined around 621,000 individuals, up almost 95,000 from 2017.  However, the majority of officials only ended up receiving internal CCP discipline and were not passed forward for formal prosecution and trial.  A total of 195,000 corruption and bribery cases involving 263,000 people were heard in courts between 2013 and 2017, according to the Supreme People’s Court.  Of these, 101 were officials at or above the rank of minister or head of province.  In 2018, a large uptick of 51 officials at or above the provincial/ministerial level were disciplined by the NSC.  One group heavily disciplined in recent years has been the discipline inspectors themselves, with the CCP punishing more than 7,900 inspectors since late-2012.  This led to new regulations being implemented in 2016 by CCDI that increased overall supervision of its investigators.

China’s overseas fugitive-hunting campaign, called “Operation Skynet,” has led to the capture of more than 5,000 fugitives suspected of corruption.  In 2018 alone, CCDI reported that 1,335 fugitives suspected of official crimes were apprehended, including 307 corrupt officials mainly suspected for graft.  Anecdotal information suggests the Chinese government’s anti-corruption crackdown oftentimes is inconsistently and discretionarily applied, raising concerns among foreign companies in China.  For example, to fight rampant commercial corruption in the medical/pharmaceutical sector, China’s health authority issued “black lists” of firms and agents involved in commercial bribery.  Several blacklisted firms were foreign companies.  Additionally, anecdotal information suggests many Chinese government officials responsible for approving foreign investment projects, as well as some routine business transactions, are slowing approvals to not arouse corruption suspicions, making it increasingly difficult to conduct normal commercial activity.

While central government leadership has welcomed increased public participation in reporting suspected corruption at lower levels, direct criticism of central government leadership or policies remains off-limits and is seen as an existential threat to China’s political and social stability.  Some citizens who have called for officials to provide transparency and public accountability by disclosing public and personal assets, or who have campaigned against officials’ misuse of public resources, have been subject to criminal prosecution.

United Nations Anti-Corruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery

China ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2005 and participates in APEC and OECD anti-corruption initiatives.  China has not signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, although Chinese officials have expressed interest in participating in the OECD Working Group on Bribery meetings as an observer.

Resources to Report Corruption

The following government organization receives public reports of corruption:

Anti-Corruption Reporting Center of the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision, Telephone Number: +86 10 12388.

The risk of political violence directed at foreign companies operating in China remains low.  Each year, government watchdog organizations report tens of thousands of protests throughout China.  The government is adept at handling protests without violence, but given the volume of protests annually, the potential for violent flare-ups is real.  Violent protests, while rare, have generally involved ethnic tensions, local residents protesting corrupt officials, environmental and food safety concerns, confiscated property, and disputes over unpaid wages.

In recent years, the growing number of protests over corporate M&A transactions has increased, often because disenfranchised workers and mid-level managers feel they were not included in the decision process.  China’s non-transparent legal and regulatory system allows the CCP to pressure or punish foreign companies for the actions of their governments. The government has also encouraged protests or boycotts of products from certain countries, like Korea, Japan, Norway, Canada, and the Philippines, in retaliation for unrelated policy decisions.  Examples of politically motivated economic retaliation against foreign firms include boycott campaigns against Korean retailer Lotte in 2016 and 2017 in retaliation for the decision to deploy the Thermal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to the Korean Peninsula, which led to Lotte closing and selling its China operations; and high-profile cases of gross mistreatment of Japanese firms and brands in 2011 and 2012 following disputes over islands in the East China Sea.  Recently, some reports suggest China has retaliated against some Canadian companies and products as a result of a domestic Canadian legal issue that impacted a large Chinese enterprise.

There have also been some cases of foreign businesspeople that were refused permission to leave China over pending commercial contract disputes.  Chinese authorities have broad authority to prohibit travelers from leaving China (known as an “exit ban”) and have imposed exit bans to compel U.S. citizens to resolve business disputes, force settlement of court orders, or facilitate government investigations.  Individuals not directly involved in legal proceedings or suspected of wrongdoing have also been subject to lengthy exit bans in order to compel family members or colleagues to cooperate with Chinese courts or investigations. Exit bans are often issued without notification to the foreign citizen or without a clear legal recourse to appeal the exit ban decision.

In the past few years, Chinese authorities have detained or arrested several foreign nationals, including American citizens, and have refused to notify the U.S. Embassy or allow access to the American citizens detained for consular officers to visit.  These trends are in direct contravention of recognized international agreements and conventions.

For U.S. companies operating in China, finding adequate human resources remains a major challenge.  Finding, developing, and retaining domestic talent, particularly at the management and highly-skilled technical staff levels, remain difficult challenges often cited by foreign firms.  In addition, labor costs continue to be a concern, as salaries along with other inputs of production have continued to rise. Foreign companies also continue to cite air pollution concerns as a major hurdle in attracting and retaining qualified foreign talent to relocate to China.  These labor concerns contribute to a small, but growing, number of foreign companies relocating from China to the United States, Canada, Mexico, or other parts of Asia.

Chinese labor law does not protect rights such as freedom of association and the right of workers to strike.  China to date has not ratified the United Nations International Labor Organization conventions on freedom of association, collective bargaining, and forced labor, but it has ratified conventions prohibiting child labor and employment discrimination.  Foreign companies often complain of difficulty navigating China’s ever-evolving labor laws, social insurance laws, and different agencies’ implementation guidelines on labor issues. Compounding the complexity, local characteristics and the application by different localities of national labor laws often vary.

Although required by national law, labor contracts are often not used by domestic employers with local employees.  Without written contracts, employees struggle to prove employment, thus losing basic labor rights like claiming severance and unemployment compensation if terminated, as well as access to publicly-provided labor dispute settlement mechanisms.  Similarly, regulations on agencies that provide temporary labor (referred to as “labor dispatch” in China) have tightened, and some domestic employers have switched to hiring independent service provider contractors in order to skirt the protective intent of these regulations.  These loopholes incentivize employers to skirt the law because compliance leads to substantially higher labor costs. This is one of many factors contributing to an uneven playing field for foreign firms that compete against domestic firms that circumvent local labor laws.

Establishing independent trade unions is illegal in China.  The law allows for worker “collective bargaining”; however, in practice, collective bargaining focuses solely on collective wage negotiations – and even this practice is uncommon.  The Trade Union Law gives the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a CCP organ chaired by a member of the Politburo, control over all union organizations and activities, including enterprise-level unions.  The ACFTU’s priority task is to “uphold the leadership of the Communist Party,” not to protect workers’ rights or improve their welfare. The ACFTU and its provincial and local branches aggressively organize new constituent unions and add new members, especially in large multinational enterprises, but in general, these enterprise-level unions do not actively participate in employee-employer relations.  The absence of independent unions that advocate on behalf of workers has resulted in an increased number of strikes and walkouts in recent years.

ACFTU enterprise unions issue a mandatory employer-borne cost of 2 percent of payroll for membership.  While labor laws do not protect the right to strike, “spontaneous” worker protests and work stoppages occur with increasing regularity, especially in labor intensive and “sunset” industries (i.e., old and declining industries such as low-end manufacturing).  Official forums for mediation, arbitration, and other similar mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution have generally been ineffective in resolving labor disputes in China.  Some localities actively discourage acceptance of labor disputes for arbitration or legal resolution. Even when an arbitration award or legal judgment is obtained, getting local authorities to enforce judgments is problematic.

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

With GDP growth of 5.17 percent in 2018, Indonesia’s young population, strong domestic demand, stable political situation, and well-regarded macroeconomic policy make it an attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). Indonesian government officials welcome increased FDI, aiming to create jobs and spur economic growth, and court foreign investors, notably focusing on infrastructure development and export-oriented manufacturing. However, foreign investors have complained about vague and conflicting regulations,  bureaucratic issues, ambiguous legislation in regards to  tax enforcement, poor existing infrastructure, rigid labor laws, sanctity of contract issues, and corruption.

The Investment Coordination Board, or BKPM, serves as an investment promotion agency, a regulatory body, and the agency in charge of approving planned investments in Indonesia. As such, it is the first point of contact for foreign investors, particularly in manufacturing, industrial, and non-financial services sectors. In July 2018, Indonesia launched the OSS system to streamline 488 licensing and permitting processes through the issuance of Government Regulation No.24/2018 on Electronic Integrated Business Licensing Services. As a new process, OSS implementation is a work in progress and would benefit from greater socialization, especially at the subnational level. Special expedited licensing services are available for investors meeting certain criteria, such as making investments in excess of approximately IDR100 billion (USD7.4 million) or employing 1,000 local workers.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Restrictions on FDI are, for the most part, outlined in Presidential Decree No.44/2016, commonly referred to as the Negative Investment List or the DNI. The Negative Investment List aims to consolidate FDI restrictions from numerous decrees and regulations, in order to create greater certainty for foreign and domestic investors. The 2016 revision to the list eased restrictions in a number of previously closed or restricted fields. Previously closed sectors, including the film industry (including filming, editing, captioning, production, showing, and distribution of films), on-line marketplaces with a value in excess of IDR100 billion (USD7.4 million), restaurants, cold chain storage, informal education, hospital management services, and manufacturing of raw materials for medicine, are now open for 100 percent foreign ownership. The 2016 list also raises the foreign investment cap in the following sectors, though not fully to 100 percent: online marketplaces under IDR100 billion (USD7.4 million), tourism sectors, distribution and warehouse facilities, logistics, and manufacturing and distribution of medical devices. In certain sectors, restrictions are liberalized for foreign investors from other ASEAN countries. Though the energy sector saw little change in the 2016 revision, foreign investment in construction of geothermal power plants up to 10 MW is permitted with an ownership cap of 67 percent, while the operation and maintenance of such plants is capped at 49 percent foreign ownership. For investment in certain sectors, such as mining and higher education, the 2016 Negative Investment List is useful only as a starting point, as additional licenses and permits are required by individual ministries. A number of sensitive business areas, involving, for example, alcoholic beverages, ocean salvage, certain fisheries, and the production of some hazardous substances, remain closed to foreign investment or are otherwise restricted.

Foreign investment in small-scale and home industries (i.e. forestry, fisheries, small plantations, certain retail sectors) is reserved for micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) or requires a partnership between a foreign investor and local entity. Even where the 2016 DNI revisions lifted limits on foreign ownership, certain sectors remain subject to other restrictions imposed by separate laws and regulations. In November 2018, the government announced its plans to liberalize further DNI sectors through the XVI economic policy package, before shelving the idea a few weeks later.

In November 2016, Bank Indonesia issued Regulation No.18/2016 on the implementation of payment transaction processing.  The regulation governs all companies providing the following services: principal, issuer, acquirer, clearing, final settlement operator, and operator of funds transfer.  The BI regulation capped foreign ownership of payments companies at 20 percent, though it contained a grandfathering provision.  BI’s July 2017 Regulation No.19/2017 on the National Payment Gateway (NPG) subsequently imposed a 20 percent foreign equity cap on all companies engaging in domestic debit switching transactions.  Firms wishing to continue executing domestic debit transactions are obligated to form partnership agreements with a NPG switching company.

Foreigners may purchase equity in state-owned firms through initial public offerings and the secondary market. Capital investments in publicly listed companies through the stock exchange are not subject to Indonesia’s Negative Investment List.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The latest World Trade Organization (WTO) Investment Policy Review of Indonesia was conducted in April 2013 and can be found on the WTO website: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp378_e.htm .

The most recent OECD Investment Policy Review of Indonesia, conducted in 2010, can be found on the OECD website: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentfordevelopment/indonesia-investmentpolicyreview-oecd.htm .

UNCTADs report on ASEAN Investment can be found here: http://www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/unctad_asean_air2017d1.pdf .

Business Facilitation

Business Registration

In order to conduct business in Indonesia, foreign investors must be incorporated as a foreign-owned limited liability company (PMA) through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Once incorporated, a PMA must register through the OSS system. Upon registration, a company will receive a business identity number (NIB) along with proof of participation in the Workers Social Security Program (BPJS) and endorsement of any Foreign Worker Recruitment Plans (RPTKA).  An NIB remains valid as long as the business operates in compliance with Indonesian laws and regulations. Existing businesses will eventually be required to register through the OSS system. In general, the OSS system simplified processes for obtaining NIB from three days to one day.

Once an investor has obtained a NIB, he/she may apply for a business license. At this stage, investors must: document their legal claim to the proposed project land/location; provide an environmental impact statement (AMDAL); show proof of submission of an investment realization report; and provide a recommendation from relevant ministries as necessary.  Investors also need to apply for commercial and/or operational licenses prior to commencing commercial operations. Previously the business license process averaged 260 days.  Following establishment of the 2018 OSS system, which includes 488 licenses for various ministries/agencies, the process of starting business has been reduced to 20 days according to the World Bank’s 2019 Ease of Doing Business report, which placed Indonesia 73^rd out of the 190 countries surveyed in the report. Special expedited licensing services are also available for investors meeting certain criteria, such as making investments in excess of approximately IDR 100 billion (USD 7.2 million) or employing 1,000 local workers. After obtaining a NIB, investors in some designated industrial estates can immediately start project construction.

Foreign investors are generally prohibited from investing in MSMEs in Indonesia, although the 2016 Negative Investment List opened some opportunities for partnerships in farming and catalog and online retail. In accordance with the Indonesian SMEs Law No. 20/2008, MSMEs are defined as enterprises with net assets less than IDR10 billion (USD0.8 million) or with total annual sales under IDR50 billion (USD 3.7 million). However, the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics defines MSMEs as enterprises with fewer than 99 employees. The government provides assistance to MSMEs, including: expanded access to business credit for MSMEs in farming, fishery, manufacturing, creative business, trading and services sectors; a tax exemption for MSMEs with annual sales under IDR 200 million (USD 14.8 million); and assistance with international promotion.

The Ministry of Law and Human Rights’ implementation of an electronic business registration filing and notification system has dramatically reduced the number of days needed to register a company. Foreign firms are not required to disclose proprietary information to the government.

Screening of FDI

BKPM is responsible for issuing “investment licenses” (the term used to encompass both NIB and business licenses) to foreign entities and has taken steps to simplify the application process. The OSS serves as an online portal which allows foreign investors to apply for and track the status of licenses and other services online. The OSS coordinates many of the permits issued by more than a dozen ministries and agencies required for investment approval. In addition, BKPM now issues soft-copy investment and business licenses. While the OSS’s goal is to help streamline investment approvals, investments in the mining, oil and gas, plantation, and most other sectors still require multiple licenses from related ministries and authorities. Likewise, certain tax and land permits, among others, typically must be obtained from local government authorities. Though Indonesian companies are only require to obtain one approval at the local level, businesses report that foreign companies often must additional approvals in order to establish a business.

The Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, and BKPM issued a circular in 2010 to clarify which government offices are responsible for investment that crosses provincial and regional boundaries. Investment in a regency (a sub-provincial level of government) is managed by the regency government; investment that lies in two or more regencies is managed by the provincial government; and investment that lies in two or more provinces is managed by the central government, or central BKPM. BKPM has plans to roll out its one-stop-shop structure to the provincial and regency level to streamline local permitting processes at more than 500 sites around the country.

Outward Investment

Indonesia’s outward investment is limited, as domestic investors tend to focus on the domestic market. BKPM has responsibility for promoting and facilitating outward investment, to include providing information about investment opportunities in and policies of other countries. BKPM also uses their investment and trade promotion centers abroad to match Indonesian companies with potential investment opportunities. The government neither restricts nor provides incentives for outward investment.

Real Property

The Basic Agrarian Law of 1960, the predominant body of law governing land rights, recognizes the right of private ownership and provides varying degrees of land rights for Indonesian citizens, foreign nationals, Indonesian corporations, foreign corporations, and other legal entities. Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution states that all natural resources are owned by the government for the benefit of the people. This principle was augmented by the passage of a land acquisition bill in 2011 that enshrined the concept of eminent domain and established mechanisms for fair market value compensation and appeals. The National Land Agency registers property under Regulation No. 24/1997, though the Ministry of Forestry administers all ‘forest land’. Registration is sometimes complicated by local government requirements and claims, as a result of decentralization. Registration is also not conclusive evidence of ownership, but rather strong evidence of such. Government Regulation No.103/2015 on house ownership by foreigners domiciled in Indonesia allows foreigners to have a property in Indonesia with the status of a “right to use” for a maximum of 30 years, with extensions available for up to 20 additional years.

Intellectual Property Rights

Indonesia is currently on the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 priority watch list for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. According to U.S. stakeholders, Indonesia’s failure to effectively protect intellectual property and enforce IPR laws has resulted in high levels of physical and online piracy. Local industry associations have reported tens of millions of pirated films, music, and software in circulation in Indonesia in recent years, causing potentially billions of dollars in losses.  Indonesian physical markets, such as Pasar Mangga Dua, and online markets Tokopedia, Bukalapak, and IndoXXI.com were included in USTR’s Notorious Markets list in 2018.

Indonesian efforts to enhance IP protection policy were mixed this year. The 2016 Patent Law, continues to be a source of significant concern for IP stakeholders, especially expansive compulsory license provisions and a requirement under Article 20 to produce a patented product in Indonesia within 36 months of the grant of a patent. In July 2018, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (MLHR) enacted Ministerial Regulation 15/2018, allowing patent holders to request a five-year, renewable exemption from the 36-month local production requirement under Article 20.  However, MLHR issued Ministerial Regulation 39/2018 on December 28, providing new procedures for obtaining compulsory licenses for a variety of patented products. Regulation 39/2018 would allow individuals, government institutions, and patent holders to apply for a compulsory license on three bases: 1) failure to produce a patented product in Indonesia within 36 months; 2) use of a patent in a manner detrimental to the public interest; and 3) where a patent cannot be implemented without utilizing another party’s patent. The new regulation also gives MLHR the discretion to grant compulsory licenses to produce, import, and export patented products needed to remedy human disease in Indonesia and third countries.

MLHR reports that the five-year exemption from local production requirements under Regulation 15/2018 will continue to be available despite the issuance of Regulation 39/2018. The 2016 Patent Law contains several other provisions that some have defined as “concerning”, including a  definition of “invention” that potentially imposes an additional “increased meaningful benefit” requirement for patents on new forms of existing compounds, an expansive national interest test for proposed patent licenses, and disclosure of genetic information and traditional knowledge to promote access and benefit sharing.  The Directorate General for Intellectual Property (DGIP) is currently drafting guidelines on pharmacy, computer, and biotechnology patents for examiners; DGIP plans to release the guidelines in 2019.

DGIP has become more active in its efforts to collect patent annuity fees. On August 16, 2018, DGIP issued a circular letter warning stakeholders that it may refuse to accept new patent applications from rights holders that have not paid patent annuity fee debts. The letter gave rights holders until February 16, 2019, to settle unpaid patent annuity payments. On February 17, 2019, DGIP issued another circular letter on its website to extend the period of time for a patent holder to settle any unpaid annuities for 6 months to August 17, 2019. The U.S. government continues to monitor implementation of this policy with DGIP and industry stakeholders.

Indonesia deposited its instrument of accession to the Madrid Protocol with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in October 2017 and issued implementing regulations in June 2018. Under the new rules, Madrid Protocol applicants are required to register their application with DGIP first, and must be Indonesian citizens, domiciled in Indonesia, or have clear industrial or commercial interests in Indonesia. Although the Trademark Law of 2016 expanded recognition of non-traditional marks, Indonesia still does not recognize certification marks. In response to stakeholder concerns over a lack of consistency in treatment of international well-known trademarks, the Supreme Court issued Circular Letter 1/2017, which advised Indonesian judges to recognize cancellation claims for well-known international trademarks with no time limit stipulation.

The Ministry of Finance’s Directorate General for Customs and Excise (DGCE) continued to implement ex officio authorities to investigate shipments of infringing goods in 2018. Under MOF Regulation 40/2018, DGCE launched an online trademark recordation system that enables customs officials to detain a shipment of potentially IP-infringing goods for up to two days in order to inform a registered rights holder of the suspect shipment. Once the rights holder confirms the shipment is suspect, it has four days to file a request to suspend the shipment with the Indonesian Commercial Court. Rights holders are required to provide a monetary guarantee of IDR 100 million (approximately USD 7,700) when they request suspension of a shipment. Despite  business stakeholder concerns, the GOI retained a requirement that only companies with offices domiciled in Indonesia may use the recordation system.

In 2015, DGIP and KOMINFO jointly released implementing regulations under the Copyright Law to provide for rights holders to report websites that offer IP-infringing products and sets forth procedures for blocking IP-infringing sites. Also in 2015, Indonesia’s Creative Economy Agency (BEKRAF) launched an anti-piracy task force with film and music industry stakeholders. BEKRAF reported that the taskforce remained focused on coordinating the review of complaints from industry about infringing websites in 2018. KOMINFO reported that it blocked 442 infringing websites in 2018.

DGIP reports that its directorate of investigation has increased staffing to 187 investigators, including 40 nationwide investigators and 147 staff certified to act as local investigators in 33 provinces when needed for a pending case, and saw the number of investigations double from 16 in 2017 to 36 in 2018. BPOM, Indonesia’s food and drug administration, reported the seizure of more than USD 6.3 billion in counterfeit drugs and cosmetics during the year. Trademark, Patent, and Copyright legislation requires a rights-holder complaint for investigations, and DGIP and BPOM investigators lack the authority to make arrests so must rely on police cooperation for any enforcement action.

Resources for Rights Holders

Additional information regarding treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, can be found at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) country profile website http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ .For a list of local lawyers, see: http://jakarta.usembassy.gov/us-service/attorneys.html.

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) index has 618 listed companies as of December 2018 with a market capitalization of USD 526 billion. There were 57 initial public offerings in 2018 – the most in 26 years. As of January 2019, domestic entities conducted more than half of total IDX stock trades (65.08 percent). In November 2018, IDX introduced T+2 settlement, with sellers now receiving proceeds within two days instead of the previous standard of three days (T+3).

In 2011, the IDX launched the Indonesian Sharia Stock Index (ISSI), its first index of sharia-compliant companies, primarily to attract greater investment from Middle East companies and investors. In 2017, the IDX introduced the first online sharia stock trading platform. As of December 2018, the ISSI is composed of 403 stocks that are a part of IDX’s Jakarta Composite Index, with a total market cap of USD 275 billion.

Government treasury bonds are the most liquid bonds offered by Indonesia. Treasury bills are less liquid due to their small issue size. Liquidity in BI-issued Sertifikat Bank Indonesia (SBI) is also limited due to the three-month required holding period. The government also issues sukuk (Islamic treasury notes) treasury bills as part of its effort to diversify Islamic debt instruments and increase their liquidity. Indonesia’s sovereign debt as of December 2018 was rated as BBB- by Standard and Poor, BBB by Fitch Ratings and Baa2 by Moody’s.

The Financial Services Supervisory Authority (OJK) began overseeing capital markets and non-banking institutions in 2013, replacing the Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Board, and assumed BI’s supervisory role over commercial banks as of 2014. Foreigners have access to the Indonesian capital markets and are a major source (37.32 percent of government securities) of portfolio investment. Indonesia respects International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Foreign ownership of Indonesian companies may be limited in certain industries as determined by the Negative Investment List.

Money and Banking System

Although there is some concern regarding the operations of the many small and medium sized family-owned banks, the banking system is generally considered sound, with banks enjoying some of the widest interest rate margins in the region. As of May 2018, the 11 top banks had IDR 4,877 trillion (USD 348.3 billion) in total assets. Loans grew 11.5 percent in 2018 compared to 8.1 percent a year earlier. Gross non-performing loans in December 2018 remained at 2.4 percent y-o-y from 2.4 percent the previous year. For 2019, analysts project annual credit growth at 10-12 percent and deposit growth around 8-10 percent for Indonesia’s banking industry.

OJK Regulation No.56/03/2016 has limited bank ownership to no more than 40 percent by any single shareholder, applicable to foreign and domestic shareholders. This does not apply to foreign bank branches in Indonesia. Foreign banks may establish branches if the foreign bank is ranked in the top 200 global banks by assets.  A special operating license is required from OJK in order to establish a foreign branch. The OJK granted an exception in 2015 for foreign banks buying two small banks and merging them. To establish a representative office, a foreign bank must be ranked in the top 300 global banks by assets. In 2017, HSBC, which previously registered as a foreign branch, changed its legal status to a Limited Liability Company and merged with a local bank subsidiary which it had purchased in 2008.

In 2015, OJK eased rules for foreigners to open a bank account in Indonesia. Foreigners can open a bank account with a balance between USD 2,000-50,000 with just their passport. For accounts greater than USD 50,000, foreigners must show a supporting document such as a reference letter from a bank in the foreigner’s country of origin, a local domicile address, a spousal identity document, copies of a contract for a local residence, and/or credit/debit statements.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

The rupiah (IDR), the local currency, is freely convertible. Currently, banks must report all foreign exchange transactions and foreign obligations to the central bank, Bank Indonesia (BI). With respect to the physical movement of currency, any person taking rupiah bank notes into or out of Indonesia in the amount of IDR 100 million (approximately USD 7,377) or more, or the equivalent in another currency, must report the amount to DGCE. The limit for any person or entity to bring foreign currency bank notes into or out of Indonesia is the equivalent of IDR 1 billion (USD 71,429).

Banks on their own behalf or for customers may conduct derivative transactions related to derivatives of foreign currency rates, interest rates, and/or a combination thereof. BI requires borrowers to conduct their foreign currency borrowing through domestic banks registered with BI. The regulations apply to borrowing in cash, non-revolving loan agreements, and debt securities.

Under the 2007 Investment Law, Indonesia gives assurance to investors relating to the transfer and repatriation of funds, in foreign currency, on:

• capital, profit, interest, dividends and other income;
• funds required for (i) purchasing raw material, intermediate goods or final goods, and (ii) replacing capital goods for continuation of business operations;
• additional funds required for investment;
• funds for debt payment;
• royalties;
• income of foreign individuals working on the investment;
• earnings from the sale or liquidation of the invested company;
• compensation for losses; and
• compensation for expropriation.

U.S. firms report no difficulties in obtaining foreign exchange.

BI began in 2012 to require exporters to repatriate their export earnings through domestic banks within three months of the date of the export declaration form. Once repatriated, there are currently no restrictions on re-transferring export earnings abroad. Some companies report this requirement is not enforced.

In 2015, the government announced a regulation requiring the use of the rupiah in domestic transactions. While import and export transactions can still use foreign currency, importers’ transactions with their Indonesian distributors must now use rupiah, which has impacted some U.S. business operations. The central bank may grant a company permission to receive payment in foreign currency upon application, and where the company has invested in a strategic industry.

Remittance Policies

The government places no restrictions or time limitations on investment remittances. However, certain reporting requirements exist. Banks should adopt Know Your Customer (KYC) principles to carefully identify customers’ profile to match transactions.

Carrying rupiah bank notes of more than IDR 100 million (approximately USD 7,377) in cash out of Indonesia requires prior approval from BI, as well as verifying the funds with Indonesian Customs upon arrival. Indonesia does not engage in currency manipulation.

As of 2015, Indonesia is no longer subject to the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) monitoring process under its on-going global Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) compliance process. It continues to work with the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) to further strengthen its AML/CTF regime. In July 2018, Indonesia was granted observer status by FATF, a necessary milestone toward becoming a full FATF member.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Indonesia does not operate a traditional sovereign wealth fund, but several SOEs invest in the domestic market. In 2015, the Finance Ministry authorized one of those SOEs, PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur (SMI) to manage the assets of the Pusat Investasi Pemerintah (PIP), or Government Investment Center (which had previously been seen as a potential sovereign wealth fund). SMI can use the funds for direct investment in infrastructure financing, the placement of funds in the form of government securities, Bank Indonesia Certificates, and/or other financial instruments in accordance with the provisions of laws. Indonesia does not participate in the IMF’s Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds.

Indonesia had 114 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 28 subsidiaries divided into 12 sectors as of December 2018, 10 of which contributed more than 85 percent of total SOE profit. Of the 114 SOEs, 17 are listed on the Indonesian stock exchange, and 14 are special purpose entities under the SOE Ministry (BUMN), with one SOE, the Indonesian Infrastructure Guarantee Fund, under the Ministry of Finance. Since mid-2016, the Indonesian government has been publicizing plans to consolidate SOEs into six holding companies based on sector of operations. In November 2017, Indonesia announced the creation of a mining holding company, PT Inalum, the first of the six planned SOE-holding companies.  Information regarding the SOEs can be found at the SOE Ministry website (http://www.bumn.go.id/ ) (Indonesian language only). There are also an unknown number of SOEs owned by regional or local governments. SOEs are present in almost all sectors/industries including banking (finance), tourism (travel), agriculture, forestry, mining, construction, fishing, energy, and telecommunications (information and communications).

In 2018 (the most recent data available), SOE profits increased by 0.01 percent year-on-year to IDR 188 trillion (USD 13.4 billion). As of year-end 2018, SOEs assets stood at IDR 8,092 trillion (USD578 billion) compared to the previous year at IDR 7,210 trillion (USD 515 billion). On December 31, 2018, the 17 listed state-owned companies had a market capitalization of IDR 1,578 trillion (USD 112.7 billion) or 22.46 percent of the total capitalization of shares listed on the IDX stock exchange. Indonesia is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement. Private enterprises can compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. However, in reality, many sectors report that SOEs receive strong preference for government projects. SOEs purchase some goods and services from private sector and foreign firms. SOEs publish an annual report and are audited by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP), and external and internal auditors.

Privatization Program

While some state-owned enterprises have offered shares on the stock market, Indonesia does not have an active privatization program.

Indonesian businesses are required to undertake responsible business conduct (RBC) activities under Law 40/2007 concerning Limited Liability Companies. In addition, sectoral laws and regulations have further specific provisions on RBC. Indonesian companies tend to focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs offering community and economic development, and educational projects and programs. This is at least in part caused by the fact that such projects are often required as part of the environmental impact permits (AMDAL) of resource extraction companies, which undergo a good deal of domestic and international scrutiny of their operations. Because a large proportion of resource extraction activity occurs in remote and rural areas where government services are reported to be limited or absent, these companies face very high community expectations to provide such services themselves. Despite significant investments – especially by large multinational firms – in CSR projects, businesses have noted that there is limited general awareness of those projects, even among government regulators and officials.

The government does not have an overarching strategy to encourage or enforce RBC, but regulates each area through the relevant laws (environment, labor, corruption, etc.). Some companies report that these laws  are not always enforced evenly. In 2017, the National Commission on Human Rights launched a National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights in Indonesia, based on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

The Financial Services Authority (OJK) regulates corporate governance issues, but the regulations and enforcement are not yet up to international standards for shareholder protection.

OECD Guidelines On Corporate Governance Of SOEs

Indonesia does not adhere to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, nor has been recorded  the government encouraging adherence to those guidelines. Many companies claim that the government does not encourage adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas or any other supply chain management due diligence guidance. Indonesia does participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Indonesia was suspended by the EITI Board due to a missed deadline for its first EITI report, but the suspension was lifted following publication of its 2012-2013 EITI Report in November 2015.

President Jokowi was elected in 2014 on a strong good-governance platform. However, corruption remains a serious problem according to some U.S. companies, preventing increased FDI. The government has issued detailed directions on combating corruption in targeted ministries and agencies, and the 2018 release of the updated and streamlined National Anti-Corruption Strategy mandates corruption prevention efforts across the government in three focus areas (licenses, state finances, and law enforcement reform). The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was established in 2002 as the lead government agency to investigate and prosecute corruption.  KPK is one of the most trusted and respected institutions in Indonesia, and President Jokowi has continually expressed support for a strong and independent KPK, opposing proposals by legislators to weaken the anti-graft body’s authorities. The KPK has taken steps to encourage companies to establish effective internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of public officials. By law, the KPK is authorized to conduct investigations, file indictments, and prosecute corruption cases involving law enforcement officers, government executives, or other parties connected to corrupt acts committed by those entities; attracting the “attention and the dismay” of the general public; and/or involving a loss to the state of at least IDR 1 billion (approximately USD 74,500).The government began prosecuting companies who engage in public corruption under new corporate criminal liability guidance issued in a 2016 Supreme Court regulation, with the first conviction of a corporate entity in January 2019.  Presidential decree No. 13/2018 issued in March 2018 clarifies the definition of beneficial ownership and outlines annual reporting requirements and sanctions for non-compliance.

Indonesia’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2018 improved to 89 out of 180 countries surveyed, compared to 96 out of 180 countries in 2017.  Indonesia’s score of public corruption in the country, according to Transparency International, improved to 38 in 2018 (scale of 0/very corrupt to 100/very clean). At the beginning of President Jokowi’s term in 2014, Indonesia’s score was  34. Indonesia ranks 4^th of the 10 ASEAN countries.

Nonetheless, according to certain reports, corruption remains pervasive despite laws to combat it. Some have noted that KPK leadership, along with the commission’s investigators and prosecutors, are sometimes harassed, intimidated, or attacked due to their anticorruption work. In early 2019, a Molotov cocktail and bomb components were placed outside the homes of two KPK commissioners, and in 2017 unidentified assailants committed an acid attack against a senior KPK investigator. Police have not identified the perpetrators of either attack. The Indonesian National Police and Attorney General’s Office also investigate and prosecute corruption cases; however, neither have the same organizational capacity or track-record of the KPK. Giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal act, with possible fines ranging from USD 3,850 to USD 77,000 and imprisonment up to a maximum of 20 years or life imprisonment, depending on the severity of the charge.

UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery

Indonesia ratified the UN Convention against Corruption in September 2006. Indonesia has not yet acceded to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, but attends meetings of the OECD Anti-Corruption Working Group. In 2014, Indonesia chaired the Open Government Partnership, a multilateral platform to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and strengthen governance. Several civil society organizations function as vocal and competent corruption watchdogs, including Transparency International Indonesia and Indonesia Corruption Watch.

Resources to Report Corruption

Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Anti-Corruption Commission)
Jln. HR Rasuna Said Kav. C1 Kuningan
Jakarta Selatan 12920
informasi@kpk.go.id

Indonesia Corruption Watch
Jl. Kalibata Timur IV/D No. 6 Jakarta Selatan 12740
Tel: +6221.7901885 or +6221.7994015
Email: info@antikorupsi.org

As in other democracies, politically motivated demonstrations occasionally occur throughout Indonesia, but are not a major or ongoing concern for most foreign investors.

Since the large-scale Bali bombings in 2002 that killed over 200 people, Indonesian authorities have aggressively and successfully continued to pursue terrorist cells throughout the country, disrupting multiple aspirational plots. Despite these successes, violent extremist networks and terrorist cells remain intact and have the capacity to become operational and conduct attacks with little or no warning, as do lone wolf-style ISIL sympathizers.

According to the industry, foreign investors in Papua face certain unique challenges. Indonesian security forces occasionally conduct operations against the Free Papua Movement, a small armed separatist group that is most active in the central highlands region. Low-intensity communal, tribal, and political conflict also exists in Papua and has caused deaths and injuries. Anti-government protests have resulted in deaths and injuries, and violence has been committed against employees and contractors of a U.S. company there.

Travelers to Indonesia can visit the U.S. Department of State travel advisory website for the latest information and travel resources: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/Indonesia.html.

Companies have reported that the Indonesian labor market faces a number of structural barriers, including skills shortages and lagging productivity, restrictions on the use of contract workers, and reduced gaps between minimum wages and average wages. Recent significant increases in the minimum wage for many provinces have made unskilled and semi-skilled labor more costly. In the bellwether Jakarta area, the minimum wage was raised again from IDR 3.3 million (USD 243.4) per month in 2017 to IDR 3.6 million (USD 256.6) per month in 2018. Unions staged largely peaceful protests across Indonesia in 2018 demanding the government increase the minimum wage, decrease the price for basic needs, and stop companies from outsourcing and employing foreign workers. Under the new wage setting policy adopted as part of the 2018 economic stimulus package, annual minimum wage increases will be indexed directly to inflation and GDP growth. Previously, minimum wage adjustments were subject to negotiations between local governments, industry, and unions, and the changes varied widely from year to year and from region to region.

As only about 7.6 percent of the workforce is unionized, the benefits of union advocacy (including increases in minimum wage) do not always filter down to the rest of the workforce. While restrictions on the use of contract workers remain in place, continued labor protests focusing on this issue suggest that government enforcement continues to be lax. Unemployment has remained steady at 5.5 percent. Unemployment tends to be higher than the national average among young people.

Indonesian labor is relatively low-cost by world standards, but inadequate skills training and complicated labor laws combine to make Indonesia’s competitiveness lag behind other Asian competitors. Investors frequently cite high severance payments to dismissed employees, restrictions on outsourcing and contract workers, and limitations on expatriate workers as significant obstacles to new investment in Indonesia.

Employers also note that the skill base provided by the education system is lower than that of neighboring countries, and successive Labor Ministers have listed improved vocational training as a top priority. Labor contracts are relatively straightforward to negotiate but are subject to renegotiation, despite the existence of written agreements. Local courts often side with citizens in labor disputes, contracts notwithstanding. On the other hand, some foreign investors view Indonesia’s labor regulatory framework, respect for freedom of association, and the right to unionize as an advantage to investing in the country. Expert local human resources advice is essential for U.S. companies doing business in Indonesia, even those only opening representative offices.

Minimum wages vary throughout the country as provincial governors set an annual minimum wage floor and district heads have the authority to set a higher rate. Indonesia’s highly fractured and historically weak labor movement has gained strength in recent years, evidenced by significant increases in the minimum wage. As noted above, recent changes to the minimum wage setting system may make the process less dependent on political factors and more aligned with actual changes in inflation and GDP growth. Labor unions are independent of the government. The law, with some restrictions, protects the rights of workers to join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. Indonesia has ratified all eight of the core ILO conventions underpinning internationally accepted labor norms. The Ministry of Labor maintains an inspectorate to monitor labor norms, but enforcement is stronger in the formal than in the informal sector. A revised Social Security Law, which took effect in 2014, requires all formal sector workers to participate. Subject to a wage ceiling, employers must contribute an amount equal to 4 percent of workers’ salaries to this plan. In 2015, Indonesia established the Social Security Organizing Body of Employment (BPJS-Employment), a national agency to support workers in the event of work accident, death, retirement, or old age.

A proposed revision to Indonesia’s 2003 labor law may establish more stringent restrictions on outsourcing, currently used by many firms to circumvent some formal-sector job benefits.

Additional information on child labor, trafficking in persons, and human rights in Indonesia can be found online through the following references:

Child Labor Report: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/indonesia .

Trafficking in Persons Report: https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-trafficking-in-persons-report/indonesia/

Human Rights Report: https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

The Philippines seeks foreign investment to generate employment, promote economic development, and contribute to sustained growth.  The Board of Investments (BOI) and PEZA are the lead investment promotion agencies (IPAs). They provide incentives and special investment packages to investors.  Noteworthy advantages of the Philippine investment landscape include free trade zones, including PEZAs, and a large, educated, English-speaking, relatively low-cost Filipino workforce.  Philippine law treats foreign investors the same as their domestic counterparts, except in sectors reserved for Filipinos by the Philippine Constitution and the Foreign Investment Act (see details under Limits on Foreign Control section).  Additional information regarding investment policies and incentives are available on the BOI   and PEZA   websites.

Restrictions on foreign ownership, inadequate public investment in infrastructure, and lack of transparency in procurement tenders hinder foreign investment.  The Philippines’ regulatory regime remains ambiguous in many sectors of the economy, and corruption is a significant problem. Large, family-owned conglomerates, including San Miguel, Ayala, and SM, dominate the economic landscape, crowding out other smaller businesses.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Foreigners are prohibited from fully owning land under the 1987 Constitution, although the 1993 Investors’ Lease Act allows foreign investors to lease a contiguous parcel of up to 1,000 hectares (2,471 acres) for a maximum of 75 years.  Dual citizens are permitted to own land.

The 1991 Foreign Investment Act (FIA) requires the publishing every two years of the Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL), which outlines sectors in which foreign investment is restricted.  The latest FINL was released in October 2018. The FINL bans foreign ownership/participation in the following investment activities: mass media (except recording and internet businesses); small-scale mining; private security agencies; utilization of marine resources, including the small-scale use of natural resources in rivers, lakes, and lagoons; cooperatives; cockpits; manufacturing of firecrackers and pyrotechnic devices; and manufacturing, repair, stockpiling and/or distribution of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons and anti-personnel mines.  With the exception of the practices of law, radiologic and x-ray technology, and marine deck and marine engine officers, other laws and regulations on professions allow foreigners to practice in the Philippines if their country permits reciprocity for Philippine citizens, these include medicine, pharmacy, nursing, dentistry, accountancy, architecture, engineering, criminology, teaching, chemistry, environmental planning, geology, forestry, interior design, landscape architecture, and customs brokerage. In practice, however, language exams, onerous registration processes, and other barriers prevent this from taking place.

The Philippines limits foreign ownership to 40 percent in the manufacturing of explosives, firearms, and military hardware.  Other areas that carry varying foreign ownership ceilings include: private radio communication networks (40 percent); private employee recruitment firms (25 percent);  advertising agencies (30 percent); natural resource exploration, development, and utilization (40 percent, with exceptions); educational institutions (40 percent, with some exceptions); operation and management of public utilities (40 percent); operation of commercial deep sea fishing vessels (40 percent); Philippine government procurement contracts (40 percent for supply of goods and commodities); contracts for the construction and repair of locally funded public works (40 percent with some exceptions); ownership of private lands (40 percent); and rice and corn production and processing (40 percent, with some exceptions).

Retail trade enterprises with capital of less than USD 2.5 million, or less than USD 250,000, for retailers of luxury goods, are reserved for Filipinos.  The Philippines allows up to full foreign ownership of insurance adjustment, lending, financing, or investment companies; however, foreign investors are prohibited from owning stock in such enterprises, unless the investor’s home country affords the same reciprocal rights to Filipino investors.

Foreign banks are allowed to establish branches or own up to 100 percent of the voting stock of locally incorporated subsidiaries if they can meet certain requirements.  However, a foreign bank cannot open more than six branches in the Philippines. A minimum of 60 percent of the total assets of the Philippine banking system should, at all times, remain controlled by majority Philippine-owned banks.  Ownership caps apply to foreign non-bank investors, whose aggregate share should not exceed 40 percent of the total voting stock in a domestic commercial bank and 60 percent of the voting stock in a thrift/rural bank.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted a Trade Policy Review of the Philippines in March 2018 and an Investment Policy Review of the Philippines in 2016, respectively.  The reviews are available online at the WTO website. (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp468_e.htm ) and OECD website (http://www.oecd.org/daf/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-philippines-2016-9789264254510-en.htm ).

Business Facilitation

Business registration in the Philippines is cumbersome due to multiple agencies involved in the process.  It takes an average of 31 days to start a business in Quezon City in Metro Manila, according to the 2019 World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report.  Touted as one of the Duterte Administrations’ landmark laws, the Republic Act No. 11032 or the Ease of Doing Business and Efficient Government Service Delivery Act amends the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007, and legislates standardized deadlines for government transactions, a single business application form, a one-stop-shop, automation of business permits processing, a zero contact policy, and a central business databank.

The law was passed in May 2018, and it creates an Anti-Red Tape Authority (ARTA – http://arta.gov.ph/  ) under the Office of the President to carry out the mandate of business facilitation.  ARTA is governed by a council that includes the Secretary’s of Trade and Industry, Finance, Interior and Local Governments, and Information and Communications Technology.  The Department of Trade and Industry serves as interim Secretariat for ARTA. Without the rules and regulations being issued, compliance has not been in effect. The implementing rules and regulations are currently being drafted (http://arta.gov.ph/pages/IRR.html  ).

The Philippines also signed into law the Revised Corporation Code, a business friendly legislation amendment that encourages entrepreneurship, improves the ease of business, and promotes good corporate governance.  This new law amends part of the four-decade-old Corporation Code and allows for existing and future companies to hold a perpetual status of incorporation, compared to the previous 50-year term limit which required renewal.  More importantly, the amendments allow for the formation of one-person corporations, providing more flexibility to conduct business; the old code required all incorporation to have at least five stockholders and provided less protection from liabilities.

Outward Investment

There are no restrictions on outward portfolio investments for Philippine residents, defined to include non-Filipino citizens who have been residing in the country for at least one year; foreign-controlled entities organized under Philippine laws; and branches, subsidiaries, or affiliates of foreign enterprises organized under foreign laws operating in the country.  However, outward investments funded by foreign exchange purchases above USD 60 million or its equivalent per investor per year, or per fund per year for qualified investors, may require prior approval.

Real Property

The Philippines recognizes and protects property rights, but the enforcement of laws is weak and fragmented.  The Land Registration Authority and the Register of Deeds (http://www.lra.gov.ph/), which facilitate the registration and transfer of property titles, are responsible for land administration, with more information available on their website  s.  Property registration processes are tedious and costly.  Multiple agencies are involved in property administration, which results in overlapping procedures for land valuation and titling processes.  Record management is weak due to a lack of funds and trained personnel. Corruption is also prevalent among land administration personnel and the court system is slow to resolve land disputes.  The Philippines ranked 114th out of 190 economies in terms of ease of property registration in the World Bank’s 2018 Ease of Doing Business report.

Intellectual Property Rights

The Philippines is not listed on the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report.  The country has a robust intellectual property rights (IPR) regime in place, although enforcement is irregular and inconsistent.  The total estimated value of counterfeit goods reported seized in 2018 was USD 453 million, nearly a 180 percent increase from USD 162 million in 2017.  The sale of imported counterfeit goods in local markets has visibly decreased, though stakeholders report the amount of counterfeit goods sold online is gradually increasing.

The Intellectual Property (IP) Code provides legal framework for IPR protection, particularly in key areas of patents, trademarks, and copyrights.  The Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL) is the implementing agency of the IP Code, with more information available on its website  .  The Philippines generally has strong patent and trademark laws.  IPOPHL’s IP Enforcement Office (IEO) reviews IPR-related complaints and visits establishments reportedly engaged in IPR-related violations.  However, weak border protection, corruption, limited enforcement capacity by the government, and lack of clear procedures continue to weaken enforcement.  In addition, IP owners still must assume most enforcement costs when counterfeit goods are seized.

Enforcement actions are often not followed by successful prosecutions.  The slow and capricious judicial system keeps most IP owners from pursuing cases in court.  IP infringement is not considered a major crime in the Philippines and takes a lower priority in court proceedings, especially as the courts become more crowded out with criminal cases, which receive higher priority.  Many IP owners opt for out-of-court settlements (such as ADR) rather than filing a lawsuit that may take years to resolve in the unpredictable Philippine courts. The IPOPHL has jurisdiction to resolve certain disputes concerning alleged infringement and licensing through its Arbitration and Mediation Center.

For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at the local IP offices, see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/  .

Resources for Rights Holders

Contact at Mission:

Douglas Fowler, Economic Officer
Economic Section, U.S. Embassy Manila
Telephone: (+632) 301.2000
Email: ManilaEcon@state.gov

A list of local lawyers can be found on the U.S. Embassy’s website: https://ph.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The Philippines welcomes the entry of foreign portfolio investments, including into local and foreign-issued equities listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE  ).  Investments in certain publicly listed companies are subject to foreign ownership restrictions specified in the Constitution and other laws.  Non-residents are allowed to issue bonds/notes or similar instruments in the domestic market with prior approval from the Central Bank; in certain cases, they may also obtain financing in Philippine pesos from authorized agent banks without prior Central Bank approval.

Although growing, the PSE (with fewer than 270 listed firms as of the end of 2017) lags behind many of its neighbors in size, product offerings, and trading activity.  The securities market is growing but remains dominated by government bills and bonds. Hostile takeovers are uncommon because most companies’ shares are not publicly listed and controlling interest tends to remain with a small group of parties.  Cross-ownership and interlocking directorates among listed companies also decrease the likelihood of hostile takeovers.

In September 1995, the Philippines accepted International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII obligations to refrain from imposing restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.  The IMF staff did not raise/report any issues involving restrictions on current international payments and transfers following its most recent annual consultations with the Philippines in 2017.

Credit is generally granted on market terms and foreign investors are able to obtain credit from the liquid domestic market.  However, some laws require financial institutions to set aside loans for preferred sectors (e.g. agriculture, agrarian reform, and MSMEs).  To help promote lending at competitive rates to MSMEs, the government is working to fully operationalize a centralized credit information system that collects and disseminates information about the track record of borrowers and credit activities of entities in the financial system.

Money and Banking System

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP, the Central Bank) is a highly respected institution.  The banking system is stable. The Central Bank has pursued regulatory reforms promoting good governance and aligning/adapting risk management regulations and the risk-based capital framework with international standards.  Capital adequacy ratios are well above the 8 percent international standard and the central bank’s 10 percent regulatory requirement. The non-performing loan ratio was at 1.7 percent as of the end of 2018. There is ample liquidity, with the liquid assets-to-deposits ratio estimated at about 48 percent.  Commercial banks constitute more than 90 percent of the total assets of the Philippine banking industry. The five largest commercial banks represented about 60 percent of the total resources of the commercial banking sector as of 2018. Twenty-two of the 44 commercial banks operating in the country are foreign branches, including three U.S. banks (Citibank, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase).  Citibank has the largest presence among the foreign bank branches and currently ranks 12th overall in terms of assets.

Foreign residents and non-residents may open foreign and local currency bank accounts.  Although non-residents may open local currency deposit accounts, they are limited to the funding sources specified under central bank regulations.  Non-residents’ foreign currency accounts cannot be funded from foreign exchange purchases from banks and banks’ subsidiary/affiliate foreign exchange corporations.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange Policies

The Central Bank has actively pursued reforms since the 1990s to liberalize and simplify foreign exchange regulations.  As a general rule, the Central Bank allows residents and non-residents to purchase foreign exchange from banks, banks’ subsidiary/affiliate foreign exchange corporations, and other non-bank entities operating as foreign exchange dealers and/or money changers and remittance agents to fund legitimate foreign exchange obligations, subject to provision of information and/or supporting documents on underlying obligations.  No mandatory foreign exchange surrender requirement is imposed on exporters, overseas workers’ incomes, or other foreign currency earners; these foreign exchange receipts may be sold for pesos or retained in foreign exchange in local and/or offshore accounts. The Central Bank follows a market-determined exchange rate policy, with scope for intervention to smooth excessive foreign exchange volatility.

Remittance Policies

The Central Bank does not restrict payments and transfers for current international transactions, including payments for imports, subject to submission of a duly accomplished foreign exchange purchase application form if the foreign exchange is sourced from banks and/or their subsidiary/affiliate foreign exchange corporations within specified thresholds (currently USD 500,000 for individuals and USD 1 million for corporates/other entities).  Purchases above the thresholds are also subject to the submission of minimum documentary requirements but do not require prior Central Bank approval.

Foreign exchange policies do not require approval of inward foreign direct and portfolio investments.  Registration of foreign investments with the Central Bank or custodian banks is generally optional. Duly registered foreign investments are entitled to full and immediate repatriation of capital and remittance of dividends, profits, and earnings.

As a general policy, current regulations require prior Central Bank approval of government-guaranteed foreign loans/borrowings (including those in the form of notes, bonds, and similar instruments) by the private sector.  Although there are exceptions, private sector loan agreements should also be registered with the Central Bank if serviced through the purchase of foreign exchange from the banking system.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed the Philippines from its gray list of countries with strategic deficiencies in countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism in 2013.  Although a high reporting threshold and exclusion of junket operators and non-cash transactions are weaknesses, a law signed in July 2017 to include casinos as covered institutions in the Philippine anti-money laundering regime has allowed the Philippines to stave off a return to the FATF gray list thus far.  Although not a systemic issue, some local banks and money service businesses have been affected by the “de-risking” phenomenon reported by various jurisdictions in recent years, driven in part by risk aversion of foreign banks due to anti-money laundering/terrorism financing compliance costs. The Philippines has a restrictive regime for accessing bank accounts to detect or prosecute financial crimes, which is a significant impediment to enforcing laws against corruption, tax evasion, smuggling, laundering, and other economic crimes.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

The Philippines does not presently have sovereign wealth funds.

State-owned enterprises, known in the Philippines as government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC), are predominant in the power, transport, infrastructure, communications, land and water resources, social services, housing, and support services sectors.  There were 103 operational and functioning GOCCs as of April 2019 (a list is available on the Governance Commission for GOCC [GCG] website  ).  GOCCs are required to remit at least 50 percent of their annual net earnings (e.g. cash, stock, or property dividends) to the national government.

Private and state-owned enterprises generally compete equally.  The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS  ) is the only agency, with limited exceptions, allowed to provide coverage for the government’s insurance risks and interests, including those in BOT projects and privatized government corporations.  Since the national government acts as the main guarantor of loans, stakeholders report GOCCs often have an advantage in getting financing from government financial institutions and some private banks.  Most GOCCs are not statutorily independent, but attached to cabinet departments, and, therefore, subject to political interference.

OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs

The Philippines is not an OECD member country.  The 2011 GOCC Governance Act addresses problems experienced by GOCCs, including poor financial performance, weak governance structures, and unauthorized allowances.  The law allows unrestricted access to GOCC account books and requires strict compliance with accounting and financial disclosure standards; establishes the power to privatize, abolish, or restructure GOCCs without legislative action; and sets performance standards and limits on compensation and allowances.  The GCG   formulates and implements GOCC policies.  GOCC board members are limited to one-year term, subject to reappointment based on a performance rating set by GCG, with final approval by the Philippine President.

Privatization Program

The Philippine Government’s privatization program is managed by the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance (DOF).  The privatization of government assets undergoes a public bidding process. Apart from restrictions stipulated in FINL, no regulations discriminate against foreign buyers and the bidding process appears to be transparent.  Additional information is available on the PMO website (http://www.pmo.gov.ph/index.htm )

Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is regularly practiced in the Philippines, although no domestic laws require it.  The Philippine Tax Code provides RBC-related incentives to corporations, such as tax exemptions and deductions. Various non-government organizations and business associations also promote RBC.  The Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP  ) is the largest corporate-led social development foundation involved in advocating corporate citizenship practice in the Philippines.  U.S. companies report strong and favorable responses to RBC programs among employees and within local communities.

OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises

The Philippines is not an OECD member country.  The Philippine government strongly supports RBC practices among the business community but has not yet endorsed the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to stakeholders.

Corruption is a pervasive and long-standing problem in both the public and private sectors.  The country’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index declined from 101 in 2016 to 111 in 2017 of 176 countries worldwide yet rebounded to 99 out of 180 in 2018.   The World Economic Forum’s 2017-2018 Global Competitiveness Report ranked corruption among the top problematic factors for doing business in the Philippines. The Bureau of Customs is still considered to be one of the most corrupt agencies in the country, having fired and replaced five customs commissioners in as many years.

The Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022 outlines strategies to reduce corruption by streamlining government transactions, modernizing regulatory processes, and establishing mechanisms for citizens to report complaints.  A front line desk in the Office of the President, the Presidential Complaint Center, or PCC (https://op-proper.gov.ph/contact-us/  ), receives and acts on corruption complaints from the general public.  The PCC can be reached through its complaint hotline, text services (SMS), and social media sites.

The Philippine Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the Code of Ethical Conduct for Public Officials all aim to combat corruption and related anti-competitive business practices.  The Office of the Ombudsman investigates and prosecutes cases of alleged graft and corruption involving public officials, with more information available on its website  .  Cases against high-ranking officials are brought before a special anti-corruption court, the Sandiganbayan, while cases against low-ranking officials are filed before regional trial courts.

The Office of the President can directly investigate and hear administrative cases involving presidential appointees in the executive branch and government-owned and controlled corporations.  Soliciting, accepting, and/or offering/giving a bribe are criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment, a fine, and/or disqualification from public office or business dealings with the government.  Government anti-corruption agencies routinely investigate public officials, but convictions by courts are limited, often appealed, and can be overturned. Recent positive steps include the creation of an investors’ desk at the Ombudsman’s Office, and corporate governance reforms of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery

The Philippines ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2003.  It is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:

Office of the Ombudsman
Ombudsman Building, Agham Road, North Triangle
Diliman, Quezon City
Hotline:  (+632) 926.2662
Telephone:  (+632) 479.7300
Email/Website: pab@ombudsman.gov.ph / http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph  /

Presidential Complaint Center
Gama Bldg., Minerva St. corner Jose Laurel St.
San Miguel, Manila
Telephone: (+632) 736.8645, 736.8603, 736.8606
Email: pcc@malacanang.gov.ph / https://op-proper.gov.ph/presidential-action-center/ 

Contact Center ng Bayan
Text:  (+63) 908 881.6565
Call:  1-6565
Email/Website: email@contactcenterngbayan.gov.ph / contactcenterngbayan.gov.ph  

Terrorist groups and criminal gangs operate in some regions.  The Department of State publishes a consular information sheet and advises all Americans living in or visiting the Philippines to review the information periodically.  A travel advisory is in place for those U.S. citizens contemplating travel to the Philippines.

Terrorist groups, including the ISIS-Philippines affiliated Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Maute Group, Ansar al-Khalifa Philippines (AKP) and elements of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), periodically attack civilian targets, kidnap civilians – including foreigners – for ransom, and engage in armed attacks against government security forces.  These groups have mostly carried out their activities in the western and central regions of Mindanao, including the Sulu Archipelago and Sulu Sea. They are also capable of operating in some areas outside Sulu, as evidenced by the 2015 kidnapping of four hostages from Samal Island, just outside Davao City.

ISIS-affiliated groups in Mindanao occupied and held siege to Marawi City for five months in 2017, prompting President Duterte to declare martial law over the entire Mindanao region – approximately one-third of the country’s territory.  Congress granted multiple extensions of martial law, which will remain in place until the end of 2019. Security forces ultimately cleared the city and eliminated much of the terrorist leadership, but suffered many casualties during the siege.

The New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), is responsible in some parts of the country, mostly Mindanao, for civil disturbances through assassinations of public officials, sporadic attacks on military and police forces, bombings, and attacks on infrastructure, such as power generators and telecommunications towers.  The NPA relies on extortionist revolutionary taxes from local and some foreign businesses to fund its operations. The Philippine government ended a unilateral ceasefire with the CPP/NPA in 2017 and initiated a process for designating the group as a terrorist organization under domestic law.

The Philippines’ most significant human rights problems were killings allegedly undertaken by vigilantes, security forces, and insurgents; cases of apparent governmental disregard for human rights and due process; official corruption; and a weak and overburdened criminal justice system notable for slow court procedures, weak prosecutions, and poor cooperation between police and investigators.

President Duterte’s administration continued a nationwide campaign, led primarily by the Philippine National Police (PNP), to eliminate illegal narcotics.  The ongoing operation received worldwide attention for its harsh tactics.

Managers of U.S. companies in the Philippines report that local labor costs are relatively low and workers are highly motivated, with generally strong English language skills.  In 2018, the Philippine labor force reached 43 million workers, with an employment rate of 94.6 percent and an unemployment rate of 5.4 percent. These figures include employment in the informal sector and do not capture the substantial rates of underemployment in the country.  Youths between the ages of 15 and 24 made up nearly 50 percent of the unemployed. More than half of all employment was in the services sector, with 23.1 percent and 19.4 percent in agriculture and industry sectors, respectively.

Compensation packages in the Philippines tend to be comparable with those in neighboring countries.  Regional Wage and Productivity Boards meet periodically in each of the country’s 16 administrative regions to determine minimum wages.  The non-agricultural daily minimum wage in Metro Manila is approximately USD 9.86, although some private sector workers receive less. Most regions set their minimum wage significantly lower than Metro Manila.  Violation of minimum wage standards is common, especially non-payment of social security contributions, bonuses, and overtime. Philippine law also provides for a comprehensive set of occupational safety and health standards.  The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) has responsibility for safety inspection, but a shortage of inspectors has made enforcement difficult.

The Philippines Constitution enshrines the right of workers to form and join trade unions.  The trend among firms using temporary contract labor to lower employment costs continues despite government efforts to regulate the practice.  The DOLE Secretary has the authority to end strikes and mandate a settlement between parties in cases involving national interest. DOLE amended its rules concerning disputes in 2013, specifying industries vital to national interest:  hospitals, the electric power industry, water supply services (excluding small bottle suppliers), air traffic control, and other industries as recommended by the National Tripartite Industrial Peace Council (NTIPC). Economic zones often offer on-site labor centers to assist investors with recruitment.  Although labor laws apply equally to economic zones, unions have noted some difficulty organizing inside the zones.

The Philippines is signatory to all International Labor Organization (ILO) core conventions, but has faced challenges with enforcement.  Unions allege that companies or local officials use illegal tactics to prevent workers from organizing. The quasi-judicial National Labor Relations Commission reviews allegations of intimidation and discrimination in connection with union activities.  Meanwhile, the NTIPC monitors the application of international labor standards.

Reports of forced labor in the Philippines continue, particularly in connection with human trafficking in the commercial sex, domestic service, agriculture, and fishing industries.

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

Thailand continues to welcome investment from all countries and seeks to avoid dependence on any one country as a source of investment. The FBA prescribes a wide range of business that may not be conducted by foreigners unless a relevant license has been obtained or an exemption applies. The term “foreigner” includes Thai-registered companies in which half or more of the capital is held by non-Thai individuals, foreign-registered companies, and Thai-registered companies that are themselves majority foreign-owned.  BOI, Thailand’s investment promotion agency, assists Thai and foreign investors to start and conduct businesses in targeted economic sectors by offering both tax and non-tax incentives.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Various Thai laws set forth foreign-ownership restrictions in certain sectors, primarily in services such as banking, insurance, and telecommunications. The FBA details the types of business activities reserved for Thai nationals. Foreign investment in those businesses must comprise less than 50 percent of share capital, unless specially permitted or otherwise exempt.

The following three lists detail restricted businesses for foreigners:

List 1. This contains activities non-nationals are prohibited from engaging in, including:  newspaper and radio broadcasting stations and businesses; rice and livestock farming; forestry and timber processing from a natural forest; fishery in Thai territorial waters and specific economic zones; extraction of Thai medicinal herbs; trading and auctioning of antique objects or objects of historical value from Thailand; making or casting of Buddha images and monk alms bowls; and land trading.

List 2. This contains activities related to national safety or security, arts and culture, traditional industries, folk handicrafts, natural resources, and the environment. Restrictions apply to the production, sale and maintenance of firearms and armaments; domestic transportation by land, water, and air; trading of Thai antiques or art objects; mining, including rock blasting and rock crushing; and timber processing for production of furniture and utensils. A foreign majority-owned company can engage in List 2 activities if Thai nationals or legal persons hold not less than 40 percent of the total shares and the number of Thai directors is not less than two-fifths of the total number of directors.

List 3. Restricted businesses in this list include:  accounting, legal, architectural, and engineering services; retail and wholesale; advertising businesses; hotels; guided touring; selling food and beverages; and other service-sector businesses. A foreign company can engage in List 3 activities if a majority of the limited company’s shares are held by Thai nationals. Any company with a majority of foreign shareholders (more than 50 percent) cannot engage in List 3 activities unless it receives an exception from the Ministry of Commerce under its Foreign Business License (FBL) application.

Thailand does not maintain an investment screening mechanism, but investors can receive additional incentives/privileges if they invest in priority areas, such as high-technology industries. Investors should contact the Board of Investment [https://www.boi.go.th/index.php?page=index  ] for the latest information on specific investment incentives.

The U.S. Commercial Service, U.S. Embassy Bangkok, is responsible for issuing a certification letter to confirm that a U.S. company is qualified to apply for benefits under the Treaty of Amity. The applicant must first obtain documents verifying that the company has been registered in compliance with Thai law. Upon receipt of the required documents, the U.S. Commercial Service office will then certify to the Foreign Administration Division, Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce (MOC) that the applicant is seeking to register an American-owned and managed company or that the applicant is an American citizen and is therefore entitled to national treatment under the provisions of the Treaty. For more information on how to apply for benefits under the Treaty of Amity, please e-mail: ktantisa@trade.gov.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The World Trade Organization conducted a Trade Policy Review of Thailand in November 2015. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp426_e.htm  . The next review is scheduled for October 2020.

Business Facilitation

The MOC’s Department of Business Development (DBD) is generally responsible for business registration, which can be performed online or manually. A legal requirement that documentation must be submitted in Thai language has caused foreign entities to spend three to six months to complete the process, as they typically have to hire a law firm or consulting firm to handle their applications. Firms engaging in production activities also must register with the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Labor and Social Development.

To operate restricted businesses as defined by the FBA’s List 2 and 3, non-Thai entities must obtain a foreign business license, approved by the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and/or Director-General of the MOC’s Department of Business Development, depending on the business category.

Effective June 9, 2017, the MOC removed certain business categories from FBA’s Annex 3 list. Businesses no longer subject to restrictions include regional office services and contractual services provided to government bodies and state-owned enterprises.

American investors who wish to take majority shares or wholly own businesses under FBA’s Annex 3 list may apply for protection under the U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity. https://2016.export.gov/thailand/treaty/index.asp#P5_233  

Americans planning to invest in Thailand are advised to obtain qualified legal advice, especially considering Thai business regulations are governed predominantly by criminal, not civil, law. Foreigners are rarely jailed for improper business activities, but violations of business regulations can carry heavy criminal penalties. Thailand has an independent judiciary and government authorities are generally not permitted to interfere in the court system once a case is in process.

In March 2019, the MOC’s Department of Business Development completed an annual report on suggestions for FBA changes, particularly the possible removal of certain service businesses from FBA’s List 3.  The report is pending the Cabinet’s review, which is expected to take place after a new government assumes office.

A company is required to have registered capital of two million Thai baht per foreign employee in order to obtain work permits. Foreign employees must enter the country on a non-immigrant visa and then submit work permit applications directly to the Department of Labor. Application processing takes approximately one week. For more information on Thailand visas, please refer to http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/services/4908/15388-Non-Immigrant-Visa- percent22B percent22-for-Business-and.html  .

In February 2018, the Thai government launched a Smart Visa program for foreigners with expertise in specialized technologies in ten targeted industries. Under this program, foreigners can be granted a maximum four-year visa to work in Thailand without having to obtain a work permit and can enjoy relaxed immigration rules for their spouses and children. More information is available at https://www.boi.go.th/index.php?page=detail_smart_visa&language=en.

Outward Investment

Thai companies are expanding and investing overseas, especially in neighboring ASEAN countries to take advantage of lower production costs, but also in the United States, Europe and Asia. A stronger domestic currency, rising cash holdings, and subdued domestic growth are helping to drive outward investment. Food, agro-industry, and chemical sectors account for the main share of outward flows. Thai corporate laws allow outbound investments in the form of an independent affiliate (foreign company), as a branch of a Thai legal entity, or by a financial investment abroad from a Thai company. BOI and the MOC’s Department of International Trade Promotion (DITP) share responsibility for promoting outward investment, with BOI focused on outward investment in leading economies and DITP covering smaller markets.

Real Property

Property rights are guaranteed by the Constitution against being condemned or nationalized without fair compensation. Thai government policy generally does not permit foreigners to own land, but there have been cases of granting official permission under certain laws or ministerial regulations for residential, business or even religious purposes. Foreigners can freely lease land, as the governing Civil and Commercial Code does not distinguish between foreign and Thai nationals in the exercise of lease rights. Foreign ownership of condominiums and buildings is also permitted under certain laws. Secured interests in property, such as mortgage and pledge, are recognized and enforced. Under Thai law, unoccupied property legally owned by foreigners or Thais may be subject to adverse possession by squatters or people who stay on that property for at least 10 years. According to the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business report, Thailand’s Registering Property ranking rose to 66 from 68 in 2018.

Intellectual Property Rights

Thailand’s efforts to clamp down on widespread commercial IP counterfeiting and piracy have been enhanced by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha’s strong political commitment to IPR enforcement. The Prime Minister ordered the establishment of a 12-agency IPR Cabinet sub-committee and the development of a 20-year IP Roadmap as well as closer coordination among the country’s Internal Security Operations Command, law enforcement agencies, and IP rights holders. In December 2018, the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC), the country’s telecom regulator, the Royal Thai Police, and the Department of the Intellectual Property (DIP) at the Ministry of Commerce combined to set up a new “Center of Operational Policing for Thailand against Intellectual Property Violations and Crimes on the Internet Suppression” to expedite efforts to tackle online IPR violations.

Patents and Trademarks

Thailand’s patent regime generally provides protection for most inventions. The examination of patent applications through issuance of patents takes on an average of six to eight years. Patent issuance may take longer in certain technology sectors. In order to address the backlog problem, DIP hired 88 additional patent and trademark examiners over the last few years.  Additional examiners helped decrease the patent application backlog by 20 percent in 2018. As of September 2018, approximately 16,000 patent applications were pending for examination, according to DIP. With regard to trademarks, DIP takes on average 10-14 months for trademark approvals.

The Thai government is in the process of adopting an amendment to the Patent Act that would streamline the patent registration process and implement its international obligations under the Amendment of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) related to patent and public health, which Thailand ratified in January 2016.  The draft amendment is pending the legislature’s approval.

Starting in September 2017, rights owners can file for sound trademark registration, a development enabled by a July 2016 amendment of Thailand’s Trademark Act. Thailand acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (Madrid Protocol) in August 2017, and the agreement entered into effect in November 2017. The Thai government is also working on an amendment to the Patent Act to prepare Thailand for accession to the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs.

Copyrights

Thailand’s amended Copyright Act came into effect on March 11, 2019. Thailand is a member of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled. Thailand deposited the instrument of accession to the Marrakesh Treaty with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on January 28, 2019.  

In addition, Thailand is in the process of a two-phase amendment of the Copyright Act. The first phase would enhance mechanisms to protect copyrights in the digital environment and prepare Thailand for accession to the WIPO Copyright Treaty; the second phase would prepare Thailand for accession to the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. The first-phase draft is under review by the Council of State, while the second phase amendment is in the drafting process.  

The Thai government amended the Computer Crime Act in 2017 to add IPR infringement as a predicate offense under Section 20, enabling IP right holders to file requests to either DIP or the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society for removal of IPR-infringing content from online computer systems or disabling of access to it. Online video providers and human rights advocates continue to voice serious concerns regarding use of the Computer Crimes Act to limit free speech and to compel internet service providers (ISP) to comply with Thai government requests to remove content or else face penalties.

Geographical Indications

Thailand’s Geographical Indications (GI) Act has been in force since April 2004. Thailand protects GIs, which identify goods by their specific geographical origins. The geographical origins identified by a GI must attribute to the reputation, qualities, or characteristics of the good. In Thailand, a registered trademark does not prevent a similar geographical name to be registered as a GI.

IP Enforcement

Thailand has provided ex-officio authority for border enforcement officials with respect to in-transit goods; set enforcement benchmarks; began monthly publishing of enforcement statistics online; and stepped up efforts to investigate IP cases. Thailand has a Court of Appeal for Specialized Cases, which hears appeals from the Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, including administrative appeals from DIP that already received a first instance decision from the Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court.

In late 2017, Thailand was upgraded from the USTR Special 301 Priority Watch List, where it had been placed since 2007, to the Watch List. Currently, there are no Thai markets listed in the USTR Notorious Markets Report.

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/  .

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The Thai government maintains a regulatory framework that broadly encourages and facilitates portfolio investment and largely avoids market-distorting support for specific sectors. The Stock Exchange of Thailand, the country’s national stock market, was set up under the Securities Exchange of Thailand Act B.E. 2535 in 1992. There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to allow investors to enter and exit sizeable positions. Government policies generally do not restrict the free flow of financial resources to support product and factor markets. The Bank of Thailand, the country’s central bank, has respected IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

Credit is generally allocated on market terms rather than by “direct lending.” Foreign investors are not restricted from borrowing on the local market. In theory, the private sector has access to a wide variety of credit instruments, ranging from fixed term lending to overdraft protection to bills of exchange and bonds. However, the private debt market is not well developed; most corporate financing, whether for short-term working capital needs, trade financing, or project financing, requires borrowing from commercial banks or other financial institutions.

Money and Banking System

In general, a commercial bank in Thailand provides services of accepting deposits from the public, granting credit, buying and selling foreign currencies, buying and selling bills of exchange (including discounting or re-discounting, accepting, and guaranteeing bills of exchange).  Commercial banks also provide credit guarantees, payment, remittance and financial instruments for risk management, such as interest-rate derivatives and foreign-exchange derivatives. Additional business to support capital market development, such as debt and equity instruments, is allowed. A commercial bank may also provide other services, such as bank assurance and e-banking, which enhance its efficiency.

Thailand’s banking sector, with 14 domestic commercial banks, is sound and well-capitalized. As of December 2018, non-performing loan rates were low (around 2.93 percent) and the ratio of capital funds/risk assets (capital adequacy) was high (17.6 percent). Thailand’s largest commercial bank is Bangkok Bank, with assets totaling USD 96.5 billion as of December 2018. The combined assets of the five largest commercial banks totaled USD 413 billion, or 77 percent of the total assets of the Thai banking system, at the end of 2018.

Thailand’s central bank is the Bank of Thailand (BOT), which is headed by a Governor appointed for a five-year term. The BOT prints and issues banknotes and other security documents, promotes monetary stability and formulates monetary policies, manages the BOT’s assets, provides banking facilities to the government, acts as the registrar of government bonds, and provides banking facilities for financial institutions.

There are currently 11 registered foreign bank branches and four foreign bank subsidiaries operating in Thailand, including Citibank, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase. Foreign commercial banks can set up a branch in Thailand, once the applicant obtains a recommendation from the Bank of Thailand and a license from the Ministry of Finance. Foreign commercial bank branches are limited to three branches/ATMs and foreign commercial bank subsidiaries are limited to 20 branches and 20 off-premise ATMs per subsidiary. Foreign banks must maintain minimum capital funds of 125 million baht (USD 3.86 million at end of 2018 exchange rates) invested in government or state enterprise securities, or directly deposited in the Bank of Thailand. The number of expatriate management personnel is limited to six people at full branches, although Thai authorities frequently grant exceptions on the basis of need. There are no records of losses among banks in the past three years.

Non-residents can open and maintain foreign currency accounts without deposit and withdrawal ceilings. Any deposits in Thai Baht currency must be derived from one of the following sources:  conversion of foreign currencies; payment of goods and services; or capital transfers. Withdrawals are freely permitted, except the withdrawal of funds for credit to another non-resident person or purchase of foreign currency involving an overdraft.

Since mid-2017, the BOT has approved Thai domestic banks’ requests to develop financial innovations based on blockchain technology, but the system is being closely monitored under the BOT’s “Regulatory Sandbox guidelines.”

Thailand’s alternative financial services include cooperatives, micro-saving groups, the state village funds, and informal money lenders, who provide basic but expensive financial services to households, mostly in rural areas. These alternative financial services, with the exception of informal money lenders, are regulated by the government.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

There are no limitations placed on foreign investors for converting, transferring, or repatriating funds associated with an investment; however, supporting documentation is required. Any person who brings Thai Baht currency or foreign currency in or out of Thailand with aggregate amount exceeding USD 15,000 or the equivalent must declare the currency at a Customs checkpoint. Investment funds are allowed to be freely converted into any currency.

The exchange rate is generally determined by market fundamentals but is carefully scrutinized by the BOT under a managed float system. During periods of excessive capital inflows/outflows (i.e., exchange rate speculation), the central bank has stepped in to prevent extreme movements in the currency and to reduce the duration and extent of the exchange rate’s deviation from a targeted equilibrium.

Remittance Policies

Thailand imposes no limitations on the inflow or outflow of funds for remittances of profits or revenue for direct and portfolio investments. There are no time limitations on remittances.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Thailand does not have a sovereign wealth fund and the Bank of Thailand is not pursuing the creation of such a fund. However, the International Monetary Fund has urged Thailand to create a sovereign wealth fund due to its large accumulated foreign exchange reserves (USD 205.6 billion as of December 2018.

Thailand’s 56 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have total assets of USD 422 billion and a combined net income of USD 8.3 billion (end of 2018 figures). They employ around 270,000 people, or 0.7 percent of the Thai labor force. Thailand’s SOEs operate primarily in service delivery, in particular in the energy, telecommunications, transportation, and financial sectors. The full list of SOEs is available at the website of the State Enterprise Policy Office under the Ministry of Finance: (www.sepo.go.th  ).

The Thai government generally defines SOEs as special agencies established by law for a particular purpose that are 100 percent owned by the government (through the Ministry of Finance as a primary shareholder). The government recognizes a second category of “limited liability companies/public companies” in which the government owns 50 percent or more of the shares. Of the 56 total SOEs, 43 are wholly-owned and 13 are majority-owned. Twelve of these companies are classed as limited liability companies. Five are publicly listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand:  Thai Airways International Public Company Limited; Airports of Thailand Public Company Limited; PTT Public Company Limited; MCOT Public Company Limited; and Krung Thai Bank Public Company Limited. By regulation, at least one-third of SOE boards must be comprised of independent directors.

Private enterprises can compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products/services, and incentives in most sectors, but there are some exceptions, such as fixed-line operations in the telecommunications sector.

According to officials at the State Enterprise Policy Committee (SEPO), Thai SOEs adhere to OECD guidelines on corporate governance, including guidelines relating to the state acting as an owner. Nevertheless, adherence to the OECD guidelines is not sufficient in Thailand to ensure a level playing field between SOEs and private sector enterprises, which are often disadvantaged in competing with Thai SOEs for contracts.

Generally, SOE senior management reports directly to a line minister and to SEPO. Corporate board seats are typically allocated to senior government officials or politically-affiliated individuals. The SEPO Committee purportedly tries to limit political interference in board appointments.

Privatization Program

The 1999 State Enterprise Corporatization Act provides a framework for conversion of SOEs into stock companies, and corporatization is viewed as an intermediate step toward eventual privatization. (Note: “corporatization” describes the process by which an SOE adjusts its internal structure to resemble a publicly-traded enterprise; “privatization” denotes that a majority of the SOE’s shares is sold to the public; and “partial privatization” refers to a situation in which less than half of a company’s shares are sold to the public.) Foreign investors are allowed to participate in privatizations, but restrictions are applied in certain sectors, as regulated by the FBA and the Act on Standards Qualifications for Directors and Employees of State Enterprises of 1975, as amended. However, privatizations have been on hold since 2006 largely due to strong opposition from labor unions.

A 15-member State Enterprises Policy Commission, or “superboard,” oversees reform of the country’s 56 SOEs. In March 2015, the superboard approved, in principle, the establishment of a holding firm to supervise 12 SOEs, which have been partially equitized and listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The reform plan calls for SEPO to retain supervisory authority over SOEs that have been established by specific laws, including the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, the Metropolitan Electricity Authority, and the Provincial Electricity Authority. As of the end of 2018, the superboard is still in the process of advancing a new law that would reform SOEs and ensure transparent management decisions; however, privatization is not part of this process.

In 2018, the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights visited Thailand and commended the Thai government’s 2017 commitment to implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP). Thailand does not have a National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct (RBC), nor does it maintain a National Contact Point (NCP) for OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Various line ministries have taken steps to encourage RBC through integrated sustainable business practices focused on respecting human rights, environmental protection, labor relations, and financial accountability. The Ministry of Justice is currently drafting a National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights (NAP).

The Ministry of Industry’s Department of Industrial Works encourages the private sector to implement its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR-DIW) standards as a precursor to achieving ISO 26000 standards (an international standard on CSR). In 2017, the Ministry of Industry joined the National Human Rights Committee, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the Federation of Thai Industries, the Thai Bankers Association, the Thai Chamber of Commerce, and the Global Computing Network of Thailand in signing a memorandum of cooperation to advance implementation of the UNGP.

There are several local NGOs that promote and monitor RBC. Most such NGOs operate without hindrance, though a few have experienced intimidation as a result of their work monitoring civil rights issues. International NGOs continue to call on the Thai government and Thai companies with transboundary investments to act more responsibly with respect to human and labor rights.

Thailand has a legal framework and a range of institutions to counter corruption. The Organic Law to Counter Corruption criminalizes corrupt practices of public officials and corporations, including active and passive bribery of public officials. The anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials and to political parties.

Thai Procurement Regulations prohibit collusion amongst bidders. If an examination confirms allegations or suspicions of collusion among bidders, the names of those applicants must be removed from the list of competitors.

Thailand adopted its first national government procurement law in December 2016. Based on UNCITRAL model laws and the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, the law applies to all government agencies, local authorities, and state-owned enterprises, and aims to improve transparency. Officials who violate the law are subject to 1-10 years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to USD 11,000.

Since 2010, the Thai Institute of Directors has built an anti-corruption coalition of Thailand’s largest businesses. Coalition members sign a Collective Action Against Corruption Declaration and pledge to take tangible, measurable steps to reduce corruption-related risks identified by third party certification. The Center for International Private Enterprise equipped the Thai Institute of Directors and its coalition partners with an array of tools for training and collective action.

Established in 2011, the Anti-Corruption Organization of Thailand (ACT) aims to encourage the government to create laws to reduce corruption. ACT has 51 member organizations drawn from the private, public and academic sectors. Their signature program is the “integrity pact.” Drafted by ACT and the Finance Ministry and based on a tool promoted by Transparency International, the pact forbids bribes from signatory members in bidding for government contacts. Member agencies and companies must adhere to strict transparency rules by disclosing and making easily available to the public all relevant bidding information such as the terms of reference and the cost of the project.

Thailand is a party to the UN Anti-Corruption Convention, but not the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

Thailand’s Witness Protection Act offers protection (to include police protection) to witnesses, including NGO employees, who are eligible for special protection measures in anti-corruption cases.

Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Thailand 99th out of 180 countries in 2018. According to some studies, a cultural propensity to forgive bribes as a normal part of doing business and to equate cash payments with finders’ fees or consultants’ charges, coupled with the low salaries of civil servants, encourages officials to accept illegal inducements. U.S. executives with experience in Thailand often advise new-to market companies that it is far easier to avoid corrupt transactions from the beginning than to stop such practices once a company has been identified as willing to operate in this fashion. American firms that comply with the strict guidelines of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) are able to compete successfully in Thailand. U.S. businessmen say that publicly affirming the need to comply with the FCPA helps to shield their companies from pressure to pay bribes.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies responsible for combating corruption:

International Affairs Strategy Specialist
Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission
361 Nonthaburi Road, Thasaai District, Amphur Muang Nonthaburi 11000, Thailand
Tel: +662-528-4800
Email: TACC@nacc.go.th

Contact at “watchdog” organization:

Dr. Mana Nimitmongkol
Secretary General
Anti-Corruption Organization of Thailand
44 Srijulsup Tower, 16th floor, Phatumwan, Bangkok 10330
Tel: +662-613-8863
Email: mana2020@yahoo.com

On March 24, 2019, Thailand held its first national election since the 2014 military coup that ousted democratically elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. On June 5, the newly-seated Parliament elected coup leader General Prayut Chan-o-cha to continue on in his role as Prime Minister. However, stark political divisions remain in the country.

Violence related to an ongoing Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces has claimed more than 7,000 lives since 2004. Although the number of deaths and violent incidents has decreased year-over-year, efforts to end the ethno-nationalist insurgency have so far been unsuccessful. The government is currently engaged in peace talks with an insurgent umbrella group, but the principal insurgent faction refuses to participate. Almost all attacks have occurred in the three southernmost provinces of the country.

In 2018, 38.4 million people were in Thailand’s formal labor pool, comprising 58 percent of the total population. Thailand’s official unemployment rates stood at 1.1 percent at the end of 2018, slightly less than 1.2 percent the previous year. Unemployment among youth (15-24 years old) is around 4.8 percent, while the rate is only 0.5 percent for adults over 25 years old. Well over half the labor force (55.3 percent) earns income in the informal sector, including through self-employment and family labor, which limits their access to social welfare programs.

Low fertility rates and an aging population, as well as a skills mismatch, is exacerbating labor shortages in many sectors. Despite provision of 15 years of universal, free education, Thailand continues to suffer from a skills mismatch that impedes innovation and economic growth. Manufacturing firms in Thailand consider the lack of skilled workers a top constraint for further investment and growth. However, as the second-largest economy in ASEAN, Thailand has an agile business sector and a large cohort of educated individuals who could increase productivity in the future. Regional income inequality and labor shortages, particularly in labor-intensive manufacturing, construction, hospitality and service sectors, have attracted millions of migrant workers, mostly from Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. In 2019, the International Organization for Migration estimated Thailand hosts 4.9 million migrant workers, or 13 percent of country’s labor force. Flows of documented migrant workers entering the country through formal work agreements, or “MOUs,” increased by 40 percent over the previous year to 442,726 in 2018. However, about two-thirds of registered migrant workers currently in Thailand initially entered the country through unauthorized channels, often without any primary identity documents from their countries of origin.

In 2018, the Thai government sought to strengthen labor migration management and increase protections for migrant workers by, first, working with neighboring source countries to make it easier for migrant workers to obtain primary identity documents and, second, registering 1.2 million previously undocumented migrant workers. Thailand is the first country in ASEAN to accede to the ILO Forced Labor Protocol (P29) and ILO Work in Fishing Convention (C188). Additional information on migrant workers issues and rights can be found in the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report, as well as the Labor Rights chapter of the U.S. Human Rights report.

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

Vietnam continues to welcome FDI and foreign companies play an important role in the economy. According to the Government Statistics Office (GSO), FDI exports of USD 175 billion accounted for 72 percent of total exports in 2018 (compared to 47 percent in 2000).

Despite improvements in the business environment, including economic reforms intended to enhance competitiveness and productivity, Vietnam has benefited from global investors’ efforts to diversify their supply chains. Vietnam’s rankings fell in the most recent World Economic Forum Competitiveness Index (from 74/135 in 2017 to 77/140 in 2018) and World Bank Doing Business Index (from 68 in 2018 to 69 in 2019), but its raw scores improved compared to prior years. According to the 2018 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Investment Policy Review, Vietnam has an “average” level of openness compared to other OECD countries, though it is second to only Singapore within ASEAN. The OECD ranked Vietnam’s openness to FDI as higher than that of South Korea, Australia, and Mexico.

Vietnam seeks to move up the global value chain by attracting FDI in sectors that will facilitate technology transfer, increase skill sets in the labor market, and improve labor productivity, specifically targeting high-tech, high value-added industries with good environmental safeguards. Assisted by the World Bank, the government is drafting a new FDI Attraction Strategy for 2030. This new strategy is intended to facilitate technology transfer and environmental protection, and will supposedly move away from tax reductions to other incentives, such as using accelerated depreciation and more flexible loss carry-forward provisions and focusing on value-added qualities instead of on sectoral categories.

Since the Prime Minister included the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) as a target for improving national business competitiveness in Resolution 19 in 2014, PCI has become a major measurement for provincial economic governance policy reform. In January 2019, a new Resolution 02 also included PCI targets as a means to improve the business and investment environment in Vietnam.

Although there are foreign ownership limits (FOL), the government does not have investment laws discriminating against foreign investors; however, the government continues to favor domestic companies through various incentives. According to the OECD 2018 Investment Policy Review, SOEs account for one third of Vietnam’s gross domestic product and receive preferential treatment, including favorable access to credit and land. Regulations are often written to avoid overt conflicts and violations of bilateral or international agreements, but in reality, U.S. investors feel there is not always a level playing field in all sectors. In the 2018 Perceptions of the Business Environment Report, the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) stated: “Foreign investors need a level playing field, not only to attract more investment in the future, but also to maintain the investment that is already here. Frequent and retroactive changes of laws and regulations – including tax rates and policies – are significant risks for foreign investors in Vietnam.”

The Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) oversees an Investment Promotion Department to facilitate all foreign investments, and most of provinces and cities have investment promotion agencies. The agencies provide information, explain regulations, and offer support to investors when requested.

The semiannual Vietnam Business Forum allows for a direct dialogue between the foreign business community and government officials. The U.S.-ASEAN Business Council (USABC) also hosts multiple missions for its U.S. company members enabling direct engagement with senior government officials through frequent dialogues to try to resolve issues. In addition, the 2018 PCI noted 68.5 percent of surveyed companies stated that dialogues and business meetings with provincial authorities helped address obstacles and that they were satisfied with the way provincial regulators dealt with their concerns.  

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own businesses in Vietnam, except in six prohibited areas (illicit drugs, wildlife trading, prostitution, human trafficking, human cloning, and chemical trading). If a domestic or foreign company wants to operate in 243 provisional sectors, it must satisfy conditions in accordance with the 2014 Investment Law. Future amendments to the law are likely to narrow this list further, allowing firms to engage in more business areas. Foreign investors must negotiate on a case-by-case basis for market access in sectors that are not explicitly open under existing signed trade agreements. The government occasionally issues investment licenses on a pilot basis with time limits, or to specifically targeted investors.

Vietnam allows foreign investors to acquire full ownership of local companies, except when mentioned otherwise in international and bilateral commitments, including equity caps, mandatory domestic joint-venture partner, and investment prohibitions. For example, as specified in the Vietnam’s World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments, highly specialized and sensitive sectors (such as banking, telecommunication, and transportation) still maintain FOL, but the Prime Minister can waive these restrictions on a case-by-case basis. Vietnam also limits foreign ownership of SOEs and prohibits importation of old equipment and technologies more than 10 years old. No mechanisms disadvantage or single out U.S. investors.

Merger and acquisition (M&A) activities can be complicated if the target domestic company is operating in a restricted or prohibited sector. For example, when a foreign investor buys into a local company through an M&A transaction, it is difficult to determine which business lines the acquiring foreign company is allowed to maintain and, in many cases, the targeted company may be forced to reduce its business lines.

The 2017 Law on Technology Transfer came into effect in July 2018, along with its implementing documents Decree 76/2018/ND-CP and Circular 02/2018/TT-BKHCN. These require mandatory registration of technology transfers from a foreign country to Vietnam. This registration is separate from registration of intellectual property rights and licenses.  

Vietnam allows for five years of regulatory data protection (RDP) as part of its U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement obligations.  However, Vietnamese law requires companies to apply separately for RDP within the 12 months following receipt of market authorization for any country in the world. Specifically, decree No. 169/2018/ND-CP, effective from February 2018, tightened the regulatory process for the registration of medical devices and no longer accepted foreign classification results in Vietnam, lengthening procedural time and increasing expenses for foreign manufacturers.

Vietnamese authorities screen investment-license applications using a number of criteria, including: 1) the investor’s legal status and financial capabilities; 2) the project’s compatibility with the government’s “Master Plan” for economic and social development and projected revenue; 3) technology and expertise; 4) environmental protection; 5) plans for land-use and land-clearance compensation; 6) project incentives including tax rates, and 7) land, water, and sea surface rental fees. The decentralization of licensing authority to provincial authorities has, in some cases, streamlined the licensing process and reduced processing times. However, it has also caused considerable regional differences in procedures and interpretations of investment laws and regulations. Insufficient guidelines and unclear regulations can prompt local authorities to consult national authorities, resulting in additional delays. Furthermore, the approval process is often much longer than the timeframe mandated by laws. Many U.S. firms have successfully navigated the investment process, though a lack of transparency in the procedure for obtaining a business license can make investing riskier.

Provincial People’s Committees approve all investment projects, except the following:

• The National Assembly must approve investment projects that:
  • have a significant environmental impact;
  • change land usage in national parks;
  • are located in protected forests larger than 50 hectares; or
  • require relocating 20,000 people or more in remote areas such as mountainous regions.
• The Prime Minister must approve the following types of investment project proposals:
  • building airports, seaports, or casinos;
  • exploring, producing and processing oil and gas;  
  • producing tobacco;
  • possessing investment capital of more than VND 5,000 billion (USD 233 million);
  • including foreign investors in sea transportation, telecommunication or network infrastructure, forest plantation, publishing, or press; and
  • involving fully foreign-owned scientific and technology companies or organizations.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

Vietnam went through an OECD Investment Policy Review in 2018. The WTO reviewed Vietnam’s trade policy and the report is online. (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp387_e.htm  ).

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) conducted an investment policy review in 2009. (https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=521  )

Business Facilitation

Vietnam’s business environment continues to improve due to new laws that have streamlined the business registration processes.

The 2018 PCI report found that 75 percent of companies rated paperwork and procedures as simple, compared to 51 percent in 2015. Vietnam decreased duplicate and overlapping inspections with only 10 percent of companies reporting such cases in 2018, compared to 25 percent in 2015. However, many firms still felt the entry costs remain too high and 16 percent reported waiting over one month to complete all required paperwork (aside from getting a business license) to become fully legal. In addition, a 2018 AmCham position paper cited very frequent and largely unnecessary post-import audits as creating burdens for companies. Multiple U.S. companies report facing recurring and unpredictable tax audits based on assumptions or calculations not in alignment with international standards.

Vietnam’s nationwide business registration site is http://dangkykinhdoanh.gov.vn  . In addition, as a member of the UNCTAD international network of transparent investment procedures, information on Vietnam’s investment regulations can be found online (http://vietnam.eregulations.org/  ). The website provides information for foreign and national investors on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations, including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal and regulatory citations for seven major provinces. The 2019 World Bank’s Doing Business Report stated it took on average 17 days to start a business compared to 22 days in 2018. Vietnam is one of the few countries to receive a 10-star rating from UNCTAD in business registration procedures.

Outward Investment

The government does not have a clear mechanism to promote or incentivize outward investments. The majority of companies engaged in overseas investments are large SOEs, which have strong government-backed financial resources. The government does not implicitly restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. Vietnamese companies have increased investments in the oil, gas, and telecommunication sectors in various developing countries and countries with which Vietnam has close political relationships. According to a government’s most recent report, between 2011-2016, SOE PetroVietnam made USD 7 billion in outbound investments out of a total of USD 12.6 billion from all SOEs.

Real Property

The State collectively owns and manages all land in Vietnam, and therefore neither foreigners nor Vietnamese nationals can own land. However, the government grants land-use and building rights, often to individuals.  According to the Ministry of National Resources and Environment (MONRE), as of September 2018, the government has issued land-use rights certificates for 96.9 percent of land in Vietnam. If land is not used, according to the land-use rights certificate or if it is unoccupied, it reverts to the government. Vietnam is building a national land-registration database, and some localities have already digitized their land records.

The MONRE is drafting amendments to the 2013 Land Law, which would focus on several major issues, including eradicating the farmland acquisition quota, increasing cases of land recovery by the State, assigning district-level administrators rather than provincial-level administrators to accurately set land prices, and allowing foreigners to own homes in Vietnam. MONRE expects to submit the draft law to the National Assembly for review and approval in 2020.    

State protection of property rights is still evolving, as the State can expropriate land for socio-economic development. Under the Housing Law and Real Estate Business Law passed by the National Assembly in November 2014, the government can take land if it deems it necessary for socio-economic development in the public or national interest and the Prime Minister, the National Assembly, or the Provincial People’s Council approves such action. However, the law loosely defined “socio-economic” development, and there are many outstanding legal disputes between landowners and local authorities. Disputes over land rights continue to be a significant driver of social protest in Vietnam. Foreign investors also may be exposed to land disputes through merger and acquisition activities when they buy into a local company.

In addition to land, the State’s collective property includes “forests, rivers and lakes, water supplies, wealth lying underground or coming from the sea, the continental shelf and the air, the funds and property invested by the government in enterprises, and works in all branches and fields – the economy, culture, society, science, technology, external relations, national defense, security – and all other property determined by law as belonging to the State.”

The Housing Law and Real Estate Business Law extended “land-use rights” to foreign investors, allowing titleholders to conduct property transactions, including mortgages. Foreign investors can lease land for renewable periods of 50 years, and up to 70 years in some poor areas of the country.

In June 2018, the National Assembly decided to delay indefinitely the debate on and adoption of the controversial draft Law on Special Administrative and Economic Zones. The law aimed to loosen regulations on foreign investors, permitting them to lease land in the Van Don, Bac Van Phong, and Phu Quoc Special Administrative and Economic Zones for up to 99 years. The National Assembly’s decision followed widespread protests against the proposed law.  

Some investors have encountered difficulties amending investment licenses to expand operations onto land adjoining existing facilities. Investors also note that local authorities may intend to increase requirements for land-use rights when current rights must be renewed, particularly in instances when the investment in question competes with Vietnamese companies.

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)

The legal basis for IPR includes the 2005 Civil Code, the 2005 Intellectual Property (IP) Law as amended in 2009, the 2015 Penal Code, and implementing regulations and decrees. Vietnam has joined the Paris Convention on Industrial Property and the Berne Convention on Copyright; the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations; the Patent Cooperation Treaty; the Madrid Protocol; and the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. It has worked to meet its commitments under these international treaties. The Vietnamese government has ratified the revised Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights protocol, which took effect on January 23, 2017.  On January 1, 2018, the 2015 Penal Code entered into force with clearer guidelines on the application of criminal penalties for certain acts of IPR infringement or piracy. For the first time, commercial entities can be liable for violations. On June 12, 2018, the National Assembly passed a new Law on Competition, eliminating outdated IP-related unfair competition provisions and bringing guidelines in line with Vietnam’s other IP laws. The government also issued Decree No. 22/2018/ND-CP, which replaced a 2006 regulation and updated copyright guidelines under the Civil Code and Law on IP. However, enforcement agencies still lack clarity and experience in how to impose criminal penalties on IPR violators and continue to wait for further implementing guidelines. On June 19, 2018, the Prime Minister issued Directive No. 17/CT-TTg to strengthen the fight against smuggling, commercial fraud, and the production and trade of low-quality foods and fake goods, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics.

Circular No. 16/2016/TT-BKHCN, which amends and supplements a number of articles of Circular No. 01/2007/TT-BKHCN, one of the core regulations in the Vietnam IP system, came into force on January 15, 2018. IP attorneys expect the circular will have a significant, positive impact on patent and trademark examination procedures, but also expect further revisions in 2019 and in the IP Law revision. The National Assembly ratified the CPTPP on November 2, 2018, and Vietnam intends to amend laws, including the Law on Intellectual Property, to align with the international treaty by 2021. With technical support from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Vietnam in 2017 also completed a National Strategy for Intellectual Property to create a roadmap for promoting innovation and a more effective IP framework by 2030.

Although Vietnam has made progress in establishing a legal framework for IPR protection, significant problems remain and new challenges are emerging. The country remains on the Special 301 Watch List. The rate of unlicensed software in Vietnam is still high, at 74 percent, according to the Software Alliance’s latest data, representing a commercial value of USD 492 million. In 2018, Vietnam had mixed results in its efforts to protect IPR. Vietnam’s continued integration into the global economic community, as well as increasing domestic pressure for IP protections, may stimulate positive change. Nevertheless, infringement and piracy remained commonplace, and the impact of digital piracy and the increasing prevalence of counterfeit goods sold online continued to undermine the IPR environment. The increasingly sophisticated capabilities of domestic counterfeiters, coupled with developing smuggling routes through Vietnam’s porous borders, were also worrisome trends. There are ten ministries sharing some level of responsibility for IPR enforcement and protection, which often leads to duplication or confusion. Additionally, the roles and power of these ministries and agencies varies widely. In October 2018, the MOIT upgraded the Market Surveillance Agency, the country’s leading IP enforcement agency, to the Directorate of Market Surveillance (DMS). The move requires all 63 provincial-level market surveillance departments to report directly to the national agency rather than to local provincial governments, improving coordination and efficiency among enforcement agencies.

In 2018, the Intellectual Property Office of Vietnam (IP Vietnam) reported receiving 108,375 IP applications of all types (an increase of 5.9 percent compared to 2017), of which 63,617 were registered for industrial property rights (up 8.7 percent compared to 2017). IP Vietnam reported granting 2,212 patents in 2018 (up 27 percent from 2017). Industrial designs registrations reached 2,360 in 2018 (up 4.1 percent from 2017). In total, IP Vietnam granted more than 29,040 protection titles for industrial property, out of more than 63,617 applications in 2018 (up 8.1 percent from 2017). The DMS processed 6,149 counterfeit and IP infringement cases and collected USD 5,500 in fines.  The most infringed products were agricultural materials, agricultural and pharmaceutical products, and spare automobile parts.  

The Copyright Office of Vietnam received and settled seven copyright petitions, and received and settled 12 requests for copyright assessment in 2018. In 2018, the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism Inspectorate carried out inspections for software licensing compliance and discovered 46 violations that resulted in fines of USD 58,000, a 15 percent decrease in fines from 2017.

For more information, please see the following reports from the U.S. Trade Representative:

Special 301 Report:

https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/intellectual-property/special-301/2018-special-301-review  

Notorious Markets Report: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2017 percent20Notorious percent20Markets percent20List percent201.11.18.pdf 

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/  .

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

While the government has acknowledged the need to strengthen both the capital and debt markets, there has been little progress, leaving the banking sector as the primary capital source for Vietnamese companies. Challenges to raising capital domestically include insufficient transparency in Vietnam’s financial markets and non-compliance with internationally accepted accounting standards.

Vietnam welcomes foreign portfolio investment; however, Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) continues to classify Vietnam as a Frontier Market, which precludes some of the world’s biggest asset managers from investing in its stock markets. Vietnam is improving its legal framework in an effort to reach its goal of meeting the “emerging market” criteria in 2020 and attracting more foreign capital. The UK-based FTSE Russell’s decision to place Vietnam on its watch list for possible reclassification as a “Secondary Emerging Market” in September 2018 could also encourage faster reforms.  

The government is drafting amendments to the Securities Law (revised in 2010) along with decrees, circulars, and guiding documents, and is targeting submission to the National Assembly for approval late in 2019. These will likely include comprehensive changes on securities trading, corporate governance, share issuance, and most notably foreign ownership limits (FOL), to help move Vietnam toward emerging market status.

The State Securities Commission (SSC) under the MOF regulates Vietnam’s two stock exchanges, the HCMC Stock Exchange (HOSE), which lists larger companies, and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX), which has smaller companies, bonds, and derivatives. Vietnam also has a market for unlisted public companies (UPCOM) at the Hanoi Securities Center, where many equitized SOEs first list their shares (due to lower transparency requirements) before moving to the HOSE or HNX. In January 2019, the Prime Minister approved a plan to establish the Vietnam Stock Exchange (VSE) as a MOF wholly state-owned company, which would own both the HOSE and HNX.

There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and maintain sizable positions.  Stock and fund certificate liquidity increased in 2018, reaching an average trading value per session of around USD 280 million, up 30 percent from 2017. Combined market capitalization at the end of 2018 was approximately USD 169 billion, equal to 80 percent of Vietnam’s GDP, with the HOSE accounting for USD 124 billion, the HNX USD 8 billion, and the UPCOM USD 37 billion. Bond market capitalization reached over USD 50 billion in 2018, the majority of which were government bonds, largely held by domestic commercial banks. Insurance firms also were noticeably more active government bond investors in 2018.  

Vietnam complies with International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII. The government notified the IMF that it accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, effective November 8, 2005.

Local banks charge relatively high interest rates for new loans because they must continue to service existing non-performing loans (NPLs). Domestic companies, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs), often have difficulty accessing credit. Foreign investors are generally able to obtain local financing.

Money and Banking System

Since recovering from the 2008 global downturn, Vietnam’s banking sector has been stable. However, despite various banking reforms, the sector continues to be concentrated at the top and fragmented at the bottom. Based on its 2018 survey, the central bank, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), estimated that 50 percent of Vietnam’s population is underbanked or does not have bank accounts, due to an inherent distrust of the banking sector; the ingrained habit of holding assets in cash, foreign currency, and gold; and the limited use of financial technology tools. However, this SBV estimate appears significantly understated, with the likely percentage being closer to 70 percent.  The World Bank’s The Global Findex Database 2017 (the most recent available) estimated that only 31 percent of Vietnamese over the age of 15 had an account at a financial institution or through a mobile money provider.

The banking sector’s estimated total assets in 2018 were USD 481 billion, of which USD 207 billion belonged to seven state-owned and majority state-controlled commercial banks, accounting for 44 percent of total assets. Though grouped under joint-stock (private) commercial banks, the Bank of Investment and Development Bank (BIDV), Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Industry and Trade (VietinBank), and Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (Vietcombank) all are majority-controlled by SBV. In addition, the SBV holds 100 percent of Agribank, Global Petro Commercial Bank (GPBank), Construction Bank (CBBank), and Oceanbank.  

In addition, there were nine foreign-owned banks (HSBC, Standard Chartered, Shinhan, Hong Leong, Woori Bank, Public Bank, CIMB Bank, ANZ, and United Overseas Bank), 49 branches of foreign banks, 52 representatives of foreign credit institutions, and two joint-venture banks (Vietnam-Russia Bank and Indovina Bank).

Vietnam has made progress in recent years to reduce its NPLs, but most domestic banks remain under-capitalized with high NPL levels that continue to drag on economic growth. Accurate NPL data is not available and the central bank frequently underreports the level of NPLs. In 2018, the NPL ratio on the banks’ balance sheets reportedly went down to 2.4 percent, from 2.5 percent in 2017, while the off-balance sheet NPL ratio remain unpublished. The SBV attributes the declining NPL level to the uptrend of the property markets and its application of the National Assembly’s 2017 Resolution 42 which helps credit institutions and the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) to repossess collateral and better manage bad loans. Under its Development Strategy of the Vietnam Banking Sector to 2025, the SBV aims to reduce the NPL ratio at the banks and the VAMC to below 3 percent by 2020 (excluding poorly performing banks under a separate structure.)

Other issues in the banking sector include state-directed lending by state-owned commercial banks, cross-ownership, related-party lending under non-commercial criteria, and preferential loans to SOEs that crowd out credit to SMEs. By law, banks must maintain a minimum-chartered capital of VND 3 trillion (roughly USD 134 million); however, Vietnam is moving towards adoption of Basel II standards in 2020.

Currently, the total FOL in a Vietnamese bank is 30 percent, with a 5 percent limit for non-strategic individual investors, a 15 percent limit for non-strategic institutional investors, and a 20 percent limit for strategic institutional partners. Prudential measures and regulations apply the same to domestic and foreign banks. To meet the capital adequacy ratio required by Basel II, many banks are seeking overseas capital, and calling for relaxation of the FOL.

We are unaware of any lost correspondent-banking relationships in the past three years. However, after the SBV took over three failing banks (Ocean Bank, Construction Bank, and GP Bank), and placed Dong A Bank under special supervision in 2015, correspondent-banking relationships with those banks may have been limited.

The government is trying to leverage Vietnam’s high adoption rate of mobile and smart phones to promote financial inclusion, increase use of electronic payments, and shift Vietnam towards a cashless society. Although the SBV announced plans to implement a “regulatory sandbox” for financial technology (fintech) activities to inform its future updates to the legal framework, it has not yet published details and has licensed only 26 organizations to provide cashless services. Fintech is rapidly gaining market acceptance as many banks have implemented QR code payments and others have deployed online payment services. Nearly 100 fintech startups have reportedly launched in Vietnam, operating mainly in the e-payments space. However, these startups must overcome many legal mechanisms and policies, such as obtaining licenses.  No foreign e-payments fintech companies have such licenses yet.

Cryptocurrencies remain prohibited as legal tender, preventing the issuance, supply, and use of Bitcoin and other similar virtual currency as a means of payment. Failure to comply can result in criminal prosecution. However, in 2018, the MOJ reportedly submitted to the Prime Minister’s office for approval a crypto-assets proposal, though it has yet to make public any details.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange Policies

There are no restrictions on foreign investors converting and repatriating earnings or investment capital from Vietnam. However, funds associated with any form of investment cannot be freely converted into any world currency.

The SBV has a mechanism to determine the interbank reference exchange rate. In order to provide flexibility in responding to exchange rate volatility, the SBV announces a daily interbank reference exchange rate. The rate is determined based on the previous day’s average interbank exchange rates, taking into account movements in the currencies of Vietnam’s major trading and investment partners.

Remittance Policies

Vietnam mandates all monetary transactions must be in Vietnamese Dong (VND), and allows foreign businesses to remit lawful profits, capital contributions, and other legal investment activity revenues in foreign currency authorized credit institutions. There are no time constraints on remittances or limitations on outflow; however, outward foreign currency transactions require supporting documents (such as audited financial statements, import/foreign-service procurement contracts and proof of tax obligation fulfillment, and approval of the SBV on loan contracts etc.). Foreign investors are also required to submit notification of profit remittance abroad to tax authorities at least seven working days prior to the remittance.

The inflow of foreign currency to Vietnam is less constrained.  There are no recent changes or plans to change investment remittance policies that either tighten or relax access to foreign exchange for investment remittances.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) technically qualifies as a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), as its mandate includes investing dividends and proceeds from privatization.  The Ministry of Finance transferred oversight of SCIC and 18 other large SOEs to the Committee for Management of State Capital at Enterprises (CMSC) in November 2018, following the CMSC’s launch in September 2018 and the issuance of the Prime Minister’s Decree 131 defining its functions, tasks, powers, and organizational structure.

As of August 31, 2018, the SCIC had invested in 139 businesses, with nearly USD 866.3 million in state capital (book value). The SCIC does not manage or invest balance-of-payment surpluses, official foreign currency operations, government transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, or surpluses from resource exports. SCIC’s primary mandate is to manage the non-privatized portion of SOEs. The SCIC invests 100 percent of its portfolio in Vietnam, and the SCIC’s investment of dividends and divestment proceeds does not appear to have any ramifications for U.S. investors. The SCIC budget is reasonably transparent, audited, and can be found at http://www.scic.vn/  .

According to the World Bank, SOEs would benefit from a “modern corporate governance system that separates state ownership rights from regulatory functions and implements an objective and transparent mechanism for the selection of CEOs and board members.” The government framework for wholly owned SOEs is fragmented, incoherent, and the management of SOEs is not in line with sound corporate governance. To improve corporate governance and SOE efficiency, the government established the CMSC in 2018. The government’s aim was to separate state ownership from regulatory oversight of 19 large centrally owned SOEs by moving their supervision away from the line ministries to CMSC.

Vietnam currently has over 500 wholly owned SOEs – including seven groups, 57 corporations, and 441 other enterprises managed by ministries and localities, according to the Ministry of Finance. Vietnam does not publish a full list of SOEs and they operate in nearly every industrial sector. However, in 2016, the government issued Decision 58/2016/QD-TTg (Decision 58) specifying the industries and areas in which the government will have wholly owned and majority-owned enterprises, including electricity distribution, airport management and operation, large-scale mineral mining, production of basic chemicals, and telecommunications services with network infrastructure, among others.

While SOEs have boards of directors, these boards are not independent. After CMSC’s establishment, it took over the oversight of the 19 largest SOEs. Aside from the CMSC’s supervision of the 19 largest SOEs, ministries govern the remaining centrally owned SOEs, while provincial governments run local SOEs. CMSC, ministries, and local governments all can appoint their staff to the boards. For SOEs with majority shares owned by government, the government ministries, and provincial governments still have the right to appoint executive staff of the companies. SOE senior officials do not typically retain their government positions, but they still retain links to the government, and may return to government service once they terminate their employment with the SOE.

SOEs do not operate on a level playing field with domestic companies and continue to benefit from preferential access to resources such as land, capital, and political largesse. However, in the 2018 PCI report, the percentage of surveyed firms that believe provincial authorities favored SOEs declined from 41 percent in 2017 to 32 percent in 2018.

In 2015, the government issued Decree 81/2015/ND-CP to require SOEs to implement strict information disclosure procedures in accordance with listed company requirements. However, because there is no clear punishment for violations, SOEs have little incentive to follow the decree. Although over 40 percent of SOEs disclose the required information, MPI confirmed the quality of reporting was insufficient to assess the SOEs’ transparency. Although there are penalties for insufficient disclosure and non-disclosure, these penalties are not significant enough to improve information disclosure.

Privatization Program

Vietnam has been working to reform the SOE sector for over 15 years. Because SOE share sales have historically only transferred a nominal interest (2 to 3 percent) to the private sector, the process of privatization (also known as equitization) has been slow. Inadequate regulations specifying equitization procedures and pressure from vested interests present the biggest obstacles. Decree 58 specified sectors targeted for equitization, including airport management and related services, mineral mining and extraction, financial service and banking, chemical manufacturing, rice wholesale, petro and oil importation, telecommunications, rubber and coffee processors, and electricity distribution. It appears the government plans to sell or partially privatize the best, most efficient SOEs first to quickly raise cash, but has been slow to address inefficiencies in the rest.

Although the government appears more committed to privatization due to fiscal budget pressures and the necessity of expanding the private sector for continued economic growth, it has yet to meet its annual SOE equitization targets. After some notable large deals (Vinamilk in 2016 and Sabeco in 2017), the government released decision 1232/2017/QD-TTg in 2017, which listed 406 additional SOEs it would divest in the period 2017-2020, along with specific target divestment percentages. The decision aimed to reduce the number of wholly owned SOEs to about 150 by 2020. However, only 12 SOEs were equitized in 2018 against a target of 85 and share proceeds totaled less than USD 1 billion and divestments USD 880 million. The MOF expects the process to speed up in 2019 with equitization and divestment proceeds of over USD 2 billion. 

Foreign investors can invest in SOEs. SOE share bidding process information can be found at https://www.hsx.vn/Modules/Auction/Web/AucInfoList?fid=271f94f836a14eb0a7d2207c05f7a39e  , https://www.hnx.vn/en-gb/dau-gia/lich-dau-gia.html  , and http://www.scic.vn/english/index.php/investment.html  . SOE financial information is available on http://business.gov.vn/C percentC3 percentB4ngb percentE1 percentBB percent91Th percentC3 percentB4ngtin/Th percentC3 percentB4ngtindoanhnghi percentE1 percentBB percent87p.aspx  .

The government has issued regulations intended to protect the public from adverse business practices in relation to labor rights, consumer protection, and environmental protection. However, the enforcement of these laws is weak. The Enterprise Law allows shareholders to take court action against the management of a company and can nullify fully, or partly, a resolution of a shareholder general meeting through a court order or an arbitration decision. Companies are required to publish their corporate social responsibility activities, corporate governance work, information of related parties and transactions, and compensation of the management. Companies must also announce extraordinary circumstances, such as changes to management, dissolution, or establishment of subsidiaries, within 36 hours of the event.

Most multinational companies implement Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs that contribute to improving the business environment, and awareness of CSR programs is increasing among large domestic companies. The Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) conducts CSR training and highlights corporate engagement on a dedicated website (http://www.csr-vietnam.eu/  ) in partnership with the UN. In addition, AmCham also has a CSR group that organizes events and activities to raise awareness of social issues. Non-governmental organizations collaborate with government bodies, such as the VCCI and the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA), to promote business practices in Vietnam in line with international norms and standards. Discussions on ethical business standards during negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the CPTPP – in addition to the gradual introduction of CSR practices by some multinational corporations over the years – have helped to shift social expectations around business responsibilities in Vietnam.

Overall, the government has not defined responsible business conduct (RBC), nor has it established a national plan or agenda for RBC. The government has yet to establish a national contact point or ombudsman for stakeholders to get information or raise concerns about RBC. Vietnam may make additional strides in labor rights and ethical business practices in its revised Labor Code, due for discussion by the National Assembly in 2019.  

The 2005 Law on Enterprises in theory regulates corporate governance in line with OECD corporate governance principles. However, corporate governance standards are relatively weak in Vietnam, which ranks lower than Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, according to the most recent Asia Development Bank (ADB) 2017 report on ASEAN listed companies.

The government does not have regulations encouraging companies to adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas, but many multinational companies already comply. In 2016, the Prime Minister called on the MOIT to implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in order to improve the efficiency of the minerals extraction industry. However, to date, Vietnam has not agreed to do so. Vietnam remains only an observer in EITI. Decree 158/2016/ND-CP came into effect in January 2017 and provides guidelines for implementing the Mineral Law, which may improve transparency in the mining sector.

For labor rights regulations, see Section 11 on Labor Policies and Practices, and for a detailed description of regulations on worker/labor rights in Vietnam, see the Department of State’s Human Rights Report (https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/vietnam/).

Environmental Protection

Vietnam’s current legal framework for environmental protection is fragmented and often confusing, while enforcement of environmental crimes and violations is weak and ineffective.  The government has issued many legal documents regulating the environment, including the revision of the Environmental Protection Law of 2014, the Constitution of 2013, the Law on Water Resources of 2012, the Law on Fisheries of 2017, as well as hundreds of decrees and circulars that guide the implementation of these laws. While these legal documents specify civil penalties for environmental crimes, the penalties are rarely high enough to have a deterrent effect. There are virtually no criminal penalties in the law. Additionally, some industry sectors have little regulation. For example, government and industry contacts note that inspections of pollution emission testing devices rarely occur. When they do, it is often following advance notice that enables the firm being inspected to show compliance, regardless of how non-compliant its normal operations may be.  

Historically, Vietnam has prioritized economic growth over environmental protection. In 2016, after a massive fish kill gained nationwide attention, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources embarked on an ambitious plan to update Vietnam’s environmental laws and regulations.  This effort is ongoing and will likely result in newer, and moderately stronger, environmental protections.

While Vietnam’s legal framework is marginal, enforcement of environmental laws is weak and ineffective. For example, the Law on Environmental Protection requires that entities, individuals, and households that discharge waste must classify the waste for recycling and reuse. However, violations of this provision are rampant and rarely punished. The 2017 Law on Fisheries stipulates that fishing organizations and individuals must follow set standards when catching fish, specifies significant financial penalties for individuals and organizations engaged in illegal fishing, and prohibits the use of explosives for fishing. However, in practice, violations of these regulations are quite common.

Vietnam is a party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, and enacted new penalties in its 2015 Penal Code, which took effect on January 1, 2018. However, Vietnam rarely investigates or arrests wildlife traffickers. Although the lack of official statistics makes an official accounting impossible, according to an analysis by members of civil society groups, the number of arrests and prosecutions has actually decreased since the new stricter law went into effect.

Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) determined Vietnam had taken positive steps to improve some areas of its anti-corruption legal framework and policies. However, Vietnam’s 2018 rank of 117 out of 180 in the CPI global index reflects the country’s continuing challenges. Also according to the 2018 PCI report, corruption declined, with 55 percent of enterprises reporting paying informal charges (bribes), which equaled up to 10 percent of their revenue. The CPI report recommends more sustained effort by government agencies and cooperation from businesses. Firms need to improve management controls, strengthen legal understanding and compliance, and strive to operate with integrity.

Corruption is due, in large part, to low levels of transparency, accountability, and media freedom, as well as poor remuneration for government officials and inadequate systems for holding officials accountable. Competition among agencies for control over business and investments has created overlapping jurisdictions and bureaucratic procedures that, in turn, create opportunities for corruption.

In November 2018, Vietnam’s legislature revised its 2005 anti-corruption law to strengthen asset-reporting requirements for government officials and set strict penalties for corrupt practices. However, many officials lamented the law does not provide sufficient oversight authorities to Vietnam’s legislature or government agencies to ensure its full implementation. Furthermore, the law does not recognize the role of civil society or an independent mechanism to promote government accountability and transparency.

The Government has tasked various agencies to deal with corruption, including the Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption (chaired by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary Nguyen), the Government Inspectorate, and line ministries and agencies. Formed in 2007, the Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption, since February 2013, has been under the CPV Central Commission of Internal Affairs. The National Assembly provides oversight to the operations of government ministries. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have encouraged the government to establish a single independent agency with oversight and enforcement authority, and to ensure enforcement.

A new Penal Code came into effect in January 2018, which introduced a number of provisions relating to corporate criminal liability and corruption, increased the risks for businesses in the country. While the previous Vietnamese criminal code only provided for criminal liability for individuals, now corporate entities can face criminal sanctions too. The new Penal Code also criminalizes private-sector corruption—something that was absent from Vietnam’s previous anti-corruption regime.

Vietnam signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in December 2003 and ratified it in August 2009. The law does not cover family members of officials, but does cover ranking members of the Communist Party.

The government increased its scrutiny of conflict-of-interest concerns in public procurement since late 2016. To signal the government’s seriousness about reforming government procurement, the Prime Minister approved in July 2016 a 10-year master plan for procurement, including developing the national e-Government Procurement Application to promote online tendering and increase transparency and reduce corruption opportunities. In January 2019, with help from the ADB and the World Bank, the government implemented an e-bidding public procurement site, which will supplement its existing e-procurement portal.

There are laws prohibiting companies from bribing public officials. While some private companies have internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials, the government does not require companies to establish such internal codes of conduct.

Since 2016, the government has embarked on a large anti-corruption initiative. As a result, perceptions of corruption, and the burden of administrative procedures, are both declining. While high-profile arrests have grabbed the focus of the news media, there has been less attention paid to institutional changes meant to prevent corrupt activities, including greater transparency and civil-service reforms to encourage accountability.

According to the 2018 PCI, there were statistically significant declines in three core indicators of corruption: 1) the share of firms believing informal charges are common; 2) the estimated bribe payments by firms as a share of revenue; and 3) whether commissions are necessary to win government procurement contracts. Although the 2018 PCI results indicate signs of declining corruption, surveyed companies reported that it took more than a month to complete necessary paperwork to start their business and obtain certificates for technical regulatory conformity and certificates of qualification for doing conditional business lines. The report concluded that government authorities were more cautious to approve big projects due to fear of being swept up and implicated in the ongoing, widespread anti-corruption campaign.

The 2018 PCI findings are consistent with the results of UN Development Program’s 2018 annual Provincial Administrative Performance Index (PAPI) survey.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption:

Mr. Phan Dinh Trac
Chairman, Communist Party Central Committee Internal Affairs
4 Nguyen Canh Chan
+84 0804-3557

Contact at NGO:

Ms. Nguyen Thi Kieu Vien
Executive Director, Towards Transparency
Transparency International National Contact in Vietnam
Floor 4, No 37 Lane 35, Cat Linh street, Dong Da, Hanoi, Vietnam
Phone: +84-24-37153532
Fax: +84-24-37153443
kieuvien@towardstransparency.vn  

Vietnam is a unitary single-party state, and its political and security environment is largely stable. Protests and civil unrest are rare, though there are occasional demonstrations against perceived social, environmental, and labor injustices. There have been anti-China protests on multiple occasions since 2008. In May 2014, Vietnam experienced large protests against China’s movement of its Haiyang Shiyou Oil Rig 981 into Vietnam’s territorial waters. Anti-China protests resulted in at least one death and dozens of injuries among the plant’s Chinese workers; protesters separately destroyed and looted multiple foreign-owned factories.

In April 2016, after the Formosa Steel plant discharged toxic pollutants into the ocean and caused a massive fish death, the affected fishermen and residents in central Vietnam began a series of regular protests against the company and the government’s lack of response to the disaster. Protests continued into 2017 in multiple cities until security forces largely suppressed the unrest. Many activists who helped organize or document these protests were subsequently arrested and imprisoned, including influential blogger Nguyen Ngoc Nhu Quynh (aka “Mother Mushroom,” who was released in 2018 and now resides in the United States), labor activist Hoang Duc Binh, and videographer Nguyen Van Hoa.

Nationwide protests erupted in June 2018 in response to the proposed Special Administrative Economic Zone Law. The protests, reportedly the largest since 1975, drew tens of thousands of Vietnamese citizens in Ho Chi Minh City and six other provinces who objected to the law’s tax and lease benefits for companies investing in three Economic Zones. Many believed Chinese investors were the primary beneficiaries of this bill, leading to widespread fears of growing Chinese investment and economic influence in Vietnam. Responding to the protests and other pushback against the law, the government ultimately decided to delay its passage indefinitely.

The protests had little effect on the operations of U.S. companies.

The government increased its anti-corruption efforts in 2016, resulting in a number of arrests and convictions of senior officials across the public and private sector. In January 2018, the party stripped former Politburo member and Ho Chi Minh Secretary Dinh La Thang of his party membership and he was sentenced to 20 years in prison for mismanagement of state assets during his tenure as Chairman of state-owned PetroVietnam (PVN) between 2009 and 2011. Thang was tried with 22 other defendants for their alleged roles in corrupt practices at PVN and its subsidiaries.

According to official government statistics, in 2018 there were 55 million people participating in the formal labor force in Vietnam out of over 72 million people aged 15 and above.  The labor force is relatively young, with 15-to-39 year olds currently accounting for about half of the total labor force. This demographic structure represents Vietnam’s best opportunity to make significant economic strides in the coming decades. Despite the strong shift towards urbanization, the majority of workers are still located in rural areas, making up over 68 percent of the total labor force.  

The official labor participation rate was over 78 percent of the total population, based on the most recent data available in 2017. The official unemployment and underemployment rates hover around 2 percent; however, this figure is likely underreported by counting people who have multiple, low-paying informal jobs, along with those with one formal job. The official unemployment rate among youth, defined as those between the ages of 15 and 24 years, was 7 percent in 2018.  Wages have grown 9 percent since 2017 to an average of USD 2,160 per year.

Despite relatively high literacy rates, enrollment, and graduation rates for primary and secondary education, less than 20 percent of the employed population have ever attended college or received vocational training or mid-term professional training. Those who complete a post-secondary degree are often unprepared with the types of skills necessary to enter a highly skilled workforce. Many Vietnamese companies report a shortage of workers with adequate skills.  While there is a shortage of educated and skilled labor, Vietnam is a labor surplus country, with a un- and under-employed labor force that serves as an abundant source of migrant labor regionally as well as globally.

Shortages or Surpluses of Specialized Labor Skills

According to World Economic Forum’s 2017 Global Human Capital Index (the most recent available), Vietnam ranked 64th overall (after fellow ASEAN countries Singapore (11), Malaysia (33), and Thailand (40)). Many businesses reported it is difficult to find skilled labor in Vietnam. The government is aware of the deficiencies in higher education and vocational training, and admits the need for reform in order to increase the skills of its labor force. To this end, the Law on Vocational Education took effect in 2015, which stressed the importance of vocational training in human resource development, as well as the government’s strategy for vocation education through 2020. In addition, the national employment fund, managed by the MOLISA, will sponsor targeted vocational training programs for poor households, youth, members of the military, and entrepreneurs.  

Foreign nationals are restricted to employment in high-skilled professions, such as managers, executives, and consultants. The government relatively readily grants work-permits for high-skilled foreign workers, especially those at multinational corporations and NGOs.

Nearly 84,000 foreigners were working in Vietnam in 2017 (the most recent year available) compared to 12,600 in 2004, and the country was developing policies and methods to collect social insurance payments from these workers.  

Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance

An employer is permitted to lay off employees because of technological changes or changes in organizational structure (in cases of a merger, consolidation, or cessation of operation of one or several departments), or where the employer faces economic difficulties. If these changes lead to the termination of two or more employees, the employer, in conjunction with the local trade union, is required to form and implement a “labor usage plan.” Companies can terminate two or more employees only after consultation with the local trade union and after a 30-day notice to the provincial labor authority.

The employer must pay a job-loss allowance for a laid-off employee who had regularly worked for the employer for at least 12 full months. The job-loss allowance is equal to one month’s salary for each year of service with the employer. After layoffs, workers will receive unemployment benefits if they contributed to the unemployment fund for at least 12 months.  

There are no waivers made to labor requirements to attract foreign investment.

Collective Bargaining

The constitution affords the right of association and the right to demonstrate, but limits the exercise of these rights, including preventing workers from organizing or joining independent unions of their choice. While workers may choose whether to join a union and at which level (local or “grassroots,” provincial, or national), the law requires every union to be under the legal purview and control of the country’s only trade union confederation, the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL), an organization run by the CPV.

The law gives the VGCL exclusive authority to recognize unions and confers on VGCL upper-level trade unions the responsibility to establish workplace unions. The law also limits freedom of association by not allowing trade unions full autonomy in administering their affairs. The law confers on the VGCL ownership of all trade-union property and gives it the right to represent lower-level unions.  Union members do not elect trade union leaders and officials; the CPV appoints them.

Chapter 5 of the Labor Code provides conditions for collective bargaining. Although collective bargaining is not a new concept in Vietnam, the quality of collective bargaining agreements (CBA) is limited. Vietnam had approximately 27,866 CBAs accounting for 68 percent of unionized enterprises, according to 2017 figures. While CBAs are weakly enforced, VGCL in recent years has collaborated with the International Labor Organization (ILO) to pilot multi-employer CBAs in some industrial zones and sectoral CBAs in the textile sector.

Labor Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

The 2012 revised Labor Code introduced a process of mediation and arbitration for labor disputes. The law allows trade unions and employer organizations to facilitate and support collective bargaining, and requires companies to establish a mechanism to enable management, and the workforce to exchange information, and to consult on subjects that affect working conditions. Regulations require conducting workplace dialogues every three months. The Labor Code stipulates that trade unions have the right and responsibility to organize and lead strikes and establishes certain substantive and procedural restrictions on strikes. Strikes that do not arise from a collective labor dispute, or do not adhere to the process outlined by law, are illegal. The law makes a distinction between “interest-based” disputes (“a dispute arising out of the request of the workers’ collective on the establishment of a new working condition … in the negotiation process between the workers’ collective and the employers”) and “rights-based” disputes (“a dispute between the workers’ collective with the employer arising out of different interpretation and implementation of provisions of labor laws, collective bargaining agreements, internal working regulations, other lawful regulations and agreements.”) In contravention of international standards, the law forbids strikes over “rights-based” disputes. This includes strikes arising out of economic and social policy measures that are not a part of a collective negotiation process, as they are both outside the law’s definition of protected “interest-based” strikes.

The Labor Code prescribes an extensive and cumbersome process of mediation and arbitration before a lawful strike over an interest-based collective dispute can occur. Before workers may hold a strike, they must submit their claims through a process involving a conciliation council (or a district-level labor conciliator where no union is present). If the two parties do not reach a resolution, unions must submit claims to a provincial arbitration council. Unions (or workers’ representatives where no union is present) have the right either to appeal decisions of provincial arbitration councils to provincial people’s courts, or to strike. Individual workers may take cases directly to the people’s court system, but in most cases they may do so only after conciliation has been attempted and failed.  

If a workplace trade union does not exist, the law requires that an “immediate upper-level trade union” must perform the tasks of a grassroots union, even where workers have not so requested or have voluntarily elected not to organize. For non-unionized workers to organize a strike, they must request that the strike “be organized and led by the upper-level trade union,” and if non-unionized workers wish to bargain collectively, the upper-level VGCL union must represent them.

The law prohibits strikes by workers in businesses that serve the public or that the government considers essential to the national economy, defense, public health, and public order. “Essential services” include electricity production, post and telecommunications, maritime and air transportation, navigation, public works, and oil and gas production. The law stipulates strikers may not be paid wages while they are not at work. By law, individuals participating in strikes declared illegal by a people’s court and found to have caused damage to their employer are liable for damages. The law also grants the prime minister the right to suspend a strike considered detrimental to the national economy or public safety.

Strikes in Vietnam

According to VGCL, there have been 6,000 strikes in Vietnam since 1990, though most were not VGCL-led.  More than 73 percent of the 189 strikes in the first eight months of 2018 occurred at foreign direct-investment companies (mainly Korean, Taiwanese, Japanese, and Chinese companies), and nearly 40 percent occurred in the southern economic zone area in Binh Duong, Dong Nai, and Ba Ria-Vung Tau provinces and HCMC, according to the VGCL. None of the strikes followed the authorized conciliation and arbitration process, and thus authorities considered them illegal “wildcat” strikes. The government, however, took no action against the strikers and, on occasion, actively mediated agreements in the workers’ favor. For example, in 2018 the Prime Minister had dialogues with 1,000 workers in the northern region, and with 3,000 workers in the south, and 2,000 workers in the central region during 2016-2017. In some cases of government mediation, the government imposed heavy fines on employers, especially of foreign-owned companies, that engaged in illegal practices that led to strikes.

Gaps in Compliance in Law or Practice with International Labor Standards

Vietnam has been a member of the ILO since 1992, and has ratified five of the core ILO labor conventions (Conventions 100 and 111 on discrimination, Conventions 138 and 182 on child labor, and Convention 29 on forced labor). While the constitution and law prohibit forced or compulsory labor, Vietnam has not ratified Convention 105 dealing with forced labor as a means of political coercion and discrimination, or Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining, although the government is currently taking steps toward ratification.  Under the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, however, all ILO members, including Vietnam, have pledged to respect and promote core ILO labor standards, including those regarding association, the right to organize, and collective bargaining.

Vietnam’s legal framework on child labor appears generally in accordance with international standards, however, the Labor Code allows children under age 13 to work in “specific work regulated by the MOLISA.” Since 2012, the U.S. Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor has included Vietnamese garments, produced with child labor and forced labor, and bricks, produced with child labor, in violation of international standards.  Vietnamese garments are also included in a list of products produced by forced or indentured child labor under Executive Order 13126: Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor. Based on the results of Vietnam’s National Child Labor Survey, in 2016, the U.S. Department of Labor included 14 additional goods produced by child labor in Vietnam to the List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor: cashews, coffee, fish, footwear, furniture, leather, pepper, rice, rubber, sugarcane, tea, textiles, timber, and tobacco.

The government has increasingly acknowledged the issue of child labor in recent years and is a participant in a five-year, USD 8 million project implemented by the ILO to enhance national capacity to reduce and prevent child labor. The government is also in the process of enhancing its policy and regulatory framework for occupational safety and health (OSH).  The OSH law, passed in June 2015, extends OSH protections to all workers, including the informal economy, and includes the establishment of an injury compensation system for workers in the informal economy, which constitutes more than 60 percent of the workforce. The ILO is assisting the government with the drafting of implementing regulations for the law and finalizing a national OSH program for 2016-2020.

In January 2018, Penal Code amendments entered into effect, criminalizing all forms of labor trafficking of adults and prescribing penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment and fines of approximately USD 860 to USD 4,300 (VND 20-100 million). The amendments also criminalized labor trafficking of children under the age of 16 and prescribed penalties of seven to 12 years imprisonment and fines of USD 2,150 to USD 8,620 (VND 50-200 million). NGOs continued to report occurrences of forced labor of men, women, and children within the country. Labor recruitment firms, most of which were affiliated with SOEs, and unlicensed brokers reportedly charged workers seeking international employment higher fees than the law allows, doing so with impunity. Those workers incurred high debts and were thus more vulnerable to forced labor, including debt bondage.

As part of the government’s 2016-20 National Plan of Action for Children and National Program for Child Protection, the government continued efforts to prevent child labor and specifically targeted children in rural areas, disadvantaged children, and children at risk of exposure to hazardous work conditions. The Vietnam National Child Labor Survey 2012 report (the most recent data available) categorized 1.75 million working children as “child laborers,” accounting for 9.6 percent of the national child population or 62 percent of children engaged in economic activities. Of child laborers, 40 percent were girls, nearly 85 percent lived in rural areas, and 60 percent belonged to the 15-17 age group. Some children started work as young as age 12 and nearly 55 percent did not attend school (5 percent of whom would never attend school). Agriculture was the most common sector for child laborers, accounting for 67 percent of all child labor, while 15.7 percent worked in construction/manufacturing and 16.7 percent in services. There were reports of children between ages 10 and 18, and some as young as six, producing garments under forced-labor conditions. International and domestic NGOs noted successful partnerships with provincial governments to implement national-level policies combating child labor.  

It is illegal to establish independent labor unions and therefore, no government-sanctioned domestic labor NGOs can organize workers. Independent labor activists seeking to form unions separate from the Communist Party-run VGCL or inform workers of their labor rights sometimes suffer government harassment. However, government-sanctioned local labor NGOs have supported VGCL’s efforts to raise awareness of worker rights and occupational safety and health issues and to support internal and external migrant workers. Multiple international labor NGOs collaborated with the VGCL to provide training to VGCL-affiliated union representatives on labor organizing, collective bargaining, and other trade union issues. The ILO-International Finance Corporation (IFC) Better Work project reported that management interference in the activities of the trade union was one of the most significant issues in garment factories in the country.  

Credible reports, including from the ILO-IFC Better Work 2017 Annual Report, indicated that factories exceeded legal overtime thresholds and did not meet legal requirements for rest days. The ILO-IFC report stated that, while a majority of factories in the program complied with the daily limit of four hours of overtime, 77 percent exceeded monthly limits (30 hours) and 72 percent exceeded annual limits (300 hours). In addition, and because of the high prevalence of Sunday work, 44 percent of factories failed to provide at least four days of rest per month to all workers.

MOLISA is the principal labor authority, and it oversees the enforcement of the labor law, administers labor relations policy, and promotes job creation. The Labor Inspections Department is responsible for workplace inspections to confirm compliance with labor laws and occupational safety and health standards. Inspectors may use sanctions, fines, withdrawal of operating licenses or registrations, closures of enterprises, and mandatory training. Inspectors may take immediate measures when they have reason to believe there is an imminent and serious danger to the health or safety of workers, including temporarily suspending operations, although such measures were rare. MOLISA acknowledged shortcomings in its labor inspection system and emphasized the number of labor inspectors countrywide, fewer than 1,000 for a country of 96 million people, was insufficient.

New Labor Related Laws or Regulations

Planned amendments to Vietnam’s Labor Code were delayed until 2019. According to current plans, the government will make public the draft Labor Code for public comment in April-May 2019 and will submit the draft to the National Assembly for discussion in October 2019. The National Assembly will likely not pass a labor law until 2020, at the earliest. Lack of consensus about increasing the retirement age (from 60 to 62 to men and from 55 to 60 for women), among other issues, has delayed the process. Although progress has been slow, recent shifts within MOLISA leadership may signal more progress and reforms on labor issues in comparison with previous years, including on challenging issues such as industrial relations.  

The CPTPP and EV FTA, if passed, may help advance labor reform in Vietnam.  In particular, the EV FTA would require Vietnam to publish a timeline for ratifying the three remaining core ILO conventions: Convention 98 (on the right to collective bargaining) in 2019; Convention 105 (abolition of forced labor) in 2020; and Convention 87 (freedom of association and protection of the right to organize) in 2023. The most important of these are Convention 98 and 87 as they would allow trade unions, currently dominated by the VGCL, to better represent workers’ interests. Even with new momentum on labor issues, enactment of legal and regulatory changes to improve working conditions in Vietnam will still take years to fully develop and implement.