HomeReportsHuman Rights Reports...Custom Report - 66a0316d1c hide Human Rights Reports Custom Report Excerpts: Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama +7 more Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Sort by Country Sort by Section In this section / Nicaragua Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Niger Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Nigeria Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Norway Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Oman Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Pakistan Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Palau Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Panama Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Papua New Guinea Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Paraguay Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Peru Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Philippines Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Poland Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Portugal Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Qatar Executive Summary Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Nicaragua Executive Summary Nicaragua has a highly centralized, authoritarian political system dominated by President Daniel Ortega Saavedra and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo Zambrana. Ortega’s Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) party exercises total control over the executive, legislative, judicial, and electoral functions despite the country’s official status as a multiparty constitutional republic. President Ortega was inaugurated to a third term in office in January 2017 following a deeply flawed electoral process. The 2016 elections expanded the ruling party’s supermajority in the National Assembly, which previously allowed for changes in the constitution that extended the reach of executive branch power and the elimination of restrictions on re-election for executive branch officials and mayors. Observers have noted serious flaws in municipal, regional, and national elections since 2008. Civil society groups, international electoral experts, business leaders, and religious leaders identified persistent flaws in the 2017 municipal elections and noted the need for comprehensive electoral reform. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over police and parapolice security forces. Parapolice are nonuniformed, masked, and armed groups with tactical training and organization, acting in coordination with government security forces, under the direct control of the government, and reporting directly to the Nicaraguan National Police (NNP). In April President Ortega and Vice President Murillo ordered police and parapolice forces to put down with violence peaceful protests that began over discontent with a government decision to reduce social security benefits. The government’s excessive response included the use of live ammunition and snipers. Protesters built makeshift roadblocks and confronted NNP and parapolice with rocks and homemade mortars. As of late November, the ensuing conflict left at least 325 persons dead, more than 2,000 injured, hundreds illegally detained and tortured, and more than 52,000 exiled in neighboring countries. Beginning in August the Ortega government instituted a policy of “exile, jail, or death” for anyone perceived as opposition, amended terrorism laws to include prodemocracy activities, and used the justice system to characterize civil society actors as terrorists, assassins, and coup-mongers. Human rights deteriorated markedly during the year. Issues included reports of unlawful or arbitrary killings committed by the government or its agents; forced disappearance by parapolice forces; torture; physical abuse, including rape, by government officials; and arbitrary arrest and detention. There were harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; political prisoners; arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy; arrests of journalists, censorship, site blocking, and criminal libel; and substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including attacks on the Roman Catholic Church and Church officials. The government stripped the legal status of several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations, seizing their assets and preventing them from operating. There was widespread corruption; trafficking in persons; attacks against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons; discrimination against ethnic minorities and indigenous communities; and child labor. President Ortega actively strengthened impunity for human rights abusers who were loyal to him. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. NNP officers and parapolice forces shot high-caliber weapons from concealed, elevated, and distant locations at protesters in Esteli, Masaya, and Managua. Independent forensic investigations by human rights organizations and local media suggested the shooters specifically aimed to kill, as 19 victims suffered high-precision gunshot wounds to the head and thorax. On May 10, the NNP and parapolice raided the Polytechnic University in Managua and fired live ammunition, killing several students. On July 12-13 in Managua, the NNP and parapolice attacked students from the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN) who had found shelter in a nearby church, leaving one student dead. Parapolice, reportedly well trained and equipped with vehicles and high-caliber weapons, and the NNP attacked roadblocks and barricades throughout the country, resulting in numerous deaths. There were several reports from individuals claiming that a family member believed to have been detained was later found dead. Such bodies were found in the morgue or discovered strewn about city streets. Approximately 40 of the protest deaths were police officers or members of the ruling party, according to President Ortega. There were credible reports the government killed some police officers for refusing to follow orders to suppress protests. There were credible reports the government directed the Ministry of Health to deprive protesters of medical attention and instructed public hospitals and clinics under the control of the Social Security Institute not to provide medical care to wounded protesters. On April 20, a 15-year-old who was shot in the face while bringing water to protesters was denied medical care and became the first minor to die in the protests. Reports of killings were common in the north-central regions and the North Caribbean Autonomous Region (RACN). These killings were widely believed to be related to the army’s pursuit of armed antigovernment groups in the north-central region, although the army admitted only the presence of criminals and delinquents. Government forces continued to carry out arbitrary or unlawful killings during confrontations with armed groups (both criminal organizations and possibly antigovernment groups), in the north-central and Caribbean regions. Human rights organizations and independent media alleged some killings were politically motivated, an allegation difficult to confirm because the government refused to conduct official inquiries. In some cases, the individuals killed by military or police personnel were members of groups identifying themselves on social media as politically motivated and that had taken up arms against the government. There was no indication the government investigated claims that three members of a self-proclaimed politically motivated armed group in Siuna, in the RACN, had been tortured and killed extrajudicially in 2017. There were no further developments in the September 2017 killing of three individuals in Siuna by the army’s “Ecological Battalion.” There was no further investigation of the November 2017 killing of six individuals, including a known opposition figure, his brother, and two minors, by the military in the municipality of La Cruz de Rio Grande in the South Caribbean Autonomous Region (RACS). The Nicaraguan Pro-Human Rights Association (ANPDH) reported more than 500 disappearances between April 19 and July 26. Armed parapolice forces arbitrarily detained protesters and often held them in makeshift facilities without allowing them to inform family members or seek legal counsel. The detentions generally lasted between two weeks and one month. NNP officers and prison authorities often denied detainees were in custody. Other detainees were eventually found dead in the morgue or in city streets. Human rights organizations claimed the NNP and prison system’s inability to locate prisoners was not due to poor recordkeeping, but was instead a deliberate part of a misinformation campaign. The government made no efforts to prevent, investigate, or punish such acts. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Although the law prohibits such practices, cases of torture were well documented, and public officials intentionally carried out acts that resulted in severe physical or mental suffering for the purposes of securing information, inflicting punishment, and psychologically deterring other citizens from reporting on the government’s actions or participating in civic actions against the government. Members of civil society and student leaders involved in the protests that began on April 19 were more likely than members of other groups to be subjected to such treatment. In its August 29 report, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) gave detailed accounts from detainees who had been subjected to physical and psychological torture by the NNP, parapolice, or prison authorities, including burnings with Taser guns and cigarettes, use of barbed wire, beatings with fists and tubes, attempted strangulation, and death threats. Local NGO Permanent Commission for Human Rights reported at least one detainee had one of his nails pulled out and another received electric shocks. Another detainee reported suffering beatings, electrocution, waterboarding, and sodomization with a firearm. Several detainees released from La Modelo prison said the NNP brought police cadets into the prison to show them how to beat prisoners without leaving obvious marks. The OHCHR reported many detainees were subjected to degrading treatment and sexual violence, including rape of men and women, while in the custody of parapolice forces, prison officials, and the NNP, as well as the Directorate of Judicial Assistance (DAJ), a special police investigations unit, in its jail commonly referred to as “El Chipote,” especially during arrests related to the protests. According to media reports, on August 30, NNP members beat a man in Esteli, raped him using a knife, and subsequently castrated him and left him on the side of a road. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Prison conditions were harsh and potentially life threatening. Overcrowding, poor sanitation, difficulties obtaining medical care, and violence among prisoners remained serious problems in prison facilities. Physical Conditions: Prison conditions continued to deteriorate due to antiquated infrastructure and increasing inmate populations. In October the government reported holding 20,918 prisoners in facilities with a capacity of 11,781. Due to overcrowding, pretrial detainees often shared cells with convicted prisoners and juveniles shared cells with adults. Many prisoners suffered mistreatment from prison officials and other inmates. Inmates also suffered from parasites, inadequate medical attention, frequent food shortages, contaminated water, and inadequate sanitation. Released prisoners and family members of prisoners reported poor ventilation and lighting in the DAJ jail located in Managua. Although conditions for female inmates were generally better than those for men, they were nevertheless unsafe and unhygienic. Conditions in jails and temporary holding cells were also harsh. Most facilities were physically decrepit and infested with vermin; had inadequate ventilation, electricity, or sewage systems; and lacked potable water. Administration: Although prisoners and detainees could submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship and request investigation of credible allegations of inhuman conditions, authorities often ignored or did not process complaints. The extent to which the government investigated allegations of poor prison conditions was unknown. The government ombudsman could serve on behalf of prisoners and detainees to consider such matters as informal alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent offenders, although this generally did not occur. In certain instances the government restricted prisoners’ access to visitors, attorneys, and physicians. Staff members of human rights organizations, family members, and other interested parties were not allowed access to the prison system or to prisoners in custody. Independent Monitoring: The government denied prison visits by local human rights groups and media. NGOs generally received complaints through family members of inmates and often were unable to follow up on cases until after the release of the prisoner due to lack of access. The government denied all requests from local human rights organizations for access to prison facilities. There was limited independent monitoring of prison conditions by international human rights organizations. Authorities allowed the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) rapporteur on the rights of persons deprived of liberty into the Chipote and Modelo prisons during a May 18-21 visit to the country, but they did not respond to his request for a follow-up visit in September. The government denied the IACHR access to the DAJ offices and jail facilities on June 28 but on July 2 granted access to the IACHR rapporteur for Nicaragua, Antonia Urrejola, who was in the country to confirm the location and conditions of detainees from antigovernment protests. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Human rights NGOs noted hundreds of cases of arbitrary arrests by the NNP, parapolice forces, and army, although parapolice and the army have no authority to make arrests. Many members of a group of 170 detainees released on April 24 were unloaded from vans along a road leading to La Modelo prison in Tipitapa rather than being released to family members, human rights organizations, or Catholic Church representatives. On September 19, the vice minister of interior, Luis Canas, acknowledged the penitentiary system had 204 detainees in the context of civil protests; human rights organizations believed the number was closer to 500. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The constitution establishes the NNP as an apolitical, nonpartisan institution protecting all citizens equally under the law. The army is responsible for external security but also has some domestic responsibilities, including countering illicit trafficking in narcotics and human trafficking and providing for the transportation of election-related materials, including ballots. The NNP responds directly to the president as commander in chief, as established by constitutional changes in 2014 that diminished the Ministry of Interior’s role in oversight of the NNP. Parapolice forces emerged on May 30 in the context of stopping social unrest. On July 30, President Ortega said these parapolice forces were voluntary police, although their actions, including arrests, killings, and forced disappearances, did not fit within the legal structure afforded to voluntary police. Parapolice members were heavily armed, shot live ammunition at protesters, and coordinated actions with regular police. In some cases, police vehicles transported them. The army is a functionally autonomous force responding directly to the president pursuant to constitutional and military code reforms enacted in 2014 that diminished the role of the (civilian) Defense Ministry in oversight of the army. The army repeatedly stated it would remain neutral during the protests and government repression that began on April 19 and denied reports of its participation in the violence. Security experts, including former Nicaraguan military officials, suggested the military did cooperate with suppressing the protests, noting the high-caliber weapons handled by highly trained persons during the repression of protesters were used exclusively by the military. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the NNP and the military, and the government did not employ effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse. The NNP Office of Internal Affairs is responsible for investigating complaints and abuses regarding police officers or internal police activities. The Ministry of Interior and the NNP each have law enforcement and internal security responsibilities throughout the country. The Ministry of Interior oversees the General Directorate for Migration and Foreigner Services, which works together with police to oversee migration and border security. The Office of the Inspector General is responsible for investigating abuses and corruption in the army, but public information available on its activities was limited. Observers noted the politicization of the NNP, exemplified by the use of parapolice forces outside the NNP chain of command and under no legal framework, to respond to orders from President Ortega and his wife, Vice President Murillo. The NNP arrested protesters on grounds of crimes including terrorism, organized crime, and financing terrorism, and the Prosecutor’s Office and judges processed their cases. The NNP Office of Internal Affairs, and to a lesser extent the Office of the Inspector General, are responsible for investigating police abuse; however, lack of separation of power among the NNP, the ruling party, and the justice system did not allow for an impartial investigation into corruption, inefficiency, and violations of human rights. Due to limited information on the activities of the Office of Internal Affairs, human rights organizations and security experts were unable to assess how the NNP investigated allegations of abuses and human rights violations by its members. Human rights organizations and civil society activists continued to express strong concern regarding the 2015 Sovereign Security Law, which significantly broadened the definition of state sovereignty and security and established a National Committee of Sovereign Security, an executive-level committee with the enforcement backing of the military. The law includes “any other factor that creates danger to the security of the people, life, family, and community, as well as the supreme interests of the Nicaraguan nation” when it outlines potential risks and threats to the country’s sovereign security. Human rights NGOs and civil society organizations argued the Sovereign Security Law was the basis for repression against protests, although the government did not publicly cite the law in specific cases. Impunity remained a severe problem, and the government did not provide training to increase respect for human rights by security forces. The NNP, Prosecutor’s Office, and judges under the influence of the ruling party arrested, investigated, and charged antigovernment protesters while ignoring crimes committed by the NNP, progovernment individuals, and parapolice. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES The law requires police to obtain a warrant from a judicial authority prior to detaining a suspect and to notify family members of the detainee’s whereabouts within 24 hours, but this rarely happened within the context of arrests related to civil unrest. Police may hold a suspect legally for 48 hours before arraignment, when they must bring the person before a judge. A judge then must order the suspect released or transferred to jail for pretrial detention. The suspect is permitted family member visits after the initial 48 hours. The detainee has the right to bail unless a judge deems there is a flight risk. The criminal code lists a number of crimes that may be tried by a judge without a jury and that would not qualify for bail or house arrest during the duration of the trial. The Truth, Justice, and Peace Commission, created by the National Assembly to investigate violence related to civil unrest, stated in its July report that 204 of the 505 known detainees had been detained for more than the established 48 hours without being brought before a judge. Detainees have the right to an attorney immediately following their arrest, and the state provides indigent detainees with a public defender. There were numerous reports detainees did not have immediate access to an attorney or legal counsel and were not afforded one during their 48-hour detention. In several instances authorities denied having detainees under custody in a specific jail, even to their family members or legal counsel. Arbitrary Arrest: According to NGOs and other human rights groups, arbitrary arrests occurred regularly, including but not limited to the context of the protests that started in April. Numerous reports claimed authorities used DAJ jail cells for arbitrary arrests beyond the prescribed 48 hours of detention legally allowed. Many arrests were allegedly made without warrants and without informing family members or legal counsel. Human rights organizations indicated delays in the release of prisoners after finishing prison terms led to many cases of arbitrary continuation of a state of arrest. The NNP and army also committed irregular arrests and detentions during investigations into armed opposition groups or other violent crimes in the north-central regions of the country. On November 26, immigration authorities called women’s activist Ana Quiros, a Nicaraguan-Costa Rican dual citizen, to their offices, whereupon authorities handcuffed her, detained her in El Chipote prison for more than five hours, revoked her Nicaraguan citizenship, deported her to Costa Rica in violation of due process. Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention continued to be a problem. Many of those arrested during the social upheaval that started on April 19 were detained and held with no charges and without following due process. Observers noted that in several instances lengthy pretrial detention was intentional against specific protest leaders. Observers attributed other delays to limited facilities, an overburdened judicial system, judicial inaction, and high crime rates. No information was available on the percentage of the prison population in pretrial detention or the national average length of pretrial detention. Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: While the law provides detainees the ability to challenge the legality of their detention before a court, the government generally did not allow those detained in the unrest to challenge in court the lawfulness of their arrests or detentions. There were reports legal counsels faced obstacles when they attempted to invoke constitutional protections for detainees, including habeas corpus, and courts frequently ignored their requests. The law provides for an independent judiciary, but the government did not respect judicial independence and impartiality. The law requires vetting of new judicial appointments by the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ), a process wholly influenced by nepotism, personal influence, and political affiliation. Once appointed, many judges submitted to political pressure and economic inducements for themselves or family members that compromised their independence. NGOs complained of delayed justice caused by judicial inaction and widespread impunity, especially regarding family and domestic violence and sexual abuse. In many cases trial start times were changed with no information provided to one or both sides of the trial, according to human rights organizations. Authorities occasionally failed to respect court orders. According to the constitution, defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty; observers claimed, however, that persons detained in the context of the antigovernment protests were criminalized even before the start of the trial. In a July 13 session at the Organization of American States (OAS), Foreign Minister Denis Moncada said that Medardo Mairena, coordinator of the anti-Law 840 peasant group and a civil society member of a national dialogue, was a terrorist. Authorities arrested Mairena that same day and later accused him of terrorism. Authorities provided neither a reason for his arrest nor legal representation, nor did they inform his family, all of which were violations of due process. Following a trial that was deeply procedurally and substantively flawed, the prosecutor recommended a 72-year sentence. TRIAL PROCEDURES Changes to the law enacted in 2017 allowed judges to deny jury trials in a wider range of cases, deny bail or house arrest based on unclear rules, and arbitrarily move a case from other judicial districts to Managua, to the disadvantage of defendants, their families, or their counsel. Defendants have the right to be fully and promptly informed of the charges against them and the right to a fair trial. While the law establishes specific time periods for cases to come to trial, most cases encountered undue delay. Trials are public, but in some cases involving minors or at the victim’s request, they may be private. The law requires defendants must be present at their trial, although this was not always respected. Proceedings in most cases related to charges of terrorism brought against protesters in the context of antigovernment protests starting on April 19 were made private, except for official media. One judge who made a protest-related proceeding public was dismissed from her position within a few days. Defendants have the right to legal counsel, and the state provides public defenders for indigent persons. Defendants have the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense, but judges commonly failed to grant counsel’s access to the defendant. In several instances related to antigovernment protests, defendants were not allowed to name their legal counsel and the court appointed a public defendant, which family members of the accused and human rights organizations claimed was in detriment of the defendant’s case. In many cases legal counsels of the defendants received death threats, which caused some to resign. Although the constitution recognizes indigenous languages, defendants were not always granted court interpreters or translators. Defendants may confront and question witnesses and have the right to appeal a conviction. Defendants may present their own witnesses and evidence in their defense; however, some judges refused to admit evidence on behalf of the defense. Defendants may not be compelled to testify or confess guilt. The August 29 OHCHR report found that “trials of people charged in relation to the protests have serious flaws and do not observe due process, including the impartiality of the courts.” On August 30, a court found Brandon Lovo Taylor and Glen Slate guilty of the April 21 murder of journalist Angel Gahona in the Caribbean coastal town of Bluefields. Gahona died of a single gunshot to the head while streaming live protests from his phone. The trial was conducted in Managua, limiting the defendants’ access to legal counsel and their family members. Proceedings took place behind closed doors except for official government media. The IACHR Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts did not have access to the courtroom in this case, despite an agreement with the government to help with legal proceedings stemming from protest-related violence. The prosecutor alleged the two men shot a homemade weapon at the journalist from across the street. When the defense’s independent ballistics expert stated that would be impossible given the distance, angle, and precision of the shot, the judge dismissed the independent expert witness. None of the prosecutor’s witnesses could place the accused at the scene of the crime, and the NNP officers on the scene did not participate in the trial. Women’s rights organizations believed the court system continued to operate under unofficial orders to forgo jail time or pretrial detention in domestic violence cases. The policy reportedly applied only to domestic violence cases considered mild. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES Human rights NGOs characterized the protesters detained in the context of antigovernment protests starting on April 19 as political prisoners. As of November 19, the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH) counted more than 600 protesters detained. The NNP arrested more than 100 of the detainees under charges of terrorism, organized crime, and financing terrorism. The FSLN supermajority in the National Assembly enabled some of these arrests when it amended Law 977 to apply to “anyone who damages public or private buildings, wishes to alter the constitutional order, or wishes to force the government to take a certain action or refrain from taking certain action.” The prison sentence for such acts is 15 to 20 years. After the July 2 IACHR visit, the government did not allow local or international human rights organizations access to these political prisoners, so it was unknown if such persons were given the same protections as other detainees. On September 19, the government issued photographs of three high-profile political prisoners as purported proof of their well-being, but human rights organizations claimed the photographs were taken closer to the time of arrest. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Individuals and organizations may file suit in civil courts to seek damages for human rights violations, but authorities did not always respect court decisions. The lack of an effective civil law system resulted in some civil matters being pursued as criminal cases, which were often resolved more quickly. In a number of instances, individuals and groups appealed to the IACHR, which passed their cases to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. PROPERTY RESTITUTION The government regularly failed to enforce court decisions with respect to seizure, restitution, or compensation of private property. Enforcement of court orders was frequently subject to nonjudicial considerations. Members of the judiciary, including those at senior levels, were widely believed to be corrupt or subject to political pressure. The government failed to evict those who illegally took possession of private property. Within the context of social upheaval starting on April 19, members of the FSLN illegally took over privately owned lands, with implicit and explicit support by municipal and national government officials. Some land seizures were politically targeted and directed against specific individuals, such as businessmen traditionally considered independent or against the ruling party. As of August 24, the private sector confirmed approximately 15,000 acres remained seized. The government failed to respect prohibitions against unlawful interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence. FSLN party-based grassroots organizations such as the Citizen Power Councils colluded with parapolice, armed masked men, or party loyalists to target the homes of antigovernment protesters. Without a warrant and under no legal authority, these groups illegally raided homes and detained occupants. These actions were widespread in the large cities, particularly Managua, Matagalpa, Esteli, Masaya, Rivas, Leon, and Jinotega. On June 16, after occupants reportedly refused to allow them to place gunmen on the roof of a Managua home, parapolice set fire to the house, killing a family of six. Parapolice remained outside the house, guns drawn, to ensure the family could not escape the blaze and to prevent access to the house by voluntary firefighters, according to witnesses. Six months later, the NNP issued a press accusing student protestors of the arson and CENIDH of a secret campaign to persuade survivors to blame the NNP in exchange for visas. Domestic NGOs, Catholic Church representatives, journalists, and opposition members alleged the government monitored their email and telephone conversations. Church representatives also stated their sermons were monitored. As part of a continuing social media campaign against antigovernment protests, ruling party members and supporters used social media to publish personal information of human rights defenders and civil society members. Progovernment supporters marked the houses of civil society members with derogatory slurs or threats and then published photographs of the marked houses on social media. On October 3, the government published an amendment to the Financial Analysis Unit (UAF) Law to allow the UAF to access individuals’ personal data held by eight public institutions, including salary information, international travel, personal property registration, and credit and banking records. The UAF does not require a judicial decision or warrant to access this information, nor is it required to disclose to the individual that he or she is under investigation. The UAF investigated perceived members of the opposition in order to support charges of terrorist financing. Inhabitants in northern towns, particularly in the departments of Nueva Segovia, Jinotega, and Madriz, as well as the RACS and the RACN, alleged repeated government interrogations and searches without cause or warrant, related to supposed support for armed groups, while government officials claimed they were confronting common criminals. The ruling party reportedly required citizens to demonstrate party membership in order to obtain or retain employment in the public sector and have access to public social programs. Niger Executive Summary Niger is a multiparty republic. President Issoufou Mahamadou won a second term in 2016. He won 92 percent of the vote in a second round boycotted by the opposition. The African Union certified the election as free and fair despite the criticism of some domestic observers who noted the jailing of the leadership of the lead opposition party among other irregularities. The government refused to follow a Constitutional Court ruling in 2017 for a parliamentary election in the district of Maradi to replace a representative who had died. The political opposition boycotted a political mediation council and the newly formed National Independent Electoral Commission through much of the year. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. Human rights issues included unlawful killings and forced disappearances by the government, allied militias, terrorists, and armed groups; arbitrary arrest and detention by government security forces and armed groups; harsh and life-threatening prison and detention center conditions; political prisoners; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; reported government support of Malian armed groups accused of unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers; trafficking in persons; lack of accountability for cases of violence against women due in part to government inaction; caste-based slavery and forced labor, especially forced or compulsory or child labor. The government took some steps to prosecute officials who committed abuses, but impunity remained a problem. Terrorist groups targeted and killed civilians and recruited child soldiers. The government reportedly provided some limited material and logistical support in Niger to a Mali-based militia, the Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA), a group that has been reported to recruit and use child soldiers. The government was involved in campaigns against terrorist groups on its borders with Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad, and it was wary of increasing terror attacks in Burkina Faso and spillover from insecurity in Libya. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were reports that the government and its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. For example, the armed forces were accused of sometimes executing persons believed to be fighting with extremist groups in both Diffa and Tillabery Regions rather than holding them in detention. There was evidence in Tillabery Region that the government allowed Malian militia groups to operate in Nigerien territory and may have at times collaborated with or provided limited material and logistical support to them. Malian militia groups the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad and GATIA were accused of committing human rights abuses on Nigerien soil, including kidnapping and killing persons believed to be collaborating with extremist groups. The governmental National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) reported receiving several complaints about arbitrary and unlawful killings attributed to security forces and to Malian militias operating within conflict areas of the country. The CNDH had limited resources to investigate the complaints. Armed terrorist groups including Boko Haram and groups affiliated with al-Qaida, ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS), and ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA) attacked and killed civilians and security forces (see section 1.g.). There were some reports of disappearances perpetrated by security forces in both Tillabery and Diffa Regions. For example, unidentified sources alleged that soldiers detained some youths who returned to a town in the Diffa area the day after it had been the focus of a Boko Haram attack, and the youths were reportedly not seen again. There were also several instances of kidnappings by armed groups and bandits (see section 1.g). For example, unidentified armed persons kidnapped the mother and sister of a parliamentarian in the Diffa Region on September 3. The kidnappers released the two on September 16, probably after the payment of a ransom. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The constitution and law prohibit such practices; however, there were reports security forces beat and abused civilians, especially in the context of the fight against terrorism in Diffa and Tillabery Regions. Security forces were also accused of rape and sexual abuse, which the government claimed to investigate. For example, the government reported that the state prosecutor was investigating three rapes attributed to agents of local security forces in the Diffa Region. There were indications that security officials were sometimes involved in abusing or harming detainees, especially members of the Fulani minority or those accused of affiliation with Boko Haram or other extremist groups. There were allegations that security forces and local leaders in the Diffa Region would harass or detain citizens they accused of collusion with Boko Haram, forcing the citizens to pay a “ransom” to end the harassment. As of October the CNDH, to the extent that resources allowed, was investigating allegations that security forces or agents of the government had committed extrajudicial killings, abuse, and disappearances. The government and military reportedly also investigated these accusations, although no information was available on their conclusions. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Conditions in the prisons were harsh and life threatening due to food shortages, overcrowding, and inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care. Physical Conditions: The government reported in October there were 39 prisons designed to hold 10,005 persons. According to the government, prisons held 9,570 inmates; however, human rights observers stated that overcrowding remained a widespread problem. For example, in Kollo Prison, prisoners slept outside in the courtyard due to lack of space inside the wards. Prison officials held female inmates in separate quarters that were less crowded and relatively cleaner than men’s quarters. They generally held juveniles separately in special rehabilitation centers or in judicially supervised homes, although they held some juvenile prisoners with adult prisoners. The prison system made no provision for special services for detainees with disabilities. Authorities held pretrial detainees with convicted prisoners. Prison deaths occurred regularly, some from malaria, meningitis, and tuberculosis, but no statistics were available. Nutrition, sanitation, potable water, and medical care were poor, although officials allowed inmates to receive supplemental food, medicine, and other items from their families. Basic health care was available, and authorities referred patients with serious illness to public health-care centers. Administration: Judicial authorities and the CNDH investigated and monitored prison and detention center conditions and followed up on credible allegations of inhuman conditions. Prison management generally permitted prisoners and detainees to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship. Independent Monitoring: Authorities generally granted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the CNDH, and human rights groups access to most prisons and detention centers, including police station jails, and these groups conducted monitoring visits during the year. Improvements: The Ministry of Justice stated that access to fresh water had improved in some prisons. The government built two new detention centers in the Maradi Region. The ICRC worked with local prison administration to facilitate family visits for those detained in connection with the conflict in Tillabery and Diffa Regions and imprisoned far from their families in Niamey. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, and the law prohibits detention without charge for more than 48 hours, but police occasionally violated these provisions. The law allows individuals accused of terror-related crimes to be detained without charge for a longer period. Persons arrested or detained are entitled to challenge in court the legal basis or arbitrary nature of their detention. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The national police, under the Ministry of Interior, Public Security, Decentralization, and Customary and Religious Affairs (Ministry of Interior), is responsible for urban law enforcement. The gendarmerie, under the Ministry of National Defense, has primary responsibility for rural security. The National Guard, also under the Ministry of Interior, is responsible for domestic security and the protection of high-level officials and government buildings. The armed forces, under the Ministry of National Defense, are responsible for external security and, in some parts of the country, for internal security. Every 90 days the parliament reviews the state of emergency (SoE) declaration in effect in the Diffa Region and in parts of Tahoua and Tillabery (most recently expanding the SoE to three new parts of Tillabery on November 30 and renewing the SoE in all existing areas on December 17). On November 30, the council of ministers declared a new SoE in three additional departments of Tillabery (Torodi, Tera, and Say). Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control over security forces, although at times individual soldiers and police acted independently of the command structure. Police effectiveness was limited due to a lack of basic supplies, such as vehicle fuel, radios, and other investigatory and law enforcement equipment. Patrols outside of Niamey were sporadic. Police training was minimal, and only specialized police units had advanced weapon-handling skills. National Guard troops were assigned rotationally as prison guards for six months at a time but had little or no prison-specific training. A law passed in 2017 created a specialized cadre of prison police, and the police system had reportedly launched a first round of training but had not fully implemented the law. Citizens complained security forces did not adequately police border regions, remote rural areas, and major cities. Corruption remained a problem. The gendarmerie and the police inspector general are responsible for the investigation of police abuses; nevertheless, police impunity remained a problem. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES The constitution and law require arrest warrants. The law allows individuals to be detained for 48 hours without charge and an additional 48 hours if police need more time to gather evidence, although authorities sometimes held detainees implicated in sensitive cases longer than legally permitted. Under the Terrorism Law, individuals detained on suspicion of committing terrorism-related offenses may be detained for 10 days, extendable once for an additional 10 days. This 10-day period begins once suspects reach the Niamey Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism; terror suspects apprehended in the rural Diffa Region may spend days or weeks in custody before officials transport them to Niamey. Security forces usually informed detainees promptly of the charges against them. There was a functioning bail system for crimes carrying a sentence of less than 10 years. Authorities must notify those arrested of their right to a lawyer within 24 hours. The constitution calls for the government to provide a lawyer for indigents in civil and criminal cases, although this did not always occur. Widespread ignorance of the law and lack of funds prevented many defendants from exercising their rights to bail and an attorney. Except for detainees suspected of terrorism, authorities did not detain suspects incommunicado. Arbitrary Arrest: Police occasionally conducted warrantless sweeps to detain suspected criminals. Police and other security force members sometimes rounded up persons accused of being members of, or supporting terrorist groups, based on circumstantial evidence, subsequently holding them for months or even years (see section 1.g.). In 2015-16, following the government’s implementation of a SoE in Diffa, the security forces used their authority to arrest at least 1,400 individuals for violating state-of-emergency restrictions and curfews, or in response to denunciations. Lacking investigations and evidence, most of these prisoners remained in detention, mostly in Kollo Prison in Niamey far from their families, until the government prioritized a trial procedure starting in 2017. The cases of approximately 800 individuals had been brought to trial by the end of the year, with many trials leading to acquittal for lack of evidence. Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. Although the law provides for maximum pretrial confinement of 30 months for serious crimes and 12 months for less serious offenses (with special extensions in certain sensitive cases, including terrorist-related offenses), some detainees waited as long as five years to be tried. A majority of prisoners were awaiting trial, with one nongovernmental organization (NGO) stating the percentage was as high as 75 percent. Judicial inefficiency, inadequate resources, staff shortages, corruption, and executive branch interference lengthened pretrial detention periods. Civil society activists and members of opposition political parties appeared to be especially subject to irregular implementation of their due process rights, including prolonging of pretrial detention to allow prosecutors time to assemble evidence. By contrast some high-profile detainees benefited from extended provisional release. Saidou Bakari, Ide Kalilou, and Mallah Ari, all associated with the main opposition party the Democratic Movement for an African Federation (MODEN-FA Lumana), were arrested in 2016 on allegations of misappropriating humanitarian assistance in 2005. At the end of the year, they remained in jail awaiting trial, despite being cleared of wrongdoing by a gendarmerie investigation commissioned by the government. Although the constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, the executive branch sometimes interfered with the judicial process. The government reassigned some judges to low-profile positions after they asserted independence in handling high-profile cases or rendered decisions unfavorable to the government. There were allegations the government interfered or attempted to interfere in high-profile court cases involving opposition leaders. Judicial corruption–exacerbated by low salaries and inadequate training–and inefficiency remained problems. There were reports family and business ties influenced lower-court decisions in civil matters. Judges granted provisional release pending trial to some high-profile defendants, who were seldom called back for trial and had complete freedom of movement, including departing the country, and could run as candidates in elections. Customary courts and traditional mediation did not provide the same legal protections as the formal court system. Traditional chiefs may act as mediators and counselors. They have authority to arbitrate many customary law matters, including marriage, inheritance, land, and community disputes, but not all civil issues. Chiefs received government stipends but had no police or judicial powers. Customary courts, based largely on Islamic law, try only civil law cases. A legal practitioner with basic legal training, advised by an assessor with knowledge of Islamic traditions, heads these courts. Formal law does not regulate the judicial actions of chiefs and customary courts, although defendants may appeal a verdict to the formal court system. In contrast with the formal court system, women do not have equal legal status with men in customary courts and traditional mediation, nor do they enjoy the same access to legal redress. TRIAL PROCEDURES The law affirms the presumption of innocence. Defendants have the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them. The law also provides free interpretation for defendants who do not speak French, the official language, from the moment charged through all appeals. Trials are public, and defendants have the right to be present at their trial. Defendants have the right to counsel, which is at public expense for minors and indigent defendants charged with crimes carrying a sentence of at least 10 years’ imprisonment. Officials provided defendants adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Defendants have the right to confront witnesses and present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf. They are not compelled to testify or confess guilt. Defendants may appeal verdicts, first to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. Although the constitution and law extend these rights to all citizens, widespread ignorance of the law prevented many defendants from taking advantage of these rights. Judicial delays due to the limited number of jurisdictions, staff shortages, and lack of resources were common. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES There were reports of political prisoners who remained incarcerated during the year. Saidou Bakari and Ide Kalilou, members of the leading opposition party, and Mallah Ari, an assistant to the president of the leading opposition party, have been jailed since 2016 on corruption charges dating back to 2005, although a gendarmerie investigation found no proof of wrongdoing. Critics alleged their continued jailing was political in nature. The trial of 11 military officers and one civilian arrested in 2015 on accusations of plotting a coup concluded on January 26, with 15-year sentences for the three alleged leaders of the coup plot, General Souleymane Salou, Lieutenant Ousmane Awal Hambaly, and Captain Issa Amadou Kountche. The court gave five- and 10-year sentences to six other soldiers. The court acquitted two soldiers and gave the single civilian in the case, Niandou Salou, son of accused ringleader General Salou, five years in prison. All of the charges linked those found guilty to “fomenting between November and December 2015 a conspiracy to attack the authority or security of the state.” Critics alleged that the government fabricated the coup attempt to justify the arrest, along with these 12 persons tried in 2018, of virtually all the opposition leaders in the lead-up to the 2016 presidential election, most of whom were eventually released without charge. Authorities generally granted the ICRC, the CNDH, and human rights groups access to political prisoners, and these groups conducted visits during the year. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Individuals or organizations may seek civil remedies for human rights violations. They may also appeal decisions to the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Individuals and organizations may appeal adverse domestic court decisions to regional human rights bodies, such as the ECOWAS Court of Justice. The constitution and law generally prohibit such actions, but there were exceptions. Police may conduct searches without warrants when they have a strong suspicion a house shelters criminals or stolen property. Under state-of-emergency provisions in the Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillabery Regions, authorities may search houses at any time and for any reason. The regional fight against the terrorist group Boko Haram continued in the east, while extremist groups linked to the conflict in Mali terrorized the west of the country. Several groups with links to al-Qaida and ISIS were active in the country during the year. Killings: Criminals and extremist groups conducted terrorist attacks in the western regions of Tillabery and Tahoua, with the attacks and security force responses to the attacks together leading to 74 deaths in the first 10 months of the year, according to data tracked by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Conflict in the Diffa Region during the first 10 months of the year killed an estimated 107 persons. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), an organization tracking conflict deaths through media reporting, there were 12 terror-related deaths in the Agadez Region in the north of the country during the first seven months of the year, 103 terror-related deaths in Tillabery and Tahoua Regions, and 53 in Diffa Region. Numbers varied due to different tracking and sourcing protocols. Of the 168 total fatalities reported by ACLED, 110 appeared to be civilians, with 58 of these civilian fatalities resulting from security force actions. Abductions: Terrorist groups and bandits kidnapped dozens of citizens and two Westerners. Armed groups in the Diffa Region including Boko Haram and bandits abducted civilians. For example, unidentified armed men kidnapped the mother and sister of a parliamentarian on September 3 in Diffa Region. Armed groups in northern Tillabery Region also abducted several citizens during the year, as well as one German and one Italian citizen. The status of one U.S. citizen abducted in Tahoua in 2016 remained undetermined. Of the 39 women kidnapped by Boko Haram in 2017 in the village of Ngalewa in the Diffa Region, 37 remained missing. Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: Boko Haram militants often targeted noncombatants, including women and children, and used violence, intimidation, theft, and threats to get what they wanted from local villagers. Child Soldiers: Boko Haram recruited and used children in both combatant and noncombatant roles. There were reports of forced marriages to Boko Haram militants. (See also section 6 on conditions for these juvenile detainees.) The government provided some limited material and logistical support in Niger to a Mali-based militia, GATIA, a group that has been reported to recruit and use child soldiers. Also see the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/. Other Conflict-related Abuse: Aid organizations in Diffa Region were sometimes unable to obtain the required security escorts to travel outside of Diffa town for aid distribution; security forces deemed certain areas insufficiently secure for humanitarian access and at times did not have sufficient resources to provide escorts. Boko Haram militants burned homes and villages, displacing civilians. Extremists in northern Tillabery Region reportedly began charging local villagers taxes, while extremists in western Tillabery Region reportedly burned some government-funded schools, telling villagers their children should not attend such schools. Nigeria Executive Summary Nigeria is a federal republic composed of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). In 2015 citizens elected President Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressives Congress party to a four-year term in the first successful democratic transfer of power from a sitting president in the country’s history. Civilian authorities did not always maintain effective control over the security services. The insurgency in the Northeast by the militant terrorist groups Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISIS-WA) continued. The groups conducted numerous attacks on government and civilian targets that resulted in thousands of deaths and injuries, widespread destruction, the internal displacement of approximately 1.8 million persons, and external displacement of an estimated 225,000 Nigerian refugees to neighboring countries, principally Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Widespread violence across rural Nigeria, including conflict over land and other resources between farmers and herders, resulted in an estimated 1,300 deaths and 300,000 persons internally displaced between January and July, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG). Human rights issues included unlawful and arbitrary killings by both government and nonstate actors; forced disappearances by both government and nonstate actors; torture by both government and nonstate actors and prolonged arbitrary detention in life-threatening conditions particularly in government detention facilities; harsh and life threatening prison conditions including civilian detentions in military facilities, often based on flimsy or no evidence; infringement on citizens’ privacy rights; criminal libel; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, in particular for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons; refoulement of refugees; corruption; progress to formally separate child soldiers previously associated with the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF); lack of accountability concerning violence against women, including female genital mutilation/cutting, in part due to government inaction/negligence; trafficking in persons, including sexual exploitation and abuse by security officials; crimes involving violence targeting LGBTI persons and the criminalization of status and same-sex sexual conduct based on sexual orientation and gender identity; and forced and bonded labor. The government took steps to investigate alleged abuses but fewer steps to prosecute officials who committed violations, whether in the security forces or elsewhere in the government. Impunity remained widespread at all levels of government. The government did not adequately investigate or prosecute most of the major outstanding allegations of human rights violations by the security forces or the majority of cases of police or military extortion or other abuse of power. The Borno State government provided financial and in-kind resources to the CJTF, a nongovernmental self-defense militia that coordinated and at times aligned with the military to prevent attacks against civilian populations by Boko Haram and ISIS-WA. Human rights organizations and press reporting charged the CJTF with committing human rights abuses. The government took few steps to investigate or punish CJTF members who committed human rights abuses. Boko Haram and ISIS-WA conducted numerous attacks targeting civilians. Boko Haram recruited and forcefully conscripted child soldiers and carried out scores of suicide bombings, many by young women and girls forced into doing so — and other attacks on population centers in the Northeast and in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Abductions by Boko Haram and ISIS-WA continued. Both groups subjected many women and girls to sexual and gender-based violence, including forced marriages, sexual slavery, and rape. The government investigated attacks by Boko Haram and ISIS-WA and took steps to prosecute their members, although the majority of suspected insurgent group supporters were held in military custody without charge. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were several reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary and unlawful killings. The national police, army, and other security services used lethal and excessive force to disperse protesters and apprehend criminals and suspects and committed other extrajudicial killings. Authorities generally did not hold police, military, or other security force personnel accountable for the use of excessive or deadly force or for the deaths of persons in custody. State and federal panels of inquiry investigating suspicious deaths generally did not make their findings public. In August 2017 the acting president convened a civilian-led presidential investigative panel to review compliance of the armed forces with human rights obligations and rules of engagement, and the panel submitted its findings in February. As of November no portions of the report had been made public. As of September there were no reports of the federal government further investigating or holding individuals accountable for the 2015 killing and subsequent mass burial of members of the Shia group Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and other civilians by Nigerian Army (NA) forces in Zaria, Kaduna State. In 2016 the government of Kaduna made public the Kaduna State judicial commission’s nonbinding report, which found the NA used “excessive and disproportionate” force during the 2015 altercations in which 348 IMN members and one soldier died. The commission recommended the federal government conduct an independent investigation and prosecute anyone found to have acted unlawfully. It also called for the proscription of the IMN and the monitoring of its members and their activities. In 2016 the government of Kaduna State published a white paper that included acceptance of the commission’s recommendation to investigate and prosecute allegations of excessive and disproportionate use of force by the NA. As of September, however, there was no indication that authorities had held any members of the NA accountable for the events in Zaria. It also accepted the recommendation to hold IMN leader Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky responsible for all illegal acts committed by IMN members during the altercations and in the preceding 30 years. In 2016 a federal court declared the continued detention without charge of Zakzaky and his wife illegal and unconstitutional. The court ordered their release by January 2017. The federal government did not comply with this order, and Zakzaky, his spouse, and other IMN members remained in detention. In April the Kaduna State government charged Zakzaky in state court with multiple felonies stemming from the death of the soldier at Zaria. The charges include culpable homicide, which can carry the death penalty. As of December the case was pending. In July a Kaduna High Court dismissed charges of aiding and abetting culpable homicide against more than 80 IMN members. As of September the Kaduna State government had appealed the ruling. Approximately 100 additional IMN members remained in detention. In October security forces killed 45 IMN members that were participating in processions and protests, according to Amnesty International (AI) (see section 2.b.). In January AI reported that the Nigerian Air Force used excessive force in responding to intercommunal violence in December 2017 in Numan local government area (LGA) in Adamawa State. According to the report, hundreds of herdsmen attacked eight villages in Adamawa in response to a massacre by farming communities of up to 51 herders, mostly children, in Kikan village the previous month. The Nigerian Air Force said it responded at the request of relevant security agencies for show of force flights to disperse the “hoodlums” engaged in ransacking and burning villages, and subsequently aimed to shoot in front of crowds to deter them from attacking Numan. AI reported that the Air Force response resulted in a fire and destruction in the town, and that Air Force rockets and bullets hit civilian buildings directly and resulted in multiple civilian deaths. The report also stated it was not possible to establish conclusively how much of the death and destruction was attributable to the Air Force’s actions and how much to the concurrent attack by herdsmen. The Air Force denied the claims in a statement but reportedly ordered an investigation. As of September it was unclear if the investigation had been concluded. In January 2017 the air force mistakenly bombed an informal internally displaced persons (IDP) settlement in Rann, Borno State, which resulted in the killing and injuring of more than 100 civilians and humanitarian workers. Army personnel also were injured. The government and military leaders publicly assumed responsibility for the strike and launched an investigation. The air force conducted its own internal investigation, but as of December the government had not made public its findings. No air force or army personnel were known to have been held accountable for their roles in the event. There were reports of arbitrary and unlawful killings related to internal conflicts in the Northeast and other areas (see section 1.g.). After more than two years of incommunicado detention by the State Security Service (SSS) without trial, access to counsel, or family visitation, the publisher of Bayelsa State-based tabloid the Weekly Source, Jones Abiri, was released on bail in August. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported Abiri was accused of being a member of a Niger Delta militant group but was not formally charged, and said Abiri’s detention was in response to critical coverage from the July 2016 edition of the Weekly Source. Following an open letter from the CPJ and significant public outcry, Abiri was arraigned and eventually released on bail. Abiri told reporters that he was blindfolded, held in an underground cell for most of the two years, and did not have access to medication in detention (see section 2.a.). In August AI issued a statement on the International Day of the Disappeared, calling on the government to end unlawful arrests and incommunicado detentions, including the reported disappearances of more than 600 members of the IMN, and an unknown number of individuals in the Northeast where Boko Haram had been active. In August the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) signed the mandate documents and a standard operating procedure to establish a database of missing persons in the country, with technical advice from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). As of September the database was not operational. Criminal groups abducted civilians in the Niger Delta and the Southeast, often to collect ransom payments. Maritime kidnappings remained common as militants turned to piracy and related crimes to support themselves. On March 26, for example, Nigerian pirates boarded a fishing vessel off the coast of Ghana, kidnapping three Korean sailors and taking them by speedboat back to the Niger Delta. The pirates reportedly released the sailors after the Ghanaian parent company paid a ransom. Other parts of the country experienced a significant number of abductions. Prominent and wealthy figures were often targets of abduction. For example, in January a member of the Taraba State House of Assembly, Hosea Ibi, was abducted and killed by unknown assailants. Boko Haram and ISIS-WA conducted large-scale abductions in Borno and Yobe States (see section 1.g.). c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The constitution and law prohibit torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. In December 2017, the president signed the Anti-Torture Act, which defines and specifically criminalizes torture. The Act prescribes offences and penalties for any person, including law enforcement officers, who commits torture or aids, abets, or by act or omission is an accessory to torture. It also provides a basis for victims of torture to seek civil damages. The Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA), passed in 2015, prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of arrestees; however, it fails to prescribe penalties for violators. Each state must also individually adopt the ACJA for the legislation to apply beyond the FCT and federal agencies. As of November the states of Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Cross Rivers, Delta, Ekiti, Enugu, Kaduna, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo, and Rivers had adopted ACJA-compliant legislation. The Ministry of Justice previously established a National Committee Against Torture (NCAT). Lack of legal and operational independence and lack of funding, however, prevented NCAT from carrying out its work effectively. The law prohibits the introduction into trials of evidence and confessions obtained through torture. Authorities did not respect this prohibition, however, and, according to credible international organizations, the Special Antirobbery Squad (SARS) often used torture to extract confessions later used to try suspects. Police also repeatedly mistreated civilians to extort money. In 2016 AI reported police officers in the SARS regularly tortured detainees in custody as a means of extracting confessions and bribes. In response to AI’s findings, the inspector general of police reportedly admonished SARS commanders and announced broad reforms to correct SARS units’ failures to follow due process and their use of excessive force. Allegations of widespread abuse by SARS officers, however, continued throughout the year. In late 2017 citizens began a social media campaign (#EndSARS) to document physical abuse and extortion by SARS officers and demand SARS units be disbanded. In December 2017 the inspector general of police announced plans to reorganize SARS units, but complaints of abuse continued. Several SARS officers were dismissed from the force and, in some instances, prosecuted, and the National Police Force (NPF) sought technical assistance for investigations of SARS officers. The vast majority of misconduct cases, however, went uninvestigated and unpunished. In August then-acting President Yemi Osinbajo ordered the inspector general of police to overhaul the management and activities of SARS, and ordered the NHRC to set up a “Special Panel” with public hearings on SARS abuses. The panel’s work was ongoing at the end of the year and it had not yet issued a report. Local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international human rights groups accused the security services of illegal detention, inhuman treatment, and torture of criminal suspects, militants, detainees, and prisoners. Military and police reportedly used a range of torture methods including beatings while bound, rape and other forms of sexual violence. According to reports, security services committed rape and other forms of violence against women and girls, often with impunity. As of December the government had not held any responsible officials to account for reported incidents of torture in detention facilities in the Northeast, including Giwa Barracks. Police used a technique commonly referred to as “parading” of arrestees, which involved walking arrestees through public spaces and subjecting them to public ridicule and abuse. Bystanders often taunted and hurled food and other objects at arrestees. The sharia courts in 12 northern states may prescribe punishments such as caning, amputation, and death by stoning. The sharia criminal procedure code allows defendants 30 days to appeal sentences involving mutilation or death to a higher sharia court. Statutory law mandates state governors treat all court decisions equally, including amputation or death sentences, regardless of whether issued by a sharia or a nonsharia court. Authorities, however, often did not carry out caning, amputation, and stoning sentences passed by sharia courts because defendants frequently appealed, a process that could be lengthy. Federal appellate courts had not ruled on whether such punishments violate the constitution because no relevant cases reached the federal level. Although sharia appellate courts consistently overturned stoning and amputation sentences on procedural or evidentiary grounds, there were no challenges on constitutional grounds. There were no reports of canings during the year. Defendants generally did not challenge caning sentences in court as a violation of statutory law. In the past sharia courts usually carried out caning immediately. In some cases convicted individuals paid fines or went to prison in lieu of caning. The United Nations reported that it had received four allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against peacekeepers from Nigeria deployed to the United Nations Mission in Liberia. The cases involve both sexual exploitation (three allegations) and abuse (one allegation). Investigations both by the United Nations and Nigeria were pending. Three allegations were reported in 2017. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Prison and detention center conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Prisoners and detainees reportedly were subjected to torture, gross overcrowding, inadequate medical care, food and water shortages, and other abuses; some of these conditions resulted in deaths. The government often detained suspected militants outside the formal prison system (see section 1.g.). Physical Conditions: Overcrowding was a significant problem. Although the total designed capacity of the country’s prisons was 50,153 inmates, as of July they held 73,631 prisoners. Approximately 68 percent of inmates were in pretrial detention or remanded. As of July there were 1,475 female inmates. Authorities sometimes held female and male prisoners together, especially in rural areas. Prison authorities often held juvenile suspects with adults. Prisoners and detainees were reportedly subjected to torture, gross overcrowding, food and water shortages, inadequate medical treatment, deliberate and incidental exposure to heat and sun, and infrastructure deficiencies that led to wholly inadequate sanitary conditions that could result in death. Guards and prison officials reportedly extorted inmates or levied fees on them to pay for food, prison maintenance, transport to routine court appointments, and release from prison. Female inmates in some cases faced the threat of rape. Most of the 240 prisons were 70 to 80 years old and lacked basic facilities. Lack of potable water, inadequate sewage facilities, and severe overcrowding resulted in dangerous and unsanitary conditions. For example, according to press reports from December 2017, Agodi Minimum Security Prison, in Oyo State, had 1,104 inmates despite a maximum capacity of 390. Port Harcourt Prison, designed to hold 800 inmates, held approximately 5,000, while Kirikiri Maximum Security Prison in Lagos, with a capacity of 956 inmates, held approximately 2,600. Disease remained pervasive in cramped, poorly ventilated prison facilities, which had chronic shortages of medical supplies. Inadequate medical treatment caused many prisoners to die from treatable illnesses, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. In April 2017 the Lagos State Controller of Prisons stated that 32 inmates died in 2016 in a single Lagos prison due to lack of access to medical care. The House of Representatives confirmed more than 900 inmates died in prisons across the country in 2016 due to severe lack of drugs and health care. Although authorities attempted to isolate persons with communicable diseases, facilities often lacked adequate space, and inmates with these illnesses lived with the general prison population. There were no reliable statistics on the total number of prison deaths during the year. Only prisoners with money or support from their families had sufficient food. Prison officials routinely stole money provided for prisoners’ food. Poor inmates often relied on handouts from others to survive. Prison officials, police, and other security force personnel often denied inmates food and medical treatment to punish them or extort money. In general prisons had no facilities to care for pregnant women or nursing mothers. Although the law prohibits the imprisonment of children, minors–many of whom were born in prison–lived in the prisons. The NGO Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of Errants (CURE)-Nigeria reported children in some cases remained with their inmate mothers up to at least age six. While the total number of children living in prison with their mothers was unknown, CURE-Nigeria’s April 2017 survey of 198 of the country’s women inmates found more than 30 women with children in just three prisons. Approximately 10 percent of survey respondents reported they were pregnant. Results of surveys of women and children in prisons conducted by CURE-Nigeria revealed many children in custody did not receive routine immunizations, and authorities made few provisions to accommodate their physical needs, to include hygiene items, proper bedding, proper food, and recreation areas. According to its 2016 report, female inmates largely relied on charitable organizations to obtain hygiene items. Generally prisons made few efforts to provide mental health services or other accommodations to prisoners with mental disabilities (see section 6). Several unofficial military prisons continued to operate, including the Giwa Barracks facility in Maiduguri, Borno State. Although conditions in the Giwa Barracks detention facility reportedly marginally improved, detainees were denied due process and subjected to arbitrary and indefinite detention in conditions that remained harsh and life threatening (see section 1.g.). An AI report released in May documented multiple cases where women determined their husbands had died in custody in previous years. The same report also documented the arbitrary detention of women and children at Giwa Barracks. AI reported that citizens were generally not able to access any information about the fate or welfare of family members in military detention, or whether they were in fact detained. There were no reports of accountability for past reported deaths in custody, nor for earlier reports from AI alleging that an estimated 20,000 persons in the region were arbitrarily detained between 2009-15 with as many as 7,000 dying of thirst, starvation, suffocation, disease due to overcrowding, lack of medical attention, the use of fumigation chemicals in unventilated cells, torture, or extrajudicial execution. After multiple releases during the year (see Improvements sub-subsection), it was unclear how many children or adults remained in detention at Giwa Barracks or other unofficial detention facilities. According to press and NGO reporting, the military continued to arrest and remand to military detention facilities, including Giwa Barracks, additional persons suspected of association with Boko Haram or ISIS-WA. The government continued to arrest and, in some cases, inappropriately detain for prolonged periods, women and children removed from or allegedly associated with Boko Haram and ISIS-WA. They included women and girls who had been forcibly married to or sexually enslaved by the insurgents. The government reportedly detained them for screening and their perceived intelligence value. A credible international organization, however, reported the typical length of time spent in detention shortened during the year. Separately, an AI report from May documented severe restrictions on freedom of movement for IDPs held in satellite camps in many parts of Borno State. According to the report, restrictions on entry and exit confined IDPs, in some instances, to conditions constituting de facto detention for prolonged periods. Administration: While prison authorities allowed visitors within a scheduled timeframe, few visits occurred, largely due to lack of family resources and travel distances. The ACJA provides that the chief judge of each state, or any magistrate designated by the chief judge, shall conduct monthly inspections of police stations and other places of detention within the magistrate’s jurisdiction, other than prisons, and may inspect records of arrests, direct the arraignment of suspects, and grant bail if previously refused but appropriate. The NHRC conducts prison audits. Despite an expressed willingness and ability to investigate credible allegations of inhuman conditions, however, the NHRC has not publicly released an audit report since 2012. In June the NHRC announced it was beginning a nationwide audit of all detention facilities. As of October the audit was not complete. Through its Legal Aid Council, the Ministry of Justice reportedly provided some monitoring of prisons through the Federal Government Prison Decongestion Program. Independent Monitoring: There was limited monitoring of prisons by independent nongovernmental observers. The International Committee of the Red Cross had access to police detention, Nigerian Prisons Services (NPS), and some military detention facilities. Improvements: An international organization reported that at least 2,486 persons were released from Giwa Barracks during the year. The majority were transferred to a rehabilitation center run by the Borno State government in Maiduguri. Another 159 were transferred to a deradicalization program in Gombe State, under the auspices of Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC). For the first time OPSC graduated 91 former low-level Boko Haram affiliate members and former Giwa Barracks detainees from its deradicalization program. Some OPSC graduates faced difficulty in reintegrating into communities due to stigmatization from being associated with Boko Haram, and 46 graduates originally from Gwoza LGA were initially “rejected” by their communities. The Gwoza LGA subcommittee on reintegration was actively working with the community to reintegrate them. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Although the constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, police and security services employed these practices. According to numerous reports, since 2013 the military arbitrarily arrested and detained–often in unmonitored military detention facilities–thousands of persons in the context of the fight against Boko Haram in the Northeast (see section 1.g.). According to AI, freedom of movement restrictions in IDP camps in Borno State, in some instances, constituted de facto detention (see section 1.c.). In their prosecution of corruption cases, law enforcement and intelligence agencies often failed to follow due process and arrested suspects without appropriate arrest and search warrants. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The NPF is the country’s largest law enforcement agency. An inspector general of police, appointed by and reporting directly to the president, commands the NPF. In addition to traditional police responsibilities of maintaining law and order in communities in each of the states and the FCT, the inspector general oversees law enforcement operations throughout the country involving border security, marine (navigation) matters, and counterterrorism. A state commissioner of police, nominated by the inspector general and approved by the state governor, commands NPF forces in each of the states and the FCT. Although administratively controlled by the inspector general, operationally the state commissioner reports to the governor. In the event of societal violence or emergencies, such as endemic terrorist activity or national disasters requiring deployment of law enforcement resources, the governor may also assume operational control of these forces. The Department of State Services (DSS) is responsible for internal security and reports to the president through the national security adviser. Several other federal organizations have law enforcement components, such as the Economic & Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Attorney General’s Office, Ministry of Interior, and federal courts. Due to the inability of law enforcement agencies to control societal violence, the government continued to turn to the armed forces to address internal security concerns. The constitution authorizes the use of the military to “[s]uppress insurrection and act in aid of civil authorities to restore order.” Armed forces were part of continuing joint security operations in the Niger Delta, Middle Belt, and Northwest. Police, DSS, and military reported to civilian authorities but periodically acted outside civilian control. The government lacked effective mechanisms and sufficient political will to investigate and punish most security force abuse and corruption. Police remained susceptible to corruption, committed human rights violations, and operated with widespread impunity in the apprehension, illegal detention, and torture of suspects. In September the NPF Public Complaint and Rapid Response Unit reported it had recovered approximately 1.1 million naira ($3,038) in bribery payments and dismissed 10 officers in the past two years. Dismissals of low-level officers, however, did not deter continuing widespread extortion and abuse of civilians. The DSS also reportedly committed human rights abuses. In some cases private citizens or the government brought charges against perpetrators of human rights abuses, but most cases lingered in court or went unresolved after an initial investigation. In the armed forces, a soldier’s commanding officer determined disciplinary action, and the decision was subject to review by the chain of command according to the Armed Forces Act. In 2016 the army announced the creation of a human rights desk to investigate complaints of human rights violations brought by civilians, and set up a standing general court martial in Maiduguri. The human rights desk in Maiduguri coordinated with the NHRC and Nigerian Bar Association to receive and investigate complaints, although their capacity and ability to investigate complaints outside of major population centers remained limited. As of September the court martial in Maiduguri had reached verdicts in 39 cases since inception, some of which resulted in convictions for rape, murder, and abduction of civilians. Many credible accusations of abuses, however, remained uninvestigated and unpunished. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES Police and other security services have the authority to arrest individuals without first obtaining warrants if they have reasonable suspicion a person committed an offense, a power they often abused. The law requires that, even during a state of emergency, detainees must appear before a magistrate within 48 hours and have access to lawyers and family members. In many instances government and security officials did not adhere to this regulation without being bribed. Police held for interrogation individuals found in the vicinity of a crime for periods ranging from a few hours to several months, and after their release, authorities frequently asked the individuals to return for further questioning. The law requires an arresting officer to inform the accused of charges at the time of arrest, transport the accused to a police station for processing within a reasonable time, and allow the suspect to obtain counsel and post bail. Families were afraid to approach military barracks used as detention facilities. Police routinely detained suspects without informing them of the charges against them or allowing access to counsel and family members; such detentions often included solicitation of bribes. Provision of bail often remained arbitrary or subject to extrajudicial influence. Judges often set exceedingly stringent bail conditions. In many areas with no functioning bail system, suspects remained incarcerated indefinitely in investigative detention. Authorities kept detainees incommunicado for long periods. Numerous detainees stated police demanded bribes to take them to court hearings or to release them. If family members wanted to attend a trial, police often demanded additional payment. Arbitrary Arrest: Security personnel arbitrarily arrested numerous persons during the year, although the number remained unknown. In the Northeast the military and members of vigilante groups, such as the CJTF, rounded up individuals during mass arrests, often without evidence. Security services detained journalists and demonstrators during the year (see sections 2.a. and 2.b.). Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention remained a serious problem. According to NPS figures released in March, approximately 70 percent of the prison population consisted of detainees awaiting trial, often for years. The shortage of trial judges, trial backlogs, endemic corruption, bureaucratic inertia, and undue political influence seriously hampered the judicial system. In many cases multiple adjournments resulted in years-long delays. Many detainees had their cases adjourned because the NPF and the NPS did not have vehicles to transport them to court. Some persons remained in detention because authorities lost their case files. Prison officials did not have effective prison case file management processes, to include a databases or cataloguing systems. In general, the courts were plagued with inadequate, antiquated systems and procedures. Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Detainees may challenge the lawfulness of their detention before a court and have the right to submit complaints to the NHRC. Nevertheless, most detainees found this approach ineffective because, even with legal representation, they often waited years to gain access to court. Although the constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, the judicial branch remained susceptible to pressure from the executive and legislative branches. Political leaders influenced the judiciary, particularly at the state and local levels. Understaffing, underfunding, inefficiency, and corruption prevented the judiciary from functioning adequately. Judges frequently failed to appear for trials. In addition the salaries of court officials were low, and they often lacked proper equipment and training. There was a widespread public perception that judges were easily bribed and litigants could not rely on the courts to render impartial judgments. Citizens encountered long delays and received requests from judicial officials for bribes to expedite cases or obtain favorable rulings. Although the Ministry of Justice implemented strict requirements for education and length of service for judges at the federal and state levels, no requirements or monitoring bodies existed for judges at the local level. This contributed to corruption and the miscarriage of justice in local courts. The constitution provides that, in addition to common law courts, states may establish courts based on sharia or customary (traditional) law. Sharia courts functioned in 12 northern states and the FCT. Customary courts functioned in most of the 36 states. The nature of a case and the consent of the parties usually determined what type of court had jurisdiction. In the case of sharia courts in the North, the impetus to establish them stemmed at least in part from perceptions of inefficiency, cost, and corruption in the common law system. The constitution specifically recognizes sharia courts for “civil proceedings,” but they do not have the authority to compel participation, whether by non-Muslims or Muslims. Non-Muslims have the option to have their cases tried in the sharia courts if they wish. The constitution is silent on the use of sharia courts for criminal cases. In addition to civil matters, sharia courts also hear criminal cases if both complainant and defendant are Muslim and agree to the venue. Sharia courts may pass sentences based on the sharia penal code, including for “hudud” offenses (serious criminal offenses with punishments prescribed in the Quran) that provide for punishments such as caning, amputation, and death by stoning. Despite constitutional language supporting only secular criminal courts and the prohibition against involuntary participation in sharia criminal courts, a Zamfara State law requires that a sharia court hear all criminal cases involving Muslims. Defendants have the right to challenge the constitutionality of sharia criminal statutes through the common law appellate courts. As of November no challenges with adequate legal standing had reached the common law appellate system. The highest appellate court for sharia-based decisions is the Supreme Court, staffed by common-law judges who are not required to have any formal training in the sharia penal code. Sharia experts often advise them. TRIAL PROCEDURES Pursuant to constitutional or statutory provisions, defendants are presumed innocent and enjoy the rights to: be informed promptly and in detail of charges (with free interpretation as necessary from the moment charged through all appeals); receive a fair and public trial without undue delay; be present at their trial; communicate with an attorney of choice (or have one provided at public expense); have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense; confront witnesses against them and present witnesses and evidence; not be compelled to testify or confess guilt; and appeal. Authorities did not always respect these rights, most frequently due to a lack of capacity and resources. Insufficient numbers of judges and courtrooms, together with growing caseloads, often resulted in pretrial, trial, and appellate delays that could extend a trial for as many as 10 years. Although accused persons are entitled to counsel of their choice, there were reportedly some cases where defense counsel absented himself or herself from required court appearances so regularly that a court might proceed with a routine hearing in the absence of counsel, except for certain offenses for which conviction carries the death penalty. Authorities held defendants in prison awaiting trial for periods well beyond the terms allowed by law (see section 1.c.). Human rights groups stated the government denied terror suspects detained by the military their rights to legal representation, due process, and to be heard by a judicial authority. In October 2017 the government announced it had begun hearings in front of civilian judges at the Kainji military facility for 1,669 detained persons and intended to do so for 651 held at Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri. Human rights groups generally welcomed the initiative as a step towards delivering justice for victims of Boko Haram, but raised serious concerns regarding potential due process violations of the accused. Subsequent rounds of hearings took place in February and July, with increasing access for national and international monitoring organizations and somewhat improved process. Rights groups including Human Rights Watch (HRW); however, expressed concerns regarding inadequate access to defense counsel, a lack of interpreters, and inadequate evidence leading to an overreliance on confessions. It was unclear if confessions were completely voluntary. According to a credible international organization, the three rounds of hearings resulted in 366 convictions for terrorism-related offenses, primarily based on confessions and guilty pleas; 421 cases at or awaiting trial, primarily involving individuals who pled not-guilty; and 882 individuals whose cases were dismissed because the state had insufficient evidence to bring charges. Those whose cases were dismissed, however, reportedly remained in detention without clear legal authority. By common law women and non-Muslims may testify in civil or criminal proceedings and give testimony that carries the same weight as testimony of other witnesses. Sharia courts usually accorded the testimony of women and non-Muslims less weight than that of Muslim men. Some sharia court judges allowed different evidentiary requirements for male and female defendants to prove adultery or fornication. Pregnancy, for example, was admissible evidence of a woman’s adultery or fornication in some sharia courts. In contrast, sharia courts could convict men only if they confessed or there was eyewitness testimony. Sharia courts, however, provided women some benefits, including increased access to divorce, child custody, and alimony. Military courts tried only military personnel, but their judgments could be appealed to civilian courts. Members of the military are subject to the Armed Forces Act regarding civil and criminal matters. The operational commanding officer of a member of the armed forces must approve charges against that member. The commanding officer decides whether the accusation merits initiation of court-martial proceedings or lower-level disciplinary action. Such determinations are nominally subject to higher review, although the commanding officer makes the final decision. If the case proceeds, the accused is subject to trial by court-martial. The law provides for internal appeals before military councils as well as final appeal to the civilian Court of Appeals. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary in civil matters, but the executive and legislative branches, as well as business interests, exerted influence and pressure in civil cases. Official corruption and lack of will to implement court decisions also interfered with due process. The law provides for access to the courts for redress of grievances, and courts may award damages and issue injunctions to stop or prevent a human rights violation, but the decisions of civil courts were difficult to enforce. The law prohibits arbitrary interference, but authorities infringed on this right during the year, and police entered homes without judicial or other appropriate authorization. There were reports of warrantless arrests of young men in the Niger Delta region on suspicion of having links with militant groups. In their pursuit of corruption cases, law enforcement agencies reportedly carried out searches and arrests without warrants. State and local governments forcibly evicted some residents and demolished their homes, often without sufficient notice or alternative compensation, and sometimes in violation of court orders. Justice & Empowerment Initiatives noted that the practice was an ongoing concern. For example, in September 2017 the Lagos State government, at the request of the University of Lagos, demolished 220 houses in Iwaya, a small, informal settlement abutting the University of Lagos campus. The demolitions occurred despite a 2017 Lagos State High Court injunction banning further demolition. According to Justice & Empowerment Initiatives, members of these 220 households were rendered homeless after the demolitions and have since settled in nearby slum communities. Press reporting indicated that the army was responsible for burning villages in areas where Boko Haram was suspected to have been operational and possibly supported by the local population. These actions reportedly contributed to the high number of internally displaced persons in the Northeast. Killings: Units of the NA’s Third, Seventh, and Eighth Divisions, the NPF, and the DSS carried out operations against the terrorist groups Boko Haram and ISIS-WA in the Northeast. Some military forces allegedly killed suspected members of the groups and engaged in retaliatory tactics against civilians believed to have harbored or be associated with the groups. Security forces also committed mass arrests, primarily of men and boys perceived to be of fighting age, for suspected collaboration with or tacit support of the insurgents. In March 2017 the army convened a board of inquiry (BOI) to investigate allegations of human rights violations committed by the army during campaigns against the insurgency in the Northeast, including in its detention centers. In May 2017 the BOI presented its findings to the chief of army staff. While the full report was not publicly available, the board briefed the press on some of the report’s conclusions and recommendations. The board documented conditions at military detention facilities, including the center at Giwa Barracks, and found instances of overcrowded cells and unsanitary conditions. The BOI concluded that these detention conditions, and delays in trials of alleged Boko Haram members, sometimes resulted in deaths in custody. The BOI also found that the denial of access to legal representation was a violation of human rights. The board, however, reportedly found no evidence of arbitrary arrests or extrajudicial executions of detainees. The board also stated it was “unable to substantiate” any of the allegations against senior officers, claiming a lack of documents or other forensic evidence. The BOI reportedly did not find any individual member of the NA at fault for any human rights violation in military detention facilities, nor did it recommend prosecutions or other accountability measures for any member of the Armed Forces of Nigeria or other government entity. Notably, however, the BOI did not meet internationally accepted best practices for investigations. In particular, the board lacked full independence, did not have forensic or other evidentiary expertise, and did not consult testimonies from victims of human rights violations in compiling its evidence, thus calling into question some of its conclusions. In August 2017 acting President Osinbajo announced a civilian-led presidential investigative panel to review compliance of the armed forces with human rights obligations and rules of engagement. The panel conducted hearings across the country and submitted its findings to the presidency in February. As of December the report had not been made public. Boko Haram and ISIS-WA attacked population centers and security personnel in Borno State. Boko Haram also conducted limited attacks in Adamawa, while ISIS-WA attacked targets in Yobe. These groups targeted anyone perceived as disagreeing with the groups’ political or religious beliefs or interfering with their access to resources. While Boko Haram no longer controls as much territory as it once did, the two insurgencies nevertheless maintain the ability to stage forces in rural areas and launch attacks against civilian and military targets across the Northeast. Both groups carried out attacks through large numbers of roadside improved explosive devices. ISIS-WA maintained the ability to carry out effective complex attacks on military positions. Boko Haram continued to employ indiscriminate suicide bombings targeting the local civilian populations. Women and children carried out many of the attacks. According to a 2017 study by UNICEF, nearly one in five suicide attacks by Boko Haram used a child, and more than two-thirds of these children were girls. For example, on February 16, three female suicide bombers simultaneously detonated themselves at a market in Konduga, southeast of Maiduguri, in Borno State, reportedly killing 22 persons and injuring 28. Boko Haram continued to kill scores of civilians suspected of cooperating with the government. ISIS-WA targeted civilians with attacks or kidnappings less frequently than Boko Haram, but employed targeted acts of violence and intimidation against civilians in order to expand its area of influence and gain control over critical economic resources. As part of a violent and deliberate campaign, ISIS-WA also targeted government figures, traditional leaders, and contractors. In multiple instances, ISIS-WA issued “night letters” or otherwise warned civilians to leave specific areas, and subsequently targeted civilians who failed to depart. Abductions: As of September NGO and activist allegations of thousands of enforced civilian disappearances by security forces in the Northeast remained uninvestigated by the government. Boko Haram abducted men, women, and children, often in conjunction with attacks on communities. The group forced men, women, and children to fight on its behalf. Women and girls abducted by Boko Haram were subjected to physical and psychological abuse, forced labor, forced marriage, forced religious conversions, and sexual abuse, including rape and sexual slavery. Boko Haram also forced women and girls to participate in military operations. Most female suicide bombers were coerced in some form and were often drugged. Boko Haram also used women and girls to lure security forces into ambushes, force payment of ransoms, and leverage prisoner exchanges. While some NGO reports estimated the number of Boko Haram abductees at more than 2,000, the total count of the missing was unknown since abductions continued, towns repeatedly changed hands, and many families were still on the run or dispersed in IDP camps. Many abductees managed to escape Boko Haram captivity, but precise numbers remained unknown. On February 19, ISIS-WA abducted 110 girls from the town of Dapchi, Yobe State. According to press reports, five of the girls died in the course of being abducted, while 106 were released March 22 for unknown reasons. One girl remained with the insurgents, reportedly because she refused to convert from Christianity. All other abductees were Muslims. Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: Security services used excessive force in the pursuit of Boko Haram and ISIS-WA suspects, often resulting in arbitrary arrest, detention, or torture (see section 1.c.). Arbitrary mass arrests continued in the Northeast, and authorities held many individuals in poor and life-threatening conditions. There were reports some of the arrested and detained included children believed to be associated with Boko Haram, some of whom may have been forcibly recruited. Conditions in Giwa Barracks reportedly marginally improved during the year, as the military periodically released groups of women and children, and less frequently men, from the facility to state-run rehabilitation centers; however, some deaths in detention continued. According to army statements to the press, the 2017 BOI report made numerous recommendations for improving detention conditions and judicial processes for suspected Boko Haram and ISIS-WA members. As of August, however, no one had been held accountable for abuses in Giwa Barracks or other military detention facilities. Boko Haram engaged in widespread sexual violence against women and girls. Those who escaped or that security services or vigilante groups rescued faced ostracism by their communities and had difficulty obtaining appropriate medical and psychosocial treatment and care. Reports indicated soldiers, police, CJTF and others committed sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls and such exploitation and abuse was a major concern in state-run IDP camps, informal camps, and local communities in and around Maiduguri, the Borno State capital, and across the Northeast. In a report issued in May, AI documented cases where soldiers and CJTF members used force or coercion to take advantage of desperate living circumstances to have sex with women in so called “satellite” IDP camps. In Bama Hospital IDP camp, for example, the report said that at least nine women were raped in late 2015 and early 2016 when they refused to have sex in exchange for food or other assistance, or while walking outside the camp to collect water. During the same period, the report documented 10 women who complied with demands to become “wives” or “girlfriends” of soldiers or CJTF members in order to obtain enough food or other necessary items for their families to survive. According to the report, despite a relative improvement in the humanitarian situation, women and girls continued to be exploited in sex trafficking. There were no reports that government officials, security force members, or other alleged perpetrators were held criminally accountable for these offenses. Child Soldiers: Children under age 18 participated in Boko Haram attacks. The group paid, forcibly conscripted, or otherwise coerced young boys and girls to serve in its ranks and perpetrate attacks and raids, plant improvised explosive devices, serve as spies, and carry out suicide bombings, often under the influence of drugs. For example, on January 31, Boko Haram used two girls as human bombs in an attack on Dalori, near Maiduguri. Both girls were killed when their improvised explosive devices detonated, killing two men and injuring 44 persons, including 22 children. The group also used abducted girls as sex slaves and forced them to work for the group. Reports indicated that the military coordinated closely on the ground with the CJTF, a nongovernmental self-defense militia that received limited state government funding. The CJTF and United Nations worked to implement an action plan to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children, which was signed by both parties and witnessed by the Borno State government in September 2017. According to a credible international organization, since the signing of the action plan the CJTF had ceased the recruitment and use of child soldiers. At a public ceremony in October, UNICEF, the CJTF, and the Borno State government marked the formal separation of 833 children formerly associated with the group. A credible international organization reported that the verification, demobilization, and reintegration of child soldiers previously associated with the CJTF was progressing but, due to security concerns, full verification of demobilization in a number of LGAs was pending at the end of the year. The majority of the demobilized former child soldiers were awaiting formal reintegration into communities. Unlike previous years, there were no reports that the military used children in support roles. Also see the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/. Norway Executive Summary Norway is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy. The government consists of a prime minister, a cabinet, and a 169-seat parliament (Storting), which is elected every four years and may not be dissolved. The monarch generally appoints the leader of the majority party or majority coalition as prime minister with the approval of parliament. Observers considered the multiparty parliamentary elections in September 2017 to be free and fair. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. There were no reports of egregious human rights abuses. The government investigated officials who committed violations. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The constitution and law prohibit such practices, and there were no reports that government officials employed them. Prison and Detention Center Conditions There were no significant reports regarding prison or detention center conditions that raised human rights concerns. Physical Conditions: Prisons and detention centers generally met international standards, and there were no major concerns regarding physical conditions or inmate abuse. Administration: Procedures are in place to report abuse or mistreatment of prisoners or other detainees. Authorities conducted proper investigations of credible allegations of mistreatment. Independent Monitoring: The government permitted visits, including unannounced visits, by independent human rights observers. Improvements: In response to concerns raised in 2016 and 2017 by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including Amnesty International Norway and the Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers (NOAS) as well as the parliamentary civilian ombudsman, the government remodeled the Trandum detention center, where rejected asylum applicants are held before deportation. The facility was upgraded to include single rooms with separate bathrooms. Because Trandum is not a criminal detention facility, internal security practices were relaxed, and guards no longer wear uniforms. The government also established a separate facility in Hurdal, north of Oslo, that is better equipped than Trandum to accommodate families with young children whose asylum applications were rejected. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention and provide for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The national police have primary responsibility for internal security. Police may call on the armed forces for assistance in crises. In such circumstances, the armed forces operate under police authority. The National Police Directorate oversees the police force. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the national police, and the government has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse. There were no reports of impunity involving the security forces. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES The law requires warrants authorized by a prosecutor for arrests. The police may make an arrest without a warrant if any delay would entail risk of injury to the police or civilians or damage to property. If police arrest a person without a warrant, a prosecutor must consider as soon as possible whether to uphold the arrest. Detainees must be informed of the charges against them immediately after an arrest, and, if the prosecutor wishes to detain suspects, he or she must arraign them no later than three days after arrest. The arraigning judge determines whether the accused should be held in custody or released pending trial. There is a bail system, but it was rarely utilized. Officials routinely released defendants accused of minor crimes pending trial, including nonresident foreigners. Defendants accused of serious or violent crimes usually remained in custody until trial. Before interrogation, authorities allowed detainees access to a lawyer of their choice or, if the requested lawyer was unavailable, to an attorney appointed by the government. The government pays the attorney fees in all cases. Authorities usually allowed arrested persons access to family members. The law mandates that detainees be transferred from a temporary police holding cell to a regular prison cell within 48 hours. The law provides that a court must supervise whether and how long a detainee may be held in solitary confinement during pretrial detention. Spot counts by prison authorities revealed an average of almost 100 prisoners in solitary confinement (among an average prison population of 3,800). In 2017, the latest year for which data was available, the Correctional Services Directorate received six reports of cases where the total period of solitary confinement of a prisoner exceeded 42 days (after which authorities must evaluate the status every 14 days). The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality. TRIAL PROCEDURES The constitution and the law provide for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence and the right to be informed promptly of the charges against them. Trials were held without undue delay. Defendants have the right to be present at their trials. Defendants also have the right to counsel of their choice at public expense, to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense, to free interpretation as necessary from the moment charged through all appeals, to confront and question adverse witnesses, to present their own evidence and witnesses, and to appeal. Defendants may not be compelled to testify or to confess guilt. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Individuals or organizations may seek civil remedies for human rights violations through domestic courts. They may appeal cases alleging violations of the European Convention on Human Rights by the government to the European Court of Human Rights after exhausting all avenues of appeal in domestic courts. PROPERTY RESTITUTION The government and the Jewish Community reported that Holocaust-era restitution was not an issue and that no litigation or restitution claims regarding real or immovable property covered by the Terezin Declaration, which the government endorsed, were pending before authorities. The constitution and law prohibit such actions, and there were no reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions. Oman Executive Summary The Sultanate of Oman is a hereditary monarchy ruled by Sultan Qaboos al-Said since 1970. The sultan has sole authority to enact laws through royal decree, although ministries and the bicameral Majlis Oman (parliament) can draft laws on nonsecurity-related matters, and citizens may provide input through their elected representatives. The Majlis Oman is composed of the Majlis al-Dawla (upper house or State Council), whose 84 members are appointed by the sultan, and the elected 85-member Majlis al-Shura (lower house or Consultative Assembly). In October 2015 more than 250,000 citizens participated in the country’s Majlis al-Shura elections for the Consultative Assembly; there were no independent observers and no notable claims of improper government interference. The Royal Office and Royal Diwan–the sultan’s personal offices–maintained effective control over the security forces. Human rights issues included occasional allegations of torture of prisoners and detainees in government custody; undue restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet, including censorship, site blocking, and criminal libel; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on political participation, and criminalization of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) conduct. Authorities generally held security personnel and other government officials accountable for their actions. The government acted against corruption during the year, with cases proceeding through the court system. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The law prohibits such practices. In an open April letter to the sultan, however, French activist Theirry Danaudet, who spent approximately six months in prison in 2017 for violating Omani customs laws pertaining to prescription medication, cited reports from fellow prisoners, most of whom were of South or Southeast Asian origin, that they suffered systematic beatings and exposure to extreme temperatures. Prison and Detention Center Conditions While prison and detention center conditions generally met international standards there were some allegations of abuse and life-threatening conditions. Physical Conditions: Danaudet’s letter alleged that prison guards abused some prisoners. Human rights organizations reported that activist Hassan al-Basham died on April 28 while in detention at Samail Central Prison. Human rights groups further alleged that courts ignored requests from al-Basham’s lawyers for a medical examination, despite his deteriorating health. Al-Basham had been detained since 2015 after he was convicted on charges including insulting Oman’s ruler and using the internet to prejudice religious values. Administration: There was no established prison authority to which prisoners could bring grievances concerning prison conditions. There is no ombudsman to serve on behalf of prisoners and detainees; this responsibility falls under the public prosecutor’s jurisdiction. Prisoners and detainees did not always have regular access to visitors. Independent Monitoring: The Oman Human Rights Commission (OHRC), a quasi-independent government-sanctioned body, investigated and monitored prison and detention center conditions through site visits. OHRC authorities investigated claims of abuse but did not publish the results of their investigations, purportedly to protect the privacy of the individuals involved. The law permitted visits by independent human rights observer groups, yet none existed in the country, and there were no reports of independent, nongovernmental observers from abroad requesting to visit the country. Consular officers from some embassies reported difficulties in meeting with prisoners or delayed notification about detained citizens. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, but the law permits the government to detain suspects for up to 30 days without charge. Persons arrested or detained are entitled to challenge in court the legal basis of their detention. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The Ministry of the Royal Office controls internal and external security and coordinates all intelligence and security policies. Under the Royal Office, the Internal Security Service (ISS) investigates all matters related to domestic security. The Royal Oman Police (ROP), including the ROP Coast Guard, is also subordinate to the Royal Office and performs regular police duties, provides security at points of entry, and serves as the country’s immigration and customs agency. The Ministry of Defense, particularly the Royal Army of Oman (RAO), is responsible for securing the borders and has limited domestic security responsibilities. The Sultan’s Special Force (SSF) facilitates land and maritime border security in conjunction with the ROP, including rapid reaction antismuggling and antipiracy capabilities. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the ISS, the SSF, the RAO, and the ROP. There were no reports of judicial impunity involving the security forces during the year. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES The law does not require the ROP to obtain a warrant before making an arrest, but it stipulates that police must either release the person or refer the matter to the public prosecution within specified timeframes. For most crimes the public prosecutor must formally arrest or release the person within 48 hours of detention; however, in cases related to security, which is broadly defined, authorities can hold individuals for up to 30 days without charge. The law requires those arrested be informed immediately of the charges against them. There was a functioning bail system. Detainees generally had prompt access to a lawyer of their choice. The state provided public attorneys to indigent detainees, as required by law. Authorities generally allowed detainees prompt access to family members. In cases involving foreign citizens, police sometimes failed to notify the detainee’s local sponsor or the citizen’s embassy. Arbitrary Arrest: The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, individuals can be held for up to 30 days without charge. Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, the sultan may act as a Court of Final Appeal and exercise his power of pardon as chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, the country’s highest legal body, which is empowered to review all judicial decisions. Principles of sharia (Islamic law) inform the civil, commercial, and criminal codes. The law allows women to serve as judges. Civilian or military courts try all cases. There were no reports judicial officials, prosecutors, and defense attorneys faced intimidation or engaged in corruption. TRIAL PROCEDURES The law provides for the right to a fair trial and stipulates the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Citizens and legally resident noncitizens have the right to a public trial, except when the court decides to hold a session in private in the interest of public order or morals; the judiciary generally enforced this right. The government reserved the right to close sensitive cases to the public. The government did not uniformly provide language interpretation for non-Arabic speakers. Defendants have the right to consult with an attorney. The law guarantees defendants the right to be informed promptly of charges. There is no guarantee for adequate time for defense attorneys to prepare, but in practice most court dates provide ample time. There is no guarantee for free interpretation. Courts provide public attorneys to indigent detainees and offer legal defense for defendants facing prison terms of three years or more. The prosecution and defense counsel direct questions to witnesses through the judge. Defendants have the right to be present, submit evidence, and confront witnesses at their trials. There is no known systemic use of forced confession or compulsion to self-incriminate during trial proceedings in the country. Those convicted in any court have one opportunity to appeal a jail sentence longer than three months and fines of more than 480 rials ($1,250) to the appellate courts. The judiciary enforced these rights for all citizens; some foreign embassies claimed these rights were not always uniformly enforced for noncitizens, particularly migrant workers. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES The number of political prisoners was unknown. Previously, the government has publicly acknowledged that it holds a “small number” of political prisoners, and human rights organizations reported that several individuals were detained during the year for their use of social media. Political prisoners were usually detained for short periods of time and without being formally charged with a crime. Political prisoners were afforded the same rights as other prisoners, and could ask to speak with representatives from the Oman Human Rights Commission or the ICRC. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Civil laws govern civil cases. Citizens and foreign residents could file cases, including lawsuits seeking damages for human rights violations, but no known filings occurred during the year. The Administrative Court reviews complaints about the misuse of governmental authority. It has the power to reverse decisions by government bodies and to award compensation. Appointments to this court are subject to the approval of the Administrative Affairs Council. The court’s president and deputy president are appointed by royal decree based on the council’s nomination. Citizens and foreign workers may file complaints regarding working conditions with the Ministry of Manpower for alternative dispute resolution. The ministry may refer cases to the courts if it is unable to negotiate a solution. The 2018 penal code does not allow public officials to enter a private home without first obtaining a warrant from the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The government monitored private communications, including cell phone, email, and internet chat room exchanges. The government blocked most voice over internet protocol sites, such as Skype and FaceTime. Authorities blocked the import of certain publications, e.g., pornography and religious texts without the necessary permit. Shipping companies claimed customs officials sometimes confiscated these materials. The Ministry of Interior requires citizens to obtain permission to marry foreigners, except nationals of Gulf Cooperation Council countries, whom citizens may marry without restriction; authorities do not automatically grant permission, which is particularly difficult for Omani women to obtain. Citizen marriage to a foreigner abroad without ministry approval may result in denial of entry for the foreign spouse at the border and preclude children from claiming citizenship and residency rights. It also may result in a bar from government employment and a fine of 2,000 rials ($5,200). Despite legal protections for women from forced marriage, deeply embedded tribal practices ultimately compel most citizen women towards or away from a choice of spouse. Pakistan Executive Summary Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic. In July the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party won the most National Assembly seats in the general elections, and in August PTI’s Imran Khan became prime minister. While independent observers noted technical improvements in the Election Commission of Pakistan’s management of the polling process itself, observers, civil society organizations and political parties raised concerns about pre-election interference by military and intelligence agencies that created an uneven electoral playing field. Some political parties also alleged significant polling day irregularities occurred. The military and intelligence services nominally reported to civilian authorities but essentially operated without effective civilian oversight. Human rights issues included credible reports of extrajudicial and targeted killings; forced disappearances; torture; arbitrary and lengthy pretrial detention; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; censorship, site-blocking, and arbitrary restrictions on journalists’ freedom of movement; severe harassment and intimidation of and high-profile attacks against journalists and media organizations; government restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly and association, including overly restrictive nongovernmental organizations (NGO) laws; restrictions on religious freedom and discrimination against members of religious minority groups; restrictions on freedom of movement; corruption within the government; recruitment and use of child soldiers by nonstate militant groups; lack of criminal investigations or accountability for cases related to rape, sexual harassment, so-called honor crimes, female genital mutilation/cutting, and violence based on gender, gender identity and sexual orientation; legal prohibitions of consensual same-sex sexual conduct; forced and bonded labor and transnational trafficking in persons; and the worst forms of child labor. There was a lack of government accountability, and abuses often went unpunished, fostering a culture of impunity among the perpetrators, whether official or unofficial. Authorities seldom punished government officials for human rights abuses. Terrorist violence and human rights abuses by nonstate actors contributed to human rights problems. Military, police, and law enforcement agencies continued to carry out significant campaigns against militant and terrorist groups. Nevertheless, violence, abuse, and social and religious intolerance by militant organizations and other nonstate actors, both local and foreign, contributed to a culture of lawlessness. As of December 23, terrorism fatalities stood at 686, in comparison with 1,260 total fatalities in 2017, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, a database compiled by the public-interest advocacy organization Institute for Conflict Management, which collects statistics on terrorism and low intensity warfare in South Asia. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Security forces reportedly committed extrajudicial killings in connection with conflicts throughout the country (see section 1.g.). On January 13, police in Karachi (Sindh) shot and killed a Pashtun man, Naqeebullah Mehsud, in what Karachi police authorities initially claimed was a counterterror operation. According to Mehsud’s family, he had been detained 10 days earlier. Pakistan’s National Commission for Human Rights–an independent government body charged with investigating alleged human rights abuses–concluded police staged a fake raid in order to carry out Mehsud’s extrajudicial killing. Furthermore, the report linked then-Senior Superintendent of Police for Karachi’s Malir District, Rao Anwar, to the deaths of at least 444 individuals in similar staged police encounters. The Supreme Court ordered Sindh’s Police Inspector General to conduct an immediate inquiry into the killing and Anwar’s role. Authorities removed Anwar from his position. He fled and was eventually arrested. He was subsequently released on bail, and his trial was ongoing as of December 3. Physical abuse while in official custody allegedly caused the death of some criminal suspects. Lengthy trial delays and failure to discipline and prosecute those responsible for killings contributed to a culture of impunity. In February police officers in Rawalpindi reportedly entered a home without a warrant, detained a resident, and beat him to death while in custody at a police station. The four officers who entered the young man’s home without a warrant were suspended from duty pending an investigation of the incident, but it was unclear as of November whether any further action was taken in the case. On January 10, police in Kasur (Punjab) reportedly fired live rounds into a crowd that stormed a police station in protest against a series of unsolved rapes and killings of children in the district. Two civilians died and one was wounded in the incident. Police officials claimed protesters shot first at police. There were numerous reports of fatal attacks against police. On January 9, a vehicle rammed a police checkpoint outside the Balochistan Provincial Assembly, killing five police officers in the resulting explosion. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility, saying the police–not the Assembly–were the intended targets. In March, three police officers were killed when an improvised explosive device (IED) targeted a police convoy in Punjab province. On April 24, 10 police officers died in three separate suicide attacks in Balochistan. Hizbul Ahrar, a TTP splinter group, claimed responsibility for all three attacks. In August, two terrorists attacked a police checkpoint in the Gilgit Baltistan region, killing three police officers. Militants and terrorist groups killed hundreds and injured thousands with bombs, suicide attacks, and other violence (see section 1.g.). There were kidnappings and forced disappearances of persons in nearly all areas of the country. The Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances received an increased number of complaints compared with 2017. The commission had received 899 cases as of October 31, while there were a total 868 complaints in 2017. Some officials from intelligence agencies, police, and other security forces reportedly held prisoners incommunicado and refused to disclose their location. On February 15, in Badin, Sindh, plainclothes security reportedly abducted Rafaqat Ali Jarwar, a senior journalist with Daily Koshish. According to media reports, Jarwar was formerly associated with a Sindhi nationalist group. On June 6, prominent journalist and opinion writer Gul Bukhari was abducted in Lahore by unidentified assailants. Bukhari was released hours later, after news reports highlighted her disappearance and the case received significant attention on social media. She is known as a prominent critic of the military and security services, and was listed by the military as a social media threat to the state two days before her brief abduction. Bukhari did not identify her captors. Media reported that in December 2017 civil society activist Raza Khan disappeared after cohosting a small public event in Lahore to discuss the government’s capitulation to the demands of a hardline religious group, Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), in the wake of TLP’s weeks-long, highly disruptive protest in Islamabad. Khan reportedly returned home in July. Human rights organizations reported many Pashtun rights activists, and Sindhi and Baloch nationalists, disappeared or were arrested without cause or warrant. For example, in April the Progressive Youth Alliance alleged that 11 of its members were abducted following a series of Pashtun rights rallies in Karachi. Nationalist parties in Sindh also alleged that law enforcement agencies and security agencies kidnapped and killed Sindhi political activists. Throughout the first half of the year, Pashtun rights activists used social media to highlight the arrests, enforced disappearances, and other forms of harassment by security agencies against members of the Pashtun Tahafuz (Protection) Movement, or PTM. Most of those detained were rank-and-file supporters of the group. Unofficial estimates, however, suggest that the military released up to 300 individuals who had been detained without charge–in some cases for several years–in response to PTM’s protest campaign against enforced disappearances. Observers believed authorities released detainees in response to activist demands, but it gave rise to further allegations that authorities had mistreated those in custody, and fueled calls for an end to enforced disappearances and for a more transparent legal process to formally charge or release those still in detention. The Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances, headed by Supreme Court justice Javed Iqbal and retired law enforcement official Muhammad Sharif Virk, received 5,507 missing persons cases between 2011 and October 31. The commission had closed 3,633 of those inquiries, while 1,874 remained open. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Although the constitution prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the criminal code has no specific section against torture. There were reports that security forces, including the intelligence services, tortured and abused individuals in custody. According to the Committee against Torture of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in 2017 there were reports that state officials and forces practiced torture on a widespread scale. Human rights organizations noted the government’s lack of serious efforts to curb the use of torture and claimed that perpetrators–mostly police, military, and intelligence agency members–operated with impunity. In August, however, authorities did dismiss two constables after a video surfaced showing the officers torturing girls accused of partaking in obscene activity. There were reports police personnel employed cruel and degrading treatment and punishment. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported that police committed “excesses” in at least 52 cases as of May 6, compared with 127 total cases in 2017. Multiple sources reported that police excesses sometimes resulted in death or serious injury and was often underreported. On October 16, police reportedly arrested a man in Sargodha (Punjab) on robbery charges. He died later that day, and his grandmother stated in a police report that his death was the result of police brutality while in custody. Some police agencies took steps to curb abuses. For example, in 2017 the Inspector General of the Islamabad Capital Territory Police appointed human rights officers in all 22 Islamabad police stations in an effort to prevent violations. Multiple police agencies include human rights in training curricula. More than 50,000 police countrywide have received human rights related training since 2011. While the passage of the 25th Amendment to the country’s constitution formally merged the Federally and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (FATA and PATA) and ended the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901, the FATA Interim Governance Regulation (FIGR) that replaced it preserves the most draconian criminal justice elements of the FCR. For example, authorities may still apply collective punishment without regard to individual rights. Collective punishment is imposed incrementally, starting with the first immediate male family members, followed by the subtribe, and continuing outward. Human rights NGOs expressed concern about the concept of collective responsibility, as authorities used it to detain members of fugitives’ tribes, demolish their homes, confiscate or destroy their property, or lay siege to their villages pending surrender or punishment of the fugitives by their own tribes in accordance with local tradition. As of November 30, the country had 5,339 troops and police performing peacekeeping duties around the world. During the year, the United Nations reported one possible new case of sexual exploitation and abuse implicating a Pakistani peacekeeper. The case involved allegations of transactional sex that occurred in 2017. An investigation into an alleged exploitative sexual relationship that began in June 2011 and continued until an unspecified date in 2012 was pending additional information as of December 28. Investigations into three reports were closed due to lack of evidence: one involved a 2016 report that a Pakistani deployed in Cote d’Ivoire raped a minor in 2014; one was related to a 2017 report of attempted sexual assault that allegedly occurred in September 2016; and the third involved allegations that Pakistani peacekeepers engaged in transactional sex from August 2015 to March 2016. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Conditions in some civilian prisons and military detention centers were harsh and life threatening due to overcrowding, inadequate food and medical care, and unsanitary conditions. Physical Conditions: Prison conditions often were extremely poor. Overcrowding remained a serious problem, largely due to structural issues in the criminal justice system that led to a high rate of pretrial detention. According to a May, Cursor of Development and Education Pakistan study, conducted in cooperation with Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Agency and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the total nationwide prison population stood at 84,287 in 112 prisons across the country as of October 1, 2017. The official capacity of these prisons is approximately 54,000, putting the occupancy rate of the civilian prison system at approximately 150 percent. Provincial governments were the primary managers of civilian prisons and detention centers. Although quality and quantity of prison food improved, inadequate food and medical care in prisons continued to cause chronic health problems. Malnutrition remained a problem, especially among inmates unable to supplement their diets with help from family or friends. In many facilities sanitation, ventilation, lighting, and access to potable water were inadequate. Most prison facilities were antiquated and had no means to control indoor temperatures. A system existed for basic and emergency medical care, but bureaucratic procedures slowed access. Prisoners with disabilities usually lacked adequate care. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported 20 deaths due to violence in prisons as of May 20. According to an April report on Dunya News TV, in 2017 at least 145 prisoners died in Punjab province prisons of natural causes, including diseases such as AIDS and hepatitis. One former prisoner who spent 15 years in a Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province jail petitioned the Peshawar High Court to direct medical testing of the province’s inmate population, claiming 12 inmates at the jail in which he was incarcerated were HIV positive, and approximately 50 had hepatitis. The former prisoner also petitioned for disclosure of the province’s prison capacity and actual population, claiming the institution in which he was incarcerated had a capacity of 125 and a population of 640. Representatives of Christian and Ahmadiyya Muslim communities claimed their members were often subjected to abuse in prison and violence at the hands of fellow inmates. Civil society organizations reported prisoners accused of blasphemy violations were frequently subjected to poor prison conditions. NGOs reported that many individuals accused of blasphemy remained in solitary confinement for extended periods, sometimes for more than a year. The government asserted this treatment was for the individual’s safety, given the likelihood that prisoners accused of blasphemy would face threats from the general prison population. Authorities held female prisoners separately from men. Nevertheless, NGOs reported transgender women were held with men and faced harassment. Balochistan had no women’s prison, but authorities housed detained women in separate barracks. Due to lack of infrastructure, police often did not segregate detainees from convicted criminals, although Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces were in the process of constructing new prisons focused on modern segregation mechanisms to address this issue, as well as overcrowding. Prison officials kept juvenile offenders in barracks separate from adults. Juveniles and adults were in close proximity when waiting for transport but were kept under careful supervision at this time. According to the Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child, prisoners and prison staff subjected children to abuse, rape, and other forms of violence. Administration: There was an ombudsman for detainees, with a central office in Islamabad and offices in each province. Inspectors General of prisons irregularly visited prisons and detention facilities to monitor conditions and handle complaints. By law, prison authorities must permit prisoners and detainees to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship and to request investigation of credible allegations of inhumane conditions. There were reports, however, that prisoners refrained from submitting complaints to avoid retaliation from jail authorities. The law also provides for visitation privileges, but overcrowding and lack of adequate visitor facilities in some prisons restricted detainees’ ability to receive visits. In most cases, authorities allowed prisoners to observe their religious traditions. Independent Monitoring: International organizations responsible for monitoring prisons reported difficulty accessing some detention sites, in particular those holding security-related detainees. Authorities did not allow international organizations access to detention centers most affected by violence in KP, FATA, and Balochistan. Authorities at the local, provincial, and national levels permitted some human rights groups and journalists to monitor prison conditions of juveniles and female inmates. Improvements: Infrastructure improvements and new policies in existing prisons, along with the construction of new facilities, increased the frequency with which pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners were separated. In July the government broke ground on a project to construct a new training facility for the Sindh Prisons Department, to enable a larger training program in prison management. Digitized prison management information systems were installed in 48 Punjab and Sindh province prisons, up from 20 Punjab prisons in 2017. The government, in collaboration with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, worked to expand its use of computerized databases to more securely and accurately track prisoners. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, but authorities did not always observe these requirements. Corruption and impunity compounded this problem. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS Police have primary domestic security responsibility for most of the country. Local police are under the jurisdiction of provincial governments. Police resources and effectiveness varied by district, ranging from well-funded and effective to poorly resourced and ineffective. Paramilitary organizations–including the Frontier Corps, which operates in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the former FATA; and the Rangers, which operates in Sindh and Punjab–provide security services under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. The Frontier Corps reports to the Ministry of Interior in peacetime and the army in times of conflict. The military is responsible for external security but continues to play a role in domestic security. The mid-year passage of the 25th Amendment to the country’s constitution formally merged the Federally and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (FATA and PATA) into KP province, bringing the tribal areas into the country’s political and constitutional mainstream. The FATA Interim Governance Regulation (FIGR) replaced the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in mid-year as the framework for law and order in the former FATA. Similar to the FCR, the FIGR is implemented through appointed deputy commissioners (formerly known as “political agents”) who report to the KP governor. The 25th Amendment gives the Peshawar High Court and the Supreme Court jurisdiction in the former FATA, but this new system had not been fully implemented by year’s end. Under the FIGR, trial by a Council of Elders (known as a “jirga,” or assembly of community leaders that makes decisions by consensus) does not allow tribal residents legal representation. If the accused is an adult man, he appears before the Council of Elders in person to defend his case. Parents normally represent their minor children, and men normally represent their female relatives. Observers criticized both the FCR and the FIGR for their harsh provisions. Following its merger in KP province, police began to operate alongside paramilitary forces in the former FATA. Paramilitary forces present in the former FATA included the Frontier Corps, the Frontier Constabulary, “Khasadars” (hereditary tribal police), and the FATA Levies Force, which reported to deputy commissioners (the appointed administrative heads of each tribal agency). Tribal leaders convened “lashkars” (tribal militias) to deal with temporary law and order disturbances, but these operated as private militias and not as formal law enforcement entities. The KP provincial police force was in the process of recruiting and training additional personnel in order to extend its remit fully into the former FATA. Civilian authorities’ failure to punish abuses contributed to a climate of impunity throughout the country. According to civil society sources, police and prison officials frequently used the threat of abuse to extort money from prisoners and their families. The inspectors general, district police, district nazims (chief elected officials of local governments), provincial interior or chief ministers, federal interior minister, prime minister, or courts can order internal investigations into abuses and order administrative sanctions. Executive branch and police officials have authority to recommend, and the courts may order, criminal prosecution. The court system remained the only means available to investigate abuses by security forces. The National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR), established in 2015, may not inquire into any complaints against intelligence agencies and must refer such complaints to the concerned competent authority. The NCHR may seek a report from the national government on any complaint made against the armed forces, and after receipt of a report, can either end the process or forward recommendations for further action to the national government. During the year the federal government continued to use military and paramilitary organizations to augment domestic security. Paramilitary forces, including Rangers and the Frontier Constabulary, provided security to some areas of Islamabad and continued active operations in Karachi. The military-led Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad employed civilian and paramilitary cooperation against militants throughout the country. In January 2015, in response to the December 2014 attack on the Peshawar Army Public School, Parliament approved a constitutional amendment allowing military courts to try civilians on terrorism, militancy, sectarian violence, and other charges. The military courts’ mandate to try civilians was set to expire in January 2017, but Parliament extended it until January 2019. Civil society members expressed concerns about the use of military courts for trying civilian suspects, citing lack of transparency and redundancy with the civilian judicial system. Police often failed to protect members of religious minorities–including Ahmadiyya Muslims, Christians, Shia Muslims, and Hindus–from attacks. Activists from Christian, Sikh, Parsi, and Hindu communities reported widespread distrust of law enforcement within their communities. They explained that community members frequently refrained from reporting crimes, because they believed the police would not act. They also accused law enforcement of treating minorities particularly harshly when they are accused of crimes, and described how police meted out collective punishment on the Christian residents of a Karachi neighborhood in May, after a Christian committed a crime against an intelligence officer. Police carried out unauthorized searches of people and property, arrested Christians at random, and threatened physical and legal retributions against the community at large unless community members brought forward the perpetrator. Police agencies continued to professionalize and modernize through training, including on human rights. Some local authorities demonstrated the ability and willingness to protect minorities from discrimination and mob lynching, at great risk to their personal safety. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES A first information report (FIR) is the legal basis for any arrest, initiated when police receive information about the commission of a “cognizable” offense. A third party usually initiates a FIR, but police can file FIRs on their own initiative. A FIR allows police to detain a suspect for 24 hours, after which a magistrate may order detention for an additional 14 days if police show detention is necessary to obtain evidence material to the investigation. Some authorities did not observe these limits on detention. Authorities reportedly filed FIRs without supporting evidence in order to harass or intimidate detainees or did not file them when adequate evidence was provided unless the complainant paid a bribe. There were reports of persons arrested without judicial authorization and of individuals paying bribes to visit prisoners. The Ministry of Interior did not routinely provide notification of the arrest of foreigners to embassies or consulates. In 2015 the government began requiring that foreign missions request access to their arrested citizens 20 days in advance. Many foreign missions reported that requests for access to arrested citizens were unanswered for weeks or months. Foreign prisoners often remained in prison long after completion of their sentences because they were unable to pay for deportation to their home countries. There was a functioning bail system. Human rights groups noted, however, that judges sometimes denied bail until payment of bribes. NGOs reported authorities sometimes denied bail in blasphemy cases on the grounds that defendants who faced the death penalty were likely to flee or were at risk from public vigilantism. Defendants facing lower-order blasphemy charges were often simultaneously charged with terrorism offenses, which are nonbailable. NGOs also reported that lawyers representing individuals accused of blasphemy often asked that their clients remain in custody to protect them from vigilante violence. Bail is not available in antiterrorism courts or in the military courts established under the 2015 amendment to the constitution. The government provided state-funded legal counsel to prisoners facing the death penalty, but it did not regularly provide legal representation in other cases. The constitution recognizes the right of habeas corpus and allows the high courts to demand that a person accused of a crime be present in court. The law allows citizens to submit habeas corpus petitions to the courts. In many cases involving forced disappearances, authorities failed to present detainees according to judges’ orders. Arbitrary Arrest: There were reports police arbitrarily detained individuals to extort bribes for their release or detained relatives of wanted individuals to compel suspects to surrender. Ethnic Rohingya in Karachi who lacked official identification documents reported arbitrary arrests and harassment by police authorities. They reported police, including officers from the Federal Investigation Agency, made the arrests to extract bribes. Pretrial Detention: According to Cursor for Development and Education (CODE) Pakistan reports published in May, 66 percent of prisoners were either awaiting or undergoing trial as of October 1, 2017. CODE notes that Pakistani prison authorities did not differentiate between pretrial detainees and under-trial prisoners when collecting prison data. Police sometimes held persons in investigative detention without seeking a magistrate’s approval and often held detainees without charge until a court challenged the detention. Magistrates generally approved investigative detention at the request of police without requiring justification. When police did not develop sufficient evidence to try a suspect within the 14-day period, they generally requested that magistrates issue new FIRs, thereby further extending the suspect’s detention. By law detainees must be brought to trial within 30 days of arrest. There were exceptions: a district coordination officer has authority to recommend preventive detention on the grounds of “maintenance of public order” for up to 90 days and may–with approval of the Home Department–extend it for an additional 90 days. In some cases trials did not start until six months after a FIR, and at times individuals remained in pretrial detention for periods longer than the maximum sentence for the crime with which they were charged. Authorities seldom informed detainees promptly of charges against them. Special rules apply to cases brought to court by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), which investigates and prosecutes corruption cases. The NAB may detain suspects for 15 days without charge (renewable with judicial concurrence) and deny access to counsel prior to charging. Offenses under the NAB are not bailable, and only the NAB chairperson has the power to decide whether to release detainees. Under the FIGR in the former FATA, the deputy commissioner has legal authority to preventively detain individuals on a variety of grounds and may require bonds to prevent undesired activities. Indefinite detention is not allowed, and detained persons may appeal to a tribunal. Prisoners have the right to compensation for wrongful punishment. Cases must be decided within a specified period, and authorities may release arrested persons on bail. Regulations require prisoners to be brought before FIGR authorities within 24 hours of detention, which curtails the ability of deputy commissioners to arbitrarily arrest and hold persons for up to three years. The accused have the right of appeal under a two-tiered system: the first appeal is to a commissioner or additional commissioner, and the second is referred to the Peshawar High Court, which is the highest appellate forum under the FIGR. In KP (including the former FATA), security forces may restrict the activities of terrorism suspects, seize their assets for up to 48 hours, and detain them for as long as one year without charges. Human rights and international organizations reported that security forces held an unknown number of individuals allegedly affiliated with terrorist organizations indefinitely in preventive detention, where they were often tortured and abused. In many cases authorities held prisoners incommunicado, denying them prompt access to a lawyer of their choice. Family members often were not allowed prompt access to detainees. The 2011 Actions in Aid of Civil Power Regulation (retroactive to 2008) provides the military legal authority to detain suspected terrorists in the former FATA and PATA when called upon by the civilian government. Critics stated the regulation violates the constitution because of its broad provisions expanding military authority and circumventing legal due process. Under the regulation, detainee transfers to internment centers continued on a regular basis. Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: There were reports of persons arrested or detained who were not allowed to challenge in court the legal basis or nature of their detention, obtain relief, or receive compensation. The law provides for an independent judiciary, but according to NGOs and legal experts, the judiciary often was subject to external influences, such as fear of reprisal from extremist elements in terrorism or blasphemy cases and public politicization of high-profile cases. Civil society organizations reported judges were reluctant to exonerate individuals accused of blasphemy, fearing vigilante violence. The media and the public generally considered the high courts and the Supreme Court credible. Extensive case backlogs in the lower and superior courts undermined the right to effective remedy and to a fair and public hearing. Antiquated procedural rules, unfilled judgeships, poor case management, and weak legal education caused delays in civil and criminal cases. The Lahore High Court took steps to improve judicial efficiency. In 2017 the court’s chief justice introduced legal reforms intended to reduce strikes and formalized an alternate dispute resolution (ADR) system. ADR centers received 16,010 cases as of October 12, and had resolved 4,885. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the high courts does not extend to several areas that operated under separate judicial systems. For example, Azad Kashmir area (AK) has its own elected president, prime minister, legislature, and court system. Gilgit-Baltistan also has a separate judicial system. Many lower courts remained corrupt, inefficient, and subject to pressure from wealthy persons and influential religious or political figures. There were incidents of unknown persons threatening or killing witnesses, prosecutors, or investigating police officers in high-level cases. On April 14, three Balochistan police officials were arrested for pressuring a rape victim to withdraw her allegations, after a medical examination corroborated the victim’s allegations. The use of informal justice systems that lacked institutionalized legal protections continued, especially in rural areas, and often resulted in human rights abuses. Large landholders and other community leaders in Sindh and Punjab and tribal leaders in Pashtun and Baloch areas sometimes held local council meetings (panchayats or jirgas) outside the established legal system. Such councils settled feuds and imposed tribal penalties, including fines, imprisonment, and sometimes the death penalty. These councils often sentenced women to violent punishment or death for so-called honor-related crimes. In the former FATA, such councils were held under FIGR or FCR guidelines. Assistant commissioners (previously known as assistant political agents), supported by tribal elders of their choosing, are legally responsible for justice in the former FATA and conducted hearings according to their interpretation of Islamic law and tribal custom. TRIAL PROCEDURES The civil, criminal, and family court systems provide for a fair trial and due process, presumption of innocence, cross-examination, and appeal. There are no trials by jury. Although defendants have the right to be present and consult with an attorney, courts must appoint attorneys for indigents only in capital cases. Defendants generally bear the cost of legal representation in lower courts, but a lawyer may be provided at public expense in appellate courts. Defendants may confront or question prosecution witnesses and present their own witnesses and evidence. Due to the limited number of judges, a heavy backlog of cases, lengthy court procedures, frequent adjournment, and political pressure, cases routinely lasted for years, and defendants made frequent court appearances. The Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child noted that police lacked training to properly handle child delinquency, and cited reports of police brutality against juveniles. Many juveniles spent long periods behind bars because they could not afford bail. In May, Parliament passed the Juvenile Justice System Act, replacing the 2000 Juvenile Justice System Ordinance. The new law mandates the creation of juvenile courts and “juvenile justice committees,” intended to expedite the administration of justice for minors by resolving cases that involve minor offenses without resorting to formal judicial proceedings. Despite a directive that these courts and committees be established within three months of the law’s passage, as of November 28, the government had not done so. Both the new law and the previous 2000 Juvenile Justice System Ordinance ban the use of the death penalty for minors, yet children were sentenced to death under the Antiterrorism Act. Furthermore, lack of documentation made determining the ages of possible minors problematic. There were instances of lack of transparency in court cases, particularly if the case involved high-profile or sensitive issues such as blasphemy. NGOs reported the government often located such trials in jails due to concerns for the safety of defendants, lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and witnesses. Although these safety concerns were well-founded, NGOs expressed concerns about both transparency issues and the lack of privacy for defendants to consult with their lawyers during jail trials. The Antiterrorism Act allows the government to use special, streamlined antiterrorism courts (ATCs) to try persons charged with terrorist activities and sectarian violence. In other courts, suspects must appear within seven working days of their arrest, but ATCs are free to extend that period. Human rights activists criticized this parallel system, charging it was more vulnerable to political manipulation. According to a February report by the Research Society of International Law, when authorities were under political and media pressure to expedite cases they often referred them ATCs, even if they had no terrorism nexus. The frequent use of ATCs for nonterrorism cases led to significant backlogs, and despite being comparatively faster than the regular court system, ATCs often failed to meet speedy trial standards. The government continued to utilize military courts to try civilians on terrorism and related charges. Trials in military courts are not public (see section 1.d.). The Federal Shariat Court typically reviewed cases prosecuted under the Hudood Ordinance, a law enacted in 1979 by military leader Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq to implement a strict interpretation of Islamic law by punishing extramarital sex, false accusations of extramarital sex, theft, and alcohol consumption. Should a provincial high court decide to hear an appeal in a Hudood case, the Shariat Court lacks authority to review the provincial high court’s decision. The Supreme Court may bypass the Shariat Appellate Bench and assume jurisdiction in such appellate cases. The Federal Shariat Court may overturn legislation judged inconsistent with Islamic tenets, but such decisions may be appealed to the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court and ultimately may be heard by the full bench of the Supreme Court. Courts routinely failed to protect the rights of religious minorities. Courts discriminatorily used laws prohibiting blasphemy against Shia, Christians, Ahmadis, and members of other religious minority groups. Lower courts often did not require adequate evidence in blasphemy cases, and some convicted persons spent years in jail before higher courts eventually overturned their convictions or ordered their release. In a landmark case, On October 31, the Supreme Court acquitted Asia Bibi, a Christian woman sentenced to death for blasphemy in 2010. In the wake of widespread protests by antiblasphemy groups following the decision, the government agreed not to oppose a petition seeking additional review of her case, further postponing final resolution of the case. Bibi was released from prison, but as of December 3 was widely believed to remain in government custody for her own protection, and the judicial review was pending. In some cases, police arrested individuals after acts of vigilantism related to blasphemy or religious discrimination. In February an ATC convicted 31 individuals for their role in the 2017 mob lynching of university student Mashal Khan for allegedly committing blasphemy. The ATC sentenced the primary shooter to death, sentenced five others to life in prison, and 25 individuals to four years’ imprisonment, although the Peshawar High Court later suspended the sentences and released on bail the 25 individuals. Also see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES Some Sindhi and Baloch nationalist groups claimed that authorities detained their members based on political affiliation or beliefs. Under the 2009 Aghaz-e-Haqooq (“beginning of the rights”) Balochistan legislative package of reforms (intended to address the province’s political, social, and economic problems), the government announced a general amnesty for all Baloch political prisoners, leaders, and activists in exile as well as those allegedly involved in “antistate” activities. In 2015 the federal and Balochistan provincial governments jointly announced a new peace package called “Pur Aman Balochistan” (“peaceful Balochistan”), intended to offer cash and other incentives for “militants” who wished to rejoin mainstream society. Despite the amnesty offers, illegal detention of Baloch leaders and the disappearance of private Baloch citizens continued. During an August 15 National Assembly session Akhtar Mengal, leader of the Balochistan National Party-Mengal, raised the issue of disappearances in Balochistan, claiming there were five thousand missing citizens in his province. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Individuals may petition the courts to seek redress for various human rights violations, and courts often took such actions. Individuals may seek redress in civil courts against government officials, including on grounds of denial of human rights. Observers reported that civil courts seldom issued official judgments in such cases, and most cases were settled out of court. Although there were no official procedures for administrative redress, informal reparations were common. Individuals and organizations could not appeal adverse decisions to international human rights bodies, although some NGOs submitted human rights “shadow reports” to the United Nations and other international actors. The law requires court-issued warrants for property searches. Police sometimes ignored this requirement and on occasion reportedly stole items during searches. Authorities seldom punished police for illegal entry. Police at times detained family members to induce a suspect to surrender. In cases pursued under the Antiterrorism Act, law enforcement agencies have additional powers, including that of search and seizure without a warrant of property related to a case. Several domestic intelligence services monitored politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists, NGOs, employees of foreign entities, and media professionals. These services included the Inter-Services Intelligence, Police Special Branch, the Intelligence Bureau, and Military Intelligence. There were credible reports authorities routinely used wiretaps, monitored cell phone calls, intercepted electronic correspondence, and opened mail without court approval. The military and paramilitary organizations conducted multiple counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations to eradicate militant safe havens. The military’s Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, launched in February 2017, continued throughout the year. Radd-ul-Fasaad is a nationwide counterterrorism campaign aimed at consolidating the gains of the 2014-2017 Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which countered foreign and domestic terrorists in the former FATA. Law enforcement agencies also acted to weaken terrorist groups, arresting suspected terrorists and gang members who allegedly provided logistical support to militants. In raids throughout the country, police confiscated caches of weapons, suicide vests, and planning materials. Police expanded their presence into formerly ungoverned areas, particularly in Balochistan. Poor security, intimidation by both security forces and militants, and control by government and security forces over access by nonresidents to Balochistan and the former FATA impeded the efforts of human rights organizations to provide relief to victims of military abuses and of journalists to report on any such abuses. On August 24, security forces fired on residents protesting military search operations in Hamzoni, North Waziristan district, killing two and injuring 11. The incident followed the imposition of a curfew in the aftermath of an IED attack targeting military personnel in the area on the previous day. Although the shooting occurred in a relatively remote area, Pashtun rights activists shared news of the protest through social media, culminating in a strongly worded Twitter exchange between the military’s official spokesman and a recently elected Member of the National Assembly from North Waziristan (who is also a leader of the nascent Pashtun rights movement). Militant and terrorist activity continued, and there were suicide and bomb attacks in all four provinces, the former FATA, and Gilgit Baltistan. Militants and terrorist groups, including the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and the Islamic State Khorasan Province targeted civilians, journalists, community leaders, security forces, law enforcement agents, and schools, killing and injuring hundreds with bombs, suicide attacks, and other forms of violence. Militant and terrorist groups often attacked religious minorities. A low-intensity separatist insurgency continued in Balochistan. Security forces reportedly committed extrajudicial killings in the fight against militant groups. Militants carried out numerous attacks on political party offices, candidates, and campaign rallies leading up to the July 25 general elections. On July 10, a suicide bomber killed Awami National Party politician Haroon Bilour and 21 others at a campaign rally in Peshawar. On July 13, at an election rally in Mastung, Balochistan, a suicide bombing killed more than 130 persons. On July 22, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province’s Dera Ismail Khan district, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf provincial assembly candidate Kramullah Gadapur was killed in a suicide attack on his vehicle. A third suicide attack at a Quetta polling station on election day killed 31 individuals. Political, sectarian, criminal, and ethnic violence in Karachi continued, although violence declined and gang wars were less prevalent than before security operations in the city. On March 13, however, gang members armed with automatic weapons and hand grenades attacked Sindh Rangers patrolling Karachi’s Lyari neighborhood. One Ranger was killed and four injured, while five gang members died in the firefight. Killings: There were reports that government security forces caused civilian casualties and engaged in extrajudicial killings during operations against suspected militants throughout the country. There were numerous media reports of police and security forces killing terrorist suspects in “police encounters.” One prominent case involved the January 13 Karachi Police killing of a young Pashtun man, Naqibullah Mehsud, which both National Commission for Human Rights and Sindh Police investigations determined was an extrajudicial killing perpetrated in a staged counterterror operation. The senior police officer accused of ordering the operation was suspended and detained, but subsequently was released on bail. His trial was ongoing as of November 28. Sectarian violence decreased significantly across the country, although some attacks continued, including a November 23 bombing of a Shia mosque in Hangu (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) that killed at least 33 individuals and marked the first major sectarian attack of the year. Targeted killings of religious minorities continued. There were reports of targeted killings of Shia individuals, including the custodian of a Shia congregation hall, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Dera Ismail Khan, a historically Shia area that in recent years absorbed an influx of Sunni households displaced by military operations. The Supreme Court ordered police to take additional steps to curb sectarian killings in the area. In April, six Shia Hazaras were killed in four targeted drive-by shooting incidents in Quetta, Balochistan. The rash of killings sparked sustained protest by Quetta’s ethnic Hazara community. Charan Jeet Singh, an interfaith activist and leader of the Sikh community in Peshawar, was killed in a targeted shooting on May 29. Unknown gunmen killed an Ahmadi man in his home on June 25, in what appeared to be a targeted killing due to his faith. Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: Nonstate militant groups targeted noncombatants and killed civilians in various incidents across the country. Child Soldiers: Nonstate militant groups recruited children as young as 12 to spy, fight, or die as suicide bombers. The militants sometimes offered parents money, often sexually and physically abused the children, and used psychological coercion to convince the children the acts they committed were justified. The government operated a center in Swat (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) to rehabilitate, educate, and reintegrate former child soldiers. Other Conflict-related Abuse: The terrorist groups TTP, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and related factions bombed government buildings and attacked and killed female teachers and polio vaccination workers. On January 18, unknown assailants killed a female health worker and her daughter as the two administered polio vaccinations to patients outside Quetta. In another incident just outside Quetta, in Yaro, a Frontier Corps was wounded on April 11 when a man opened fire on health workers administering polio vaccines. On April 23, two assailants attacked a female health worker with knives; she survived the attack. The TTP particularly targeted girls’ schools to demonstrate its opposition to girls’ education but also destroyed boys’ schools. Military operations created hardships for the local civilian population when militants closed key access roads and tunnels and attacked communications and energy networks, disrupting commerce and the distribution of food and water. Palau Executive Summary Palau is a constitutional republic. Voters elect the president, vice president, and members of the legislature (House of Delegates) for four-year terms. In 2016 voters re-elected Tommy E. Remengesau, Jr. president for a four-year term in a generally free and fair election. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. There were no reports of egregious human rights abuses. The government took steps to prosecute officials who committed abuses, although it did not punish any officials for involvement in human trafficking offenses. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The constitution prohibits such practices, and there were no reports that government officials employed them. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Prison and detention center conditions did not meet international standards. Physical Conditions: The country’s only jail, in Koror, with a capacity of 58, housed 76 inmates, all male as of December. There was one report of a death (suicide by hanging) in prison. Administration: Authorities investigated allegations of mistreatment. Independent Monitoring: The government permitted visits by independent human rights observers. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The Ministry of Justice maintained effective control over the national police and marine police, and the government has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. There were no reports of impunity involving security forces. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES The law requires warrants for arrests, and officials observed the law. The Office of the Attorney General prepares warrants and a judge signs them. The law provides for a prompt judicial determination of the legality of detention, a requirement authorities observed. Authorities informed detainees promptly of charges against them and provided prompt access to family members and lawyers. If a detainee could not afford a lawyer, the public defender or a court-appointed lawyer was available. There is a functioning system of bail. An arrested person has the right to remain silent and to speak to and receive visits from counsel, a family member, or employer. Authorities must release or charge those arrested within 24 hours, and authorities must inform detainees of these rights. The law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality. TRIAL PROCEDURES The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. Judges conduct trials and render verdicts. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, the right to be informed promptly and in detail of charges, to a fair and public trial without undue delay, to be present at their trial, to consult with an attorney of choice (or have one provided at public expense), and to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Defendants are entitled to free interpretation services as necessary from the moment charged through all appeals. Defendants may question witnesses and present evidence on their own behalf. They cannot be compelled to testify or confess guilt, and they have the right to appeal. The law extends these rights to all defendants. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Individuals or organizations may seek civil remedies for human rights violations through domestic courts. The law prohibits such actions, and there were no reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions. Panama Executive Summary Panama is a multiparty constitutional democracy. In 2014 voters chose Juan Carlos Varela Rodriguez as president in national elections that international and domestic observers considered generally free and fair. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. Human rights issues included undue restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet, including censorship, site blocking, and criminal libel; and widespread corruption. The Varela administration and the Public Ministry continued investigations into allegations of corruption against public officials. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The constitution prohibits such practices, and there were no reports that government officials employed them. In 2017 civilian correctional officers used batons and tear gas to control inmates who refused to be transported. Penitentiary System authorities investigated the incident and dismissed the case, citing evidence that showed standard procedures were enforced due to serious misconduct by the inmates. In May the Ombudsman’s Office decried the possible use of excessive force and the conclusion of the penitentiary authorities. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Prison conditions remained harsh, due primarily to overcrowding, a shortage of prison guards, and inadequate medical services and sanitary conditions. Physical Conditions: As of August the prison system, with an intended capacity of 14,842 inmates, held 16,069 prisoners. Pretrial detainees shared cells with convicted prisoners due to space constraints. Prison conditions for women were generally better than for men, but conditions for both populations remained poor, with some overcrowded facilities, poor inmate security and medical care, and a lack of basic supplies for personal hygiene. Female inmates had access to more rehabilitation programs than male inmates. There were 1,170 prison guards nationwide, including 60 new guards hired during the year. Officials estimated, however, the system required 2,870 guards to staff the prisons adequately, according to international standards. Authorities acknowledged that staff shortages limited exercise time for inmates on certain days. Juvenile pretrial and custodial detention centers also suffered from a lack of prison officials. Authorities acknowledged that staff shortages limited exercise time for inmates on certain days. Juvenile pretrial and custodial detention centers also suffered from an insufficient number of prison officials. One prison, Punta Coco, falls under the control of the Ministry of Public Security rather than the Ministry of Government’s National Directorate of the Penitentiary System (DGSP). In March the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) reiterated its request to close Punta Coco due to the lack of appropriate medical attention for inmates. Lawyers and relatives of the inmates had to travel 66 miles by boat to reach the prison, located on an island. In August authorities transferred 12 inmates temporarily from the Punta Coco facility to a Panama City prison while they upgraded it to international prison standards by orders of the Supreme Court of Justice. It was reopened on December 6, and the 12 prisoners were transferred back to the facility. The Ministry of Health conducted fewer vaccination campaigns in prisons, compared with previous years. HIV/AIDS treatment was available, but insulin was scarce throughout the country, which affected provisions for inmates. Prison medical care overall was inadequate due to the lack of personnel, transportation, and medical resources. Sixty percent of complaints received by the Ombudsman’s Office from January through August related to the lack of access to medical attention and medications. Authorities permitted relatives of inmates to bring medicine, although there were reports that some relatives paid bribes to prison personnel, including police agents, to bypass the required clearances. Authorities transferred patients with serious illnesses to public clinics, but there were constant difficulties arranging inmate transportation. Inmates often missed medical appointments with specialized physicians. Because the DGSP did not have ambulances, inmates were transported in police vehicles or in emergency services ambulances when available. Emergency services ambulances staff were reluctant to service the prisons. Lack of prison guards also affected the transfers. As of August, 17 male inmates had died in custody, most from natural causes or disease. One inmate died due to inmate-on-inmate violence. Administration: Authorities conducted proper investigations of credible allegations of mistreatment. Independent Monitoring: The government permitted prison monitoring by independent nongovernmental observers. The Ombudsman’s Office conducted unannounced visits to the prisons without restrictions. Human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) seeking access to prisons during visiting hours were required to send a written request to the DGSP 15 days in advance. Improvements: During the year a new centrally based system for better tracking of prisoners and statistics was implemented, and the data was published on a public website. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these prohibitions. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The country has no military forces. The Panama National Police (PNP) is principally responsible for internal law enforcement and public order. Civilian authorities in the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of the Presidency maintained effective control over all police, investigative, border, air, maritime, and migration services in the country. The government has mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption, but information on the process and results of investigations were rarely made public. Penitentiary authorities remained concerned over internal corruption, since unannounced inspections during the year resulted in findings of larger than usual amounts of drugs and illegal items in inmates’ possession. Due to the insufficient number of prison guards, the PNP was sometimes responsible for security both outside and inside the prisons. PNP leadership expressed concern over insufficient training and equipment. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES The law requires arresting officers to inform detainees immediately of the reasons for arrest or detention and of the right to immediate legal counsel. Detainees gained prompt access to legal counsel and family members, and the government provided indigent defendants with a lawyer. The country completed its transition to an accusatory justice system in 2016, but cases opened prior to the transition continued to be processed under the previous inquisitorial system, known for its vulnerability to corruption, inefficiencies, and bureaucratic hurdles. Under the accusatorial system, bail exists but was rarely granted because of the implementation of a less costly provisional release system. Under the inquisitorial system, a functioning bail procedure existed for a limited number of crimes but was largely unused. Most bail proceedings were at the discretion of the Prosecutor’s Office and could not be independently initiated by detainees or their legal counsel. Bail was granted in high-profile corruption cases, which prompted complaints by civil society about the Public Ministry’s administering “selective” justice. The law prohibits police from detaining adult suspects for more than 48 hours but allows authorities to detain minor suspects for 72 hours. In the accusatorial system, arrests and detention decisions were made on a probable cause basis. Pretrial Detention: Under the inquisitorial system, the government regularly imprisoned inmates for more than one year before a pretrial hearing, and in some cases pretrial detention exceeded the minimum sentence for the alleged crime. According to the DGSP director, 52 percent of inmates were pretrial detainees as of July. Some observers criticized the judiciary for applying unequal pretrial restrictive measures for individuals facing substantially similar charges. Prosecutors also reported internal pressure from the Public Ministry to prevent release of those accused of crimes pending trial. While the law provides for an independent judiciary, the judicial system was inefficient and susceptible to corruption as well as internal and external influence, and it faced allegations of manipulation by the executive branch. In August a judge dismissed corruption charges against 22 government officials. Among the accused were individuals who had considerable influence in the community. Court proceedings for cases in process under the inquisitorial system were not publicly available, while accusatory system cases were. As a result nonparties to the inquisitorial case proceedings did not have access to these proceedings until a verdict was reached. Under the inquisitorial system, judges could decide to hold private hearings and did so in high-profile cases. Consequently the judiciary sometimes faced accusations, particularly in high-profile cases, of procedural irregularities. Since most of these cases had not reached conclusion, however, the records remained under seal. Interested parties generally did not face gag orders, but because of this mechanism, it was difficult to verify facts. TRIAL PROCEDURES The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and the judiciary generally enforced this right. The law provides that all citizens charged with crimes enjoy the right to a presumption of innocence. They have the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges (with free interpretation as necessary for non-Spanish speaking inmates), to have a trial without undue delay, to have counsel of their choice and adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense, to refrain from incriminating themselves or close relatives, and to be tried only once for a given offense. The accused may be present with counsel during the investigative phase of proceedings. During the year new criminal cases were tried under the accusatory system. Under this system, trials were open to the public. All trials must be completed in less than 18 months. Judges may order the presence of pretrial detainees for providing or expanding upon statements or for confronting witnesses. Trials are conducted based on evidence presented by the public prosecutor. Defendants have the right to be present at trial and to consult with an attorney in a timely manner, along with the right to enter into a plea deal. Defendants may confront or question adverse witnesses and present their own witnesses and evidence. Defendants have a right of appeal. The judiciary generally enforced these rights. The judiciary complained that many hearings were canceled due to inmates’ failure to appear, especially those involving inmates processed under the old inquisitorial system. This was usually due to administrative shortcomings, such as a dearth of PNP agents to transfer the inmates to the courts. Authorities were also aware that available correctional officers and PNP agents focused more on inmates tried under the new accusatory system because the law fines police and correctional officers 100 balboas (one balboa is equal to one U.S. dollar) for failing to deliver an inmate to a hearing. The judiciary continued to promote videoconference hearings. Judges were receptive to using this tool, and during the year the government continued to add video conference and hearing rooms to prison facilities. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES There were no credible reports of political prisoners or detainees. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Citizens have access to the courts to bring lawsuits seeking damages for, or cessation of, human rights violations, although most do not pursue such lawsuits due to the length of the process. There are administrative and judicial remedies for alleged wrongs, and authorities often granted them to citizens who followed through with the process. The court can order civil remedies, including fair compensation to the individual injured. Individuals or organizations may initiate cases involving violations of an individual’s human rights by submitting petitions to the IACHR. The 2016 Community Justice System, which provides another path for citizens to seek redress for human rights violations, entered into effect in January. Although peace judges were appointed, lack of municipal funds throughout the country prevented the assignment of professional-level salaries for the judges as well as the relocation of the facilities for administrative or community justice to be served. The peace judges replaced the 679 corregidores under the 77 mayors nationwide. The corregidor system, a leftover of the military regime, was considered for years an unfair process that violated human rights through unjustified imprisonment imposed by unqualified, politically influenced “judges.” Training for National Police agents and Judicial Investigative agents on the new system was also insufficient. The law prohibits arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence, and the government generally respected these prohibitions. The law also sets forth requirements for conducting wiretap surveillance. It denies prosecutors authority to order wiretaps on their own and requires judicial oversight. The investigation of the 2015 illegal wiretapping case against former president Ricardo Martinelli as well as against Alejandro Garuz and Gustavo Perez, two former intelligence directors in his administration, continued during the year. Hearings under the accusatorial system against Martinelli began in June upon his extradition from the United States. Hearings under the inquisitorial system against Garuz and Perez took place on September 3-14. Papua New Guinea Executive Summary Papua New Guinea is a constitutional, federal, multiparty, parliamentary democracy. Parliamentary elections took place in 2017, and the People’s National Congress party won a majority in the 111-seat unicameral parliament, led by Prime Minister Peter O’Neill. In some parts of the country, electoral contests involved widespread violence, fraud, bribery, voter intimidation, and undue influence. Civilian authorities at times did not maintain effective control over the security forces. Human rights issues included unlawful or arbitrary killings by police; torture; government corruption; gender-based violence, including acts committed by police; trafficking in persons; the criminalization of same sex conduct between men, although the law was not enforced; and child labor. The government frequently failed to prosecute or punish officials who committed abuses, whether in the security services or elsewhere in the government. Impunity was pervasive. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: During the year there were numerous reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. In January police officers shot and killed a man near his home in East New Britain Province. The officers involved claimed police acted on a tipoff from locals that the man, who allegedly had a criminal history, was part of a group of prison escapees. The victim’s family rejected these allegations. Public concern about police and military violence against civilians and about security forces’ impunity persisted. There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Although the constitution prohibits torture, individual police and correctional services officers frequently beat and otherwise abused citizens or suspects before or during arrests, during interrogations, and in pretrial detention. There were numerous press accounts of such abuses, particularly against young detainees. In July, two police officers from the Airborne Tactical Unit in Port Moresby assaulted a 15-year-old boy in Kimbe, West New Britain Province. The officers claimed the victim had stolen from a woman at the market. A video of the assault circulated on social media. In August the West New Britain Provincial Commander suspended the officers, charged them with assault, and referred them to the Police Internal Affairs Unit for investigation. There were reports police raped and sexually abused women while in detention. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Prison conditions were poor overall, but prison conditions improved in the country’s largest prison, Bomana. The prison system continued to suffer from serious underfunding, food shortages, inadequate medical facilities, and overcrowding in some facilities. Physical Conditions: The country’s prisons were overcrowded. Infrequent court sessions, slow police investigations, and bail restrictions for certain crimes exacerbated overcrowding. One prison commander also suggested that the closure of prisons in some provinces led to overcrowding and health issues in neighboring prisons. The prison in Wabag, Enga Province, remained closed due to unresolved land disputes, while the prison in Tari, Hela Province, reopened in September. Authorities held pretrial detainees in the same prisons with convicted prisoners but in separate cells. Pretrial detainees, frustrated by the slow processing of their cases, were the leaders of prison breaks, which were common. In five prison breaks during the year, 120 persons escaped, and prison guards shot and killed nine of the escapees. The largest breakout was from Lakiemata Prison in Kimbe, where 39 persons escaped and prison guards shot and killed three of the escapees. Four persons were killed trying to escape from Buimo Prison in Lae. Correctional Services has not reported on the incidents nor suggested disciplinary action against the officers. A national court judge suggested that the national court needed more resources to reduce the number of pretrial detainees overcrowding prisons. All prison facilities had separate accommodations for juvenile offenders. The Department of Justice and attorney general operated four juvenile facilities, and the Roman Catholic Church operated three juvenile reception centers to hold minors awaiting arraignment prior to posting of bail. Human Rights Watch reported authorities routinely held juveniles with adults in police detention cells, where older detainees often assaulted the younger detainees. Police sometimes denied access by juvenile court officers to detainees. Authorities usually held male and female inmates separately, but some rural prisons lacked separate facilities. Sanitation was poor, and prisoners complained that rations were insufficient. In May a magistrate ordered the immediate transfer of 97 detainees from the Jomba police station holding cells after the provincial police commander reported they had run out of funds to buy food rations. A number of prisons experienced problems with inadequate ventilation and lighting. The Manus Island Regional Processing Centre (RPC), paid for by the Australian government, officially closed in 2017. As of September 403 refugees and 124 non-refugees were still being held on Manus Island in facilities operated by the government’s Immigration and Citizenship Authority. The government continued to encourage non-refugees to return to their country of origin, although many refused or could not obtain travel documents from their country of origin. There were reports local security forces on Manus physically abused refugees. Refugees also reported that facilities were overcrowded and there was an irregular supply of clean water and electricity. Detainees continued to have inadequate access to basic health services, including mental health care. Notably, the conditions in the largest prison, Bomana, improved from the previous year. Under new management, there have been no major incidents between prisoners and prison guards, sanitation has improved, and rehabilitation programs have been developed for prisoners. Administration: The government mandated the Ombudsman Commission to visit prisons, but the commission lacked adequate resources to effectively monitor and investigate prison conditions. The team visited two prisons during the year. Authorities generally allowed family visits, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) assisted family visits to Bougainville prisoners held in Kerevat Correctional Institution in East New Britain Province and Bekut Correctional Institution on Buka Island. Independent Monitoring: The government permitted monitoring visits by independent observers. During the year the ICRC and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) visited facilities in the country. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, but police frequently detained citizens arbitrarily without evidence. In some cases police detained family members of suspects to force their surrender. In May, six police officers assaulted and detained a former deputy police commissioner for five hours without any charges before releasing him. The Police Internal Affairs Unit reported that the officers were suspended and would be charged once the investigation was complete. Persons have the right to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, but the government did not always respect this right. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) is responsible for maintaining internal security in all regions of the country. The RPNGC commissioner reports to the minister of police. The Autonomous Region of Bougainville maintains its own police force and minister of police with authority to enforce local law, but the RPNGC retains authority over the Bougainville police in enforcement of national law. The Papua New Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF) is responsible for maintaining external security but also has some domestic security responsibilities. Clan rivalries and a serious lack of resources and discipline diminished police effectiveness and hampered internal security activities throughout the country. Societal violence, particularly among tribes, was common, and in many cases police lacked sufficient personnel or resources to prevent attacks or respond effectively to them. Warring tribal factions in rural areas often were better armed than local police, and authorities often tolerated intertribal violence in isolated rural areas until the tribes themselves agreed to a negotiated settlement. Police are responsible for security during national elections, although additional funding and manpower was generally limited. Civilian authorities maintained control over the RPNGC and PNGDF, although impunity was a serious problem. In December 2017 men in police uniform reportedly shot and killed a 15-year-old who was waiting to shower at a water pump in Port Moresby. In June police said two officers had been identified for further questioning, but as of November no formal charges had been brought. The RPNGC Internal Affairs Unit investigates, and a coroner’s court reviews, police shootings of suspects and bystanders. If the court finds the shooting was unjustifiable or otherwise due to negligence, authorities may try the officers involved. Families of persons killed or injured by police may challenge the coroner’s finding in the National Court, with the assistance of the Office of the Public Solicitor. Investigations remained unresolved in many cases, largely due to a lack of funding and resources to complete investigations, especially in rural areas where such shootings often occurred. Additionally, police officers’ reluctance to give evidence against one another and witnesses’ fear of police retribution undermined investigations. The Ombudsman Commission deals with public complaints and concerns regarding police officers. In June police reported that from 2015 to 2017, more than 250 police officers were dismissed through the police disciplinary process due to lack of discipline, disgraceful conduct, and corruption. To improve the RPNGC’s professional capacity, it accepted training, including on human rights, from a number of foreign governments and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). As part of the Papua New Guinea-Australia Policing Partnership (PNG-APP), Australian Federal Police officers provided advisory support and mentoring to a number of directorates and work areas within the RPNGC, including Family and Sexual Violence Units, Juvenile Justice Units, the National Fraud and Anti-Corruption Unit, the Internal Affairs Unit, and national police training at the Bomana Police College. Much of the training provided under the partnership included instruction on human rights principles and gender awareness with a focus on empowering female members of the RPNGC. Although the majority of the PNG-APP effort was concentrated within Port Moresby, advisors also trained police from many major provincial areas throughout the country. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) had an agreement to provide training for new police recruits on human rights, human trafficking, and exploitation. The ICRC facilitated workshops on international human rights law and policing standards for officers from the RPNGC in Port Moresby, Mount Hagen, and Bougainville. The OHCHR developed human rights modules and used them to instruct police mobile response units in seven provinces. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES By law police must have reason to believe that a crime was, is being, or is expected to be committed before making an arrest. A warrant is not required, but police, prosecutors, and citizens may apply to a court for a warrant. Police normally do so only if they believe it would assist them in carrying out an arrest. Judicial authorization is usually provided promptly but is not requested in the majority of cases. There were numerous reports of persons detained for weeks without charges or judicial authorization. These suspects may be charged with minor offenses and released after bail is paid. Only national or Supreme Court judges may grant bail to persons charged with murder or aggravated robbery. In all other cases, police or magistrates may grant bail. If bail is denied or not granted promptly, suspects are transferred to prisons and can wait for years before they appear before a judge. Arrested suspects have the right to legal counsel and to be informed of the charges against them; however, the government did not always respect these rights. Detainees may have access to counsel, and family members may have access to detainees. Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detainees comprised approximately 40 percent of the prison population. Due to very limited police and judicial resources and a high crime rate, authorities often held suspects in pretrial detention for lengthy periods. According to correctional services data, detainees could wait for as long as three years before trial, sentencing, or release, but there were media reports of detainees who waited for as long as nine years. Although pretrial detention is subject to strict judicial review through continuing pretrial consultations, the slow pace of police investigations, particularly in locating witnesses, and occasional political interference or police corruption, frequently delayed cases for years. In addition, there were delays due to infrequent circuit court sittings because of shortages of judges and travel funds. The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality. TRIAL PROCEDURES The law provides for a presumption of innocence and due process, including a public trial, and the court system generally enforced these provisions. Judges conduct trials and render verdicts. Defendants have the right to an attorney, to be informed promptly and in detail of charges against them, to be present at their trial, to free interpretation services if desired, and to not be compelled to testify or confess guilt. The Public Solicitor’s Office provides legal counsel for those accused of “serious offenses” (charges for which a sentence of two years or more is the norm) who are unable to afford counsel. Defendants and their attorneys may confront witnesses, present evidence, plead cases, and appeal convictions. The shortage of judges created delays in both the trial process and the rendering of decisions. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES There is an independent and impartial judiciary for individuals and organizations to seek civil remedies for human rights violations. The national court established a mechanism to fast-track cases of alleged human rights abuses. Through this process the national court may award civil remedies in cases of human rights abuses. District courts may order “good behavior bonds,” commonly called “protection orders,” in addition to ordering that compensation be paid for violations of human rights. Courts had difficulty enforcing judgments. In addition, largely unregulated village courts adjudicated many human rights matters. Village and district courts often hesitated to interfere directly in domestic matters. Village courts regularly ordered payment of compensation to an abused spouse’s family in cases of domestic abuse rather than issuing an order to detain and potentially charge the alleged offender. PROPERTY RESTITUTION Although the constitution prohibits such actions, there were instances of abuse. Police raids, searches, and forced evictions of illegal squatter settlements and suspected criminals often were marked by a high level of violence and property destruction. In June police officers raided a compound in Hobu, Morobe Province, in search of a suspected killer. According to media reports, armed officers burned down 27 homes, leaving more than 100 persons homeless, assaulted residents, and destroyed food gardens, in retaliation for the killing of a senior police officer. As of September no charges were laid against the officers. Their provincial commander said the officers acted in anger after one of their own was killed. Police units operating in highland regions sometimes used intimidation and destruction of property to suppress tribal fighting. Police threatened and at times harmed family members of alleged offenders. Paraguay Executive Summary Paraguay is a multiparty, constitutional republic. In April, Mario Abdo Benitez of the Colorado Party, also known as the National Republican Association (ANR), won the presidency in elections recognized as free and fair. Legislative elections took place at the same time. Civilian authorities at times did not maintain effective control over the security forces. Critics asserted the government did not deploy or monitor forces effectively, particularly in the northeastern section of the country. Human rights issues included reports of torture by government officials; harsh and at times life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; corruption of prosecutors and judges, and police involvement in criminal activities; violent intimidation of journalists by organized crime groups and government officials; legal impunity and widespread corruption in all branches and all levels of government; widespread and sometimes lethal violence against women and indigenous persons, despite government efforts to curtail such acts, as well as police violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons; and child labor, particularly in domestic service and informal agricultural sectors. The executive branch took steps to prosecute and punish low- and mid-ranked officials who committed abuses, but general impunity for officials in the police and security forces continued to be widely reported. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: In contrast with the previous year, as of October 1, there were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. On July 2, a court convicted police officer Gustavo Florentin of homicide for the March 2017 shooting of Liberal Party official Rodrigo Quintana following protests that resulted in the partial burning of the congressional building. The judge sentenced Florentin to 12 years in prison. On July 26, the Supreme Court annulled the convictions of all 11 defendants found responsible for the 2012 Marina Cue confrontation near Curuguaty that resulted in the deaths of 11 farmers and six police officers. Senate President Fernando Lugo did not follow up on the Senate-appointed independent commission report on the role of the police in the Marina Cue events during his tenure as senate president, which ended on July 1. As of August 24, Senate President Silvio Ovelar, who began his term on July 1, had not followed up on the report. Authorities had not prosecuted any members of the police involved in the incident. There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities. The Special Human Rights Unit in the Attorney General’s Office investigated cases of forced disappearance and kidnapping. On February 5, the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP), a rebel guerilla group, released hostages Franz Hiebert Wieler and Bernhard Blatz Friessen, kidnapped in August and September 2017, respectively. The EPP released the two farmers after their families paid a ransom of $500,000 for Hiebert Wieler and $750,000 for Blatz Friessen. On January 11, the government found the remains of Abraham Fehr, a Paraguayan-Mexican farmer kidnapped by the EPP in 2015. The EPP had previously communicated to Fehr’s family the location of the remains. An autopsy confirmed Fehr’s identity and determined he died soon after his abduction. On April 11, authorities informed the family of Eladio Edelio Morinigo, a police officer kidnapped by the EPP in 2014, that they believed Morinigo was deceased. Authorities relied on a note found in an alleged EPP camp with instructions on how to dispose of Morinigo’s corpse. It was the first time the government provided this type of information without having located the victim’s remains. Morinigo’s death was not definitively confirmed. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The law prohibits such practices, and the government generally respected these provisions, but there were credible reports that some government officials employed such practices. The Attorney General Office’s Special Human Rights Unit opened 18 torture investigation cases during the year, but there were no convictions, and all investigations were pending as of September 5. Unlike other criminal cases, torture charges do not have a statute of limitations or a defined period within which charges, an investigation, or the oral trial must be completed. The unit was investigating more than 100 open cases as of September 5, including many from the 1954-89 Stroessner dictatorship. In October 2017 the government’s quasi-independent watchdog agency, the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture (NMPT), filed a report alleging that officials at the Villarica penitentiary tortured inmates Esteban Villasanti, Fidel Villasanti, and Alicio Caceres. The Attorney General’s Human Rights Unit continued to take witnesses’ sworn statements throughout the year. Several civil society groups publicly criticized, and called for, the disbandment of the Joint Task Force (FTC) for human rights violations and corruption in the northeastern region of the country. The FTC operated in the region with the principal goal of eliminating the EPP and included personnel from the armed forces, National Police, and National Anti-Narcotics Secretariat (SENAD). Prison and Detention Center Conditions Prison and detention center conditions were harsh and, at times, life threatening due to inmate violence, mistreatment, overcrowding, poorly trained staff, deteriorating infrastructure, and unsanitary living conditions. Physical Conditions: According to the NMPT, prisons were overcrowded, with inmates at some facilities forced to share bunks, sleep on floors, and sleep in shifts. As of August 13, the Ministry of Justice reported the country’s 18 penitentiaries held 52 percent more inmates than their design capacity allowed. The NMPT also reported that four of the eight facilities for juveniles had exceeded their design capacity. Penitentiaries did not have adequate accommodations for inmates with physical disabilities. The Justice Ministry’s Directorate for the Care of Convicted Juveniles assigned minors convicted of juvenile crimes to one of eight youth correctional facilities, one of which was dedicated to young women. Prisons and juvenile facilities generally lacked adequate temperature control systems, of particular concern during hot summer months. Some prisons had cells with inadequate lighting, in which prisoners were confined for long periods without an opportunity for exercise. Although sanitation and medical care were generally considered adequate, some prisons lacked sufficient medical personnel. Adherence to fire prevention norms was lacking. Government authorities in the northeastern region of the country along the border with Brazil continued to report inmate recruitment within the prisons by members of the Brazilian First Capital Command gang. Administration: Authorities conducted some investigations of credible allegations of mistreatment, but the NMPT stated authorities failed to conduct sufficient investigations, particularly into prison directors with previous accusations of mistreatment. During the year the Justice Ministry’s Internal Affairs Office continued random, unannounced visits to several prisons. Visitors reportedly needed to offer bribes frequently to visit prisoners, hindering effective representation of inmates by public defenders. Although married and unmarried heterosexual inmates were permitted conjugal visits, the ministry prohibited such visits for homosexual inmates. Independent Monitoring: The government granted the media, independent civil society groups, and diplomatic representatives access to prisons with prior coordination. Representatives of the media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) conducted regular prison visits. Government agencies, such as the NMPT, the Public Defender’s Office, and representatives of the judicial branch, also conducted independent visits. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, but the government did not always observe these requirements. In some cases police ignored requirements for a warrant by citing obsolete provisions that allow detention if individuals are unable to present personal identification upon demand (although the law does not obligate citizens to carry or show identity documentation). ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The National Police, under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, are responsible for preserving public order, protecting the rights and safety of persons and entities and their property, preventing and investigating crimes, and implementing orders given by the judiciary and public officials. The constitution charges military forces with guarding the country’s territory and borders. By law civilian authorities are in charge of the security forces. The law authorizes the president to mobilize military forces domestically against any “internal aggression” endangering the country’s sovereignty, independence, or the integrity of its democratic constitutional order. The law requires the president to notify congress within 48 hours of a decision to deploy troops. By law the president’s deployment order must define a geographic location, be subject to congressional scrutiny, and have a set time limit. As of August 24, the government continued to maintain a deployment of more than 1,200 personnel from the FTC, of whom approximately 1,000 were military, to the departments of Concepcion, San Pedro, and Amambay. The Ministry of National Defense, also under the president’s authority but outside the military’s chain of command, handles some defense matters. The ministry is responsible for the logistical and administrative aspects of the armed forces, especially the development of defense policy. The law authorizes SENAD and units within the National Police, all under the president’s authority, to enforce the law in matters related to narcotics trafficking and terrorism. The law provides for SENAD to lead operations in coordination with the Attorney General’s Office and the judiciary. To arrest individuals or use force, SENAD must involve members of the National Police in its operations, but reportedly it often did not do so. The Special Human Rights Unit of the Attorney General’s Office and the Disciplinary Review Board of the National Police are responsible for determining whether police killings legitimately occurred in the line of duty. The military justice system has jurisdiction over active military personnel. Several human rights NGOs and media reported incidents of police involvement in homicides, rape, arms and narcotics trafficking, soliciting bribes, robbery, extortion, and kidnapping, with reported abuses particularly widespread in Ciudad del Este, Pedro Juan Caballero, and other locations on the border with Brazil. Hundreds of cases of excessive use of force, torture, and other abuses by security forces remained unresolved and open with the Special Human Rights Unit in the Attorney General’s Office. No information was available whether any of these cases resulted in convictions or penalties during the year. Although the National Police reportedly struggled with inadequate training, funding, and widespread corruption, it continued to investigate and punish members involved in crimes and administrative violations. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES Police may arrest individuals with a warrant or with reasonable cause. The law provides that after making an arrest, police have up to six hours to notify the Attorney General’s Office, at which time that office has up to 24 hours to notify a judge if it intends to prosecute. The law allows judges to use measures such as house arrest and bail in felony cases. According to civil society representatives and legal experts, in misdemeanor cases judges frequently set bail too high for many poor defendants to post bond, while politically connected or wealthy defendants pay minimal or no bail or receive other concessions, including house arrest. The law grants defendants the right to hire counsel, and the government provides public defenders for those who cannot afford counsel. According to the NGO Paraguayan Human Rights Coordinator (CODEHUPY) and the NMPT, heavy caseloads adversely affected the quality of representation by public defenders. Detainees had access to family members. Arbitrary Arrest: The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention. During the year NGOs reported several cases of arbitrary arrest and detention of persons without a warrant. Pretrial Detention: The law permits detention without trial for a period equivalent to the minimum sentence associated with the alleged crime, a period that could range from six months to five years. Some detainees were held in pretrial detention beyond the maximum allowed time. According to the NMPT, 76 percent of male prisoners and 69 percent of female prisoners awaited trial and sentencing as of August 13. The NMPT alleged the high number of prisoners in pretrial detention was principally a result of legislation that disproportionately affects low-level drug offenders. Specifically, it claimed the legislation prohibits judges from applying alternative measures to pretrial detentions for crimes with a potential sentence of five or more years. It also said the legislation sets overly strict guidelines on preventive detention for suspects in drug cases. As of July 13, 63 percent of all female detainees were low-level drug offenders. The constitution provides for an independent judiciary. Undue external influence, however, often compromised the judiciary’s independence. Interested parties, including politicians, routinely attempted to influence investigations and pressure judges and prosecutors. Judicial selection and disciplinary review board processes were often politicized. The law requires that specific seats on the board be allocated to congressional representatives, who were reportedly the greatest source of corrupt pressure and influence. Courts were inefficient and subject to corruption, and NGOs and government officials alleged that some judges and prosecutors solicited or received bribes to drop or modify charges against defendants. Authorities generally respected court orders. TRIAL PROCEDURES The constitution provides for the right to a fair and public trial, which the judiciary nominally provided, albeit through a lengthy trial process exacerbated by legal defense tactics that remove or suspend judges and prosecutors working on cases. Impunity was common due to politicization of and corruption within the judiciary and regular manipulation of the judicial process by defense attorneys who pushed statutes of limitations to expire before trials reached conclusion. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence and a right of appeal. Both defendants and prosecutors may present written testimony from witnesses and other evidence. Defendants may confront adverse witnesses, except in cases involving domestic or international trafficking in persons, in which case victims may testify remotely or in the presence of the defendant’s lawyers, in lieu of the defendant. Defendants have the right to prompt information and detail of the indictments and charges they face, but some defendants received notification only when they faced arrest charges or seizure of their property. Defendants have the right to access free interpretation services as necessary, including translation to Guarani–the country’s second official language. Defendants have the right to a trial without undue delay, although trials were often protracted, as well as the right to be present at the trial. Defendants have the right to communicate with an attorney of their choice or one provided at public expense. Defendants have the right to a reasonable amount of time to prepare their defense and to access their legal files. Defendants may confront prosecution or plaintiff witnesses and present their own witnesses and evidence. Defendants are not compelled to testify or confess guilt and may choose to remain silent. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Citizens have access to the courts to file lawsuits seeking damages for, or cessation of, human rights violations. There are administrative and judicial remedies for alleged wrongs, and authorities generally granted them to citizens. The court may order civil remedies, including fair compensation to the injured party; however, the government experienced problems enforcing court orders in such cases. Individuals and organizations may appeal adverse domestic decisions to regional human rights bodies. PROPERTY RESTITUTION The government generally enforced court orders with respect to seizure, restitution, or compensation for taking private property. Systemic inadequacies within the land registry system, however, prevented the government from compiling a reliable inventory of its landholdings. Registered land far exceeded the size of the country, and there were allegations of corruption within local government and the National Institute for Rural Development and Land, the government agency charged with implementing land reform, and reports of forced evictions. The dispute between Brazilian-Paraguayan families claiming title to 555,436 acres of land and farming families occupying 222,965 acres of the disputed land in Colonia Guahory, Caaguazu Department, continued throughout the year. Police attempted to conduct several eviction operations, but the farming families remained in place. Legal counsel for the small-scale farming families alleged the Brazilian-Paraguayan families illegally purchased titles to the land. The case was pending as of October 15. Despite the government’s acceptance of the donation of the disputed land on which the 2012 Curuguaty/Marina Cue confrontation occurred, the Public Registry refused to register the property. Officials explained they could not act until lawsuits establishing previous ownership were resolved. The constitution and law prohibit such actions, and the government generally respected these prohibitions, but there were reports that members of the security forces failed to respect the law in certain instances. NGOs, local Roman Catholic Church organizations, and some national legislators alleged FTC personnel in the departments of Concepcion, San Pedro, and Amambay searched homes and schools without warrants. Catholic priests accused FTC personnel of sexual harassment against women living in the area of FTC operations. The Special Human Rights Unit in the Attorney General’s Office did not receive reports of any new cases of unlawful interference with private correspondence during the year, but it continued to investigate cases from previous years. Peru Executive Summary Peru is a constitutional, multiparty republic. Pursuant to the constitution, in March First Vice President Martin Vizcarra assumed the presidency following the resignation of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski. Kuczynski, leader of the Peruanos Por el Kambio (Peruvians for Change) party, had won the 2016 national elections in a vote widely considered free and fair. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control over the security forces. Human rights issues included isolated cases of torture; government corruption, including in the judiciary; violence against women and girls; and forced labor (human trafficking) at illegal gold mining sites. The government took steps to investigate and in some cases prosecute or otherwise punish public officials accused of abuses. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. There were no significant developments in the investigation into allegations members of the Peruvian National Police (PNP) committed the extrajudicial killings of more than 27 criminal suspects during at least nine separate police operations from 2012 to 2015 as part of a scheme to obscure police corruption as well as a means to receive awards and promotions. Fourteen PNP regular police officers remained in preventive detention, eight in prison and six under house arrest, awaiting trial for their roles in one of the operations. The Shining Path domestic terrorist group conducted several terrorist acts during the year that caused the injury and death of security force members and civilians, including the August 21 killing of a husband, wife, and adult son in a small town located in the remote region of Junin. Shining Path terrorists conducted two separate attacks on police and military contingents in June, killing four police officers and wounding several others. On September 11, the National Criminal Court sentenced 10 former leaders of the Shining Path to life in prison for committing the 1992 Tarata Street bombing that killed 25 persons in Lima. The court postponed sentencing an 11th leader, Moises Limaco, who fled the country in 2014, and cleared a 12th, Elizabeth Cardenas. There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities. The Ministry of Justice’s Directorate for Disappeared Persons oversees the recovery, identification, and return of remains of the approximately 13,000-20,000 persons who disappeared during the internal conflict of 1980-2000. To expedite this effort, President Vizcarra signed a law on September 7 to create a genetic database to identify and recover disappeared victims’ remains. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The law prohibits such practices. Local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), however, and the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office reported that torture by police occurred and stated the government did not effectively prevent and punish those who committed such abuses. In a June report, the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office identified 174 cases of police-related torture and abuse between March 2017 and April 2018. The incidents occurred nationwide, across all police units, but without any apparent pattern and were not found to be the result of a government policy. According to the local NGO Human Rights Commission, many victims did not file formal complaints about their alleged torture, and those who did so purportedly had difficulty obtaining judicial redress and adequate compensation. Transgender women reported to NGOs that municipal police in metropolitan Lima committed acts of extortion, violence, and degrading treatment against them. Prison and Detention Center Conditions The law prohibits such practices. Local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), however, and the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office reported that torture by police occurred and stated the government did not effectively prevent and punish those who committed such abuses. In a June report, the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office identified 174 cases of police-related torture and abuse between March 2017 and April 2018. The incidents occurred nationwide, across all police units, but without any apparent pattern and were not found to be the result of a government policy. According to the local NGO Human Rights Commission, many victims did not file formal complaints about their alleged torture, and those who did so purportedly had difficulty obtaining judicial redress and adequate compensation. Transgender women reported to NGOs that municipal police in metropolitan Lima committed acts of extortion, violence, and degrading treatment against them. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention and provide for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements. The government constitutionally suspended the right to freedom from arrest without warrant in designated emergency zones. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The PNP is responsible for all areas of law enforcement and internal security, including migration and border security. The PNP functions under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. The armed forces are responsible for external security under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. The armed forces have limited domestic security responsibilities, particularly in the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro Rivers (VRAEM) emergency zone. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the military and police forces, and the government had effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuses. Corruption and a high rate of acquittals, however, in civilian courts for military personnel accused of crimes remained serious problems. The Public Ministry conducted investigations, although access to evidence held by the Ministry of Defense was not always forthcoming. The Ombudsman’s Office can also investigate cases and submit conclusions to the Public Ministry for follow-up. The Ministries of Interior and Defense employed internal mechanisms to investigate allegations of security force abuse. The Ministry of Interior’s Office of Inspector General reported it disciplined approximately 1,400 police officers from January to September, compared with over 33,000 in the first eight months of 2017. Analysts attributed the apparent dramatic decrease in PNP disciplinary actions during the year to the fact that there were an unusually high number of disciplinary actions the previous year, which were the result of reforms the Interior Ministry implemented in 2017. Police continued operating under a use-of-force doctrine adopted in 2015. When a police action causes death or injury, the law requires an administrative investigation and notification to the appropriate oversight authorities. The law is applicable to all police force members and defines the principles, rules, situations, and limitations for police use of force and firearms. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES The law requires a written judicial warrant based on sufficient evidence for an arrest, unless authorities apprehend the alleged perpetrator of a crime in the act. Only judges may authorize detentions. Authorities are required to arraign arrested persons within 24 hours, except in cases of suspected terrorism, drug trafficking, or espionage, for which arraignment must take place within 15 days. In remote areas, arraignment must take place as soon as practicable. Military authorities must turn over persons they detain to police within 24 hours. Police must file a report with the Public Ministry within 24 hours after an arrest. The Public Ministry, in turn, must issue its own assessment of the legality of the police action in the arrest, and authorities respected this requirement. The law permits detainees access to family members and a lawyer of their choice. Police may detain suspected terrorists incommunicado for 10 days. Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention continued to be a problem. As of June, judicial authorities had sentenced 52,966 of the 87,995 detainees held in detention facilities and prisons. The length of pretrial detention occasionally equaled, but did not exceed, the maximum sentence of the alleged crime. Delays were due mainly to judicial inefficiency, corruption, and staff shortages. In accordance with the law, courts released prisoners held more than nine months (up to 36 months in complex cases) whom the justice system had not tried and sentenced. The courts factored pretrial detention into final sentences. The constitution provides for an independent judiciary. Some NGOs and other advocates alleged the judiciary did not always operate independently, was not consistently impartial, and was sometimes subject to political influence and corruption. In July the media released audiotaped phone conversations of judges implicating themselves in influence peddling, which included court decisions. Immediately following the scandal, President Vizcarra implemented measures to address judicial corruption. Authorities generally respected court orders from the judiciary. TRIAL PROCEDURES The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and the judiciary generally enforced this right, although reports of corruption in the judicial system were common. The government continued the implementation, begun in 2006, of the transition from the inquisitorial to the accusatory legal system and the application of a new criminal procedure code designed to streamline the penal process. As of October the government had initiated the transition and introduced the code in 31 of the 34 judicial districts, although implementation in the largest judicial districts–Lima and South Lima–remained pending. The law presumes all defendants are innocent. The government must promptly inform defendants in detail of the charges against them and provide defendants a trial without undue delay. Defendants also have the right to be present at their trial and to communicate with an attorney of their choice or have one provided at public expense. State-provided attorneys, however, often had poor training. Although the law grants citizens the right to trial in their own language, interpreting and translation services for non-Spanish speakers were sometimes unavailable. This deficiency primarily affected indigenous persons living in the highlands and Amazon regions. The law gives all defendants the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare for their defense. Defendants have the right to confront adverse witnesses and present their own witnesses and evidence. The government cannot compel defendants to testify or confess to a crime. Defendants may appeal verdicts to a superior court and ultimately to the Supreme Court. The Constitutional Tribunal may rule on cases involving issues such as habeas corpus or the constitutionality of laws. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees during the year. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Citizens may seek civil remedies for human rights violations, but court cases often take years to resolve. Press reports, NGOs, and other sources continued to allege that persons outside the judiciary frequently corrupted or influenced judges. The law prohibits such actions, and there were no reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions. The government’s continued declaration of an emergency zone in the VRAEM, due to drug trafficking and criminal activity, suspended the right to home inviolability. Philippines Executive Summary The Philippines is a multi-party, constitutional republic with a bicameral legislature. President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, elected in May 2016, began his constitutionally limited six-year term in June 2016. The 2016 presidential election was generally seen as free and fair. Barangay (village) and youth council elections originally scheduled for 2016 were twice postponed but ultimately held in May. These, too, were generally free and fair, although there were reports of violence and vote buying. Civilian control over the Philippine National Police (PNP) continued to improve but was not fully effective. Extrajudicial killings have been the chief human rights concern in the country for many years and, after a sharp rise with the onset of the antidrug campaign in 2016, they continued in the reporting year, albeit at a lower level. From January to September 29, media chronicled 673 deaths in police operations suspected to be connected with the government’s antidrug campaign. The PNP Internal Affairs Service (IAS) is required to investigate all deaths or injuries committed in the conduct of a police operation. IAS claimed it began investigations of all reported extrajudicial killings. There were no reports that civilian control over other security forces was inadequate. Human rights issues included unlawful or arbitrary killings by security forces, vigilantes, and others allegedly connected to the government, and by insurgents; forced disappearance; torture; arbitrary detention; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; political prisoners; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; criminal libel; killings of and threats against journalists; official corruption and abuse of power; and the use of forced and child labor. The government investigated a limited number of reported human rights abuses, including abuses by its own forces, paramilitaries, and insurgent and terrorist groups. Concerns about police impunity increased significantly following the sharp increase in killings by police in 2016. President Duterte publicly rejected criticism of alleged police killings, but said authorities would investigate any actions taken outside the rule of law. Significant concerns persisted about impunity of civilian national and local government officials and powerful business and commercial figures. Slow judicial processes remained an obstacle to bringing government officials allegedly involved in human rights abuses to justice. Muslim separatists, communist insurgents, and terrorist groups continued to attack government security forces and civilians, causing displacement of civilians and resulting in the deaths of security force members and civilians. Terrorist organizations engaged in kidnappings for ransom, bombings of civilian targets, beheadings, and the use of child soldiers in combat or auxiliary roles. The government called off negotiations with the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, the political arm of the communist New People’s Army, in June, but continued to explore ways to resume talks. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were numerous reports that government security agencies and their informal allies committed arbitrary or unlawful killings in connection with the government-directed campaign against illegal drugs. Killings of activists, judicial officials, local government leaders, and journalists by antigovernment insurgents and unknown assailants also continued. From July 2016 to July 2018, law enforcement agencies reported that an average of six persons died daily in antidrug operations. The 105,658 antidrug operations conducted from July 2016 to September 2018 led to the deaths of 4,854 civilians and 87 members of the security forces. Government data on the antidrug campaign were provided through #RealNumbersPH, operated by the Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs. In an illustrative case, an unknown gunman shot and killed Tanauan City Mayor Antonio Halili during a flag ceremony at city hall on July 2. Mayor Halili was on the president’s “narco list” and known for his “Walk of Shame” parade for drug suspects. Three other mayors and two vice-mayors were killed in similar incidents. The reported number of alleged extrajudicial killings varied widely, since government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) used different definitions. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an independent government agency responsible for investigating alleged human rights violations, investigated 301 new complaints of alleged extrajudicial or politically motivated killings involving 387 victims as of August, including 70 cases of drug-related extrajudicial killings involving 90 victims. The CHR suspected PNP or Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) involvement in 208 of these new complaints and the armed forces (AFP) or paramilitary personnel in 19 cases. The CHR attributed the higher number of investigations of extrajudicial killings to an increase in investigations initiated on its own authority based on monitoring news reports, reports to the CHR in social media, or information received following CHR outreach efforts. The PNP’s Task Force Usig, responsible for investigating and monitoring killings of members of the press, labor activists, and foreigners, opened no new cases from January to July. The NGO Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), which documented cases of alleged state perpetrated, politically motivated killings carried out by unspecified security forces, was unable to provide data for the reporting year. The TFDP covered such cases separately from killings in the antidrug campaign. President Duterte continued his anticrime campaign, specifically targeting the widespread trafficking and abuse of illegal narcotics. Fatalities fell dramatically following the PNP’s suspension of the counternarcotics campaign in accordance with a presidential memorandum in October 2017. The president reversed the suspension in December 2017 and reported extrajudicial killings increased, but to a lower level than prior to the suspension. On July 23, in his State of the Nation Address, the president reiterated that the drug war was “far from over” and would continue to be “relentless and chilling.” In specific cases President Duterte commented that if police were found to be corrupt, they should go to jail, or that he would deploy a “special unit” of officers to hunt and kill them. Civil society organizations accused police of planting evidence, tampering with crime scenes, unlawfully disposing of the bodies of drug suspects, and other actions to cover up extrajudicial killings. The CHR reported that the PNP refused to share information on investigations into police and vigilante killings, as required by the constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that the PNP must turn over documents. The PNP indicated in May that it had turned over 95 percent of the required records to the solicitor general, although it was not clear whether these records were subsequently turned over to the Supreme Court. President Duterte continued to maintain lists of suspected drug criminals, including government, police, military officials, and members of the judiciary. Many viewed the list as an implied threat. The list now includes 96 politicians. PDEA Chief Aaron Aquino reported in July that the president would no longer publicly announce the names on the list because of “complications” that followed doing so. The AFP Human Rights Office reported no cases of forced disappearance attributed to or implicating government authorities from January to August. Separately, the CHR reported five cases of abduction and forced disappearance from January to August. The law allows family members of alleged victims of disappearances to compel government agencies to provide statements in court about what they know regarding the circumstances surrounding a disappearance (or extrajudicial killing) and the victim’s status. Evidence of a kidnapping or killing requires the filing of charges, but in many past cases, evidence and documentation were unavailable or not collected. Investigative and judicial action on disappearance cases was insufficient; a small number of previously reported cases were prosecuted. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The constitution and law prohibit torture, and evidence obtained through its use is inadmissible in court. According to the CHR, however, members of the security forces and police allegedly routinely abused and sometimes tortured suspects and detainees. Common forms of abuse during arrest and interrogation reportedly included electric shock, cigarette burns, and suffocation. As of August the CHR had investigated 30 cases of alleged torture involving 36 victims; it suspected police involvement in eight of the cases. In March, several farmers and miners from the Compostela Valley in Mindanao filed a complaint with the CHR alleging that AFP soldiers beat and burned them in November 2017 because the soldiers suspected the miners and farmers were members of the New People’s Army (NPA). There were no convictions specifically for torture during the year, but a few cases continued under the antitorture law. According to NGOs and press reports, mental abuse, including shaming–illegal under the Anti-Torture Act–reportedly occurred, especially in drug cases. In July local media reported on strip searches of drug suspects, including women, conducted in March by Makati City police officers. Videos of the incident showed police officers laughing during the searches, including that of a naked woman. As part of the antidrug campaign, authorities called on drug criminals to turn themselves in to police to avoid more severe consequences. As of June the PNP reported 1,274,148 surrenders facilitated since July 2016, although civil society actors questioned the official figures. Civil society and other observers claimed a climate of fear led many persons associated with drugs to surrender. Reports of rape and sexual abuse of women in police or protective custody continued. The Center for Women’s Resources reported eight cases of rape involving 16 police officers from January 2017 to July 2018. The Center noted that many of the rapes occurred in connection with police antidrug operations. The United Nations reported receiving one allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse against a Filipino peacekeeper deployed to the UN Mission in Liberia. The case, which alleged the rape of a minor, was reported in 2017. An investigation by both the United Nations and the Philippine government was pending. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Prison conditions were often harsh and potentially life threatening and, in most cases, included gross overcrowding, inadequate sanitary conditions, physical abuse, and constant lack of resources including medical care and food. NGOs reported that abuses by prison guards and other inmates were common, but they stated that prisoners, fearing retaliation, declined to lodge formal complaints. The juvenile justice law exempts minors from criminal liability. Drug syndicates often used minors as runners, traffickers, cultivators, or drug den employees. Rescued minors are turned over to the custody of Department of Social Welfare and Development. In accordance with the juvenile justice law, police stations had youth relations officers to ensure that authorities treated minor suspects appropriately, but in some cases they ignored procedural safeguards and facilities were not child friendly. The law mandates that the Social Welfare Department provide shelter, treatment, and rehabilitation services to these children. From January to June, the department assisted 1,650 children in conflict with the law (that is, alleged as, accused of, or judged as having committed an offense) in 16 rehabilitation centers nationwide. Additionally, several local governments established and managed youth centers that provided protection, care, training, and rehabilitation for these children and other at-risk youth. Physical Conditions: The Bureau of Corrections (BuCor), under the Department of Justice, administered seven prisons and penal farms nationwide for individuals sentenced to prison terms exceeding three years. BuCor facilities operated at more than 2.5 times the official capacity of 16,010, holding 43,978 prisoners. The capacity remained the same as in 2017, but the number of prisoners grew by 2,000. The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), under the Department of the Interior and Local Government and the PNP, controlled 926 city, district, municipal, and provincial jails that held pretrial detainees, persons awaiting final judgment, and convicts serving sentences of three years or less. The BJMP reported its jails operated at an average of more than four times their designated capacity; the CHR reported BJMP jails were at 612 percent of capacity. Overcrowding led to a staff-to-detainee ratio of approximately 1:74. The Navotas City Jail, in one of the poorest areas in Metro Manila, had an official capacity of 23 inmates, yet as of July held 937 prisoners. Several NGOs observed that overcrowding was more severe in smaller cities, a condition that reportedly triggered violence among inmates and promoted gang rivalries. The CHR confirmed that overcrowding had worsened because of the antidrug campaign, and that this was compounded by the June order to arrest loiterers (see “Arbitrary Arrest or Detention” below). According to Manila Police District statistics, 55 inmates died due to overcrowding in detention facilities between July 2016 and June 2018. Juveniles younger than 18 years were typically released by court order or following a petition by the Public Attorney’s Office, the inmate’s private lawyer, or through NGO-led appeals. As of July juveniles made up less than 1 percent of the prison population. Prison authorities did not uniformly enforce BJMP and BuCor regulations that require holding male and female inmates in separate facilities, and, in national prisons, overseeing them with guards of the same sex. In some facilities, authorities did not fully segregate juveniles from adults. BJMP and BuCor reported insufficient custodial and escort personnel, especially in large jails, with about 70 prisoners assigned to each custodial staff member. In larger prisons, for example, such as the New Bilibid Prison, one prison guard oversaw 100 to 150 prisoners. Reports indicated that poor sanitation, inadequate ventilation, poor access to natural lighting, and a lack of potable water were chronic problems in correctional facilities and contributed to health problems. From January to July, BuCor and the BJMP reported 766 inmate deaths, a death rate of 0.42 percent. Prison authorities report that most deaths were the result of illness. Authorities provided BuCor inmates with medical care; however, some medical services and treatments were not available. In such cases, authorities referred inmates to an outside hospital. Inmates received a medicine allowance of 10 Philippine pesos ($0.19) per day. For example, congestion at the Manila Police District 9, Binan Police Station Custodial Facility, a BJMP Facility in San Pedro City, led some detainees to suffer from an apparently bacterial infection that, in one case, led to death. Opportunities for prisoner recreation, learning, and self-improvement remained scarce. Administration: The BJMP helped expedite court cases to promote speedy disposition of inmates’ cases. Through this program, authorities released 53,751 inmates from BJMP jails from January to July. Prisoners, their families, and lawyers may submit complaints to constitutionally established independent government agencies, and the CHR referred complaints it received to the appropriate agency. Authorities generally allowed prisoners and detainees to receive visitors, but local NGOs reported that authorities periodically restricted family visits for some detainees accused of insurgency-related crimes. Prison officials noted that security concerns and space limitations at times also restricted prisoner access to visitors. Muslim officials reported that, while Muslim detainees were allowed to observe their religion, Roman Catholic mass was often broadcast by loudspeaker to prison populations of both Roman Catholic and non-Roman Catholic prisoners and detainees. BuCor has a rehabilitation program that focuses on inmates’ moral and spiritual concerns. Independent Monitoring: Authorities permitted international monitoring groups, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, free and timely access to jails and prisons. The constitution grants the CHR authority to visit jails, prisons, or detention facilities to monitor the government’s compliance with international treaty obligations. The CHR reported some detention facilities still lacked an understanding of the CHR’s mandate and continued to deny CHR representatives access to detention facilities. For example, the Caloocan Yakap Center, a youth detention home in Metro Manila, required a CHR team to ask the head of the facility for permission to monitor compliance by submitting a letter prior to the visit. Improvements: To reduce overcrowding, the government began to encourage plea bargaining in drug offense cases. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements. As of July the Office of the Ombudsman, an independent agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting charges of public abuse and impropriety, reported 16 arbitrary detention violations committed by law enforcement agencies or the AFP. In September, President Duterte declared void on procedural grounds the 2011 amnesty that opposition Senator Antonio Trillanes IV received for his leadership roles in a 2003 coup attempt and 2007 rebellion. President Duterte’s Presidential Proclamation declared Trillanes’ amnesty void because he did not follow correct procedures when applying for it. During a June speech to newly promoted officers, President Duterte told police to arrest loiterers as an additional element of the antidrug campaign. While the PNP generally interpreted the remarks as a verbal directive to intensify enforcement of existing local ordinances, such as those against public urination or intoxication, there were also reports of forced confessions of drug use and of deaths in detention among those arrested for loitering. For example, after his arrest in June for loitering, 25-year-old Genesis “Tisoy” Argoncillo was held along with murder suspects despite the minor charges against him. Argoncillo died after cellmates allegedly beat him to death. On August 16, police detained three lawyers during a drug operation at a bar in Manila. Police asserted that the three harassed them by demanding to see the search warrant, blocking their access to parts of the building, and taking photographs. The lawyers, representing one of the bar’s owners, claimed they were present to take notes and observe the operation. Police charged the three with obstruction of justice. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The 180,000 member PNP is charged with maintaining internal security in most of the country and reports to the Department of the Interior and Local Government. The AFP, which reports to the Department of National Defense, is responsible for external security but also carries out domestic security functions in regions with a high incidence of conflict, particularly in areas of Mindanao. The two agencies share responsibility for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. The PNP Special Action Force is responsible, in particular, for urban counterterrorism operations. President Duterte’s May 2017 declaration of martial law for the entire region of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago was extended to the end of December 2018, giving the military expanded powers. Human rights groups continued to express concern about the potential for human rights abuses. Governors, mayors, and other local officials have considerable influence over local police units, including appointment of top departmental and municipal police officers and the provision of resources, an arrangement that often resulted in graft and corruption. The PNP’s institutional deficiencies and the public perception that corruption was endemic within the force continued. PNP Director General Oscar Albayalde, appointed in April, publicly reiterated his desire to cleanse the PNP ranks of corruption. This included reporting to the IAS more than 600 officers who allegedly committed human rights violations during antidrug operations since July 2016, and having the PNP’s Counter-Intelligence Task Force monitor police personnel suspected of illegal activities. From January to July, the PNP reported that 441 of its personnel were accused of committing human rights violations. Of these, it claimed, court charges were pending in 375 cases, 50 personnel were exonerated; 10 cases were dismissed; four persons were dismissed from service, one suspended, and one demoted. An additional 21 PNP personnel were dismissed from service for actions taken in antidrug operations. The IAS, mandated to ensure police operate within the law, remained largely ineffective. In April the IAS reported that from 2015 to 2017, final reports with a recommendation for action had been submitted to PNP leadership in only 721 out of 2,431 cases. The IAS reported that manpower and resource limitations hampered the legally required investigations into deaths resulting from police operations, but asserted nonetheless that 100 percent of the deaths in police shootings resulted from legitimate, lawful police actions. Other government mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption in the security forces were poorly resourced and remained largely ineffective. In the 2017 killing of juvenile Kian delos Santos, however, prosecutors and the courts moved swiftly to hold the officers directly responsible to account. On November 29, the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court found three police officers guilty of the killing, sentencing each to 40 years’ imprisonment and ordering them to pay the victim’s family 345,000 pesos ($6,450). Previously, President Duterte had said of the killing, which sparked a public backlash against the antidrug campaign, “this is not performance of duty.” The presidential spokesperson hailed the verdict. Human rights activists welcomed the convictions, but also called on the government to take far more action to bring perpetrators of killings to justice. President Duterte publicly condemned corruption in government and the security forces. From January to August, complainants reported 114 cases of alleged military and law enforcement involvement in human rights abuses to the Office of the Ombudsman, including killings, injuries, unlawful arrest, and torture. A majority of the cases were against low-ranking officials. As of August all cases, except one dismissed case, remained open pending additional investigation. Many cases from previous years were still open. Of the police officers involved cases of killings in 2017 of minors allegedly involved in the drug trade, only five were jailed and indicted; four of their superiors were cleared of command responsibility and promoted. Efforts continued to reform and professionalize the PNP through improved training, expanded community outreach, and salary increases. Human rights modules were included in all PNP career courses, and the PNP Human Rights Affairs Office conducted routine training nationwide on human rights responsibilities in policing. Several NGOs suggested that PNP training courses should have a follow up mechanism to determine the effectiveness of each session. The AFP Human Rights Office monitored and reviewed alleged human rights abuses involving members of the military. From January through July, the office identified and investigated five reported incidents, including a forced disappearance, two extrajudicial killings, and an alleged murder. The military routinely provided human rights training to its members, augmented by training from the CHR. The AFP used its revised Graduated Curricula on Human Rights/International Humanitarian Law for the Military to provide a uniform standard of training across service branches. The AFP adhered to a 2005 Presidential Memorandum requiring the incorporation of human rights and international humanitarian law into all AFP education and training courses. Successful completion of these courses is required to complete basic training and for induction, promotion, reassignment, and selection for foreign schooling opportunities. From January to August, various AFP service units conducted a total of 59 human rights-related training programs, seminars, or workshops. CHR representatives noted that participants were highly engaged. The Congressional Commission on Appointments determines whether senior military officers selected for promotion have a history of human rights violations and solicits input from the CHR and other agencies through background investigations. The commission may withhold a promotion indefinitely if it uncovers a record of abuses. Violations, however, do not preclude promotion. Human rights groups noted little progress in implementing and enforcing reforms aimed at improving investigations and prosecutions of suspected human rights violations. Potential witnesses often were unable to obtain protection through the witness protection program managed by the Department of Justice due to inadequate funding or procedural delays or failure to step forward because of doubts about the program’s effectiveness. The CHR operated a smaller witness protection program that was overburdened by witnesses to killings in the antidrug campaign. The loss of family income due to the relocation of a family member was also, in some cases, a barrier to witnesses’ testimony. The Office of the Ombudsman also reported that witnesses often failed to come forward, or failed to cooperate, in police abuse or corruption cases. This problem sometimes followed pressure on witnesses and their families or arose from an expectation of compensation for their cooperation. The government continued to support and arm civilian militias. The AFP controlled Civilian Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGUs), while Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVOs) fell under PNP command. These paramilitary units often received minimal training and were poorly monitored and regulated. Some political families and clan leaders, particularly in Mindanao, maintained private armies and, at times, recruited CVO and CAFGU members into those armies. Prolonged delays in the justice system reinforced the perception of impunity for national, provincial, and local government actors accused of human rights abuses. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES Warrants based on sufficient evidence and issued by an authorized official are required for an arrest unless 1) the suspect is observed attempting to commit, in the act of committing, or just after committing an offense; 2) there is probable cause based on personal knowledge that the suspect just committed an offense; or 3) the suspect is an escaped prisoner. Authorities are required to file charges within 12 to 36 hours for arrests made without warrants, depending on the seriousness of the crime. In terrorism cases, the law permits warrantless arrests and detention without charges for up to three days. Detainees have the right to bail, except when held for capital offenses or those punishable by a life sentence. The bail system largely functioned as intended, and suspects were allowed to appeal a judge’s decision to deny bail. The law provides an accused or detained person the right to choose a lawyer and, if the suspect cannot afford one, to have the state provide one. Due to an underresourced Public Attorney’s Office, however, indigent persons had limited access to public defenders. Arbitrary Arrest: Security forces continued to detain individuals, including juveniles, arbitrarily and without warrants on charges other than terrorism, especially in areas of armed conflict. Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem due largely to the slow and ineffectual justice system. According to the Supreme Court, there were more than 780,000 pending cases before 2,617 first and second level courts nationwide, 78 percent of which were pending before 1,054 regional trial courts. Pending cases were not evenly distributed among the courts, which resulted in some severely overburdened courts. Large jails employed paralegals to monitor inmates’ cases, prevent detention beyond the maximum sentence, and assist with decongestion efforts. The law provides for an independent judiciary and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality. Corruption through nepotism, personal connections, and sometimes bribery continued to result in relative impunity for wealthy or influential offenders. Insufficient personnel, inefficient processes, and long procedural delays also hindered the judicial system. These factors contributed to widespread skepticism that the criminal justice system delivered due process and equal justice. Supreme Court Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno was removed from office in June due to her alleged failure to submit all wealth declaration documents when she applied for the position in 2012. Human rights groups alleged Sereno’s vocal opposition to the conduct of the drug war played a significant role in the decision. Trials took place as a series of separate hearings, often months apart, as witnesses and court time became available, contributing to lengthy delays. There was a widely recognized need for more prosecutors, judges, and courtrooms. As of June 30, approximately one-third of authorized prosecutor positions (1,060 positions) were unfilled. Sharia (Islamic law) court positions continued to be particularly difficult to fill because of the requirement that applicants be members of both the Sharia Bar and the Integrated Bar. Sharia courts do not have criminal jurisdiction. Although the Prosecutor General received authority to hire hundreds of new prosecutors for sharia courts, training for them was of short duration and considered inadequate. The Supreme Court continued efforts to provide speedier trials, reduce judicial malfeasance, increase judicial branch efficiency, and raise public confidence in the judiciary. It continued to implement guidelines to accelerate resolution of cases in which the maximum penalty would not exceed six years in prison. In 2016 the judiciary instituted new court rules and procedures for case processing that limited the postponement of hearings and made other procedural changes to expedite case processing. Implementation of the most significant part of the reform, e‑Courts and the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases in Pilot Courts, began in 2017. TRIAL PROCEDURES The constitution provides for the right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial. An independent judiciary generally enforced this right, although not in a timely manner. The law requires that all persons accused of crimes be informed of the charges against them and grants rights to counsel, adequate time to prepare a defense, and a speedy and public trial before a judge. No criminal proceeding goes forward against a defendant without the presence of a lawyer. The law presumes defendants are innocent. They have the right to confront witnesses against them, be present at their trial, present evidence in their favor, appeal convictions, and not be compelled to testify or confess guilt. The court may appoint an interpreter if necessary. If the court’s interpreter makes serious mistakes, a party can challenge the interpretation. The government generally implemented these requirements, except for the right to a speedy trial. Although the law provides that cases should be resolved within three months to two years, depending on the court, trials effectively had no time limits. Government officials estimated it took an average of five to six years to obtain a decision. In September a court convicted retired general Jovito Palparan and two subordinates of kidnapping and illegal detention after a four-year-long trial. The incident, in 2006, involved the disappearance of two university students. Palparan, who was allegedly also deeply involved in extrajudicial killings and torture, was sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction was a positive example of the courts’ ability to hold security force leaders accountable for their actions. Authorities respected a defendant’s right to representation by a lawyer, but poverty often inhibited access to effective legal counsel. The Public Attorney’s Office, which reports to the Department of Justice, did not have the necessary resources to fulfill its constitutional mandate and used its limited resources to represent indigent defendants at trial rather than during arraignments or pretrial hearings. During pretrial hearings courts may appoint any lawyer present in the courtroom to provide on-the-spot counsel to the accused. Sentencing decisions were not always consistent with legal guidelines, and judicial decisions sometimes appeared arbitrary. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES Under a 1945 law, the government defines political prisoners as those who may be accused of any crime against national security. Using this definition, BuCor reported 185 political prisoners in its facilities as of August. The BJMP does not track political prisoners and defines prisoners based only on security risk. Various human rights NGOs maintained lists of incarcerated persons they considered political prisoners. The TFDP tracked political detainees, most of whom were in pretrial detention. The TFDP noted that, in the majority of cases, authorities mixed political prisoners with the general inmate population, except in the National Bilibid Prison, where they held most political prisoners in maximum-security facilities. Two years after her arrest, during which prosecutors used a variety of legal tactics to delay arraignment, including filing new and amending previous charges, Senator Leila de Lima was arraigned in August on a charge of conspiracy to commit drug trading. An arraignment scheduled for May was postponed when prosecutors sought another opportunity to revise the charges. The opening of the trial in September was postponed when a prosecution witness recanted his testimony. De Lima’s case began in 2016 after she opened hearings into killings related to the antidrug campaign. Although in detention, de Lima had access to the media and some visitors. Her case attracted widespread domestic and international attention, with many observers denouncing the charges as politically motivated. The government permitted regular access to political prisoners by international humanitarian organizations. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Most analysts regarded the judiciary as independent and impartial in civil matters. Complainants have access to local trial courts to seek civil damages for, or cessation of, human rights abuses. There are administrative as well as judicial remedies for civil complaints, although overburdened local courts often dismissed these cases. There were no regional human rights tribunals that could hear an appeal from the country. The government generally respected citizens’ privacy, although leaders of communist and leftist organizations and rural-based NGOs alleged routine surveillance and harassment. Authorities routinely relied on informant systems to obtain information on terrorist suspects and for the antidrug campaign. Although the government generally respected restrictions on search and seizure within private homes, searches without warrants continued to occur. Judges generally declared evidence obtained illegally to be inadmissible. Poland Executive Summary Poland is a republic with a multiparty democracy. The bicameral parliament consists of an upper house, the senate (Senat), and a lower house (Sejm). The president and the Council of Ministers headed by the prime minister share executive power. Observers considered the October 21 nationwide regional and local elections free and fair. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. Human rights issues included criminal defamation penalties and violence targeting members of ethnic minorities. The government took steps to investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who committed human rights abuses. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The constitution and law prohibit such practices. There were reports of problems, however, with police misconduct and corrections officers’ abuse of prisoners. The law lacks a clear legal definition of torture, but all actions that could be considered “torture” are prohibited and penalized in criminal proceedings under other provisions of the law that directly apply the country’s obligations under international treaties and conventions prohibiting torture. The law outlines disciplinary actions for police, including reprimand, demotion in rank, and dismissal. Civil society groups noted cases of police misconduct against persons in custody. On January 30, the Lublin local court sentenced three former police officers to three- and one-year prison terms for using an electroshock weapon against two intoxicated men they detained in June 2017. The judge determined that this action met the definition of torture. On July 12, the Wroclaw district court began a trial against four former police officers charged with abuse of power and physical and psychological violence against a 25-year-old man who died in police custody in Wroclaw in 2016. Video footage showed police beating and using an electroshock weapon on the man, who was handcuffed in a jail cell. In May 2017, the interior and administration minister had dismissed the Lower Silesia regional police commander, deputy commander, and the Wroclaw city police chief in response to the incident. On July 25, the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) published a report on its May 2017 visit to detention facilities in the country. The report cited a number of allegations of excessive force used at the time of apprehension against persons who did not resist arrest and a few allegations of punches and kicks in the course of questioning. The CPT concluded that persons taken into police custody in the country continued to run an appreciable risk of mistreatment. On August 27, the human rights defender notified the prosecutor’s office that police beat a 70-year-old man in their custody in Ryki on August 22 over suspicions he had vandalized the grave of a police officer. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Prison and detention center conditions were adequate. There were no significant reports regarding prison or detention center conditions that raised human rights concerns. Nonetheless, insufficient prison medical staff and limited prisoner access to specialized medical treatment continued to be problems. Physical Conditions: While authorities generally separated juveniles from adults, the law allows shared housing in prisons and detention centers in exceptional cases. Juveniles were at times held together with adult prisoners. Authorities usually sent juveniles between the ages of 17 and 21 accused of serious crimes to pretrial detention. The law permits authorities to commit prisoners to the National Center for the Prevention of Dissocial Behaviors when they have served their prison sentences and have undergone a custodial therapy program, but have mental disabilities believed to create a high probability they would commit another serious crime against a person. Administration: Authorities investigated credible allegations of inhuman conditions and made their findings publicly accessible. The human rights defender may join proceedings in civil and administrative courts on behalf of prisoners and detainees, either when these file a complaint or when information otherwise leads to an allegation of inhuman conditions. The human rights defender administers the national preventive mechanism, an independent program responsible for monitoring conditions and treatment of detainees in prisons and detention facilities. Independent Monitoring: The government allowed independent monitoring of prison conditions and detention centers on a regular basis by local human rights groups as well as by the CPT. The Helsinki Human Rights Foundation and other local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) made occasional visits to prisons. Improvements: In response to reports of police mistreatment, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration announced police officers would receive cameras to record all interventions. During the year police received more than 2,000 such cameras. During the year the government continued implementation of a four-year, two billion zloty ($450 million) prison administration modernization plan to improve the security of detention facilities, prison infrastructure and working conditions for prison guards from 2017 to 2020. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The constitution and the law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention and provide for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court, and the government generally observed these requirements. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The police force is a national law enforcement body with regional and municipal units overseen by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration. The border guard is responsible for border security and combating irregular migration; it reports to the Ministry of the Interior and Administration. The Internal Security Agency (ABW) has responsibility for investigating and combating organized crime, terrorist threats, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA) is responsible for combating government, business, and financial corruption. The prime minister appoints the head and deputy heads of the CBA and supervises the bureau, which may investigate any matter involving public funds. The prime minister supervises the heads of both ABW and CBA, which also report to parliament. The 2016 counterterrorism law designates the ABW as the primary authority for combatting terrorism and increased its law-enforcement powers. The human rights defender withdrew its 2017 referral of the law to the Constitutional Court, stating that the judges selected to hear the case were not legally appointed to the Constitutional Court. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the police force, the border guard, the ABW, and the CBA, and the government has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. There were no reports of impunity involving the security forces during the year. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES The constitution and the law require authorities to obtain a court warrant based on evidence to make an arrest, and authorities generally complied with the law. The constitution and the law allow detention of a person for 48 hours before authorities must file charges and an additional 24 hours for the court to decide whether to order pretrial detention. The law allows authorities to hold terrorism suspects without charges for up to 14 days. The law sets a five-day limit for holding a juvenile in a police establishment for children if the juvenile escaped from a shelter or an educational or correctional facility. It allows police to hold for up to 24 hours in a police establishment for children a juvenile who is being transferred to a shelter or an educational or correctional facility, in case of a “justified interruption of convoy.” The law provides that police should immediately notify a detained person of the reasons for his or her detention and of his or her rights. Usually this information is initially delivered orally; later, at the police station, the detainee signs a statement that he or she has been advised of his rights and duties. Police give the detained person a copy of the report on his detention. Authorities generally respected these rights. Only a court may order pretrial detention. There was a functioning bail system, and authorities released most detainees on bail. Defendants and detainees have the right to consult an attorney at any time. The government provided free counsel to indigent defendants. The July 25 CPT report stated that access to a lawyer while in police custody was problematic in practice. On July 30, the president signed an amendment to the law on free legal counsel to facilitate access to free legal services to all citizens unable to afford legal fees. Under the previous law, free legal counsel, including at the pretrial stage, was restricted to poor, young, and senior citizens, veterans, members of multichild families, and victims of natural disasters. Authorities did not hold suspects incommunicado or under house arrest. While the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the government adopted measures during the year that some claim limited the scope of judicial independence. During the year the government continued to implement and introduce new measures related to the judiciary that drew strong criticism from some legal experts, NGOs, and international organizations. In April and May, the president signed into law amendments to the common courts law, the National Judiciary Council law, and the 2017 amendments to the Supreme Court law in response to the December 2017 European Commission rule of law recommendation and infringement procedure. On July 2, the European Commission launched an infringement procedure against the country two days before provisions of the revised Supreme Court law lowering the mandatory retirement age for judges went into effect, affecting 27 of the 74 Supreme Court justices at that time. The chief justice of the Supreme Court refused to recognize the president’s authority to force her retirement, arguing her constitutionally established length of term takes precedence over legislation lowering the mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court judges. On August 2, the Supreme Court ruled to suspend further implementation of the mandatory retirement age provisions of the amended Supreme Court law, and requested that the European Court of Justice rule on whether these provisions comply with EU law. The president refused to acknowledge the Supreme Court’s suspension of the mandatory retirement provisions. On September 24, the European Commission referred the country’s amended Supreme Court law to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), stating “the Polish law on the Supreme Court is incompatible with EU law as it undermines the principle of judicial independence, including the irremovability of judges.” The European Commission asked the ECJ to review the law and order interim measures to restore the Supreme Court to its composition before the revised law was implemented. In September and October, the president continued to implement the amended Supreme Court law by appointing judges to the newly created disciplinary and extraordinary appeals chambers and to positions vacated by voluntarily retired judges. Some judicial experts, NGOs, and international organizations saw the president’s appointments as an attempt to preempt any adverse ruling by the ECJ. On October 19, the ECJ issued an interim injunction requiring the government to reinstate those judges who had been retired under the amended law. On November 19, the government submitted legislation to automatically reappoint all justices retired under the Supreme Court law to fulfill the ECJ’s interim measures, and President Duda signed the legislation into law on December 17. At the end of the year, the ECJ had not announced a date for considering the European Commission’s case against Poland’s Supreme Court law. An increase in the average duration of judicial proceedings made the judiciary less effective. According to Justice Ministry statistics, the average trial lasted approximately 5.5 months in 2017, compared with 4.7 months in 2016 and 4.2 months in 2015. While the government claimed its judicial reforms were motivated at least in part to promote judicial efficiency, some legal experts asserted that the government’s judicial reforms had the opposite effect. The trial continued of a former chief judge of the Krakow Appellate Court accused of abuse of powers, participating in an organized criminal group, and accepting bribes. The case is part of a wider anticorruption investigation into the Krakow Appellate Court in which 26 persons were charged, 13 of whom remained in pretrial detention. The trial also continued of the former head of the appeals prosecutor’s office and Rzeszow regional prosecutor on charges of accepting bribes and abuse of power. TRIAL PROCEDURES The constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial, and the judiciary generally enforced this right. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence and the right to prompt and detailed notification of the charges against them, with free interpretation for defendants who do not speak Polish from the moment charged through all appeals. They have the right to a fair and public trial without undue delay and the right to be present at their trial. Trials are usually public, although the courts reserve the right to close a trial in some circumstances, including divorce proceedings, cases involving state secrets, and cases whose content may offend public morality. Defendants have the right to legal representation, and indigent defendants may consult an attorney provided without cost. The government must provide defendants and their attorneys adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Defendants may confront and question witnesses and present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf. Prosecutors may grant witnesses anonymity if they express fear of retribution from defendants. The prosecutor general may release to media information concerning any investigation, except if such information is classified, with due consideration to important public interests. Defendants may not be compelled to testify or confess guilt. After a court issues a verdict, a defendant has seven days to request a written statement of the judgment; courts must provide a response within 14 days. A defendant has the right to appeal a verdict within 14 days of the response. A two-level appeal process is available in most civil and criminal matters. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Individuals or organizations may seek civil remedies for human rights violations. The government’s implementation of court orders, particularly for payment of damages, remained slow, and cumbersome. After they exhaust remedies available in the domestic courts, persons have the right to appeal court decisions involving alleged government violations of the European Convention on Human Rights to the European Court for Human Rights. The dispute regarding judicial appointments to the Constitutional Court in 2015 and 2016 was not resolved by the end of the year. PROPERTY RESTITUTION The law provides for restitution of communal property, such as synagogues and cemeteries, seized during the Communist era or under Nazi occupation, but the process proceeded slowly during the year. By the end of September the property commissions had resolved 7,000 of slightly more than 10,500 communal property claims. The government has put in place legal and administrative procedures for private property restitution, but NGOs and advocacy groups reported it did not make significant progress on resolution of Holocaust-era claims, including for foreign citizens. No comprehensive law addresses the return of or compensation for private property, but individuals may seek the return of confiscated private property through administrative proceedings and the courts. NGOs and advocacy groups described the current process as cumbersome and ineffective. During the year Warsaw city authorities continued publishing lists of properties under a 2016 law barring Warsaw public properties from being returned to their precommunist-era owners and extinguishing long-dormant claims after a six-month notice period if no claimant stepped forward to pursue a restitution case. The 2016 legislation was intended to end abusive practices in the trading of former property owners’ claims. Nonetheless, NGOs and advocacy groups expressed serious concerns that it fell short of providing just compensation to former owners who lost property as a result of nationalization of properties by the communist-era government and also properties taken during the Holocaust era. The Constitutional Court upheld the legislation, and the law entered into force in 2016. By June 21, the city authorities published notifications for 206 properties, and issued 39 decisions, 33 of which denied the return of properties currently used for public purposes, including schools, preschools, a park, and a police command unit. The World Jewish Restitution Organization asserted that Warsaw City’s administration of the law unjustly denied the time necessary for potential claimants, particularly Holocaust survivors and their heirs, to meet difficult documentary requirements for providing proof of ownership or inheritance. On February 12, the head of the Council of Minister’s committee that coordinates legislation announced that the comprehensive private property restitution draft legislation, announced by the Justice Ministry in October 2017 needed further amendments and analysis, including questions about its potential cost and compliance with national and international law. The proposed law would block any physical return of former properties, provide compensation of 20-25 percent of the property’s value at the time of taking in cash or government bonds, and set a one-year claims-filing period. Critics have argued the legislation would exclude potential foreign citizen claimants, many of whom were Holocaust survivors or their heirs, and allow only direct heirs to file claims, a provision that in effect would exclude many heirs of survivors. As of early November the government had not announced any updates on the status of the draft law. The law prohibits such actions but allows electronic surveillance with judicial review for crime prevention and investigation. On March 14, the human rights defender withdrew his referral from the Constitutional Court of a 2016 law regulating police and security services surveillance, stating that there is no expectation of an unbiased and substantial review of the law in question by the Constitutional Court. The human rights defender referred the law to the Constitutional Court in 2017, arguing it infringes on privacy rights and EU data privacy norms and does not provide sufficient protections for privileged communications (e.g., attorney-client, priest-penitent). Portugal Executive Summary Portugal, which includes the archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira, is a constitutional semipresidential representative democracy with a president, prime minister, and parliament elected in multiparty elections. Observers considered presidential elections in 2016 and local government elections in 2017 free and fair. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. There were no reports of egregious human rights abuses during the year. The government investigated, prosecuted, and punished officials who committed human rights abuses. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment While the constitution and law prohibit such practices, there were credible reports of excessive use of force by police and of mistreatment and other forms of abuse of prisoners by prison guards. In 2017 the government-run Inspectorate General of Internal Administration (IGAI) received 772 reports of mistreatment and abuse by police and prison guards. Complaints of physical abuse consisted primarily of slaps, punches, and kicks to the body and head, as well as beatings with batons. The complaints were against the Public Security Police (PSP), the Republican National Guard (GNR), and the Foreigners and Borders Service (SEF), with 406, 288, and 22 complaints, respectively. The IGAI investigated each complaint. In 2017 the government conducted 102 investigations of members of the security forces. Punishment ranged from letters of reprimand, temporary suspension from duty, mandatory retirement with pension cuts, discharge from duty, and prison sentences. In June media reported extensively that a Colombian woman reported being attacked in Porto by a security guard working for the local public transit company. The woman accused the perpetrator of aggression and racism and said that PSP officers at the site of the incident did not assist her. The Commission for Equality and Against Discrimination referred the case to the attorney general, who opened an investigation. At the request of the IGAI, the PSP did the same to determine whether PSP officers had acted properly in the case. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) cited reports of mistreatment of prisoners by guards in some prisons. Other reported issues included general overcrowding, inadequate facilities, poor health conditions, and violence among inmates. Physical Conditions: Several of the country’s prisons were overcrowded. As of December 1, the Directorate-General of Prison Services reported that the prison system overall was at 98.9 percent of capacity. Authorities sometimes held juveniles in adult facilities, despite the existence of a youth prison in Leiria. The prison system held pretrial detainees with convicted criminals. In February the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) published a report on its 2016 visit to the country. The report stated that during the visit the CPT delegation received “a considerable number of credible allegations” of mistreatment at the time of a suspect’s apprehension and during police custody. It reported that living conditions within parts of the Caxias, Lisbon Central, and Setubal prisons “may amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.” For instance, in the basement areas of Lisbon Central Prison, the cells were cold, dark, and damp, with crumbling plaster and rats entering the cells via the floor-level toilets. Prisoners at both Caxias and Setubal prisons were held in poor conditions with less than 32 square feet of living space each and confined to their cells for up to 23 hours a day. In response, government authorities provided detailed information on the steps being taken to reduce prison overcrowding and improve detention conditions, as well as numerous other actions designed to address the recommendations made by the CPT, particularly in the area of health-care provision. CPT made the report and response public at the request of the Portuguese authorities. The Directorate-General of Reintegration and Prison Services reported 69 deaths in prisons in 2017 (15 suicides and 54 due to illness). Infectious diseases associated with drug abuse were the leading cause of death in prison. Independent Monitoring: The government permitted visits by independent human rights observers and the CPT. In 2017 the IGAI, university researchers, and news media visited prisons. Local human rights and media groups were fully independent bodies and had unrestricted access to prisons. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The constitution and federal law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention. Persons arrested or detained regardless of whether on criminal or other grounds are entitled to challenge in court the legal basis or arbitrary nature of their detention and any delay in obtaining judicial rulings. If the court finds persons to have been detained unlawfully, they are entitled to prompt release and compensation. The government generally observed these practices. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The Ministries of Internal Administration and Justice are primarily responsible for internal security. The Ministry of Internal Administration oversees the SEF, PSP, and GNR. The SEF has jurisdiction over immigration and border issues, the PSP has jurisdiction in cities, and the GNR has jurisdiction outside cities. The Judiciary Police is responsible for criminal investigations and reports to the Ministry of Justice. The IGAI, in the Ministry of Internal Administration, operates independently, investigates deaths caused by the security forces, and evaluates whether they occurred in the line of duty or were otherwise justifiable. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security agencies, and the government has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. An independent ombudsman chosen by parliament and the IGAI investigates complaints of abuse or mistreatment by police. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES The constitution and law provide detailed guidelines covering all aspects of arrest and custody, and authorities generally followed the guidelines. Individuals are arrested only on a judicial warrant, but law enforcement officials and citizens may make warrantless arrests when there is probable cause that a crime has just been or is being committed, or that the person to be arrested is an escaped convict or a suspect who escaped from police custody. Authorities must bring the suspect before an investigating judge within 48 hours after arrest. By law the investigating judge determines whether an arrested person should be detained, released on bail, or released outright. Authorities generally informed detainees promptly of charges against them. Investigative detention for most crimes is limited to four months. If authorities do not file a formal charge within that period, they must release the detainee. In cases of serious crimes such as murder, armed robbery, terrorism, and violent or organized crime, and crimes involving more than one suspect, the investigating judge may decide to hold a suspect in detention while the investigation is underway for up to 18 months, and up to three years in extraordinary circumstances. Bail exists, but authorities generally do not release detainees on their own recognizance. Depending on the severity of the crime, a detainee’s release may be subject to various legal conditions. Detainees have the right to legal counsel from the time of arrest, but media reports cited instances when police, in particular the Judiciary Police, did not inform detainees of their rights. An attorney must accompany detainees appearing before a judge for the first hearing. If detained persons cannot afford a private lawyer, the government appoints one and assumes legal costs. Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem. As of November 1, according to the Directorate-General of Prison Services, there were 2,218 individuals (17 percent of the prison population) in pretrial detention, approximately the same number as the previous year. The majority of pretrial detainees spent six months to a year in incarceration. Observers, including media, business corporations, and legal observers, estimated the backlog of cases awaiting trial to be at least a year. Lengthy pretrial detention was usually due to lengthy investigations and legal procedures, judicial inefficiency, or staff shortages. Pretrial detention applies toward a convicted detainee’s prison sentence. A detainee found not guilty has the right to compensation for this time. The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality. TRIAL PROCEDURES The constitution provides for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right. The law presumes all defendants innocent and provides the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges (with free interpretation when necessary from the moment charged through all appeals). Authorities must bring a suspect in investigative detention to trial within 14 months of a formal charge. If a suspect is not in detention, the law specifies no deadline for going to trial. When the crime is punishable by a prison sentence of eight years or longer, either the public prosecutor or the defendant may request a jury trial. Defendants have the right to be present at their trials and to consult with an attorney, at government expense if necessary, from the time of arrest. Defendants have adequate time and facilities to prepare their defense. They may confront and question witnesses against them and present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf. Defendants cannot be compelled to testify or confess guilt. Those convicted have the right of appeal. The law extends these rights to all defendants. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES There is an independent and impartial judiciary in civil matters. Citizens, foreign residents, and organizations have access to a court to bring lawsuits seeking damages for, or cessation of, a human rights violation, and they may appeal adverse domestic decisions to regional human rights bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights. Besides judicial remedies, administrative recourse exists for alleged wrongs. PROPERTY RESTITUTION Holocaust-era restitution is no longer a significant issue. The government has laws and mechanisms in place and is a signatory of the Terezin Declaration of 2009 and the Guidelines and Best Practices of 2010. The 1999 report commissioned by the government and chaired by the country’s former president and prime minister Mario Soares, at the time a member of the European Parliament, found there was “no basis for additional restitution” following the payment made by Portugal in 1960 for gold transactions carried out between Portuguese and German authorities between 1936 and 1945. NGOs and advocacy groups, including the local Jewish community, reported no significant outstanding Holocaust-era claims, including for foreign citizens. The government has not responded to the 2016 European Shoah Legacy Institute’s Immovable Property Restitution Study Questionnaire covering past and present restitution regimes. The constitution and laws prohibit such actions, and there were no reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions. Qatar Executive Summary Qatar is a constitutional monarchy in which Amir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani exercises full executive power. The constitution provides for hereditary rule by men in the Amir’s branch of the Al Thani family. The most recent elections were in 2015 for the Central Municipal Council, an advisory and consultative body. Observers considered these elections free and fair. All cabinet members are appointed by the Amir, including the prime minister. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over security forces. Human rights issues included criminalization of libel; restrictions on peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including prohibitions on political parties and labor unions; restrictions on the freedom of movement for migrant workers’ travel abroad; limits on the ability of citizens to choose their government in free and fair elections; and criminalization of consensual same-sex sexual activity. There were reports of forced labor that the government took steps to address. The government took limited steps to prosecute those suspected of committing human rights abuses. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities. c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment The constitution and law prohibit torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment. The government interprets sharia as allowing corporal punishment for certain criminal offenses, including court-ordered flogging in cases of alcohol consumption and extramarital sex by Muslims. Courts typically reduced sentences to imprisonment or a fine. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Aside from the Deportation Detention Center (DDC), prison conditions generally met international standards. In its 2017 report the National Human Rights Committee (NHRC), an independent government-funded nongovernmental organization (NGO), investigated one case of an expatriate prisoner who complained about his conditions in the detention facility. The NHRC visited the facility, met with the prisoner and the detention center management, and submitted a list of recommendations to the management about this case. The NHRC recommended updating the official documents of the prisoner and discussed the possibility of lifting the ban on his bank account. The NHRC further recommended that the government publically declare the number of accusations of mistreatment of prisoners reported to it as well as any follow up actions taken. The committee made 177 visits to eight different detention and interrogation facilities across the country during the year and concluded that the facilities met international standards. The NHRC also conducted a training for Ministry of Interior officials on international obligations to refrain from torture of prisoners. Physical Conditions: There were no major concerns in prisons and detention centers regarding physical conditions. Administration: No statute allows ombudsmen to advocate for prisoners and detainees. Independent Monitoring: The government permitted monitoring visits by independent human rights observers and international bodies to all facilities except the state security prison. The government routinely provided foreign diplomats access to state security prisoners. Representatives from the NHRC conducted regular visits to all facilities. d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court. The government usually observed these requirements. Authorities may detain individuals in the state security prison for indefinite periods under the Protection of Society Law and the Combating Terrorism Law. The government limited detention to two months for all DDC detainees, except those facing additional financial criminal charges. The processing time for deportations ranged from two days to 10 months. There were reports that authorities delayed deportations in cases where detainees had to resolve financial delinquencies before they departed the country. The NHRC 2017 report stated that the committee investigated five cases of citizens and expatriates arrested arbitrarily by security forces and submitted recommendations to security forces in three cases to accelerate the process of referring the detainees to the prosecution. ROLE OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY APPARATUS The national police and state security forces maintain internal security. State security forces address internal threats such as terrorism, political disputes, cyberattacks, or espionage while the national police are the regular law enforcement body. The army is responsible for external security. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over police under the Ministry of Interior, state security forces, which report directly to the Amir, and military forces under the Ministry of Defense. The government employed effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. There were isolated reports of police aggressively turning away, through threats of physical force, foreign domestic workers seeking assistance with claims against their employers. ARREST PROCEDURES AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES Criminal law requires that persons be apprehended with warrants based on sufficient evidence and issued by an authorized official, be charged within 24 hours, and be brought before a court without undue delay. The law provides procedures that permit detention without charge for as long as 15 days, renewable for up to six months. The law permits an additional six months’ detention without charge with the approval of the prime minister, who may extend the detention indefinitely in cases of threats to national security. The law allows the Ministry of Interior to detain persons suspected of crimes related to national security, honor, or impudence; in these cases, persons detained are generally released within 24 hours or brought before a court within three days of detention. Decisions under this law are subject to appeal to the prime minister only. A provision of this law permits the prime minister to adjudicate complaints involving such detentions. The law permits a second six-month period of detention with approval from the criminal court, which may extend a detention indefinitely with review every six months. The state security service may arrest and detain suspects for up to 30 days without referring them to the public prosecutor. In most cases a judge may order a suspect released, remanded to custody to await trial, held in pretrial detention pending investigation, or released on bail. Although suspects are entitled to bail (except in cases of violent crimes), bail was infrequent. Authorities were more likely to grant bail to citizens than to noncitizens. Noncitizens charged with minor crimes may be released to their employer (or a family member for minors), although they may not leave the country until the case is resolved. By law in nonsecurity-related cases, the accused is entitled to legal representation throughout the process and prompt access to family members. There are provisions for government-funded legal counsel for indigent prisoners in criminal cases, and authorities generally honored this requirement. There were no new reported cases invoking either the Protection of Society Law or the Combating Terrorism Law. By law all suspects except those detained under the Protection of Society Law or the Combating Terrorism Law must be presented before the public prosecutor within 24 hours of arrest. If the public prosecutor finds sufficient evidence for further investigation, authorities may detain a suspect for up to 15 days with the approval of a judge, renewable for similar periods not to exceed 45 days, before charges must be filed in the courts. Judges may also extend pretrial detention for one month, renewable for one-month periods not to exceed half of the maximum punishment for the accused crime. Authorities typically followed these procedures differently for citizens than for noncitizens. The NHRC called on the government to amend the Criminal Procedures Code to set a maximum period for preventive detention, as the law does not specify a time limit for pretrial detention. Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the Amir, based on recommended selections from the Supreme Judicial Council, appoints all judges, who retain their positions at his discretion. Foreign detainees had access to the legal system, although some complained of opaque legal procedures and complications mostly stemming from language barriers. Foreign nationals did not uniformly receive translations of legal proceedings, although interpretation was generally provided within courtrooms. Worker Dispute Settlement Committees were established in March to increase the efficiency and speed of decision making in the overloaded labor courts and included court translators who were present throughout all hearings. Some employers filed successful deportation requests against employees who had pending lawsuits against them, thus denying those employees the right to a fair trial. TRIAL PROCEDURES The law provides for the right to a fair public trial for all residents, and the judiciary generally enforced this right. The law provides defendants the presumption of innocence, and authorities generally inform defendants promptly of the charges brought against them, except for suspects held under the Protection of Society Law and Combating Terrorism Law. The defendant may be present at his or her trial. Defendants are entitled to choose their legal representation or accept it at public expense throughout the pretrial and trial process. In matters involving family law, Shia and Sunni judges may apply their interpretations of sharia for their religious groups. The law approves implementing the Shiite interpretation of sharia upon the agreement and request of the parties involved in the dispute. In family law matters, a woman’s testimony is deemed half that of a man’s. Defendants usually have free interpretation as necessary from the moment charged through all appeals, while court documents are provided only in Arabic. Defendants have access to government-held evidence, have the right to confront prosecution or plaintiff witnesses and present one’s own witnesses and evidence, and have the opportunity to give a statement at the end of their trial. Defendants have the right to appeal a decision within 15 days; use of the appellate process was common. The Court of Cassation requires a fee to initiate the appeals process. In some cases, courts waived fees if an appellant demonstrated financial hardship. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES There were no substantiated reports of political prisoners or detainees. CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES Civil remedies are available for those seeking damages for, or cessation of, human rights violations, but there were no cases reported during the year. The law specifies circumstances that necessitate a judge’s removal from a case for conflict of interest, and authorities generally observed these laws. Individuals and organizations may not appeal adverse domestic decisions to regional human rights bodies. The constitution and the criminal procedures code prohibit such actions, and the government generally respected these prohibitions. Police and security forces, however, reportedly monitored telephone calls, emails, and social media posts. Citizens must obtain government permission to marry foreigners, which is sometimes not granted for female citizens. Male citizens may apply for residency permits and citizenship for their foreign wives, but female citizens may apply only for residency for their foreign husbands and children, not citizenship.