Transparency of the Regulatory System

Angola’s regulatory system is complex, vague, and inconsistently enforced. In many sectors, no effective regulatory system exists due to a lack of institutional and human capacity. The banking system is slowly adhering to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Public sector companies (SOEs) are still far from practicing IFRS. The public does not participate in draft bills or regulations formulation, nor does a public online location exist where the public can access this information for comment or hold government representatives accountable for their actions. The Angolan Communications Institute (INACOM) sets prices for telecommunications services and is the regulatory authority for the telecommunications sector. Revised energy-sector licensing regulations have permitted some purchase power agreements (PPA) participation.

Overall, Angola’s national regulatory system does not correlate to other international regulatory systems. However, Angola is a member of the WB, ADB AfDB, OPEC (January 2007), the United Nations (UN) and most of its specialized agencies – International Conference on Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), UNCTAD, the IMF, the World Health Organization (WHO), the WTO, and has a partnership agreement with the EU. At the regional level, the GRA is part of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), and the SADC, among other organizations. Angola has yet to join the SADC Free Trade Zone of Africa as a full member. On March 21, 2018 together with 44 African countries, Angola joined the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), an agreement aimed at paving the way for a liberalized market for goods and services across Africa. Angola is also a member of the Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA), which seeks to maintain relations with other port authorities or associations, regional and international organizations and governments of the region to hold discussions on matters of common interest.

Angola became a member of the WTO on November 23,1996. However, it is not party to the Plurilateral Agreements on Government Procurement, the Trade in Civil Aircraft Agreement and has not yet notified the WTO of its state-trading enterprises within the meaning of Article XVII of the GATT. A government procurement management framework introduced in late 2010 stipulates a preference for goods produced in Angola and/or services provided by Angolan or Angola-based suppliers. TBT regimes are not coordinated. There have been no investment policy reviews for Angola from either the OECD or UNCTAD in the last four years. Angola conducts several bilateral negotiations with Portuguese Speaking countries (PALOPS), Cuba and Russia and extends trade preferences to China due to credit facilitation terms, while attempting to encourage and protect local content.

Regulation reviews are based on scientific or data driven assessments or baseline surveys. Evaluation is based on data. However, evaluation is not made available for public comment.

The National Assembly is Angola’s main legislative body with the power to approve laws on all matters (except those reserved by the constitution to the government) by simple majority (except if otherwise provided in the constitution). Each legislature comprises four legislative sessions of twelve months starting on October 15 annually. National Assembly members, parliamentary groups, and the government hold the power to put forward all draft-legislation. However, no single entity can present draft laws that involve an increase in the expenditure or decrease in the State revenue established in the annual budget.

The president promulgates laws approved by the assembly and signs government decrees for enforcement. The state reserves the right to have the final say in all regulatory matters and relies on sectorial regulatory bodies for supervision of institutional regulatory matters concerning investment. The Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers oversees investment regulations that affect the country’s economy including the ministries in charge. Other major regulatory bodies responsible for getting deals through include:

• The National Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANPG): The government regulatory and oversight body responsible for regulating oil exploration and production activities. On February 6, 2019, the parastatal oil company Sonangol launched the National Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANPG) through the Presidential decree 49/19 of February 6. The ANPG is the new national concessionaire of hydrocarbons in Angola, authorized to conduct, execute and ensure oil, gas and biofuel operations run smoothly, a role previously held by Sonangol. The ANPG must also ensure adherence to international standards and establish relationships with other international agencies and sector relevant organizations.

• The Regulatory Institute of Electricity and Water Services (IRSEA): The regulatory authority for renewable energies and enforcing powers of the electricity regulatory authority.

• The Angolan Communications Institute (INACOM): The institute sets prices for telecommunications services and is the regulatory authority for the telecommunications sector. Revised energy-sector licensing regulations have improved legal protection for investors to attract more private investment in electrical infrastructure, such as dams and hydro distribution stations.

• As of October 1, 2019, a 14 percent VAT regime came into force, replacing the existing 10 percent Consumption Tax. The General Tax Administration (AGT) is the office that oversees tax operations and ensures taxpayer compliance. The new VAT tax regime aims to boost domestic production and consumption, and reduce the incidence of compound tax created for businesses unable to recover consumption tax incurred. VAT may be reclaimed on purchases and imports made by taxpayers, making it neutral for business.

Angola acceded to the New York Arbitration Convention on August 24, 2016 paving the way for effective recognition and enforcement in Angola of awards rendered outside of Angola and subject to reciprocity. Angola participates in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which includes a peer review mechanism on good governance and transparency. Enforcement and protection of investors is under development in terms of regulatory, supervisory, and sanctioning powers. Investor protector mechanisms are weak or almost non-existent.

There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations, and the government does not allow the public to engage in the formulation of legislation or to comment on draft bills. Procurement laws and regulations are unclear, little publicized, and not consistently enforced. Oversight mechanisms are weak, and no audits are required or performed to ensure internal controls are in place or administrative procedures are followed. Inefficient bureaucracy and possible corruption frequently lead to payment delays for goods delivered, resulting in an increase in the price the government must pay.

No regulatory reform enforcement mechanisms have been implemented since the last ICS report, in particular those relevant to foreign investors. The Diário da República (the Federal Register equivalent), is a legal document where key regulatory actions are officially published.

International Regulatory Considerations

Angola’s overall national regulatory system does not correlate to other international regulatory systems and is overseen by its constitution. Angola is not a full member of the International Standards Organization (ISO), but has been a corresponding member since 2002. The Angolan Institute for Standardization and Quality (IANORQ) within the Ministry of Industry & Commerce coordinates the country’s establishment and implementation of standards. Angola is an affiliate country of the International Electro-technical Commission that publishes consensus-based International Standards and manages conformity assessment systems for electric and electronic products, systems and services.

A government procurement management framework introduced in late 2010 stipulates a preference for goods produced in Angola and/or services provided by Angolan or Angola-based suppliers. Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) regimes are not coordinated. Angola acceded to the Kyoto Convention on February 23, 2017.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Angola’s formal legal system is primarily based on the Portuguese legal system and can be considered civil law based, with legislation as the primary source of law. Courts base their judgments on legislation and there is no binding precedent as understood in common law systems. The constitution proclaims the constitution as the supreme law of Angola (article 6(1) and all laws and conduct are valid only if they conform to the constitution (article 6(3).

The Angolan justice system is slow, arduous, and often partial. Legal fees are high, and most businesses avoid taking commercial disputes to court in the country. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 survey ranks Angola 186 out of 190 countries on contract enforcement, and estimates that commercial contract enforcement, measured by time elapsed between filing a complaint and receiving restitution, takes an average of 1,296 days, at an average cost of 44.4 percent of the claim.

Angola has commercial legislation that governs all commercial activities but no specialized court. In 2008, the Angolan attorney general ruled that Angola’s specialized tax courts were unconstitutional. The ruling effectively left businesses with no legal recourse to dispute taxes levied by the Ministry of Finance, as the general courts consistently rule that they have no authority to hear tax dispute cases, and refer all cases back to the Ministry of Finance for resolution. Angola’s Law 22/14, of December 5, 2014, which approved the Tax Procedure Code (TPC), sets forth in its Article 5 that the courts with tax and customs jurisdiction are the Tax and Customs Sections of the Provincial Courts and the Civil, Administrative, Tax and Customs Chamber of the Supreme Court. Article 5.3 of the law specifically states that tax cases pending with other courts must be sent to the Tax and Customs Section of the relevant court, except if the discovery phase (i.e., the production of proof) has already begun.

The judicial system is administered by the Ministry of Justice at trial level for provincial and municipal courts and the supreme court nominates provincial court judges. In 1991, the constitution was amended to guarantee judicial independence. However, as per the 2010 constitution, the president appoints supreme court judges for life upon recommendation of an association of magistrates and appoints the attorney general. Confirmation by the General Assembly is not required. The system lacks resources and independence to play an effective role and the legal framework is obsolete, with much of the criminal and commercial code reflecting colonial era codes with some Marxist era modifications. Courts remain wholly dependent on political power.

There is a general right of appeal to the court of first instance against decisions from the primary courts. To enforce judgments/orders, a party must commence further proceedings called executive proceedings with the civil court. The main methods of enforcing judgments are:

• Execution orders (to pay a sum of money by selling the debtor’s assets);
• Delivery up of assets; and,
• Provision of information on the whereabouts of assets.

The Civil Procedure Code also provides ordinary and extraordinary appeals. Ordinary appeals consist of first appeals, review appeals, interlocutory appeals, and full court appeals, while extraordinary appeals consist of further appeals and third-party interventions. Generally, an appeal does not operate as a stay of the decision of the lower court unless expressly provided for as much in the Civil Procedure Code.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

AIPEX is the investment and export promotion center tasked with promoting Angola’s export potential, legal framework, environment, and investment opportunities in the country and abroad. Housed within the Ministry of Industry & Commerce, AIPEX is also responsible for ensuring the application of the 2018 NPIL on foreign direct investments, entered into force on June 26, 2018.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

On May 17, 2018 Angola’s National Assembly approved the nation’s first anti-trust law. The law set up the creation of the Competition Regulatory Authority, which prevents and cracks down on actions of economic agents that fail to comply with the rules and principles of competition. The Competition Regulatory Authority of Angola (Autoridade Reguladora da Concorrência – ARC) was created by Presidential Decree no. 313/18, of December 21, 2018, and it succeeds the now defunct Instituto da Concorrência e Preços. It has administrative, financial, patrimonial and regulatory autonomy, and is endowed with broad supervisory and sanctioning powers, including the power to summon and question persons, request documents, carry out searches and seizures, and seal business premises.

The ARC is responsible, in particular, for the enforcement of the new Competition Act of Angola, approved by Law no. 5/18, of May 10, 2018 and subsequently implemented by Presidential Decree no. 240/18, of October 12. The Act has a wide scope of application, pertaining to both private and state-owned undertakings, and covers all economic activities with a nexus to Angola. The Competition Act prohibits agreements and anti-competitive practices, both between competitors (“horizontal” practices, the most serious example of which are cartels), as well as between companies and its suppliers or customers, within the context of “vertical” relations.

Equally prohibited is abusive conduct practiced by companies in a dominant position, such as the refusal to provide access to essential infrastructures, the unjustified rupture of commercial relations and the practice of predatory prices, as well as the abusive exploitation, by one or more companies, of economically-dependent suppliers or clients. Prohibited practices are punishable by heavy fines that range from one-ten percent of the annual turnover of the companies involved. Offending companies that collaborate with the ARC, by revealing conduct until then unknown or producing evidence on a voluntary basis, may benefit from significant fine reductions, under a leniency program yet to be developed and implemented by the ARC. Considering the ample powers and potentially heavy sanctions at the disposal of the ARC, companies present in (or planning to enter) Angola are well advised to consider carefully the impact of the new law on their activities, in order to mitigate any risk that its market conduct may be found contrary to the Competition Act.

Expropriation and Compensation

Under the Land Tenure Act of November 9, 2004 and the General Regulation on the Concession of Land (Decree no 58/07 of July 13, 2007), all land belongs to the state and the state reserves the right to expropriate land from any settlers. The state is only allowed to transfer ownership of urban real estate to Angolan nationals, and may not grant ownership over rural land to any private entity (regardless of nationality), corporate entities or foreign entities. The state may allow for land usage through a 60-year lease to either Angolan or foreign persons (individuals or corporate), after which the state reserves legal right to take over ownership.

Expropriation without compensation remains a common practice. Land tenure became a more significant issue following independence from Portugal when over 50 percent of the population moved to urban centers during the civil war. The state offered some areas for development within a specific timeframe. After this timeframe, areas that remained underdeveloped reverted to the state with no compensation to any claimants. In most cases, claimants allege unfair treatment and little or no compensation.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Angola is not a member state to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention), but has ratified the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Its ratification was endorsed domestically via resolution No. 38/2016, published in the Official Gazette of Angola on August 12, 2016.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The Angolan Arbitration Law (Law 16/2003 of July 25) (Voluntary Arbitration Law — VAL) provides for domestic and international arbitration. Substantially inspired by Portuguese 1986 arbitration law, it cannot be said to strictly follow the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. In contrast, the VAL contains no provisions on definitions, rules on interpretation, adopts the disposable rights criterion in regards to arbitration, does not address preliminary decisions, nor distinguish between different types of awards, and permits appeal on the merits in domestic arbitrations, unless the parties have otherwise agreed.

Angola is also a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which can provide dispute settlement assistance as part of its political risk insurance products and eligibility for preferential trade benefits under the African Growth Opportunity Act. The United States and Angola have signed a TIFA, which seeks to promote greater trade and investment between the two nations. The U.S. Embassy is aware of one ongoing formal investment dispute involving an American company.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Although not widely implemented, the Government of Angola and public sector companies recognize the use of arbitration to settle disputes with foreign arbitration awards issued in foreign courts. In 2016, Angola took a major step in international arbitration by signing the New York Convention on recognition of foreign arbitration awards. On March 6, 2017, the Government of Angola deposited its instrument of accession to the Convention with the UN Secretary General. The Convention entered into force on June 4, 2017.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Angola is ranks 168 out of 190 on the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report on resolving insolvency. Banks are bound to comply with prudential rules aimed at ensuring that they maintain a minimum amount of funds not less than the minimal stock capital at all times to ensure adequate levels of liquidity and solvability. Insolvency is regulated by the Law on Financial Institutions No. 12/2015 of June 17, 2015. Based on this law, the BNA increased the social capital requirement for banks operating in the country by 200 percent (BNA notice 2/2015) to guard against possible damages to clients and the financial system. All monetary deposits up to 12.5 million Kwanzas (USD 27,000 equivalent) are also to be deposited into the BNA’s Deposit Guarantee Funds account (Presidential Decree 195/18 of 2018) so that clients (both local and foreign) are guaranteed a refund in case of bankruptcy by their respective bank. Article 69 of the law expressly states that it is the responsibility of the president of the Republic to create the fund, but it is silent on the rules governing its operation or the amounts guaranteed by the fund.

In 2018, based on Notice 2/2018 on the “Adequacy of Minimum Capital Stock and Regulatory Own Funds of Financial Banking Institutions,” commercial banks were required to increase their operating capital from 2.5 billion to 7.5 billion kwanzas (USD 35 million) by the end of the year. In late 2019, following results from an Asset Quality Review, the government announced plan to recapitalize the largest state-owned bank, Banco de Poupanco e Credito (BPC). The injection of capital will constitute the third capital injection into BPC by the state since 2015, which has previously received close to USD2 billion of state funds to help restructure the bank.  In early 2019, the BNA revoked the operating licenses of two private banks, Banco Mais and Banco Postal, due to their inability to recapitalize to meet new mandatory operating capital requirements. A third bank, Banco Angolano e Comércio de Negócios (BANC), was also put under administration due to its poor governance and a failure to also raise the mandatory operating capital to meet new minimum requirements.

In 2015, following the 2014 collapse of Banco Espirito Santo Angola (BESA), the subsidiary of Portugal’s Banco Espírito Santo, the State intervened and restructured BESA which now operates as Banco Economico. In August 2019, the BNA ordered Banco Economico’s shareholders to increase the bank’s capital to comply with the new BNA-imposed capital requirements no later than June 2020. While Angola’s arbitration law (Arbitration Law No. 16/03) for insolvency adopted in 2013 introduced the concept of domestic and international arbitration, the practice of arbitration law is still not widely implemented.

The law criminalizes bankruptcy under the following classification: condemnation in Angola or abroad for crimes of fraudulent bankruptcy, i.e. involvement of shareholders or managers in fraudulent activities that result in the bankruptcy, negligence bankruptcy, forgery, robbery, or involvement in other crimes of an economic nature. The Ministry of Finance, the BNA and the Capital Markets Commission (CMC) oversee credit monitoring and regulation.

Investment Incentives

The NPIL seeks to award incentives to attract and retain investment. Investment incentives in the NPIL include:

• Eliminates the minimum investment value and the value required to qualify for incentives in foreign and local investments, previously set at USD 1,000,000 and USD 500,000 respectively. There is no more limit to invest and qualify for incentives;
• Eliminates the obligation for foreign investors to establish a partnership with an Angolan entity with at least a 35 percent stake in the capital structure of investments in the electricity and water, tourism, transport and logistics, construction, media, telecommunications and IT sectors. Under the new law, investors will decide on their capital structure and origin.
• Grants foreign investors “the right and guarantee to transfer abroad” dividends or distributed profits, the proceeds of the liquidation of its investments, capital gains, the proceeds of indemnities and royalties, or other income from remuneration of indirect investments related to technology transfer after proof of implementation of the project and payment of all tax dues.

Investment incentives are granted by the AIPEX, the State’s investment agency, as opposed to by the president, as mandated in the 2015 investment law. Companies need to apply for such incentives when submitting an investment application to the newly created AIPEX and the relevant ministry. The NPIL restructures the country into three economic development zones (zones A through C) determined by political and socio-economic factors, up from two as per the 2015 investment law. For Zone A, investors have a 3-year moratorium on taxes reduced between 25- 50 percent of the tax levied on the distribution of profits and dividends. For Zone B, it is between three to six years with a 50 to 60 percent tax reduction, and for Zone C between six to eight years with a tax reduction between 60-70 percent of the tax levied on distribution of profits and dividends.

1. The State guarantees “non-public interference in the management of private companies” and “non-cancellation of licenses without administrative or judicial processes.”
2. The State provides a new and simplified procedure for the approval of investment projects, along with the adoption of measures aimed at accelerating the contractual process. It also provides special rights projects (undefined), including easier access to visas for investors and priority in the repatriation of dividends, and capital.

Note: Angola is a signatory to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) applicable to foreign investment.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Angola is a signatory to SADC but not a member of the SADC Free Trade Zone. Angola is analyzing and revising its tariff schedule to accommodate beneficial adjustments in regional trade under the SADC Free Trade Area (SFTA).

Under the NPIL, Angola is divided into three economic zones, zone A through C. Zone A offers a three-year tax exemption for capital tax and a reduction in the tax burden by 25-50 percent; Zone B a three to six-year tax exemption for capital tax with a reduction in the tax burden by 50-60 percent; and, for Zone C, an eight year tax exemption for capital tax with a with a 60-70 percent reduction in the tax burden.

Porto Caio is under construction in the province of Cabinda. The port is designated as a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) and is slated to provide numerous opportunities for warehousing, distribution, storage, lay down area and development of oil and gas related activity. The Port will also serve as a new major gateway to international markets from the west coast of Angola, and the development will facilitate exports and render them more cost-effective for companies.

Although the government has not yet established regional or international free trade zones, on March 21, 2018 the government signed an agreement to join the AfCFTA. The AfCFTA is the result of the African Free Trade Agreement among all 55 members of the African Union, and will be the largest FTZ in the world since the emergence of the WTO. The agreement’s implementation could create a market of 1.2 billion consumers. The UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) has estimated a 52 percent increase in intra-African trade by 2022. Currently, intra-African trade is only 16 percent, with intra-Latin American at 19 percent, intra-Asian at 51 percent, and intra-European at 70 percent.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Angola widely observes a policy to restrict the number of foreign workers and the duration of their employment. The policy aims to promote local workforce recruitment and progression. Decree 6/01, of 2001 establishes that expatriate workers can only be recruited if the Labor Inspectorate gets confirmation from the employer that no Angolan personnel duly qualified to perform the job required is available in the local market. The same decree limits foreign employment to 36 months and temporary employment less than 90 days on the explicit authorization of the Labor Inspectorate. Employers must register an employment contract entered into with a foreign national within 30 days at the employment center. The registration includes submission of a copy of the job description approved by the Labor Inspectorate during registration of the employment contract and the payment of a registration fee of 5 percent of the gross salary plus all the benefits.

Companies must deregister upon termination of the contract. Deregistration equally applies to administration personnel and to the board of directors. Foreign employees require work permits, and no employment is authorized on tourist visas. The visa application procedure, though improved, remains complex, slow and inconsistent. Processes and requirements vary according to the labor market situation at the time of application, the type of work permit being applied for, the nationality of the applicant, the country of application, and personal circumstances of the assignee and any family dependents.

Through the NPIL Angola created the investor visa, granted by the immigration authority to foreign investors, representatives, or attorneys of an investing company, to carry out an approved investment proposal. It allows for multiple entries, and a stay of two years renewable for the same period. The NPIL liberalizes foreign investment, few instances translate to “forced localization,” and enforcement procedures for performance requirements are strictly observed in the labor, immigration, and petroleum sectors only. International oil companies are working with the government on a new local-content initiative that will establish more explicit sourcing requirements for the petroleum sector in staffing and material. Specific to the oil sector, because of the significance it represents to the Angolan economy, the Petroleum Activities Law requires Sonangol and its associates to acquire materials, equipment, machinery, and consumer goods produced in Angola.

Currently, local content regulations offer only guidelines that are loosely enforced, and companies lack clarity as to how much is enough to satisfy the Angolan government. While this situation may make it easier for foreign companies to comply with local content regulations, this lack of specificity challenges companies in their business planning. For example, it is difficult for companies to compare their competitive position against each other when competing for lucrative concessions and licenses from the government, as local content is sometimes considered during competition for government tenders. Legal guidance to get the guarantees for investors under the NPIL is strongly encouraged.

Data storage is not applicable; however, the Institute for Communications of Angola (INACOM) oversees and regulates data in liaison with the Ministry of Telecommunications. Regulations around data management including encryption are still at nascent stages.

Real Property

Transparency and land property rights are critical for Angolan economic development, given that two thirds of Angolans work in agriculture and are directly dependent on land property rights. However, the Land Act (Lei de Terras de Angola) has not been revised since its approval in December 2004. While the land act is a crucial step toward addressing issues of land tenure, normalization of land ownership in Angola persists with problems such as difficulties in completing land claims, land grabbing, lack of reliable government records, and unresolved status of traditional land tenure. Among other provisions, the law included a formal mechanism for transforming traditional land property rights into legal land property rights (clean titles). During the civil war, a transparent system of land property rights did not exist, so it was crucial to re-establish one shortly after the end of hostilities in 2002.

According to the “Land Act,” the State may transfer or constitute, for the benefit of Angolan natural or legal persons, a multiplicity of land rights on land forming part of its private domain. Although, it is possible to transfer ownership over some categories of land, the transfer of State land almost never implies the transfer of its ownership, but only the formation of minor land rights with leasehold being the most common form in Angola. The recipient of private property rights from the State can only transfer those rights with consent of the local authority and after a period of five years of effective use of the land (GRA 2004 law). Weak land tenure legislation and lack of secure legal guarantees (clean titles), are the reasons given by most commercial banks for their greater than 80 percent refusal rate for loans since land is used as collateral. Foreign real-estate developers therefore seek out public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements with State actors who can provide protection against land disputes and financial risks involved in projects that require significant cash outlays to get started.

Registering parcels of land over 10,000 hectares must be approved by the Council of Ministers. Registering property takes 190 days on average, ranking 167 out of 173 according to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 survey, with fees averaging three percent of property value. Owners must also wait five years after purchasing before reselling land. There are no written regulations setting out guidelines defining different forms of land occupation, including commercial use, traditional communal use, leasing, and private use. Over the years, the government has given out large parcels of land to individuals in order to support the development of commercial agriculture. However, this process has largely been unsystematic and does not follow any formal rule change on land tenure by the State.

Before obtaining proof of title nationwide, an Angolan citizen or an Angolan legal entity must also obtain the Real or Leasing Rights (“Usufruct”) of the Land from the Instituto de Planeamento e Gestão Urbana de Luanda, an often a time-consuming procedure that can take up to a year or more. However, in the case that a company already owns the land, it must secure a land property title deed from the Real Estate Registry in Luanda. An updated property certificate (“certidão predial”) is obtained from the relevant Real Estate Registry, with the complete description of the property including owner(s) information and any charges, liens, and/or encumbrances pending on the property. The complex administration of property laws and regulations that govern land ownership and transfer of real property as well as its tedious registration process may reduce investor appetite for real estate investments in Angola. Despacho no. 174/11 of March 11, 2011 mandates the total fees for the “certidão predial” include stamp duty (calculated according to the Law on Stamp Duty); justice fees (calculated according to the Law on Justice Fees); fees to justice officers (according to the set contributions for the Justice budget); and, notary and other fees. The total fee is also dependent on the current value of the fiscal unit (UCF).

Intellectual Property Rights

Angolan law recognizes the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). Angola’s National Assembly adopted the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Intellectual Property in August 2005, incorporating the 1979 text, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty concluded in 1970 and later amended in 1979 and 1984. The Ministry of Industry administers IPR for trademarks, patents, and designs under Industrial Property Law 3/92. The Ministry of Culture regulates authorship, literary, and artistic rights under Copyright Law 4/90. Angola is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and follows international patent classifications of patents, products, and services to identify and codify requests for patents and trademark registration.

IAPI (Instituto Angolano de Propriedade Intelectual) is the governmental body within the Ministry of Industry & Commerce charged with implementing patent and trademark law. The Ministry of Culture, Tourism & Environment oversees copyright law. IP infringement is widespread, most notably in the production and distribution of pirated CDs, DVDs, and other media, largely for personal consumption. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals are another major area of concern.

There are currently no statistics available regarding counterfeit goods seized by the Angolan government. INADEC (Instituto Nacional de Defesa dos Consumidores), under the umbrella of the Ministry of Industry & Commerce, tracks and monitors the Angolan government’s seizures of counterfeit goods. They do not currently have a website, nor do they regularly publish statistics. They publish information on seizures of counterfeit products on an ad-hoc basis, primarily in the government-owned daily, Jornal de Angola.

Angola is not included in the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List.

For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ . The U.S. Embassy point of contact for IPR related issues is Mballe Nkembe (NkembeMM@state.gov). For legal counsel, refer to Angola’s Country Commercial Guide Local Professional Services List (http://export.gov/ccg/angola090710.asp )

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Angola’s capital markets remain nascent. To respond to the need for increased sources of financing for the economy, in 2013, the Angolan government created the Capital Markets Commission (CMC). Angola’s banks are likely the most established businesses that could potentially list on an exchange. However, many Angolan banks have a high rate of non-performing loans, reported to be as high as 37 percent. Angola’s banks have struggled in recent years due to the country’s deteriorating economic environment and increasingly high rate of delinquent loans. The Governor of the BNA has stated that Angola’s banks must go through a consolidation phase and ordered an asset quality review of the banks in early 2019. So far, the BNA has revoked the licenses of three banks based on their failure to meet the mandatory new share-capital minimum requirement, will recapitalize the largest state-owned bank, and has ordered another bank’s shareholders to increase the bank’s operating capital or face potential revocation. The process may limit banks’ ability in the near-term to list on the country’s fledgling stock exchange.

The Angolan government raised USD 3 billion in its third Eurobond issue in international markets with investor demand reportedly reaching USD 8.44 billion, exceeding the government’s expectations. For its second Eurobond issue in May 2018, Angola sold a USD 1.75bn, ten year bond at a coupon interest rate of 8.25 percent and a 30 year bond worth USD 1.25bn with a yield of 9.375 percent. According to Angola’s finance ministry, the second Eurobond issuance received more than 500 investor submissions totaling USD 9 billion, three times the final sale value. In November 2015, Angola raised a USD 1.5 billion, 10-year Eurobond with a 9.5 percent yield. Plans to return to the internal bond market in 2020 have been put on hold due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and the ensuing downturn in global oil prices.

The BNA has developed a market for short-term bonds, called Titulos do Banco Central, and long-term bonds, called Obrigaçoes do Tesouro. Most of these bonds are bought and held by local Angolan banks. The Obrigaçoes have maturities ranging from one to 7.5 years, whereas the Titulos have maturities of 91 to 182 days. For information on current rates, see: http://www.bna.ao/ .

Foreign investors do not normally access credit locally. For Angolan investors, credit access is very limited, and if available, comes with a collateral requirement of 125 percent, so they either self-finance, or seek financing from non-Angolan banks and investment funds. The termination of the “Angola Invest” government-subsidized funding program for micro, small and medium private enterprises (SMEs) on September 25, 2018, has further reduced funding opportunities for many SMEs. Since its inception in 2012, Angola Invest financed approximately 515 projects worth USD 377 million.

The Angolan National Development Plan provides for the liquidation of unviable state-owned enterprises, the privatization of non-strategic state enterprises and the sale of shareholding by 2022. In January 2018, the president created a commission – the State Asset Management Institute (IGAPE), to prepare and implement the privatization program (PROPRIV), with assistance from the Stock Exchange BODIVA. By April 2020, the Government had reportedly sold an estimated seven entities under its privatization initiative.

Money and Banking System

The BNA, Angola’s central bank and currency regulator has remained under considerable pressure to stabilize Angola’s economy as a high rate, currently 37 percent, of non-performing loans has crippled the banks’ ability and willingness to foster private sector lending. The BNA implemented a contractionary monetary policy, reducing local currency in circulation over fears of escalating inflation and foreign currency arbitrage. To further address these concerns, in early 2018, the government also scrapped the Angolan currency’s fixed peg to the U.S. dollar in favor of greater rate flexibility, and began regular foreign exchange auctions to banks, preventing the allocation of dollars to preferred clients. From January 2018 to December 2019, the Angolan currency lost 178 percent of its purchasing capacity against the Dollar. The Net International Reserves, despite a loss of purchasing power of more than 100 percent taking into account the price of the currency, suffered a reduction of 40 percent from 2017 to June 2019. The 178 percent devaluation from 2018 has translated into an increase in Angola’s debt, now close to 111 percent of GDP.

Angola’s agreement with the IMF for USD 3.7 billion in financial support for which it has requested an additional USD 800 million, suggests the government’s intent to reassure investors, and to diversify Angola’s source of borrowing. As a key condition of the IMF loan, Angola cannot have any new oil collateralized debt. The government also resorted to international capital markets and raised USD 3 billion in its third Eurobond issue with investor demand reportedly reaching nearly USD 8.44 billion.

There are currently 27 banks in Angola. Five banks, Banco Angolano de Investimentos (BAI), Banco Economico, Banco de Fomento Angola (BFA), Banco BIC Angola (BIC), and Banco de Poupança e Credito S.A.R.L. (BPC), control over 80 percent of total banking assets, deposits, and loans. Angolan banks focus on profit generating activities including transactional banking, short-term trade financing, foreign exchange, and investments in high-interest government bonds. Banks had until the end of 2018 to comply with the newly BNA-set USD 50 million mandatory capital start-up requirement, up from the previous USD 25 million requirement. In early 2019, the BNA revoked the operating licenses of two banks, Banco Mais and Banco Postal, for failing to increase their capital to meet the new minimum requirements. Another bank, Banco Angolano de Negocios e Comercio, is currently under BNA administration.

Angola is scheduled for its next Financial Action Task Force (FATF) mutual evaluation review in 2020/2021 which may also be postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2016, the FATF adjudged that Angola had made significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime and established the requisite legal and regulatory framework to meet its commitments in its action plan regarding strategic deficiencies the identified by the FATF during reviews in 2010 and 2013. Angola has continued to work with the regional FATF body, the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), to address its remaining strategic deficiencies in anticipation of the 2020/2021 review.

Angola has been affected by the broader global de-risking trends wherein banks decide to stop lending to businesses in markets deemed too risky from an anti-money laundering and terrorist financing compliance standpoint. In December 2016, Deutsche Bank, the last international bank providing dollar-clearing services, closed its dollar clearing services in Angola. A limited number of international banks still operate in Angola and provide limited trade finance such as Germany’s Commerzbank and South Africa’s Standard Bank. In 2018, there were no further correspondent bank losses. International banks previously refrained from entering the Angolan market because of the risk of fines and other penalties, but in 2018 there was more interest, with several banks conducting independent assessments of the business climate.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

Angola continues trading mostly in two currencies, the U.S. dollar and the Euro, with the Renminbi gaining greater prominence given the degree of trade with China. In a bid to deal with the foreign currency shortage and substantial foreign currency arbitrage in the parallel market, the government has opted for a managed float for its currency exchange rate. The Angolan Kwanza was pegged at a rate of 166.00 per U.S. dollar from April 2016 to January 2018 following a steep devaluation due to the slump in oil prices. On January 10, 2018, the BNA began conducting foreign currency auctions allowing the kwanza to fluctuate within an undisclosed but controlled band. Since dropping the peg to the U.S. dollar in January 2018, the Kwanza has depreciated by approximately 178 percent as at the end of December 2019 where a USD was equivalent to 462 Kwanzas.

As of November 29, 2019, the BNA’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) authorized direct sales of foreign currency between oil companies and commercial banks, and reduced banks’ foreign exchange position limit from 5.0 percent of its own funds to 2.5 percent. The controlling exchange rate is determined by the transaction rate applied on the sale. Occasionally, the BNA may also sell forex through auctions to commercial banks. Banks may charge a margin of up to 2 percent on the reference exchange rate published on the institutional website of the BNA, considered high for investors. Currently, the BNA also publishes daily for public consumption the rates at which each individual commercial bank is selling and purchasing forex.

The informal activity in the supply of foreign currency, products, and services is still winning the daily battle against the formal market, even when taking into account availability, quantity, speed, and stability. In 2019, the BNA took steps to eliminate remaining imbalances in the foreign exchange market. Commercial banks may assign foreign currency to their clients based on a schedule submitted and approved by the BNA. On the sale by banks to exchange offices and remittance companies, banks may only make foreign currency available in physical notes on a collateral basis, as they must, and at the time of sale debit the national currency account of those institutions against delivery of physical notes. Payment of remittances in any form and non-strategic imports face a lengthy wait between 90-180 days for foreign exchange. Priority is given to strategic importers of food, raw materials for construction, agriculture, medicine and the oil sector. According to the IMF, the government accumulated USD 51 million in new arrears between end-December 2018 and end-June 2019, due to constraints associated with correspondent banks transacting in U.S. dollars. The government further accumulated about USD 30 million in new arrears between end-June and end-September 2019 and was expected to accumulate an additional USD 30 million by year-end, due to the same correspondent banking constraints.

Investors cannot freely convert their earnings in kwanza to any foreign exchange rate due to limited available foreign exchange. Credit cards and other options for payment are extremely limited and money-servicing businesses (Western Union & MoneyGram) have ceased foreign outward transactions in foreign currency. From June 9, 2019, Letters of credit have been designated as the preferential payment instrument for imports.

The National Bank of Angola (BNA) Notice no. 15/19, published 30 December 2019, defines new procedures for foreign exchange operations carried out by non-residents.

According to the notice, the new procedures apply to foreign exchange transactions related to foreign direct investment – that is, foreign exchange non-resident operations carried out, alone or cumulatively, including divestment operations – in the following ways:

• Transfer of personal funds from abroad;

• Application of cash and cash equivalents in national and foreign currency, in bank accounts opened in financial institutions domiciled in Angola, held by foreign exchange residents, susceptible to repatriation;

• Imports of machinery, equipment, accessories and other tangible fixed assets;

• Incorporation of technologies and knowledge, provided that they represent an added value to the investment and are susceptible to financial evaluation;

• Provision of supplementary capital payments or supplies to partners or shareholders;

• Application, in the national territory, of funds in the scope of reinvestment;

• Conversion of credits resulting from the execution of contracts for the supply of machinery, equipment and goods, as long as they are proven to be liable to payments abroad; and,

• Foreign investment in securities or divestment of such assets, covering: i) shares; ii) obligations; iii) units of participation in collective investment undertakings and other documents representing homogeneous legal situations.

These procedures also apply to foreign exchange transactions related to foreign investment projects that have been registered with the BNA prior to 30 December 2019. However, they do not apply to investments made by non-foreign exchange residents in the oil sector, which will continue to be governed by proper legislation.

The following obligations are applicable to non-resident foreign exchange entities that intend to invest in Angola, within the scope of the new procedures:

• They must be holders of foreign exchange non-resident accounts, opened with a banking financial institution domiciled in Angola,

• For the purpose of receiving payments, including for the purchase of shares listed on the stock exchange, foreign currency must be sold to the investment banking intermediary financial institution, except in the case of purchase of securities denominated in foreign currency traded on a regulated market in Angola;

• Transfer income related to a foreign direct investment is only allowed after the project has been completed and after payment of the taxes due.

The non-resident foreign exchange investor is allowed to maintain in national currency values relating to income, reimbursement of supplies or proceeds from the sale of investments to make new investments or convert to foreign currency at a future date.

Finally, the following obligations are now imposed on financial institutions that carry out transactions with non-resident foreign exchange entities:

• Report to BNA the transfer of securities to and from abroad related to the import and export of capital and associated income, at the time of registration in the accounts of its clients who are not foreign exchange residents;

• Require full identification and knowledge of its customers, as well as confirmation of their status as non-resident foreign exchange;

• Transfer the financial resources designated for making investments to a specific sub-account created, that should be used only for that purpose;

• Ensure that movements in bank accounts held by foreign exchange non-residents, in national and foreign currency, are supported by documents that allow a clear identification of the origin or destination of the funds;

• For the purpose of assessing the legitimacy of transfers abroad of income from foreign direct investments not quoted on a stock exchange, make sure that the investment was made, through the copy of the Private Investment Registration Certificate (CRIP), among other requirements.

• For the purpose of validating the export proceeds from the sale of securities and related income, validate the source of the credit in the bank accounts of non-resident customers.

Breach of the obligations summarized above is punishable by fines of up to AOA 150 million (USD 305,000) for individuals or up to AOA 500 million (USD 1.02 million) for legal persons.

Remittance Policies

In 2019, the Angolan government amended its anti-money laundering previously established in January 2014. The new law, Law no. 5/20, applies particularly to financial and non-financial entities, accountants, lawyers, law firm partners and auditors acting (including intermediation) in representation of clients in transactions that involve real estate’s acquisition/sale, incorporation of companies and bank accounts’ opening, management or movement, in attempts to better combat illicit remittance flows. Importantly, the new law expressly prohibits the incorporation of shell banks — banks with no physical presence in Angola nor connection to any financial group, requires reporting on capital movement in any commercial bank exceeding USD 1000, and requires enhanced scrutiny of local politically exposed persons. The subsequent drop in foreign exchange availability in Angola, beginning in 2015 due to declining petroleum revenues, has severely impeded personal and legitimate business remittances.

International and domestic companies operating in Angola face delays securing foreign exchange approval for remittances to cover key operational expenses, including imported goods and expatriate salaries. The government has improved profit and dividend remittances for most companies, including foreign airlines with withheld remittances for the sector currently valued by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) at USD 4 million, down from 137 million in early 2019.

The BNA has facilitated remittances of international supplies by introducing payment by letters of credit. Also, the 2018 NPIL grants foreign investors “the right and guarantee to transfer abroad” dividends or distributed profits, the proceeds of the liquidation of their investments, capital gains, the proceeds of indemnities and royalties, or other income from remuneration of indirect investments related to technology transfer after proof of implementation of the project and payment of all taxes due. The government continues to prioritize foreign exchange for essential goods and services including the food, health, defense, and petroleum industries.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

In October 2012, former President Eduardo dos Santos established a petroleum-funded USD 5 billion sovereign wealth fund called the Fundo Soberano de Angola (FSDEA). The FSDEA was established in accordance with international governance standards and best practices as outlined in the Santiago Principles. In February 2015, the FSDEA was recognized as transparent by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI), receiving a score of 8 out of 10. The FSDEA has the express purpose of profit maximization with a special emphasis on investing in domestic projects that have a social component (http://www.fundosoberano.ao/investments/ ). Jose Filomeno dos Santos (Zenu), son of former President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, was appointed chairman of FSDEA in June 2013, but was removed by President Lourenco, based reportedly on poor results at the FSDEA and conspiracy with the Fund’s wealth manager, Quantum Global (QG), to embezzle FSDEA funds. Former Minister Carlos Alberto Lopes was named new head of the FSDEA. Zenu remains under investigation for money laundering, embezzlement, and fraud related to his management of the FSDEA, and is currently on trial for fraud in connection with the transfer of USD 500 million from the Angolan Central Bank to a bank in the UK. On March 22, 2019, the government freed Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais, QG’s CEO, in preventive detention since September 2018, based on the insufficiency of evidence to support the collection of malfeasance charges, while it continues to build its case against him.

Half of the initial endowment of FSDEA was invested in agriculture, mining, infrastructure, and real estate in Angola and other African markets, and the other half was supposedly allocated to cash and fixed-income instruments, global and emerging-market equities, and other alternative investments. The FSDEA is in possession of approximately USD 3.35 billion of its private equity assets previously under the control of QG, and announced that the government will use USD 1.5 billion of the fund’s assets to support social programs on condition of future repayment through increased tax on the BNA’s rolling debts.

In Angola, certain state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exercise delegated governmental powers, especially in the mining sector where the government is the sole concessionaire. Foreign investors may sometimes find demands made by SOEs excessive, and under such conditions, SOEs have easier access to credit and government contracts. There is no law mandating preferential treatment to SOEs, but in practice they have access to inside information and credit. Currently, SOEs are not subject to budgetary constraints and quite often exceed their capital limits.

SOEs, often benefitting from a government mandate, operate mostly in the extractive, transportation, commerce, banking, and construction sectors. All SOEs in Angola are required to have boards of directors, and most board members are affiliated with the government. SOEs are not explicitly required to consult with government officials before making decisions. By law, SOEs must publish annual financial reports for the previous year in the national daily newspaper Jornal de Angola by April 1. Such reports are not always subject to publicly released external audits (though the audit of state oil firm Sonangol is publicly released). The standards used are often questioned. Not all SOEs fulfill their legal obligations, and few are sanctioned.

Angola’s supreme audit institution, Tribunal de Contas, is responsible for auditing SOEs. However, the Tribunal de Contas does not make its reports publicly available. Angola’s fiscal transparency would be improved by ensuring its supreme audit institution audits SOEs, as well as the government’s annual financial accounts, and makes public its findings within a reasonable period. Publicly available audit reports would also improve the transparency of contracts between private companies and SOEs.

In November 2016, the Angolan Government revised Law 1/14 “Regime Juridico de Emissão e Gestão da Divida Publica Directa e Indirecta,” which now differentiates between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ public debt. The GRA considers SOE debt as indirect public debt, and only accounts in its state budget for direct government debt, thus effectively not reflecting some substantial obligations in fact owed by the government. President Lourenço has launched various reforms to improve financial sector transparency, enhance efficiency in the country’s SOEs as part of the National Development plan 2018-2022 and Macroeconomic Stability Plan. The strategy included the prospective privatization of 74 SOEs that are deemed not profitable to the state. The privatization will possibly include the restructuring of the national air carrier TAAG, as well as Sonangol and its subsidiaries. The latter intends to sell off its non-core businesses as part of its restructuring strategy to make the parastatal more efficient.

Angola is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Angola does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate governance for SOEs.

Privatization Program

The government has a plan to privatize 74 of 90 public companies by 2022 through the Angola Debt and Securities Exchange market (BODIVA) and under the supervision of the Institute of Management of Assets and State Participations (IGAPE). The privatization plan is in line with the provisions of the Government’s Interim Macroeconomic Stabilization Program (PEM), which aims to rid the government of unprofitable public institutions. The terms of reference for the privatization program are not yet public, except for seven factories located in the Special Economic Zone (ZEE). The seven industrial units with full terms of reference are:

UNIVITRO – glassworks industry; JUNTEX – plaster industry; CARTON – carton and packaging industry; ABSOR – absorbent products industry; INDUGIDET – sanitation and detergents industry; COBERLEN – blankets and linens industry; and, SACIANGO – cement bags industry. By April 2020, the Government had reportedly sold an estimated seven entities under its privatization initiative, mostly farms, and did not include the seven industrial units with full terms of reference.

The government plans to privatize part of state-owned Angola Telecommunications Company, companies in the oil and energy sector, as well as several textile industries. The government has stated that the privatization process will be open to interested foreign investors and has guaranteed a transparent bidding process. Proposals from investors for seven industrial units at the ZEE will be given special attention to those who decide to retain local workers in these units. The government created a privatization commission on February 27, 2018 and a website https://igape.minfin.gov.ao/PortalIGAPE/#!/sala-de-imprensa/noticias/5413/anuncio-de-concurso-tender-announcement  for submission of tenders. Full tender documents can be obtained by visiting the below link: http://www.ucm.minfin.gov.ao/cs/groups/public/documents/document/zmlu/mdu4/~edisp/minfin058842.zip 

Alternatively, contact igape@minfin.gov.ao. The tenders are open to local and foreign investors.

The government has few initiatives to promote responsible business conduct. On March 26, 2019, the UNDP launched the National Network of Corporate Social Responsibility, called “RARSE,” to promote the creation of a platform to reconcile responsible business conduct with the needs of the population. The government, through the Ministry of Education, also held a campaign under the theme, “Countries that have a good education, that enforce laws, condemn corruption, privilege and practice citizenship, have as a consequence successful social and economic development.” The government has enacted laws to prevent labor by children under 14 and forced labor, although resource limitations hinder adequate enforcement. In June 2018, the government passed a National Action Plan (2018-2022) to eradicate the worst forms of child labor (the PANETI). With limitations, the laws protect the rights to form unions, collectively bargain, and strike. Government interference in some strikes has been reported. The Ministry of Public Administration, Employment, and Social Security, has a hotline for workers who believe their rights have been infringed. Angola’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry established the Principles of Ethical Business in Angola.

The GRA does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons but is making significant efforts to do so. A National Action Plan to Combat and Prevent Trafficking in Persons in 2019 includes measures to improve the capacities of coordination agencies, investigating more potential trafficking cases, convicting more traffickers, training front-line responders, conducting some awareness-raising activities, and improving data collection on trafficking crimes through use of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regional data collection tool.

The government continues to strengthen its bilateral efforts on anti-corruption and improved governance. On July 1, 2019, the government signed a signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Security and Public Order with the United States. The MOU will enable the two governments to cooperate in the fields of information exchange related to the prevention, investigation, and combatting of criminal activity, including the collection and processing of evidence. The MOU encourages the exchange of information on criminal investigation techniques, the implementation of professional training programs, and exchange of delegations.

In 2015, Angola organized an interagency technical working group to explore Angola’s possible membership in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Angola has been a member of the Kimberley Process (KP) since 2003, and chaired the KP in 2015, until handing over the rotating chair to the United Arab Emirates.

Angola is not a party to the WTO’s GPA, and does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate for SOEs.

Corruption remains a strong impediment to doing business in Angola and has had a corrosive impact on international market investment opportunities and on the broader business climate. Transparency International’s 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Angola 165 out of 175 countries in its corruption level survey, improving two places from the previous year’s ranking due to ongoing efforts to reduce corruption.

Since coming into office on an anti-corruption platform, President Lourenco has led a concerted effort to restore investor confidence by prioritizing anti-corruption and the fight against nepotism. In December, the government froze the assets and accounts of Isabel dos Santos, the former first daughter, and subsequently indicted her on fraud-related charges for mismanaging and embezzling funds during her 18-month stint as chair of the state’s oil firm, Sonangol. Several other government officials were also sacked from office, detained and tried on corruption charges. On September 19, the Supreme Court ordered that Norberto Garcia, the former spokesman of the ruling MPLA party and former director of the defunct Technical Unit for Private Investment, a state institution, charged with fraud, money laundering and document falsification, be placed under house arrest in Luanda. The case dates back to November 2017 when Garcia and six foreigners allegedly tried to set up a state project in a USD 50 billion scam.

In another high-profile anti-corruption case, the trial of the former head of Angola’s sovereign wealth fund, José “Zénu” Filomeno dos Santos and his co-conspirator, former Central Bank Governor Valter Felipe, began on December 9. The former stands accused of embezzling USD 1.5billion of public money during his tenure at the Sovereign wealth fund (2013-2017), and both stand accused of fraud and embezzlement related to the illegal transfer of USD 500 million from the BNA coffers to a Credit Suisse account in London. Meanwhile, in August, a court sentenced former Transport Minister Augusto da Silva Tomás to 14 years in prison on fraud charges, but later reduced his sentence to eight years.

Angola has a comprehensive anti-corruption legal framework but implementation remains a severe challenge. In January, the government issued a general conduct guide mostly for the National Public Procurement Service, the regulatory and supervisory body of public procurement in Angola, outlining whistleblowing responsibilities for corruption and related offences in public procurement. Following approval in October, a new law on anti-money laundering, combating the Financing of Terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction came into force in January 2020, superseding Law No. 34/11, of 12 December 2011. The new law incorporates several IMF and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations. Importantly, it finally recognizes and includes politically exposed persons to be any national or foreign person that holds or has held a public office in Angola, or in any other country or jurisdiction, or in any international organization, and subjects them to greater scrutiny by the financial sector. Other significant improvements in the new law include:

• The definition of “ultimate beneficial owner” was expanded to encompass, notably, all persons that hold, directly or indirectly, a controlling interest in a company, including the control of the share capital, voting rights or a significant influence in the company. There is no longer a minimum threshold to determine the existence of control;

• Identification and diligence duties are now applicable to occasional transactions executed via wire transfers in an amount of more than USD 1,000, in national or foreign currency;

• The scope of the duty to communicate suspicious transactions in cash or wire transfers has been amended and is now applicable to transactions between USD 5,000 and USD 15,000, depending on the underlying operation;

• Payment-service providers that control the ordering and reception of a wire transfer must consider the information received from the sender and the beneficiary to determine whether there is a communication duty;

• The Tax Authorities now have a duty to report suspicious cross-border payments.

The president approved a set of amendments to the Public Contracts Law on November 16, 2018, which imposed further requirements for the declaration of assets and income, interests, impartiality, confidentiality, and independence in the formation and execution of public contracts.  In December 2018, the Government of Angola rolled out of a national anti-corruption strategy (NACS) billed under the motto, “Corruption – A fight for All and By All.” The five-year strategy, developed in concert with the UNDP, is designed to improve government transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to citizen needs.  The NACS focuses on three pillars in the fight against corruption – prevention, prosecution, and institutional capacity building.

Crimes linked to corruption are enforced through the Public Probity Law of 2010. President Lourenco’s mandate for senior government officials requires all public officials to disclose their assets and income once every two years, and it prohibits public servants from receiving money or gifts from private business deals. The Penal Code makes it a criminal offense for private enterprises to engage in business transactions with public officials.

Angola has incorporated regional anti-corruption guidelines and into their domestic legislation, including: the SADC “Protocol Against Corruption,” the African Union’s “Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption,” and the United Nation’s “Convention against Corruption.” Angola does not have an independent body to investigate and prosecute corruption cases, and generally, enforcement of existing laws is weak or non-existent. However, the Attorney General’s office has a department for Investigation of Corruption crimes and Recovery of Assets. Three institutions – the Audit Court, the Inspector General of Finance, and the Office of the Attorney General – perform many of the anti-corruption duties in Angola. http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/sub-saharan-africa/angola/initiatives/public-anti-corruption-initiatives.aspx 

The government also passed the Law on the Repatriation of Financial Resources in June 2018, which established the terms and conditions for the repatriation of financial resources held abroad by resident individuals and legal entities with registered offices in Angola. The law exempted individuals and legal entities, who voluntarily repatriated their financial resources within a period of 180 days following the date of entry into force of the Law, by transferring the funds to an Angolan bank account, from any obligation or liability of tax, foreign exchange and criminal nature. Upon expiry of the grace period for repatriation, the Law allowed for the possibility of coercive repatriation by the government. The government estimates that USD 30 billion of Angolan assets are sheltered overseas. In early 2019, the government established the National Asset Recovery Service (SNRA), an institution linked to the Attorney General’s Office (PGR), in charge of ensuring compliance with the repatriation law.

Private sector companies have individual internal controls for ethics, compliance and tracking fraudulent activities. However, they do not have a mechanism to detect and report irregularities related to dealings with public officials. It is important for U.S. companies, regardless of their size, to assess the business climate in the sector in which they will be operating or investing, and to have an effective compliance program or measures to prevent and detect corruption, including foreign bribery. U.S. individuals and firms operating or investing in Angola, should take the time to become familiar with the relevant anticorruption laws of both Angola and the United States in order to properly comply with them, and where appropriate, they should seek legal counsel.

Angola is not a member state to the UN Anticorruption Convention or the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery. On March 26, 2018 it ratified and published in the national gazette the African Union Convention on the Prevention and Fight against Corruption and now takes legislative measures against illicit enrichment (Article 8), confiscation and seizure of proceeds and means of corruption (Article 16), and international cooperation in matters of corruption and money laundering (Article 20).

Resources to Report Corruption

Hélder Pitta Grós
Procurador Geral da Republica (Attorney General of the Republic)
Procurador Geral da Republica (Attorney General’s Office)
Travessa Antonio Marques Monteiro 22, Maianga
Telephone: 244-222-333172

Angola maintains a politically stable environment under the motto “Together, we are stronger” politically motivated violence is not a high risk, and incidents are rare. President Joao Lourenco’s government seeks reform of the state and national cohesion. Local elections – “Autarquias” are scheduled to take place in 2020 with objectives to reduce asymmetries, dissemination of governance powers and equitable distribution of financial resources essential for economic and social development. However, the elections may be postponed due to the COVID-10 pandemic.

The last significant incident of political violence happened in 2010 during an attack against the Togolese national soccer team by FLEC-PM (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda—Military Position) in the northern province of Cabinda. FLEC threatened Chinese workers in Cabinda in 2015 and claimed in 2016 that they would return to active armed struggle against the Angolan government forces. No attacks have since ensued and the FLEC has remained relatively inactive. President Lourenco has pledged to govern for all Angolans, and combat two of the country’s major problems: corruption and mismanagement of public funds.

Russia remains Angola’s premier security cooperation partner. However, a May 2017 U.S.–Angola Defense Cooperation MOU has enabled more open mil-to-mil coordination. Our security cooperation aims to build the U.S.-Angolan military relationship, address Angolan defense priorities, and develop sustainable proficiency in areas of common interest, such as maritime safety and security, civil-military operations, humanitarian assistance, medical readiness, and English language programs.

In September 2019 UN Secretary-General António Guterres held a meeting with Lourenço during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing. During the meeting, Guterres highlighted the role of Angola in the effort to maintain peace and stability in Southern Africa and the Great Lakes region.

In October 2019, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet condemned the mass deportation of Congolese nationals, who were illegally working and residing in Angola. Angola deported thousands of Congolese nationals for allegedly exploiting diamonds and other forms of illegal trade in the northern and southern Lundas provinces.

Activist groups continuously face repression by police for online and offline activities and for using online spaces to criticize and organize protests. Social media has been a mobilizing tool for demonstrations and there are no instances of damage to property or vandalism by protestors who decry continued economic hardships, high unemployment and poverty, highlighting President Joao Lourenco’s election pledge to create jobs.

Angola engages multilaterally, through the AU, SADC, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, to address its security and economic equities with the DRC. Angola continues to struggle with its legacy of land mines and is far from reaching its goal of becoming mine impact free by 2025. Since 1995, the United States (Angola’s largest demining donor) has invested more than USD 134 million in Angola to clear and dispose of landmines and unexploded ordnance. The United States donated USD 3.1 million in demining assistance in 2019. The Angolan government also pledged in 2019 an unprecedented USD 60 million of its own money for humanitarian demining over the next five years, largely focused on a potential corridor for tourism and sustainable development in the southeast, linked to the Okavango Delta.

The Angolan labor force has limited technical skills, English language capabilities, and managerial ability. Many employers find it necessary to invest heavily in educating and training their Angolan staff. Angola’s labor force was estimated to be 13.1 million in 2019. The literacy rate is estimated to be 70 percent (82 percent male, 60.7 percent female). According to the National Statistics Institute, in 2019, the unemployment rate in the population aged 15 and above was around 31 percent, although more than 60 percent of all jobs are in the informal sector. Eighty six percent of primary school age children attend school. The law mandates that children must attend school for six years beginning at age six. 29 percent of boys and 17 percent of girls attend high school.

There are gaps in compliance with international labor standards which may pose a reputational risk to investors. Children are sometimes employed in agriculture, construction, fishing, and coal industries. Forced labor is sometimes used in agricultural, fishing, construction, domestic services, and artisanal diamond mining sectors. Additional information is available in the 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, (https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-Report.pdf [16 MB] ), 2019 Country Report on Human Rights Practices (https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/), and 2018 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, (https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/angola ).

Angola’s General Labor Law (Law No. 2/00), updated in 2015, recognizes the right of workers, except members of the armed forces and police, to form and join independent unions, to collectively bargain, and to strike, but these rights are either limited or restricted. To establish a union, a minimum of 30 percent of workers from a sector at the provincial level must participate and prior authorization by authorities with accompanying bureaucratic approvals is required. Unlike workers in the private sector, civil service employees do not have the right to collective bargaining. While the law allows unions to conduct their activities without government interference, it also places some restrictions on engaging in a strike. Strict bureaucratic procedures must be followed for a strike to be considered legal. The government can deny the right to strike or obligate workers to return to work for members of the armed forces, police, prison staff, fire fighters, “essential services” public sector employees, and oil workers. The government may intervene in labor disputes that affect national security, particularly strikes in the oil sector. The definition of civil service workers providing “essential services” is broadly defined, encompassing the transport sector, communications, waste management and treatment, and fuel distribution.

Collective labor disputes are to be settled through compulsory arbitration by the Ministry of Labor, Public Administration and Social Security. The law does not prohibit employer retribution against strikers, but it does authorize the government to force workers back to work for “breaches of worker discipline” or participation in unauthorized strikes. The law prohibits anti-union discrimination and stipulates that worker complaints be adjudicated in the labor court. Under the law, employers are required to reinstate workers who have been dismissed for union activities.

The General Labor Law also spells out procedures for hiring workers. For work contracts of indefinite duration, the law provides for a basic probationary period of up to six months, during which the worker or employer can terminate the contract without notice or justification. After the probationary period ends, dismissed workers have the right to appeal to a labor court. Many employers prefer to reach a monetary settlement with workers when a dispute arises, rather than bring cases before the labor court. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report found that fired workers with one to ten years of service received on average 13.6 weeks of salary compensation. The notice period before dismissing a worker is 4.3 weeks.

The government conducts annual surveys of the oil industry to implement a requirement that oil companies hire Angolan nationals when qualified applicants are available. If no qualified nationals apply for the position, then the companies may request the government’s permission to hire expatriates. Outside of the petroleum sector, policies to encourage “Angolanization” of the labor force, i.e. the hiring of locals, discourages bringing in expatriates. However, the associated visa processes for the oil industry are currently easier and faster due to a special process the Angolan Ministry of Petroleum offers companies in that sector. Additionally, working visas for other sectors have also become easier to obtain and the GRA has launched the investor’s visa in 2018.

On April 10, 2019, the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of Finance of the government of Angola to increase trade of goods and services between the United States and Angola. Under the MOU, EXIM and the Ministry of Finance agreed to exchange information on business opportunities to further the procurement of U.S. goods and services by both state-owned and private-sector small and medium-sized businesses in Angola. Sectors for business development include energy, oil and gas development, infrastructure, railway and road transportation, supply chain infrastructure, environmental projects, agriculture, health care, water and sanitation, and telecommunications. EXIM agreed to explore options for providing the bank’s medium- and long-term guarantees on loans of up to USD 4 billion to support U.S. exports to Angola. For projects that may be eligible for EXIM support, the cooperation between the Ministry of Finance and EXIM would be directed towards qualifying such projects for approval by both institutions.

Since 1994, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), now the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), has provided investment insurance to projects in Angola. U.S. investors can apply for DFC insurance, including coverage under the “Quick Cover” program for projects valued at less than USD 50 million. DFCC’s portfolio in Angola currently totals USD 20.4 million. Since the agreement, DFC’s support has helped facilitate critical investments in the energy, services, health care, manufacturing, and financial services sectors.

Angola is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which provides insurance to foreign investors against such risks as expropriation, non-convertibility, and war or civil disturbance. MIGA also provides investment dispute resolution on a case-by-case basis.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Bureaucratic procedures necessary to start and maintain a business tend to be open, though slow, and regulatory procedures can be cumbersome to navigate.  In 2018, Botswana launched a Regulatory Impact Assessment Strategy that will work to improve the regulatory environment and ensure legislation is necessary and cost effective, reduce administrative burdens imposed by the regulatory environment to businesses, improve transparency, consultation, and government accountability.  Foreign investor complaints generally focus on the inefficiency and/or unresponsiveness of mid- and low-level government bureaucrats.  The GoB has introduced a Performance Management System to improve the service and accountability of its employees.  Unfair business practices or conduct can be reported to the Competition Authority, which seeks to level the playing field for all business operators and foster a conducive environment for business.  Bills in Botswana, including investment laws, go through a public consultation process and are available for public comment.  Bills are also debated in Parliament, whose sessions are open to the public.

The Companies Act of 2004 requires all companies registered in Botswana to prepare annual financial statements on the basis of generally accepted accounting principles.  It further requires every public company, including non-exempt private companies, to prepare their Financial Statement in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards.

The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) oversees all government tenders. Prospective government contractors are required to register with the PPADB.  The PPADB maintains a process by which tender decisions can be challenged; bidders can also challenge a tender procedure in the courts.  The PPADB publishes its decisions concerning awarded tenders, prequalification lists, and newly registered contractors. Since 2014, PPADB has partnered with the United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) in the Global procurement Initiative, a shared commitment to utilizing best-value determination procurement practices and promoting professionalization in procurement.

PPADB successfully implemented the Integrated Procurement Management System (IPMS) to level the procurement playing field by automating contractor registration, e-bidding and other operations.  This has enabled them to introduce a Procurement Plan Platform where government entities list all their procurement plans for the year, allowing companies to plan ahead.  An e-bidding system, still being developed, will allow companies to compete for and submit tenders online.

Online services are available at: www.ppadb.co.bw/Pages/Publications.aspx#WebPartWPQ3 

The PPADB Act calls for preferential procurement of citizen-owned contractors for works, service, and supplies, as well as specific, disadvantaged women’s communities, though it states that such preferences must be time-bound, phased in and out as necessary, and consistent with the country’s external obligations and its “market-oriented, macroeconomic framework.”  When a procuring entity wishes to reserve a tender for citizen-only participation, it is required to publish a notice to that effect either in the bid document or the pre-qualification notice.

Health and safety laws, embodied in the Factories Act of 1973, provide basic protection for workers from unsafe working conditions.  Minimum working conditions required on work premises include cleanliness of the premises, adequate ventilation and sanitation, sufficient lighting, and the provision of safety precautions.  Health inspectors and the Botswana Bureau of Standards carry out periodic checks at both new and operating factories.

International Regulatory Considerations

Botswana is a member of SACU and SADC.  Neither has authority over member state national regulatory systems.  Botswana is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and notifies all draft technical regulations to the WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary system.  Botswana’s legal system is based on Roman-Dutch law as influenced by English common law. This type of system exists with legislation, judicial decisions, and local customary law.  The courts enforce commercial contracts, and the judicial system is widely regarded as being fair.  Both foreign and domestic investors have equal access to the judicial system.  Botswana does not have a dedicated commercial court.  The Industrial Court, set up by the Trade Dispute Act of 2004, primarily addresses labor matters.

The GoB is planning to create a corps of commercially specialized judges within the civil court system.  Under the new system, commercial cases will be overseen by these commercial judges in order to expedite handling and ensure relevant expertise.  The country already has a specialized anti-corruption court that handles all corruption cases.

Some U.S. litigants have reported that the time to obtain and enforce a judgment in a commercial dispute is unreasonably long.  The turnaround time for civil cases is approximately two years.  In an effort to create more efficient adjudications, the GoB has established a land tribunal, and industrial, small claims, and corruption courts.  During the past several years, some dockets have improved, but progress has been uneven.

Local laws are accessible through the Botswana Attorney General’s Office website (www.laws.gov.bw ). It can take up to 24 months for a law, once passed, to appear on the website.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

Under Botswana’s Company Act, foreigners who wish to operate a business are required to register, as well as obtain, the relevant licenses and permits as prescribed by the Trade Act of 2008.

Licenses are required for a wide spectrum of businesses, including banking, non-bank financial services, transportation, medical services, mining, energy provision, and alcohol sales.  Although amendments to the Trade Act have eliminated the catchall miscellaneous business license category, investors have reported on local authorities insisting a business apply for a license even when it does not fall within the established categories.  In addition, some businesses have observed the enforcement of licenses, as well as the time taken for inspections to comply with licensing requirements, varies widely across local government authorities.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

Botswana has developed anti-trust legislation and policies to ensure appropriate competition in the business environment.  Under the Competition Act, the Competition Authority (CA) is now monitoring mergers and acquisitions.  During the year 2018/2019 the CA dealt with a few cases to address the non-competitive business conduct and for the first time it dealt with cases relating to the conduct of resale price maintenance (vertical agreements). The CA is empowered to reject mergers deemed not to be in the public best interest.  It has interpreted this ability to mean that it can prohibit mergers that result in the concentration of most shares in the hands of foreign investors.

Expropriation and Compensation

Section 8 of the country’s Constitution prohibits the nationalization of private property.  The GoB has never pursued a policy of forced nationalization and is highly unlikely to adopt one.  The Acquisition of Property Act provides a process for any expropriation, including parameters to determine market value and receive compensation.  The 2007 Amendment to the Electricity Supply Act allows the GoB to revoke an Independent Power Producer’s license and confiscate the operations, with compensation, for public interest purposes.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

GoB has ratified the convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention).  GoB is also a member state to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID convention), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

There are no known investment disputes involving U.S. persons.  Botswana accepts international arbitration to settle investment disputes.  Judgments by foreign courts recognized by the GoB are enforceable under the local courts where the appropriate bilateral agreements between the countries exist.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

There are no known complaints about transparency or discrimination by local courts in Botswana.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Botswana’s commercial and bankruptcy laws are comprehensive.  Secured and unsecured creditors enjoy similar rights under bankruptcy proceedings as those they would enjoy in the United States.

Investment Incentives

Botswana has several mechanisms in place to attract FDI.  BITC assists local and foreign investors.  BITC is responsible for promoting FDI, investor aftercare, and the promotion of locally manufactured goods in export markets.  It assists investors with company registration, land acquisition, factory shells, utility connections, and work and residence permits for essential staff.  Investors’ requests for support from BITC and other agencies are evaluated based on the extent to which the proposed project assists in the GoB’s diversification efforts, contributes to the growth of priority sectors, and provides employment and training to Botswana citizens.  The GoB also makes grants available to investors who partner with citizens and will extend credit to investors presenting proposals that have undergone appropriate due diligence and that have completed a feasibility study.  Foreign investors are encouraged to transfer technology to Botswana and skills to Botswana citizens with a view to preparing them for promotion into management positions.

Botswana offers a relatively low tax rate of 22 percent on corporate taxable income and 7.5 percent withholding tax on all dividends distributed.  MITI can grant manufacturing companies the reduced level of 15 percent taxable income.  Companies can pay the reduced rate of 15 percent of profit with accreditation from the Innovation Hub or the International Financial Services Centre on approved operations.

The Minister of Finance and Economic Development has the authority to issue development approval orders that are used for specific projects, which include providing tax holidays, education, and training grants.  The Minister must be satisfied the proposed project will be beneficial to Botswana’s economy.  Any firm, local or foreign, may apply for a Development Approval Order through the Permanent Secretary at the finance ministry.  Applications are evaluated against the following criteria: job creation for Botswana citizens; the company’s training plans for Botswana citizens; the company’s plans to localize non-citizen positions; Botswana citizen participation in company management; amount of equity held by Botswana citizens in the company; the location of the proposed investment; the project’s effect on the stimulation of other economic activities; and the project’s effect on reducing local consumer prices.  MITI also offers rebates on imported materials for manufacturers that produce products for export.

In 2017, Parliament approved and implemented a special incentive package for Selebi-Phikwe geared to promote economic growth and diversification.  Some of the incentives include reduced corporate tax of five percent for the first five years and 10 percent thereafter (versus the 22 percent national tax rate), zero customs duty on imported raw materials, rebates for customs duty and value-added tax for any exports outside the SACU, and a minimum of 50 years on land leases (instead of the standard lease of 25 years).

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Parliament established a new parastatal organization, the Special Economic Zones Authority (SEZA), with the mandate to develop and operate special economic zones around the country.  It has earmarked five geographic areas with a total of eight zones, though they are not yet fully operational.  In 2015, Parliament approved a Special Economic Zones (SEZ) law to streamline investment in sector-targeted geographic areas in the country including two Gaborone area SEZs (multi-use, diamond processing, and financial services); two Selebi-Phikwe SEZs (mineral processing and horticulture); and additional SEZs in Lobatse (beef, leather, biogas); Palapye (energy); Pandamatenga (agriculture); and Francistown (mining and logistics).  The Special Economic Zones Act is available for sale in hard copy at the GoB bookshop.  SEZA has prioritized four SEZs—Lobatse (leather park), Gaborone Fairgrounds (Financial Services), Gaborone Sir Seretse Khama Airport (Diamond and Logistics) and Pandamatenga (Agriculture)—and is actively recruiting investors, private developers, and manufacturers.  BURS has also introduced an electronic Customs Management System to replace the Automated System for Customs Data and launched the National Single Window, an electronic trade platform that makes trading more secure and efficient.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Performance requirements are not imposed as a condition for establishing, maintaining, or expanding an investment in Botswana.  Foreign investors are encouraged, but not compelled, to establish joint ventures with citizens or citizen-owned companies.

Foreign investors wishing to invest in Botswana are required to register the company in accordance with the Companies Act and comply with other applicable legislation.  Investors are encouraged, but not required, to purchase from local sources.  The GoB does not require investors to locate in specific geographical areas, use a specific percentage of local content, permit local equity in projects, manufacture substitutes for imports, meet export requirements or targets, or use national sources of financing for private-sector investments.  However, GoB entities, including BITC, use the criteria of diversifying the economy, creating employment, and transferring skills to Botswana citizens in determining whether to assist foreign investors.

As a matter of policy, the GoB encourages foreign firms to hire qualified Botswana nationals rather than expatriates.  The granting of work permits for foreign workers may be made contingent upon establishment of demonstrable localization efforts.  The government may additionally require evidence that a local is being trained to assume duties currently being fulfilled by a foreign worker, specially focused at the middle-management level.  The GoB offers incentives to companies that train local employees, including the deduction of 200 percent of training expenses when an accredited institution conducts the training.

Business leaders cite difficulty securing work permits combined with local skills deficits and constrained labor productivity as one of the foremost business constraints in Botswana. However, since President Masisi assumed power in April 2018, GoB reports suggest permits for foreign workers have increased with approval rates in excess of 90 percent.  Select grants are available to foreign investors who partner with Botswana citizens.  The Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency has established a venture capital fund to provide equity to citizens and ventures between citizens and foreign investors.  The majority of GoB loans and grants are designed specifically for citizen-owned contracting firms or for small enterprises and are therefore not available to foreign investors.

The GoB, the largest procuring entity in the country, has directed central government, local authorities, and state-owned enterprises to purchase all products and services from locally based manufacturers and service providers if the goods and services are locally available, competitively priced, and meet tender specifications in terms of quality standards as certified or recognized by the Botswana Bureau of Standards.  Local preferences arise from numerous sources.  In 2015, MITI instituted a program to give locally based small companies a 15 percent preferential price margin in GoB procurement, with mid-sized companies receiving a 10 percent margin, and large companies a five percent margin.  The directive applies to 27 categories of goods and services ranging from textiles to chemicals, and food, in addition to a broad range of consultancy services.  In 2014, the GoB and the Chamber of Mines created a committee to oversee the purchasing of mining supplies with a 10 percent preference towards those produced locally.  The 2012 Citizen Economic Empowerment Policy also emphasized the preference for local companies and the GoB’s PPADB registers citizen-owned companies for preference purposes. In 2020, the GoB announced new policy that all government contracts less than ~USD 900,000 were reserved for Motswana-owned businesses.

For a foreign firm to qualify with the Department of Industrial Affairs as a locally-based manufacturer or service provider to sell goods or services to the GoB, the firm must first be registered with the Registrar of Companies and possess a relevant license or waiver letter.  These procedures can be completed online, however, companies may choose to engage the services of a Company Secretary to perform these and other required documentation services.  Tenders are generally designed based on the products available in the local market and with locally-based companies in mind.  In addition, many tenders require local registration as a prerequisite for bids and the GoB frequently breaks up large-scale projects into a series of tenders.  All of these factors make it difficult to compete for tenders from outside Botswana.   

Real Property

Property rights are enforced in Botswana.  The World Bank ranks Botswana 82 out of 190 in the Registering Property category.  There are three main categories of land in Botswana: freehold, state land, and tribal land.  Tribal and state land cannot be sold to foreigners.  There are no restrictions on the sale of freehold land, but only an approximate five percent of land in Botswana is freehold. All minerals in Botswana, even those on private lands, are viewed as property of the State. In the capital city of Gaborone, the number of freehold plots is limited.  In 2019, the GoB increased the rate of Transfer Duty on the sale and transfer of property to non-citizens (both individuals and companies) from five percent to 30 percent.

State land represents about 25 percent of land in Botswana.  On application to the Department of Lands, both foreign-owned and local enterprises registered in Botswana may lease state land for industrial or residential use.  Commercial use leases are for 50 years and residential leases are for 99 years.  Waiting periods tend to be long for leasehold applications, but subleases from current leaseholders are available.  In 2014, the GoB changed its implementing regulation to allow companies with less than five employees to operate in residential areas if their operations do not pose a health or safety risk to residents.

Tribal land represents 70 percent of land in Botswana.  To obtain a lease for tribal land, the investor must approach the relevant local Land Board.  Processes are unlikely to be streamlined or consistent across Land Boards.

Since independence, the trend in Botswana has been to increase the area of tribal land at the expense of both state and freehold land.  Landlord-tenant law in Botswana tends to be moderately pro-landlord.

In addition to helping investors who meet its criteria obtain appropriate land leaseholds, BITC has also built factory units for lease to industrialists with the option to purchase at market value.

Intellectual Property Rights

Botswana’s legal intellectual property rights (IPR) structure is adequate, although some improvements are needed.  The key challenge facing the GoB is effective implementation. CIPA was established in 2014 and is comprised of three offices: the Companies and Business Office, the Industrial Property Office, and the Copyright Office.  Intellectual property is registered through CIPA.  This organizations’s priorities n are to strengthen and implement Botswana’s IPR regime and improve interagency cooperation.  IPR infringement occurs in Botswana primarily through the sale of counterfeit items in low-end sales outlets.  According to CIPA, targeted raids by local law enforcement have reduced the availability of counterfeit goods across the country.   In 2019, CIPA and the Botswana Police Service seized 3,888 counterfeit CDs and DVDs valued at USD 30,000 compared to nearly 13,000 counterfeits valued at over USD 107,000 seized in 2017.  The U.S. government continues to work with the GoB to modernize and improve enforcement of IPR.

IPR is protected under the Industrial Property Act of 2010, which provides protections on patents, trademarks, utility designs, handicrafts, traditional knowledge, and geographic indicators.  The 2000 Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act also protects art and literary works, and the 1975 Registration of Business Names Act oversees corporate name and registration procedures.  Other IPR-related laws include the Competition Act, the Value Added Tax Act, the Botswana Penal Code, the Customs and Excise Duty Act, the Monuments and Relics Act, the Broadcasting Act, and the Societies Act.

Botswana is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List.

Botswana is a signatory to the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs, the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.

For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ .

Resources for Rights Holders

Goitseone Montsho
Economic/Commercial Specialist
MontshoG@state.gov
+267 373-2431

Local lawyers’ list: https://bw.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/attorneys/

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The government encourages foreign portfolio investment, although there are limits on foreign ownership in certain sectors.  It also embraces the establishment of new and diverse financial institutions to support increased foreign and domestic investment and to fill existing gaps where finance is not commercially available.  There are nine commercial banks, one merchant bank, one offshore bank, two statutory deposit-taking institutions, and one credit union operating in Botswana.  All have corresponding relationships with U.S. banks. Additional financial institutions include various pension funds, insurance companies, microfinance institutions, stock brokerage companies, asset management companies, statutory finance institutions, collective investment undertakings, and statutory funds. Historically, commercial banks have accounted for 92 percent of total deposits and 98 percent of total loans in Botswana.  A large portion of the population does not participate in the formal banking sector.

Money and Banking System

The central bank, the Bank of Botswana, acts as banker and financial advisor to the GoB and is responsible for the management of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, the administration of monetary and exchange rate policies, and the regulation and supervision of financial institutions in the country.  Monetary policy in Botswana is widely regarded as prudent, and the GoB has successfully managed to maintain a sensible exchange rate and a stable inflation rate, generally within the target of three to six percent.

Banks may lend to non-resident-controlled companies without seeking approval from the Bank of Botswana.  Foreign investors usually enjoy better access to credit than local firms do.  In July 2014, USAID’s Development Credit Authority (now DFC – U.S. International Development Finance Corporation), in collaboration with ABSA (formerly Barclays Bank of Botswana), implemented a program to allow small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) to access up to USD 15 million in loans in an effort to diversify the economy.

At the end of 2019, there were 25 companies on the Domestic Board and eight companies on the Foreign Equities Board of the Botswana Stock Exchange (BSE).  In addition, there were 46 listed bonds and three exchange traded funds listed on the Exchange.  The total market capitalization for listed companies at year-end 2019 was USD 37 billion, though one company constitutes the majority of that figure, Anglo-American plc, which has a market capitalization of approximately USD 30 billion. The BSE is still highly illiquid compared to larger African markets and is dominated by mining companies which adds to index volatility.  Laws prohibiting insider trading and securities fraud are clearly stipulated under Section 35 – 37 of the Securities Act, 2014 and charges for contravening these laws are listed under Section 54 of the same Act.

The government has legitimized offshore capital investments and allows foreign investors, individuals and corporate bodies, and companies incorporated in Botswana, to open foreign currency accounts in specified currencies.  The designated currencies are U.S. Dollar, British Pound sterling, Euro, and the South African Rand.  There are no known practices by private firms to restrict foreign investment participation or control in domestic enterprises.  Private firms are not permitted to adopt articles of incorporation or association which limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control.

In general, Botswana exercises careful control over credit expansion, the pula exchange rate, interest rates, and foreign and domestic borrowing.  Banking legislation is largely in line with industry norms for regulation, supervision, and payments.  However, the country failed to meet compliance requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) resulting in a grey listing in October 2018.  Botswana is currently implementing an action plan to remedy the situation. The Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA) was established in 2008 and provides regulatory oversight for the non-banking sector.  It extends know-your-customer practices to non-banking financial institutions to help deter money laundering and terrorist financing.  NBFIRA is also responsible for regulating the International Financial Services Centre, a hub charged with promoting the financial services industry in Botswana.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

There are no foreign exchange controls in Botswana or restrictions on capital outflows through financial institutions.  Commercial banks are required to ensure customers complete basic forms indicating name, address, purpose and other details prior to processing funds transfer requests or loan applications.  The finance ministry monitors data collected on the forms for statistical information on capital flows, but the form does not require government approval prior to the processing of a transaction and does not delay capital transfers.

To encourage portfolio investment, develop domestic capital markets, and diversify investment instruments, non-residents are able to trade in and issue Botswana pula-denominated bonds with maturity periods of more than one year, provided such instruments are listed on the Botswana Stock Exchange (BSE).  Only Botswana citizens can purchase Botswana’s Letlole National Savings Certificate (equivalent to a U.S. Treasury bond).  Foreigners can hold shares in BSE-listed Botswana companies.

Travelers are not restricted to the amount of currency they may carry, but they are required to declare to customs at the port of departure any cash amount in excess of 10,000 pula (~USD 950).  There are no quantitative limits on foreign currency access for current account transactions.

Bank accounts denominated in foreign currency are allowed in Botswana.  Commercial banks offer accounts denominated in U.S. Dollars, British Pounds, Euros and South African Rand.  Businesses and other bodies incorporated or registered domestically may open accounts without prior approval from the Bank of Botswana.  The GoB also permits the issuance of foreign currency denominated loans.

Upon disinvestment by a non-resident, the non-resident is allowed immediate repatriation of all proceeds including profits, rents, and fees.

The Botswana Pula has a crawling peg exchange rate and is tied to a basket of currencies of major trading partner countries.  In 2018 the weights of the Pula basket currencies were maintained at 45 percent for the South African Rand and 55 percent for the Special Drawing Rights (consisting of the U.S. Dollar, the Euro, British Pound, Japanese Yen, and Chinese Renminbi) respectively.  Movements of the South African Rand against the U.S. Dollar heavily influence the Pula.  There is no difficulty in obtaining foreign exchange.  Shortages of foreign exchange that would lead banks to block transactions are highly unlikely.

Remittance Policies

There are no restrictions or limitations placed on foreign investors in converting, transferring, or repatriating funds associated with an investment.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

The Bank of Botswana maintains a long-term sovereign wealth fund, known as the Pula Fund, in addition to a regular foreign reserve account providing basic import cover. The Pula Fund, with an estimated value of some USD 4.74 billion as of 2018, was established under the Bank of Botswana Act and forms part of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, which are primarily funded by diamond revenues.  The Pula Fund is wholly invested in foreign currency-denominated assets and is managed by the Bank of Botswana Board with input from recognized international financial management and investment firms.  All realized market and currency gains or losses are reported in the Bank of Botswana’s income statement.  Botswana is among the founding members of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Fund and was one of the architects of the Santiago Principles in 2008.  More information is available at: http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/assets/uploaded/BOTSWANA percent20PULA percent20FUND percent20- percent20SANTIAGO percent20PRINCIPLES percent20(2).pdf 

State-owned enterprises (SOEs), known as “parastatals,” are majority or 100 percent owned by the GoB.  There is a published list of SOEs at the GoB portal (www.gov.bw) with profiles of financial and development SOEs. Some SOEs are state-sanctioned monopolies, including the Botswana Meat Commission, the Water Utilities Corporation, Botswana Railways, and the Botswana Power Corporation.

The same business registration and licensing laws govern private and government-owned enterprises.  No law or regulation prohibits or restricts private enterprises from competing with SOEs.  Botswana law requires SOEs to publish annual reports, and private sector accountants or the Auditor General audits SOEs depending on how they are constituted.  GoB ministries together with their respective SOEs are compelled on an annual basis to appear before the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee to provide reports and answer questions regarding their performance.  Some SOEs are not performing well and have been embroiled in scandals involving alleged fraud and mismanagement.

Botswana is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO.

Privatization Program

The GOB has committed to privatization on paper.  It established a task force in 1997 to privatize all of its state-owned companies and formed a Public Enterprises Evaluation and Privatization Agency (PEEPA) to oversee this process.  Implementation of its privatization commitments has been limited to the January 2016 sale offer of 49 percent of the stock of the state-owned Botswana Telecommunications Corporation to Botswana citizens only.  In February 2017, the GoB issued an Expressions of Interest for the privatization of its national airline, but progress stopped due to the decision to re-fleet the airline before privatization.  In early 2019, President Masisi announced the Botswana Meat Commission was being placed in the hands of a private management company prior to privatization. Conversely, the GoB has created new SOEs such as the Okavango Diamond Company, the Mineral Development Company, and Botswana Oil Limited in recent years.

The GoB, some foreign and local firms, and customers, recognized and embraced Responsible Business Conduct (RBC), although Botswana is not an adherent of the OECD’s RBC Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and has not specified its definition of RBC.  Large companies in the mining, communications technology, food supply, and financial services sectors have established RBC programs, sponsor projects, and support local nonprofit concerns.  However, the ethos has not taken hold in many smaller firms.  The U.S. Embassy worked with the local chamber of commerce, Business Botswana, on the issue of corporate social responsibility and ethical compliance, to help enlist companies to sign onto a Corporate Code of Conduct that covers, among other things, conflicts of interest, bribery, political interference, political party funding, procurement and bidding, and issues surrounding residence and work permits.  To date more than 300 firms have signed the Code of Conduct.

The Companies Act also sets out the expectations of business conduct and governance for directors and shareholders for both private and public companies.  Botswana is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.  Botswana’s Mines and Minerals Act and associated regulations govern mineral contracts and licenses.  Botswana’s laws and procedures for awarding mining contracts are fairly well developed.  Mining licenses are required to undergo a public comment period before they are awarded, and that rule is followed.

Botswana has a reputation for a relative lack of corruption and a willingness to prosecute corrupt officials.  Transparency International ranks Botswana as the least corrupt country in Africa (34th worldwide).  Investors with experience in other developing nations describe the relative lack of obstruction or interference by law enforcement or other government agents as among the country’s most important assets.  Nevertheless, private sector representatives note rising corruption levels in government tender procurements.

The major corruption investigation body is the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC).  Anecdotal reports on the DCEC’s effectiveness vary.  The DCEC has embarked on an education campaign to raise public awareness about the cost of corruption and is also working with GoB departments to reform their accountability procedures. Corruption is punishable by a prison term of up to 10 years, a fine of USD 50,000, or both.  The GoB has prosecuted high-level officials.  Corruption allegations have surfaced recently around pension fund management and government procurement procedures and are still under investigation.

The 2000 Proceeds of Serious Crime Act expanded the DCEC’s mandate to include combatting money laundering.  The 2009 Financial Intelligence Act provides a comprehensive legal framework to address money laundering and establishes a financial intelligence agency (FIA).  The FIA, which operates under the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, cooperates with various institutions, such as Directorate of Public Prosecutions, Botswana Police Service, Bank of Botswana, the Non-Banking Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority, the DCEC, and foreign FIAs to uncover and investigate suspicious financial transactions.  Botswana is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a regional standards-setting body for ensuring appropriate laws, policies, and practices to fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism.  In October 2018, Botswana was “gray-listed” by the Financial Action Task Force and is currently implementing an action plan to address shortcomings that led to the listing.

UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery

Botswana is not a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, but is a party to the 2005 United Nations Convention against Corruption.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contacts for agencies responsible for combating corruption:

Name: Brigadier Joseph Mathambo
Tittle: Director General
Organization: Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime
Address: Madirelo Extension 6, Gaborone, Botswana
Telephone Number: +267 3914002/+267 3604200
Email:  dcec@gov.bw

Name: Mr. Elijah Motshidi
Tittle: Executive Director
Organization: Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board
Address: Private Bag 0058, Gaborone, Botswana
Telephone Number: +267 3602000
Email:  webmaster@ppadb.co.bw

Name: Mr. Abraham Sethibe
Tittle: Director
Organization: Financial Intelligence Agency
Address: Private Bag 0190, Gaborone, Botswana
Telephone Number: +267 3998400
Email:  asethibe@gov.bw

One can also reach out to the Minister of the relevant Ministry for a particular tender and provide a copy of the complaint to the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) Executive Director.

The threat of political violence is low in Botswana.  Public demonstrations are rare and seldom turn violent.  The last large-scale strikes, which involved public sector employees, occurred April-June 2011 and were not violent. In September 2015, roughly 200 people participated in a peaceful march organized by an opposition political party to protest water shortages in the capital.  In August 2016, police forcefully dispersed a small demonstration protesting unemployment outside the National Assembly.  In February and March 2017, some student-led protests occurred at tertiary institutions necessitating police deployment but were not overtly political.  There were multiple reports of police brutality, including the use of rubber whips and rubber bullets.  Another peaceful march against corruption was held in March 2018.  This followed allegations of embezzlement of the National Petroleum Fund by a company charged with the management of the funds together with some GoB officials.  In late 2019, following general election, the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) held a peaceful march of no more than 200 people protesting the election results.

Botswana has a high unemployment rate and a constricted worker skills base.  The latest statistics released in late 2019 showed an increase of unemployment from 17.7 percent to just over 20 percent, although the real rate is suspected to be higher due to the way the GoB counts who is included in the statistic.  Employers can expect to engage in significant training efforts, depending on the industry.  Retention of workers and absenteeism can pose problems.  In addition, managers often cite workforce productivity as a point of frustration.  The lack of trained local citizen professionals is generally addressed by contracting expatriates if they can secure work permits.  There is minimal labor strife in Botswana.  In 2015, there were a handful of small and peaceful strikes, the most notable of these was by a portion of BURS officials, but as with most unions across sectors, only a portion of BURS officials were unionized, allowing the GoB to maintain customs operations.

The Employment Act provides basic guidelines for employment in Botswana.  The legislation sets requirements for a minimum wage, length of the workweek, annual and maternity leave, hiring and termination.  Standards set by the Act are consistent with international best practice as described by International Labour Organization (ILO) model legislation and guidelines.

Employment-related litigation occurs and is both an example of trust in the court system and a cost to doing business in Botswana.  Employers avoid considerable expense and frustration if they observe the provisions of the Employment Act, relevant labor regulations, and prudence in advance of potential litigation.  Before a potential litigant goes to one of 11 labor courts, the parties must attempt mediation through the Department of Labor.  Court cases offering severance terms for employees laid off due to fluctuating market conditions are also common.  Section 25 of the Employment Act allows employers to terminate contracts for reducing the size of their work force, known as redundancy, using the first-in-last-out principle.  This method of terminating contracts is separate from firing for serious misconduct as specified by Section 26 of the Act. The GoB has social safety net programs in place to assist the unemployed and destitute.

Collective bargaining is common in government and the private sector and the Labor Commissioner can grant collective bargaining authority upon request.  The largest unions are comprised of public sector workers.

In August 2016 Parliament passed a Trade Disputes Act with a list of services deemed “essential” and barred from striking that exceeds international labor standards. The Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity, and Skills Development is coordinating with the ILO and other partners to review labor laws to ensure they align with ILO standards.  The review process is ongoing and Ministry sources claim they plan to conclude a draft bill and present it to Parliament by July 2020.

The DFC has a presence in Botswana through its previous Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Development Credit Authority (DCA) programs. OPIC has a USD 250 million loan guarantee facility for the local diamond industry, and two separate SME loan facilities with local financial institutions. DCA also has a loan facility in place which targets SMEs.

Botswana is a member of MIGA, which offers investors protection against inconvertibility, or transfer of currency, expropriation, breach of contract, and war and civil disturbance.

The Export Credit Insurance & Guarantee Company (Botswana) Pty. Ltd. allows investors to purchase coverage against certain events and losses such as the insolvency and inability of buyers to pay for purchases, unanticipated import restrictions, or the blockage by the buyer’s country of foreign exchange transfer.

According to the Bank of Botswana, investment in Botswana totaled 80.5 billion Pula in 2017, of which 28.9 billion Pula were non-FDI investments.  Africa (36 percent) and Europe (56 percent) accounted for most of the 51.64 billion Pula influx of FDI.  Within these regions, South Africa and the United Kingdom were the predominant players, accounting for 10.6 and 26.3 billion Pula respectively.  Little data on FDI sources is available for countries and regions with limited investments in Botswana.  Mining accounted for 35.1 percent of Foreign Investment inflows in 2017.

The U.S.-DRC Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) was signed in 1984 and entered into force in 1989.  The BIT guarantees reciprocal rights and privileges to each country’s investors and provides that, should a claim arise under the treaty, it can be submitted to a dispute resolution mechanism through international arbitration.  U.S. companies have at times reported difficulties with the tax authorities from arbitrary enforcement of the taxation code.

Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, South Korea, and China have also signed bilateral investment treaties with the DRC, while South Africa and Kenya are currently negotiating BITs.  Lebanon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso have negotiated, but not signed, BITs with the DRC.  In October 2016, the DRC and Rwanda signed an agreement on a simplified trade regime covering only small-scale commerce between the countries.

There is no bilateral taxation treaty between the United States and the DRC.  In August 2015, Zambia and the DRC signed a bilateral taxation treaty that abolished customs taxes across their common border.

The DRC does not have a legal system to address the issue of competition.  By joining the regional legal body OHADA and the regional Central and Southern African trade group COMESA, the DRC plans to implement the standards and regulations of these structures in order to create a more transparent and effective policy to promote competition.

There are no informal regulations run by private or nongovernmental organizations that discriminate against foreign investors.  However, some investors perceive the regulations in the mining code as discriminatory against foreign investment.

The GDRC authority on business standards, the Congolese Office of Control (OCC), oversees foreign businesses engaged in the DRC.

There are no formal or informal provisions systematically employed by the GDRC to impede foreign investment.  Companies most often complain of facing administrative hurdles as laws and regulations are often poorly or unevenly applied.

Proposed laws and regulations are rarely published in draft format for public discussion and comment;  discussion is typically limited to the governmental entity that proposes the draft law and Parliament prior to enactment.  Sometimes the government will hold a public hearing after public appeals.

By implementing the OHADA system, the GDRC strengthened its legal framework in the areas of contract, company, and bankruptcy law and set up an accounting system better aligned to international standards.  For this purpose, a Coordination Committee was established internally in the GDRC to monitor OHADA implementation.

The government announced the creation of a business unit (CCA) in December 2019 to enact needed regulatory reforms.

The DRC is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a multi-stakeholder initiative to increase transparency in transactions between governments and companies in the extractive industries.  The DRC’s validation process for compliance with the EITI Standard commenced in November 2018, with an assessment due in 2020.  The initial report published by the International EITI Secretariat in April 2019 stated that the DRC EITI failed to adequately address 13 of the  requirements of the EITI Standard, with two of these assessed as unmet with inadequate progress.  The report also stressed the need to clarify the financial flows of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the DRC’s extractive sector.

In 2019 the DRC failed to meet the minimum requirements of fiscal transparency according to the State Department’s Fiscal Transparency report.  While the DRC publishes budgets that are publicly available and timely, the published budgets were not reliable indicators of actual government spending.

International Regulatory Considerations

The DRC is a member of several regional economic blocs, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC).

According to the Congolese National Standardization Committee, the DRC has adopted 470 harmonized COMESA standards.

The DRC is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and seeks to comply with Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIM) requirements, including notifying regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).

Legal System and Judicial Independence

The DRC is a civil law country, and the main provisions of its private law can be traced to the Napoleonic Civil Code.  The general characteristics of the Congolese legal system are similar to those of the Belgian system.  Various local customary laws regulate both personal status laws and property rights, especially the inheritance and land tenure systems in traditional communities throughout the country.  The Congolese legal system is divided into three branches: public law, private law and economic law.  Public law regulates legal relationships involving the state or state authority; private law regulates relationships between private persons; and economic law regulates interactions in areas such as labor, trade, mining and investment.

In 2018 the DRC established thirteen commercial courts located in DRC’s main business cities, including Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Matadi, Boma, Kisangani, and Mbuji-Mayi.  These courts are designed to be led by professional judges specializing in commercial matters and exist in parallel to an otherwise inadequate judicial system.  A lack of qualified personnel and a reluctance by some DRC jurisdictions to fully recognize OHADA law and institutions have hindered the development of commercial courts.

The current judicial process is not procedurally reliable and its rulings are not always respected.  The current executive branch has generally not interfered with the proceedings.  The national court system provides an appeals mechanism under the OHADA framework.  Legal documents in the DRC can be found at: http://www.leganet.cd/index.htm .

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

The 2002 Investment Code governs most foreign direct investment (FDI), providing for the protection of investments.  In practice, an inadequate legal system has insufficiently protected foreign investors in the event of a dispute.  Mining, hydrocarbons, finance, and other sectors have sector-specific investment laws.

ANAPI is the DRC agency with the mandate to simplify the investment process, make procedures more transparent, assist new foreign investors, and improve the image of the country as an investment destination (www.investindrc.cd).

The GDRC has a “Guichet Unique,” which is a one-stop shop to simplify business creation, cutting processing time from five months to three days, and reducing incorporation fees from USD 3,000 to USD 120. (www.guichetunique.cd ). A “one-stop-shop” also exists for import-export business, covering aspects such as the collection of taxes and transshipment operations. (https://segucerdc.cd/ ).

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

There is no national agency that reviews transactions for competition or antitrust-related concerns.  As a member of COMESA the DRC follows the COMESA Competition Regulations and rules, and the COMESA competition body regulates competition.

Expropriation and Compensation

The GDRC may proceed with an expropriation when it benefits the public interest, and the person or entity subject to an expropriation should receive fair compensation.  The U.S. Embassy is unaware of any new expropriation activities by the GDRC against U.S. citizens in the past three years, but there are a number of existing and long-standing claims made against the GDRC.  Some claims have been taken to arbitration, though many arbitral judgments against the GDRC are not paid in a timely manner, if at all.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

The DRC is a member of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention and a Contracting State to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).  It is important to note that the New York Convention does not apply toward disputes relating to immovable property, which includes mining rights.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The DRC is subject to international arbitration.  A U.S. mining company  sued under the BIT to recover losses suffered when FARDC troops sacked its mine in Kasai Central Province in 1995. The arbitration courts ruled the GDRC liable for damages totaling USD 13 million, and the GDRC started paying back the awarded amount plus interest to the U.S. company.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

The DRC adopted the OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration (the UAA).  The UAA sets out the basic rules applicable to any arbitration where the seat of arbitration is located in an OHADA member state.  The requirements set out under Article 5 of the New York Convention for the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards applies where the seat of any arbitration is outside an OHADA member state, or where the parties choose arbitration rules outside the UAA.

OHADA‘s UAA offers an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for settling disputes between two parties where the place of arbitration is situated in a Member State.  Disputes must be submitted to the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) in Abidjan in accordance with the provisions of the OHADA Treaty and the OHADA Arbitration Rules.

The UAA, while not directly based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law, is similar in that it provides for the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards and supersedes the national laws on arbitration to the extent that any conflict arises.  Arbitral awards with a connection to an OHADA member state are given final and binding status in all OHADA member states, on par with a national court judgment.  Support is provided by the CCJA which can rule on the application and interpretation of the UAA.

Arbitral awards rendered in any OHADA Member State are enforceable in any other OHADA member state, subject to obtaining an exequatur (a legal document issued by a sovereign authority allowing a right to be enforced in the authority’s domain of competence) of the competent court of the State in which the award is to be made.  Exequaturs are granted unless the award clearly affects public order in that State.  Decisions granting or refusing to grant an exequatur may be appealed to the CCJA.

Bankruptcy Regulations

The OHADA Uniform Act on Insolvency Proceedings provides a comprehensive framework not only for companies encountering financial difficulties and seeking relief from the pressing demands of creditors, but also for creditors to file their claims.  The GDRC judiciary system has agreed to enforce the OHADA Insolvency Act.  Bankruptcy is not criminalized.

According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, there were no foreclosure, liquidation or reorganization proceedings filed in the country in 2019, making it impossible to assess the time, cost or outcome for an insolvency proceeding.

Investment Incentives

Investment incentives can range from tax breaks to duty exemptions, and are dependent upon the location and type of enterprise, the number of jobs created, the degree of training and promotion of local staff, and the export-producing potential of the operation.  Investors who wish to take advantage of customs and tax incentives in the 2002 Investment Code must apply to the National Agency for Investment Promotion (ANAPI), which submits applications to the Ministries of Finance and Planning for final approval.  The government does not have a history of providing guarantees or jointly financing FDI projects.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

The DRC does not have any designated free trade areas or free port zones.  President Tshisekedi has signaled that he will revive stalled efforts to join the East African Community (EAC).  In November 2019, the Presidency submitted a law authorizing the ratification of the agreement of the African continental free-zone (ZLEC).  The law is still pending approval by the Parliament.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Foreign investors must negotiate many of the conditions of their investments with ANAPI.  Performance requirements agreed upon with ANAPI typically include a timeframe for the investment, use of OHADA accounting procedures and periodic authorized GDRC audits, protection of the environment, periodic progress reports to ANAPI, and the maintenance of international and local norms for the provision of goods and services.  The investor must also agree that all imported equipment and capital will remain in-country for at least five years.

The Ministry of Labor controls expatriate residence and work permits.  For U.S. companies, the BIT assures the right to hire staff of their choice to fill some management positions, but companies agree to pay a special tax on expatriate salaries.  Visa, residence or work permit requirements are not discriminatory or excessively onerous, and are not designed to prevent or discourage foreigners from investing in the DRC.

The DRC does not have specific legislation on data storage or limits on the transmission of data.

Real Property

The DRC’s Constitution protects private property ownership without discriminating between foreign and domestic investors.  Despite this provision, the GDRC has acknowledged the absence of enforcement protecting property rights.  Congolese law related to real property rights enumerates provisions for mortgages and liens. Real property (buildings and land) is protected and registered through the Ministry of Land’s Office of the Mortgage Registrar.  Land registration may not fully protect property owners, as records can be incomplete and legal disputes over land deals are common.  Many owners lack a clear registered title to the land.  In addition, there is no specific regulation of real property lease or acquisition.

Ownership interest in personal property (e.g. equipment, vehicles, etc.) is protected and registered through the Ministry of the Interior’s Office of the Notary.

Intellectual Property Rights

Intellectual property rights (IPR) are legally protected in the DRC, but enforcement of IPR regulations is limited.  The DRC’s intellectual property laws date from the 1980s and remain in force. However,  enforcement is weak, and IPR theft is common.  The country is a signatory to a number of relevant agreements with international organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and is subject to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).   The government does not keep a record of IPR violations.

The DRC is not included in the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or Notorious Markets List.

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IPR offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/.

Capital Market and Portfolio Investment

Portfolio investment is nonexistent in the DRC and there is no domestic stock market.  A small number of private equity firms are actively investing in the mining industry.  The institutional investor base is not well developed, with only an insurance company and a state pension fund as participants.  There is no market for derivatives in the country.  Cross-shareholding and stable shareholding arrangements are also not common.  Credit is allocated on market terms, but there are occasional complaints about unfair privileges extended to certain investors in profitable sectors such as mining and telecommunications.

Although reforms have been initiated, the Congolese financial system remains small, heavily dollarized, characterized by fragile balance sheets, and cumbersome to use.  Further reforms are needed to strengthen the financial system, support its expansion, and spur economic growth.  Inadequate risk-based controls, weak enforcement of regulations, low profitability, and excessive reliance on demand deposit undermine the shock resilience of the financial system.

The Central Bank of Congo (BCC)  refrains from payments and transfers on current international transactions.  The DRC’s capital market remains underdeveloped and consists mainly of the issuance of treasury bonds.  In 2019, the BCC issued its first domestic bond in 24 years, which was oversubscribed.  Most of the buyers were local Congolese banks.

It is possible for foreign firms to borrow from local banks, but their options are limited.  Maturities for loans are usually limited to 3-6 months, and interest rates are typically around 16-21 percent.  The inconsistency of the legal system, the often-cumbersome business climate, and the difficulty in obtaining inter-bank financing discourages banks from providing long-term loans.  There are limited possibilities to finance major projects in the domestic currency, the Congolese franc (CDF).

Money and Banking system

The Congolese financial system is improving but it remains fragile.  The BCC controls monetary policy and regulates the banking system.  Banks are concentrated primarily in Kinshasa, Kongo Central, North and South Kivu, and Haut Katanga provinces.  Banking rate penetration is roughly 7 percent or about 4.1 million accounts, which places the country among the most under-banked nations in the world.  Mobile banking has the potential to greatly increase banking customers as an estimated 35 million Congolese use mobile phones.

There is no debt market.  The financial health of DRC banks is fragile, reflecting high operating costs and exchange rates.  The situation improved in 2019 as deposits have increased.  Fees charged by banks are a major source of revenue.

The financial system is mostly banking-based with aggregate asset holdings estimated at USD 5.1 billion.  Among  the five largest banks, four are local and one is controlled by foreign holdings.  The five largest banks hold almost 65 percent of bank deposits and more than 60 percent of total banks assets, about USD 3.1 billion.  There are no statistics on non-performing loans, as many banks only record the balance due instead of the total amount of their non-performing loans.

There is one correspondent bank, Citigroup.  All foreign banks accredited by the BCC are considered Congolese banks with foreign capital and fall under the provisions and regulations covering the credit institutions’ activities in the DRC  There are no restrictions on foreigners establishing an account in a DRC bank.

Foreign Exchange and Remittance

Foreign Exchange

The international transfer of funds is permitted when channeled through local commercial banks.  On average, bank declaration requirements and payments for international transfers take less than one week to complete.  The Central Bank is responsible for regulating foreign exchange and trade.  The only currency restriction imposed on travelers is a USD 10,000 limit on the amount an individual can carry when entering or leaving the DRC.

The GDRC requires the BCC to license exporters and importers.  The DRC’s informal foreign exchange market is large and unregulated and offers exchange rates slightly more favorable than the official rate.  BCC regulations set the Congolese franc (CDF) as the main currency in all transactions within the DRC, required for the payment of fees in education, medical care, water and electricity consumption, residential rents, and national taxes.  Exceptions to this rule occur where both parties involved and the appropriate monetary officials agree to use another currency.

Remittance Policies

There are no legal restrictions on converting or transferring funds.  Exchange regulations require a 60 day waiting period for in-country foreigners to remit income.  Foreign investors may remit through parallel markets when they are legally established and recognized by the Central Bank.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

The DRC does not have any reported Sovereign Wealth Funds, though the 2018 Mining Code discusses a Future Fund that is to be capitalized by a percentage of mining revenues.

There are 20 DRC state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in the mining, transportation, energy, telecommunications, finance, and hospitality sectors.  In the past, Congolese SOEs have stifled competition and have been unable to provide reliable electricity, transportation, and other important services over which they have monopolies.  Some SOEs and other Congolese parastatal organizations are in poor financial and operational state due to indebtedness and the mismanagement of resources and employees.  The list of SOEs can be found at: http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit percent20Public/EPub/d.09.12.24.04.09.htm .

There is limited reporting on the assets of SOEs and other parastatal enterprises, making valuation difficult.  DRC law does not grant SOEs an advantage over private companies in bidding for government contracts or obtaining preferential access to land and raw materials.  The government is often accused of favoring SOEs over private companies in contracting and bidding.

The DRC is not a party to the WTO’s procurement agreement (GPA), but nominally adheres to the OECD guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs.  The DRC is a Participating Country in the Southern Africa SOE network, with the Ministry of Portfolio and the Steering Committee for SOE reforms designated as Regularly Participating Institutions.

Privatization Program

The DRC has no official privatization program.

The GDRC has taken actions of limited impact to support responsible business conduct (RBC), by encouraging companies to develop and adhere to a code of ethics and respect for the environment.  The DRC Labor Code includes provisions to protect employees, and there are legal provisions that require businesses to protect the environment.  However, the DRC does not possess a legal framework to protect the rights of consumers, and there are no existing domestic laws to protect individuals from adverse business impact.

The Global Compact Network DRC, a public-private consortium affiliated with the United Nations, encourages locally operating businesses to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies.  In 2016, the DRC issued the Guide on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR Guide) for the mining sector in Haut Katanga.

The DRC has adopted the OECD due diligence guidelines on responsible mineral supply chains as defined by the United Nations Group of Experts, as well as various resolutions of the UN Security Council related to business and human rights in the Congolese mining sector.  The DRC participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and publishes reports on its revenue from natural resources, although in recent years the reports have been late or incomplete.

The 2018 Mining Code provides domestic transparency measures requiring the disclosure of payments made to government entities.  Promines, a technical parastatal body financed by the GDRC and the World Bank, works to improve transparency in the artisanal mining sector.  Amnesty International, Pact Inc., Global Witness, and the Carter Center have published reports on RBC in the DRC mining sector.  The Dodd-Frank Act mandated companies publicly listed in the United States to declare their supply chains for DRC-sourced “3Ts” (tin, tungsten, and tantalum) and gold.  Although the Securities and Exchange Commission is no longer actively enforcing the act, many U.S. multinationals appear to be complying voluntarily to avoid possible reputational damage.

The Tshisekedi government has used public prosecutions of high-level officials and the creation of an anti-corruption unit to improve the DRC’s reputation on corruption.  DRC’s 2018 Corruption Perception Index score—161 out of 180—underlines the endemic and deep roots of corruption in the country.  The DRC constitution includes laws intended to fight corruption and bribery by all citizens, including public officials.  Anti-corruption laws extend to family members and political parties.  Private companies have applied their own controls to limit corruption, and have in the past been more effective at controlling it.

In March 2020, President Tshisekedi created the National Agency to Fight Corruption.  In June 2020, the National Assembly began discussing the law on the creation, organization, and  function of the Agency.  The National Assembly forwarded the proposal to the Political, Administrative, and Judiciary Commission for analysis prior to a vote.  Currently corruption investigations are ongoing for three Managing Directors of SOEs.  In June, the court convicted Tshisekedi’s former Chief of Staff of embezzlement and public corruption, and sentenced him to 20 years in prison.

The DRC is a signatory to the UN Anticorruption Convention, but not to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.  The DRC ratified a protocol agreement with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on Fighting Corruption.  NGOs such as the group “The Congo is Not for Sale,” have an important role in revealing corrupt practices, and the law protects NGOs in a whistleblower role.

U.S. firms see corruption as one of the main hurdles to investment in the DRC, particularly in the awarding of concessions, government procurement, and taxation treatment.

The Agency in charge of fighting corruption in the DRC is:

Agence de Prévention et de Lutte contre la Corruption (APLC)
Ghislain Kikangala, Coordinator
Tel: +243 893 302 819

In January 2019, Felix Tshisekedi became President in the DRC’s first peaceful transition of power, ushering a period of relative political stability.  The December 2018 elections were the result of international, including U.S pressure, as well as a long period of mediation involving the Catholic Church, the government, and the opposition.  Maintaining public support for the Tshisekedi government will ultimately require the administration to deliver on the campaign slogan of “the people first.”

The security situation continues to be a concern.  Thousands of members of armed groups have been disarming and turning themselves in to the United Nations’ DRC peacekeeping operation (MONUSCO) and the GDRC since President Tshisekedi’s election, according to international observers.  Most of the defections have taken place in eastern and central DRC.  International statistics indicate that over 140 armed groups continue to operate in 17 of the DRC’s 26 provinces, primarily in the east of the country.  The ISIS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group in eastern DRC is one of the country’s most notorious and intractable armed groups, and its members have shown no interest in demobilizing.  Armed groups previously interfered with the effort to eradicate the Ebola outbreak in eastern DRC, but interference decreased and the eastern outbreak was declared over on June 25.  President Tshisekedi appears cognizant of the important role security plays in attracting foreign investment, and has encouraged the Congolese army to work with MONUSCO to eliminate armed groups.

US citizens and interests are not being specifically targeted by armed groups, but can easily fall victim to violence or kidnapping by being in the wrong place at the wrong time.  The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset tracks political violence in developing countries, including the DRC, http://www.acleddata.com/.  Kivu Security Tracker (www.kivusecurity.org) is another database for information on attacks in eastern DRC.   In addition, the Department of State continues to advise travelers to review the Embassy’s travel advisory: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/DemocraticRepublicoftheCongoDRC.html

The DRC labor market has a large and low-skilled labor force with high youth unemployment.  Expatriates frequently fill jobs requiring technical training in the key mining sector.  About 85 percent of the non-agricultural workforce is in the informal sector.

DRC labor law stipulates that for businesses with over 100 employees, 10 percent of all employees should be local.  If the managing director is a foreigner, his or her deputy or secretary general is expected to be a Congolese citizen.  The government can waive these provisions depending on the sector of activity and expertise available.  There are no onerous conditionality, visa, residence, or work permit requirements inhibiting the mobility of foreign investors and their employees.

While the agricultural sector is expanding, it continues to face poor infrastructure and a lack of access to technology.  About 60 percent of the workforce is in agriculture.

The DRC faces a deficit in skilled labor across all sectors.  There are few formal vocational training programs, though Article 8 of the labor law stipulates that all employers should provide training to their employees.  To address the high unemployment rate, the GDRC enacted a policy giving Congolese a preference in hiring over expatriates.  Laws prevent firms from firing workers under most conditions without compensation.  These restrictions have deterred hiring and encouraged the use of temporary contracts in lieu of permanent hiring.  There is no government safety net to compensate laid off workers.

Congolese law bans collective bargaining in certain sectors, including by civil servants and public employees, and the law does not provide adequate protection against anti-union discrimination.  While the right to strike is recognized, there are provisions which require unions to obtain permission and adhere to lengthy compulsory arbitration and appeal procedures before starting a strike.  Unions often strike for higher wages or the payment of back wages.

The DRC government ratified the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) eight core conventions, but some Congolese laws continue to be inconsistent with the ILO Convention on Forced Labor.

DRC law prohibits discrimination in employment and occupation based on race, gender, language, or social status.  The law does not specifically protect against discrimination based on religion, age, political opinion, national origin, disability, pregnancy, sexual orientation, gender identity, or HIV-positive status.  Additionally, no law specifically prohibits discrimination in the employment of career public service members.  According to some businesses, the government does not effectively enforce relevant employment laws.

Labor law defines different standard workweeks, ranging from 45 to 72 hours, for various jobs, and prescribes rest periods and premium pay for overtime.  Employers in both the formal and informal sectors often do not respect these provisions.  The law does not prohibit compulsory overtime.

The labor code specifies health and safety standards, but the government does not effectively enforce labor standards in the informal sector, and enforcement is uneven to non-existent in the formal sector.  The Ministry of Labor employs 200 labor inspectors but has not provided funds to conduct labor inspections.

Lebanon has signed bilateral investment treaties with the following partners (in alphabetical order, as of May 2020):  Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium/Luxemburg, Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Korea (Republic of), Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Netherlands, OPEC Fund, Pakistan, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sudan, Sultanate of Oman, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Yemen.  For more information, please visit the Ministry of Finance’s website on: http://www.finance.gov.lb/en-us/Finance/IA/IPA/   

Lebanon is a member of the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA), which includes:  Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.   Lebanon has a free trade agreement with the European Union as well as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.  Lebanon launched free trade agreement negotiations with MERCOSUR countries in 2016, but negotiations are unlikely to continue in the short term.  The accession of Lebanon to the Agadir Free Trade Agreement (Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia) has been approved by member countries and awaits Lebanese Parliament’s ratification to enter into effect.

Lebanon does not have a bilateral taxation treaty with the United States.  It has bilateral taxation treaties with Algeria, Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Gabon, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sudan, Sultanate of Oman, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, Ukraine, and Yemen.  For more information, please visit:  http://www.finance.gov.lb/en-us/Finance/IA/TC/Pages/default.aspx 

Lebanon formally requested an IMF program on May 1, and on April 30, the Lebanese Cabinet approved an economic reform plan that includes fiscal reform measures designed to help Lebanon achieve a budget surplus by 2024.  This includes some tax increases, including on corporate tax rates, interest income, high salaries, capital gains, and VAT for luxury goods only.  No new taxes have been implemented yet, however.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Private firms should exercise caution when bidding on public projects.  Lebanese Government agencies often sole-source contracts, undertaking direct contracting processes that operate according to differing standards and without a formal competitive solicitation.  Public institutions evade regulations that promote full and open competition by splitting contract requirements into smaller solicitations whose values do not exceed government agency procurement limits.  There is no unified procurement law.  A modern procurement law is currently under preparation and will require the Cabinet’s and Parliament’s ratification.  The Public Procurement Management Administration (PPMA), known as the “Tender Board,” technically has the authority to review terms of reference and evaluate bids for GoL contracts.  The Tender Board is generally transparent, but corruption often arises within the scope of the tenders and the ministries that issue them.  The Central Inspection Board (CIB), an oversight body within the Office of the Prime Minister, oversees government administrative processes, and the Court of Audit has oversight over public expenditures. The Social Security Fund and the Council for Development and Reconstruction, public entities that manage large funding flows, remain outside the CIB jurisdiction.

Excessive regulation hampers procedures for business entry, operation, and exit.  However, the process does not discriminate against foreign investors.  International companies face an unpredictable and opaque operating environment and often encounter unanticipated obstacles or costs late in the process.

Trademark registration, economic and trade indicators, and market surveillance reports are available online at:  http://www.economy.gov.lb .  Some procedures, including those related to branch offices or representative offices of foreign companies, or to protecting intellectual property rights, still require the right-holder to visit the ministry in person to finalize and pay required dues.

All legislation, government decrees, decisions, and official announcements are published in the Official Gazette.  The government does not publish proposed draft laws and regulations for public comment, but a parliamentary commission may invite private sector stakeholders to comment on legislation.  Telecom Law No. 431 requires the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TRA) to issue regulations in draft for public consultation to promote transparency and enable the general public to shape future regulations.  The TRA has not introduced new regulations since the term of its executive board expired in February 2012.  Publicly listed companies adhere to international accounting standards.  In general, legal, regulatory, and accounting systems for Lebanese businesses in the formal sector accord with international norms.

Lebanon passed the Access to Information Law in January 2017 to promote transparency in the public sector.  The law permits anyone, including foreigners, to request information from government agencies.  A Whistleblower Protection law also passed in October 2018.  While the Whistleblower law is in force, the establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Commission to oversee the law’s implementation was only approved by Parliament in April 2020 and has yet to be staffed.  In January 2017, Lebanon announced its intent to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI), a global standard to promote transparency of the extractive sector, though it has not yet joined.  In September 2018, Parliament adopted the Transparency in Oil and Gas Law to facilitate the EITI accession process.  To complete Lebanon’s candidacy, the Minister of Energy and Water announced that Lebanon would form a Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG), with representatives from government, private firms operating in Lebanon, and civil society.  In March 2019, the Minister of Energy and Water invited civil society to choose independently its representative to the MSG, as per the EITI’s requirements. EITI membership will require annual data disclosures on licenses, contracts, beneficial ownership, payments, revenues, and production.

Lebanon’s public finances are not transparent; budget documents did not present a full picture of Lebanon’s expenditures and revenue streams, and Lebanon has not published an end-of-year report.  Details regarding allocations to and earnings from state-owned enterprises were limited.  The information in the budget was not considered reliable or reasonably accurate and did not correspond to actual revenues and expenditures.  Lebanon’s supreme audit institution did not make its audit reports publicly available.  While Lebanon’s debt obligations are transparent, some analysts have questioned the Central Bank’s reported foreign currency position.  The Lebanese government hired three private auditors to audit its Central Bank as part of its economic reform plan, approved by the Cabinet on April 30.

International Regulatory Considerations

Lebanon is not part of any regional economic block.  It adopts a variety of standards based on the type of product and product destination.  Lebanon is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but has held observer status since 1999.  Lebanon does have a WTO/TBT (technical barriers to trade) Enquiry Point that handles enquiries from WTO Member States and other interested parties.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Lebanon has a civil (roman and codified law) legal system inspired by the French civil procedure code (three degrees of jurisdictions:  First Instance, Appeal, and Supreme Court).  Ownership of property is enforced by registering the deed in the Property Registry.  Lebanon has a written commercial law and contractual law.  Lebanon has commercial, civil, and penal courts, but no specialized courts to hear intellectual property (IP) claims.  Civil and/or penal courts adjudicate IP claims.  Lebanon has an administrative court, the State Council, which handles all disputes involving the state.  Lebanon has a labor court in seven out of its nine governorates to hear claims of unfair labor practices.

Local courts accept investment agreements subject to foreign jurisdictions, if they do not contravene Lebanese law.  Judgments of foreign courts are enforced subject to the Exequatur obtained.  Weak judicial capacity (i.e., shortage of judges, inadequate support structures, administrative delays) results in delays in the handling of cases.  The Lebanese Constitution guarantees the judicial system’s independence.  However, politicians and powerful lobbying groups often interfere in the court system.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

A foreigner may establish a business under the same conditions as a Lebanese national but must register the business in the Commercial Registry.  Foreign investors who do not manage their business from Lebanon need not apply for a work permit.  However, foreign investors who own and manage their businesses within Lebanon must apply for an employer work permit and a residency permit.  Employer work permits stipulate that a foreign investor’s capital contribution cannot be less than USD 67,000.  The investor must also hire three Lebanese employees and register them in the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) within the first six months of employment.

Companies established in Lebanon must abide by the Lebanese Commercial Code and are required to retain the services of a lawyer to serve as a corporate agent.  Local courts are responsible for enforcing contracts.  There are no sector-specific laws on acquisitions, mergers, or takeovers, with the exception of bank mergers.

Lebanese law does not differentiate between local and foreign investors, except in land acquisition (see Real Property section).  Foreign investors can generally establish a Lebanese company, participate in a joint venture, or establish a local branch or subsidiary of their company without difficulty.  Specific requirements apply for holding and offshore companies, real estate, insurance, media (television and newspapers), and banking.

Lebanese law allows the establishment of joint-stock corporations, limited liability, offshore, and holding companies.  However, offshore and holding companies must be joint-stock corporations (Société Anonyme Libanaise – SAL).  The Lebanese Commercial Code governs these entities.

IDAL’s website (http://investinlebanon.gov.lb/ ) provides investors information on investment legislation, regulations, and starting a business.  IDAL’s proposed changes to investment-related laws and regulations, including amending requirements for IT companies to benefit from IDAL incentives, are pending government approval.  IDAL is finalizing a detailed ICT plan aimed at expanding facilities, developing incentives, and facilitating investments in the ICT sector.  IDAL intends to focus its investment promotion strategy on attracting high value-added innovative investments related to all of the sectors under its mandate.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

Lebanon has not enacted a law that governs competition.  Local courts review claims on competition-related issues under various laws.

Expropriation and Compensation

Land expropriation in Lebanon is relatively rare.  The Law on Expropriation (Law No. 58, dated May 29, 1991, Article 1) and Article 15 of the Constitution specify that expropriation must be for a public purpose and calls for fair and adequate compensation.  The government pays compensation at the time of expropriation, but the rate is often perceived as below fair market value.  The government does not discriminate against foreign investors, companies, or their representatives on expropriations.

The government established three real estate companies in the mid-1990s to encourage reconstruction and development in Greater Beirut following the Lebanese Civil War:  1) private corporation Solidere for the development and reconstruction of Beirut’s downtown commercial district, 2) private corporation Linord, for northern Beirut, and 3) public institution Elyssar for the southwest suburbs of Beirut.  Linord has been dormant for years, and Elyssar’s projects have stalled since 2007.  The government granted these three companies the authority to expropriate certain lands for development under the Law on Expropriation.  Landowners and squatters have challenged the land seizures in court.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Lebanon is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention).  Lebanon ratified the 1958 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) in 2007.  Lebanese law conforms to both conventions.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The government accepts international arbitration related to investment disputes.  In cases involving concessions or public projects, the government does not accept binding international arbitration unless the contract includes an arbitration clause that was obtained through prior approval by Cabinet decree.  However, there is an exception for investors from countries that have a signed and ratified investment protection agreement with Lebanon that provides for international arbitration in the case of disputes.  In the past, the government has faced challenges related to previously-awarded contracts and resorted to international arbitration for resolution.  To post’s knowledge, there are no known new cases.  In 2010, the government settled a dispute with a Chinese contracting company working to expand the northern port of Tripoli.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

International arbitration is accepted as a means to settle investment disputes between private parties.  The Lebanese Centre for Arbitration was created in 1995 by local economic organizations, including the Lebanese chambers of commerce, industry, and agriculture.  The Centre resolves domestic and international conflicts related to trade and investment.  Its statutes are similar to those of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, and its conciliation and arbitration rules are modeled on those of the Paris ICC.  Judgments of foreign courts are enforced subject to the exequatur obtained.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Lebanon does not have a Bankruptcy Law.  However, the Commercial Code (Book No. 5, Articles 459-668) and the Penal Code govern insolvency and bankruptcy.  Workers may resort to the Labor Court and the National Social Security Fund to recover pay and benefits from local and foreign firms that go bankrupt.  The law criminalizes fraudulent bankruptcy.

Investment Incentives

Lebanon’s Investment Law No. 360 encourages investment in information technology, telecom, media, tourism, industry, agriculture, and agro-industry.  The law divides the country into three investment zones, with different incentives in each zone.  These include facilitating permits for foreign labor and tax benefits, which range from a five-year, 50 percent reduction on income and dividend distribution taxes to a total exemption of these taxes for 10 years, starting from the date of operation (tied to the issuance of the first invoice).  Companies that list 40 percent of their shares on the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) are exempt from income tax for two years.  The law also introduces tailored incentives through package deals for large investment projects, regardless of the project’s location.  These may include tax exemptions for up to 10 years, reductions on construction and work permit fees, and a total exemption on land registration fees.  IDAL exempts joint-stock companies that benefit from package deal incentives from the obligation to have a majority of a board of directors be Lebanese nationals (Law No. 771, dated November 2006).  Investors who seek to benefit from work permit incentives under package deals must hire two Lebanese for every foreigner and register them with the NSSF.  IDAL is working on several amendments to Investment Law 360 that would expand incentives to sectors, including ICT.  The government does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects.

Other laws and legislative decrees provide tax incentives and exemptions depending on the type of investment and its geographical location.  Industrial investments in rural areas benefit from tax exemptions of six or 10 years, depending on specific criteria (Law No. 27, dated July 19, 1980, Law No. 282, dated December 30, 1993, and Decree No. 127, dated September 16, 1983).  Exemptions are also available for investments in South Lebanon, Nabatiyeh, and the Bekaa Valley (Decree No. 3361, dated July, 2, 2000).  For example, new industrial establishments manufacturing new products benefit from a 10-year income tax exemption.  Factories currently based on the coast, which relocate to rural areas or areas in South Lebanon, Nabatiyeh, or the Bekaa Valley benefit from a six-year income tax exemption.  Parliament enacted a law in April 2014 to reduce income tax on industrial exports by 50 percent.  More information can be found on IDAL’s website at http://investinlebanon.gov.lb/en/doing_business/investment_incentives .

Domestic and foreign investors may benefit from Central Bank-subsidized loans covering housing, investment in productive sectors, energy efficiency and renewable energy, and financing projects.  The Central Bank continues, in cooperation with the European Investment Bank (EIB) (Euro 50 million) and AFD (Agence Francaise de Developpement, the French USAID counterpart) to subsidize loans for energy efficiency projects.  The Central Bank has made preparations to launch “The Oxygen Fund” to support the import of raw materials to Lebanese industries and has pledged USD 100 million to this fund; it has also committed an additional USD100 million as a bridge loan for industrialists to import raw materials until this fund becomes operational.  Analysts question whether such efforts, absent external assistance, will be enough.

The government grants customs exemptions to industrial warehouses for export purposes.  Companies located in the Beirut Port or the Tripoli Port Free Zone benefit from customs exemptions and are exempt from the value-added tax (VAT) for export purposes.  They are also not required to register their employees with the NSSF, if they provide equal or better benefits.

As part of its mandate, IDAL promotes and supports Lebanese exports, especially in the agriculture, agro-industry, and industry sectors, by providing assistance on export requirements and studies on potential new markets, supporting exporter participation in international fairs and exhibitions, as well as subsidizing export transportation costs.

Lebanon does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Foreign-owned firms have the same investment opportunities as Lebanese firms.  Lebanon has one duty-free zone at Beirut-Rafik Hariri International Airport and two free trade zones, the Beirut Port and the Tripoli Port.  The WTO-compatible Customs Law issued by Decree No. 4461 fosters the development of free zones (Articles 242-261 cover free trade zones and Articles 262-266 cover duty free zones) and is available online at www.customs.gov.lb .  The government enacted Law No. 18, dated September 5, 2008, that established the Tripoli Special Economic Zone (TSEZ) to attract investment in trade, industry, services, storage, and other services, as well as to grant investors tax exemptions and offer other incentives such as relaxed allowances for foreign labor and unrestricted currency conversion.  On April 9, 2015, the Cabinet appointed a TSEZ Authority to regulate the zone, and according to the TSEZ Authority, efforts are underway with the International Finance Corporation to build and develop the zone.  The TSEZ Authority has completed an interim licensing regime to grant licenses for logistics activities, and is working with the IFC towards a full-fledge licensing regime, expected to be ready by the end of 2020 or early 2021.  The master plan for the industrial and logistics site next to Tripoli Port is completed and awaits Cabinet approval.

On March 29, 2018, the Cabinet approved expanding the geographical area of the TSEZ to include an additional 75,000 square meters of the Rachid Karami Fair in Tripoli and to establish a knowledge-innovation center.  The Authority has completed the architectural concept for the Rachid Karami zone for knowledge and innovation center and will start with the Master Plan this year.  The Authority expects the TSEZ will begin logistics activities in early 2021.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

The government mandates local employment, and the Ministry of Labor publishes annually a list of jobs restricted to Lebanese nationals.  Foreign and local participation on the board of directors is contingent upon the firm’s structure as defined in Lebanese commercial law.  Foreign investors enjoy the same incentives as local investors.

Foreigners doing business in Lebanon through a company, factory, or office must hold work and residency permits.  There are no discriminatory or excessively onerous visa, residence, or work permit requirements.  Travelers who hold passports that contain visas or entry/exit stamps for Israel will likely be denied entry into Lebanon and may be subject to arrest or detention.  Even if travel documents contain no Israeli stamps or visas, persons who have previously traveled to Israel may still face arrest and/or detention if prior travel is disclosed.

Registration with a chamber of commerce is required to import and handle a limited number of products that are subject to control requirements for safety reasons.  Products with such special import requirements constitute less than one percent of total tradable goods.  Registration with a chamber of commerce is required to ensure that established facilities meet safety, handling, and storage requirements.

Lebanon does not follow any forced localization policy and does not require foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance.  Lebanon’s Central Bank requires all banks to keep data backups in Lebanon, while service providers are required to do the same.

Real Property

The right to private ownership is respected in Lebanon.  The concept of a mortgage exists and secured interests in property, both movable and real, are recognized and enforced.  Such security interests must be recorded in the Commercial Registry and the Real Estate Registry.  The Real Estate Law governs acquisition and disposition of all property rights by Lebanese nationals, while Law No. 296, dated April 3, 2001, governs real estate acquisition by non-Lebanese.  Over ten percent of land, mostly in rural and remote areas, does not have clear title.  The government is undertaking efforts to identify property owners and register land titles.

Intellectual Property Rights

While Lebanon is not a WTO member, its intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation is generally compliant with Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) standards.  .  The Ministry of Energy and Trade’s (MoET) Intellectual Property Protection Office (IPPO) has led efforts to improve the IPR regime but suffers from limited financial and human resources, and insufficient political support.  Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces (ISF) and Customs play roles in enforcement.  While IPR awareness within the Lebanese judiciary has improved somewhat in recent years, gaps remain with regards to understanding the negative economic impact that IPR violations have on the economy.  The MoET’s new draft laws and amendments to existing laws aimed at improving the IPR environment, notably for industrial design, trademark, geographical indications, as well as amendments to the copyright law, await parliamentary approval.

Existing IPR laws cover copyright, patent, trademarks, and geographical elements.  Lebanon’s 1999 Copyright Law largely complies with WTO regulations and needs only minor amendments to become fully compatible.  Copyright registration in Lebanon is not mandatory, and copyright protection is granted without the need for registration.  The MoET launched an online registration service in January 2013 for copyrights and trademarks on https://portal.economy.gov.lb/ .  This service simplified the registration process and over 80 percent of registrations of trademarks and copyrights now take place online.  Due to the complexity of copyrights and patents, registration is still accepted in person at the MoET, and payment must also take place in person.  The switch  to an objection system for trademarks also remains stalled due to the need for parliamentary approval.  However, the MoET noted that it implements the objection system in practice.

Lebanon’s Parliament ratified the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) in February 2010.  Ratification documents have not yet been deposited with WIPO, however, since this would also require amendments to the Copyright Law.

A modern TRIPS-compatible Patent Law, approved in 2000, provides general protection for semiconductor chip layout designs and plant varieties.  Data protection and undisclosed information fall under Article 47 of the Patent Law, but current provisions for pharmaceutical registration are subject to interpretation.  Generic manufacturers in Lebanon are not prohibited from using original data (e.g., data published on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration website) to register competing products that are identical to original products.  Decree No. 571 on the conditions of registering, importing, marketing, and classifying pharmaceuticals, which should have improved the process of drug registration and reduced the number of copycat drugs being registered, still leaves some room for interpretation.  There are no current plans to amend the Patent Law.  On patent registrations, the Lebanese legal regime does not require examination for novelty, utility, and innovation.  Simple patent deposit is required at the MoET, where the application is examined only for conformity with general laws and ethics.

The Internal Security Force (ISF) Cybercrime and IP Unit under ISF’s Judicial Police directorate focuses its efforts on online counterfeiting and copyright violations, whereas the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Unit investigates trademark violations associated with counterfeit physical goods.  Lebanese Customs also plays a direct role in IPR enforcement by seizing counterfeits and an indirect role as part of its efforts to combat smuggling.  The U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 annual review of intellectual property protection worldwide has retained Lebanon on its watch list since 2008.

The IPPO acts upon the requests of rights holders or in an ex officio capacity.  The ISF cannot act in an ex officio capacity and still requires a criminal complaint to be filed with the prosecutor’s office in order for it to take action.  The sale and distribution of pirated, counterfeit, and copycat products continued across Lebanon, in commercial establishments and through street vendors.  This included leather goods, apparel and luxury items, fast-moving consumer goods (FMCGs), software, optical media, and pharmaceuticals.

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ .

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

There are no restrictions on portfolio investment, and foreign investors may invest in Lebanese equities and fixed income certificates.  While legally Lebanon is a free market economy and does not restrict the movement of capital into or out of the country, Lebanon’s financial sector imposed ad hoc capital controls on financial outflows from Lebanon since October 2019 due to dollar illiquidity.  There are de facto restrictions on outbound payments and transfers for current international transactions, although these have yet to be codified into law.  Money transfer services such as Western Union and MoneyGram must now disburse inbound transfers in local currency.  The Banking Control Commission of Lebanon (BCCL) has a department which oversees and conducts on-site and off-site audits of money exchange institutions and electronic money transfer firms operating in Lebanon using a risk-based supervision approach.

Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors may obtain credit facilities on the local market.  However, as Lebanon entered its economic crisis in  the fall of 2019 and defaulted on its dollar-denominated debt in March 2020, local and international credit is virtually nonexistent. The private sector may access overdrafts and discounted treasury bills in addition to a variety of credit instruments, such as housing, consumer, or personal loans, as well as corporate loans for SMEs.

Government legislation allows the listing of tradable stocks on the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE).  By regulation, an investor should inform the BSE when her/his portfolio of shares in any listed company reaches ten percent and five percent in any listed bank.  For an investor to acquire more than five percent of shares of any listed bank requires prior approval from the Central Bank.  Currently, the BSE lists six commercial banks, four companies including Solidere — one of the largest publicly held companies in the region — and eight sovereign Eurobond issues (all in U.S. dollars).  However, the BSE suffers from a lack of liquidity and low trading volumes in the absence of significant institutional and foreign investors and had an annual trading volume of only 2.6 percent of market capitalization in 2019.  Weak market turnover discourages investors from committing funds to the market and discourages issuers from seeking listings on the BSE.

Traditional businesses owned by commercially powerful families dominate most sectors.  The government is trying to improve the transparency of such firms to help solidify an emerging capital market for company shares.  The Cabinet approved in September 2017 a decree to establish the Beirut Stock Exchange SAL (BSE SAL) as a joint-stock company that will replace the current BSE.  Initially, the Lebanese state will own the capital of BSE SAL and will privatize the company within one year.  The delay in the process triggered the CMA to issue in January 2019 a Request for Proposal (RFP) for an electronic trading platform that will allow trading in products not traded in the BSE, such as foreign currencies, commodities, and listed SMEs and start-ups.  The CMA has granted the winning consortium of Bank Audi and the Athens Stock Exchange (ATHEX) a license to set up and operate an electronic trading platform (ETP).  The consortium will contribute capital of $20 million to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that will be created to operate the platform.  The consortium has opened the door for banks and financial institutions to also contribute to the SPV’s capital.  After ten years of operating the ETP, the consortium will have to list nearly 60 percent of the SPV shares on the ETP.  More information can be found on:  www.cma.gov.lb/.  Lebanon hosts the headquarters of the Arab Stock Exchanges.

Money and Banking System

Lebanon’s financial sector entered an unprecedented crisis in late 2019.  Lebanon relied on dollar inflows from abroad to finance imports and public spending and to maintain the Lebanese lira-to-USD peg, in place since 1997.  Those dollars were deposited in Lebanese banks, which in turn lent them to the state in the form of deposits at the Central Bank or Lebanese debt instruments.  Nearly 70 percent of bank assets are tied to the sovereign in those two forms.  As dollar inflows dried up and banking sector assets were tied to long-term deposits at the Central Bank and illiquid debt instruments, banks had trouble meeting their dollar obligations to clients.

This illiquidity continued for rest of 2019 and the first quarter of 2020, during which most banks stopped providing any dollars to clients.  Banks are no longer serving their core functions:  making productive loans or allowing those with dollar deposits to withdraw them.  Clients cannot transfer money overseas, except in “emergency” cases, as determined by individual banks.  Lebanon has yet to adopt formal capital controls legislation, but most economic analysts believe such a law is necessary to preserve what limited foreign currency is left in the country and provide a level playing field to all Lebanese.  At the behest of the Central Bank, in April 2020, banks began providing Lebanese lira at rates double the official pegged rate to customers with dollar-denominated accounts.

Lebanon’s default on its dollar-denominated debt in March 2020 – Lebanese banks at the time held $12.7 billion in Lebanon’s dollar bonds – further eroded the balance sheets of Lebanese banks.  Analysts estimate that perhaps 30 percent of loans from Lebanese banks are non-performing.  This number is expected to rise in 2020.  Bankers report that correspondent banks overseas have stopped providing them with lines of credits – or only provide facilities with onerous conditions – further hampering bank efficacy in Lebanon.  On April 30, the Cabinet approved an economic rescue plan, which noted the Lebanese financial sector experienced losses of nearly USD 80 billion, meaning that it will be unable to repay all what it owes to Lebanese with dollar-denominated accounts.  The economic plan hints at a potential “haircut” on dollar deposits, in which wealthy account holders could lose some of their deposits to help recapitalize banks after shareholders “bail-in” (convert their deposits into bank shares) their financial institutions.

The Lebanese banking sector covers the entire country with 1,051 operating commercial and investment bank branches as of November 2019.  There are 4,757 residents per branch in Lebanon (assuming five million inhabitants), which compares favorably to regional and emerging markets.  According to World Bank Development indicators, there are 534 depositors with commercial banks per 1,000 adults, 215 borrowers from commercial banks per 1,000 adults, and 38 ATMs per 100,000 adults.  The total domestic assets of Lebanon’s five largest commercial banks reached approximately $115 billion as of the end of 2019 (about 51.4 percent of total banking assets), according to Central Bank data.

Lebanon’s Central Bank was established in 1963.  Lebanon’s Central Bank imposes strict compliance with regulations on banks and financial institutions, and commercial banks, in turn, maintain strict compliance regimes.  However, the United States designated Jammal Trust Bank in August 2019 as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for its role in financing Foreign Terrorist Organization Hizballah.  Foreign banks and branches need the Central Bank’s approval to establish operations in Lebanon.  Moreover, any shareholder with more than five percent of a bank’s share capital must obtain prior approval from the Central Bank to acquire additional shares in that bank, and must inform the Central Bank when selling shares.  In addition, any shareholder needs to obtain prior approval from the Central Bank if he/she wants to become a board member.   The use of cryptocurrencies is prohibited in Lebanon by the Central Bank.  The Central Bank announced that it is developing a digital currency that it plans to issue in Lebanese Pounds for domestic use only.

There are no restrictions in Lebanon on a foreigner or non-resident’s ability to open a bank account in local currency or foreign currencies, provided they abide by Lebanese compliance rules and regulations.  Banks claim they have stringent inquiry mechanisms to ensure compliance with international and domestic regulations and implement Lebanon’s anti-money laundering and counter-terror finance laws.  Banks inform customers of Know-Your-Customer requirements and ask them about the purpose of opening new accounts and about the sources of funds to be deposited.  Lebanese banks note they are compliant with the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).  Lebanon adopted the OECD Common Reporting Standards since January 1, 2018.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

For the first time in Lebanon’s history, commercial banks in late 2019 introduced ad hoc capital controls on Lebanese depositors to stem the outflow of foreign currency.  Depending on a client’s individual bank and account size, he or she is subject to strict limits on foreign transfers for “emergency” purposes only, as defined by a client’s bank.  Clients with Lebanese lira (LBP) denominated accounts can only convert their lira to dollars outside of banks at licensed and unlicensed money exchange houses.

As of May 2020, Lebanon in practice had several different exchange rates.  Since 1997, the LBP has been pegged to the U.S. dollar at 1,507.5 LBP to USD.  However, as Lebanese continue to demand scarce dollars in the Lebanese financial system, the currency has depreciated on secondary markets.  The Central Bank only made dollars available to importers at the official rate for imports of fuel, wheat, and medicine.  For inbound electronic transfers, the Central Bank set the rate at 3,800 LBP/1 USD as of May 2020.  Licensed money exchange houses have sold dollars for as high as 4,400 LBP/1 USD, but as of May 2020, most had closed in response to a government crackdown on purported price gouging.  Unlicensed money exchange houses – the black market – continued to sell dollars in May 2020 at rates ranging from 4,000 to 4,500 LBP/1 USD.  Banks allowed clients to withdraw LBP from their dollar-denominated accounts at 3,000 LBP/1 USD.  Finally, banks offered another preferential exchange rate for those willing to bring new dollar banknotes to bank counters.  Different stores and shops offered varying exchange rate conversions at ad hoc rates as well.

The conversion of foreign currencies or precious metals is unfettered.  Lebanon’s Central Bank posts a daily local currency-exchange rate on its website:  http://www.bdl.gov.lb/ .  Lebanon has one of the most heavily dollarized economies in the world, and businesses commonly accept payment (and return change) in a combination of LBP and U.S. Dollars.

Remittance Policies

While capital controls curtailed the ability of those holding dollar-denominated bank accounts in Lebanon to withdraw or transfer their currencies overseas, those in Lebanon with access to “fresh dollars” (i.e., new dollar bills from abroad or not within the local financial system) were able to access, withdraw, and transfer overseas dollars.  For the vast majority of Lebanese and businesses in Lebanon, remitting any money overseas, including investment returns, remained nearly impossible.  Analysts believe capital controls must continue for the foreseeable future to prevent a bank run and preserve the limited foreign currency remaining in Lebanon.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Lebanon does not have a sovereign wealth fund.  The government’s economic rescue plan, approved by the Cabinet on April 30, calls for the creation of a Public Asset Management Company that would include state assets and properties to help restore depositors’ funds and boost economic recovery.  Lebanon’s Offshore Petroleum Resource Law states that proceeds generated from oil and gas exploration must be deposited in a Sovereign Wealth Fund.  Creating the fund requires a separate law, which the government has yet to adopt.  Lebanon currently receives no proceeds from natural resources that could flow into a sovereign wealth fund.

The Lebanese government maintains several state-owned monopolies.  State-owned Ogero owns and operates all fixed line telecommunications in Lebanon, while the two mobile operators, Touch and Alfa, are also owned by the state.  While they were previously managed by Kuwait’s Zain and Egypt’s Orascom Telecom, the Ministry of Telecommunications took over management of the two mobile operators and will prepare tenders for new management contracts later in 2020.  Electricité du Liban (EdL) provides nationwide electricity production and transmission, and four regional authorities provide water service.

La Régie des Tabacs et Tombacs conducts tobacco procurement, manufacturing, and sales, and Casino du Liban operates as a mixed public-private enterprise.  The Central Bank owns 99.23 percent of the air carrier Middle East Airlines, whose monopoly is scheduled to end in 2024.  Other major state-owned enterprises or public institutions include the Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre ports, the Rashid Karami International Fair (in northern Lebanon), the Sports City Center, and real estate development institution Elyssar.  The government also owns shares in Intra Investment Co., a mixed public-private investment company that owns 96.62 percent of Finance Bank, a Lebanese commercial bank.

There is no uniform definition of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and each has separate internal by-laws.  Decree 4517 (dated 1972) establishes two types of public institutions, one administrative category that involves public enterprises such as the Lebanese University, and a second that holds commercial institutions such as EdL and La Régie.  The Ministry of Finance maintains an unpublished list of SOEs and public institutions.  SOEs and public institutions may purchase or supply goods or services from the private sector or foreign firms.  Their procurement process is governed by separate regulations but under the same terms and conditions as public procurement.  SOEs and public institutions benefit from certain tax exemptions.

The state electricity monopoly restricts production to EdL alone, but numerous private investors operate unregulated generators across the country and sell electricity to citizens at significantly higher rates during the country’s frequent power cuts.  EdL awarded several concessions to privately-owned companies for power distribution in specific regions, and these companies are interested in meeting customer demand.  Independent Power Producers (IPP) may provide municipalities with 10 MW of electricity without receiving a direct concession from EdL.  In April 2014, Parliament granted the Cabinet authority through 2018 to license private companies to generate electricity (Law 288).  On April 17, 2019, Parliament extended Law 288 and granted the Public Tender Office authority to oversee electricity contracts as part of the government’s electricity sector reform.  Law 462 of 2002 called for the corporatization and privatization of the electricity sector, and the creation of an electricity regulatory authority (ERA).  However, as implementation of the privatization law stalled, Law 288 delegated issuance of production permits and licenses for new electricity projects from ERA to the Lebanese government.  Since 2012, EdL has contracted three private companies to manage bill collection, maintenance, and power distribution.

Lebanon’s SOEs report to shareholders, whereas public institutions are subject to oversight by the concerned ministries as well as by the Ministry of Finance.  Public institutions require the approval of concerned ministries for major business decisions.  SOEs may independently prepare their budgets, which must be approved only by their board of directors.  The SOEs and public institutions are required by law to publish an annual report, submit their books for independent audits, and transmit their books to the Court of Audit.

The Lebanese Government currently has no formal plans to privatize SOEs or public institutions.  The April 30 economic reform plan did not specify any government privatization plans other than noting it would likely sell Casino du Liban.  The plan also suggested the creation of a Public Asset Management Company (PAMC) to hold government assets, including government stakes in the “main state-owned enterprises and real estate.”  Profits from the PAMC would go to fund capital increases of the Central Bank, which would in turn allow it to repay its liabilities to the local financial sector.  The plan did not specify which state-owned assets would go into the PAMC or which would be privatized.  Some political leaders and economists have called for SOE privatization to be a larger part of the government’s reform efforts.  The Governor of the Central Bank previously stated plans to list 25 percent of Middle East Airlines (which is 99.23 percent owned by the Central Bank) on the BSE, but this has not happened.

SOEs and public institutions have independent boards staffed primarily by politically-affiliated individuals, appointed by the Cabinet for public institutions, and by shareholders for SOEs.  These boards always include a cabinet-appointed Government Commissioner who reports to the concerned ministries.  SOEs do not currently adhere to the Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD) Corporate Governance Guidelines.

Privatization Program

Lebanon enacted laws in 2002 for the privatization of the telecom sector (Law 431) and the electricity sector (Law 462).  However, neither has been implemented.

Parliament passed a two-year law authorizing the Cabinet to issue Independent Power Producers (IPP) licenses to investors in April 2014.  It later amended the law to extend its application through April 2018.  On April 17, 2019, Parliament passed a new law extending the application of Law 288 through April 2021, granting the Tender Office authority to tender IPP projects.  The Ministry of Energy and Water launched tenders in March 2017 for solar power plants under the IPP law and has issued three wind power plants licenses under IPP.  It planned to issue tenders for two combined cycle gas turbine IPPs in September 2019, but those efforts stalled.  The government reportedly now aims to procure IPPs on a bilateral government-to-company negotiation process.

The High Council for Privatization and Partnerships (HCP) manages privatization and public-private sector partnership (PPP) projects.  In accordance with the provisions of the Privatization Law 228 and the PPP Law 48, the HCP conducts competitive tendering processes for both privatization and PPP projects.  The PPP law introduced a legal framework to attract local and international private investments in infrastructure projects.  The PPP legislation is published on the HCP website http://hcp.gov.lb .  The HCP has yet to fully manage or complete any privatization project.

The Capital Markets Law calls for the corporatization and subsequent privatization of the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) within a two-year period from the date that the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) is appointed.  The Cabinet appointed the CMA in June 2012, and in September 2017 issued a decree to corporatize the BSE.  The corporatization has yet to occur.

Lebanese firms are aware of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and responsible business conduct (RBC), including on environmental, social, and governance issues.  This is true for the banking sector as well as companies in industry, which are slowly creating sustainable supply chains or pursuing social initiatives to appeal to consumers.  The Lebanese Standards Institution (LIBNOR), part of the Ministry of Industry, strives to expand the use of the ISO 26000 standard on Social Responsibility (SR) in Lebanon, one of the eight pilot countries in the Middle East.  However, laws related to human and labor rights, consumer protection, and environment protections are unevenly enforced.

The Central Bank of Lebanon works with banks to direct their financial resources towards projects that improve society and the environment.  This includes issuing circulars to create favorable environmental and educational loans, encourage entrepreneurship through private equity investments, and facilitate improved governance through customer protection.  Lebanon’s economic crisis, however, has frozen project  and corporate lending.  In 2015, the banking sector started to implement Central Bank Circular No. 134, requiring banks to apply measures to ensure transparent and fair dealings with their customers, a reflection of the CSR principles of corporate governance and consumer protection.  The Central Bank also established the Institute for Finance and Governance (IFG).  Some Lebanese banks attempt to align their business plans and CSR policy with the UN Sustainable Development Goals.  Several banks issue their own annual CSR reports.

The government does not require or encourage private companies to establish internal codes of conduct.  However, several companies have adopted a Code of Ethics and corporate governance codes, including the business association ‘Rassemblement de Dirigeants et Chefs d’Entreprises Libanais’ (RDCL, or the Group of Lebanese Business Owners) Code of Business Ethics, and the Lebanese Code of Corporate Governance (CG), which is under the auspices of the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA).  However, these codes are strictly voluntary and the government provides no incentives or enforcement for their adoption.

U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI, including in government procurement, award of contracts, dispute resolution, customs, and taxation.  A key demand of the anti-government protest movement that led to resignation of the previous government in October 2019 was stricter anti-corruption measures.  Corruption is reportedly more pervasive in government contracts (primarily in procurement and public works), taxation, and real estate registration, than in private sector transactions.  Lebanese law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but they are not implemented effectively.  For instance, Lebanon does not effectively enforce the Illicit Wealth Law.  The Illicit Wealth Law applies to all state employees, government and senior officials, and municipality members and extends to family members.  The law does not extend to political parties.  The legislation has articles to counter conflict-of interest in awarding contracts and government procurement, but they are not enforced.  The Access to Information Law is not effectively implemented.

In April 2020, Parliament approved several laws seen as key to anti-corruption efforts:  an anti-corruption law targeting public sector employee and creating a National Committee to Combat Corruption, and a law to lift immunity of (low-level) public service employees.  Implementations of these laws will be critical to their success.  In May 2020, the government approved its National Anti-Corruption Strategy, while Parliament approved a law allowing the committee and Lebanon’s Financial Intelligence Unit to lift bank secrecy for top government officials.  It also approved a law changing appointments of top civil servants to a merit-based system, but implementation for all of these changes remains key to determining how they will combat entrenched corruption.

Lebanon ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in April 2009.  Lebanon is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

As for civil society, the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA) is a key advocate for stronger anti-corruption enforcement.  The LTA also established the Lebanese Advocacy and Legal Advice Center (LALAC) to inform citizens of their rights and to encourage victims and witnesses to take action against cases of corruption.  LALAC operates a hotline for victims and witnesses to report cases of corruption and receive free legal advice and assistance with their case.  The program is currently funded by Transparency International (TI) and the German Foreign Office.  LTA also conducted several workshops targeting municipalities, public servants, investigative journalists, and civil society groups promoting access to information right in Lebanon.

Resources to Report Corruption

Lebanese Transparency Association
Sami El Solh Avenue, Kaloot Bldg, 9th Floor
Badaro, Beirut
P.O. Box 50-552, Lebanon
Tel/Fax: +961-1-388113/4/5
Cell: 70-035777
Email: info@transparency-lebanon.org

Sustained anti-government protests began on October 17, 2019, and  led to resignation of the previous government on October 29.  The protests continued for months, with demonstrators demanding an end to corruption, poor governance, and economic stagnation.  A new government, which drew support from Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Hizballah, did not form until January 21, 2020.  Public demonstrations continued since October, albeit with lesser frequency.  Since October 2019, some protests have turned violent and targeted property, particularly banks and public institutions.

Hizballah continued fighting in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime, while some Lebanese Sunnis reportedly lent support to the Syrian opposition.  Lebanon continues to host more refugees per capita than any other country in the world.  The refugee presence led to increased social tensions and competition for low-skill jobs, and strained infrastructure and provision of public services.

The U.S. government considers the potential threat to U.S. Embassy personnel assigned to Beirut sufficiently serious enough to require all official personnel to live and work under security restrictions.  These limitations occasionally prevent the movement of U.S. Embassy officials and the provision of consular services in certain areas of the country.  U.S. citizen visitors are encouraged to contact the Embassy’s Consular Section for the most recent safety and security information concerning travel to Lebanon.  On March 18, 2020, the Department of State required the ordered departure of non-emergency U.S. government employees and associated family members in Lebanon due to COVID-19-related concerns, including travel restrictions and quarantine procedures that affected commercial flights.  More information may be found at https://lb.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services.

The 1946 Labor Law provides for written and oral contracts and specifies a maximum workweek of 48 hours (with several exceptions, notably agricultural and domestic workers, who are not covered under the Labor Law).  The legal minimum wage was raised in 2012 to 675,000 LBP (USD 450 per the official exchange rate, but closer to $155 per the market exchange rate as of May 2020) per month.  Lebanon is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and signatory to all of its fundamental conventions except on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize. The Ministry of Labor issues an annual list of jobs restricted to only Lebanese.  Local unskilled labor is in short supply.  Arab (mainly Syrian, Egyptian, and Palestinian), Asian, and African laborers are hired to work in construction, agriculture, industry, and households.

The law provides for the right of private sector workers to form and join trade unions, strike, and bargain collectively, although the law places a number of restrictions on these rights.  It provides protection against anti-union discrimination but enforcement is weak and anecdotal evidence suggests anti-union discrimination was widespread.  Lebanon has a government-recognized General Labor Confederation (CGTL), whose membership is limited exclusively to Lebanese workers.  The CGTL’s activities are mainly limited to demanding cost-of-living increases and other social benefits for workers.  The general labor-management relationship remains difficult and the Labor Law is not always properly enforced.  Strikes and demonstrations are not uncommon, and are usually aimed at pressuring the government for better employment conditions.  The law requires businesses to adhere to safety standards, but enforcement is weak.

Lebanon’s labor force (defined locally as aged 15 and above) totals 2.4 million in 2019, including foreign residents but excluding the seasonal work force, according to the World Bank. The World Bank estimated Lebanon’s total population, including refugees, at 6.8 million as of 2018.  There are no official statistics on unemployment.  The Lebanese Finance Minister estimated the unemployment rate above 35 recently, and the World Bank estimated unemployment at 35 percent for youth under 35 years of age in 2019.  The last study on unemployment in Lebanon, conducted by Lebanon’s Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) in partnership with the International Labor Organization in 2018, revealed a general unemployment rate of 11.4 percent and 23.3 percent among younger workers before the economic crisis.  The Minister of Economy and Trade publicly noted that there was competition between Lebanese and Syrian labor for low- to high-skilled jobs and also at the level of micro to small enterprises.  There were widespread anecdotal reports of arbitrary dismissals of Lebanese who were then replaced by non-Lebanese, particularly Syrians, in various economic and productive sectors.  However, there were no official statistics to confirm or quantify the scale of such dismissals.

In 1981, Lebanon and the United States signed an Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) agreement, which become operational in 1996.  OPIC is currently active in Lebanon in insurance, financing, and investment.  To date, OPIC has provided more than USD 300 million in credit line guarantees for transactions in Lebanon.

The Lebanese government’s National Investments Guarantee Corporation (NIGC) continues to insure new investments against political risks, riots, losses due to non-convertibility of currencies, and transfer of profits.  Lebanon has been a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), part of the World Bank, since 1994.

* Source for Host Country Data: The Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics (CAS).  The BDL is compiling FDI statistics without geographical breakdown. Accordingly, the inward/outward FDI positions from/to US are considered as partial figures and resulting from the Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) addressed to banking, financial, and insurance sectors.  CDIS data of 2019 is not yet available

Source: BdL; IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey-CDIS, June 2019
N.B. BdL statistical data sources include International Transactions Reporting System (public and private sectors), Ministry of Finance Land Registry Directorate and CDIS.
CDIS data of 2019 is not yet available.

Source: BdL; IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey-CPIS, June 2019.
N.B. CPIS data of Dec-2019 is not yet available.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Lack of transparency poses one of the greatest hurdles to FDI, as investors must navigate an opaque regulatory bureaucracy. Companies routinely find themselves embroiled in tax, customs, and labor disputes arbitrated by court officials who make decisions that do not conform with Congolese law and ROC Ministry of Justice regulations.

ROC has no known informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations.

The government develops new regulations internally and rarely requests input from industry representatives. Various ministries have regulatory authority over the individual industries in their area of responsibility, with overall authority coordinated by the Ministry of Economy. The government does not usually offer a formal, public comment period.

The accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures are transparent. ROC uses Francophone Africa’s OHADA – the Organization for Business and Customs Harmonization, or Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires – system of accounting, legal, and regulatory procedures.

The government does not normally make draft bills or regulations available for public comment.

The government publishes new laws and regulations in ROC’s Official Journal. The Official Journal is available for download at the website of the Secretary General of the Government maintains the Official Journal online at http://www.sgg.cg.

Each government ministry has an inspector general that conducts oversight to ensure that government agencies follow administrative processes. The office of the president additionally has an inspector general who supervises the entire government.

The government announced no new regulatory system, including enforcement reforms, during the reporting period.

The inspector general process is not legally reviewable and not accountable to the public.

No known instances exist where the government made public scientific studies or quantitative analyses on the impact of regulations.

The government makes transparent some public finances and debt obligations, including explicit and contingent liabilities. The Ministry of Finance publishes the arrangements on its website, https://www.finances.gouv.cg/.

International Regulatory Considerations

ROC participates as a member in the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), a regional economic cooperation community, and in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), a monetary union of six Central African states. These regional economic organizations control much of the national regulatory system.

ROC’s regulatory system for business disputes and regulations governing company registration structure and incorporation incorporate Francophone African regulatory norms promulgated by OHADA – the Organization for Business and Customs Harmonization, or Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires.

ROC participates as a member country of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The government does not provide information as to whether or not it notifies the WTO Committee of all draft regulations relating to Technical Barriers to Trade. ROC signed the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement but has not begun implementing the agreement.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

The French civil law legal system serves as the basis of the Congolese legal system.

OHADA, the Organization for Business and Customs Harmonization, or Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires, provides the basis for ROC’s national commercial law, which also incorporates provisions unique to ROC. A commercial court exists in ROC but has not convened since 2016.

The judicial system remains independent in principle, however, in practice the executive branch has intervened in the judicial system.

Appellate courts exist and receive appeals of enforcement actions. Public Law 6-2003, which established the country’s Investment Charter, states that Congolese law will resolve investment disputes. Judgments of foreign courts are difficult to enforce in ROC. Though the government does not usually deny those judgments outright, it may propose process or procedural delays that prolong the matter indefinitely without resolution.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

ROC’s Commercial Court has authority over any legal disputes involving foreign investors. Investors may also file legal complaints in the OHADA court – based in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire – which has jurisdiction throughout Francophone Africa. ROC’s Hydrocarbons Law and Mining Code of 2016 contain industry-specific regulations for foreign investments.

The ROC Agency for Business Creation, or Agence Congolaise Pour la Création des Entreprises (ACPCE), serves as a “one-stop shop” for establishing a business. Its website has limited information about laws, rules, and reporting requirements: http://www.acpce.cg/.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

No agencies review transactions for competition-related concerns, either domestic or international in nature. Ministries in general monitor individual industries and review industry-related transactions.

Expropriation and Compensation

The ROC government may legally expropriate property if it finds a public need for a given public facility or infrastructure (e.g. roads, hospitals, etc.).

No recent history of expropriation regarding private companies exists. Historically, however, the ROC government has expropriated private property from Congolese citizens to build roads and stadiums. Law entitles the claimants to fair market value compensation, but the government made such compensation inconsistently.

Beginning in 2012, the ROC government expropriated the land of Congolese private property owners in the Kintele suburb of Brazzaville to build a state-of-the-art sports complex for the 2015 African Games. The government offered no compensation, and property owners complained of a lack of legal recourse against the government.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

ROC is a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID). The ROC government has not ratified the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

There is no specific domestic legislation providing for enforcement of awards under the ICSID Convention.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

ROC is a member of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), which includes binding international arbitration of investment disputes.

ROC has a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States. U.S. investors have made no recent claims under the agreement.

There have been two investment disputes involving U.S. entities in the past ten years.

In one, a company successfully negotiated a settlement with ROC authorities after filing suit in a New York district court. In the second, a company successfully sued ROC in U.S. and French courts over non-payment for goods and services, however, the ROC government refused to recognize the judgements. Congolese courts subsequently issued their own judgements in favor of the ROC government. The ROC government no longer responds to attempts by the company or intermediaries to engage on this dispute.

Local courts have rarely recognized and enforced foreign arbitral awards issued against the government.

There is no known history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

There is no known alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms available in ROC. ROC inconsistently abides by international arbitration for any treaty, international convention, or organization of which it is a member. In practice, arbitral judgments are difficult to enforce.

Commercial courts constitute the domestic arbitration bodies within the country. The commercial court legislation and structure follows French commercial legislation and structure.

Local courts inconsistently recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards. ROC law allows for the recognitions of foreign judgments when the relevant laws appear sufficiently similar to Congolese law. Congolese courts have not accepted any foreign arbitral awards in recent years.

Post is not aware of any investment disputes involving state owned enterprises in recent years.

Bankruptcy Regulations

ROC has no specific law that governs bankruptcy. As a member of OHADA, the Organization for Business and Customs Harmonization or Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires, ROC applies OHADA bankruptcy provisions in the event of corporate or individual insolvency. No laws criminalize bankruptcy. ROC does not have a credit bureau or other credit monitoring authority serving the country’s market.

Investment Incentives

ROC’s Ministry of Economy, Industrial Development, and Promotion of the Private Sector has overall responsibility for investment promotion. When a potential investor believes its investment will bring substantial investment and job creation to the Congolese economy, it may apply for preferential tax and customs treatment by applying to the Ministry of Finance’s National Committee on Investments. The Minister of Finance chairs this committee, which includes the Minister of Economy and Industrial Development as well as the Minister of Budget Planning. The committee reviews applications annually.

Presidential decree No. 2004-30 of February 18, 2004 defines the requirements for foreign and national companies to benefit from incentives offered by the Congolese Investment Charter. The decree promulgates four types of incentives:

(a)Incentives to export;
(b)Incentives to reinvest the company’s profit in ROC;
(c)Incentives for businesses in remote areas or areas that are difficult to access; and
(d)Incentives for social and cultural investment.

Examples of incentives include: reduced or exempted taxes below the corporate tax rate of 30 percent; reduced customs duties over a period of five to 10 years; a 50 percent reduction in business registration fees; and an accelerated depreciation mechanism. For companies owned at least 25 percent by domestic entities, other incentives include a reduced dividend tax rate of 10 percent, capital gains tax reductions, deductions for business expenditures, reduced rents, and deductible remunerations. Businesses may negotiate other incentives during the incorporation process.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

The ROC government has named four special economic zones (SEZs): in the main economic hub of Pointe-Noire, the capital Brazzaville, and the cities of Ouesso and Oyo. ROC signed memoranda of understanding with the Governments of Mauritius, Singapore, and the People’s Republic of China to advise on the development of the SEZs. The government has also expressed a desire to attract U.S. investment. Little to no activity occurs in the SEZs, and no known timeline exists to render the SEZs operational.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Foreign companies must offer local employment to receive tax and investment benefits through the National Committee on Investment. Major foreign direct investment must demonstrate a significant economic windfall for the local community, including increased local employment, to receive an investment agreement from the National Committee on Investment.

ROC’s labor code requires the top manager of all companies to be a Congolese national. The government frequently waives this requirement for multinational companies.

Applications for residence or work permits involve multiple, paperwork-intensive steps. Business have reported that immigration and customs officials solicited bribes during the application process. Visitors require a letter of invitation, approved by the immigration authority, prior to applying for any type of visa. A visitor or an investor must obtain a visa before travel. Authorities do not provide visas on arrival.

The ROC government encourages local purchasing and production but in most cases does not impose requirements. The 2016 Hydrocarbons Law includes local content requirements for companies operating in the energy sector.

The Ministry of Commerce applies price controls on roughly four dozen staple products, including food and fuel. The Ministry of Commerce also subsidizes certain products – such as sugar, for example – to make the domestic market more profitable for companies that might otherwise seek to export additional supply.

ROC enforces water pollution safeguards and forest regeneration requirements in the oil and forestry sectors. All forestry companies, both foreign- and locally-owned, are required by law to process 85 percent of their timber domestically and export it as furniture or otherwise transformed wood, and allows timber companies to export up to 15 percent of their wood product as natural timber. In practice, however, the economy exports much timber as natural timber.The timber industry in ROC increasingly requires international certification, most often Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification. 28 of 32 timber companies in ROC operate without FSC certification. FSC-certified companies may benefit from future government incentives as ROC continues to participate in a Voluntary Partnership Agreement with the European Union’s Forest Law Enforcement and Governance Transparency program and with the United Nations’ Reducing Emissions from Degradation and Deforestation program.

The 2016 Hydrocarbons Law includes local content requirements for companies operating in the energy sector.

No known performance requirements exist for foreign or local companies. No known restrictions apply to U.S. or other foreign firms’ participation in ROC government-financed or subsidized research and development programs.

No known procedures for performance requirements exist in the Republic of the Congo.

No requirements for foreign information technology providers exist to provide source code and/or access to encryption.

No requirements prevent companies from transmitting customer or other business data outside the country.

No known requirements enforce local data storage.

Real Property

The government enforces property rights, though companies and individuals cite inconsistent enforcement. Mortgages and liens exist. A generally reliable recording system exists.

No known regulations prohibit land lease or acquisition by foreign investors.

The government has no definitive registry of untitled land.

Property ownership can transfer to other owners if the property remains unoccupied for 10 consecutive years while having been simultaneously occupied by another user (squatter).

Intellectual Property Rights

As a member of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), ROC participates in the African Intellectual Property Organization (AIPO). AIPO manages a single copyright system for all member states. Additionally, as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), ROC must ensure that intellectual property legislation conforms to WTO norms and standards. The Ministry of Commerce leads on issues related to counterfeit products. Local authorities have historically seized and destroyed contraband items, such as medical supplies and food products. The ROC government reportedly uses unlicensed software on its computers. Intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement remains uncommon overall.

The government has not enacted any new IPR-related laws or regulations in the past year. ROC maintains no formal system of tracking and reporting seizures of counterfeit goods.

ROC is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR)Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List.

ROC is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at https://www.wipo.int/directory/en.

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The ROC government maintains a neutral attitude toward foreign portfolio investment and does not widely practice foreign portfolio investment.

ROC does not have a national stock exchange. ROC-based companies may seek regional listing on the Douala Stock Exchange, which merged with the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) Zone Stock Exchange. The Bank of Central African States, BEAC, determines monetary and credit policies within the CEMAC framework to ensure the stability of the common regional currency.

Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources, though complex products are not widely used.

The government and Central Bank respect IMF Article VIII in principle, however, within the last year the Bank of Central African States imposed restrictions on international payments and transfers. Mining and oil companies especially expressed concerns about the new restrictions.

In June 2019, the Bank of Central African States issued a number of directives to implement currency exchange controls previously approved by CEMAC on December 21, 2018. The CEMAC regulation provides the framework, terms, and conditions for the regulation of foreign exchange transactions in the CEMAC member States – Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of the Congo. The new regulation increases the BEAC’s role in declaring and authorizing international transactions, the control of the compliance with the foreign exchange regulations and the interpretation of the CEMAC Regulation. The regulation entered into force on March 1, 2019.

The Bank of Central African States (BEAC) monitors credits and market terms. Foreign investors can obtain credit on the local market as long as they have a locally registered company. ROC, however, offers only a limited range of credit instruments.

Money and Banking System

Banking penetration likely remains in the 10- to 12-percent range, although a government survey conducted in 2015 estimated a rate of 25-30 percent. High intermediation costs and high collateral requirements limit the pool of customers. Microfinance banks and mobile banking remain the fastest growth areas in the banking sector.

The current economic crisis and the government’s consecutive years of fiscal deficits have additionally strained the banking sector over the past five years. Overall loan default has increased and has reached about 30 percent in the reporting period due to strained economic conditions.

Non-performing loans increased to approximately 30 percent in 2019.

Fiscal transparency issues limit any estimate of the total assets controlled by ROC’s largest banks. The assets of the largest banks have likely decreased significantly in recent years as a result of the economic crisis.

ROC participates in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) zone and the Central Bank of the Central African States (BEAC) system. BEAC’s regulatory body, the Banking Commission of Central Africa (COBAC), supervises the Congolese banking sector.

Foreign banks and branches may operate in ROC and constitute the majority of banking operations in ROC. BEAC banking regulations govern foreign and domestic banks in ROC. No banks have left ROC in the past ten years.

No known restrictions exist on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

In 2019, the Bank of the Central African States (BEAC) imposed new restrictions on international payments and transfers that have negatively affected foreign exchange. CEMAC regulations require banks to record and report the identity of customers engaging in transactions valued at over USD 10,000. The BEAC recently began monitoring closely fund transfers larger than USD 100,000.

New BEAC restrictions have created difficulties obtaining foreign currencies from commercial banks. No U.S.-based banks operate in ROC but transfers directly to and from the United States are possible.

ROC and other CEMAC member states use the Central African CFA Franc (FCFA, sometimes abbreviated XAF) as a common currency. The CFA is pegged to the Euro as an intervention monetary unit at a fixed exchange rate of 1 Euro: 655.957 CFA Franc.

Remittance Policies

In 2019, the Bank of the Central African States (BEAC) imposed new restrictions on international payments and transfers that have negatively affected remittances.

In June 2019, the Central Bank of Central African States issued a number of standard operating procedures to implement currency exchange controls. Since the implementation of these regulations, the average waiting period for any fund transfer is 20 days.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

ROC maintains no formal Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). An ROC law envisages the establishment of an SWF at the BEAC and acquiring mostly risk-free foreign assets. The sovereign wealth fund is not operational.

As a former people’s republic, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominated the Congolese economy of the 1970s and 1980s. The number of SOEs remains comparatively small following a wave of privatization in the 1990s. The national oil company (SNPC), electricity company (E2C), and water supply company (LCDE) constitute the largest remaining SOEs. SOEs report to their respective ministries.

Constraints on SOEs operating in the non-oil sector appear sufficiently monitored and subject to civil society and media scrutiny. The operations of SNPC, however, continue to present transparency concerns. SOEs must publish annual reports subject to examination by the government’s supreme audit institution. In practice, these examinations do not always occur.

The government publishes no official list of SOEs.

Private companies may compete with public companies and have in some cases won contracts sought by SOEs. Government budget constraints limit SOEs’ operations.

Privatization Program

ROC has no known program for privatization.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) remains a well-known concept in ROC that local communities view favorably. Foreign oil companies constitute the primary CSR actors. Telecommunications and transportation companies and banks have increasingly supported CSR initiatives and improved their public images. The government promotes CSR to finance hospitals, education, nutrition programs, and road construction.

The government has not taken any specific measures to encourage responsible business conduct (RBC). The government has not established a national contact point or ombudsman for RBC, nor has it established a national action plan to define and drive its approach to RBC. The government encourages RBC by partnering with or endorsing companies’ CSR initiatives. RBC policies do not factor significantly into government procurement decisions.

No known high-profile, controversial instances exist of private sector entities negatively impacting human rights.

ROC inconsistently enforces laws related to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protections and commerce.

No known corporate governance, accounting, or executive compensation standards exist to protect shareholders.

No independent NGOs, investment funds, worker organizations/unions, or business associations promote or monitor RBC practices. Civil society groups promote individual matters of interest on a case-by-case basis.

ROC does not adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. No domestic measures require supply chain due diligence for companies that source minerals that may originate from conflict-affected areas.

ROC has participated in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) since 2012 and published reports up to 2017. No domestic transparency measures require the disclosure of payments made to the government and/or of RBC policies or practices.

ROC adopted a law against corruption by public officials, “Code de Transparence dans les Finances Publiques,” on March 9, 2017. The ROC government inconsistently enforces the law.

The corruption law applies to elected and appointed officials. It does not extend to family members of officials or to political parties.

No specific laws or regulations address conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement.

ROC does not encourage or require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that prohibit bribery of public officials.

Some private companies, multinationals in particular, use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials.

ROC serves as a party to the UN Anticorruption Convention.

ROC does not provide protection to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to include NGOs investigating corruption.

U.S. companies routinely cite corruption as an impediment to investment, particularly in the petroleum sector, where corruption practices remain prolific.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption:

Emmanuel Ollita Ondongo
Président
Observatoire Anti-Corruption
Centre Ville, Brazzaville, République du Congo
+242 06 944 6165 or +242 05 551 2229
emmallita2007@yahoo.fr

Contact at a “watchdog” organization:

Christian Mounzeo
President
Rencontre pour la Paix et les Droits de l’Homme (RPDH, the local chapter of “Publish What You Pay” – Publiez Ce Que Vous Payez)
B.P. 939 Pointe-Noire, République du Congo
+242 05 595 52 46
http://www.rpdh-cg.org/

Congo has experienced several periods of politically-motivated violence and civil disturbance since its independence in 1960. The most recent period ended in December 2017, when anti-government forces in the Pool region – which surrounds the capital of Brazzaville – signed a ceasefire agreement with the government that has held since that signing.

There are no known examples of damage to commercial projects and/or installations in the past ten years. Civil disturbances have occasionally resulted in damage to high-profile, public places such as police stations.

The political environment is noticeably calmer since the end of the 2017 legislative elections.

Unemployment in ROC remains high, with youth and women disproportionately affected. Reliable unemployment figures do not exist. The International Labor Organization ILO of the United Nations reports an overall unemployment rate of 18 percent, with unemployment among the 15-24 age group at 12.1 percent.

Skilled labor shortages exist in a number of technical areas, including medicine, engineering, math, science, and banking. The government has no specific training programs to address these shortages.

Excepting in the hydrocarbons sector, no government policy requires the hiring of Congolese nationals.

Government regulations govern employment adjustments attempting to respond to changing market conditions, including a severance requirement. Employers must demonstrate that market conditions have changed and obtain government approval before adjusting employment. Congolese severance laws differentiate between layoffs and firing. An employer must generally document malfeasance in order to terminate an employee for cause.

The government may waive some labor laws to attract or retain investment on a case-by-case basis. ROC has, for example, waived the requirement for certain multinationals to hire a Congolese general manager. No known labor law exceptions exist for Special Economic Zones.

Collective bargaining is widely used in this economy, more than half of companies used it in various industries.

Courts mediate and arbitrate labor disputes.

No major strikes that posed an investment risk occurred during the reporting period.

No serious questions of compliance in law or practice with international labor standards that may pose a reputational risk to investors exist. The International Labor Organization has not identified any potential gaps in law or practice with international labor standards.

The government did not enact any new labor laws or regulations during the last year.

One U.S. company in Congo has a political risk insurance program with DFC. ROC participates in the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

DFC maintains an agreement with ROC that existed between ROC and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation’s (OPIC).

* Source for Host Country Data: National Institute of Statistics

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

South African laws and regulations are generally published in draft form for stakeholders to comment, and legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms.

The DTIC is responsible for business-related regulations. It develops and reviews regulatory systems in the areas of competition, standards, consumer protection, company and intellectual property registration and protections, as well as other subjects in the public interest. It also oversees the work of national and provincial regulatory agencies mandated to assist the DTIC in creating and managing competitive and socially responsible business and consumer regulations. The DTIC publishes a list of Bills and Acts that govern its work at: http://www.thedtic.gov.za/legislation/legislation-and-business-regulation/?hilite=%27IDZ%27 

The 2015 Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Act authorized the creation of the South African Healthcare Products Regulatory Authority (SAHPRA), meant in part to address the backlog of more than 7000 drugs waiting for approval to be used in South Africa. Established in 2018, and unlike its predecessor, the Medicines Control Council (MCC), SAHPRA is a stand-alone public entity governed by a board that is appointed by and accountable to the South African Ministry of Health. SAHPRA is responsible for the monitoring, evaluation, regulation, investigation, inspection, registration, and control of medicines, scheduled substances, clinical trials and medical devices, in vitro diagnostic devices (IVDs), complementary medicines, and blood and blood-based products. SAHPRA intends to do this through 207 full-time in-house technical evaluators, though this structure has not been fully staffed. Unlike with the MCC, SAHPRA’s funding is provided by the retention of registration fees. Despite its launch in 2018, the full staffing and implementation of SAPHRA is anticipated to take up to five years, and clearing the backlog of drug registration dossiers will also take significant time.

South Africa’s Consumer Protection Act (2008) went into effect in 2011. The legislation reinforces various consumer rights, including right of product choice, right to fair contract terms, and right of product quality. Impact of the legislation varies by industry, and businesses have adjusted their operations accordingly. A brochure summarizing the Consumer Protection Act can be found at: http://www.thedtic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/CP_Brochure.pdf . Similarly, the National Credit Act of 2005 aims to promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer credit and for that purpose to provide the general regulation of consumer credit and improves standards of consumer information. A brochure summarizing the National Credit Act can be found at: http://www.thedtic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/NCA_Brochure.pdf 

International Regulatory Considerations

South Africa is a member of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the oldest existing customs union in the world. SACU functions mainly on the basis of the 2002 SACU Agreement which aims to: (a) facilitate the cross-border trade in goods among SACU members; (b) create effective, transparent and democratic institutions; (c) promote fair competition in the common customs area; (d) increase investment opportunities in the common customs area; (e) enhance the economic development, diversification, industrialization and competitiveness of member States; (f) promote the integration of its members into the global economy through enhanced trade and investment; (g) facilitate the equitable sharing of revenue arising from customs and duties levied by members; and (h) facilitate the development of common policies and strategies.

The 2002 SACU Agreement requires member States to develop common policies and strategies with respect to industrial development; cooperate in the development of agricultural policies; cooperate in the enforcement of competition laws and regulations; develop policies and instruments to address unfair trade practices between members; and calls for harmonization of product standards and technical regulations. SACU continues to work on developing these common policies.

In general, South Africa models its standards according to European standards or UK standards where those differ.

South Africa is a member of the WTO and attempts to notify all draft technical regulations to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), though often after the regulations have been implemented.

In November 2017, South Africa ratified the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement. According to the government, it has implemented over 90 percent of the commitments as of May 2020. The outstanding measures were notified under Category B, to be implemented by the indicative date of 2022 without capacity building support and include Article 3 and Article 10 commitments on Advance Rulings and Single Window.

The South African Government is not party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPO).

Legal System and Judicial Independence

South Africa has a mixed legal system composed of civil law inherited from the Dutch, common law inherited from the British, and African customary law, of which there are many variations. As a general rule, South Africa follows English law in criminal and civil procedure, company law, constitutional law, and the law of evidence, but follows Roman-Dutch common law in contract law, law of delict (torts), law of persons, and family law. South African company law regulates corporations, including external companies, non-profit, and for-profit companies (including state-owned enterprises). Funded by the national Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, South Africa has district and magistrates courts across 350 districts and high courts for each of the provinces (except Limpopo and Mpumalanga, which are heard in Gauteng). Often described as “the court of last resort,” the Supreme Court of Appeals hears appeals, and its jurisprudence may only be overruled by the apex court, the Constitutional Court. Moreover, South Africa has multiple specialized courts, including the Competition Appeal Court, Electoral Court, Land Claims Court, the Labour and Labour Appeal Courts, and Tax Courts to handle disputes between taxpayers and the South African Revenue Service. These courts exist parallel to the court hierarchy, and their decisions are subject to the same process of appeal and review as the normal courts. Analysts routinely praise the competence and reliability of judicial processes, and the courts’ independence has been repeatedly proven with high-profile rulings against controversial legislation, as well as against former presidents and corrupt individuals in the executive and legislative branches.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

The February 2019 ratification of the Competition Amendment Bill introduced, among other revisions, section 18A that mandates the President create a committee – comprised of 28 Ministers and officials chosen by the President – to evaluate and intervene in a merger or acquisition by a foreign acquiring firm on the basis of protecting national security interests. The new section states that the President must identify and publish in the Gazette – the South African equivalent of the U.S. Federal Register – a list of national security interests including the markets, industries, goods or services, sectors or regions in which a merger involving a foreign acquiring firm must be notified to the South African government. It also suggests the President consider a merger’s impact on the economic and social stability of South Africa. As of May, 2020, the president has not established the committee, nor has he published the list of national security interests.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

The Competition Commission is empowered to investigate, control and evaluate restrictive business practices, abuse of dominant positions, and mergers in order to achieve equity and efficiency. Their public website is www.compcom.co.za 

The Competition Tribunal has jurisdiction throughout South Africa and adjudicates competition matters in accordance with the Competition Act. While the Commission is the investigation and enforcement agency, the Tribunal is the adjudicative body, very much like a court.

In addition to the points made in the previous section, the amendments, presented by the Ministry for Economic Development that revise the Competition Act of 1998 and entered effect in February 2019 extend the mandate of the competition authorities and the executive to tackle high levels of economic concentration, address the limited transformation in the economy, and curb the abuse of market power by dominant firms. The changes introduced through the Competition Amendment Act are meant to curb anti-competitive practices and break down monopolies that hinder “transformation” – the increased participation of black and HDSA in the South African economy. The amendments aim to deter the abuse of market dominance by large firms that use practices such as margin squeeze, exclusionary practices, price discrimination, and predatory pricing. By increasing the penalties for these prohibited business practices – for repeat offences the penalties could amount to between 10 percent to 25 percent of a firm’s annual turnover – and allowing the parent or holding company to be held liable for the actions of its subsidiaries that contravene competition law, the Competition Commission hopes to break down these anticompetitive practices and open up new opportunities for SMEs.

Expropriation and Compensation

Racially discriminatory property laws and land allocations during the colonial and apartheid periods resulted in highly distorted patterns of land ownership and property distribution in South Africa. Given the slow and mixed success of land reform to date, the National Assembly (Parliament) passed a motion in February 2018 to investigate a proposal to amend the constitution (specifically Section 25, the “property clause”) to allow for land expropriation without compensation (EWC). The constitutional Bill of Rights, where Section 25 resides, has never been amended. Some politicians, think-tanks, and academics argue that Section 25, as written, allows for EWC in certain cases, while others insist that in order to implement EWC more broadly, amending the constitution is required. Academics foresee a few test cases for EWC over the next year, primarily targeted at abandoned buildings in urban areas, informal settlements in peri-urban areas, and involving labor tenants in rural areas.

Parliament tasked an ad hoc Constitutional Review Committee – made up of parliamentarians from various political parties – to report back on whether to amend the constitution to allow EWC, and if so, how it should be done. In December 2018, the National Assembly adopted the committee’s report recommending a constitutional amendment. Following elections in May 2019 the new Parliament created an ad hoc Committee to Initiate and Introduce Legislation to Amend Section 25 of the Constitution. That committee drafted proposed constitutional amendment language that would explicitly allow for EWC and is currently holding public workshops and accepting public comments on the draft language. Parliament had tasked the committee with finalizing the draft language for submission to Parliament by the end of May 2020. That deadline will likely be extended due to restrictions on Parliament’s legislative abilities under the current national declaration of a state of disaster respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. South African law requires that Parliament engage in a rigorous public participation process. Parliament must publish a proposed bill to amend the Constitution in the Government Gazette at least 30 days prior to its introduction to allow for public comment. Any change to the constitution would need a two-thirds parliamentary majority (267 votes) to pass, as well as the support of six out of the nine provinces in the National Council of Provinces. Currently, no single political party has such a majority.

In addition to an amendment to Section 25 of the Constitution, Parliament must also pass an Expropriation Bill to set forth the legal procedures of how the expropriation process will occur. A draft Expropriation Bill was published in December 2018 for public comment but has not yet been submitted to Parliament.

In September 2018, President Ramaphosa appointed an advisory panel on land reform, which supports the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Land Reform chaired by Deputy President David Mabuza. Comprised of ten members from academia, social entrepreneurship, and activist organizations, the panel published its Report on Land Reform and Agriculture in May 2019 and submitted it to the National Assembly Committee on Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development in March 2020. The 144-page report was a comprehensive overview of all aspects of land reform in rural and urban areas, including land tenure, agriculture, access to land, infrastructure development, and the failure of the government’s current land reform policies. The panel made recommendations, many focused on improving current programs and making them more efficient. The panel recognized expropriation without compensation (EWC) as one tool of land reform but saw its usefulness in only limited circumstances and reinforced the need to protect the rights of landowners.

Existing expropriation law, including The Expropriation Act of 1975 (Act) and the Expropriation Act Amendment of 1992, entitles the government to expropriate private property for reasons of public necessity or utility. The decision is an administrative one. Compensation should be the fair market value of the property as agreed between the buyer and seller, or determined by the court, as per Section 25 of the Constitution. In several restitution cases in which the government initiated proceedings to expropriate white-owned farms after courts ruled the land had been seized from blacks during apartheid, the owners rejected the court-approved purchase prices. In most of these cases, the government and owners reached agreement on compensation prior to any final expropriation actions. The government has twice exercised its expropriation power, taking possession of farms in Northern Cape and Limpopo provinces in 2007 after negotiations with owners collapsed. The government paid the owners the fair market value for the land in both cases. A new draft expropriation law, intended to replace the Expropriation Act of 1975, was passed and is awaiting Presidential signature. Some analysts have raised concerns about aspects of the new legislation, including new clauses that would allow the government to expropriate property without first obtaining a court order.

In 2018, the government operationalized the 2014 Property Valuation Act that creates the office of Valuer-General charged with the valuation of property that has been identified for land reform or acquisition or disposal by a department. Among other things, the Act gives the government the option to expropriate property based on a formulation in the Constitution termed “just and equitable compensation.” This considers the market value of the property and applies discounts based on the current use of the property, the history of the acquisition, and the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and capital improvements to the property. Critics fear that this could lead to the government expropriating property at a price lower than fair market value. The Act also allows the government to expropriate property under a broad range of policy goals, including economic transformation and correcting historical grievances.

The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA), enacted in 2004, gave the state ownership of all of South Africa’s mineral and petroleum resources.  It replaced private ownership with a system of licenses controlled by the government of South Africa, and issued by the Department of Mineral Resources.  Under the MPRDA, investors who held pre-existing rights were granted the opportunity to apply for licenses, provided they met the licensing criteria, including the achievement of certain B-BBEE objectives.  Amendments to the MPRDA passed by Parliament in 2014, but were not signed by the President.  In August 2018, the Minister for the Department of Mineral Resources, Gwede Mantashe, called for the recall of the amendments so that oil and gas could be separated out into a new bill.  The Minister also announced the B-BBEE provisions in the new Mining Charter would not apply during exploration, but would start once commodities were found and mining commenced. On November 28, 2019, the newly merged Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) published draft regulations to the MPRDA, giving a 30-day window for providing public comments. On December 24, 2019, the DMRE published the Draft Upstream Petroleum Resources Development Bill for public comment, with a February 20, 2020 deadline for the submission of public comments. Oil and gas exploration and production is currently regulated under the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 (MPRDA), but the new Bill will repeal and replace the relevant sections pertaining to upstream petroleum activities in the MPRDA.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

South Africa is a member of the New York Convention of 1958 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards as implemented through the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, No. 40 of 1977 . South Africa is not a member of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, nor a member of the World Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The 2015 Promotion of Investment Act removes the option for investor state dispute settlement through international courts typically afforded through bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Instead, investors disputing an action taken by the South African government must request the Department of Trade and Industry to facilitate the resolution by appointing a mediator. A foreign investor may also approach any competent court, independent tribunal, or statutory body within South Africa for the resolution of the dispute.

Dispute resolution can be a time-intensive process in South Africa. If the matter is urgent, and the presiding judge agrees, an interim decision can be taken within days while the appeal process can take months or years. If the matter is a dispute of law and is not urgent, it may proceed by application or motion to be solved within months. Where there is a dispute of fact, the matter is referred to trial, which can take several years. The Alternative Dispute Resolution involves negotiation, mediation or arbitration, and may resolve the matter within a couple of months.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Arbitration in South Africa follows the Arbitration Act of 1965, which does not distinguish between domestic and international arbitration and is not based on UNCITRAL model law. South African courts retain discretion to hear a dispute over a contract entered into under U.S. law and under U.S. jurisdiction; however, the South African court will interpret the contract with the law of the country or jurisdiction provided for in the contract.

South Africa recognizes the International Chamber of Commerce, which supervises the resolution of transnational commercial disputes. South Africa applies its commercial and bankruptcy laws with consistency and has an independent, objective court system for enforcing property and contractual rights.

Alternative Dispute Resolution is increasingly popular in South Africa for many reasons, including the confidentiality which can be imposed on the evidence, case documents, and the judgment. South Africa’s new Companies Act also provides a mechanism for Alternative Dispute Resolution.

Bankruptcy Regulations

South Africa has a strong bankruptcy law, which grants many rights to debtors, including rejection of overly burdensome contracts, avoiding preferential transactions, and the ability to obtain credit during insolvency proceedings. South Africa ranks 68 out of 190 countries for resolving insolvency according to the 2020 World Bank Doing Business report, a drop in its ranking from its 2018 rank of 55 and 2019 rank of 65.

Investment Incentives

The Public Investment Corporation SOC Limited (PIC) is an asset management firm wholly owned by the government of South Africa, represented by the Minister of Finance and is governed by the Public Investment Corporation Act, 2004 . PIC’s clients are mostly public sector entities, including the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) and Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), among others. The PIC runs a diversified investment portfolio including listed equities, real estate, capital market, private equity and impact investing. The PIC has been known to jointly finance foreign direct investment if the project will create social returns, primarily in the form of new employment opportunities for South Africans.

South Africa offers various investment incentives targeted at specific sectors or types of business activities. The DTIC has a number of incentive programs ranging from tax allowances to support in the automotive sector and helping innovation and technology companies to film and television production:

• Tax Allowance: is designed to support new industrial projects that utilize only new and unused manufacturing assets and expansions or upgrades of existing industrial projects. The incentive offers support for both capital investment and training.
• Agro-Processing Support Scheme (APSS): aims to stimulate investment by South African agro-processing/beneficiation (agri-business) enterprises.
• Aquaculture Development and Enhancement Programme (ADEP): is available to South African registered entities engaged in primary, secondary, and ancillary aquaculture activities in both marine and freshwater classified under SIC 132 (fish hatcheries and fish farms) and SIC 301 and 3012 (production, processing and preserving of aquaculture fish).
• Automotive Investment Scheme (AIS): designed to grow and develop the automotive sector through investment in new and/ or replacement models and components that will increase plant production volumes, sustain employment and/ or strengthen the automotive value chain.
• Medium and Heavy Commercial Vehicles Automotive Investment Scheme (MHCV-AIS): is designed to grow and develop the automotive sector through investment in new and/or replacement models and components that will increase plant production volumes, sustain employment and/or strengthen the automotive value chain.
• People-carrier Automotive Investment Scheme (P-AIS): provides a non-taxable cash grant of between 20 percent and 35 percent of the value of qualifying investment in productive assets approved by the dtic.
• Black Industrialist Scheme (BIS): The BIS program is aimed at unlocking the industrial potential of black-owned and managed businesses that operate within South Africa through financial and non-financial interventions.
• Capital Projects Feasibility Programme (CPFP): is a cost-sharing grant that contributes to the cost of feasibility studies likely to lead to projects that will increase local exports and stimulate the market for South African capital goods and services.
• Critical Infrastructure Programme (CIP): aims to leverage investment by supporting infrastructure that is deemed to be critical, thus lowering the cost of doing business.
• Clothing and Textile Competitiveness Improvement Programme (CTCIP): aims to build capacity among manufacturers and in other areas of the apparel value chain in South Africa, to enable them to effectively supply their customers and compete on a global scale.
• Export Marketing and Investment Assistance (EMIA): develops export markets for South African products and services and recruits new foreign direct investment into the country. The purpose of the scheme is to partially compensate exporters for costs incurred with respect to activities aimed at developing an export market for South African product and services and to recruit new foreign direct investment into South Africa.
• Film Incentive: The South African government offers a package of incentives to promote its film production and post-production industry. There are four incentives schemes: Foreign Film and Television Production and Post Production; SA Film & TV Production and Co-production; South African film and television production incentive; The South African Emerging Black Filmmakers Incentive.
• Global Business Services Incentive (GBS): The incentive aims to create employment in South Africa through servicing offshore business process outsourcing activities.
• Innovation and Technology Funding instruments: click on the link to see a graphic of the various funding instruments the government has made available.
• Manufacturing Competitiveness Enhancement Programme (MCEP): aims to encourage manufacturers to upgrade their production facilities in a manner that sustains employment and maximizes value-addition in the short to medium term. Participants can also apply for incentives for energy efficiency and green economy incentives.
• Production Incentive (PI): forms part of the Clothing and Textile Competitiveness Program, and forms part of the customized sector program for the clothing, textiles, footwear, leather and leather goods industries.
• Sector-Specific Assistance Scheme (SSAS): is a reimbursable cost-sharing incentive scheme which grants financial support to organizations that support the development of industry sectors and those that contribute to the growth of South African exports.
• Shared Economic Infrastructure Facility (SEIF) – contact the Department of Small Business Development on +27 861 843 384 (select option 2) or E-Mail: for more information.
• Support Programme for Industrial Innovation (SPII): is designed to promote technology development in South Africa’s industry, through the provision of financial assistance for the development of innovative products and/or processes. SPII is focused on the development phase, which begins when basic research concludes and ends at the point when a pre-production prototype has been produced.
• Strategic Partnership Programme (SPP): The SPP aims to develop and enhance the capacity of small and medium-sized enterprises to provide manufacturing and service support to large private sector enterprises.
• Workplace Challenge Programme (WPC): managed by Productivity South Africa, WPC aims to encourage and support negotiated workplace change towards enhancing productivity and world-class competitiveness, best operating practices, continuous improvement, lean manufacturing, while resulting in job creation.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

South Africa designated its first Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) in 2001. IDZs offer duty-free import of production-related materials and zero VAT on materials sourced from South Africa, along with the right to sell in South Africa upon payment of normal import duties on finished goods. Expedited services and other logistical arrangements may be provided for small to medium-sized enterprises or for new foreign direct investment. Co-funding for infrastructure development is available from the DTIC. There are no exemptions from other laws or regulations, such as environmental and labor laws. The Manufacturing Development Board licenses IDZ enterprises in collaboration with the South African Revenue Service (SARS), which handles IDZ customs matters. IDZ operators may be public, private, or a combination of both. There are currently five IDZs in South Africa: Coega IDZ, Richards Bay IDZ, Dube Trade Port, East London IDZ, and Saldanha Bay IDZ.

South Africa also has Special Economic Zones (SEZs) focused on industrial development. The SEZs encompass the IDZs but also provide scope for economic activity beyond export-driven industry to include innovation centers and regional development. There are five SEZ in South Africa: Atlantis SEZ, Nkomazi SEZ, Maliti-A-Phofung SEZ, Musina/Makhado SEZ, and O.R. Tambo SEZ. The broader SEZ incentives strategy allows for 15 percent Corporate Tax as opposed to the current 28 percent, Building Tax Allowance, Employment Tax Incentive, Customs Controlled Area (VAT exemption and duty free), and Accelerated 12i Tax Allowance. For more detailed information on SEZs, please see: http://www.thedtic.gov.za/sectors-and-services-2/industrial-development/special-economic-zones/?hilite=%27SEZ%27 

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Foreign investors who establish a business or who invest in existing businesses in South Africa must show within twelve months of establishing the business that at least 60 percent of the total permanent staff are South African citizens or permanent residents.

The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) program measures employment equity, management control, and ownership by historically disadvantaged South Africans for companies which do business with the government or bid on government tenders. Companies may consider the B-BBEE scores of their sub-contractors and suppliers, as their scores can sometimes contribute to or detract from the contracting company’s B-BBEE score.

A business visa is required for foreign investors who will establish a business or who will invest in an existing business in South Africa. They are required to invest a prescribed financial capital contribution equivalent to R2.5million (USD 178 thousand) and have at least R5 million (USD 356 thousand) in cash and capital available. These capital requirements may be reduced or waived if the investment qualifies under one of the following types of industries/businesses: information and communication technology; clothing and textile manufacturing; chemicals and bio-technology; agro-processing; metals and minerals refinement; automotive manufacturing; tourism; and crafts.

The documentation required for obtaining a business visa is onerous and includes, among other requirements, a letter of recommendation from the Department of Trade and Industry regarding the feasibility of the business and its contribution to the national interest, and various certificates issued by a chartered or professional South African accountant.

U.S. citizens have complained that the processes to apply for and renew visas and work permits are lengthy, confusing, and difficult. Requirements frequently change mid-process, and there is little to no feedback about why an application might be considered incomplete or denied. Many U.S. citizens use facilitation services to help navigate these processes.

The government does not require the use of domestic content in goods or technology, though it incentivizes it. The transfer of personal information about a subject to a third party who is in a foreign country is prohibited unless certain conditions are met. These conditions are outlined in the Protection of Personal Information (PoPI) Act, which the government enacted in 2013 to regulate how personal information may be processed. The conditions relate to: accountability, processing limitations, purpose specification, information quality, openness, security safeguards, and data subject participation. PoPI also created an Information Regulator (IR) to draft regulations and enforce them; the five member body that comprises the IR was established in 2018. The IR released regulations on personal information processing in December 2018.

There are no performance requirements on investments.

Real Property

The South African legal system protects and facilitates the acquisition and disposition of all property rights (e.g., land, buildings, and mortgages). Deeds must be registered at the Deeds Office. Banks usually register mortgages as security when providing finance for the purchase of property.

Foreigners may purchase and own immovable property in South Africa without any restrictions, as foreigners are generally subject to the same laws as South African nationals. Foreign companies and trusts are also permitted to own property in South Africa, provided that they are registered in South Africa as an external company.

South Africa ranks 108 of 190 countries in registering property according to the 2020 World Bank Doing Business report.

Intellectual Property Rights

South Africa has a strong legal structure and enforcement of intellectual property rights through civil and criminal procedures.  Criminal procedures are generally lengthy, so the customary route is through civil enforcement.  There are concerns about counterfeit consumer goods, illegal commercial photocopying, and software piracy.

Owners of patents and trademarks may license them locally, but when a patent license entails the payment of royalties to a non-resident licensor, the DTIC must approve the royalty agreement. Patents are granted for twenty years – usually with no option to renew. Trademarks are valid for an initial period of ten years, renewable for ten-year periods. The holder of a patent or trademark must pay an annual fee to preserve ownership rights. All agreements relating to payment for the right to use know-how, patents, trademarks, copyrights, or other similar property are subject to approval by exchange control authorities in the SARB. A royalty of up to four percent is the standard approval for consumer goods, and up to six percent for intermediate and finished capital goods.

Literary, musical, and artistic works, as well as cinematographic films and sound recordings are eligible for copyright under the Copyright Act of 1978. New designs may be registered under the Designs Act of 1967, which grants copyrights for five years. The Counterfeit Goods Act of 1997 provides additional protection to owners of trademarks, copyrights, and certain marks under the Merchandise Marks Act of 1941. The Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act of 1997 amended the Merchandise Marks Act of 1941, the Performers’ Protection Act of 1967, the Patents Act of 1978, the Copyright Act of 1978, the Trademarks Act of 1993, and the Designs Act of 1993 to bring South African intellectual property legislation fully into line with the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS). Further Amendments to the Patents Act of 1978 also brought South Africa into line with TRIPS, to which South Africa became a party in 1999, and implemented the Patent Cooperation Treaty. The private sector and law enforcement cooperate extensively to stop the flow of counterfeit goods into the marketplace, and the private sector believes that South Africa is making significant progress in this regard. Statistics on seizures are not available.

In an effort to modernize outdated copyright law to incorporate “digital age” advances, the DTIC introduced the latest draft of the Copyright Amendment Bill in May 2017. The South African Parliament and the National Council of Provinces approved the Copyright Amendment Bill in March 2019 and sent the bill to the president for signature. Among the issues of concern to some private sector stakeholders is the introduction of the U.S. model of “fair use” for copyright exemptions without prescribing industry-specific circumstances where fair use will apply, creating uncertainty about copyrights enforcement. Other concerns that stakeholders have include a clause which allows the Minister of Trade Industry and Competition to set royalty rates for visual artistic works and impose compulsory contractual terms. The bill also limits the assignment of copyright to 25 years before it reverts back to the author. In June 2020, the president sent the bill back to the Parliament noting concerns regarding the constitutionality of the bill as well as its compliance with international treaties.

The Performers’ Protection Amendment Bill seeks to address issues relating to the payment of royalties to performers; safeguarding the rights of contracting parties; and promotes performers’ moral and economic rights for performances in fixations (recordings). Similar to the Copyright Amendment Bill, this bill gives the Minister of Trade and Industry authority to determine equitable remuneration for a performer and copyright owner for the direct or indirect use of a work. It also suggests that any agreement between the copyright owner and performer will only last for a period of 25 years and does not determine what happens after 25 years. The bill also does not stipulate how it will address works with multiple performers, particularly how to resolve potential problems of hold-outs when contracts are renegotiated that could hinder the further exploitation of a work. In June 2020, the president sent the bill back to the Parliament.

The DTIC released the final Intellectual Property Policy of the Republic of South Africa Phase 1 in June, 2018, that informs the government’s approach to intellectual property and existing laws. Phase I focuses on the health space, particularly pharmaceuticals. The South African Government, led by the DTIC, held multiple rounds of public consultations since its introduction and the 2016 release of the IP Consultative Framework.

Among other things, the IP policy framework calls for South Africa to carry out substantive search and examination (SSE) on patent applications and to introduce a pre- and post-grant opposition system. The DTIC repeatedly stressed its goal of creating the domestic capacity to understand and review patents, without having to rely on other countries’ examinations. U.S. companies working in South Africa have been generally supportive of the government’s goal; they are concerned, however, that the relatively low number of examiners currently on staff (20) to handle the proposed SSE process and the introduction of a pre-grant opposition system in South Africa could lead to significant delays of products to market. The South African Government is working with international partners (including USPTO and the European Union) to provide accelerated training of their patent reviewers while also recruiting new staff.

The new IP policy framework also raises concerns around the threat of separate patentability criteria for medicines and a more liberalized compulsory licensing regime. Stakeholders are calling for more concrete assurances that the use of compulsory licensing provisions will be as a last resort and applied in a manner consistent with WTO rules. Industry sources report they are not aware of a single case of South Africa issuing a compulsory license.

South Africa is currently in the process of implementing the Madrid Protocol. CIPC has completed drafting legislative amendments after consultations with stakeholders and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on the implementation process in South Africa. WIPO has conducted a number of missions to South Africa on this matter, the latest of which was in February 2018. South Africa has also engaged with national IP offices with similar trade mark legislation, such as New Zealand.

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ .

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

South Africa recognizes the importance of foreign capital in financing persistent current account and budget deficits and openly courts foreign portfolio investment.  Authorities regularly meet with investors and encourage open discussion between investors and a wide range of private and public-sector stakeholders. The government enhanced efforts to attract and retain foreign investors.  President Cyril Ramaphosa hosted investment conferences in October 2018 and October 2019 and attended the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2019 to promote South Africa as an investment destination. South Africa suffered a two-quarter technical recession in 2019 with economic growth registering only 0.2 percent for the entire year.

South Africa’s financial market is regarded as one of the most sophisticated among emerging markets.  A sound legal and regulatory framework governs financial institutions and transactions.

The fully independent South African Reserve Bank (SARB) regulates a wide range of commercial, retail and investment banking services according to international best practices, such as Basel III, and participates in international forums such as the Financial Stability Board and G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. There are calls to “nationalize” the privately-held SARB, which would not change its constitutional mandate to maintain price stability. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) serves as the front-line regulator for listed firms, but is supervised in these regulatory duties by the Financial Services Board (FSB). The FSB also oversees other non-banking financial services, including other collective investment schemes, retirement funds and a diversified insurance industry. The South African government has committed to tabling a Twin Peaks regulatory architecture to provide a clear demarcation of supervisory responsibilities and consumer accountability and to consolidate banking and non-banking regulation in 2017.

South Africa has access to deep pools of capital from local and foreign investors which provide sufficient scope for entry and exit of large positions.  Financial sector assets amount to almost three times GDP, and the JSE is the largest on the continent with capitalization of approximately USD 670 billion and 344 companies listed on the main, alternative and other smaller boards. Non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) hold about two thirds of financial assets.  The liquidity and depth provided by NBFIs make these markets attractive to foreign investors, who hold more than a third of equities and government bonds, including sizeable positions in local-currency bonds. A well-developed derivative market and a currency that is widely traded as a proxy for emerging market risk allows investors considerable scope to hedge positions with interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives.

The SARB’s exchange control policies permit authorized currency dealers, normally one of the large commercial banks, to buy and borrow foreign currency freely on behalf of domestic and foreign clients.  The size of transactions is not limited, but dealers must report all transactions to SARB, regardless of size. Non-residents may purchase securities without restriction and freely transfer capital in and out of South Africa.  Local individual and institutional investors are limited to holding 25 percent of their capital outside of South Africa. Given the recent exchange rate fluctuations, this requirement has entailed portfolio rebalancing and repatriation to meet the prescribed prudential limits.

Banks, NBFIs, and other financial intermediaries are skilled at assessing risk and allocating credit based on market conditions. Foreign investors may borrow freely on the local market.  A large range of debt, equity and other credit instruments are available to foreign investors, and a host of well-known foreign and domestic service providers offer accounting, legal and consulting advice. In recent years, the South African auditing profession has suffered significant reputational damage with the leadership of two large foreign firms being implicated in allegations of aiding and abetting irregular client management practices that were linked to the previous administration, or of delinquent oversight of listed client companies. South Africa’s WEF competitiveness rating for auditing and reporting fell from number one in the world in 2016, to number 60 in 2019.

Money and Banking System

South African banks are well capitalized and comply with international banking standards. There are 19 registered banks in South Africa and 15 branches of foreign banks. Twenty-nine foreign banks have approved local representative offices. Five banks – Standard, ABSA, First Rand (FNB), Capitec, and Nedbank – dominate the sector, accounting for over 85 percent of the country’s banking assets, which total over USD 390 billion. The SARB regulates the sector according to the Bank Act of 1990. There are three alternatives for foreign banks to establish local operations, all of which require SARB approval: separate company, branch, or representative office. The criteria for the registration of a foreign bank are the same as for domestic banks. Foreign banks must include additional information, such as holding company approval, a letter of “comfort and understanding” from the holding company, and a letter of no objection from the foreign bank’s home regulatory authority. More information on the banking industry may be obtained from the South African Banking Association at the following website: www.banking.org.za .

The Financial Services Board (FSB) governs South Africa’s non-bank financial services industry (see website: www.fsb.co.za/ ). The FSB regulates insurance companies, pension funds, unit trusts (i.e., mutual funds), participation bond schemes, portfolio management, and the financial markets. The JSE Securities Exchange SA (JSE) is the sixteenth largest exchange in the world measured by market capitalization and enjoys the global reputation of being one of the best regulated. Market capitalization stood at USD 670 billion as of March 2020, with 344 firms listed. The Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA) is licensed under the Financial Markets Control Act. Membership includes banks, insurers, investors, stockbrokers, and independent intermediaries. The exchange consists principally of bonds issued by government, state-owned enterprises, and private corporations. The JSE acquired BESA in 2009. More information on financial markets may be obtained from the JSE (website: www.jse.co.za ). Non-residents are allowed to finance 100 percent of their investment through local borrowing. A finance ratio of 1:1 also applies to emigrants, the acquisition of residential properties by non-residents, and financial transactions such as portfolio investments, securities lending and hedging by non-residents.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) Exchange Control Department administers foreign exchange policy. An authorized foreign exchange dealer, normally one of the large commercial banks, must handle international commercial transactions and report every purchase of foreign exchange, irrespective of the amount. Generally, there are only limited delays in the conversion and transfer of funds. Due to South Africa’s relatively closed exchange system, no private player, however large, can hedge large quantities of Rand for more than five years.

While non-residents may freely transfer capital in and out of South Africa, transactions must be reported to authorities. Non-residents may purchase local securities without restriction. To facilitate repatriation of capital and profits, foreign investors should ensure an authorized dealer endorses their share certificates as “non-resident.” Foreign investors should also be sure to maintain an accurate record of investment.

Remittance Policies

Subsidiaries and branches of foreign companies in South Africa are considered South African entities and are treated legally as South African companies. As such, they are subject to exchange control by the SARB. South African companies may, as a general rule, freely remit the following to non-residents: repayment of capital investments; dividends and branch profits (provided such transfers are made out of trading profits and are financed without resorting to excessive local borrowing); interest payments (provided the rate is reasonable); and payment of royalties or similar fees for the use of know-how, patents, designs, trademarks or similar property (subject to prior approval of SARB authorities).

While South African companies may invest in other countries, SARB approval/notification is required for investments over R500 million (USD 43.5 million). South African individuals may freely invest in foreign firms listed on South African stock exchanges. Individual South African taxpayers in good standing may make investments up to a total of R4 million (USD 340,000) in other countries. As of 2010, South African banks are permitted to commit up to 25 percent of their capital in direct and indirect foreign liabilities. In addition, mutual and other investment funds can invest up to 25 percent of their retail assets in other countries. Pension plans and insurance funds may invest 25 percent of their retail assets in other countries.

Before accepting or repaying a foreign loan, South African residents must obtain SARB approval. The SARB must also approve the payment of royalties and license fees to non-residents when no local manufacturing is involved. When local manufacturing is involved, the DTIC must approve the payment of royalties related to patents on manufacturing processes and products. Upon proof of invoice, South African companies may pay fees for foreign management and other services provided such fees are not calculated as a percentage of sales, profits, purchases, or income.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Although the President announced in February, 2020 the aim to create a Sovereign Wealth Fund and the Finance Minister followed up with a mention of it in his February budget speech, no action has been taken to create such a fund.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a significant role in the South African economy.  In key sectors such as electricity, transport (air, rail, freight and pipelines), and telecommunications, SOEs play a lead role, often defined by law, although limited competition is allowed in some sectors (e.g., telecommunications and air).  The government’s interest in these sectors often competes with and discourages foreign investment.  South Africa’s overall fixed investment was 19 percent of GDP.  The SOEs share of the investment was 21 percent while private enterprise contributed 63 percent (government spending made up the remainder of 16 percent).  The IMF estimates that the debt of the SOEs would add 13.5 percent to the overall national debt.

The Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) has oversight responsibility in full or in part for seven of the approximately 700 SOEs that exist at the national, provincial and local levels:  Alexkor (diamonds); Denel (military equipment); Eskom (electricity generation, transmission and distribution); South African Express and Mango (budget airlines); South African Airways (national carrier); South African Forestry Company (SAFCOL – (forestry); and Transnet (transportation).   These seven SOEs employ approximately 105,000 people. For other national-level SOEs, the appropriate cabinet minister acts as shareholder on behalf of the state. The Department of Transport, for example, has oversight of the state-owned South African National Roads Agency (SANRAL), Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), and Airports Company South Africa (ACSA), which operates nine of South Africa’s airports. The Department of Communications has oversight of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC).

Combined, South Africa’s SOEs that fall under DPE’s authority posted a loss of R15.5 billion (USD 1.3 billion) in the 2017/2018 financial year. In recent years many have been plagued by mismanagement and corruption, and repeated government bailouts have exposed the public sector’s balance sheet to sizable contingent liabilities. The election of President Cyril Ramaphosa and appointment of Minister of Public Enterprises Pravin Gordhan signaled a renewed emphasis on improving SOE governance and performance.

The state-owned electricity giant Eskom generates approximately 95 percent of the electricity used in South Africa.  Coal-fired power stations generate approximately 93 percent of Eskom’s electricity.  Eskom’s core business activities are generation, transmission, trading and distribution.  South Africa’s electricity system operates under strain because of low availability factors for base load generation capacity due to maintenance problems.  The electricity grid’s capacity reserve margins frequently fall under two percent, well below international norms.  Beginning in November 2013, Eskom periodically declared “electricity emergencies,” and asked major industrial users to reduce consumption by ten percent for specified periods (usually one to two days).   To meet rising electricity demand, Eskom is building new power stations (including two of the world’s largest coal-fired power stations, but both are years overdue and over budget).  Eskom and independent industry analysts anticipate South Africa’s electricity grid will remain constrained for at least the next several years.  In December 2019 Eskom implemented State 6 load shedding, when portions of the grid are put offline for planned or unplanned maintenance on a rotating basis, which was a major blow to the economy and raised concerns about the viability of Eskom’s ability to generate sufficient power to meet South Africa’s electricity needs. In February 2019, President Ramaphosa announced that Eskom would be split into multiple entities for power generation, transmission, and distribution, but new structural changes have not occurred within the utility other than a new CEO starting in February 2020.

In October 2019 the DMRE finalized its Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), which outlines South Africa’s plan for new power generation up until 2020. The IRP calls for an increase in renewable energy, the decommissioning of coal-fired power plants, and does not provide for new nuclear power. The South African government has implemented a renewable energy independent power producer procurement program (REIPPP) that in the past three years has added 1500Mw of a planned 3900Mw of renewable energy production to the grid and in April 2018 signed 27 Independent Power Producer agreements to provide an additional 2,300 MW to the grid. DMRE published a Request for Information (RFI) with the public comment period ending on January 31, 2020 for new power generation. Companies were asked to provide solutions for energy generation that the government would consider in developing procurement requests for proposals. Given the new IRP, the RFI, and Eskom’s implementation of load shedding, industry is expecting new procurement rounds to be announced for renewable energy and battery storage in 2020. Considering that new energy generation procurements will take place and there is the potential for a new bid round for the REIPPP, recent credit rating agency downgrades could impact investors ability to obtain credit to finance long-term energy deals. All three major credit ratings agencies have downgraded Eskom’s debt. The rating agencies’ decision follows Moody’s downgrade of South Africa’s sovereign debt rating in March 2020, affecting South African government-related entities such as Eskom.

Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA), the monopoly responsible for South Africa’s ports, charges some of the highest shipping fees in the world.  In March 2014, Transnet announced an average overall tariff increase of 8.5 percent at its ports to finance a USD 240 million modernization effort.  High tariffs on containers subsidize bulk shipments of coal and iron ore, thereby favoring the export of raw materials over finished ones.  According to the South African Ports Regulator, raw materials exporters paid as much as one quarter less than exporters of finished products.  TNPA is a division of Transnet, a state-owned company that manages the country’s port, rail and pipeline networks.  In April 2012, Transnet launched its Market Driven Strategy (MDS), a R336 billion (USD 28 billion) investment program to modernize its port and rail infrastructure.  Transnet’s March 2014 selection of four OEMs to manufacture 1064 locomotives is part of the MDS.  This CAPEX is being 2/3 funded by operating profits with the remainder from the international capital markets.  In 2016, Transnet reported it had invested R124 billion (USD 10.3 billion) in the previous four years in rail, ports, and pipeline infrastructure.  In recent years ratings agencies have downgraded Transnet’s rating to below the investment-grade threshold. In November 2019 S&P downgraded Transnet’s local currency rating from BB+ to BB.

Direct aviation links between the United States and South Africa are limited to flights between Atlanta, New York (JFK), and Washington (Dulles) to Johannesburg and Newark to Cape Town.  The growth of low-cost carriers in South Africa has reduced domestic airfares, but private carriers are likely to struggle against national carriers without further air liberalization in the region and in Africa.  The launch of the Single African Air Transport Market, which is composed of 23 African Union member states including South Africa, in January 2018 demonstrates the potential for further cooperation on the continent.

In South Africa, the state-owned carrier, South African Airways (SAA), relies on the government for financial assistance to stay afloat and received back-to-back bailouts of R5 billion (USD 357 million) in 2018 alone to repay creditors.  That same year, the airline’s management requested a R21.7 billion (USD 1.55 billion) bailout from the government over three years to turn the company around. In 2019, however, creditors initiated business rescue proceedings, the equivalent of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, to restructure and salvage the airline after a crippling strike over wage increases left the airline’s finances in complete disarray. SAA last released its earnings for fiscal year 2017/2018, in which it lost R5.7 billion (USD 407 million) and brought the company’s cumulative losses since 2011 to a total of R23 billion (USD 1.65 billion).

The telecommunications sector in South Africa, while advanced for the continent, is hampered by regulatory uncertainty and poor implementation of the digital migration, both of which contribute to the high cost of data.  In 2006, South Africa agreed to meet an International Telecommunication Union deadline to achieve analogue-to-digital migration by June 1, 2015.  As of May 2020, South Africa has initiated but not completed the migration.  Until this process is finalized, South Africa will not be able to effectively allocate the spectrum freed up by the conversion.  The biggest development in 2019 was the unveiling of the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies (DCDT), which reintegrated the Department of Communications (DOC) and the Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services (DTPS) that had been split 2014.

In October 2016, DTPS released a policy paper addressing the planned course of action to realize the potential of the ICT sector.  The paper advocates for open access requirements that could overhaul how telecommunications firms gain access to and use infrastructure.  It also proposes assigning high-demand spectrum to a Wireless Open Access Network.  Some stakeholders, including state-owned telecommunications firm Telkom, agree with the general approach.  Others, including the major private sector mobile carriers, feel the interventions would curb investment while doing little to facilitate digital access and inclusion.  In November 2017, DTPS published a draft Electronic Communications Amendment Bill that would implement the ICT White Paper, but the Minister of Communications withdrew the bill in February 2019. Private industry and civil society had criticized the reach of the bill. The Minister stated that the DCDT would consult with relevant stakeholders to re-draft the bill before submitting it to Parliament.

Privatization Program

Although in 2015 and 2016 senior government leaders discussed allowing private-sector investment into some of the more than 700 SOEs and a recently released report of a presidential review commission on SOE that called for rationalization of SOEs, the government has not taken any concrete action to enable this. The CEO of SAA has stated that a fund-raising plan to sell a stake in SAA to an equity partner will be shelved until the airline can shore up its balance sheet. He announced the restructuring of the national carrier into three segments: international, regional, and domestic, but he has not articulated how that would occur in practice. SAA is currently in business rescue.

Other candidates for unbundling of SOEs / privatization are ESKOM and defense contractor Denel.

Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is well-developed in South Africa, and is driven in part by the recognition by the private sector that it has an important role to play in uplifting society. The socio-economic development element of B-BBEE has formalized and increased RBC in South Africa, as firms have largely aligned their RBC activities to the element’s performance requirements. The 2013 B-BBEE amendment’s compliance target is one percent of net profit after tax spent on RBC, and at least 75 percent of the RBC activity must benefit historically disadvantaged South Africans, referred to the B-BBEE act as black people, which includes South Africans of black, colored, Chinese and Indian descent. Most RBC is directed towards non-profit organizations involved in education, social and community development, and health.

The South African mining sector follows the rule of law and encourages adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. For example South Africa is a founding member of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), the process established in 2000 to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the mainstream rough diamond market. The Kimberley Process is designed to ensure that diamond purchases do not finance violence by rebel movements and their allies seeking to undermine legitimate governments.

South Africa does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). South African mining, labor and security legislation seek to speak to the values as embodied by Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.

South African mining laws and regulations allow for the accounting of all revenues from the extractive sector in the form of mining taxes, royalties, fees, dividends and duties. The reporting and accounting of all revenues from the extractive sector is done through Parliament by such institutions as the Auditor General and the National Treasury budgetary processes and the results are publicly available. There is a sizeable illicit mining sector in South Africa, mostly in decommissioned gold mines.

South Africa has a robust anti-corruption framework, but laws are inadequately enforced and accountability in public sectors tends to be low. The law provides for criminal penalties for conviction of official corruption, and the government continued efforts to curb corruption, but officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.

High-level political interference has undermined the ability of the country’s National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) – constitutionally responsible for all prosecutions – to pursue criminal proceedings and enforce accountability. After an unprecedented consultative process, President Ramaphosa appointed Shamila Batohi as the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) in December 2018, and he created an Investigative Directorate within her office in March 2019 to focus on the significant number of cases emanating from ongoing corruption investigations. The Constitutional Court ruled in August 2018 that Zuma’s appointment of Shaun Abrahams as the former NDPP was invalid and ordered President Ramaphosa to replace Abrahams within 90 days. Widely praised by civil society, the court also ordered former NDPP Mxolisi Nxasana to repay a “golden handshake” (an illegal departure bonus) of 10.2 million rand (USD 788,000) he received when Zuma replaced him with Abrahams in 2015.

The Department of Public Service and Administration formally coordinates government initiatives against corruption, and the “Hawks” – South Africa’s Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations – focuses on organized crime, economic crimes, and corruption. In 2018, the Office of the Public Protector, a constitutionally mandated body designed to investigate government abuse and mismanagement, investigated thousands of cases, some of which involved high-level officials. The public and NGOs considered the Office of the Public Protector independent and effective, despite limited funding. According to the NPA’s 2017-2018 Annual Report, it recovered 410,000 rand (USD 31,700) from government officials involved in corruption, a 92-percent decrease from the previous year. Courts convicted 213 government officials of corruption.

The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PCCA) officially criminalizes corruption in public and private sectors and codifies specific offenses (such as extortion and money laundering), making it easier for courts to enforce the legislation. Applying to both domestic and foreign organizations doing business in the country, the PCCA covers receiving or offering bribes, influencing witnesses and tampering with evidence in ongoing investigations, obstruction of justice, contracts, procuring and withdrawal of tenders, and conflict of interests, among other areas.  Inconsistently implemented, the PCCA does not include any protectionary measures for whistleblowers. Complementary acts – such as the Promotion of Access to Information Act and the Public Finance Management Act – calls for increased access to public information and review of government expenditures. “State capture” – the popular term used to describe systemic corruption of the state’s decision-making processes by private interests – has become synonymous with the administration of former president Jacob Zuma. In response to widespread calls for accountability, President Cyril Ramaphosa has denounced corruption since assuming office in February 2018. He has vowed to tackle the scourge at all levels of government, including through proposed lifestyle audits of officials to expose bribery, corruption, and public tender irregularities. He has also launched four separate judicial commissions of inquiry to investigate corruption, fraud, and maladministration, including in the Public Investment Corporation, South African Revenue Service, National Prosecuting Authority, and writ large across the government. These commissions have revealed pervasive networks of criminality across all levels of the municipal, provincial, and national government. Numerous former senior officials had already testified before the commission; a number of them directly implicated former president Jacob Zuma in corruption cases.

“State capture” – the popular term used to describe systemic corruption of the state’s decision-making processes by private interests – has become synonymous with the administration of former president Jacob Zuma. In response to widespread calls for accountability, President Cyril Ramaphosa has denounced corruption since assuming office in February 2018. He has vowed to tackle the scourge at all levels of government, including through proposed lifestyle audits of officials to expose bribery, corruption, and public tender irregularities. He has also launched four separate judicial commissions of inquiry to investigate corruption, fraud, and maladministration, including in the Public Investment Corporation, South African Revenue Service, National Prosecuting Authority, and writ large across the government. These commissions have revealed pervasive networks of criminality across all levels of the municipal, provincial, and national government. Numerous former senior officials had already testified before the commission; a number of them directly implicated former president Jacob Zuma in corruption cases.

Corruption charges were reinstated against Zuma in 2018 related to a USD 2.5-billion arms deal in the late 1990s. The Zuma-linked Gupta family, which owns interests in multiple industries from computer services to mining, has also been placed under investigation and its assets frozen while the state investigates allegations of state capture, bribery, and the siphoning off of public funds meant for small-holder farmers. These and other ongoing efforts are meant to rebuild the public’s trust in government and to foment transparency and predictability in the business environment in order to woo investors.

South Africa signed the Anticorruption Convention on 9 Dec 2003 and ratified it on 22 Nov 2004.  South Africa also signed the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery in 2007, with implementing legislation dating from 2004.

South Africa is also a party to the SADC Protocol Against Corruption, which promotes the development of mechanisms needed to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the public and private sector. The protocol also seeks to facilitate and regulate cooperation in matters of corruption amongst Member States and foster development and harmonization of policies and domestic legislation related to corruption. The Protocol defines ‘acts of corruption,’ preventative measures, jurisdiction of Member States, as well as extradition. http://www.sadc.int/files/7913/5292/8361/Protocol_Against_Corruption2001.pdf 

Resources to Report Corruption

To report corruption to the government:

Advocate Busisiwe Mkhwebane
Public Protector
Office of the Public Protector, South Africa
175 Lunnon Street, Hillcrest Office Park, Pretoria 0083
Anti-Corruption Hotline: +27 80 011 2040 or +27 12 366 7000
http://www.pprotect.org  or customerservice@pprotect.org

Or for a non-government agency:

David Lewis
Executive Director
Corruption Watch
87 De Korte Street, Braamfontein/Johannesburg 2001
+27 80 002 3456 or +27 11 242 3900 http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/content/make-your-complaint 
info@corruptionwatch.org.za

South Africa has a history of politically-motivated violence and civil disturbance.  Violent protests, often by residents in poor communities against the lack of effective government service delivery, are common.  Killings of, and by, mostly low-level political and organized crime rivals take place on a regular basis.  Still, South Africa enjoys strong, democratic political institutions and the overall political environment is stable and secure.

In May 2018, President Cyril Ramaphosa set up an inter-ministerial committee in the security cluster to serve as a national task force on political killings. The task force includes the Police Minister‚ State Security Minister‚ Justice Minister‚ National Prosecuting Authority, and the National Police Commissioner. The task force ordered multiple arrests, including of high profile officials, in what appears to be a crackdown on political killings.

There is suspicion that criminal threats have been used to resolve business disputes. There was one known incident in 2018 when two expat employees of a U.S. company managing an ongoing construction project received threats to leave the country. The threats escalated to mention the expats’ families as targets, and the company evacuated them from South Africa. Subcontractors accused of using substandard construction materials were suspected. There were no reports of physical damage at the project.

Labor unrest in one part of South Africa has caused damage to property and halted operations to a U.S. company operating in an industrial zone. In this case, the U.S. company was targeted as a single employer by strikes and labor unrest on what was a national bargaining council issue.

Since 1994, the South African government has replaced apartheid-era labor legislation with policies that emphasize employment security, fair wages, and decent working conditions. Under the aegis of the National Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC), government, business, and organized labor are to negotiate all labor laws, with the exception of laws pertaining to occupational health and safety. The South African Constitution and South African laws allows workers to form or join trade unions without previous authorization or excessive requirements. Labor unions that meet a locally negotiated minimum threshold of representation (often, 50 percent plus one union member) are entitled to represent the entire workplace in negotiations with management. As the majority union or representative union, they may also extract agency fees from non-union members present in the workplace. In some workplaces and job sectors, this financial incentive has encouraged inter-union rivalries, including intimidation and violence, as unions compete for the maximum share of employees in seeking the status of representative union.

In February 2020, South Africa reported a year-on-year unemployment rate increase of 2.0 percentage points to 29.1 percent. However, labor force participation increased by 0.4 percentage points to 59.8 percent from 59.4 percent in 2019. The youth unemployment (ages 15-24) rate has hovered at or just over 50 percent since 2015. Approximately 3.3 million (32 percent) of the 10.3 million of these South Africans were not in employment, education, or training. On a quarterly basis, employment in the formal sector increased in all industries with the exception of professional employment and skilled agriculture. Due to a lag in data collection and reporting, the full effect on unemployment due to COVID-19 related business closures will not be reported until the anticipated September 2020 report, covering April – June 2020.

There are 205 trade unions registered with the Department of Labor as of February 2019 (latest published figures), up from 190 the prior year, but down from the 2002 high of 504. According to the 2019 Fourth Quarter Labor Force Survey (QLFS) report from Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), 4.071 million workers belonged to a union, an increase of 30,000 from the fourth quarter of 2018. Department of Labor statistics indicate union density declined from 45.2 percent in 1997 to 24.7 percent in 2014, the most recent data available. Using StatsSA data, however, union density can be calculated: The February 2020 QLFS reported 4.071 million union members and 13.868 million employees, for a union density of 29.4percent.

The right to strike is protected under South Africa’s constitution and laws. The law allows workers to strike due to matters of mutual interest, such as wages, benefits, organizational rights disputes, socioeconomic interests of workers, and similar measures. Workers may not strike because of disputes where other legal recourse exists, such as through arbitration. Although the number of workdays lost to strikes fell to 1.06 million in 2019, down from 1.95 million in 2018, the figure remains low in comparison to the 2005-2014 period in which every year but one (2008) saw lost workdays total at least 2.3 million. Layoffs and retrenchments are permitted for economic reasons, but they are subject to a statutory process requiring consultations between employers and labor unions in an effort to reach consensus.

Employers and employees are each required to pay one percent of workers’ wages to the national unemployment fund. The fund pays benefits based on reverse sliding scale of the prior salary, up to 58 percent of the prior wage, for up to 34 weeks.

There are robust labor dispute resolution institutions in South Africa, including the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), the bargaining councils, and specialized labor courts of both first instance and appellate jurisdiction.

Improved labor stability is essential for South Africa’s economic stability and development and vital to the country’s ability to continue to attract and retain foreign investment. The government of South Africa does not waive labor laws to attract or retain investment.

Collective bargaining is a cornerstone of the current labor relations framework. As of February 2019, the South Africa Department of Labor listed 39 private sector bargaining councils through which parties negotiate wages and conditions of employment. Per the Labor Relations Act, the Minister of Labor must extend agreements reached in bargaining councils to non-parties of the agreement operating in the same sector. Employer federations, particularly those representing small and medium enterprises (SMEs) argue the extension of these agreements – often reached between unions and big business – negatively impacts SMEs that cannot afford to pay higher wages. In 2019, the average wage settlement resulted in a 7.1 percent wage increase, on average 2.9 percent above the increase in South Africa’s consumer price index and down slightly from the average increase of 7.4 percent in 2018.

Major labor legislation includes:

As of January 1, 2019, South Africa has a national minimum wage of R20/hour, with lower rates for domestic (R16/hour) and agricultural (R 18/hour) workers. This rate is subject to annual increases as suggested by the 13-member National Minimum Wage Commission and as approved by parliament and signed by the president. Effective March 2020, the Commission raised the minimum wage by 3.8 percent, to R 20.76 for most workers. Domestic and agricultural workers received the same percentage raises.

In November 2018, President Ramaphosa signed an amendment to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act which provides benefits to new parents. Fathers may now claim ten days of paternity leave, whereas adoptive parents and commissioning parents in a surrogate motherhood agreement may now claim ten weeks of leave. South Africa’s Unemployment Fund funds this leave at the same rate for unemployment claims (see above) and not at the claiming employee’s wage rate.

The Labor Relations Act (LRA), in effect since 1995 with amendments made in 2014, provides fair dismissal guidelines, dispute resolution mechanisms, and retrenchment guidelines stating employers must consider alternatives to retrenchment and must consult all relevant parties when considering possible layoffs. The Act enshrines the right of workers to strike and of management to lock out striking workers. The Act created the Commission on Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration (CCMA), which can conciliate, mediate, and arbitrate in cases of labor disputes, and is required to certify an impasse in bargaining council negotiations before a strike can be called legally. The CCMA’s caseload currently exceeds what was anticipated; the South African Government provided the CCMA an additional USD 60 million to handle its caseload and any possible increase caused by the 2014 amendments to the LRA. Amendments to the LRA modify the regulation of temporary employment service firms, extend organizational rights to workplaces with a majority of temporary or fixed term contract workers, reduces the maximum period of temporary or fixed term contract employment to three months, establishes joint liability by temporary employment services and their clients for contraventions of employment law, and strengthens other protections for temporary or contract workers.

The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA), implemented in 1997 and amended in 2014, establishes a 45-hour workweek, standardizes time-and-a-half pay for overtime, and authorizes four months of maternity leave for women. No employer may require or permit an employee to work overtime except by agreement, and overtime may not be more than 10 hours a week. The law stipulates rest periods of 12 consecutive hours daily and 36 hours weekly and must include Sunday. The law allows adjustments to rest periods by mutual agreement. A ministerial determination exempted businesses employing fewer than 10 persons from certain provisions of the law concerning overtime and leave. Farmers and other employers can apply for variances from the law by showing good cause. The law applies to all workers, including workers in informal sectors, foreign nationals, and migrant workers, but the government did not prioritize labor protections for workers in the informal economy. The law prohibits employment of children under age 15 and prohibits anyone from requiring or permitting a child under age 15 to work. The law allows children under age 15 to work in the performing arts, but only if their employers receive permission from the Department of Labor and agree to follow specific guidelines. Amendments made in 2014 clarify the definitions of employment, employers, and employees to reflect international labor conventions, closing a loophole that previously existed in South African law between the LRA and the BCEA. The Act gives the Minister of Labor the power to set sectoral minimum wages and annual minimum wage increases for employees not covered by sectoral minimum wage agreements.

The Employment Equity Act of 1998 (EEA), amended in 2014, protects all workers against unfair discrimination on the grounds of race, age, gender, religion, marital status, pregnancy, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, disability, conscience, belief, political, opinion, culture, language, HIV status, birth, or any other arbitrary ground. The EEA further requires large- and medium-sized companies to prepare employment equity plans to ensure that historically disadvantaged South Africans, such as Blacks, South Asians, and Coloreds, as well as women and disabled persons, are adequately represented in the workforce. The EEA amendments increase fines for non-compliance with employment equity measures and have a new provision of equal pay for work of equal value. The Act prohibits the use of foreign nationals to meet employers’ affirmative action targets and relaxes the standards for parties in labor disputes to access the CCMA instead of going directly to the Labor Court.

More information regarding South African labor legislation can be found at: www.labour.gov.za/legislation 

The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is the successor agency to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).  DFC is open for business in South Africa via an Investment Incentive Agreement signed by its predecessor agency OPIC in 1993.

As of March 31, 2020, DFC’s total exposure in South Africa was approximately USD 888 million.  DFC has a representative office in Johannesburg, South Africa to support financing and insurance of DFC transactions across sub-Saharan Africa, including South Africa.  DFC’s commitments in South Africa span a range of sectors, such as renewable energy, transportation, minerals and natural resources, and education.  Additional information on DFC programs that involve South Africa may be found on DFC’s website: http://www.dfc.gov.  

* Source for Host Country Data: South Africa Reserve Bank (www.resbank.co.za ); Statistics South Africa (www.statssa.gov.za)

Sudan has 30 signed bilateral investment agreements – specifically with Algeria, Bahrain, Belarus, the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Oman, Qatar, Romania, South Africa, Switzerland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.  https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/199/sudan 

Sudan does not have a bilateral taxation treaty with the United States.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Some ministries and regulatory agencies distribute the text or summary of proposed regulations before their enactment to interested stakeholders but are under no legal obligation to do so.  There is no set period of time by law for the text of the proposed regulations to be publicly available.  Some agencies make received comments publicly accessible.  There is no specialized government body or department tasked with soliciting and receiving these comments.  Some ministries and agencies report on the results of the consultation on proposed regulations in the form of one consolidated response in an official gazette, journal, or other publication or directly distributed to interested stakeholders.  This reporting on the results of the consultation is not required by law.  https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/sudan# .  There is no centralized online location where key regulatory actions are published. https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/sudan# .

International Regulatory Considerations

Sudan ranks 157 out of 190 for starting a limited liability company in the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business rankings.  A company typically must register with the Commercial Registrar, taxation chambers, labor authorities, Social Insurance Fund, and the Sudan Currency Printing Press Company.  In total, business registration typically takes an estimated 34.5 days.  http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/441871575346787051/pdf/Doing-Business-2020-Comparing-Business-Regulation-in-190-Economies-Economy-Profile-of-Sudan.pdf .  The report noted that the number of procedures and the amount of time it takes to register a business are higher than the sub-Saharan Africa average.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Sudan follows British Common law practices, Islamic Law, and customary law in some cases.  Contracts are enforced through the courts.  Sudan has written commercial and contractual laws.  Business regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system.  The Investment Act of 2013 established courts to handle disputes.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

Sudan’s investment authority lists the process by which businesses much register to operate at: http://www.sudaninvest.org/English/Default.htm .  The website outlines procedures for companies that wish to invest, including forming and ending relationships and license applications.  There is not an online business registration process.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

Sudan’s contract awards system is opaque. We do not have information to identify which agencies review transactions for competition-related concerns (whether domestic or international in nature).

Expropriation and Compensation

The government controls most of the agricultural land in Sudan and has sold millions of acres to Saudi Arabia and other countries.  Land laws have historically been an issue of dispute between local communities and the government and are the source of conflict.  The most recent examples of government expropriations were those of the authorities prior to 2019 under the Bashir regime bulldozing churches and selling the land to private investors.  The government claimed the churches did not have permits.  Some churches remained in the same location for decades without permits because the government would not issue them.  The government claimed the churches had no legal right and were simply squatting on the land.  According to the law, for eminent domain claims, the government should have compensated the churches.  That did not happen in all cases.  Government and Arab militias’ expropriation of land in Darfur, Gedaref, and Kassala states without compensation were reported.  In some cases, displaced persons returned to their land only to be denied access.  In most instances, the government did not adequately respond to appeals.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Sudan has been a member of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States since 1973.  Sudan became a member of the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 2018.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

The Sudanese Arbitration Act of 2016 codifies Sudan’s role in arbitration. “Application of the Act: Subject to the provisions of international agreements, pertaining to arbitration, to which Sudan is a party: 1) the provisions of this Act shall apply to every arbitration conducted in the Sudan, or abroad, where the parties thereof have agreed to subject the same to the provisions of this Act whenever the legal relation is of a civil nature, whether contractual or non-contractual…” https://www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp…/Sudan-Arbitration-Law.pdf 

Bankruptcy Regulations

The World Bank ranks Sudan 152 of 190 countries for ease of resolving insolvency.  It has a recovery rate of 30.2 cents on the dollar for creditors with an average timeline of two years and a cost of 20 percent of the value of the debtor’s estate to recover the debt.  http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/441871575346787051/Doing-Business-2020-Comparing-Business-Regulation-in-190-Economies-Economy-Profile-of-Sudan .  Sudan has the Bankruptcy Act of 1929.

Investment Incentives

The Sudanese government lists the following investment incentives:

• Exemption from taxes on profits for a term of not less than ten years;
• Free land or land at an incentivized price for the project;
• Nondiscriminatory treatment of the capital of investment, whether be it public, private, cooperative, or multi-sector capital;
• Guarantees the capital shall not to be nationalized, confiscated, or expropriated except through a law and against indemnity;
• Guarantees that money invested in a project shall not be confiscated or frozen, except through a judicial order;
• Recognition that the investor is entitled to transfer his or her money and profits; and
• Customs privileges for vehicles.

http://sudanembassyke.org/index.php/economy-investment/why-invest-in-sudan/ 

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

The Free Zones and Free Markets Law of 1994 governs such zones.  The investment authority reports that projects in areas designated as Free Trade Zones and Duty Free Zones enjoy the following policies:

• Exemption from a tax on profits for 15 years, renewable for an extra period;
• Exemption from personal income tax for salaries of expatriates;
• Exemption from all customs fees and taxes except service fees for products imported into or exported abroad from the zone;
• Exemption from all taxes and fees for real estate inside the zone;
• Authorization to transfer invested capital and profits from Sudan abroad through any bank licensed to operate in the zone;
• Exemption from customs fees for products of industrial projects established in the zones depending on materials used and local costs incurred in production and provided the value be estimated by a designated committee;
• Guarantees that money invested in the zones may not be frozen, confiscated, or arrested;
• Authorization to store goods transiting Sudan in zones under the supervision of customs police; and
• Authorization to rent its land and buildings according to the terms it agrees upon and without being bound by any other law.

http://www.sudaninvest.org/English/Sudan-Invest-FreeZone.htm 

Real Property

Sudan ranked 95 out of 190 for ease of registering property in the World Bank’s index.  Sudan has six procedures required to legally transfer title on immovable property taking a total of 11 days and at a cost of 2.6 percent of property value.  The World Bank gave Sudan a rating of 5.5 out of 30 for quality of land administration (e.g., reliability of infrastructure, land dispute resolution).  http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/441871575346787051/pdf/Doing-Business-2020-Comparing-Business-Regulation-in-190-Economies-Economy-Profile-of-Sudan.pdf 

Intellectual Property Rights

The legislative framework on intellectual property rights (IPR) is adequate, but enforcement remains uneven.  Trademarks of popular American businesses, usually chain restaurants, are often used or changed slightly to suggest  the original brand.  Many grocery and hardware stores display American name-brand products shipped from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Sudan is not listed in the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) 2020 Special 301 report or the 2019 Notorious Markets List. Sudan is in the accession process to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), and is not currently a party to the  WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  Sudan is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).   For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see the s WIPO country profiles at https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/details.jsp?country_code=SD .

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Sudan has a stock market (KSE) which is located in Khartoum.  The KSE has over 60 companies (http://www.kse.com.sd/ ) that include Sudanese Animal Resources Company, Financial Investment Bank, and Blue Nile Insurance.  Since 2018, there have been two more companies listed in the Industry sector, 11 more companies listed in the Investment and Development sector, and four more companies listed in the Telecom and Media sectors.  The total market value of all sectors is currently listed as 8,684,351,734,000 SDG (USD 157,897,304,255). http://www.kse.com.sd/Pages/default.aspx?c=550&sid=1 

Money and Banking System

Historically, Sudan has not had access to international banking institutions as it was under comprehensive U.S. economic and financial sanctions until late 2017.  Despite lifting of these comprehensive sanctions, international banks remain wary of operating in Sudan due to reputation risk associated with Sudan’s continued designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.  Most foreign banks operating in Sudan are based in Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, or Qatar.  Sudan faces a monetary crisis, with limited foreign exchange and a significant currency black market.  The Central Bank of Sudan lists banks operating in Sudan at: https://cbos.gov.sd/en/content/operating-banks-sudan 

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

Remittances come into Sudan via the informal market.  International banking institutions have not begun transactions with Sudan although U.S. financial sanctions have been lifted.  Foreign investors should be aware that they might face problems making or receiving payments.  The exchange rate is determined by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance.  The official exchange rate does not float with the international markets.  However, the vast majority of transactions in Sudan are determined by the parallel market rate (130 SDG: 1 USD), currently at more than double the official rate (55 SDG: 1 USD).

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Sudan has a sovereign wealth fund called the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account, established in 2008.  The Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) ranked it 32 out of 34 funds in its 2017 Resource Governance Index.

https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/SDN/oil-gas .

The exact number of state-owned enterprises is unknown, although government officials acknowledge that the defense and security agencies may control over 100 companies.  The NRGI ranked the state-owned Sudanese Petroleum Corporation (SPC) 69 out of 84 SOEs in its 2017 Resource Governance Index.  NRGI assessed that though the SPC discloses sufficient information about joint ventures and subsidiaries, it is opaque in its commodity sales, production, and government transfers.  Other areas for improvement included financial reporting and corporate governance.
https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/country-profiles/SDN/oil-gas .

Sudan’s Investment Law (National Investment Encouragement Act, 1999, Amended (2013)) sets the standards for business conduct and obligations.  The law and its executive rules are applied to both Sudanese and foreign investors.  The investment authority maintains oversight for “responsible business conduct” and provides information on regulations, services, and the various departments to which the investor could contact on its website: http://www.sudaninvest.org/English/About-Ministry.htm .  The investment authority also developed a “one-stop-shop” for information on land, customs, taxes, commercial registration, and agriculture among others.  The law under its Chapter 6 “Privileges and Guarantees” and Chapter 8 “General Rules” commits the government to “non-nationalization or non-confiscation of projects.”  Sudan’s Investment Council and Specialized Court create the regulations and are the bodies which settle overlapping issues.  Sudan makes available an ombudsman at its Public Grievance Chamber (www.ombudsman.gov.sd ).  The Sudanese Constitution (1998) first established the General Ombudsman body.  In 2011, Chapter V, Article 147 (1) of the Constitution (2011) established the Public Grievances Chamber.  The Ombudsman’s office explains its complaint process and other information online.  Corruption in the supply chain for commodities and minerals within the major cities and in the conflict-affected areas remains a concern.

Sudan falls short of consistently strong supply chain due diligence.  For example, while the government takes positive steps through its Ministry of Animal Resources (http://mar.gov.sd/en/index.php/departments/view_dept/2 ) to outline regulations for implementation of livestock and fisheries administration, it does not, through its Ministry of Energy and Mining prohibit the harmful use of cyanide or other dangerous chemicals in gold mining operations.  In fact, the government and private companies use cyanide in gold extraction.  Sudan is neither an EITI member country nor participates in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.

The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials; nevertheless, government corruption at all levels was widespread.  The Bashir regime made a few efforts to enforce legislation aimed at preventing and prosecuting corruption.  According to the World Bank’s most recent Worldwide Governance Indicators, corruption was a severe problem.  The law provides the legislative framework for addressing official corruption, but implementation under the Bashir regime was weak, and many punishments were lenient.  Officials found guilty of corrupt acts could often avoid jail time if they returned ill-gotten funds.  Under the Bashir regime, journalists who reported on government corruption were sometimes intimidated, detained, and interrogated by security services.

A special anticorruption attorney investigated and prosecuted corruption cases involving officials, their spouses, and their children.  Punishments for embezzlement include imprisonment or execution for public service workers, although these were almost never carried out.  All bank employees were considered public-service workers.  Under the Bashir regime, media reporting on corruption was considered a “red line” set by the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and a topic that authorities, for the most part, prohibited newspapers from covering (see section 2.a. of link below).  While reporting on corruption was no longer a red line under the CLTG, media continued to practice self-censorship on issues related to corruption.  In August 2019, Omar Bashir was formally indicted on charges of corruption and illegal possession of foreign currency.  Bashir’s trial began in August 2019; in December 2019, he was convicted and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on these charges.  Other more serious charges are pending.

Financial Disclosure: Under the Bashir regime, the law required high-ranking officials to publicly disclose income and assets.  There were no clear sanctions for noncompliance, although the former Anti-Corruption Commission possessed discretionary powers to punish violators.  The Financial Disclosure and Inspection Committee and the Unlawful and Suspicious Enrichment Administration at the Ministry of Justice both monitored compliance.  Despite three different bodies ostensibly charged with monitoring financial disclosure regulations, there was no effective enforcement or prosecution of offenders.

The 2019 constitutional declaration includes financial disclosure and prohibition of commercial activity provisions for members of the Sovereign Council and Council of Ministers, state and regional governors, and members of the Transitional Legislative Council.  It also mandates an Anti-Corruption and Restoration of Stolen Wealth Commission.

https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/sudan/

Resources to Report Corruption

Wajdi Salih
Spokesperson
High Anti-Corruption and Regime Dismantling Committee
+249 (0)91-235-2485

Shaza Elmahdi
Consultant on Sudan
Center for International Private Enterprise
1211 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036
+1 202-721-9200
selmahdi@cipe.org

While there have been civil disturbances and political violence associated with the protests against the Bashir regime and the declining economy, damage to property has not been directed specifically at U.S. business interests.  The 30-year Bashir regime was ousted in April 2019 after months of massive protests against the deteriorating economic situation.  After brief rule by the Transitional Military Council (TMC), the constitutional declaration was signed in August 2019, and the CLTG led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok took office in September 2019. This transitional government has a 39-month mandate to establish basic democratic institutions and hold elections.  Despite government efforts to resolve high inflation, exchange rate disparities, and fuel and bread shortages, these issues remain concerns and potential investors should take note.

The law provides that employees of companies with more than 100 workers can form and join independent unions.  Other employees can join preexisting unions.  The law establishes a single national trade union federation and excludes police, military personnel, prison employees, legal advisers in the Justice Ministry, and judges from membership.  In some cases, membership in international unions was not officially recognized.

The TMC dissolved all trade unions and associations in April 2019 but restored the right to form unions on May 22, 2019.  On November 26, 2019, the CLTG dissolved all trade unions and associations as part of its effort to dismantle the remnants of the Bashir regime.  The CLTG encouraged the formation of new trade unions, although amended laws are still being drafted by authorities.  According to industry leaders, the High Anti-Corruption and Regime Dismantling Committee appointed steering committees to guide activities in the different sectors on an interim basis until new unions are formed.  These steering committees remain in operation.

The unskilled labor market is plentiful.  There are many workers from Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Syria.

https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/sudan/

There is no DFC agreement between Sudan and the United States.

* Source for Host Country Data

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Data not available.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Suriname does not use transparent policies and effective laws to foster competition. The National Assembly has delayed its vote on a draft competition law. The Competitiveness Unit Suriname coordinates and monitors national competitiveness and is working towards establishing policies and suggesting legislation to foster competition. Current legislation such as tax, environment, health and safety, or other laws are not purposely used to impede investment, but may still form obstacles. Employment protection legislation is among the most stringent in the world. Labor laws, for instance, prohibit employers from firing an employee without the permission of the Ministry of Labor once the employee has fulfilled his or her probationary period, which by law is limited to two months. Tax laws are criticized for overburdening the formal business sector, while a large informal sector goes untaxed. Many public sector contracts and concessions are not awarded in a clear and transparent manner.

Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are often outdated and therefore not transparent nor consistent with international norms. The National Assembly passed the Act on Annual Accounts in 2017 to create more fiscal transparency by requiring all companies, including state owned enterprises, to publish annual accounts based on the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The law will go into effect in 2020 for large companies and 2021 for small and medium sized companies.

There are no informal regulatory processes managed by non-governmental organizations or private sector associations.

Rule-making and regulatory authority exist within relevant ministries at the national level. It is this level of regulation that is most relevant for foreign businesses. The government may consult with relevant stakeholders on regulations but there is no required public process. The government presents draft laws and regulations to the Council of Minsters for discussion and approval. Once approved, the president’s advisory body, the State Council, considers the draft. If approved, the government presents a draft to the National Assembly for discussion, amendment, and approval, and then to the President for signature. Legislation only goes into effect with the signature of the President and after publication in the National Gazette.

There is no current requirement for specific accounting standards. Some companies create financial reports using The Netherlands Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (NL GAAP), some develop standards internal to the company, and some larger firms use resident international firms for their accounting needs. Not all companies prepare financial statements. There is no current requirement for companies to be audited, though some companies include it in their Articles of Association.

Suriname passed new legislation in October 2018 to professionalize and institute better standards in the accountancy profession. The legislation created the Suriname Chartered Accountants Institute (SCAI) and makes membership mandatory for accountants in Suriname. The board of the SCAI has the responsibility to monitor the quality of the profession and apply disciplinary measures. As per 2020, companies (there is an exception for small companies) are obliged to implement IFRS in their financial reports.

Draft bills or regulations are discussed in view of the public and relevant stakeholders may be consulted. The National Assembly has established the email address feedbackwetgeving@dna.sr as a place where individuals can give their opinion on draft legislation.

There is no centralized online location similar to the Federal Register in the United States where key regulatory actions are published. However, the National Assembly publishes the actual text of adopted laws on its website.

It is unclear what the regulatory enforcement mechanisms that ensure the government follows administrative processes might be, as the processes have not been made accountable to the public. There is no public administration law. The Auditor General’s office is an independent body in charge of supervising the financial management of government funds. The Supreme Audit Institution reports to the National Assembly. The Central Accountant Service exercises control on administrative processes at the ministries and reports to the Ministry of Finance. There is no centralized online location where key regulatory actions or their summaries are published, similar to the Federal Register in the United States.

The minimum wage law was revised by State Decree on July 18, 2019. The government will determine the minimum wage biennially.

Regulatory reform efforts announced in prior years have largely not been fully implemented. Suriname has been planning to introduce VAT for a number of years, but adoption and implementation of a VAT law have been delayed so far.

Regulations are developed by ministries that have jurisdiction over the relevant area, in consultation with involved stakeholders.

It is unclear what the regulatory enforcement mechanisms are, as the process has not been made public.

Regulation is not reviewed on the basis of scientific or data-driven assessments. Scientific studies or quantitative analysis on the impact of regulations or rarely conducted and/or not publicly available for comment.

The government’s executive budget proposal and enacted budget are easily accessible to the public. Actual revenues and expenditures regularly deviate from the enacted budget, and the origin and level of accuracy of some information in the budget were not reliable. A full end-of-year report is not publicly available. The Supreme Audit Institution publishes a limited audit based on self-reporting by the ministries.

The State Debt Management Office (SDMO) is responsible for the operational management of the public debt of the government. Data regarding public debt is published every three months in the Government Gazette of Suriname and on the SDMO website.

International Regulatory Considerations

As a member of CARICOM, Suriname has committed to regionally-coordinated regulatory systems. Suriname uses national and international standards. Standards developed by other (international/regional) standardization bodies that Suriname utilizes include: ISO, Codex Alimentarius, International Electro Technical Commission, CROSQ, ASTM International, COPANT, SMIIC (Standards and Metrology Institute for Islamic Countries), NEN (Nederland Normalisatie Instituut), ETSI, GLOBAL GAP, etc.

Suriname uses national and international standards. Standards developed by other (international/regional) standardization bodies that Suriname utilizes include: ISO, Codex Alimentarius, International Electro Technical Commission, CROSQ, ASTM International, COPANT, SMIIC (Standards and Metrology Institute for Islamic Countries), NEN (Nederland Normalisatie Instituut), ETSI, GLOBAL GAP, etc.

Suriname is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) lists only one notification from Suriname in 2015.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Suriname’s legal system is based on the Dutch civil system. Judges uphold the sanctity of contracts, and enforce them in accordance with their terms. When an individual or company disputes a signed contract, they have the right to take the case to court. The judiciary consistently upholds local law, applies it, and enforces it for local and international businesses. Laws are defined in criminal, civil, and commercial codes and verdicts are based on the judge’s interpretation of those codes. There is no specialized commercial court. The commercial codes contain commercial legislation.

Historically, the judicial system has been considered to be independent of the executive branch. Most observers consider the judicial system to be procedurally competent, fair, reliable, and free of overt government interference. Due to a shortage of judges and administrative staff, processing of civil cases can be delayed. Last year, the Court of Justice appointed seven new judges to ease the delay in court cases. The number of judges is now 26.In November 2019, a Court Martial found President Desire Delano Bouterse guilty of the 1982 murder of fifteen political dissidents during a military regime he headed in the 1980s. In January 2020, President Bouterse was due in court to deliver an objection to the verdict, but the hearing was adjourned and postponed. In August 2019, the National Assembly passed legislation to create a Constitutional Court, which could eventually rule on aspects of the President’s murder case.

Draft regulations may be reviewed by involved stakeholders and they may be given the opportunity to comment. Since October 2019, individuals have also had the option to comment on draft legislation via email at feedbackwetgeving@dna.sr. There is no formal, required public consultation process. Suriname has no general administrative law, so there are no special administrative tribunals. Judges of the regular courts also hear cases of administrative law.Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

The overall regime, and more particularly the approval of foreign direct investment (FDI), may be discretionary rather than rules-based, leading to heightened unpredictability and uncertainty, and associated risks of favoritism and corruption.

The National Assembly approved the amendment of the commercial code chapter regarding the establishment of a limited liability company in 2016. Parameters addressing enforcement are forthcoming. In 2019, no new legislation or regulation regarding investments was drafted or implemented.

In March 2019, The National Assembly adopted legislation to join the Kimberley Process Certificate of the World Diamond Council Association.

In August 2019, the National Assembly passed legislation to create a Constitutional Court.

In November 2019, the National Assembly amended the State Debt Act, which raised the government’s debt ceiling from 60% of GDP to 95% of GDP.

In February 2020, former Central Bank Governor Robert van Trikt was arrested on fraud charges. As of May 2020, he remained in custody and his legal case was ongoing. In April 2020, the Attorney General asked the National Assembly to indict Finance Minister Gillmore Hoefdraad on charges related to corruption and money laundering.In March 2020, the National Assembly passed the Foreign Exchange Act, which places constraints on the use of foreign currency in cash transactions and establishes a strict exchange rate for the Surinamese dollar. It also grants the government broad authorities to enforce the law, as well as the power to halt the import of “non-essential” goods. In May 2020, a judge suspended the law over questions concerning its constitutionality. The fate of the law will likely be determined by the nascent Constitutional Court.

In April 2020, the National Assembly passed the COVID-19 State of Emergency Law, which grants the government broad powers to enforce COVID-19-related precautionary measures. It also created a $53 million fund to assist struggling businesses, and it allowed the government to take all loans and advances from local institutions since 2002 and consolidate them into a single mega-loan.

There is no primary one-stop-shop website for investments that provide relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

There are no domestic agencies currently reviewing transactions for competition-related concerns. There are draft laws on competition and consumer protection that have been pending review by the National Assembly for five years now. According to the authorities, no date for enactment is foreseen. Both draft laws also cover state-owned enterprises. The CARICOM Competition Commission is based in Suriname, and it monitors potential anti-competitive practices for enterprises operating within the CARICOM Single Market and Economy.

Expropriation and Compensation

According to Article 34 of Suriname’s constitution, expropriation will take place “only for reasons of public utility” and with prior compensation. In practice, the government has no history of expropriations. However, Article 42 of Suriname’s constitution specifically refers to all natural resources as property of the nation, and states that the nation has inalienable rights to take possession of all natural resources to utilize them for the economic, social, and cultural development of Suriname.There is no history of expropriation.

According to Article 34 of Suriname’s constitution, expropriation will take place “only for reasons of public utility” and with prior compensation. In practice, the government has no history of expropriations. However, Article 42 of Suriname’s constitution specifically refers to all natural resources as property of the nation, and states that the nation has inalienable rights to take possession of all natural resources to utilize them for the economic, social, and cultural development of Suriname.There is no history of expropriation.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Suriname is not a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (ICSID). Suriname has been a member of the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards since 1964, when the country was still a colony of the Netherlands. Upon becoming independent in 1975, Suriname automatically continued its membership in international conventions and treaties.

There is no specific domestic legislation providing enforcement of awards under the 1958 New York Convention and /or under the ICSID convention.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The government is a signatory to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

Suriname has no BIT or FTA with an investment chapter with the United States.

There have been no publicly known investment disputes in the past 10 years involving a U.S person or other foreign investor. Every effort is made to settle investment disputes outside the court system or via arbitration.

Judgments of foreign arbitral awards are enforced by the local courts only if Suriname has a legal treaty of jurisprudence with the foreign country involved. If not, the foreign judgment can be brought before the Surinamese court for consideration as long as the court determines it has jurisdiction and doing so does not otherwise violate any Surinamese laws. With Suriname’s participation and membership in the Caribbean Court of Justice, judgments from this court are also binding for local courts. Cases have been successfully filed against Suriname before the Inter-American Court of Justice and the Organization of American States. Judgments from these courts have been upheld by the Surinamese legal system.

There is no known history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors.International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Court

Suriname’s civil law includes options for arbitration. The government reactivated the Suriname Arbitration Institute (SAI) in August 2014 to offer arbitration and mediation services. The SAI collaborates with the Dutch Arbitration Institute.

Local courts only recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards if doing so is stipulated in the contract or agreement and it does not contradict local law. Foreign arbitration is an accepted means of settling disputes between private parties, but only if local alternatives are exhausted.

There have been no publicly known investment disputes in which state-owned enterprises are involved. Court processes are in general considered transparent and non-discriminatory.Bankruptcy Regulation

Suriname has bankruptcy legislation. Creditors, equity shareholders, and holders of other financial contracts, including foreign contract holders, have the right to file for liquidation of debts due to insolvency. In a case where there is a loan from a commercial bank, repayment of the bank loan takes precedence. Bankruptcy, in principle, is not criminalized. However, in cases where a board of directors encouraged a company to pursue bankruptcy to avoid creditors, courts have viewed this behavior as a criminal offense. In the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, Suriname stands at 138 in the ranking of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency.

Investment Incentives

Under current regulations, foreign investors can benefit from both tax and non-tax based incentives. Tax-based incentives include a nine-year tax holiday that can be extended by one year if the investment is at least USD 13 million; accelerated depreciation of assets; and tax consolidation. Under the Raw Minerals Act, the government grants an exemption of duties for the import of raw materials from CARICOM member countries. Exemptions are also granted in the food industry, the soft drink industry, and the fruit juice industry. In 2011, the government eliminated import duties on computers and related items. The law accords special consideration on investments exceeding USD 50 million and investments in the exploration and exploitation of bauxite, hydrocarbons, gold, and radioactive minerals. Large investments in the mining sector are subject to extensive negotiations between the government and investors. The government maintains the ability to grant incentives that depart from the provisions in the 2001 Investment Law, for example, incentives related to the provisions of infrastructure. The government does not have a practice of issuing guarantees or jointly financing foreign direct investment projects.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

There are no duty-free import zones in Suriname.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

There are no policies that mandate hiring local employment; however, the Work Permits Act prohibits employers from employing foreigners without a work permit granted by the Ministry of Labor. Some large multinationals have specific agreements with the government mandating hiring local employees.

There are no policies requiring that senior management and board of directors should be Surinamese nationals.

There are no excessively onerous visa, residence, or work permit requirements inhibiting foreign investors’ mobility. Foreigners with short-term business in Suriname can apply online for a e-visa at: https://suriname.vfsevisa.com/ . Business visas require a letter of introduction from the business the applicant will be working with in Suriname. Foreigners who want to work in Suriname first need to apply for a residency permit at the Ministry of Justice and Police, after which they can apply for a work permit at the Ministry of Labor. The free movement of artists, university graduates, media workers, musicians, and athletes of CARICOM origin is arranged through CSME regulations. CSME regulations also provide for the free movement for those seeking to establish or conduct business within the community.

There are no government/authority-imposed conditions on permission to invest. In practice, large foreign investments, especially in the extractives sector, require approval from the relevant Minister.

The government does not impose forced localization policies on foreign investors.

There are no enforcement procedures for performance requirements on investors.

The 2001 Investment Law authorizes the Minister of Finance to grant both tax and non-tax incentives for new investments and for the expansion of existing investments. Incentives for new investments are on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the Ministry of Finance. Incentives are available for both domestic and foreign investors, but investors must apply for these incentives before the initial investment is made.

Foreign IT providers are not required to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption.

There are no measures that prevent or unduly impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside the country’s territory.

There are no mechanisms used to enforce any rules on local data storage within the country.

Real Property

Interest in property is enforced. Mortgages and liens are common. Mortgages are registered with the Mortgage Office. However, no effective registration system exists for other types of liens.

Non-residents can request to lease land from the government if they have established a company under Surinamese law. However, the process from application to approval is lengthy.The percentage of land in Suriname that lacks a clear land title remains unknown. There is no sustained effort by the government to identify property owners and register land titles. Article 1-1 of the L-1 decree, Principles of Land Policy, states that “all land, to which others have not proven their right to ownership, is domain of the State.” Furthermore, Article 41 of the Surinamese constitution states that wealth and resources are property of the nation and shall be used to promote economic, social, and cultural development. There is no effective demarcation of substantial land claims by indigenous people in the interior. Unoccupied, legally-purchased property cannot be reverted to other owners, such as squatters.

Intellectual Property Rights

Suriname is a member of the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); however, it has not ratified the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. Even though Suriname is party to multiple agreements, intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement is weak. The current legal framework mentions protection of copyright, trademarks, and patents, but ;that legislation dates back to 1912 (amended in 2001). Although the National Assembly passed amendments to the Music Copyright Law of 1913 in March 2015, there is no enforcement. Infringement on rights and theft are not uncommon due to the absence of enforcement capacity. There is also no protection provided for industrial designs, utility models, geographical indications, layout designs of integrated circuits or undisclosed information.

No IPR-related laws or regulations have been enacted in the past year. A draft IPR bill has been pending since 2015. Currently, patents and copyrights must be registered abroad due to a lack of local legislation. In 2012, the Suriname Port Unit was established to improve port security and prevent the illegal use of sea containers in drug trafficking and transnational organized criminal activities, such as trafficking in chemicals used in the manufacture of drugs (precursors), smuggling of goods (including counterfeit goods), tax evasion and possible terrorist acts.

In 2012, the Suriname Port Unit was established to improve port security and prevent the illegal use of sea containers in drug trafficking and transnational organized criminal activities, such as trafficking in chemicals used in the manufacture of drugs (precursors), smuggling of goods (including counterfeit goods), tax evasion and possible terrorist acts.

Suriname is not mentioned in the United States Trade Representative’s Special 301 Report, nor is it named in the Notorious Markets List.

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The government does not promote portfolio investment.

There is a small self-regulating stock market with eleven companies registered. It meets twice a month but does not have an electronic exchange. There is no effective regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. At present, Suriname is facing liquidity shortfalls.

Sufficient policies do exist to facilitate the free flow of financial resources.

As an IMF Article VIII member, Suriname has agreed to refrain from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

Credit is allocated on market terms and at market rates. Foreign investors that establish businesses in Suriname are able to get credit on the local market, usually with a payment guarantee from the parent company. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Larger companies can obtain customized credit products. There is, however, a Central Bank regulation that limits a commercial bank’s credit exposure to a single client.

Money and Banking System.

The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Larger companies can obtain customized credit products.

According to the IMF Article IV Consultation in 2019, the banking system faces pressing vulnerabilities. Based on the latest (July 2019) data, the capital adequacy ratio for the banking system stood at 10.5 percent (above the 10 percent minimum requirement), but non-performing loans in the banking system remained high (12.5 percent of gross loans), and profitability was low (0.7 percent return on assets). Deposit and loan dollarization remain high.

Total estimated assets of Suriname’s largest banks:

DSB Bank (annual report, 2018): USD 1,007 billion

Hakrin Bank (annual report 28, 2018): USD 627.6. million

Republic Bank Limited (2019 annual report, Suriname-based assets): USD 473 million. (The Republic Bank Limited of Trinidad and Tobago acquired Royal Bank of Canada’s Suriname holdings in 2015.)

Finabank (annual report, 2018): $269 million.

Suriname has a central bank system Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in Suriname. They are subject to the same measures and regulations as local banks. According to an IMF assessment in 2016, banks in Suriname are among those in the region that have lost their correspondent relationships. The IMF notes that though the loss of correspondent banking relationships has not reached systemic proportions, a critical risk still exists. The Central Bank admits that compliance regarding legislation and procedures is lacking, and that strengthening of enforcement is needed. According to the IMF’s Article IV Consultation report in 2019, there is a possibility of losing corresponding banking relationships given recent overseas investigations of potential money laundering via Suriname’s financial sector. The reputational risk to both local and foreign banks acting as their correspondents is substantial. Suriname is in the process of completing a National Risk Assessment to identify and assess the money laundering risks.

There are no restrictions for foreigners to open a bank account. Banks require U.S. citizens to provide the information necessary to comply with the Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

There are no restrictions or limitations placed on foreign investors in converting, transferring, or repatriating funds associated with an investment, such as remittances of investment capital, earnings, loan or lease payments, or royalties. There can be shortages in the availability of U.S. cash dollars at local banks, which can affect businesses.

Funds associated with any form of investment can be freely converted into a usable currency at legal market clearing rates with the permission of the Foreign Exchange Commission. However, the criteria for obtaining permissions are opaque.

Suriname maintains an official exchange rate of 7.52 Surinamese dollars (SR to $1.) government also registers and supervises money exchanges called cambios, which offer parallel exchange rates. For much of 2019, those parallel rates exchange rate fluctuated between 8.40 to 8.65 SRD to $1. In March 2020, they reached as high as 14 to 16 SRD

Remittance Policies

There are no recent changes or plans to change investment remittance policies.

The waiting period on remittances can be relatively short for dividends; return on investments, interest, and principal on private foreign debt; lease payments; royalties; and management fees. The time needed to process the requests depends on the sector and the amount transferred. Transfers through the banking system can range from same day to one week waiting times, contingent upon approval by the Foreign Exchange Commission.Sovereign Wealth Funds

On May 4, 2017, the National Assembly passed legislation establishing a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). Suriname does not participate in the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds.

State owned enterprises (SOEs) operate in the oil, agribusiness, mining, communication, travel, energy, and financial sectors. SOEs provide little information regarding their operations. Only a few produce annual reports accessible to the public. Staatsolie, Suriname’s state-owned oil company, has publicly available audited accounts. As of 2020, all state-owned enterprises will be required to publish annual accounts. Several have been accused of fraud or corrupt practices.

There is no public list of SOEs.

SOEs receive advantages when competing in the domestic market. These include access to government guarantees and government loans otherwise unavailable to private enterprises. Additionally, SOEs have access to land and raw materials inaccessible to private entities.

The government does not yet adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs.

Privatization Program

The GOS did announce a privatization program largely in the agricultural sector, but the only privatization was the state-owned banana company in 2014.

Foreign investors can participate in privatization programs. In 2014, the Belgium multinational UNIVEG acquired a 90 percent stake in the state-owned banana company through a public, international bidding process. The European Commission assisted with the bidding process. UNIVEG later pulled out of Suriname. As this is the only example of privatization within Suriname, no standard privatization or public bidding processes have been established by the GOS.

There is a growing awareness of expectations of standards for responsible business conduct (RBC) among consumers and producers. Historically, Alcoa’s subsidiary, Suralco, took the lead on RBC in Suriname, and large multinationals such as Newmont continue to be the largest proponents of RBC. Some larger, state-owned and local companies also model RBC, including Staatsolie, Surinam Airways, Telesur, and the Fernandes Group of Companies, which holds the distribution rights for Coca-Cola, and the McDonalds franchise rights.

The government has not taken systematic measures to encourage or promote RBC. Companies are allowed to develop their own policies and standards. The government does incorporate RBC in some of its partnerships and agreements with multinational firms. For example, recent agreements between Staatsolie and foreign companies for offshore drilling include stipulations regarding RBC. The government has no national point of contact or ombudsman for stakeholders to acquire information or raise concerns about RBC. The GOS has not conducted a National Action Plan on RBC and/or Business and Human Rights. It is not known if RBC policies are part of the government’s procurement decisions.

There have been no recent high-profile controversial instances of private sector impact on human rights, though indigenous land rights in the interior is an ongoing issue.

The Labor Inspection Department from the Ministry of Labor supervises and enforces the observance of legal regulations regarding the conditions of employment and the protection of employees performing duties. Laws were enforced only in the formal sectors. Labor inspectors did not make regular occupational safety and health inspections. The government is drafting consumer and environmental protection laws. In March 2020, the National Assembly passed an Environment Framework Law.

Currently there is no legislation for corporate governance and executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. The Act on Annual Accounts will require companies to publish annual accounts based on the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) starting in 2020.

The Suriname Trade and Business Association has taken the lead in promoting RBC. The Suriname Conservation Foundation initiated a Green Partnership Program this year signed by 14 enterprises, 13 of which are local, to stimulate awareness about a green economy and nature preservation. So far, no incidents have been reported indicating that those monitoring and or advocating around RBC cannot work freely.

The host government has not encouraged adherence to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chain of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas. In March 2019, the government adopted legislation to join the Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme in order to become a member of the World Diamond Council Association.

Suriname became a member of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative on May 24, 2017. The 2016 and 2017 reports were recently made publicly available. There are no domestic transparency measures requiring the disclosure of payments made to governments and/or other RBC/BHR policies or practices.

Suriname’s legal code penalizes corruption, but there is virtually no enforcement. Government officials are occasionally removed from assignments, but convictions are rare. On September 1, 2017, parliament passed anti-corruption legislation, nearly 15 years after the initial draft bill was introduced to the National Assembly. As of May 2020, the President had not yet signed the measured into law, and the anti-corruption commission has not yet been installed. Suriname ranks on 70 out of 180 countries on the Corruption Index of Transparency International.

Existing laws that deal with corruption do not extend to family members of officials, or to political parties.

There are no laws or regulations to counter conflicts of interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. The government does not encourage or require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct prohibiting bribery of public officials.

The government does not encourage or require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct prohibiting bribery of public officials.

Local private companies do not use internal control, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Suriname has signed and ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. Suriname has not yet signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption. Suriname is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery.

Suriname has signed and ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. Suriname has not yet signed and ratified the UN Convention against Corruption. Suriname is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery.

There are no NGOs that focus exclusively on investigating corruption. U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI. Corruption is believed to be most pervasive in government procurement, the awarding of licenses and concessions, customs, and taxation.

U.S. firms have identified corruption as an obstacle to FDI. Corruption is believed to be most pervasive in government procurement, the awarding of licenses and concessions, customs, and taxation.

Resources to Report Corruption

Fraud Department
Suriname Police Force
( Korps Politie Suriname)
Havenlaan, Paramaribo, Suriname
(597) 404-943

Since the restoration of democracy in 1987, Suriname has not seen politically motivated violence or civil disturbance.In July 2019, illegal goldminers damaged property at the Rosebel goldmine after the company’s security personnel fatally shot an illegal goldminer. The mine was subsequently closed for one month, and then reopened. Suriname is increasingly polarized politically, however past elections were considered to be free and fair by international observers.

In general, both skilled and unskilled labor is available in the local market. According to the IMF Article IV report the unemployment rate is around six percent. Foreign workers are mainly active in the extractive industries and agricultural sector. Not only Haitians, but also an influx of Cubans entered the workforce and are active in several sectors for lower wages. Documented foreign workers are protected by labor laws. The unemployment rate in 2019 was approximately 6.17 percent. An estimated 15 percent of the working-age population worked in the informal economy.

Heavy equipment operators, welders, and other skilled workers in the extractive industries are in high demand. In recent years, Suriname recruited physicians and ER nurses from the Philippines to work in hospital emergency rooms. Because of the economic downturn in 2015/2016, the majority of these workers have left the country, resulting in a shortage of nurses and medical staff. Since 2005, Suriname has welcomed Cuban medical professionals on a rolling basis. In March 2020, Cuba sent 20 doctors and 30 nurses to Suriname to assist with the government’s COVID-19 response.

There are no policies that require the hiring of nationals; however, the Work Permits Act prohibits employers from employing foreigners without a work permit granted by the Ministry of Labor.

Legislation makes it difficult for employers to respond to fluctuating market conditions. The Dismissal Permits Act prohibits employers from dismissing employees without permission from the Ministry of Labor. Collective redundancy for organizational or economic reasons is permitted in cases such as the closure or decline of a business.

Generally, when an employee is laid off, unions negotiate with the employer regarding a package and duration of social benefits. Labor organizations sometimes object to work based on contracts as opposed to full time, ongoing employment.

Labor laws are not waived to attract or retain investment. As Suriname has no special economic zones, foreign trade zones, or free ports with alternative labor policies, all entities are subject to existing legislation.

Collective bargaining agreements are widespread in both the private and public sector. Data regarding the percentage of the economy covered by collective bargaining agreements is unavailable. Employees of most large multi-national firms are unionized.

Labor dispute mechanisms are in place and freely used for mediation and arbitration.

Strikes that pose an investment risk are rare.

Suriname is a member of the International Labor Organization and recognizes international labor law in its domestic legislation. In 2018, Suriname made a moderate advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor. The government ratified International Labor Organization Convention 138 concerning the minimum age for admission to employment, acceded to the Protocol to the Forced Labor Convention, and amended the Law on Labor for Children and Young People, raising the minimum age of work to 16 years.

Labor laws incorporate freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively, along with prohibitions against forced labor, child labor, and employment discrimination. Existing legislation also provides for humane working conditions, occupational safety and health, and standardized working hours. The Labor Inspection Department supervises observance of labor abuses, health, and safety standards. Laws were effectively enforced only in the formal sectors.

Suriname qualifies for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The GSP framework includes clauses on labor standards.

In June 2019, the National Assembly adopted the family protection law regarding maternity and paternity leave. In July 2019, the National Assembly approved an update of the Minimum Wage Act which set the minimum wage at SRD 8.4 per hour, effective July 10. Every two years, starting 2020, a National Wage Board will advise on a new minimum wage to the Minister of Labor.

There are no DFC programs.

The Peoples Republic of China provides significant investment financing in Suriname. In many cases, these projects are funded by China’s Export-Import Bank and completed by Chinese companies.

Government-funded investment opportunities are rarely publicly advertised.

Suriname signed an Investment Incentive Agreement with the United States in 1993.

* Source for Host Country Data: Central Bank of Suriname

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Note: Suriname does not release foreign direct investment data publicly. The IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) has no information on Suriname. There are no tax haven sources of inward FDI.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Note: Portfolio investment data are not available in Suriname on the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey. The host government does not publish portfolio investment data.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

According to the World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance (http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/ ), Tanzania scores low in regulatory governance with 1.5 out of 5 total in transparency of regulatory governance (neighboring Kenya and Uganda, by contrast, both score 3.25)

Tanzania has formal processes for drafting and implementing rules and regulations. Generally, after an Act is passed by Parliament, the creation of regulations is delegated to a designated ministry. In theory, stakeholders are legally entitled to comment on regulations before they are implemented. However, ministries and regulatory agencies frequently fail to provide adequate opportunity for meaningful input as there is no minimum period of time for public comment set forth in law. Stakeholders often report that they are either not consulted or given too little time to provide meaningful input. Ministries or regulatory agencies do not have the legal obligation to publish the text of proposed regulations before their enactment. Sometimes, it is difficult to obtain the final, adopted version of a bill in a timely manner nor is it always public information if and when the President signed the bill. Moreover, the government has increasingly used presidential decree powers to bypass regulatory and legal structures.

In 2016, the President signed the Access to Information Act into law. In theory, the Act gives citizens more rights to information; however, some claim that the Act gives too much discretion to the GoT to withhold disclosure. Although information, including rules and regulations, is available on the GoT’s “Government Portal” (https://www.tanzania.go.tz/documents ), the website is generally not current and incomplete. Alternatively, rules and regulations can be obtained on the relevant ministry’s website, but many offer insufficient information.

Nominally, independent regulators are mandated with impartially following the regulations. The process, however, has sometimes been criticized as being subject to political influence, depriving the regulator of the independence it is granted under the law.

Tanzania does not meet the minimum standards for transparency of public finances and debt obligations.

International Regulatory Considerations

Tanzania is also part of both the EAC and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and subject to their respective regulations. However, according to the 2016 East African Market Scorecard (most recent), Tanzania is not compliant with several EAC regulations.

Tanzania is a member of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). The national standards body, the Tanzania Bureau of Standards, was established in 1975. It has been most active in promoting standards and quality in process technology, including agro-processing, chemicals and textiles, and engineering, including mining and construction.

Tanzania is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its National Enquiry Point (NEP) is the Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS). As the WTO NEP, TBS handles information on adopted or proposed technical regulations, as well as on standards and conformity assessment procedures. Tanzania does not notify all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Tanzania’s legal system is based on the English Common Law system. The first source of law is the 1977 Constitution, followed by statutes or acts of Parliament; and case law, which are reported or unreported cases from the High Courts and Courts of Appeal and are used as precedents to guide lower courts. The Court of Appeal, which handles appeals from Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, is the highest court, followed by the High Court, which handles civil, criminal and commercial cases. There are four specialized divisions within the High Courts: Labor, Land, Commercial, and Corruption and Economic Crimes. The Labor, Land, and Corruption and Economic Crimes divisions have exclusive jurisdiction over their respective matters, while the Commercial division does not claim exclusive jurisdiction. The High Court and the District and Resident Magistrate Courts also have original jurisdiction in commercial cases subject to specified financial limitations.

Apart from the formal court system, there are quasi-judicial bodies, including the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal and the Fair Competition Tribunal, as well as alternate dispute resolution procedures in the form of arbitration proceedings. Judgments originating from countries whose courts are recognized under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (REFJA) are enforceable in Tanzania. To enforce such judgments, the judgment holder must make an application to the High Court of Tanzania to have the judgment registered. Countries currently listed in the REFJA include Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Zambia, Seychelles, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, the United Kingdom, and Sri Lanka.

The Tanzanian constitution guarantees judicial independence. However, the degree of judicial independence has varied significantly in the past few years, and many perceive that political interference in justice has increased over the past five years.

Regulations and enforcement actions are appealable and they are adjudicated in the national court system.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

In 2017, new laws and regulations were enacted that may impact the risk-return profile on foreign investments, especially those in the extractives and natural resources industries. The laws/regulations include the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017, Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Renegotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act 2017, Written Laws (Miscellaneous Act) 2017, and Mining (Local Content) Regulations 2018. The three new acts were introduced by the executive branch under a certificate of urgency, meaning that standard advance publication requirements were waived to expedite passage. As a result, there was minimal stakeholder engagement.

Investors, especially those in natural resources and mining, have expressed concern about the effects of these new laws. Two of the new laws apply to “natural wealth and resources,” which are broadly defined and not only include oil and gas, but in theory, could include wind, sun, and air space. Investors are encouraged to seek legal counsel to determine the effect these laws may have on existing or potential investments. For natural resource contracts, the laws remove rights to international arbitration and subject contracts, past and present, to Parliamentary review. More specifically, the law states “Where [Parliament] considers that certain terms …or the entire arrangement… are prejudicial to the interests of the People and the United Republic by reason of unconscionable terms it may, by resolution, direct the Government to initiate renegotiation with a view to rectifying the terms.”  Further, if the GoT’s proposed renegotiation is not accepted, the offending terms are automatically expunged. “Unconscionable” is defined broadly, including catch-all definitions for clauses that are, for example, “inequitable or onerous to the state.” Under the law, the judicial branch does not play a role in determining whether a clause is “unconscionable.”

The Mining (Local Content) Regulations 2018 require that indigenous Tanzanian companies are given first preference for mining licenses. An ‘indigenous Tanzanian company’ is one incorporated under the Companies Act with at least 51 percent of its equity owned by and 100 percent of its non-managerial positions held by Tanzanians. Furthermore, foreign mining companies must have at least 5 percent equity participation from an indigenous Tanzanian company and must grant the GoT a 16 percent carried interest. Lastly, foreign companies that supply goods or services to the mining industry must incorporate a joint venture company in which an indigenous Tanzanian company must hold equity participation of at least 20 percent.

The Mining (Local Content) Regulations 2018 also set the timeframe for local content percentages to be raised over the next 10 years which vary by type of good or service provided. There are immediate requirements to use 100 percent local content for financial, insurance, legal, catering, cleaning, laundry, and security services. All contractors must submit a local content plan to the GoT, which includes provisions to favor local content and meets required local content percentages. The plan must include five sub-plans on employment and training; research and development; technology transfer; legal services; and financial services. The regulations also require contractors to implement bidding procedures to acquire goods and services and to award contracts to indigenous Tanzanian companies if they do not exceed the lowest bidder by more than 10 percent. There are also regular contractor reporting requirements. Violating these regulations can lead to a fine of up to TZS 500 million or five years imprisonment.

The Tanzania Investment Center contains many relevant laws, rules, procedures, and reporting requirements for investors on its portal at http://tanzania.eregulations.org , but it is not comprehensive.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

The Fair Competition Commission (FCC) is an independent government body mandated to intervene, as necessary, to prevent significant market dominance, price fixing, extortion of monopoly rent to the detriment of the consumer, and market instability. The FCC has the authority to restrict mergers and acquisitions if the outcome is likely to create market dominance or lead to uncompetitive behavior.

Expropriation and Compensation

The constitution and investment acts require government to refrain from nationalization. However, the GoT may expropriate property after due process for the purpose of national interest. The Tanzanian Investment Act guarantees payment of fair, adequate, and prompt compensation; access to the court or arbitration for the determination of adequate compensation; and prompt repatriation in convertible currency where applicable. For protection under the Tanzania Investment Act, foreign investors require USD 500,000 minimum capital and Tanzanian investors require USD 100,000.

GoT authorities do not discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives in expropriation. There have been cases of government revocation of hunting concessions that grant land rights to foreign investors, including a U.S.-based company with strategic investor status in 2016. In late 2018, the GoT expropriated several dormant cashew-processing factories. In early 2019, the GoT reportedly repossessed 16 previously-privatized factories that were not in operation. At the same time, the government issued a notice to more than 30 businesses, including hotels and other factories, warning them that if they did not present a plan for revitalizing their businesses, the GoT would repossess them. The ownership structures of these businesses are unconfirmed; however, there are reports that some have foreign ownership. At least one factory with substantial U.S. investment reports that the GoT has blocked the sale of its assets.

There are numerous examples of indirect expropriation, such as confiscatory tax regimes or regulatory actions that deprive investors of substantial economic benefits from their investments.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Tanzania is a member of both the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Tanzania is a signatory to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Awards.

A new Arbitration Act adopted in February 2020 replaces the 1931 Arbitration Act and is generally a replica of the English Arbitration Act, 1996. The act slightly amends the Public Private Partnership (PPP) (Amendment) Act, No. 9 of 2018 (the PPP Amendment Act) which stated that PPP agreements are subject to local arbitration under the arbitration laws of Tanzania and must take place on Tanzanian soil. With the change, however, the arbitrator body may be international. There was a similar semantic change to the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, 2017 and the Natural Wealth and Resources (Review and Re-Negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act, 2017 (collectively the Natural Wealth Laws) to again allow for international arbitration as long as they are governed by Tanzanian law and the venue is in Tanzania. However, it is important to note that interpretations of this act vary among legal practitioners and thus far, there has been no foreign arbitral body to travel to Tanzania

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Investment-related disputes in Tanzania can be protracted. The Commercial Court of Tanzania operates two sub-registries located in the cities of Arusha and Mwanza. The sub-registries, however, do not have resident judges. A judge from Dar es Salaam conducts a monthly one-week session at each of the sub-registries. The government said it intends to establish more branches in other regions including Mbeya, Tanga, and Dodoma, though progress has stalled. Court-annexed mediation is also a common feature of the country’s commercial dispute resolution system.

Despite legal mechanisms in place, foreign investors have claimed that the GoT sometimes does not honor its agreements. Additionally, investors continue to face challenges receiving payment for services rendered for GoT projects. One high profile example of such a dispute is that of a U.S.-based energy company, which in 2017 filed an application for ICSID arbitration seeking USD 561 million for alleged breach of contract of a purchase power agreement. The dispute is ongoing.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Tanzania has a bankruptcy law which allows for companies to declare insolvency. The insolvency process includes the appointment of receiver managers, administrative receivers, or liquidators. In practice the process is very long and expensive. Preferential debts such as government taxes and rents, outstanding wages and salaries, and other employee compensation take priority over other claims, including those from creditors. Insolvent or illiquid companies may also seek the protection of the courts by seeking a compromise or arrangement as proposed between a company and its creditors, a certain class of creditors, or its shareholders.

According to the 2020 World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report, it takes an average of three years to conclude bankruptcy proceedings in Tanzania. The recovery rate for creditors on insolvent firms was reported at 20.4 U.S. cents on the dollar, with judgments typically made in local currency.

Investment Incentives

The Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) offers a package of investment benefits and incentives to both domestic and foreign investors without performance requirements. A minimum capital investment of USD 500,000 if foreign owned or USD 100,000 if locally owned is required.

These incentives include the following:

• Discounts on customs duties, corporate taxes, and VAT paid on capital goods for investments in mining, infrastructure, road construction, bridges, railways, airports, electricity generation, agribusiness, telecommunications, and water services.
• 100 percent capital allowance deduction in the years of income for the above-mentioned types of investments – though there is ambiguity as to how this is accomplished.
• No remittance restrictions. The GoT does not restrict the right of foreign investors to repatriate returns from an investment.
• Guarantees against nationalization and expropriation. Any dispute arising between the GoT and investors may be settled through negotiations or submitted for arbitration.
• Allowing interest deduction on capital loans and removal of the five-year limit for carrying forward losses of investors.

Investors may apply for “Strategic Status” or “Special Strategic Status” to receive further incentives. The criteria used to determine whether an investor may receive these designations are available on TIC’s website (www.tic.co.tz/strategicInvestor ).

The government habitually introduces waivers through the Public Finance Act with the aim of attracting investment in certain targeted sectors. In Financial Year 2019/2020, the government introduced a VAT exemption for the following items in order to encourage investment: import of grain drying equipment; supply of aircraft lubricants to a local operator of air transportation; and imports refrigerated by a person in horticulture for exclusive use in Tanzania Mainland.  The GoT also introduced a reduction of corporate income tax for new investors involved in the production of sanitary pads from 30% to 25% for two years, subject to the investor signing a performance agreement with the government.

The Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA) oversees Tanzania’s Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and Special Economic Zones (SEZs). EPZA’s core objective is to build and promote export-led economic development by offering investment incentives and facilitation services. Minimum capital requirements for EPZ and SEZ investors are USD 500,000 for foreign investors and USD 100,000 for local investors. Investment incentives offered for EPZs include the following.

• An exemption from corporate taxes for ten years.
• An exemption from duties and taxes on capital goods and raw materials.
• An exemption on VAT for utility services and on construction materials.
• An exemption from withholding taxes on rent, dividends, and interests.
• Exemption from pre-shipment or destination inspection requirements.
• SEZs offer similar incentives, excluding the ten-year exemption from corporate taxes.

The Zanzibar Investment Promotion Agency (ZIPA) and the Zanzibar Free Economic Zones Authority (ZAFREZA) offer following incentives:

CATEGORY “A” FREE ECONOMIC ZONE DEVELOPERS: DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE

1. The developer of a Free Economic Zone shall benefit to the following incentives:

• exemption from payment of taxes and duties for machinery, equipment, heavy duty vehicles, building and construction materials, and any other goods of capital nature to be used for purposes of development of the Free Economic Zone infrastructure;
• exemption from payment of corporate tax for an initial period of ten years and thereafter a corporate tax, shall be charged at the rate specified in the Income Tax Act;
• exemption from payment of withholding tax on rent, dividends ‘and interest for the first ten years;
• exemption from payment of property tax for the first ten years;
• remission of customs duty, value added tax and any other tax payable in respect of importation of one administrative vehicle, ambulances, firefighting equipment and firefighting vehicles and up to two buses for employees’ transportation to and from the Free Economic Zone;
• exemption from payment of stamp duty on any instrument executed in or outside the Free Economic Zone relating to transfer, lease or hypothecation of any movable or immovable property situated within the Free Economic Zone or any document, certificate, instrument, report or record relating to any activity, action, operation, project, undertaking or venture in the Free Economic Zone;
• treatment of goods destined into Free Economic Zones as transit goods; and
• on site customs inspection of goods within Free Economic Zones.

CATEGORY “B” FREE ECONOMIC ZONES OPERATORS: APPROVED INVESTORS PRODUCING FOR SALE INTO THE CUSTOMS TERRITORY

1. Approved Investors whose primary markets are within the customs territory shall be entitled to the:

• remission of customs duty, value added tax and any other tax charged on raw materials and goods of capital nature related to the production in the Free Economic Zones;
• exemption from payment of withholding tax on interest on foreign sourced loan;
• remission of customs duty, value added tax and any other tax payable in respect of importation of one administrative vehicle, one ambulances, firefighting equipment and firefighting vehicles and up to two buses for employees’ transportation into and from the Free Economic Zones;
• exemption from pre-shipment or destination inspection requirements;
• on site customs inspection of goods within Free Economic Zones;
• access to competitive, modern and reliable services available within the Free Economic Zones; and
• subject to compliance with applicable conditions and procedures for foreign exchange and payment of tax whenever appropriate, unconditional transfer through any authorized dealer bank in freely convertible currency of;

(i) net profits or dividends attributable to the investment;       (ii) payments in respect of loan servicing where a foreign loan has been obtained;

(ii) payments in respect of loan servicing where a foreign loan has been obtained;       (iii) royalties, fees and charges for any technology transfer agreement;

(iii) royalties, fees and charges for any technology transfer agreement;       (iv) the remittance of proceeds in the event of sale or liquidation of the licensed business or any interest attributable to the licensed business; and

(iv) the remittance of proceeds in the event of sale or liquidation of the licensed business or any interest attributable to the licensed business; and       (v) payments of emoluments and other benefits to foreign personnel employed in Tanzania in connection with the licensed business.

(v) payments of emoluments and other benefits to foreign personnel employed in Tanzania in connection with the licensed business.

CATEGORY “C” FREE ECONOMIC ZONE OPERATORS: APPROVED INVESTORS PRODUCING FOR EXPORT MARKETS

1. Approved Investors producing for export markets m non-manufacturing or processing sectors shall be entitled to the:

• subject to compliance with applicable conditions and procedures, accessing the export credit guarantee scheme;
• remission of customs duty, value added and any other tax charged on raw materials and goods of capital nature related to the production in the Free Economic Zones;
• exemption from payment of corporate tax for an initial period of ten years and thereafter, a corporate tax shall be charged at the rate specified in the Income Tax Act;
• exemption from payment of withholding tax on rent, dividends and interests for the first ten years;
• exemption from payment of all taxes and levies imposed by the Local Government Authorities for products produced in the Free Economic Zones for a period of ten years;
• exemption from pre-shipment or destination inspection requirements;
• on site customs inspection of goods in the Free Economic Zones;
• remission of customs duty, value added tax and any other tax payable in respect of importation of one administrative vehicle, ambulances, firefighting equipment and vehicles and up to two buses for employees’ transportation to and from the Free Economic Zones;
• treatment of goods destined into Free Economic Zones as transit goods;
• access to competitive, modern and reliable services available within the Free Economic Zones; and
• subject to compliance with applicable conditions and procedures for foreign exchange and payment of tax whenever appropriate unconditional transfer through any authorized dealer bank in freely convertible currency of:

(i) net profits or dividends attributable to the investment;

(ii) payments in respect of loan servicing where a foreign loan has been obtained;

(iii) royalties, fees and charges ifor any technology transfer agreement;

(iv) the remittance of proceeds in the event of sale or liquidation of the business enterprises or any interest attributable to the investment;

(v) payments of emoluments and other benefits to foreign personnel employed in Tanzania in connection with the business enterprise; twenty percent of total turnover is allowed to be sold to the local market and is subject to the payment of all taxes;

• twenty percent of total turnover is allowed to be sold to the local market and is subject to the payment of all taxes;
• hundred percent foreign ownership is allowed ; and
• no limit to the duration that goods may be stored in the Freeport Zones.

2. For purposes of this section investors licensed primarily for export markets are investors whose exports are more than eighty percent of total annual production.

Incentives and allowances outside Free Economic Zones

1. Approved investor investing outside Free Economic Zones, may be granted the:

• exemption from payment of import duty, excise duty Value Added Tax and other similar taxes on machinery, equipment, spare parts, vehicles and other input necessary and exclusively required by that enterprise during construction period indicated in the Investment Certificate;
• exemption from payment of business license fee for the first three months of trial operation;
• corporate tax exemption for up to five years;
• hundred percent foreign ownership;
• hundred percent retention of all profits after tax;
• hundred percent allowance Research and Development; and
• hundred percent allowance for free repatriation of profit after tax.

2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Part, approved investor investing in manufacturing sector may further be granted the:

• exemption from payment of any tax on all goods produced for exports;
• exemption from payment of trade levy for raw materials and industrial inputs procured from Tanzania Mainland;
• exemption from payment of import duty, Value Added Tax and other similar taxes on raw and packaging materials during project operations;
• exemption of Income Tax on interest on registered borrowed capital; and
• hundred percent allowance investment deduction on capital expenditure within five years;

3. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Part, Approved Investor investing in real estate business may also be granted the:

• exemption of income tax on interest on borrowed capital;
• stamp duty exemption;
• hundred percent allowance investment deduction on capital expenditure within five years; and
• capital gains tax on properties sold or purchased.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Tanzania’s export processing zones (EPZs) and special economic zones (SEZs) are assigned geographical areas or industries designated to undertake specific economic activities with special regulations and infrastructure requirements. EPZ status can also be extended to stand-alone factories at any geographical location. EPZ status requires the export of 80 percent or more of the goods produced. SEZ status has no export requirement, allowing manufacturers to sell their goods locally. As of March 2018, there were 14 designated EPZ/SEZ industrial parks, 10 of which are in development, and 75 stand-alone EPZ factories.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

The Non-Citizens (Employment Regulation) Act (see Section 12 Labor Policies and Practices below) requires employers to attempt to fill positions with Tanzanian citizens before seeking work permits for foreign employees, and to develop plans to transition all positions held by foreign employees to local employees over time.

Because the local content (LC) initiative cuts across all economic sectors, the government decided that oversight of LC development should take a multi-sector approach, rather than being confined to a single ministry or sector. In 2015, the government directed the National Economic Empowerment Council (NEEC) to oversee implementation of local empowerment initiatives. The objective of the local content policy is to put local products and services – delivered by businesses owned and operated by Tanzanians – in an advantageous position to exploit opportunities emanating from inbound foreign direct investments. In 2015, the GoT enacted The Petroleum Act and, subsequently, issued The Petroleum (Local Content) Regulations 2017. Similarly, in 2017, the GoT amended mining laws, issuing The Mining (Local Content) Regulations 2018. (See Chapter 4: Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment for more on recent local content laws.)

As of November 2019, Bank of Tanzania (BoT) regulations require banks to physically house their primary data centers in Tanzania or face steep penalties. The Tanzanian Bankers Association is appealing the requirement as it is cumbersome, expensive, and contrary to industry best practices.

In 2016, the GoT launched a USD 94 million national data center (NDC), which is operated by the GoT’s Telecommunications Corporation (TTC). Under the Tanzania Telecommunications Corporation (TTC) Act 2017, the TTC plans, builds, operates and maintains the “strategic telecommunications infrastructure,” which is defined as transport core infrastructure, data center and other infrastructure that the GoT proclaims “strategic” via official public notice.

Real Property

All land is owned by the government and procedures for obtaining a lease or certificate of occupancy may be complex and lengthy. Less than 15 percent of land has been surveyed, and registration of title deeds is handled manually, mainly at the local level. Foreign investors may occupy land for investment purposes through a government-granted right of occupancy (“derivative rights” facilitated by TIC), or through sub-leases from a granted right of occupancy. Foreign investors may also partner with Tanzanian leaseholders to gain land access.

Land may be leased for up to 99 years, but the law does not allow individual Tanzanians to sell land to foreigners. There are opportunities for foreigners to lease land, including through TIC, which has designated specific plots of land (a land bank) to be made available to foreign investors. Foreign investors may also enter into joint ventures with Tanzanians, in which case the Tanzanian provides the use of the land (but retains ownership, i.e., the leasehold).

Secured interests in property are recognized and enforced. Though TIC maintains a land bank, restrictions on foreign ownership may significantly delay investments. Land not in the land bank must go through a lengthy approval process by local-level authorities, the Ministry of Lands, Housing, Human Settlements Development (MoLHHSD), and the President’s Office to be designated as “general land,” which may be titled for investment and sale.

The MoLHHSD handles registration of mortgages and rights of occupancies and the Office of the Registrar of Titles issues titles and registers mortgage deeds. Title deeds are recognized as collateral for securing loans from banks. In January 2018, the GoT amended the land law, requiring that loan proceeds secured by mortgaging underdeveloped land be used solely to develop the specific piece of land used as collateral. The changes apply to general land managed by the MoLHHSD’s Commissioner for Lands, who must receive a report from the lender showing how loan proceeds will be used to develop the land. The law does not apply to village land allocated by village councils, which cannot be mortgaged to a financial institution.

Tanzania’s Registering Property rank in the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business report deteriorated from 142 in 2018 to 146 in 2019 and 2020. According to the report, it takes eight procedures and 67 days to register property compared the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 51.6 days.

Intellectual Property Rights

The GoT’s Copyright Society of Tanzania (COSOTA) is responsible for registration and enforcement of copyrighted materials, while the Business Registrations and Licensing Agency (BRELA) within the Ministry of Trade administers trademark and patent registration. o It is the responsibility of the rights holders to enforce their rights where relevant, retaining their own counsel and advisors. The Fair Competition Commission (FCC) promotes competition, protects consumers against unfair market conduct, and has quasi-judicial powers to determine trademark and patent infringement cases. The FCC is also tasked with combating the sale of counterfeit merchandise. However, the Tanzania Medicines and Medical Devices Authority (TMDA) handles counterfeit human medicines, cosmetics, and packaged food materials. and its mandate is stipulated in the Tanzania Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act (TFDCA) as per the amendment of 2019. Despite its efforts, limited resources make it difficult for the GoT to adequately combat counterfeiting.

Tanzania is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List.

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ .

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) is a self-listed publicly-owned company. In 2013, the DSE launched a second tier market, the Enterprise Growth Market (EGM) with lower listing requirements designed to attract small and medium sized companies with high growth potential. As of December 2017, DSE’s total market capitalization reached USD 10.5 billion, a 20.6 percent increase over the previous year’s figure. The Capital Markets and Securities Authority (CMSA) Act facilitates the free flow of capital and financial resources to support the capital market and securities industry. Tanzania, however, restricts the free flow of investment in and out of the country, and Tanzanians cannot sell or issue securities abroad unless approved by the CMSA.

Under the Capital Markets and Securities (Foreign Investors) Regulation 2014, there is no aggregate value limitation on foreign ownership of listed non-government securities. Despite progress, the country’s capital account is not fully liberalized and only foreign individuals or companies from other EAC nations are permitted to participate in the government securities market. Even with this recent development allowing EAC participation, ownership of government securities is still limited to 40 percent of each security issued.

Tanzania’s Electronic and Postal Communications Act 2010 amended in 2016 by the Finance Act 2016 requires telecom companies to list 25 percent of their shares via an initial public offering (IPO) on the DSE. Of the seven telecom companies that filed IPO applications with the CMSA, only Vodacom’s application received approval. TiGo’s IPO is reportedly close to approval.

As part of the Mining (Minimum Shareholding and Public Offering) Regulations 2016, large scale mining operators were required to float a 30 percent stake on the DSE by October 7, 2018. In February 2017 the GoT moved the date to August 23, 2017. To date, no mining companies have listed on the DSE.

Money and Banking System

Tanzania’s financial inclusion rate increased significantly over the past decade thanks to mobile phones and mobile banking. However, participation in the formal banking sector remains low. Low private sector credit growth and high non-performing loan (NPL) rates are persistent problems.

According to the IMF’s most recent Financial System Stability Assessment, Tanzania’s bank-dominated financial sector is small, concentrated, and at a relatively nascent stage of development. Financial services provision is dominated by commercial banks, with the ten largest institutions being preeminent in terms of mobilizing savings and intermediating credit. The report found that nearly half of Tanzania’s 45 banks are vulnerable to adverse shocks and risk insolvency in the event of a global financial crisis. (Source: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/12/04/United-Republic-of-Tanzania-Financial-Sector-Assessment-Program-Press-Release-Staff-Report-46418 )

The two largest banks are CRDB Bank and National Microfinance Bank (NMB), which represent almost 30 percent of the market. The only U.S. bank is Citibank Tanzania Limited. Private sector companies have access to commercial credit instruments including documentary credits (letters of credit), overdrafts, term loans, and guarantees. Foreign investors may open accounts and earn tax-free interest in Tanzanian commercial banks.

The Banking and Financial Institution Act 2006 established a framework for credit reference bureaus, permits the release of information to licensed reference bureaus, and allows credit reference bureaus to provide to any person, upon a legitimate business request, a credit report. Currently, there are two private credit bureaus operating in Tanzania – Credit Info Tanzania Limited and Dun & Bradstreet Credit Bureau Tanzania Limited.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

Tanzanian regulations permit unconditional transfers through any authorized bank in freely convertible currency of net profits, repayment of foreign loans, royalties, fees charged for foreign technology, and remittance of proceeds. The only official limit on transfers of foreign currency is on cash carried by individuals traveling abroad, which cannot exceed USD 10,000 over a period of 40 days. Investors rarely use convertible instruments.

The Bank of Tanzania’s new Bureau de Change regulations with stringent requirements came into force in June 2019. The regulations include a minimum capital requirement of TZS 1 billion (Approx. USD 431,000) and a non-interest bearing deposit of USD 100,000 with the Bank of Tanzania (the regulator). Regulations also require the business premises to be fitted with CCTV cameras, and new stringent procedures and policies for detecting and reporting money laundering and terrorism finance. Bank of Tanzania closed more than ninety percent of all forex shops in the country, stating that they did not pass inspection for compliance with these requirements. In response, commercial banks and Tanzania Posts Corporation were licensed to provide forex services.

The value of the Tanzanian currency, the shilling, is determined by a free-floating exchange rate system based on supply and demand in international foreign exchange markets. However, Interbank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM) and the rates quoted by commercial banks and exchange bureaus often vary considerably. There are reports that the Bank of Tanzania has stepped in several times over the past few years to stabilize the exchange rate.

Remittance Policies

There are no recent changes or plans to change investment remittance policies that either tighten or relax access to foreign exchange for investment remittances.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Tanzania does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

Public enterprises do not compete under the same terms and conditions as private enterprises because they have access to government subsidies and other benefits. SOEs are active in the power, communications, rail, telecommunications, insurance, aviation, and port sectors. SOEs generally report to ministries and are led by a board. Typically, a presidential appointee chairs the board, which usually includes private sector representatives. SOEs are not subjected to hard budget constraints. SOEs do not discriminate against or unfairly burden foreigners, though they do have access to sovereign credit guarantees.

As of June 2019, the GoT’s Treasury Registrar reported shares and interests in 266 public parastatals, companies and statutory corporations. (See  http://www.tro.go.tz/index.php/en/latest-news/382-treasury-registrar-sets-record-with-552pc-increase-in-annual-dividend )

Relevant ministry officials usually appoint SOEs’ board of directors to serve preset terms under what is intended to be a competitive process. As in a private company, senior management report to the board of directors.

Privatization Program

The government retains a strong presence in energy, mining, telecommunication services, and transportation. The government is increasingly empowering the state-owned Tanzania Telecommunications Corporation Limited (TTCL) with the objective of safeguarding the national security, promoting socio-economic development, and managing strategic communications infrastructure. The government also acquired 51 percent of Airtel Telecommunication Company Limited and became the majority shareholder. In the past, the GoT has sought foreign investors to manage formerly state-run companies in public-private partnerships, but successful privatizations have been rare. Though there have been attempts to privatize certain companies, the process is not always clear and transparent.

Responsible business conduct (RBC) includes respecting human rights, environmental protection, labor relations and financial accountability, and it is practiced by a number of large foreign firms. Tanzania has laws covering labor and environmental issues. The Employment and Labor Relations Act (ELRA) establishes labor standards, rights and duties, while the Labor Institutions Act (LIA) specifies the government entities charged with administering labor laws.

The GoT’s National Environment Management Council (NEMC) undertakes enforcement, compliance, review and monitoring of environmental impact assessments; performs research; facilitates public participation in environmental decision-making; raises environmental awareness; and collects and disseminates environmental information. Stakeholders, however, have expressed concerns over whether the NEMC has sufficient funding and capacity to handle its broad mandate.

There are no legal requirements for public disclosure of RBC, and the GoT has not yet addressed executive compensation standards. Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) listed companies, however, must release legally required information to shareholders and the general public. In addition, the DSE signed a voluntary commitment with the United Nations Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative in June 2016, to promote long-term sustainable investments and improve environmental, social and corporate governance. Tanzania has accounting standards compatible with international accounting bodies.

The Tanzanian government does not usually factor RBC into procurement decisions. The GoT is responsible for enforcing local laws, however, the media regularly reports on corruption cases where offenders allegedly avoid sanctions. There have also been reports of corporate entities collaborating with local governments to carry out controversial undertakings that may not be in the best interest of the local population.

Some foreign companies have engaged NGOs that monitor and promote RBC to avoid adversarial confrontations. In addition, some of the multinational companies who are signatories to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs) have taken the lead and appointed NGOs to conduct programs to mitigate conflicts between the mining companies, surrounding communities, local government officials and the police.

Tanzania is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and in 2015 Tanzania enacted the Extractive Industries Transparency and Accountability Act, which demands that all new concessions, contracts and licenses are made available to the public. The government produces EITI reports that disclose revenues from the extraction of its natural resources.

Tanzania has laws and institutions designed to combat corruption and illicit practices. It is a party to the UN Convention against Corruption, but it is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. Although corruption is still viewed as a major problem, President Magufuli’s focus on anti-corruption has translated into an increased judiciary budget, new corruption cases, and a decline in perceived corruption, especially low-level corruption. This improvement is partly attributed to instituting electronic services which reduce the opportunity for corruption through human interactions at agencies such as the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA), the Business Registration and Licensing Authority (BRELA), and the Port Authority.

Tanzania has three institutions specifically focused on anti-corruption. The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) prevents corruption, educates the public, and enforces the law against corruption. The Ethics Secretariat and its associated Ethics Tribunal under the President’s office enforces compliance with ethical standards defined in the Public Leadership Codes of Ethics Act 1995.

Companies and individuals seeking government tenders are required to submit a written commitment to uphold anti-bribery policies and abide by a compliance program. These steps are designed to ensure that company management complies with anti-bribery polices.

The GoT is currently implementing its National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan Phase III (2017-2022) (NACSAP III) which is a decentralized approach focused on broad government participation. NACSAP III has been prepared to involve a broader domain of key stakeholders including GoT local officials, development partners, civil society organization (CSOs), and the private sector. The strategy puts more emphasis on areas that historically have been more prone to corruption in Tanzania such as oil, gas, and other natural resources. Despite the outlined role of the GoT, CSOs, NGOs and media find it increasingly difficult to investigate corruption in the current political environment.

President Magufuli’s current anti-corruption campaign has affected public discourse about the prevailing climate of impunity, and some officials are reluctant to engage openly in corruption. Transparency International (TI), which ranks perception of corruption in public sector, gave Tanzania a score of 37 points out of 100 for 2019 and 36 points for 2018. The Afrobarometer report estimates that between 2016 and 2018 the corruption increase in the previous 12 months was only 10% in Tanzania, the lowest in Africa. While for the same period, 23% of the respondents voted that Tanzania is doing a bad job of fighting corruption, again the lowest in Africa.

Some critics, however, question how effective the initiative will be in tackling deeper structural issues that have allowed corruption to thrive. Despite President Magufuli’s focus on anti-corruption, there has been little effort to institutionalize what often appear to be ad hoc measures, a lack of corruption convictions, and persistent underfunding of the country’s main anti-corruption bodies.

Resources to Report Corruption

The Director General
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau
P.O.  Box 4865, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Tel: +255 22 2150043   Email: dgeneral@pccb.go.tz

Executive Director
Legal and Human Rights Centre
P.O.  Box 75254, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Tel: +255 22 2773038/48   Email: lhrc@humanrights.or.tz

Since gaining independence, Tanzania has enjoyed a relatively high degree of peace and stability compared to its neighbors in the region.  Tanzania has held five national multi-party elections since 1995, the most recent in 2015. The next national elections are scheduled for October 2020. Mainland Tanzania government elections have been generally free of political violence.  Elections on the semi-autonomous archipelago of Zanzibar, however, have been marred by political violence several times since 1995, including in 2015.

October 2015 general elections were conducted in a largely open and transparent atmosphere; however, simultaneous elections in Zanzibar were controversially annulled after an opposition candidate declared victory.  A heavily criticized re-run election was held on March 20, 2016 despite an opposition boycott. Since the 2015 election, the GoT has placed several restrictions on political activity, including severely limiting the ability of opposition political parties and civil society organizations to debate issues publicly, or assemble peacefully.  Elections in 2018 and 2019 were marred by allegations of irregularities and suppression of opposition candidates and voters. National elections, including Presidential elections on the Mainland and Zanzibar are scheduled for October 2020.

In addition to monitoring the political climate, foreign investors remain concerned about land tenure issues. Although the government owns all land in Tanzania and oversees the issuance of land leases of up to 99 years, many Tanzanian citizens judge that foreign investors exploit Tanzanian resources, sometimes resulting in conflict between investors and nearby residents. In Arusha and Mtwara, among other areas, conflicts have led to violence, prompting the GoT to emphasize its commitment to supporting foreign investment while also ensuring the intended benefit of the investments to Tanzanian citizens.

There are also concerns about insecurity spilling over from neighboring countries, particularly along the Tanzania-Mozambique border, as well as from conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi.

The GoT’s Five Year Development Plan 2016-2021 (FYDP II), which is in its fourth year of implementation, acknowledges Tanzania’s shortage of skilled labor and the importance of professional training to support industrialization. The Integrated Labor Force Survey Analytical Report of 2014 (most recent) found that only 3.6 percent of Tanzania’s 20-million-person labor force is highly skilled. On the regional front, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya have committed to the EAC’s 2012 Mutual Recognition Agreement of engineers, making for a more regionally competitive engineering market.

In Tanzania, labor and immigration regulations permit foreign investors to recruit up to five expatriates with the possibility of additional work permits granted under specific conditions.

The Non-Citizens (Employment Regulation) Act 2015 introduced stricter rules for hiring foreign workers. Under the Act, the Labor Commissioner must determine if “all possible efforts have been explored to obtain a local expert” before approving a non-citizen work permit. In addition, employers must submit “succession plans” for foreign employees, detailing how knowledge and skills will be transferred to local employees.

Non-citizens may be granted two-year work permits, renewable up to five years, while foreign investors may be granted ten-year work permits which may be extended if the investor is deemed to be contributing to the economy and well-being of Tanzanians. Some stakeholders fear that this provision creates an opening for corruption and arbitrarily prejudicial decisions against foreign investors. Since the passage of the Act, GoT officials have been conducting aggressive “special permit inspections” to verify the validity of work permits. The process for obtaining work permits remains immensely bureaucratic, opaque at times, and slow.

Mainland Tanzania’s minimum wage, which has not changed since July 2013, is set by categories covering 12 employment sectors. The minimum wage ranges from TZS 100,000 (USD 45) per month for agricultural laborers to TZS 400,000 (USD 180) per month for laborers employed in the mining sector. Zanzibar’s minimum wage is TZS 300,000 (USD 135), after being increased from TZS 150,000 (USD 68) in April 2017.

Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar governments maintain separate labor laws. Workers on the Mainland have the right to join trade unions. Any company with a recognized trade union possessing bargaining rights can negotiate in a Collective Bargaining Agreement. In the public sector, the government sets wages administratively, including for employees of state-owned enterprises.

Mainland workers have the legal right to strike and employers have the right to a lockout. The law restricts the right to strike when doing so may endanger the health of the population. Workers in certain sectors are restricted from striking or subject to limitations. In 2017, the GoT issued regulations that strengthened child labor laws, created minimum one-year terms for certain contracts, expanded the scope of what is considered discrimination, and changed contract requirements for outsourcing agreements. In 2019, the government adopted a new National Strategy Against Child Labor, though it has not officially been implemented.

The labor law in Zanzibar applies to both public and private sector workers. Zanzibar government workers have the right to strike as long as they follow procedures outlined in the Employment Act of 2005, but they are not allowed to join Mainland-based labor unions. Zanzibar requires a union with 50 or more members to be registered and sets literacy standards for trade union officers. An estimated 40 percent of Zanzibar’s workforce is unionized. (See Chapter 4: Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment for more on recent local content laws.)

In 1996, the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the predecessor agency to U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), signed an incentive agreement with the GoT. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has in principle agreed that the existing OPIC agreement will allow for the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to operate in Tanzania. The current portfolio includes projects in agriculture, energy, micro-finance, and logistics. In addition, the DFC inherits USAID’s Development Credit Authority (DCA)’s active portfolio including guarantees to several banks to encourage lending to small and medium sized enterprises.

Tanzania is also a member of the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which offers political risk insurance and technical assistance to attract FDI.

* Source for Host Country Data:
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS): 2018 GDP: TZS 129.4 trillion (www.nbs.go.tz)
Bank of Tanzania (BoT): 2018 Investment Report (www.bot.go.tz )

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
The IMF’s The Bank of Tanzania reports the top source countries for inward direct investment to Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar separately. Data on outward direct investment is not available.

According to the Bank of Tanzania, the top sources for inward foreign investment into Mainland Tanzania in 2017 were: United Kingdom, South Africa, Norway, Netherlands, Nigeria, Mauritius, and Kenya.

According to the Bank of Tanzania, the top sources for inward foreign investment into Zanzibar in 2017 were: United Kingdom, Italy, Kenya, Luxembourg, South Africa, Spain, and the United States.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

On paper, Uganda’s legal and regulatory systems are generally transparent and non-discriminatory, and comply with international norms. In practice, bureaucratic hurdles and corruption significantly impact all investors, but with disproportionate effect on foreigners learning to navigate a parallel informal system. While Ugandan law requires open and transparent competition on government project tenders, U.S. investors have alleged that endemic corruption means that competitors not subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or similar legislation, often pay bribes to win awards.

Ugandan law allows the banking, insurance, and media sectors to establish self-regulatory processes through private associations. The government continues to regulate these sectors, however, and the self-regulatory practices generally do not discriminate against foreign investors.

Potential investors must be aware of local, national, and supra-national regulatory requirements in Uganda. For example, EAC rules on free movement of goods and services would affect an investor planning to export to the regional market. Similarly, regulations issued by local governments regarding operational hours or the location of factories would only affect an investor’s decision at the local level. Foreign investors should liaise with relevant ministries to understand regulations in the proposed sector for investment.

Uganda’s accounting procedures are broadly transparent and consistent with international norms, though full implementation remains a challenge. Publicly listed companies must comply with accounting procedures consistent with the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board.

Governmental agencies making regulations typically engage in only limited public consultation. Draft bills similarly are subject to limited public consultation and review. Local media typically cover public comment only on more controversial bills. Although the government publishes laws and regulations in full in the Uganda Gazette, the gazette is not available online and can only be accessed through purchase of hard copies at the Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation offices. The Uganda Legal Information Institute also publishes all enacted laws on its website (https://ulii.org/ ).

Uganda’s court system and Inspector General of Government are responsible for ensuring the government adheres to its administrative processes, however, anecdotal reports suggest that corruption significantly undermines the judiciary’s oversight role.

In June 2019, Members of Parliament passed the Landlord and Tenants Bill that seeks to regulate the relationship between landlords and tenants. For foreign investors, the bill imposes a restriction against charging tenants rental fees in foreign currency, caps increment on rental charges to no more than 10 percent annually, and provides tenants with significantly more rights. President Museveni has yet to sign the bill into law. If signed into law, this bill could undermine investment in the real estate sector by giving disproportionate rights to tenants (commercial and residential) over property owners. The GOU has struggled to fully implement regulatory reforms announced in prior years.

Generally, there is legal redress to review regulatory mechanisms through the courts, and the process is made public.

Uganda’s legislative process includes public consultations, and, as needed, subject matter expert presentations before parliament; however, not all comments received by regulators are made publicly available and parliament’s decisions tend to be primarily politically driven. Formal scientific analyses of the potential impact of a pending regulation are seldom conducted.

Public finances are generally transparent and budget documents are available online. The government annually publishes the Annual Debt Statistical Bulletin, which contains the country’s debt obligations including status of public debt, cost of debt servicing, and liabilities. However, the government’s significant use of supplementary and classified budget accounts undermines parliamentary and public oversight of public finances.

International Regulatory Considerations

Per treaty, Uganda’s regulatory systems must conform to the below supranational regulatory systems. In practice, domestication of supranational legislation remains imperfect: -African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP)

• African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP)
• African Union (AU)
• Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
• Commonwealth of Nations
• East African Community (EAC)

Uganda, through the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) is a member of ISO, Codex Alimentarius and International Organization of Legal Metrology (OIML), and Afrinet. Uganda applies European Union directives and standards, but with modifications.

Uganda is a member of the WTO and notifies the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of all draft technical regulations through the Ugandan Ministry of Trade’s National TBT Coordination Committee.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Uganda’s legal system is based on English Common Law. The courts are responsible for enforcing contracts. Litigants must first submit commercial disputes for mediation either within the court system or to the government-run Center of Arbitration for Dispute Resolution (CADER). Uganda does not have a singular commercial law; multiple statutes touch on commercial and contractual law. A specialized commercial court decides commercial disputes. Approximately 80 percent of commercial disputes are resolved through mediation. Litigants may appeal commercial court decisions and regulatory and enforcement actions through the regular national court system.

While in theory independent, in practice there are credible reports that the executive may attempt to influence the courts in high-profile cases. More importantly for most investors, endemic corruption and significant backlogs hamper the judiciary’s impartiality and efficacy.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

The Constitution and ICA regulate FDI. The UIA provides an online “one-stop shop” for investors (www.ugandainvest.go.ug ).

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

Uganda does not have any specialized laws or institutions dedicated to competition-related concerns, although commercial courts occasionally handle disputes with competition elements. There was no significant competition related dispute handled by the courts in 2019.

Expropriation and Compensation

The constitution guarantees the right to property for all persons, domestic and foreign. It also prohibits the expropriation of property, except when in the “national interest” as eminent domain and preceded by compensation to the owner at fair market value. The GOU’s new policy requiring telecommunication companies to list or sell 20 percent of their equity is what some are calling a form of indirect expropriation. Particularly considering that the few Ugandans who could afford to purchase this equity are likely to be closely associated with the government.

In 1972, then President Idi Amin expropriated assets owned by ethnic Asians (Indians). The expropriation was extrajudicial and was ordered by presidential decree. The government did not allow judicial challenge to the expropriations, nor offer any compensation to the owners. The GOU has since returned the vast majority of the properties to the original owners or their representatives. There have not been any expropriations since, and government projects are often significantly delayed by judicial disputes over compensation for property the GOU seeks to expropriate under eminent domain.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Uganda is a party to both the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The 2000 Domestic Arbitration and Conciliation Act incorporates the 1958 New York Convention.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Pursuant to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the courts and government in theory accept binding arbitration with foreign investors and between private parties. In practice, the overall challenges of the judiciary are likely to impede full enforcement. Uganda has not been involved in any official investment disputes with a U.S person in the last ten years; however, U.S. firms do complain about serious corruption in the award of government tenders.

Ugandan courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards, including those issued against the government. The country is a party to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Additionally, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act creates a framework for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, including those against the government.

Uganda has not had any experience of extrajudicial action against foreign investors. However, in 1972, the government of then President Idi Amin extra judicially expropriated property owned by ethnic Asians.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Ugandan law provides for arbitration and mediation of civil disputes. The legal framework on arbitration includes the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and Commercial Court Division Mediation Rules. Litigants must first submit all civil disputes to mediation before a court-appointed mediator. CADER is a statutory institution that facilitates the mediation and operates based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules. However, unrecorded private arbitration is the most effective investment dispute resolution mechanism in Uganda.

The Foreign Judgments Reciprocal Enforcement Act enables the recognition and enforcement of judgments and awards made by foreign courts.

There is no evidence that Ugandan courts favor state owned enterprises when arbitrating or settling disputes. However, court decisions are often influenced by corruption or high-level government officials.

Bankruptcy Regulations

The Bankruptcy Act of 1931, the Insolvency Act of 2011, as well as the Insolvency Regulations of 2013 generally align Uganda’s legal framework on insolvency with international standards. The 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report ranked Uganda 99 out of 190 countries for resolving insolvency. On average, Uganda recovers USD 0.39 per dollar, well above the sub-Saharan average of USD 0.20. Bankruptcy is not criminalized.

Investment Incentives

The Public Private Partnership Act of 2015 creates a legal framework for the government to partner with private investors, both local and foreign, to finance investments in key sectors. The government has undertaken joint ventures with foreign investors in the oil and gas sector and for infrastructure projects.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

The Uganda Free Zones Authority (UFZA) (https://freezones.go.ug/ ) regulates free trade zones, which offer a range of tax advantages. The government’s process in awarding free trade zone status is generally transparent. However, there have been reports that corrupt individuals in government are allocating free trade zones in return for bribes. By the end of 2019, UFZA issued three new Free Zone Licenses, increasing the number of Free Zones in the country to 16. UFZA states that the actual investment of the three new free zones was USD 21.74 million.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

The ICA does not impose any direct requirements regarding local employment or specify mandatory numbers for local employment in management positions. The broadness of its provisions, however, arguably leaves the door open for enforcement of local employment requirements. The Petroleum Exploration, Development, and Production Act and the Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission, and Midstream Storage Act require investors in the oil sector to contribute to the creation of a local skilled Ugandan workforce. The National Local Content Bill, which is currently undergoing parliamentary review, would require companies to petition the GOU for permission to hire a non-Ugandan, in conjunction with the claim that no qualified Ugandan is available. Additionally, the bill requires companies to have a Ugandan deputy for every non-Ugandan senior manager and submit a clear plan to localize these positions to the governing authority.

While the UIA has significantly improved its processing of work permits and investment licenses for foreigners, bureaucratic hurdles, inconsistent enforcement, and corruption can still make obtaining visas and work permits onerous and expensive. All foreign investors must acquire an investment license from the UIA.

In as much as there is no specific localization law in Uganda, some sector specific laws impose localization requirements. The petroleum laws require foreign oil companies to prioritize the use of local goods and labor when available, and the MEMD has the authority to determine the extent of local content requirements in the sector. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, which regulates government procurements, also imposes thresholds on the contracts for which a foreign company can apply. In the petroleum laws, MEMD has the responsibility to monitor companies in the oil sector to ensure they are meeting the local content requirements. Additionally, the Office of the Auditor General carries out audits to ensure adherence to local content requirements. These performance reviews can form grounds for granting incentives or enforcement of the restrictions. Since the 2013 oil laws were passed, no company has been punished for breaching local content rules. Investment incentives in Uganda are quite controversial because they apply on a case by case basis, even though the ICA lists seven grounds for granting investment incentives.

While there are no general requirements for foreign information technology (IT) providers to give the government any source code or information related to encryption, the National Information Technology Authority Act allows the Minister for Information, Communication, and Technology to order an IT provider to submit any information to the National Information Technology Authority (NITA). Similarly, the Computer Misuse Act allows the government to “compel a service provider…to co-operate and assist the competent authorities in the collection or recording of traffic data in real time, associated with specified communication transmitted by means of a computer system.” These regulatory requirements apply to all IT providers, both foreign and local. There are no measures to prevent or unduly impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside of Uganda. In 2017, however, the Bank of Uganda interpreted Uganda’s cyber security legislation as providing it with the mandate to require financial institutions to relocate their data centers to Uganda to provide the government with access to customers’ digital financial information. Citing customer privacy concerns, financial firms remain in negotiations with the Bank of Uganda over this policy.

Real Property

Land rights are complicated in Uganda and present a significant barrier to investment. Uganda enforces property rights through the courts; however, corruption often influences final judgments. The Mortgage Act and associated regulations make provisions for mortgages, sub-mortgages, trusts, and other forms of lien. However, due to widespread corruption and an inefficient bureaucracy, investors frequently struggle with the integrity of land transactions and recording systems.

Foreigners cannot own land directly and may only acquire leases. Such leases cannot exceed 99 years. However, foreign investors can create a Ugandan-based firm to purchase and own real estate.

The Land Act provides for four forms of land tenure: freehold, customary, “Mailo” (a form of freehold), and leasehold. Freehold, leasehold, and Mailo tenure owners hold registered titles, while customary or indigenous communal landowners – who account for up to 80 percent of all landowners – do not. Ugandan law provides for the acquisition of prescriptive rights by individuals who settle onto land (squatters) and whose settlement on such land is unchallenged by the owner for at least twelve years.

Intellectual Property Rights

Ugandan law provides for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), but enforcement mechanisms are weak. The country lacks the capacity to prevent piracy and counterfeit distribution. As a result, theft and infringement of IPR is common and widespread. Uganda did not enact any IP related laws and regulations in the past year.

Uganda does not track seizures of counterfeit goods or prosecutions of IPR violations. Agriculture experts estimate some 20 percent of agriculture products under copyright in Uganda are counterfeit. Uganda is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR)Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List.. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles (http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ ).

Uganda is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR)Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List.. For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles (http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ ).

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The government generally welcomes foreign portfolio investment and has put in place a legal and institutional framework to manage such investments. The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) licenses brokers and dealers and oversees the Uganda Securities Exchange (USE), which is now trading the stock of 18 companies. Liquidity remains constrained to enter and exit sizeable positions on the USE. Capital markets are open to foreign investors and there are no restrictions for foreign investors to open a bank account in Uganda. However, the government imposes a 15 percent withholding tax on interest and dividends. Foreign-owned companies may trade on the stock exchange, subject to some share issuance requirements. The government respects IMF Article VIII and refrains from restricting payments and transfers for current international transactions.

Credit is available from commercial banks on market terms and foreign investors can access credit. However, the high yields on GOU-issued (risk-free) securities pushes up interest rates on commercial loans, undermining the private sector’s access to affordable credit.

Money and Banking System

Formal banking participation remains low, with only 20 percent of Ugandans having access to bank accounts, many via their membership in formal savings groups. However, only about five million Ugandans have bank accounts, while more than 24 million use mobile money to conduct basic financial transactions. Uganda’s banking and financial sector is generally healthy, though non-performing loans remain a problem. According to the Bank of Uganda’s 2019 Financial Stability Report, Uganda’s non-performing loan rate stood at 3.8 percent at the end of June 2019. Uganda has 26 commercial banks with the top six controlling at least 60 percent of the banking sector’s total assets, valued at USD 8.6 billion. The Bank of Uganda regulates the banking sector, and foreign banks may establish branches in the country. In February, the Financial Action Taskforce added Uganda to its “Grey List” due to the country’s insufficient implementation of its anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism policies. As a result, Uganda’s correspondent banking relationships will face increased oversight, increasing transaction costs, and potentially jeopardizing some correspondent banking relationships. Uganda does not restrict foreigners’ ability to establish a bank account.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

Uganda keeps open capital accounts, and there are no restrictions on capital transfers in and out of Uganda. If, however, an investor benefited from tax incentives on the original investment, he or she will need to seek a “certificate of approval to “externalize” the funds. Investors may convert funds associated with any form of investment into any world currency. The Ugandan shilling (UGX) trades on a market-based floating exchange rate.

Remittance Policies

There are no restrictions for foreign investors on remittances to and from Uganda.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

In 2015, the government established the Uganda Petroleum Fund (PF) to receive and manage all government revenues from the oil and gas sector. By law, the government must spend a portion of proceeds from the fund on oil-related infrastructure, with parliament appropriating the remainder of revenues through the normal budget procedure. At the end of 2019, the PF had a balance of USD 20 million. The 2019 Auditor General’s report concluded that the absence of a policy regarding the management of the PF has led to inefficient and ineffective spending and investment decisions. In 2019, the GOU established the Petroleum Investment Advisory Committee (Committee) to oversee the investment of PF funds, however, the Committee did not pass the proposed Petroleum Investment Reserve Policy (Policy), which aimed to establish the investment guidelines. In the absence of the Policy, PF funds continue to be allocated to the national budget.

Uganda has thirty State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). However, the GOU does not publish a list of its SOEs, and the public is unable to access detailed information on SOE ownership, total assets, total net income, or number of people employed. While there is insufficient information to assess the SOEs’ adherence to the OECD Guidelines of Corporate Governance, the GOU’s 2019 Office of Auditor General report noted corporate governance issues in some SOEs. SOEs do not get special financing terms and are subject to hard budget constraints. According to the Ugandan Revenue Authority Act, they have the same tax burden as the private sector. According to the Land Act, private enterprises have the same access to land as SOEs. One notable exception is the Uganda National Oil company (UNOC), which receives proprietary exploration data on new oil discoveries in Uganda. UNOC can then sell this information to the highest bidder in the private sector to generate income for its operations.

Privatization Program

The government privatized many SOEs in the 1990s. Uganda does not currently have a privatization program.

Awareness of responsible business conduct varies greatly among corporate actors in Uganda. No organizations formally monitor compliance with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) standards. CSR is not a requirement for an investor to obtain an investment license and CSR programs are voluntary. While government officials make statements encouraging CSR, there is no formal government program to monitor, require, or encourage CSR. In practice, endemic corruption often enables companies to engage in harmful or illegal practices with impunity. Regulations on human and labor rights, and consumer and environmental protection, are seldom and inconsistently enforced. Several non-governmental organizations attempt to hold companies accountable for poor behavior through “name-and-shame” campaigns, usually with limited success.

Uganda’s capacity and political will to regulate the mineral trade across its borders remain weak. Credible organizations allege that Uganda’s gold refining sector, led by the African Gold Refinery (AGR), relies on conflict minerals illicitly imported from neighboring countries, especially from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. While Uganda has no significant gold reserves, in FY 2018/2019, gold became the country’s largest export, totaling USD 1.06 billion.

Due to Uganda’s rampant corruption and culture of unaccountability, the GOU does not adequately enforce domestic laws related to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protections, or other laws intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. According to UN Panel of Experts reports, AGR, Uganda’s largest refinery, does not adhere to OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas, and there is no indication the GOU is urging it to do so. Uganda announced in January 2019 that it would join the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, however, is still in the process of fulfilling the requirements to become a member. Uganda has also not formally adopted the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.

Uganda has generally adequate laws to combat corruption, and an interlocking web of anti-corruption institutions. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority Act’s Code of Ethical Standards (Code) requires bidders and contractors to disclose any possible conflict of interest when applying for government contracts. However, endemic corruption remains a serious problem and a major obstacle to investment. Transparency International ranked Uganda 137 out of 180 countries in its 2019 Corruption Perception Index. While anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials and political parties, in practice many well-connected individuals enjoy de facto impunity for corrupt acts and are rarely prosecuted in court.

The government does not require companies to adopt specific internal procedures to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. Larger private companies implement internal control policies; however, with 80 percent of the workforce in the informal sector, much of the private sector operates without such systems. While Uganda has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention, it is not yet party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and does not protect non–governmental organizations investigating corruption. Some corruption watchdog organizations allege government harassment.

U.S. firms consistently identify corruption as a major hurdle to business and investment. Corruption in government procurement processes remains particularly problematic for foreign companies seeking to bid on GOU contracts.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contacts at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:
Justice Irene Mulyagonja
Inspector General of Government
Inspectorate of Government
Jubilee Insurance Centre, Plot 14, Parliament Avenue, Kampala
Telephone: +256-414-344-219
Website: www.igg.go.ug 

Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA)
UEDCL Towers Plot 39 Nakasero Road
P.O. Box 3925, Kampala Uganda
Telephone: +256-414-311100.
Email: info@ppda.go.ug
Website: https://www.ppda.go.ug/ 

Contact at “watchdog” organization:
Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda
Cissy Kagaba
Telephone: +256-414-535-659
Email: kagabac@accu.or.ug
Website: http://accu.or.ug 

Uganda has experienced periodic political violence associated with elections and other political activities. Security services routinely use excessive force to stop peaceful protests and demonstrations. There are no prominent examples in the past ten years of such violence leading to significant damage of projects or installations. There has been an uptick in crime over the past several years, and political tensions are likely to increase in the run up to 2021 general elections.

Over 70 percent of Ugandans are engaged in the agriculture sector, and only 20 percent work in the formal sector. Statistics on the number of foreign/migrant workers are not publicly available; however, given the abundance of cheap domestic labor, there is minimal import of unskilled labor. Conversely, there is an acute shortage of skilled and specialized laborers.

While there are no explicit provisions requiring the hiring of nationals, there are broad standards requiring investors to contribute to the creation of local employment. The Petroleum Exploration, Development, and Production Act of 2013 and the Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission, and Midstream Storage Act of 2013 require investors to contribute to workforce development by providing skills training for workers.

Ugandan labor laws specify procedures for termination of employment and for termination payments. Depending on the employee’s duration of employment, employers are required to notify an employee two weeks to three months prior to the termination date. Employees terminated without notice are entitled to severance wages. Ugandan law only differentiates between termination with notice (or payment in lieu of notice) and summary dismissal (termination without notice). Summary dismissal applies when the employee fundamentally violates his/her terms of employment. Uganda does not provide unemployment insurance or any other social safety net programs for terminated workers. Current law requires employers to contribute 10 percent of an employee’s gross salary to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). The Uganda Retirement Benefits Regulatory Authority Act of 2011 provides a framework for the establishment and management of retirement benefits schemes for the public and private sectors and created an enabling environment for liberalization of the pension sector.

The Employment Act of 2006 does not allow waivers of labor laws for foreign investors.

Ugandan law allows workers, except members of the armed forces, to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU) has 20 member unions. Its rival, the Central Organization of Free Trade Unions (COFTU), also has 20 union members. Union officials estimate that nearly half of employees in the formal sector belong to unions. In 2014, the Government of Uganda created the Industrial Court (IC) to arbitrate labor disputes. Public sector strikes are not uncommon in Uganda; however, there were no strikes during the past year.

Uganda ratified all eight International Labor Organization fundamental conventions enshrining labor and other economic rights, and partially incorporated these conventions into the 1995 Constitution, which stipulates and protects a wide range of economic rights. Despite these legal protections, many Ugandans work in unsafe environments due to poor enforcement and the limited scope of the labor laws. Labor laws do not protect domestic, agricultural, and informal sector workers.

In August 2019, President Museveni rejected the Minimum Wage Bill, which would have increased the monthly minimum wage from USD 1.60 to USD 36, and returned it to parliament for review. Museveni continues to argue that increasing Uganda’s minimum wage would undermine FDI and international competitiveness.

The DFC is currently funding several projects in Uganda and maintains a bilateral agreement with the government of Uganda. Active projects in Uganda can be found here: https://www3.opic.gov/ActiveProjectsMap/Default.aspx# 

* Source for Host Country Data: Uganda Bureau of Statistics Statistical Abstract 2019

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) lists the UAE as having 88 bilateral investment treaties, of which 51 are in force, and 37 signed agreements.  There is no bilateral investment treaty between the United States and the UAE.  In 2019, the UAE signed bilateral investment treaties with Hong Kong and Brazil.

In June 2018, the UAE signed the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty-Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting to reinforce its position as a cooperative and transparent jurisdiction in combating avoidance of double taxation.  The UAE was added in March 2019 to an EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions, but was removed from the list in October 2019, after tightening rules for establishing offshore corporations in the country.

In March 2004, the United States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the UAE to provide a formal framework for dialogue on economic reform and trade liberalization:  https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/tifa/asset_upload_file305_7741.pdf .  As a member of the GCC, the UAE is also party to the U.S.-GCC Framework Agreement on Trade, Economic, Investment, and Technical Cooperation, signed in 2012.  The Department of State negotiated and signed a Memorandum of Understanding creating an Economic Policy Dialogue (EPD) with the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012, to address a variety of topics including trade, investment, sector-specific cooperation, competitiveness, and entrepreneurship.  A CEO Summit process for the EPD was established in 2013, bringing recommendations from the private sector into the EPD discussions.  In 2019, the sixth U.S.-UAE Economic Policy Dialogue was held in Washington, D.C., at which the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to deeper ties and the importance of the U.S.-UAE economic relationship in promoting regional prosperity and stability.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

As indicated elsewhere in this report, the regulatory and legal framework in the UAE is generally more favorable for local rather than foreign investors.

The Trade Companies Law requires all companies to apply international accounting standards and practices, generally the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  The UAE does not have local generally-accepted accounting principles.

Legislation is only published after it has been enacted into law and is not formally available for public comment beforehand, although the press will occasionally report details of high-profile legislation.  Final versions of federal laws are published in an official register “The Official Gazette,” usually only in Arabic, though there are private companies that translate laws into English.  The UAE Ministry of Justice (MoJ) maintains translated laws on its website, but it is not kept current.  Other ministries and departments sometimes offer official English translations of laws on their websites.  The official gazettes of the emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah are available online in Arabic.  Regulators are not required to publish proposed regulations before enactment, but may share them either publicly or with stakeholders on a case-by-case basis.

International Regulatory Considerations

The UAE is a member of the GCC, along with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.  It maintains regulatory autonomy, but coordinates efforts with other GCC members through the GCC Standardization Organization (GSO).  In 2018, the UAE submitted 51 notifications to the WTO committee, including notifications on antidumping, countervailing and safeguard measures.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

In the UAE constitution, Islam is identified as the state religion, as well as the principal source of domestic law.  The legal system of the country is generally divided between the British-based system of common law used in offshore free trade zones, and domestic law.  Domestic law is a dual legal system of civil and Sharia laws – the majority of which has been codified.  Most codified legislation in the UAE is a mixture of Islamic law and other civil laws such as the Egyptian and French civil laws.

The mechanism for enforcing ownership of property through offshore or domestic courts is generally considered to be predictable and fair.  As is the case with civil law systems, common law principles, such as adopting previous court judgments as legal precedents, are generally not recognized in the UAE, although lower courts typically follow higher court judgments. Judgments of foreign civil courts are typically recognized and enforceable under the local courts.  The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York signed a memorandum with Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) courts that provides companies operating in Dubai and New York with procedures for the mutual enforcement of financial judgments.

UAE-based financial free zones, such as Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM), DIFC, and Ras Al Khaimah International Corporate Centre maintain wills and probate registries, allowing non-Muslims to register a will under internationally-recognized common law principles.  In 2019, the DIFC Registry issued new Registry Rules (New Rules), which expand the geographic scope of the DIFC Registry and the applicable number of witnesses.  The New Rules allow testators to include movable and immovable assets located in any part of the world into a DIFC will.

The UAE constitution stipulates that each emirate can decide whether to set up its own judicial system (local courts) to adjudicate local cases or rely exclusively on federal courts.  The Federal Judicial Authority has jurisdiction over all cases involving a “federal entity” with the Federal Supreme Court in Abu Dhabi, the highest court at the federal level, having exclusive jurisdiction in seven types of cases:  disputes between emirates, disputes between an emirate and the federal government, cases involving national security, interpretation of the constitution, questions over the constitutionality of a law, and cases involving the actions of appointed ministers and senior officials while performing their official duties.  Although the federal constitution permits each emirate to have its own judicial authority, the federal government administers the courts in Ajman, Fujairah, Umm al Quwain, and Sharjah, including the vetting and hiring of judges, and payment of salaries.  Judges in these courts apply both local and federal law, as warranted.  Dubai, Ras Al Khaimah, and Abu Dhabi administer their own local courts, hiring, vetting, and paying their own judges and attorneys.  The local courts in Dubai, Ras al Khaimah, and Abu Dhabi have jurisdiction over all matters that the constitution does not specifically reserve for the federal system.  Abu Dhabi is the only emirate that operates both local (the Abu Dhabi Judicial Department) and federal courts in parallel.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

There are four major federal laws affecting investment in the UAE: the Federal Commercial Companies Law, the Trade Agencies Law, the Federal Industry Law, and the Government Tenders Law.

The Federal Commercial Companies Law (Law No. 2, 2015) applies to commercial companies operating in the UAE.    Federal Law No. 19 of 2018 eased restrictions on foreign ownership of companies incorporated onshore.  The new law allows foreigners to own up to 100 per cent of the share capital in UAE companies operating in certain sectors, subject to licensing requirements.  The Cabinet approved a list of economic sectors eligible for 100 percent foreign ownership including 122 economic activities in 13 sectors, including industrial, agricultural, and service industries.  The Cabinet confirmed that each emirate may decide on the percentage of foreign ownership it will allow in each sector.  The Cabinet also issued a “ Negative List” which enumerates sectors closed to foreigners, including oil exploration and production; investigation, security, military (including manufacturing of military weapons, explosives, dress and equipment); banking and financial activities; insurance; pilgrimage and umrah services; certain recruitment activities; water and electricity provision; fishing and related services; post, telecommunication and other audio-visual services; road and air transport; printing and publishing; commercial agency; medical retail (including pharmacies); blood banks and venom/poison banks.

Branch offices of foreign companies outside free zones are required to have a local agent with 100 percent UAE ownership, unless the foreign company has established its office pursuant to an agreement with the federal or emirate-level government.  Apple and Tesla have opened stores outside free zones without local partners, having secured permission on an exceptional basis via a decree from the Ministry of Economy.  Existing commercial law allows companies to offer between 30 and 70 percent of their shares in an initial public offering (IPO), and eliminates the requirement to issue new shares at the time of the IPO.  The law also streamlines the process for forming a limited liability company by requiring between 1 to 75 shareholders (the prior requirement was between 2 to 50 shareholders).  Public joint stock companies are required to have 51 percent GCC ownership at the time of listing, and UAE nationals must chair and comprise the majority of board members of any public joint stock company.

In 2019, the emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai introduced economic incentives to stimulate the economy and attract foreign investments, including cutting and freezing fees on certain government services, waiving fines, offering fee payment on an installment basis, and licensing businesses without physical locations for up to two years.  The Ministry of Economy has also formed a new FDI committee to unify licensing investment procedures in all emirates.

The Trade Agencies Law requires that foreign principals distribute their products in the UAE only through exclusive trade agents who are either UAE nationals or companies wholly owned by UAE nationals.  The Ministry of Economy handles registration of trade agents.  A foreign principal can appoint one agent for the entire UAE, or for a particular emirate or group of emirates.  It remains difficult, if not impossible, to sell in the UAE without a local agent. The Trade Agencies Law’s provisions apply to all registered commercial agents are collectively set out in Federal Law No. 18 of 1981 on the Organization of Trade Agencies, as amended by Federal Law No. 14 of 1988 (the Agency Law).  Federal Law No. 18 of 1993 (Commercial) and Federal Law No. 5 of 1985 (Civil Code) govern unregistered commercial agencies.

On January 18, 2020, the UAE Cabinet announced a draft law for amending certain provisions in the Trade Agencies Law.  The main amendments would allow family-owned companies to convert to public joint stock companies, and establish rules of governance and protection against default.  The changes are intended to encourage UAE nationals to engage in business activities, and invest in public companies and their commercial agencies with the “least possible risk”.  The changes offer protections for small shareholders and owners of SMEs, granting them statutory protection in cases of termination or non-renewal of agreements without “material reasons.”

According to the Central Bank Law, a bank incorporated in the United Arab Emirates must be 60 percent owned by UAE nationals.  The limit on foreign ownership of local banks is subject to approval by regulators on a case-by-case basis.  Some major banks have been allowed to reach the maximum foreign ownership of 40 percent in recent years.  Foreign banks are only allowed to be licensed in the UAE as branches of foreign banks, with no more than eight local branches allowed per bank.

The Federal Industry Law stipulates that industrial projects must have 51 percent UAE national ownership.  The law also requires that projects either be managed by a UAE national or have a board of directors with a majority of UAE nationals.  Exemptions from the law are provided for projects related to the extraction and refining of oil and natural gas, and select hydrocarbon projects governed by special laws or agreements.

To register with the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, go to: https://www.adx.ae/English/Pages/Members/BecomeAMember/default.aspx 

To obtain an investor number for trading on Dubai Exchanges, go to:  http://www.nasdaqdubai.com/assets/docs/NIN-Form.pdf 

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

The Competition Regulation Committee under the Ministry of Economy reviews transactions for competition-related concerns.

Expropriation and Compensation

Mission UAE is not aware of foreign investors subjected to any expropriation in the UAE in the recent past.  There are no federal rules governing compensation if expropriations were to occur, and individual emirates would likely treat expropriations differently.  In practice, authorities would be unlikely to expropriate unless there were a compelling development or public interest need to do so.  In such cases, compensation would likely be generous to maintain foreign investor confidence.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

The UAE is a contracting state to the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID convention) and a signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral awards (1958 New York Convention).

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Mission UAE is aware of several substantial investment and commercial disputes over the past few years involving U.S. or other foreign investors and government and/or local businesses. There have also been several contractor/payment disputes with the government as well as with local businesses.  Some observers have characterized dispute resolution as difficult and uncertain, and payment following settlements tend to be slow.  Disputes are generally resolved by direct negotiation and settlement between the parties themselves, arbitration, or recourse within the legal system.  Small, medium, and some larger enterprises fear being frozen out of the UAE market for escalating payment disputes through civil or arbitral courts, particularly disputes involving politically-connected local parties.  Some firms might feel compelled to exit the UAE market as they are unable to sustain the pursuit of legal or dispute-resolution mechanisms that can take months or even years to reach resolution.  Arbitration may commence by petition to the UAE federal courts on the basis of mutual consent (a written arbitration agreement), independently (by nomination of arbitrators), or through referral to an appointing authority without recourse to judicial proceedings.  There have been no confirmed reports of government interference in the court system that could affect foreign investors, but there is a widespread perception that domestic courts are likely to find in the favor of Emirati nationals over foreigners.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

The UAE government’s accession to the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the Convention) became effective in November 2006.  An arbitration award issued in the UAE is now enforceable in all 138 member states, and any award issued in another member state is directly enforceable in the UAE.  The Convention supersedes all incompatible legislation and rulings in the UAE.  Mission UAE is not aware of any U.S. firm attempting to use arbitration under the UN convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  While recognizing progress in compliance with this convention, some market watchers have raised concerns about delays and procedural obstacles encountered by firms seeking to enforce their arbitration awards in the UAE.

In June 2018, Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration came into force.  The Federal Law on Arbitration is based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.    The new law is expected to bolster confidence in the UAE’s arbitration regime.

Bankruptcy Regulations 

A new bankruptcy law, the Federal Decree Law No. 9 of 2016, came into effect in December 2016 and was applied for the first time in February 2019.  The law covers companies governed by the Commercial Companies Law, most free trade zone companies, sole proprietorships, and civil companies conducting professional business.  It allows creditors that are owed USD 27,225 or more, to file insolvency proceedings against a debtor 30 business days after notification in writing to the debtor.  The law decriminalized “bankruptcy by default,” requiring companies and their owners in default for more than 30 days to initiate insolvency procedures rather than face fines and potential imprisonment.   The Ministry of Finance initiated a review of the law in 2019.

A new bankruptcy law for individuals, Insolvency Law No. 19 of 2019, came into effect on November 29, 2019.  The Law applies only to natural persons and estates of the deceased.  The law allows a debtor to reach a settlement with his creditors without compromising the rights of the creditors by allowing an individual to seek court assistance for debt settlement or to enter into liquidation proceedings as a result of the inability to pay for an extended period of time.  Under this law, a debtor facing financial difficulties may apply to the court for assistance and guidance in the settlement of his financial commitments through one or more court-appointed experts, or through a court-supervised binding settlement plan.  If a debtor fails to pay any of his due debts for a period exceeding 50 consecutive business days, he shall apply to the court to commence liquidation proceedings for liquidation of his assets.  However, observers allege that the law does not offer adequate protection to individuals, and non-payment of debt generally remains a criminal offense.

Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) enacted a New Insolvency Law on May 30, 2019. The law, which applies only to DIFC companies, introduces methods to deal with insolvency situations, including a new debtor in possession regime, appointment of an administrator in cases of mismanagement, and adoption of UNCITRAL Model Law, consistent with globally recognized best practices.

The UAE Federal Government’s Al Etihad Credit Bureau (AECB) has partnered with local institutions to assist in assessing credit risk.  In December 2019, Dubai Real Estate Centre (DREC), a prominent real estate and development firm in Dubai, announced it would use credit reports and scores from AECB to help assess the risk of tenants failing to fulfil their payment obligations on renewals of existing tenancy contracts.

Investment Incentives

All free trade zones provide incentives to foreign investors.  Outside the free trade zones, the UAE provides no incentives, although the ability to purchase property as freehold in certain prime developments could be considered an incentive to attract foreign investment.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

There are numerous free trade zones throughout the UAE.  Foreign companies generally enjoy the same investment opportunities within those zones as Emirati citizens.  The chief attraction of free trade zones is that foreigners may own up to 100 percent of the equity in a free trade zone enterprise.  All free trade zones provide 100 percent import and export tax exemption, 100 percent exemption from commercial levies, 100 percent repatriation of capital and profits, multi-year leases, easy access to ports and airports, buildings for lease, energy connections (often at subsidized rates), and assistance in labor recruitment.  In addition, free trade zone authorities provide extensive support services, such as sponsorship, worker housing, dining facilities, and physical security.

Free trade zones have their own independent authority with responsibility for licensing and helping companies establish their businesses.  Investors can register new companies in a free trade zone, or license branch or representative offices.  In 2018, the Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development (ADED) introduced dual onshore licenses for all Abu Dhabi free zone companies as part of stimulus package to attract foreign direct investments.  However, free trade zones still have limited liability and are governed by special laws and regulations.  Companies in free trade zones seeking to operate within the UAE may be governed by the new Federal Commercial Companies Law, if the laws of the relevant free trade zone permit them to operate outside of the free zones.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

The Emiratization Initiative is a federal incentive program that aims to increase the number of Emirati citizens employed within the private sector.  Exact requirements vary by industry, but the Vision 2021 national strategic plan aims to increase the percentage of Emiratis working in the private sector from five percent in 2014 to eight percent by 2021.  Most Emirati citizens are employed by the government or one of its many government-related entities (GREs).

All foreign defense contractors with over USD 10 million in contract value over a five-year period must participate in the Tawazun Economic Program, previously known as the UAE Offset Program.  This program also requires defense contractors that are awarded contracts valued at more than USD 10 million to establish commercially-viable joint ventures with local business partners, which would be projected to yield profits equivalent to 60 percent of the contract value within a specified period, usually seven years.

The UAE does not force foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology or compel foreign IT providers to turn over source code, but it strongly encourages companies to utilize local content.  In February 2018, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) piloted a new In-Country Value (ICV) strategy, which gives preference in awarding contracts to foreign companies that use local content and employ Emirati citizens.  In February 2020, the Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development and ADNOC signed an agreement to drive ICV strategy and to standardize ADNOC’s ICV certification program across the Abu Dhabi Government’s procurement process.  Following this agreement, businesses can make a one-time application for a unified ICV certificate that will now be applicable for the Abu Dhabi Government’s commercial evaluation process of goods and services procurement.  UAE government officials have indicated plans to expand the ICV program to other sectors of the economy, and to other emirates, in the coming years.  In 2019, Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development introduced the Abu Dhabi Local Content (ADLC) initiative as part of Ghadan 21, an accelerator program to encourage private sector participation in Abu Dhabi government tenders.

Real Property

The UAE government allows individual emirates to decide on the mechanisms through which ownership of land may be transferred within their borders.  Abu Dhabi has generally limited ownership to Emirati or other GCC citizens, who may then lease the land to foreigners.  The property reverts to the owner at the conclusion of the lease.  However, in 2019, the Abu Dhabi Government issued Law No. 13 of 2019 amending the rules on foreign ownership of real estate in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.  Effective April 16, 2019 foreign individuals and companies wholly or partially-owned by foreigners are allowed to own freehold interests in land located within certain investment areas of the Abu Dhabi Emirate for an unrestricted time period.  The law also extends the right for public joint stock companies to own a freehold interest in land and property anywhere in the Abu Dhabi Emirate provided that at least 51 percent of the company is owned by UAE nationals.  Prior to the issuance of this law, foreign owners’ interest in land was limited to a “Musataha,” a long-term lease of up to 99 years, renewable upon the agreement of both parties.

Although Dubai has identified restricted areas within its borders mostly in the older, more established neighborhoods, traditional freeholds, also known as outright ownership, are also widely available, particularly in newer developments.  Subject to very few regulations, freehold owners own the land and may sell it on the open market.  The contract rights of lienholders, as well as ownership rights of freeholders, are generally respected and enforced throughout the UAE, which in some cases has employed specialized courts for this purpose.

Mortgages and liens are permitted with restrictions, and each emirate has its own system of recordkeeping.  In Dubai, for example, the system is centralized within the Dubai Land Department, and is considered extremely reliable.  In September 2019, Dubai’s ruler issued a law, in which the Real Estate Regulatory Agency (RERA) came under the Dubai Land Department (DLD).  According to the new law, DLD will replace RERA in the registration of real estate rental contracts.

The World Bank Ease of Doing Business Report notes that not all privately-held land plots in the economy are formally registered in an immovable property registry.  Much of the country is unregistered desert; such land is generally owned by emirate-specific governments.  Land not otherwise allocated or owned is the property of the emirate, and may be disposed of at the will of its ruler who generally consults with his advisors prior to disposition.  The UAE does not have a securitization process for lending purposes.

Intellectual Property Rights

Intellectual property rights (IPR) holders face three main challenges in the UAE:  the trade and transshipment of counterfeit goods, unpredictable pharmaceutical patent protection, and the absence of a collective management organization (CMO) for royalty payments for copyrighted music.  While some UAE enforcement authorities periodically seize and destroy counterfeit goods, concerns related to the re-export of seized goods, significant copyright piracy, and trademark infringement persist.  UAE police forces and investigators have generally been responsive when policing against pirated CDs, DVDs, and software, however, the failure to grant the necessary operating license to establish a CMO, which is allowed under the UAE’s 2002 Copyright Law and Ministerial Decision No. 133 of 2004, is a major obstacle to adequate enforcement of IPR.

The 2019-2020 Global Competitiveness Report issued by the World Economic Forum ranked the UAE 19th globally on IPR protection, up from 26th in 2018-2019.  The UAE’s legal framework for IPR is generally considered compliant with international obligations.  Emirate-level authorities such as economic development authorities, police forces, and customs authorities enforce IPR-related issues, while federal authorities manage IPR policy.  However, many of these laws are inconsistently implemented or enforced at federal and emirate-levels, criminal sentences are often non-deterrent, and enforcement actions require specific written complaints from right holders.

In April 2017, UAE officials allowed domestic manufacture of generic versions of a pharmaceutical product still under patent protection in the United States.  The UAE claimed that Decree No. 404, a measure providing reliable protection for pharmaceutical products with valid country of origin patents, is no longer valid.  It is also unclear whether the UAE courts will consistently recognize patents granted by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Patent Office.

Dubai Police announced a total of 297 counterfeit cases in 2019, compared to 264 in 2018.  Enforcement authorities in the UAE’s northern emirates also conducted inspection campaigns during 2019.  Many counterfeit products in the UAE are promoted via social media, and the UAE Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TRA) has been active in tracking and blocking these accounts.  In 2019, TRA banned 134 websites for IPR violations, compared to 152 in 2018. In addition to enforcement efforts, the UAE continued to hold IPR-related public awareness events and reginal conferences.

The UAE did not enact any new laws related to IP protection in 2019.  The UAE was included in both the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) 2020 Special 301 Report (https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2020_Special_301_Report.pdf) and the 2019 Notorious Markets List. (https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Review_of_Notorious_Markets_for  Counterfeiting_and_Piracy.pdf)  The latter mentions two physical marketplaces in the UAE that are gateways for distribution of Chinese-sourced counterfeit goods to other markets in the region, including North Africa and Europe.

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

UAE government efforts to create an environment that fosters economic growth and attracts foreign investment has resulted in:  i) no taxes or restrictions on the repatriation of capital; ii) free movement of labor and low barriers to entry (effective tariffs are five percent for most goods); and iii) an emphasis on diversifying the economy away from oil, which offers a broad array of investment options for FDI.  Key drivers of the economy include real estate, energy, tourism, logistics, manufacturing, and financial services.

The UAE has three stock markets:  Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, Dubai Financial Market, and NASDAQ Dubai.  The regulatory body, the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA), classifies brokerages into two groups:  those which engage in trading only while the clearance and settlement operations are conducted through clearance members, and those which engage in trading clearance and settlement operations for their clients.  Under the regulations, trading brokerages require paid-up capital of USD 820,000, whereas trading and clearance brokerages need USD 2.7 million.  USD 367,000 in bank guarantees is required for brokerages to trade on the bourses.

The UAE issued investment funds regulations in September 2012, known as the “twin peak” regulatory framework designed to govern the marketing of investment funds established outside the UAE to domestic investors, and the establishment of local funds domiciled inside the UAE.  This regulation gave the SCA, rather than the Central Bank, authority over the licensing, regulation and oversight of the marketing of investment funds.  The marketing of foreign funds, including offshore UAE-based funds, such as those domiciled in the DIFC, requires the appointment of a locally-licensed placement agent.  The UAE government has also encouraged certain high-profile projects to be undertaken via a public joint stock company to allow the issuance of shares to the public.  Further, the UAE government requires any company carrying out banking, insurance, or investment services for a third party to be a public joint stock company.

In 2019, SCA issued a number of capital-related decisions.  In May 2019, SCA issued a decision concerning the Capital Adequacy Criteria of Investment Manager and Management Company, which stipulates that the investment manager and the management  company must allocate capital to constitute a buffer for credit risk, market risk, or operational risk, even if it does not appear as a line item in the balance sheet.

In 2019, SCA also issued a decision concerning Real Estate Investment Fund control, which stipulates that a public or private real estate investment fund shall invest at least 75 percent of its assets in real estate assets.  According to this decision, a real estate investment fund may establish or own one or more real estate services companies provided that its investment in the ownership of each company and its subsidiaries shall not be more than 20 percent of the fund’s total assets.

Credit is generally allocated on market terms, and foreign investors can access local credit markets.  Interest rates are usually very close to those in the United States considering the local currency is pegged to the dollar.  There have been complaints that GREs crowd out private sector borrowers.

Money and Banking System

The UAE has a robust banking sector with 49 banks, 27 of which are foreign institutions.  The number of national bank branches declined to 656 at the end of 2019, compared to 743 at the end of December 2018, due to bank mergers and an ongoing transition to online banking.

Non-performing loans (NPL) comprised 6.2 percent of outstanding loans in 2019, compared with 5.7 percent in 2018, according to figures from the Central Bank of the UAE (CBUAE).  Under a new reporting standard, the NPL ratio of the UAE banking system for the year-end 2018 stood at 5.6 percent, compared to 7.1 percent under the previous methodology.  The CBUAE recorded total sector assets of USD 839 billion as of January 2020.

There are some restrictions on foreigners’ ability to establish a current bank account, and legal residents and Emiratis can access loans under more favorable terms than non-residents.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange Policies

According to the IMF, the UAE has no restrictions on making payments and transfers for international transactions, except security-related restrictions.   Currencies are traded freely at market-determined prices.  The UAE dirham has been pegged to the dollar since 2002.  The mid-point between the official buying and selling rate for the dirham (AED or Dhs) is fixed at AED 3.6725 per USD.

Remittance Policies

The Central Bank of the UAE initiated the creation of the Foreign Exchange & Remittance Group (FERG), made up of various exchange companies, which is registered with the Dubai Chamber of Commerce & Industry.  Unlike their counterparts across the world that deal mainly in money exchange, exchange companies in the UAE are the primary conduits for transferring large volumes of remittances through official channels.  According to migration and remittance data from the World Bank, in 2018 the UAE had migrant remittance outflows of USD 42.2 billion.  The Central Bank reported migrant remittances totaling USD 44.9 billion in 2019.  Exchange companies are important partners in the UAE government’s electronic salary transfer system, called the Wage Protection System, designed to ensure workers are paid according to the terms of their employment.  They also handle various ancillary services ranging from credit card payments, to national bonds, and traveler’s checks.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Abu Dhabi is home to two sovereign wealth funds—the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), and Mubadala Investment Company—with estimated total assets of approximately USD $1 trillion as of June 2019.  Each fund has a chair and board members appointed by the Ruler of Abu Dhabi.  President Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan is the chair of ADIA and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan is the chair of Mubadala.  Emirates Investment Authority, the UAE’s federal sovereign wealth fund, is modest by comparison, with estimated assets of about USD 15 billion.  The Investment Corporation of Dubai (ICD) is Dubai’s primary sovereign wealth fund, with an estimated USD 264 billion in assets according to ICD’s June 2019 financial report.

UAE funds vary in their approaches to managing investments.  ADIA generally does not actively seek to manage or take an operational role in the public companies in which it invests, while Mubadala tends to take a more active role in particular sectors, including oil and gas, aerospace, infrastructure, and early-stage venture capital.  ADIA exercises its voting rights as a shareholder in certain circumstances to protect its interests, or to oppose motions that may be detrimental to shareholders as a body.  According to ADIA, the fund carries out its investment program independently and without reference to the government of Abu Dhabi.

In 2008, ADIA agreed to act alongside the IMF as co-chair of the International Working Group of sovereign wealth funds, which eventually became the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF).  Comprising representatives from 31 countries, the IFSWF was created to demonstrate that sovereign wealth funds had robust internal frameworks and governance practices, and that their investments were made only on an economic and financial basis.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a key component of the UAE economic model.  There is no

published list of SOEs or GREs, at the national or individual emirate level.  Some SOEs, such as the influential Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), are strategically important companies and a major source of revenue for the government.  Mubadala established Masdar in 2006 to develop renewable energy and sustainable technologies industries.  A number of SOEs, such as Emirates Airlines and Etisalat, the largest local telecommunications firm, have in recent years emerged as internationally recognized brands.  Some but not all of these companies have competition.  In some cases, these firms compete against other state-owned firms (Emirates and Etihad airlines, for example, or telecommunications company Etisalat against du).  While they are not granted full autonomy, these firms leverage ties between entities they control to foster national economic development.  Perhaps the best example of such an economic ecosystem is Dubai, where SOEs have been used as drivers of diversification in sectors including construction, hospitality, transport, banking, logistics, and telecommunications.  Sectoral regulations in some cases address governance structures and practices of state-owned companies.  The UAE is not party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement.

Privatization Program

There is no privatization program in the UAE.  There have been several listings of portions of SOEs, on local UAE stock exchanges, as well as some “greenfield” IPOs focused on priority projects.

There is a general expectation that businesses in the UAE adhere to responsible business conduct standards, and the UAE’s Governance Rules and Corporate Discipline Standards (Ministerial Resolution No. 518 of 2009) encourage companies to apply social policy towards supporting local communities.  In February 2018, the UAE issued Cabinet Resolution No. 2 regarding Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), which encourages voluntary contributions to a National Social Responsibility Fund.  The Emirate of Ajman has made annual CSR contributions of USD 417 mandatory for all businesses.  Many companies maintain CSR offices and participate in CSR initiatives, including mentorship and employment training; philanthropic donations to UAE-licensed humanitarian and charity organizations; and initiatives to promote environmental sustainability.  The UAE government actively supports and encourages such efforts through official government partnerships, as well as through private foundations.  The 2015 Commercial Companies Law requires managers and directors to act for the benefit of the company and makes any company provisions exempting a directors and managers from personal liability voidable.

In April 2015, the Pearl Initiative and the United Nations Global Compact held their inaugural Forum in Dubai.  The Pearl Initiative is an independent, non-profit organization founded by Sharjah-based Crescent Enterprises working across the Gulf region to encourage better business practices.  The UAE has not subscribed to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and has not actively encouraged foreign or local enterprises to follow the specific United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.  The UAE government has not committed to adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas, nor does it participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.  The Dubai Multi-Commodities Center (DMCC), however, passed the DMCC Rules for Risk-Based Due Diligence in the Gold and Precious Metals Supply Chain, which it claims are fully aligned with the OECD guidance.

The UAE has stiff laws, regulations, and enforcement against corruption and has pursued several high-profile cases.  For example, the UAE federal penal code and the federal human resources law criminalize embezzlement and the acceptance of bribes by public and private sector workers.  The Dubai financial fraud law criminalizes receipt of illicit monies or public funds.  There is no evidence that corruption of public officials is a systemic problem.  The State Audit Institution and the Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority investigate corruption in the government.  The Companies Law requires board directors to avoid conflicts of interest.  In practice, however, given the multiple roles occupied by relatively few senior Emirati government and business officials, myriad conflicts of interest exist.  Business success in the UAE also still depends much on personal relationships.

The monitoring organizations GAN Integrity and Transparency International describe the corruption environment in the UAE as low-risk, and rate the UAE highly with regard to anti-corruption efforts both regionally and globally.  Some third-party organizations note, however, that the involvement of members of the ruling families and prominent merchant families in certain businesses can create economic disparities in the playing field, and most foreign companies outside the UAE’s free zones must rely on an Emirati national partner, often with strong connections, who retains majority ownership.  The UAE has ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption.  There are no civil society organizations or NGOs investigating corruption within the UAE.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:

Dr. Harib Al Amimi
President
State Audit Institution
20th Floor, Tower C2, Aseel Building, Bainuna (34th) Street, Al Bateen, Abu Dhabi, UAE
+971 2 635 9999
info@saiuae.gov.ae

There have been no reported instances of politically-motivated property damage in recent years.

Despite an economic slowdown in 2019, unemployment among UAE citizens remains low.  Expatriates, who represent over 85 percent of the country’s 9.6 million residents, account for more than 95 percent of private sector workers.  As a result, there would be large labor shortages in all sectors of the economy if not for expatriate workers.  Most expatriate workers derive their legal residency status from their employment.

A significant portion of the country’s expatriate labor population consists of low-wage workers who are primarily from South Asia and work in labor-intensive industries such as construction, maintenance, and sanitation.  In addition, several hundred thousand domestic workers, primarily from South and Southeast Asia and Africa, work in the homes of both Emirati and expatriate families.  Federal labor law does not apply to domestic, agricultural, or public sector workers.  In 2014, the federal government implemented a law mandating a standard contract for all domestic workers.  In 2017, the UAE issued a domestic workers law, which regulates their rights and contracts.  Various regulations require businesses in certain sectors such as financial services to employ minimum quotas of Emiratis.

Under UAE labor law, employers must pay severance to workers who complete one year or more of service except in cases of termination under certain conditions described in Article 120 of the federal labor law, which relate to misconduct by workers.  Expatriate workers do not receive UAE government unemployment insurance.  Termination of UAE nationals in most situations requires prior approval from the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization.

A guest worker system generally guarantees transportation back to country of origin at the conclusion of employment.  There have been no reports of excessively onerous visa, residence, work permit, or similar requirements inhibiting mobility of employees.  In June 2018, the UAE cabinet approved a revamped repatriation scheme to replace the USD 817 guarantee employers had to deposit per worker.  Under the new system, repatriation insurance costs USD 16 per year per employee.  In November 2018, the UAE cabinet approved five-year residence visas for investors who purchase property worth USD 1.4 million or more, and 10-year residence visas for individuals who invest USD 2.8 million in a business.  The government also introduced new visas for entrepreneurs, and specialized talent in science, medicine and specialized technical fields.  In 2018, the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization introduced a part-time work permit, allowing employees who live in the UAE on a work visa to undertake part-time jobs and to work for multiple employers simultaneously.

Although UAE federal law prohibits the payment of recruitment fees, many prospective workers continue to make such payments in their home countries.  In 2018, the UAE government launched Tadbeer Centers, publicly regulated but privately operated agencies that are meant to replace recruitment agencies by 2020.  There is no minimum wage legally mandated by the UAE; however, some labor-sending countries require their citizens to receive certain minimum wage levels as a condition for allowing them to work in the UAE.  In January 2020, the UAE government introduced a salary requirement for residents seeking to directly sponsor a domestic worker, raising the minimum monthly salary from USD 1,630 to 6,810.

Federal Law No. 8 of 1980 prohibits labor unions.  The law also prohibits public sector employees, security guards, and migrant workers from striking, and allows employers to suspend private sector workers for doing so.  In addition, employers have the ability to cancel the contracts of striking workers, which can lead to deportation.  According to government statistics, there were approximately 30 to 60 strikes per year between 2012 and 2015, the last year for which data is available.  In December 2019, construction workers in Abu Dhabi engaged in an hours-long strike, claiming they had not been paid in months and that each was owed over USD 3,400.  The police intervened to defuse the protests and arrested some of the workers for resisting.  Mediation plays a central role in resolving labor disputes.  The federal Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization (MHRE) and local police forces maintain telephone hotlines for labor dispute and complaint submissions.  The MHRE manages 11 centers around the UAE that provide mediation services between employers and employees.  Disputes not resolved by the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization move to the labor court system.

The MHRE inspects company workplaces and company-provided worker accommodations to ensure compliance with UAE law.  Emirate-level government bodies, including the Dubai Municipality, also carry out regular inspections.  The MHRE also enforces a mid-day break from 12:30 p.m. – 3:00 p.m. during the extremely hot summer months.  The federally-mandated Wage Protection System (WPS) monitors and requires electronic transfer of wages to approximately 4.5 million private sector workers (about 95 percent of the total private sector workforce).  There are reports that small private construction and transport companies work around the WPS to pay workers less than their contractual salaries.  Domestic workers are not paid through the WPS, although the UAE governments hopes to incorporate them into the system beginning in the third quarter of 2020.

Following the promulgation of similar legislation in Abu Dhabi, Dubai’s government fully implemented Law No. 11 in May 2017, which mandates employers provide basic health insurance coverage to their employees or face fines.  Dubai’s mandatory health insurance law covers 4.3 million people, and applies to employees residing in other emirates but working in Dubai.

The multi-agency National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking is the federal body tasked with monitoring and preventing human trafficking, including forced labor.  Child labor is illegal and rare in the UAE.  The UAE continues to participate in the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, engage in the Colombo Process, and partner with other multilateral organizations such as the International Organization for Migration and International Labor Organization in regard to labor exploitation and human trafficking.

Section 7 of the Department of State’s Human Rights Report (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt) provides more information on worker rights, working conditions, and labor laws in the UAE.  The Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report (https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2018/index.htm) details the UAE government’s efforts to combat human trafficking.

The UAE does not have a bilateral agreement with DFC after its agreement with OPIC was suspended in 1995 for not meeting statutory “taking steps” standards on worker rights.  The UAE is a Very High Income country as defined by OPIC’s statutes, and as a development finance agency, DFC gives priority to financing projects in middle and low income countries.

* Economic Report: Ministry of Economy

Data from the Annual Report of the Ministry of Economy (2019) indicates that the GDP for 2018 in real prices (base year 2010) were approximately USD $392.7 billion, while the estimated GDP at current prices was about USD $414.1 billion in 2018.

According to the UAE Ministry of Economy’s Annual Economic Report 2019, the net annual FDI inflows to the UAE in 2018 were $10.4 billion, similar to 2017.  The largest investors in the UAE were:  India, United States, UK, Japan, China, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Kuwait, France and the Netherlands.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment
Data not available.