The U.S. government estimates the total population at 33.3 million (July 2016 estimate). There are no reliable statistics available concerning the percentages of Shia and Sunni Muslims in the country; the government’s Central Statistics Office does not collect data disaggregated in this way. Shia leaders claim Shia make up approximately 20-25 percent of the population, while Sunni leaders claim the Shia comprise only 10 percent.

The Shia population includes Ismailis and a majority of ethnic Hazaras. Other religious groups, mainly Hindus, Sikhs, Bahais, and Christians, comprise less than 0.3 percent of the population. The number of Sikhs and Hindus is declining due to emigration. Sikh and Hindu leaders estimate there are 180 Sikh and Hindu families totaling 900 individuals, which is a decline from 343 families totaling 2,000 individuals in 2015. Reliable estimates of the Bahai and Christian communities are not available. There are small numbers of practitioners of other religions, including one Jew.

The Hazaras live predominantly in the central and western provinces, while the Ismailis live mainly in Kabul and in the central and northern provinces. Followers of the Bahai Faith are based predominantly in Kabul, with a small community in Kandahar.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam the official state religion and says no law may contravene the beliefs and provisions of the “sacred religion of Islam.” It further states there shall be no amendment to the constitution’s provisions with respect to adherence to the fundamentals of Islam. According to the constitution, followers of religions other than Islam are “free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of the law.”

There is no definition of apostasy in the criminal code. Apostasy falls under the seven offenses making up the hudud as defined by sharia. According to Sunni Hanafi jurisprudence, which the constitution states shall apply “if there is no provision in the constitution or other laws about a case,” beheading is appropriate for male apostates, while life imprisonment is appropriate for female apostates, unless they repent. A judge may also impose a lesser penalty, such as short-term imprisonment or lashes, if doubt about the apostasy exists. Under Hanafi jurisprudence, the government may also confiscate the property of apostates or prevent apostates from inheriting property. This guidance applies to individuals who are of sound mind and have reached the age of maturity. Civil law states the age of majority for citizens is 18, except it is 16 for females with regard to marriage. Islamic law defines it as the point at which one shows signs of puberty.

Conversion from Islam to another religion is apostasy according to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence applicable in the courts. If someone converts to another religion from Islam, he or she shall have three days to recant the conversion. If the person does not recant, then he or she shall be subject to the punishment for apostasy. Proselytizing to try to convert individuals from Islam to another religion is also illegal according to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence applicable in the courts and subject to the same punishment.

Blasphemy, which may include anti-Islamic writings or speech, is a capital crime according to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence applicable in the courts. Similar to apostates, blasphemers have three days to recant or face death, although there is no clear process for recanting under sharia. Some hadiths (sayings or traditions of the Prophet Muhammad that serve as a source of religious law or guidance) address the issue, suggesting discussion and negotiation with an apostate to encourage the apostate to recant.

According to a 2007 ruling from the General Directorate of Fatwas and Accounts under the Supreme Court, the Bahai Faith is distinct from Islam and is a form of blasphemy. All Muslims who convert to it are considered apostates; Bahai practitioners are labeled infidels.

The law prohibits the production, reproduction, printing, and publishing of works and materials contrary to the principles of Islam or offensive to other religions and denominations. It also prohibits publicizing and promoting religions other than Islam and bans articles on any topic the government deems might harm the physical, spiritual, and moral well-being of persons, especially children and adolescents. The law instructs National Radio and Television Afghanistan (RTA), a government agency, to provide broadcasting content reflecting the religious beliefs of all ethnic groups in the country. The law also obligates RTA to adjust its programs in light of Islamic principles as well as national and spiritual values.

Licensing and registration of religious groups are not required. Registration as a group (which gives the group the status of a shura or council) or an association conveys official recognition and the benefit of government provision of facilities for seminars and conferences. By law, anyone who is 18 years of age or older may establish a social or political organization. Such an entity must have a charter consistent with domestic laws as well as a central office. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) may dissolve such organizations through a judicial order. Groups recognized as shuras or councils may cooperate with one another on religious issues. Associations may conduct business with the government or the society as a whole. Both groups and associations may register with the MOJ. According to the MOJ database, 2,215 Sunni and Shia organizations are registered, while the Sikh and Hindu National Shura is registered with the Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs.

The criminal code punishes “crimes against religions,” which include verbal and physical assaults on a follower of any religion. It specifies a person who attacks a follower of any religion shall receive a prison sentence of not less than three months but no more than a year, and a fine of between 3,000 and 12,000 afghanis ($44 to $177).

The criminal code states persons who forcibly stop the conduct of rituals of any religion, those who destroy or damage “permitted places of worship” (a term not defined by the code) where religious rituals are conducted, or those who destroy or damage any sign or symbol of any religion are subject to a medium-term punishment. The criminal code defines medium-term as confinement in jail for a minimum of one year and a maximum of five years and/or a fine of between 12,000 and 60,000 afghanis ($177 to $884).

According to the constitution, the “state shall devise and implement a unified educational curriculum based on the provisions of the sacred religion of Islam” and develop courses on religion on the basis of the “Islamic sects” in the country. The national curriculum includes materials designed separately for Sunni-majority schools and Shia-majority schools, as well as textbooks which emphasize nonviolent Islamic terms and principles. The curriculum includes courses on Islam, but not on other religions. Non-Muslims are not required to study Islam in public schools.

According to the law, all funds contributed to madrassas by private or international sources must be channeled through the Ministry of Education (MOE).

The civil and penal codes derive their authority from the constitution. The constitution stipulates the courts shall apply constitutional provisions as well as the law in ruling on cases. For instances in which neither the constitution nor the penal or civil code address a specific case, the constitution declares the courts may apply Hanafi Sunni jurisprudence within the limits set by the constitution to attain justice. The constitution also allows courts to apply Shia law in cases involving Shia followers. Non-Muslims may not provide testimony in matters requiring sharia jurisprudence. The constitution makes no mention of separate laws applying to non-Muslims.

A Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim woman, but the woman must first convert if she is not an adherent of one of the other two Abrahamic faiths – Christianity or Judaism. It is illegal for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man.

The government’s national identity cards indicate an individual’s religion. Individuals are not required to declare belief in Islam to receive citizenship.

The constitution requires the president and vice presidents to be Muslim. Other senior officials (ministers, members of parliament, judges) must swear allegiance and obedience to the principles of Islam as part of their oath of office.

The constitution allows the formation of political parties, provided the program and charter of a party are “not contrary to the principles of the sacred religion of Islam.” The constitution states political parties may not be based on sectarianism.

In September parliament passed electoral reform legislation mandating an additional seat in parliament’s lower house be reserved for a member of the Hindu/Sikh community.

According to the MOJ’s database, the country has signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), but the parliament has not yet ratified the country’s signature.

Government Practices

The supreme court upheld the appellate court’s reversal of a death sentence handed down to four individuals convicted of the 2015 mob killing of a woman who allegedly had burned a Quran. The court ordered a review of one-year prison sentences given to seven police officers in the case, which resulted in the appellate court increasing their punishments. As in the past two years, there were no reported prosecutions for apostasy or blasphemy, but individuals who converted from Islam continued to state they feared government punishment as well as reprisals from family and society. Members of the Hindu and Sikh communities reported they continued to avoid settling disputes in the courts for fear of retaliation. They preferred to settle disputes through community councils. Representatives of minority religions continued to report the courts denied non-Muslims the same rights as Muslims. A small number of Sikhs and Hindus continued to serve in government positions. Although some Shia held senior positions in the government, Shia leaders said the number of official positions held by Shia did not reflect the country’s demographics.

In March the supreme court upheld an appellate court’s 2015 decision to reduce four death sentences handed down in the case of a woman killed by a mob in March 2015 for allegedly burning a Quran to 20 years imprisonment. The supreme court upheld the 16-year prison sentences given to eight other civilian suspects in the case, but rejected the sentences of seven police officers who had received suspended one-year prison terms. The court ruled the suspended sentences were too lenient. The court also called on the attorney general’s office to investigate the acquittals of 11 more officers who had been indicted in the case. The supreme court did not release the reasoning for its ruling or provide guidance to the appellate court. On August 7, the appellate court changed the one-year suspended sentences for the seven police officers to two-year suspended sentences, stipulating the police officers would not serve any prison time as long as they maintained clean records and committed no further crimes. The appellate court also sentenced a civilian who had not been sentenced in the initial decision to 16 years in prison.

Individuals who converted from Islam continued to report they risked annulment of their marriages, rejection by their families and communities, loss of employment, and possibly the death penalty.

As in the previous two years, there were no reports of prosecutions for blasphemy or apostasy during the year, including of Bahais who, although labeled infidels, were not considered to be converts and as such not charged with either crime. One individual convicted of blasphemy in 2013 remained in prison serving a 20-year sentence.

The Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs (MOHRA) continued to be responsible for managing pilgrimages (Hajj and Umrah), revenue collection for religious activities, acquisition of property for religious purposes, issuance of fatwas, educational testing of imams, sermon preparation and distribution for government-supported mosques, and raising public awareness of religious issues. The government continued to permit both Sunnis and Shia to go on pilgrimages, with no quota on either group. MOHRA also facilitated pilgrimages for Hindus and Sikhs to India, but did not collect any revenue for or from non-Muslims.

MOHRA estimated between 4,800 and 5,000 mullahs were registered with and worked directly for MOHRA out of a total of approximately 300,000 mullahs in the country as of the end of 2015, the last year for which data was available. The mullahs continued to receive an average monthly salary of 4,700 afghanis ($69) from the government. MOHRA continued to require mullahs who applied to be prayer leaders in MOHRA-registered mosques to hold at least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent, verified by the Ministry of Higher Education According to MOHRA, approximately 50,000 of the approximately 150,000 to 160,000 mosques in the country were registered, including the registration of an additional 700 mosques during the year. MOHRA said the ministry continued to lack the financial resources to create a comprehensive registry of mullahs and mosques in the country.

MOHRA continued to allocate a portion of its budget for the construction of new mosques. Local groups continued to pay the largest portion of the costs for new mosques and continued not to be required to inform the ministry about the new construction unless they wished to request financial or other assistance.

According to Hindus and Sikhs, the government continued not to restrict them from training other Hindus and Sikhs to become clergy, but per the law punishing conversion, they could not proselytize. The government continued not to hinder their communities from building places of worship.

According to Sikh and Hindu community members, they continued not to pursue land disputes through the courts for fear of retaliation, particularly when powerful local leaders occupied their property.

MOHRA reported there were 5,000 registered madrassas and “Quran learning centers” throughout the country. While the government did register some madrassas during the year, it did not report how many. More than 340,000 students were enrolled in the madrassas, mostly in Kabul, Balkh, Nangarhar, and Herat provinces, according to the latest available estimate from 2015.

The registration process continued to require a school to demonstrate it had suitable buildings, classrooms, accredited teachers, and dorms if students lived on campus. MOHRA registered madrassas collocated with mosques, while MOE registered madrassas not associated with mosques. In MOHRA-run madrassas, students received individual instruction, with one imam teaching approximately 50 to 70 children studying at various levels. Registration did not mean the government controlled a madrassa, but qualified the madrassa’s diplomas and certificates for government recognition. Only certificates issued by registered madrassas allowed students to pursue higher education at government universities.

MOHRA did not offer data on the number of unregistered madrassas, but estimated registered madrassas “far outnumbered” unregistered madrassas following the registration effort. The MOE had the authority to close unregistered madrassas, but ministry officials said in practice it was almost impossible to close any due to local sensitivities. The ministry officials reported the government did not close any madrassas during the year due to the potential for negative societal repercussions. They said the government was attempting to raise awareness within the madrassa community of the benefits of registering madrassas, including recognition of graduation certificates and financial and material assistance, such as furniture or stationery.

MOHRA did not operate primary level madrassas; mosques provided primary-level religious studies instead. While MOHRA operated no madrassas offering standard two-year degree programs, there were 80 madrassas registered with the MOE offering two-year degree programs. There were 1,200 public and 200 private madrassas registered with the MOE.

According to government authorities, the legal requirement for registered madrassas to route private or international donations through the MOE allowed the government to monitor financial assistance to institutes of learning, but the MOE seldom imposed a ban for failing to comply with this requirement. The tendency to make cash donations directly to the madrassas made it difficult, they said, for the government to track funds coming from private sources or abroad. Despite this, the government continued its efforts to solicit donations from other Muslim countries and from private individuals to support the madrassas. The MOE also continued to require independent madrassas to be accredited and disclose their funding sources.

Registered madrassas continued to follow the standardized curriculum provided by the MOE’s Department of Islamic Education. This curriculum specified 60 percent of the subjects taught in madrassas had to be religious in nature, while the other 40 percent consisted of mathematics, history, geography, and Dari literature.

There remained one government-sponsored school for Sikh children, located in Kabul. The government continued to provide the same proportionate funding to cover staff salaries, books, and maintenance as it did for other schools. The MOE also continued to provide the curriculum for the Sikh school, except for religious studies. The community appointed a teacher for religious studies, and the MOE paid the teacher’s salary.

The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, a Swedish NGO, continued to support a privately-funded Sikh school in Jalalabad. A few Sikh children continued to attend private international schools. Hindus did not have separate schools but sometimes sent their children to Sikh schools. There continued to be no Christian schools.

According to observers, the courts relied primarily on statutory law in both civil and criminal cases. In some instances, however, members of minority religious groups reported the courts used Hanafi jurisprudence, even where such law conflicted with the country’s international commitments to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Disabled Persons.

The Ulema Council, a group of senior Sunni and Shia scholars, imams, and Muslim jurists, continued to advise the president on Islamic legal issues. It met with the president every two months, discussing topics such as support for the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and peace negotiations with insurgent groups. The Ulema Council also continued to advise the parliament and ministries on the formulation of new legislation and the implementation of existing law. In November the council voiced its support for the peace agreement between the government and the insurgent group Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Although the Ulema Council remained officially independent from the government, its members continued to receive financial support from the state. The council also continued to advise some provincial governments, although in villages and rural areas scholars, NGO representatives and government officials said decisions continued to be based mostly on local interpretations of Islamic law and tradition.

Representatives of minority religions continued to report the courts did not apply protections provided to them by the law and denied non-Muslims the same rights as Muslims, even when the non-Muslims were legally entitled to those same rights. Members of minority religious communities said the state, including the courts, continued to treat all citizens as if they were Muslims, and some basic citizenship rights of non-Muslims were not codified. As a result, they said, non-Muslims continued to risk being tried according to Hanafi jurisprudence.

Sikhs and Hindus stated their community members continued not to take civil cases to court because they continued to feel unprotected by dispute resolution mechanisms such as the Special Land and Property Court. Instead, their members continued to prefer to settle disputes within their communities.

Leaders of both Hindu and Sikh communities stated they continued to face discrimination, including long delays to resolve cases in the judicial system. The most common judicial issues concerned illegal appropriation of Sikh properties. In one case reported by a Sikh community leader, a high-ranking Ministry of Interior official reportedly occupied a piece of land owned by a member of the Sikh community who was still a resident of the country. In another instance, according to the Sikh community leader, a National Directorate of Security (NDS) official reportedly stole the land of a Sikh who had emigrated to Germany and threatened the owner’s proxy at gunpoint when the proxy went to claim the land. Court proceedings continued in both cases, albeit very slowly according to the plaintiffs.

A small number of Sikhs and Hindus continued to serve in government positions, including one at the municipal level, one at the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries, and one as a presidentially appointed member of the upper house of parliament. Although Shia Muslims held senior positions in government, they said appointments to government administrative bodies continued not to reflect the country’s demographics based on their estimate of the percentage of Shia in the country’s population. Sunni members of the Ulema Council stated Shia were overrepresented in government based on Sunni estimates of the percentage of Shia in the population.

Shia leaders stated the law placed no restrictions on their participation in public life, but the government continued to neglect security in majority-Shia areas.

Although four Ismailis continued to serve as members of parliament, members of the Ismaili community continued to raise concerns about what they called the exclusion of Ismailis from other positions of political authority.

Judicial, constitutional, and human rights commissions composed of members of different Islamic religious groups (Sunni and Shia) and supported by the government continued to meet to work towards Muslim intrafaith reconciliation. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs and MOHRA continued to work together toward the stated goal of allowing women to attend mosques. The government funded Moderation Center of Afghanistan continued to promote what the government viewed as a moderate interpretation of Islam. The center continued educational exchanges to send Shia and Sunni clerics to Kuwait for training, and then appointed them as teachers in various provinces to train other clerics. Other organizations continued to work on intrafaith reconciliation as well, including the Ulema Council, the Islamic Brotherhood Council, and the MOHRA.

The ONSC continued to work on addressing religiously-motivated violent extremism as part of its effort to develop an overall strategy to counter violent extremism (CVE). Beginning in September, the ONSC sponsored a series of provincial-level conferences on religiously-motivated violent extremism to collect data to use in this effort. Concurrently, the ONSC established an inter-ministerial working group to coordinate the efforts of relevant government institutions and NGOs to implement the strategy.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

The media continued to report attacks by the Taliban, the ISKP, and other insurgent groups targeted at specific religious and ethno-religious groups, such as the Hazara Shias, as well as at individual religious leaders because of their reported links to the government or their interpretations of Islam.

In July suicide bombers attacked a protest demonstration in Kabul organized by the Enlightenment Movement, an NGO composed primarily of Hazara Shias. At least 97 people were killed and more than 260 injured. Shortly after the attack, the ISKP claimed responsibility for the bombing in a statement on the group’s Amaq News Agency, calling it a “martyrdom attack” against the Shia community.

In November a suicide bomber struck a gathering of Shiite Muslims commemorating Arbaeen, a Shiite observance of loss and grief, in the Baqir ul-Uloom mosque in western Kabul, killing at least 30. ISIS subsequently claimed responsibility.

In October a group of gunmen entered the Karte-Sakhi mosque in Kabul and opened fire on worshippers gathered to mark Ashura. According to an organization monitoring extremist websites, the attackers killed 17 worshippers and wounded 58, including women and children. The Amaq News Agency published an article stating the ISKP was involved in planning the attack and an ISKP fighter was among the gunmen. ISKP later claimed full responsibility for the assault. A day later, a suicide bomber killed 14 civilians and wounded 17 in a bomb blast outside a Shia mosque in Balkh province. There were no official claims of responsibility for the second day’s attack. Shia community leaders condemned the attacks, and said many Shia believed the attacks were attempts by radical elements to foment sectarian tensions in the country. Shia leaders urged the Shia community to avoid any violent reaction that might escalate tensions between Sunnis and Shias, and asked the government to investigate the incident and take necessary steps to protect Shias.

In June unknown militants kidnapped 17 Shia Hazaras from a bus in the northern province of Sar-i-Pul. A provincial council member said the Taliban likely had abducted the passengers to exchange them for a local commander who had been detained by Afghan forces during clashes the day before. The incident came two days after the Taliban killed 13 people and took several others hostage after ambushing a bus convoy in Kunduz province. Local tribal elders were reportedly able to mediate the release of the kidnap victims.

In September eight Hazaras traveling from Bamiyan to Kabul were reportedly kidnapped in Wardak province, just 150 meters away from a police checkpoint. In another incident, a group of militants stopped two passenger vans in Ghor province. The militants singled out five passengers they identified as Hazaras, and took them away at gunpoint. According to government contacts, the Hazaras were kidnapped by the Taliban, who were hoping to exchange them for one of their commanders. One student was killed when government forces attempted to secure their release, while the rest were later freed when tribal elders intervened to mediate. In Ghazni, a student was killed during a clash between the Taliban and government security forces following a Taliban attempt to abduct six Hazara students. In October the Taliban abducted 25 Hazaras traveling on the Kabul-Bamiyan Highway. They were reportedly released through the mediation of local tribal elders.

In December media reported a Kunduz Sikh community leader, Lala Del Souza, was shot dead by unknown gunmen in Kunduz city. Police reported three suspects were arrested in connection with his death. There was media speculation the Taliban were behind the killing, although there was no claim of responsibility from the Taliban.

The Taliban and other insurgents continued to threaten religious leaders with death for preaching messages contrary to the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam or its political agenda. The Taliban also continued to warn mullahs not to perform funeral prayers for government security officials. Between June and September in the Rodat and Momand Dara districts of Nangarhar, the Taliban reportedly killed a number of clerics, including two imams. As a result, according to the director of madrassas at the MOHRA, imams stated they feared performing funeral rites for Afghan National Security Forces and other government employees. The Taliban also continued to monitor the social habits of local populations in areas under their control and imposed punishments on residents according to their interpretation of Islamic law. Insurgents claiming affiliation with ISKP continued to engage in similar activities. The provincial director of MOHRA reported the ISKP seized control of 10 madrassas and removed the government curriculum, replacing it with their own, which included paramilitary training.

Government officials reported in August the Taliban replaced cultural, tourism, and sports curricula in parts of Baghlan and Logar provinces under their control with Islamic teachings administered by imams handpicked by the group. In October Kunduz provincial council members reported the Taliban had taken over more than half the schools in the province. One official estimated the Taliban controlled as many as 80 percent of schools. While the government continued to pay the salaries of the teachers, he said, the Taliban established the school curriculum and selected the teachers as well as school administrators. The government continued to pay salaries to staff selected by the group.

Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, and other non-Muslim minorities stated they continued to face harassment and, in some cases, violence, although Hindus and Sikhs continued to be able to practice their religions publicly. Members of the Hindu community said they continued to face fewer incidents of harassment than Sikhs, ascribing the difference to their lack of a distinctive male headdress. Despite the differences between the groups, many Afghans reportedly continued to use the terms Sikh and Hindu interchangeably. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was often difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

According to the leader of the Sikh community, in September a man with a sword reportedly pounded on the gate of a Sikh temple in Kabul, shouting “convert to Islam.” A week after the incident, the leader of the Hindu/Sikh community reported he found a cow’s head in front of its temple compound in Kabul. Some Sikhs reported instances in which residents and high-ranking government officials told them they were “not from Afghanistan,” that they were “Indians,” and “did not belong here.”

Christians continued to report hostile public opinion toward converts to Christianity and to the idea of Christian proselytizing. Members of the Christian community, who often had converted to Christianity while in other countries, said they continued to worship alone or in small congregations in private homes out of fear of societal discrimination and persecution.

Women of several different religions reported local Muslim religious leaders continued to confront them over their attire. As a result, they said, many women continued to wear burqas in public in rural areas and in some urban areas. In urban areas, where most women no longer wore the burqa, almost all women said they continued to wear some form of head covering, either by personal choice or due to societal pressure. Many said they chose to cover to increase their security in public. The Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs and the National Ulema Council both stated there was no official pressure on women regarding their attire.

Minority religious leaders stated few places of worship remained for the decreasing numbers of Sikhs, Hindus and other religious minorities. According to the Sikh and Hindu Council, there had been 64 gurdwaras (Sikh temples) and mandus (Hindu temples) across the country, but residents of Kandahar, Ghazni, Paktya, and other provinces had seized approximately 30 sites in previous years. Fourteen of those remaining continued to be active, including two sites belonging to the Hindu community. The Hindu community reported it presented the list of its places of worship to the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs in an effort to stop further illegal seizures and to reclaim the land and buildings previously lost. Kabul’s lone synagogue remained inactive, and there were no public Christian churches. Worship facilities for noncitizens of various faiths were located at coalition military facilities and at embassies in Kabul. Buddhist foreigners were free to worship in Hindu temples.

Hindus and Sikhs continued to report interference in their efforts to cremate the remains of their dead in accordance with their customs from individuals who lived near cremation sites. A leader of the Hindu/Sikh community reported an incident in which unknown individuals threw stones and bricks at the community’s cremation site on the day following a fellow Sikh’s cremation. Although the government provided land to use as cremation sites, the distance from any major urban area and the lack of security in the region rendered the land unusable, according to Sikh leaders. The government continued to provide police support to protect the Sikh and Hindu communities while they performed their cremation rituals.

Members of the Sikh and Hindu communities reported they continued not to send their children to public schools due to harassment from other students. In the past, Hindus and Sikhs said they had sent their children to private Hindu and Sikh schools, but many of those schools had closed due to the decreasing sizes of the two communities as well as their members’ declining economic circumstances. Per the Sikh and Hindu Council, there was one school in Nangarhar and two schools in Kabul which remained operational.

According to Sikh leaders, a lack of employment opportunities remained the main cause of Hindu and Sikh emigration. They reported emigration continued to increase as economic conditions worsened and security concerns increased for the two communities. Hindus and Sikhs remained largely illiterate, they said, which continued to limit their employment opportunities.

Observers stated societal discrimination against the Shia minority by the Sunni majority continued to decline. They cited as an example the response to the suicide attack on the Enlightenment Movement when hundreds of Sunnis went to hospitals to donate blood for injured Shias. The observers said there continued to be reports of discrimination in different localities, however.

According to observers, suspicion of development assistance projects continued to exist among Muslim residents, some of whom reportedly suspected such assistance projects were surreptitious efforts to advance Christianity or engage in proselytizing.

Observers reported local Muslim religious leaders continued their efforts to limit social activities inconsistent with Islamic doctrine, such as female participation in sports.

U.S. embassy officers continued to meet with government officials to promote religious tolerance and enhance the government’s capacity to counter violent extremism. Senior embassy officers and other embassy staff continued to discuss the protection of religious minorities with government officials.

Embassy representatives met with high-level government and religious officials to discuss ways to better ensure the curriculum offered by madrassas did not encourage religiously-motivated violent extremism. The embassy coordinated with the ONSC as well as other governmental and non-governmental stakeholders to assist the ONSC in creating a national strategy to combat violent extremism.

Embassy officials met with leaders of major religious groups, scholars, and NGOs to discuss ways to enhance religious tolerance and introduce the public to a broader range of religious perspectives.

During Ramadan, embassy staff hosted iftars with government, civil society, and religious leaders to promote religious dialogue and tolerance.

The embassy sponsored visits by several prominent religious leaders to the United States and third countries to broaden religious dialogue. Embassy officials facilitated several meetings of different research bodies to coordinate research efforts on violent extremism. The embassy also hosted roundtables with leading researchers and religious scholars from organizations such as the Moderation Center and MOHRA to discuss the primary sources of violent extremism and the mechanisms to counter it.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 40 million (July 2016 estimate), more than 99 percent of whom are Sunni Muslim. Groups together constituting less than 1 percent of the population include Christians, Jews, Ahmadi Muslims, Shia Muslims, and a community of Ibadi Muslims residing principally in the province of Ghardaia. Some religious leaders estimate there are fewer than 200 Jews.

The Christian community includes Roman Catholics, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, members of the Protestant Church of Algeria, Lutherans, members of the Reformed Church, Anglicans, and an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 Egyptian Coptic Christians. Religious leaders’ unofficial estimates of the total number of Christians in the country range from 20,000 to 200,000. Although numbers cannot be confirmed, some church leaders say foreign residents make up the majority of the Christian population. One Christian leader estimates his church has between 20,000 and 40,000 foreign members, compared to fewer than 100 citizen members. The proportion of students and immigrants without legal status from sub-Saharan Africa among the Christian population is also increasing. Christian leaders say citizens who are Christians predominantly belong to Protestant groups. Christians reside mostly in the cities of Algiers, Annaba, and Oran. The Protestant community has an evangelical wing, most of whose members live in the Kabylie region.

Legal Framework

The constitution declares Islam to be the state religion and prohibits state institutions from engaging in behavior incompatible with Islamic values. On February 7, parliament enacted amendments to the constitution, which included adding specific language providing for freedom of worship in accordance with the law. The new constitutional language reflected preexisting provisions in the law pertaining to freedom of worship. Prior to the amendments, the constitution only stated that freedom of conscience and freedom of opinion were inviolable. That language remains in the revised text.

While the law does not prohibit conversions from Islam, proselytizing of Muslims by non-Muslims is a criminal offense. The law prescribes a maximum punishment of one million dinars ($9,174) and five years’ imprisonment for anyone who “incites, constrains, or utilizes means of seduction tending to convert a Muslim to another religion; or by using to this end establishments of teaching, education, health, social, culture, training…or any financial means.” Making, storing, or distributing printed documents or audiovisual materials with the intent of “shaking the faith” of a Muslim is also illegal and subject to the same penalties.

The law criminalizes “offending the Prophet Muhammad” or any other prophets. The penal code provides a punishment of three to five years in prison and/or a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 dinars ($458 to $916) for denigrating the creed or prophets of Islam through writing, drawing, declaration, or any other means. The law also criminalizes insults to any other religion, with the same penalties.

The law grants all individuals the right to practice their religion as long as they respect public order and regulations.

The constitution establishes a High Islamic Council and states it shall encourage and promote ijtihad (the use of independent reasoning as a source of Islamic law for issues not precisely addressed in the Quran) and express opinions on religious questions presented for its review. The president appoints the members of the council and oversees its work. The constitution requires the council to submit regular reports to the president on its activities. A presidential decree further defines the council’s mission as taking responsibility for all questions related to Islam, for correcting mistaken perceptions, and for promoting the true fundamentals of the religion and a correct understanding of it. The council may issue fatwas at the request of the president.

The law requires any group, religious or otherwise, to register with the government as an association prior to conducting any activities. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) grants association status to religious groups; only registered associations are officially recognized. MOI’s registration requirements for national-level associations stipulate the founding members must furnish documents proving their identities, addresses, and other biographic details; furnish police and judicial records to prove their good standing in society; show they have founding members residing in at least one quarter of the country’s provinces to prove the association merits national standing; submit the association’s constitution signed by its president; and submit documents indicating the location of its headquarters. The law requires the ministry to provide a receipt for the application once it has received all the required documentation and to give a response to the application within 60 days of submission of the completed application. The law states applicants are de facto approved if the ministry fails to make a decision within the 60-day limit. The law grants the government full discretion in making registration decisions, but provides applicants an opportunity to appeal a denial to an administrative tribunal.

Registration applications of religious associations must be approved by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA). The law, however, does not specify additional requirements for religious associations or further specify the MRA’s role in the process. Religious groups may appeal an MRA denial to an administrative tribunal. For associations seeking to register at the local or provincial level, application requirements are similar, but the association’s membership and sphere of activity is strictly limited to the area in which it registers. An association registered at the wilaya (provincial) level is confined to a specific wilaya.

The National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups, a government entity, is responsible by law for facilitating the registration process for all non-Muslim groups. The MRA presides over the commission, composed of senior representatives of the Ministries of National Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, the presidency, the national police, the national gendarmerie, and the governmental National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (CNCPPDH).

The CNCPPDH monitors and evaluates human rights issues, including matters related to religious freedom. The law authorizes the agency to issue opinions and recommendations, to conduct awareness campaigns, and to work with other government authorities to address human rights issues. The agency may address concerns of individuals and groups who believe they are not being treated fairly by the MRA. The CNCPPDH does not have the authority to enforce its decisions. It submits an annual report to the president, who appoints the agency’s members.

The law specifies the manner and conditions under which religious services, Muslim or otherwise, may take place. The law states religious demonstrations are subject to regulation and the government may shut down any religious service taking place in private homes or in outdoor settings without official approval. With the exception of daily prayers, which are permissible anywhere, Islamic services may take place only in state-sanctioned mosques. Friday prayers are further limited to certain specified mosques. Non-Muslim religious services must only take place in buildings registered with the state for the exclusive purpose of religious practice, run by a registered religious association, open to the public, and marked as such on the exterior. A request for permission to observe special non-Muslim religious events must be submitted to the relevant wali (governor) at least five days before the event, and the event must occur in buildings accessible to the public. Requests must include information on three principal organizers of the event, its purpose, the number of attendees anticipated, a schedule of events, and its planned location. The organizers also must obtain a permit from the wali. The wali may request the organizers move the location of an event or deny permission for it to take place if he deems it would be a danger to public order or harm “national constants,” “good mores,” or symbols of the revolution. If unauthorized meetings go forward without approval, participants are subject to dispersal by the police. Failure to disperse at the behest of the police may result in arrest and a prison term of two to twelve months under the penal code.

The penal code states only government-authorized imams, whom the state hires and trains, may lead prayer in mosques and penalizes anyone other than a government-authorized imam who preaches in a mosque with fines of up to 100,000 dinars ($916) and prison sentences of one to three years. Fines as high as 200,000 dinars ($1,834) and prison sentences of three to five years are stipulated for any person, including government-authorized imams, who acts “against the noble nature of the mosque” or in a manner “likely to offend public cohesion.” The law states such acts include exploiting the mosque to achieve purely material or personal objectives or with a view to harming people or groups.

By law, the MRA provides financial support to mosques and pays the salaries of imams and religious personnel, as well as health care and retirement benefits. The law also provides for the payment of salaries and benefits to non-Muslim religious leaders who are citizens. The Ministry of Labor regulates the amount of an individual imam’s or mosque personnel’s pay, and likewise sets the salaries of citizen non-Muslim religious leaders based on their position within their individual churches.

The Ministries of Religious Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Commerce must approve the importation of non-Islamic religious writings, except those intended for personal use.

The law states the government must approve any modification of structures intended for non-Muslim collective worship.

Under the law, children born to a Muslim father are considered Muslim regardless of the mother’s religion.

The Ministries of National Education and Religious Affairs require, regulate, and fund the study of Islam in public schools. Religious education focuses on Islamic studies but includes information on Christianity and Judaism and is mandatory at the primary and secondary school levels. The Ministry of National Education requires private schools to adhere to curricula in line with national standards, particularly regarding the teaching of Islam and the use of Arabic as the primary language of instruction, or risk being closed.

The law states that discrimination on the basis of religion is prohibited and guarantees state protection for non-Muslims and for the “toleration and respect of different religions.” It does not prescribe penalties for religious discrimination.

The constitution prohibits non-Muslims from running for the presidency. Non-Muslims may hold other public offices and work within the government.

The family code prohibits Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim men unless the man converts to Islam. The code does not prohibit Muslim men from marrying Christian or Jewish women.

By law, individuals who have converted from Islam to another religion are ineligible to receive an inheritance via succession.

The law prohibits religious associations from receiving funding from political parties or foreign entities. The constitution prohibits the establishment of political parties based on religion.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Police arrested at least 83 Ahmadi Muslims in connection with the practice of their religion. A court sentenced a Christian convert arrested for insulting the Prophet Muhammad on Facebook to a three-year prison sentence. An appeals court ordered the release of a journalist previously sentenced to prison for insulting the Prophet Muhammad. Some Christian groups continued to report facing a range of administrative difficulties in the absence of a written government response to their requests for recognition as associations. In October the MRA issued two permits to import Bibles and other Christian religious materials. The government issued the import authorization in four months, compared with an 18-month wait for the previous request made in 2014. MRA officials, including the minister, continued to state publicly the government’s willingness to accommodate minority faiths who wished to practice in the country by opening places of worship. Christian leaders stated the lack of government responsiveness to visa applications continued to pose complications for religious workers.

On June 13, police arrested nine Ahmadi Muslims in Blida and charged them with operating an unauthorized religious organization, illegally collecting contributions, and printing books. On October 2, police arrested 18 members of the Ahmadi Muslim community in the wilaya of Skikda for conducting Friday prayers outside of an authorized place of worship. In November the media reported that 17 Ahmadi Muslims in Skikda were given suspended sentences of between one and six months in prison, while three others were acquitted. The media reported the arrest and subsequent release on provisional liberty of six Ahmadis in the wilaya of Ain Temouchent in November. The press also reported the arrest of six Ahmadis in the wilaya of M’sila on November 26 on charges of “harming national security” and holding unauthorized prayer services. At year’s end, it was unknown whether they were released. Press reports stated four Ahmadi Muslims were arrested for the unauthorized practice of religion and proselytization on December 19 in the wilaya of Relizane. Authorities continued to detain them at year’s end. On December 12, press outlets reported the arrest and subsequent release on provisional liberty of 40 Ahmadis in the wilaya of Setif. The status of charges against them was unknown at year’s end. In December Minister of Religious Affairs Mohamed Aissa stated the Ahmadi Islamic “sect” no longer existed in the country and that an effort must be made to bring youth who had been influenced by Ahmadi doctrine back to “our national religious beliefs.” Ministry officials said the Ahmadi community, along with other religious groups they described as “sects” such as the Bahai Faith, were not considered legitimate religious groups and would likely not receive permission to operate legally.

On July 31, police in Setif arrested Slimane Bouhafs, a Christian convert, for posting statements deemed offensive to the Prophet Muhammad on his Facebook page. A court sentenced him on August 7 to five years in prison and a fine of 100,000 dinars ($916). On September 6 his sentence was reduced to three years in prison. Bouhafs had reportedly posted altered verses from the Quran that satirized the Prophet Muhammad’s life. In July a court sentenced Christian convert Samir Chamek, to five years in prison for Facebook posts he made in 2015that the court found were offensive to the Prophet Muhammad. Christian media reported the Facebook post compared the Prophet Muhammad to Hitler and accused him of terrorism.

On June 14, the national gendarmerie published a press release saying it had “dismantled an international criminal network of blasphemers and anti-Muslim proselytizers on the internet.” News reports referenced the press release when they reported the arrests of Rachid Fodil and Daif Hichem in M’Sila Province for content on their Facebook page that the government said attacked the precepts of Islam and denigrated the Prophet Muhammad. Media reported in December Fodil was sentenced to five years in prison and a 20,000 dinar ($183) fine and Hichem to three years in prison and a 20,000 dinar ($183) fine.

Christian leaders reported two Protestants were arrested in Bejaia for transporting unauthorized religious literature. Additional details were unavailable.

In April an appeals court overturned the conviction of journalist Mohamed Chergui, who had been sentenced in 2015 to three years imprisonment and a fine of 200,000 dinars ($1,834) for insulting the Prophet Muhammad following charges filed by the newspaper which had employed him. Authorities promptly released Chergui, who had authored an article in mid-2014 about European research on “Quranic expressions,” which had prompted the newspaper to fire him and pursue a legal complaint.

Some appeals of criminal convictions remained unresolved for several years after the defendant’s conviction. An appeal hearing continued to be delayed for Abdelkrim Siaghi, a Christian convert sentenced to five years in prison in 2011 for offending the Prophet Muhammad.

While the government continued to maintain the right to prescreen and approve sermons before imams delivered them during Friday prayers, MRA officials said they rarely did so. The MRA said it sometimes provided preapproved sermon topics for Friday prayers to address the public’s concerns following major events, such as after a highly publicized child kidnapping, or when trying to raise awareness, such as on World AIDS Day.

According to information provided by MRA officials, if a ministry inspector suspected an imam’s sermon was inappropriate, the inspector had the authority to summon the imam to a “scientific council” composed of Islamic law scholars and other imams who assessed the sermon’s correctness. The government could decide to relieve an imam of duty if he was summoned multiple times. The government also monitored activities in mosques for possible security-related offenses and prohibited the use of mosques as public meeting places outside of regular prayer hours.

The government continued to enforce the ban on proselytizing by non-Muslim groups. Several Christian representatives stated continued government observance of the ordinance against proselytizing by non-Muslims prompted churches to restrict some activities not related to proselytizing, such as the distribution of religious literature and holding of events in the local community that Muslims might attend.

Christian leaders said authorities in March threatened two house churches in the Kabylie region with closure. The churches remained open as of the end of the year. There were no reported cases of government prosecution of Christian citizens belonging to unregistered religious groups, who continued to meet in unofficial “house churches,” which were often homes or businesses of church members. Christian leaders said the authorities generally did not prosecute practitioners as long as house churches respected public order. Some of these groups met openly, while others held worship services more discreetly. These groups were most frequently reported in the Kabylie region. MRA officials said they privately urged such groups to come forward and operate in the open, saying the country tolerated religious minorities.

Christian leaders reported being able to visit Christians, most of whom were migrants, in prison.

Several religious groups that had been registered under the previous associations law prior to 2012 continued to try to reregister with the government. In November the MOI told the Protestant Church of Algeria, which had submitted a registration application in 2013, it considered that application incomplete. The Church submitted supplemental documentation in December. It was awaiting an MOI response at year’s end.

The Seventh-day Adventist and Reformed Churches were uncertain as to the status of registration applications they had pending with the government at year’s end.

According to the MOI, although religious associations were de facto registered if the ministry did not reject their application within 60 days of its submission, the 60-day clock did not begin until the ministry considered the application complete and had issued a receipt to that effect. NGOs and religious leaders said the MOI routinely failed to provide them with a receipt proving they had submitted a completed registration application.

Some religious groups viewed themselves as de facto registered after 60 days. Religious groups stated that even if they considered themselves de facto registered under the 60-day rule, service providers, such as utilities and banks, insisted on proof of registration. As a result, without official papers affirming their status, these groups still faced the same administrative constraints as unregistered associations.

MRA officials stated the delay in approvals had arisen because the government had hoped to issue a refinement of the law, specifically to address religious associations. The MRA stated it had never rejected a registration application for a religious group.

Members of Christian religious groups waiting for a ministry response to their applications reported there continued to be no government interference with their holding religious services, but said they continued to face administrative and bureaucratic difficulties because of their lack of documented registered status. They reported problems including a lack of standing to pursue legal complaints, an inability to open bank accounts or establish related charitable activities, and difficulty managing church billing accounts without documented standing as an association. Most Christian leaders stated they had had no contact with the National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups, despite its legal mandate to work with them on registration, since its establishment in 2006. Christian leaders stated some Protestant groups continued to avoid applying for recognition and instead operated discreetly because they lacked confidence in the registration process.

MRA officials said Muslim associations remained equally burdened under the registration process because the opening of every new mosque required the formation of an association under the law. Government officials stated the law was designed to apply the same constraints on non-Muslims as on Muslims, including ensuring the compliance of religious rites with the law and respect for public order, morality, and the rights and basic freedoms of others.

According to some Christian leaders, individuals and groups who believed the MRA was not treating them fairly rarely addressed their concerns to the CNCPPDH, which was viewed as having limited authority. The MRA said it instructed employees of the agencies making up the National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups to fairly enforce the ordinance which prohibited religious discrimination, and it prohibited its employees from manipulating application of the law based on the employees’ own beliefs.

According to the MRA, the government continued to allow government employees to wear religious clothing including the hijab, crosses, and the niqab. Authorities continued to instruct some female government employees, such as security forces, not to wear head and face coverings that could complicate the performance of their official duties.

In October the government granted two permits, after a four month delay, for the importation of Christian religious texts to one authorized organization, which had sole standing to import Bibles on behalf of all Christian entities in the country. Christian leaders said they viewed the waiting period as an improvement over the 18-month delay in approving the previous request made in 2014. Non-Islamic religious texts, music, and video media continued to be available on the informal market, and stores and vendors in the capital sold Bibles in several languages, including Arabic, French, and Tamazight. The government enforced its prohibition on dissemination of any literature portraying violence as a legitimate precept of Islam.

The government, along with private contributions from local Muslims, continued to fund mosque construction. The government and public and private companies also funded the preservation of some churches, particularly those of historical importance. The province of Oran, for example, continued to work in partnership with local donors on an extensive renovation of Notre-Dame de Santa Cruz as part of its cultural patrimony.

MRA officials restated the government’s willingness to respond to a request to open a synagogue, while saying Jewish religious authorities did not believe there was a large enough Jewish community to require a synagogue. A ministry official said the ministry would be equally willing to open any other religious place of worship at the request of a minority population, but had received no such requests.

Christian leaders said when Christian converts died family members sometimes buried them according to Muslim rites, and the church had no standing to intervene on their behalf. Christian groups reported some villages continued not to permit Christians to be buried alongside Muslims. The government stated people whose lifestyle gave the impression they were non-Muslims were buried in Muslim cemeteries on the basis of their family’s testimonies. A ministry official stated that, where burial grounds were private, the cases were outside of the government’s domain.

Christians reported they continued to encounter refusals or delays when seeking government authorization to give Biblical names to their children, but said a second request following a refusal typically led to approval. The MRA stated similar delays sometimes occurred with other names which were uncommon locally, and attributed delays in approving Biblical names to overzealous local officials, who were unfamiliar with the proposed names and required additional time to seek higher-level approval.

The government did not always enforce the family code prohibition against Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men.

Government owned radio stations continued to broadcast Christmas and Easter services in French, although many Christians said they would prefer services to be broadcast in Arabic or Tamazight.

In May a member of parliament affiliated with the Green Alliance, a coalition of three Islamist political parties that represented a segment of the parliamentary opposition, criticized the government for granting a visa to an Israeli journalist accompanying the French prime minister on an April visit to Algeria. An Arabic language newspaper stated that, in the member of parliament’s view, the government was normalizing relations with “Zionists who make France a door to infiltrate” the country.

Government officials continued to invite leading Christian citizens to events celebrating national occasions, such as the November 1 commemoration of the revolution, according them the same status as Muslim, cultural, and national figures.

MRA representatives, in particular the minister, continued to make public statements warning against the spread of “extremist” Salafism, Wahhabism, Shia Islam, Ahmadi Islam, and the Bahai Faith. For example, in a radio interview in October, Minister Aissa stated, “We are living through a [religious] sectarian invasion.” In June he said “Neither Ahmadism, Shiism, Wahhabism, nor other sects are the products of Algerians.”

Senior government officials publicly condemned acts of violence committed in the name of Islam by nonstate actors, and urged all members of society to reject extremist behavior. At an April 19 seminar, Minister Aissa called on imams to “indefatigably fight” extremist doctrines, which he characterized as “contrary to the values and principles of Algeria.” In response to terrorist attacks in other countries during the year, including in the United States, Mali, France, Libya, and Turkey, the government issued statements calling the attacks “criminal acts” for taking innocent human lives in contradiction to the tenets of Islam.

Government officials regularly made statements about the need for tolerance of non-Islamic religious groups. In remarks at an international conference on Sufism on May 18, the Inspector General of the Ministry of Religious Affairs praised Sufism for providing “a radiant image of the Muslim religion based on tolerance, open-mindedness, and the illumination and acceptance of the other.” On December 28, Minister of Religious Affairs Aissa said, “We do not criticize Christians who celebrate the birth of Jesus Christ, may God’s peace be upon him. It is their culture.” In November, a member of the Council of the Nation, the upper house of parliament, spoke at a conference on tolerance in Beirut on behalf of the Council, saying, “Integrated into the society and solidified at the legal, political, cultural, and religious levels, [Algeria’s Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation] seeks to eliminate all forms of conflict, fanaticism, and discrimination and to establish peace, security, stability, and coexistence.” During Ramadan, the government continued to dedicate numerous media programs to promoting interfaith tolerance, a message the government instructed imams to amplify in their sermons.

Church groups continued to report government delays in responding to the visa applications of religious workers; they said the government often provided no response rather than a documented refusal. Both Catholic and Protestant groups continued to identify the delays as a significant hindrance to religious practice. One religious leader identified lack of visa issuances as a major impediment to maintaining contact with the church’s international organization. The government typically continued to grant short-stay tourist visas and some cultural work visas, rather than the requested long-term work visas; religious leaders reported recipients of these visas were concerned about their legal status when working with churches while on tourist visas. Higher-level intervention with the officials responsible for visa issuance by senior MRA and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials at the request of religious groups often resulted in the issuance of long-term visas, according to religious groups.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, a U.S. government-designated terrorist organization, continued to operate in the country, stating the government was an “apostate regime.” The group claimed credit for a March 18 attack on a gas plant in Krechba. The Jund al-Khilafa group, which has sworn allegiance to ISIS and also is a U.S. government-designated terrorist organization, claimed responsibility for killing a police officer in the city of Constantine in October and continued to call for violence against those who disagreed with its interpretation of Islam.

Several Christian leaders reported instances where citizens who converted, or who expressed interest in learning more about Christianity, were assaulted by family members, or otherwise pressured to recant their conversion.

Some Muslim citizens who converted to Christianity reported they and others in their communities continued to keep a low profile due to their concern for their personal safety and the potential for legal, familial, career, and social problems. Other Muslim citizens who converted to Christianity continued to practice their new religion openly, however, according to members of the Christian community.

Christian leaders continued to report cases in which Muslim parents successfully pressured their Muslim children to divorce their Christian spouses.

Some Christian parents reported their children were reprimanded in school for openness about their religion.

The media criticized religious communities it portrayed as “sects” or “deviations” from Islam or as “foreign,” such as Ahmadis, Shia, Ismailis, and Bahais. In October a privately owned TV channel with national coverage aired a program asserting the Ahmadiyya “sect” was more dangerous than criminal gangs. Among those who openly practiced any religion other than Sunni Islam, many reported that family, neighbors, or members of the general population criticized their choice to practice such a religion, harassed them to convert, and occasionally, insinuated they could be in danger because of their choice.

There were reports that some non-Muslims concealed their religious affiliation in the workplace for fear of losing their jobs.

In January following media reports that foreign embassies were under investigation for spreading Shia Islam, youth in Biskra organized a public awareness campaign warning against the spread of the Shia faith. They reportedly distributed leaflets which described Shia Islam as “invading” the country.

Both private and state run media produced reports throughout the year examining the supposed foreign ties and dangers of religious groups such as Shia, Ahmadis, and Salafists. For example, following the arrests of Ahmadi Muslims in Skikda in October, the private Ennahar television channel aired a program that featured interviews with a professor, an imam, and a scholar of Islam about what they described as the dangers of the Ahmadi faith. The program did not feature opposing viewpoints defending the Ahmadis.

Jewish citizens said they continued to try to keep their religious identity private, while otherwise engaging with society. After an Israeli journalist was granted a visa to visit Algeria in May, an Arabic-language newspaper wrote that the journalist had a “strong, Jewish-sounding name,” and an online news outlet referred to the journalist as an “Israeli Jew,” adding that the government-issued visa allowed him to “strut in the streets of Algiers to meet whoever he wants.”

Some Muslims continued to show an interest in Catholic places of worship, including visiting them for prayer; Catholics reported the interest was because Catholic religious figures, such as the Virgin Mary, were mentioned in the Quran. In some areas of major cities, observers reported shops sold Christmas trees and decorations.

One church reported local youths attempted to trespass onto its grounds to commit vandalism; the church said local security forces were supportive and subsequently boosted security around the site. Other Christian leaders said they had good relations with Muslims in the country, but reported that residents in the churches’ neighborhoods, including children, sometimes threw objects or shouted insults at church staff on days when services were held.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy officers met with government officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Religious Affairs to discuss the difficulties Christian and other religious minority groups faced in registering as associations, in importing religious materials, and in obtaining visas. Embassy officers also addressed the government’s stance toward minority Muslim communities.

The Ambassador and other embassy officers met throughout the year with government-affiliated and independent religious leaders, and representatives of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities to discuss interreligious dialogue and tolerance, and in the case of religious minorities, their rights and status.

The embassy sponsored the visit of a U.S. citizen Muslim writer and scholar to Algiers and Oran to engage youth in discussions of religious freedom and tolerance.

The embassy discussed the practice of religion, its intersection with politics, and the religious and political roles of women with Islamist political parties and Islamic political figures, as well as with the Muslim Scholars Association. The embassy sponsored visits of several Muslim scholars, a representative of a Sufi order, and members of Islamist political parties to the United States and to U.S. government-funded international conferences on countering violent extremism and promoting religious moderation and tolerance. During a September visit, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor met with several officials from the Ministry of Religious Affairs to stress the importance of religious tolerance and freedom of worship.

During Ramadan, the Ambassador and embassy staff filmed messages in support of religious pluralism in the country and shared examples of pluralism and religious tolerance on social media. The Ambassador and other embassy staff hosted several iftars, which featured discussions emphasizing the theme of religious tolerance. Embassy staff and embassy-sponsored U.S. speakers also addressed these themes in discussions with youth.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 86,000 (July 2016 estimate). There are no statistics on the size of religious groups or census data on religious group membership. The majority of the population is Roman Catholic. Smaller religious groups include Muslims, Hindus, Jews, Anglicans, Seventh-day Adventists, Bahais, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church), the New Apostolic Church, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Muslim community, of which the large majority is immigrant, has grown in recent years. Muslim leaders estimate the community has 800-2,000 members. The Jewish community reports it has approximately 100 members.

Legal Framework

The constitution “guarantees freedom of ideas, religion, and cult.” It prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion and stipulates no one shall be required to disclose his or her religion or beliefs. The constitution states such freedoms may be limited only to protect public safety, order, health, or morals as prescribed by law or to protect the rights of others. The constitution acknowledges a special relationship with the Catholic Church “in accordance with Andorran tradition” and recognizes the “full legal capacity” of the bodies of the Catholic Church, granting them legal status “in accordance with their own rules.” One of two constitutionally designated princes of the country (who serves equally as joint head of state with the other prince, the President of France) is the Catholic Bishop of Urgell, Joan Enric Vives i Sicilia, whose diocese in Spain includes Andorra.

Faiths other than Catholicism do not have legal status as religious groups. The government registers religious communities as cultural organizations under the law of associations, which does not specifically mention religious groups. To build a place of worship or seek government financial support for community activities, a religious group must register as a nonprofit cultural organization and acquire legal status. To register, a group must provide its statutes and foundational agreement, a statement certifying the names of persons appointed to the board or other official positions in the organization, and a patrimony declaration that identifies the inheritance or endowment of the organization. A consolidated register of associations records all types of associations, including religious groups. The law governing the issuance of official documents such as residence permits, passports, and driver’s licenses, requires individuals to appear and be photographed with their heads uncovered.

According to the law, municipalities are responsible for the construction, preservation, and administration of cemeteries and funerary services.

In August the government approved a regulation on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing. Halal slaughter is permitted so long as it takes place under the supervision of the veterinary services of the country’s slaughterhouse.

Instruction in the Catholic faith is optional in public schools. The Catholic Church provides teachers for religion classes, and the government pays their salaries. The Ministry of Education also provides space in the public schools where the religion classes are taught.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Catholic Church continued to receive special privileges not available to other religious groups. The government paid the salaries of the eight Catholic priests serving in local churches and granted all foreign Catholic priests citizenship for as long as they exercised their functions in the country.

In September the government held initial meetings with the Jewish and Muslim communities to discuss the possible construction of a cemetery where they could conduct burials in accordance with their religious beliefs and customs. Although these communities could bury their dead in existing cemeteries, municipalities did not allocate separate burial areas in those cemeteries, or land for separate cemeteries, for use by the Jewish and Muslim communities. As a result, these communities generally buried their dead outside the country. The Jewish community, for example, used cemeteries in Toulouse, France, and Barcelona, Spain. The Muslim community tended to use cemeteries in Toulouse, France, or repatriate its dead and bury them in their countries of origin.

According to the prosecutor’s office, a 2014 assault by two individuals of a Jew outside of a discotheque in the city of La Massana remained under investigation.

The government continued to fund three Catholic schools at the primary and secondary level.

Foreigners performing religious functions for religious groups other than the Catholic Church could not obtain religious working permits because the law did not define what constituted a “religious worker.” These workers had to enter the country under a different status. Foreign religious workers could enter the country with permits for other positions such as schoolteachers or business workers and were able to carry out religious work without hindrance.

Members of the Muslim community again raised concerns that individuals wearing head coverings for religious reasons could not remain covered in photographs for official documents.

There continued to be no mosque in the country, but there were two Muslim prayer rooms. The Catholic Church of Santa Maria del Fener in Andorra la Vella lent its sanctuary twice a month to the Anglican community so that visiting Anglican clergy could conduct services for the English-speaking community.

The Muslim community processed halal products locally throughout the year. The Jewish community continued to import kosher products, as it was too small to produce them locally.

During periodic visits, the U.S. Ambassador to Spain, who is accredited to the country, and the Consul General and other officials from the U.S. Consulate General in Barcelona discussed concerns about the lack of cemeteries for the Jewish and Muslim communities with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior and Justice officials. The officials stated they were exploring the possibility of building cemeteries for those communities.

Embassy officials met with representatives of the Jewish and Muslim communities to discuss issues such as the lack of legal status as religious groups for faiths other than Catholicism, the implications of regulations requiring individuals to remove head coverings for official identity documents, and the lack of cemeteries for the Jewish and Muslim communities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 94,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, 17.6 percent of the population is Anglican, 12.4 percent Seventh-day Adventist, 12.2 percent Pentecostal, 8.3 percent Moravian, 8.2 percent Roman Catholic, and 5.6 percent Methodist. Those having unspecified or no religious beliefs account for 5.5 percent and 5.9 percent of the population, respectively. Members of the Baptist Church, the Church of God, and the Wesleyan Holiness Consortium each account for less than 5 percent. The census categorizes an additional 12.2 percent of the population as belonging to other religious groups, including Rastafarians, Muslims, Hindus, and Bahais.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of worship as well as the right to change and practice the religion of one’s choosing. The constitution protects individuals from taking oaths contradictory to their beliefs or participating in events and activities of religions not their own, including participating in or receiving unwanted religious education. These freedoms may be limited in the interests of defense or public safety, order, morality or health, or to protect the rights of others, unless actions under such limitations can be shown “not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.” The constitution prohibits members of the clergy from running for elected office. No law may be adopted that contradicts these constitutional provisions. The law that outlaws blasphemous language is not enforced.

In order to receive tax and duty-free concessions and to own, build, or renovate property, religious groups must register with the government. To register, religious groups must fill out an online tax form which determines the group’s activities and the corresponding taxes. The completed form is submitted to the Inland Revenue Department for review and approval. Registration and tax statuses are routinely granted.

Public schools do not allow religious instruction. Private religious schools may provide religious instruction.

The law prohibits the use of marijuana, including for religious purposes.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Caribbean Rastafari Organization (CRO) said the government’s prohibition of marijuana restricted the practice of their religious rights because marijuana was integral to their religious rituals. The CRO said Rastafarians disagreed with the public school requirement that children be vaccinated, which it stated was against the religious beliefs of Rastafarians. The organizations also said the requirement to remove head coverings for passport photos and at security checkpoints was an infringement of Rastafarians’ religious rights. Members of religious groups were permitted to wear their head coverings for passport photos if they provided a letter from their religious organization verifying membership.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy officers engaged various government officials on religious freedom. Embassy officers also met with members of nongovernmental organizations, religious leaders, including leaders of minority religious groups, and the head of the Christian Council to discuss religious freedom issues.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 156.2 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 census, the latest available, Sunni Muslims constitute 90 percent of the total population, and Hindus 9.5 percent. The remainder of the population is predominantly Christian (mostly Roman Catholic) and Theravada-Hinayana Buddhist. There are also small numbers of Shia Muslims, Bahais, animists, Ahmadi Muslims, agnostics, and atheists. Many of these communities estimate their numbers at between a few thousand and 100,000 adherents. Many ethnic minorities practice minority religions and are concentrated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and northern districts. For example, the Garo in Mymensingh are predominantly Christian as are the Santal in Gaibandha. Most Buddhists are members of the indigenous (non-Bengali) populations of the CHT. Bengali and ethnic minority Christians live in communities across the country, with relatively high concentrations in Barisal City, Gournadi in Barisal District, Baniarchar in Gopalganj, Monipuripara, and Christianpara in Dhaka city, Nagori in Gazipur and Khulna city.

The largest noncitizen population consists of Rohingya Muslims. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, there are 32, 967 Rohingya refugees from Burma registered in the country residing in one of two official refugee camps within Cox’s Bazar district. The International Organization for Migration estimates another 200,000 to 500,000 unregistered Rohingya from Burma are in the southeast in Cox’s Bazar district. As many as 90,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh following violence in Rakhine State in October.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, “the state religion of the Republic is Islam, but the State shall ensure equal status and equal rights in the practice of the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and other religions.” The constitution also stipulates the state shall uphold secularism by not granting political status in favor of any religion and by prohibiting the abuse of religion for political purposes and discrimination or persecution of persons practicing any religion. It also provides for the right to profess, practice, or propagate all religions “subject to law, public order, and morality,” and states religious communities or denominations have the right to establish, maintain, and manage their religious institutions. The constitution stipulates no one attending any educational institution shall be required to receive instruction in, or participate in ceremonies or worship pertaining to, a religion to which he or she does not belong.

Under the penal code, statements or acts made with a “deliberate and malicious” intent to insult religious sentiments are subject to fines of up to two years in prison. Although the code does not define “intent to insult religious sentiments,” the courts have interpreted it to include insulting the Prophet Muhammad. The criminal code allows the government to confiscate all copies of any newspaper, magazine, or other publication containing language that “creates enmity and hatred among the citizens or denigrates religious beliefs.” The law applies similar restrictions to online publications.

The constitution limits freedom of association in instances where an association is formed for the purpose of destroying religious harmony or creating discrimination on religious grounds among citizens.

There is no registration requirement for individual houses of worship, but religious groups that wish to form associations with multiple houses of worship are required to register with either the NGO Affairs Bureau if they receive foreign assistance for development projects, or the Ministry of Social Welfare if they do not. Parliament enacted a new law in October further regulating institutions that receive foreign funding. The law places restrictions on the receipt of foreign funds by NGOs, including religious organizations. The act requires the NGO Affairs Bureau to approve and monitor all projects. The director general has the authority to impose sanctions on NGOs for violating the law, including fines of up to three times the amount of the foreign donation or closure of the NGO. NGOs are also subject to penalties for “derogatory” comments about the constitution or constitutional institutions (i.e. the government). Expatriate staff must receive a security clearance from the National Security Intelligence Agency, the Special Branch of the police, and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence.

The registration requirement and procedures are the same as for secular associations. The requirements to register with the Ministry of Social Welfare include submission of certification that the name being registered is not taken; provision of the bylaws/constitution of the organization; a security clearance for leaders of the organization from the country’s intelligence agency; minutes of the meeting appointing the executive committee; a list of all executive committee and general members and photographs of principal officers; a work plan; a copy of the deed or lease of the organization’s office and a list of property owned; a budget; and a recommendation by a local government representative. Requirements to register with the NGO Affairs Bureau are still in flux, but they are expected to be similar.

Family law concerning marriage, divorce, and adoption has separate provisions for Muslims, Hindus, and Christians. These laws are enforced in the same secular courts. There is a separate civil family law for mixed faith families or those of other faiths or no faith. The family law of the religion of the two parties concerned governs their marriage rituals and proceedings. A Muslim man may have as many as four wives although he must obtain the written consent of his existing wife or wives before marrying again. A Christian man may marry only one woman. Under Hindu law, men may have multiple wives, but there are officially no options for divorce. Women may not inherit property under Hindu law. Buddhists are covered under Hindu law and divorced Hindus and Buddhists may not legally remarry. Divorced men and women of other religions and widowed individuals of any religion may remarry. Marriage between members of different religious groups is allowed and occurs under civil law. To be legally recognized, Muslim marriages must be registered with the state by either the couple or the cleric performing the marriage, but many are not. Registration for Hindus is optional, and other faiths may determine their own guidelines.

Under the Muslim family ordinance, a widow receives one eighth of her husband’s estate, and the remainder is divided among the children with each female child receiving half the share of each male child. Wives have fewer divorce rights than husbands. Courts must approve divorces and the law requires a Muslim man to pay a former wife three months of alimony, but these protections generally apply only to registered marriages; unregistered marriages are by definition undocumented and difficult to substantiate. In addition, authorities do not always enforce the alimony requirement even in cases involving registered marriages.

Alternative dispute resolution is available to all citizens, including Muslims, for settling family arguments and other civil matters not related to land ownership. With the consent of both parties, lawyers may be identified to facilitate the arbitration, the results of which may be used in court.

Fatwas may be issued only by Muslim religious scholars, and not by local religious leaders, to settle matters of religious practice. Fatwas may not be invoked to justify meting out punishment, nor may they supersede existing secular law.

Religious studies are compulsory and part of the curriculum for grades three through 10 in all government-accredited schools. Private schools do not have this requirement. Students receive instruction in their own religious beliefs from teachers provided by the government although the teachers are not always adherents of the students’ faith.

The code regulating prisons allows for observance of religious commemorations for prisoners, including access to extra food on feast days or permission to fast for religious reasons. The law does not guarantee prisoners regular access to clergy or regular religious services, but prison authorities may arrange special religious programs for them. Prison authorities are required to provide prisoners facing the death penalty access to a religious figure from a religion of their choice before execution.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government arrested suspects in the killings of several secular bloggers who reportedly “offended Islam.” On July 20, five men were charged in Oyasiqur Rahman’s March 2015 killing and their trial began on August 4. Three of the suspects remained in custody, including Akram Hossain Hasib (also known as Boro Bhai), while the other two were released on bail. Police also arrested Patwary, a suspect in the killing of Ahmedur Rashid Tutul, and Moinul Islam Shamim, a suspect in the killing of Bangladeshi American writer Faisal Arefin Deepan, on June 15 and August 24, respectively. Shariful Islam Shihab, a suspect in the killing of Avijit Roy, was killed during a “gunfight” with police on June 19, although human rights organizations stated that this and other gunfights with police were in fact extrajudicial killings. Police offered monetary rewards for leads in the secular blogger killings, which led to the May 19 arrest of two members of the militant group Ansarullah Bangla Team who were suspected to have links to the attacks.

Religious minority communities such as Hindus and Christians, who are often also ethnic minorities, reported the government continued to displace them, by force if necessary, because of land ownership disputes that disproportionately affected them. According to religious associations, such disputes continued to occur in areas near new roads or industrial development zones, where land prices had recently increased. They also stated local police, civil authorities, and political leaders sometimes enabled property appropriation for financial gain or shielded politically influential property appropriators from prosecution. Some human rights groups attributed the lack of resolution of these disputes to the ineffectiveness of the judicial and land registry systems and to the lack of political and financial clout of the targeted religious communities rather than to government policy disfavoring religious or ethnic minorities.

On November 6, police in Gaibandha fired on Santal tribal people, most of whom were Christian, who were trying to occupy land the government had acquired in 1962 to grow sugarcane for a sugar mill. The Santal people used bows and arrows to fight the police and former mill employees. Three Santal people were killed and 25 were injured in the altercation. In May the media reported that the district administration of Moulvibazar in the northeast issued a notice to 700 mostly Catholic indigenous Khasia people to move from their ancestral lands and accused them of illegally occupying 60 hectares (150 acres) of government property and running betel leaf plantations. Tribal activists stated the district administration was acting in support of the Nahar Tea Estate, a company which had been trying to expand into the property since 2007. Tribal activists continued to fight the order at the year’s end.

In August the media reported Aktar Hossain, a local council member in Rangpur, directed a local woman and man be punished for an “extramarital affair” that occurred when the man broke into the woman’s house while her husband was gone. Without hearing testimony from the woman, council members determined her husband should cane her 101 times before 400 assembled villagers while the council member should cane the man 20 times. In the same month, the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development, and Cooperatives stated it ordered district commissioners to mandate local councils prevent village leaders from using fatwas to punish villagers extrajudicially.

The government continued to provide law enforcement personnel at religious sites, festivals, and events considered targets for violence. The government also provided additional security at the Hindu festival of Durga Puja, Christmas, Easter, the Buddhist festival of Buddha Purnima, and the Bengali New Year or Pohela Boishakh.

Although most mosques were independent of the state, the government continued to provide guidance to imams throughout the country on some aspects of the content of their sermons. Following well publicized terrorist attacks on the Holey Artisan Bakery and the Sholakia Eid prayer grounds in July, the government-funded Islamic Foundation issued a sermon denouncing militancy, and suggested imams use it during Friday afternoon prayers. After a backlash from imams against government interference, the Islamic Foundation issued key passages from the Quran, which it suggested imams highlight. A prominent government-aligned cleric issued a religious edict denouncing militancy, which more than 100,000 imams reportedly signed but which many nongovernment-aligned imams rejected.

As part of its antimilitancy drive, the government pledged in July to monitor the sermons of the country’s more than 250,000 mosques for provocative messaging using the Islamic Foundation’s 1,400 regular staff, civil servants, law enforcement authorities, and the general public. The government could appoint and remove imams and had a strong influence over sermon content at the state-run National Mosque in Dhaka. Religious community leaders said imams in all mosques usually avoided sermons that contradicted government policy.

The government prohibited transmission of India-based Islamic televangelist Zakir Naik’s Peace TV Bangla, which it stated spread extremist ideologies, and closed “peace schools” affiliated with his teachings. According to civil society organizations, the government overreached in its efforts to ban Peace TV Bangla and could have allowed the locally produced programs featured on the channel to air, even if they wanted to censor Zakir Naik’s show.

On May 4, Minister of Information Hasanul Haque Inu announced the implementation of a media monitoring cell, which he stated would follow media and blogs that write negatively about Hindu, Muslim, and other religious beliefs, which he said contributed to theist-atheist divisions in the country. Activists stated the government Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission took steps in May to block the popular online blog platform somewhereinblog, a site used in the past by secular bloggers.

Following attacks against bloggers whom militants accused of offending Islam, Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan stated bloggers “should control their writing…people should be careful not to hurt anyone by writing anything” that might hurt “any religion, any people’s beliefs, and religious leaders.” Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed stated “It’s not at all acceptable if anyone writes against our prophet or other religions.”

The government again did not adjudicate any of the more than one million pending restitution cases involving land seized from Hindus who left Bangladesh before the nation’s independence and were characterized as enemies of the state at that time. The cases have remained pending since a 2011 law allowed the prior owners of the land to appeal the seizures.

Religious minorities said minority students sometimes were not able to enroll in religion classes of their faith because of a lack of minority teachers for mandatory religious education classes. In these cases, school officials generally allowed for arrangements with local religious institutions, parents, or others to hold religious studies classes for such students outside of school hours and sometimes exempted the students from the religious education requirement.

Civil society groups, including Manusher Jonno Foundation (MJF), Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), Bangladesh Mahila Parishad, and Banchte Shekha criticized the government for maintaining restrictive laws with regard to Hindu marriage and divorce. A survey conducted during the year by Research Initiatives in Bangladesh and MJF showed that 26.7 percent of Hindu men and 29.2 percent of Hindu women would like to obtain a divorce but did not do so because of existing laws.

The government provided the Islamic Foundation, administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, with 3.5 billion taka ($44.3 million) in 2015, the latest figures available, from a line item in the government budget for activities relating to promoting the values and ideals of Islam, including religious education and provision of training for imams. The government also provided grants in aid to 2,134 Muslim institutions amounting to 185.49 million taka ($2.3 million). In 2016, the government worked with representatives from three trusts intended to benefit minority religious groups: the Hindu Welfare Trust (with assets of 205 million taka, $2.6 million), the Christian Religious Welfare Trust (assets of 50 million taka, $633,000), and the Buddhist Welfare Trust (assets of 70 million taka, $886,000). The three trusts were managed by trustees who were members of their respective religious communities and used interest from their assets to fund temple, church, and monastery development and repairs.

During the year, the Hindu and Buddhist trusts received support from the government for religious education. In addition, the Hindu Welfare Trust received from the government payment for staff salaries. Also, 1,173 Hindu institutions received 41.95 million taka ($531,000) from parliament from the revenue budget for temple development and a 15 million taka ($190,000) donation from the prime minister to celebrate Durja Puja. One hundred and forty six Buddhist institutions received 4.13 million taka ($52,300) for temple development and repairs and the Buddhist Welfare Trust received 5 million taka ($63,300) from the prime minister to celebrate religious festivals.

Fifteen Christian institutions received 3.15 million taka ($39,900) from the government for church upkeep and repair. The Christian Religious Welfare Trust did not apply for additional special grants from the government. Minority religious leaders continued to state the government did not fund the trusts on an equal basis with the Islamic Foundation. They reported the foundation received yearly allocations of funds from the state budget while the trusts had to rely on income generated from government contributions to their capital funds.

The president continued to host receptions to commemorate each of the principal Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian holidays.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Extremist groups, many claiming to be affiliated with ISIS or al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), attacked religious minorities. Assailants used machetes in most of the attacks. The majority of attacks targeted members of the Hindu community. Ten Hindus, including priests, temple workers, teachers, and businesspeople, were killed in 10 separate attacks between February and July, compared to three attacks resulting in one death in 2015. ISIS claimed responsibility for seven of the attacks.

On July 1, five militants killed 24 people, most of them non-Muslims, at the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka. Assailants reportedly targeted non-Muslims and asked some hostages to recite verses from the Quran. The media reported the attackers tortured some of the hostages and killed them with machetes. Military forces killed the five attackers during a rescue operation. In August police killed Tamim Ahmed Chowdhury, one of the suspected organizers of the attack and captured or killed other suspected collaborators during a series of raids in the second half of 2016. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, but the government stated the perpetrators belonged to an offshoot of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, to which it referred as the Neo JMB.

There were also attacks directed against Muslims. On July 7, ISIS claimed responsibility for a bomb blast and gun battle near the site of a mass Eid al-Fitr prayer in Sholakia in which four people were killed and seven wounded.

ISIS claimed responsibility for the killing of two people who converted from Islam to Christianity. In the first incident on January 7, Chhamir Uddin Mandal, an 85-year-old homeopathic doctor, was found in his office in Jhenaidah with stab wounds to the chest. In the second incident on March 22, Hussein Ali Sarkar, also a Christian convert, was hacked to death in Kuringram.

ISIS also claimed the June 30 killing using machetes of Buddhist farmer and local Awami League leader, Mong Shwe Lung Marma, in the Bandarban area.

ISIS claimed responsibility for the killing of Christian grocer, Sunil Gomez, in Baraigram on June 5.

ISIS claimed responsibility for a May 20 attack in which homeopathic doctor and Baul enthusiast (a disappearing style of folk song often performed by followers of Sufism) Sanaur Rahman and friend Saif uz Zaman were riding on a motorcycle when they were attacked by at least three men, also riding motorcycles. Rahman was killed while Zaman, a university professor, was seriously wounded. The attack took place in Kushtia in Khulna District.

ISIS claimed responsibility for killing an elderly Buddhist monk, Mong Shu You Chak, on May 14 in his monastery in Bandarban district.

On April 23, Professor Rezaul Karim Siddique was killed on his way to work in Rajshahi. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack and stated Siddique was killed for “calling others to atheism.” Siddique was reportedly Muslim and had founded a music school and was editor of a literary magazine – activities ISIS conflated with “atheism.”

On April 6, attackers claiming affiliation with AQIS used machetes to kill Nazimuddin Samad, a graduate law student at Jagannath University, whom they accused of “abusing God, the Prophet Muhammad, and Islam.” In February an unknown group released a list of bloggers to target. On April 13, AQIS released a video online claiming responsibility for past blogger killings and calling for “killing all those who slander and insult Prophet Muhammad.”

ISIS also claimed responsibility for the killing of a Shia preacher, Hadith Abdur Razzak, who was stabbed to death in Jhenaidah on March 14.

ISIS news agency Amaq claimed responsibility for an August 23 machete attack on a Hindu grocer, Chittaranjan Arjya, in Narsingdi District. Arjya survived the attack. He was a patron of Kali Temple, located next to his store.

Communal violence involving minority religious groups continued to result in deaths, injuries, and damage to property. Land disputes at times disproportionately affected religious minorities, particularly the Hindu community. Members of religious minorities also stated they experienced continued discrimination in employment and housing. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

According to the human rights NGO ASK, attacks targeting Hindus or their property during the year killed seven persons and injured 67, compared to none killed and 60 injured in 2015. Attackers destroyed 197 statues, monasteries, or temples compared to 213 in 2015; and destroyed 192 homes and 2 businesses compared to 104 homes and six businesses in 2015. The motivation for these incidents was often unclear.

On February 21, attackers in Panchagarh slit the throat of Jogeshwar Das Adhikari, a Hindu priest, and he was reported dead. The attackers reportedly threw homemade bombs as they escaped on motorcycles. Two witnesses also were injured.

The media reported that no one claimed responsibility for the May 6 killing of a Sufi Pir Mohammed Shahidullah, found hacked to death in the village of Tanore near Rajshahi. Police stated the attack resembled those of previous militant attacks, in which Sufis were targeted for their beliefs.

On January 9 in Naogaon District, authorities found the disfigured, partially burned body of a tribal Catholic killed by unknown attackers, according to media reports.

On July 2, three machete-wielding masked men assaulted Hindu priest Palash Chakrabarty in the Kishoreganj district northwest of Dhaka, but he fended off his attackers by striking them with an iron rod, according to Bangladeshi press. In a separate incident on July 2, Bhabashindhu Bar, a Hindu priest in Satkira was hospitalized in critical condition after assailants tried to hack him to death. On July 1, a masked individual with knives reportedly tried to enter the room of Hindu priest Babul Chakraborty in Bandarban. The individual fled when spotted by the priest’s daughter in law. Media reported the incident as an “attempted murder.”

In May media reported attackers threw six to seven crude bombs into the home of a family living in Western Chuadanga who had converted from Islam to Christianity, critically injuring one man.

Buddhist monk Tain Dima Bikkhu survived an attack at Dabonkhali Marma Para Buddhist Temple in Bandarban District on the evening of August 4. Four to five men wielding knives allegedly broke down the door to the temple, but Dima was able to ward them off by activating a loudspeaker and calling for help.

There were attacks against followers of the mystic/religious Baul practice. Several Baul followers, who reportedly lived together, survived another attack in Chuadanga on July 17. On July 30, media reported 22 to 25 men assaulted three members of the Baul faith again in Chuadanga. The attackers restrained the Baul followers for approximately 90 minutes, burned their akhra (religious structure) and literature, cut off their hair, and threatened to return to kill them and blow up their house if they continued their religious practice in the area.

There was communal violence against Hindus. On January 11, a crowd besieged a Hindu ashram and temple after a local imam and madrassah head claimed the adherents had burned copies of the Quran. Although the crowd did not damage the ashram and temple, unknown attackers set fire to the house of the Hindu man who was accused of burning the Quran.

Individuals continued to kill and threaten bloggers whom they accused of offending Islam. In May messaging on the website Salauddiner Ghora urged followers to behead five Bangladeshi bloggers living overseas for blasphemy against Islam. Many bloggers and activists reportedly continued to limit their publications because of the ongoing threats. Some sought refuge in neighboring countries, including Nepal and Sri Lanka.

During local elections in June, violence reached unprecedented levels and members of religious minorities were attacked. In a suburb of Dhaka, media reported hundreds of attackers used sticks and bamboo poles to beat a group of Catholics and vandalize their homes and shops to stop them from voting for three Catholic candidates. An estimated 60 people, including 10 women, were injured in the attacks. Police later charged 25 people in the case and arrested four people in connection with the attacks. The suspects had reportedly been released on bail at year’s end.

On October 30, 100 to150 villagers in Nasirnagar in the eastern part of the country reacted violently to a Hindu resident’s Facebook post showing a Hindu deity pasted over the Kaaba in Mecca. They vandalized 52 Hindu homes and 15 temples, injured more than 100 people, and set fire to eight shops during the Diwali holiday. The violence followed public rallies in the same area protesting the Facebook post by Muslim groups and local ruling party politicians. Law enforcement officials arrested 104 people in connection with the attack, and the National Human Rights Commission conducted a fact-finding mission which stated the attack was orchestrated to drive Hindus from the area to obtain their land. According to media accounts, the attacks on Hindu homes and temples resulted from acrimony between two factions of the local chapters of the ruling Awami League Party. The reports also stated some Hindu protesters blamed local current cabinet member Sayedul Haque for inciting violence and insulting Hindus. In January, October, and November, individuals destroyed idols and vandalized and looted Hindu temples in Gopalganj, Chittagong, Netrokona, and Barisal. Authorities arrested suspects, who were undergoing trial at the year’s end. In a video conference on November 12, Prime Minister Hasina instructed field-level officials to ensure the security of members of minority groups.

NGOs continued to report tensions in the CHT between the predominantly Muslim Bengali settlers and members of indigenous groups, primarily Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian, largely over land ownership. The government worked to resolve land ownership disputes with an amendment to the existing law that provides for a more inclusive decision making and harmonization of the law with the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord. In Bandarban, an NGO stated that Muslim residents attempted to convert indigenous Christian and Hindu children to Islam.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy staff met with officials from the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Home Affairs as well as local government representatives to underscore the importance of religious freedom and tolerance. They discussed the interface between religion and violent extremism and the positive impact of respecting human rights and religious freedom in counterterrorism efforts. The embassy officials noted the importance of respecting religious minorities’ viewpoints and protecting such minorities in the wake of violent extremist attacks on these groups.

During his visit to the country in December, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom stressed with government interlocutors the importance of upholding the country’s tradition of religious tolerance and bringing perpetrators of attacks on religious minorities to justice. In meetings with government and civil society interlocutors, the Ambassador at Large highlighted the interdependence of the rights to freedoms of religion and expression and noted that restricting offensive speech for the purposes of maintaining public order was counterproductive.

Embassy officials also met with government officials to discuss protection and humanitarian assistance for the increasing numbers of Rohingya Muslims crossing into the country from Burma. The Ambassador, embassy officials, and the Ambassador at Large visited refugee camps and makeshift settlements in the southeastern part of the country to speak directly with Rohingya about their ability to pursue their religious practices. Embassy officials met with Buddhist groups in Cox’s Bazar to learn about the status of their case for a 2012 attack on their temples. As part of community policing training, the embassy encouraged law enforcement officials to protect the rights of religious minorities.

Embassy and other U.S. government officials expressed support for religious minorities in public and private forums. During a March visit to the Hindu Dhakeshwari national temple, the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights expressed U.S. support for enforcement of laws ensuring protection of all religions. In January, February, March, October, and December, the Embassy hosted roundtable discussions with members of Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian minority groups, both individually and with multiple faiths represented, to discuss challenges faced by their respective communities. Embassy officials also met with Muslim leaders and groups to discuss the balance between countering violent extremism and religious freedom and the intersection of politics and religion. Embassy officials met regularly with a wide range of religious organizations and representatives, some of the most prominent including the Saadi Foundation (a nonpolitical Islamic organization), the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, the Bangladesh Christian Association, Hindu Mohajote, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness – Bangladesh, the Christian Religious Welfare Trust, the apostolic nuncio, the Asian Conference of Religion and Peace Central Committee, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat (Bangladesh), the Bangladesh Purja Celebration Committee, Hotline Human Rights Bangladesh , and the Human Rights Congress for Bangladesh Minorities.

Embassy officials met regularly with a working group of 11 foreign missions to discuss assistance to secular bloggers under threat, including several bloggers stating their desire to take refuge in the United States. Many bloggers were able to identify means for increasing their personal protection using programs and resources identified by the embassy. During the Ambassador at Large’s visit, the embassy convened heads of mission from countries participating in the International Contact Group on Freedom of Religion or Belief to discuss coordination of efforts to address issues of concern, including impunity for perpetrators of violence against religious minorities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 750,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the Pew Research Center, approximately 75 percent of the population follows the Drukpa Kagyu or Nyingma schools of Buddhism, while Hindus comprise approximately 22 percent of the total population and reside mostly in southern areas of the country.

Estimates of the size of the Christian community range from 2,000 (from the Pew Research Center) to 15,000 (from the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Transformation Index 2016 country report). The estimates by local and international Christian groups range from 3,000 to15,000. Most Christians are reportedly concentrated in towns in the south of the country. Although traditional Bon practices are often combined with Buddhist practices, very few citizens adhere exclusively to this religious tradition, according to scholars. The Sharchop ethnic group, which forms the majority of the population in the east, practices elements of Tibetan Buddhism combined with elements of the Bon tradition and Hinduism, according to the advocacy group Alliance Defending Freedom.

According to a December estimate by the Ministry of Labor and Human Resources there are 54,000 Indian laborers in the country, most of whom are Hindu or Muslim.

Legal Framework

The constitution recognizes Buddhism as the state’s “spiritual heritage” and stipulates it is “the responsibility of all religious institutions and personalities to promote the spiritual heritage of the country.” The constitution states every citizen has “the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” and bans discrimination based on religion. The constitution states the king must be Buddhist and requires the king to be the “protector of all religions.”

The constitution states “no person shall be compelled to belong to another faith by means of coercion or inducement.” The penal code criminalizes coercion or inducement to convert as a misdemeanor, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment.

The law prohibits oral or written communication “promoting enmity between religious groups” and provides for sentences of up to three years’ imprisonment for violations. There were no reports of prosecutions.

The penal code states individuals found guilty of promoting civil unrest by advocating “religious abhorrence,” disturbing public tranquility, or committing an act “prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony” between religious groups shall be subject to punishment of five to nine years’ imprisonment. There were no reports of prosecutions.

The law requires religious groups to register with the CRO. In order to register, a religious group must submit an application demonstrating its leaders are citizens and disclosing their educational background and financial assets. The law also specifies the organizational structure, bylaws, and procedural rules registered religious organizations must follow. The law prohibits religious organizations from “violating the spiritual heritage” of the country and requires them to protect and promote it. The law also states no religious organization shall do anything to impair the sovereignty, security, unity, or territorial integrity of the country. The law mandates the CRO certify religious groups applying for registration meet the requirements specified in the law.

Registered religious groups may raise funds for religious activities and are exempt from taxes. Registered groups require permission from local government authorities to hold public meetings outside of their registered facilities and must seek permission from the Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs to invite foreign speakers to address them or to receive foreign funds.

Unregistered religious groups may not organize publicly, own property, raise funds, conduct outreach activities, or import literature. According to the law, these activities are subject to penalties ranging from fines to prison terms, depending upon the offense. Unregistered religious groups may hold private worship services in homes. The law states it is an offense for a religious group to provide false or misleading information in its religious teachings, to misuse investments, or to raise funds illegally. The CRO has authority to determine whether the content of a group’s religious teachings is false or misleading, as well as whether it has raised funds illegally. Sanctions include fines and potential revocation of registration.

The law states the CRO shall consist of an eight-member board responsible for overseeing the structure of religious institutions, enforcing the constitutional separation between the government and religious organizations, and monitoring religious fundraising activities. The chairperson of the board is a cabinet minister appointed by the prime minister. A senior official from the Ministry of Finance and one of the king’s appointees to the National Council also sit on the board. The director of culture in the Ministry of Home Affairs serves as an ex-officio secretary. The remaining seats are occupied by the heads of Buddhist religious bodies and a Hindu body. The law requires the CRO to “ensure that religious institutions and personalities promote the spiritual heritage of the country” by developing a society “rooted in Buddhist ethos.”

The constitution states the king shall appoint the chief abbot of the central monastic body on the advice of the five masters of the monastic body. Those individuals and a civil servant administrative secretary make up the Commission for Monastic Affairs, which manages issues related to Buddhist doctrine. The constitution says the state will provide funds and “facilities” to the central monastic body.

The law permits the government to “avoid breaches of the peace” by requiring licenses for public assembly, prohibiting assembly in designated areas, and imposing curfews. The government may apply these measures to groups and organizations of all kinds, including religious groups.

Government approval is required to construct religious buildings. All religious buildings are legally required to adhere to traditional Bhutanese architectural standards. The CRO determines conformity with these standards.

The constitution states religious institutions have the responsibility to ensure religion remains separate from the state. It also says “religious institutions and personalities shall remain above politics.”

The law prohibits religious organizations from involvement in political activity. Ordained members of the clergy of any religion are prohibited from engaging in political activities, including running for office or voting.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

NGO representatives continued to express concern over the lack of a clear definition in the constitution and legal code for terms such as “inducement to religious conversion.” They stated the lack of clarity continued to put the religious activities of minority religious groups at risk, citing religious teaching, charitable services, and public education as examples of activities that could be penalized. Civil society representatives continued to say there was the potential for misuse and arbitrary action by the government, but they confirmed religious conversions nonetheless continued to take place. They stated the government had not used the law to penalize anyone as of the end of the year.

At least one group of Christian churches reportedly applied for registration, but did not receive a response from the CRO as of year’s end. As it had in previous years, the CRO reported no Christian groups had applied for registration. Members of Christian associations reported Christian groups had similarly attempted to register on multiple occasions in the past, but had also received no official response. Christian groups said the lack of registration meant they continued not to be able to raise funds.

Christian groups and media sources reported the government continued to provide preferential treatment for Buddhist groups in terms of registration and financial support. Of a total of 96 registered groups, the Hindu Dharma Samudaya, an umbrella body representing the Hindu population, remained the only registered non-Buddhist organization.

NGO representatives reported unregistered religious groups continued to be able to worship in private, but remained unable to exercise certain rights such as property ownership.

Members of the Christian community continued to report holding religious meetings discreetly in private facilities. They also continued to report some Christians living close to the country’s border traveled to India for worship.

The government continued its financial assistance for the construction of Buddhist temples and shrines, as well as funding for monks and monasteries. Government construction continued on a large Hindu temple in Thimphu.

Local NGOs reported there continued to be compulsory Buddhist prayer sessions in schools every morning. There were reports children of Christian families faced discrimination from teachers and were sometimes denied access to schools. The government reportedly continued to provide scholarships for Hindus to study Sanskrit in India.

Some government institutions, such as courts, remained housed within Buddhist monasteries. Some religious groups stated government ceremonies continued to involve mandatory Buddhist prayer rituals. Although there were reports of Christians employed in government contracting positions, NGO representatives continued to report government pressure on non-Buddhists to observe “traditional Drukpa values” and participate in Buddhist prayer rituals. According to NGOs, some non-Buddhist government employees continued to say their participation in these ceremonies was a requirement for career advancement.

According to NGOs, there continued to be societal pressure on individuals to participate in Buddhist traditions and practices.

The NGO Open Doors reported Christians continued to face discrimination in their personal and professional lives.

The United States does not have a diplomatic presence in the country and does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with the government. The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi continued to conduct informal relations through periodic visits, including by the Ambassador. Embassy officers promoted tolerance of religious minorities in meetings with government officials and discussed issues affecting religious minorities in meetings with NGOs and members of various religious communities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 3.9 million (July 2016 estimate). On June 30, the country’s Agency of Statistics released the results of the first post-conflict population census conducted in October 2013. According to the results, Sunni Muslims constitute approximately 51 percent of the population, Serbian Orthodox Christians 31 percent, Roman Catholics 15 percent, and others, including Protestants and Jews, approximately 3 percent.

There is a strong correlation between ethnicity and religion: Bosnian Serbs with the SOC, and Bosnian Croats with the Roman Catholic Church. Bosniaks are predominantly Muslims. According to the Jewish community, it has approximately 1,000 members, with the majority living in Sarajevo. The majority of Serbian Orthodox adherents live in the RS, and the majority of Muslims and Catholics in the Federation. Protestant and most other small religious communities have their largest membership in Sarajevo and Banja Luka.

Legal Framework

Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which serves as the country’s constitution, provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. It stipulates no one shall be deprived of citizenship on grounds of religion and all persons shall enjoy the same rights and freedoms without discrimination as to religion. The entity constitution of the Federation states all individuals shall have freedom of religion, including of public and private worship, and freedom from discrimination based on religion or creed. It defines religion as a vital national interest of constituent peoples.

The entity constitution of the RS establishes the SOC as “the church of the Serb people and other people of Orthodox religion.” It guarantees equal freedoms, rights, and duties for all citizens, irrespective of religion, and specifies religious communities shall be equal before the law and free to manage their religious affairs and hold religious services; open religious schools and conduct religious education in all schools; engage in commercial activities; receive gifts; and establish and manage legacies in accordance with the law.

A state law on religion guarantees freedom of conscience, grants legal status to churches and religious communities, and grants to registered religious communities numerous rights, including the right to assemble, to conduct collaborative actions such as charity work, to raise funds, and to construct and occupy places of worship. The law states churches and religious communities serve as representative institutions and organizations of believers, founded in accordance with their own regulations, teachings, beliefs, traditions, and practices. The law recognizes the legal status of four “traditional” religious communities: the IC, the SOC, the Catholic Church, and the Jewish community. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) maintains a unified register of all religious communities, and the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees is responsible for documenting violations of religious freedom.

According to the law, any group of 300 or more adult citizens may apply to register a new religious community or church through a written application to the MOJ. Other legal requirements for registration include the development of a statute defining the method of religious practice and a petition for establishment with the signatures of at least 30 founders. The ministry must issue a decision within 30 days of receipt of the application, and a group may appeal a negative decision to the state-level Council of Ministers. The law allows registered religious organizations to operate without restrictions. The law also stipulates the ministry may deny the application for registration if it concludes the content and manner of worship may be “contrary to legal order, public morale, or is damaging to the life and health or other rights and freedoms of believers and citizens.”

The law states no new church or religious community may be founded bearing the same or similar name as an existing church or religious community. The law also states no one may use the symbols, insignia, or attributes of a church or a religious community without their consent.

A concordat with the Holy See recognizes the public juridical personality of the Catholic Church and grants a number of rights, including establishing educational and charitable institutions, carrying out religious education, and official recognition of Catholic holidays. The commission for implementation of the concordat comprises five members from the government and five from the Holy See. A similar agreement exists with the SOC, but a commission for implementation does not yet exist.

The state recognizes the IC as the sole supreme institutional religious authority for all Muslims, including immigrants and refugees, as well as for Bosniaks and other Muslim nationals living outside the country who accept the IC’s authority. According to law, no Islamic group may register with the MOJ, or open a mosque, without the permission of the IC.

The law affirms the right of every citizen to religious education. The law calls for a representative of each of the officially registered religious communities to be responsible for teaching religious studies in all public and private pre-, primary, and secondary schools and universities. Children from minority religious groups are entitled to religious education only when there are 18 or more students from that religious group in one class. Religious communities train and select their respective religious education teachers. These individuals are employees of the schools in which they teach, but receive accreditation from the religious body governing the curriculum.

The IC, the SOC, and the Catholic Church develop and approve religious curricula across the country. Public schools offer religious education in a school’s majority religion, with some exceptions. Secondary students who do not wish to attend the religion class have the legal right to opt out if their school offers a class in ethics as an alternative, which many schools do. Primary school students may do the same at their parents’ request.

In the Federation’s five Bosniak-majority cantons, primary and secondary schools offer Islamic religious instruction as a twice-weekly course. In cantons with Croat majorities, Croat students in primary and secondary schools attend an elective Catholic religion course twice a week. In the 13 primary and secondary Catholic schools in the Federation, parents may choose either an elective Catholic religion course or a course in ethics. In Sarajevo and Tuzla, primary and secondary students may either opt out or take ethics courses in lieu of religious education classes. The Sarajevo Canton Ministry of Education offers Orthodox and Protestant religious education in addition to classes offered to the Muslim and Catholic communities.

A law against discrimination prohibits exclusion, limitation, or preferential treatment of individuals based on religion in employment, and the provision of social services in both the government and private sectors.

The Bosnia and Herzegovina constitution provides for representation of the three major ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) in the government and the armed forces. The constitution makes no explicit mention of representation for religious groups, although each ethnicity mentioned by the constitution is associated with a particular religion. Parliamentary seats and government positions are apportioned among the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) according to quotas set by constitutional provisions.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Legal proceedings in Livno Municipal Court continued throughout the year without conclusion against eight individuals charged with perpetrating a 2015 attack on a mosque in the Omerovici village of Tomislavgrad, which involved verbally attacking worshippers, breaking windows, and placing a propane tank in front of the premises.

In February, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council reconfirmed its 2015 decision prohibiting employees of judicial institutions from wearing any form of “religious insignia” at work, including headscarves. On February 7, according to media reports, more than 2,000 women marched in Sarajevo to protest the measure.

According to IC officials, Croat and Serb members of the presidency reportedly continued to resist an agreement between the government and the IC approved in 2015 by the Council of Ministers on dietary restrictions in public institutions, employer accommodations for daily prayer, time off to attend Friday prayers, and a one-time trip to Mecca for the Hajj. As of year’s end, the presidency had neither approved the agreement nor sent it to parliament for ratification.

According to representatives of the Catholic Church, the joint commission for implementation of the concordat with the Holy See made gradual progress but failed to reach agreement because the government and parliament remained unwilling to implement the church’s proposals, including specific legislation on observing religious holidays.

There continued to be no agreement on establishing a commission to implement the government’s agreement with the SOC. According to SOC representatives, the lack of government initiative and the SOC’s inability to reach internal consensus among its bishops regarding the composition of the commission contributed to the continued failure to reach an agreement.

Religious officials of minority populations throughout the country continued to report discrimination by local authorities regarding the use of religious property and the issuance of permits for new religious properties. In one instance, the Banja Luka Catholic diocese reported the Drvar municipal authorities continued to refuse construction permits for a new Catholic Church, emphasizing there had not been one prior to the 1990s conflict. Catholic Church officials in Banja Luka also reported the continued refusal of municipal authorities to return any of their nationalized properties, even after the authorities returned most of the previously nationalized property to the SOC.

Mostar city officials continued to deny issuance of the necessary reconstruction permits to the Mostar Evangelical Church to rebuild the church in the city center, as they have for the past 17 years, despite the evangelical church’s reported completion of all the legal and administrative requirements. Church representatives said this was the result of their continued failure to pay a bribe to municipal officials, as well as active lobbying by local Catholic Church officials against the evangelical church’s presence in Mostar.

Officials continued not to implement provisions in the law regarding religious education, particularly in segregated school systems or where there was resistance from party officials at the municipal level. In the RS, parents of more than 500 Bosniak returnee children in several communities, including Konjevic Polje in the Bratunac municipality and Vrbanjci in the Kotor Varos municipality, continued to boycott public schools for a fourth year, choosing instead to send their children to alternative schools organized by the IC and financed by the Federation Ministry of Education. Parents organized the boycott in response to a refusal by the RS Ministry of Education to approve a group of national subjects, including religious education, for the Bosniak returnee community. According to academics and representatives from NGOs, students from both majority and minority religious communities continued to face social pressure from teachers and peers to attend instruction in their respective religions.

Religious minorities, especially those comprising refugees returning to their original communities pursuant to the Dayton Peace Agreement, such as Bosniak communities in the RS, continued to report selective enforcement of their rights by government authorities. They said the authorities often failed to provide government services and protections to the minorities, including access to health care, pensions, and other social benefits, and the transfer of student records between districts as needed. Leaders of minority religious groups also continued to report discrimination by local authorities in terms of providing police protection and investigating threats of violence, harassment, and vandalism. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many actions as being solely based on religious identity.

Government authorities continued not to implement a 2009 decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) calling for an amendment to the constitution to allow religious and other minorities, including Jews, to run for president and the parliament’s upper house. According to the ECHR ruling, observers said, the constitution discriminated against minority groups in apportioning government positions and seats in the parliament only among Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, which by extension meant to the SOC, the Catholic Church, and the Muslim community, respectively. Individuals who did not self-identify with one of the three major ethnic/religious groups said they continued to be unable to hold one of the proportionally guaranteed government positions, including president.

Political parties dominated by a single ethnic group continued to identify closely with the religion associated with that ethnic group. The biggest ethnic Bosniak party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), remained aligned with the IC. The biggest ethnic Croat party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), remained associated with the Catholic Church. The two largest Serb parties, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), remained associated with the SOC.

In October, the Sarajevo Canton Assembly named a street and an elementary school after Mustafa Busuladzic, a World War II-era anti-Semite who glorified Hitler. The president of the Jewish Community strongly condemned the act. As of the end of the year, the school had not officially changed its name.

On August 22, Sarajevo Canton Police arrested an individual on suspicion of arson related to a blaze set the day before to a work shed attached to the SOC Holy Transfiguration Church in Sarajevo. Police identified and detained the suspect through a video surveillance tape obtained from the church. The police established no motive for the arson. The investigation remained ongoing as of the end of the year. Representatives from each of the religious communities, the IRC, and numerous local politicians and citizens condemned the incident. According to SOC officials, the church had been subject to more than 40 acts of vandalism since 2000.

The arson case was the only one out of nine cases involving attacks against religious sites in which the police arrested a suspected perpetrator, according to the IRC. The other eight cases involved vandalism at seven Islamic sites (primarily in the RS) and at one other Orthodox site in the Federation. The police investigated but did not report results in most of these eight cases, which mainly involved breaking windows and vandalizing graves, although the vandalism was accompanied by verbal attacks on religious officials in a few of the cases. Police did not ascribe these incidents to religious hatred, but stated the individuals responsible were either juveniles or intoxicated or mentally unstable. For example, police charged an individual with a misdemeanor and fined him 1,000 convertible marks ($539) for urinating on a memorial at the Atik Mosque in Bijeljina dedicated to Bosniak war dead. According to the IRC, which continued to monitor attacks on religious sites and advocate for the criminal prosecution of the perpetrators, the police response continued to reflect ignorance about hate crimes and a desire to deflect attention away from possible religious intolerance.

There were continued reports of conflicts between members of the IC and minority Muslim groups, some of them Shia, who practiced outside the IC’s purview. Incidents included physical and verbal confrontations during Friday prayers, when minority Muslims disrupted prayers to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with traditional Bosniak interpretations of Islam, according to the IC. There were no reports of injuries. Some members of the IC continued to refer to adherents of minority Salafist groups as intolerant or extremist or as “Wahhabis.”

In February, the IC called on 64 unregistered Islamic congregations (or para-jamaats), which gathered predominantly Salafist followers and operated outside the purview of the IC, to cease their “unsanctioned” religious practices and officially unite with the IC. By the end of March, of the 38 para-jamaats that had entered into negotiations, 14 had joined the IC. Beginning in March the Federation Administration for Inspection Affairs and the Federation Police supported by the State Investigation and Protection Agency and the Intelligence Security Agency, carried out unannounced inspections of several unregistered para-jamaats, reportedly issuing fines for improper registration with the MOJ.

On April 2, unknown perpetrators verbally attacked the imam in the Catholic majority town of Kupres, in front of his house and city mosque. The local Catholic priest and his assistant received a delegation from the IC soon afterwards and condemned the attack. In response, the police pledged increased patrols of the area.

According to a media report, an individual who had reportedly gone abroad to join ISIS threatened the country’s grand mufti via the internet. In an online video clip, the individual said he would “cut the throat” of the mufti and stated the mujahedin were “coming to Bosnia.” The grand mufti had previously repeatedly condemned Islamic extremism. He asked the authorities for protection, which they reportedly were providing.

According to the IRC, the nine attacks on religious sites and officials recorded from January through December represented a “significant decrease” compared to the 19 acts the IRC recorded in 2015 and the 28 acts it recorded in 2014. The IRC attributed the decrease to continued monitoring, public condemnation of attacks, and community engagement.

On January 1, unidentified perpetrators broke the windows on the house adjacent to Careva Mosque in Foca.

The IRC sponsored numerous projects involving women and youth to advance interfaith dialogue, including visits by IRC youth representatives to places memorializing the suffering of each of the country’s dominant religions, such as sites where Bosniaks were massacred during the 1990s conflict and the Ustasha concentration camps that held Serbs and Jews during World War II.

On May 7, representatives of the Orthodox, Jewish, and Catholic communities, along with high-level RS officials, joined the Islamic community in the RS capital of Banja Luka for the ceremonial re-opening of the rebuilt historic Ferhadija Mosque. Mufti Osman Effendi Kozlic focused his remarks at the event on the revitalization of the country’s historic interreligious harmony and reconciliation. Observers called the re-opening the most significant interfaith event of the year.

Embassy officers engaged with the Presidency and a range of government ministries to discuss the government’s efforts to combat violent extremism related to religion.

The embassy continued to meet regularly with the leaders and representatives of the four traditional religious communities, both individually and collectively, as well as leaders of smaller religious communities such as evangelical Protestants to promote increased interreligious dialogue and to discuss ways the religious communities could contribute to the further development of a peaceful and stable society. Embassy officials regularly attended significant events in the various religious communities, including Eid-al-Fitr celebrations with the IC, Christmas and Easter celebrations with the Orthodox and Catholic communities, and a Passover Seder hosted by the Jewish community. On May 7, the Ambassador attended the opening of the newly rebuilt historic Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka, along with representatives of the Islamic, Orthodox, Jewish, and Catholic communities, as well as high level state and entity officials, to demonstrate continued U.S. support for interfaith reconciliation.

The embassy maintained regular contact with the IRC to support its work, and engaged with regional and religious authorities, particularly the SOC, to help overcome political obstacles to IRC activities. The embassy explored grant opportunities with the IRC leadership to develop its institutional capacity further. The IRC also participated in U.S. government funded programs aimed at addressing and overcoming ethnic/religious divisions in communities through dialogue, and restoring trust among the country’s multiple ethnic and religious groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.2 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2011 Population and Housing Census reporting on the population 12 years and over, 79 percent of citizens are members of Christian groups, 15 percent espouse no religion, 4 percent are adherents of the Badimo traditional indigenous religious group, and all other religious groups comprise less than 1 percent of the population.

Anglicans, Methodists, and members of the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa make up the majority of Christians. There are also Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Mormons, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, members of the Dutch Reformed Church, Mennonites, and members of other Christian denominations. According to the 2011 census, there are approximately 11,000 Muslims, many of whom are of South Asian origin. There are small numbers of Hindus and Bahais, as well as a small Jewish community. Immigrants and foreign workers are more likely to be members of non-Christian religious groups than are native-born citizens.

Legal Framework

Under its broader protections of freedom of conscience, the constitution provides for freedom of thought and religion, the right to change religion or belief, and the right to manifest and propagate religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance. The constitution permits the government to restrict these rights in the interest of protecting the rights of other persons, national defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or public health when the restrictions are deemed “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.” The government has never exercised this provision. The constitution’s provision of rights also prohibits discrimination based on creed.

The constitution permits every religious group to establish places for religious instruction at the group’s expense. The constitution prohibits requiring religious instruction, as well as requiring participation in religious ceremonies in a religion other than one’s own. The constitution also prohibits compelling an individual to take an oath that is contrary to that individual’s religious beliefs. The penal code criminalizes “hate speech” towards any person or group based on “race, tribe, place of origin, color or creed” with a maximum fine of 500 pula (BWP) ($47).

All organizations, including religious groups, must register with the government. To register, a group must submit its constitution to the registrar of societies section of the Ministry of Nationality, Immigration and Gender Affairs. A group must register to conduct business, sign contracts, or open an account at a local bank. Any person who manages, assists in the management of, or holds an official position in an unregistered group is subject to a fine of up to BWP 1,000 ($94) and up to seven years in prison. Any member of an unregistered group is subject to penalties including fines up to BWP 500 ($47) and up to three years in prison.

Senior government officials indicated the country changed its policy to eliminate long-term residence permits for all religious workers; the policy change was not announced publicly until November.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

As of the end of the year, an amendment passed in March 2015 raising the minimum membership threshold for registration for new religious groups from 10 to 250 members had not been implemented as it was pending presidential assent. Previously registered groups were not affected by the amendment.

Optional religious education remained part of the curriculum in public schools; this curriculum continued to emphasize Christianity but also addressed other religious groups in the country. Government regulation of private schools did not distinguish among Christian, Muslim, or secular schools.

Some registered Christian organizations reported some of their missionaries had difficulty obtaining residence permits for missionary work. For example, the government denied multiple applications for residence permits to Mormon missionaries, continuing a pattern that started in October 2013. The Ministry of Nationality, Immigration and Gender Affairs attributed this difficulty to unspecified “security issues.” President Ian Khama expressed concern about unregulated and unscrupulous churches coming into the country to take advantage of local citizens. There were anecdotal reports of pastors, including some from other African countries, demanding tithes and donations for routine services or special prayers.

The government deported a U.S. pastor from the Faithful World Baptist Church on September 20 for visa improprieties and for what the government determined to be “hate speech” during the pastor’s participation on a live radio interview earlier that morning. In the radio interview, the pastor called for LGBTI persons “to be stoned to death.” President Khama ordered the pastor’s immediate deportation stating, “We do not want hate speech in this country.”

Although it was common for government meetings to begin with a Christian prayer, members of non-Christian groups occasionally led prayers as well.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The U.S. Ambassador and senior Department of State officials engaged the president, vice president, and relevant ministries at the highest level, urging greater transparency on resident permit regulations for missionaries and advocating on behalf of religious freedom generally.

After the U.S. pastor’s September deportation, the embassy hosted a media roundtable underscoring U.S. support for freedom of speech and religion, as well as the human rights of LGBTI persons.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 437,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to a 2011 census, approximately 78.8 percent of the population is Muslim, 8.7 percent Christian, and 7.8 percent Buddhist, while the remaining 4.7 percent consists of other religions including indigenous beliefs.

There is significant variation in religious identification among ethnic groups. According to official statistics (Brunei Darussalam Statistical Yearbook 2015), ethnically Malay Bruneians comprise 66 percent of the population, and are presumed to be Muslim as an inherited status. The Chinese population, which is approximately 10 percent of the total population and includes both citizens and permanent residents, is 65 percent Buddhist and 20 percent Christian. Indigenous tribes such as Dusun, Bisaya, and Murut make up approximately 4 percent of the population and are roughly 50 percent Muslim, 15 percent Christian, and the remainder are other religious groups, including adherents of traditional practices. The remaining fifth of the population includes foreign-born workers, primarily from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Asia, and stateless residents. According to official statistics, approximately half of these temporary and permanent residents are Muslim, more than one quarter Christian, and 15 percent Buddhist.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the religion of the country shall be the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam, but allows all other religions to be practiced “in peace and harmony” by the persons professing them.

The legal system is divided between civil law and sharia, which run parallel systems of both criminal and civil/family law and operate separate courts under a single judiciary department. While the civil courts are based on common law, the sharia courts follow Islamic jurisprudence, including no law of precedence. Sharia courts have jurisdiction over both criminal law and civil/family matters involving Muslims and hear cases brought under longstanding sharia legislation as well as under the SPC. In some cases non-Muslims are subject to sharia courts.

Almost all crimes included in the first phase of the SPC, currently in force, were already prohibited in the country; however, the SPC applies some laws to non-Muslims for the first time, increases penalties such as fines, and broadens some definitions. Phase one of the SPC runs in parallel with the existing common law-based criminal law system and primarily involves offenses punishable by fines or imprisonment. It expands restrictions in longstanding domestic sharia law on drinking alcohol, eating in public during the fasting hours of Ramadan, cross-dressing, close proximity between unmarried people of different genders, and propagating religions other than Islam. It includes a prohibition of “indecent behavior,” which criminalizes any act that “tends to tarnish the image of Islam, deprave a person, bring bad influence, or cause anger to the person who is likely to have seen the act.” The SPC applies to both Muslims and non-Muslims, including foreigners, as well as to offenses committed outside the country by citizens or permanent residents. Non-Muslims are exempted from certain sections, such as requirements for men to join Friday prayers or payments of zakat (obligatory annual alms-giving). It states that Muslims will be identified for purposes of the law by “general reputation.”

The second phase of the SPC, which would include amputating the hands of thieves, is not scheduled to come into effect until one year after the publication of a Sharia Courts Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). The government has not published the CPC. Phase three of the SPC – which includes punishments, in certain situations, such as stoning to death for rape, adultery, or sodomy, and execution for apostasy, contempt of the Prophet Muhammad, or insult of the Quran – is scheduled to be implemented two years after the publication of the CPC. The punishments included in phases two and three include different standards of proof than the common law-based penal code, such as requiring four pious men to witness personally an act of fornication to support a sentence of stoning. Stoning sentences, however, could be supported by a confession in lieu of evidence at the discretion of a sharia judge.

The government describes its official national philosophy as Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB), or Malay Islamic Monarchy, which the government defines as “a system that encompasses strong Malay cultural influences, stressing the importance of Islam in daily life and governance, and respect for the monarchy as represented by His Majesty the Sultan.” The government has said this system is essential to the country’s way of life and its main defense against extremism. A government body, the MIB Supreme Council, seeks to spread and strengthen the MIB philosophy and ensure MIB is enshrined in the nation’s laws and policies. MIB is a compulsory subject for students in both public and private schools, including at the university level.

The Religious Enforcement Division under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) is the lead agency in many investigations related to religious practices, but other agencies also play a role. MORA’s Religious Enforcement Division leads investigations on crimes that exist only in the SPC and other sharia legislation, such as male Muslims failing to pray on Fridays. Cases involving crimes that are not covered by sharia legislation such as human trafficking are investigated by the Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF). Cases involving crimes covered by both sharia and the existing civil code are also investigated by the RBPF and referred to the Attorney General’s Chamber (AGC). In these cases, the AGC determines in each case if a specific crime should be prosecuted and whether it should be filed in the sharia or civil court. No official guidelines for the AGC’s determination process have been published.

The government bans several religious groups it considers deviant, including the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Al-Arqam, Abdul Razak Mohammad, Al-Ma’unah, Saihoni Tasipan, Tariqat Mufarridiyyah, Silat Lintau, Qadiyaniah, the Bahai Faith, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. The list is based on fatwas made by the state mufti or the Islamic Religious Council – a government body and the sultan’s highest authority on matters on Islam – and is publicly available on the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ website. The SPC also bans any practice or display of “black magic.”

The SPC includes a list of words and expressions, including the word “Allah,” reserved for use by only Muslims or in relation to Islam.

The law forbids the teaching or promotion of any religion other than Islam to Muslims or to persons of no faith. Under the first phase of the SPC, the penalty for propagating religions other than Islam is up to five years in prison, a fine of up to 20,000 Brunei dollars (BND) ($13,840), or both. The SPC includes a provision that makes it illegal to criticize Islam, including the SPC itself, though no cases, arrests, or charges under this provision have been reported.

Muslims are legally permitted to renounce their religion until phase three of the SPC is implemented but must inform the Islamic Religious Council in writing. The law states the conversion of children is not automatic with the conversion of the parent. A person must be at least 14 years and seven months old to convert to Islam. Children are presumed to be of the same religion as their parents.

The law requires all organizations, including religious groups, to register and provide the names of their members. Applicants are subject to background checks for leaders and board members, and proposed organizations are subject to naming requirements. Registered organizations must furnish information on leadership, election of officers, members, assets, activities, and any other information requested by the registrar. Benefits of registration include the ability to operate, to reserve space in public buildings, and to apply for permission to raise funds. The registrar of societies oversees the application process, exercises discretion over applications, and is authorized to refuse approval for any reason. Organizations are prohibited from affiliation with any organization outside the country without written approval by the registrar. Unregistered organizations may face charges of unlawful assembly and may be subject to fines. Individuals who participate in or influence others to join unregistered organizations may be fined, arrested, and imprisoned. The general penalty for violating laws on the registration and activity of organizations is a fine of up to BND 10,000 ($6,920), imprisonment for up to three years, or both.

The law states that any public assembly of five or more persons requires official approval in advance. Under longstanding emergency powers, this applies to all forms of public assembly, including religious. In practice, however, places of worship are viewed as private.

The law establishes two sets of schools: those offering the national or international curriculum and administered by the Ministry of Education (MOE), and those offering supplemental religious education (ugama) that are administered by MORA. MOE schools teach a course on Islamic religious knowledge, which is required for all Muslim children aged seven to 15 who reside in the country and who have at least one parent who is a citizen or permanent resident. Ugama instruction in the MORA schools is a seven to eight-year course that teaches the day-to-day practice of Sunni Islam according to the Shafi’i school and is mandatory for Muslim students aged seven to 14 who hold citizenship or permanent residency. Ugama is studied alongside the national curriculum. Alternatively, MORA also administers a set of schools taught in Arabic that offer the national curriculum combined with ugama religious education. Muslim parents who fail to enroll their children in ugama school may face a BND 5,000 ($3,460) fine, imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or both. The law promulgates the officially recognized Shafi’i school and does not make accommodations for Muslims who have non-Shafi’i beliefs.

Public and private schools, including private schools run by churches, are prohibited from providing religious instruction in beliefs other than the Shafi’i school of Islam during school hours. Schools may be fined or school officials imprisoned for teaching non-Islamic religious subjects. The SPC criminalizes exposing Muslim children or the children of parents who have no religion to the beliefs and practices of any religion other than Islam. The law also requires practitioners to obtain official permission before teaching any matter relating to Islam. Churches and religious schools are permitted to offer non-Shafi’i Islam education in private settings.

Laws and regulations limit access to religious literature. The law states it is an offense for a person to import any publication deemed objectionable, which is defined in part as describing, depicting, or expressing matters of race or religion in a manner likely to cause “feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will, or hostility between different racial or religious groups.” The law also bans distributing materials relating to religions other than Islam to Muslims or persons of no faith.

All parental rights are awarded to the Muslim parent if a child is born to mixed-faith parents. The non-Muslim parent is not recognized in any official document, including the child’s birth certificate, unless that parent has converted to Islam. The law bans any Muslim from surrendering custody of a minor or dependent in his or her guardianship to a non-Muslim.

Under the SPC, non-Muslims may be arrested for zina (fornication or adultery) or khalwat (close proximity between the sexes), provided that the other accused party is Muslim. Foreigners are also subject to these laws.

The country is not a party to the ICCPR.

Government Practices

The government continued to enforce sharia restrictions and prosecute offenses under the SPC. It continued to apply sharia to Muslims and, for certain offenses, non-Muslims, resulting in arrests, fines, and confiscations, as well as to impose traditional Islamic social norms more broadly. These included placing limitations on businesses, activities suspected of encouraging mingling of men and women, proselytizing, and religious education.

The authorities continued to arrest and prosecute persons for offenses under both the SPC and longstanding sharia. From January to August the government reported 52 criminal cases prosecuted under sharia including not respecting the month of Ramadan, intercourse or pregnancy out of wedlock, and alcohol consumption. During the same period the government also prosecuted 55 khalwatcases, resulting in 46 convictions including one of a non-Muslim. Not all of those investigated or accused of sharia crimes were formally arrested. There were some reports of administrative penalties, such as travel bans or suspension from government jobs, for individuals accused but not yet convicted of khalwat, but application of such practices reportedly was not consistent. Implementing regulations governing sharia proceedings were not issued by year’s end.

In August a local man was arrested for wearing women’s clothing in a public area as part of a joint operation between religious enforcement officers and the RBPF, but was not convicted. Other arrests and prosecutions under sharia were generally not reported by local media.

The government continued to enforce restrictions on non-Muslims proselytizing to Muslims or people with no religion. During the year, religious enforcement officers investigated an accusation of “propagating a faith other than Islam” against a manager of an international franchise.

Friday sermons were uniform across all mosques with approved texts drafted by MORA and preached by registered imams. The government periodically warned the population about “outsiders” preaching non-Shafi’i versions of Islam, including both “liberal” practices and those associated with jihadism, Wahhabism, or Salafism. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah in December warned students studying abroad not to misuse the internet and to be cautious of religious gatherings so as to not “fall into any activities that violate any laws and religion.” In February the sultan called for the strengthening of da’wah (dissemination of Islamic teachings) amid “uncertain times” and “social ills” affecting the country.

During the Christmas season religious leaders and government officials warned citizens that the act of publicly displaying symbols of religions other than Islam could be seen as the propagation of religions other than Islam, an offense under the SPC. In February the minister of religious affairs spoke at an education seminar in which he encouraged Muslims to be respectful and tolerant of other religions as commanded in the Quran, while also reminding them of the restriction imposed in Islam that forbids one to imitate or copy other religious practices or beliefs. There were no reports of raids or charges, although businesses and members of the Christian community reported practicing self-censorship. As with past years, the government limited traditional Lunar New Year lion dance performances to a three-day period and restricted them to the Chinese temple, Chinese school halls, and private residencies of Chinese Association members. There were no reports of charges. Members of the royal family and the minister of religious affairs publicly attended Lunar New Year celebrations and lion dance performances during the allowed period, with extensive coverage in state-influenced media.

There was no legal requirement for women to wear head coverings in public; however, religious authorities continued to reinforce social customs to encourage Muslim women to wear the tudong (a traditional Muslim head covering) and many women did so. Muslim civil servants were expected to join prayers in the workplace, and some employees reported being pressured by supervisors to attend. Muslim women employed by the government were expected to wear a tudong to work, although some chose not to with no reports of official repercussions. In government schools and institutions of higher learning, Muslim female students were required to wear a uniform that includes a head covering. Male students were expected to wear the songkok (a traditional hat), although this was not required in all schools. Women who were incarcerated, including non-Muslims, were required to wear a uniform that included a tudong.

The government continued to enforce strict customs controls on importing non-Islamic religious texts such as Bibles, as well as on Islamic religious teaching materials or scriptures intended for sale or distribution.

The MOE required courses on Islam and MIB in all schools, with non-Muslims exempted from some religious requirements. The government reported many non-Muslim children elected to take courses on Islam. MORA posted religious teachers in some embassies abroad to teach Brunei citizens in those locations. Most school textbooks were illustrated to portray Islam as the norm, and women and girls were shown wearing the tudong. There were no depictions of the practices of other religious groups in textbooks.

Authorities continued to prohibit non-Muslims and non-Shafi’i Muslims from receiving non-Shafi’i religious education in schools. The government tolerated non-Islamic religious education in private settings, such as at home or in approved churches. All church-associated schools were recognized by the MOE and remained open to students of any religion, although they were not permitted to teach religions other than Shafi’i Islam.

Churches confirmed that a longstanding fatwa that discourages Muslims from assisting in perpetuating non-Muslim faiths continued to inhibit expansion, renovation, or construction of new facilities. With only six approved churches in the country, facilities were often too small to accommodate their congregations without significant overflow seating outdoors. Chinese temples were also subjected to the same fatwa, with only one official Chinese temple in the country preserved as a cultural heritage. Data from 2015 indicated there were 99 registered mosques. Christian churches and associated schools were generally allowed, for safety reasons, to repair and renovate buildings on their sites, but the approval process remained lengthy and difficult and there were reports of the government stalling new construction projects for not meeting the complicated permitting process requirements. Government officials denied permission for a church to shift the location of one of its facilities. Christian worshippers reported difficulty accessing churches on some Sundays because of road closures by the government for official events, with some services being rescheduled to other times.

Throughout the year, the government enforced business hour restrictions for all businesses, requiring they close for the two hours of Friday prayers. Religious enforcement officers continued to enforce a ban on restaurants serving dine-in food during the fasting hours of Ramadan, although take-out food to be consumed in private was permitted, and officers issued verbal warnings to restaurants and customers found in breach of the ban. According to Chinese social media, at least three restaurants were raided, with religious enforcement officers issuing warnings to those present. The government continued to enforce a ban on eating, drinking, or smoking in public during the fasting hours of Ramadan, which was applied to both Muslims and non-Muslims. The government reported 17 convictions during the year for not respecting Ramadan.

The government maintained a longstanding ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes, and a restriction against the import or consumption of alcoholic beverages by Muslims. Religious authorities partnered with the RBPF in conducting “anti-vice raids” in which they confiscated alcoholic beverages and nonhalal meats brought into the country without proper customs clearance. They also monitored restaurants and supermarkets to ensure conformity with halal practices. In June the sultan warned the government to avoid shortcuts in halal certification that could violate Islamic law. Religious authorities allowed non-halal restaurants and non-halal sections in supermarkets to operate without interference, but continued to hold public outreach sessions to encourage restaurants to become halal.

The government continued to favor the propagation of Shafi’i beliefs and practices, particularly through public events and the education system.

The government clarified that the use of certain words, such as “Allah” by non-Muslims, did not constitute an SPC offense when used in a nonreligious context or social activity, and there were no reports during the year of charges or prosecutions based on violations of using words or expressions in question.

Incentives offered to prospective converts to Islam and the Shafi’i school, especially those from indigenous communities in rural areas, included help with housing, welfare assistance, or funds to perform the Hajj. In April the Islamic Da’wah Center gave three Muslim convert families new homes using zakat funds, and in August, seven converts each received BND 14,000 ($9,688) in funding for the Hajj as a gift from the sultan. The government gave presentations on the benefits of converting to Islam that received extensive press coverage in state-influenced media, which reported conversions to Islam increased in the first half of the year. According to government statistics, each year an average of 500 people convert to Islam. Converts included citizens and permanent residents, as well as foreigners. Official government policy supported the Islamic faith through the national MIB philosophy as well as through government pledges to make the country a zikir nation (a nation that remembers and obeys Allah).

Despite the absence of a legal prohibition of Muslims marrying non-Muslims, all Muslim weddings required approval from the sharia courts, and officiants, who are imams approved by the government, required the non-Muslim party to convert prior to the marriage.

Most government meetings and ceremonies commenced with an Islamic prayer, which the government continued to state was not a legal requirement but a matter of custom.

The government required residents to carry identity cards that stated the bearer’s ethnicity, which were used in part to determine whether he or she was Muslim; for example, all Malays were assumed to be Muslim. Female Muslim citizens were required to wear a tudong in photographs on national identity cards and passports, and non-Muslim women were required to dress conservatively. Ethnic Malays traveling in the country were generally assumed to be Muslim and required to follow certain Islamic religious practices or potentially face fines, arrest, and imprisonment. Religious authorities reportedly checked identity cards for ethnicity when conducting raids against suspected violators of sharia. Visitors to the country were asked to identify their religion on their visa applications and foreign Muslims were subject to the same laws governing local Muslims.

In February the sultan called on his officials to proceed with finalizing the CPC, the prerequisite for implementing phases two and three of the SPC. Officials continued to state the harshest punishments included in the later phases of the SPC, if implemented, would rarely if ever be applied because of the extremely high standards of proof required.

Non-Muslims and Muslims faced social pressure to conform to Islamic guidelines regarding behavior. There were fewer reports of public debate and more reports of Muslims being open to allowing other religious groups to celebrate their holidays than in the years since the SPC launched. For example, Christian leaders reported more Muslims wished Christians a “Merry Christmas” and attended holiday parties.

Some Muslims who wished to convert to another religion reportedly feared social retribution, such as ostracism by friends, family, and their community. If parents converted to Islam, there was often family and official pressure for the children to do the same. Some non-Muslims said they felt pressured in the workplace or in social groups to convert to Islam.

Residents who questioned the SPC or Islamic values on social media sometimes received online abuse and threats, and reported official monitoring. One social media user relayed how positive reactions to his postings criticizing sharia would disappear on some sites while only the negative comments remained. Some vocal activists who challenged established norms reported family and friends would pressure them to keep quiet out of fear they would attract the attention of authorities or damage the family’s reputation.

In August a self-identified Bruneian made a post on social media calling for the demolition of churches in Malaysia along the highway between Brunei and the Malaysian city of Miri. The individual accused the churches of proselytizing to Muslims by displaying “provocative” words praising Jesus Christ and God on exterior walls. The post launched a social media debate in which online users also identifying as Bruneian chastised the poster, many of whom applauded the religious unity displayed in Miri.

Some Muslim women who did not cover their heads before the SPC was implemented said they started to do so because of social pressure.

After the sultan indicated he would continue implementation of the SPC, the U.S. President, Secretary of State, and U.S. Trade Representative exchanged letters with him and Foreign Minister II Pehin Lim Jock Seng in which U.S. officials urged the government to commit, including publicly, that implementation of sharia would be consistent with international human rights obligations and standards; to ratify the UNCAT and the ICCPR; and to establish a national human rights commission.

In July the Secretary of State met with the foreign minister II in Laos to emphasize the SPC, if implemented, should be fully consistent with Brunei’s international human rights commitments and obligations, including the UNCAT.

The U.S. Special Representative to Muslim Communities (SRMC) returned to the country in August to follow up on previous conversations and visits. He met with the sultan, the state mufti, minister of religious affairs, and other key officials. He urged the government to delay further implementation of the SPC until it could ensure that implementation would not undermine the country’s international human rights commitments. The SRMC encouraged open academic discussions on religion and human rights and interfaith dialogue. The meetings received wide and positive press coverage. The SRMC followed up on these points in a meeting with the foreign minister II in September.

The Ambassador and other U.S. officials repeatedly raised concerns and suggestions about religious freedom throughout the year to government officials on all levels. U.S. officials coordinated with other governments including Australia and the United Kingdom to raise concerns about implementation of the SPC and suggested postponing implementation. U.S. embassy officials emphasized the seriousness with which the United States takes assurances from the government that the evidentiary and witness standards in the SPC would as a matter of procedure and policy be so exacting as to effectively guarantee that torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment will not be carried out in practice. The Ambassador and other U.S. government officials also raised concerns that a confession could be used in lieu of evidence, and that those accused could feel social pressure to confess. They urged officials to defer the publication of the procedural code that is a necessary precursor to the remaining phases of the SPC. Embassy officials also urged compliance with international human rights norms with religious enforcement officers and officials involved in drafting, implementing, and enforcing the SPC.

Embassy exchange programs exposed students to concepts of religious freedom in other countries and allowed them to discuss religion and religious freedom with individuals of other faiths. Events with U.S. government officials also encouraged discussion of these ideas. In August the SRMC engaged local youth in a roundtable conversation on “Being Muslim in America” and discussed the value of interfaith dialogue and interfaith action locally and around the world. The embassy also selected an official from the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports to visit the United States on a three-week exchange project on community engagement with young people to examine policies and practices used in the United States to prevent at-risk youth and individuals from engaging in violent activities and becoming attracted to extremist views.

Embassy officials met with representatives of all principal religious groups, sharia court judges, and religious enforcement officers, as well as lawyers defending individuals charged with violations of sharia.

Embassy and other U.S. government officials visited places of worship, spoke with leaders of various religious groups, and facilitated discussions on religious freedom issues, including obstacles to practicing religions and beliefs other than Shafi’i Islam and laws and policies affecting religious freedom, including provisions of sharia. The embassy hosted a holiday reception that brought together the minister of religious affairs and leaders of religious minority groups. The Ambassador emphasized religious tolerance by participating in numerous Lunar New Year celebrations and attending a Christian schoolchildren’s Christmas event, while a senior embassy official represented the embassy at a Catholic Mass on Christmas Eve. Embassy officials, including the Ambassador, as well as other official visitors, engaged legal, religious, and political leaders on the SPC and the country’s international human rights and religious freedom commitments.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 19.5 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2006 census, 61 percent of the population is Muslim, predominantly Sunni, 19 percent is Roman Catholic, 4 percent belong to various Protestant groups, and 15 percent maintain exclusively indigenous beliefs. Less than 1 percent is atheist or belongs to other religious groups. Statistics on religious affiliation are approximate because Muslims and Christians often adhere simultaneously to some aspects of indigenous religious beliefs.

Muslims reside largely in the northern, eastern, and western border regions, and Christians are concentrated in the center of the country. Indigenous religious beliefs are practiced throughout the country, especially in rural communities. The capital has a mixed Muslim and Christian population. There is no significant correlation between religious affiliation, ethnicity, or political or socio-economic status.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the country is secular, and both it and other laws provide for the right of individuals to choose and change their religion and to practice the religion of their choice. The constitution states freedom of belief is subject to respect for law, public order, good morals, and “the human person.” Political parties based on religion, ethnicity, or regional affiliation are forbidden.

The law allows all organizations, religious or otherwise, to register with the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Internal Security, which is in charge of religious affairs. The ministry, through the Directorate for Customary Affairs and Worship, monitors the implementation of standards for burial, exhumation, and transfer of the remains; helps organize religious pilgrimages; promotes and fosters interreligious dialogue and peace; and develops and implements measures for the erection of places of worship and the registration of religious organizations and religious congregations. The registration process usually takes approximately three to four weeks and costs less than 50,000 CFA francs ($80). Registration confers legal status but no specific obligations or benefits. Religious organizations are not required to register, but when they do so, failure to comply with applicable regulations required by all registered organizations may result in a fine of 50,000 to 150,000 CFA francs ($80 to $240).

Religious groups operate under the same regulatory framework for publishing and broadcasting as other entities. The Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Internal Security has the right to request copies of proposed publications and broadcasts to verify they are in accordance with the nature of the religious group as stated in their registration.

Religious teaching is not allowed in public schools. Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant groups operate private primary and secondary schools and some schools of higher education. By law, schools (religious or otherwise) must submit the names of their directors to the government and register their schools with the Ministry of National Education and Literacy, but the government does not appoint or approve these officials.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The National Observatory of Religious Facts (ONAFAR), an organization created by the government to “monitor regulations on cultural practices” and promote tolerance and interfaith dialogue, continued to monitor religious communities and cultural practices. Along with monitoring, the ONAFAR played a mediator role within the religious community. In August the ONAFAR monitored a dispute among members of the Federation of Burkina Islamic Associations (FAIB), an organization intended to unite Muslim organizations in Burkina Faso, on the renewal of their leadership.

The government gave all religious groups equal access to registration and routinely approved their applications, according to religious group leaders.

The government did not fund religious schools or require them to pay taxes unless they conducted for-profit activities. Likewise, the government taxed religious groups only if they engaged in commercial activities, such as farming or dairy production. The government reviewed the curricula of religious schools to ensure they offered the full standard academic curriculum; however, the majority of Quranic schools were not registered, and thus their curricula were not reviewed.

The government allocated 75 million CFA francs ($120,000) each to the Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, and traditional animistic communities. According to the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Internal Security, the government could provide an additional subsidy when the religious community or organization pursued a mission of general interest, such as education, health, or vocational training; when the religious community conducted an activity of national interest, such as promoting peace or social stability; or when the success or failure of an activity could have affected a significant part of the population, as in the case of religious pilgrimages. For example, in September the government allocated approximately 1.1 billion CFA francs ($1.76 million) to subsidize the cost of the pilgrimage of the 5,500 Muslims going on the Hajj. The government also provided funding to registered Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim (commonly referred to as “Franco-Arabic”) schools through subsidies for teacher salaries, which were typically less than those of public school teachers.

In March the government established a constitutional commission to draft a new constitution. Of the 92 members appointed in June, six were representatives of the main religious communities.

The ethics commission of the High Council of Communication (CSC), the governmental body in charge of regulating media, summoned and questioned officials of the Al Houda and Femina FM radio stations on August 12 for content it stated was “undermining the principle of religious tolerance” and violating the terms of agreements signed between the CSC and media organizations. According to the CSC, Al Houda and Femina FM broadcast “offending” sermons. The government stated the broadcasts in question provided a comparative analysis of Islam and other religions with a “strong tendency to denigrate other religions, including Christianity.” The media executives present at the hearing reportedly indicated to the CSC they had not listened to the sermons in question beforehand and pledged to take steps to prevent such content in the future.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

On January 15, gunmen armed with heavy weapons attacked a restaurant and two hotels in Ouagadougou, killing 30 and wounding more than 50. A counterattack by Burkinabe and international forces killed three attackers and freed 176 people who had been trapped in one of the hotels. AQIM and Al-Mourabitoun claimed responsibility for the attacks, which they described in a statement as being targeted against the “enemies of religion.”

In July in the midst of a years-long dispute and an ongoing legal battle between the Muslim community and members of the Siamou ethnic group about ownership of a plot of land in Orodara, a group of Siamou youths looted and vandalized a Sunni mosque located on the disputed land. According to media reports, a recent addition to the mosque, built on land the Siamou community reportedly considered sacred, triggered the incident. Local and national authorities attempted unsuccessfully to mediate between the two groups. In August the minister of territorial administration, decentralization, and internal security met with delegations of the FAIB and ONAFAR to discuss the dispute in Orodara and encourage the parties to find a peaceful resolution. Both delegations stated they welcomed the initiative of the minister and said they were committed to bring key actors together to find “consensual and durable solutions.”

Members of the Burkinabe Muslim Community Organization, the Catholic Archdiocese of Ouagadougou, and the (Protestant) Federation of Evangelical Churches stated religious tolerance was widespread and numerous examples existed of families of mixed faiths.

Embassy staff regularly discussed incidents affecting religious freedom with the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Internal Security, including the incident in Orodara.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy officials met separately with Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant religious leaders throughout the country, at the local and national levels, to encourage their efforts to promote interfaith dialogue and advocate for religious tolerance and freedom.

The embassy organized a roundtable on religious freedom on September 15. Guests included two representatives of each of the Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant communities; the director of religious affairs at the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Internal Security; the president of the ONAFAR; and two journalists. The discussion focused on the participants’ views of the state of religious freedom in the country, ways to promote interfaith dialogue, and how to maintain peaceful coexistence among the various religious communities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 56.9 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the most recently available estimates, approximately 88 percent are Theravada Buddhists. Approximately 6 percent are Christians (primarily Baptists, Roman Catholics, and Anglicans, along with several small Protestant denominations). Muslims (mostly Sunni) comprise approximately 4 percent of the population. The Rohingya population, which is predominantly Sunni Muslim, is estimated at approximately 1 million by NGOs, with more than 800,000 stateless individuals in Rakhine State, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There are small communities of Hindus and practitioners of traditional Chinese and indigenous religions. There is a very small Jewish community in Rangoon.

There is significant correlation between ethnicity and religion. Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion among the majority Bamar ethnic group and also among the Shan, Rakhine, and Mon ethnic groups. Christianity is dominant among the Kachin, Chin, and Naga ethnic groups. Christianity also is practiced widely among the Karen and Karenni ethnic groups, although many Karen and Karenni are Buddhist and some Karen are Muslim. People of South Asian ancestry, who are concentrated in major cities and in the south central region, are predominantly Hindu or Muslim, although some are Christian. Islam is practiced widely in Rakhine State and in Rangoon, Irrawaddy, Magwe, and Mandalay Divisions by some Bamar and ethnic Indians as well as ethnic Kaman Muslims and Rohingya. Chinese ethnic minorities generally practice traditional Chinese religions and to a lesser extent Islam and Christianity. Traditional indigenous beliefs are practiced widely among smaller ethnic groups in the highland regions.

Legal Framework

The constitution states that every citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess and practice his or her religious beliefs. The constitution limits those rights if they threaten public order, health, morality, or other provisions of the constitution. It further provides that every citizen has the right to profess and practice his or her religion if not contrary to laws on security, law and order, community peace, or public order and morality.

The law prohibits deliberate and malicious speech or acts intended to outrage or wound the religious feelings of any class by insulting or defaming its religion or religious beliefs. The law also prohibits injuring, defiling, or trespassing on any place of worship or burial grounds with the intent to insult religion.

All organizations, whether secular or religious, are required to register to obtain official status. This official status is required for organizations to gain title to land, obtain construction permits, and conduct religious activities.

The law bars members of religious orders (such as priests, monks, and nuns) from running for public office, and the constitution bars members of religious orders from voting. The government restricts by law the political activities and expression of the Buddhist clergy (sangha). The constitution forbids “the abuse of religion for political purposes.” Although there is no official state religion, the constitution notes that the government “recognizes the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union.” The constitution “also recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Animism as the religions existing in the Union at the day of the coming into operation of this Constitution.”

The government bans any organization of Buddhist monks other than nine state-recognized monastic orders. Violations of this ban are punishable by immediate public defrocking and criminal penalties. The nine recognized orders submit to the authority of the State Sangha Monk Coordination Committee (SSMNC), the members of which are elected by monks.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Department for the Perpetuation and Propagation of the Sasana (Buddhist teaching) oversees the government’s relations with Buddhist monks and schools.

The package of four laws passed in 2015 for the “protection of race and religion,” remains in effect. The Buddhist Women Special Marriage law stipulates notification and registration requirements for marriages between non-Buddhist men and Buddhist women and introduces new obligations to be observed by non-Buddhist husbands and penalties for noncompliance. The Religious Conversion law regulates conversion through an extensive application and approval process. The Population Control Law allows for the designation of special zones for which population control measures could be applied, including authorizing local authorities to implement three-year birth spacing. The Monogamy Law bans polygamous practices, which were already criminalized under the country’s penal code.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

There were reports of killings, sexual abuse, arbitrary arrest, burning of structures, continued detention of Rohingya Muslims, restrictions on religious practice and travel, forced displacement, discrimination in employment, granting of building permits, and access to citizenship. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

Following October and November attacks on security forces that killed dozens, Burmese military and police forces conducted “security operations” that suspended access to humanitarian aid, independent media, and human rights monitors over a broad area. The government reported that during these operations in northern Rakhine State there were approximately 100 civilian deaths, 200 arrests, as well as 900 homes burned down. According to UNHCR, the operations displaced approximately 93,000 civilians, of which approximately 70,000 fled to Bangladesh. While close linkages between religion and ethnicity made it difficult to categorize alleged incidents of abuse as solely based on religion or ethnicity, some refugees in Bangladesh reported to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights instances in which security forces forcibly shaved the beards of imams and burned or desecrated Qurans. Human Rights Watch released satellite imagery showing at least 1,500 structures had been burned down during the “security operations” and said the Burmese military was responsible; the government said the buildings were burned down by “extremists.”

On December 30, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it would take back in 2017 2,415 Rohingya Muslims from the larger population of long-term refugees who were living in Bangladesh over the years that it had recognized as citizens of Burma.

On December 3, during conflict with ethnic armed groups, media reports indicated the Burmese military took refuge and stored weapons in the Saint Francis Xavier Catholic Church in Mong Ko, northern Shan State. According to reports, the military left the area following the battle and subsequently bombed the church to prevent armed groups from obtaining the weapons there. The government said that the church was damaged by ethnic armed groups during fighting. On December 24, Kachin State Baptist Pastors Dom Dawng Nawng and La Jaw Gam Hseng were reported missing after they helped journalists report on the bombed church, according media reports. Civil society groups reported that the military had arrested the pastors and held both incommunicado. The pastors’ whereabouts remained unknown at year’s end.

On October 6, a Maha Aungmye Township, Mandalay Division court sentenced Dutch tourist Klaas Haytema to three months of hard labor in prison for “disturbing religious assembly.” Haytema had originally been charged with a more serious charge of “defiling a place of worship” after he unplugged an amplifier sound system broadcasting a Buddhist sermon in September, but the court changed the charge upon conviction. Haytema said he had no intention of insulting religion and had unplugged the amplifier after it woke him up at night. He was released December 27.

In October three Muslim men stood trial for illegally importing over 90 cows intended for ritual slaughter during Eid al-Fitr after MaBaTha monks reportedly pressured local authorities to ban the practice. According to a news report, the police were looking for 30 other people in the case and a local Muslim leader said the case amounted to religious persecution. The cows were confiscated and kept in police custody, drawing criticism from social media users that the monks’ complaints led to a waste of public resources. The cows were subsequently released to a local market and the three men were released on bail. The trial remained unresolved at the end of the year.

On February 26, a court convicted interfaith activists Zaw Zaw Latt, Pwint Phyu Latt, and Zaw Win Bo of entering the country illegally and sentenced each to two years in prison and hard labor. On April 8, Zaw Zaw Latt and Pwint Phyu Latt were additionally convicted of unlawful association with banned organizations and each sentenced to an additional two years in prison. Zaw Win Bo was released April 17 through a presidential pardon while Zaw Zaw Latt and Pwint Phyu Latt remained in detention through the end of the year and continued to appeal the ruling.

Unlike in previous years, the government did not take action against individuals whose actions were construed to be insulting to religion. In January and April the president released and pardoned approximately 400 political prisoners and political detainees including Htin Lin Oo, an information officer of the National League for Democracy (NLD) who was detained in 2015 and charged with religious defamation for a public speech deemed as insulting Buddhism.

New Zealander Philip Blackwood was released from prison in January. Blackwood and two Burmese colleagues, Htut Ko Ko Lwin and Tun Thurein, were sentenced in 2015 to two and a half years of hard labor for posting an image to Facebook of the Buddha wearing headphones to promote their bar in Rangoon, and had been charged with insulting religion. Htut Ko Ko Lwin and Tun Thurein were not pardoned and remained in detention at the end of the year.

The government also released Shin Nyana, a monk sentenced in 2010 to 20 years in prison for teaching a religious doctrine that did not comport with Theravada Buddhism as part of the January presidential pardons.

Religious organizations said that an estimated 100 people of predominantly Buddhist faith had been arrested in violation of the Monogamy Law due to extramarital affairs, but that the 2015 laws adopted for the “protection of race and religion” remained largely unenforced around the country and the government did not draft any implementation guidelines. In July, however, the government defended the package of laws at the UN following criticism that it was discriminatory towards women. The Population Control Law drew local and international condemnation for providing the government the ability to designate geographic areas where a waiting period between births could be enforced, which some press and civil society groups said could disproportionately impact Muslim communities. The UN panel at the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women raised concerns that the law could be used to target ethnic minorities, such as Rohingya Muslims, and could allow state officials to enter into homes and perform spot checks. In response, the government delegation said there was no such thing in the country as targeting or marginalizing of minority groups, and that the law would be voluntary. As of the end of the year, the government said it had not used the law to designate any geographic area where a waiting period between births applied.

During the year, the number of Rohingya who left the country by boat to countries such as Thailand or Malaysia declined to its lowest level since 2011, with only a few hundred leaving the country by boat, and unlike in previous years, there were no reports of associated human rights abuses.

The government said it completed resettlement of all 3,700 internally displaced persons (IDPs) displaced by intercommunal violence in 2013 in Meiktila Township, Mandalay Division, completely closing the IDP camps at the beginning of the year. According to civil society and the government, the estimated 200 displaced persons who remained during the year resettled with family in Mandalay. The media reported some remaining IDPs were unable to return to their original homes and encountered barriers to resettling in neighboring communities. Some Muslim IDPs said they faced conflict from the residents of villages where they were resettled, who said they were trespassers. The Muslim IDPs said some of them were evicted by the villagers, and the township government and police said they could not guarantee their security. Interfaith leaders encouraged local governments to resolve these issues peacefully and indicated that by the end of the year all IDPs had resettled with family in other communities.

According to various religious organizations and NGOs, the registration process remained lengthy and, due largely to what they say is bureaucratic inefficiency in local administrative governments, was often not completed. Except in a few cases, however, organizations noted the lack of registration did not hinder the majority of religious practices.

There were reports of local authorities preventing Muslims from conducting prayer services at religious facilities in some villages.

There were approximately 3,900 Hajj pilgrims. The government expedited passport issuance for 280 of the pilgrims and simplified procedures for all Hajj travelers.

The government continued to subject all public events, including religious ceremonies and festivals, to security regulations and other controls. There were reports that any public religious event (i.e., outside a house of worship) required prior written permission from ward, township, police, district, and division-level authorities. All public religious celebrations also required prior written permission from religious affairs authorities and applications needed to be submitted approximately three weeks in advance. Some religious minority groups, primarily Christians and Muslims, reported longer delays in approving some of their applications.

Some Christian theological seminaries and Bible schools continued to operate, along with several madrassahs.

The government continued to fund two state sangha universities in Rangoon and Mandalay, respectively, which trained Buddhist monks under the purview of the SSMNC, as well as the International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University in Rangoon.

The government continued to financially support Buddhist seminaries and Buddhist missionary activities. Religious organizations said Buddhist groups generally did not experience difficulty obtaining permission to build new pagodas, monasteries, or community religious halls, in contrast with minority religious groups. According to religious organizations, the Ministry of Religious Affairs financially supported the SSMNC and religious ceremonies.

Some teachers at government schools reportedly continued to require students to recite Buddhist prayers, although such practices were no longer a mandated part of the curriculum. Many classrooms displayed Buddhist altars or other Buddhist iconography.

Due to movement restrictions, reportedly many Rohingya could not access education in state-run schools. Authorities did not permit Rohingya high school graduates from Rakhine State and others living in IDP camps to travel outside the state to attend college or university. Authorities continued to bar Muslim university students who did not possess citizenship scrutiny cards from graduating. These students were permitted to attend classes and take examinations, but they could not receive diplomas unless they claimed a “foreign” ethnic minority affiliation.

On June 30, in Lone Khin Village, Hpakant Township, Kachin State, following months of complaints by Buddhist villagers over reported illegal construction at a mosque, village administrators ordered the mosque to be dismantled despite the Muslim leaders reportedly providing the administrators with the requisite construction permits. The religious leaders of the mosque appealed to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the State Counsellor’s Office, but on July 1, a crowd estimated between 400 and 1,000 people marched to the mosque and burned it to the ground. There were no reports of injury from the attack. Nearly 30 Muslim families fled the village after the riot, according to media reports. On July 5, authorities in Kachin arrested five people in connection to the incident. No formal charges were filed and the five individuals were reportedly released on July 6. Police reportedly responded to prevent the mob violence but stated they were unable to intervene due to the size of the crowds.

On June 23, in Thaye Thamain Village, Waw Township, Bago Division, local leaders and media reported that an argument over the legality of new construction near a local mosque following a Facebook post led to a group of approximately 200 villagers to attack and injure the man building the new structure, destroying his home and the mosque itself. The structure was reportedly slated to be a storehouse with no religious purpose. No one was arrested following the attack; the local government said any arrests would only worsen local tensions and police reportedly did not further intervene due to the size of the mob. All 44 villagers who fled the violence returned home within two weeks of the incident.

Religious leaders continued to note delays by local authorities in issuing permits for repairs of non-Buddhist religious buildings, as well as on permits authorizing construction of new facilities around the country. Christian communities in Chin and Kachin States reported that while applications to local authorities for property registration, construction, and renovation were not denied, the applications encountered delays spanning several years or were lost altogether. These included continued reports that local government officials delayed permits to restore crosses previously destroyed, or to renovate and build Christian churches in Chin State. Local authorities in Chin State also continued to delay applications from Christian groups and churches from buying land in the name of their religious organizations. Religious groups said individual members circumvented this requirement by purchasing land on behalf of the group, a practice the government tolerated.

Christian and Muslim groups that sought to build small places of worship on side streets or other inconspicuous locations continued to be able to do so only with informal approval from local authorities, according to religious groups.

Muslim groups reported official building requests encountered significant delays, and even when approved could subsequently be reversed. They also reported it remained extremely difficult for them to acquire permission to repair existing mosques, although authorities permitted internal maintenance in some cases. Historic mosques in Meiktila in Mandalay Division, Mawlamyine in Mon State, and Sittwe in Rakhine State, as well as in Rangoon and other areas continued to deteriorate because authorities did not allow routine maintenance.

Rohingya were unable to obtain employment in any civil service positions. Rohingya couples needed to obtain government permission to marry. In addition, some Rohingya sources expressed concern about the two-child policy for Rohingya families, referring to a 2005 local order promulgated in northern Rakhine State.

In Rakhine State, the government and security forces imposed restrictions on the movement of various ethnic groups, particularly Rohingya Muslims, including IDPs, both before and during the violence beginning in October. The government stated it imposed these restrictions because of reported threats of violence received from members of Rakhine communities. These restrictions impeded the ability of Rohingya and some non-Rohingya Muslims to pursue livelihoods, gain access to markets and other basic services, and engage other communities. According to civil society groups, government officials denied this population access to basic services, including hospitals. Additionally, as the vast majority of the restricted groups in the area were Muslim, individuals stereotyped by security forces as appearing to be Muslim received additional scrutiny on movements in the region, regardless of their actual religion.

Restrictions governing the travel of foreigners, Rohingya, and others between townships in northern Rakhine State varied depending on the township, usually requiring submission of an immigration form. The traveler could obtain this form only from the Township Immigration and National Registration Department and only if that person provided an original copy of a family list, temporary registration card, and two guarantors. Travel was authorized under the form for 14 days. Authorities granted Muslims outside of Rakhine State more freedom to travel, but they still faced restrictions on travel into and out of Rakhine State.

Muslim community representatives reported that in some cases Muslim-owned businesses encountered significant delays to procure government contracts without a Buddhist “front” person. Media and religious sources said local authorities in some villages restricted the licensing and butchering of cattle by slaughterhouses, the vast majority of which are owned by Muslims, which negatively affected business operations and the ability of Muslim communities to celebrate Islamic holidays.

While the military and civil service continued outreach to various ethnic groups, including by inviting various ethnic groups to attend the Defense Services Academy in an effort to support a more ethnically and religiously diverse workforce; nearly all senior officials within the military and civil service remained Buddhist. Applications for civil service and military positions required the applicant to list his or her religion. Unlike in past years, there were no reports of officers being encouraged to convert to Buddhism in order to be promoted.

In June the government relaunched its citizenship verification exercise to address the status of the Rohingya in Rakhine State. As of the end of the year, more than 2,000 Rohingya and Kaman Muslims had gained either full or naturalized citizenship since the program began in 2015, primarily from Myebon and Kyaukpyu Townships. Recipients of naturalized citizenship were ineligible to participate in some political activities and professions, although all citizens had the right to vote. Although recognized by law as one of the 135 ethnic groups that automatically qualifies for citizenship, religious groups said some Kaman Muslims in Rakhine State chose to participate in the citizenship verification pilot as a quick means to gain status after being displaced by the 2012 violence and living in IDP camps alongside Rohingya. The government no longer required participants to identify as “Bengali” if they wished to be verified for citizenship, and did not permit race or religion on any of the forms at the earliest phases of the process. The government continued to call for Rohingya to participate but communities expressed a variety of objections to the exercise and the need for more assurances about the results of the process before taking part. Reportedly, the program initially received significant numbers of participants in Kyaukpyu and Myebon Townships, but was met with strong resistance in other townships of Rakhine State, with local Muslims rejecting the verification and identification forms, in some cases because individuals wanted to clearly state their ethnicity as “Rohingya” on their documentation. Reportedly, residents said they would not participate or accept the new cards until “Rohingya Muslim” was available as the identifying ethnicity and religion. Officials said they would not allow individuals to identify as such; government policy since May was to avoid using either terms of “Bengali” or “Rohingya,” saying both are emotive terms that could hinder progress between communities in Rakhine State.

Authorities required citizens and permanent residents to carry government-issued identification cards that permitted holders to access services and prove citizenship. These identification cards often indicated religious affiliation and ethnicity, but there appeared to be no consistent criteria governing whether a person’s religion was indicated on the card. The government also required citizens to indicate their religion on certain official applications for documents such as passports, although passports themselves do not indicate the bearer’s religion. Members of religious minorities, particularly Muslims, faced problems obtaining identification and citizenship cards. Some Muslims reported that they were required to indicate a “foreign” ethnicity if they self-identified as Muslim on applications for citizenship cards.

The SSMNC and the government denounced what they said was MaBaTha’s “propagation of conflict” and the government began drafting legislation to prohibit hate speech. On July 3, during a trip to Singapore following intercommunal violence against Muslims in Bago Division and Kachin State, Chief Minister of Rangoon Phyo Min Thein responded to questions about MaBaTha by stating the group was unnecessary. Despite criticism from MaBaTha, he clarified his statement on July 6 in Rangoon stating that MaBaTha was duplicative of the SSMNC and was an unnecessary, unofficial governing council of Buddhism in the country. MaBaTha said it would hold national protests absent an official apology. On July 8, MaBaTha said the government would be held responsible if it did not address the chief minister’s comments by July 14 – which the government refused to do. On July 13, during a plenary meeting, the SSMNC leaked a statement stating that no Sangha convention had endorsed MaBaTha’s legitimacy. This statement reportedly distanced the SSMNC from MaBaTha, delegitimized the organization in the eyes of many Buddhists around the country, and signaled that the group would be subject to state regulation. The Ministry of Religious Affairs continued to draft a law prohibiting hate speech through the end of the year and publicly warned MaBaTha that its existence would be uncertain if it continued using religion to spread conflict. MaBaTha subsequently reportedly called itself a religious missionary group committed to the peaceful resolution of religious conflict.

State-controlled media frequently depicted government officials and family members paying respect to Buddhist monks; offering donations at pagodas; officiating at ceremonies to open, improve, restore, or maintain pagodas; and organizing “people’s donations” of money, food, and uncompensated labor to build or refurbish Buddhist shrines nationwide. The government published and distributed books on Buddhist religious instruction.

Although the law prohibits mixing of religion and politics, some local political parties developed campaign slogans and platforms to protect Buddhism. According to civil society organizations, anti-Muslim campaign slogans leading into the 2015 elections declined following the elections. The Arakan National Party convened a meeting in June with Arakanese (ethnic Rakhine) “nationalists,” monks, and civil society organizations in Sittwe, Rakhine State, to launch a poster campaign protesting the government’s use of the term “the Muslim community in Rakhine State” to refer to Rohingya Muslims, calling for the government to instead refer to Rohingya as “Bengali,” reportedly to imply that they are undocumented immigrants from Bangladesh and not legal citizens of Burma. Earlier in June, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi had said the government would avoid using the term “Rohingya” when referring the group and instead use “‘the Muslim community in Rakhine State’ for the sake of harmony and trust between two communities.”

The government officially recognized a number of interfaith groups, including the Interfaith Dialogue Group of Myanmar, which organized monthly meetings and sponsored several religious activities promoting peace and religious tolerance around the country throughout the year. The group’s leadership included Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, and Hindu leaders as well as other religious groups.

The government permitted foreign religious groups to operate. Local religious organizations were also able to send official invitations for visa purposes to clergy from faith-based groups overseas, and foreign religious visitors acquired either a tourist or business visa for entry. Authorities permitted Rangoon-based groups to host international students and experts.

During clashes between government security forces and a militant group the government called Aqa Mul Mujahideen following the October attacks in northern Rakhine State, there were reports of reprisal killings inside the Rohingya community, with Rohingya killing other Rohingya for being informants or “collaborators” with the government.

MaBaTha published and spread what the government considered to be anti-Muslim hate speech in print and social media, although Buddhist religious leaders said its influence waned following the government and SSMNC denunciation in July. Wirathu, a MaBaTha monk, continued using social media to inflame religious tensions by using terms widely considered racially and religiously derogatory and divisive towards Muslims as well as calling for violence against Muslims, including following the October 9 attack in Rakhine State. There were reports anti-Muslim literature continued circulating in some communities and included incitement to violence.

On July 3, thousands of Buddhists in Rakhine State, including monks, participated in protests against the government’s announced use of the term “Muslim community in Rakhine State” to refer to Rohingya, and demanded that Rohingya be referred to as “Bengali.” The Buddhists also protested the government’s announced change in nomenclature from “ethnic Rakhine” to “the Buddhist community in Rakhine State,” saying ethnic Rakhine Buddhists originated from Rakhine State and that their identity should not be attenuated. The government withdrew use of “the Buddhist community in Rakhine State” the day following the protest.

There were reports of some local Buddhist-majority village leaders preemptively placing sign posts deterring Muslims from buying land or moving into the villages. In October ethnic Rakhine groups in Minbya Township distributed pamphlets encouraging residents to avoid trading, employing, or interacting socially with Muslims in villages in central Rakhine State. In Karen and Mon States there were anti-Muslim sermons and campaigns to prohibit business dealings between Buddhists and Muslims. In other areas, Buddhists reportedly would not sell or rent property to Muslims.

In April in Karen State, followers of monk Myaing Gyi Ngu constructed a stupa (a mound-like structure that contains relics and is used as a place of meditation) and planted a Buddhist flag in the St. Mark Anglican Church. His supporters said the land had previously held a Buddhist structure. They subsequently built a pagoda in Hlaingbwe, a Muslim-majority village, near a mosque. This was the third religious building commissioned by Myaing Gyi Ngu, following similar construction in Hpa-An in September 2015. According to media reports, Buddhist authorities, local government authorities, the Myanmar Baptist Convention, and ethnic armed groups in the area asked the monks to stop to prevent religious tensions, but construction continued unabated. According to news reports, to avoid further conflict, Bishop Saw Stylo of the Anglican Church and other Christian leaders allotted tracts of the land for the Buddhists and said they would not pursue actions against them.

In October a small group of Buddhist monks gathered at a longstanding madrassah in Thaketa Township, Rangoon Division, demanding the owners to show authorized permits for the building and its religious activities. The monks reportedly threatened those in the madrassah unless they stopped teaching. After the monks left, the madrassah owners reported the incident to local police who reportedly did not respond.

Buddhist and Muslim communities continued collaborating to quell rumors and prevent violence through formal and informal community-centered mechanisms. For example, in June in northern Shan State, stories reporting Muslim children had spray-painted images of the Buddha in a monastery began spreading through social media. Administrators of a local social media platform prevented photos of the vandalism from spreading further and worked with religious and community leaders to quell rumors and calm voices that were advocating violence. Subsequently, local police disciplined the children for vandalism and there were no reports of communal violence.

Religious and community leaders and civil society activists organized intrafaith and interfaith events and worked jointly to develop mechanisms to monitor and counter hate speech and to promote religious tolerance and diversity. A coalition of interfaith civil society groups worked throughout the year to draft legislation to counter hate speech and promote interfaith harmony. In Mandalay Division, various NGOs and interfaith leaders continued to hold meetings and public events to promote peace and religious tolerance for community leaders and youth. A number of interfaith groups continued mobilizing civil society around the country to promote religious tolerance. A leader active in the Interfaith Dialogue Group, Catholic Cardinal Charles Maung Bo, was honored for his work by the Parliament of the United Kingdom in May where his speech, widely covered in Burmese press, called on the international community to encourage the country’s new government to take action against hate speech, reinstate and allow humanitarian access to displaced communities, address citizenship issues for Rohingya Muslims, and establish a credible independent investigation with international experts into the crisis in Rakhine State. He also focused on the importance of truly democratic societies celebrating religious diversity and protecting the basic human rights of every person.

In June the Rangoon Heritage Trust NGO recognized the country’s only synagogue as a site of historical significance and heritage. Only 11 other buildings in the city have received similar recognition.

Senior U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State, the Ambassador, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator, the Deputy National Security Advisor, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Counselor of the State Department, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stability Operations, consistently raised ongoing U.S. concerns about religious freedom, the plight of the Rohingya in Rakhine State, hardships facing religious minority communities in Kachin and northern Shan states in the midst of ongoing military conflicts, and hate speech on social media. They and other U.S. government officials consistently called for long-term and durable solutions to the root causes of longstanding issues in Rakhine State and the lack of citizenship status for Rohingya Muslims, including a voluntary and transparent path to restoration and provision of citizenship, and the reinstatement of access to humanitarian aid for the Muslim-majority region. Embassy officials also urged government and interfaith leaders to improve efforts to mitigate religiously motivated violence such as that in Kachin State and Bago Division.

Embassy officials at all levels discussed the importance of addressing the lingering effects of past ethnoreligious-based violence and hate speech, including anti-Muslim rhetoric, and promoting religious freedom and tolerance in meetings with high-level government officials, including then-President Thein Sein, civilian Vice President Henry Van Thio, State Counsellor Suu Kyi, the ministers of foreign affairs, home affairs, and the president’s office, the deputy minister of religious affairs, the speaker of the lower house of parliament, parliamentarians, members of civil society, scholars, and representatives of other governments.

Embassy officials traveled to states containing ethnic minorities to discuss religious freedom and tolerance with state and local government officials, NGOs, and members of community-based organizations and religious communities. The Ambassador visited Rakhine and Kachin states, areas affected by ethnoreligious-based violence since 2012, and other areas that had suffered from and were identified as at risk of ethnoreligious conflict. An embassy-based conflict advisor traveled to nine states and divisions over the course of six months to analyze the root causes and effective prevention mechanisms of interreligious conflict. The Ambassador and embassy officials used this analysis to guide their public and official engagements with various religious leaders and organizations to promote religious tolerance. The Ambassador’s multiple visits to Rakhine State to assess the situation helped inform the embassy’s efforts and strategies in engaging the government and advocating for the rights of all communities in the state.

The embassy continued to call for respect for religious freedom, tolerance, and unity in its interactions with all sectors of society, and on its widely viewed Facebook page. Embassy representatives spoke out against intercommunal conflict and hate speech, and for religious freedom at high-profile events. Interfaith breakfasts hosted by the Ambassador, and publicized on Facebook, emphasized the value of bringing representatives together from diverse religious backgrounds. Embassy representatives, including the Ambassador, met repeatedly with Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, Hindu, and Muslim leaders, including ethnic minority religious leaders, members of faculties of theology, and other religiously affiliated organizations – including MaBaTha – and NGOs to promote religious freedom, diversity, and tolerance. The Ambassador hosted a breakfast on July 15 to bring civil society leaders and various faith communities together to discuss issues pertaining to religious freedom and communal relations in celebration of Eid al-Fitr. The embassy also shared multiple posts with its audience on Facebook about religious pluralism, tolerance, and shared identity in the United States.

The embassy regularly published statements highlighting concerns about religious-based tension and anti-Muslim discrimination as well as called for respect for religious diversity, unity, and tolerance. On April 20, the embassy released a statement on Rakhine State, welcoming the new government’s commitment to protect all communities. After the violent incident on October 9, the embassy issued a statement in support of the government’s stated efforts to resolve the underlying causing of conflict in Rakhine. U.S. Embassy facilities in Rangoon and Mandalay respectively also hosted numerous discussions for youth and civil society on religious tolerance. A U.S. government-sponsored program on supporting political and civic engagement provided several courses to civil society representatives on pluralism, as well as hosted a well-attended youth forum on interfaith advocacy in June. As in prior years, the embassy partnered with and supported numerous faith-based and civil society organizations working on programs promoting religious freedom and tolerance.

Since 1999, Burma has been designated as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On October 31, 2016, the Secretary of State redesignated Burma as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11.1 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2008 national census, 62 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 21.6 Protestant, 2.5 Muslim, and 2.3 Adventist. Another 6.1 percent have no religious affiliation and 3.7 percent belong to indigenous religious groups. The Muslim population lives mainly in urban areas, and the head of the Islamic Community of Burundi (COMIBU) estimates Muslims constitute closer to 10-12 percent of the population. Most Muslims are Sunni. There are some Shia Muslims and also a small Ismaili community. Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent include Jehovah’s Witnesses, Orthodox Christians, The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Hindus, and Jains.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes a secular state, prohibits religious discrimination, recognizes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and provides for equal protection under the law regardless of religion. These rights may be limited by law in the general interest or to protect the rights of others, and may not be abused to compromise national unity, independence, peace, democracy, or the secular nature of the state, or to violate the constitution. The constitution prohibits political parties from preaching religious violence, exclusion, or hate.

The government recognizes and registers religious groups through its law covering nonprofit organizations, which states these organizations must register with the Ministry of Interior. Each religious group must provide the denomination or affiliation of the institution, a copy of its bylaws, the address of its headquarters in the country, an address abroad if the local institution is part of a larger group, and the names and addresses of the association’s governing body and legal representative. Registration also entails identifying any property and bank accounts owned by the religious group. The ministry usually processes registration requests within two to four weeks. Leaders of religious groups who fail to comply or who practice in spite of denial of their registration are subject to six months’ to five years’ imprisonment.

The law does not generally grant tax exemptions or other benefits to religious groups. Some religious and nonreligious schools have signed agreements with the government entitling them to tax exemptions when investing in infrastructure or purchasing school equipment and educational materials.

According to the Ministry of Education, the official education program includes religion and morality classes in the curriculum for all secondary and primary schools. The program offers religious classes for Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam, although all classes may not be available if the number of students interested is insufficient in a particular school. Students are free to choose from one of these three religion classes or attend morality classes instead.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In March media sources reported President of the National Assembly Pascal Nyabenda accused the Catholic Church of playing a “purely political, not spiritual role” and said the government would not talk to “sponsors of terrorism.” A representative of the Association of Member Episcopal Conferences in Eastern Africa denied the Church was sponsoring violence and said government critics should not be deemed “terrorists.” In November Nyabenda publicly sought a rapprochement with the Church, appearing before thousands of church-goers in Bujumbura and asking for the Church’s assistance in engaging with international donors to encourage them to provide assistance to the country. He also asked the Church to support the government’s efforts to repatriate refugees.

In June the Conference of Catholic Bishops of Burundi (CCBB) issued a message read in all churches that expressed compassion for what they said were those who were suffering as a result of President Pierre Nkurunziza’s bid for a third term in 2015 and suggested ways forward. The CCBB characterized the president’s third term as a political crisis in the wake of killings, property destruction, thefts, exile, and economic deterioration. Their suggestions included ways to resolve the political crisis. The ruling party issued a counterstatement, which Catholic Church officials stated they perceived as an attempt to deter the Church from preaching freely on sensitive issues.

All of Eusebie Ngendakumana’s followers detained in prison were released after varying lengths of time in custody, according to Ngendakumana’s lawyer. Ngendakumana was accused of leading an unrecognized cult that formed after she reported seeing visions of the Virgin Mary in 2013. She was, however, never formally charged with any crime. Forty of her followers were convicted of rebellion against administrative orders and sentenced to prison from six months to five years. According to their lawyer, a number of those convicted were freed before the expiration of their sentences if they pledged to refrain from going on a pilgrimage to the location where the Virgin Mary was said to appear. Ngendakumana reportedly fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo with many of her followers in 2015.

A Catholic representative reported the University of Burundi chaplain and two other priests who fled the country in April 2015 had not returned as of the end of the year. The three fled after receiving anonymous death threats accusing them of supporting an insurgency against the government. The chaplain provided moral support to, and helped identify temporary shelter for, approximately 600 university students who sought refuge outside the U.S. embassy in April 2015 after authorities closed the university (including their housing) amid protests and violence related to the president’s re-election bid.

The government administration comprised both Christian and Muslim officials. The president was a Protestant while several prominent members of his cabinet were Catholic or Muslim.

Government benefits – such as tax waivers – were granted to religious groups for the acquisition of materials to manage development projects. According to the Burundi Revenue Authority, the Catholic Church was granted a tax waiver in August for the import of a car for one of its seminaries and another tax waiver was granted in October for construction materials for Office of the Development of the Archdiocese of Gitega, one of the Church’s development agencies.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The U.S. embassy continued to encourage and support broad based religious tolerance and dialogue.

The embassy encouraged societal leaders to support religious tolerance and promote interfaith discussion of the collaborative role religious groups could play in disseminating a message of peace and tolerance to the population.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 553,000 (July 2016 estimate). The national government’s statistics indicate 77 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 10 percent Protestant, 2 percent Muslim, and 1 percent does not identify with any religion. The second largest Christian denomination is the Church of the Nazarene. Other Christian denominations include Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Assemblies of God, Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, and other Pentecostal and evangelical groups. There are small Bahai and Jewish communities.

Legal Framework

The constitution states freedom of conscience, religion, and worship are inviolable rights and protects the right of individuals to choose, practice, profess, and change their religion, and to interpret their religious beliefs for themselves. It provides for the separation of religion and state and prohibits the state from imposing religious beliefs and practices on individuals. It prohibits political parties from adopting names associated with particular religious groups. The constitution prohibits ridiculing religious symbols or practices. Rights may only be suspended in a state of emergency or siege under the constitution.

Violations of religious freedom are crimes subject to penalties of between three months and three years in prison.

The law codifies the constitution’s religious freedom provisions by providing for equal rights and guarantees for all religions in accordance with the constitution and international law. The law separates religion and state, but allows the government to sign agreements with religious entities on matters of public interest. Specific sections of the law guarantee the protection of religious heritage, the right to religious education, freedom of organization of religious groups, and the free exercise of religious functions and worship.

A 2014 concordat between the government and the Holy See recognizes the legal status of the Catholic Church and its right to carry out its apostolic mission freely. The concordat further recognizes Catholic marriages under civil law, the right of Catholics to carry out religious observances on Sundays, and specifies a number of Catholic holidays as public holidays. It protects places of worship and other Catholic properties and provides for religious educational institutions, charitable activities, and pastoral work in the military, hospitals, and penal institutions. The concordat exempts Church revenues and properties used in religious and nonprofit activities from taxes and makes contributions to the Church tax deductible.

The law requires all associations, whether religious or secular, to register with the Ministry of Justice. The constitution states an association may not be armed; be in violation of penal law; or promote violence, racism, xenophobia, or dictatorship. To register, a religious group must submit a copy of its charter and statutes signed by its members. Failure to register does not result in any restriction of religious practice, but registration provides additional benefits such as exemptions from national, regional, and local taxes and fees. Registered religious groups may receive exemptions from taxes and fees in connection with places of worship or other buildings intended for religious purposes, activities with exclusively religious purposes, institutions and seminaries intended for religious education or training of religious leaders, goods purchased for religious purposes, and distribution of publications with information on places of worship. Legally registered churches and religious groups may use broadcast time on public radio and television at their own expense.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to grant privileges to the Catholic Church that other groups did not receive including in educational institutions, in government facilities, and in access to media. Some minority religious groups said this practice strengthened the perception the government favored the Catholic Church as the “official religion” over other religious groups. The government used Catholic Church representatives to inaugurate public buildings throughout the country. Public television transmitted religious programming paid for by the Catholic Church, most of which was of Catholic services. A Brazilian-owned television network (TV Record) covered the religious activities of the Universal Church. Other religious groups received minimal TV broadcast time reportedly because they did not request it or had no means to pay for it.

Muslim community leaders expressed concerns regarding the “nonlegalization” of mosques in the country, referring to the cases of individuals intending to open mosques in their residences and mentioned the existence of some restrictions when requesting visits to prisons in order to meet with Muslim prisoners. Prison authorities did not grant some requests to visit on Fridays to meet with prisoners and hold Friday prayers. Muslim leaders stated the registration process was straightforward.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy representatives promoted religious freedom in discussions with government officials at all levels, including the minister of parliamentary affairs (responsible for issues related to religion). After meeting with Islamic community representatives, embassy officials addressed issues raised in the meeting, including establishment of mosques and prison visits, with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice. The embassy also spoke with civil society representatives regarding religious freedom. Embassy representatives reiterated the importance of respecting religious freedom in formal meetings with the Catholic Church, the Muslim community, and the Church of the Nazarene, among others. The embassy also used social media channels to raise awareness about the need to protect religious freedom.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 16.0 million (July 2016 estimate). The 2013 Inter-censal Population Survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics said Buddhists make up 97.9 percent of the population, and an estimated 95 percent of the population is Theravada Buddhist, according to the Ministry of Cults and Religions (MCR). The vast majority of ethnic Khmer Cambodians are Buddhist. Ethnic Vietnamese who reside in the country traditionally practice Mahayana Buddhism although there are many who have adopted Theravada Buddhism. Other ethnic Vietnamese practice Roman Catholicism, and they make up the vast majority of Catholics in the country. Ethnic Vietnamese make up approximately 5 percent of the population. According to government estimates, approximately 2.6 percent of the population is Muslim, although some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) estimate the Muslim population to be 4 to 5 percent. The Muslim population is predominantly ethnic Cham, although not all Cham are Muslim. The Cham typically live in towns and rural fishing villages on the banks of the Tonle Sap Lake and the Mekong River, as well as in Kampot Province. There are four branches of Islam represented in the country: the Shafi’i branch, practiced by as many as 90 percent of Muslims in the country; the Salafi (Wahhabi) branch; the indigenous Iman-San branch; and the Kadiani branch. The remainder of the population includes Bahais, Jews, ethnic Vietnamese Cao Dai, and members of various Christian denominations.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of belief and religious worship, provided such freedom neither interferes with others’ beliefs and religions nor violates public order and security. The constitution establishes Buddhism as the state religion and provides for state support of Buddhist education; it also prohibits discrimination based on religion. The law requires that religious groups refrain from openly criticizing other religious groups, although this provision is rarely tested. The law also forbids religious organizations from organizing events, rallies, meetings, and training sessions that are politically focused.

The law requires all religious groups, including Buddhist groups, to register with the MCR to conduct religious activities. The law mandates that groups must inform the government of the goals of their religious organization, describe its activities, provide biographical information of all religious leaders, describe funding sources, commit to submitting annual reports detailing all activities, and refrain from insulting other religious groups, fomenting disputes, or undermining national security. Registration requires approvals from numerous local, provincial, and national government offices, a process which can take up to 90 days. The MCR, however, has no authority to punish religious groups for failing to register, and there are no associated penalties for failing to register. Registered religious groups receive an income tax exemption from the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

While the law formally bans non-Buddhist groups from door-to-door proselytizing and stipulates that non-Buddhist literature may only be distributed inside religious institutions, the MCR reports some Christian groups still carry out these activities without facing arrest. The law also prohibits offers of money or materials in order to convince people to convert.

The law requires separate registration of all places of worship and religious schools. Unregistered places of worship and religious schools may be shut down temporarily until they are registered, although the MCR reports it has not taken such action. The law also makes a legal distinction between “places of worship” and “offices of prayer.” The establishment of a place of worship requires that the founders own the structure and the land on which it is located. The facility must have a minimum capacity of 200 persons, and the permit application requires the support of at least 100 congregants. By contrast, an office of prayer may be located in a rented property and has no minimum capacity requirement. The permit application for an office of prayer requires the support of at least 25 congregants. Places of worship must be located at least two kilometers (1.2 miles) from each other and may not be used for political purposes or to house criminals or fugitives. The distance requirement applies only to the construction of new places of worship and not to offices of religious organizations or offices of prayer.

Religious schools must be registered with the MCR and the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport (MOEYS). Religious schools are advised to follow the MOEYS core curriculum which does not include a religious component; however, schools may supplement lessons with a religious curriculum in addition to the ministry-core curriculum. The government promotes Buddhist religious instruction in public schools in coordination with MOEYS, although non-Buddhist students were allowed to opt out of this instruction. The law does not mandate non-Buddhist religious instruction, and no other religions are taught in public schools. Non-Buddhist religious instruction may, however, be provided by private institutions.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

In early June the government closed Radio Sap Cham, a daily hour-long radio program broadcasting since 2004 on issues related to the preservation of Cham identity, language, religion, and culture. It was the only Cham-language radio program in the country and the closure drew criticism from the Cham community on social media. The government did not elaborate on the reasons for shutting down the program.

In June the Ratanakiri provincial government dispersed a group of approximately 50 ethnic minority Jarai Christians who had gathered for a Bible study session, saying they had not obtained proper permission from the local authorities. Later that month, provincial police briefly detained three ethnic Jarai and ordered them to delete photographs of prayer meetings stored on their personal electronic devices. Local media reported that authorities broke up the gatherings because of fears the group was focusing on political issues.

In September the National Election Committee released a statement reaffirming the rights of Muslims to wear religious headscarves or caps in voter registration photographs, marking a departure from previous restrictions against wearing headscarves and caps in photographs used for official identification documents.

The government continued to promote Buddhist holidays, provide Buddhist training and education to monks and others in pagodas, and provide financial support to an institute that performed research and published materials on Khmer culture and Buddhist traditions.

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, continued to hear testimony related to charges of ethnic- and religious-based genocide against the Cham population during the Khmer Rouge era from 1975 to 1979.

According to Radio Free Asia, in June authorities allowed police from Vietnam to question a group of approximately 150 Vietnamese Montagnard Christian refugees in Phnom Penh. Activist groups and the representatives of the UNHCR said refugees should not be subject to interviews from police of the country they fled. According to media reports, the Montagnards expressed fear following the questioning that the Cambodian government would deport them back to Vietnam, which they reportedly fled because of religious and other reasons. In a statement to Radio Free Asia, government officials said they were unaware of the Vietnamese police visit; some of the Montagnards said, however, that the Vietnamese police were accompanied by local police. In October the Ministry of Interior announced that a majority of the remaining Montagnards had not been granted asylum following extensive interviews, stating “their answers do not comply with the convention on refugees.” Local media initially reported the ministry provided them two weeks’ notice to leave the country or face arrest and immediate deportation to Vietnam. In December the UNHCR escorted 13 of the Montagnards back to their villages in Vietnam. Because religion, ethnicity, and politics are closely linked, it was difficult to categorize the government’s actions as being solely based on religious identity.

During Ramadan, Prime Minister Hun Sen hosted an iftar for members of the Muslim community. In his speech, he told his guests there was no basis for political discrimination in the country and called on Buddhist followers to be tolerant and accepting of the Muslim and Christian communities.

There were reports from some members of the Cham Muslim community of barriers to full integration into society. Local media reported some members of the majority Buddhist community and other minority ethnic groups continued to view the Cham with suspicion and superstition as purported practitioners of “black magic.” In some cases, those who were suspected of practicing black magic were killed by villagers or even their own family members. In April 62-year-old Soa Siv was beheaded by his daughter-in-law Mao Channy and her aunt Em Sun because they said he had killed Channy’s father with black magic.

In January unidentified individuals sent death threats and attacked teachers and school officials of a Muslim school for young women in a predominantly Cham community in Tbong Khmum Province, resulting in the deployment of police to protect the premises. In one instance, a rock thrown over the wall was reportedly wrapped in a piece of paper written with death threats mentioning the school’s founder and local Imam Muhammad Abdulrahman, as well as his son and the school’s teachers, according to Commune Police Chief Seng Ly. In other incidents, Abdulrahman reported unknown individuals throwing firecrackers against dormitory walls as students slept and placing feces in the water tanks from which students drink.

U.S. embassy officials raised religious freedom with MCR representatives and other government officials. Embassy officials also discussed the issue of deportation and residency of Montagnard Christians with government officials and members of international and local NGOs.

The embassy underscored the importance of acceptance of religious diversity with leaders of Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim groups, emphasizing the importance of interfaith tolerance in a democratic society. Embassy programs focused on faith-based communities and promoted pluralism through exchanges and youth programs.

The embassy continued several programs specifically focusing on the Cham population. One of the programs sought to help preserve Cham heritage, including religious heritage, through reading and writing instruction in the native Cham language, and included the preservation and study of religious artifacts from the ancient Kingdom of Champa from which present-day Cham trace their lineage. Another program consisted of a series of speaking engagements and focus groups in which Islamic leaders from around the world engaged with the Cham community to provide the Cham with a deeper understanding of the constructive role that various Muslim populations play throughout the world in their workforces and communities.

Other embassy programs invited Muslims to participate in workshops with guest speakers from throughout Southeast Asia. The workshops focused on interfaith cooperation, community leadership, and conflict resolution. Embassy officials toured the country on several occasions to meet members of the community, in the process promoting religious tolerance, showing respect for Cham culture, lessening the isolation of the Cham, and supporting Cham integration into the wider culture. They discussed ways the Cham could further integrate into society while preserving their cultural and religious identity, and lay the groundwork for genuine, long-lasting religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.5 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2003 census, the population is 51 percent Protestant, 29 percent Roman Catholic, 10 percent Muslim, and 4.5 percent other religious groups, with 5.5 percent having no religious beliefs. The nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Oxfam and Coef5 estimate the percentage of Muslims at up to 15 percent. Some Christians and Muslims incorporate aspects of indigenous beliefs into their religious practices.

Legal Framework

The Transitional National Charter, adopted in 2013, and the constitution, adopted by referendum in December 2015 and which went into effect on March 30 when the newly elected president was inaugurated, both provide for freedom of religion under conditions set by law and equal protection under the law regardless of religion. They prohibit all forms of religious intolerance and “religious fundamentalism,” which is not defined in law. They specify an oath of office for the head of state made “before God” that includes a promise to fulfill the duties of the office without any consideration of religion or faith.

Religious groups, except for indigenous religious groups, are required to register with the Ministry of the Interior, Public Security, and Territorial Administration. To register, religious groups must prove they have a minimum of 1,000 members and their leaders have adequate religious education, as judged by the ministry.

The law permits the ministry to deny registration to any religious group it deems offensive to public morals or likely to disturb social peace, and to suspend the operation of registered religious groups if it finds their activities subversive. Registration is free and confers official recognition and certain benefits, such as customs duty exemptions for vehicles or equipment. There are no penalties prescribed for groups that fail to register.

The law does not prohibit religious instruction in public or private schools, but it is not part of the public school curriculum.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to media reports and religious and civil society leaders, civilian authorities did not maintain effective control over the security forces. Human rights organizations stated the government did not take steps to investigate and prosecute officials who committed violations, whether in the security forces or elsewhere in the government, which they stated was a longstanding problem and one that fostered a climate of impunity. In June the government removed the commander of the Central Office for the Repression of Banditry following accusations of extrajudicial killings, but did not investigate or punish suspected perpetrators of human rights abuses.

Muslims continued to report harassment outside of PK5, a Muslim enclave in Bangui, and exclusion from national decision making. Muslim leaders cited situations where Muslims were treated as outsiders or as a different class of citizens, especially when requesting government services. Muslim leaders were reportedly harassed, beaten, and restricted from free movement in the country. According to a group of Muslim youth, after being identified as Muslim (by name or by appearance) by government officials, they were charged bribes and other fees exceeding those charged to Christians.

According to a truck driver in the PK5 neighborhood, when driving between Bangui and Bambari in September, Muslim drivers were systematically singled out at security checkpoints, harassed, and forced to pay money to police, gendarmerie, and FACA. The driver stated that officials seized and destroyed identity cards or other official documents of those who did not pay.

On June 24, the interior minister issued a statement that security services should not arrest citizens on the basis of their religion in response to an incident where members of the ex-Seleka in PK5 took six police officers hostage.

In February during his inaugural address, President Touadera pledged to be “the protector of the weak and the defender of the rights of all citizens, without exception.” Touadera appointed three Muslim ministers to his 23-member cabinet. Media sources reported his actions were intended to send a message of reconciliation which was reflected in the composition of the government. In previous years, the government received some criticism for not appointing more Muslims into senior government positions. In March a Muslim was elected president of the National Assembly.

Some government officials stated they intended to focus efforts on reconciliation among religious groups, although observers stated they made limited progress by year’s end. Following elections in March, President Touadera listed reconciliation among one of the highest priorities of the new administration and subsequently created the position of presidential advisor for national reconciliation. In his June 7 address to the National Assembly, Prime Minister Simplice Sarandji announced the government would establish a Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission intended to reconcile differences across religious lines, among other objectives. The commission was not active at year’s end. The Ministry of Social Affairs and National Reconciliation announced plans to establish Local Peace and Reconciliation Committees throughout the country, in accordance with a recommendation adopted at the May 2015 Bangui Forum. The committees were officially launched by President Touadera on December 21 in Bangui.

On June 27, President Touadera hosted an iftar at the presidential palace, reportedly the first time that a Central African president has done so. The government declared July 5 a public holiday in observance of Eid al-Fitr and September 12 a public holiday in observance of Eid al-Adha. The two holidays were added to the official permanent calendar of national holidays. Unlike corresponding Christian holidays, however, both were unpaid.

On September 14, President Touadera visited the Catholic Church of Fatima in the third district of Bangui where he joined a large congregation for Mass on the occasion of the Feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross. At the end of the Mass, the president delivered a speech encouraging the faithful to engage in social cohesion and donated money to support the IDPs taking refuge at the church compound.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

Armed groups, which generally operated freely in certain areas of the country, committed many of the actions affecting religious freedom. The government remained incapable of imposing its authority throughout the territory, preventing violations or ensuring the rule of law and the administration of justice, according to many observers.

Armed groups, such as the anti-Balaka (mostly Christian) and ex-Seleka (mostly Muslim), controlled significant swaths of territory throughout the country and acted as de facto governing institutions, according to media and UN reports.

Police and gendarmerie failed to stop or punish abuses committed by the ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka militias, including abductions, physical mistreatment, extortion, killings, and gender-based violence.

MINUSCA was deployed to multiple areas within the country in response to the rising violence between anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka elements in the second half of the year.

According to MINUSCA, clashes between the anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka militias broke out on September 16 in Kaga Bandoro, which resulted in the death of six Christian civilians and the injury of one peacekeeper.

The death of an ex-Seleka fighter on October 11 was quickly followed by a large clash in the northern town of Kaga Bandoro. According to reports, ex-Seleka fighters attacked the predominantly Christian town, including an IDP camp, a Catholic Church compound, and a school, which resulted in 30 people dead – including 12 ex-Seleka fighters – and over 40 wounded. According to MINUSCA, a local peace committee secured commitments from anti-Balaka and ex-Seleka fighters to allow freedom of movement for the local population which it said helped reduce tensions.

On October 4, an armed gang killed Marcel Mobeka, a high-ranking FACA military officer, in PK5. After Mobeka was killed, anti-Balaka and FACA elements killed several Muslims. President Touadera and his security team promised to apprehend the men responsible for the retaliatory killings; however, the government took no known action. The individuals responsible for killing Mobeka remained under the protection of ex-Seleka. According to the government, the act further fueled the sectarian violence within the capital.

On June 19, ex-Seleka fighters took six police officers hostage in the PK5 neighborhood. Police reported at least two people were shot and killed in the chaos. The police officers were released on June 24. According to media reports, the kidnapping was a retaliatory action after police arrested 26 residents suspected of illegally bringing in arms. The following day, fighting erupted within PK5 between MINUSCA and ex-Seleka elements, leading to the closing of the neighborhood’s sole police station. As of the end of the year, the police station had not reopened, which Muslim sources said contributed to greater insecurity within PK5.

On October 23, following the funeral of a Muslim who had been killed by anti-Balaka fighters in the village of Barya in Koui, an unknown number of Muslim community members and fighters from the armed group Return, Reclamation, and Rehabilitation (3R) killed one Christian man in retaliation. The 3R, comprising hundreds of predominantly Muslim armed fighters, was formed to protect the ethnic Peulh minority from anti-Balaka militias and controlled territory along the border with Cameroon, according to an international human rights organization.

According to the July UN Report of the Independent Expert, between January and June there were 63 documented cases of violence against people accused of practicing witchcraft. The report stated that for the most part anti-Balaka forces located in the capital and in the western part of the country committed these acts. Women were the most frequently accused, except in Bangui where these accusations were levied mainly against children. The report stated that accusations of witchcraft were more often than not actually attempts by armed groups to extort money from the victims.

MINUSCA reported that on August 29, ex-Seleka elements assaulted a 62-year-old man for practicing witchcraft near the town of Bria. MINUSCA also reported that on November 7 two suspected anti-Balaka individuals in Bandjiti village killed a 55-year-old woman accused of witchcraft.

While most observers stated violent conflict and instability in the country had other sources, religion continued to be used as a tool to divide the population. Many but not all members of the ex-Seleka and its factions were Muslim, having originated in neighboring countries or in the remote Muslim north. Members of the anti-Balaka were mostly Christian and continued to control the western part of the country. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

On June 11, an assailant robbed and stabbed to death a Muslim motorcycle taxi driver in Bangui. The killing was reportedly regarded as a direct attack on Muslims by many in the PK5 neighborhood. Two Christians were subsequently killed on June 12, in what observers described as a revenge killing in response to the incident the night before.

According to MINUSCA, on October 20, assailants killed a Muslim man in Bangui, cut his remains into pieces, and deposited them at the Central Mosque. In retaliation, assailants abducted a Christian man, although it was unclear whether he was safely returned to his family.

On October 23, MINUSCA reported a Muslim was severely beaten and presumed dead following a fight with a Christian and thrown into the Sangha River. He reportedly regained consciousness and was rescued by Muslims.

On November 17, individuals conveyed three Muslim men to the Kouango health center following an attack by a group of anti-Balaka militiamen in Bangao and Pende. The town was reportedly deserted the next morning and seven houses were burned.

On November 6, a government official and a Muslim community leader each confirmed that four men armed with automatic weapons and hand grenades interrupted a church service in Bangui’s predominantly Muslim third district and threatened the worshippers. The men chased members of the congregation and caused some damage to church property. The individuals were arrested shortly after the incident by members of a self-defense group and later released.

The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bangui led an interfaith peace march on October 12 through the third district.

Hate speech and negative comments about or directed toward Muslims were still common in most media outlets. Private media outlets reportedly continued to be heavily influenced by their financers, generally representing a Christian perspective, and led by Christian editors. There has been no Muslim-operated radio station or Muslim-oriented program on the national radio station since September 2015.

Muslims continued to report facing consistent social discrimination, including an inability to move freely and therefore feeling “marginalized” by a lack of access to schools, hospitals, and basic necessities, including services provided by the government, as well as those provided by private donors and organizations. One imam in PK5 raised concerns about discrimination due to religious beliefs and the difficulties in carrying out commercial activities. Muslims also expressed a general discomfort in wearing traditional dress outside of the PK5 enclave, stating it drew negative attention or comments from non-Muslims.

Muslims reported facing several challenges within their community, including identity, discrimination, and internal division over leadership. A conference focused on intra-Muslim dialogue in Vienna from February 25-26 to addressed concerns over leadership, the marginalization of Muslim women in social cohesion work, policies and practices of discrimination against Muslims, and the role of Islam in the country.

The Lakouanga Mosque in Bangui, destroyed for a second time during intercommunal violence in September 2015, reopened in April. A Muslim cemetery in Bangui closed in October due to ongoing tensions reopened on December 13.

The Muslim community in the third district and the Christian community of Bimbo signed a “nonaggression and community reconciliation pact” at a public ceremony on February 11. The pact guaranteed free access for Muslims to an important Muslim burial ground in Bimbo’s Boeing neighborhood. Muslims had been unable to access the cemetery since September 2015 and were forced to bury their deceased at home. The pact was reported as a step forward for interfaith relations.

On December 11, Muslims and Christians attended a symbolic reconciliation ceremony at a Mass at Bangui stadium.

The Interreligious Platform, consisting of members from the Protestant, Catholic and Muslim faiths, continued to spread messages of peace and reconciliation throughout the country. In September the platform outlined its plan to expand the scope and geographical reach of its activities, including the establishment of health clinics, vocational education programs, and a radio station to promote peace and social cohesion. According to the Interreligious Platform, the newly elected government had a perceived lack of interest in engaging with it.

The U.S. Ambassador raised religious freedom concerns and encouraged outreach to all religious communities in high-level meetings, including with President Touadera, the presidential advisor for national reconciliation, and the minister of social affairs and reconciliation.

The Ambassador and embassy officials engaged regularly with religious leaders, including the leaders of the Interreligious Platform, the Imam of the Central Mosque, and the Coordinating Committee for Central African Muslim Organizations on issues related to religious freedom and reconciliation, and discussed ways to broaden access and dialogue to elected officials.

In January the Ambassador met with members of a Muslim Youth Association and a Muslim student organization to discuss the concerns of young Muslims and ways to promote tolerance and social cohesion.

In May the Ambassador delivered remarks at the Central African Interfaith Peacebuilding Partnership launching ceremony. In June the embassy organized a leadership training workshop on resolving identity-based conflicts. Participants included imams, youth leaders, women, and members of community-based organizations in PK5. The program came about after community members stated that the neighborhood suffered from a divisive identity crisis that interfered with reconciliation.

In February the Ambassador attended the burial of three Muslims who had been killed in a car accident. The event was the first burial at the Muslim cemetery in the Boeing community in predominantly Christian Bimbo following the signing of the “nonaggression and community reconciliation pact” between Christians in Bimbo and Muslims in the third district. Muslims had previously been unable to access the cemetery.

On July 6, the U.S. Ambassador joined President Touadera for a visit to Bangui’s Lakouanga Mosque for Eid al-Fitr. The president called the mosque, which was rebuilt after being destroyed during the intercommunal violence in September 2015, a “symbol of reconciliation.”

During a visit in March the U.S. Ambassador to the UN delivered remarks at a reception honoring the inauguration of President Touadera in which she paid tribute to the religious leadership in the country and its work to promote peace. She also traveled to the Boeing community in Bimbo to visit the site of the Muslim cemetery. While there, the UN Ambassador participated in a meeting with Christian and Muslim members of the community to hear their concerns and express U.S. commitment to peace and reconciliation.

During a visit in September and October, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom met with Muslim and Christian leaders, government officials, and residents of Christian and Muslim IDP camps to discuss progress on religious tolerance and reconciliation since the installation of the elected government. He also discussed continuing challenges faced by citizens, especially Muslims and IDPs.

In October a visiting Assistant Secretary of State met with senior government and UN officials, civil society, and religious leaders to discuss issues related to reconciliation and inclusivity, the protection of civilians and atrocity prevention, and community violence reduction. He visited PK5 and met with residents to better understand the ongoing struggles faced by Muslims in Bangui under the new government; he also met with the Imam of the Central Mosque.

In April a visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, along with the U.S. Ambassador, visited Bangui’s Central Mosque. He also met with Muslim leaders, officials from the newly installed government, and residents of Muslim and Christian IDP camps to discuss challenges facing the Muslim community, particularly in the PK5 district, and displaced persons.

In February the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, the Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic States, and an embassy official participated in the conference in Vienna focused on intra-Muslim dialogue and capacity building in the Central African Republic. In their remarks, both the Ambassador at Large and the Special Envoy reiterated the U.S. government remains a committed partner to faith communities in the country and encouraged religious solidarity, tolerance, and a peaceful resolution to ongoing conflict.

An officer from the Department of State’s Office of International Religious Freedom visited Bangui in June to meet with religious leaders, Muslim and Christian youth, and civil society organizations working on mediation programs in Bangui. The embassy increased its outreach to Muslim youth and community members in its public events and program of exchanges to the United States.

On June 29, the U.S. Ambassador hosted an iftar, bringing together members of the Muslim community and non-Muslim government officials and representatives of international organizations. During the iftar, the Ambassador asked all participants to adhere to a sense of community and mutual understanding while also promoting peace and stability. There were 48 participants, including representatives from 20 Muslim organizations, the Interreligious Platform, the minister of reconciliation, the presidential advisor on reconciliation, and two of the cabinet’s four Muslim ministers.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 11.9 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the Second General Population Census (2009), approximately 58 percent of the population is Muslim, 18 percent Roman Catholic, 16 percent Protestant, and the remaining 8 percent practices indigenous religious beliefs. Most Muslims adhere to the Sufi Tijaniyah tradition. A small minority hold beliefs associated with Wahhabism or Salafism. The majority of Protestants are evangelical Christians. There are also small numbers of Bahais and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Most northerners practice Islam, and most southerners practice Christianity or indigenous religions; religious distribution is mixed in urban areas.

Legal Framework

The constitution establishes the state as secular and affirms the separation of religion and state. The constitution provides for freedom of religion and equality before the law without distinction as to religion. These rights may be regulated by law and may only be limited by law to ensure mutual respect for the rights of others and for the “imperative” of safeguarding public order and good morals. It prohibits “denominational propaganda” that infringes on national unity or the secular nature of the state.

Under the law, all associations, religious or otherwise, must register with the Ministry of Territorial Planning, Urban Development, and Housing. The associations must provide a list of all the founding members and their positions in the organization, the founders’ resumes, copies of the founders’ identification cards, minutes of the establishment meetings, a letter to the minister requesting registration, the principal source of the organization’s revenue, the address of the organization, a copy of the rules and procedures, and the statutory documents of the organization. The Ministry of Public Security and Immigration conducts background checks on every founding member and establishes a six-month temporary but renewable authorization to operate, pending the final authorization and approval. Failure to register with the ministry may lead to the banning of a group, one month to a year in prison, and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 CFA francs ($80 to $804). Organizations that fail to register are not considered legal entities and may not open a bank account or enter into contracts. Registration does not confer tax preferences or other benefits.

Burqas, defined in a ministerial notice as a burqa, or any other garment where one sees only the eyes, are forbidden in the entire national territory by ministerial decree.

The constitution states public education shall be secular. The government prohibits religious instruction in public schools but permits religious groups to operate private schools.

The government-created High Council for Islamic Affairs (HCIA) oversees Islamic religious activities, including some Arabic-language schools and institutions of higher learning, and represents the country at international Islamic forums. The Salafi community is not a party to the council. The Grand Imam of N’Djamena, who is selected by a committee of Muslim elders and approved by the government, is the de facto president of the HCIA and oversees the grand imams from each of the country’s 23 regions. He has the authority to restrict Muslim groups from proselytizing, regulate the content of mosque sermons, and control activities of Islamic charities.

The constitution states military service is obligatory and prohibits invoking religious belief to “avoid an obligation dictated by the national interest.” The government does not enforce conscription, however.

The Office of the Director of Religious and Traditional Affairs under the Ministry of Territorial Planning, Urban Development, and Housing oversees religious matters. The office is responsible for mediating intercommunal conflict, reporting on religious practices, coordinating religious pilgrimages, and ensuring religious freedom.

According to regulations of the government board that oversees the distribution of oil revenues, Muslim and Christian leaders share a rotational position on the board.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government maintained its ban on the leading Salafist association but anecdotal evidence suggested that enforcement of this ban proved difficult. Those practicing this interpretation of Islam continued to meet and worship in their own mosques.

On July 6, during a speech marking the Eid al-Fitr Muslim holiday at the end of Ramadan, Prime Minister Albert Pahimi Pakacke stated that religious leaders of different faiths, through their prayers and actions, were the cornerstone of the country’s peace. Religious leaders of various faiths, diplomats, and other officials all attended the speech. The prime minister called on religious leaders to intensify interreligious dialogue and to continue to raise awareness about what he termed the trap of religious extremism. The prime minister congratulated young people who helped secure places of worship by using their own funds to purchase metal detectors, participating in interfaith vigilance committees, monitoring perimeters, and sometimes searching individuals entering places of worship to ensure that people could worship safely. On several occasions, Muslims and Christians coordinated this security jointly.

President Idriss Deby Itno encouraged religious tolerance in public statements and urged religious leaders to promote peaceful relations among religious groups. During the celebration of Eid al-Adha in September, political and religious authorities called on all religious groups to coexist peacefully and promote national unity. The president remarked, “The interreligious dialogue which has already proved its worth must be maintained on a permanent and lasting basis.” During a December 14 meeting with members of the Episcopal Conference, The president reiterated his appreciation of the religious leaders’ efforts for peaceful cohabitation in the country. He encouraged them to continue building a foundation of peace among different religious groups.

On April 23, the Episcopal Conference of Chad (CET) dedicated a new headquarters building constructed with financial support from the government. The structure centralized the CET’s various organizations working in the service of education, health, justice, peace, and rural development. On October 15, the prime minister, accompanied by several cabinet members, represented the president at Catholic Archbishop Edmond Djitangar’s installation ceremony.

The government conducted a long running public education campaign in the national media to inform people of the burqa ban; however, during the year there were no known prosecutions for violating this ban.

The government generally did not fund construction or maintenance of places of worship. The government offered, however, to contribute partial funding towards the construction of the country’s first Catholic basilica, as well as restoration of the Catholic Notre Dame Cathedral in N’Djamena. Both construction projects remained incomplete at the end of the year.

In May a group that included foreign government officials and representatives of Sufi and Salafi Islamic traditions met in N’Djamena to examine the state of relations between the Sufi and Salafi communities. The group concluded that intra-Muslim tensions in the country were high, pointing to the absence of a Salafi representative in the HCIA as a particular concern.

Religious leaders, including the secretary of the Chadian Churches and Evangelical Mission for Harmony, the vice president of the Catholic Church’s Episcopal Conference of Chad, and the HCIA publicly stated they supported the president’s statements advocating religious tolerance.

Religious leaders continued to raise awareness of the risks of terrorist attacks and to advocate for security in places of worship. In July during Eid al-Fitr, the imam of the Great Mosque of Am-Djarass stated, “Anyone who kills in the name of Islam is a disbeliever. Islam is far from these barbaric acts.”

The Regional Forum on Interfaith Dialogue, comprising representatives of evangelical Protestant churches, the Catholic Church, and the Islamic community, met three times during the year to promote religious tolerance and combat prejudice.

On July 6, during Ramadan, members of the HCIA discussed the country’s socio-economic challenges, peaceful interreligious coexistence, and global terrorism. They pledged to support the government in the fight against religious extremism, and made speeches explaining the purpose of the burqa ban. The HCIA and Radio al-Quoran used positive messaging to strengthen communities and counter religious extremism.

In October local Roman Catholic bishops called for “a new Chad,” committing the Church to supporting development, education, health care, and national reconciliation, with particular emphasis on Christian unity and interreligious dialogue. They denounced corruption and mismanagement of land resources, advocated for reform of international donor cooperation, and reminded government authorities and citizens about the value of education.

Muslims and Christians commonly attended each other’s ceremonies and celebrations. For example, Christians regularly attended iftars celebrating Muslim holidays, and in October, several imams attended the installation of the new Catholic Archbishop of N’Djamena.

The Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights visited the country in October to discuss strategies for combating violent religious extremism with the president and other government officials. She also met with staff at Radio al-Quoran and imams from the HCIA.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy representatives met with N’Djamena’s grand imam and with Catholic and Protestant leaders to monitor and promote religious freedom and tolerance and to discuss efforts to counter extremist messages. The Ambassador attended events of the Union of Quranic Schools, including the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday. The Ambassador hosted an iftar attended by more than 40 religious leaders, including Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and Bahai representatives, and government officials. At the iftar, attendees discussed religious freedom and tolerance in the country. Embassy officials met regularly with imams in training sessions and workshops to promote tolerance and human rights.

The U.S. government provided funding to the nongovernmental organization Equal Access, which worked with religious leaders of all faiths to promote moderate messaging on community radio stations. For example, Equal Access created and promoted moderate content for programming on Muslim radio stations.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 795,000 (July 2016 estimate). The U.S. government estimates the population is 98 percent Sunni Muslim. Roman Catholics, Shia, Sufi, and Ahmadi Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Protestants together make up less than 2 percent of the population. Non-Muslims are mainly foreign residents and are concentrated in the country’s capital, Moroni, and the capital of Anjouan, Mutsamudu. Shia and Ahmadi Muslims mostly live in Anjouan.

Legal Framework

The constitution states Islam is the state religion and citizens shall draw the state’s governing principles and rules from Islamic tenets. It proclaims equality of rights and obligations for all individuals regardless of religion or belief. A law establishes the Sunni Shafi’i doctrine as the “official religious reference” and provides sanctions of five months to one year imprisonment and/or a fine of 100,000 to 500,000 Comorian francs ($216 to $1,081) for campaigns, propaganda, or religious practices or customs in public places which could cause social unrest or undermine national cohesion.

Proselytizing for any religion except Sunni Islam is illegal, and the law provides for deportation of foreigners who do so. The penal code states “whoever discloses, spreads, and teaches Muslims a religion other than Islam will be punished with imprisonment of three months to one year and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 Comorian francs” ($108 to $1,081).

There is no official registration for religious groups. The law allows Sunni religious groups to establish places of worship, train clergy, and assemble for peaceful religious activities. It does not allow non-Sunni religious groups to assemble for peaceful religious activities in public places.

The proselytizing or performance of non-Sunni religious rituals in public places is prohibited on the basis of “affronting society’s cohesion and endangering national unity”. Without specifying religion, the penal code provides penalties for the profaning of any spaces designated for worship, interfering with the delivery of religious leaders in the performance of their duties, or in cases where the practice of sorcery, magic, or charlatanism interferes with public order.

By law the president nominates the grand mufti, the senior Muslim cleric who is part of the government and manages issues concerning religion and religious administration. The grand mufti heads an independent government institution called the Supreme National Institution in Charge of Religious Practices in the Union of the Comoros. The grand mufti counsels the government on matters concerning the practice of Islam and Islamic law. The grand mufti chairs and periodically consults with the Council of Ulema, a group of religious elders cited in the constitution, to assess whether citizens are respecting the principles of Islam.

The law provides that before the month of Ramadan, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the Council of Ulema publish a ministerial decree providing instructions to the population for that month.

The government uses the Quran in public primary schools for Arabic reading instruction. There are more than 200 public schools with Quranic instruction. The tenets of Islam are sometimes taught in conjunction with Arabic in public and private schools at the middle school and high school levels.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government did not consistently enforce the law prohibiting proselytizing and did not prosecute any such cases during the year.

In October just before Ashura, the minister of the interior issued a ban on non-Sunni religious practices. Several Shia Muslims nonetheless observed Ashura in private residences. After a video of their activities appeared on Facebook, gendarmerie officers arrested Shia clerics and temporarily detained them in Moroni and Mutsamudu. A number of blogs and media articles criticized the intervention as illegal. A Sunni cleric in Anjouan stated the detention of the Shia clerics during Ashura was justified because they were considered to be practicing “in public.” Given the alleged razing of nine or 10 Shia mosques over the years, the imam allocated a part of his home as a “mosque” and invited his congregation to worship there. The Sunni cleric explained that local religious authorities understood “in private” to mean “with your immediate family only.” This case was never tried in court, however.

Gendarmes in Mutsamudu prevented Ahmadi Muslims from celebrating the inauguration of the first Ahmadi mosque in the country, which opened on October 21.

During the year the minister of interior banned alcohol consumption and daytime swimming during Ramadan, which the police enforced.

The grand mufti regularly addressed the country on the radio, applying Islamic principles to social issues such as delinquency, alcohol abuse, marriage, divorce, and education.

Almost all children between the ages of three and six attended private, informal schools at least part-time to learn to read and recite the Quran. During the year, the government announced its plans to expand religious and Arabic teaching to all public schools to further reduce the demand for unlicensed and unregulated private classes and reduce the potential for abuse in private facilities.

The government funded an Islamic studies program, known as the Faculty of Arabic and Islamic Science (Imam al-Shafi’i Faculty) within the country’s only public university. The government stated it initiated this step in 2003 to ensure the availability of local educational opportunities and to respond to concerns that youth who studied abroad in countries with differing or no Islamic traditions could return home and attempt to influence what the government considered to be the moderate Sunni tradition on the islands. The government restricted study by its citizens in Iran and Pakistan.

As in previous years, there were reports communities unofficially shunned from their activities individuals who were suspected of converting from Islam to Christianity. Societal abuse and discrimination against non-Muslim citizens persisted, particularly against Christians or those who were converts from Islam. Non-Muslim foreigners reported little to no discrimination. All citizens faced pressure to practice elements of Islam, particularly during Ramadan. Most societal pressure and discrimination occurred behind closed doors at the village level. The extent of de facto discrimination typically depended on the level of involvement of local Islamic teachers. Most non-Muslim citizens reportedly did not openly practice their faith for fear of societal rejection. Persons who raised their children with non-Muslim religious teachings faced societal discrimination. Societal pressure and intimidation continued to restrict the use of the country’s three churches to non-citizens.

There is no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in the country. Representatives from the U.S. embassy in Antananarivo, Madagascar visited the country and engaged with government officials on issues of religious freedom, including the minister of justice, the minister of interior, the commander of the gendarmerie, and the governors of Anjouan and Moheli. Embassy representatives met with the minister of education to discuss madrassas. Embassy officers also met with Muslim religious and civil society leaders and others on issues of religious freedom, including the NGO Service d’Ecoute.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 11.2 million (July 2016 estimate). There is no independent, authoritative source on the overall size or composition of religious groups. The Roman Catholic Church estimates 60 to 70 percent of the population identify as Catholic. Membership in Protestant churches is estimated at 5 percent of the population. Pentecostals and Baptists are likely the largest Protestant denominations. The Assemblies of God reports approximately 110,000 members and the Four Baptist Conventions estimate their combined membership at more than 100,000 members. Jehovah’s Witnesses estimate their members at 96,000; Methodists at 36,000; Seventh-day Adventists at 35,000; Anglicans, 22,500; Presbyterians, 15,500; Episcopalians, 6,000; Quakers, 300; and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), 100. The Jewish community estimates it has 1,500 members, of whom 1,200 reside in Havana. According to the Islamic League, there are 2,000 to 3,000 Muslims residing in the country, of whom an estimated 1,500 are Cubans. Other religious groups include Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Buddhists, and Bahais.

Many individuals, particularly in the African Cuban community, practice religions with roots in West Africa and the Congo River Basin, known collectively as Santeria. These religious practices are commonly intermingled with Catholicism, and some require Catholic baptism for full initiation, making it difficult to estimate accurately their total membership.

Legal Framework

According to the constitution, “the state recognizes, respects, and guarantees freedom of religion” and states “different beliefs and religions enjoy the same considerations under the law.” The constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion. It also declares the country to be secular and provides for the separation of church and state, but says “the Communist Party of Cuba …is the superior leading force of the society and the State…”

The MOJ, which includes the ORA, regulates religious institutions and the practice of religion.

By law, religious groups are required to apply to the MOJ for official recognition. The application process requires religious groups to identify the location of their activities, their proposed leadership, and the source of their funding. Once the ministry grants official recognition, the religious group must request permission from the ORA to conduct activities such as holding meetings in approved locations, publishing major decisions from meetings, receiving foreign visitors, importing religious literature, purchasing and operating motor vehicles, and constructing, repairing, or purchasing places of worship. Groups that fail to register may face penalties ranging from fines to closure of their organizations.

Military service is mandatory for all men. For religious groups that actively oppose military participation, there are no legal provisions exempting their members as conscientious objectors; in practice, the authorities allow conscientious objectors to perform alternative service.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Religious and human rights groups stated that the government harassed and detained outspoken religious figures, especially those who discussed human rights or collaborated with independent human rights groups. Government security forces took measures, including detentions that were sometimes accompanied by violence, which inhibited the ability of members of the peaceful protest group Ladies in White to attend Catholic Mass. According to a researcher for the charity Open Doors, Christians were harassed and subject to strict surveillance and discrimination, including occasional imprisonment of leaders. The researcher added that “all believers are monitored and all church services are infiltrated by informers.” Some independent evangelical Christian churches said government authorities closely monitored and detained, for unspecified periods of time, their leadership and members of their families. CSW reported that Baptist pastor Reverend Mario Felix Lleonart Barroso was arrested on March 20 and his wife was put under house arrest. CSW reported Lleonart Barroso was denied food, water, and necessary medical care while in detention and that the phone lines to his house were cut.

CSW published a report in January that stated there was an increase in what it termed violations of freedom of religion and belief from 220 in 2014 to 2,300 in 2015. The report stated that the majority of the incidents involved the government declaring illegal more than 2,000 Assemblies of God churches, the forced closure or dismantling of Assemblies of God churches, and the expropriation of church properties from various Christian denominations. The report also stated there were numerous detentions, many involving individuals who were forcibly removed from Sunday worship services. The leadership of the Assemblies of God said in September that the Church had reached an oral agreement with the government to keep its churches open and that the forced closure of churches had ceased.

Morning Star News, a Christian news agency, reported the sentencing of Pastor Juan Carlos Nunez to house arrest for one year for “disturbing the peace.” His case was under appeal at year’s end. According to Nunez, his neighbors complained that his speakers were too large and loud during his Sunday sermons. He stated he reduced the size of the speakers, but neighbors and police said the volume was still too loud. Nunez’s church was part of the apostolic movement, an unregistered network of Protestant churches. The authorities dismantled the church structure, which was located on his private property, on January 8 and the 550 members had to meet in the courtyard of the house since that time. The report stated Nunez was sentenced before his attorney had adequate time to defend him.

CSW reported the dismantling of an Apostolic Church in Las Tunas on April 9. The church’s pastor, Reverend Mario Jorge Travieso, stated he was detained by authorities during the dismantling process and threatened with seven years’ imprisonment if he spoke publicly about the incident.

In January the government dismantled at least two other open-air structures that members of the evangelical apostolic movement used as unregistered churches.

Many religious leaders stated they stayed away from overtly political topics. Some said they feared their direct or indirect criticism of the government could result in government reprisals, such as denials of permits from the ORA, dismantling of religious buildings, or other measures that could limit the growth of their religious groups.

The ORA allowed the use of private homes, known as “house churches,” for religious services but required that applicant groups be recognized and seek approval for each proposed location through the formal registration process. Many religious groups used private homes as house churches in response to restrictions on constructing new buildings. Estimates of the total number of house churches for Protestant groups varied significantly, from fewer than 2,000 to as many as 10,000. Religious groups said authorities approved many applications within two to three years from the date of the application, but did not respond to or denied other applications arbitrarily.

According to the Protestant community, some groups were only able to register a small percentage of house churches. In practice, most unregistered house churches reportedly operated with little or no interference from the government. A number of religious groups, including the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Mormons, continued to wait for a decision from the MOJ on pending applications for official recognition, some dating as far back as 1994. These groups reported the authorities permitted them to conduct religious activities, hold meetings, receive foreign visitors, make substantial renovations to their facilities, and send representatives abroad. They also reported that state security monitored their movements, telephone calls, visitors, and religious meetings.

The government reportedly interpreted the law on association as a means for the MOJ to deny the registration of certain religious groups. If it decided that a group was duplicating the activities of another, it denied recognition. In some cases, the MOJ delayed the request for registration or cited changing laws as a reason why a request had not been approved.

Both the Catholic Church and the CCC reported they were able to conduct religious services in prisons and detention centers in some provinces. The Protestant seminary in Matanzas and churches in Pinar del Rio continued to train chaplains and laypersons to provide religious counseling for prison inmates and to provide support for their families. In November the CCC opened a training facility at which they offered courses on chaplain work as well as courses on caring for sacred religious objects, gender and women’s issues, and seminars for international students. The CCC stated it had an agreement with the Ministry of Interior that allowed it to operate a nationwide prison chaplain system.

Religious groups reported their leaders continued to travel abroad to participate in two-way exchanges between local faith-based communities and those in other countries. The majority of religious groups continued to report improvement in their ability to attract new members without government interference, and a reduction in interference from the government in conducting their services.

The ORA continued to require a license to import religious literature and other religious materials. The government owned nearly all printing equipment and supplies and regulated printed materials, including religious literature, although some religious leaders said they had received permission to print religious materials on their own presses. The CCC reported it received permission to import $300,000 worth of new high-tech printers that it would use to augment its established press capability.

World Watch Monitor, an international web-based Christian news outlet, reported a local Christian pastor saying that Christian literature was only rarely available and that the government considered such literature a threat. Other religious leaders reported few restrictions in their ability to import religious materials and donated goods. Several groups were successful in importing large quantities of Bibles, books, clothing, and other donated goods, although the importation of computers and electronic devices was reportedly much more difficult. The Catholic Church and Protestant religious groups were able to maintain small libraries, print periodicals and other information, and operate their own websites with little or no formal censorship. The Catholic Church continued to publish periodicals and hold regular forums at the Varela Center that sometimes criticized official social and economic policies.

In November the archbishop publicly requested the government to allow the Church to reopen religious schools and have open access to broadcast on television and radio. The Church had been limited to broadcasts of Christmas and Easter messages on state-run radio stations. The ORA authorized the CCC to host a monthly radio broadcast, which allowed the council’s messages to be heard throughout the country. No other churches had access to media, all of which were owned by the state. Several religious leaders protested the restriction on broadcasting religious services over the radio or on TV. Church leaders said that a lack of access to media platforms hindered their ability to promote their faiths.

A government decree in 2015 granted government officials the power to expropriate property under new zoning restrictions and to change the status of the churches to rent paying tenants. Some religious leaders reported the government attempted to stop or limit activity by threatening to expropriate property. Members of the Assemblies of God requested the government pass reforms to the law on association that would validate and legalize the property the church owned, as well as allow the church to build new temples. The ORA stated in November that the law was being revised, although it did not provide a timeline for when the revisions would be finalized.

Several religious leaders stated the ORA granted new permits to repair or restore existing buildings, allowing the expansion of some structures and in some cases the construction of essentially new buildings on the foundations of the old. Some leaders stated the government would regularly grant permits to buy properties to be used as house churches and in some cases would do so even if the titleholder to the property did not plan to live there. Other religious groups stated securing permission for the purchase or construction of new buildings remained difficult, if not impossible.

Several religious leaders, particularly those from smaller, independent house churches or Santeria communities, expressed concern the government was less tolerant of groups that relied on informal locations, including house churches and private meeting spaces, to practice their beliefs. They reported being monitored, and at times being prevented from holding religious meetings in their spaces.

With the exception of established seminaries and interfaith training centers, the government continued to prevent religious groups from establishing accredited schools. Although not specifically allowed or accredited, the government did not interfere with the efforts of some religious groups to operate before- and after-school programs and eldercare programs, weekend retreats, workshops for primary and secondary students, and higher education programs. The Catholic Church offered coursework that led to a bachelor’s and master’s degree through foreign partners, and several Protestant communities offered bachelor’s or master’s degrees in theology, the humanities, and related subjects via distance learning.

Leaders of the Jehovah’s Witnesses encouraged members to avoid university education in the country, finding the requirements for university admission and the course of study incompatible with the group’s beliefs prohibiting political involvement. Jehovah’s Witnesses specifically objected, based on incompatibility with their beliefs, to the expectation that students participate in political activities in support of the government and the requirement they be available for assignment to government duties for three years after graduation. By avoiding universities and corresponding political activities, Jehovah’s Witnesses were ineligible for some professional careers.

Church leaders reported the government continued an unofficial practice of allowing civilian public service to substitute for mandatory military service for those who objected on religious grounds. Church leaders submitted official letters to a military committee, which then decided whether to grant these exemptions. Jehovah’s Witnesses and Seventh-day Adventist leaders stated their members generally were permitted to perform social service in lieu of military service.

Some religious leaders reported restrictions on their ability to receive donations from overseas. They cited a measure that prohibited churches and religious groups from using individuals’ bank accounts for their organizations, and required existing individual accounts used in this way to be consolidated into one per denomination or organization. According to these religious leaders, the regulations allowed the government to curb the scope and number of activities of individual churches and to single out groups that could be held accountable for withdrawing money intended for purposes not approved by the government.

Religious groups continued to report they were able to engage in community service programs, including assisting the elderly, providing potable water to small towns, growing and selling fruits and vegetables at below-market prices, and establishing health clinics. International faith-based charitable operations, such as Caritas, Sant’Egidio, and the Salvation Army maintained local offices in Havana.

The Director of the ORA stated that the government considered religious communities to be important partners, including in the process of what she said was perfecting the country’s economic and social models. She acknowledged some of the challenges that certain religious groups have had in gaining recognition, and said the government is in the process of updating its registration process.

Multiple high-level Catholic, Protestant, and minority religious leaders agreed that the religious freedom environment had improved compared to past years.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy officers met with officials in the ORA and the head of the Council of Cuban Churches. U.S. officials raised concerns about the ability of unregistered churches to gain official status, as well as the rights these unregistered churches have to practice their religion. ORA officials met with the U.S. Special Representative for Religion and Global Affairs, the first ever meeting between the U.S. government and the ORA. The ORA officials welcomed increased engagement with U.S. religious groups and U.S. government counterparts.

In a July meeting led by the Special Representative for Religion and Global Affairs, multiple high-level Catholic, Protestant, and minority religious leaders discussed the current state of religious freedom in the country. The Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom met with Baptist and independent church leaders in October.

In public statements, the U.S. government called upon the government to respect fundamental freedoms of its citizens, including the freedom of religion.

Embassy officers met frequently with a wide range of religious groups, including Protestants, Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, and Catholics, to discuss the principal issues of religious freedom and tolerance affecting each group. Religious groups noted a wide range of concerns, including those involving free assembly, church expansion, access to state-owned media, and the ability to open private religious schools. Embassy engagement with smaller religious groups under pressure from the government included an assessment of how the recent change in diplomatic relations affected these communities.

Embassy engagement included facilitating exchanges between visiting religious delegations and religious groups, including between visiting representatives of religious organizations from the United States and local institutions. Officials from the U.S. embassy met frequently with U.S. citizens visiting as part of faith-based exchanges and humanitarian aid programs and encouraged these faith-based representatives to engage directly with local faith-based institutions.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 25.1 million (July 2016 estimate). In a 2002 report to the UN Human Rights Committee, the government reported there were 12,000 Protestants, 10,000 Buddhists, and 800 Roman Catholics. The report noted that Cheondoism, a modern religious movement based on a 19th century Korean neo-Confucian movement, had approximately 15,000 practitioners. Consulting shamans and engaging in shamanistic rituals is reportedly widespread but difficult to quantify. The South Korea-based Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) reported in its 2016 white paper that five priests from the Russian Orthodox Church are in Pyongyang. South Korean and other foreign religious groups estimate the number of religious practitioners in the country is considerably higher. The UN estimates there are between 200,000 and 400,000 Christians in the country. According to a September Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) report, Cornerstone Ministries International (CMI) stated in 2012 that it was in contact with 37,000 churchgoers in the country. CMI said it presumed based on its research that 10-45 percent of those imprisoned in detention camps are Christians. The COI report stated that based on the government’s own figures, the proportion of religious adherents among the population dropped from close to 24 percent in 1950 to 0.016 percent in 2002.

Legal Framework

Article 68 of the constitution provides that, “Citizens shall have the right of faith. This right guarantees them chances to build religious facilities or perform religious rituals.” It further provides, however, that “religion must not be used as a pretext for drawing in foreign forces or for harming the state and social order.”

The 2014 Report of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies, an official government document, states “Freedom of religion is allowed and provided by the State law within the limit necessary for securing social order, health, social security, morality and other human rights.”

Ownership of Bibles or other religious materials brought in from abroad is reportedly illegal and also punishable by imprisonment and severe punishment, including, in some cases, execution.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to deal harshly with those who engaged in almost any religious practices through executions, torture, beatings, and arrests. An estimated 80,000 to 120,000 political prisoners, some imprisoned for religious reasons, were believed to be held in the political prison camp system in remote areas under horrific conditions. CSW said a policy of guilt by association was often applied in cases of detentions of Christians, meaning that the relatives of Christians were also detained regardless of their beliefs.

Religious and human rights groups outside the country provided numerous reports that members of underground churches were arrested, beaten, tortured, or killed because of their religious beliefs. According to the NKDB, there was a report during the year of disappearances of people who were found to be practicing religion within detention facilities. International NGOs reported any religious activities conducted outside of those that are state-sanctioned, including praying, singing hymns, and reading the Bible, could lead to severe punishment including imprisonment in political prison camps.

In 2015, the NKDB aggregated 1,165 violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief within the DPRK, with charges including propagation of religion, possession of religious items, religious activities, and contact with religious practitioners. According to a survey of 10,000 defectors from North Korea referenced in the 2015 NKDB white paper, 99.6 percent said there was no religious freedom in the country. Just 4.2 percent said they had seen a Bible when they lived there, although survey data reflects a slight increase in recent years.

According to media reports, in April Christian Pastor Han Choong Yeol was killed in China by whom activists said were DPRK agents. The pastor operated a church in Changbai, Jilin Province, and had provided aid to defectors from North Korea. DPRK authorities said South Korea was responsible for the killing.

The DPRK has in the past detained foreigners allegedly engaging in religious work within its borders, and reports indicate at least one foreign Christian remained detained by DPRK authorities.

In January and September the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK and in February the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights released reports reiterating concerns about the country’s use of arbitrary executions, political prison camps, and torture amounting to crimes against humanity. In March and December the UN Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly plenary session, respectively, adopted resolutions by consensus which “condemned in the strongest terms” longstanding and ongoing systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations, including denial of the right to religious freedom, and urged the government to acknowledge such violations of human rights and take immediate steps to end all such violations and abuses through the implementation of relevant recommendations by the UN. The annual resolutions again welcomed the Security Council’s continued consideration of the relevant conclusions and recommendations of the COI. The February 2014 COI final report concluded there was an almost complete denial by the government of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as well as the rights to freedom of opinion, expression, information, and association. It further concluded that, in many instances, the violations of human rights committed by the government constituted crimes against humanity, and it recommended that the United Nations ensure those most responsible for the crimes against humanity were held accountable.

The COI report found the government considered Christianity a serious threat, as it challenged the official cult of personality and provided a platform for social and political organization and interaction outside of the government. The report concluded Christians faced persecution, violence, and heavy punishment if they practiced their religion outside the state-controlled churches. The report further recommended the country allow Christians and other religious believers to exercise their religion independently and publicly without fear of punishment, reprisal, or surveillance.

Defectors reported the government increased its investigation, repression, and persecution of unauthorized religious groups in recent years, but access to information on current conditions was limited.

According to the South Korean government-funded Korea Institute for National Unification’s (KINU) 2016 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, while Article 68 of the constitution provides for freedom of religion, the report states “it is practically impossible for North Korean people to have a religion in their daily lives.” According to the NKDB, Article 68 of the constitution represents only a nominal freedom granted to supporters, and only when the regime deems it necessary to use it as a policy tool.

Juche, or self-reliance, and Suryong, or “supreme leader,” remained important ideological underpinnings of the government and the cult of personalities of the late Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and current leader Kim Jong Un. Refusal on religious or other grounds to accept the leader as the supreme authority was regarded as opposition to the national interest and reportedly resulted in severe punishment.

Some scholars stated the Juche philosophy and reverence for the Kim family resembled a form of state-sponsored theology. Approximately 100,000 Juche research centers reportedly exist throughout the country. The government’s 2014 Report of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies stated that, “Every citizen has chosen to follow the Juche Idea…and is firmly believing in JucheIdea thinking and acting according to its requirement” and that Juche is a belief system not forced upon citizens.

While shamanism has always been practiced to some degree in the country, NGOs noted an apparent increase in shamanistic practices, including in Pyongyang. These NGOs reported that government authorities continued to react by taking measures against the practice of shamanism.

In April an NGO reported a government official was accused of having consulted a fortune teller. According to a defector residing in South Korea, the government repeatedly reinforced the declaration that “fortune telling and superstitious beliefs are toxins that damage society and human beings,” and to only trust a future provided by the state. Defector reports cited an increase in party members consulting fortune tellers in order to gauge the best time to defect.

The NKDB estimated the existence of 121 religious facilities in the country, including 64 Buddhist temples, 52 Cheondoist temples, and five state-controlled Christian churches. The government’s 2014 Report of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies also cited the existence of 64 Buddhist temples, but said that the temples have lost religious significance in the country and only remained as cultural heritage sites or tourist destinations. The KINU white paper counted 60 Buddhist temples, and noted that most North Koreans did not realize Buddhist temples were religious facilities nor see Buddhist monks as religious figures.

The five state-controlled Christian churches in Pyongyang included three Protestant churches (Bongsu, Chilgol, and Jeil churches), a Catholic church (Jangchung Cathedral), and Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church. Chilgol Church was dedicated to the memory of former leader Kim Il Sung’s mother, Kang Pan Sok, who was a Presbyterian deaconess. The number of congregants regularly worshiping at these five churches was unknown, and there was no information available on whether scheduled services were available at these locations. Reports from visitors taken to these churches to attend services when visiting Pyongyang reported local Koreans in attendance appear to have been brought in for the occasion, but they seemed to be observers rather than participants. Numerous defectors from outside of Pyongyang reported no knowledge of these churches, and according to the 2016 KINU white paper, no Protestant or Catholic churches existed in the country except in Pyongyang.

KINU also reported in 2015 the existence of state-sanctioned religious organizations in the country such as the Korean Christians’ Federation (KCF), Korean Buddhists Federation, Korea Catholic Association (KCA), Korea Cheondoist Society, and the Korean Association of Religionists. The NKDB white paper also noted the existence of the Korean Orthodox Church Committee. There was minimal information available on the activities of such organizations, except for some information on inter-Korean religious exchanges in 2015.

The government-established KCA provided basic services at the Jangchung Roman Catholic Cathedral, but had no ties to the Vatican. There also were no Vatican-recognized Catholic priests, monks, or nuns residing anywhere in the country. Visiting priests reportedly celebrated Mass at the Jangchung Cathedral in the past. In April the South Korean Catholic Archbishop of Gwangju celebrated Easter Mass in Pyongyang following a December 2015 government agreement with the Catholic Church in South Korea to send priests to the country on a “regular basis.”

According to religious leaders who have traveled to the country, there were Protestant pastors at the Bongsu and Chilgol churches, although it was not known if they were resident or visiting pastors.

Five Russian Orthodox priests served at the Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church, purportedly to provide pastoral care to Russians in the country. Several of them reportedly studied at the Russian Orthodox Seminary in Moscow.

In its July 2002 report to the UN Human Rights Committee, the government reported the existence of 500 “family worship centers.” According to the KINU white paper, however, while some Pyongyang residents had heard of them, most people living outside of Pyongyang were not aware of the existence of such family churches. Those who were aware of their existence were not able to identify them as places of worship. According to a survey of more than 9,000 defectors cited in the 2014 NKDB white paper, not one of the defectors had ever seen any of these purported home churches, and only 1.2 percent of respondents believed they existed. Observers stated that “family worship centers” may be part of the state-controlled KCF.

The COI report concluded that authorities systematically sought to hide from the international community the persecution of Christians who practiced their religion outside state-controlled churches by pointing to the small number of state-controlled churches as exemplifying religious freedom and pluralism.

The KINU white paper indicated the government continued to use authorized religious organizations for external propaganda and political purposes and reported citizens were strictly barred from entering places of worship. According to the white paper, ordinary citizens considered such places primarily as “sightseeing spots for foreigners.” Foreigners who met with representatives of government-sponsored religious organizations stated they believed some members were genuinely religious, but noted others appeared to know little about religious doctrine. KINU concluded the lack of churches or religious facilities in the provinces indicated ordinary citizens did not have religious freedom.

The NKDB white paper stated that officials conduct thorough searches of incoming packages and belongings at ports and airports to search for religious items as well as other items deemed objectionable by the government.

Little was known about the day-to-day life of individuals practicing a religion. There were no reports that members of government-controlled religious groups suffered discrimination, but the government reportedly regarded members of underground churches or those connected to missionary activities as subversive elements. NKDB reported that in its survey of more than 10,000 defectors, none reported fleeing in the first instance due to religious persecution, indicating limited knowledge of and access to religion in the country. Scholars said authorities meted out strict punishment to forcibly returned defectors, including those who had contact with Christian missionaries or other foreigners while in China.

The government reportedly allowed certain forms of religious education, including programs at three-year colleges for training Protestant and Buddhist clergy, a religious studies program at Kim Il-sung University, a graduate institution that trained pastors, and other seminaries related to Christian or Buddhist groups.

Christians were restricted to the lowest class rungs of the songbun system, which classifies people on the basis of social class, family background, and presumed support of the regime based on political opinion and religious views. The songbun classification system results in discrimination in education, health care, employment opportunities, and residence. According to the KINU white paper, the government continued to view Christianity in particular as a means of foreign Western encroachment. The white paper again reported that citizens continued to receive education from authorities at least twice a year emphasizing ways to detect and identity individuals who engage in spreading Christianity.

The government reportedly was concerned that faith-based South Korean relief and refugee assistance efforts along the northeast border of China had both humanitarian and political goals, including the overthrow of the government, and alleged these groups were involved in intelligence gathering.

The government allowed some overseas faith-based aid organizations to operate inside the country to provide humanitarian assistance. Such organizations reported they were not allowed to proselytize; their contact with nationals was limited and strictly monitored, and government escorts accompanied them at all times. Some workers of such organizations reported being permitted to take their personal Bibles into the country.

Defector accounts indicated religious practitioners often concealed their activities from neighbors, coworkers, and other members of society for fear their activities would be reported to the authorities.

The COI report concluded government messaging regarding the purported evils of Christianity led to negative views of Christianity among ordinary citizens.

The 2015 KINU white paper reported credible accounts of private Christian religious activity in the country, although the existence of underground churches and the scope of underground religious activity remained difficult to verify. While some NGOs and academics estimated there may be up to several hundred thousand Christians practicing their faith underground, others questioned the existence of a large-scale underground church or concluded it was impossible to estimate accurately the number of underground religious believers. Individual underground congregations were reportedly very small and typically confined to private homes. Some defector reports confirmed unapproved religious materials were available and secret religious meetings occurred, spurred by cross border contact with individuals and groups in China. Some NGOs reported individual underground churches were connected to each other through well-established networks. The government did not allow outsiders access to confirm such claims.

Foreign legislators who attended services in Pyongyang in previous years reported congregations arrived and departed services as groups on tour buses, and some observed the worshipers did not include any children. Some foreigners noted they were not permitted to have contact with worshipers, and others stated they had limited interaction with them. Foreign observers had limited ability to ascertain the level of government control over these groups, but generally assumed the government monitored them closely.

According to the KINU white paper, defectors reported being unaware of any recognized religious organizations that maintained branches outside of Pyongyang. Religious ceremonies such as for weddings and funerals were almost unknown.

The U.S. government does not have diplomatic relations with the DPRK and has no official presence in the country. It used other mechanisms to address religious freedom concerns, however.

The United States cosponsored resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council that condemned the country’s “systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations.” The resolutions further expressed grave concern over the DPRK’s denial of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, as well as of the rights to freedom of opinion, expression, and association, and urged the government to take immediate steps to ensure these rights.

On July 6, the Department of State submitted the first biannual Report on Human Rights Abuses and Censorship in North Korea to Congress. The report identified eight entities and 15 government officials, including Kim Jong Un, as responsible for or associated with serious human rights abuses or censorship. The report stated, “The government also maintains an extensive system of forced labor through its rigid controls over workers, and restricts the exercise of freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, association, religion or belief, and movement.”

The U.S. government raised concerns about religious freedom in the DPRK in other multilateral forums and in bilateral discussions with other governments, particularly those with diplomatic relations with the country. The United States has made clear that addressing human rights, including religious freedom, would significantly improve prospects for closer ties between the two countries. Senior U.S. government officials, including the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea, met with defectors and NGOs that are focused on the country, including some Christian humanitarian organizations.

Since 2001, the country has been designated as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On October 31, 2016, the Secretary of State redesignated the country as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing restrictions to which North Korea is subject, pursuant to sections 402 and 409 of the Trade Act of 1974 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment) pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 81.3 million (July 2016 estimate). The last national census was performed in 1981, and many existing demographic statistics vary in estimates and reliability. The Pew Research Center estimates 95.8 percent of the population is Christian, 1.5 percent is Muslim, and 1.8 percent report no religious affiliation (2010 estimate). Of the Christian groups, 48.1 percent are Protestant, including evangelical Christians and the Church of Jesus Christ on Earth through the Prophet Simon Kimbangu (Kimbanguist), and 47.3 percent are Catholic. Other Christian groups include the Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and the Greek Orthodox Church. There are small communities of Hindus, Jews, Buddhists, Bahais, and followers of indigenous religious beliefs. Muslim leaders estimate their community to be approximately 5 percent of the population, rather than the 1.5 percent reported by Pew.

A significant portion of the population combines traditional beliefs and practices with Christianity or other religious beliefs.

Most religious groups are found throughout the country and are widely represented in cities and large towns. Muslims mainly reside in the provinces of Maniema, North Kivu, and Kinshasa, and in the former provinces of Orientale, Kasai Occidental, and Bandundu.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and provides for freedom of religion and the right to worship subject to “compliance with the law, public order, public morality, and the rights of others.” It stipulates the right to religious freedom cannot be abrogated even when the government declares a state of emergency or siege.

The law regulates the establishment and operation of religious groups. According to the law, the government may legally recognize, suspend recognition of, or dissolve religious groups. The government grants tax-exempt status to recognized religious groups. Nonprofit organizations, including religious groups, foreign and domestic, must register with the government to obtain official recognition by submitting a copy of their bylaws and constitution. Religious groups must register only once for the group as a whole, but nonprofit organizations affiliated with a religious group must register separately. Upon submission, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (MOJ) issues a provisional approval and, within six months, a permanent approval or rejection. Unless the ministry specifically rejects the application, the group is considered approved and registered after six months even if the ministry has not issued a final determination. Applications coming from international headquarters of religious organizations must be approved by the presidency after submission through the MOJ. The law requires officially recognized religious groups to operate as nonprofits and respect the general public order. It also permits religious groups to establish places of worship and train clergy. The law prescribes penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment and/or 200,000 Congolese francs (CDF) ($165) for groups which are not properly registered but receive gifts and donations on behalf of a church or religious organization.

The constitution allows public schools to work with religious authorities to provide religious education to students in accordance with students’ religious beliefs, provided the parents request it.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Because religious and political issues overlap, it was difficult to categorize some incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

In March a dozen armed men wearing FARDC uniforms killed Rev. Vincent Machozi, a Catholic priest, at a gathering of tribal and religious leaders in North Kivu. Machozi was a member of the Augustinians of the Assumption religious order and operated a website documenting atrocities committed against ethnic Nande (Yira) people. In October armed assailants shot and killed another Catholic priest, Rev. Joseph Milimbi Nguli, in Lubumbashi. Milimbi had previously preached in favor of respect for presidential term limits and respect for the constitution. Authorities arrested three FARDC soldiers in connection with the killing, but there was no information on their status at year’s end.

Authorities arrested several local imams in Beni territory along with dozens of ADF members following an August 13-14 ADF attack in Luhanga that killed approximately 50 people. Several imams were charged with involvement with the armed militia group. Separately, the government arrested and sentenced one imam to death, which was commuted to life in prison, in an expedited trial for recruiting youth to join “terrorist” groups.

Some religious organizations criticized the government’s failure to hold constitutionally mandated elections during the year and there were reports of retaliatory political intimidation. Two Catholic priests were arrested during antigovernment protests on September 19-20, but were released several days later. The ANR arrested Protestant minister Remy Flame Manguamba on September 15 during a civil society workshop hosted by his church, and held him incommunicado and without charge until he was released on October 17.

Some representatives of the Catholic Church, which publicly urged the government to abide by constitutionally mandated electoral deadlines, stated they were subjected to verbal harassment and government interference based on their political advocacy.

In conjunction with government military operations in North Kivu against the ADF, there were reports that in the Beni and Goma areas the national police and army harassed members of the Muslim community, particularly those dressed in a way that identified them as Muslim. According to reports, this usually involved demanding money or property such as cell phones. Leaders of the Muslim community reported they kept in frequent contact with the government to share information regarding the ADF.

The MOJ has not issued final registration permits for religious groups since 2014, reportedly due to an internal investigation into registration practices resulting in fraud. In the interim, however, groups have been presumed approved and have been permitted to organize, and unregistered domestic religious groups reported they operated unhindered. The MOJ estimated over 2,000 registration applications for both religious and nonreligious NGOs remained pending. Foreign religious groups reported they operated without restriction after receiving registration approval from the government.

Leaders of all major denominations reported their members practiced their faith without interference from the government or local authorities and fully participated in their communities without religious discrimination. Aside from tension over electoral issues, Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, and Kimbanguist religious leaders stated they had a good relationship with the government, and the government continued to rely on religious organizations to provide public services such as education and healthcare throughout the country. According to the Ministry of Education, approximately 72 percent of primary school students and 65 percent of secondary school students attended government-funded schools administered by religious organizations.

Muslim community leaders said the government did not afford them some of the same privileges as larger religious groups. The government continued to deny Muslims the opportunity to organize chaplains to provide services for Muslims in the military, police force, and hospitals, despite a complaint filed the previous year with the president and his cabinet.

One of the civil society positions on the Independent National Electoral Commission continued to be reserved for a member of the clergy.

According to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of their community were sometimes targeted by members of other groups, in particular some members of the Lega tribe, for refusing to participate in traditional Kimbilikiti rituals.

On October 2, Kibuya Matangi, a 60-year-old Jehovah’s Witness woman, was stabbed to death by villagers in Bulungu, Kwilu Province, after refusing to consult a traditional healer. Matangi reported previously receiving death threats because of her refusal on religious grounds to participate in customary exorcism practices. Local authorities arrested four individuals, including family members, thought to have been complicit in the killing, but the two main suspects, including the chief of the local community, remained at large and the case was ongoing at year’s end.

On August 3, a court convicted and sentenced to life in prison Jedidia Mwanga for the 2015 killing of a Jehovah’s Witness, Kingeleji Mukoso, for allegedly refusing to consult a traditional healer. A second Jehovah’s Witness was injured in the attack. The court also ordered Mwanga to pay reparations to the victim’s family.

In late September a Muslim man killed a Christian woman in a financial dispute in Katale, South Kivu Province. According to a local Muslim leader, as retribution for the killing, the woman’s family, along with other members of the local Christian community, burned down two local mosques in early October.

On November 8, local media reported members of the Lega ethnic group in Kindu, Maniema Province, had targeted village members, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, who refused to participate in traditional Kimbilikiti initiation rituals. Kimbilikiti followers reportedly raped two women and beat several members of local Jehovah’s Witness families. The group also destroyed a local Jehovah’s Witness worship hall, assaulted two individuals, and robbed and destroyed the homes of three Jehovah’s Witness families. On November 9, local police with reinforcements from the FARDC arrested 12 people in connection with the attacks. The governor and mayor both later visited to assess damages.

On July 29, three men assaulted Bernard Nzela, a Jehovah’s Witness in Makalanga, South Kivu Province, and kidnapped his son because they reportedly refused to participate in or support local Kimbilikiti initiation rituals. Nzela was temporarily hospitalized for his injuries.

Some religious leaders reported continued tensions between Christian and Muslim communities in the eastern part of the country linked to the government’s ongoing fight against the ADF.

The U.S. Ambassador and embassy representatives met regularly with the government to discuss issues of religious freedom, such as government attitudes and actions toward religious organizations. The Ambassador and embassy representatives regularly urged the government and other community and political leaders to refrain from violence and respect the rights of civil society, including religious groups, to assemble and express themselves freely.

The embassy also discussed these issues with religious leaders, particularly in the eastern part of the country, and human rights organizations and used social media to highlight religious freedom issues and promote tolerance. The U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom met with Conference of Catholic Bishops leaders during their visit to Washington, D.C. in April to discuss the political advocacy of the Catholic Church.

To address the role of religious groups in promoting religious tolerance and general peacebuilding efforts, the embassy included members of different religious groups on professional exchange programs to the United States. For example, the head of the Muslim community in Goma was selected to attend a program focused on using interfaith dialogue to support peace efforts.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 847,000 (July 2016 estimate), of which 94 percent is Sunni Muslim. Shia Muslims, Roman Catholics, Protestants, Ethiopian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hindus, Jews, Bahais, and atheists constitute the remaining 6 percent. Non-Muslims are generally foreign-born citizens and expatriates, highly concentrated in Djibouti City.

Legal Framework

Islam is the religion of the state, according to the constitution. The constitution mandates the government respect all faiths and guarantees equality before the law, regardless of one’s religion. The law does not impose sanctions on those who do not observe Islamic teachings or who practice other religious beliefs. The constitution prohibits religiously based political parties.

The Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs has authority over all Islamic matters and institutions, including mosques, religious events, and private Islamic schools. The Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs and the Ministry of Education jointly oversee the school curricula and teacher certification of approximately 40 Islamic schools. The public school system is secular.

The president swears an Islamic religious oath.

Muslims may bring matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance either to family courts whose code includes elements of civil and Islamic law or to civil courts. Civil courts address the same matters for non-Muslims. In legal matters, citizens are officially considered Muslims if they do not specifically identify with another religious group.

The government requires all foreign and domestic non-Muslim religious groups to register by submitting an application to the Ministry of Interior, which conducts a lengthy background investigation of the group. Domestic and foreign Muslim religious groups must inform the Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs of their existence and intent to operate and are neither subject to registration nor investigation by the Ministry of Interior. Muslim and non-Muslim foreign religious groups must also gain approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to operate in the country. Once approved, every foreign religious group signs a one-year agreement detailing the scope of its activities. Foreign religious groups must submit quarterly reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and renew their agreements every year. The quarterly report details the activities, origin of funding for activities, scope of work completed, and identifies beneficiaries. Non-Muslim religious groups may not operate in the interim while awaiting registration.

The government is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The government declared a reservation regarding proselytizing in open public spaces.

Government Practices

The Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs continued its efforts to implement a 2014 decree executing a law on state control of mosques, which converted the status of imams to civil service employees under the ministry and transferred ownership of mosque properties and other assets to the government. Government officials stated the decree aimed to eliminate political activity from mosques, provide greater government oversight of mosque assets and activities, and counter foreign influence. The implementation process has been slow. Fewer than half of the mosques in the country had an imam who was considered a civil service employee. The High Islamic Council met with an association of civil service employee imams to provide training and to have discussions. The training and discussions covered topics on the management of facilities, operational needs, the volume of microphones, not using the mosque as a political platform, and the uniformity of sermons across all mosques.

At the beginning of the year President Ismail Omar Guelleh issued a decree forbidding outside gatherings from December 2015 to mid-April. The Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs postponed a regional conference of Muslim religious leaders until after the April election.

The government continued to permit registered non-Islamic groups, including Catholic, Protestant, Greek Orthodox, and Ethiopian Orthodox churches, to operate freely, according to Christian leaders. For several of these groups, the government subsidized the cost of utilities at church properties as it considered some church properties to be part of the national patrimony. Religious groups not independently registered with the government, such as Ethiopian Protestant and non-Sunni Muslim congregations, operated under the auspices of registered groups. Smaller groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Bahais, were not registered with the government, but operated privately without incident, according to Christian leaders.

The government legally recognized Islamic marriages conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and civil marriages conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior for non-Muslims and interfaith couples. The government also recognized non-Islamic religious marriages, when documentation from the religious organization performing the ceremony was provided.

The Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs sponsored a program in which religious leaders visited public schools for one-hour sessions to answer students’ questions about religion. These weekly sessions were not mandatory.

The government allowed non-Islamic religious groups to host events and proselytize on the groups’ private property; in practice, groups refrained from proselytizing in public spaces, such as hotels or street corners due to restrictions by the government. The government permitted a limited number of Christian missionaries to sell religious books and pamphlets at a local book store.

The government issued visas to foreign Islamic and non-Islamic clergy and missionaries, but required they belong to registered religious groups before they could work in the country or operate nongovernmental organizations.

In response to the violent attack on an Orlando nightclub by a Muslim claiming allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), President Ismail Omar Guelleh sent messages of condolence condemning the attack and expressing his solidarity with the victims’ families. The government-run newspaper, La Nation, published President Guelleh’s message.

Societal norms and customs discouraged conversion from Islam, but conversions still occurred. There was a report from the Markazi refugee camp (a camp for Yemeni refugees) of abuse and intimidation of a convert to Christianity by fellow refugees and local authorities. Christian groups reported discrimination in employment and education against converts to Christianity who changed their names.

Some representatives of Christian denominations reported incidents of animosity by individuals, such as throwing stones at church property. Representatives of Christian denominations reached out to students and staff at neighboring schools in an effort to foster religious tolerance and understanding, leading to a decrease in stoning of church property, according to a Christian leader.

U.S. embassy officials met with the secretary general of the Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs to discuss issues of religious freedom, including the transfer of mosques’ assets and personnel to government control and outreach to refugee camps. The Ambassador shared President Obama’s Ramadan message on the importance of religious freedom with government, religious, and civil society leaders, including at an embassy-hosted iftar. The Ambassador posted on the embassy’s Facebook page an Eid al-Adha greeting in French, Arabic, Afar, and Somali, while wearing traditional Djiboutian clothing. Over 100,000 people viewed the video, and the government-run newspaper, La Nation, released an article about the post. La Nation featured President Obama’s Ramadan statement on the front page.

Embassy officials met with Christian and Muslim leaders to discuss interfaith relations and issues of respect for religious freedom. For instance, during a meeting to discuss the safety and security concerns of converts to Christianity, a Christian leader expressed his willingness to assist the converts and provided housing and protection for a Yemeni refugee.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 73,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to preliminary data from the 2011 census, approximately 53 percent of the population is Roman Catholic. Evangelical Protestants comprise approximately 20 percent of the population. The largest evangelical Protestant groups are Pentecostals with 6 percent, Baptists with 5 percent, and the Christian Union Mission with 4 percent. Seventh-day Adventists comprise 7 percent of the population. Other smaller religious groups include Anglicans, Methodists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, and Rastafarians. Nine percent of the population professes no religious affiliation.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, including freedom of thought, freedom to practice religion, and freedom from taking oaths contrary to one’s beliefs. By law, the government may make exceptions to constitutionally required provisions in the interests of public order and morality if the exceptions being made are for activities “shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.”

Religious groups seeking nonprofit status must register with the attorney general’s office. They must submit a letter signed by five executives of the religious group and provide the official name of the religious group with an address identifying the place of worship. The registration fee is 25 Eastern Caribbean dollars ($9.25). The attorney general’s registry office reviews and approves applications. Any organization denied permission to register has the right to apply for judicial review. By law, religious groups must also register buildings used to publish banns of marriage (announcements of marriage) or used as places of worship.

The constitution grants religious groups the right to establish and maintain schools and to provide religious instruction.

The government prohibits the use of marijuana, including for religious purposes.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Rastafarians stated they continued to disagree with the government’s prohibition of marijuana use, which they described as integral to their religious rituals. They said the government continued to enforce a ban on marijuana but reported no arrests during the year. Rastafarians protested the marijuana ban occasionally through marches, including a march on April 20.

The government subsidized teacher salaries at schools affiliated with the Catholic, Methodist, and Seventh-day Adventist Churches.

At public schools, teachers, principals, and students led nondenominational prayers during morning assemblies. Students were not required to participate.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The U.S. embassy raised general religious freedom subjects with the government.

Embassy officials engaged religious group and civil society leaders and, including the leadership of the Rastafarian communities, on issues of religious freedom and discrimination.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 759,000 (July 2016 estimate). A local 2015 census conducted in collaboration with the United Nations, however, puts the total population at 1.2 million. According to the most recent estimates, 88 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 5 percent is Protestant. Many Christians reportedly practice some aspects of traditional indigenous religions as well. Two percent of the population is Muslim (mainly Sunni). The remaining 5 percent adhere to animism, the Bahai Faith, and other beliefs.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and worship and prohibits political parties based on religious affiliation. The law also states the country has no national religion. The law states individuals are free to change religions. Christians converting to Islam are permitted to add Muslim names to their Christian names on their official documents.

Regulations establish an official preference for the Roman Catholic Church and the Reformed Church of Equatorial Guinea. Neither group is required to register. The state provides funding to the Roman Catholic Church for its schools, the only religious group to receive such funding for operating educational institutions.

Catholic and Reformed churches are not required to register with the MJRAPI. Some long-standing religious groups such as Muslims or Bahais hold permanent authorizations and are not required to renew their registrations with the MJRAPI. Newer groups and denominations may be required to renew their registration annually. To register, religious groups at the congregational level must submit a written application to the director general of religion in the MJRAPI. Those seeking to register must supply detailed information about the leadership (e.g., curriculum vitae) and members of the group; construction plans of the religious building; property ownership documents, accreditations, and religious mandate; and pay a fee of 100,000 Central African Francs (CFA) ($161). The director general of religion adjudicates these applications and may order an inspection by the MJRAPI before processing.

The adjudication of the registration application rests solely with the director general of religion – the commission of representatives of several government agencies that is supposed to adjudicate the applications has been inactive for several years. Those seeking to register must supply information about the group such as a list of members, and the MJRAPI may conduct an inspection before processing an application. The government may fine or shut down unregistered groups. The law requires a permit for door-to-door proselytism.

A MJRAPI decree specifies that any religious activities taking place outside the hours of 6 a.m. to 9 p.m., or outside of registered places of worship, require prior authorization from the MJRAPI. The decree prohibits religious acts or preaching within private residences if those acts involve people who do not live there. Foreign religious representatives or authorities must obtain advance permission from the MJRAPI to participate in religious activities. The decree exempts the Catholic Church.

The government recognizes official documents issued by authorized religious groups, such as birth certificates and marriage certificates.

The constitution states individuals are free to study religion in schools and may not be forced to study a faith other than their own. Catholic religious classes are part of the public school curriculum, but with a note from a leader of another religious group, such study may be replaced by non-Catholic religious study, or by a recess.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

While the government routinely granted religious groups permission for any activities outside of places of worship, except in private homes, it usually denied permits to hold activities outside of the prescribed hours of 6 a.m. to 9 p.m. All religious groups, including small Bahai and Jewish groups, were allowed to hold services as long as they finished before 9 p.m. and did not disturb the peace. Evangelical Christian groups continued to hold activities outside the prescribed period. The authorities routinely issued permits for proselytism. Religious leaders said door-to-door proselytism occurred without incident.

Foreign evangelical missionaries were required to obtain residency permits to remain in the country. Evangelical Christians reported the permits were prohibitively expensive, leading some missionaries to risk the consequences of not obtaining or renewing such permits. The local police reportedly enforced the requirement with threatened deportation and requested a small bribe as an alternative. There were no deportations reported. The residency permits were not required for Catholic missionaries.

Protestant groups, including the Reformed Church, Seventh-day Adventists, Assemblies of God, Baptists, and other evangelical Christians operated primary and secondary schools. These schools had to be registered with the government and fulfill standard curriculum requirements.

Catholic masses were a normal part of all major ceremonial functions, such as National Day on October 12 and the President’s Birthday on June 5. Catholic leaders met publicly with government officials and were usually the only religious leaders to do so. Catholic and Reformed Church leaders were often seated in preferred locations at official functions. On May 28, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo opened the new Catholic Church of Our Lady of Bisila, which was totally financed by the government, on the mountain peak above Malabo.

The President of the Federation of Evangelical Churches stated that its annual Easter procession went smoothly and without any intervention from the police. In previous years, the national police initially tried to stop the procession, but the event was allowed to proceed after proof of government authorization.

Some non-Catholics who worked for the government continued to report that their supervisors strongly encouraged participation in religious activities related to their government positions, including attending Catholic masses. Government officials stated they were expected to attend the president’s birthday Mass at the Catholic Church.

Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim leaders, as well as other religious leaders with large congregations, reported no incidents involving restriction of religious practice, and had not heard of any incidents against other groups.

U.S. embassy officials met with the director general of religion to discuss religious freedom and the ability of individuals to practice any religion free of discrimination. The embassy also met with the imam for Malabo, the Archbishop of Malabo, evangelical Christian pastors, Protestant leaders, and a representative of the Bahai Faith, to acquire their insights as well as to discuss the need to promote mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect for all religious groups, especially for minority religious groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.8 million (July 2016 estimate). The Eritrean government estimates the population at 3.5 million. There are no reliable figures on religious affiliation. Government, religious, and local UN sources estimate the population is approximately 48-50 percent Christian and 48-50 percent Sunni Muslim. The Christian population is predominantly Eritrean Orthodox. Catholics, Protestants, and other Christian denominations including the Greek Orthodox Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Pentecostals, total less than 5 percent of the Christians. Some estimates suggest approximately 2 percent of the population is animist, and there is a small Bahai community of approximately 300 members. There is a very small Jewish community.

Legal Framework

The law and unimplemented constitution prohibit religious discrimination and provide for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief and the freedom to practice any religion.

A longstanding proclamation requires religious groups to register with the government or cease activities. Members of religious groups that are unregistered or otherwise not in compliance with the law are subject to penalties under the provisional penal code. Such penalties may include fines and prison terms. The Office of Religious Affairs has authority to regulate religious activities and institutions, including approval of the applications of religious groups seeking official recognition. Each application must include a description of the religious group’s history in the country, an explanation of the uniqueness or benefit the group offers compared with other religious groups, names and personal information of the group’s leaders, detailed information on assets, a description of the group’s conformity to local culture, and a declaration of all foreign sources of funding.

The government has registered and recognizes four religious groups: the Eritrean Orthodox Church, Sunni Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Eritrea. It also appoints the heads of the Eritrean Orthodox Church and the Sunni Islamic community.

Groups must renew their registration every year. In 2002, the minister of information issued a decree requiring all religious groups, except the Eritrean Orthodox Church, Sunni Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Eritrea (affiliated with the Lutheran World Federation), to submit registration applications and cease religious activities and services until these applications were approved. Since 2002, the government has not approved the registration of additional religious groups; information on how many registrations are pending is not available.

Religious groups may print and distribute documents only with the authorization of the Office of Religious Affairs, which has only approved requests from the four officially registered religious groups. If a religious institution disseminates a publication or broadcast through the media without government approval, the author of the publication or director of the broadcast is subject to a fine of up to 10,000 nakfa ($667) and/or two years’ imprisonment.

Religious groups must obtain government approval to build facilities for worship.

The law does not address religious education in public school. Religious education is allowed in private schools.

By law all citizens between 18 and 50 must perform national service, with limited exceptions, including for health reasons such as physical disability or pregnancy. In 2012, the government instituted a compulsory citizen militia, requiring persons not already in the military, including many who were demobilized, elderly, or otherwise exempted from military service in the past, to carry firearms and attend militia training. Failure to participate in the militia or national service could result in detention. Militia duties mostly involve security-related activities, such as airport or neighborhood patrolling. Militia training primarily involves occasional marches and listening to patriotic lectures. The law does not provide for conscientious objector status for religious reasons, nor are there alternative activities for persons willing to perform national service but unwilling to engage in military or militia activities.

The law prohibits any involvement in politics by religious groups and prohibits religiously affiliated media outlets from commenting on political matters.

All citizens must obtain an exit visa prior to departure. The application requests the applicant’s religious affiliation, but the law does not require that information.

The law limits foreign financing for religious groups. The only contributions legally allowed are from local followers, from the government, or from government-approved foreign sources.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Government lack of transparency and intimidation of sources made it difficult to obtain accurate information on specific religious freedom cases. According to the international NGO Human Rights Watch, all religious groups, to varying degrees, continued to be subject to government restrictions. Other observers noted that the government continued to impose restrictions on proselytizing, accepting funding from NGOs and international organizations, groups selecting their own religious leaders, gathering for worship, constructing places of worship, and teaching religious beliefs to others. Amnesty International stated that the government subjected members of unrecognized religious groups to arbitrary detention, torture, forced recanting as a condition of release, and other ill-treatment.

According to the June 2016 COI report, individuals stated that members of nonauthorized religious groups continued to suffer acute discrimination, detention, beatings, and coercion to renounce their religion. There was a reported incident where military police forced individuals to sign documentation stating their commitment to Eritrean Orthodox Church in 2014 and 2015. A witness who reported being detained several times, including from 2014 to November 2015 for practicing a nonauthorized religion and who fled the country this year, told the COI that “Protestants detained are only released after denouncing their faith and promising to worship in the Eritrean Orthodox Church.” Authorities reportedly sometimes released detainees who promised to renounce adherence to an unregistered religious group.

The June 2016 COI report concluded that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that Eritrean officials have and still continue to deprive Eritrean ‘Pentes,’ and some Muslims, of fundamental rights contrary to international law on religious grounds. Muslims were targeted, in particular in the 1990’s, in 2007-2008, and after the Forto incident in 2013. Jehovah’s Witnesses have been targeted since May 1991, and other nonauthorized religious denominations since no later than 2002.” The COI also concluded, “Persecution on both religious and ethnic grounds has been an integral part of the Eritrean leadership’s plan to maintain its authority in a manner contrary to international law.” This caused the commission to conclude “that Eritrean officials have committed the crime of persecution, a crime against humanity, in a large-scale and routine manner since May 1991.” The COI found “that, at a minimum, the persecution of members of nonauthorized religious denominations persists.” The government continued to deny the COI access to the country.

According to international representatives of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, on April 5, Saron Gebru, a 28-year-old female Jehovah’s Witness, began serving a six-month sentence after “being convicted for attending the 2014 Memorial of Christ’s death.” She was released on October 5. Jehovah’s Witnesses also reported on the case of Meraf Seyum Habtemariam, a 53-year-old female Jehovah’s Witness, who remained in jail after being arrested for taking part in a “religious activity” in October 2015.

Government secrecy and intimidation of sources made it impossible to determine the precise number of those imprisoned because of their religious beliefs. Releases and arrests often went unreported. Information from outside the capital was extremely limited. Independent observers noted that many people remained imprisoned with no charges.

International religious organizations reported that authorities interrogated detainees about their religious affiliation and asked them to identify members of unregistered religious groups.

January marked the tenth year of Patriarch Abune Antonios’s house arrest. Patriarch Antonios was appointed by the Orthodox Church leadership in Cairo and put under house arrest in 2006 for protesting government interference in Church affairs. Church leaders and several NGOs, including Christian Solidarity Worldwide, raised concerns about his poor health and called for his release. The COI was also able to corroborate reports that more than 10 Orthodox priests were detained in April 2016 for protesting his continued detention and expressing concern about government plans to appoint a new patriarch following the death of Abune Dioskoros, who was appointed by the government following the detention of Patriarch Abune Antonio.

The government continued to detain persons associated with unregistered religious groups without due process, occasionally for long periods of time, and sometimes on the grounds of threatening national security. According to World Watch Monitor, the majority of the pastors arrested after the government began to crack down on banned religious groups in 2002 remained imprisoned. None have been charged with a crime or brought before a court.

The government continued to single out Jehovah’s Witnesses for particularly harsh treatment because of their blanket refusal to bear arms. Jehovah’s Witnesses estimated that 54 of their members were in detention as of October, including three men imprisoned without charges for more than 20 years. Other NGO sources corroborated reports of such detentions.

The government continued to consider Jehovah’s Witnesses and other religious prisoners as being held for their religious affiliation or for national security reasons. Prisoners held for national security reasons were not allowed visitors, and families often did not know where they were being held. Authorities generally permitted family members to visit prisoners detained for religious reasons only. Released prisoners who had been held for their religious beliefs reported harsh detention conditions, including solitary confinement, physical abuse, and inadequate food, water, and shelter.

The government continued to require students in their final year of secondary school to attend the Sawa National Training Center where military training occurs. Students who did not want to attend military training at Sawa, including some conscientious objectors, sometimes fled the country, according to many media sources. The COI found that religious practice was “severely restricted” in the military; authorities informed conscripts that they were prohibited from practicing their religion. One refugee reported to an NGO that Muslims were allowed to pray in the army, but Christians were banned from reading the Bible and from praying or talking with others. He said that possessing a Bible was seen as a sign that the person was a Pentecostal Christian.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reported that members continued to be unable to obtain official identification documents. Jehovah’s Witnesses were collectively stripped of citizenship in 1994 after their refusal to participate in the country’s 1993 independence referendum. The government continued to withhold documents and entitlements such as passports, national identification cards (required for employment), exit visas, and ration cards. In October the government began requiring customers to present a national identification card in order to use the computers at private internet cafes.

Official attitudes toward members of unregistered religious groups worshipping in homes or rented facilities differed. Some local authorities tolerated the presence and activities of unregistered groups, while others attempted to prevent them from meeting. According to an NGO representative who spoke with refugees outside the country, members of some unregistered Christian groups continued to meet, worship, and evangelize despite the dangers. The refugee also reported that individuals known to be practicing Christians did not receive the water distributions when neighbors did, and that they did not receive special government coupons to purchase subsidized food as did others in their communities. Local authorities sometimes denied government coupons (which allowed shoppers to buy at a discounted price at certain stores) to Jehovah’s Witnesses and members of Pentecostal groups.

The leaders of the four recognized religious groups stated that their officially registered members did not face impediments to religious practice.

Most religious facilities not belonging to the four officially registered religious groups remained closed. The government continued to allow the practice of Sunni Islam only and banned all other practices of Islam. Religious structures used by unregistered Jewish and Greek Orthodox groups continued to exist in Asmara. The government protected the historic Jewish synagogue building. Other structures belonging to unregistered groups, such as Seventh-day Adventists and the Church of Christ, remained shuttered. The government allowed the Bahai center to remain open, and, according to reports, the members of the center had access to the building for at least some forms of meetings. The Greek Orthodox church remained open, but there were no services. There were services held in the Anglican church building, but only under the auspices of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. There were reports of other Protestant denominations holding services in homes, but not openly.

Some church leaders stated the government’s restriction on foreign financing reduced church income and religious participation by preventing the churches from training clergy or building facilities. The government permitted the Catholic Church to receive financing from the Holy See. The government also allowed funding from the Papal Foundation in the amount of $90,700 to “subsidize the cost of the elderly priests’ residence.” The government did not permit the Evangelical Lutheran Church to receive foreign funding.

Government control of all mass media restricted the ability of unregistered religious group members to bring attention to religious persecution, which observers indicated was caused by government officials. Restrictions on public assembly and freedom of speech severely limited the ability of unregistered religious groups to assemble and conduct their worship, according to members of these groups.

The sole political party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), appointed both the Mufti of the Sunni Islamic community and the Patriarch of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, as well as some lower-level religious officials for both communities. PFDJ-appointed lay administrators managed some operations of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, including disposition of donations and seminarian participation in national service.

The government continued to permit a limited number of Sunni Muslims, mainly the elderly and those not fit for military service, to take part in the Hajj, travel abroad for religious study, and host clerics from abroad. The government generally did not permit Muslim groups to receive funding from governments of nations where Islam was the dominant religion on grounds that such funding threatened to import foreign “fundamentalist” or “extremist” tendencies.

The government sometimes granted visas permitting Catholic dioceses to host visiting clergy from Rome or other foreign locations. Catholic clergy were permitted to travel abroad for religious purposes and training, although not in numbers Church officials considered adequate; they were discouraged from attending certain events while overseas. Students attending the Roman Catholic seminary as well as Catholic nuns did not perform national service and did not suffer repercussions from the government, according to Church officials. Some religious leaders stated, however, that national service requirements prevented adequate numbers of seminarians from completing theological training in Rome or other locations, because those who had not completed national service were not able to obtain passports or exit visas.

Some Eritrean Orthodox clergy operating outside the country said the government sought to control Eritrean Orthodox churches in foreign countries. Authorities reportedly pressured one such overseas Eritrean Orthodox church to send money to the government or risk preventing church members from visiting relatives in Eritrea and potential seizure of assets held by the church members in the country.

Government control of all media, expression and public discourse has made it difficult to observe any potential societal actions impacting religious freedom. Foreign diplomats have reported that individuals in positions of power were often reluctant to share power with Muslim countrymen and were distrustful of Muslims outside of the country. Some Christian leaders, however, have reported that Muslim leaders and communities have been willing to work with them on community projects.

Refugees outside the country reported that neighbors in the country sometimes turned in to local authorities members of unregistered religious groups that met together in homes to worship.

U.S. embassy representatives met periodically with government officials to raise religious freedom concerns, including advocating for the release of Jehovah’s Witnesses and alternative service for conscientious objectors refusing to bearing arms for religious reasons. Embassy officers raised issues of religious freedom with a wide range of interlocutors, including visiting international delegations, Asmara- and regionally based diplomats accredited to Eritrea, and UN and other international organization representatives.

Embassy staff met with clergy, leaders, and other representatives of most religious groups, including unregistered ones. Embassy officials attended religious celebrations, weddings, and funeral ceremonies of the four registered faiths as invitees of the government or of religious leaders and on an ad hoc basis.

The embassy’s social media platforms regularly posted articles that focused on tolerance of religious diversity in the United States and the U.S. commitment to human rights. The embassy hosted well-attended public events such as the public screening of President Obama’s talk at the Islamic Society of Baltimore and a Muhammad Ali film festival tribute that allowed embassy staff to engage members of the public on issues of religious freedom and religious tolerance in the United States.

Since 2004, Eritrea has been designated as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On October 31, 2016, the Secretary of State redesignated Eritrea as a CPC and identified the following sanction that accompanied the designation: the existing ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act. Restrictions on U.S. assistance resulting from the CPC designation remained in place.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 111,000 (July 2016 estimate). The U.S. government estimates that 44.6 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 11.5 percent Anglican, 11.3 percent Pentecostal, 10.5 percent Seventh-day Adventist, 2.9 percent Baptist, and 2.6 percent Church of God. Religious groups with totals of 2 percent or less of the population include Methodists, evangelical Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Rastafarians. Smaller groups include Brethren, Bahais, Hindus, Moravians, Muslims, Mennonites, and members of the Salvation Army and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). There is a small Jewish community. Those belonging to no religion represent 3.6 percent of the population.

Legal Framework

The constitution protects “freedom of conscience, including freedom of thought and of religion.” It guarantees the right to change one’s religion and to manifest and propagate it. The constitution prohibits forced participation in any religious ceremony or instruction.

The government allows religious headdress of certain types in photographs for national identity documents, provided the face is visible and not shadowed. The criminal code prohibits written blasphemous language.

The government funds public schools administered by Christian groups, including the Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Seventh-day Adventists, and Mennonite communities. In accordance with the constitution’s protections for freedom of conscience and religion, students at such schools are not obliged to attend religion classes, and alternatives to religion classes are available. Public funding is not limited to these groups. The government provides subsidies to denominational schools, which are managed by a board of directors and staffed by the faith-based organization to which they are aligned.

In order for religious groups to qualify for customs and tax exemptions, they must be recognized as nonprofit organizations, register with the Corporate Affairs and Intellectual Property Office (CAIPO) and Inland Revenue, and provide a letter of request to the Ministry of Finance. Applications are routinely granted. Recognition as a nonprofit requires the group to submit details to CAIPO regarding the organization, including information on directors, location of activities, and the general nature of its activities.

Foreign missionaries require a worker’s permit costing 1000 to 5000 East Caribbean dollars ($370 to $1,852) or a waiver costing 100 East Caribbean dollars ($37) from the Minister of Labor. They must demonstrate prior experience and be sponsored by a registered religious group.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government continued to fund public schools administered by long-established Christian groups, including the Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Seventh-day Adventist, and Mennonite communities.

In November voters defeated all seven proposals of a constitutional referendum, including a Rights and Freedom bill that would have provided greater protection of fundamental rights, including on the basis of religion.

The Ministry of Youth, Sports and Religious Affairs organized meetings for all faith-based organizations to discuss areas for collaboration with the government to “improve national society.” One of the discussion topics was working with the government to combat the growing incidences of heart disease, diabetes, and certain types of cancer by educating congregants on how to adopt a healthier lifestyle.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

Embassy officials engaged government officials and members of the country’s religious communities to discuss religious freedom in law and in practice.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 12.1 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the SRA, approximately 85 percent of the population is Muslim, 8 percent is Christian, and 7 percent adheres to indigenous religious beliefs. Much of the population incorporates some indigenous rituals into its religious practices. Muslims are generally Sunni; however, Sufism is also present. Christian groups include Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, and several evangelical groups. There is a small Bahai community. There are also small numbers of Hindus, Buddhists, and adherents of traditional Chinese religious beliefs among foreign residents.

Muslims constitute a majority in all four regions of the country. Christians are most numerous in Conakry, large cities, the south, and the eastern Forest Region. Adherents of indigenous religious beliefs are most prevalent in the Forest Region.

Legal Framework

The constitution states the state is secular, prohibits religious discrimination, and provides for the right of individuals to choose and profess their religious faith. It recognizes the right of religious institutions and groups to establish and manage themselves freely. It bars political parties that identify with a particular religious group. These rights are subject only to “those limits that are indispensable to maintain the public order and democracy.”

By law, the SRA must approve all religious groups. Groups must provide a written constitution and application to the SRA along with their address and a fee of 250,000 Guinean francs (GNF) ($27). The SRA then sends the documents to the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization for final approval and signature. Once approved, the group becomes an officially recognized religion. Each registered religious group must present to the government a report on its affairs every six months. Registration entitles religious groups to value-added tax (VAT) exemptions on incoming shipments and to select energy subsidies.

Unregistered religious groups are not entitled to VAT exemptions and other benefits. By law, the government may shut down unregistered groups and expel foreign group leaders. There is limited opportunity for legal appeal of these penalties.

Religious groups may not own radio or television stations.

The compulsory primary school curriculum does not include religious studies.

The imams and administrative staff of the principal mosque in Conakry and the principal mosques in the main cities of the four regions are government employees. These mosques are directly under the administration of the government. Other mosques and some Christian groups receive government subsidies for pilgrimages.

The SRA secretary general of religious affairs appoints six national directors to lead the Offices of Christian Affairs, Islamic Affairs, Pilgrimages, Places of Worship, Economic Affairs and the Endowment, and Inspector General. The SRA is charged with promoting good relations among religious groups and coordinates with other members of the informal Interreligious Council, which is composed of Muslims and members from Catholic, Anglican, and other Protestant churches as well as the SRA.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The SRA continued to issue mandatory weekly themes for inclusion in Friday sermons at mosques and Sunday sermons in churches. The stated purpose of the weekly guidance was to harmonize religious views in order to prevent radical or political connotations in sermons. Although the SRA did not monitor sermons at every mosque and church, its inspectors were present in every region and responsible for ensuring that mosque and church sermons were consistent with SRA directives. Clerics whom the SRA judged to be noncompliant were subject to disciplinary action.

Opposition politicians continued to say some imams who supported them or their parties were replaced by the government, but offered no specific examples.

After two years of Ebola outbreaks, Saudi Arabia resumed allowing Guineans to participate in the Hajj. The SRA facilitated and organized the travel of approximately 6,000 applicants who each had to pay approximately 40 million GNF ($4,340) toward the cost of travel. The government continued to subsidize the travel of Catholics on pilgrimages to the Holy Land, Greece, and Italy, providing 2 billion GNF ($217,000) compared to 3 billion GNF ($325,000) in 2015. The decrease in subsidy from the previous year led the government to decide to rotate the benefits to a different Christian group each year, including Anglican, Catholics, and Adventists, for their pilgrimages to the holy sites. The decision to alternate benefits to Christian groups will be implemented beginning in 2017.

According to the SRA, several unregistered religious groups operated freely but did not receive the tax and other benefits received by registered groups. The small Jehovah’s Witness community reportedly proselytized from house to house without interference, although neither it nor the Bahai community requested official recognition. Some groups stated they preferred not to have a formal relationship with the SRA.

The congregation of a mosque closed in December 2015 by the government due to its proximity to Conakry international airport runway said that they accepted the closure but complained about the lack of communication from the government. Authorities said they closed the mosque in response to terrorist attacks in neighboring countries and said the closure was to prevent a “potential attack” against the airport. The mosque was not compensated for the closure.

Islamic schools were prevalent throughout the country and were the traditional forum for religious education. Some Islamic schools were wholly private, while others received local government support. Islamic schools, particularly common in the Fouta Djalon region, taught the compulsory government curriculum along with additional Quranic studies. Private Christian schools, which accepted students of all religious groups, existed in the nation’s capital and most other large cities. They taught the compulsory curriculum but did not receive government support and held Christian prayers before school.

The government allocated free broadcast time on state-owned national television for Islamic and Christian programming, including Islamic religious instruction, Friday prayers from the central mosque, and church services. Muslim broadcasts received more air time, while different Christian groups received broadcast time on Sundays on a rotating basis. The government permitted religious broadcasting on privately owned commercial radio.

In some parts of the country such as the middle and the upper regions, strong familial, communal, cultural, social, or economic pressure discouraged conversion from Islam.

Members of the Bahai Faith reported being discriminated against, and banned from their families because of their religious beliefs. The wife of the secretary of the spiritual assembly of Conakry reported she received pressure from her family who did not accept her union with her husband, a member of the Bahai Faith.

In February unidentified individuals burned a mosque built and led by the president of the Islamic organization Nourdine Islam, a well-known scholar from Kankan. The incident was followed by clashes between groups supportive of the scholar and the suspected perpetrators. The investigation did not conclude why the incident occurred; the scholar stated that it was triggered by family rivalries and jealousy over his fame.

The Office of Christian Affairs reported that the father of two Muslim women accused a pastor of kidnapping his daughters, aged 27 and 29. The women converted to Christianity and started to attend the pastor’s church in the suburbs of Conakry. The pastor was interviewed by the police in February but was not detained or charged. According to sources the women were threatened with death by their father for their conversion.

The SRA did not resolve disputes among the Karambaya and Touraya Muslim communities in Touba. No trial took place following 2015 clashes between the two Muslim groups that resulted in five deaths. The two groups quarreled about the building of a new mosque.

The Kalima Catholic Mission did not begin construction on a church despite authorization by the government in 2015. The Muslim community reportedly lobbied against and stopped the project from proceeding the previous year. Religious authorities of both sides continued to work on resolving this issue. The chief of the mission reported local authorities of the region were influenced by Muslims to stop issuing necessary permits in this case.

Many Muslim students not enrolled in private Islamic schools received religious education at madrassahs, some of which were associated with mosques and others supported by local communities. Unlike the Islamic schools, the madrassahs did not teach the compulsory primary school curriculum. Although the government did not recognize the madrassahs or require them to register, it allowed them to operate freely. They focused on Quranic studies and instruction was in Arabic rather than French. Funds from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states supported some madrassahs. Most students in madrassahs also attended public or private schools teaching the compulsory curriculum, which did not include religious studies.

The Ambassador met several times with the secretary of the religious affairs and the grand imam of Conakry. He also met with the grands imams of Labe and Kankan. Each time, he delivered messages of religious tolerance.

U.S. embassy personnel worked closely with the SRA and religious leaders, including the grand imams of Conakry, Kankan, and Labe; Catholic and Anglican bishops; and Islamic and Christian clergy. Embassy officers advocated for religious tolerance.

U.S. embassy personnel participated in several iftar celebrations nationwide to promote good relations and mutual understanding among religious groups and as an opportunity to relay a message of respect for religious freedom and reconciliation among religious groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.8 million (July 2016 estimate). Estimates of the religious composition of the population vary widely, but according to a 2010 study by the Pew Research Center, approximately 45 percent is Muslim, 31 percent follows indigenous religious practices, and 22 percent is Christian. There are small communities of Buddhists, Hindus, and Jews, many of whom are foreign nationals.

The Fula (Peuhl or Fulani) and Mandinka (Malinke) ethnic groups are the most numerous followers of Islam. Muslims generally live in the north and northeast, and most Muslims are Sunni. Adherents of indigenous religious beliefs generally live in all but the northern parts of the country. The Christian population, including Roman Catholics and Protestants, are primarily from the Pepel, Manjaco, and Balanta ethnic groups and are concentrated in Bissau and along the coast. Large numbers of Muslims and Christians hold indigenous beliefs as well.

Legal Framework

The constitution stipulates the state shall be separate from religious institutions and shall respect and protect legally recognized religious groups, whose activities shall be subject to the law. It holds freedom of conscience and religion as inviolable, even if the state declares a state of siege, and provides for freedom of worship as long as it does not violate the fundamental principles cited in the constitution. It establishes that all citizens are equal under the law with the same rights and obligations, irrespective of their religion. Political parties and labor unions are barred from affiliating with a particular religious group. The constitution recognizes the freedom of religious groups to teach their faith.

The government requires religious groups to obtain licenses. The formal process, which is not often followed, entails providing information on the name, location, type, and size of the organization to the Ministry of Justice.

According to the constitution, there is no religious instruction in public schools. The Ministry of Education regulates and enforces the decree against religious teaching in public schools. There are some private schools operated by religious groups.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

There were no reports of significant government action affecting religious freedom.

Some Muslim community members reported concerns about foreign imams teaching what they termed radical Islamic practices to the local Muslim population.

Religious group representatives reported there was positive societal respect among religious groups, in line with a tradition of religious moderation and tolerance.

There is no permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in the country. Representatives from the U.S. Embassy in Dakar, Senegal, discussed religious freedom, including the presence of foreign Christian and Muslim missionaries in the country, with government officials and representatives of religious groups. These included the minister of justice and the attorney general. Embassy representatives from Dakar also met with and discussed religious activity and religious freedom with representatives of an Islamic women’s organization, members of the Islamic Council, U.S. and Brazilian Protestant missionaries, the Bishop of Bissau (the country’s leading Roman Catholic official), and various Catholic priests.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 736,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2012 census, 64 percent of the population is Christian, 25 percent Hindu, 7 percent Muslim (mainly Sunni), and less than 1 percent belong to other religious groups. Among Christians, Pentecostals make up 23 percent of the total population; Roman Catholics, 7 percent; Anglicans, 5 percent; Seventh-day Adventists, 5 percent; Methodists, 1 percent; and other Christians, 21 percent. Groups that together constitute less than 1 percent of the population include Rastafarians and Bahais. An estimated 3 percent of the population does not profess any religious affiliation.

The membership of most religious groups includes a cross section of ethnic groups, although nearly all Hindus are of Indian descent and most Rastafarians are of African descent.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religion and worship, including the right to choose and change one’s religion. An unenforced law requires a prison term of one year for a blasphemous libel conviction, but exempts religious expression made in “good faith and decent language.”

There is no system to register a religious group, but to receive formal recognition all places of worship must be registered with the government through the deeds registry. The deeds registry requires an organization to submit a proposed name and address for the place of worship, as well as the names of executive group members or congregation leaders. Once formally recognized, a place of worship falls under legislation governing not-for-profit organizations, which allows the organization to conduct financial operations, buy property, and receive tax benefits in its name.

Foreign religious workers require a visa from the Ministry of Citizenship. Religious groups seeking to enter Amerindian villages for the purpose of proselytizing must apply for and obtain the permission from the village council.

There are both public and private religiously-affiliated schools. Private schools are operated entirely by private groups and are not funded by the state; students of private schools pay fees to attend, which are not controlled by the government. Religious education is compulsory in all private schools with a religious affiliation. There is no religious education in public schools, whether religiously-affiliated or not. Most public schools’ religious affiliations are Anglican or Methodist.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government declared holy days of Guyana’s three major religious groups as national holidays.

The government maintained regulations which limited the number of visas for foreign representatives of religious groups based on historical trends, the relative size of the group, and the president’s discretion; however, religious groups reported the visa quotas allotted to them did not adversely affect their activities, as the visa-limitation rule was rarely applied stringently.

The Guyana Defense Force (GDF) coordinated with civilian religious groups to provide military personnel with access to religious services. Leaders of the three major religious groups conducted prayer services and counseling on GDF bases.

Government representatives participated regularly in the observance of Christian, Muslim, and Hindu religious holidays throughout the year. In September the president and government ministers participated in an interfaith ceremony to celebrate the country’s indigenous people.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

U.S. embassy officials joined the Ministry of Social Cohesion on several occasions throughout the year at interfaith and religious events. Embassy officials engaged in social media discussions and promotion of religious freedom and tolerance after these events.

Embassy representatives met with the major religious groups and attended various religious and interfaith functions to support and advance religious tolerance and inclusion. At these events, embassy officials spoke on acceptance, tolerance, and harmony in a multifaith cultural context.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 10.5 million (July 2016 estimate). The U.S. government estimates that 55 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 29 percent Protestant, 7 percent adhere to other religions, and 5 percent do not subscribe to any religion. Groups present in small numbers include The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims, Rastafarians, Scientologists, and atheists. According to societal leaders, an estimated 50 to 80 percent of the population practices some form of Vodou, often blended with elements of other religions, usually Catholicism. Muslim leaders estimate their community at approximately 8,000 to 10,000. There are fewer than 100 Jews.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the free exercise of all religions and establishes laws to regulate the registration and operation of religious groups. The constitution protects against being compelled to belong to a religious group contrary to one’s belief. The MFA is responsible for monitoring and administering laws relating to religious groups, while the Bureau of Worship, an office within the ministry, is responsible for registering churches and other religious buildings, clergy, and missionaries of various religious denominations.

An 1860 concordat between the Holy See and the state remains in effect and gives the Vatican power to approve and select a specific number of bishops in the country with the consent of the government. Under the concordat, the government provides a monthly stipend to Catholic priests. Catholic and Episcopalian bishops have official license plates and carry diplomatic passports.

All religious groups are legally required to register with the MFA. Registration affords religious groups standing in legal disputes, provides tax-exempt status, and extends civil recognition to documents such as marriage and baptismal certificates, which are issued in a similar way to birth certificates. The government does not tax registered religious groups and exempts their imports from customs duties. Requirements for registration include information on qualifications of the group’s leader, a membership directory, and a list of the group’s social projects. Registered religious groups must submit annual updates of their membership, projects, and leadership to the MFA. Foreign missionaries are required to submit registration paperwork to operate privately funded clinics, schools, and orphanages.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Although Vodou was registered in 2003, the government continued not to recognize Vodou marriage and baptism ceremonies. The MFA continued to accept applications requesting such recognition.

The MFA did not act on a pending request for registration of Islam as a religious group or communicate an explanation for the inaction to the National Council of Muslims. Muslims were required to obtain civil marriage licenses while Christian clergy were able to conduct government-recognized ceremonies.

The government continued to provide financial support for the maintenance of Catholic churches and some Catholic schools. Despite ongoing negotiations between the Protestant Federation and the MFA, the Protestant Federation said in May that the system of financial support was still unavailable to other religious groups.

Muslims and many nondenominational Christian groups stated they operated freely without formal registration.

Government sources stated their continued limited institutional capacity restricted their ability to provide the full range of religious services for prisoners requested by Muslims, particularly in facilities outside of Port-au-Prince. Volunteers provided religious services in some prisons, and prisoners were unhindered from exercising their religious beliefs.

Protestant and Catholic clergy continued to report good working relationships with the government. The Catholic Church and Protestant groups operated schools and provided numerous social services.

According to media reports, a mob decapitated a Vodou houngan – a male Vodou priest – in the town of Toman in May. Members of the community reportedly believed the houngan had used his spiritual powers to cause the death of a local woman and a former director of a local church. No one was charged in the case.

According to the MFA, while many Christians were tolerant of Vodouism, others rejected it as incompatible with their beliefs. Vodou community leaders stated Vodou practitioners continued to experience some social stigmatization for their beliefs and practices. The KNVA leadership stated that in Catholic and Protestant schools, teachers and administrators at times openly rejected and condemned Vodou culture and customs as contrary to the teachings of the Bible.

U.S. embassy representatives met regularly with government officials, including the minister of foreign affairs and religious denominations, to advocate for fair and equal treatment for all religious groups as well as to advocate for registration of religious groups that have completed the requisite registration procedures.

Embassy officials met with faith-based NGOs and religious leaders in the Protestant, Catholic, and Vodou communities to discuss their views on religious freedom, clergy, and marriage recognition, as well as on the registration of religious minority clergy. In meetings with religious leaders, embassy officials stressed the importance of religious freedom and tolerance and discussed the influential role of religion in society.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 82.8 million (July 2016 estimate). According to U.S. government estimates and other statistical reports, including Global Security and Iran Press Watch, Muslims constitute 99 percent of the population; 89-94 percent are Shia and 5-9 percent Sunni (mostly Turkmen, Arabs, Baluchis, and Kurds living in the northeast, southwest, southeast, and northwest, respectively). Afghan refugees, economic migrants, and displaced persons also make up a significant Sunni population but accurate statistics on the breakdown between Sunni and Shia are unavailable. There are no official statistics available on the number of Muslims who practice Sufism, although unofficial reports estimate several million.

According to U.S. government estimates and other statistical estimates, including Global Security, Iran Press Watch, and Iran Primer, groups together constituting the remaining less than 1 percent of the population include Bahais, Christians, Jews, Sabean-Mandaeans, Zoroastrians, and Yarsanis. The three largest non-Muslim minorities are Bahais, Christians, and Yarsanis.

There is no official count of Yarsanis, but one NGO and some Yarsani leaders estimate there are up to one million. Yarsanis have often been classified by the government as Shia Muslims practicing Sufism, but Yarsanis identify Yarsan as a distinct faith (known as Alhe Haq or Kakai). Yarsanis are mainly located in Loristan and the Kurdish regions.

According to Human Rights Watch data, Bahais number at least 300,000.

According to World Christian Database statistics, there are approximately 285,000 Christians, although some estimates suggest there may be many more Christians than actually reported. While the government’s Statistical Center of Iran reports there are 117,700, Elam Ministries, an Iranian Christian organization, estimates that there could be between 300,000 and one million Christians. The majority of Christians are ethnic Armenians concentrated in Tehran and Isfahan. Estimates by the Assyrian Church of the total Assyrian and Chaldean Christian population put their combined number at 7,000. There are also Protestant denominations, including evangelical groups, but there are no authoritative data on their numbers. Christian groups outside the country estimate the size of the Protestant community to be less than 10,000, although many Protestants and other converts to Christianity from Islam reportedly practice in secret.

According to Zoroastrian groups and the Statistical Center of Iran, there are approximately 25,000 Zoroastrians.

According to the Tehran Jewish Committee, there are approximately 9,000 Jews, while one British media report estimated their number at 18,000-20,000. There reportedly are 5,000 to 10,000 Sabean-Mandaeans.

Legal Framework

The constitution defines the country as an Islamic republic, and Ja’afari Shia Islam to be the official state religion. The constitution stipulates all laws and regulations must be based on “Islamic criteria” and official interpretation of sharia. The constitution states citizens shall enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, “in conformity with Islamic criteria.”

The constitution states the investigation of an individual’s ideas is forbidden, and no one may be “subjected to questioning and aggression for merely holding an opinion.” The law prohibits Muslim citizens from changing or renouncing their religious beliefs. The only recognized conversions are from another religion to Islam. Apostasy from Islam is a crime punishable by death. Under the law, a child born to a Muslim father is considered to be Muslim.

By law, non-Muslims may not engage in public persuasion, or attempted conversion of Muslims. These activities are considered proselytizing and are punishable by death. In addition, citizens who are not recognized as Christians, Zoroastrians, or Jews may not engage in public religious expression, such as worshiping in a church, or wearing religious symbols, such as a cross. Some exceptions are made for foreigners belonging to unrecognized religious groups.

The penal code specifies the death sentence for moharebeh (enmity towards or waging war against God or “drawing a weapon on the life, property or chastity of people or to cause terror as it creates the atmosphere of insecurity”), fisad fil-arz (corruption on earth – including apostasy or heresy), and sabb al-nabi (“insulting the prophets” or “insulting the sanctities”).

The constitution states the Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi Sunni schools of Islam are “deserving of total respect” and their followers are free to perform religious practices. It states these schools may follow their own jurisprudence in matters of religious education and certain personal affairs, including marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

The constitution states Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians are the only recognized religious minorities. “Within the limits of the law,” they have permission to perform religious rites and ceremonies and to form religious societies. They are also free to address personal affairs and religious education according to their own religious canon. The government does not recognize evangelicals as Christian. Because the law prohibits citizens from converting from Islam to another religion, the government only recognizes the Christianity of citizens who are Armenian or Assyrian Christians, since the presence of these groups in the country predates Islam, or, reportedly, of citizens who can prove that they or their families were Christian prior to 1979 revolution. The government also recognizes Sabean-Mandaeans as Christian, even though the Sabean-Mandaeans do not consider themselves to be Christians. Any citizen who is not a registered member of one of these three groups or of Judaism or Zoroastrianism or who cannot prove that his or her family was Christian prior to 1979 is considered Muslim. Citizens who are members of one of these recognized religious minorities must register with the authorities.

Registration conveys certain rights, including the use of alcohol for religious purposes. Failure of churchgoers to register and attendance at churches by unregistered individuals may subject a church to closure and arrest of its leaders by the authorities. Christian converts are not recognized as Christian under the law; they cannot register, and are not entitled to the same rights as recognized members of Christian communities.

The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security monitor religious activity, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also monitors churches.

The constitution provides for freedom of the press except when it is “harmful to the principles of Islam or the rights of the public.” Unrecognized religious minorities, such as Yarsanis and Bahais, report they are unable to legally produce or distribute religious literature.

The religious curriculum of public schools is determined by the Ministry of Education. All school curricula, public and private, must include a course on Shia Islamic teachings and all pupils must pass this course in order to advance to the next educational level through university. Sunni students and students from recognized minority religious groups must also take and pass the courses on Shia Islam, although they may also take courses on their own religious beliefs separately.

Recognized religious minority groups, except for Sunni Muslims, may operate private schools. The Ministry of Education supervises the private schools operated by the recognized minority religious groups and imposes certain curriculum requirements. The ministry must approve all textbooks used in coursework, including religious texts. These schools may provide their own religious instruction and in languages other than Farsi, but authorities must approve those texts as well. Minority communities must bear the cost of translating the texts into Farsi so the authorities can review them. Directors of such private schools, whether Muslim or of another religious affiliation, must demonstrate loyalty to the official state religion (a requirement known as gozinesh review, an evaluation to determine adherence to the government ideology and system as well as knowledge of the government interpretation of Shia Islam).

The law bars Bahais from founding their own educational institutions. A Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology order requires universities to exclude Bahais from access to higher education or expel them if their religious affiliation becomes known. Government regulation states Bahais are permitted to enroll in schools only if they do not identify themselves as such. To register for the university entrance examination, Bahai students must identify themselves as followers of a religion other than Bahai. To pass the entrance examination, university applicants must pass an exam on Islamic, Christian, or Jewish theology based on their official religious affiliation.

According to the constitution, Islamic scholars in the Assembly of Experts, an assembly of 86 popularly elected clerics, whose qualifications include piety and religious scholarship, elect the supreme leader, the country’s putative head of state. To “safeguard” Islamic ordinances and to ensure the compatibility with Islam of legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (i.e., the parliament or Majlis), a Guardian Council composed of six Shia clerics appointed by the supreme leader, and six Shia legal scholars nominated by the judiciary must review and approve all legislation. The Guardian Council also reviews all candidates for the Assembly of Experts, president, and parliament and supervises elections for those bodies.

The constitution bans the parliament from passing laws contrary to Islam and states there may be no amendment to its provisions related to the “Islamic character” of the political or legal system or to the specification of Shia Ja’fari Islam as the official religion.

Non-Muslims may not be elected to a representative body or hold senior government, intelligence, or military positions, with the exception of five of the 290 parliament seats reserved by the constitution for recognized religious minorities. There are two seats reserved for Armenian Christians, one for Assyrian and Chaldean Christians together, one for Jews, and one for Zoroastrians.

The constitution states, in regions where followers of one of the recognized Sunni schools constitute the majority, local regulations are to be in accordance with that school within the bounds of the jurisdiction of local councils and without infringing upon the rights of the followers of the other schools.

According to the constitution, a judge should rule on a case on the basis of the codified law, but in a situation where such law is absent, he should deliver his judgment on the basis of “authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwas.”

The constitution specifies the government and all Muslims are “required to treat non-Muslims in conformity with the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human rights, as long as those non-Muslims have not conspired or acted against Islam and the Islamic republic.

The law authorizes collection of “blood money” or diyeh as restitution to families for the death of Muslims and members of recognized religious minorities. Bahai families are not entitled to receive diyeh. This law also reduces the diyeh for recognized religious minorities and women to half that of a Muslim man.

By law, non-Muslims may not serve in the judiciary, the security services (separate from regular armed forces), or as public school principals. Officials screen candidates for elected offices and applicants for public sector employment based on their adherence to and knowledge of Islam and loyalty to the Islamic republic (gozinesh requirements), although members of recognized religious minorities, may serve in the lower ranks of government if they meet these gozinesh requirements. Government workers who do not observe Islamic principles and rules are subject to penalties and may be fired or barred from work in a particular sector.

Bahais are banned from all government employment. They are not allowed to participate in the governmental social pension system. Bahais cannot receive compensation for injury or crimes committed against them and cannot inherit property. A religious edict (fatwa) from the supreme leader encourages citizens to avoid all dealings with Bahais.

The government does not recognize Bahai marriages or divorces, but allows a civil attestation of marriage to serve as a marriage certificate, which allows for basic recognition of the union but does not offer legal protections in marital disputes. Bahai activists report this often leaves women without legal protections provided for in government-recognized marriage contracts.

Recognized religious groups issue marriage contracts in accordance with their religious laws.

The constitution permits the formation of political parties based on Islam or on one of the recognized religious minorities, provided the parties do not violate the “criteria of Islam,” among other stipulations.

The constitution states the military must be Islamic, must be committed to Islamic ideals, and must recruit individuals who are committed to the objectives of the Islamic revolution. In addition to the regular military, there is an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps charged with upholding the Islamic nature of the revolution at home and abroad. The law does not provide for exemptions from military service based on religious affiliation. The law forbids non-Muslims from holding positions of authority over Muslims in the armed forces, thus limiting upward mobility of religious minorities. Members of recognized religious minorities with a college education may serve as officers during their mandatory military service, but may not continue to serve beyond the mandatory service period to become career military officers.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

According to Amnesty International and other international human rights NGOs, the government convicted and executed dissidents, political reformers, and peaceful protesters on charges of moharebeh and anti-Islamic propaganda. The government executed more than 20 Sunni Kurds on charges of moharebeh and incarcerated numerous prisoners on varying charges related to religion. According to the U. S.-based NGO United for Iran, there were 198 political prisoners incarcerated on charges “waging war against God,” 31 for “insulting Islam,” and 12 for “corruption on earth.” Shia religious leaders who did not support government policies reportedly continued to face intimidation and arrest. The government continued to harass, interrogate, and arrest Bahais. The government also continued to regulate Christian religious practices closely to enforce the prohibition on proselytizing and conversion. Security officials continued to raid and demolish existing prayer sites belonging to Sunnis; the government reportedly barred the construction of new Sunni mosques. Authorities continued demolition of a Bahai cemetery in Shiraz. There were reports of authorities placing restrictions on Bahai businesses or forcing them to shut down.

According to multiple reports from international media, such as Reuters, and NGOs, including the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (ICHRI) and Amnesty International, on August 2, one week after airing their confessions on television, the government executed more than 20 Sunni Kurdish prisoners at Rajai Shahr Prison on charges of moharebeh, “being affiliated with Salafi groups”, and “acting against national security.” Those executed included Bahman Rahimi, Mokhtar Rahimi, Yavar Rahimi, Arash Sharifi, Kaveh Veisi, Ahmad Nasiri, Kaveh Sharifi, Behrouz Shahnazari, Talek Malek, and Shahram Ahmadi. Courts had upheld the death sentences even though NGOs reported the charges were based on confessions obtained through torture.

Courts also upheld the 2015 death sentences of Sunni prisoners Mohammad Kayvan Karimi, Amjad Salehi, and Omid Payvand, on charges of “enmity against God through spreading propaganda against the system,” despite NGO reports the convictions were based on confessions obtained through torture.

IHRDC reported the government executed one individual with the initials H.S. on charges of moharebeh in January in Zanjan. Additional information about the case was unavailable.

According to the Iranian Human Rights News Agency, on November 18, Mohammad Eshaqabadi, a member of the Gonabadi community of Sufi dervishes, died several days after he was detained by plainclothes policemen in Tehran.

Residents of provinces with large Sunni populations, including Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and Sistan-Baluchistan, reported continued repression by the judiciary and security services, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest, and torture in detention, as well as discrimination, including suppression of religious rights, lack of basic government services, and inadequate funding for infrastructure projects. Sunnis reported it was sometimes difficult to distinguish whether the cause of government discrimination against them was religious or ethnic, since most Sunnis were also members of ethnic minority groups.

According to Baluchi rights activists, Baluchi journalists and human rights activists faced arbitrary arrest, physical abuse, and unfair trials. Baluchi rights activists reported families of those in prison were often pressured to remain silent and threatened with retaliation for speaking out about cases. Baluchistan Human Rights Group reported on October 19 that Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) agents arrested Ameneh Issazadeh, a Sunni Baluchi girl from Sirik Township, at her home for criticizing religious ceremonies on social media during the month of Moharam. She contacted her family from a MOIS detention center in Bandar Abbas after several days, but her family was not allowed to see her.

Christians who were arrested were reportedly subject to severe physical and psychological mistreatment. The Christian news website, Mohabat News, said the mistreatment sometimes included beatings and solitary confinement.

According to the Iran Prison Atlas data set from United for Iran, there were 31 political prisoners incarcerated on charges of “insulting Islam,” 198 for moharebeh, and 12 for “corruption on earth” and at least 103 members of minority religious groups remained imprisoned for their religious activities. According to the Bahai International Community (BIC), there were 86 Bahai prisoners incarcerated at year’s end. According to Christian World Watch Monitor, there were 82 arrests of Christians (including converts) during the year. According to IHRDC, at least 261 people remained imprisoned at the end of the year for their membership in or activities on behalf of a minority religious group, including at least 115 Sunnis, 80 Bahais, 26 Christian converts, 18 Sufis, and 10 Yarsanis.

Mohammad Ali Taheri, founder of the spiritual doctrine Interuniversalism, remained in prison serving a life sentence for “insulting the sanctities.” Taheri reportedly began a hunger strike on September 28 and was transferred to the hospital after fainting, according to local media reporting. One of his supporters, Sara Saei was summoned to court in January for participating in protests of Taheri’s prison conditions, according to IHCRI. In October security forces, using tear gas and beating participants with batons, reportedly broke up a gathering of Taheri’s supporters in front of Baghiatollah Hospital, where he was believed to be hospitalized, and arrested 15 people.

The September 6 report of the UN by Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Iran, Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, stated that flogging continued to be used as punishment for not fasting during the month of Ramadan.

Multiple Bahais remained incarcerated, serving sentences on charges including “insulting religious sanctities,” “corruption on earth,” “propaganda against the system,” and actions against national security, or for their involvement with the Bahai Institute for Higher Education (BIHE), a university-level educational institution the government considered illegal. Of seven Bahai leaders serving 20-year terms after 2011 convictions, one, Afif Naeimi, was provisionally released in July for medical reasons due to a heart condition. He remained out of jail at year’s end. Two of the remaining six, Fariba Kamalabadi and Mahvash Sabet received five-day furloughs before returning to prison. Prison authorities denied Abdolfattah Soltani, an attorney who defended teachers at BIHE and was serving a 13-year sentence, family visitation and adequate medical treatment, according to an August 17 report by ICHRI. Amanollah Mostaghim, who had been serving a five-year sentence, was released due to continued medical issues, according to official online Bahai records.

The BIC reported that on January 24, 24 Bahais were sentenced to long-term imprisonment for religious activity. At year’s end, the individuals were free on bail awaiting the outcome of an appeal. Police arrested 14 Bahais in Shiraz and Karaj for their religious beliefs on September 28 according to the BIC. Police arrested Behzad Zabihi Mahforouzaki, a Bahai business owner, on March 8, first charging him with “propaganda against the regime” and later with “propaganda against Islam and the Quran.” Zabihi spent seven days in a detention center and was released on bail of 900 million rials ($27,800). Zabihi said he was illegally arrested, subjected to torture and insults, prevented from defending himself, and pressured to abandon his faith. There was no further information on the status of his case. Peyman Koushk-Baghi, who was sentenced to five years in prison in 2015 for his activities at BIHE, appealed both his sentence and that of his wife, Azita Rafizadeh, who had been previously convicted of similar charges and was serving a four-year prison sentence. Rafizadeh continued to serve her sentence, but Koushk-Baghi remained free at year’s end pending his appeal.

According to the BIC, the government continued to prohibit Bahais from officially assembling or maintaining administrative institutions, actively closed such institutions, harassed Bahais, and disregarded their property rights. On October 4 in Qorveh, security forces raided the home of, and arrested Bahai homeopathic physician Maria Kosari on charges that she was violating sanitary codes by practicing in a field banned to Bahais.

Christians, particularly evangelicals and converts from Islam, continued to experience disproportionate levels of arrests and detention, and high levels of harassment and surveillance, according to reports from exiled Christians. Numerous Christians remained imprisoned at year’s end on charges related to their religious practices. Prison authorities reportedly continued to withhold medical care from prisoners, including some Christians, according to human rights groups. According to human rights NGOs, the government also continued to enforce the prohibition on proselytizing.

Several converts who used wine during communion services were arrested during the year. According to reporting from the NGO Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Christian converts Yasser Mossayebzadeh, Saheb Fadaie, and Mehdi Reza Omidi were arrested on May 13 for drinking communion wine and convicted and sentenced to 80 lashes each in the city of Rasht on September 10. All were appealing their sentences at year’s end.

According to Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Amin Afshar Naderi, Hadi Asgari, Amir Saman Dashti, Mohammad Dehnavi, and Ramil Bet-Tamraz were arrested on August 26 in a private garden in Firouzkooh for having Bibles. Four of the five were Christian converts. According to Mohabat Christian news site, Naderi was beaten by security forces for resisting arrest. On October 18, Christian Solidarity Worldwide reported that two of the arrested Christians, Ramil Bet-Tamraz and Mohammad Dehnavi, were released on bail. The rest remained in Evin prison. In August authorities arrested a Christian convert after raiding his house, confiscating religious materials found there. He was convicted of “acting against national security” and sentenced to one year in jail. According to the British online news site Christian Today, on June 24, police arrested three Azerbaijani Christians while they were leading a Bible study in a private apartment. After being detained for two months at Evin Prison, the three were released after paying bail and returned to Azerbaijan.

According to Mohabat News, prison guards beat Ebrahim Firouzi on July 12 for writing an open letter stating he would not attend any hearings about his case. Firouzi was serving a five-year sentence at Rajai Shahr Prison after a 2013 conviction for “collusion against national security” for converting to and practicing Christianity.

Christian convert Maryam Naghash Zargaran, originally arrested in 2012, continued to serve beyond her original four-year sentence on charges of “propaganda against the Islamic regime and collusion intended to harm national security” for her activities in the Christian community. According to Mohabat News, Zarfaran went on two hunger strikes to seek conditional early release under a provision of the penal code. She was reported to be in poor health but was not on medical furlough.

Pastor Yousef Nadarkhani was rearrested in Rasht on May 13 for proselytizing. His wife and three members of his church were also arrested, but their charges were not specified. Pastor Nadarkhani’s wife was subsequently released, and the pastor was released on bail July 24. The three church members remained in custody at year’s end.

The authorities often arrested members of unrecognized churches for operating illegally in private homes or on charges of supporting and accepting assistance from enemy countries. Many arrests reportedly took place during police raids on religious gatherings, during which the authorities also confiscated religious property.

Other unrecognized religious minorities such as Bahai and Yarsan also often gathered in private homes to practice their faith in secret.

According to the Article 18 Organization, an NGO, on April 27, plainclothes security agents arrested 17 Christians who were attending a private social event in Tehran. Following this incident, attendees of the event were reportedly subjected to interrogations and intimidation and had their private property seized. Two attendees were reportedly banned from continuing their university studies for engaging in “illegal activities” while other attendees lost their jobs. Several other attendees were charged with crimes against national security by propagating Christianity in a house church. On October 4, university authorities expelled a Christian pastor post-graduate student for engaging in unauthorized religious activities.

The government continued to regulate Christian religious practices closely. The authorities prevented Muslim converts to Christianity from entering Armenian or Assyrian churches, according to UN Special Rapporteur Shaheed. According to Christian community leaders, if the authorities found Armenian or Assyrian churches were baptizing new converts or preaching in Farsi, they closed the churches. The authorities reportedly also barred all unregistered or unrecognized Christians from entering church premises, closed churches that allowed them to enter, and arrested Christian converts. Christian advocacy groups stated the government, through such pressure and through church closures, had eliminated in recent years all but a handful of Farsi-language church services, restricting services to the Armenian and Assyrian languages. The government continued to ban Farsi-language churches, according to Christian Solidarity Worldwide. Security officials monitored registered congregation centers to perform identity checks on worshippers to confirm non-Christians or converts did not participate in services. In response, many citizens who had converted to Protestantism or other Christian faiths practiced their religion in secret.

The government continued to monitor the statements and views of senior Shia religious leaders. Shia religious leaders who did not support government policies or supreme leader Ali Khamenei’s views reportedly continued to face intimidation, arrest, and imprisonment on charges related to religious offenses.

The supreme leader oversaw the extrajudicial Special Clerical Courts, not provided for by the constitution. The courts, headed by a Shia Islamic legal scholar, operated outside the judiciary’s purview and were charged with investigating offenses committed by clerics, including political statements inconsistent with government policy and nonreligious activities. The courts also issued rulings based on independent interpretation of Islamic legal sources. Critics stated clerical courts were used to control non-Shia Muslim clerics, as well as to prosecute Shia clerics who expressed controversial ideas and participated in activities outside the sphere of religion, such as journalism or reformist political activities. On August 16, Vice President for Legal Affairs Majid Ansari declared cases of individuals and entities who insulted the president would be tried in the Special Clerical Courts.

Local media reported the Qom branch of the Special Clerical Court interrogated prominent cleric Hojjatoleslam Ahmad Montazeri on August 14 for posting audio recordings of his father, the late cleric Hossein Ali Montazeri, condemning a 1988 mass execution of political prisoners. After Hojjatolleslam Ahmad Montazeri’s interrogation, he was arrested September 4 for “endangering national security” and “leaking secrets of the Islamic system.” On September 5, he was released on a 700 million rials ($21,620) bail. On November 27, he was sentenced to 21 years in prison, of which he was ordered to serve six. The government suspended 15 years of his sentence because of what it said was respect for his family’s role and sacrifice in the 1979 revolution.

According to Amnesty International, Shia cleric Ayatollah Hossein Kazemeini Boroujerdi, serving an 11-year sentence after conviction on charges including “moharebeh” and “abusing his clerical flock,” was transferred to a medical clinic on January 19 to treat recurring stomach pain, nausea, vomiting, and dizziness, but was returned by prison officials to his cell the same day without undergoing full treatment.

Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Nekounam, who was originally arrested in 2015, remained in prison in Qom despite appeals for his release on medical grounds to the Special Clerical Court after he suffered a stroke during the year while in solitary confinement, according to Human Rights Activist News Agency (HRANA). Reportedly, the authorities brought him before the Special Clerical Court in June for further investigation.

There continued to be reports of arrests and harassment of Sunni clerics and congregants. ICHRI reported that in August Hassam Amini, a Sunni cleric and Islamic judge, was interrogated for two days by the intelligence ministry for his criticism of the execution of the 20 Sunni Kurdish prisoners in Rajai Shahr Prison and visiting the victim’s families. His interrogators reportedly said Amini “had acted against the state,” that his criticisms “disturbed the public and undermined the judiciary,” and his visit with the families meant he was supporting their positions. The intelligence ministry also interrogated Sunni religious scholar Hashemi Hossein Panahi on August 8 after he criticized the executions.

According to Majzooban-e-Noor, a website reporting on the Gonabadi (Sufi) dervish community, Gonabadi followers Kazem Dehghan and Salahaddin Moradi were charged with being members of an illegal group, a group countering the government and/or its theology, and conspiring to disrupt the country’s security. There was no further information on their case.

According to a February 1 report by Majzooban-e-Noor, a special clerical court sentenced seven dervishes of Kavar to internal exile on charges including moharebeh. The court sentenced Kazem Dehghan, Hamid Reza Arayesh, and Mohammad Ali Shamshirzan to permanent internal exile, and sentenced Mohammad Ali Dehghan, Mohammad Ali Sadeghi, Ebrahim Bahrami, and Mohsen Esmaeili to seven years of internal exile.

Security officials continued to raid prayer sites belonging to Sunnis. News media outlet Al Sharq Al Awsat reported 18 parliamentarians had presented a warning to Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli after the closure of a Sunni mosque in Eslamshahr, west of Tehran. Parliament member Mahmoud Sadeghi said the closure of the mosque “contradict the Shia-Sunni unity that is always stressed by the supreme leader.” Sadeghi also said authorities had blocked attendance at other Sunni mosques, including at Tehran Pars Mosque. HRANA reported plainclothes security agents raided a mosque in northwest Tehran and attacked worshippers there on the eve of Eid al-Fitr.

The government continued to require women of all religious groups to adhere to “Islamic dress” standards in public, including covering their hair and fully covering their bodies in loose clothing – a manteau (overcoat) and a rousari (headscarf), or, alternatively, a chador(full body length semicircle of fabric worn over both the head and clothes). Although the government at times eased enforcement of rules for such dress, it also punished “un-Islamic dress” with arrests, lashings, fines, and dismissal from employment. In May according to media reports, 99 students in Qazvin, both men and women, were each given 99 lashes for attending a coed party where the women were, according to authorities, improperly dressed in accordance with Islam.

According to members of the Sabean-Mandaean and Yarsan religious communities, authorities continued their harassment of these communities, including by denying them permission to perform religious ceremonies in public and denying them building permits for places of worship. The government continued to classify Yarsanis as Shia Muslims practicing Sufism, although Yarsanis identified themselves as practitioners of a distinct faith. Yarsanis reported continued discrimination in the military and school systems, where they faced harassment. They also faced discrimination in the birth registration system, which prevented them from giving their children Yarsani names. Without providing details, Yarsanis in exile reported thousands of community members remained missing after arrests by security forces.

The intelligence and security services reportedly continued their harassment of prominent Sufi leaders and raided Sufi businesses as a means of intimidation and information gathering. Government legal restrictions on Sufi groups and their husseiniya (auxiliary prayer and teaching spaces) also continued due to the groups’ differences with the government’s interpretation of Islam.

According to human rights activists, the government maintained a legal interpretation of Islam that required citizens of all faiths to follow strict rules based on the government’s interpretation of Shia jurisprudence, creating differentiation under the law between the rights granted to men and women. The government continued to enforce gender segregation and discrimination throughout the country without regard to religious affiliation.

The authorities, employers, bureaucrats, hotels, and others reportedly often used marriage contracts to identify and discriminate against religious minorities.

Government restrictions on published religious material continued. Government officials frequently confiscated Bibles and pressured publishing houses printing Bibles or unsanctioned non-Muslim materials to cease operations. Books about the Yarsan religion remained banned. Books published by religious minorities, regardless of their topic, were required to carry labels on the cover denoting their non-Shia authorship.

Iranian media reported there were nine Sunni mosques operating in Tehran and 15,000 across the country. International media and the Sunni community reported no new Sunni mosques were allowed to be built in Tehran to meet demand. Sunnis reported the existing number of mosques in the country did not meet the demands of the local population. Sunnis continued to cite the absence of a Sunni mosque in Tehran, despite the presence of more than one million Sunnis in the city, as an example of government discrimination. Sunni leaders said, because the government barred them from building or worshiping in their own mosques, they relied on ad hoc, underground prayer halls, or namaz khane, to practice their faith.

According to the BIC website, authorities continued demolition of the Bahai cemetery in Shiraz. A cultural and sports recreation center for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps built on the site of the cemetery was reportedly near completion. The BIC reported authorities representing the Ardestan Municipal Council bulldozed the Bahai cemetery in Ardestan on October 27. Although the BIC presented an official petition to the Municipal Council and the office of the Friday prayer leader of Ardestan, authorities did not launch an investigation. Instead, the BIC reported the municipal council put up a banner requiring any burial in the area to have a special permit and stipulating that anyone carrying out a burial without a permit could be prosecuted.

The government continued to hold many Bahai properties it had seized following the 1979 revolution, including cemeteries, holy places, historical sites, and administrative centers. The government also continued to prevent Bahais from burying their dead in accordance with their religious tradition.

According to the BIC, authorities continued to restrict Bahai businesses, making it difficult for Bahais to earn their livelihood. The government continued to raid Bahai homes and businesses and confiscated private and commercial property, as well as religious materials. There were reports of authorities placing restrictions on Bahai businesses or forcing them to shut down when they had temporarily closed in observance of Bahai holidays. On April 20, authorities sealed off 17 Bahai owned shops after the owners closed their businesses for Bahai holy days. The shops included two toy stores, two pharmacies, a tire repair shop, a women’s clothing store, and two optical stores. Authorities also reportedly asked managers of private companies to dismiss Bahai employees, and denied applications from Bahais for new or renewed business and trade licenses.

The Bahai community wrote a public letter to President Hassan Rouhani in September protesting the government’s continuing seizure of Bahai personal property and stating its denial of access to education and employment eroded the Bahai community’s economic base and threatened its survival. There was no public response from the government to the letter.

According to the Article 18 Organization, on July 26, the Third Branch of Tehran’s Revolutionary Court confirmed a 2015 court order to seize an Assemblies of God retreat center in Mohammadshahr. The court stated the U.S. Government funded the Assemblies of God to infiltrate the country and the Islamic world by conducting evangelistic activities.

Sunni leaders reported the authorities had banned Sunni religious literature and teachings from religion courses in some public schools, even in predominantly Sunni areas. Other schools, notably in the Kurdish regions, included specialized Sunni religious courses for the students. Assyrian Christians reported the government continued to permit their community to write its own religious textbooks for use in schools, after the government reviewed and authorized their content.

Members of the Bahai community reported teachers and administrators in public schools continued to try to convert Bahai children to Islam. The BIC stated in its October report, The Bahai Question Revisited, that “students were being pressured to convert to Islam, were required to endure slander of their faith by religious instructors, and were being taught and tested … from authorized texts that denigrate, distort, and brazenly falsify Bahai religious heritage.” According to the report, Bahai students were often transferred to schools farther from home and told not to teach or discuss their religion with other students.

According to the Tehran Jewish Committee, five Jewish schools and two kindergartens continued to operate in Tehran, but authorities required their principals to be Muslim. The government reportedly continued to allow Hebrew instruction but limited the distribution of Hebrew texts, particularly nonreligious texts, making it difficult to teach the language, according to the Jewish community. The government reportedly required Jewish schools to remain open on Saturdays, in violation of Jewish religious law, to conform to the schedule of other schools.

Public and private universities continued to deny Bahais admittance and to expel Bahai students once their religion became known. ICHRI reported the June expulsion of Faraz Karin-Kani Sisan from Ghiyaseddin Jamshid Kashani Institute for Higher Education (GJKI) in Abyek, Alborz Province, although he had already completed two years of study, after administrators found out he was Bahai. Many Bahais reportedly did not try to enroll in state-run universities because of the Bahai Faith’s tenet not to deny one’s faith.

During the year Bahai students reported they were unable to register for university, even if they passed entrance exams, because of error messages in the online registration system. According to HRANA, a Bahai high school graduate in Abadan, Seraj Azadi, was told by university admissions he could not register for university, despite successfully passing entrance exams, because he had “insufficient/incomplete documentation,” a statement reportedly used to deny Bahai students entrance into universities.

Many Bahais reportedly turned to online education at BIHE despite government censorship through use of internet filters and blocking of websites and the arrests of teachers associated with the program. As the BIHE’s operations, online and offline, were illegal, students and teachers faced risk of arrest for participation. BIHE instructor Azita Rafizadeh remained in prison serving out her four-year sentence for teaching at the institution. The government’s lack of recognition of degrees from BIHE resulted in employment barriers for graduates from the institution.

Authorities reportedly continued to deny the Sabean-Mandaean and Yarsan religious communities access to higher education and government employment unless they declared themselves to be Christian or Muslim, respectively, on their application forms.

According to Majzooban-e-Noor website, at the beginning of the new school year, authorities continued to bar Gonabadi Sufis from studying and teaching at universities. In September security at Azad University of Shiraz refused to allow Farshid Yadollahi, Sufi attorney and activist in his second year of graduate studies, to continue his education at the university.

Representatives of minority religious groups, such as the Bahais and Yarsanis, reported the government continued to avoid investigating crimes committed against members of religious minority groups and against their property, including religious sites and graveyards.

International news media, such as the UK newspaper The Independent, quoted Jewish community representatives as saying there continued to be government restrictions and discrimination against Jews, but little interference with Jewish religious practices. According to the government, there were 31 publicly-listed synagogues in Tehran. The Tehran Jewish Committee reported in 2015 there were 13 active synagogues in Tehran.

Jewish community representatives said they were free to travel in and out of the country, and the government generally did not enforce a prohibition against travel to Israel by Jews, although it enforced the prohibition with other citizens.

The government officially did not limit voting rights on account of religion, although there were separate election processes for the seats reserved for representatives of the recognized religious minority communities in parliament. The government continued to permit Sunnis, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Jews to serve in parliament but not the Assembly of Experts. Through the end of the year, the Guardian Council, assigned by the constitution to confirm the eligibility of candidates for the presidency, had deemed only Shia Muslims eligible for the presidency.

According to reporting from Mazjooban-e-Noor, university professor Sharam Pazouki was prevented from teaching at Azad University after authorities discovered his ties to the Gonbadi dervish community.

Sunnis reported continued underrepresentation in government-appointed positions in the provinces where they formed a majority, such as Kurdistan and Khuzestan, as well as inability to obtain senior government positions.

Sunni activists reported that throughout the year, and especially during the month of Moharam, the government sent hundreds of Shia missionaries to areas with large Sunni Baluch populations to try to convert the local population.

According to the Bahai International Community, government regulations continued to ban Bahais from participating over 25 types of work, many related to food industries, because the government deemed Bahais to be “unclean.”

The government allowed operation of a 100-bed Jewish hospital in Tehran, according to the Tehran Jewish Committee.

According to reports from the Bahai community, government-sponsored public denunciations of Bahais continued to increase steadily, as they had for several years, with over 20,000 pieces of anti-Bahai propaganda in the Iranian media during the year. Government media statements continued to accuse Bahais of sexual deviance and illegitimate relations, calling them members of a “cult” which was a threat to national security.

Former parliamentarian Faezeh Hashemi Rafsanjani was publicly criticized for visiting Bahai prisoner of conscience, Fariba Kamalabadi, in her home during a five-day furlough from jail. In response to Rafsanjani’s visit, on May 16, the Tasnim news agency quoted Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Sadeq Amoli-Larijani as saying the Bahai Faith “is a threat to Iran’s national security” and that relatives of senior clerics who socialized with Bahais “damage the norms.” An article in Javan magazine stated “…the deviant Bahai sect was created by colonists,” and called on Rafsanjani to apologize for her visit. Rafsanjani’s father, former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, also criticized his daughter’s visit.

Government officials continued to employ anti-Semitic rhetoric in official statements and sanction them in media outlets, publications, and books. On January 27, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s official website posted a video that questioned whether the Holocaust happened and criticized the U.S. and European governments for disapproving of Holocaust denial.

On April 29, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum cited the Iranian government’s partial funding of a Holocaust cartoon contest, which included anti-Semitic cartoons, stating, “The organizations associated with the contest are sponsored or supported by government entities, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Islamic Guidance.” There continued to be reports of government officials and government-affiliated religious figures making anti-Semitic statements, including a January video produced by the office of the supreme leader, questioning the facts surrounding the Holocaust. Government-sponsored rallies continued to include chants of “death to Israel” and accused other religious minorities, such as Bahais and Christians, of collusion with Israel. On June 30, Kayhan newspaper, whose management is appointed by the office of the supreme leader, published an article stating the Holocaust was a myth and a figment of Jewish historians’ imaginations.

Official reports and the media continued to characterize Christian house churches as “illegal networks” and “Zionist propaganda institutions.”

The government continued to allow recognized religious minority groups to establish community centers and certain self-financed cultural, social, athletic, and/or charitable associations.

Bahais, and those who advocated for their rights, reported Bahais continued to be a major target of social stigma and violence. According to The Bahai World News Service, Farhang Amiri, was stabbed to death outside his residence in Yazd on September 26 by individuals, one of whom stated during the police investigation that he had carried out the killing because Amiri was Bahai.

In March an attacker involved in 2014 acid attacks against women was arrested by authorities and charged with “deliberate destruction, arson, and attacks on women.” The media had reported at the time the attacks were being motivated by the women’s “improper Islamic dress.”

There continued to be reports of non-Bahais dismissing or refusing employment to Bahais, sometimes in response to government pressure, according to BIC.

Yarsanis outside the country reported there was widespread discrimination against Yarsanis in the country. Yarsani children were socially ostracized in school and shared community facilities. Yarsani men, recognizable by their particular mustaches, often faced employment discrimination. Friday preachers often encouraged such social discrimination against the Yarsani. During the year, protests broke out in the city of Eslamabad after police officers were seen mocking Yarsani men’s mustaches in the street.

According to Christian Solidarity Worldwide, converts from Islam faced societal pressure and rejection by family or community members.

Shia clerics and prayer leaders reportedly continued to denounce Sufism and the activities of Sufis in both sermons and public statements.

Sunni students reported professors routinely insulted Sunni religious figures in class.

On May 20, Fars Provincial TV aired a sermon by Shiraz Imam Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Razavi-Ardakani, who said the Bahai religion is not a religion but a political party that was created by the United Kingdom and that intelligence and security services should be attentive to Bahais operating in some of the cities in the country.

Bahai representatives in the U.S. reported there were at least three cases of destruction or vandalism of Bahai cemeteries. In July the Bahai cemetery in Ghorveh was completely destroyed and the gravestones razed to the ground. The Semnan Bahai cemetery was also vandalized in July. In October according to Iran Press Watch, vandals attacked the Bahai cemetery in Urmieh for the second time, cutting down trees, burning parts of the grounds, and demolishing graves. Local Bahais reported the incident to the police, who reportedly took no action.

The United States has no diplomatic relations with the country, and therefore did not have regular opportunities to raise concerns directly with the government over its religious freedom abuses and restrictions.

The U.S. government continued to call for the government to respect religious freedom and continued to condemn its abuses of religious minorities in a variety of ways and in different international forums. This included public statements by senior U.S. government officials and reports issued by U.S. government agencies, support for relevant UN and NGO efforts, diplomatic initiatives, and sanctions. Senior U.S. government officials publicly reiterated calls for the release of prisoners held on grounds related to their religious beliefs. For example, in May the Department of State issued a press statement condemning the continued detention of the seven members of the Bahai leadership council and called for their release. The Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom regularly criticized the country’s continued discrimination against Bahais and other religious minorities. In an August 24 statement, the Ambassador called upon the country to end the use of blasphemy and apostasy laws. In an October 4 Voice of America editorial, he reiterated the U.S. government’s concerns with the Iranian government’s discriminatory actions against religious minority groups, specifically Bahais. In other statements, U.S. government officials, including the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, called attention to the situation of Bahais and Christians in the context of supporting religious freedom for members of all minority religious groups in the country.

The United States supported an extension of the mandate of the UN special rapporteur for human rights in Iran in a vote at the UN Human Rights Council. The United States also voted in November and December in the UN General Assembly in favor of resolutions expressing concern over Iran’s human rights practices, including the continued persecution of religious minorities.

Since 1999, Iran has been designated as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On October 31, 2016, the Secretary of State redesignated Iran as a CPC and identified the existing sanctions as ongoing travel restrictions based on serious human rights abuses under section 221(a)(1)(C) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 107,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2010 census, approximately 56 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 34 percent is Kiribati Protestant (a Congregationalist denomination), and 5 percent belongs to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). Groups that together constitute less than 5percent of the population include the Bahai Faith (2 percent), the Seventh-day Adventist Church (2 percent), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Assembly of God, and Muslims. The Mormon Church states it has a higher number of adherents, with membership exceeding 15 percent. Persons with no religious affiliation account for less than 1 percent of the population. Members of the Catholic Church are concentrated in the northern islands, while Protestants constitute the majority in the southern islands.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience (including religion), expression, assembly, and association. These rights may be limited by law “which is reasonably required” in the interests of public defense, safety, order, morality, or health, or to protect the rights of others.

By law any religious group with adult members representing no less than 2 percent of the total population (according to the most recent census) must register with the government. The religious organization submits a request to the Ministry of Women, Youth, and Social Affairs, signed by the head of the group and supported by five other members of the organization. Also required in the request is information and proof of the number of adherents, and the religious denomination and name under which it wishes to be registered. Although the law requires a religious organization representing 2 percent of the population to register, there are no legal consequences for not registering.

There is no mandated religious education in public schools. Public schools in the country allow a variety of religious groups, including Catholics, Methodists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Mormons to provide religious education in schools. Students who opt out of religious education must participate in a supervised study period.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Most governmental meetings and events began and ended with an ordained minister or other church official delivering a Christian prayer.

The government continued to administer a small grants program for church projects from registered religious organizations.

The population of two islands – Arorae and Tamana – remained largely Protestant, at 99 percent and 94 percent respectively, according to the 2010 census, although a small number of Catholic, Seventh-day Adventist, Mormon, and Bahai adherents were also present. The residents of these islands continued their “one-church-only” tradition, which they stated was in deference to Protestant missionaries who came to the islands in the 1800s, according to government reports. On these islands, residents of other religions worshiped in their own homes. Religious groups outside the Kiribati Protestant Church were discouraged by villagers from proselytizing or holding meetings. The Ministry of Women, Youth, and Social Affairs reported receiving no complaints from other groups regarding the tradition.

The U.S. Ambassador to Fiji was accredited to the government. Representatives of the Embassy in Fiji also visited the country and discussed religious tolerance and religious practices on the outer islands with government representatives and Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim leaders. In October the Ambassador visited the country and met with representatives from the Muslim community to discuss issues facing religious minority groups.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 1.9 million (July 2016 estimate). Census data from 2011 identifies 95.6 percent of the population as Muslim, 2.2 percent as Roman Catholic, and 1.4 percent as Serbian Orthodox. A boycott of that census by ethnic Serbs resulted in a significant undercounting of SOC members. The SOC estimates there are 120,000 Serbian Orthodox believers in Kosovo, or 6.3 percent. Protestants and those without a religious affiliation said they were incorrectly classified as Muslims by census takers. Per the census regulation, census takers did not inquire if citizens were Protestant. The Protestant community estimates 20,000 followers throughout the country, or 1.1 percent of the population. Census categories for “other,” “none,” or “no response” each constitute less than 1 percent.

The majority of the Muslim population belongs to the Hanafi Sunni school, although a number follow Sufi and Shia traditions that are part of Bektashi or Tarikat groups. Most SOC members reside in majority ethnic Serb municipalities in the south of the country, or in four northern Serb-majority municipalities. The largest Catholic communities are in Gjakove/Djakovica, Janjeve/Janjevo, Kline/Klina, Pristina, and Prizren. Evangelical Protestant populations are located throughout the country and concentrated in Pristina and Gjakove/Djakovica. There are small numbers of Jews in Prizren and Pristina.

Religion and ethnicity are often linked. The majority of ethnic Albanians are Muslim, while some are Catholic and Protestant; almost all ethnic Serbs belong to the SOC. The majority of ethnic Ashkalis, Bosniaks, Egyptians, Goranis, Roma, and Turks are also Muslim, while most ethnic Montenegrins and some Roma belong to the SOC. Ethnic Croats almost all belong to the Catholic Church.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience and religion for all residents, including the right to change, express, or not express religious belief; to practice or abstain from practicing religion; and to join or refuse to join a religious community. These rights are subject to limitations for reasons of public safety and order or to protect the health or rights of others. The constitution provides for the separation of religious communities from public institutions, including the right of religious groups to independently regulate their own organizations, activities, and ceremonies, and the right to establish religious schools and charity institutions. It guarantees equal rights for all religious communities, stipulates the country is secular and neutral with regard to religion, declares that the state shall ensure the protection and preservation of the country’s religious heritage, and prohibits discrimination based on religion. The constitution stipulates the law may limit freedom of expression to prevent provocation of violence and hostility on grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity, or religion. It allows courts to ban organizations or activities that encourage racial, national, ethnic, or religious hatred.

The constitution stipulates communities traditionally present in the country, including religious communities, shall have specific rights, including to maintain, develop, and preserve their religion, use their own language, establish and manage their own private schools with financial assistance from the state, have access to public media, establish and use their own media, maintain unhindered peaceful contacts with persons outside the country with whom they share a religious identity, and have equitable access to public employment. It guarantees 20 of 120 seats in the national assembly to minority communities and stipulates the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any laws pertaining to religious freedom and cultural heritage or to agreements with religious communities requires a majority of the deputies present holding seats guaranteed for minority communities as well as a majority of the all the deputies present.

The constitution provides for the Ombudsperson’s Institution, which is responsible for monitoring religious freedom among other human rights and recommending actions to correct violations. It stipulates the state shall take all necessary measures to protect individuals who may be subject to threats, hostility, discrimination, or violence because of their religious identity.

The law does not provide a legal mechanism or specific guidance for religious groups to obtain legal status through registration or other means. The law does not require groups to register, but without legal status, religious groups may not own property, open bank accounts, employ staff, access the courts, or perform other administrative tasks in their own name.

The law stipulates there is no official religion, but it lists five “traditional” religious communities: the BIK, the SOC, the Catholic Church, the Hebrew (Jewish) community, and the Evangelical (Protestant) Church. The law provides extra protections and benefits to these five groups, such as reduced taxes and relief from water tariffs. According to a law passed in 2015, religious buildings belonging to these five communities, but not their administrative offices, are eligible for waivers of water utility fees. Religious institutions must apply with the public water provider to be granted the waiver.

According to the law, “public education institutions shall refrain from teaching religion or other activities that propagate a specific religion.”

Municipalities hold titles to all public cemeteries, including those for religious communities, and are required by law to maintain them.

The law provides safeguards for religious and cultural Special Protection Zones (SPZs), based on religious and cultural significance, by restricting nearby activities that could damage the surrounding historical, cultural, or natural environment. According to the law, the Implementation and Monitoring Council (IMC) arbitrates disputes between the government and the SOC concerning SPZs and other matters related to protecting the SOC’s religious and cultural heritage. The IMC is a special body that stems from the Comprehensive Plan for Kosovo and the SPZ law. It became operational in 2010. Its mandate includes safeguarding SOC heritage as included in the law on Velika Hoca/Hoce e Madhe village and the law on Prizren’s historic center. The IMC includes the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning (as cochair); the MCYS; the SOC; the Special Representative of the European Union (as cochair) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The IMC’s charter calls for meetings every two months; however, the group only met once during the year in April.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The government took steps to counter radicalization and violent extremism related to religion. According to religious communities, the government continued to respond to societal violence and vandalism against several religious minority communities. Parliament considered, but did not vote on, a government-recommended bill that would allow religious groups to register and acquire legal status so they would be able to conduct business. Religious minorities said municipalities failed to act on requests to build churches and cemeteries, and the government failed to assist them with zoning issues. Several longstanding disputes over ownership of religious property remained unresolved.

On January 30, the Kosovo Police (KP) arrested four ethnic Albanians in front of the Visoki Decani Monastery. According to the KP, the suspects were in possession of an AK-47 rifle and a pistol, and some wore clothing that the authorities stated was typically associated with ISIS militants. On February 1, a local prosecutor told the press two of the arrestees had been involved with the conflict in Syria. According to the KP, those arrested were fined for illegal possession of weapons and the case was closed. Father Sava, the monastery’s Abbot, said the KP was uncooperative with the monastery during the investigation and deliberately downplayed the case in public. He said this incident demonstrated the need for Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops to remain at the monastery. Sava also expressed his concern that the suspects were not charged with more serious offenses.

On May 20, the Basic Court of Ferizaj/Urosevac convicted Imam Zekirja Qazimi, formerly from a BIK mosque in Gjilan/Gnjilane, on charges of recruitment for terrorism and incitement of hatred, and sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment. On November 25, the Court of Appeals confirmed his sentence.

On July 26, prosecutors charged Iranian cleric Hasan Azari Bejandi with laundering money through a nominally nongovernmental organization (NGO) he operated. Authorities said Bejandi was the head of the Quran Foundation of Kosovo, the reported umbrella group for five Shia organizations he ran in the country with links to Iran. The KP did not arrest Bejandi, who fled the country on July 28. The government subsequently shut down the five organizations.

On September 15, prosecutors charged four ethnic Albanian imams; two of the imams were charged with committing terrorist acts and the other two were charged with “inciting national, racial, religious, or ethnic hatred.”

The government worked with the BIK and civil society groups to combat violent extremism. As part of the government’s strategy, the BIK held sessions in its madrassahs and Islamic studies facilities that urged students not to fall prey to extremism.

Leaders of the country’s BIK, Catholic, Jewish, Protestant, SOC, Tarikat (Sufi and Shia orders) and Bektashi (Shia orders) communities continued to criticize the government for its failure to complete a draft law that would provide a legal mechanism through which religious groups could gain legal status so they would be able to conduct business and legal matters with the state and private entities. The Bektashi community also requested that such a law should state it is a community constituting part of the historical heritage and cultural and social life of the country. Although many groups said they had found alternative methods to conduct some of their business affairs, most reported difficulties in registering property and vehicles, opening bank accounts, and paying taxes on employee salaries. Some religious communities opened bank accounts that were not in their communities’ names, and the Kosovo Protestant Evangelical Church received a tax accounting number from the government in order to pay taxes as if it were a business. Some communities said it was difficult to undertake basic financial tasks, and that they were taxed as for-profit businesses.

Ethnic Albanian protestors threw stones and bottles and prevented Serbian Orthodox pilgrims from celebrating the Feast of the Assumption on August 28 at the ruins of the SOC Holy Trinity Monastery in the village of Mushutishte/Musutiste in the Suhareka/Suva Reka Municipality. The protestors also targeted police, injuring six. The KP evacuated a local priest and his aide from the monastery and turned back approximately 150 pilgrims, accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Branimir Stojanovic and Communities and Returns Minister Dalibor Jevtic, who observed the holiday in Zociste Monastery (approximately 14 miles away). The KP responded to the violence with tear gas and antiriot measures, and arrested 25 protesters. President Hashim Thaci and Speaker of Parliament Kadri Veseli condemned the violence and called for peace and respect for displaced persons, regardless of their ethnicity. Opposition parties condemned “police violence” against protesters.

Some school officials applied a mandatory administrative instruction previously issued by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology prohibiting primary and secondary students from wearing religious garb on school property; others did not. According to the BIK, public schools did not expel any students for wearing headscarves while attending classes. The Ombudsperson Institution did not receive any reports of a school barring students wearing religious garb, such as headscarves, from attending classes. Some members of the BIK, however, reported girls were forced to remove headscarves in order to study in public schools.

Religious groups said government authorities did not take steps to ensure municipalities treated religious organizations equally on property issues, in particular with regard to churches and cemeteries. Although the law specified that municipalities held title to cemeteries and were responsible for their upkeep, in practice some municipalities allowed religious groups to take de facto possession of public cemeteries. Protestants said most municipalities had not granted land for cemeteries, nor addressed most of their requests to build churches on land the community owned. The Pristina Municipal Assembly approved a Protestant cemetery on December 2; however, at year’s end, challenges remained at the central government level. The Gllogovc/Glogovac Municipality also granted land to the Protestant community for a cemetery and a church, and the community was working with the municipality to implement the decision. At year’s end, none of these municipalities had a Protestant cemetery where Christians could be buried with a cross. Existing Jewish cemeteries were reportedly in disrepair. Members of the Jewish community said they lacked the resources to maintain Jewish cemeteries and local authorities did not maintain these public sites as required by law. The Serbian Orthodox cemetery in Pristina was reportedly also in disrepair and not maintained by municipal authorities. The SOC cited member displacement from the area as a reason for its inability to adequately care for the cemetery. In both cases, the Municipality of Pristina denied these cemeteries were in disrepair.

Protestants continued to lack a designated burial area anywhere in the country. Protestant leaders in Pristina and Gjakove/Djakovica said they faced limitations on holding Protestant funeral services or burying members with crosses at the public cemetery. Protestants said they faced discrimination from municipal or religious leaders who exercised de facto control over some publicly owned burial sites. They said the BIK and the Catholic Church had dedicated spaces, but the Protestant community did not, particularly in Gjakove/Djakovica.

Protestant leaders met with central and local government officials, including Pristina Mayor Shpend Ahmeti, Gjakove/Djakovica Mayor Mimoza Kusari-Lila, Gjilan/Gnjilane Mayor Lutfi Haziri, and former Gllogovc/Glogovac Mayor Nexhat Demaku to discuss these issues. The Protestant community engaged in negotiations with Gjakova/Djakovica municipal officials, including Mayor Kusari-Lila, on providing a dedicated space where its parishioners could be buried in a Protestant ceremony and with a Christian cross at the city cemetery. The municipality stated Protestants could be buried with a cross and that the grave was personal property of the owner. The municipality allowed the Protestant community to join the municipal safety council, which acts as a forum for community institutions to discuss local issues of significance. Municipal officials in Ferizaj/Urosevac issued a decision to cover the burial expenses for all citizens, including Protestants. Ferizaj/Urosevac Mayor Muharrem Svarqa also pledged to identify land for a Protestant cemetery, but at year’s end the municipality had not done so.

Representatives of the Messiah Evangelical Church in Pristina reported the Municipal Assembly agreed to issue a building permit in November for a house of worship, on land the church purchased. Municipal authorities had previously denied a permit for this church for more than a decade. The Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning, however, had not issued a final permit by year’s end.

The BIK expressed concern over what it said were false press reports that the Municipality of Mitrovica/Mitrovice North would seize the site of the former Ibar Mosque for use for an international humanitarian project. On September 27, BIK Mufti Naim Ternava visited the site where the mosque had stood before Serb forces destroyed it in 1999 and confirmed the community’s intention to rebuild the mosque as soon as the European Union completed revitalization work on the adjacent Austerlitz Bridge. In reference to the mosque reconstruction, Mitrovica/Mitrovice Noestarth mayor Goran Rakic told the media on July 22 that a yet-to-be-established association of Serb-majority municipalities would decide upon mosque construction in the north of the country.

On May 20, after 16 years of litigation, the Constitutional Court confirmed the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court’s (SCSC) 2012 ruling that more than 24 acres of land should be returned to the SOC’s Visoki Decani Monastery. The ruling legally ended the SOC’s dispute with a defunct state-owned enterprise from the Yugoslav era and the municipality of Decan/Decani. The Constitutional Court’s decision rejected the 2015 finding of the SCSC’s Appellate Panel that had sought to return jurisdiction of the case to the Basic Court in Decan/Decani. The Mayor of Decan/Decani, Rasim Selmanaj, called the Constitutional Court’s ruling unacceptable and vowed not to implement it, stating he would resign rather than register the SOC as the owner. At year’s end, the mayor had not resigned. Municipal employees went on strike for one week in objection to the ruling. On May 25, the Decan/Decani Municipal Assembly adopted a resolution opposing the ruling, calling the monastery’s property claims dishonest and unjust. Italian KFOR troops continued to provide fixed security at the monastery. In response to a call for action from Decan/Decani Mayor Selmanaj, several hundred protestors demonstrated in opposition to the ruling on May 26. On June 16, approximately 800 people again protested against the Constitutional Court’s decision. The leader of the Vetevendosje party, Visar Ymeri, called the ruling “shameful,” stating it “gave legitimacy to the [Slobodan] Milosevic regime’s decisions.”

The Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) continued to occupy an SOC-owned building and parking lot in Pristina without paying the rent stipulated by a 2011 prime ministerial decision. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MLSW) vacated a second SOC-owned building adjacent to the agency. The MLSW stopped paying the agreed rent on that building to the SOC in 2014. The MLSW said it recognized that rent was owed to the SOC, and negotiated with the ACA to settle with the church on past and future rent. At year’s end, however, no agreement had been reached, and the ACA continued to block a settlement proposed by the MLSW despite multiple years of Auditor General Reports stating it should pay the rent.

On February 17, the SOC received notice that the University of Pristina (UP) had appealed the Pristina Basic Court’s 2015 dismissal of the UP’s 2012 lawsuit that requested the demolition of the unfinished Christ the Savior Church and the transfer of the land back to the university. A municipal assembly decision had transferred the land from the UP to SOC in the 1990s. On February 24, the SOC responded that the UP’s claim should be dismissed as unfounded.

On September 9, unknown persons burned tires inside the SOC St. Saviors Church, which caused large plumes of black smoke to be emitted from the church. The church’s gate, interior, and facade were also damaged. The KP attributed the damage to a homeless person. SOC Bishop Teodosije Sibalic condemned the “arson” of the church, and blamed police for failing to protect the area. He also called for the unfinished church’s construction to recommence. On September 11, Bishop Teodosije, accompanied by clergy and Deputy Prime Minister Branimir Stojanovic, with a KFOR guard, cleaned and attempted to make light repairs to the gate. According to international experts on site, on September 15, Pristina municipal inspectors entered the church without legal permission and ordered the church to stop cleaning debris and repairing the fire damage, on the grounds that it lacked a construction permit to do so. The SOC called the entry official harassment and discrimination. Inspectors, assisted by police, reportedly confiscated the clergy’s IDs and threatened to seal the church with crime scene tape if the clergy failed to report to the municipal inspection department. The SOC presented ownership documents, including those issued by the municipality itself in 2012, and departed the church. The municipal inspectors did not address their complaint in the Serbian language, as required by law. Pristina Mayor Ahmeti stated on social media the municipality had no evidence the SOC owned the property, and Pristina authorities stated the church needed to hold a construction permit to undertake work, including painting over graffiti, inside the church.

On October 12, the MCYS’s Institute for the Protection of Monuments denied the SOC’s request to reconstruct the St. Nicolas Church in the Holy Archangels Monastery in Prizren. The monastery’s only church was destroyed in 1999, and the St. Nicholas Church was destroyed at the end of the 16th century. According to some IMC members, MCYS Minister Kujtim Shala’s refusal to issue the permit for reconstruction prompted the SOC to stop participating in the IMC. In November the SOC submitted additional information, in support of its application, but by years’ end the institute had not issued the permit. Due to the lack of a permit, municipal inspectors ordered the SOC to halt construction on several occasions. The SOC stated the institute’s denial of the permit came after a legal deadline, after which the construction should have been allowed to proceed automatically. Notwithstanding the application, the SOC had full discretion to manage its property based on Annex V of the Ahtisaari plan.

The Municipality of Pristina appealed the Basic Court’s 2015 ruling that the Catholic Church owned property adjacent to the Mother Teresa Cathedral. An appeal was pending at year’s end.

The SOC expressed concern that the MCYS did not consult with it on a draft law on cultural heritage that it said could annul the SOC’s legally guaranteed autonomy and preclude it from independently deciding upon the restoration and renovation of its buildings. At year’s end, the MCYS had not completed development of the new cultural heritage strategy.

The central government provided some funding to Islamic education in BIK madrassahs in Pristina, Prizren, and Gjilan/Gnjilane. The government did not provide funding for religious education to any other religious group. Some members of other religious groups and secular representatives voiced concern about the government’s funding of religious education in madrassahs over others.

Kosovo Serbs, Kosovo Gorani, Kosovo Croatians, and some Kosovo Roma attended Serbian-language public schools that followed a curriculum designed by the Serbian government, based on municipal education laws and in coordination with the education ministry. Restrictions on religious education did not apply to these public schools. Most ethnic Serbs elected to enroll in Serbian Orthodox religious classes instead of civic education. The Serbian government funded the salaries of all teachers in Serbian-language schools, including religious instructors. The Kosovo government supplemented the salaries of some teachers and staff in Serbian-language schools.

On September 23, the Water Regulatory Agency issued an administrative instruction based on the law waiving water utility fees for religious buildings belonging to the five “traditional” religious communities. The instruction directed eligible religious institutions to apply for the waiver with the public water provider. Although the law stipulated the waiver was applicable to all five religious communities, the Protestant community stated it followed the procedure but was not granted a waiver, whereas another religious group had received it.

The police’s unit for specialized protection of cultural and religious heritage sites provided 24-hour security at 24 sites around the country. Despite this protection, theft and vandalism continued at SOC sites, primarily outside of the SPZ where special protection was not provided. For example, individuals set a fire set inside the unfinished Christ the Savior Church in Pristina on September 6. According to SOC Bishop Teodosije, the fire and other acts of desecration were a result of the government’s failure to provide permanent police protection at the church.

On October 3, the SOC said the Pristina Municipality had ignored the vandalism of a chapel at the Serbian Orthodox cemetery in Pristina, stating it had been used as a garbage dump and toilet despite the presence of a guard.

In May the Pristina Municipality approved a request by the Beit Israel NGO to provide assistance in constructing a synagogue. By year’s end, however, the municipality had not provided the assistance, and Beit Israel criticized it for not following through on its approval.

During the year, supporters of Turkish Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen stated authorities, including the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology as well as Kosovo Police, sought to overly regulate their schools and restrict the ability of their affiliated clergy to lead prayers. As a result, Gulenist school representatives said they might be forced to close some of their licensed schools in the country.

As part of its Interfaith Kosovo program, the government undertook several initiatives to promote religious tolerance. The Interfaith Kosovo website provided news about all religious communities in the country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized the fifth International Interfaith Conference on June 1-2, highlighting the role of women in interfaith dialogue and countering violent extremism. On March 19, Interfaith Kosovo organized a workshop in Prizren, focusing on interfaith dialogue and cultural heritage protection to promote reconciliation and combat religious extremism. The workshop gathered 100 participants from around the world.

There were instances of religious-based violence, interference with religious pilgrimages, hate speech, and vandalism. Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it is difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity.

In Gjakove/Djakovica, where a group of 150 Serbian Orthodox pilgrims was visiting a Serbian Orthodox monastery for the Assumption Day Feast, protestors attempted to block the car of a visiting Serbian official and threw stones as he exited the monastery. The pilgrims departed safely to Visoki Decani Monastery.

On June 28, an unidentified person threw stones at a van on its way to the Jarinje border crossing, causing slight injuries to two visiting Serbian pilgrims who were celebrating St. Vitus Day. On the same day, the KP reported unidentified individuals threw two Molotov cocktails at an escorted convoy of buses near Mitrovice/Mitrovica South, causing no damage. There were no arrests in either incident.

On January 6, a group of demonstrators gathered in front of an SOC church in Gjakove/Djakovica to protest Orthodox Christmas services. Protestors threw eggs and snowballs at police and towards pilgrims from Serbia who were refugees and previously lived in the city. Protest organizer Mimoza Shala, an activist from the Vetevendosje Party, told the media “war criminals disguised as pilgrims” were unwelcome in Kosovo. The KP removed the protestors without making any arrests. Gjakove/Djakovica Mayor Kusari-Lila called for peaceful protest and respect for religious rites.

The SOC criticized the media for calling its representatives “criminals” and for what it said was contributing to a climate of intolerance. The BIK said the media generally portrayed Muslims in a negative light.

As of September the police had registered 20 incidents of property usurpation, theft, and damage involving SOC facilities, primarily vandalism or theft of metal objects later sold for scrap.

Early in the year, unknown perpetrators urinated in the SOC’s unfinished Christ the Savior Church in Pristina. Deputy Prime Minister Branimir Stojanovic condemned the act.

On August 14, an ethnic Serb from the village of Pasjane in the Partes/Partesh Municipality broke into a nearby mosque in Velekince/Velekinca village and climbed the minaret, partially dismantling and damaging it. Police arrested the perpetrator, while a local imam helped calm several hundred ethnic Albanians who witnessed the vandalism. On August 15, Kosovo-Serb leaders condemned the incident, and SOC Bishop Teodosije addressed a letter to Mufti Naim Ternava, expressing solidarity and stating the perpetrator suffered from drug addiction and mental health problems. On August 16, the Gjilan/Gnjilane Basic Court ordered the perpetrator to one month’s detention.

On October 9, Catholics inaugurated a new church in the village of Llapushnik/Lapusnik in the Gllogovc/Glogovac Municipality, following protests in 2015 by Muslim residents who opposed the allocation of land to the church.

Leaders of different religious groups reported generally good relations with one another and participated in numerous interfaith discussions and initiatives. The OSCE continued to coordinate some activities among religious groups, including meetings with municipal mayors, to discuss issues such as access to graveyards and permits to build religious buildings.

U.S. embassy representatives met frequently with government officials, including the president, speaker and members of parliament, and prime minister, to urge passage of legislation to allow for the registration of religious institutions and to support full implementation of the law on SPZs. Embassy officials urged increased dialogue between ethnic Albanian members of the government and civil society with SOC members. The embassy urged government officials to resolve the land dispute involving St. Nicolas Chapel in the Holy Archangels Monastery in Prizren and the government’s lack of rent payments owed to the SOC for the ACA’s use of the property in Pristina. The embassy discussed the property issues of other religious groups with government officials on numerous occasions and urged officials to settle the issues based on law.

Embassy officials regularly discussed religious tolerance with leaders of the SOC, as well as with the Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Tarikat, Bektashi, and Jewish communities. The U.S. Ambassador hosted a local ecumenical iftar in Gjilan/Gnjilane, during which he discussed the importance of countering violent extremism, SOC property disputes, providing cemetery space for all communities, and the importance of religious freedom in the country, including the draft law on religious freedom. Embassy officials met with BIK imams to discuss efforts to promote tolerance and counter violent extremism and discussed draft laws on religious freedom and cultural heritage with religious leaders. Embassy officials met with the religious leaders on multiple occasions to discuss their human rights and legal concerns.

The embassy cofunded the International Interfaith Conference 2016, held June 1-2 in Pristina, which focused on the role of women in interfaith dialogue and countering violent extremism. Nobel Peace Laureates Shirin Ebadi and Tawakkol Karman participated at the conference, which included 300 participants and religious leaders from 50 countries.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 5.7 million (July 2016 estimate). According to Kyrgyz government estimates, approximately 85 percent of the population is Muslim, the vast majority of whom are Sunni. The government estimates Shia make up less than 1 percent of the Muslim population. According to an international organization, there is also a small Ahmadiyya Muslim Community not reflected in government figures estimated at 1000 individuals. According to NGO estimates, 5 percent of the population is Russian Orthodox and approximately 10 percent is unaffiliated or adheres to other religious groups, including Baptists, Lutherans, Pentecostals, Presbyterians, charismatics, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roman Catholics, Jews, Buddhists, and Bahais.

According to the National Statistics Committee, ethnic Kyrgyz make up approximately 73 percent of the country’s population, while ethnic Uzbeks comprise approximately 14.5 percent. Ethnic Uzbeks are most numerous in the South, making up almost half the population of the southern city of Osh, for example. Both ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks are primarily Muslim, making Islam the main religion in both urban and rural areas. Ethnic Russians mostly belong to the Russian Orthodox Church or one of the several Protestant denominations. Members of the Russian Orthodox Church and other non-Muslim religious groups live mainly in major cities.

Legal Framework

The constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, the right to practice or not practice a religion, individually or jointly with other persons, and the right to refuse to express one’s religious views. It bans actions inciting religious hatred.

The constitution establishes the separation of religion and state. It prohibits the establishment of religiously based political parties and the pursuit of political goals by religious groups. The constitution prohibits the establishment of any religion as a state or mandatory religion.

The law states all religions and religious groups are equal. It prohibits the involvement of minors in organized, proselytizing religious groups, “insistent attempts to convert followers of one religion to another (proselytism),” and, “illegal missionary activity,” defined as missionary activity of groups not registered with the State Commission on Religious Affairs (SCRA).

The law requires all religious groups, and religiously affiliated schools, to register with the SCRA, which is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the law’s provisions on religion. The law prohibits activity by unregistered religious groups. Groups applying for registration must submit an application form, organizational charter, minutes of an institutional meeting, and a list of founding members to the SCRA for review. Each congregation of a religious group must register separately and must have at least 200 founding resident citizens. Foreign religious organizations are required to renew their registration with the SCRA annually.

The SCRA is legally authorized to deny the registration of a religious group if it does not comply with the law or is considered a threat to national security, social stability, interethnic and interdenominational harmony, public order, health, or morality. The SCRA may also deny or postpone the certification of a particular religious group if it deems the proposed activities of the group are not religious in character. Denied applicants may reapply or may appeal to the courts. Unregistered religious groups are prohibited from actions such as renting space and holding religious services. Violations may result in an administrative fine of 500 soms ($7).

After the SCRA has approved a group’s registration as a religious entity, the group must register with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) to obtain status as a legal entity so it may own property, open bank accounts, and otherwise engage in contractual activities. The organization must submit an application to the MOJ, which includes a group charter with an administrative structure and a list of board and founding members. If a religious group engages in a commercial activity, it is required to pay taxes. By law, religious groups are designated as nonprofit organizations exempt from taxes on their religious activities.

The law gives the SCRA authority to ban a religious group as long as the SCRA delivers written notice to the group stating it is not in compliance with the law. The group may appeal the decision in the courts.

The law prohibits religious groups from “involvement in organizational activities aimed at inciting ethnic, racial, or religious hatred.” A conviction for inciting ethnic, racial or religious hatred may lead to a prison term of three to eight years while a conviction for creating an organization aimed at inciting ethnic, racial or religious hatred may lead to a term of five to 10 years. Murder committed on the grounds of religious hatred is punishable by life imprisonment.

In April President Atambaev signed into law a measure mandating separate prison facilities for prisoners convicted of “terrorism” and “extremism.” In August he signed into law a measure stripping the citizenship of any Kyrgyz national convicted of terrorism or extremism.

According to the law, only individuals representing registered religious organizations may conduct missionary activity. If a foreign missionary represents an organization approved by the SCRA, the individual foreign missionary must apply for a visa with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Visas are valid for up to one year and a missionary is allowed to work three consecutive years in the country. All religious foreign entities, including missionaries, must operate within these restrictions and must reregister annually. Representatives of religious groups acting inconsistently with the law may be fined or deported. Violations of the law may result in fines in the amount of 1000 soms ($14), and deportation in the case of foreign missionaries.

The law provides for the right of religious groups to produce, import, export, and distribute religious literature and materials in accordance with established procedures, which include examination by state “experts.” The law does not define the criteria for religious expert. The law prohibits the distribution of religious literature and materials in public locations or in visits to individual households, schools, and other institutions. The law specifies fines based on the nature of the violations.

The law allows public secular schools an option to offer religion courses which discuss the history and character of religions as long as the subject of such teaching is not religious doctrine and does not promote any particular religion. Private religious schools need to register with SCRA to operate as such.

According to the law, religion is grounds for conscientious objection to and exemption from military service. Conscientious objectors must pay a fee of 18,000 soms ($260) to opt out of military service. Draft-eligible males must pay the fee before turning 27 years of age. Failure to pay by the age limit will require the person to perform 240 hours of community service or a fine of up to 20,000 soms ($289). Draft-eligible men who evade military service and do not fall under an exemption are subject to a fine or imprisonment of up to two years. There is no option to perform alternative service.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The authorities maintained bans on approximately 20 “religiously oriented” groups they considered to be extremist and arrested hundreds of individuals they accused of participating in “extremist” incidents. One suspect in the attempted murder of the director of a religious center had his sentence reduced on appeal from life to 20 years imprisonment. Three individuals previously convicted of religious extremism were sentenced to life imprisonment following criminal acts during a highly publicized prison break which occurred in 2015. The authorities opened a criminal case against one of the police officers accused of attacking participants in a 2015 Jehovah’s Witnesses gathering, while they unsuccessfully appealed the acquittal of the leader of the Jehovah’s Witness service for illegal religious activity. Minority religious groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, continued to face difficulties in registering, but some unregistered groups said they continued to be able to hold religious services without government interference. The defeat of a bill in parliament to amend the labor code by extending Friday lunch breaks to accommodate Muslim prayers was followed by public statements by the ex- grand mufti, criticizing government officials for opposing the bill, and statements by government officials saying the actions of the ex-grand mufti violated the secular nature of the state.

The government continued to maintain bans on approximately 20 “religiously oriented” groups it considered to be extremist, including al-Qaida, the Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkistan, the Kurdish Peoples’ Congress, the Organization for the Release of Eastern Turkistan, Hizb ut- Tahrir (HT), the Union of Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Party of Turkistan, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church; Mun San Men Church), Takfir Jihadist, Jaysh al-Mahdi, Jund al-Khilafah, Ansarullah, At-Takfir Val Hidjra, Akromiya, ISIS, Djabhat An Nusra, Katibat al-Imam al-Buhari, Jannat Oshiqlari, and the Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Authorities also continued the ban on all materials or activities connected to A.A. Tihomirov aka Said Buryatsky.

Law enforcement authorities stated they had recorded 441 extremist incidents for the year. They opened criminal cases for 180 of these events and arrested 418 people. In comparison, there were 360 extremist incidents recorded in 2015, for which132 people were convicted of extremism and terrorism and 278 people were arrested. The Vice-Chairman of the Kyrgyz State Penitentiary Service stated as of March there were approximately 200 individuals accused of affiliation with extremist or terrorist organizations who continued to serve prison sentences.

In June a Bishkek court sentenced Tilek Uulu Alibek to life in prison for attempted murder in the November 2015 attack on Kadyr Malikov, Director of the Religion, Law, and Politics Analytical Center. In August an appeals court reduced Tilek Uulu’s sentence to 20 years, the maximum under the law for attempted murder. Tilek Uulu had left the country shortly after the attack, reaching Turkey at the end of November 2015. Turkey extradited him in March. His suspected accomplice, Yryskul Beishenaliyev remained in Turkey, continuing to fight extradition.

In June three Muslims previously convicted of extremism were sentenced to life imprisonment following their escape in a highly publicized prison break and manhunt in October 2015, which had resulted in the deaths of several prison guards. A man and woman convicted of providing shelter to the escapees were sentenced to four years’ imprisonment and a four-year suspended sentence, respectively.

In July the Prosecutor General’s Office opened a criminal case against one of the police officers accused of attacking participants in an August 2015 Jehovah’s Witness gathering in Osh following an appeal from the Jehovah’s Witnesses to do so. The Prosecutor General’s Office referred the case to the Osh city prosecutor, who had declined to initiate criminal proceedings immediately after the attack, citing a “lack of facts and circumstances” to support a case against the officers. Subsequent to the opening of the case in July, lawyers for the Jehovah’s Witnesses asked the Prosecutor General’s Office to recuse the Osh city prosecutor’s office and to have the criminal case handled in the capital city of Bishkek. In August the Prosecutor General’s office informed the lawyers the case had been transferred to the Osh Regional Prosecutor for investigation, but as of the end of the year there was no report of further developments.

In March the Supreme Court rejected efforts by the Osh Prosecutor to re-open a case against Nurlan Usupbaev, the leader of the 2015 Jehovah’s Witness gathering in Osh. Police had charged Usupbaev with “illegal religious activity” and had reportedly beaten him. The Supreme Court’s decision upheld Usupbaev’s previous acquittal of the charge of “illegal religious activity.” The Supreme Court stated the prosecutor had failed to adhere to the procedural deadline for contesting the lower court’s decision acquitting Usupbaev.

In April the Supreme Court revised its February ruling granting an appeal filed by the Osh City prosecutor contesting the acquittal of two Jehovah’s Witnesses, a mother and daughter, of alleged criminal activities while sharing their faith with others in 2013. A new trial had been scheduled for April 25, but lawyers for the two women successfully argued the three year statute of limitations had passed and the court agreed their acquittal should stand. According to the NGO Forum18, in 2014 the original trial court, in acquitting the two women, stated they had been targeted by the Osh Department of Internal Affairs and Osh City Prosecutor’s office solely because of their religion.

As of June, the most recent date for which statistics were available, authorities had “registered” 4,154 people as “adherents of extremist views.” In 2015, authorities registered 1,866 “adherents of extremist views” in the country and of these they classified 1,361 as adherents of HT. The Ministry of Interior reported there were approximately 200 adherents of HT in Bishkek. Registration meant the police picked up potential suspects for questioning in advance of a possible decision to arrest them. Police continued to register people as extremists without a subsequent arrest, and to keep their names in police files.

MOI data continued to show 62 percent of adherents of extremist views were residents of the south, where most of the religiously active members of the ethnic Uzbek community resided, and 74 percent of crimes of an extremist nature occurred in the south. HT adherents reportedly continued to be mostly active in the south, where 70 percent of the arrests of HT adherents occurred. The authorities also observed continued HT activity in Talas and Chui Provinces. Of the total number of registered adherents of designated religious extremist organizations, the government continued to estimate approximately 23 percent were women.

In February the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the Jehovah’s Witnesses to overturn the SCRA’s refusal to register communities in Osh, Naryn, Jalal-abad, and Batken. Representatives of the Jehovah’s Witnesses stated the refusal to register them was in contravention to a 2014 Supreme Court Constitutional Chamber decision declaring unconstitutional the section of the religion law regarding registration requirements. Jehovah’s Witness leaders reported authorities continued to deny registration to groups if they did not have 200 founding resident citizens in each region. The church leaders continued to assert the SCRA’s policy continued to create difficulties for them because without the required minimum number of members, groups could not register, and without registration they could not meet and recruit members to fulfill the minimum registration requirement. The lawyer representing the church stated the SCRA had refused the application, “by arguing that although Article 10(2) of the Religion Law had been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Chamber, Parliament had not yet amended the Law.”

Although the government continued not to list the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community as a banned organization, the Ahmadiyya Community in the U.S. reported the SCRA continued to deny it re-registration. A U.S. representative of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community confirmed the Community still had not obtained registration. The Ahmadiyya community initially had registered in 2002, but the SCRA had declined to renew its re-registration since 2012.

Religious groups continued to report the SCRA registration process was cumbersome, taking anywhere from a month to several years to complete. Unregistered groups continued to report they were able to hold regular religious services without government interference, especially if they had been registered in the past and their annual application for re-registration was pending. According to Forum 18, Protestant pastors stated there were many new churches in the country which would like to register, but did not have the 200 founders required for registration.

As of the end of the year, the registered religious groups and organizations reported by the authorities included 2,743 mosques;10 Islamic higher educational institutions; 89 madrassas; 74 Muslim foundations, centers and unions; 380 Christian organizations and unions; 51 Russian Orthodox churches; four Catholic communities; 50 Baptist communities; 31 Seventh-day Adventist churches; 56 Pentecost communities; 20 Lutheran communities; 38 Presbyterian communities; 43 Charismatic communities; 26 foreign Protestant organizations; 18 non-denominational Protestant organizations; one Jewish community; one Buddhist community; and 12 Bahai Faith communities.

In June the parliament considered a bill amending the labor code to extend Friday lunch breaks for up to two hours to accommodate Muslim prayer rituals. Proponents of the bill included the country’s Islamic leaders, including ex-Grand Mufti Chubak Ajy Jalilov. When parliament declined to pass the draft bill on the grounds it was unnecessary because the labor code did not prohibit employers from offering an accommodation of a longer lunch hour for those who requested it, Jalilov posted a video message on his Facebook page criticizing members of parliament who opposed the adoption of the bill. Then-director of the State Committee on Religious Affairs, Orozbek Moldaliev, then told the media Jalilov had breached the constitution by calling those who did not pass the law “kafirs” (unbelievers). Moldaliev said Jalilov had “violated the secular system.” On June 9, the State Committee on National Security issued an official warning to Jalilov about the unacceptability of extremist statements. The following day, President Atambayev met with opponents of the draft bill, stating publicly “religious activists should never be allowed to interfere in politics. They attempt to violate the constitutional principle of the secular system of the state.”

The government did not provide religious materials to prisoners charged with affiliation with banned religious groups, according to NGOs, but the government allowed them to practice their religion and conduct prayers in prison. There continued to be no specific procedure for hiring or evaluating the experts performing the examination of religious literature which groups wanted to distribute. According to religious studies academics, SCRA employees or religious scholars with whom the agency contracted continued to be chosen serve as the experts. Attorneys for religious groups continued to say the experts chosen by the SCRA were biased in favor of prosecutors, and were not formal experts under the criminal procedure code.

In March the Bishkek Interdistrict Court rejected a suit filed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses after permission to import the November 2015 issue of its journal Awake! was denied by the SCRA. The court stated it was not competent to overrule the evaluation done by the SCRA.

According to representatives of religious groups, refusal either to serve or to pay a fee to opt out of military service continued to subject a conscientious objector to hardship because military service continued to be a prerequisite for employment in the government and with many private employers.

According to the NGO Forum 18, non-Muslim religious minorities continued to face difficulties arranging for burial of their dead in public cemeteries. In one case in October, local villagers and imams in the Jalal-Abad region twice exhumed the body of a deceased Protestant woman to remove it from public cemeteries while local officials, police officers, and National Security Committee officers reportedly looked on but did not interfere. Regional officials reportedly stated they then buried the woman in a third, undisclosed location. There were contradictory reports whether the authorities were taking any action against the perpetrators of the exhumations. On October 27, the Ministry of Interior announced it had filed a criminal case under the provision of the criminal code prohibiting desecration of the dead and their burial site over the illegal exhumation of the body. According to Forum 18, on December 29, the authorities put three local residents on trial for their involvement in the incident. The authorities reportedly did not charge the imams who had incited the exhumations or the officials who had not prevented the exhumations.

In July giant billboards featuring three groups of women side-by-side in a variety of traditional and religious dress appeared in the capital city, Bishkek, sparking public debate. The billboard portrayed one group of women in traditional Kyrgyz costume, next to women in white hijabs, and finally, women in black niqabs covering their entire bodies. A caption under the photos read, “Oh poor nation, where are we headed?” The arrangement of pictures appeared to some observers as a commentary on the spread of foreign, fundamentalist Muslim customs in the country. A prominent Islamic scholar called the billboards a “provocation” and said the authorities should investigate the billboards for signs of incitement of religious hatred. In response to the controversy, President Atambaev expressed his support for the billboards, saying fundamentalist religious dress common in the Middle East was “alien” to Kyrgyz culture. The muftiate stated the billboards would divide the people of the country while the Bishkek Mayor’s Office stated the billboards did not incite hatred or violence. Many news reports cited social media reaction in support of the billboards, while other reports called the billboards a “provocation” against Muslim practitioners.

The highest Islamic administrative body in the country, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Kyrgyz Republic, known as the “muftiate,” continued to oversee all Islamic entities, including institutes, madrassahs, and mosques. Although an independent entity per the constitution, NGOs reported the government continued to exert influence over the office, including the mufti selection process.

The Hazreti Umar Islamic University, an affiliate of the muftiate, remained responsible for overseeing the work of all Islamic schools, including madrassahs and secondary schools. The university continued its work, projected to take years to complete, to develop a standardized curriculum with the stated goal of curbing the spread of religious teaching deemed extremist by either the muftiate or the SCRA.

The SCRA and the Ministry of Education Science and Culture held a teacher training course in August as part of a pilot program introducing a new, secular course on the “History of Religious Culture” for ninth grade students at 10 Bishkek and Osh area schools.

The Ambassador and embassy officers continued to meet regularly with government officials, including the SCRA, to discuss programs to counter violent extremism, improve the qualifications of religious teachers and the quality of education at religious institutions, and to urge greater religious tolerance.

Embassy officers also continued to engage with representatives of the muftiate, leaders of minority religious groups, NGOs, and civil society representatives to discuss the new law enacted on terrorism and extremism, the ability of independent religious groups to register, and the rights of religious minorities.

The embassy sponsored a conference, led by a visiting Muslim cleric from the U.S., which addressed, among other issues, civic engagement on the part of students and young professionals to promote interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance. The embassy continued its sponsorship of English language classes and vocational training at local madrassas to enable students in remote areas to obtain better access to information on religious tolerance. The embassy continued to fund NGOs whose programs fostered religious tolerance.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.0 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the Christian Council of Lesotho, approximately 90 percent of the population is Christian, including Roman Catholics, Anglicans, evangelical Christians, Methodists, members of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, and Pentecostals. The remaining 10 percent is Muslim, Hindu, Bahai, belongs to indigenous or other religious groups, or is atheist. Many Christians practice traditional indigenous rituals in conjunction with Christianity. There is a small number of Jews, most of whom are not citizens. Muslims live primarily in the northern area of the country. There is no significant correlation between religious affiliation and ethnicity.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and provides for freedom of conscience, thought, and religion, including the freedom to change religion or belief and to manifest and propagate one’s religion. These rights may be limited by laws in the interests of defense, public safety, order, morality, or protecting the rights of other persons, provided the limitations are the minimum necessary.

The government has no established requirements for recognition of religious groups. By law any group, religious or otherwise, may register as a legal entity with the government, regardless of its purpose, as long as it has a constitution and a leadership committee. Most religious groups register, but there is no penalty for those that do not. The benefits of registration are administrative. It gives a group legal standing and formalizes its structure under the law. In the absence of registration, religious organizations may operate freely and tend to business as they see fit, but without any of the legal standing or protections of registered organizations.

The education ministry pays and certifies all teachers at government funded schools, including religious schools, and requires a standard curriculum for both secular and religious schools. The government does not mandate religious education in schools, and the constitution exempts students at any educational institution from requirements to receive instruction or attend any ceremony or observance associated with a religion not their own. All curricula, including for religious education classes, must be approved by the minister of education.

The country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Churches owned and operated approximately 80 percent of all primary and secondary schools. The Roman Catholic Church, the Lesotho Evangelical Church, the Anglican Church, and, to a lesser extent, the Methodist Church were the primary operators of religious schools, which were publicly funded. In practice, in any school offering religious education – including all religious schools and some secular schools – the subject was mandatory. Children continued to be permitted to attend schools run by a religious group other than their own, and some families chose this option. Others went to public schools or secular private schools.

The Christian Council of Lesotho continued to be regularly invited to open government ceremonies and meetings. On September 15, the government held its annual national independence prayer service in honor of Lesotho’s 50th year of independence. For the first time, the government included Muslim leaders at the event.

There were no reports of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.

The U.S. embassy discussed religious freedom with the government, typically in the context of broader discussions about human rights. The embassy also maintained regular contact with religious leaders, including with representatives of the Christian Council of Lesotho, an umbrella organization of five Christian churches.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 4.3 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2008 National Population and Housing Census, the population is 85.6 percent Christian, 12.2 percent Muslim, 0.6 percent adherents of indigenous religious beliefs, 1.4 percent persons who claim no religion, and less than 1 percent members of other religious groups, including Bahais, Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists. The Muslim percentage of the population is a source of contention, as unofficial reports and surveys estimate Muslims constitute up to 20 percent of the population. Many members of religious groups incorporate elements of indigenous beliefs into their religious practices. Christian groups include United Methodists, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Baptists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and members of the African Methodist Episcopal (AME), AME Zion, and a variety of Pentecostal churches.

Christians reside throughout the country. Muslims belonging to the Mandingo and Fula ethnic groups reside throughout the country, while Muslims of the Vai ethnic group live predominantly in the west. Traditional practitioners include the secret Sande and Poro societies, seen both as religious and cultural practitioners and highly influential in the northern, western, and central regions of the country. Other secret cultural or religious societies exist in the southeastern counties, including the Kui Society and Bodio priests.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the separation of religion and state, and stipulates all persons are entitled to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. It states no one shall be hindered in the exercise of these rights except as required by law to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights of others. It also provides for equal protection under the law and prohibits political parties that exclude citizens from membership on the basis of religious affiliation.

The government encourages all religious groups, except for indigenous ones who generally operate under customary law, to register their articles of incorporation and their organizations’ statements of purpose. Local religious organizations register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and pay a one-time fee of approximately 5,000 Liberian dollars ($55) to file their articles of incorporation, and an annual fee of 3,500 Liberian dollars ($38) for registration and to receive a registration certificate. Foreign religious organizations are charged $400 (36,400 Liberian dollars) for registration annually, and a one-time fee of $500 (45,500 Liberian dollars) to file their articles of incorporation. Religious organizations also pay 1,000 to 2,000 Liberian dollars ($11 to $22) to the Liberia Revenue Authority for notary services for articles of incorporation to be filed with the MFA and an additional 1,000 Liberian dollars ($11) to receive a registered copy of the articles. An accreditation of the articles of incorporation is awarded at the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.

Registered religious organizations, including missionary programs, religious charities, and religious groups, receive tax exemption and duty-free privileges benefits not afforded unregistered groups. Registered groups may also appear in court as a single entity.

The law requires high-level government officials to take an oath ending with the phrase, “So help me God,” when assuming office. Christians kiss the Bible and Muslims the Quran on those occasions.

Public schools offer nonsectarian religious and moral education as an elective in all grades.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Some religious groups continued to pursue a constitutional amendment declaring the country a “Christian nation,” an effort that developed in 2015 at the Constitutional Review Conference where a majority of delegates endorsed the proposition, known as Proposition 24. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, along with Catholic, Episcopal, Baptist, Lutheran, and Muslim communities, all opposed the initiative, while some evangelical Christian pastors and members of the national legislature supported it.

In March the National Muslim Council of Liberia (NMCL) briefly suspended its membership within the Inter-Religious Council of Liberia (IRCL), a council established to assist post-war Liberia engender religious tolerance. According to the NMCL, the suspension was in response to a campaign by the Liberia Council of Churches (LCC) to pass Proposition 24, which the NMCL said would prejudice other religious groups. The LCC had not publicly voiced opposition to the constitutional amendment until May when it officially rejected Proposition 24. This action reduced tensions, according to Muslim leaders, and subsequently the NMCL restored its membership in the IRCL. The LCC rejection of Proposition 24 splintered the group, and one part launched the National Christian Council of Liberia (NCCL) in July. The NCCL continued to advocate for a countrywide vote on Proposition 24 and for its passage. The NMCL stated the events surrounding Proposition 24 ignited an unfortunate stalemate between Muslim and Christian leaders and threatened to endanger the IRCL. While thus far blocked by the president, the vote on the constitutional amendment remained pending at year end.

In January local media reported that a group of Muslim youths protested the demolition of a mosque in Ganta, Nimba County. The mosque, according to news sources, was among buildings demolished by local authorities to enable road reconstruction, but some members of the Muslim community stated county authorities targeted Muslims and did not consult them before destroying the mosque. The government deployed national police to the site of the protest, which ended peacefully. The National Council of Imams stated it was aware of the incident, but did not consider it serious enough to warrant follow-up actions or discussions.

In July Sheikh Abubakar Sumaworo, Mufti of the NMCL, called on members of the legislature, diplomatic missions, and international partners to pressure the government to declare Eid al-Fitr a national holiday. The request to make Eid al-Fitr a national holiday has been pending since 1995. In August Senator Prince Johnson submitted a bill to the legislature that would have made Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha national holidays. Johnson said the bill would enhance harmony among tribal and religious groups, including Muslims. In September Representative Edwin Snowe submitted a similar bill, proposing to make Eid al-Adha a national holiday, which remained pending at year end.

In response to the Ebola epidemic in 2015, the government continued to discourage traditional and religious burial rites that could potentially increase the number of infections.

The government, through city ordinances and presidential proclamations, required businesses and markets, including Muslim-owned or -operated businesses and shops, to remain closed on Sundays for municipal street cleaning and on Christmas in accordance with the law. Muslim-owned businesses stated they viewed the regular Sunday municipal street cleaning as an excuse for the government to force their businesses to close to honor the Christian Sabbath. According to both the National Imam Council of Liberia (NICL) and the NMCL, the ordinances and proclamations were a violation of the constitution and a threat to the peace. The NMCL reported that it brought action in court seeking redress for the forced closures. Since penalties – consisting of fines of up to 200 Liberian dollars ($2.27) – were not strictly enforced, some Muslim-owned or -operated shops opened for limited hours on Sundays. Both NICL and NMCL said they would not have a problem with the closing of Muslim-owned businesses on Christmas if the end of Ramadan was also observed as a national holiday.

Government ceremonies commonly included opening and closing prayers. The prayers were usually Christian but occasionally were both Christian and Muslim. In Lofa County, where a large number of Muslims reside, opening and closing prayers were alternately Christian and Muslim.

The government subsidized private schools, most of which were affiliated with either Christian or Muslim organizations, and subsidies were provided proportionally, based on the number of students.

In a December 2015 report UNICEF expressed concern over “prayer camps” in the country. Children were reportedly given to a local preacher after their parents were told the children had been inducted into witchcraft, were possessed, and that their ailments/problems could be solved through prayer. According to UNICEF and the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Protection (MGCSP), those inside the prayer camps were not allowed to leave until they paid an undisclosed fee to the preacher. The MGCSP and UNICEF worked to reunite more than 300 children with their parents and guardians in River Gee County. Under MGCSP regulations, “institutions” for children cannot be responsible for more than 28 children. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, however, which has jurisdiction over all traditional religious groups, gave the prayer camp in question a certificate to operate and did not intervene in the case.

UNICEF also stated concern for the increasing number of cases of children being accused of witchcraft and/or demonic possession. The UN labeled certain religious practices harmful, including trial by ordeal, cleansing or exorcism rituals, and forced initiation into secret societies through kidnapping.

Sporadic, localized quarrels between religious and traditional groups occurred in remote parts of the country, but because religion and ethnicity were often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity. Religious and tribal leaders mediated such incidents and regularly had the support of the National Police.

According to the IRCL, in Lofa County Christians of the Lorma ethnic group predominantly patronized Christian-owned businesses, while local Muslims predominantly patronized Muslim-owned businesses.

According to St. John York, the consultant for Global Inter-faith relations building at the IRCL and former Secretary General of the IRCL, religious tensions were not always localized, and there was a tendency within the IRCL for Christians and Muslims to form opposing blocs on major issues of conflict, despite the organization’s stated purpose of increasing religious dialogue in support of conflict resolution.

Some employers excused Muslims from employment or classes to attend Friday prayers, although there was no legal requirement to do so.

In response to the campaign to declare the country a “Christian nation,” the U.S. Ambassador and embassy staff engaged with government officials, including officials from the Ministry of Justice’s human rights division, members of the legislature, and others to stress the U.S. government’s support of religious freedom and tolerance. The embassy also met with a variety of civil society and religious figures.

During Ramadan the Ambassador delivered greetings from President Obama on an Islamic radio station that underscored the U.S. commitment to religious freedom and tolerance. The Ambassador met with NCCL representatives to discuss Proposition 24. The Ambassador emphasized the separation of state and religion in both the U.S. and Liberian constitutions. Embassy officials also met with Christian and Muslim religious leaders to discuss tolerance and the importance of religion bringing communities together.

The U.S. government estimates the population at 6.5 million (July 2016 estimate). Sunni Muslims represent 97 percent and the remaining 3 percent includes Christians, Hindus, Bahais, Ahmadi Muslims, Buddhists, and Jews. Many members of the Amazigh ethnic minority are Ibadi Muslims; nearly all other non-Sunni Muslims are foreign residents.

Small Christian communities consist almost exclusively of sub-Saharan African and Egyptian migrants and a small number of U.S. and European foreign residents. The last recorded estimates indicated there are 50,000 Coptic Christians, most of whom are Egyptian foreign residents. According to media reports, the number of Christians has decreased since the outbreak of armed conflict in 2014. Small numbers of Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Greek and Russian Orthodox, and nondenominational Christians, many of whom are foreign workers, remain in the country. Since the evacuation of western diplomatic missions from Tripoli in July 2014, no reliable surveys have been conducted on the number of foreign workers remaining in the country.

There are no reliable estimates of the small Jewish population.

Legal Framework

The constitutional declaration of 2011 functions as the interim constitution. It states Islam is the state religion and sharia is the principal source of legislation, but accords non-Muslims the freedom to practice their religion. The interim constitution also states “there shall be no discrimination among Libyans on the basis of religion or sect” with regard to legal, political, and civil rights. The GNA remains bound by the constitutional declaration until a new constitution is drafted and passed by the HoR and a public referendum is held. The laws governing religious practice predate the internal conflict and provide a national legal framework with regard to religious freedom.

There is no law providing for individuals’ right to choose or change their religion or to study, discuss, or promulgate their religious beliefs, nor is there a law prohibiting conversion from Islam to another religion or prohibiting proselytizing. The law prohibits “instigating division” and insulting Islam or the Prophet Muhammad, charges that carry a maximum sentence of death.

The Ministry for Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MEIA) administers mosques, supervises clerics, and has primary responsibility for ensuring all religious practices within the country conform to state-approved Islamic norms. According to the law, the grand mufti, appointed by the parliament, is the leading religious authority in the country, and Dar al-Ifta is the government office that issues fatwas the grand mufti deems appropriate. In November 2014, the HoR voted to dismiss Grand Mufti Sadiq Al-Ghiryani, dissolve Dar al-Ifta, and transfer its authorities to the MEIA.

Religious instruction in Islam is required in public and private schools. Attendance at religious instruction is mandatory for all students; students cannot opt out.

Sharia governs family matters for Muslims, including inheritance, divorce, and the right to own property. Under sharia, a non-Muslim woman who marries a Muslim man is not required to convert to Islam; however, a non-Muslim man must convert to Islam to marry a Muslim woman. The MEIA administers non-Muslim family law issues, although there is no separate legal framework governing non-Muslim family law. The ministry draws upon neighboring countries’ family law precedents for non-Muslims.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported that courts in the area controlled by the GNA continued to sentence defendants to corporal punishment in accordance with its interpretation of sharia, including flogging for adultery and amputations for theft.

The GNA continued not to respond to reports of groups such as ISIS perpetrating attacks on individuals and religious sites, reportedly on the basis of religious belief. This was partly due to the GNA’s lack of capacity or lack of control over large areas of the country.

The GNA continued to fail to maintain law and order through the justice and security systems. Instead, a variety of groups – revolutionary brigades, tribal militias, and local strongmen – supported local security. The government reported it did not have much control over these groups, and its response to instances of violence against members of minority religious groups was limited to condemnations.

During the year, the LNA operated in the east outside the purview of the GNA, and intensified its military campaign against violent extremist organizations. LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar publicly declared his intention to rid the country of all “Islamists,” and made no distinction between groups that espoused violence as a tactic and those that did not. Neither the HoR nor GNA maintained effective civilian control over the LNA.

According to UNSMIL, the judiciary did not adequately function and citizens had little recourse for violations of religious freedom.

The role of Islam in policymaking remained a major point of contention among members of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly, the elected body in charge of drafting the new constitution. In the current draft constitution, sharia is defined as “the source of legislation”; however, there is a spectrum of dissenting opinions ranging from those calling for a secular constitution to those saying the draft is not “Islamic enough.”

The MEIA provided texts for Friday services to imams, often including political and social messages. The government permitted religious scholars to form organizations, to issue fatwas, and to provide advice to followers. The fatwas did not have legal weight. The GNA, however, did not have effective administrative control of mosques and supervision of clerics outside the limited areas under its control. Political opponents of the GNA stated that the GNA’s “bureaucracy” charged with overseeing religious affairs did not regulate imams and other officials who supported ISIS and other violent extremist organizations.

Former Grand Mufti Al-Ghiryani, who remained influential among Islamist groups, rejected the GNA, publicly opposing its seating in Tripoli in March. Al-Ghiryani said Libyans who supported the GNA would suffer “divine punishment.” Al-Ghiryani also rejected the LNA and called for “revolutionaries” to travel to Benghazi to fight Commander Haftar. The Association of Libyan Religious Scholars criticized Al-Ghiryani’s statements. In August anti-Ghiryani and anti-Muslim Brotherhood posters appeared on a wide scale in Tripoli, seemingly overnight according to media reports. The Muslim Brotherhood quickly sought to distance itself from Al-Ghiryani and his incitement of violence and civil conflict.

Abuses by Foreign Forces and Nonstate Actors

U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations such as Ansar al-Sharia and ISIS operated across large swathes of territory during the year. Ansar al-Sharia operated branches in Benghazi and Derna, and maintained cells in other parts of the country. ISIS effectively controlled Sirte until December when a GNA military operation pushed it out of the city and the GNA declared its liberation; it was reported to have a smaller presence in other areas of the country. While in control of Sirte, ISIS and other extremist groups engaged in forced conversions, killings, and a slave trade of Christian migrants from neighboring countries. In Tripoli, some militias imposed restrictions on women’s dress and movement, and punished men for behavior they deemed “un-Islamic.”

ISIS conducted targeted killings, kidnappings, and suicide bombings that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of citizens, according to media reports and human rights organizations. In August Reuters reported that ISIS had abducted more than 500 Christian migrants en route to Europe, and enslaved, raped, and sold or exchanged at least 63 of the women captured. Many of those abducted were subject to forced conversation to Islam. There were reports of public executions. On February 7, ISIS executed five men in Sirte after accusing them of “Salafism” and of membership in brigades that attacked ISIS in 2015. In April ISIS executed eight people in Sirte and Ben Jawad for being part of a Salafi group. On April 5, ISIS publicly beheaded another man in Sirte for Salafi affiliation.

ISIS was widely reported to have restricted residents’ freedom to worship in areas under its control, and reportedly publicly executed and flogged residents it accused of violating sharia. Restrictions included forcing women to wear veils, banning music and smoking, and closing all shops during prayer times.

The eastern city of Derna was controlled by the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna, an umbrella organization consisting of Salafist groups, including Ansar al-Sharia, opposed to ISIS. This group was widely reported to have restricted Derna’s Sunni Muslims’ freedom to worship. They reportedly publicly executed and flogged residents accused of violating sharia, for instance by drinking alcohol.

Multiple sources, including international media, reported a restrictive social environment, particularly in the capital. This included a continuation of government officials at airports throughout the country preventing women from traveling alone outside the country, although no law or government regulation restricts such travel. NGOs and the UN attributed that environment to conservative interpretations of sharia. NGOs with local staff reported women often had male relatives accompany them to the airport and carried written permission from them to enable them to leave the country.

Following the U.S. embassy evacuation from Tripoli and suspension of operations in July 2014, there were limited opportunities for high-level engagement on religious freedom with Libyan interlocutors. The U.S. government discussed religious freedom on a number of occasions with a variety of local and national leaders, particularly in the context of confronting extremist groups such as ISIS.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 38,000 (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2010 census, religious group membership is as follows: 76 percent Roman Catholic, 6.5 percent Protestant Reformed, 5.4 percent Muslim, 1.3 percent Lutheran, 1.1 percent Christian Orthodox, 1.8 percent other religious groups, 5.4 percent no religious affiliation, and 2.5 percent unspecified.

The great majority of Muslims are Sunni, predominantly from Turkey, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Jewish community consists of approximately 30 individuals. Immigrants come mainly from Switzerland and Austria and predominantly belong to the same religious groups as native-born citizens.

Legal Framework

The constitution states all people shall have the freedom to choose their faith and the state shall be responsible for ‘‘protecting the religious…interests of the People.” The constitution specifies Roman Catholicism is the state religion which “shall enjoy full protection from the state.” The constitution stipulates other religions may practice their beliefs and hold religious services “within the bounds of morality and public order.”

There is no law requiring the registration of religious groups. Religious groups may organize themselves as private associations, which enables public registration in the commercial registry, and must do so to receive government funding for such activities as providing religious education in schools. To publicly register an association in the commercial registry, the association must submit an official letter of application to the Office of Justice, including the organization’s name, purpose, board members, and head office location as well as a memorandum of association based on local law, a trademark certification, and a copy of the organization’s statutes.

The law prohibits the slaughter of animals without anesthetization, making the ritual slaughter of animals for kosher and halal meat illegal. Importation of such meat is legal.

The criminal code prohibits any form of public incitement to hatred or discrimination against or disparagement of any religion or its adherents by spoken, written, visual, or electronic means. The criminal code also prohibits the denial, trivialization, and justification of genocide and other crimes against humanity by spoken, written, visual, or electronic means. Penalties may include a prison sentence of up to two years. The criminal code prohibits refusing service to a person or group of persons based on religious affiliation as well as membership in any association that aims to promote discrimination against a person or persons based on religious affiliation.

The law requires religious education be included in the curriculum in public schools, both at the primary and secondary levels. Catholic or Protestant religious education is compulsory in all primary schools; exemptions are available for children whose parents request them from the Office of Education. Parents are not required to give a reason for exemptions. Islamic education is not compulsory but offered in primary school and funded partly by the respective Muslim community, which provides the teachers, and partly from the government’s integration budget. The Catholic Church determines the Catholic curriculum, with minimal supervision from municipalities. Religious groups provide teachers who are partially supported by the government.

At the secondary school level, parents and students may choose between a course on Catholic religious education, which the government finances and the Catholic religious community organizes, and a general course in religion and culture taught from a sociological perspective.

To receive residency permits, foreign religious workers must have completed theological studies, belong to a nationally known religious group, and be sponsored by a resident clergy member of the religious group.

The country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Funding for religious institutions continued to derive mainly from the municipalities, according to parliamentary or municipal decisions. The government provided Catholic and Protestant churches annual contributions in proportion to membership; smaller religious groups were eligible to apply only for grants for projects, such as language courses aimed at facilitating the societal integration of foreigners. The government spent 82,000 Swiss francs ($80,470) on integration projects in 2015, the last year for which data were available. Within these projects, Islamic education in primary schools received 22,800 Swiss francs ($22,370) in funding. All religious groups were exempt from certain taxes, but not from fees.

Liechtenstein’s state prosecutor said police suspended a criminal investigation for lack of evidence in a case of reported Holocaust denial and pro-Nazi rhetoric by a Liechtenstein member of European Action during a presentation in the Swiss canton of St. Gallen in 2015.

The government’s Immigration and Passport Office did not issue visas for religious workers, granting them residency permits, valid for five years, instead. The government continued to grant one short-term residency permit each year during Ramadan to an imam of either the Turkish Association or the Islamic Community of Liechtenstein, who agreed not to allow or preach sermons that incited violence or advocated intolerance. An imam from the Turkish Association received the short-term permit for 2016. Clergy from other religious groups were required to abide by the same rules and regulations.

Municipalities owned cemeteries and continued to allow all religious groups, including Muslims, to bury their dead in them.

According to the foreign ministry, the country’s integration commission continued to function as the main body responsible for the integration of Muslims due to the inability of the two main representative bodies of the Muslim community, the Islamic Community and the Turkish Association, to reach an agreement on the founding of an Islamic umbrella organization. The Islamic Community and Turkish Association each continued to maintain regular contact with the government.

On January 27, Foreign Minister Aurelia Frick held a service together with the Liechtenstein Friends of Yad Vashem to remember the victims of the Holocaust, during which she stressed the importance of civil courage in fighting racism and anti-Semitism. Approximately 100 people attended the service, including school students and the head of parliament.

Nine public primary schools offered Islamic education twice each month, with a total of 68 students between the ages of six and 12 attending classes.

Schools continued to include Holocaust education as part of their curriculum and held discussion forums on the Holocaust to mark the Day of Remembrance on January 27. In March a primary school invited the honorary president of the Liechtenstein Friends of Yad Vashem to hold a photo exhibition on the Holocaust. In April the Liechtenstein Grammar School held the same photo exhibition as part of a special course on the Holocaust. In June members of Austria’s Ministry of Education met with the country’s education authority to exchange views on Holocaust education and remembrance.

Several churches continued to open their chapels to other denominations and faiths upon request, including to Orthodox and Islamic groups.

The European Action organization continued to advocate for freedom to question and deny the Holocaust on its Facebook page, voicing criticism of prosecutions against persons who deny the Holocaust.

There were no mosques in the country and one Islamic prayer room run by the Turkish Association. An additional prayer room run by the Islamic Community of Liechtenstein existed in the canton of St. Gallen in neighboring Switzerland.

U.S. embassy staff continued to discuss religious freedom issues, such as access to religious education by different religious groups, with the foreign ministry. Embassy staff also continued to discuss the effects of existing laws on religious practices, such as the prohibition of ritual animal slaughter, with civil society organizations, including Amnesty International, the Islamic Community of Liechtenstein, and the Liechtenstein Friends of Yad Vashem.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 24.4 million (July 2016 estimate), and according to the last national census in 1993, 52 percent adheres to indigenous beliefs, 41 percent is Christian, and 7 percent is Muslim. Although precise figures are not available, Muslim leaders and local scholars estimate Muslims currently constitute between 20 and 25 percent of the population, although they state it is common to alternate between religious identities, or to mix traditions. Muslims predominate in the northwestern coastal areas, and Christians predominate in the highlands. According to local Muslim religious leaders and secular academics, the majority of Muslims are Sunni. Citizens of ethnic Indian and Pakistani descent and Comorian immigrants represent the majority of Muslims, although there is a growing number of ethnic Malagasy converts.

Local religious groups state nearly half of the population is Christian. The four principal Christian groups are Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Anglicans, and the (Presbyterian) Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar (FJKM). Smaller Christian groups include The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, and local evangelical denominations.

According to Christian groups, the most numerous non-Christian groups are adherents of indigenous religions. In addition, many individuals hold a combination of indigenous and Christian or Muslim beliefs.

There are small numbers of Hindus and Jews across the country. The Jewish community reported it consists of approximately 150 individuals as of September.

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for freedom of religious thought and expression and prohibits religious discrimination in the workplace. Other laws protect individual religious freedom against abuses by government or private actors.

The constitution also provides that such rights may be limited by the need to protect the rights of others or to preserve public order, national dignity, or state security. The labor code prohibits religious discrimination within labor unions and professional associations. Public schools do not offer religious education. There is no law prohibiting or limiting religious education in public or private schools.

The law requires religious groups to register with the MOI. By registering, a religious group receives the legal status necessary to receive direct bequests and other donations. Once registered, the group may apply for tax exemption each time it receives a gift from abroad. Registered religious groups also have the right to acquire land from individuals to build places of worship; however, the law states landowners should first cede those lands back to the state, and the state will then transfer it to the religious group. To qualify for registration, a group must have at least 100 members and an elected administrative council of no more than nine members, all of whom must be citizens.

Groups failing to meet registration requirements may instead register as “simple associations.” Simple associations may not receive donations or hold religious services, but the law allows them to conduct various types of community and social projects. Associations engaging in additional activities are subject to legal action. Religious associations must apply for a tax exemption each time they receive a donation from abroad. If an association has foreign leadership and/or members, it may form an association “reputed to be foreign.” An association is reputed foreign only if the leader or members of the board include foreign nationals. The law does not prohibit national associations from having foreign nationals as members not in those positions. Such foreign associations may only receive temporary authorizations, subject to periodic renewal and other conditions.

The government requires a permit for all public demonstrations, including religious events such as outdoor worship services.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Muslim leaders continued to state that because of their particular settlement history and mixed marriages over time, Muslims remained negatively affected by the country’s nationality code, which restricts children born of Malagasy mothers and foreign national fathers from obtaining citizenship. While there were no official figures on statelessness, a study by the NGO Focus Development and the UNHCR, which sampled residents in largely Muslim communities between October 2013 and January 2014, estimated that approximately 6 percent of individuals in the communities surveyed were stateless. Of this number, more than 85 percent were born in the country.

The MOI registered seven new religious groups through the middle of October, bringing the total to approximately 283 officially registered groups. Religious groups reported the government did not always enforce registration requirements and in general did not deny requests for registration.

Decisions by local authorities continued to affect the ability of some religious groups to practice their faith, according to religious leaders. Religious leaders also stated that inadequate government enforcement of labor laws resulted in some employers requiring their employees to work during religious services. A Catholic priest in Antananarivo who managed a social services center that caters to factory workers stated some employers failed to respect the labor code provisions requiring a 24-hour break weekly, which affects factory workers’ ability to attend worship services.

The government failed to restore or reimburse the value of FJKM-owned Radio Fahazavana’s equipment, which had been seized by the former government on the stated ground that the station was associated with deposed President Marc Ravalomanana.

Leadership of the Muslim Malagasy Association, which states it represents all Muslims in Madagascar, reported that some Muslims continued to report difficulty obtaining official documents such as national identity cards and passports because of their Arabic-sounding names. Some Muslims reported religious discrimination when applying for civil service positions. For example, to apply to civil service positions, applicants must provide criminal records, which some Muslims found difficult to obtain from the government.

On September 19, local newspapers reported that the MOI deported 10 foreign imams working in the southeast. According to press reports, they were Pakistani nationals operating a mosque in Vohipeno and a Quranic school in Manakara. The MOI confirmed the deportation, noting that the imams had entered Malagasy territory on a 15-day tourist visa which was extended to a three-month visa at the regional police station. They noted that missionary work or other work-related activities were not permitted on a tourist visa. In November Prime Minister Olivier Mahafaly reaffirmed that the imams were deported because of their illegal immigration status. One of the newspapers added that the MOI started an investigation of the imams when the sacrifice of 200 zebus in Manakara and Vohipeno for the Eid al-Adha celebration on September 11-12 aroused local concerns. While zebu sacrifice is common among animists, Muslims, and occasionally at royal funerals, a single sponsor financing 200 zebus is extremely uncommon which led many in the local community to suspect foreign entities funded the sacrifice.

State-run Malagasy National Television continued to provide free broadcasting to the Seventh-day Adventist Church and to Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Anglicans, and Presbyterians on weekends, along with the Muslim community once a week. During Ramadan, the Muslim community was able to purchase additional airtime.

For the fourth year, the government decreed that Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr would be paid holidays for Muslims. Leaders of the Muslim community reported they continued to lobby without success for these holidays to be paid for everyone, rather than just for Muslims, on an equal basis with national holidays based on the Christian faith.

In May after five years of self-study of Judaism, 121 members of a community of formerly messianic Christian individuals underwent formal Orthodox conversions in a process overseen by rabbis from the U.S. and Canada. These took place over a 10-day period and concluded with 12 weddings.

The new converts reported they were subjected to stares and unwelcome comments due to their uncommon attire, and some discrimination by people who learned of their Jewish faith. Some private schools refused to allow them to register their children after discovering they were Jewish. In one case, a landlord cancelled a leasing contract with one of the recent Jewish converts when he found out that the house was going to be used as a religious school.

Members of the Muslim community also reported some of their children were refused admission to private Catholic schools because they were unable to produce a baptismal certificate.

U.S. embassy officials engaged regularly with the government on issues affecting religious freedom. Embassy officials discussed the nationality code with the prime minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, local officials, members of the diplomatic community, and local representatives of the United Nations focused on human rights.

In September the U.S. embassy invited representatives of different religious groups and the MOI to exchange views on religious freedom. In an informal environment, participants openly communicated about the existing relationships among different religious groups in the country. A representative from the MOI answered questions related to the legal framework.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 18.6 million (July 2016 estimate). According to the 2016 Demographic and Health Survey, 76.9 percent of the population is Christian and 12.5 percent Muslim. Christian denominations include Roman Catholics at 18.1 percent, Central Africa Presbyterians at 17.4 percent, Seventh-day Adventist/Seventh-day Baptists (the survey groups the two into one category) at 6.9 percent, and Anglicans at 2.6 percent. Another 41.9 percent fall under the “other Christians” category. Individuals claiming no religious affiliation are 0.5 percent and 0.1 percent declare other religions including Hindus, Bahais, Rastafarians, Jews, and Sikhs.

The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni. Most Sunnis of African descent follow the Shafi’i School of Islamic legal thought, while the smaller community of ethnic Asians mostly follows the Hanafi School. There is also a small number of Shia Muslims, mostly of Lebanese origin.

According to the 2008 census, there are two majority Muslim districts, Mangochi (72 percent) and Machinga (64 percent). These neighboring districts at the southern end of Lake Malawi account for more than half of all Muslims in the country. Most other Muslims also live near the shores of Lake Malawi. Christians are present throughout the country.

Traditional cultural practices with a spiritual dimension are sometimes practiced by Christians and Muslims. For example, the gule wamkulu spirit dancers remain of importance among Chewas, who are concentrated in the central region of the country.

Legal Framework

The constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion and provides for freedom of conscience, religion, belief, and thought. These constitutional rights may be limited only when the president has declared a state of emergency.

The law states that holders of broadcast licenses “shall not broadcast any material which is…offensive to the religious convictions of any section of the population.”

Religious groups, like nonprofit organizations, must register with the government to be recognized as legal entities. Registered groups, like other legal entities, may own property and open bank accounts in the group’s name. Groups must submit documentation detailing the structure and mission of their organization and pay a fee of 1,000 kwacha ($1.34). The government reviews the application for administrative compliance only. According to the government, registration does not constitute approval of religious beliefs, nor is it a prerequisite for religious activities. Religious groups may apply to the Ministry of Finance for tax exemptions regardless of registration status.

Detainees have a right to consult with a religious counselor of their choice.

Religious instruction is mandatory in public primary schools, with no opt-out provision, and is available as an elective in public secondary schools. According to the constitution, eliminating religious intolerance is a goal of education. In some schools, the religious curriculum is a Christian-oriented “Bible knowledge” course, while in others it is an interfaith “moral and religious education” course drawing from the Christian, Islamic, Hindu, and Bahai faiths. According to the law, local school management committees, elected at parent-teacher association meetings, decide on which religious curriculum to use. Private Christian and Islamic schools offer religious instruction in their respective faiths. Hybrid “grant-aided” schools are managed by private, usually religious, institutions, but their teaching staffs are paid by the government. In exchange for this financial support, the government chooses a significant portion of the students who attend. At grant-aided schools, a board appointed by the school’s operators decides whether the “Bible knowledge” or the “moral and religious education” curriculum will be used.

Foreign missionaries are required to have employment permits.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

A representative of the Rastafarian community reported children with dreadlocks continued to be prohibited from attending public school, where children are required to shave their heads in order to attend. According to the representative, most parents relented and shaved their children’s heads but the children of at least one family continued to be denied access to public school because of their dreadlocks and dropped out of school. The case, and the larger issue of Rastafarian children’s access to education, remained under investigation by the Malawi Human Rights Commission.

Some Muslim groups continued to request the education ministry to discontinue use of the “Bible knowledge” course and use only the broader-based “moral and religious education” curriculum in primary schools, particularly in predominantly Muslim areas. The issue arose most frequently in grant-aided, Catholic-operated schools.

Muslim organizations continued to express concern about the impact of operating schools in two shifts. Due to rapidly rising enrollment, certain schools in urban areas offered classes in two shifts – one in the morning and another in the afternoon, or staggered beginning and ending times. Muslim groups stated the shifts complicated the delivery of religious education at madrassahs in the afternoon on government school premises.

Most government meetings and events began and ended with a prayer, usually Christian in nature. At larger events, government officials generally invited clergy of different faiths to participate.

Christians, Muslims, and Hindus often participated in business or civil society organizations together. Religious organizations and leaders regularly expressed their opinions on political issues and their statements received coverage in the media. For example, the Livingstonia Synod released a statement in November that discussed the “perpetual failure” of the government to have meaningful dialogue about socio-economic challenges.

Religious groups operated 12 radio and four television stations.

The U.S. Ambassador met with representatives of religious groups, including representatives from the Muslim Association of Malawi, the largest Islamic association in the country, to discuss their concerns about the shift system and the “Bible knowledge” course. The Ambassador and embassy officials discussed issues of religious freedom with representatives of religious groups, the interfaith Public Affairs Committee, and members of parliament.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 393,000 (July 2016 estimate), which includes approximately 110,000 foreign workers from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan. The Maldives government estimates there may be another 15,000 to 20,000 undocumented foreign workers in the country