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Brunei

Section I. Religious Demography

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 451,000 (July 2018 estimate).  According to the 2011 census, 78.8 percent of the population is Muslim, 8.7 percent Christian, and 7.8 percent Buddhist, while the remaining 4.7 percent consists of other religions, including indigenous beliefs.

There is significant variation in religious identification among ethnic groups.  According to 2016 official statistics, ethnically Malay Bruneians comprise 66 percent of the population and are presumed to be Muslim as an inherited status.  The Chinese population, which is approximately 10 percent of the total population and includes both citizens and permanent residents, is 65 percent Buddhist and 20 percent Christian.  Indigenous tribes such as Dusun, Bisaya, and Murut make up approximately 4 percent of the population and are estimated to be 50 percent Muslim, 15 percent Christian, and the remainder followers of other religious groups, including adherents of traditional practices.  The remaining fifth of the population includes foreign-born workers, primarily from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Asia or are stateless residents.  According to official statistics, approximately half of these temporary and permanent residents are Muslim, more than one-quarter Christian, and 15 percent Buddhist.

Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom

Legal Framework

The constitution states the religion of the country shall be the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam but allows all other religions to be practiced “in peace and harmony” by the persons professing them.

The legal system is divided between civil law and sharia, which have parallel systems of both criminal and civil/family law and operate separate courts under a single judiciary department.  The civil courts are based on common law.  The sharia courts follow the Shafi’i school of Islamic jurisprudence, in which there is no law of precedence and judges are not bound by the decisions of a higher court.  Sharia courts have jurisdiction over both criminal law and civil/family matters involving Muslims and hear cases brought under long-standing sharia legislation as well as under the SPC.  In some cases, non-Muslims are subject to sharia courts, such as in the case of khalwat (close proximity between the sexes) if the other accused party is Muslim.

In 2014, the government announced it would introduce the SPC in three phases, and the first phase came into force that year.  The SPC exists in parallel with the common law-based criminal law system and primarily involves offenses punishable by fines or imprisonment.  It includes long-standing domestic sharia laws such as on drinking alcohol, propagating religions other than Islam, eating in public during the fasting hours of Ramadan, cross-dressing, and close proximity between unmarried persons of the opposite sex.  It prohibits “indecent behavior,” including pregnancies out of wedlock, and criminalizes any act that “tends to tarnish the image of Islam, deprave a person, bring bad influence, or cause anger to the person who is likely to have seen the act.”  The SPC applies to both Muslims and non-Muslims, including foreigners, as well as to offenses committed outside the country by citizens or permanent residents.  Non-Muslims are exempt from certain sections, such as requirements for men to join Friday prayers or payments of zakat (obligatory annual alms giving).  It states that Muslims will be identified for purposes of the law by “general reputation.”

Government gazettes dated December 29 contained orders from the sultan that the CPC – a necessary step to implement the SPC – would enter into force on January 1, 2019, and both the SPC second and third phases, with provisions for both corporal and capital punishments, would take effect on April 3, 2019.  The CPC outlines the procedures that law enforcement agencies and the sharia court need to follow when investigating and prosecuting sharia-related offenses.

When fully implemented, the SPC will introduce corporal punishments, including amputation for crimes such as theft, and capital punishments such as stoning to death for rape, fornication, adultery, or sodomy, and execution for apostasy, contempt of the Prophet Muhammad, or insult of the Quran.  The punishments included under the SPC have different standards of proof from the common law-based penal code, such as requiring four pious men to witness personally an act of fornication to support a sentence of stoning.  Stoning sentences, however, could be supported by a confession in lieu of evidence at the discretion of a sharia judge.

The government describes its official national philosophy as Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB), or Malay Islamic Monarchy, which the government defines as “a system that encompasses strong Malay cultural influences, stressing the importance of Islam in daily life and governance, and respect for the monarchy as represented by His Majesty the Sultan.”  The government has said this system is essential to the country’s way of life and its main defense against extremism.  A government body, the MIB Supreme Council, seeks to spread and strengthen the MIB philosophy and ensure MIB is enshrined in the nation’s laws and policies.  MIB is a compulsory subject for students in both public and private schools, including at the university level.

The Religious Enforcement Division under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) is the lead agency in many investigations related to religious practices, but other agencies also play a role.  The Religious Enforcement Division leads investigations on crimes that exist only in the SPC and other sharia legislation, such as male Muslims failing to pray on Fridays.  Cases involving crimes that are not covered by sharia legislation, such as human trafficking, are investigated by the Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF).  Cases involving crimes covered by both sharia and the civil code are also investigated by the RBPF and referred to the AGC.  In these cases, a committee of AGC and MORA officials determines in each case if a specific crime should be prosecuted and whether it should be filed in the sharia or civil court.  No official guidelines for the committee’s determination process have been published.

The government has permitted Shafi’i Muslims and members of non-Muslim religious minorities to practice their faiths but has continued to ban several religious groups it considers “deviant,” including the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Al-Arqam, Abdul Razak Mohammad, Al-Ma’unah, Saihoni Tasipan, Tariqat Mufarridiyyah, Silat Lintau, Qadiyaniah, the Baha’i Faith, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.  The list is based on fatwas proclaimed by the state mufti or the Islamic Religious Council – a government body and the sultan’s highest authority on matters on Islam – and is publicly available on MORA’s website.  The SPC also bans any practice or display of “black magic.”

The SPC includes a list of words and expressions, including the word “Allah,” reserved for use by only Muslims or in relation to Islam.  In 2016, the government clarified that the use of certain words, such as “Allah” by non-Muslims, did not constitute an SPC offense when used in a nonreligious context or social activity.

Muslims are legally permitted to renounce their religion until authorities implement the complete SPC, but individuals wishing to renounce their faith must inform the Islamic Religious Council in writing.  A person must be at least 14 years and seven months old to convert to a different religion.  If parents convert to Islam, their children automatically become Muslim.

The law requires all organizations, including religious groups, to register and provide the names of their members.  Applicants are subject to background checks for leaders and board members, and proposed organizations are subject to naming requirements.  Registered organizations must furnish information on leadership, election of officers, members, assets, activities, and any other information requested by the registrar.  Benefits of registration include the ability to operate, reserve space in public buildings, and apply for permission to raise funds.  The registrar of societies oversees the application process, exercises discretion over applications, and is authorized to refuse approval for any reason.  Organizations are prohibited from affiliation with any organization outside the country without written approval by the registrar.  Unregistered organizations may face charges of unlawful assembly and may be subject to fines.  Individuals who participate in or influence others to join unregistered organizations may be fined, arrested, and imprisoned.  The general penalty for violating laws on the registration and activity of organizations is a fine of up to 10,000 Brunei dollars (BND) ($7,300), imprisonment for up to three years, or both.

The law states that any public assembly of five or more persons requires official approval in advance.  Under long-standing emergency powers, this applies to all forms of public assembly, including religious assembly.  In practice, however, places of worship are viewed as private.

The law forbids the teaching or promotion of any religion other than Islam to Muslims or to persons of no faith.  Under the first phase of the SPC, the penalty for propagating religions other than Islam is up to five years in prison, a fine of up to 20,000 BND ($14,700), or both.  The SPC includes a provision that makes it illegal to criticize Islam, including the SPC itself.

Laws and regulations limit access to religious literature.  The law states it is an offense for a person to import any publication deemed objectionable, which is defined in part as describing, depicting, or expressing matters of race or religion in a manner likely to cause “feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will, or hostility between different racial or religious groups.”  The law also bans distributing materials relating to religions other than Islam to Muslims or persons of no faith.

The law establishes two sets of schools:  those offering the national or international curriculum and administered by the Ministry of Education (MOE), and those offering supplemental religious education (ugama) that are administered by MORA.

MOE schools are required to teach a course on Islamic religious knowledge, which is required for all Muslim children ages seven to 15 who reside in the country and who have at least one parent who is a citizen or permanent resident.  Non-Muslims are exempted from all religious study requirements and receive teaching on moral behavior.  Muslim students must also attend separate, MORA-run religious schools (often in the afternoon after MOE schools have adjourned), which provide additional ugama instruction.

Ugama instruction in MORA schools is a seven-to-eight-year course that teaches the day-to-day practice of Sunni Islam according to the Shafi’i school and is mandatory for Muslim students ages seven to 14 who hold citizenship or permanent residency.

Alternatively, MORA also administers a set of schools taught in Arabic that offer the national curriculum combined with ugama religious education.

A 2012 government order mandates that every Muslim child between the ages of seven and 15 attend a MORA religious school.  Parents may be fined up to 5,000 BND ($3,700), imprisoned for a term not exceeding one year, or both for failure to comply with the order.  The law does not make accommodations for Muslims who have non-Shafi’i beliefs.

In July the sultan directed that Islamic history be made a compulsory subject in all educational institutions, including private schools.

Public and private schools, including private schools run by churches, are prohibited from providing religious instruction in beliefs other than the Shafi’i school of Islam during school hours.  Schools may be fined or school officials imprisoned for teaching non-Islamic religious subjects.  The SPC criminalizes exposing Muslim children or the children of parents who have no religious affiliation to the beliefs and practices of any religion other than Islam.  The law also requires practitioners to obtain official permission before teaching any matter relating to Islam.  Churches and religious schools are permitted to offer non-Shafi’i Islamic education in private settings, such as private homes.

All parental rights are awarded to the Muslim parent if a child is born to parents who are not both Muslim.  The non-Muslim parent is not recognized in any official document, including the child’s birth certificate, unless that parent has converted to Islam.  The law bans any Muslim from surrendering custody of a minor or dependent in his or her guardianship to a non-Muslim.

Under the SPC, non-Muslims may be arrested for zina (fornication or adultery) or khalwat, provided that the other accused party is Muslim.  Foreigners are also subject to these laws.

A regulation requires businesses that produce, supply, and serve food and beverages to obtain a halal certificate or apply for an exemption if serving non-Muslims.

MORA has declared circumcision for Muslim girls (sunat) a religious rite obligatory under Islam and describes it as the removal of the hood of the clitoris (Type I per World Health Organization classification).  The government has stated it does not consider this practice to be female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) and has expressed support for the World Health Organization’s call for the elimination of FGM/C.  In his 2017 fatwas, the state mufti stated that both male and female circumcision are required and specified that female circumcision involves a “small cut above the vagina.”

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Government-provided statistics indicated sharia courts prosecuted 123 cases resulting in 71 convictions between January and August.  The majority of convictions were for khalwat and illicit sex.  Additionally, two individuals were convicted for disrespecting the month of Ramadan.

The defendant in a long-running sedition case, accused of criticizing MORA’s halal policy, fled the country before his verdict in order to seek refuge in Canada.  In response, the prosecution obtained an arrest warrant and informed the court it intended to apply for judgment in absentia.

Public and private practitioners in the local legal community stated that the CPC does not fully address evidentiary standards for prosecution of corporal and capital punishment cases for phases two and three of the SPC.

MORA continued to provide texts for Friday sermons to all mosques, which were then required to deliver the approved texts, and the government required the sermons to be preached only by registered imams.

The Reporters Without Borders 2018 World Press Freedom Index for Brunei stated journalists in the country practiced self-censorship as a rule when reporting on religion.

There was no legal requirement for women to wear head coverings in public; however, religious authorities continued to reinforce social customs to encourage Muslim women to wear the tudong (a traditional Islamic head covering), and many women did so.  When applying for passports, drivers’ licenses, and national identity cards, Muslim females were required to wear a tudong.  Muslim women employed by the government were expected to wear a tudong to work, although some chose not to with no reports of official repercussions.  In government schools and institutions of higher learning, Muslim female students were required to wear a uniform that includes a head covering.  Male students were expected to wear the songkok (a traditional hat), although this was not required in all schools.  Women who were incarcerated, including non-Muslims, were required to wear a uniform that included a tudong.

Religious leaders and government officials did not officially warn citizens against publicly displaying symbols of religions other than Islam during Christmas and Chinese New Year, as they did last in 2016.  Many businesses still chose not to display decorations; however, Christmas decorations were on display for sale in many shops in popular malls.  As in past years, the government limited traditional Lunar New Year lion dance performances to a three-day period and restricted them to the Chinese temple, Chinese school halls, and private residencies of Chinese Association members.  Members of the royal family publicly attended Lunar New Year celebrations and lion dance performances during the allowed period, with front-page coverage in state-influenced media.

The government periodically warned the population about “outsiders” preaching non-Shafi’i versions of Islam, including both “liberal” practices and those associated with jihadism, Wahhabism, or Salafism.  In November while addressing an audience that contained international Islamic scholars and several senior government officials, the head of the Religious Teachers’ University College stated the ideas of liberalism and individual freedom in religion were dangerous.

According to a local press article, in May the head of the Traditions and Customs Council, Pengiran Aziz, told members of the Brunei-China Friendship Association that foreigners residing in the country must adopt the national philosophy, MIB, and described it as a concept of life and the foundation of national unity.

The government continued to enforce strict customs controls on importing non-Islamic religious texts such as Bibles, as well as on Islamic religious teaching materials or scriptures intended for sale or distribution.  Authorities generally continued to ban non-Islamic religious texts from import, and the censorship board continued to review Islamic texts to ensure they did not contain text that deviated from the Shafi’i school of Islam.  Personal packages entering the country continued to be checked by customs to ensure they did not contain anything of a non-Shafi’i Islamic or perceived sexual nature, such as magazines showing women in swimsuits.

Churches stated that a long-standing fatwa discouraging Muslims from assisting in perpetuating non-Muslim faiths continued to inhibit expansion, renovation, or construction of new facilities.  Christian religious groups said, however, authorities generally permitted churches and associated schools to repair and renovate buildings on their sites if required for safety.  This approval process remained lengthy and difficult, and there were continuing reports of the government stalling new construction projects for not meeting the complicated permit process requirements.  With only six approved churches in the country, facilities were often too small to accommodate their congregations without significant overflow seating outdoors.  Chinese Buddhist temples were also subject to the same fatwa, with only one official Chinese temple preserved as a cultural heritage site.  Government data from 2015, the latest available, indicated there were 99 registered mosques.  Christian worshippers continued to report difficulty accessing churches on many Sundays because of road closures by the government for official events, with some services being rescheduled to other times.

The minister of religious affairs reported there had been a significant increase in the number of students attending religious school since the implementation of the 2012 order on compulsory religious education.  The government reported many non-Muslim children elected to take courses on Islam.  Reportedly, those applying for government-funded scholarships believed having such courses could be advantageous.  Most school textbooks were illustrated to portray Islam as the norm, and women and girls were shown wearing the tudong.  There were no depictions of the practices of other religious groups in textbooks.

Authorities continued to prohibit non-Muslims and non-Shafi’i Muslims from receiving non-Shafi’i religious education in schools.  The government tolerated non-Islamic religious education in private settings, such as at home or in approved churches.  All church-associated schools were recognized by the MOE and remained open to students of any religion, although they were not permitted to offer religious instruction other than for Shafi’i Islam.

Throughout the year, the government enforced business hour restrictions requiring all businesses to close for the two hours of Friday prayers.  Religious enforcement officers continued to enforce a ban on restaurants serving dine-in food during the fasting hours of Ramadan and issued verbal warnings to those found in breach of the ban.  In May an article in Borneo Bulletin, citing the SPC, advised local eateries not to serve dine-in customers during daylight hours and cautioned the public not to eat, drink, or smoke in public places during daylight hours throughout Ramadan.  During Ramadan, a picture of government officials entering a restaurant and reportedly issuing a verbal warning for serving dine-in food during fasting hours went viral on social media platforms WhatsApp and Reddit.  In March the owner of a prominent restaurant was fined 825 BND ($610) for violating halal regulations by having alcohol and nonhalal meat products on his premises.  The government continued to enforce a ban on eating, drinking, or smoking in public during the fasting hours of Ramadan, which was applied to both Muslims and non-Muslims.

Authorities reportedly stepped up enforcement of anti-alcohol laws.  Law enforcement agencies raided two hotels and several private parties for serving alcohol illegally.  The government maintained a long-standing ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes, and a restriction against the import or consumption of alcoholic beverages by Muslims.  In March border enforcement agencies began more rigorous enforcement and increased the frequency of border inspections, specifically seeking out those with alcohol or cigarettes.  Religious authorities allowed nonhalal restaurants and nonhalal sections in supermarkets to operate without interference but continued to hold public outreach sessions to encourage restaurants to become halal.

The government offered incentives to prospective converts to Islam and the Shafi’i school, especially those from indigenous communities in rural areas, including help with housing, welfare assistance, or help to perform the Hajj.  During the year, Hajj participants received designer luggage from the government.  The government gave presentations on the benefits of converting to Islam that received extensive press coverage in state-influenced media.  According to government statistics, approximately 500 individuals converted to Islam during the year, similar to previous years.  Converts included citizens and permanent residents, as well as foreigners.  Official government policy supported Islam through the national MIB philosophy as well as through government pledges to make the country a zikir nation (a nation that remembers and obeys Allah).

Despite the absence of a legal prohibition of Muslims marrying non-Muslims, all Muslim weddings required approval from the sharia courts, and officiants, who were required to be imams approved by the government, required the non-Muslim party to convert prior to the marriage.

Most government meetings and ceremonies commenced with an Islamic prayer, which the government continued to state was not a legal requirement but a matter of custom.

The government required residents to carry identity cards that stated the bearer’s ethnicity, which were used in part to determine whether he or she was Muslim; for example, all ethnic Malays, including those traveling in the country, were assumed to be Muslim.  Malays were required to follow certain Islamic religious practices or potentially face fines, arrest, and imprisonment.  Religious authorities reportedly checked identity cards for ethnicity when conducting raids against suspected violators of sharia.  Visitors to the country were asked to identify their religion on their visa applications.

Speaking at the closing of the Legislative Council session in March, the minister of religious affairs stated, “If asked by anyone where the democracy of Brunei’s MIB is, answer assertively that our democracy is based on the teachings of Islam.  We will not export Brunei’s democracy, as it is a democracy that fits the land.”

In June As-Syahadah Muallaf Youth, a government-associated youth group, hosted a first of its kind multifaith iftar and invited non-Muslims to the event at one of the country’s biggest mosques.  Muhammad Yusri Hj Abdul Majid, one of the event organizers, stated the group hosted the iftar to foster understanding between Muslims and non-Muslim communities.  Following the occasion, local press reported MORA intended to make the multifaith iftar an annual event.

Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom

Non-Muslims and Muslims faced social pressure to conform to Islamic guidelines regarding behavior.  Male members of the Islamic community reportedly felt pressure from family and friends to attend Friday prayers despite not having strong religious beliefs.  Members of the LGBTI community expressed fears about openly expressing their sexuality as they thought it would bring shame on their families who were religious.

In discussion of religion and religious freedom on social media outlets such as Facebook and Reddit, Muslims and non-Muslims posted comments questioning the relevance of the MIB national philosophy, and some commenters called for religion to play no part in government policy.  Others called for increased Islamification and increased restrictions on non-Muslims.  Residents who questioned the SPC or Islamic values on social media sometimes reported receiving online abuse and threats and official monitoring.  Some vocal activists who challenged established norms reported family and friends would pressure them to keep quiet due to fear they would attract the attention of authorities or damage the family’s reputation.

Some Muslims who wished to convert to another religion reportedly continued to fear social retribution, such as ostracism by friends, family, and their community.  If parents converted to Islam, there was often family and official pressure for the children to do the same.  Some non-Muslims said they felt pressured in the workplace or in social groups to convert to Islam.

In March an imitation grenade found in the parking lot of the Sharia Court building in the capital city prompted a security alert.

Laos

Section I. Religious Demography

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 7.2 million (July 2018 estimate).  According to the 2015 national census (the most recent figures available), 64.7 percent of the population is Buddhist, 1.7 percent Christian, 31.4 percent has no religion, and the remaining 2.1 percent identify as other or having a nonlisted religion.  Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion of the ethnic or “lowland” Lao, who constitute 53.2 percent of the overall population.  According to the LFNC and MOHA, the remainder of the population comprises at least 48 ethnic minority groups, most of which practice animism and ancestor worship.  Animism is predominant among Sino-Thai groups, such as the Thai Dam and Thai Daeng, and the Mon-Khmer and Burmo-Tibetan groups.  Among lowland Lao, many pre-Buddhist animist beliefs are incorporated into Theravada Buddhist practice, particularly in rural areas.  Roman Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Baha’is, Mahayana Buddhists, Seventh-day Adventists, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ) members, and followers of Confucianism together constitute less than 3 percent of the population.  According to the international Christian rights NGO Aid to the Church in Need’s 2018 Religious Freedom Report, Christians comprise 3.2 percent of the population.  The Lao Evangelical Church (LEC) estimates its membership at 200,000 and the Catholic Church estimates its at 55,000.

Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom

Legal Framework

The constitution provides for the right and freedom to believe or not believe in any religion and states citizens are equal before the law regardless of their beliefs or ethnic group.  The government officially recognizes four religious umbrella groups – Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and the Baha’i Faith.  It generally requires other religious groups to affiliate with one of these four groups in order to operate legally.  The constitution also states the government respects and protects all lawful activities of Buddhists and followers of other religions, and “mobilizes and encourages Buddhist monks and novices as well as the priests of other religions to participate in activities that are beneficial to the country and people.”  It prohibits all acts that create division between religious groups and classes of persons.

Decree 315, enacted in 2016, upholds “respect for the religious rights and freedom” of both believers and nonbelievers.  The decree’s stated purpose is to set the principles, regulations, and laws concerning the governance and protection of religious activities for clergy, teachers of religion, believers, and religious groups in order to preserve and promote national culture, increase solidarity among members of religious groups, and “preserve and develop the nation.”  The decree clarifies rules for religious practice, extends registration requirements to Buddhist groups, which had previously had a de facto exemption, and defines the government as the final arbiter of permissible religious activities.  The decree reiterates the constitutional priority that religious practice should serve national interests by promoting development and education and by instructing believers to be good citizens.

The decree requires any religious group operating in the country to register with MOHA.  The government encourages other religious groups seeking official recognition to affiliate with one of the four umbrella groups.  Government-recognized Christian denominations are limited to the Catholic Church, the LEC, and the Seventh-day Adventist Church.  All other Christian denominations wishing to be recognized are encouraged to register as part of the LEC instead of receiving separate recognition.

Under the decree, religious groups must present information on elected or appointed officeholders to national, provincial, and district and village-level MOHA offices for review and certification.  Religious groups operating in multiple provinces must obtain national MOHA approval; groups operating in multiple districts are required to obtain provincial level approval; and groups operating in multiple villages are required to obtain district level approval.  If a group wishes to operate beyond its local congregation, it must obtain approval at the corresponding level.  A religious activity occurring outside a religious group’s property requires village authority approval.  Activities in another village require approval from district authorities, from provincial authorities for activities in another district, and from national authorities for activities in another province.  Religious groups must submit annual plans of all activities, including routine events, in advance for local authorities to review and approve.

The decree states nearly all aspects of religious practice – such as congregating, holding religious services, travel for religious officials, building houses of worship, modifying existing structures, and establishing new congregations in villages where none existed – require permission from a provincial, district-level, and/or central MOHA office.  The decree empowers MOHA to order the cessation of any religious activities or beliefs not in agreement with policies, traditional customs, laws, or regulations within its jurisdiction.  It may stop any religious activity threatening national stability, peace, and social order, causing serious damage to the environment, or affecting national solidarity or unity between tribes and religions, including threats to the lives, properties, health, or reputations of others.  The decree also requires MOHA to collect information and statistics on religious operations, cooperate with foreign countries and international organizations regarding religious activities, and report religious activities to the government.

All houses of worship must register under the law and conform to applicable regulations.  Any maintenance, restoration, and construction activities at religious facilities must receive MOHA approval from all levels.  Local authorities may provide opinions regarding building, care, and maintenance of religious facilities, present their findings to their respective provincial governors and city mayors for consideration, and subsequently ask MOHA to review and approve activities conducted in religious facilities.

The Decree on Associations, No. 238, passed in late 2017, allows government to control and/or prohibit the formation of associations and includes measures to criminalize unregistered associations and allow for prosecution of their members.

Individuals entering the clergy for more than three months require approval from district and village authorities, agreement from the receiving religious establishment, and agreement from a guardian or spouse, if applicable.  For a period of less than three months, the village authority, as well as a guardian or spouse, if applicable, must approve.  The shorter period stipulations are particularly relevant to Buddhists, as every Buddhist male is expected to enter the monkhood at least once in his life, often for fewer than three months.

The Ministry of Education and Sports (MOES) and MOHA must approve the travel abroad of clergy and religious teachers for specialized studies.  Generally, students going abroad for any kind of study (including religious studies) require approval from the MOES.  Religious organizations conducting religious activities overseas must receive approval from the appropriate geographical MOHA level.

According to the LFNC Law as amended in April, the LFNC may educate and meet with religious leaders, clergy, teachers, and members to ensure compliance with laws and regulations, reduce ethnic and religious tensions, and “contribute to the development of the nation.”  LFNC officials may listen to opinions and concerns of religious communities in order to work with police or other authorities to investigate and resolve problems.

The government controls written materials for religious audiences.  The decree regulates the importation and printing of religious materials and production of books, documents, icons, and symbols of various religions.  The Ministry of Culture and MOHA must approve religious texts or other materials before they are imported.  MOHA may require religious groups to certify the imported materials are truly representative of their religions, to address issues of authenticity, and to ensure imported materials comport with values and practices in the country.  The law prohibits the import or export of unapproved printed or electronic religious materials.

The decree states the government may continue to sponsor Buddhist facilities, incorporate Buddhist rituals and ceremonies in state functions, and promote Buddhism as an element of the country’s cultural and spiritual identity and as the predominant religion of the country.

The decree requires Buddhist clergy to have identification cards, and clergy of other religions are required to have certificates to prove they have received legitimate religious training.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with a reservation that Article 18 on freedom of religion shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any activities to directly or indirectly coerce or compel an individual to believe or not to believe in a religion or to change his or her religion or belief, and that all acts that create division and discrimination among ethnic groups and religious groups are incompatible with the article.

Government Practices

Reports continued of authorities, especially in isolated villages, arresting, detaining, and exiling followers of minority religions, particularly Christians.  The central government said it continued efforts to offer protections to religious groups as stipulated in the law, but stated this was a challenge in isolated areas.

In August a pastor with close connections to Christians throughout the country reported that district authorities in Mahaxsai District in Khammoune Province told a group of Christians to stop worshipping and then tried to extort money from them.  When the group did not give them any money, the authorities arrested the group leader and detained him for five days.

In September authorities detained seven members of the LEC for a week at a district jail in Champassack Province.  Before they were taken to jail, the village chief forced the LEC members into a vehicle belonging to the jail and reportedly drove them around the village, warning other villagers not to follow the LEC faith.  One of the detainees said local authorities released them in part because MOHA organized a workshop on Decree 315 in the same province that week.  The detainees were released after the workshop ended.

The advocacy group Human Rights Watch for Lao Religious Freedom (HRWLRF) reported that on November 18 three police officers in Keovilia village, Vilabouly District, Savannakhet Province, arrested three men and one elderly woman for being Christian.  The report identified the woman as “Grandma Bounlam” and the three men by the surnames Duangtha, Khampan, and Ponsawan.  The officers who made the arrests were identified by their surnames as Don, a police major stationed at Vilabouly District, and two officers stationed in Vang District, Pim and No.  According to HRWLRF, the police held the men in handcuffs and feet stocks.  Police released the four, but evicted them from their homes and confiscated their property.  According to HRWLRF, police threatened them with unspecified criminal charges if they did not renounce Christianity.

Radio Free Asia and HRWLRF reported that in December five other Christians were arrested in Non Soung Village, Phin District, Savannakhet Province, including one pastor who had come from another village to help celebrate Christmas.  Radio Free Asia quoted an anonymous local who said that Christians were subject to restrictions and “are not allowed to teach from the Bible or to spread their religion to others because Christianity is the religion of the Europeans and Americans.”

According to Radio Free Asia, HRWLRF reported police in Nakanong village, Phin District, Savannakhet Province, arrested three church leaders and four other Christians on December 29 for conducting an “illegal” church service and held them for several days before releasing them.  HRWLRF reportedly said authorities also demolished the church stage, cut the power line, destroyed the sound system, and seized three mobile phones.

In some cases, church members reportedly were arrested for practicing their faith but charged with another crime.  In Houaphanh Province, three members of the LEC were arrested for traveling without proper documentation and were charged with illegally entering a forest.

According to Christian media outlet World Watch Monitor, in January local officials in Luang Prabang forced a Christian and his family to move to another part of the city and fined them the equivalent of $400.  According to a local source, the “family book” identification document of the family, necessary to move about freely, was kept by the local chief.  The family could not return to collect the book without incurring additional fines of up to $1200, the fine given to anyone who chooses to become a Christian in that area, according to the source.

Some local officials pressured Christians to renounce their faith or encouraged them to move elsewhere.  For example, in Huaython village in Luang Prabang Province, local officials told approximately 20 families belonging to the LEC to renounce their faith because they should not believe in a “foreign religion.”  One family renounced their religion and local authorities gave them approximately 50,000 Lao kip ($6) as a reward.  In Sone District in Houaphanh Province, district officials told nine families they would have to move to another province if they did not renounce their Christian faith.  Eight of the nine families opted to move to Bokeo Province.

A representative of the Seventh-day Adventist Church said village authorities in Khammouane Province forced Church members to sign a pledge, promising they would not gather for religious services.  According to the representative, the village authorities said that Church members could believe in a religion but could not gather to worship.

Leaders of the recognized minority religious groups said they were aware of fewer incidents of abuse of villagers who had converted to Christianity than in previous years; in most cases, those who were arrested were fined and released.  In some cases local officials reportedly threatened Protestants with arrest or expulsion from their villages if they did not comply with orders issued by the local authorities either to stop practicing their faith or not to join in community activities.

In discussing Decree 315 and other laws, religious leaders said officials in urban areas and in some districts had a strong understanding of laws governing religious activities, but conflicts and other incidents that restricted religious freedom remained prevalent in rural areas.  MOHA and LFNC officials continued to acknowledge some local officials were incorrectly applying regulations, were creating their own regulations contrary to national law, or simply were unaware of all provisions in Decree 315.  A representative from the National Assembly’s Department of Ethnic and Religious Affairs said that Decree 315 had “not reached all areas.”

Religious officials said that while Decree 315 helped delineate religious rights, the decree established requirements many religious groups felt were onerous, unrealistic, and used to restrict religious practices.  According to some minority religious groups, both local and central government officials referred to the constitution, Decree 315 (or its predecessor, Decree 92), and social harmony as reasons for continuing to restrict and monitor religious activity, especially the activities of new or small Christian organizations among minority ethnic group members.

Religious groups said they were concerned the government had not yet implemented the decree fully in practice.  If the government attempted to enforce all aspects of the decree, one church official said, “We won’t be able to do anything.”  Baha’i representatives said the decree was a positive development and reflected the government’s “sincerity” to promote religious freedom.  They also said the decree was not overly restrictive, but needed more clarity.  They recommended the government devote more resources to implementing it at the district level.

A number of nonprofit associations (NPAs) and some religious groups called for the repeal of the Decree on Associations No. 238, which they said had the potential to restrict operations of nonprofit organizations.  While the decree pertains to NPAs, Voice of the Martyrs, an international Christian NGO, stated local Christians were concerned authorities could use the decree to shut down religious activity and religious expression.  Mission Network News said the decree threatened Christians’ right to meet.  There were no reports from other local religious groups the decree had been used to regulate religious activity.

Some minority religious groups, including the Catholic Church, LEC, Baha’i Faith, and Seventh-day Adventists, successfully met the annual administrative requirements outlined in Decree 315, such as providing information on the number of members, religious texts, and plans for services during the year.  Other groups, including the Church of Jesus Christ, were still waiting for the government to approve their registration applications at year’s end.  A MOHA official stated the registration process was not easy and said that during the review process MOHA consulted with other religious groups to discuss the registration application in an attempt to minimize conflicts between established and new religious groups.  The MOHA official said some Christian groups questioned whether another group wishing to register was Christian.

The LEC, the second largest religious group after Buddhists, continued to serve as an umbrella group for all registered Christian denominations other than Catholics and Seventh-day Adventists, as religious leaders reported applications for recognition of new Christian groups were too difficult.  Several unregistered religious groups, including the Church of Jesus Christ, continued their efforts to register independently from the LEC due to differences in doctrinal beliefs; their applications remained pending at year’s end.

Although the law prohibits members of religious groups not registered with MOHA or the LFNC from practicing their faith, members of several groups reportedly did so quietly without interference.

Religious leaders reported various incidents throughout the country related to obtaining travel permission.  Some religious officials were detained even with proper travel authorization; most cases were resolved within hours of occurrence.  An official with the Seventh-day Adventist Church said if a member of the Church needed to travel to another province, he or she must submit an application to MOHA in advance and needed approval at the national and provincial levels, and it could take up to 20 days to get approval.  An official at MOHA said it tried to approve travel plans within 10 days, and encouraged religious groups to submit annual travel plans.

In March an official with the Catholic Church in Vientiane said the LFNC reportedly gave his local church permission to hold a religious service on April 1 for Easter.  Local authorities, however, stopped a church official who was traveling on March 31 to participate in the service and told him he could only travel on April 1.

Religious leaders said the Christmas season presented challenges, especially involving detention of Christians traveling without permission to attend religious events outside of their normal locales.  Members of the LEC said they submitted travel plans for the Christmas season to all appropriate levels of government but did not receive all the required approvals.

According to Radio Free Asia, in December an LFNC official from Xiengkhouang Province said authorities allowed Christians to conduct Christmas services in their churches or at their pastors’ homes provided they did not preach against the government and law and they invited local officials to attend to guarantee “order and security.”  Radio Free Asia also reported that, according to a Christian in Vientiane, Christians conducted Christmas services in the capital with government authorities present for “security and protection.”

According to Muslim community leaders, Muslims continued to worship at the two active mosques in Vientiane, the only mosques in the country.  According to the Muslim Association, its leaders met regularly with LFNC and MOHA officials and maintained an effective working relationship with the government.  The government permitted individuals from Thailand to conduct Islamic lessons.

While animists generally reported little governmental interference, the government continued to discourage animist practices it deemed outdated, dangerous, or illegal, such as the practice in some tribes of killing children born with defects or burying the bodies of deceased relatives beneath homes.

Representatives of Baha’i communities in urban areas, including Vientiane, Savannakhet, and Luang Prabang, reported local authorities generally were “comfortable” with Baha’i practitioners and did not interfere with or restrict their activities.

Christian religious leaders said authorities continued to enforce a ban on proselytizing in public.  Some religious groups, including the Church of Jesus Christ, said they relied on word-of-mouth to attract new members.  Authorities continued to enforce rules requiring programs or activities conducted outside houses of worship receive prior approval from local or higher officials.

The government strictly enforced a prohibition on proselytizing by foreigners.  Several religious groups said they welcomed foreign members to visit the country but needed to be cautious about the kinds of activities foreigners engaged in.  The Church of Jesus Christ had an agreement with MOHA that allowed two missionaries in the country but the missionaries were allowed only to teach English and could not engage in religious discussions.

Authorities continued to control imports of religious materials but several religious groups said they could find most religious texts and documents online so they did not need government permission.  MOHA officials said they coordinated with religious groups to review imported materials to help ensure they were in line with the organization’s beliefs.

Several religious groups reported problems with building places of worship.  An official with the LEC said there were approximately 600 LEC churches throughout the country.  He said the LEC had more than 1,000 “unofficial” churches where worship services were conducted in homes, in part due to the difficulties of obtaining building permits from local authorities.  An official with the Catholic Church said it had encountered challenges building churches as well.  During the year, the Church asked for permission to build churches in several villages but only received vague responses.  The LFNC Religious Affairs Department continued to urge that designated church structures replace house churches whenever possible.  Local authorities in many areas considered group worship in homes illegal and told villagers they needed a permit to worship at home, although Christian groups said local authorities in many areas considered group worship in homes illegal even with a permit.  Religious group representatives said the building permit process began at the local level and then required district, provincial, and ultimately central-level LFNC and MOHA permission.  Christian groups said the government would not issue permits to build new churches, and local officials used the process to block construction of new churches.  There were reports, however, of authorities permitting the construction of new churches, for example in the city of Vang Vieng and in Attapeu Province.

Many religious leaders said they continued to experience lengthy delays in obtaining permits for church construction, and generally received no response to requests.  Some religious leaders said that Decree 315 had neither clear guidelines nor clear timelines for construction of religious buildings.  A Christian religious official said the government used bureaucratic delays to halt construction as long as possible in order to keep minority religious groups from expanding.  According to the director general of the National Assembly’s Ethnic and Religious Affairs Department, many of the delays involved legal matters concerning construction, or in some cases, a cluster of Christian families in a village wished to build two or three churches in their village, which would result in more churches than authorities believed necessary for the number of Christians.

At year’s end, the Catholic Church continued to discuss plans with the LFNC to reacquire land adjoining the Sacred Heart Cathedral in central Vientiane that the Church previously owned before the Communist Party came to power in 1975.  The Catholic Church has tried to reacquire the land since 2001.  In November 2017, the government announced plans to build a school on that land with funding from China and did not inform the Church of these plans.

According to MOES, there was no Buddhist curriculum taught as religion in any public schools.  The government, however, promoted the teaching of Buddhist practices in public schools as part of national culture.  Mandatory cultural sessions included lessons taught in Buddhist temples and, in order to advance to the next grade level, educational authorities required all students pray in Buddhist temples.  Christian students reported discomfort with the requirement.  MOES said it allowed parents to remove their children from the classes if they were dissatisfied with the program.  In several provinces, however, lessons in Buddhism remained mandatory to pass to the next grade level.  This was especially true in areas where temples provided education because the government was unable to support a public school.  A number of private schools affiliated with various religious groups existed throughout the country and accepted students from any religious denomination.

With advance permission and a requirement there be no open proselytizing, government authorities permitted Lao and expatriate Christians to organize a public, open-air religious music event for the second year in a row.  The Vientiane International Gospel Music Festival took place November 2-4 at the Vientiane Center shopping mall, with performances by local and foreign artists and bands.  LEC officials said, however, the government told the organizers it would be the last time they received a permit to hold the festival.  The LEC officials also said that the word “gospel” was not translated into Lao and only appeared in English-language materials.

A Christian pastor said that in limited cases, provincial government officials continued to ask religious leaders not to report grievances to foreigners to avoid unwanted publicity.  He added the LEC did not want to embarrass the government or jeopardize its relatively strong relationship so the Church often chose not to publicize incidents related to religious freedom.  One religious official said the government blamed religious groups for publicizing grievances and giving the country a bad reputation.  According to religious groups, in some instances local authorities continued efforts to keep individuals who had been arrested, banished, punished, marginalized, or had otherwise been the victim of abuses due to their religious beliefs out of sight of international observers.

An official with the Catholic Church said government officials who are Catholic were promoted at a slower rate than their Buddhist counterparts and needed to take precautions to not be seen attending church services.  Other religious groups noted it was hard for their members to join the government or advance to higher-level positions, or to become village chiefs.  Religious groups stated they were aware of no openly non-Buddhist or non-animist government officials in higher-level posts at the provincial or national levels, although a Baha’i official said there were three Baha’i village chiefs.

Religious officials said that during the year, a man with mental health issues caused disruptions in a village.  Local authorities blamed minority religious groups for the disruptions, claiming the man was a member of both the LEC and the Seventh-day Adventists, even though he was not a registered member of either church.  Other religious officials said local authorities at times used religion as a scapegoat for domestic violence or other issues within a family.

In dealing with local conflicts regarding religious problems, officials at MOHA reported they first waited for local authorities to resolve an issue before getting involved.  One MOHA official said the ministry did not have the resources to respond to every conflict.

The LFNC and MOHA stated they continued to visit areas where religious freedom abuses had reportedly taken place to instruct local officials on government policy and law.  LFNC and MOHA officials said they frequently traveled out of the capital to encourage religious groups to practice in accordance with the country’s laws and regulations.  They also hosted training workshops for local officials to explain officials’ obligations under the constitution and the right to believe or not to believe in religion.  During these sessions, central authorities provided training to provincial LFNC and MOHA officials on Decree 315 and other laws governing religion and held workshops with local officials and religious leaders that reviewed the basic tenets of Buddhism, Christianity, the Baha’i Faith, and Islam.  With support from an international NGO, MOHA held seven workshops in six different provinces during the year with nearly 400 officials in attendance, including a four-day workshop on religious freedom in Bolikhamxai Province in October.  The LFNC offered seven workshops in four provinces with more than 250 participants.  The government directly funded one workshop, and religious groups contributed some funding for the workshops.  Officials said the workshops provided a forum for MOHA and LFNC to explain the different aspects of Decree 315 and hear about the challenges that minority religious groups encounter under it and other provisions of the law.

In collaboration with the LFNC, an international NGO continued to conduct training for provincial and district officials and local religious leaders throughout the year.  The training was designed to help the officials and religious leaders understand the law and each other better.

In October the National Assembly organized a three-day workshop that included officials from the four recognized religions and assembly members from all 18 provinces.  The religious organizations presented their beliefs, administration, and contributions to the country, while MOHA and MOPS discussed aspects of the new decree.  Assembly members also had the opportunity to ask questions of the religious officials.

The officially recognized religious groups and the government continued to print and distribute the decree and its implementation guidelines.

The Church of Jesus Christ organized study tours to Utah for government officials.  These and similar trips required approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom

Christian sources reported religious tensions occurred in villages and rural areas, particularly in response to the growth of Christian congregations or disagreements over access to village resources.  One religious official said persons living in villages were often unaware of Decree 315 and village leaders did not encourage religious freedom.  The LEC noted continued conflicts in the southern part of the country where church officials said local residents continued to see their church as an unwelcome “foreign religion.”  Some religious leaders said misunderstandings continued to occur, which they said were due to low education levels in remote parts of the country.  In some cases, villagers threatened to expel Christians from the village if they did not renounce their faith, or offered them payment to renounce their religion.  In many villages, disputes of all kinds (including religious disputes) resolved by a committee without getting police or other government officials involved.  Christian group leaders said this process often resulted in compromises, such as encouraging Christians to support local Buddhist or animist ceremonies without participating in them.

Christians said burial practices remained an issue throughout the year.  Some animists continued to be concerned about the Christian practice of burying their dead within the village boundary or nearby confines, believing that the deceased’s spirit would bring disharmony to the village and conflict with the village spirits because the body was not cremated.  In some rural areas, Christians said they were not allowed to use public cemeteries and were not given land for separate cemeteries, so they had to resort to burying their dead on farms or in backyards.

According to an official from a Christian church, conflicts between animists and Christians continued, with reports of family feuds that resulted in damaged or destroyed animist relics.  Older animists said they opposed their younger family members adopting non-animist beliefs and threatened them via various means, including government intervention.

Several private preschools and English-language schools received support from religious groups abroad of various denominations.  Many boys received instruction in religion and other subjects in Buddhist temples, which continued to play a traditional schooling role in smaller communities where formal education was limited or unavailable.  Two Buddhist colleges and two Buddhist secondary schools provided religious training for children and adults.  Christian denominations, particularly the LEC and Seventh-day Adventists, conducted religious education for children and youth.  Baha’i groups conducted religious training for children and adult members.  The Catholic Church operated a seminary in Khammouane Province for students with high school diplomas.  The Muslim community offered limited educational training.

Some members of ethnic groups associated with the United States during the Vietnam War era said they felt abandoned by the United States and had rejected Christianity, which they viewed as an American religion, and in many cases in subsequent years had returned to their animist roots.  This sentiment reportedly continued to cause problems in remote areas where these ethnic communities placed additional pressure on Christians to renounce their religion, including from their own families and neighbors.

Several religious groups noted they provided donations after a dam collapsed in Attapeu Province in July, resulting in severe flooding and the displacement of residents.

Singapore

Section I. Religious Demography

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 6 million (July 2018 estimate).  Of the four million individuals the local government counts as citizens or permanent residents, 81.5 percent stated a religious affiliation in the General Household Survey.  According to 2015 data, approximately 33.2 percent of the population of citizens and permanent residents are Buddhist, 18.8 percent Christian, 14 percent Muslim (predominantly Sunni), 10 percent Taoist, and 5 percent Hindu.  Groups together constituting less than 1 percent of the population include Sikhs, Zoroastrians, Jains, Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Unification Church.  Although estimates varied widely, the government estimated there were 2,500 members in the Jewish community.

According to a 2018 report by the Department of Statistics, 74.3 percent of the resident population is ethnic Chinese, 13.4 percent ethnic Malay, 9.0 percent ethnic Indian, and 3.2 percent other, including Eurasians.  Nearly all ethnic Malays are Muslim.  According to a 2016 national survey, among ethnic Indians, 59.9 percent are Hindu, 21.3 percent Muslim, and 12.1 percent Christian.  The ethnic Chinese population includes Buddhists (42.3 percent), Christians (20.9 percent), and Taoists (12.9 percent).

Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom

Legal Framework

The constitution states every person has a constitutional right to profess, practice, or propagate his or her religious belief as long as such activities do not breach any other laws relating to public order, public health, or morality.  The constitution also prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion in the administration of any law or in the appointment to or employment in any office under a public authority.  It states every religious group has the right to manage its own religious affairs and it does not prohibit restrictions on employment by a religious institution.  The constitution states no person shall be required to receive instruction or take part in any ceremony or act of worship other than his or her own.

The government maintains a decades-long ban on Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Unification Church.  The government banned Jehovah’s Witnesses in 1972 on the grounds it nation was prejudicial to public welfare and order because it objected to national service, reciting the national pledge, or singing the national anthem.  A 1996 decision by the Singapore Appeals Court upheld the rights of individual members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses to profess, practice, and propagate their religious beliefs.  The government does not arrest Jehovah’s Witnesses for attending or holding meetings in private homes; however, it does not allow them to hold public meetings or publish or import their literature.  The government banned the Unification Church in 1982 on grounds it was a “cult” that could have detrimental effects on society.

The Presidential Council for Religious Harmony reports on matters affecting the maintenance of religious harmony and considers cases referred by the minister for home affairs or by parliament.  The president appoints the council’s members on the advice of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights.  The law requires two-thirds of Council for Religious Harmony members to be representatives of the major religions in the country, which according to law are Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism.

The law authorizes the minister of home affairs to issue a restraining order against any person in a position of authority within a religious group if the minister ascertains the person causes feelings of enmity or hostility between different religious groups, promotes political causes, carries out subversive activities, or excites disaffection against the government under the guise of practicing religion.  Restraining orders are at the discretion of the minister, depending on the situation, and prevent a person in a position of authority within a religious group from making or participating in additional statements.  Failure to comply can result in criminal action.  Any restraining order issued must be referred to the Council for Religious Harmony, which recommends to the president that the order be confirmed, cancelled, or amended.  Restraining orders lapse after 90 days, unless confirmed by the president.  The minister must review a confirmed restraining order at least once every 12 months and may revoke such an order at any time.  The law prohibits judicial review of such restraining orders.  In addition, under the penal code, “wounding the religious or racial feelings of any person” or knowingly promoting “disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill will between different religious or racial groups” can result in detention and or imprisonment.

The constitution states Malays are “the indigenous people of Singapore” and requires the government to protect and promote their interests, including religious interests.  The MUIS, established under the Ministry for Culture, Community, and Youth (MCCY), administers affairs for all Muslims in the country such as the construction and management of mosques, halal certification, fatwa issuances, preparation of Friday sermons, and the Hajj.  The MUIS includes representatives from the Sunni majority as well as Muslim minority groups, including Shia.  Use of MUIS sermons is not compulsory, but imams who use their own content are responsible for it and may be investigated if there are complaints.

The government appoints all members of the MUIS and the Hindu Endowments Board, and nominates four of the 11 members of the Sikh Advisory Board.  These statutory boards manage various aspects of their faith communities, ranging from managing properties and endowments to safeguarding customs and the general welfare of the community.

The law requires all associations of 10 or more persons, including religious groups, to register with the government.  Registration confers legal identity, which allows property ownership, the ability to hold public meetings, and the ability to conduct financial transactions.  Registered religious groups may apply to establish and maintain charitable and humanitarian institutions, which enable them to solicit and receive funding and tax benefits, such as income tax exemptions.  Registered societies are subject to potential deregistration by the government on a variety of grounds, such as having purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare, or good order.  Deregistration makes it impossible to maintain a legal identity as a religious group, with consequences related to owning property, conducting financial transactions, and holding public meetings.  A person who acts as a member of or attends a meeting of an unregistered society may be punished with a fine of up to 5,000 Singapore dollars (SGD) ($3,700), imprisonment of up to three years, or both.

Prisoners, including those in solitary confinement, are allowed access to chaplains of various faiths.

Citizens need a permit to speak at indoor public gatherings outside of the hearing or view of nonparticipants if the topic refers to race or religion.  Indoor, private events are not subject to the same restrictions.  Organizers of private events, however, must prevent inadvertent access by uninvited guests, or they could be cited for noncompliance with the rules regarding public gatherings.

By law, a publication is objectionable if it describes, depicts, expresses or deals with, among other things, matters of race or religion in such a manner that the availability of the publication is likely to cause feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will, or hostility between racial or religious groups.  The government may prohibit the importation of publications, including religious publications, under the law.  For offenses involving the publication of objectionable material, an individual may be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding 5,000 SGD ($3,700) or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or both.  A person in possession of a prohibited publication may be fined up to 2,000 SGD ($1,500) and jailed for up to 12 months for a first conviction.  All written materials published by the International Bible Students Association and the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, publishing arms of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, remain banned by the government.

The Ministry of National Development and the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) establish the guidelines on land development and use of space for religious activities.  The URA regulates all land usage and decides where organizations may be located.  Religious buildings are primarily classified as places of worship.  A group seeking a new place of worship must apply to the URA for a permit.  The Ministry of National Development and the URA determine whether a religious institution meets the requirements as a place of worship, such as being located in an allotted zone and meeting the maximum plot ratio and building height.  URA guidelines regulate the use of commercially and industrially zoned space for religious activities and religious groups, and apply equally to all religious groups.  Commercial or industrial premises that host religious activities but are not zoned as places of worship must be approved by the URA.  They may not be owned by or exclusively leased to religious organizations or limited to religious use and must also be available to rent out for nonreligious events.  They may not display signage, advertisements, or posters of the religious use; be furnished to resemble a worship hall; or display any religious symbols, icons, or religious paraphernalia when the premises are not in use by the religious organization.  Use of the space for religious purposes must not cause parking, noise, or other problems.

Registration with the MUIS is compulsory for all religious teachers and centers of learning.  Registration requires adherence to minimum standards and a code of ethics, as well as fulfilment of certain training requirements.

The government does not permit religious instruction in public schools, although it is allowed in the country’s 57 government-subsidized religiously affiliated schools (mostly Christian but including three Buddhist schools).  Religious instruction in these schools is provided outside of regular curriculum time and must not include proselytization; students have a right to opt out and be given alternatives such as civics and moral education in lieu of religious instruction.  Religious instruction is allowed in private schools not aided by the government.  At the primary level, however, the law allows only seven designated private schools (six Sunni madrassahs and one Seventh-day Adventist school) to educate Singaporean citizen students; these schools must continue to meet or exceed public school performance benchmarks in annual national exams.  Other Muslim minority groups may operate part-time schools.  Public schools finish early on Fridays, which enables Muslim students to attend Friday prayers, or they allow Muslim students to leave early to attend prayers.  Secondary school students learn about the diversity of Singapore’s religious and cultural practices as a component of their character and citizenship education.

The law empowers the Ministry of Education (MOE) to regulate primary and secondary schools.  MOE rules prohibit students (but not teachers) in public schools from wearing anything not forming part of an official school uniform, including hijabs or headscarves.  Schools have discretion to grant a child dispensation from wearing the official uniform based on health but not religious requirements.  International and other private schools are not subject to the same restrictions.  For example, in madrassahs, which are all under the purview of the MUIS, headscarves are part of the uniform.  Headscarves are not banned at institutions of higher learning.

The law allows the Muslim community, irrespective of school of Islam or ethnicity, to have personal status issues governed by Islamic law, “as varied where applicable by Malay custom.”  Ordinarily the Shafi’i school of law is used, but there are provisions for use of “other accepted schools of Muslim law as may be appropriate.”  Under the law, a sharia court has nonexclusive jurisdiction over marriage issues where both parties are or were married as Muslims, including disposition of property upon divorce, custody of minor children, and inheritance.

The law permits a person involved in a sharia court divorce case to apply for permission to begin civil proceedings concerning division of property or custody of children.  Orders of the sharia court are enforced by the ordinary civil courts.  Appeals within the sharia system go to an appeal board, which is composed of three members of the MUIS, selected by the president of the MUIS from a panel of seven individuals nominated every two years by the president of the country.  The ruling of the appeal board is final and may not be appealed to any other court.  The law allows Muslim men to practice polygamy, but the Registry of Muslim Marriages may refuse requests to marry additional wives after soliciting the views of existing wives and reviewing the husband’s financial capability.

Under the law, certain criminal offenses apply only to those who profess Islam.  This includes publicly teaching or expounding any doctrine relating to Islam in a manner contrary to Islamic law, which carries a maximum fine of 2,000 SGD ($1,500), maximum imprisonment of 12 months, or both.  It is also a criminal offense for Muslims to cohabitate outside of marriage, but that law has not been enforced in decades.

Amendments to the Administration of Muslim Law Act that took effect on October 22 stipulate Muslim couples where one or both parties are under the age of 21 must complete a marriage preparation program and obtain parental or guardian consent before applying for marriage.  Each party to the marriage must be at least 18.

According to legal experts in inheritance, Islamic law governs Muslims regarding inheritance issues by default, but under certain circumstances civil law will take precedence when it is invoked.  Islamic law may result in a man receiving twice the share of a woman of the same relational level.  A man may also incur financial responsibilities for women under Islamic inheritance law.

The law does not recognize a right to conscientious objection to military service, including for religious reasons.  Male citizens or second-generation permanent residents are required to complete 24 months of uniformed national service upon reaching age 18, with no alternative provided to national service.

The Presidential Council for Minority Rights, an advisory body that is part of the legislative process, examines all legislation to ensure it does not disadvantage particular religious groups.  The council also considers and reports on matters concerning any religious group the parliament or the government refers to it.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

The Jehovah’s Witnesses official website reported as of December nine Jehovah’s Witnesses were detained in the armed forces’ detention facility for refusing to complete national service on religious grounds.  Conscientious objectors were generally court martialed and sentenced to detention, typically for 12 to 39 months.  Although they remained technically liable for national service, men who had refused to serve on religious grounds were generally not called up for reservist duties.  They did not, however, receive any form of legal documentation that officially discharged them from reservist duties.

A court convicted three Hindus in February of disorderly behavior and insulting a Muslim police officer’s religion during the Hindu festival of Thaipusam in 2015.  The trio was charged with assaulting several policemen after the officers stopped a musical troupe from playing traditional Indian drums in the Thaipusam religious procession.  At that time, the government banned musical instruments from all religious processions on foot.  The men were fined from 8,000 SGD ($5,900) to 8,500 SGD ($6,200) and one was additionally sentenced to one year and one week’s imprisonment.  While he accepted his sentence, one convicted man attributed the group’s actions to the way authorities handled and spoke to them.

A group of Hindu participants in the Thaipusam foot procession in February said police officers and a representative from the Hindu Endowments Board had attempted to stop them from singing during the procession.  Police said although the government has permitted singing religious hymns since 2011, the group’s portable loudspeakers were not permissible.

Minister for Home Affairs and Law K. Shanmugam met with Hindu community leaders in March and addressed dissatisfaction over limitations on the use of live music at Thaipusam processions after police had permitted music at an event for St. Patrick’s Day.  The minister said that other than three exemptions granted for Hindu processions on foot, only secular processions on foot were permissible.  Authorities allowed the St. Patrick’s Day event to play live music because it was a secular event and religious elements, including attire, symbols, and music, were not allowed at the event, according to the minister.  The minister stated he welcomed community proposals to increase the number of live music points along the Thaipusam procession route beyond the three that the government allowed, and the Hindu Endowments Board stated it was committed to working with authorities to achieve this objective.  The minister’s comments followed online discussion by some individuals who questioned whether the government applied “double standards” on playing musical instruments to the two events.  One person wrote on Facebook that saying St. Patrick’s Day was not religious was “a huge injustice” to the Irish Catholic community.

Media reported that MUIS counseled a couple in August after they were said to have started a new religion known as the Yayi faith.  Yayi founder Paridah Jayos reportedly instructed her followers to treat her as a god and to ignore the tenets of Islam such as fasting during Ramadan and compulsory alms giving.  Some individuals questioned online why Jayos was counselled under Islamic law, rather than being treated as a practitioner of a new religion.

Home Affairs Minister Shanmugam stated in parliament in January and March that it was important that no foreign religious preacher who could “spread ill-will towards other religions, whether in Singapore or elsewhere,” be granted permission to speak in Singapore.  He said that the government would individually assess each foreigner’s request, based on his or her previous statements as well as his or her proposed talk.  The government website said at least two months were required for processing.  The Ministry of Home Affairs told media in April that foreign religious preachers could be issued an advisory to remind them of their legal obligations.

In January the Info-communications Media Development Authority (IMDA) banned a documentary, Radiance of Resistance, which was to be shown as part of the Singapore Palestinian Film Festival.  The IMDA stated, “the skewed narrative of the film is inflammatory and has the potential to cause disharmony amongst the different races and religions in Singapore.”

Media reported that during a retreat in March for the Muslim religious counseling organization the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) Shanmugam said, “younger self-radicalized individuals tend to rely heavily on the internet and social media for information, including religious teachings.”  Shanmugam expressed his support for RRG launching a youth awareness program for individuals aged 16 to 25 that aims to engage, educate, and provide Muslim youth with a better understanding of Islam.

Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs Yaacob Ibrahim announced in parliament on March 8 the expansion of a project to combat religious extremism among Muslim youth.  He also stated the government would stand against Islamophobia.

Although government policy prohibited the wearing of hijabs by certain public sector professionals, such as nurses and uniformed military officers, many statutory boards within government agencies continued to allow Muslim staff to wear the hijab while the government continued to evolve its stance “gradually and carefully.”  Some in the Muslim community continued to quietly petition for a change in government policy.

The government assisted religious groups in locating spaces for religious observance in government-built housing, where most citizens lived.  In September the authorities introduced changes to the process for acquiring long-term leases on government-owned sites that were designated for exclusive use as “places of worship.”  The authorities said they aimed to reduce the cost and increase the availability of such leases, including for smaller religious organizations.  The changes allowed certain sites to be used for multistory developments by multiple religious organizations “belonging to the same religion,” increased the number of sites to be designated for exclusive religious use, and restricted commercial entities from bidding on them.  The government said religious groups would have to prove they had additional space needs, had adequate and sustainable local funding to finance the lease and development of the site, would not use foreign donations for the transactions, and would actively contribute to the community.  The government said at least two church and two Chinese temple sites would be made available each year for the next “few years.”  The government continued to enforce the maintenance of ethnic ratios in public housing and prevent the emergence of religious enclaves in concentrated geographic areas.

As part of the MOE’s National Education Program, the official primary and secondary public school curricula encouraged religious harmony and tolerance.  All schools celebrated the annual racial harmony day in July, which promoted understanding and acceptance of all religions within the country.  Children wore traditional clothing and celebrated the country’s racial and religious diversity.  Students were encouraged to recite the “Declaration of Religious Harmony.”

While the government did not formally prohibit proselytization, it continued to discourage its practice through the application of laws regarding public speech and assembly as it reportedly deemed proselytizing might offend other religious groups and upset the balance of intergroup relations.

The MUIS continued to operate the Harmony Center, which was set up to promote greater religious understanding.  The Harmony Center housed artifacts and information about Islam, as well as nine other major religions in Singapore.  It also organized interfaith programs, including dialogues with leaders from different religions.  In March the Harmony Center and the Archdiocesan Catholic Council for Interreligious Dialogue held a seminar entitled, “Religion, Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity.”

President Halimah Yacob, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, and government ministers regularly stressed the government’s commitment to the country as a multiracial and multi-religious society and cited religious harmony as an important policy goal.  In May the president called for the government to host an international high-level interfaith dialogue.  The president’s proposal, made during an interreligious iftar at An-Nahdhah Mosque, received support from local religious leaders and commentators.

Prime Minister Lee and four government ministers attended the consecration of the Hindu Sri Srinivasa Perumal temple in April.  Minister for Trade and Industry S. Iswaran said the event provided “an opportunity to reinforce the multi-racial, multi-religious nature of Singapore.”

Ministers gave speeches on strengthening religious pluralism.  At the IRO Day in March, MCCY Minister Grace Fu called on religious communities to continue strengthening religious harmony by fostering interreligious social mixing, discussions on faith, and community service projects.  (The IRO includes leaders of the 10 major religions in the country and has the stated objective of inculcating a spirit of friendship among various religious groups by conducting interreligious prayer services, seminars, and public talks throughout the year.)

Local government and government-affiliated organizations advocated for interreligious understanding and support for people of other religions.  The country’s five district mayors launched a national interfaith initiative called Common Senses for Common Spaces in February, which included activities such as community dialogues on Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism.

The government continued to support the operation of an “Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circle” (IRCC) in each of the country’s 27 electoral constituencies.  Under the auspices of the MCCY, the IRCCs conducted local interreligious dialogues, counseling and trust-building workshops, community celebrations, and similar activities.

The government continued to engage religious groups through the community engagement program (CEP), and trained community leaders involved in the CEP in emergency preparedness and techniques for promoting religious harmony.

The government’s BRIDGE initiative, Broadening Religious/Racial Interaction through Dialogue and General Education, started in 2017 with funding of 3 million SGD ($2.2 million) for three years, continued to provide financial support for community-based initiatives that fostered understanding of different religious practices and beliefs.

Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom

During a Christian evangelical conference in March, a visiting U.S. preacher reportedly said he would raise up a church to “push back a new modern Muslim movement” in Spain and “Muslims are taking over the south of Spain.”  Cornerstone Church, which had invited the preacher, initially called the report on the preacher a “scurrilous attack” and lodged a complaint with police, but Pastor Yang Tuck Yoong of the Church offered a public apology to Muslim leaders one week later.  Mufti of Singapore Fatris Bakaram accepted the apology and said Muslims “want to move on and look forward to more constructive and healthy relationships.”  The Church committed to be more vigilant in its selection of foreign speakers, and in what Pastor Yang stated was an effort to improve its relations with Muslims, in July it hosted Imam Syed Hassan Al-Attas and a delegation from Ba’alwie Mosque.  The minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs wrote on Facebook he appreciated the pastor’s apology because “words that sow discord and ill will among the various communities have no place in Singapore.”  Police asked that the visiting preacher return to the country for an interview, but as of year’s end he had not.

Members of the public spoke out against reported instances of religious discrimination, such as when national football coach Fandi Ahmad commented about a Sikh journalist’s turban, and when Muslim Sephia Farid reported on Facebook that an interviewer at a government agency would not permit her to wear a hijab to work.

Sandwich chain Subway eliminated pork products and became halal certified in September.  While some individuals threatened a boycott, other non-Muslims expressed support for Subway, and some Muslims argued against the move to become halal.

A group of approximately 50 churches launched the Alliance of Pentecostal-Charismatic Churches of Singapore (APCCS) in April.  Chairman Reverend Dominic Yeo said the body would serve as a “unified and collective front” for talks with the authorities in relation to the needs of the churches, government-led initiatives, or “when there is a need to address various societal issues and concerns.”  Some commentators and members of the public expressed concern religion could intrude in the public space, but Yeo said, “The APCCS is a strong advocate of racial and religious harmony in Singapore.”

Shia and Sunni Muslims continued to cooperate and to share Sunni mosques, and held intrafaith iftars during Ramadan.

Community-led programs to build understanding of others’ religions included the Ask Me Anything series, which encouraged younger individuals to raise sensitive issues related to religious practices.  The Interfaith Youth Circle and Roses for Peace provided “safe spaces” in which young people could discuss race and religion.

Religious groups and humanists continued to promote interfaith tolerance.  The Nanyang Confucian Association hosted lectures on links between Confucianism and other faiths; the United Hebrew Congregation held interfaith celebrations during Jewish festivals; and the Humanist Society Singapore collaborated to organize a multi-religious panel discussion on “Inter-Belief in a Secular Society.”

Buddhists, Taoists, and Hindus cooperated at the local level.  A group of Buddhists gave 12,000 free drinks each weekend in September to Hindu devotees at Sri Srinivasa Perumal Temple and devotees were permitted to carry statues of the Chinese goddess of mercy, as well as of the Buddha, during the Tamil Hindu religious procession of Thaipusam.

Hash.peace organized Heritage Saturdays, during which tours were organized of religious sites such as a Jewish synagogue or the Baha’i Center, so the public could learn more about the history of different communities.

Thailand

Section I. Religious Demography

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 68.6 million (July 2018 estimate).  The 2010 population census indicated 93 percent of the population is Theravada Buddhist and 5 percent Muslim.  NGOs, academics, and religious groups state that 85 to 95 percent of the population is Theravada Buddhist and 5 to 10 percent Muslim.  Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include animists, Christians, Confucians, Hindus, Jews, Sikhs, and Taoists.

Most Buddhists incorporate Hindu and animist practices into their worship.  The Buddhist clergy (sangha) consists of two main schools of Theravada Buddhism:  Mahanikaya and Dhammayuttika.  The former is older and more prevalent within the monastic community.

Islam is the dominant religion in four of the five southernmost provinces (Narathiwat, Yala, Satun, and Pattani) near the Malaysian border, commonly referred to as the Deep South.  The majority of Muslims in those provinces are ethnic Malay, but the Muslim population nationwide also includes descendants of immigrants from South Asia, China, Cambodia, and Indonesia, as well as ethnic Thai.  Statistics provided by the Religious Affairs Department (RAD) of the Ministry of Culture indicate that 99 percent of Muslims are Sunni.

The majority of ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese practice either Mahayana or Theravada Buddhism.  Many ethnic Chinese, as well as members of the Mien hill tribe, also practice forms of Taoism.

The majority of Christians are ethnic Chinese, and more than half of the Christian community is Roman Catholic.

Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom

Legal Framework

The constitution states that all persons are equal before the law regardless of religious belief and allows all persons to profess, observe, or practice any religion of their choice, as long as the exercise of these freedoms are not “harmful to the security of the State.”  The constitution empowers the state to patronize and protect Buddhism as well as other religions, but it also provides for special promotion of Theravada Buddhism through education, propagation of its principles, and the establishment of measures and mechanisms “to prevent the desecration of Buddhism in any form.”

A special order issued by the military government in 2016 guarantees the state’s promotion and protection of “all recognized religions” in the country but mandates all state agencies to monitor the “right teaching” of all religions to ensure they are not “distorted to upset social harmony.”  A law specifically prohibits the defamation or insult of Buddhism and Buddhist clergy.  Violators may face up to one year’s imprisonment, fines of up to 20,000 baht ($620), or both.  The penal code prohibits the insult or disturbance of religious places or services of all officially recognized religious groups.  Penalties range from imprisonment for one to seven years, a fine of 2,000 to 14,000 baht ($62 to $430), or both.

The law officially recognizes five religious groups:  Buddhists, Muslims, Brahmin-Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians.  As a matter of policy, the government will not recognize any new religious groups outside the five umbrella groups.  While there is no official state religion, the constitution continues to require the king to be Buddhist and declares he is the “upholder of religions.”

Religious groups associated with one of the five officially recognized religions may register to receive state benefits that include access to state subsidies, exemption from property and income taxes, and preferential allocation of resident visas for the registered organization’s foreign officials.  Registration as a religious group is not mandatory, and religious groups may still operate without government interference whether or not they are officially registered or recognized.  Under the law, the RAD is responsible for registering religious groups, excluding Buddhist groups, which the National Buddhism Bureau, an independent state agency under direct supervision of the prime minister, oversees.

The RAD may register a new religious denomination within one of the five recognized religious groups only if it meets the following qualifications:  the national census indicates the group has at least 5,000 adherents, it possesses a uniquely recognizable theology, it is not politically active, and it obtains formal approval in a RAD-organized meeting of representatives from the concerned ministries and the five recognized umbrella religious groups.  To register with the RAD, a religious group’s leader also must submit documentation on its objectives and procedures, any relationship to a foreign country, a list of executive members and senior officials, and locations of administrative, religious, and teaching sites.

The constitution prohibits Buddhist priests, novices, monks, and other clergy from voting in an election or running for seats in the House of Representatives or Senate.  According to the National Buddhism Bureau, as of September there were more than 41,000 Buddhist temples in the country with approximately 335,000 clergy who are thus ineligible to vote or run for office.  Christian clergy are prohibited from voting in elections if they are in formal religious dress.  Except for the chularajmontri (grand mufti), imams are not regarded as priests or clergy and are thus allowed to vote in elections and assume political positions.

The Sangha Supreme Council serves as Thai Buddhism’s governing clerical body.  In July the National Legislative Assembly amended the law to give the king full authority to unilaterally appoint or remove members from the Sangha Supreme Council irrespective of the monk’s rank and without consent or consultation with the supreme patriarch.

In June the Ministry of Education amended a 2008 regulation, which permitted students to dress in accordance with their religious belief, to stipulate that when attending schools located on Buddhist temple property, students must wear the uniform agreed to by the school and temple.   

The law requires religious education for all students at both the primary and secondary levels; students may not opt out.  The curriculum must contain information about all of the five recognized umbrella religious groups.  Students who wish to pursue in-depth studies of a particular religion may study at private religious schools and may transfer credits to public schools.  Individual schools, working in conjunction with their local administrative boards, are authorized to arrange additional religious studies courses.  There are two private Christian universities open to the public with religious curricula.  There are 10 Catholic grade schools whose curriculum and registration the Ministry of Education oversees.  The Sangha Supreme Council and the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand create special curricula for Buddhist and Islamic studies required in public schools, respectively.

The Central Islamic Council of Thailand, whose members are Muslims appointed by royal proclamation, advises the Ministries of Education and Interior on Islamic issues.  The government provides funding for Islamic educational institutions, the construction of mosques, and participation in the Hajj.  There are several hundred primary and secondary Islamic schools throughout the country.  There are four options for students to obtain Islamic education in the Deep South:  government-subsidized schools offering Islamic education with the national curriculum; private Islamic schools that may offer non-Quranic subjects such as foreign languages (Arabic and English) but whose curriculum may not be approved by the government; traditional pondoks, or private Islamic day schools, offering Islamic education according to their own curriculum to students of all ages; and tadika, an after-school religious course for children in grades one through six, often held in a mosque.

The Ministry of Justice allows the practice of sharia as a special legal process, outside the national civil code, for Muslim residents of the Deep South for family law, including inheritance.  Provincial courts apply this law, and a sharia expert advises the judge.  The law officially lays out the administrative structure of Muslim communities in the Deep South, including the process of appointing the chularajmontri, whom the king appoints as the state advisor on Islamic affairs.

The RAD sets a quota for the number of foreign missionaries permitted to register and operate in the country:  1,357 Christian, six Muslim, 20 Hindu, and 41 Sikh.  Registration confers some benefits, such as longer visa validity.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

Since religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents of violence due to the Malay Muslim insurgency as being solely based on religious identity.

According to the NGO Deep South Watch, insurgency-related violence from January to August resulted in at least 146 deaths – among them 128 Muslims and 18 Buddhists.  Deep South Watch also reported 196 persons were injured during that period – 91 Muslims and 105 Buddhists.  For all of 2017, Deep South Watch reported 187 Muslims, 64 Buddhists, and 12 unidentified persons were killed in the insurgency.  Local NGOs reported insurgents often considered teachers, along with their military escorts, as affiliated with the state and hence legitimate targets.  According to Deep South Watch, a Muslim teacher was killed, a Buddhist teacher was injured, and six Muslim students were injured as of August.

In September the Bangkok Criminal Court found nine Muslims from the Deep South guilty of belonging to an underground criminal group and conspiracy and sentenced each to four years’ imprisonment.  One was also found guilty of illegal possession of explosive devices and given an additional two years.  Their original sentences were halved because they confessed.  Five defendants were acquitted.  According to a human rights group, at least seven of the defendants said they were tortured in prison, including being beating and being doused with water and left in cold rooms before confessing, but the court found the accusations baseless and without evidence.  The cases arose from arrests in 2016 in connection with what authorities said was a plan for bombings in Bangkok.

There were reports authorities continued to use the emergency decree and martial law provisions in effect in the Deep South since 2005 and 2004, respectively, that give military, police, and civilian authorities significant powers to restrict certain basic rights, including pretrial detention and searches without warrant.  Authorities delegated certain internal security powers to the armed forces, often resulting in accusations of unfair treatment.

In August online newspaper Prachatai reported an unidentified unit arrested five Malay Muslims, two of whom were activists campaigning for peace in the Deep South.  The arrestees’ relatives were not informed of the charges, but authorities told them the five were arrested under “a special law.”

According to human rights groups, a portion of the country’s refugee and asylum seeker population was fleeing religious persecution elsewhere.  According to UNHCR, many of them lived in the country without legal permission to stay and as a result, as with the entire refugee and asylum seeker population, they faced the possibility of arrest, detention, and deportation regardless of whether they had registered with the agency.  During the year, immigration authorities reported conducting a series of raids targeting any person living illegally in the country.  As part of those operations, thousands were arrested, including some UNHCR-registered refugees and asylum seekers.  UNHCR reported that those detainees who were registered with them were released shortly after arrest.  The government said the raids did not target any specific religious group, and they arrested individuals with various religious affiliations.  Media coverage consistently highlighted that the arrests were part of the broader immigration crackdown and not motivated by religion.  The government and UNHCR stated the government did not deport any UNHCR-registered refugees or asylum seekers from these raids and allowed UNHCR access to these individuals.  In September the NGO International Christian Concern said more than 70 Pakistani Christians were confined to the Bangkok Immigration Center in what were described as “degrading, unclean, and overcrowded” conditions.  The same NGO said that on August 28, 181 mostly Christian Montegnards (or Degar) refugees from Vietnam were arrested and the adults were detained at the Bangkok facility, while more than 50 children were separated from their parents and sent to three shelters.

Human rights and migrant assistance groups reported difficulties among Muslim and South Asian migrants in obtaining legal status, especially after a new decree came into effect early in the year.  Muslim migrants from Burma, many of whom reportedly fled persecution, said they were unable to acquire the necessary documentation from Burma.  In April the Thai labor minister stated more than 250,000 migrants would have to leave the country.

Activists, including Human Rights Watch, expressed concerns about how the government might react to requests from China to extradite Chinese dissidents, including those associated with religious groups banned in China.  No members of banned religious groups were forcibly deported to China during the year.  Tourist police in March arrested seven Chinese nationals for distributing Falun Gong documents and fined them for overstaying their visas.

In what the government said was a move against corruption, in the spring it arrested six leading monks, including elderly monks on the Sangha Supreme Council, two senior abbots at Bangkok’s Golden Mount Temple, and Phra Buddha Issara, a monk who had previously urged the government to act against corrupt monks.  One press report described the act as an effort to assert the government’s authority over temples, while the prevailing view among close observers was that the arrests were politically motivated and designed to curry favor before the 2019 elections with voters who were concerned about reported corruption among monks.

In September police shut down a forum organized by foreign journalists to discuss whether senior military officers in Burma should face justice for alleged human rights abuses committed by their forces against Rohingya Muslims and other ethnic minorities.  According to press reports, approximately one dozen police arrived ahead of the scheduled panel discussion at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand and ordered the panelists not to speak.

Since 1984 the government has not recognized any new religious groups.  Despite the lack of formal legal recognition or registration, civil society groups continued to report unregistered religious groups operated freely, and the government’s practice of not recognizing or registering new religious groups did not restrict their activities.  Although registration provided some benefits, such as visas with longer validity, religious groups reported that being unregistered was not a significant barrier to foreign missionary activity, and many unregistered missionaries worked in the country without government interference.

On October 10, a group of monks petitioned the Election Commission to amend the laws restricting monks’ political rights.

In February a group of female Buddhist monks submitted a petition to the National Human Rights Commission to follow up on a February 2017 petition to amend the law to recognize female monks.  No action had been taken as of September.  The Sangha Supreme Council continued to prohibit women from becoming monks; women wishing to join the monkhood usually travelled to Sri Lanka to be ordained.  Of the 360,000 Buddhist clergy in the country, 229 were women.  Since a gender equality law exempts cases involving “compliance with religious principles,” female monks (bhikkhunis) were excluded from gender equality protection by the government.  Officials continued to neither formally oppose nor support female ordination.  Officials allowed bhikkhunis to practice and establish monasteries and temples.  Without official recognition, however, monasteries led by women continued to be ineligible for any of the government benefits received by other sanctioned Buddhist temples, primarily tax exemptions, free medical care, and subsidies for building construction and running social welfare programs.  Unlike male monks (bhikkhus), bhikkhunis received no special government protection from public verbal and physical attacks that sometimes involved male monks opposing the ordination of female monks.

In August the Sangha Supreme Council issued an order prohibiting the use of temple land for political activities or rallies, meetings, or seminars for purposes that violate the law or impact national security, social order, or public morals.  The order also reiterated the prohibition against monks and novices participating in political activity.

The Central Islamic Council in August issued a regulation setting 17 years as the minimum age for marriage.  According to the law, the minimum legal age for marriage, regardless of religion, is 17.  The regulation followed in the wake of the May marriage of a 41-year-old Malaysian man to an 11-year-old Thai girl in the Deep South.  The girl was returned to her family in August.

The only government-certified Islamic university in the Deep South, Fatoni University, continued to teach special curricula for Muslim students, including instruction in Thai, English, Arabic, and Bahasa Malayu; a mandatory peace studies course; and the integration of religious principles into most course offerings.  As of September 30, approximately 3,300 students and 480 academic personnel were affiliated with the school.

In January the governor of Narathiwat Province in the Deep South mandated the addition of monarchy studies – a course focused on Thai history and the relationship between Thai kings and their subjects – to the curriculum taught at pondoks.

In May the Education Ministry selected 13 committee members to develop Buddhist-only teaching for schools.  At present, more instruction time is dedicated to teaching Buddhism than other religions.

The June Ministry of Education amendment on students wearing the uniform agreed to by the school and temple was the result of a controversy that arose in May, when the director of a public school located on the grounds of a Buddhist temple in Pattani Province in the Deep South refused a request from a group of Muslim students’ parents to allow their children to wear a headscarf to school.  The school’s student body is 40 percent Muslim; however, the school dress code required students to wear a uniform, without accommodation for religious attire.  On October 29, the Songkhla Administrative Court, which had jurisdiction over Pattani Province, issued an injunction banning the school from penalizing students for wearing Islamic dress.

According to the association and faculty at a prominent university in the Deep South, scrutiny of Muslim professors and clerics continued to decline; however, the military continued to scrutinize Muslim teachers at private schools.

Duay Jai, a local human rights advocacy group in the Deep South, reported in February that a group of military officers went to a tadika in Pattani Province and demanded a list of students and photographs of teachers’ identity cards.  According to press reports, the government said the school committed financial fraud and funneled funds to a militant.  The school remained open as the investigation continued.  There were reports that security officials searched several Islamic schools on allegations of corruption and possible connection to insurgency funding.

Starting with the October 1, 2017-September 30, 2018 fiscal year, the government transferred the management of the approximately 410 million baht ($12.67 million) budget for non-Buddhist initiatives from the RAD to the Ministry of Interior (MOI).  Approximately 333 million baht ($10.29 million) of that allocation went to strategic planning for religious, art, and cultural development.  The budget included grants of approximately 18 million baht ($556,000) for the maintenance and restoration of non-Buddhist religious sites of the five officially recognized religious groups and 240,000 baht ($7,400) for the chularajmontri’s annual per diem.  The Muslim community reportedly said that it preferred the MOI to manage the budget as it was easier to navigate, and the MOI had more capacity to manage the budget.

The National Buddhism Bureau, funded separately from the RAD, received 4.9 billion baht ($151.47 million) in government funding, 1.9 billion baht ($58.73 million) of which went to empowerment and human capital development projects.  A total of 1.6 billion baht ($49.46 million) was allocated for personnel administration, 1.2 billion baht ($37.09 million) for education projects, including scripture and bookkeeping instruction for monks and novices, and 256 million baht ($7.91 million) for Deep South conflict resolution and development projects.

The government continued to recognize 39 elected Provincial Islamic Committees nationwide.  Their responsibilities included providing advice to provincial governors on Islamic issues; deciding on the establishment, relocation, merger, and dissolution of mosques; appointing persons to serve as imams; and issuing announcements and approvals of Islamic religious activities.  Committee members in the Deep South continued to report acting as advisers to government officials in dealing with the area’s ethnonationalist and religious tensions.

Religious groups continued to proselytize without reported interference.  Thai Buddhist monks working as missionaries were active, particularly in border areas among the country’s tribal populations, and received some public funding.  According to the National Buddhism Bureau, there were 5,426 Buddhist missionaries working nationwide.  Buddhist missionaries needed to pass training and educational programs at Maha Makut Buddhist University and Maha Chulalongkorn Rajavidyalaya University before receiving appointments as missionaries by the Sangha Supreme Council.  Per government regulations, no foreign monks were permitted to serve as Buddhist missionaries within the country.

During the year, there were 11 registered foreign missionary groups with visas operating in the country:  six Christian, one Muslim, two Hindu, and two Sikh groups.  There were 1,357 registered foreign Christian missionaries.  The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ), which is not an officially recognized Christian group, continued to exercise its special quota for 200 missionaries through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Security Council.  Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus had smaller numbers of missionaries in the country.  Many foreign missionaries entered the country using tourist visas and proselytized without the RAD’s authorization.  Non-Buddhist missionaries did not receive public funds or state subsidies.

Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom

Ethnic Malay insurgents continued to attack Buddhists and Muslims in the Deep South.  As in 2017, there were no reports of Muslims advocating violence against Buddhists.  According to human rights and civil society groups, more than a decade of continuing violence had decreased interaction between the Muslim and Buddhist communities.  The Duay Jai Group reported the prohibition on Islamic dress in certain schools, which was later overturned, further distanced the two populations. Some press reports indicated a rise in anti-Muslim sentiment in the country.  Deutsche Welle, a German news site, reported that Buddhists in Thailand and other places saw Buddhism under threat, and “fear ‘Islam and Muslims are trying to take over their country.’”  Both Buddhist and Muslim religious leaders, however, stated the majority of their communities continued to advocate for interfaith dialogue and cultural understanding.  As evidence, local media reported on a regional survey on extremism conducted by the Malaysia-based Merdeka Center for Opinion Research that found while respondents in nearby countries revealed high rates of intolerance toward persons of other faiths, Muslims and Buddhists in Thailand expressed favorable views of one another.

According to news reports, on August 1, a gunman shot and killed an Islamic teacher, Adul Sima, as he left prayers in a mosque in Pattani’s Mai Kaen District.  Authorities stated they believed his killing was related to the insurgency.

The Duay Jai Group, Look Rieng Group, Deep South Student Council, and Buddhist Network for Peace issued statements denouncing an August 11 shooting that killed a Buddhist mother and her 13-year-old daughter riding a motorcycle to a market in Narathiwat Province.  A Muslim man was arrested and confessed to the shooting.  Human Rights Watch and the Buddhist Network for Peace also issued statements condemning a series of landmine attacks in June and July targeting Buddhist farmers in Yala Province.

Buddhist activists continued to campaign to designate Buddhism as the country’s official religion.  In June a Buddhist movement in Bungkan Province staged a campaign to name Buddhism as the province’s official religion and to designate the province the Buddhism capital of Thailand.

In February the Election Commission and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Thailand signed a cooperation agreement to educate, train, empower, and develop the capacity of Catholic communities, networks, schools, and students on democracy-related issues.

Vietnam

Section I. Religious Demography

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 97 million (July 2018 estimate).  According to statistics released by the Government Committee for Religious Affairs (CRA), 26.4 percent of the population is categorized as religious believers:  14.91 percent is Buddhist, 7.35 percent Roman Catholic, 1.09 percent Protestant, 1.16 percent Cao Dai, and 1.47 percent Hoa Hao Buddhist.  Within the Buddhist community, Mahayana Buddhism is the dominant affiliation of the Kinh (Viet) ethnic majority, while approximately 1.2 percent of the total population, almost all from the ethnic minority Khmer group, practices Theravada Buddhism.  Smaller religious groups that combined constitute less than 0.16 percent of the population include a devotional form of Hinduism, mostly practiced by an estimated 70,000 ethnic Cham in the south-central coastal area; approximately 80,000 Muslims scattered throughout the country (approximately 40 percent are Sunnis; the remaining 60 percent practice Bani Islam); an estimated 3,000 members of the Baha’i Faith; and approximately 1,000 members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ).  Religious groups originating within the country (Buu Son Ky Huong, Tu An Hieu Nghia, Minh Su Dao, Minh Ly Dao, Tinh Do Cu Si Phat Hoi, Phat Giao Hieu Nghia Ta Lon) comprise a total of 0.34 percent.  A small, mostly foreign, Jewish population resides in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

Other citizens say they have no religious affiliation, or practice animism or the veneration of ancestors, tutelary and protective saints, national heroes, or local, respected persons.  Many individuals blend traditional practices with religious teachings, particularly Buddhism and Christianity.

Ethnic minorities constitute approximately 14 percent of the population.  Based on adherents’ estimates, two-thirds of Protestants are members of ethnic minorities, including groups in the Northwest Highlands (H’mong, Dzao, Thai, and others) and in the Central Highlands (Ede, Jarai, Sedang, and M’nong, among others, including groups referred to as Montagnards).  The Khmer Krom ethnic group overwhelmingly practices Theravada Buddhism.

Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom

Legal Framework

The constitution states that all individuals have the right to freedom of belief and religion, including the freedom to follow no religion.  The constitution acknowledges the right to freedom of religion or belief of those whose rights are limited, including inmates or any foreigners and stateless persons.  The constitution states all religions are equal before the law and the state must respect and protect freedom of belief and religion.  The constitution prohibits citizens from violating the freedom of belief and religion or taking advantage of a belief or religion in order to violate the law.

The Law on Belief and Religion and implementing Decree 162, which came into effect on January 1, serve as the primary documents governing religious groups and their activities.  At year’s end, a decree prescribing penalties for noncompliance with the new law had yet to be finalized.  The law reiterates citizens’ rights to freedom of belief and religion and that individuals may not use the right of belief and religious freedom to undermine peace, national independence, and unification; incite violence or propagate wars; proselytize in contravention of the state’s laws and policies; divide people, nationalities, or religions; cause public disorder; infringe upon the life, health, dignity, honor and/or property of others; impede the exercise of civic rights and performance of civic obligations; or conduct superstitious activities or otherwise violate the law.

The government recognizes 38 religious organizations and one dharma practice (a set of spiritual practices) that affiliate with 15 distinct religious traditions as defined by the government.  The 15 religious traditions are:  Buddhism, Islam, Baha’i, Catholicism, Protestantism, Church of Jesus Christ, Hoa Hao Buddhism, Cao Dai, Buu Son Ky Huong, Tinh Do Cu Si Phat Hoi, Tu An Hieu Nghia, Phat Duong Nam Tong Minh Su Dao, Minh Ly Dao Tam Tong Mieu, Khmer Brahmanism, and Hieu Nghia Ta Lon Buddhism.  Distinct denominations within these religious traditions must seek their own registration and/or recognition.  Three additional groups – the Assemblies of God, Ta Lon Dutiful and Loyal Buddhism, and Vietnam Full Gospel Church – have “registration for religious operation” but are not recognized as official organizations.

The law provides for government control over religious practices and permits restrictions on religious freedom in the interest of “national security” and “social unity.”

The new law reduced the waiting period for a religious group, and its affiliate group or groups, to obtain recognition from 23 years to five years and for the first time specifies that recognized religious organizations and their affiliates are noncommercial legal entities.  The law also specifies that religious organizations be allowed to conduct educational, health, social protection, charitable, and humanitarian activities in accordance with the relevant laws, but it does not specify which law prevails in instances in which the law may contradict other laws, or where other laws do not have clear provisions, such as the Law on Education.

The CRA is responsible for implementing religious laws and decrees, and it maintains offices at the central, provincial, and, in some areas, district level.  The law lays out specific responsibilities for central-, provincial-, and local-level CRA offices and delegates certain religion-related management tasks to provincial- and local-level people’s committees (i.e., local leaders).  The central-level CRA is charged with disseminating information to authorities and assuring uniform compliance with the legal framework on religion at the provincial, district, commune, and village levels.

By law, forcing others to follow or renounce a religion or belief is prohibited.

The law requires “religious practices” to register with communal authorities where the “lawful premises for the religious practice is based” and prescribes two stages of institutionalization for religious organizations seeking to gather at a specified location to “practice worship rituals, pray, or express their religious faith.”  The first stage is “registration for religious operation” with the provincial- or national-level CRA, depending on the geographic extent of the group’s activities.  A registration for religious operation allows the group to organize religious ceremonies and religious practice; preach and conduct religious classes at approved locations; elect, appoint, or designate functionaries; repair or renovate the headquarters; engage in charitable or humanitarian activities; and organize congresses to approve its charter.  To obtain this registration, the group must submit a detailed application package with information about its doctrine, history, bylaws, leaders, and members and proof it has a legal meeting location.  The relevant provincial CRA office or the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), depending on whether the group in question is operating in one or more provinces, is responsible for approving a valid application for registration within 60 days of receipt.  The relevant provincial CRA office or the MHA is required to provide any rejection in writing.

The second stage of institutionalization is recognition.  A religious group may apply for recognition after it has operated continuously for at least five years since the date of receiving the “registration for religious operation.”  The religious group is required to have a legal charter and bylaws, leaders in good standing without criminal records, and to have managed assets and conducted transactions autonomously.  To obtain such recognition, the group must submit a detailed application package to the provincial or national level CRA, depending on the geographic extent of the organization.  The application dossier must include a written request specifying the group’s structure, membership, geographical scope of operation and headquarters location; summary of history, dogmas, canon laws and rites; list and resumes, judicial records, and summary of religious activities of the organization’s representative and tentative leaders; charter; declaration of the organization’s lawful assets; and proof of lawful premises to serve as a headquarters.  The relevant provincial people’s committee or the MHA is responsible for approving a valid application for recognition within 60 days of receipt.  The relevant provincial people’s committee or MHA is required to provide any rejection in writing.  Recognition allows the religious group to conduct religious activities in accordance with the religious organization’s charter; organize religious practice; publish religious texts, books, and other publications; produce, export, and import religious cultural products and religious articles; renovate, upgrade, or construct new religious establishments; and receive lawful donations from domestic and foreign sources, among other rights.

The law states that religious organizations and their affiliates, clergy, and believers have the right to file complaints or civil and administrative lawsuits, or make formal complaints about government officials or agencies (denunciations) under the relevant laws and decrees.  The law also states that organizations and individuals have the right to bring civil lawsuits in court regarding the actions of religious groups or believers.  There were no specific analogous provisions in the previous laws.

The law provides a separate process for unregistered, unrecognized religious organizations or groups of individuals to receive permission for specific religious activities by submitting an application package to the commune-level people’s committee.  Current regulations require the people’s committee to respond in writing to such an application within 20 working days of receipt.  The law specifies that a wide variety of religious activities require advance approval or registration from the authorities at the central and/or local levels.  These activities include “belief activities” (defined as traditional communal practices related to ancestor, hero, or folk worship); “belief festivals” being held for the first time; the establishment, split, or merger of religious affiliates; the ordination, appointment, or assignment of religious administrators (or clergy with administrative authority); establishment of a religious training facility; conducting religious training classes; holding major religious congresses; organizing religious events, preaching or evangelizing outside of approved locations; traveling abroad to conduct religious activities or training; and joining a foreign religious organization.

Certain religious activities do not require advance approval, but instead require notification to the appropriate authorities.  Activities requiring notification include recurring or periodic “belief festivals”; dismissal of clergy; conducting fundraising activities; notification of enrollment figures at a seminary or religious school; the repair or renovation of religious facilities not considered cultural-historical relics; ordination, appointment, or assignment of religious clergy (such as monks); transfers or dismissals of religious administrators (or clergy with administrative authority); conducting operations at an approved religious training facility; routine religious activities (defined as “religious preaching, practicing religious tenets and rites, and management of a religious organization”); and internal conferences of a religious organization.

The law provides prisoners access to religious materials, with conditions, while in detention.  It reserves authority for the government to restrict the “assurance” of that right.  Decree 162 states detainees may use religious documents that are legally published and circulated, in line with legal provisions on custody, detention, prison, or other types of confinement.  This use and/or practice must not affect rights to belief/religion or nonbelief/religion of others or go against relevant laws.  The decree states the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs shall be responsible for providing guidelines on the management of religious documents, and the time and venue for the use of these documents.

The law specifies that religious organizations must follow numerous other laws for certain activities.  Religious organizations are allowed to conduct educational, health, charitable, and humanitarian activities in accordance with the relevant laws, but the law does not provide clarification as to which activities are permitted.  In addition, construction or renovation of religious facilities must be undertaken in accordance with relevant laws and regulations on construction and foreigners participating in religious activities must abide by immigration law.

The law states that publishing, producing, exporting, or importing religious texts must be in accordance with laws and regulations related to publishing.  Publishing legislation requires all publishers be licensed public entities or state-owned enterprises.  Publishers must receive prior government approval to publish all documents, including religious texts.  By decree, only the Religious Publishing House may publish religious books.  Any bookstore may sell legally published religious texts and other religious materials.

The constitution states the government owns and manages all land on behalf of the people.  According to the law, land use by religious organizations must conform to the land law and its related decrees.  The land law recognizes that licensed religious institutions and schools may acquire land-use rights and be allocated or leased land.  The law specifies religious institutions are eligible for state compensation if their land is seized under eminent domain.  The law allows provincial-level people’s committees to seize land via eminent domain in order to facilitate the construction of religious facilities.

Under the law, provincial-level people’s committees may grant land-use certificates for a “long and stable term” to religious institutions if they have permission to operate, the land is dispute-free, and the land was not acquired via transfer or donation after July 1, 2004.  Religious institutions are not permitted to exchange, transfer, lease, donate, or mortgage their land-use rights.  In land disputes involving a religious institution, the chairperson of the provincial-level people’s committee has authority to settle disputes.  Those who disagree with the chairperson’s decision may appeal to the minister of natural resources and environment or file a lawsuit in court.

In practice, if a religious organization has not obtained recognition, members of the congregation may acquire a land-use title individually, but not corporately as a religious establishment.

The renovation or upgrade of facilities owned by religious groups also requires notification to authorities, although it does not necessarily require a permit, depending on the extent of the renovation.

The government does not permit religious instruction in public and private schools.  Private schools are required to follow a government-approved curriculum, which does not allow for religious instruction.  The government does not permit religious groups to run private schools; however, some religious groups, such as Catholics and Buddhists, run kindergartens, and some Christian churches have seminaries.

The law no longer requires individuals to specify their religious affiliation on national identification cards.

There are separate provisions of the law for foreigners legally residing in the country to request permission to conduct religious activities, teach, attend local religious training, or preach in local religious institutions.  The law requires religious organizations or citizens to receive government permission in advance of hosting or conducting any religious activities involving foreign organizations, foreign individuals, or travel abroad.  Current regulations also contain requirements for foreigners conducting religious activities within the country, including those involved in religious training, ordination, and leadership, to seek permission for their activities.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Government Practices

On February 9, a court in An Giang Province sentenced six independent Hoa Hao Buddhists – Bui Van Trung, Bui Van Tham, Nguyen Hoang Nam, Le Thi Hong Hanh, Le Thi Hen, and Bui Thi Bich Tuyen – to two to six years in prison on charges of “resisting persons in the performance of their official duties.”  Bui Van Trung was additionally charged with “causing public disorder.”  Le Thi Hen’s sentence was later suspended due to health concerns, and authorities had not yet forced Bui Thi Bich Tuyen to report to prison.  According to the indictment by the People’s Procuracy of An Phu District in November 2017, the defendants “disturbed the public order and impacted the safety and order of the traffic, causing a traffic jam on national route 91C by hindering, obstructing, pushing, and screaming to provoke and denounce transportation police.”  According to Radio Free Asia, the basis of the charges against Trung was that in April 2017 family members and friends attempted to hold an unregistered death anniversary commemoration in Trung’s home prayer hall.

On April 5, a court in Hanoi sentenced independent Hoa Hao follower and religious freedom and human rights activist Nguyen Bac Truyen and Protestant Pastor Nguyen Trung Ton to 11 years and 12 years in prison, respectively, for “carrying out activities aimed at overthrowing the administration.”  Both had been associated with a group called the Brotherhood for Democracy and were tried with several other prominent human rights activists.  Truyen ran the Vietnamese Political and Religious Prisoners Friendship Association and, among other activities, advocated for the rights of independent and unregistered Hoa Hao followers.  Ton was a long-time advocate for human rights and religious freedom.  He had been a member of Interfaith Council in Ho Chi Minh City, a group composed predominately of representatives of unregistered religions.

The family members of Ma Seo Sung, a H’mong Protestant man who died in police custody in 2017, were forced by local authorities to leave their homes during the year after repeated harassment, including threats of arrest, from local authorities in Buon Ma Thuot, Dak Lak Province, after they publicized details of Ma Seo Sung’s death, according to individuals close to the family.  The family said commune police arrested Ma Seo Sung in 2017 under suspicion of “searching for a new Christian homeland.”

On April 12, a court in Thai Nguyen Province sentenced four Falun Gong practitioners to a total of nine years’ imprisonment for theft.  According to independent media, local authorities confiscated their assets (including drums, loudspeakers, and drumsticks) when they practiced spiritual exercises in a park.  Subsequently, the four practitioners reportedly came to the authorities’ office and took back their assets without consent.

Many independent and unsanctioned religious leaders who participated in the 2018 Southeast Asia Freedom of Religion or Belief Conference in Thailand reported they faced harassment upon their return to Vietnam, including Chang A Do, a local leader and member of the Evangelical Church of Vietnam who was harassed and threatened with arrest in October by Communist Party representatives from the central and local governments, and by police and plainclothes individuals in Doan Ket Village, Dak Ngo Commune, Tuy Duc District, Dak Nong Province, according to a nongovernmental organization (NGO).  Government officials also prevented several from leaving the country to attend the event.

On October 3 and 4, commune and district police in Krong Pac District, Dak Lak Province, convened a public denunciation of Ksor Sun, Pastor Y Nuen Ayun, and Y Jon Ayun, all members of the Evangelical Church of Christ, according to an NGO.  Police accused the individuals of going against the government and the Communist Party of Vietnam.  Police reportedly said these individuals should be sentenced to up to 20 years in prison, and if they wanted to remain in the community, they must leave the Church of Christ.

In June staff working for the warden of Gia Trung Prison, Mang Yang District, Gia Lai Province, beat Pastor A Dao of the Evangelical Church of Christ, who advocated for religious freedom for his fellow church members in the Central Highlands, according to an NGO report.

Members of various ethnic minority groups in the Central Highlands collectively known as Montagnards stated government officials continued to assault, monitor, interrogate, arbitrarily arrest, and discriminate against them, in part because of their religious practices.  Officials stated that “Degar” Christians incited violent separatism by ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands from 2001 through 2008.  State-run media published articles cautioning individuals that Degar Protestantism aimed to undertake antigovernment activities.

In some cases, Montagnards stated ongoing social and religious persecution drove them to flee to Cambodia and Thailand, where some sought asylum.  Several such asylum seekers in Thailand reported local-level (communal) Vietnamese authorities continued to harass them remotely, through social media and by harassing, intimidating, and in some cases threatening and physically assaulting family members back home.

In Song Ngoc Catholic parish, Vinh Diocese, Nghe An Province, there were multiple incidents of plainclothes individuals harassing parishioners and priests, assaulting parishioners, and damaging church property and the property of parishioners, according to Catholic representatives and NGOs.

In April plainclothes individuals assaulted parishioners of Dong Kieu parish at Dien My Commune, Nghe An Province, according to Catholic representatives and NGOs.

On December 25, police from Nan San Commune, Si Ma Cai District, Lao Cai Province in the Northwest Highlands, reportedly stopped a Christmas celebration of the H’mong Gospel Missionary Church and assaulted adherent Hang Seo Pao for holding an unsanctioned gathering.  Church members said they had applied to local authorities for permission to hold the gathering but were denied.

Throughout the year, local authorities in Trung Lap Ha Commune, Cu Chi District, Ho Chi Minh City, told members of the UBCV Lien Tri home pagoda to stop praying and to remove all banners and UBCV Buddhist flags.  The authorities said persons attending the ceremony could continue to gather but could not give offerings, pray, or administer rituals, as their location was unregistered.  According to one adherent, in August and September plainclothes police surveilled the pagoda and prevented monks from leaving.

A senior pastor of an unregistered Protestant church reported that local authorities did not allow his organization to organize summer camps for children in the Central Highlands and Northern Highlands and asked some members not to worship in Quang Ngai, Ninh Thuan, Dak Lak, and Dak Nong Provinces.

Members of the military were not permitted to read the Bible or practice religious rites at any time while on active duty; they had to take personal leave to conduct such activities, religious freedom experts reported.  The Association for the Protection of Freedom of Religion reportedly sent a petition to the government in 2015 requesting soldiers be allowed to attend church while on duty; however, the association still had yet to receive a response.  There were no clear regulations for religious expression in the military, with individual unit commanders having significant discretion, experts reported.

Authorities continued to deny some prisoners and detainees the right to religious practice.  Officers at the Nam Ha detention facility, Phu Ly District, Ha Nam Province, continued to refuse to allow a priest to visit Catholic prisoner Ho Duc Hoa, according to Hoa’s family.  Prison authorities stated this was due to the lack of appropriate facilities inside the prison for the priest to perform services.  Other prisoners continued to report they were allowed to read the Bible or other religious materials and practice their beliefs while incarcerated.  According to an NGO, independent Hoa Hao adherent Bui Van Trung was able to have a censored version of the Hoa Hao scripture in prison.

Registered Protestant, Buddhist, and Cao Dai leaders reportedly did not face the same difficulties as independent or unregistered Protestant, Buddhist, and Cao Dai leaders.  Media carried reports of registered religious groups celebrating festivals without impediment.

On December 18, Joseph Vu Van Thien was installed as the new Archbishop of Hanoi at a ceremony attended by Catholic leaders from Vietnam and the Vatican and by members of the diplomatic corps.  The prime minister also received a high-level Vatican delegation on December 18.

On September 24, local and central authorities permitted a Cao Dai festival commemorating the Holy Goddess Mother to be held at the Cao Dai Holy See.  The festival drew the participation of hundreds of thousands of adherents and pilgrims, including foreign religious representatives, foreign diplomats, and international academia.  Senior officials of Tay Ninh Province and the CRA also attended the festival.

The government stated it continued to monitor the activities of certain religious groups because of their political activism and invoked national security and solidarity provisions in the constitution and penal code to override laws and regulations providing for religious freedom.  For example, the government impeded some religious gatherings and blocked attempts by religious groups to proselytize certain ethnic groups in border regions deemed sensitive, including the Central Highlands, Northwest Highlands, and certain Mekong Delta provinces.

Government treatment of foreigners seeking to worship or proselytize varied in practice from locality to locality.  Foreigners were generally able to meet and conduct services.  Municipal officials allowed multiple foreign religious congregations to meet.  Some foreign religious congregations said they could conduct charitable activities with tacit, but not official, permission.

State-run media and progovernment websites sometimes equated particular Christian denominations and other religious groups with separatist movements, blaming them for political, economic, and social problems, particularly in remote areas in the Northwest and Central Highlands where there was a high concentration of ethnic minorities.  Progovernment websites repeatedly accused these groups of being “cover” for or “tools” of “hostile forces to act against the state,” “disrupt the great solidarity” or “destroy the [Vietnamese] culture” and warned the public not to be “fooled.”  Many progovernment websites and blogs criticized various religious groups and believers who were critical of the authorities or engaged in any activities that the authorities deemed sensitive, including protests against China, the cybersecurity law, land confiscation, or various social and economic issues.  Groups attracting the most vociferous criticism on these sites included priests and Catholics in the central part of the country, particularly in Nghe An Province, Falun Gong practitioners, and Protestants in the Central Highlands.

Catholic priests in the central part of the country continued to help organize a series of demonstrations calling for stronger environmental protection.  Many Catholic churches in these provinces held demonstrations in June to protest draft laws on special administrative economic zones and a new restrictive cybersecurity law.  Priests continued to assist parishioners in filing complaints and lawsuits against the government for financial compensation for losses suffered in the aftermath of a 2016 industrial disaster in the region.  State-run media and progovernment blogs continued to publish material defaming priests who assisted activists and victims of the 2016 Formosa incident in which a steel mill discharged toxic waste into the sea, leading to a massive fish kill in the central part of the country.  Priests who helped victims were reportedly pressured by authorities to leave their parishes.  In February the Bishop of Vinh Diocese transferred Father Dang Huu Nam, who had served in Phu Yen Parish near the steel mill for three years.  State-run media quoted the bishop as saying he was not pressured to make this decision.

Progovernment blogs published multiple articles criticizing Catholic priests and parishioners who were vocal in their opposition to the government on a variety of issues, including a cybersecurity law that human rights groups and others said could lead to violations of freedom of expression and other human rights, accusing them of receiving money from and “colluding with hostile forces with the purpose of inciting public disorder and acting against the Communist Party and State.”

In August police and local authorities in Hue surrounded the local UBCV temple and reportedly harassed, intimidated, and intercepted members of the Buddhist Youth Movement as they organized the movement’s annual summer camp.

Multiple Buddhist clergy of the recognized Vietnam Buddhist Sangha who supported land rights activists or were outspoken about suspected corruption within the organization reported local authorities continued to harass them and members of their pagodas, including in Bac Giang Province and in Hanoi.  They said harassment included intimidation of monks and nuns, expulsion by force of clergy from their buildings, suspected plainclothes police breaking into religious buildings, the destruction of pagoda property, and theft of cash donations from villagers.  Central government authorities agreed to allow at least one of these individuals, a Sangha nun, to return to her pagoda if she ceased petitioning the government.

In November UBCV Supreme Patriarch Thich Quang Do stated he left the government-sanctioned Thanh Minh Monastery in Phu Nhuan District, Ho Chi Minh City, of his own accord to travel to his home province to bless a pagoda for his family.  Do subsequently returned to Ho Chi Minh City and took up residence in the UBCV-affiliated Tu Hieu Pagoda, the first time he had been able to live in a UBCV pagoda since 1998.  Earlier reports, primarily on social media, said Do’s superior monk, Thich Thanh Minh, had been pressured by authorities and asked Do to leave because his presence caused political and economic problems for the monastery.

Other UBCV leaders stated the government continued to monitor their activities and restrict their movements, although they were able to meet with some foreign diplomats, visit other UBCV members, and maintain contact with associates overseas.  General Secretary Le Cong Cau of the UBCV reported local police closely watched him and prevented him from traveling outside Hue.

Throughout the year, Falun Gong practitioners reported harassment by authorities in numerous provinces and cities, including Cao Bang, Lang Son, Son La, Nghe An, Hue, Lam Dong, Dong Thap, Ca Mau, Ho Chi Minh City, Nha Trang, Quang Ngai, Hue, and Hanoi.  Harassment included local authorities asking them to leave the parks where practitioners had gathered and other public spaces, where individuals were blaring loud music and throwing items such as fermented fish sauce on practitioners.

State media reported authorities at different levels in the Northwest Highlands, including Cao Bang, Tuyen Quang, Bac Can, and Thai Nguyen Provinces, continued to state the Duong Van Minh religious group was a threat to national security, political stability, and social order.  Authorities said eliminating membership in the group was a priority.  During the year, authorities in Cao Bang, Tuyen Quang, and Bac Can collectively reportedly destroyed 38 structures used to store funerary objects used by the Duong Van Minh group and burned the funerary objects inside.  Authorities in these provinces and Thai Nguyen also reportedly encouraged schoolchildren not to follow the Duong Van Minh religion.

Throughout the year, there were numerous reports of harassment of H’mong Protestants in the Northwest and Central Highlands.  Local officials in several provinces in the Central Highlands, including Doan Ket Village, Dak Ngo Commune, Tuy Duc District, Dak Nong Province, denied household registration, which is necessary for all Vietnamese citizens, to approximately 700 H’mong Christian individuals who had migrated there in recent years, according to an NGO and H’mong Protestant sources.  As a result, many of their children were unable to go to school.

Some registered and unregistered Protestant groups continued to report local authorities, particularly in the Central Highlands, pressured newer congregations to affiliate with older, well-established congregations.  Pastors said this practice was widespread in ethnic minority villages in Gia Lai and Kon Tum Provinces.  Authorities reportedly also pressured smaller Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam (SECV) congregations, some with as many as 100 followers, to combine into larger groups of up to 1,500 in order to be registered.  Church leaders again stated such requests were unreasonable, saying many of the congregations were composed of a variety of ethnic minority groups with different languages and incongruent worship practices.  Mountainous terrain and lack of infrastructure in the rural highlands prevented other SECV churches from sustaining the required minimum number of followers necessary to qualify for local registration.

Religious leaders expressed mixed views on the new Law on Belief and Religion.  Some religious groups and experts continued to state the new law was a step forward in certain areas for religious freedom, including the reduced registration/recognition time and granting legal personality to religious groups.  Some religious groups and experts expressed concern that a more precise legal approach and registration process could make the operations of religious groups – including registration of meeting points and clergy, expansion, and proselytization – more difficult.  Religious leaders and experts continued to emphasize that the two implementing decrees, one still in draft form, and actual implementation of the law, particularly at the local level, would be critical, and expressed frustration at the uneven implementation to date.

The government organized multiple conferences and training sessions on the new law throughout the year at the local, provincial, and national levels, including a public presentation in May for Hanoi-based diplomats and government implementers.  Religious leaders in remote areas of An Giang Province stated they had received training on the new law and that it had been translated into local languages.  Religious leaders continued to note existing laws and regulations on education, health, publishing, and construction were restrictive toward religious groups and would need to be revised to allow religious groups greater freedom to conduct such activities in practice.

Religious leaders and academics said the new law continued to enshrine in the country’s legal framework significant restrictions and bureaucratic controls over religious activity.  Many religious leaders expressed concern the law continued to give significant discretion to the government regarding approving or denying various types of applications.  Some observers continued to say the new law was not in place to protect religious freedom but rather to serve and cater to the rules of the Communist Party.  Groups also stated the law should allow religious organizations to conduct activities without the need for government approvals.

Registered and unregistered religious groups continued to state government agencies sometimes did not respond to registration applications or approval requests for religious activities within the stipulated time period, if at all, and often did not specify reasons for refusals.  Some groups reported they successfully appealed local decisions to higher-level authorities through informal channels.  Several religious leaders reported authorities sometimes asked for bribes to facilitate approvals.  Authorities attributed the delays and denials to the failure of applicants to complete forms correctly or provide complete information.  Religious groups said the process to register groups or notify activities in new locations was particularly difficult.

Churches affiliated with the ECVN had difficulty registering with local authorities in Quang Binh, Bac Giang, Bac Ninh, and Hoa Binh Provinces.  The ECVN stated that more than 1,000 affiliates and a total of 500 of its meeting points were recognized, although there were many more it wished to register.  Church leaders said that local authorities permitted individuals to gather without incident at unregistered meeting points in numerous provinces.  Numbers were not available for the south.

Local authorities continued to cite general security concerns, such as political destabilization or potential conflict between followers of established ethnic or traditional religious beliefs and newly introduced Christian beliefs, as reasons to deny approval.

According to many Catholic bishops, parishes in remote areas or with majority ethnic minority populations continued to face difficulty registering with provincial authorities, uneven and inconsistent enforcement of national laws, and a lack of accountability on the part of provincial authorities.  Catholic leaders again stated the most problematic regions were in the Central Highlands (Gia Lai, Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Kon Tum, and Lam Dong Provinces), and the Northwest Highlands, including Hoa Binh, Son La, Dien Bien, Lai Chau, Lao Cai, and Yen Bai.

Hoa Binh authorities continued to deny Luong Son parish’s application to become a parish-affiliate of Hoa Binh Diocese and did not respond to a similar request from Vu Ban parish, Catholic representatives reported.  Authorities said the Long Son application was not complete and Vu Ban was a new parish, which the Church continued to dispute, according to Catholic authorities.

Some Buddhist, Protestant, and Cao Dai groups chose not to affiliate with any government-recognized or government-registered religious organizations, nor did they seek their own registration or recognition.  Unregistered Buddhist, Cao Dai, and Christian religious groups, including members of the Interfaith Council, continued to regularly report some provincial authorities used local registration laws as a pretext to pressure, intimidate, threaten, extort, harass, and assault them, and discouraged their members’ participation in the groups.

On November 9, plainclothes police in Lam Dong reportedly set fire to a storage room at the coffee plantation of Hua Phi, an unregistered Cao Dai master, the day after he met with foreign diplomats in Ho Chi Minh City.  The storage room was completely destroyed, but no casualties were reported.

On September 11, the CRA granted a “certificate of registration for religious activities” to Vietnam Full Gospel Denomination at a ceremony in Ho Chi Minh City.  On December 14, the CRA granted a “certificate of registration for religious activities” to the Vietnam United Gospel Outreach Church, also in Ho Chi Minh City.

The ECVN and the unregistered Vietnam Baptist Convention both reported increased difficulty gathering in well-established meeting points during the year, including in Bac Giang and Thanh Hoa Provinces.  In their rejections of applications and disruptions of religious services, local authorities noted that they viewed prior gatherings as illegal and explained the meeting points had not fulfilled requirements for organizing and conducting religious gatherings.  For example, they had “no legal representatives who coordinate with the authorities in exercising the state management of religious activities in line with the law” or failed “to meet order and safety requirements.”

Throughout the year, independent Hoa Hao followers and activists reported local authorities, police, and suspected plainclothes police in several provinces, including An Giang, Vinh Long, and Dong Thap, and in Can Tho City established checkpoints to monitor and prevent them from travelling to the unregistered Quang Minh Pagoda, to participate in a major religious commemoration.  Local authorities reportedly said the government would not allow Hoa Hao followers to commemorate anniversaries related to the life of Prophet Huynh Phu So.

On April 18, public security officials in Ko M’Leo Hamlet, Hoa Thang Commune, Buon Ma Thuot City, Dak Lak Province, came to a house church of the unregistered Evangelical Church of Christ, interrogated adherents about their religious activities, and told them not to worship in a group or teach the Bible because the church was not registered, according to an NGO.  On April 27, public security officials in Ea Yong A Hamlet, Ea Yong Commune, Krong Pac District, Dak Lak Province, reportedly “invited” a churchgoer to the ward official’s office for interrogation on his religious activities and the unregistered Evangelical Church of Christ.  The officials forbade him to worship at home, attend services of the Evangelical Church of Christ, or attend other unregistered Protestant churches.  During May and June public security officials in Tot Bioch Village, Chu Se Town, Gia Lai Province, and in Buon Ho Town, Dak Lak Province, monitored suspected evangelical Christians, interrogated them about their religious activities, and told them to recant their faith, according to an NGO.

Leaders and members of unregistered congregations reported police harassment, such as being detained for questioning, undergoing increased surveillance, and having their cell phones and Bibles confiscated.  There were reports of severe harassment in Dak Lak, Kon Tum, Gia Lai, Binh Phuoc, Tra Vinh, and Phu Yen Provinces, among others.

In Muong Khuong District, Lao Cai Province, local authorities continued to prevent Catholic priests from conducting services in certain areas.  A priest stated that authorities targeted him and his parishioners on July 31 after they visited parishioners in Cao Son and La Pan Tan Village at unregistered meeting points.  Before the visit, the priest said he filed a registration request with the local authorities but received no response.

Although the law prohibits publishing of all materials, including religious materials, without government approval, in practice some private, unlicensed publishing houses continued to unofficially print and distribute religious texts without active government interference.  Other licensed publishers printed books on religion.  Publishers had permission to print the Bible in Vietnamese and a number of other languages, including Chinese, Ede, Jarai, Banar, M’nong, H’mong, C’ho, and English.  Other published texts included, but were not limited to, works pertaining to ancestor worship, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and Cao Dai.

On March 2, authorities permitted a showing of the film “Walk With Me,” a documentary on the doctrine of Zen Buddhism master Thich Nhat Hanh.  The film was reportedly shown in more than 60 theaters throughout the country.

Some Protestant church leaders, Montagnards, and followers of Duong Van Minh stated that local authorities seized their land or property partly due to their religious beliefs or that they received less compensation for seized land than others not affiliated with these groups.  Provincial authorities routinely dispersed religious gatherings and directed officials to organize public renunciations of Degar Christianity or other “unauthorized Christian beliefs” among ethnic minority communities.

In July 2017, the Thua-Thien Hue Provincial People’s Committee met representatives of the Thien An Monastery and Catholic Archdiocese of Hue to try to resolve a nearly 20-year-old land dispute related to the Thien An Monastery.  At the end of the year, the dispute remained unresolved; both sides stated they welcomed the opportunity for dialogue.

During the year, Venerable Thich Khong Tanh and monks from the Lien Tri Pagoda, which district authorities in Ho Chi Minh City demolished in 2016, were still living at dispersed locations throughout the city.  Tanh reported local authorities refused to offer any site to rebuild the pagoda other than the one previously offered in the Cat Lai area of Ho Chi Minh City, which Tanh said he found inappropriate.

On November 9 in Da Nang City, Son Tra District authorities in Da Nang City demolished the unregistered An Cu house pagoda, affiliated with the UBCV, after three years of land-use negotiations failed.

Relocation discussions between authorities and leaders of the Dong Men Thanh Gia (Lovers of the Holy Cross) Thu Thiem Catholic Convent and Thu Thiem Catholic Church continued at year’s end.

On September 19, the Ho Chi Minh City Department of Natural Resources and Environment announced the city had granted land-use certificates to more than 800 religious entities consisting of a total area of more than 200 hectares (500 acres).  The city reportedly aimed to issue land-use certificates to all local religious groups by the end of 2019.  Local authorities granted the Kon Tum Archdiocese a land-use certificate during the year.

The government continued to restrict the number of students permitted to enroll in Catholic and Protestant seminaries.  The churches’ leadership said the numbers allowed were inadequate to meet demand.  ECVN leaders said 23 students graduated from their Bible school in the last five years.  The government continued to permit them to recruit new students every two years.

On December 17 in Ho Chi Minh City, the Vietnam Seventh-day Adventist Church organized the opening ceremony of its first domestic Christian Bible College.

Authorities permitted Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Baha’i, and Buddhist groups to provide religious education to adherents in their own facilities, and religious leaders noted increased enrollment in recent years.  Students continued to participate in training sessions on fundamental Buddhist philosophy organized at pagodas nationwide during summer holidays.

Some religious leaders faced travel restrictions, and leaders and followers of certain religious groups faced restrictions on movement by government authorities.  On May 14, border guards in Bo Y Border Gate, Kon Tum Province, prohibited Catholic Redemptorist Father Dinh Huu Thoai from exiting the country without providing justification for his travel.

In January, February, and May, independent Cao Dai follower Hua Phi reported local authorities did not allow him to leave Lam Dong Province for travel to Ho Chi Minh City for medical treatment.  He said he was allowed to seek treatment later in the year.

During the year, authorities lifted travel restrictions on certain religious leaders.  Authorities again permitted Zen Master Thich Nhat Hanh to visit Danang and Hue, his second annual visit after a decade outside the country.  Hanh resided at Tu Hieu Pagoda in Hue at year’s end, and adherents reported no difficulties visiting him.

Protestant and Catholic groups continued to report that legal restrictions and lack of legal clarity on operating faith-based medical and educational facilities made them wary of attempting to open hospitals or parochial schools, despite government statements welcoming religious groups to expand participation in health, education, and charitable activities.  Catholic representatives said the government refused to return hospitals, clinics, and schools seized from the Catholic Church in past decades, although Catholic leaders noted modest progress with local authorities in land disputes around the country.  The majority of educational facilities owned and run by religious groups continued to be kindergartens and preschools.

In several cases, local authorities permitted religious organizations to operate social services and to gather for training.  For example, in Hanoi and surrounding areas, city officials continued to allow Protestant house churches to operate drug rehabilitation centers, and a church affiliated with the Full Gospel Church in Quoc Oai, a district of Hanoi, noted progress in dealing with local authorities and expanding drug treatment operations following authorities’ acceptance of the Full Gospel Church’s Registration of Religious Operation.  The registration had eased the affiliated church’s operations in areas outside Quoc Oai as well, according to the church leader.

Most representatives of religious groups continued to report adherence to a registered religious group generally did not seriously disadvantage individuals in nongovernmental civil, economic, and secular life, but that adherence to an unregistered group was more disadvantageous.  Practitioners of various registered religions served in local and provincial government positions and were represented in the National Assembly.  Many nationally recognized religious organizations, such as the Vietnam Buddhist Sangha, as well as other clergy and religious followers, were members of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, an umbrella group for government-affiliated organizations under the guidance of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).  High-ranking government officials sent greetings and visited churches during Christmas and Easter and attended Vesak activities commemorating the birth of the Buddha.  The official resumes of the top three CPV leaders stated they followed no religion.

While Catholics and Protestants could serve in the enlisted ranks (including during temporary mandatory military service), commissioned officers were not permitted to be religious believers.  Religious adherents continued to be customarily excluded through the military recruitment process.

Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom

There were several reports of registered Cao Dai adherents preventing adherents of the unsanctioned Cao Dai from performing certain religious rituals.  Registered Cao Dai members prevented the family of unsanctioned Cao Dai adherent Le Van Nha from burying him in the Cuc Lac Thai Binh Cemetery on January 7, according to a report prepared by the unregistered Cao Dai.  Unregistered Cao Dai also accused the registered group of demolishing graves of unregistered Cao Dai in the Cuc Lac Thai Binh Cemetery.  The group also reported that in January registered Cao Dai adherents prevented an unregistered Cao Dai follower from conducting the ninth-day posthumous rites for her husband unless she used a clergy member from the registered group in Ninh Phuoc Village, Ninh Thanh Ward, Tay Ninh City, Tay Ninh Province.

There continued to be some incidents of harassment of Catholics by the progovernment Red Flag Association, although the group reportedly dissolved itself in March.  On February 23, social media carried reports that members of the Red Flag Association at an elementary school at Dien Doai Commune, Dien Chau District, Nghe An Province, intimidated and beat Catholic parents meeting with the school’s leadership to get more information about the expulsion of their children after they refused to pay additional school fees.

The Catholic Institute continued to meet at the Ho Chi Minh City Archdiocese’s Pastoral Center located next to the St. Joseph Grand Seminary, while discussing a suitable permanent location with the city government.  The current venue limited the institute’s ability to accept new students because it received more applications than it could accommodate in the space.

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The Lessons of 1989: Freedom and Our Future