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South Sudan

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings

The United Nations, human rights organizations, and media reported the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Security forces, opposition forces, armed militias affiliated with the government and the opposition, and ethnically based groups were also responsible for extrajudicial killings in expanding conflict zones (see section 1.g.).

There were numerous reported unlawful killings similar to the following example: On July 11, John Gatluak, a radio journalist was shot and killed, allegedly by government forces, when the Terrain Hotel compound in Juba was attacked. According to multiple sources, Gatluak was targeted for being an ethnic Nuer.

Security and opposition forces, armed militias affiliated with the government or the opposition, and ethnically based groups abducted an unknown number of persons, including women and children (see section 1.g.). There were regular reports security forces conducted arbitrary arrests, including of journalists, civil society actors, and supposed political opponents.

There were numerous reported disappearances similar to the following: On June 4, journalist Isaac Vuni and his brother were kidnapped from their home near the border with Uganda, allegedly by men in military uniforms. On September 26, Vuni’s body was discovered on a farm in the vicinity. Vuni reportedly died from a gunshot wound. While the motivation for his murder remained unclear, Vuni had previously been detained in connection with his work. In 2009 he was arrested for reporting the SPLA and the government was implicated in a financial scandal. In 2011 he was detained during a crackdown on local journalists.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The transitional constitution prohibits such practices, but security forces tortured, beat, and harassed political opponents, journalists, and human rights workers (see sections 2.a. and 5). Government and opposition forces, armed militia groups affiliated with both, and warring ethnic groups committed torture and abuses in conflict zones (see section 1.g.).

There were numerous reported abuses similar to the following example: According to UN reporting, in July, during fighting in Juba and in the days following the fighting, government soldiers raped women and girls in the PoC sites and in area homes.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions were harsh and potentially life threatening. Overcrowding and inadequate medical care at times resulted in illness and death. While some prisons employed doctors, medical care was rudimentary, and prison physicians often had inadequate training and supplies. There were reports of abuse by prison guards.

Physical Conditions: Men and women were generally, but not always, held in separate areas, but male and female inmates often mixed freely during the day due to space constraints. Due to overcrowding authorities did not always hold juveniles separately from adults and rarely separated pretrial detainees from convicted prisoners. Children, especially infants, often lived with their mothers in prison.

Health care and sanitation were inadequate, and basic medical supplies and equipment were lacking. According to NGOs, prisoners received one meal per day and relied on family or friends for additional food. Potable water was limited. In some locations prisoners slept in overcrowded open hallways and buildings lined with bunk beds. Ventilation and lighting were inadequate.

Malnutrition and lack of medical care contributed to inmate deaths, although no statistics were available.

Detention centers were under the control of local tribal or state authorities, and conditions were uniformly harsh and life threatening. Many facilities in rural areas consisted of uncovered spaces where authorities chained detainees to a wall, fence, or tree, often unsheltered from the sun. As with state run prisons, sanitary and medical facilities were poor or nonexistent, and potable water was limited. Detainees sometimes spent days outdoors but slept inside in areas that lacked adequate ventilation and lighting.

Conditions in SPLA run detention facilities were similar, and in some cases worse, with many detainees held outdoors with poor access to sanitary or medical facilities.

The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) maintained facilities at PoC sites in Juba, Malakal, Bentiu, and Bor to hold IDPs who were criminal suspects. Authorities did not intend the holding facilities to house IDPs for more than 72 hours but sometimes held IDP suspects longer due to delays in determining how to treat individual cases. UNMISS observed prisoners daily and offered medical treatment for serious complications. Prisoners received food twice a day.

The National Security Service (NSS) operated a detention facility in Juba that held civilian prisoners (see section 1.d.).

Administration: The National Prison Service (NPS) continued weekly reporting of prisoner totals from all state prisons to its Juba headquarters, including statistics on juveniles and persons with mental disabilities (see section 1.d.). There were no prison ombudsmen.

Nonviolent offenders were kept with violent offenders because of resource and spatial constraints. There were a reported 132 juveniles in detention. The NPS reported holding 162 inmates with mental disabilities determined by a judge to be sufficiently dangerous (and “mentally ill”) after referral by family or the community, incarcerating, medicating, and keeping them in detention until a medical evaluation revealed they were no longer ill and could depart.

The NPS allowed prisoners access to visitors and permitted them to take part in religious observances, but NSS and SPLA authorities were less likely to do so. The NPS allowed prisoners to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship and to request investigation of allegations of inhuman conditions; prison authorities sometimes investigated such allegations, although they seldom took action.

Independent Monitoring: The NPS permitted visits by independent human rights observers, including UNMISS human rights officers, nongovernmental observers, international organizations, and journalists. Although authorities sometimes permitted monitors to visit detention facilities operated by the SPLA, they rarely, if ever, permitted monitors to visit facilities operated by the NSS, which held both military prisoners and civilians without legal authority.

The transitional constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention without charge. The government, however, arrested and detained individuals arbitrarily. Since the start of the crisis in 2013, there were numerous reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions (see sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.). While not legally vested with the power to arrest or detain civilians, the SPLA often did so. The NSS also routinely detained civilians. Security services rarely reported such arrests to police, other civilian authorities, or, in the case of foreigners arrested, diplomatic missions. Police also routinely arrested civilians based on little or no evidence prior to conducting investigations and often held them for weeks or months without charge or trial.

There were numerous reported arbitrary arrests or detentions similar to the following example: On June 26, men in military intelligence uniforms arrested the former governor of newly created Wau State, Elias Waya Nyipuoch, at his residence in Juba. He remained in detention, and by year’s end no charges had been brought against him. Nyipuoch had been relieved of office on June 24.


The South Sudan National Police Service, under the Ministry of Interior, is responsible for law enforcement and maintenance of order. It consisted largely of former SPLA soldiers, was poorly trained, corrupt, and widely distrusted. Authorities often based detentions on accusations rather than investigations. They rarely investigated complaints of police abuse. Police often went months without pay; they solicited bribes or sought compensation, often in the form of food or fuel, for services rendered to civilians.

The SPLA is responsible for providing security throughout the country and ostensibly operates under the Ministry of Defense and Veterans’ Affairs; current and former military personnel staff the ministry. The SPLA does not have law enforcement authority, unless acting at the request of civil authorities. Nevertheless, the SPLA regularly exercised police functions, in part due to the limited presence and general ineffectiveness of law enforcement in many areas. It routinely detained persons, including in SPLA run detention facilities to which monitors generally had little or no access. The SPLA’s approach to internal security and civilian disarmament was often unsystematic and disproportionate, contributing to conflict within and between communities while undermining the government’s legitimacy in conflict areas. The law requires cases of SPLA abuse of civilians to be heard in civilian courts, but there were no reports of cases being referred.

The NSS, which has arrest and detention authority only in matters relating to national security, often detained civil society activists, businesspersons, NGO personnel, journalists, and others to intimidate them, particularly if the NSS believed they supported opposition figures. Authorities rarely investigated complaints of arbitrary detention, harassment, excessive force, and torture.

Impunity of the security services was a serious problem. Although some internal investigations within the army and police were reportedly launched, no cases of security sector abuse were referred to civilian courts. According to media reports, the SPLA court-martialed at least 60 soldiers accused of looting and other human right abuses in July in Juba; however, undue command influence over the military justice system was a persistent problem.


While the law requires police to bring arrested persons before a public prosecutor, magistrate, or court within 24 hours, there were no public prosecutors or magistrates available below the county level in most areas. Court dockets often were overwhelmed, and cases faced long delays before coming before a judge. Police may detain individuals for 24 hours without charge. A public prosecutor may authorize an extension up to one week, and a magistrate may authorize extensions of up to two weeks. Authorities did not always inform detainees of charges against them and regularly held them past the statutory limit without explanation. Police sometimes ignored court orders to bring arrested persons before the court. Police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges were often unaware of the statutory requirement that detainees appear before a judge as quickly as possible. Police commonly conducted arrests without warrants, and warrants were often irregular, handwritten documents. Warrants were commonly drafted in the absence of investigation or evidence.

The code of criminal procedure allows bail, but this provision was widely unknown or ignored by justice sector authorities, and they rarely informed detainees of this possibility. Because pretrial appearances before judges often were delayed far past statutory limits, authorities rarely had the opportunity to adjudicate bail requests before trial. Those arrested had a right to an attorney, but the country had few lawyers, and detainees were rarely informed of this right. The transitional constitution mandates access to legal representation without charge for the indigent, but defendants rarely received legal assistance if they did not pay for it. Authorities sometimes held detainees incommunicado.

Arbitrary Arrest: Security forces arbitrarily arrested opposition leaders, civil society activists, businesspersons, journalists, and other civilians due to ethnicity or possible affiliation with opposition forces. The SPLA and NSS often abused political opponents and others whom they detained without charge. Ignorance of the law and proper procedures also led to many arbitrary detentions. Many justice sector actors, including police and judges, operated under a victim-centric approach that prioritized restitution and satisfaction for victims of crime, rather than following legal procedure. This approach led to many arbitrary arrests of citizens who were simply in the vicinity when crimes occurred, were of a certain ethnicity, or were relatives of suspects. For example, there were numerous reports women were detained when their husbands, accused of having unpaid debts, could not be located.

Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention was a problem, due largely to the lack of lawyers and judges, the difficulty of locating witnesses, misunderstanding of constitutional and legal requirements by police, prosecutors, and judges, and the absence of a strong mechanism to compel witness attendance in court. The length of pretrial detention commonly equaled or exceeded the sentence for the alleged crime. Estimates of the number of pretrial detainees ranged from one-third to two-thirds of the prison population. The chronic lack of access to law enforcement officers and judicial systems became even more severe as armed conflict displaced officials (see section 1.g.). In October the NPS reported approximately 30 children were being held in pretrial detention in Juba Central Prison, some for up to eight years.

Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: The Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 2008 (Article 50 (305)) provides compensation for wrongful arrest if the court determines there was no sufficient ground for detention. In practice, there were no known cases where an appellant successfully sought compensation for wrongful detention.

The transitional constitution provides for an independent judiciary and recognizes customary law. While the law requires the government to maintain courts at federal, state, and county levels, lack of infrastructure and trained personnel made this impossible, and few statutory courts existed below the state level.

In the majority of communities, customary courts remained the principal providers of justice services. Customary courts maintained primary authority to adjudicate most crimes other than murder. Customary courts can deal with certain aspects of murder cases if judges remit the cases to them to process under traditional procedures and determine compensation according to the customs of the persons concerned. If this happens, the judge can sentence the individual who commits a killing to no more than 10 years. Government courts also heard cases of violent crime and acted as appeals courts for verdicts issued by customary bodies. Legal systems employed by customary courts varied, with most emphasizing restorative dispute resolution and some borrowing elements of sharia (Islamic law). Government sources estimated customary courts handled 80 percent of all cases due to the capacity limitations of statutory courts.

Political pressure, corruption, discrimination toward women, and the lack of a competent investigative police service undermined both statutory and customary courts. Patronage priorities or political allegiances of traditional elders or chiefs commonly influenced verdicts in customary courts. Despite numerous pressures, some judges appeared to operate independently.

Human rights organizations raised concerns about a court martial that reportedly convicted approximately 77 soldiers of crimes associated with the July violence. In early August, monitoring groups were told there would be a court-martial and they would be provided with information so they could attend the proceedings. Approximately two weeks later, they were informed the proceedings had already taken place. An advocate for one of the accused reported he had not had time to confer with his client.


Under the transitional constitution defendants are presumed innocent and have the right to be informed promptly and in detail of charges (with free interpretation as necessary), be tried fairly and publicly without undue delay, be present at any criminal trial against them, confront witnesses against them, present witnesses and evidence, not be compelled to incriminate themselves, and to legal counsel.

Despite these protections, law enforcement officers and statutory and customary court authorities commonly presumed suspects to be guilty, and suspects faced serious infringements of their rights. Free interpretation was rarely, if ever, offered. Most detainees were not informed promptly of the charges against them. Prolonged detentions often occurred, and defendants generally did not have adequate access to facilities to prepare a defense. While court dates were set without regard for providing adequate time to prepare a defense, long remands often meant detainees with access to a lawyer had sufficient time to prepare. Defendants generally did not have access to government evidence, which often was minimal due to the government’s lack of forensic capability. Magistrates often compelled defendants to testify, and the absence of lawyers at many judicial proceedings often left defendants without recourse.

Public trials were the norm both in customary courts, which usually took place outdoors, and in statutory courts. Some high level court officials opposed media access to courts and asserted media should not comment on pending cases. The right to be present at trial and to confront witnesses was sometimes respected, but in statutory courts, the difficulty of summoning witnesses often precluded exercise of these rights. No government legal aid structure existed.

Defendants did not necessarily have access to counsel or the right of appeal, and discrimination against women was common. Some customary courts, particularly those in urban areas, had fairly sophisticated procedures, and verdicts were consistent. Some customary court judges in Juba kept records that were equal to or better than those kept in government courts.


There were reports of political prisoners and detainees, which civil society groups estimated to number in the dozens at any given time. Authorities typically held them from a few hours to a few days or weeks prior to release, usually without charge, reportedly in an effort to intimidate or stifle opposition.

For example, Professor Leonzio Angole Onek, Dean of the College of Applied and Industrial Sciences at the University of Juba, was arrested in December 2015 and detained until April 25 without charge. According to Amnesty International, Onek was one of 35 individuals detained illegally at NSS headquarters in Juba. Reportedly, most had been detained for contacts with the SPLM-IO and/or SPLA-IO. Onek was released in April, apparently because of a worsening medical condition.


Statutory and customary courts provided the only options for those seeking to bring claims to address human rights violations, and these claims were subject to the same limitations that affected the justice sector in general.


The government rarely provided proportionate and timely restitution for the government’s confiscation of property.

The transitional constitution prohibits interference with private life, family, home, and correspondence. Authorities, however, reportedly violated these prohibitions.

To induce suspects to surrender, officials at times held family members in detention centers.

During the conflict between the government and opposition forces that began in 2013, security forces, opposition forces, armed militias affiliated with the government and the opposition, and civilians committed conflict related abuses and violations around the country. Patterns of abuse continued throughout 2015 and intensified after renewed fighting broke out during the year.

Casualty totals were difficult to estimate because the belligerents typically did not maintain accurate records. The number of IDPs and refugees increased to approximately 1.3 million at year’s end. International NGOs and the United Nations reported atrocities including the targeting of civilians, rape and gang rape employed as a weapon of war, and the mass destruction of homes and personal property.

Killings: In February fighting broke out between armed actors at the UNMISS PoC site in Malakal town, where an estimated 50,000 IDPs were sheltering. Fighting among armed elements aligned along ethnic lines–Dinka, Shilluk, and Nuer–resulted in the deaths of more than 29 persons. More than 140 were injured. According to the United Nations, government soldiers involved in the fighting fired on IDPs, and looted and burned humanitarian equipment. A February 29 UN Security Council press statement, “stressed that attacks against civilians and United Nations premises may constitute war crimes.”

In July a series of clashes between government and opposition forces sparked days of intense fighting in Juba and resulted in the deaths of approximately 300 persons. Both sides sustained casualties when fighting broke out July 8 between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and others loyal to First Vice President Riek Machar, during a meeting between the two leaders. Two days later, during intense fighting across the capital, several civilians and two peacekeepers were killed.

Government forces were accused of widespread human rights abuses during the fighting and in the days following. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, while some civilians were accidentally killed in the exchange of fire between opposing forces, others were specifically targeted, largely for suspected affiliation with the SPLM-IO or SPLA-IO. Targeting along ethnic lines was also reported. According to UN reports, on July 11, SPLA soldiers arrested eight civilians in house-to-house searches, and brought them to a nearby hotel where they executed four of them. According to the report of a government investigative committee, government forces were responsible for the murder of a Nuer journalist during the attack on the Terrain hotel compound.

Following the fighting in Juba, ethnic skirmishes intensified in pockets around the country, in particular in Leer, Malakal, and Yei. In October, attacks on buses leaving Juba by armed men believed to be associated with the opposition left more than 25 dead. The majority of those killed were Dinka women and children.

Scorched earth tactics typical of the way all the armed forces conducted operations included: killing and raping civilians; looting cattle and goods; destroying property to prevent the return of those who had managed to flee, followed by repeated incursions into an area to ensure those who had fled did not return; and frequently obstructing humanitarian assistance. These actions multiplied the numbers of displaced civilians, who often were forced to travel great distances in dangerous circumstances to reach the shelter, food, and safety of UN-run PoC camps or to hide in marshes where they risked drowning or starvation.

Abductions: Abductions, particularly of children, took place in both conflict and non-conflict zones as government and opposition forces and affiliated armed militia groups recruited children and women against their will.

On April 15, armed men from the Murle ethnic group reportedly attacked 13 Nuer villages in the Gambella region of Ethiopia. According to the United Nations, the attack led to more than 200 deaths and the abduction of an estimated 159 children. Another 80 persons were reportedly wounded and more than 2,000 cattle stolen. In the first two months after the attack, Ethiopian and South Sudanese authorities rescued 91 children, but at year’s end, more than 60 remained unaccounted.

Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: Government, opposition forces, and armed militias affiliated with the government and the opposition tortured, raped, and otherwise abused civilians in conflict areas.

Sexual and gender-based violence, and conflict related sexual violence, were widespread. Rape was used widely as a weapon of war. In an August 1 press release, UNMISS stated, over the preceding few weeks, it had received reports of widespread sexual violence, including rape and gang rape of women and young girls, by soldiers in uniform and also by unidentified armed groups of men in plainclothes. UN officials who interviewed survivors reported gang rape was common. Monitors described how groups of armed men went house-to-house in the Jebel neighborhood of Juba, looting and raping. The UN Human Rights Division catalogued more than 100 separate cases in Juba alone of sexual violence against and rape of unarmed civilians, including gang rapes and sexual abuse of minors between July 8 and August 1. Men were also victims of sexual violence, but on a far reduced scale.

Child Soldiers: Following the outbreak of conflict in 2013, forced conscription by government forces, as well as recruitment and use of child soldiers by both government and anti-government forces increased. During the year, there were widespread reports government forces were recruiting child soldiers. Opposition forces and affiliated armed militias also recruited child soldiers.

International organization experts estimated 16,000 child soldiers had been recruited in the country since the conflict began in 2013 and blamed government, opposition, and militia forces. On August 19, UNICEF announced more than 650 children had been recruited into armed groups between January and August.

The August 2015 peace agreement mandated specialized international agencies work with all warring parties to demobilize and reintegrate child soldiers from the SPLA, the SPLA-IO, the Nuer White Army, and other groups, usually those involved in community defense. Between January and June 2015, UNICEF’s program in the Greater Pibor (Jonglei State) Administrative Authority demobilized and reintegrated 1,755 child soldiers, most of whom were released by chief administrator David Yau Yau’s Cobra Faction. Another 145 children were released in October. UNICEF warned renewed fighting undermined the progress it had made in demobilizing and reintegrating child soldiers, and acknowledged some of the children had been re-recruited.

Also, see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at

Other Conflict-related Abuse: Throughout the year the environment for humanitarian operations grew increasingly difficult and dangerous as the geographic scope of humanitarian need expanded. Armed actors, including government and opposition forces, continued to restrict the ability of the United Nations and relief organizations to function safely and effectively deliver humanitarian assistance to populations in need. Access was impeded by direct denials, bureaucratic barriers, and renewed fighting in areas of the country where humanitarian needs were highest. Despite repeated safety assurances, armed elements harassed and killed relief workers, looted and destroyed humanitarian assets and facilities, and imposed bureaucratic impediments on relief organizations. On multiple occasions, fighting between armed forces put the safety and security of humanitarian workers at risk, prevented travel, forced the evacuation of relief workers, and jeopardized humanitarian operations, including forcing organizations to suspend operations entirely in areas of active conflict. Between the start of the crisis in December 2013 and December, relief workers recorded more than 2,500 incidents of access denial or interference by the SPLA, SPLA-IO, or other armed elements. During the year, relief organizations reported more than 683 humanitarian access incidents, including 100 in November. Delayed flight safety assurances, insecurity, and movement restrictions often prevented relief workers from traveling to conflict and nonconflict areas. Humanitarian personnel, independently or through a UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) access working group, negotiated with the SPLA, SPLA-IO, and other armed groups to address access problems; however, these negotiations were often protracted and caused significant delays in the delivery of assistance.

The humanitarian operating environment became more volatile, increasingly jeopardizing the safety of humanitarian workers throughout the country. The most common forms of violence against humanitarian workers included robbery and looting, harassment, armed attacks, commandeering of vehicles, and physical detention. UNMISS reported at least 67 humanitarian staff members had been killed in the country since December 2013, 22 of them during the reporting year. For example, unidentified armed actors ambushed a group of Danish Refugee Council relief workers traveling in marked vehicles near Central Equatoria State’s Yei town on April 12, resulting in the deaths of two South Sudanese humanitarian staff.

Armed actors clashed in the UNMISS PoC site in Upper Nile state’s Malakal town from February 17-18. The violence and subsequent events resulted in at least 29 deaths, including of three aid workers, and injured more than 140. Fire that began during the violence destroyed several humanitarian facilities, including three medical clinics, two schools, nutrition centers, and water tanks.

In late February, violence broke out in Jonglei state’s Pibor town, displacing thousands of civilians and forcing the relocation of relief workers. Humanitarian assets, including lifesaving nutrition supplies meant to treat 600 severely malnourished children, medical equipment, fuel, and medicines, were looted. The fighting also destroyed Pibor’s Humanitarian Hub, which provided workspace and accommodation for more than 40 aid workers.

Armed elements looted humanitarian assets and facilities during fighting in Western Bahr el Ghazal State’s Raja town on June 15. According to OCHA, the attackers looted six humanitarian compounds and the town’s main health clinic, stole three International Committee of the Red Cross vehicles, and attacked and looted a WFP warehouse in Raja.

Restrictions on humanitarian operations took other forms as well. From June 24-25, fighting in Western Bahr el Ghazal State’s Wau town displaced thousands; an estimated 79,200 persons remain displaced in and outside the town at year’s end. The violence prompted the NGO World Concern to suspend activities in the town and evacuate 10 staff members. Although relief organizations were able to assist populations outside Wau in late June and early July, access outside the town was severely limited in the months that followed. Humanitarian workers attempting to travel outside Wau were frequently stopped at checkpoints, harassed, and threatened by armed elements. On September 15, a humanitarian team planning to deliver assistance to populations outside Wau was denied access at a checkpoint, despite assurances and a letter from authorities approving unrestricted access.

Clashes between SPLA and SPLA-IO forces broke out in Juba on July 8. The violence resulted in the deaths of hundreds, including two UN peacekeepers, and temporarily displaced as many as 42,000 persons. During the clashes, armed actors and civilians looted the primary WFP warehouse in the city. Prior to the incident, the warehouse contained an estimated 4,500 metric tons of emergency food and nutrition commodities, as well as fuel, generators, office equipment, vehicles, and other items. The WFP estimated the looted nutrition supplies would have been sufficient to provide one-month rations to 220,000 persons. The looting resulted in a financial loss to WFP of approximately $28 million, including $8 million in nutrition commodities.

Artillery shells struck the maternity wing of International Medical Corp’s (IMC) hospital in the UNMISS House PoC site during the Juba clashes. The incident did not injure IMC staff or patients, although the attack forced IMC to relocate patients to another facility inside the PoC site. Despite significant impediments, including fuel and water shortages, IMC was able to continue treating injured persons during the fighting.

The early July violence in Juba spread through the Greater Equatoria region of Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Western Equatoria states. In Central Equatoria’s Yei, armed actors from both sides nearly surrounded the town with checkpoints that inhibited civilian and humanitarian movement in and out of the town, preventing persons from harvesting crops and delaying relief operations. In addition, road attacks were frequently reported in the region throughout the year; unidentified persons launched four ambushes of humanitarian workers between September 28 and October 2. During the incidents NGO vehicles were shot at and damaged, and aid workers were robbed of personal belongings. An aid worker traveling in a clearly marked NGO vehicle was killed in another ambush near Eastern Equatoria’s Torit town on October 14.

Fighting that began on July 13 in Unity State’s Leer County forced an estimated 350 persons, including relief workers, to seek refuge at a nearby UNMISS base. As a result of the clashes, more than 50 aid workers were evacuated from Leer between July 14 and 20. Due to violence, an estimated 1,600 persons were sheltering at the UNMISS base in early December.

In addition to physical security challenges, bureaucratic access constraints seriously affected humanitarian workers’ ability to deliver timely aid to populations in need. In July government delays in providing tax exemption papers left WFP-contracted trucks stranded on the Uganda-South Sudan border. The 27 trucks, carrying more than 700 metric tons of nutrition commodities, were kept at the border for more than a month until WFP could obtain the paperwork, incurring more than SSP 31.6 million ($400,000) in demurrage charges.

During the year, government officials hindered humanitarian air operations on several occasions. In late July, they demanded the WFP provide renewed clearances for air operations into South Sudan originating from Ethiopia. Resolving the issue required more than two weeks of negotiations and seriously delayed WFP distributions of emergency food assistance. On September 3, the government began requiring flight safety assurances for airdrops to all locations in the country, regardless of conflict status. This included Northern Bahr el Ghazal state, government-controlled territory that had not seen conflict yet, which faced the most acute food insecurity and had the greatest need for food assistance. The new requirement postponed WFP airdrop operations in that area for nearly two weeks.

Abyei is a disputed region between Sudan and South Sudan that, according to agreements between the two governments, is to be jointly administered until a referendum on the final status of the area is held. After South Sudanese independence, the United Nations established the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). The security situation in Abyei was calm but unpredictable throughout the year. UNISFA reported some progress in communities returning property/livestock or receiving compensation for stolen property/livestock. The mission also noted a peaceful reverse migration of Misseriya communities. Crime remained a problem, but there was a decrease in thefts and break-ins at UN and UNISFA compounds.

UNISFA and NGOs continued to provide humanitarian assistance to more than 130,000 vulnerable persons in Abyei. The conflict in South Sudan undercut the provision of aid, including by forcing the temporary relocation of international staff to Juba; looting of supplies procured in South Sudan and subsequent cost increases for those supplies; and delays in NGO activities. An estimated 1,000 displaced South Sudanese transited Abyei towards Sudan.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The transitional constitution provides for freedom of speech and press. The government and its agents frequently violated these rights, however, and the downward trend in respect for these freedoms since 2011 continued.

Freedom of Speech and Expression: Civil society organizations must register with the government under the 2013 NGO Act (and the subsequent 2016 Act). The government regularly attempted to impede criticism by monitoring, intimidating, harassing, arresting, or detaining members of civil society who publicly criticized the government.

Press and Media Freedoms: The government maintained strict control of media, both print and electronic. The government suppressed dissenting voices, forcing some civil society organizations and media houses to shut down or flee the country. Most organizations practiced self-censorship to ensure their safety. During the year, the government temporarily closed newspapers for printing content deemed antigovernment. The newspapers were generally allowed to reopen a few days later. One newspaper, the Nation Mirror, was closed on September 14 after publishing the details of a report by international advocacy group The Sentry that alleged misuse of state funds by the nation’s leaders, and remained closed at year’s end. In November, NSS closed the independent radio station Eye Radio, reportedly because it aired a voice clip from SPLM-IO leader Machar; the station resumed broadcasts more than one week later. Since the outbreak of conflict in 2013, the government tried to dictate media coverage of the conflict and threatened those who tried to publish or broadcast the opposition’s views. NSS regularly harassed, intimidated, and summoned journalists for questioning. The environment for media workers remained precarious throughout the year.

Authorities made some progress on implementing the three media bills signed into law in 2013, which were intended to resolve disputes between the government and journalists through established boards responsible for the right to access information, public service broadcasting, and media authority. President Kiir appointed chairpersons and members of the boards.

Government officials or individuals close to the government regularly interfered in the publication of articles and broadcasting of programs, and high-level government officials stated press freedom should not extend to criticism of the government or soliciting views of opposition leaders.

Violence and Harassment: Security forces commonly intimidated or detained journalists whose reporting they perceived as unfavorable to the military or government. Security forces confiscated or damaged journalists’ equipment and restricted their movements. During the year, journalists were interrogated, harassed, detained, and imprisoned, and there were instances of severe violence and suspicious death. NSS representatives frequently harassed journalists by detaining them at NSS headquarters or local police stations without formal charges. Government harassment was so pronounced that several journalists fled the country. Journalists and media agencies that reported on news of the opposition could expect questioning and possibly closure. Journalists in Juba experienced threats and intimidation and routinely practiced self-censorship. On several occasions high level officials publicly used intimidating language directed toward media outlets and representatives.

There were numerous reported such abuses similar to the following example: On July 16, Alfred Taban, a journalist and editor in chief of the Juba Monitor, was arrested after publication of an editorial in which he called for the removal of President Kiir and First Vice President Machar, criticizing them for their failure to implement the August 2015 peace agreement. Taban was released on bail 13 days later. At year’s end, there was no date set for his trial.

On October 11, Malek Bol, a reporter for the Arabic-language daily al-Maugif, was found badly injured and showing signs of torture in a cemetery in Juba. According to Reporters Without Borders, fellow journalists found him three days after he disappeared. Bol had recently posted an article on social media critical of President Kiir.

In December 2015, NSS members arrested Joseph Afandi, an editor for the Arabic daily El Tabeer, at the newspaper’s offices in Juba after he wrote an editorial critical of the ruling party. Afandi was released without charge six weeks later. According to international watchdog agencies, Afandi was abducted in March, severely tortured, and dumped in a graveyard four days later.


The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content, and there were no credible reports that the government monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority. The government, however, targeted and intimidated individuals who were critical of the government in open online forums. Additionally, in an October 12 press statement, Information Minister Michael Makuei Lueth threatened to “disconnect” social and other online media, after (false) rumors of the president’s death circulated and contributed to widespread fear of violence or a coup in Juba. The internet was unavailable in most parts of the country due to lack of electricity and communications infrastructure. According to the International Telecommunication Union, 18 percent of the population used the internet in 2015.


There were no known government restrictions on academic freedom or cultural events.


The transitional constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right, but many citizens did not gather due to fear of targeted violence. Security officials lacked nonviolent crowd control capabilities and at times fired live ammunition into the air to disperse crowds.


The transitional constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government did not respect this right for those suspected of associating with or having sympathies for opposition figures (see section 1.g.). Some civil society leaders interpreted the 2012 Political Parties Act as an attempt to suppress opposition to the SPLM (see section 3).

In February the president signed into law a bill that strictly regulates the activity and operations of civil society. The law focused particularly on NGOs working in the governance, anticorruption, and human rights fields, and imposed a range of legal barriers including limitations on the types of activities in which organizations can engage, onerous registration requirements, and heavy fines for noncompliance.

During the September 2-5 visit of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to South Sudan, UNSC Permanent Representatives met with CSOs that argued in favor of the deployment of a Regional Protection Force. Before the UNSC delegation had even left Juba, security forces began to target CSOs, detaining and threatening several CSO representatives. Security officials informed others they had to shut down their operations and their assets would be seized, because of the “antigovernment” messages they had been spreading.

See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at

d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons

The transitional constitution provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, and repatriation. The government, however, often restricted these rights, and routinely blocked travel of political figures within the country and outside the country. The transitional constitution does not address emigration.

Abuse of Migrants, Refugees, and Stateless Persons: Refugees sometimes suffered abuse, such as armed attacks, killings, gender-based violence, forced recruitment, including of children, and forced labor, according to the UN High Commission for Refugees.

In-country Movement: IDPs remained on UNMISS PoC sites due to fear of retaliatory or ethnically targeted violence by armed groups, both government- and opposition-affiliated. The government often obstructed humanitarian organizations seeking to provide protection and assistance to IDPs and refugees. Continuing conflict between government and opposition forces restricted the movement of UN personnel and the delivery of humanitarian aid (see section 1.g.).

Emigration and Repatriation: The 2012 Cooperation Agreements signed by the governments of Sudan and South Sudan cover security, economic, and other matters, including an agreement to protect freedoms of residence, movement, economic activity, and property ownership for citizens of both countries residing in Sudan or South Sudan. Although negotiating parties made progress in October 2015 in Addis Ababa on border issues, the governments failed to make substantial progress on aspects of the agreement relating to each other’s nationals.

Citizenship: During the year, the government revoked the diplomatic and official passports of some SPLA-IO representatives abroad whom they deemed enemies of the state; however, there were no reports the government revoked citizenship for political reasons.


In mid-year, conflict in the country intensified and spread to areas previously less affected by fighting. The result was mass population displacement, both within the country and into neighboring countries, and high levels of humanitarian and protection needs, which strained the ability of UN and international humanitarian personnel to provide protection and assistance. According to OCHA, conflict and food insecurity have displaced more than 1.8 million persons since December 2013, including more than 79,200 in and around Western Bahr el Ghazal State’s Wau town, and more than 1.2 million in remote areas of conflict-affected Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. Approximately 224,100 persons were sheltering in UNMISS PoC sites throughout the country as of December 12, an increase from the 193,800 sheltering in PoC sites at the end of 2015. The increased violence and food insecurity forced relief actors to delay plans for the safe return and relocation of some IDP populations.

On July 8, fighting broke out in Juba that killed hundreds of persons and newly displaced as many as 42,000 persons; nearly 39,000, both newly and previously displaced, remained in the town’s UNMISS PoC sites at year’s end. A July 11 ceasefire calmed active fighting in Juba, but reports of armed elements kidnapping and raping women outside the PoC sites increased. Relief workers recorded more than 100 cases of sexual and gender-based violence in the city in July, and noted the number was likely much higher due to underreporting.

The July violence spread from Juba to the Greater Equatoria region of Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Western Equatoria states, an area traditionally less conflict prone. Nearly 426,000 persons were displaced in the region as of October 31, and many fled the country. In addition fighting in Unity state’s Leer County escalated in July, resulting in further population displacements within the state and to neighboring countries. As of December 5, approximately 1 million citizens had sought refuge in neighboring countries, including nearly 371,000 who fled to Uganda after July 1.

IDPs suffered significant abuses, such as armed attacks, killings, ethnically targeted violence, arbitrary detention, gender-based violence, and recruitment of child soldiers. Both government and opposition forces targeted IDPs.


Access to Asylum: The South Sudan Refugee Act provides for protection of refugees as well as the granting of asylum and refugee status. The government allowed refugees from a variety of countries to settle and generally did not treat refugees differently from other foreigners.

Access to Basic Services: While refugees sometimes lacked basic services, this generally reflected a lack of capacity in the country to manage refugee problems rather than government practices that discriminated against refugees. Refugee children had access to elementary education in refugee camps through programs managed by international NGOs and the United Nations. Some schools were shared with children from the host community. Refugees had access to judiciary services in principle, although a lack of infrastructure and staff meant these resources were often unavailable.

Due to continuing conflict and scarcity of resources, some tension existed between refugees and host communities over access to resources.

Durable Solutions: The government accepted refugees and returnees for resettlement, although it did not publish a national strategy for facilitating integration or reintegration into local communities. No national procedures were in place to facilitate the provision of identity documents for returnees or the naturalization of refugees beyond procedures that were in place for all citizens and other applicants.


Citizenship is derived through birth if a person has a South Sudanese parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent on either the mother’s or the father’s side, or if a person is a member of one of the country’s indigenous ethnic communities. Individuals also may derive citizenship through naturalization. Birth in the country is not sufficient to claim citizenship.

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The Lessons of 1989: Freedom and Our Future