Nigeria’s economy – Africa’s largest – exited recession in 2017, assisted by the Central Bank’s more rationalized foreign exchange regime. Growth is expected to remain weak in the near term however – the IMF forecasts growth of 2.1 percent in 2019 and 2.53 percent in 2020, still under Nigeria’s population growth rate of around 2.6 percent. With the largest population in Africa (estimated at over 195 million), Nigeria continues to represent a large consumer market for investors and traders. A very young country with nearly two-thirds of its population under the age of 25, Nigeria offers abundant natural resources and a low-cost labor pool, and enjoys mostly duty-free trade with other member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nigeria’s full market potential remains unrealized because of significant impediments such as pervasive corruption, inadequate power and transportation infrastructure, high energy costs, an inconsistent regulatory and legal environment, insecurity, a slow and ineffective bureaucracy and judicial system, and inadequate intellectual property rights protections and enforcement. The Nigerian government has undertaken reforms to help improve the business environment, including making starting a business faster by allowing electronic stamping of registration documents, and making it easier to obtain construction permits, register property, get credit, and pay taxes. In 2017, these reforms helped boost Nigeria’s ranking on the World Bank’s annual Doing Business rankings from 169th to 145th place out of 190 economies. In 2018, it dropped one spot to 146th place.
Nigeria’s underdeveloped power sector remains a particular bottleneck to broad-based economic development. Power on the national grid currently averages 4,000 megawatts, forcing most businesses to generate much of their own electricity. The World Bank currently ranks Nigeria 171 out of 190 countries for ease of obtaining electricity for business. Reform of Nigeria’s power sector is ongoing, but investor confidence continues to be shaken by tariff and regulatory uncertainty. The privatization of distribution and generation companies in 2013 was based on projected levels of transmission and progress toward a fully cost reflective tariff to sustain operations and investment. However, tariff increases were reversed in 2015, and revenues have been severely impacted due to decreased transmission levels and currency devaluation, as well as high aggregate technical, commercial, and collections losses, resulting in a severe liquidity crisis throughout the power sector value chain. The Nigerian government, in partnership with the World Bank, published a Power Sector Recovery Plan (PSRP) (approved by the Federal Executive Council) in March 2017. However, two years after its launch, differing perspective on various PSRP interventions have complicated implementation. The Ministry of Finance appears to be driving the implementation effort and has convened three Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) committees charged with moving the process forward in the areas of regulation, policy, and finances. Discussions between FGN and World Bank appear to going forward, but sector players report skepticism that the World Bank’s USD 1 billion loan will be enacted, though FGN may proceed without it. The plan is ambitious and will require political will from the administration, external investment to address the accumulated deficit, and discipline in implementing plans to mitigate future shortfalls. It is, nevertheless, a step in the right direction, and recognizes explicitly that the Nigerian economy is losing on average approximately USD 29 billion annually due to lack of adequate power.
Nigeria’s trade regime remains protectionist in key areas. High tariffs, restricted forex availability for 43 categories of imports, and prohibitions on many other import items have the aim of spurring domestic agricultural and manufacturing sector growth. Nigeria’s imports rose in 2018, largely as a result of the country’s continued recovery from the 2016 economic recession. U.S. goods exports to Nigeria in 2017 were USD 2.16 billion, up nearly 60 percent from the previous year, while U.S. imports from Nigeria were USD 7.05 billion, an increase of 68.7 percent. U.S. exports to Nigeria are primarily refined petroleum products, used vehicles, cereals, and machinery. Crude oil and petroleum products continued to account for over 95 percent of Nigerian exports to the United States in 2016. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria was USD 5.8 billion in 2017 (latest data available), a substantial increase from USD 3.8 billion in 2016, but only a modest increase from 2015’s USD 5.5 billion in FDI. U.S. FDI in Nigeria continues to be led by the oil and gas sector. There is also investment from the United States and other countries in Nigeria’s power, telecommunications, real estate (commercial and residential), and agricultural sectors.
Given the corruption risk associated with the Nigerian business environment, potential investors often develop anti-bribery compliance programs. The United States and other parties to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention aggressively enforce anti-bribery laws, including the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). A high-profile FCPA case in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector resulted in 2010 U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and U.S. Department of Justice rulings that included record fines for a U.S. multinational and its subsidiaries that had paid bribes to Nigerian officials. Since then, the SEC has charged an additional four international companies with bribing Nigerian government officials to obtain contracts, permits, and resolve customs disputes. See SEC enforcement actions at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml.
Security remains a concern to investors in Nigeria due to high rates of violent crime, kidnappings for ransom, and terrorism. The ongoing Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa (ISIS-WA) insurgencies have included attacks against civilian and military targets in the northeast of the country, causing general insecurity and a major humanitarian crisis there. Multiple bombings (the majority linked to the insurgent groups) of high-profile targets with multiple deaths have occurred outside of Nigeria’s northeast region as well since 2010, but the pace of such attacks has dipped significantly in recent years. In the Niger Delta region, militant attacks on oil and gas infrastructure restricted oil production and export in 2016, but a restored amnesty program and more federal government engagement in the Delta region have brought a reprieve in violence and allowed restoration of shut-in oil and gas production. The longer-term impact of the government’s Delta peace efforts, however, remains unclear and criminal activity in the Delta – in particular, rampant oil theft– remains a serious concern. Maritime criminality in Nigerian waters, including incidents of piracy and crew kidnap for ransom, has increased in recent years and law enforcement efforts have been limited or ineffectual. Onshore, international inspectors have voiced concerns over the adequacy of security measures at some Nigerian port facilities. Businesses report that bribery of customs and port officials remains common to avoid delays, and smuggled goods routinely enter Nigeria’s seaports and cross its land borders.
Freedom of expression and of the press remains broadly observed, with the media often engaging in open, lively discussions of challenges facing Nigeria. However, security services detain and harass journalists in some cases, including for reporting on sensitive topics such as corruption and security. Some journalists practice self-censorship on sensitive issues.
|TI Corruption Perceptions Index||2018||144 of 180||http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview|
|World Bank’s Doing Business Report “Ease of Doing Business”||2019||146 of 190||http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings|
|Global Innovation Index||2018||118 of 126||https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator|
|U.S. FDI in Nigeria ($M USD, stock positions)||2017||$5,800||http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/|
|World Bank GNI per capita||2017||$2,100||http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD|
1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment
Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment
In 1995 the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act dismantled years of controls and limits on foreign direct investment (FDI), opening nearly all sectors to foreign investment, allowing for 100 percent foreign ownership in all sectors (with the exception of the petroleum sector, where FDI is limited to joint ventures or production sharing contracts), and creating the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) with a mandate to encourage and assist investment in Nigeria. The NIPC features a One-Stop Investment Center (OSIC) that nominally includes participation of 27 governmental and parastatal agencies (not all of which are physically present at the OSIC, however) in order to consolidate and streamline administrative procedures for new businesses and investments. Foreign investors receive largely the same treatment as domestic investors in Nigeria, including tax incentives. However, without strong political and policy support, and because of the unresolved challenges to investment and business in Nigeria, the ability of the NIPC to attract new investment has been limited.
The Nigerian government has continued to promote import substitution policies such as trade restrictions and local content requirements in a bid to attract investment that would develop domestic capacity to produce products and services that would otherwise be imported. The import bans and high tariffs used to advance Nigeria’s import substitution goals have been undermined by smuggling of targeted products (most notably rice and poultry) through the country’s porous borders, and by corruption in the import quota systems developed by the government to incentivize domestic investment. Despite the government’s stated goal to attract investment, investors generally find Nigeria a difficult place to do business.
Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment
There are currently no limits on foreign control of investments in Nigeria. However, in some instances regulatory bodies may insist on Nigerian equity as a prerequisite to doing business. The NIPC Act of 1995 liberalized the ownership structure of business in Nigeria, so that foreign investors can now own and control 100 percent of the shares in any company (as opposed to the earlier arrangement of 60 percent – 40 percent in favor of Nigerians).
The lack of restrictions applies to all industries, except in the oil and gas sector where investment is limited to joint ventures or production-sharing agreements. Additional laws restrict industries to domestic investors if they are considered crucial to national security, such as firearms, ammunition, and military and paramilitary apparel. Foreign investors must register with the NIPC after incorporation under the Companies and Allied Matters Decree of 1990. The Act prohibits the nationalization or expropriation of foreign enterprises except in cases of national interest.
Other Investment Policy Reviews
The OECD completed an investment policy review of Nigeria in May 2015. ( ). The WTO published a trade policy review of Nigeria in 2017 which also includes a brief overview and assessment of Nigeria’s investment climate. That review is available at: .
The United Nations Council on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published an investment policy review of Nigeria and a Blue Book on Best Practice in Investment Promotion and Facilitation in 2009 (available at unctad.org). The recommendations from its reports continue to be valid: Nigeria needs to diversify FDI away from the oil and gas sector by improving the regulatory framework, investing in physical and human capital, taking advantage of regional integration and reviewing external tariffs, fostering linkages and local industrial capacity, and strengthening institutions dealing with investment and related issues. NIPC and the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) developed a compendium of investment incentives which is available online at:
Although the NIPC offers the One-Stop Investment Centre, Nigeria does not have an online single window business registration website, as noted by Global Enterprise Registration (www.GER.co). The Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) maintains an information portal, and in 2018 the Trade Ministry launched an online portal for investors called ‘iGuide Nigeria’ (https://theiguides.org/public-docs/guides/nigeria). While many steps for business registration can be completed online, the final step requires submitting original documents to a CAC office in exchange for final registration. On average, it takes eight procedures and 10 days to establish a foreign-owned limited liability company (LLC) in Nigeria (Lagos), significantly faster than the regional average for Sub-Saharan Africa at 23 days. Time required is likely to vary in different parts of the country. Only a local legal practitioner accredited by the Corporate Affairs Commission can incorporate companies in Nigeria. According to the Nigerian Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, foreign capital invested in an LLC must be imported through an authorized dealer, which will issue a Certificate of Capital Importation. This certificate entitles the foreign investor to open a bank account in foreign currency. Finally, a company engaging in international trade must get an import-export license from the Nigerian Customs Service.
Although not online, the One-Stop Investment Center co-locates relevant government agencies in one place in order to provide more efficient and transparent services to investors. Investors may pick up documents and approvals that are statutorily required to establish an investment project in Nigeria. The Center assists with visas for investors, company incorporation, business permits and registration, tax registration, immigration, and customs issues. The Nigerian government has not established uniform definitions for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) with different agencies using different definitions, so the process may vary from one company to another.
The Nigerian Export Promotion Council administered an Export Expansion Grant (EEG) scheme to improve non-oil export performance, but the government suspended the program in 2014 due to concerns about corruption on the part of companies who collected the grants but did not actually export. After a period of re-evaluation and revision, the program was relaunched in 2018. The federal government set aside 5.12 billion naira (roughly USD 14.2 million) in the 2019 budget for the EEG scheme. The Nigerian Export-Import (NEXIM) Bank provides commercial bank guarantees and direct lending to facilitate export sector growth, although these services are underused. NEXIM’s Foreign Input Facility provides normal commercial terms of three to five years (or longer) for the importation of machinery and raw materials used for generating exports.
Agencies created to promote industrial exports remain burdened by uneven management, vaguely-defined policy guidelines, and corruption. Nigeria’s inadequate power supply and lack of infrastructure coupled with the associated high production costs leave Nigerian exporters at a significant disadvantage. Many Nigerian businesses fail to export because they find meeting international packaging and safety standards is too difficult or expensive. Similarly, firms often are unable to meet consumer demand for a consistent supply of high-quality goods in quantities sufficient to support exports as well as the domestic market. Therefore, the vast majority of Nigeria’s manufacturers remain unable or uninterested in competing in the international market, especially given the size of Nigeria’s domestic market.
10. Political and Security Environment
Political, religious, and ethnic violence continue to affect Nigeria. The Islamist group Jama’atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram, and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISIS-WA) have waged a violent campaign to destabilize the Nigerian government, killing tens of thousands of people, forcing over two million to flee to other areas of Nigeria or into neighboring countries, and leaving more than seven million people in need of humanitarian assistance in the country’s northeast. Boko Haram has targeted markets, churches, mosques, government installations, educational institutions, and leisure sites with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide vehicle-borne IEDS across nine Northern states and in Abuja. In 2017, Boko Haram employed hundreds of suicide bombings against the local population. Women and children carried out many of the attacks. There were multiple reports of Boko Haram killing entire villages suspected of cooperating with the government. ISIS-WA targeted civilians with attacks or kidnappings less frequently than Boko Haram. ISIS-WA employed targeted acts of violence and intimidation against civilians in order to expand its area of influence and gain control over critical economic resources. As part of a violent and deliberate campaign, ISIS-WA also targeted government figures, traditional leaders, and contractors.
President Buhari has focused on matters of insecurity in Nigeria and in neighboring countries. While the two insurgencies maintain the ability to stage forces in rural areas and launch attacks against civilian and military targets across the Northeast, Nigeria is also facing increased rural violence in the Middle Belt.
Due to challenging security dynamics in the North, the U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Nigeria has significantly limited official travel north of Abuja. Such trips occur only with security measures designed to mitigate the threats of car-bomb attacks and abductions.
Decades of neglect, persistent poverty, and environmental damage caused by oil spills have left Nigeria’s oil rich Niger Delta region vulnerable to renewed violence. Though each oil-producing state receives a 13 percent derivation of the oil revenue produced within its borders, and several government agencies, including the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, are tasked with implementing development projects, bureaucratic mismanagement and corruption have prevented these investments from yielding meaningful economic and social development in the region. Niger Delta militants have demonstrated their ability to attack and severely damage oil instillations at will as seen when they cut Nigeria’s production by more than half in 2016. Attacks on oil installations have since decreased due to a revamped amnesty program and continuous high-level engagement with the region.
Other security challenges facing Nigeria include increasing rural violence caused by criminal actors and by conflicts between migratory pastoralists and farmers, and thousands of refugees fleeing to Nigeria from Cameroon’s English-speaking region due to tensions there.