Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

China continues to be one of the largest recipients of global FDI due to a relatively high economic growth rate, growing middle class, and an expanding consumer base that demands diverse, high quality products.  FDI has historically played an essential role in China’s economic development. In recent years, due to stagnant FDI growth and gaps in China’s domestic technology and labor capabilities, Chinese government officials have prioritized promoting relatively friendly FDI policies promising market access expansion and national treatment for foreign enterprises through general improvements to the business environment. They also have made efforts to strengthen China’s legal and regulatory framework to enhance broader market-based competition.  Despite these efforts, the on-the-ground reality for foreign investors in China is that the operating environment still remains closed to many foreign investments across a wide range of industries.

In 2018, China issued the nationwide negative list that opened up a few new sectors to foreign investment and promised future improvements to the investment climate, such as leveling the playing field and providing equal treatment to foreign enterprises.  However, despite these reforms, FDI to China has remained relatively stagnant in the past few years. According to MOFCOM, total FDI flows to China slightly increased from about USD126 billion in 2017 to just over USD135 billion in 2018, signaling that modest market openings have been insufficient to generate significant foreign investor interest in the market.  Rather, foreign investors have continued to perceive that the playing field is tilted towards domestic companies. Foreign investors have continued to express frustration that China, despite continued promises of providing national treatment for foreign investors, has continued to selectively apply administrative approvals and licenses and broadly employ industrial policies to protect domestic firms through subsidies, preferential financing, and selective legal and regulatory enforcement.  They also have continued to express frustration over China’s weak protection and enforcement of IPR; corruption; discriminatory and non-transparent anti-monopoly enforcement that forces foreign companies to license technology at below-market prices; excessive cybersecurity and personal data-related requirements; increased emphasis on requirements to include CCP cells in foreign enterprises; and an unreliable legal system lacking in both transparency and rule of law.

China seeks to support inbound FDI through the MOFCOM “Invest in China” website (www.fdi.gov.cn  ).  MOFCOM publishes on this site laws and regulations, economic statistics, investment projects, news articles, and other relevant information about investing in China.  In addition, each province has a provincial-level investment promotion agency that operates under the guidance of local-level commerce departments.

• American Chamber of Commerce China 2019 American Business in China White Paper: https://www.amchamchina.org/policy-advocacy/white-paper/  
• American Chamber of Commerce China 2019 Business Climate Survey: https://www.amchamchina.org/policy-advocacy/business-climate-survey/  
• U.S.-China Business Council’s 2018 China Business Environment Member Survey: https://www.uschina.org/reports/uscbc-2018-member-survey  
• EU Chamber’s 2018 Business Confidence Survey: http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/publications-business-confidence-survey  .
• MOFCOM’s Investment Promotion Website: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_10000161_8.html  

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

In June 2018, the Chinese government issued the nationwide negative list for foreign investment that replaced the Foreign Investment Catalogue.  The negative list identifies industries and economic sectors restricted or prohibited to foreign investment. Unlike the previous catalogue that used a “positive list” approach for foreign investment, the negative list removed “encouraged” investment categories and restructured the document to group restrictions and prohibitions by industry and economic sector.  Foreign investors wanting to invest in industries not on the negative list are no longer required to obtain pre-approval from MOFCOM and only need to register their investment.

The 2018 foreign investment negative list made minor modifications to some industries, reducing the number of restrictions and prohibitions from 63 to 48 sectors.  Changes included: some openings in automobile manufacturing and financial services; removal of restrictions on seed production (except for wheat and corn) and wholesale merchandizing of rice, wheat, and corn; removal of Chinese control requirements for power grids, building rail trunk lines, and operating passenger rail services; removal of joint venture requirements for rare earth processing and international shipping; removal of control requirements for international shipping agencies and surveying firms; and removal of the prohibition on internet cafés.  While market openings are always welcomed by U.S. businesses, many foreign investors remain underwhelmed and disappointed by Chinese government’s lack of ambition and refusal to provide more significant liberalization. Foreign investors continue to point out these openings should have happened years ago and now have occurred mainly in industries that domestic Chinese companies already dominate.

The Chinese language version of the 2018 Nationwide Negative List: http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/201806/W020180628640822720353.pdf .

Ownership Restrictions

The foreign investment negative list restricts investments in certain industries by requiring foreign companies enter into joint ventures with a Chinese partner, imposing control requirements to ensure control is maintained by a Chinese national, and applying specific equity caps.  Below are just a few examples of these investment restrictions:

Examples of foreign investments that require an equity joint venture or cooperative joint venture for foreign investment include:

• Exploration and development of oil and natural gas;
• Printing publications;
• Foreign invested automobile companies are limited to two or fewer JVs for the same type of vehicle;
• Market research;
• Preschool, general high school, and higher education institutes (which are also required to be led by a Chinese partner);
• General Aviation;
• Companies for forestry, agriculture, and fisheries;
• Establishment of medical institutions; and
• Commercial and passenger vehicle manufacturing.

Examples of foreign investments requiring Chinese control include:

• Selective breeding and seed production for new varieties of wheat and corn;
• Construction and operation of nuclear power plants;
• The construction and operation of the city gas, heat, and water supply and drainage pipe networks in cities with a population of more than 500,000;
• Water transport companies (domestic);
• Domestic shipping agencies;
• General aviation companies;
• The construction and operation of civilian airports;
• The establishment and operation of cinemas;
• Basic telecommunication services;
• Radio and television listenership and viewership market research; and
• Performance agencies.

Examples of foreign investment equity caps include:

• 50 percent in automobile manufacturing (except special and new energy vehicles);
• 50 percent in value-added telecom services (excepting e-commerce);
• 51 percent in life insurance firms;
• 51 percent in securities companies;
• 51 percent futures companies;
• 51 percent in security investment fund management companies; and
• 50 percent in manufacturing of commercial and passenger vehicles.

Investment restrictions that require Chinese control or force a U.S. company to form a joint venture partnership with a Chinese counterpart are often used as a pretext to compel foreign investors to transfer technology against the threat of forfeiting the opportunity to participate in China’s market.  Foreign companies have reported these dictates and decisions often are not made in writing but rather behind closed doors and are thus difficult to attribute as official Chinese government policy. Establishing a foreign investment requires passing through an extensive and non-transparent approval process to gain licensing and other necessary approvals, which gives broad discretion to Chinese authorities to impose deal-specific conditions beyond written legal requirements in a blatant effort to support industrial policy goals that bolster the technological capabilities of local competitors.  Foreign investors are also often deterred from publicly raising instances of technology coercion for fear of retaliation by the Chinese government.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

China is not a member of the OECD.  The OECD Council decided to establish a country program of dialogue and co-operation with China in October 1995.  The most recent OECD Investment Policy Review for China was completed in 2008 and a new review is currently underway.

OECD 2008 report: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/oecdinvestmentpolicyreviews-china2008encouragingresponsiblebusinessconduct.htm  .

In 2013, the OECD published a working paper entitled “China Investment Policy: An Update,” which provided updates on China’s investment policy since the publication of the 2008 Investment Policy Review.

• OECD 2013 Update: http://www.oecd.org/china/WP-2013_1.pdf 
• OECD Regulatory Restrictiveness Survey: http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm  

World Trade Organization (WTO)

China became a member of the WTO in 2001.  WTO membership boosted China’s economic growth and advanced its legal and governmental reforms.  The sixth and most recent WTO Investment Trade Review for China was completed in 2018. The report highlighted that China continues to be one of the largest destinations for FDI with inflows mainly in manufacturing, real-estate, leasing and business services, and wholesale and retail trade.  The report noted changes to China’s foreign investment regime that now relies on the nationwide negative list and also noted that pilot FTZs use a less restrictive negative list as a testbed for reform and opening.

• WTO Investment Trade Review for China: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp475_e.htm  
• International Monetary Fund (IMF) information on China: http://www.imf.org/external/country/Chn/  
• FDI Statistics from MOFCOM: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_10000177_8.html  

Business Facilitation

China made progress in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Survey by moving from 78th in 2017 up to 46th place in 2018 out of 190 economies.  This was accomplished through regulatory reforms that helped streamline some business processes including improvements related to cross-border trading, setting up electricity, electronic tax payments, and land registration.  This ranking, while highlighting business registration improvements that benefit both domestic and foreign companies, does not account for major challenges U.S. businesses face in China like IPR protection and forced technology transfer.

• World Bank Ease of Doing Business: http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings  
• World Bank Investing Across Borders: http://iab.worldbank.org/data/exploreeconomies/china  

The Government Enterprise Registration (GER), an initiative of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), gave China a low score of 1.5 out of 10 on its website for registering and obtaining a business license.  In previous years, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) was responsible for business license approval. In March 2018, the Chinese government announced a major restructuring of government agencies and created the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) that is now responsible for business registration processes.  According to GER, SAMR’s Chinese website lacks even basic information, such as what registrations are required and how they are to be conducted.

• UNCTAD GER: https://ger.co/  
• SAMR Business Registration Information: http://www.saic.gov.cn/  

The State Council, which is China’s chief administrative authority, in recent years has reduced red tape by eliminating hundreds of administrative licenses and delegating administrative approval power across a range of sectors.  The number of investment projects subject to central government approval has reportedly dropped significantly. The State Council also has set up a website in English, which is more user-friendly than SAMR’s website, to help foreign investors looking to do business in China.

The State Council Information on Doing Business in China: http://english.gov.cn/services/doingbusiness  

The Department of Foreign Investment Administration within MOFCOM is responsible for foreign investment promotion in China, including promotion activities, coordinating with investment promotion agencies at the provincial and municipal levels, engaging with international economic organizations and business associations, and conducting research related to FDI into China.  MOFCOM also maintains the “Invest in China” website.

MOFCOM “Invest in China” Information: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_10000041_8.html  

Despite recent efforts by the Chinese government to streamline business registration procedures, foreign companies still complain about the challenges they face when setting up a business.  In addition, U.S. companies complain they are treated differently from domestic companies when setting up an investment, which is an added market access barrier for U.S. companies. Numerous companies offer consulting, legal, and accounting services for establishing wholly foreign-owned enterprises, partnership enterprises, joint ventures, and representative offices in China.  The differences among these corporate entities are significant, and investors should review their options carefully with an experienced advisor before choosing a particular Chinese corporate entity or investment vehicle.

Outward Investment

Since 2001, China has initiated a “going-out” investment policy that has evolved over the past two decades.  At first, the Chinese government mainly encouraged SOEs to go abroad and acquire primarily energy investments to facilitate greater market access for Chinese exports in certain foreign markets.  As Chinese investors gained experience, and as China’s economy grew and diversified, China’s investments also have diversified with both state and private enterprise investments in all industries and economic sectors.  While China’s outbound investment levels in 2018 were significantly less than the record-setting investments levels in 2016, China was still one of the largest global outbound investors in the world. According to MOFCOM outbound investment data, 2018 total outbound direct investment (ODI) increased less than one percent compared to 2017 figures.  There was a significant drop in Chinese outbound investment to the United States and other North American countries that traditionally have accounted for a significant portion of China’s ODI. In some European countries, especially the United Kingdom, ODI generally increased. In One Belt, One Road (OBOR) countries, there has been a general increase in investment activity; however, OBOR investment deals were generally relatively small dollar amounts and constituted only a small percentage of overall Chinese ODI.

In August 2017, in reaction to concerns about capital outflows and exchange rate volatility, the Chinese government issued guidance to curb what it deemed to be “irrational” outbound investments and created “encouraged,” “restricted,” and “prohibited” outbound investment categories to guide Chinese investors.  The guidelines restricted Chinese outbound investment in sectors like property, hotels, cinemas, entertainment, sports teams, and “financial investments that create funds that are not tied to specific investment projects.” The guidance encouraged outbound investment in sectors that supported Chinese industrial policy, such as Strategic Emerging Industries (SEI) and MIC 2025, by acquiring advanced manufacturing and high-technology assets.  MIC 2025’s main aim is to transform China into an innovation-based economy that can better compete against – and eventually outperform – advanced economies in 10 key high-tech sectors, including: new energy vehicles, next-generation IT, biotechnology, new materials, aerospace, oceans engineering and ships, railway, robotics, power equipment, and agriculture machinery. Chinese firms in MIC 2025 industries often receive preferential treatment in the form of preferred financing, subsidies, and access to an opaque network of investors to promote and provide incentives for outbound investment in key sectors.  The outbound investment guidance also encourages investments that promote China’s OBOR development strategy, which seeks to create connectivity and cooperation agreements between China and countries along the Chinese-designated “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road” through an expansion of infrastructure investment, construction materials, real estate, power grids, etc.

China has 109 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in force and multiple Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters.  Generally speaking, these agreements cover topics like expropriation, most-favored-nation treatment, repatriation of investment proceeds, and arbitration mechanisms.  Relative to U.S.-negotiated BITs and FTA investment chapters, Chinese agreements are generally considered to be weaker and offer less protections to foreign investors.

A list of China’s signed BITs:

• http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/Nocategory/201111/20111107819474.shtml  
• http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu  .

The United States and China last held BIT negotiations in January 2017.  China has been in active bilateral investment agreement negotiations with the EU since 2013.  The two sides have exchanged market access offers and have expressed an intent to conclude talks by 2020.  China also has negotiated 17 FTAs with trade and investment partners, is currently negotiating 14 FTAs and FTA-upgrades, and is considering eight further potential FTA and FTA-upgrade negotiations.  China’s existing FTA partners are Maldives, Georgia, ASEAN, Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Australia, Singapore, Pakistan, New Zealand, Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.  China concluded its FTAs with Maldives and Georgia in 2017.

China’s signed FTAs:

• http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/index.shtml  
• http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml  

The United States and China concluded a bilateral taxation treaty in 1984.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

In assessing China’s regulatory governance effectiveness, the World Bank Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance gave China a composite score of 1.75 out 5 points.  The World Bank attributed China’s relatively low score to the futility of foreign companies appealing administrative authorities’ decisions, given partial courts; not having laws and regulations in one accessible place that is updated regularly; the lack of impact assessments conducted prior to issuing new laws; and other concerns about public comments and transparency.

World Bank Rule Making Information: http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/en/data/explorecountries/china  

In various business climate surveys, U.S. businesses operating in China consistently cite arbitrary legal enforcement and the lack of regulatory transparency among the top challenges of doing business in China.  These challenges stem from a complex legal and regulatory system that provides government regulators and authorities broad discretion to selectively enforce regulations, rules, and other guidelines in an inconsistent and impartial manner, often to the detriment of foreign investor interests.  Moreover, regulators are often allowed to hinder fair competition by allowing authorities to ignore Chinese legal transgressors while at the same time strictly enforcing regulations selectively against foreign companies.

Another compounding problem is that Chinese government agencies rely on rules and enforcement guidelines that often are not published or even part of the formal legal and regulatory system.  “Normative Documents” (opinions, circulars, notices, etc.), or quasi-legal measures used to address situations where there is no explicit law or administrative regulation, are often not made available for public comment or even published, yet are binding in practice upon parties active in the Chinese market.  As a result, foreign investors are often confronted with a regulatory system rife with inconsistencies that hinders business confidence and generates confusion for U.S. businesses operating in China.

One of China’s WTO accession commitments was to establish an official journal dedicated to the publication of laws, regulations, and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), or the control of foreign exchange.  The State Council’s Legislative Affairs Office (SCLAO) issued two regulations instructing Chinese agencies to comply with this WTO obligation and also issued Interim Measures on Public Comment Solicitation of Laws and Regulations and the Circular on Public Comment Solicitation of Department Rules, which required government agencies to post draft regulations and departmental rules on the official SCLAO website for a 30-day public comment period.  Despite the fact this requirement has been mandated by Chinese law and was part of the China’s WTO accession commitments, Chinese ministries under the State Council continue to post only some draft administrative regulations and departmental rules on the SCLAO website.  When drafts are posted for public comment, the comment period often is less than the required 30 days.

China’s proposed draft regulations are often drafted without using scientific studies or quantitative analysis to assess the regulation’s impact.  When Chinese officials claim an assessment was made, the methodology of the study and the results are not made available to the public. When draft regulations are available for public comment, it is unclear what impact third-party comments have on the final regulation.  Many U.S. stakeholders have complained of the futility of the public comment process in China, often concluding that the lack of transparency in regulation drafting is purposeful and driven primarily by industrial policy goals and other anti-competitive factors that are often inconsistent with market-based principles.  In addition, foreign parties are often restricted from full participation in Chinese standardization activities, potentially providing Chinese competitors opportunity to develop standards inconsistent with international norms and detrimental to foreign investor interests.

In China’s state-dominated economic system, it is impossible to assess the motivating factors behind state action.  The relationships are often blurred between the CCP, the Chinese government, Chinese business (state and private owned), and other Chinese stakeholders that make up the domestic economy.  Foreign invested enterprises perceive that China prioritizes political goals, industrial policies, and a desire to protect social stability at the expense of foreign investors, fairness, and overall rule of law.  These blurred lines are on full display in some industries that have Chinese Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) that make licensing decisions. For instance, a Chinese financial institution who is a direct competitor to a foreign enterprise applying for a license may be a voting member of the governing SRO and can either influence other SRO members or even directly adjudicate the application of the foreign license.  To protect market share and competitive position, this company likely has an incentive to disapprove the license application, further hindering fair competition in the industry or economic sector.

For accounting standards, Chinese companies use the Chinese Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE) for all financial reporting within mainland China.  Companies listed overseas (including in Hong Kong) may choose to use ASBE, the International Financial Reporting Standards, or Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards.

International Regulatory Considerations

China has been a member of the WTO since 2001.  As part of its accession agreement, China agreed to notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee) of all draft technical regulations.  Compliance with this WTO commitment is something Chinese officials have promised in previous dialogues with U.S. government officials. The United States remains concerned that China continues to issue draft technical regulations without proper notification to the TBT Committee

Legal System and Judicial Independence

The Chinese legal system is based on a civil law model that borrowed heavily from the legal systems of Germany and France but retains Chinese legal characteristics.  The rules governing commercial activities are found in various laws, regulations, and judicial interpretations, including China’s civil law, contract law, partnership enterprises law, security law, insurance law, enterprises bankruptcy law, labor law, and several interpretations and regulations issued by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC).  While China does not have specialized commercial courts, it has created specialized courts and tribunals for the hearing of intellectual property disputes. In 2014, China launched three intellectual property (IP) courts in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai. In October 2018, the National People’s Congress approved the establishment of an national-level appellate tribunal within the SPC to hear civil and administrative appeals of technically complex IP cases .

China’s Constitution and various laws provide contradictory statements about court independence and the right of judges to exercise adjudicative power free from interference by administrative organs, public organizations, and/or powerful individuals.  However in practice, courts are heavily influenced by Chinese regulators. Moreover, the Chinese Constitution established that the “leadership of the Communist Party” is supreme, which in practices makes judges susceptible to party pressure on commercial decisions impacting foreign investors.  This trend of central party influence in all areas, not just in the legal system, has only been strengthened by President Xi Jinping’s efforts to consolidate political power and promote the role of the party in all economic activities. Other reasons for judicial interference may include:

• Courts fall under the jurisdiction of local governments;
• Court budgets are appropriated by local administrative authorities;
• Judges in China have administrative ranks and are managed as administrative officials;
• The CCP is in charge of the appointment, dismissal, transfer, and promotion of administrative officials;
• China’s Constitution stipulates that local legislatures appoint and supervise the courts; and
• Corruption may also influence local court decisions.

While in limited cases U.S. companies have received favorable outcomes from China’s courts, the U.S. business community consistently reports that Chinese courts, particularly at lower levels, are susceptible to outside political influence (particularly from local governments), lack the sophistication and educational background needed to understand complex commercial disputes, and operate without transparency.  U.S. companies often avoid challenging administrative decisions or bringing commercial disputes before a local court because of perceptions that these efforts would be futile and for fear of future retaliation by government officials.

Reports of business disputes involving violence, death threats, hostage-taking, and travel bans involving Americans continue to be prevalent.  However, American citizens and foreigners in general do not appear to be more likely than Chinese nationals to be subject to this kind of coercive treatment.  Police are often reluctant to intervene in what they consider internal contract disputes.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

The legal and regulatory framework in China controlling foreign direct investment activities is more restrictive and less transparent across-the-board compared to the investment frameworks of developed countries, including the United States.  China has made efforts to unify its foreign investment laws and clarify prohibited and restricted industries in the negative list.

On March 17, 2019 China’s National People’s Congress passed the Foreign Investment Law (FIL) that intends to replace existing foreign investment laws.  This law will go into effect on January 1, 2020 and will replace the previous foreign investment framework based on three foreign-invested entity laws: the China-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise Law, the China-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Enterprise Law, and the Foreign-Invested Enterprise (FIE) Law.  The FIL provides a five-year transition period for foreign enterprises established under previous foreign investment laws, after which all foreign enterprises will be subject to similar laws as domestic companies, like the company law, the enterprise law, etc.

In addition to these foreign investment laws, multiple implementation guidelines and other administrative regulations issued by the State Council that are directly derived from the law also affect foreign investment.  Under the three current foreign investment laws, such implementation guidelines include:

• Implementation Regulations of the China-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprises Law;
• Implementation Regulations of the China-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Enterprise Law;
• Implementation Regulations of the FIE Law;
• State Council Provisions on Encouraging Foreign Investment;
• Provisions on Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment; and
• Administrative Provisions on Foreign Investment to Telecom Enterprises.

In addition to the three central-level laws mentioned above, there are also over 1,000 rules and regulatory documents related to foreign investment in China,  issued by government ministries, including:

• the Foreign Investment Negative List;
• Provisions on Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors;
• Administrative Provisions on Foreign Investment in Road Transportation Industry;
• Interim Provisions on Foreign Investment in Cinemas;
• Administrative Measures on Foreign Investment in Commercial Areas;
• Administrative Measures on Ratification of Foreign Invested Projects;
• Administrative Measures on Foreign Investment in Distribution Enterprises of Books, Newspapers, and Periodicals;
• Provision on the Establishment of Investment Companies by Foreign Investors; and
• Administrative Measures on Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors.

The State Council has yet to provide a timeframe for new implementation guidelines for the Foreign Investment Law that will replace the implementation guidelines under the previous foreign investment system.  While the FIL reiterates existing Chinese commitments in regards to certain elements of the business environment, including IP protection for foreign-invested enterprises, details on implementation and the enforcement mechanisms available to foreign investors have yet to be provided.

In addition to central-level laws and implementation guidelines, local regulators and governments also enact their own regulations, rules, and guidelines that directly impact foreign investment in their geographical area.  Examples include the Wuhan Administration Regulation on Foreign-Invested Enterprises and Shanghai’s Municipal Administration Measures on Land Usage of Foreign-Invested Enterprises.

A Chinese language list of Chinese laws and regulations, at both the central and local levels: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/  .

FDI Laws on Investment Approvals

Foreign investments in industries and economic sectors that are not explicitly restricted or prohibited on the foreign investment negative list are not subject to MOFCOM pre-approval, but notification is required on proposed foreign investments.  In practice, investing in an industry not on the negative list does not guarantee a foreign investor national treatment in establishing an foreign investment as investors must comply with other steps and approvals like receiving land rights, business licenses, and other necessary permits.  In some industries, such as telecommunications, foreign investors will also need to receive approval from regulators or relevant ministries like the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT).

The Market Access Negative List issued December 2018 incorporated the previously issued State Council catalogue for investment projects called the Decision on Investment Regime Reform and the Catalogue of Investment Projects subject to Government Ratification (Ratification Catalogue).  Both foreign enterprises and domestic firms are subject to this negative list and both are required to receive government ratification of investment projects listed in the catalogue.  The Ratification Catalogue was first issued in 2004 and has since undergone various reiterations that have shortened the number of investment projects needed for ratification and removed previous requirements that made foreign investors file for record all investment activities.  The most recent version was last issued in 2016. Projects still needing ratification by NDRC and/or local DRCs include investments surpassing a specific dollar threshold, in industries experiencing overcapacity issues, or in industries that promote outdated technologies that may cause environmental hazards.  For foreign investments over USD300 million, NDRC must ratify the investment. For industries in specific sectors, the local Development and Reform Commission (DRC) is in charge of the ratification.

Ratification Catalogue: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-12/20/content_5150587.htm  

When a foreign investment needs ratification from the NDRC or a local DRC, that administrative body is in charge of assessing the project’s compliance with China’s laws and regulations; the proposed investment’s compliance with the foreign investment and market access negative lists and various industrial policy documents; its national security, environmental safety, and public interest implications; its use of resources and energy; and its economic development ramifications.  In some cases, NDRC also solicits the opinions of relevant Chinese industrial regulators and “consulting agencies,” which may include industry associations that represent Chinese domestic firms. This presents potential conflicts of interest that can disadvantage foreign investors seeking to receive project approval. The State Council may also weigh in on high-value projects in “restricted” sectors.

If a foreign investor has established an investment not on the foreign investment negative list and has received NDRC approval for the investment project if needed, the investor then can apply for a business license with a new ministry announced in March 2018, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR).  Once a license is obtained, the investor registers with China’s tax and foreign exchange agencies. Greenfield investment projects must also seek approval from China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment and the Ministry of Natural Resources. In several sectors, subsequent industry regulatory permits are required. The specific approvals process may vary from case to case, depending on the details of a particular investment proposal and local rules and practices.

For investments made via merger or acquisition with a Chinese domestic enterprise, an anti-monopoly review and national security review may be required by SAMR if there are competition concerns about the foreign transaction.  The anti-monopoly review is detailed in a later section of this report, on competition policy.

Article 12 of MOFCOM’s Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investment stipulates that parties are required to report a transaction to SAMR if:

• Foreign investors obtain actual control, via merger or acquisition, of a domestic enterprise in a key industry;
• The merger or acquisition affects or may affect “national economic security”; or
• The merger or acquisition would cause the transfer of actual control of a domestic enterprise with a famous trademark or a Chinese time-honored brand.

If SAMR determines the parties did not report a merger or acquisition that affects or could affect national economic security, it may, together with other government agencies, require the parties to terminate the transaction or adopt other measures to eliminate the impact on national economic security.  They may also assess fines.

In February 2011, China released the State Council Notice Regarding the Establishment of a Security Review Mechanism for Foreign Investors Acquiring Domestic Enterprises.  The notice established an interagency Joint Conference, led by NDRC and MOFCOM, with authority to block foreign M&As of domestic firms that it believes may impact national security.  The Joint Conference is instructed to consider not just national security, but also “national economic security” and “social order” when reviewing transactions. China has not disclosed any instances in which it invoked this formal review mechanism.  A national security review process for foreign investments was written into China’s new Foreign Investment Law, but with very few details on how the process would be implemented.

Chinese local commerce departments are responsible for flagging transactions that require a national security review when they review them in an early stage of China’s foreign investment approval process.  Some provincial and municipal departments of commerce have published online a Security Review Industry Table listing non-defense industries where transactions may trigger a national security review, but MOFCOM has declined to confirm whether these lists reflect official policy.  In addition, third parties such as other governmental agencies, industry associations, and companies in the same industry can seek MOFCOM’s review of transactions, which can pose conflicts of interest that disadvantage foreign investors.  Investors may also voluntarily file for a national security review.

U.S.  Chamber of Commerce report on Approval Process for Inbound Foreign Direct Investment: http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/020021_China_InvestmentPaper_hires.pdf .

Foreign Investment Law

On March 15, 2019 the National People’s Congress passed the Foreign Investment Law (FIL) that replaced all existing foreign investment laws, including the China-Foreign Joint Venture Law, the Contract Joint Venture Law, and the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises Law.  The FIL is significantly shorter than the 2015 draft version issued for public comment and the text is vague and provides loopholes through which regulators could potentially discriminate against foreign investors. While the law made policy declarations on important issues to U.S. and other foreign investors (e.g.,  equal protection of intellectual property, prohibitions again certain kinds of forced technology transer, and greater market access,), specifics on implementation and enforcement were lacking.  The law goes into effect on January 1, 2020. Many high-level Chinese officials have stated that the implementation guidelines and other corresponding legal changes will be developed prior to the law going into effect.  The content of these guidelines and future corresponding changes to other laws to become consistent with the FIL will largely determine the impact it will have on the investment climate.

Free Trade Zone Foreign Investment Laws

China issued in 2015 the Interim Measures on the National Security Review of Foreign Investment in Free Trade Zones.  The definition of “national security” is broad, covering investments in military, national defense, agriculture, energy, infrastructure, transportation, culture, information technology products and services, key technology, and manufacturing.

In addition, MOFCOM issued the Administrative Measures for the Record-Filing of Foreign Investment in Free Trade Zones, outlining a more streamlined process that foreign investors need to follow to register investments in the FTZs.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

China uses a complex system of laws, regulations, and agency specific guidelines at both the central and provincial levels that impacts an economic sector’s makeup, sometimes as a monopoly, near-monopoly, or authorized oligopoly.  These measures are particularly common in resource-intensive sectors such as electricity and transportation, as well as in industries seeking unified national coverage like telecommunication and postal services. The measures also target sectors the government deems vital to national security and economic stability, including defense, energy, and banking.  Examples of such laws and regulations include the Law on Electricity (1996), Civil Aviation Law (1995), Regulations on Telecommunication (2000), Postal Law (amended in 2009), Railroad Law (1991), and Commercial Bank Law (amended in 2003), among others.

Anti-Monopoly Law

China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) went into effect on August 1, 2008.  The National People Congress in March 2018 announced that AML enforcement authorities previously held by three government ministries would be consolidated into a new ministry called the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR).  This new agency would still be responsible for AML enforcement and cover issues like concentrations review (M&As), cartel agreements, abuse of dominant market position, and abuse of administrative powers. To fill in some of the gaps from the original AML and to address new commercial trends in China’s market, SAMR has started the process of issuing draft implementation guidelines to clarify enforcement on issues like merger penalties, implementation of abuse of market dominant position, etc.  By unifying antitrust enforcement under one agency, the Chinese government hopes to consolidate guidelines from the three previous agencies and provide greater clarity for businesses operating in China. Generally, the AML enforcement agencies have sought public comment on proposed measures and guidelines, although comment periods can be less than 30 days.

In addition to the AML, the State Council in June 2016 issued guidelines for the Fair Competition Review Mechanism that targets administrative monopolies created by government agents, primarily at the local level.  The mechanism not only requires government agencies to conduct a fair competition review prior to issuing new laws, regulations, and guidelines, to certify that proposed measures do not inhibit competition, but also requires government agencies to conduct a review of all existing rules, regulations, and guidelines, to eliminate existing laws and regulations that are competition inhibiting.  In October 2017, the State Council, State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Ministry of Finance, and three AML agencies issued implementation rules for the fair competition review system to strengthen review procedures, provide review criteria, enhance coordination among government entities, and improve overall competition-based supervision in new laws and regulations. While local government bodies have reported a completed review of over 100,000 different administrative documents, it is unclear what changes have been made and what impact it has had on actually improving the competitive landscape in China.

While procedural developments such as those outlined above are seen as generally positive, the actual enforcement of competition laws and regulations is uneven.  Inconsistent central and provincial enforcement of antitrust law often exacerbates local protectionism by restricting inter-provincial trade, limiting market access for certain imported products, using measures that raise production costs, and limiting opportunities for foreign investment.  Government authorities at all levels in China may also restrict competition to insulate favored firms from competition through various forms of regulations and industrial policies. While at times the ultimate benefactor of such policies is unclear, foreign companies have expressed concern that the central government’s use of AML enforcement is often selectively used to target foreign companies, becoming an extension of other industrial policies that favor SOEs and Chinese companies deemed potential “national champions.”

Since the AML went into effect, the number of M&A transactions reviewed each year by Chinese officials has continued to grow.  U.S. companies and other observers have expressed concerns that SAMR is required to consult with other Chinese agencies when reviewing a potential transaction and that other agencies can raise concerns that are often not related to competition to either block, delay, or force one or more of the parties to comply with a condition in order to receive approval.  There is also suspicion that Chinese regulators rarely approve “on condition” any transactions involving two Chinese companies, thus signaling an inherent AML bias against foreign enterprises.

Under NDRC’s previous enforcement of price-related monopolies, some procedural progress in AML enforcement was made, as they started to release aggregate data on investigations and publicize case decisions.  However, many U.S. companies complained that NDRC discouraged companies from having legal representation during informal discussions or even during formal investigations. In addition, the investigative process reportedly lacked basic transparency or specific best practice guidance on procedures like evidence gathering.  Observers continue to raise concern over the use of “dawn raids” that can be used at any time as a means of intimidation or to prop up a local Chinese company against a competing foreign company in an effort to push forward specific industrial policy goals. Observers also remain concerned that Chinese officials during an investigation will fail to protect commercial secrets and have access to secret and proprietary information that could be given to Chinese competitors.

In prior bilateral dialogues, China committed to strengthening IP protection and enforcement.  However, concerns remain on how China views the intersection of IP protection and antitrust. Previous AML guidelines issued by antitrust regulators for public comment disproportionately impacted foreign firms (generally IP rights holders) by requiring an IP rights holder to license technology at a “fair price” so as not to allow abuse of the company’s “dominant market position.”  Foreign companies have long complained that China’s enforcement of AML serves industrial policy goals of, among other things, forcing technology transfer to local competitors. In other more developed antitrust jurisdictions, companies are free to exclude competitors and set prices, and the right to do so is recognized as the foundation of the incentive to innovate.

Another consistent area of concern expressed by foreign companies deals with the degree to which the AML applies – or fails to apply – to SOEs and other government monopolies, which are permitted in some industries.  While SAMR has said AML enforcement applies to SOEs the same as domestic or foreign firms, the reality is that only a few minor punitive actions have been taken against provincial level SOEs. In addition, the AML explicitly protects the lawful operations of SOEs and government monopolies in industries deemed nationally important.  While SOEs have not been entirely immune from AML investigations, the number of investigations is not commensurate with the significant role SOEs play in China’s economy. The CCP’s proactive orchestration of mergers and consolidation of SOEs in industries like rail, marine shipping, metals, and other strategic sectors, which in most instances only further insulates SOEs from both private and foreign competition, signaling that enforcement against SOEs will likely remain limited despite potential negative impacts on consumer welfare.

Expropriation and Compensation

Chinese law prohibits nationalization of foreign-invested enterprises, except under “special circumstances.”  Chinese laws, such as the Foreign Investment Law, states there are circumstances for expropriation of foreign assets that may include national security or a public interest needs, such as large civil engineering projects.  However, the law does not specify circumstances that would lead to the nationalization of a foreign investment. Chinese law requires fair compensation for an expropriated foreign investment but does not provide details on the method or formula used to calculate the value of the foreign investment.  The Department of State is not aware of any cases since 1979 in which China has expropriated a U.S. investment, although the Department has notified Congress through the annual 527 Investment Dispute Report of several cases of concern.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

China is a contracting state to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) and has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention).  The domestic legislation that provides for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards related to these two Conventions includes the Arbitration Law adopted in 1994, the Civil Procedure Law adopted in 1991 (later amended in 2012), the Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures adopted in 1979 (amended most recently in 2001), and a number of other laws with similar provisions.  China’s Arbitration Law has embraced many of the fundamental principles of The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Chinese officials typically urge private parties to resolve commercial disputes through informal conciliation.  If formal mediation is necessary, Chinese parties and the authorities typically prefer arbitration to litigation.  Many contract disputes require arbitration by the Beijing-based China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).  Established by the State Council in 1956 under the auspices of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), CIETAC is China’s most widely-utilized arbitral body in China for foreign-related disputes.  Some foreign parties have obtained favorable rulings from CIETAC, while others have questioned CIETAC’s fairness and effectiveness.

CIETAC also had four sub-commissions located in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, and Chongqing.  CCPIT, under the authority of the State Council, issued new arbitration rules in 2012 that granted CIETAC headquarters greater authority to hear cases than the sub-commissions.  As a result, CIETAC Shanghai and CIETAC Shenzhen declared independence from the Beijing authority, issued new rules, and changed their names. This split led to CIETAC disqualifying the former Shanghai and Shenzhen affiliates from administering arbitration disputes, raising serious concerns among the U.S. business and legal communities over the validity of arbitration agreements arrived at under different arbitration procedures and the enforceability of arbitral awards issued by the sub-commissions.  In 2013, the Supreme People’s Court issued a notice clarifying that any lower court that hears a case arising out of the CIETAC split must report the case to the court before making a decision. However, this notice is brief and lacks detail like the timeframe for the lower court to refer and the timeframe for the Supreme People’s Court to issue an opinion.

Beside the central-level arbitration commission, there are also provincial and municipal arbitration commissions that have emerged as serious domestic competitors to CIETAC.  A foreign party may also seek arbitration in some instances from an offshore commission. Foreign companies often encounter challenges in enforcing arbitration decisions issued by Chinese and foreign arbitration bodies.  In these instances, foreign investors may appeal to higher courts.

The Chinese government and judicial bodies do not maintain a public record of investment disputes.  The Supreme People’s Court maintains an annual count of the number of cases involving foreigners but does not provide details about the cases, identify civil or commercial disputes, or note foreign investment disputes.  Rulings in some cases are open to the public.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Articles 281 and 282 of China’s Civil Procedural Law governs the enforcement of judgments issued by foreign courts.  The law states that Chinese courts should consider factors like China’s treaty obligations, reciprocity principles, basic Chinese law, Chinese sovereignty, Chinese social and public interests, and national security before determining if the foreign court judgment should be recognized.  As a result of this broad criteria, there are few examples of Chinese courts recognizing and enforcing a foreign court judgment. China has bilateral agreements with 27 countries on the recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments, but not with the United States.

Article 270 of China’s Civil Procedure Law also states that time limits in civil cases do not apply to cases involving foreign investment.  According to the 2012 CIETAC Arbitration Rules, in an ordinary procedure case, the arbitral tribunal shall render an arbitral award within six months (in foreign-related cases) from the date on which the arbitral tribunal is formed.  In a summary procedure case, the arbitral tribunal shall make an award within three months from the date on which the arbitral tribunal is formed.

Bankruptcy Regulations

China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law took effect on June 1, 2007 and applies to all companies incorporated under Chinese laws and subject to Chinese regulations.  This includes private companies, public companies, SOEs, foreign invested enterprises (FIEs), and financial institutions.  China’s primary bankruptcy legislation generally is commensurate with developed countries’ bankruptcy laws and provides for reorganization or restructuring, rather than liquidation.  However, due to the lack of implementation guidelines and the limited number of previous cases that could provide legal precedent, the law has never been fully enforced.  Most corporate debt disputes are settled through negotiations led by local governments.  In addition, companies are disincentivized from pursing bankruptcy because of the potential for local government interference and fear of losing control over the bankruptcy outcome.  According to experts, Chinese courts not only lack the resources and capacity to handle bankruptcy cases, but bankruptcy administrators, clerks, and judges all lack relevant experience.

In the October 2016 State Council Guiding Opinion on Reducing Enterprises’ Leverage Ratio, bankruptcy was identified as a tool to manage China’s corporate debt problems.  This was consistent with increased government rhetoric throughout the year in support of bankruptcy.  For example, in June 2016, the Supreme People’s Court issued a notice to establish bankruptcy divisions at intermediate courts and to increase the number of judges and support staff to handle liquidation and bankruptcy issues.  On August 1, 2016, the court also launched a new bankruptcy and reorganization electronic information platform: http://pccz.court.gov.cn/pcajxxw/index/xxwsy  .

The number of bankruptcy cases has continued to grow rapidly since 2015.  According to a National People’s Congress (NPC) official, in 2018, 18,823 liquidation and bankruptcy cases were accepted by Chinese courts, an increase of over 95 percent from last year.  11,669 of those cases were closed, an increase of 86.5 percent from the year before.  The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) reported that in 2017, 9,542 bankruptcy cases were accepted by the Chinese courts, representing a 68.4 percent year-on-year increase from 2016, and 6,257 cases were closed, representing a 73.7 percent year-on-year increase from 2016. The SPC has continued to issue clarifications and new implementing measures to improve bankruptcy procedures.

Investment Incentives

To attract foreign investment, different provinces and municipalities offer preferential packages like a temporary reduction in taxes, resources and land use benefits, reduction in import and/or export duties, special treatment in obtaining basic infrastructure services, streamlined government approvals, research and development subsidies, and funding for initial startups.  Often, these packages stipulate that foreign investors must meet certain benchmarks for exports, local content, technology transfer, and other requirements.  Preferential treatment often occurs in specific sectors that the government has identified for policy support, like technology and advanced manufacturing, and will be specific to a geographic location like a special economic zone (like FTZs), development zone, or a science park.  The Chinese government has also prioritized foreign investment in inland China by providing incentives to invest in seven new FTZs located in inland regions (2017) and offering more liberalizations to foreign investment through its Catalogue of Priority Industries for Foreign Investment in Central and Western China that provides greater market access to foreign investors willing to invest in less developed areas in Central and Western China.

While state subsidies has long been an area that foreign investors have criticized for distorting competition in certain industries, Chinese officials have publicly pledged that foreign investors willing to manufacture products in China can equally participate in the research and development programs financed by the Chinese government.  The Chinese government has also said foreign investors have equal access to preferential policies under initiatives like Made in China 2025 and Strategic Emerging Industries that seek to transform China’s economy into an innovation-based economy that becomes a global leader in future growth sectors.  In these high-tech and advanced manufacturing sectors, China needs foreign investment because it lacks the capacity, expertise, and technological know-how to conduct advanced research or manufacture advanced technology on par with other developed economies.  Announced in 2015, China’s MIC 2025 roadmap has prioritized the following industries: new-generation information technology, advanced numerical-control machine tools and robotics, aerospace equipment, maritime engineering equipment and vessels, advanced rail, new-energy vehicles, energy equipment, agricultural equipment, new materials, and biopharmaceuticals and medical equipment.  While mentions of MIC 2025 have all but disappeared from public discourse, a raft of policy announcements at the national and sub-national level indicate China’s continued commitment to developing these sectors.  Foreign investment plays an important role in helping China move up the manufacturing value chain.  However, there are a large number of economic sectors that China deems sensitive due to broadly defined national security concerns, including “economic security,” which can effectively close off foreign investment to those sectors.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

China has customs-bonded areas in Shanghai, Tianjin, Shantou, Guangzhou, Dalian, Xiamen, Ningbo, Zhuhai, Fuzhou, and parts of Shenzhen.  In addition to these official duty-free zones identified by China’s State Council, there are also numerous economic development zones and “open cities” that offer preferential treatment and benefits to investors, including foreign investors.

In September 2013, the State Council in conjunction with the Shanghai municipal government, announced the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone that consolidated the geographical area of four previous bonded areas into a single FTZ.  In April 2015, the State Council expanded the pilot to include new FTZs in Tianjin, Guangdong, and Fujian. In March 2017, the State Council approved seven new FTZs in Chongqing, Henan, Hubei, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Zhejiang, with the stated purpose to integrate these areas more closely with the OBOR initiative – the Chinese government’s plan to enhance global economic interconnectivity through joint infrastructure and investment projects that connect China’s inland and border regions to the rest of the world.  In October 2018, the Chinese government rolled out plans to convert the entire island province of Hainan into an FTZ that will take effect in 2020. This FTZ aims to provide a more open and high-standard trade and investment hub focused on improved rule of law and financial services. In addition to encourage tourism development, the Hainan FTZ will also seek to develop high-tech industries while preserving the ecology of the island. The goal of all China’s FTZs is to provide a trial ground for trade and investment liberalization measures and to introduce service sector reforms, especially in financial services, that China expects eventually to introduce in other parts of the domestic economy.

The FTZs should offer foreign investors “national treatment” for the market access phase of an investment in industries and sectors not listed on the FTZ “negative list,” or on the list of industries and economic sectors restricted or prohibited for foreign investment.  The State Council published an updated FTZ negative list in June 2018 that reduced the number of restrictions and prohibitions on foreign investment from 95 items down to 45. The most recent negative list did not remove many commercially significant restrictions or prohibitions compared to the nationwide negative list also released in June 2018.

Although the FTZ negative list in theory provides greater market access for foreign investment in the FTZs, many foreign firms have reported that in practice, the degree of liberalization in the FTZs is comparable to other opportunities in other parts of China.  According to Chinese officials, over 18,000 entities have registered in the FTZs. The municipal and central governments have released a number of administrative and sector-specific regulations and circulars that outline the procedures and regulations in the zones.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

As part of China’s WTO accession agreement, China promised to revise its foreign investment laws to eliminate sections that imposed export performance, local content, balanced foreign exchange through trade, technology transfer, and create research and development center requirements on foreign investors as a prerequisite to enter China’s market.  As part of these revisions, China committed to only enforce technology transfer requirements that do not violate WTO standards on IP and trade-related investment measures. In practice, however, China has not completely lived up to these promises with some U.S. businesses reporting that local officials and regulators sometimes only accept investments with “voluntary” performance requirements or technology transfer that helps develop certain domestic industries and support the local job market.  Provincial and municipal governments will sometimes restrict access to local markets, government procurement, and public works projects even for foreign firms that have already invested in the province or municipality. In addition, Chinese regulators have reportedly pressured foreign firms in some sectors to disclose IP content or provide IP licenses to Chinese firms, often at below market rates. These practices not only run contrary to WTO principles but hurt the competitive position of foreign investors.

China also called to restrict the ability of both domestic and foreign operators of “critical information infrastructure” to transfer personal data and important information outside of China while also requiring those same operators to only store data physically in China.  These potential restrictions have prompted many firms to review how their networks manage data. Foreign firms also fear that calls for use of “secure and controllable,” “secure and trustworthy,” etc. technologies will curtail sales opportunities for foreign firms or that foreign companies may be pressured to disclose source code and other proprietary information, putting IP at risk.  In addition, prescriptive technology adoption requirements, often in the form of domestic standards that diverge from global norms, in effect gives preference to domestic firms and their technology. These requirements not only hinder operational effectiveness but also potentially puts in jeopardy IP protection and overall competitiveness of foreign firms operating in China.

Real Property

Foreign companies have long complained that the Chinese legal system, responsible for mediating acquisition and disposition of property, has inconsistently protected the legal real property rights of foreigners.

Urban land is entirely owned by the State.  The State can issue long-term land leases to individuals and companies, including foreigners, subject to many restrictions.  China’s Property Law stipulates that residential property rights will renew automatically, while commercial and industrial grants shall be renewed if the renewal does not conflict with other public interest claims.  A number of foreign investors have reported that their land use rights were revoked and given to developers to build neighborhoods designated for building projects by government officials. Investors often complain that compensation in these cases has been nominal.

In rural China, collectively-owned land use rights are more complicated.  The registration system chronically suffers from unclear ownership lines and disputed border claims, often at the expense of local farmers who are excluded from the process by village leaders making “handshake deals” with commercial interests.  The central government announced in 2016, and reiterated in 2017 and 2018, plans to reform the rural land registration system so as to put more control in the hands of farmers, but some experts remain skeptical that changes will be properly implemented and enforced.

China’s Securities Law defines debtor and guarantor rights, including rights to mortgage certain types of property and other tangible assets, including long-term leases.  Chinese law does not prohibit foreigners from buying non-performing debt, which can only be acquired through state-owned asset management firms. However, in practice, Chinese official often use bureaucratic hurdles that limit foreigners’ ability to liquidate assets, further discouraging foreign purchase of non-performing debt.

Intellectual Property Rights

Following WTO accession, China updated many laws and regulations to comply with the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and other international agreements.  However, despite the changes to China’s legal and regulatory regime, some aspects of China’s IP protection regime fall short of international best practices.  In addition, enforcement ineffectiveness of Chinese laws and regulations remains a significant challenge for foreign investors trying to protect their IPR.

Major impediments to effective IP enforcement include the unavailability of deterrent-level penalties for infringement, a lack of transparency, unclear standards for establishing criminal investigations, the absence of evidence production methods to compel evidence from infringers, and local protectionism, among others.  Chinese government officials tout the success of China’s specialized IP courts – including the establishment of a new appellate tribunal within the SPC – as evidence of its commitment to IP protection; however, while this shows a growing awareness of IPR in China’s legal system, civil litigation against IP infringement will remain an option with limited effect until there is an increase in the amount of damages an infringer pays for IP violations.

Chinese-based companies remain the largest IP infringers of U.S. products.  Goods shipped from China (including those transshipped through Hong Kong) accounted for an estimated 87 percent of IPR-infringing goods seized at U.S. borders.  (Note: This U.S.  Customs statistic does not specify where the fake goods were made.)  China imposes requirements that U.S. firms develop their IP in China or transfer their IP to Chinese entities as a condition to accessing the Chinese market, or to obtain tax and other preferential benefits available to domestic companies.  Chinese policies can effectively require U.S. firms to localize research and development activities, practices documented in the March 2018 Section 301 Report released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).  China remained on the Priority Watch List in the 2019 USTR Special 301 Report, and several Chinese physical and online markets were included in the 2018 USTR Notorious Markets Report.  For detailed information on China’s environment for IPR protection and enforcement, please see the following reports:

• USTR Section 301 Report on China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section percent20301 percent20FINAL.PDF 
• USTR Update Concerning China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/301 percent20Report percent20Update.pdf  
• USTR 2019 Special 301 Report (see section on China): https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-publications/2019/2019-special-301-report  
• USTR’s 2018 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers in China (see section on China): https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018 percent20National percent20Trade percent20Estimate percent20Report.pdf 
• USTR’s 2018 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018-USTR-Report-to-Congress-on-China percent27s-WTO-Compliance.pdf 
• USTR’s 2018 Notorious Market Report (see China): https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2018_Notorious_Markets_List.pdf 

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local intellectual property offices, please see the World Intellectual Property Organization’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en  

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

China’s leadership has stated that it seeks to build a modern, highly developed, and multi-tiered capital market.  Bank loans continue to provide the majority of credit options (reportedly around 81.4 percent in 2018) for Chinese companies, although other sources of capital, such as corporate bonds, equity financing, and private equity are quickly expanding their scope, reach, and sophistication in China.  In the past three years, Chinese regulators have taken measures to rein in the rapid growth of China’s “shadow banking” sector, which includes vehicles such as wealth management and trust products.  The measures have achieved positive results. The share of trust loans, entrust loans and undiscounted bankers’ acceptances dropped a total of 15.2 percent in total social financing (TSF) – a broad measure of available credit in China, most of which was comprised of corporate bonds. TSF’s share of corporate bonds jumped from a negative 2.31 percent in 2017 to 12.9 percent in 2018. Chinese regulators regularly use administrative methods to control credit growth, although market-based tools such as interest rate policy and adjusting the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) play an increasingly important role.

The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), China’s central bank, has gradually increased flexibility for banks in setting interest rates, formally removing the floor on the lending rate in 2013 and the deposit rate cap in 2015 – but is understood to still influence bank’s interest rates through “window guidance.”  Favored borrowers, particularly SOEs, benefit from greater access to capital and lower financing costs, as they can use political influence to secure bank loans, and lenders perceive these entities to have an implicit government guarantee.  Small- and medium-sized enterprises, by contrast, have the most difficulty obtaining financing, often forced to rely on retained earnings or informal investment channels.

In 2018, Chinese regulators have taken measures to improve financing for the private sector, particularly small, medium and micro-sized enterprises (SMEs).  On November 1, 2018, Xi Jinping held an unprecedented meeting with private companies on how to support the development of private enterprises. Xi emphasized to the importance of resolving difficult and expensive financing problems for private firms and pledged to create a fair and competitive business environment.  He encouraged banks to lend more to private firms, as well as urged local governments to provide more financial support for credit-worthy private companies. Provincial and municipal governments could raise funds to bailout private enterprises if needed. The PBOC increased the relending and rediscount quota of RMB 300 billion for SMEs and private enterprises at the end of 2018.  The government also introduced bond financing supportive instruments for private enterprises, and the PBOC began promoting qualified PE funds, securities firms, and financial asset management companies to provide financing for private companies. The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission’s (CBIRC) Chairman said in an interview that one-third of new corporate loans issued by big banks and two-thirds of new corporate loans issued by small and medium-sized banks should be granted to private enterprises, and that 50 percent of new corporate loans shall be issued to private enterprises in the next three years.  At the end of 2018, loans issued to SMEs accounted for 24.6 percent of total RMB loan issuance. The share dropped 1 percent from 25.6 percent in 2017. Interest rates on loans issued by the six big state-owned banks – Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China (BOC), Agriculture Bank of China (ABC), Bank of Communications and China Postal Savings Bank – to SMEs averaged 4.8 percent, in the fourth quarter of 2018, down from 6 percent in the first quarter of 2018.

Direct financing has expanded over the last few years, including through public listings on stock exchanges, both inside and outside of China, and issuing more corporate and local government bonds.  The majority of foreign portfolio investment in Chinese companies occurs on foreign exchanges, primarily in the United States and Hong Kong.  In addition, China has significantly expanded quotas for certain foreign institutional investors to invest in domestic stock markets; opened up direct access for foreign investors into China’s interbank bond market; and approved a two-way, cross-border equity direct investment scheme between Shanghai and Hong Kong and Shenzhen and Hong Kong that allows Chinese investors to trade designated Hong Kong-listed stocks through the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges, and vice versa.  Direct investment by private equity and venture capital firms is also rising, although from a small base, and has faced setbacks due to China’s capital controls that complicate the repatriation of returns

Money and Banking System

After several years of rapid credit growth, China’s banking sector faces asset quality concerns.  For 2018, the China Banking Regulatory Commission reported a non-performing loans (NPL) ratio of 1.83 percent, higher than the 1.74 percent of NPL ratio reported the last quarter of 2017.  The outstanding balance of commercial bank NPLs in 2018 reached 2.03 trillion RMB (approximately USD295.1 billion).  China’s total banking assets surpassed 268 trillion RMB (approximately USD39.1 trillion) in December 2018, a 6.27 percent year-on-year increase.  Experts estimate Chinese banking assets account for over 20 percent of global banking assets.  In 2018, China’s credit and broad money supply slowed to 8.1 percent growth, the lowest published rate since the PBOC first started publishing M2 money supply data in 1986.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange Policies

While the central bank’s official position is that companies with proper documentation should be able to freely conduct business, in practice, companies have reported challenges and delays in getting foreign currency transactions approved by sub-national regulatory branches.  In 2017, several foreign companies complained about administrative delays in remitting large sums of money from China, even after completing all of the documentation requirements.  Such incidents come amid announcements that the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) had issued guidance to tighten scrutiny of foreign currency outflows due to China’s rapidly decreasing foreign currency exchange.  China has since announced that it will gradually reduce those controls, but market analysts expect they would be re-imposed if capital outflows accelerate again.

Under Chinese law, FIEs do not need pre-approval to open foreign exchange accounts and are allowed to retain income as foreign exchange or to convert it into RMB without quota requirements.  Foreign exchange transactions related to China’s capital account activities do not require review by SAFE, but designated foreign exchange banks review and directly conduct foreign exchange settlements.  Chinese officials register all commercial foreign debt and will limit foreign firms’ accumulated medium- and long-term debt from abroad to the difference between total investment and registered capital.  China issued guidelines in February 2015 that allow, on a pilot basis, a more flexible approach to foreign debt within several specific geographic areas, including the Shanghai Pilot FTZ.  The main change under this new approach is to allow FIEs to expand their foreign debt above the difference between total investment and registered capital, so long as they have sufficient net assets.

Chinese foreign exchange rules cap the maximum amount of RMB individuals are allowed to convert into other currencies at approximately USD50,000 each year and restrict them from directly transferring RMB abroad without prior approval from SAFE.  In 2017, authorities further restricted overseas currency withdrawals by banning sales of life insurance products and capping credit card withdrawals at USD5,000 per transaction.  SAFE has not reduced this quota, but during periods of higher than normal capital outflows, banks are reportedly instructed by SAFE to increase scrutiny over individuals’ requests for foreign currency and to require additional paperwork clarifying the intended use of the funds, with the express intent of slowing capital outflows.

China’s exchange rate regime is managed within a band that allows the currency to rise or fall by 2 percent per day from the “reference rate” set each morning.  In August 2015, China announced that the reference rate would more closely reflect the previous day’s closing spot rate.  Since that change, daily volatility of the RMB has at times been higher than in recent years, but for the most part, remains below what is typical for other currencies.  In 2017, the PBOC took additional measures to reduce volatility, introducing a “countercyclical factor” into its daily RMB exchange rate calculation.  Although the PBOC reportedly suspended the countercyclical factor in January 2018, the tool remains available to policymakers if volatility re-emerges.

Remittance Policies

The remittance of profits and dividends by FIEs is not subject to time limitations, but FIEs need to submit a series of documents to designated banks for review and approval.  The review period is not fixed, and is frequently completed within one or two working days of the submission of complete documents.  In the past year, this period has lengthened during periods of higher than normal capital outflows, when the government strengthens capital controls.

Remittance policies have not changed substantially since SAFE simplified some regulations in January 2014, devolving many review and approval procedures to banks.  Firms that remit profits at or below USD50,000 dollars can do so without submitting documents to the banks for review.

For remittances above USD50,000, the firm must submit tax documents, as well as the formal decision by its management to distribute profits.

For remittance of interest and principle on private foreign debt, firms must submit an application form, a foreign debt agreement, and the notice on repayment of the principle and interest.  Banks will then check if the repayment volume is within the repayable principle.

The remittance of financial lease payments falls under foreign debt management rules.  There are no specific rules on the remittance of royalties and management fees.  In August 2018, SAFE raised the reserve requirement for foreign currency transactions from zero to 20 percent, significantly increasing the cost of foreign currency transactions.  The reserve ratio was introduced in October 2015 at 20 percent, which was lowered to zero in September 2017.

The Financial Action Task Force has identified China as a country of primary concern.  Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimates that over S1 trillion of illicit money left China between 2003 and 2012, making China the world leader in illicit capital flows.  In 2013, GFI estimated that another USD260 billion left the country.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

China officially has only one sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the China Investment Corporation (CIC).  Established in 2007, CIC manages over USD941.4 billion in assets (as of 2017) and invests on a 10-year time horizon.  China’s sovereign wealth is also invested by a subsidiary of SAFE, the government agency that manages China’s foreign currency reserves, and reports directly to the PBOC.  The SAFE Administrator also serves concurrently as a PBOC Deputy Governor.

CIC publishes an annual report containing information on its structure, investments, and returns.  CIC invests in diverse sectors like financial, consumer products, information technology, high-end manufacturing, healthcare, energy, telecommunication services, and utilities.

China also operates other funds that function in part like sovereign wealth funds, including: China’s National Social Security Fund, with an estimate USD341.4 billion in assets; the China-Africa Development Fund (solely funded by the China Development Bank), with an estimated USD5 billion; the SAFE Investment Company, with an estimated USD439.8 billion; and China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund, established in December 2014 with USD40 billion to foster investment in OBOR partner countries.  Chinese SWFs do not report the percentage of their assets that are invested domestically.

Chinese SWFs follow the voluntary code of good practices known as the Santiago Principles and participate in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs.  The Chinese government does not have any formal policies specifying that CIC invest funds consistent with industrial policies or in government-designated projects, although CIC is expected to pursue government objectives.  The SWF generally adopts a “passive” role as a portfolio investor.

China has approximately 150,000 SOEs which are wholly owned by the state.  Around 50,000 (33 percent) are owned by the central government and the remainder by local governments.  The central government directly controls and manages 96 strategic SOEs through the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), of which around 60 are listed on stock exchanges domestically and/or internationally.  SOEs, both central and local, account for 30 to 40 percent of total GDP and about 20 percent of China’s total employment.  SOEs can be found in all sectors of the economy, from tourism to heavy industries.

SASAC regulated SOEs: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588035/n2641579/n2641645/c4451749/content.html  .

China’s leading SOEs benefit from preferential government policies aimed at developing bigger and stronger “national champions.”  SOEs enjoy favored access to essential economic inputs (land, hydrocarbons, finance, telecoms, and electricity) and exercise considerable power in markets like steel and minerals.  SOEs have long enjoyed preferential access to credit and the ability to issue publicly traded equity and debt.

During the November 2013 Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress – a hallmark session that announced economic reforms, including calling for the market to play a more decisive role in the allocation of resources – President Xi Jinping called for broad SOE reforms.  Cautioning that SOEs still will remain a key part of China’s economic system, Xi emphasized improved SOE operational transparency and legal reforms that would subject SOEs to greater competition by opening up more industry sectors to domestic and foreign competitors and by reducing provincial and central government preferential treatment of SOEs.  The Third Plenum also called for “mixed ownership” economic structures, providing greater economic balance between private and state-owned businesses in certain industries, including equal access to factors of production, competition on a level playing field, and equal legal protection.

At the 2018 Central Economic Work Conference, Chinese leaders said in 2019 they will promote a greater role for the market, as well as renewed efforts on reforming SOEs – to include mixed ownership reform.  In delivering the 2019 Government Work Report, Premier Li Keqiang pledged to improve corporate governance, including allowing SOE company boards, rather than SASAC, to appoint senior leadership. 

OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance

SASAC participates in the OECD Working Party on State Ownership and Privatization Practices (WPSOPP).  Chinese officials have indicated China intends to utilize OECD SOE guidelines to improve the professionalism and independence of SOEs, including relying on Boards of Directors that are independent from political influence.  However, despite China’s Third Plenum commitments in 2013 (i.e., to foster “market-oriented” reforms in China’s state sectors), Chinese officials and SASAC have made minimal progress in fundamentally changing the regulation and business conduct of SOEs.  China has also committed to implement the G-20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which apply to all publicly-listed companies, including listed SOEs.

Chinese law lacks unified guidelines or a governance code for SOEs, especially among provincial or locally-controlled SOEs.  Among central SOEs managed by SASAC, senior management positions are mainly filled by senior CCP members who report directly to the CCP, and double as the company’s Party secretary

The lack of management independence and the controlling ownership interest of the State make SOEs de facto arms of the government, subject to government direction and interference.  SOEs are rarely the defendant in legal disputes, and when they are, they almost always prevail, presumably due to the close relationship with the CCP.  U.S. companies often complain about the lack of transparency and objectivity in commercial disputes with SOEs.  In addition, SOEs enjoy preferential access to a disproportionate share of available capital, whether in the form of loans or equity.

In its September 2015 Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, the State Council instituted a system for classifying SOEs as “public service” or “commercial enterprises.”  Some commercial enterprise SOEs were further sub-classified into “strategic” or “critically important” sectors (i.e., with strong national economic or security importance).  SASAC has said the new classification system would allow the government to reduce support for commercial enterprises competing with private firms and instead channel resources toward public service SOEs.

Other recent reforms have included salary caps, limits on employee benefits, and attempts to create stock incentive programs for managers that have produced mixed results.  However, analysts believe minor reforms will be ineffective as long as SOE administration and government policy are intertwined.

A major stumbling block to SOE reform is that SOE regulators are outranked in the CCP party structure by SOE executives, which minimizes SASAC and other government regulators’ effectiveness at implementing reforms.  In addition, SOE executives are often promoted to high-ranking positions in the CCP or local government, further complicating the work of regulators.

During the Third Plenum of the CCP’s 18th Central Committee, in 2013, the CCP leadership announced that the market would play a “decisive role” in economic decision making and emphasized that SOEs needed to focus resources in areas that “serve state strategic objectives.”  However, experts point out that despite these new SOE distinctions, SOEs continue to hold dominant shares in their respective industries, regardless of whether they are strategic, which may further restrain private investment in the economy.  Moreover, the application of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, together with other industrial policies and practices that are selectively enforced by the authorities, protects SOEs from private sector competition.

China is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO, although Hong Kong is listed.  During China’s WTO accession negotiations, Beijing signaled its intention to join GPA.  And, in April 2018, President Xi announced his intent to join GPA, but no timeline has been given for accession.

Investment Restrictions in “Vital Industries and Key Fields”

The intended purpose of China’s State Assets Law is to safeguard and protect China’s economic system, promoting “socialist market economy” principles that fortify and develop a strong, state-owned economy.  A key component of the State Assets Law is enabling SOEs to play the leading role in China’s economic development, especially in “vital industries and key fields.”  To accomplish this, the law encourages Chinese regulators to adopt policies that consolidate SOE concentrations to ensure dominance in industries deemed vital to “national security” and “national economic security.” This principle is further reinforced by the December 2006 State Council announcement of the Guiding Opinions Concerning the Advancement of Adjustments of State Capital and the Restructuring of State-Owned Enterprises, which called for more SOE consolidation to advance the development of the state-owned economy, including enhancing and expanding the role of the State in controlling and influencing “vital industries and key fields relating to national security and national economic lifelines.”  These guidelines defined “vital industries and key fields” as “industries concerning national security, major infrastructure and important mineral resources, industries that provide essential public goods and services, and key enterprises in pillar industries and high-tech industries.”

Around the time the guidelines were published, the SASAC Chairman also listed industries where the State should maintain “absolute control” (e.g., aviation, coal, defense, electric power and the state grid, oil and petrochemicals, shipping, and telecommunications) and “relative control” (e.g., automotive, chemical, construction, exploration and design, electronic information, equipment manufacturing, iron and steel, nonferrous metal, and science and technology).  China has said these lists do not reflect its official policy on SOEs.  In fact, in some cases, regulators have allowed for more than 50 percent private ownership in some of the listed industries on a case-by-case basis, especially in industries where Chinese firms lack expertise and capabilities in a given technology Chinese officials deemed important at the time.

Parts of the agricultural sector have traditionally been dominated by SOEs.  Current agriculture trade rules, regulations, and limitations placed on foreign investment severely restrict the contributions of U.S. agricultural companies, depriving China’s consumers of the many potential benefits additional foreign investment could provide.  These investment restrictions in the agricultural sectors are at odds with China’s objective of shifting more resources to agriculture and food production in order to improve Chinese lives, food security, and food safety.

Privatization Program

At the November 2013 Third Plenum, the Chinese government announced reforms to SOEs that included selling shares of SOEs to outside investors.  This approach is an effort to improve SOE management structures, emphasize the use of financial benchmarks, and gradually take steps that will bring private capital into some sectors traditionally monopolized by SOEs like energy, telecommunications, and finance.  In practice, these reforms have been gradual, as the Chinese government has struggled to implement its SOE reform vision and often opted to utilize a preferred SOE consolidation approach. In the past few years, the Chinese government has listed several large SOEs and their assets on the Hong Kong stock exchange, subjecting SOEs to greater transparency requirements and heightened regulatory scrutiny.  This approach is a possible mechanism to improve SOE corporate governance and transparency. Starting in 2017, the government began pushing the mixed ownership model, in which private companies invest in SOEs and outside managers are hired, as a possible solution, although analysts note that ultimately the government (and therefore the CCP) remains in full control regardless of the private share percentage.  Over the last year, President Xi and other senior leaders have increasingly focused reform efforts on strengthening the role of the State as an investor or owner of capital, instead of the old SOE model in which the state was more directly involved in managing operations.

General awareness of Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) standards (including environmental, social, and governance issues) is a relatively new concept to most Chinese companies, especially companies that exclusively operate in China’s domestic market.  Chinese laws that regulate business conduct use voluntary compliance, are often limited in scope and are frequently cast aside when RBC priorities are superseded by other economic priorities. In addition, China lacks mature and independent NGOs, investment funds, worker unions, worker organizations, and other business associations that promote RBC, further contributing to the general lack of awareness in Chinese business practices.

The Foreign NGO Law remains a concern for U.S. organizations due to the restrictions on many NGO activities, including promotion of RBC and corporate social responsibility (CSR) best practices.  For U.S. investors looking to partner with a Chinese company or to expand operations by bringing in Chinese suppliers, finding partners that meet internationally recognized standards in areas like labor, environmental protection, worker safety, and manufacturing best practices can be a challenge.  However, the Chinese government has placed greater emphasis on protecting the environment and elevating sustainability as a key priority, resulting in more Chinese companies adding environmental concerns to their CSR initiatives.

In 2014, China signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the OECD to cooperate on RBC initiatives.  This MOU, however, does not require or necessarily mean that Chinese companies will adhere to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.  Industry leaders have pushed for China to comply with OECD guidelines and establish a national contact point or RBC center.  As a result, MOFCOM in 2016 launched the RBC Platform, which serves as the national contact point on RBC issues and supplies information to companies about RBC best practices in China.

In 2014, China participated in the OECD’s RBC Global Forum, including hosting a workshop in Beijing in May 2015.  Policy developments from the workshops included incorporation of human rights into social responsibility guidelines for the electronics industry; referencing the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; mandating social impact assessments for large footprint projects; and agreeing to draft a new law on public participation in environmental protection and impact assessments.

The MOFCOM-affiliated Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals, and Chemical Importers and Exporters (CCCMC) also signed a separate MOU with the OECD in October 2014, to help Chinese companies implement RBC policies in global mineral supply chains.  In December 2015, CCCMC released Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains, which draw heavily from the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines.  China is currently drafting legislation to regulate the sourcing of minerals, including tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold, from conflict areas.  China is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), but Chinese investors participate in EITI schemes where these are mandated by the host country.

Corruption remains endemic in China.  The lack of an independent press, along with the lack of independence of corruption investigators, who answer to and are managed by the CCP, all hamper the transparent and consistent application of anti-corruption efforts.

Chinese anti-corruption laws have strict penalties for bribes, including accepting a bribe, which is a criminal offense punishable up to life imprisonment or death in “especially serious” circumstances.  Offering a bribe carries a maximum punishment of up to five years in prison, except in cases with “especially serious” circumstances, when punishment can extend up to life in prison.

In August 2015, the NPC amended several corruption-related parts of China’s Criminal Law.  For instance, bribing civil servants’ relatives or other close relationships is a crime with monetary fines imposed on both the bribe-givers and the bribe-takers; bribe-givers, mainly in minor cases, who aid authorities can be given more lenient punishments; and instead of basing punishments solely on the specific amount of money involved in a bribe, authorities now have more discretion to impose punishments based on other factors.

In February 2011, an amendment was made to the Criminal Law, criminalizing the bribing of foreign officials or officials of international organizations.  However, to date, there have not been any known cases in which someone was successfully prosecuted for offering this type of bribe.

In March 2018, the NPC approved the creation of the National Supervisory Commission (NSC), a new government anti-corruption agency that resulted from the merger of the Ministry of Supervision and the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI).  The NSC absorbed the anti-corruption units of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and those of the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention.  In addition to China’s 89 million CCP members, the new commission has jurisdiction over all civil servants and employees of state enterprises, as well as managers in public schools, hospitals, research institutes, and other public service institutions.  Lower-level supervisory commissions have been set up in all provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.  The NPC also passed the State Supervision Law, which provides the NSC with its legal authorities to investigate, detain, and punish public servants.

The CCDI remains the primary body for enforcing ethics guidelines and party discipline, and refers criminal corruption cases to the NSC for further investigation.

President Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Efforts

Since President Xi’s rise to power in 2012, China has undergone an intensive and large-scale anti-corruption campaign, with investigations reaching into all sectors of the government, military, and economy.  President Xi labeled endemic corruption as an “existential threat” to the very survival of the CCP that must be addressed.  Since then, each CCP annual plenum has touched on judicial, administrative, and CCP discipline reforms needed to thoroughly root out corruption.  Judicial reforms are viewed as necessary to institutionalize the fight against corruption and reduce the arbitrary power of CCP investigators, but concrete measures have emerged slowly.  To enhance regional anti-corruption cooperation, the 26th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministers Meeting adopted the Beijing Declaration on Fighting Corruption in November 2014.

According to official statistics, from 2012 to 2018 the CCDI investigated 2.17 million cases – more than the total of the preceding ten years.  In 2018 alone, the CCP disciplined around 621,000 individuals, up almost 95,000 from 2017.  However, the majority of officials only ended up receiving internal CCP discipline and were not passed forward for formal prosecution and trial.  A total of 195,000 corruption and bribery cases involving 263,000 people were heard in courts between 2013 and 2017, according to the Supreme People’s Court.  Of these, 101 were officials at or above the rank of minister or head of province.  In 2018, a large uptick of 51 officials at or above the provincial/ministerial level were disciplined by the NSC.  One group heavily disciplined in recent years has been the discipline inspectors themselves, with the CCP punishing more than 7,900 inspectors since late-2012.  This led to new regulations being implemented in 2016 by CCDI that increased overall supervision of its investigators.

China’s overseas fugitive-hunting campaign, called “Operation Skynet,” has led to the capture of more than 5,000 fugitives suspected of corruption.  In 2018 alone, CCDI reported that 1,335 fugitives suspected of official crimes were apprehended, including 307 corrupt officials mainly suspected for graft.  Anecdotal information suggests the Chinese government’s anti-corruption crackdown oftentimes is inconsistently and discretionarily applied, raising concerns among foreign companies in China.  For example, to fight rampant commercial corruption in the medical/pharmaceutical sector, China’s health authority issued “black lists” of firms and agents involved in commercial bribery.  Several blacklisted firms were foreign companies.  Additionally, anecdotal information suggests many Chinese government officials responsible for approving foreign investment projects, as well as some routine business transactions, are slowing approvals to not arouse corruption suspicions, making it increasingly difficult to conduct normal commercial activity.

While central government leadership has welcomed increased public participation in reporting suspected corruption at lower levels, direct criticism of central government leadership or policies remains off-limits and is seen as an existential threat to China’s political and social stability.  Some citizens who have called for officials to provide transparency and public accountability by disclosing public and personal assets, or who have campaigned against officials’ misuse of public resources, have been subject to criminal prosecution.

United Nations Anti-Corruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery

China ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2005 and participates in APEC and OECD anti-corruption initiatives.  China has not signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, although Chinese officials have expressed interest in participating in the OECD Working Group on Bribery meetings as an observer.

Resources to Report Corruption

The following government organization receives public reports of corruption:

Anti-Corruption Reporting Center of the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision, Telephone Number: +86 10 12388.

The risk of political violence directed at foreign companies operating in China remains low.  Each year, government watchdog organizations report tens of thousands of protests throughout China.  The government is adept at handling protests without violence, but given the volume of protests annually, the potential for violent flare-ups is real.  Violent protests, while rare, have generally involved ethnic tensions, local residents protesting corrupt officials, environmental and food safety concerns, confiscated property, and disputes over unpaid wages.

In recent years, the growing number of protests over corporate M&A transactions has increased, often because disenfranchised workers and mid-level managers feel they were not included in the decision process.  China’s non-transparent legal and regulatory system allows the CCP to pressure or punish foreign companies for the actions of their governments. The government has also encouraged protests or boycotts of products from certain countries, like Korea, Japan, Norway, Canada, and the Philippines, in retaliation for unrelated policy decisions.  Examples of politically motivated economic retaliation against foreign firms include boycott campaigns against Korean retailer Lotte in 2016 and 2017 in retaliation for the decision to deploy the Thermal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to the Korean Peninsula, which led to Lotte closing and selling its China operations; and high-profile cases of gross mistreatment of Japanese firms and brands in 2011 and 2012 following disputes over islands in the East China Sea.  Recently, some reports suggest China has retaliated against some Canadian companies and products as a result of a domestic Canadian legal issue that impacted a large Chinese enterprise.

There have also been some cases of foreign businesspeople that were refused permission to leave China over pending commercial contract disputes.  Chinese authorities have broad authority to prohibit travelers from leaving China (known as an “exit ban”) and have imposed exit bans to compel U.S. citizens to resolve business disputes, force settlement of court orders, or facilitate government investigations.  Individuals not directly involved in legal proceedings or suspected of wrongdoing have also been subject to lengthy exit bans in order to compel family members or colleagues to cooperate with Chinese courts or investigations. Exit bans are often issued without notification to the foreign citizen or without a clear legal recourse to appeal the exit ban decision.

In the past few years, Chinese authorities have detained or arrested several foreign nationals, including American citizens, and have refused to notify the U.S. Embassy or allow access to the American citizens detained for consular officers to visit.  These trends are in direct contravention of recognized international agreements and conventions.

For U.S. companies operating in China, finding adequate human resources remains a major challenge.  Finding, developing, and retaining domestic talent, particularly at the management and highly-skilled technical staff levels, remain difficult challenges often cited by foreign firms.  In addition, labor costs continue to be a concern, as salaries along with other inputs of production have continued to rise. Foreign companies also continue to cite air pollution concerns as a major hurdle in attracting and retaining qualified foreign talent to relocate to China.  These labor concerns contribute to a small, but growing, number of foreign companies relocating from China to the United States, Canada, Mexico, or other parts of Asia.

Chinese labor law does not protect rights such as freedom of association and the right of workers to strike.  China to date has not ratified the United Nations International Labor Organization conventions on freedom of association, collective bargaining, and forced labor, but it has ratified conventions prohibiting child labor and employment discrimination.  Foreign companies often complain of difficulty navigating China’s ever-evolving labor laws, social insurance laws, and different agencies’ implementation guidelines on labor issues. Compounding the complexity, local characteristics and the application by different localities of national labor laws often vary.

Although required by national law, labor contracts are often not used by domestic employers with local employees.  Without written contracts, employees struggle to prove employment, thus losing basic labor rights like claiming severance and unemployment compensation if terminated, as well as access to publicly-provided labor dispute settlement mechanisms.  Similarly, regulations on agencies that provide temporary labor (referred to as “labor dispatch” in China) have tightened, and some domestic employers have switched to hiring independent service provider contractors in order to skirt the protective intent of these regulations.  These loopholes incentivize employers to skirt the law because compliance leads to substantially higher labor costs. This is one of many factors contributing to an uneven playing field for foreign firms that compete against domestic firms that circumvent local labor laws.

Establishing independent trade unions is illegal in China.  The law allows for worker “collective bargaining”; however, in practice, collective bargaining focuses solely on collective wage negotiations – and even this practice is uncommon.  The Trade Union Law gives the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a CCP organ chaired by a member of the Politburo, control over all union organizations and activities, including enterprise-level unions.  The ACFTU’s priority task is to “uphold the leadership of the Communist Party,” not to protect workers’ rights or improve their welfare. The ACFTU and its provincial and local branches aggressively organize new constituent unions and add new members, especially in large multinational enterprises, but in general, these enterprise-level unions do not actively participate in employee-employer relations.  The absence of independent unions that advocate on behalf of workers has resulted in an increased number of strikes and walkouts in recent years.

ACFTU enterprise unions issue a mandatory employer-borne cost of 2 percent of payroll for membership.  While labor laws do not protect the right to strike, “spontaneous” worker protests and work stoppages occur with increasing regularity, especially in labor intensive and “sunset” industries (i.e., old and declining industries such as low-end manufacturing).  Official forums for mediation, arbitration, and other similar mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution have generally been ineffective in resolving labor disputes in China.  Some localities actively discourage acceptance of labor disputes for arbitration or legal resolution. Even when an arbitration award or legal judgment is obtained, getting local authorities to enforce judgments is problematic.

In the aftermath of the Chinese crackdown on Tiananmen Square demonstrations in June 1989, the United States suspended Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) programs in China.  OPIC honors outstanding political risk insurance contracts. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, an organization affiliated with the World Bank, provides political risk insurance for investors in China.  Some foreign commercial insurance companies also offer political risk insurance, as does the People’s Insurance Company of China.

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S.  FDI in Host Country/Economy

*China’s National Bureau of Statistics (90.031 trillion RMB converted at 6.8 RMB/USD estimate)
** Statistics gathered from China’s Ministry of Commerce official data

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Source: IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS)

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Data not available.

Nissa Felton
Investment Officer – U.S.  Embassy Beijing Economic Section
55 Anjialou Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing, P.R.  China
+86 10 8531 3000
EMail: beijinginvestmentteam@state.gov

Other Useful Online Resources

Chinese Government

• Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C.: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng  ;
• Ministry of Commerce: http://english.mofcom.gov.cn  
• Invest in China: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/default.htm  
• National Development and Reform Commission: http://en.ndrc.gov.cn  
• State Administration of Foreign Exchange: http://www.safe.gov.cn  
• State Administration of Taxation: http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/2013/n2925  

United States Government

• U.S. Embassy in Beijing (Doing Business in China) http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/business.html  
• U.S. Department of State travel information: http://travel.state.gov
• U.S. Trade Representative: http://www.ustr.gov  
• U.S. Department of Commerce: http://www.export.gov  
• U.S. Department of the Treasury: http://www.treasury.gov  
• Export Import Bank: http://www.exim.gov  
• Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC): http://www.opic.gov  
• U.S. Trade and Development Agency: http://www.ustda.gov  

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

Malaysia has one of the world’s most trade-dependent economies with exports and imports of goods and services reaching about 130 percent of annual GDP according to the World Trade Organization. The Malaysian government values foreign investment as a driver of continued national economic development, but has been hampered by restrictions in some sectors and an at-times burdensome regulatory regime.  Some of these restrictions may be lifted by the new government in an effort to attract FDI.

In 2009, Malaysia removed its former Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) investment guidelines, enabling transactions for acquisitions of interests, mergers, and takeovers of local companies by domestic or foreign parties without FIC approval. Although the FIC itself still exists, its primary role is to review of investments related to distributive trade (e.g., retail distributors) as a means of ensuring 30 percent of the equity in this economic segment is held by the bumiputera (ethnic Malays and other indigenous ethnicities in Malaysia).

Since 2009, the government has gradually liberalized foreign participation in the services sector to attract more foreign investment. Following removal of certain restrictions on foreign participation in industries ranging from computer-related consultancies, tourism, and freight transportation, the government in 2011 began to allow 100 percent foreign ownership across the following sectors: healthcare, retail, education as well as professional, environmental, and courier services. Some limits on foreign equity ownership remain in place across in telecommunications, financial services, and transportation.

Foreign investments in services, whether in sectors with no foreign equity limits or controlled sub-sectors, remain subject to review and approval by ministries and agencies with jurisdiction over the relevant sectors. A key function of this review and approval process is to determine whether proposed investments meet the government’s qualifications for the various incentives in place to promote economic development goals. Nevertheless, the Ministerial Functions Act grants relevant ministries broad discretionary powers over the approval of specific investment projects. Investors in industries targeted by the Malaysian government often can negotiate favorable terms with ministries, or other bodies, regulating the specific industry. This can include assistance in navigating a complex web of regulations and policies, some of which can be waived on a case-by-case basis. Foreign investors in non-targeted industries tend to receive less government assistance in obtaining the necessary approvals from the various regulatory bodies and therefore can face greater bureaucratic obstacles.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

The legal framework for foreign investment in Malaysia grants foreigners the right to establish businesses and hold equity stakes across all parts of the economy.  However, despite the progress of reforms to open more of the economy to a greater share of foreign investment, limits on foreign ownership remain in place across many sectors.

Telecommunications

Malaysia began allowing 100 percent foreign equity participation in Applications Service Providers (ASP) in April 2012.  However, for Network Facilities Providers (NFP) and Network Service Provider (NSP) licenses, a limit of 70 percent foreign participation remains in effect.  In certain instances, Malaysia has allowed a greater share of foreign ownership, but the manner in which such exceptions are administered is non-transparent.  Restrictions are still in force on foreign ownership allowed in Telekom Malaysia. The limitation on the aggregate foreign share is 30 percent or five percent for individual investors.

Oil and Gas

Under the terms of the Petroleum Development Act of 1974, the upstream oil and gas industry is controlled by Petroleum Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), a wholly state-owned company and the sole entity with legal title to Malaysian crude oil and gas deposits.  Foreign participation tends to take the form of production sharing contracts (PSCs). PETRONAS regularly requires its PSC partners to work with Malaysian firms for many tenders. Non-Malaysian firms are permitted to participate in oil services in partnership with local firms and are restricted to a 49 percent equity stake if the foreign party is the principal shareholder.  PETRONAS sets the terms of upstream projects with foreign participation on a case-by-case basis.

Financial Services

Malaysia’s 10-year Financial Sector Blueprint envisages further opening to foreign institutions and investors, but does not contain specific market-opening commitments or timelines.  For example, the services liberalization program that started in 2009 raised the limit of foreign ownership in insurance companies to 70 percent. However, Malaysia’s Central Bank (Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM)), would allow a greater foreign ownership stake if the investment is determined to facilitate the consolidation of the industry.  The latest Blueprint, 2011-2020, helped to codify the case-by-case approach. Under the Financial Services Act passed in late 2012, issuance of new licenses will be guided by prudential criteria and the “best interests of Malaysia,” which may include consideration of the financial strength, business record, experience, character and integrity of the prospective foreign investor, soundness and feasibility of the business plan for the institution in Malaysia, transparency and complexity of the group structure, and the extent of supervision of the foreign investor in its home country.  In determining the “best interests of Malaysia,” BNM may consider the contribution of the investment in promoting new high value-added economic activities, addressing demand for financial services where there are gaps, enhancing trade and investment linkages, and providing high-skilled employment opportunities. BNM, however, has never defined criteria for the “best interests of Malaysia” test, and no firms have qualified.

While there has been no policy change in terms of the 70 percent foreign ownership cap for insurance companies, the government did agree to let a foreign owned insurer maintain a 100 percent equity stake after that firm made a contribution to a health insurance scheme aimed at providing health coverage to lower income Malaysians.

BNM currently allows foreign banks to open four additional branches throughout Malaysia, subject to restrictions, which include designating where the branches can be set up (i.e., in market centers, semi-urban areas and non-urban areas).  The policies do not allow foreign banks to set up new branches within 1.5 km of an existing local bank. BNM also has conditioned foreign banks’ ability to offer certain services on commitments to undertake certain back office activities in Malaysia.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

Malaysia’s most recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) investment review occurred in 2013.  Although the review underscored the generally positive direction of economic reforms and efforts at liberalization, the recommendations emphasized the need for greater service sector liberalization, stronger intellectual property protections, enhanced guidance and support from Malaysia’s Investment Development Authority (MIDA), and continued corporate governance reforms.

Malaysia also conducted a WTO Trade Policy Review in February 2018, which incorporated a general overview of the country’s investment policies.  The WTO’s review noted the Malaysian government’s action to institute incentives to encourage investment as well as a number of agencies to guide prospective investors.  Beyond attracting investment, Malaysia had made measurable progress on reforms to facilitate increased commercial activity. Among the new trade and investment-related laws that entered into force during the review period were: the Companies Act, which introduced provisions to simplify the procedures to start a company, to reduce the cost of doing business, as well as to reform corporate insolvency mechanisms; the introduction of the goods and services tax (GST) to replace the sales tax; the Malaysian Aviation Commission Act, pursuant to which the Malaysian Aviation Commission was established; and various amendments to the Food Regulations.  Since the WTO Trade Policy Review, however, the new government has already eliminated the GST, and has revived the Sales and Services Tax, which was implemented on September 1, 2018.

http://www.oecd.org/investment/countryreviews.htm  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp466_e.htm  

Business Facilitation

The principal law governing foreign investors’ entry and practice in the Malaysian economy is the Companies Act of 2016 (CA), which entered into force on January 31, 2017 and replaced the Companies Act of 1965.  Incorporation requirements under the new CA have been further simplified and are the same for domestic and foreign sole proprietorships, partnerships, as well as privately held and publicly traded corporations. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2019, Malaysia streamlined the process of obtaining a building permit and made it faster to obtain construction permits; eliminated the site visit requirement for new commercial electricity connections, making getting electricity easier for businesses; implemented an online single window platform to carry out property searches and simplified the property transfer process; and introduced electronic forms and enhanced risk-based inspection system for cross-border trade and improved the infrastructure and port operation system at Port Klang, the largest port in Malaysia, thereby facilitating international trade; and made resolving insolvency easier by introducing the reorganization procedure.  These changes led to a significant improvement of Malaysia’s ranking per the Doing Business Report, from 24 to 15 in one year.

In addition to registering with the Companies Commission of Malaysia, business entities must file: 1) Memorandum and Articles of Association (ie, company charter); 2) a Declaration of Compliance (ie, compliance with provisions of the Companies Act); and 3) a Statutory Declaration (ie, no bankruptcies, no convictions).  The registration and business establishment process takes two weeks to complete, on average. The new government repealed GST and installed a new sales and services tax (SST), which began implementation on September 1, 2018.

Beyond these requirements, foreign investors must obtain licenses.  Under the Industrial Coordination Act of 1975, an investor seeking to engage in manufacturing will need a license if the business claims capital of RM2.5 million (approximately USD 641,000) or employs at least 75 full-time staff.  The Malaysian Government’s guidelines for approving manufacturing investments, and by extension, manufacturing licenses, are generally based on capital-to-employee ratios. Projects below a threshold of RM55,000 (approximately USD 14,100) of capital per employee are deemed labor-intensive and will generally not qualify.  Manufacturing investors seeking to expand or diversify their operations will need to apply through MIDA.

Manufacturing investors whose companies have annual revenue below RM50 million (approximately USD12.8 million) or with fewer than 200 full-time employees meet the definition of small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and will generally be eligible for government SME incentives.  Companies in the services or other sectors that have revenue below RM20 million (approximately USD5.1 million) or fewer than 75 full-time employees will meet the SME definition.

[Reference]

• http://www.mida.gov.my/home/getting-started/posts/   – The Malaysian Investment Development Authority’s starting point for prospective foreign investors.  Select the “General Guidelines and Facilities” tab.
• http://www.ssm.com.my/en    – The Malaysian Companies Commission homepage for registering sole proprietorships, partnerships, and companies.
• http://www.mdec.my/    – The Malaysia Digital Economy Corporation (MDEC) is responsible for governing the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), the initiative to attract investment in information and communications technologies.
• http://www.skmm.gov.my/Sectors/Broadcasting.aspx    – The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission’s page for requirements in the communications sector.
• http://www.moh.gov.my/english.php/pages/view/160    – The Ministry of Health’s FAQs on liberalization of medical services.
• http://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/m/malaysia/MYS.pdf 
• http://iab.worldbank.org  
• http://ger.co/how-it-works/information-portals  

Outward Investment

While the Malaysian government does not promote or incentivize outward investment, a number of Government-Linked companies, pension funds, and investment companies do have investments overseas.  These companies include the sovereign wealth fund of the Government of Malaysia, Khazanah Nasional Berhad, KWAP, Malaysia’s largest public services pension fund, and the Employees’ Provident Fund of Malaysia.  Government owned oil and gas firm Petronas also has investments in several regions outside Asia.

As a member of ASEAN, Malaysia is a party to trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand; China; India; Japan; and the Republic of Korea. During the review period, the ASEAN-India Agreement was expanded to cover trade in services. Malaysia also has bilateral FTAs with: Australia; Chile; India; Japan; New Zealand; Pakistan; and Turkey.

Reference: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s366_sum_e.pdf 

Malaysia has bilateral investment treaties with 36 countries, but not yet with the United States.  Malaysia does have bilateral “investment guarantee agreements  ” with over 70 economies, including the United States. The Government reports that 65 of Malaysia’s existing investment agreements contain Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions.  Malaysia has double taxation treaties with over 70 countries, though the double taxation agreement with the U.S. currently is limited to air and sea transportation.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

In July 2013, the Malaysian Government initiated a National Policy on Development and Implementation of Regulations (NPDIR).  Under this policy, the federal government embarked on a comprehensive approach to minimize redundancies in the country’s regulatory framework.  The benefits to the private sector thus far have largely been reduced licensing requirements, fees, and approval wait-times for construction projects.  The main components of the policy have been: 1) a regulatory impact assessment (a cost-benefit analysis of all newly proposed regulations); and 2) the creation of a regulations guide, PEMUDAH (similar to the role MIDA plays for prospective investors), to aid businesses and civil society organizations in understanding regulatory requirements affecting their organizations’ activities.  Under the NPDIR, the government has committed to reviewing all new regulations every five years to determine with the new regulations need to be adjusted or eliminated.

Despite this effort to make government more accountable for its rules and to make the process more inclusive, many foreign investors continue to criticize the lack of transparency in government decision making.  The implementation of rules on government procurement contracts are a recurring concern. Non-Malaysian pharmaceutical companies claim to have lost bids against bumiputera (ethnic Malay)-owned companies further claiming they’d offered more effective medicines at lower cost.

[Reference]

(http://rulemaking.worldbank.org/  provides data for 185 economies on whether governments publish or consult with public about proposed regulations)

International Regulatory Considerations

Malaysia is one of 10 Member States that constitute the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). On December 31, 2015, the ASEAN Economic Community formally came into existence. For many years ahead of that date, and since, ASEAN’s economic policy leaders have met regularly to discuss promoting greater economic integration within the 10-country bloc.  Although trade within the 10-country bloc is robust, Member States have prioritized steps to facilitate a greater flow of goods, services, and capital. No regional regulatory system is in place. As a member of the WTO, Malaysia provides notification of all draft technical regulations to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Malaysia’s legal system generally reflects English Law in that it consists of written and unwritten laws.  Written laws include the federal and state constitutions as well as laws passed by Parliament and state legislatures.  Unwritten laws are derived from court cases and local customs. The Contract Law of 1950 still guides the enforcement of contracts and resolution of disputes.  States generally control property laws for residences, although the Malaysian government has recently adopted measures, including high capital gains taxes, to prevent the real estate market from overheating.  Nevertheless, through such programs as the Multimedia Super Corridor, Free Commercial Zones, and Free Industrial Zones, the federal government has substantial reach into a range of geographic areas as a means of encouraging foreign investment and facilitating ownership of commercial and industrial property.

In 2007 the judiciary introduced dedicated intellectual property (IP) courts that consist of 15 “Sessions Courts” that sit in each state, and six ‘High Courts’ that sit in certain states (i.e. Kuala Lumpur, Johor, Perak, Selangor, Sabah and Sarawak).  Malaysia launched the IP courts to deter the use of IP-infringing activity to fund criminal activity and to demonstrate a commitment to IP development in support of the country’s goal to achieve high-income status. These lower courts hear criminal cases, and have the jurisdiction to impose fines for IP infringing acts.  There is no limit to the fines that they can impose. The higher courts are designated for civil cases to provide damages incurred by rights holders once the damages have been quantified post-trial. High courts have the authority to issue injunctions (i.e., to order an immediate cessation of infringing activity) and to award monetary damages.

Labor Courts, which the Ministry of Human Resources describes as “a quasi-judicial system that serves as an alternative to civil claims,” provide a means for workers to seek payment of wages and other financial benefits in arrears.  Proceedings are generally informal but conducted in accordance with civil court principles. The High Court has upheld decisions which Labor Courts have rendered.

Certain foreign judgments are enforceable in Malaysia by virtue of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (REJA).  However, before a foreign judgment can be enforceable, it has to be registered. The registration of foreign judgments is only possible if the judgment was given by a Superior Court from a country listed in the First Schedule of the REJA: the United Kingdom, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Singapore, New Zealand, Republic of Sri Lanka, India, and Brunei.

To register a foreign judgment under the REJA, the judgment creditor has to apply for the same within six years after the date of the foreign judgment. Any foreign judgment coming under the REJA shall be registered unless it has been wholly satisfied, or it could not be enforced by execution in the country of the original Court.

If the judgment is not from a country listed in the First Schedule to the REJA, the only method of enforcement at common law is by securing a Malaysian judgment. This involves suing on the judgment in the local Courts as an action in debt. Summary judgment procedures (explained above) may be used to expedite the process.

Post is not aware of instances in which political figures or government authorities have interfered in judiciary proceedings involving commercial matters.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

The Government of Malaysia established the Malaysia Investment Development Authority (MIDA) to attract foreign investment and to serve as a focal point for legal and regulatory questions.  Organized as part of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), MIDA serves as a guide to foreign investors interested in the manufacturing sector and in many services sectors.  Regional bodies providing support investors include: Invest Kuala Lumpur, Invest Penang, Invest Selangor, the Sabah Economic Development and Investment Authority (SEDIA), and the Sarawak Economic Development Corporation, among others.

As noted, the Ministerial Functions Act authorizes government ministries to oversee investments under their jurisdiction.  Prospective investors in the services sector will need to follow requirements set by the relevant Malaysian Government ministry or agency over the sector in question.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

On April 21, 2010, the Parliament of Malaysia approved two bills, the Competition Commission Act 2010 and the Competition Act 2010.  The Acts took effect January 1, 2012. The Competition Act prohibits cartels and abuses of a dominant market position, but does not create any pre-transaction review of mergers or acquisitions.  Violations are punishable by fines, as well as imprisonment for individual violations. Malaysia’s Competition Commission has responsibility for determining whether a company’s “conduct” constitutes an abuse of dominant market position or otherwise distorts or restricts competition.  As a matter of law, the Competition Commission does not have separate standards for foreign and domestic companies. Commission membership consists of senior officials from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Cooperatives, and Consumerism (MDTCC), the Ministry of Finance, and, on a rotating basis, representatives from academia and the private sector.

In addition to the Competition Commission, the Acts established a Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT) to hear all appeals of Commission decisions.   In the largest case to date, the Commission imposed a fine of RM10 million on Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia in September 2013 for colluding to divide shares of the air transport services market.  The airlines filed an appeal in March 2014. In February 2016, the CAT ruled in favor of the airlines in its first-ever decision and ordered the penalty to be set aside and refunded to both airlines.

Expropriation and Compensation

The Embassy is not aware of any cases of uncompensated expropriation of U.S.-held assets, or confiscatory tax collection practices, by the Malaysian government. The government’s stated policy is that all investors, both foreign and domestic, are entitled to fair compensation in the event that their private property is required for public purposes. Should the investor and the government disagree on the amount of compensation, the issue is then referred to the Malaysian judicial system.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Malaysia signed the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID) on October 22, 1965, coming into force on October 14, 1966.  In addition, it is a contracting state of the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards since November 5, 1985.

Malaysia adopted the following measures to make the two conventions effective in its territory:

The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act, 1966. (Act of Parliament 14 of 1966); the Notification on entry into force of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act, 1966. (Notification No. 96 of March 10, 1966); and the Arbitration (Amendment) Act, 1980. (Act A 478 of 1980).

Although the domestic legal system is accessible to foreign investors, filing a case generally requires any non-Malaysian citizen to make a large deposit before pursuing a case in the Malaysian courts.  Post is unaware of any U.S. investors’ recent complaints of political interference in any judicial proceedings.

References:

• https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/MembershipStateDetails.aspx?state=ST86  
• http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries  

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Malaysia’s investment agreements contain provisions allowing for international arbitration of investment disputes.  Malaysia does not have a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United States.

Post has little data concerning the Malaysian Government’s general handling of investment disputes.  In 2004, a U.S. investor filed a case against the directors of the firm, who constituted the majority shareholders.  The case involves allegations by the U.S. investor of embezzlement by the other directors, and its resolution is unknown.

The Malaysian government has been involved in three ICSID cases — in 1994, 1999, and 2005.  The first case was settled out of court. The second, filed under the Malaysia-Belgo-Luxembourg Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA), was concluded in 2000 in Malaysia’s favor.  The 2005 case, filed under the Malaysia-UK Bilateral Investment Treaty, was concluded in 2007 in favor of the investor. However, the judgment against Malaysia was ultimately dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, namely that ICSID was not the appropriate forum to settle the dispute because the transaction in question was not deemed an investment since it did not materially contribute to Malaysia’s development. Nevertheless, Malaysian courts recognize arbitral awards issued against the government. There is no history of extrajudicial action against foreign investors.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Malaysia’s Arbitration Act of 2005 applies to both international and domestic arbitration. Although its provisions largely reflect those of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law, there are some notable differences, including the requirement that parties in domestic arbitration must choose Malaysian law as the applicable law.  Although an arbitration agreement may be concluded by email or fax, it must be in writing: Malaysia does not recognize oral agreements or conduct as constituting binding arbitration agreements.

Many firms choose to include mandatory arbitration clauses in their contracts.  The government actively promotes use of the Kuala Lumpur Regional Center for Arbitration (http://www.rcakl.org.my), established under the auspices of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee to offer international arbitration, mediation, and conciliation for trade disputes.  The KLRCA is the only recognized center for arbitration in Malaysia. Arbitration held in a foreign jurisdiction under the rules of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 1965 or under the United Nations Commission on International trade Law Arbitration Rules 1976 and the Rules of the Regional Centre for Arbitration at Kuala Lumpur can be enforceable in Malaysia.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Malaysia’s Department of Insolvency (MdI) is the lead agency implementing the Insolvency Act of 1967, previously known as the Bankruptcy Act of 1967.  On October 6, 2017, the Bankruptcy Bill 2016 came into force, changing the name of the previous Act, and amending certain terms and conditions. The most significant changes in the amendment include — (1) a social guarantor can no longer be made bankrupt; (2) there is now a stricter requirement for personal service for bankruptcy notice and petition; (3) introduction of the voluntary arrangement as an alternative to bankruptcy; (4) a higher bankruptcy threshold from RM30,000 to RM50,000; (5) introduction of the automatic discharge of bankruptcy; (6) no objection to four categories of bankruptcy for applying a discharge under section 33A (discharge of bankrupt by Certificate of Director General of Insolvency); (7) introduction of single bankruptcy order as a result of the abolishment of the current two-tier order system, i.e. receiving and adjudication orders; (8) creation of the Insolvency Assistance fund.

The distribution of proceeds from the liquidation of a bankrupt company’s assets generally adheres to the “priority matters and persons” identified by the Companies Act of 2016.  After the bankruptcy process legal costs are covered, recipients of proceeds are: employees, secured creditors (i.e., creditors of real assets), unsecured creditors (i.e., creditors of financial instruments), and shareholders.  Bankruptcy is not criminalized in Malaysia. The country ranks 46th on the World Bank Group’s Doing Business Rankings for Ease of Resolving Insolvency.

• http://www.mdi.gov.my/index.php/57-announcements/1182-announcement-on-the-enforcement-date-of-insolvency-act-1967  
• http://www.ssm.com.my/sites/default/files/companies_act_2016/
  aktabi_20160915_companiesact2016act777_0.pdf 
• http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/malaysia  

Investment Incentives

The Malaysian Government has codified the incentives available for investments in qualifying projects in target sectors and regions.  Tax holidays, financing, and special deductions are among the measures generally available for domestic as well as foreign investors in the following sectors and geographic areas: information and communications technologies (ICT); biotechnology; halal products (e.g., food, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals); oil and gas storage and trading; Islamic finance; Kuala Lumpur; Labuan Island (off Eastern Malaysia); East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia; Sabah and Sarawak (Eastern Malaysia); Northern Corridor.

The lists of application procedures and incentives available to investors in these sectors and regions can be found at: http://www.mida.gov.my/home/invest-in-malaysia/posts/ 

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

The Free Zone Act of 1990 authorized the Minister of Finance to designate any suitable area as either a Free Industrial Zone (FIZ), where manufacturing and assembly takes place, or a Free Commercial Zone (FCZ), generally for warehousing commercial stock.  The Minister of Finance may appoint any federal, state, or local government agency or entity as an authority to administer, maintain and operate any free trade zone. Currently there are 13 FIZs and 12 FCZs in Malaysia. In June 2006, the Port Klang Free Zone opened as the nation’s first fully integrated FIZ and FCZ, although the project has been dogged by corruption allegations related to the land acquisition for the site. The government launched a prosecution in 2009 of the former Transport Minister involved in the land purchase process, though he was later acquitted in October 2013.

The Digital Free Trade Zone (DFTZ) is an initiative by the Malaysian Government, implemented through MDEC, launched in November 2017 with the participation of China’s Alibaba.  DFTZ aims to facilitate seamless cross-border trading and eCommerce, and enable Malaysian SMEs to export their goods internationally. According to the Malaysian government, the DFTZ consists of two components:

An eFulfilment Hub to help Malaysian SMEs export their goods with the help of leading fulfilment service providers;

An eServices Platform to efficiently manage cargo clearance and other processes needed for cross-border trade

For more information, please visit https://mydftz.com  

Raw materials, products and equipment may be imported duty-free into these zones with minimum customs formalities. Companies that export not less than 80 percent of their output and depend on imported goods, raw materials, and components may be located in these FZs.  Ports, shipping and maritime-related services play an important role in Malaysia since 90 percent of its international trade by volume is seaborne. Malaysia is also a major transshipment center.

Goods sold into the Malaysian economy by companies within the FZs must pay import duties.  If a company wants to enjoy Common External Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates within the ASEAN Free Trade Area, 40 percent of a product’s content must be ASEAN-sourced. In addition to the FZs, Malaysia permits the establishment of licensed manufacturing warehouses outside of free zones, which give companies greater freedom of location while allowing them to enjoy privileges similar to firms operating in an FZ. Companies operating in these zones require approval/license for each activity. The time needed to obtain licenses depends on the type of approval and ranges from two to eight weeks.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Fiscal incentives granted to both foreign and domestic investors historically have been subject to performance requirements, usually in the form of export targets, local content requirements and technology transfer requirements.  Performance requirements are usually written into the individual manufacturing licenses of local and foreign investors.

The Malaysian government extends a full tax exemption incentive of fifteen years for firms with “Pioneer Status” (companies promoting products or activities in industries or parts of Malaysia to which the government places a high priority), and ten years for companies with “Investment Tax Allowance” status (those on which the government places a priority, but not as high as Pioneer Status).  However, the government appears to have some flexibility with respect to the expiry of these periods, and some firms reportedly have had their pioneer status renewed. Government priorities generally include the levels of value-added, technology used, and industrial linkages. If a firm (foreign or domestic) fails to meet the terms of its license, it risks losing any tax benefits it may have been awarded.  Potentially, a firm could lose its manufacturing license. The New Economic Model stated that in the long term, the government intends gradually to eliminate most of the fiscal incentives now offered to foreign and domestic manufacturing investors. More information on specific incentives for various sectors can be found at www.mida.gov.my.

Malaysia also seeks to attract foreign investment in the information technology industry, particularly in the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), a government scheme to foster the growth of research, development, and other high technology activities in Malaysia.  However, since July 1, 2018, the Government decided to put on hold the granting of MSC Malaysia Status and its incentives, including extension of income tax exemption period or adding new MSC Malaysia Qualifying Activities in order to review and amend Malaysia’s tax incentives.  While the MSC Malaysia Status Services Incentive has been approved and gazetted on December 31, 2018 and applications are accepted starting on April 2, 2019 for non-Intellectual Property (IP) activities, the MSC Malaysia Status IP Incentive policy is still under review. For further details on incentives, see www.mdec.my.  The Malaysia Digital Economy Corporation (MDEC) approves all applications for MSC status. For more information please visit: https://www.mdec.my/msc-malaysia  

In the services sector, the government’s stated goal is to attract foreign investment in regional distribution centers, international procurement centers, operational headquarter research and development, university and graduate education, integrated market and logistics support services, cold chain facilities, central utility facilities, industrial training, and environmental management.  To date, Malaysia has had some success in attracting regional distribution centers, global shared services offices, and local campuses of foreign universities. For example, GE and Honeywell maintain regional offices for ASEAN in Malaysia. In 2016, McDermott moved its regional headquarters to Malaysia and Boston Scientific broke ground on a medical devices manufacturing facility.

Malaysia seeks to attract foreign investment in biotechnology, but sends a mixed message on agricultural and food biotechnology. On July 8, 2010, the Malaysian Ministry of Health posted amendments to the Food Regulations 1985 [P.U. (A) 437/1985] that require strict mandatory labeling of food and food ingredients obtained through modern biotechnology.  The amendments also included a requirement that no person shall import, prepare or advertise for sale, or sell any food or food ingredients obtained through modern biotechnology without the prior written approval of the Director. There is no ‘threshold’ level on the labeling requirement. Labeling of “GMO Free” or “Non-GMO” is not permitted. The labeling requirements only apply to foods and food ingredients obtained through modern biotechnology but not to food produced with GMO feed.  The labeling regulation was originally scheduled to be enforced beginning in July 2012. However, a Ministry of Health circular published on August 27, 2012 announced that enforcement would be deferred until July 8, 2014. However, there has not been any announcement to date of its enforcement. A copy of the law and regulations respectively can be found at: http://www.biosafety.nre.gov.my/BiosafetyAct2007.shtml, and http://www.biosafety.nre.gov.my/BIOSAFETY percent20REGULATIONS percent202010.pdf.

Malaysia has not implemented measures amounting to “forced localization” for data storage.  Bank Negara Malaysia has amended its recent Outsourcing Guidelines to remove the original data localization requirement and shared that it will similarly remove the data localization elements in its upcoming Risk Management in Technology framework.  The government has provided inducements to attract foreign and domestic investors to the Multimedia Super Corridor, but does not mandate use of onshore providers. Companies in the information and communications technology sector are not required to hand over source code.

Real Property

Land administration is shared among federal, state, and local government.  State governments have their own rules about land ownership, including foreign ownership.  Malaysian law affords strong protections to real property owners. Real property titles are recorded in public records and attorneys review transfer documentation to ensure efficacy of a title transfer.  There is no title insurance available in Malaysia. Malaysian courts protect property ownership rights. Foreign investors are allowed to borrow using real property as collateral. Foreign and domestic lenders are able to record mortgages with competent authorities and execute foreclosure in the event of loan default.  Malaysia ranks 29th (ranked 42nd in 2018) in ease of registering property according to the Doing Business 2019 report, right behind Finland and ahead of Hungary, thanks to changes it made to its registration procedures.

[Reference]

http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings .

Intellectual Property Rights

In December 2011, the Malaysian Parliament passed amendments to the copyright law designed to, inter alia, bring the country into compliance with the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performance and Phonogram Treaty, define Internet Service Provider (ISP) liabilities, and prohibit unauthorized recording of motion pictures in theaters.  Malaysia subsequently acceded to the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performance and Phonogram Treaty in September 2012. In addition, the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Cooperatives, and Consumerism (MDTCC) took steps to enhance Malaysia’s enforcement regime, including active cooperation with rights holders on matters pertaining to IPR enforcement, ongoing training of prosecutors for specialized IPR courts, and the 2013 reestablishment of a Special Anti-Piracy Taskforce.

In response to trends of rising internet piracy, the interagency Special Anti-Piracy Task Force established a Special Internet Forensics Unit (SIFU) within MDTCC.  The SIFU team’s responsibilities include monitoring for sites suspected of being, or known as, purveyors of infringing content. This organization follows MDTCC’s practice of launching investigations based on information and complaints from legitimate host sites and content providers.  Capacity building remains a priority for the SIFU. Coordination with the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), which has responsibility for overall regulation of internet content, has been improving, according to many rights holders in Malaysia. Our contacts at MDTCC have told Post that the process of developing investigative leads that would support a case for the Attorney General’s Chambers (equivalent to the U.S. Department of Justice) is a work in progress.

Despite Malaysia’s success in improving IPR enforcement, key issues remain, including relatively widespread availability of pirated and counterfeit products in Malaysia, high rates of piracy over the Internet, and continued problems with book piracy.  USTR conducted an Out-of-Cycle Review of Malaysia in 2018 to consider the extent to which Malaysia is providing adequate and effective IP protection and enforcement, including with respect to patents.  During this review, the United States and Malaysia have held numerous consultations to resolve outstanding issues.  In 2019, USTR extended the Out-of-Cycle Review of Malaysia while asking Malaysia to complete actions to fully resolve these concerns in the near term.

The United States continues to encourage Malaysia to accede to the WIPO Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure.  In addition, the United States continues to urge Malaysia to provide effective protection against unfair commercial use, as well as unauthorized disclosure, of undisclosed test or other data generated to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical products, and to provide an effective system to address patent issues expeditiously in connection with applications to market pharmaceutical products.

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/  .

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Foreigners may trade in securities and derivatives.  Malaysia houses one of Asia’s largest corporate bond markets, and is the largest sukuk (Islamic bond) market in East Asia.  Both domestic and foreign companies regularly access capital in Malaysia’s bond market. Malaysia provides tax incentives for foreign companies issuing Islamic bonds and financial instruments in Malaysia.

Malaysia’s stock market (Bursa Malaysia) is open to foreign investment and foreign corporation issuing shares.  However, foreign issuers remain subject to bumiputera ownership requirements of 12.5 percent if the majority of their operations are in Malaysia.  Listing requirements for foreign companies are similar to that of local companies. There are additional criteria for foreign companies wanting to list in Malaysia including, among others: approval of regulatory authorities of foreign jurisdiction where the company was incorporated, valuation of assets that are standards applied in Malaysia or International Valuation Standards, and the company must have been registered with the Registrar of Companies under the Companies Act 1965 or 2016.

Malaysia has taken steps to promote good corporate governance by listed companies.  Publicly listed companies must submit quarterly reports that include a balance sheet and income statement within two months of each financial quarter’s end and audited annual accounts for public scrutiny within four months of each year’s end. An individual may hold up to 25 corporate directorships.  All public and private company directors are required to attend classes on corporate rules and regulations.

Legislation also regulates equity buybacks, mandates book entry of all securities transfers, and requires that all owners of securities accounts be identified.  A Central Depository System (CDS) for stocks and bonds established in 1991 makes physical possession of certificates unnecessary. All shares traded on the Bursa Malaysia must be deposited in the CDS.  Short selling of stocks is prohibited.

Money and Banking System

International investors generally regard Malaysia’s banking sector as dynamic and well regulated.  Although privately owned banks are competitive with state-owned banks, the state-owned banks dominate the market.  The five largest banks – Maybank, CIMB, Public Bank, RHB, and Ambank – account for an estimated 75 percent of banking sector loans.  According to the World Bank, total banking sector lending for 2017 was 140.27 percent of GDP, and 1.5 percent of the Malaysian banking sector’s loans were non-performing for 2017.

Bank Negara prohibits hostile takeovers of banks, but the Securities Commission has established non-discriminatory rules and disclosure requirements for hostile takeovers of publicly traded companies.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

In December 2016, the central bank, began implementing new foreign exchange management requirements. Under the policy, exporters are required to convert 75 percent of their export earnings into Malaysian ringgit. The goal of this policy was to deepen the market for the currency, with the goal of reducing exchange rate volatility.  The policy remains in place, with the Central Bank giving case-by-case exceptions. All domestic trade in goods and services must be transacted in ringgit only, with no optional settlement in foreign currency. The Central Bank has demonstrated little flexibility with respect to the ratio of earnings that exporters hold in ringgit. Post is unaware of any instances where the requirement for exporters to hold their earnings in ringgit has impeded their ability to remit profits to headquarters.

Remittance Policies

Malaysia imposes few investment remittance rules on resident companies. Incorporated and individual U.S. investors have not raised concerns about their ability to transfer dividend payments, loan payments, royalties or other fees to home offices or U.S.-based accounts.  Tax advisory firms and consultancies have not flagged payments as a significant concern among U.S. or foreign investors in Malaysia. Foreign exchange administration policies place no foreign currency asset limits on firms that have no ringgit-denominated debt. Companies that fund their purchases of foreign exchange assets with either onshore or offshore foreign exchange holdings, whether or not such companies have ringgit-denominated debt, face no limits in making remittances.  However, a company with ringgit-denominated debt will need approval from the Central Bank for conversions of RM50 million or more into foreign exchange assets in a calendar year.

The Treasury Department has not identified Malaysia as a currency manipulator.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

The Malaysian Government established government-linked investment companies (GLICs) as vehicles to harness revenue from commodity-based industries and promote growth in strategic development areas.  Khazanah is the largest of the GLICs, and the company holds equity in a range of domestic firms as well as investments outside Malaysia. The other GLICs – Armed Forces Retirement Fund (LTAT), National Capital (PNB), Employees Provident Fund (EPF), Pilgrimage Fund (Tabung Haji), Public Employees Retirement Fund (KWAP) – execute similar investments but are structured as savings vehicles for Malaysians.  Khazanah follows the Santiago Principles and participates in the International Forum on Sovereign Wealth Funds

Khazanah was incorporated in 1993 under the Companies Act of 1965 as a public limited company with a charter to promote growth in strategic industries and national initiatives.  As of December 31, 2018, Khazanah reported a 21 percent drop in its net worth and a decline in its “realizable” assets to RM136 billion (from USUSD 39.3 billion to USUSD 32.9 billion).  Khazanah also recorded a pre-tax loss of RM6.27 billion (USUSD 1.52 billion) compared to a pre-tax profit of RM2.89 billion (USUSD 723 million) the previous year. The sectors comprising its major holdings include telecommunications and media, airports, banking, real estate, health care, and the national energy utility.  According to its Annual Review 2019 presentation, in 2018, Khazanah’s mandate and objectives were refreshed, and the company will now pursue its two distinct objectives (commercial vs. strategic) through a dual-fund investment structure: (1) an intergenerational wealth fund to meet its commercial objectives (which will include public and private assets); and (2) a strategic fund to meet its strategic objective (which will include strategic assets and developmental ones).

• https://www.khazanah.com.my/khazanah/files/60/60f2c749-314c-4a89-831a-c28bd45024e6.pdf 
• https://www.khazanah.com.my/getmedia/806f3b69-9bb5-452d-a3fa-ce7e77e612b4/Khazanah-Annual-Review-2019-Presentation-Deck-5-Mar-2019_2.aspx  

State-owned enterprises play a very significant role in the Malaysian economy.  Such enterprises have been used to spearhead infrastructure and industrial projects.  As of July 2017, the government owns approximately 42 percent of the value of firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia through its seven Government-Linked Investment Corporations (GLICs), including a majority stake in a number of companies.  Only a minority portion of stock is available for trading for some of the largest publicly listed local companies. Khazanah, often considered the government’s sovereign wealth fund, owns stakes in companies competing in many of the country’s major industries.  Prime Minister Mahathir chairs Khazanah’s Board of Directors. PETRONAS, the state-owned oil and gas company, is Malaysia’s only Fortune Global 500 firm.

As part of its Government Linked Companies (GLC) Transformation Program, the Malaysian Government embarked on a two-pronged strategy to reduce its shares across a range of companies and to make those companies more competitive.  Among the notable divestments of recent years, Khazanah, the largest Government-Linked Investment Company (GLIC), offloaded its stake in the national car company Proton to DRB-Hicom Bhd in 2012. In 2013, Khazanah divested its holdings in telecommunications services giant Time Engineering Bhd.  In 2015, Khazanah cut its equity ownership of national utility company Tenaga Nasional from 31 percent to 29 percent. Khazanah’s annual report for 2017 noted only that the fund had completed 12 divestments that produced a gain of RM 2.5 billion (USD 625 million). In 2018, Khazanah partially divested its shares in IHH Healthcare Berhad, saw two successful IPOs, and issued USUSD 321 million in exchangeable sukuk.  However, significant losses at domestic companies including at Axiata, Telekom Malaysia, Tenaga Nasional, IHH Healthcare Berhad, CIMB Bank, and Malaysia Airports led to the pre-tax loss of USUSD 1.52 billion the company experienced in 2018. In April 2019, Khazanah sold 1.5 percent of its stake in Tenaga Nasional on Bursa Malaysia, after which Khazanah still owned 27.27 percent of the national electric company.

https://www.khazanah.com.my/getmedia/806f3b69-9bb5-452d-a3fa-ce7e77e612b4/Khazanah-Annual-Review-2019-Presentation-Deck-5-Mar-2019_2.aspx

State-owned enterprises (SOEs), which in Malaysia are called government-linked companies (GLCs), with publicly traded shares must produce audited financial statements every year.  These SOEs must also submit filings related to changes in the organization’s management. The SOEs that do not offer publicly traded shares are required to submit annual reports to the Companies Commission.  The requirement for publicly reporting the financial standing and scope of activities of SOEs has increased their transparency. It is also consistent with the OECD’s guideline for Transparency and Disclosure.  Moreover, many SOEs prioritize operations that maximize their earnings. However, the close relationships SOEs have with senior government officials blur the line between strictly commercial activity pursued for its own sake and activity that has been directed to advance a policy interest.  For example, Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas) is both SOE in the oil and gas sector and the regulator of the industry. Malaysia Airlines (MAS), in which the government previously held 70 percent but now holds 100 percent, required periodic infusions of resources from the government to maintain the large numbers of the company’s staff and senior executives.  The airline is still undergoing a restructuring, and the stated goal of the country’s largest sovereign wealth fund, Khazanah, which holds all of the airline’s shares, is to re-list the airline in early 2019.

Privatization Program

In several key sectors, including transportation, agriculture, utilities, financial services, manufacturing, and construction, Government Linked Corporations (GLCs) continue to dominate the market.  However, the Malaysian Government remains publicly committed to the continued, eventual privatization, though it has not set a timeline for the process and faces substantial political pressure to preserve the roles of the GLCs.  The Malaysian Government established the Public-Private Partnership Unit (UKAS) in 2009 to provide guidance and administrative support to businesses interested in privatization projects as well as large-scale government procurement projects.  UKAS, which used to be a part of the Office of the Prime Minister, is now under the Ministry of Finance. UKAS oversees transactions ranging from contracts and concessions to sales and transfers of ownership from the public sector to the private sector.

Foreign investors may participate in privatization programs, but foreign ownership is limited to 25 percent of the privatized entity’s equity.  The National Development Policy confers preferential treatment to the bumiputera, which are entitled to at least 30 percent of the privatized entity’s equity.

The privatization process is formally subject to public bidding.  However, the lack of transparency has led to criticism that the government’s decisions tend to favor individuals and businesses with close ties to high-ranking officials.

The development of responsible business conduct programs in Malaysia has shifted from a government-led initiative to business-led practices.  In 2006, Malaysian stock market regulator, the Securities Commission, published a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Framework for all publicly listed companies, which are required to disclose their CSR programs in their annual financial reports.  In 2007 the Women, Family and Community Ministry launched the Prime Minister’s CSR’s Awards to encourage the spread of CSR programs. In 2011, the Malaysian Government launched the 1Malaysia Training Plan (SL1M), an employment incentive that allows businesses to double the tax deduction for expenses to hire and train graduates from rural areas or from low-income families.  In 2011, the Board for Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility Malaysia (BCSRM) supplanted the Institute for Corporate Responsibility Malaysia as the focal point for the country’s responsible business conduct programs. The BCSRM is the local affiliate of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.

Although the Malaysian Government encourages companies to adopt RBC programs, it does not promote adherence to the principles in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises or the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.  Malaysia is not a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

The Malaysian government established the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) in 2008 and the Whistleblower Protection Act in 2010.  The Malaysian government considers bribery a criminal act and does not permit bribes to be deducted from taxes. Malaysia’s anti-corruption law prohibits bribery of foreign public officials, permits the prosecution of Malaysians for offense committed overseas, and provides for the seizure of property.

The MACC conducts investigations, but prosecutorial discretion remains with the Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC).  There is no systematic requirement for public officials to disclose their assets and the Whistleblower Protection Act does not provide protection for those who disclose allegations to the media.   In 2015, the Attorney General and Parliament opened investigations into allegations of financial mismanagement at the state development fund 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), chaired by then-Prime Minister Najib Razak.  After Najib installed a new Attorney General and removed other ministers, the MACC’s investigation closed in late 2015 and the new Attorney General declared the Prime Minister innocent.

The new government prioritized  anti-corruption efforts in its campaign manifesto. Since taking office in May 2018, it established Royal Commissions of Inquiry into alleged corruption at 1MDB, the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), the Council of Trust for the People (MARA), and the Hajj Pilgrims Fund (Tabung Haji), all government or government-linked agenices.  On May 21, 2018 the MACC established a 1MDB taskforce, including the police and central bank. As of April 2019, the government has charged former Prime Minister Najib with 42 counts of money laundering, criminal breach of trust, and abuse of power.

On July 2, 2018, the government announced it was reducing the number of agencies and departments under the Prime Minister’s Department (PMD) from over 90 to only 26 for greater transparency.  Of those reduced, 40 will be re-designated to other ministries, while 10 agencies, offices, and task forces will be abolished. Nine have been given the green light to operate as independent entities, reporting directly to Parliament while five other agencies have been merged.  The Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, the Election Commission, Human Rights Commission of Malaysia and the National Audit Department will now report directly to Parliament instead of the PMD

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:

Datuk Seri Mohd Shukri bin Abdull -Chief Commissioner
Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission
Block D6, Complex D, Pusat Pentadbiran
Kerajaan Persekutuan, Peti Surat 6000
62007 Putrajaya
+6-1800-88-6000
Email: info@sprm.gov.my

Contact at a “watchdog” organization:

Cynthia Gabriel, Director
The Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism (C4)
C Four Consultancies Sdn Bhd
A-2-10, 8 Avenue
Jalan Sg Jernih 8/1, Seksyen 8, 46050 Petaling Jaya
Selangor, Malaysia
Email: info@c4center.org

There have been no significant incidents of political violence since the 1969 national elections.  The May 9, 2018 national election led to the first transition of power between coalitions since independence and was peaceful.  In April 2012, the Peaceful Assembly Act took effect, eliminating the need for permits for public assemblies, but outlaws street protests and placing other significant restrictions on public assemblies.  On April 28 2012, the police disrupted a large protest march that took place despite restrictions the government attempted to impose. Subsequent demonstrations and protest marches took place in 2013 and 2014 without disruption.  Following the July 2014 Israeli incursion into Gaza, several Malaysian non-governmental entities organized a boycott of McDonald’s. Over a several week period, protestors picketed at several McDonalds restaurants, at times taunting and harassing employees.  Periodically, Malaysian groups will organize modest protests against U.S. government policies, usually involving demonstrations outside the U.S. embassy. To date, these have remained peaceful and localized, with a strong police presence. Likewise, several non-governmental organizations have organized mass rallies in major cities in peninsular and East Malaysia related to domestic policies that have been peaceful.

Malaysia’s 1.78 million documented and 2-4 million undocumented foreign workers make up over 20 percent of the country’s workforce.  The new Pakatan Harapan coalition government has pledged to reduce Malaysia’s reliance on foreign labor while bringing the nation’s laws up to international standards, and has begun taking steps towards reforming a foreign worker recruitment process accused of corrupt practices and leading workers into debt bondage under the former government.

Malaysia’s shortage of skilled labor is the most frequently mentioned impediment to economic growth cited in numerous studies.  Malaysia has an acute shortage of highly qualified professionals, scientists, and academics. The Embassy has heard from some U.S. companies that the shortage of skilled labor has resulted in more on-the-job training for new hires.

The Malaysian labor market operates at essentially full employment, with unemployment for Malaysians at 3.3 percent as of February 2019.  In an effort to improve the employability of local graduates, the GOM offers additional training modules at public universities in English language skills, presentation techniques, and entrepreneurship.

Malaysia is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO).  Labor relations in Malaysia are generally non-confrontational. While  a system of government controls strongly discourages strikes and restricts the formation of unions, the new government has created a National Labor Advisory Council – comprised of the Malaysian Trade Unions Congress and Malaysian Employer’s Federation – to increase labor participation in unions.  The government plans to amend its Trade Unions Act and Industrial Relations Act in July 2019 to increase freedom of association in Malaysia. Some labor disputes are settled through negotiation or arbitration by an industrial court and the new Minister of Human Resources has significantly reduced the backlog of industrial court cases over the past nine months.  Malaysian authorities have pledged to move forward with amendments to the country’s labor laws as a means of boosting the economy’s overall competitiveness and combatting forced labor conditions. In its first year in power, the government has outlawed outsourcing companies, improved oversight of employment agencies, and brought the Employment Act, Children and Young Persons Act, and Occupational Safety and Health Act in line with ILO principles.

Although national unions are currently proscribed due to sovereignty issues within Malaysia, there are a number of territorial federations of unions (the three territories being Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak).  The government has prevented some trade unions, such as those in the electronics and textile sectors, from forming territorial federations. Instead of allowing a federation for all of Peninsular Malaysia, the electronics sector is limited to forming four regional federations of unions, while the textile sector is limited to state-based federations of unions, for those states which have a textile industry.  Upcoming changes to the Trade Unions Act should address this issue and allow unions to form. Employers and employees share the costs of the Social Security Organization (SOSCO), which covers an estimated 12.9 million workers and has been expanded to cover foreign workers. No systematic welfare programs or government unemployment benefits exist; however, the Employee Provident Fund (EPF), which employers and employees are required to contribute to, provides retirement benefits for workers in the private sector.  Civil servants receive pensions upon retirement.

The regulation of employment in Malaysia, specifically as it affects the hiring and redundancy of workers remains a notable impediment to employing workers in Malaysia. The high cost of terminating their employees, even in cases of wrongdoing, is a source of complaint for domestic and foreign employers.  The Prime Minister formed an Independent Committee on Foreign Workers to study foreign worker policies. The Committee submitted 40 recommendations for streamlining the hiring of migrant workers and protecting employees from debt bondage and forced labor conditions. The recommendations remain under consideration by the Cabinet.

Some contacts at U.S. companies have reported that the government monitors the ethnic balance among employees and enforces an ethnic quota system for hiring in certain areas.  Race-based preferences in hiring and promotion are widespread in government, government-owned universities and government-linked corporations.

Fulfilling a campaign promise, the new government has increased and standardized the minimum wage across the country to RM 1100 (USD 275), a raise from RM 1,000 (USD 250) in Peninsular Malaysia and RM 920 (USD 230) in East Malaysia.  While campaigning, the government pledged to raise the minimum wage to RM1,500 (USD 375) within five years, although it has faced resistance from employer associations and the business community.

In 2018, the Department of Labor’s Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) listing of goods produced with child labor and forced labor included Malaysian palm oil (forced and child labor), electronics (forced labor), and garments (forced labor).  Senior officials across the Malaysian interagency have taken this listing seriously and have been working with the private sector and civil society to address concerns relating to the recruitment, hiring, and management of foreign workers in all sectors of the Malaysian economy, including palm oil and electronics.

Malaysia has a limited investment guarantee agreement with the U.S. under the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) program, for which it has qualified since 1959.  Few investors have sought OPIC insurance in Malaysia.

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

Embassy Kuala Lumpur Economic Section
376 Jalan Tun Razak / 50400 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia
+6-03-2168-5153
Email: KualaLumpurEcon@state.gov

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

The Philippines seeks foreign investment to generate employment, promote economic development, and contribute to sustained growth.  The Board of Investments (BOI) and PEZA are the lead investment promotion agencies (IPAs). They provide incentives and special investment packages to investors.  Noteworthy advantages of the Philippine investment landscape include free trade zones, including PEZAs, and a large, educated, English-speaking, relatively low-cost Filipino workforce.  Philippine law treats foreign investors the same as their domestic counterparts, except in sectors reserved for Filipinos by the Philippine Constitution and the Foreign Investment Act (see details under Limits on Foreign Control section).  Additional information regarding investment policies and incentives are available on the BOI   and PEZA   websites.

Restrictions on foreign ownership, inadequate public investment in infrastructure, and lack of transparency in procurement tenders hinder foreign investment.  The Philippines’ regulatory regime remains ambiguous in many sectors of the economy, and corruption is a significant problem. Large, family-owned conglomerates, including San Miguel, Ayala, and SM, dominate the economic landscape, crowding out other smaller businesses.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Foreigners are prohibited from fully owning land under the 1987 Constitution, although the 1993 Investors’ Lease Act allows foreign investors to lease a contiguous parcel of up to 1,000 hectares (2,471 acres) for a maximum of 75 years.  Dual citizens are permitted to own land.

The 1991 Foreign Investment Act (FIA) requires the publishing every two years of the Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL), which outlines sectors in which foreign investment is restricted.  The latest FINL was released in October 2018. The FINL bans foreign ownership/participation in the following investment activities: mass media (except recording and internet businesses); small-scale mining; private security agencies; utilization of marine resources, including the small-scale use of natural resources in rivers, lakes, and lagoons; cooperatives; cockpits; manufacturing of firecrackers and pyrotechnic devices; and manufacturing, repair, stockpiling and/or distribution of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons and anti-personnel mines.  With the exception of the practices of law, radiologic and x-ray technology, and marine deck and marine engine officers, other laws and regulations on professions allow foreigners to practice in the Philippines if their country permits reciprocity for Philippine citizens, these include medicine, pharmacy, nursing, dentistry, accountancy, architecture, engineering, criminology, teaching, chemistry, environmental planning, geology, forestry, interior design, landscape architecture, and customs brokerage. In practice, however, language exams, onerous registration processes, and other barriers prevent this from taking place.

The Philippines limits foreign ownership to 40 percent in the manufacturing of explosives, firearms, and military hardware.  Other areas that carry varying foreign ownership ceilings include: private radio communication networks (40 percent); private employee recruitment firms (25 percent);  advertising agencies (30 percent); natural resource exploration, development, and utilization (40 percent, with exceptions); educational institutions (40 percent, with some exceptions); operation and management of public utilities (40 percent); operation of commercial deep sea fishing vessels (40 percent); Philippine government procurement contracts (40 percent for supply of goods and commodities); contracts for the construction and repair of locally funded public works (40 percent with some exceptions); ownership of private lands (40 percent); and rice and corn production and processing (40 percent, with some exceptions).

Retail trade enterprises with capital of less than USD 2.5 million, or less than USD 250,000, for retailers of luxury goods, are reserved for Filipinos.  The Philippines allows up to full foreign ownership of insurance adjustment, lending, financing, or investment companies; however, foreign investors are prohibited from owning stock in such enterprises, unless the investor’s home country affords the same reciprocal rights to Filipino investors.

Foreign banks are allowed to establish branches or own up to 100 percent of the voting stock of locally incorporated subsidiaries if they can meet certain requirements.  However, a foreign bank cannot open more than six branches in the Philippines. A minimum of 60 percent of the total assets of the Philippine banking system should, at all times, remain controlled by majority Philippine-owned banks.  Ownership caps apply to foreign non-bank investors, whose aggregate share should not exceed 40 percent of the total voting stock in a domestic commercial bank and 60 percent of the voting stock in a thrift/rural bank.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted a Trade Policy Review of the Philippines in March 2018 and an Investment Policy Review of the Philippines in 2016, respectively.  The reviews are available online at the WTO website. (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp468_e.htm ) and OECD website (http://www.oecd.org/daf/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-philippines-2016-9789264254510-en.htm ).

Business Facilitation

Business registration in the Philippines is cumbersome due to multiple agencies involved in the process.  It takes an average of 31 days to start a business in Quezon City in Metro Manila, according to the 2019 World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report.  Touted as one of the Duterte Administrations’ landmark laws, the Republic Act No. 11032 or the Ease of Doing Business and Efficient Government Service Delivery Act amends the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007, and legislates standardized deadlines for government transactions, a single business application form, a one-stop-shop, automation of business permits processing, a zero contact policy, and a central business databank.

The law was passed in May 2018, and it creates an Anti-Red Tape Authority (ARTA – http://arta.gov.ph/  ) under the Office of the President to carry out the mandate of business facilitation.  ARTA is governed by a council that includes the Secretary’s of Trade and Industry, Finance, Interior and Local Governments, and Information and Communications Technology.  The Department of Trade and Industry serves as interim Secretariat for ARTA. Without the rules and regulations being issued, compliance has not been in effect. The implementing rules and regulations are currently being drafted (http://arta.gov.ph/pages/IRR.html  ).

The Philippines also signed into law the Revised Corporation Code, a business friendly legislation amendment that encourages entrepreneurship, improves the ease of business, and promotes good corporate governance.  This new law amends part of the four-decade-old Corporation Code and allows for existing and future companies to hold a perpetual status of incorporation, compared to the previous 50-year term limit which required renewal.  More importantly, the amendments allow for the formation of one-person corporations, providing more flexibility to conduct business; the old code required all incorporation to have at least five stockholders and provided less protection from liabilities.

Outward Investment

There are no restrictions on outward portfolio investments for Philippine residents, defined to include non-Filipino citizens who have been residing in the country for at least one year; foreign-controlled entities organized under Philippine laws; and branches, subsidiaries, or affiliates of foreign enterprises organized under foreign laws operating in the country.  However, outward investments funded by foreign exchange purchases above USD 60 million or its equivalent per investor per year, or per fund per year for qualified investors, may require prior approval.

The Philippines has neither a bilateral investment nor a free trade agreement with the United States.  The only bilateral free trade agreement the Philippines has is with Japan. The Philippines has signed bilateral investment agreements with 39 countries or entities: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Kuwait, Mongolia, Myanmar, Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Vietnam.

The Philippines is party to ASEAN regional trade agreements, including an investment chapter with trading partners Australia and New Zealand, Republic of Korea, India, and China.  It also has an investment agreement with Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland under the Philippines-European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Free Trade Agreement.

The Philippines has a tax treaty with United States to avoid double taxation and provide procedures for resolving interpretative disputes and tax enforcement in both countries.  The treaty encourages bilateral trade and investment by allowing the exchange of capital, goods, and services under clearly defined tax rules and, in some cases, preferential tax rates or tax exemptions.

U.S. recipients of royalty income qualify for preferential tax rates (currently 10 percent) under the most favored nation clause of the United States-Philippines tax treaty.  A preferential tax treaty rate of 15 percent applies to dividends and interest income from bona fide loans; and 10 percent on interest income from government bonds. The Philippine Supreme Court ruled in 2013 that securing a tax treaty relief ruling from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) is not a legal requirement to qualify for preferential treatment and tax treaty rates; however, based on experience, tax experts generally still advise filing a tax treaty relief application to avoid potential challenges or controversies.  Despite efforts to streamline processes, taxpayers find documentation requirements for tax treaty relief applications burdensome. The volume of tax treaty relief applications has resulted in processing delays, with most applications reportedly pending for over a year. Inconsistent taxation rulings are also a concern.

The BIR rules and regulations for tax accounting have not been fully harmonized with the Philippine Financial Reporting Standards.  The BIR requires taxpayers to maintain records reconciling figures presented in financial statements and income tax returns. Additional information regarding BIR regulations is available on the BIR website   (https://www.bir.gov.ph/ ).

The Philippines and United States signed a reciprocal Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) in July 2015 for automatic exchange of information between tax authorities to implement the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliant Act (FATCA).  The bilateral agreement has yet to enter into force pending completion of domestic legal remedies to overcome stringent bank secrecy restrictions to the disclosure/sharing of information.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

Proposed Philippine laws must undergo public comment and review.  Government agencies are required to craft implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) through public consultation meetings within the government and with private sector representatives after laws are passed.  New regulations must be published in newspapers or in the government’s official gazette, available online, before taking effect (https://www.gov.ph/ ). The 2016 Executive Order on Freedom of Information (FOI) mandates full public disclosure and transparency of government operations, with certain exceptions.  The public may request copies of official records through the FOI website (https://www.foi.gov.ph/).  Implementing rules for the Executive Order had not been fully developed, as of April 2019.  The order is criticized for its long list of exceptions, rendering the policy less effective.

Stakeholders report regulatory enforcement in the Philippines is generally weak, inconsistent, and unpredictable.  Many U.S. investors describe business registration, customs, immigration, and visa procedures as burdensome and frustrating.  Regulatory agencies are generally not statutorily independent but are attached to cabinet departments or the Office of the President and, therefore, are subject to political pressure.  Issues in the judicial system also affect regulatory enforcement.

International Regulatory Considerations

The Philippines is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and provides notice of draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade  (TBT).

The Philippines continues to fulfill required regulatory reforms under the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).  The Philippines is still completing its National Single Window (NSW) Phase 2 Project and targets to run and connect the NSW trade portal to the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) by end of 2019.

The Philippines passed the Customs Modernization and Tariff Act in 2016, which enables the country to largely comply with the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation.  However, the various implementing rules and regulations to execute specific provisions had not been completed by the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Customs as of April 2019.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

The Philippines has a mixed legal system of civil, common, Islamic, and customary laws, along with commercial and contractual laws.

The Philippine judicial system is a separate and largely independent branch of the government, made up of the Supreme Court and lower courts.  The Supreme Court is the highest court and sole constitutional body. More information is available on the court’s website   (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/).  The lower courts consist of: (a) trial courts with limited jurisdictions (i.e. Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, etc.); (b) Regional Trial Courts (RTCs); (c) Shari’ah District Courts (Muslim courts); and (d) Court of Appeals (appellate courts).  Special courts include the “Sandiganbayan” (anti-graft court for public officials) and the Court of Tax Appeals. Several RTCs have been designated as Special Commercial Courts (SCC) to hear intellectual property (IP) cases, with four SCCs authorized to issue writs of search and seizure on IP violations, enforceable nationwide.  In addition, nearly any case can be appealed to appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, increasing caseloads and further clogging the judicial system.

Foreign investors describe the inefficiency and uncertainty of the judicial system as a significant disincentive to investment.  Many investors decline to file dispute cases in court because of slow and complex litigation processes and corruption among some personnel.  The courts are not considered impartial or fair. Stakeholders also report an inexperienced judiciary when confronted with complex issues such as technology, science, and intellectual property cases.  The Philippines ranked 149th out of 190 economies, and 23rd among 25 economies from East Asia and the Pacific, in the World Bank’s 2018 Ease of Doing Business report in terms of enforcing contracts.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

The BOI regulates and promotes investment into the Philippines.  The Investment Priorities Plan (IPP), administered by the BOI, identifies preferred economic activities approved by the President.  Government agencies are encouraged to adopt policies and implement programs consistent with the IPP.

The Foreign Investment Act (FIA) requires the publishing of the Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL) that outlines sectors in which foreign investment is restricted.  The FINL consists of two parts: Part A details sectors in which foreign equity participation is restricted by the Philippine Constitution or laws; and Part B lists areas in which foreign ownership is limited for reasons of national security, defense, public health, morals, and/or the protection of small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

The 1995 Special Economic Zone Act allows PEZAs to regulate and promote investments in export-oriented manufacturing and service facilities inside special economic zones, including grants of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives.

Further information about investing in the Philippines is available at BOI website (http://boiown.gov.ph/ ) and PEZA website (http://www.peza.gov.ph/ ).

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

The 2015 Philippine competition law established the Philippine Competition Commission (PCC), an independent body mandated to resolve complaints on issues such as price fixing and bid rigging, and to stop mergers that would restrict competition.  More information is available on PCC website (http://phcc.gov.ph/#content ). The Department of Justice (https://www.doj.gov.ph/ ) prosecutes criminal offenses involving violations of competition laws.

Expropriation and Compensation

Philippine law allows expropriation of private property for public use or in the interest of national welfare or defense in return for fair market value compensation.  In the event of expropriation, foreign investors have the right to receive compensation in the currency in which the investment was originally made and to remit it at the equivalent exchange rate.  However, the process of agreeing on a mutually acceptable price can be protracted in Philippine courts. No recent cases of expropriation involve U.S. companies in the Philippines.

The 2016 Right-of-Way Act facilitates acquisition of right-of-way sites for national government infrastructure projects and outlines procedures in providing “just compensation” to owners of expropriated real properties to expedite implementation of government infrastructure programs.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

The Philippines is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and has adopted the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, or the New York Convention.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The Philippines is signatory to various bilateral investment treaties that recognize international arbitration of investment disputes.  Since 2002, the Philippines has been respondent to six investment dispute cases filed before the ICSID. Details of cases involving the Philippines are available on the ICSID website  .

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Investment disputes can take years to resolve due to systemic problems in Philippine courts.  Lack of resources, understaffing, and corruption make the already complex court processes protracted and expensive. Several laws on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms (i.e. arbitration, mediation, negotiation, and conciliation) were approved to decongest clogged court dockets.  Public-Private Partnership (PPP) infrastructure contracts are required to include ADR provisions to make resolving disputes less expensive and time-consuming.

A separate action must be filed for foreign judgments to be recognized or enforced under Philippine law.  Philippine law does not recognize or enforce foreign judgments that run counter to existing laws, particularly those relating to public order, public policy, and good customary practices.  Foreign arbitral awards are enforceable upon application in writing to the regional trial court with jurisdiction. The petition may be filed any time after receipt of the award.

Bankruptcy Regulations

The 2010 Philippine bankruptcy and insolvency law provides a predictable framework for rehabilitation and liquidation of distressed companies, although an examination of some reported cases suggests uneven implementation.  Rehabilitation may be initiated by debtors or creditors under court-supervised, pre-negotiated, or out-of-court proceedings. The law sets conditions for voluntary (debtor-initiated) and involuntary (creditor-initiated) liquidation.  It also recognizes cross-border insolvency proceedings in accordance with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, allowing courts to recognize proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction involving a foreign entity with assets in the Philippines.  Regional trial courts designated by the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over insolvency and bankruptcy cases. The Philippines ranked 63rd out of 190 economies, and eighth among 25 economies from East Asia and the Pacific, in the World Bank’s 2018 Ease of Doing Business report in terms of resolving insolvency and bankruptcy cases.

Investment Incentives

The Philippines’ Investment Priorities Plan (IPP) enumerates investment activities entitled to incentives facilitated by BOI, such as an income tax holiday.  Non-fiscal incentives include the following: employment of foreign nationals, simplified customs procedures, duty exemption on imported capital equipment and spare parts, importation of consigned equipment, and operation of a bonded manufacturing warehouse.

The 2017 IPP, updated every three years, provides incentives to the following activities: manufacturing (e.g. agro-processing, modular housing components, machinery, and equipment); agriculture, fishery, and forestry; Integrated Circuit design, creative industries, and knowledge-based services (e.g. IT-Business Process Management services for the domestic market, repair/maintenance of aircraft, telecommunications, etc.); healthcare (e.g. hospitals and drug rehabilitation centers); mass housing; infrastructure and logistics (e.g. airports, seaports, and PPP projects); energy (development of energy sources, power generation plants, and ancillary services); innovation drivers (e.g. fabrication laboratories); and environment (e.g. climate change-related projects).  Further details of the 2017 IPP are available on the BOI website (http://boi.gov.ph/  ).

BOI-registered enterprises that locate in less-developed areas are entitled to pioneer incentives and can deduct 100 percent of the cost of necessary infrastructure work and labor expenses from taxable income.  Pioneer status can be granted to enterprises producing new products or using new methods, goods deemed highly essential to the country’s agricultural self-sufficiency program, or goods utilizing non-conventional fuel sources.  Furthermore, an enterprise with more than 40 percent foreign equity that exports at least 70 percent of its production may be entitled to incentives even if the activity is not listed in the IPP. Export-oriented firms with at least 50 percent of revenues derived from exports may register for additional incentives under the 1994 Export Development Act.

Multinational entities that establish regional warehouses for the supply of spare parts, manufactured components, or raw materials for foreign markets also enjoy incentives on imports that are re-exported, including exemption from customs duties, internal revenue taxes, and local taxes.  The first package of the Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) law which took effect January 1, 2018, removed the 15 percent special tax rate on gross income of employees of multinational enterprises’ regional headquarters (RHQ) and regional operating headquarters (ROHQ) located in the Philippines.  RHQ and ROHQ employees are now subjected to regular income tax rates, usually at higher and less competitive rates.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Export-related businesses enjoy preferential tax treatment when located in export processing zones, free trade zones, and certain industrial estates, collectively known as economic zones, or ecozones.  Businesses located in ecozones are considered outside customs territory and are allowed to import capital equipment and raw material free of customs duties, taxes, and other import restrictions. Goods imported into ecozones may be stored, repacked, mixed, or otherwise manipulated without being subject to import duties and are exempt from the Bureau of Customs’ Selective Pre-shipment Advance Classification Scheme.  While some ecozones are designated as both export processing zones and free trade zones, individual businesses within them are only permitted to receive incentives under a single category.

Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)

PEZA operates 379 ecozones, primarily in manufacturing, IT, tourism, medical tourism, logistics/warehousing, and agro-industrial sectors.  PEZA manages four government-owned export-processing zones (Mactan, Baguio, Cavite, and Pampanga) and administers incentives to enterprises in other privately owned and operated ecozones.  Any person, partnership, corporation, or business organization, regardless of nationality, control and/or ownership, may register as an export, IT, tourism, medical tourism, or agro-industrial enterprise with PEZA, provided the enterprise physically locates its activity inside any of the ecozones.  PEZA administrators have earned a reputation for maintaining a clear and predictable investment environment within the zones of their authority. (http://www.peza.gov.ph/index.php/economic-zones/list-of-economic-zones/operating-economic-zones)

Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) and Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA)

The ecozones located inside former U.S. military bases were established under the 1992 Bases Conversion and Development Act.  The BCDA (http://www.bcda.gov.ph/  ) operates Clark Freeport Zone (Angeles City, Pampanga), John Hay Special Economic Zone (Baguio), Poro Point Freeport Zone (La Union), and Bataan Technology Park (Morong, Bataan).  The SBMA operates Subic Bay Freeport Zone (Subic Bay, Zambales). Clark and Subic have their own international airports, power plants, telecommunications networks, housing complexes, and tourist facilities.  These ecozones offer comparable incentives to PEZA. Enterprises already receiving incentives under the BCDA law are disqualified to receive incentives and benefits offered by other laws.

Other Zones

The Phividec Industrial Estate (Misamis Oriental Province, Mindanao) is governed by Phividec Industrial Authority (PIA) (http://www.piamo.gov.ph/ ), a government-owned and controlled corporation.  Other ecozones are Zamboanga City Economic Zone and Freeport (Zamboanga City, Mindanao) (http://www.zfa.gov.ph/  ) and Cagayan Special Economic Zone (CEZA) and Freeport (Santa Ana, Cagayan Province) (http://ceza.gov.ph/  ).  CEZA grants gaming licenses in addition to offering export incentives.  The Regional Economic Zone Authority (Cotabato City, Mindanao) (http://reza.armm.gov.ph/ ) has been operated by the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).  The incentives available to investors in these zones are similar to PEZA, but administered independently.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

The BOI imposes a higher export performance requirement on foreign-owned enterprises (70 percent of production) than on Philippine-owned companies (50 percent of production) when providing incentives under IPP.

Companies registered with BOI and PEZA may employ foreign nationals in supervisory, technical, or advisory positions for five years from date of registration (possibly extendable upon request).  Top positions and elective officers of majority foreign-owned BOI-registered enterprises (such as president, general manager, and treasurer, or their equivalents) are exempt from employment term limitation.  Foreigners intending to work locally must secure an Alien Employment Permit from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE  ), renewable every year or co-terminus with the duration of employment (which in no case shall exceed five years).  The BOI and PEZA facilitate special investor’s resident visas with multiple entry privileges and extend visa facilitation assistance to foreign nationals, their spouses, and dependents.

The 2006 Biofuels Act establishes local content requirements for diesel and gasoline, which must have a minimum content of locally produced biofuel (currently 2 percent for diesel and 10 percent for gasoline, by volume).  There is no other data localization requirement imposed on other goods. The Philippines does not impose restrictions on cross-border data transfers. Sensitive personal information is protected under the 2012 Data Privacy Act, which provides penalties for unauthorized processing and improper disposal of data even if processed outside the Philippines.

Real Property

The Philippines recognizes and protects property rights, but the enforcement of laws is weak and fragmented.  The Land Registration Authority and the Register of Deeds (http://www.lra.gov.ph/), which facilitate the registration and transfer of property titles, are responsible for land administration, with more information available on their website  s.  Property registration processes are tedious and costly.  Multiple agencies are involved in property administration, which results in overlapping procedures for land valuation and titling processes.  Record management is weak due to a lack of funds and trained personnel. Corruption is also prevalent among land administration personnel and the court system is slow to resolve land disputes.  The Philippines ranked 114th out of 190 economies in terms of ease of property registration in the World Bank’s 2018 Ease of Doing Business report.

Intellectual Property Rights

The Philippines is not listed on the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report.  The country has a robust intellectual property rights (IPR) regime in place, although enforcement is irregular and inconsistent.  The total estimated value of counterfeit goods reported seized in 2018 was USD 453 million, nearly a 180 percent increase from USD 162 million in 2017.  The sale of imported counterfeit goods in local markets has visibly decreased, though stakeholders report the amount of counterfeit goods sold online is gradually increasing.

The Intellectual Property (IP) Code provides legal framework for IPR protection, particularly in key areas of patents, trademarks, and copyrights.  The Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL) is the implementing agency of the IP Code, with more information available on its website  .  The Philippines generally has strong patent and trademark laws.  IPOPHL’s IP Enforcement Office (IEO) reviews IPR-related complaints and visits establishments reportedly engaged in IPR-related violations.  However, weak border protection, corruption, limited enforcement capacity by the government, and lack of clear procedures continue to weaken enforcement.  In addition, IP owners still must assume most enforcement costs when counterfeit goods are seized.

Enforcement actions are often not followed by successful prosecutions.  The slow and capricious judicial system keeps most IP owners from pursuing cases in court.  IP infringement is not considered a major crime in the Philippines and takes a lower priority in court proceedings, especially as the courts become more crowded out with criminal cases, which receive higher priority.  Many IP owners opt for out-of-court settlements (such as ADR) rather than filing a lawsuit that may take years to resolve in the unpredictable Philippine courts. The IPOPHL has jurisdiction to resolve certain disputes concerning alleged infringement and licensing through its Arbitration and Mediation Center.

For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at the local IP offices, see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/  .

Resources for Rights Holders

Contact at Mission:

Douglas Fowler, Economic Officer
Economic Section, U.S. Embassy Manila
Telephone: (+632) 301.2000
Email: ManilaEcon@state.gov

A list of local lawyers can be found on the U.S. Embassy’s website: https://ph.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The Philippines welcomes the entry of foreign portfolio investments, including into local and foreign-issued equities listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE  ).  Investments in certain publicly listed companies are subject to foreign ownership restrictions specified in the Constitution and other laws.  Non-residents are allowed to issue bonds/notes or similar instruments in the domestic market with prior approval from the Central Bank; in certain cases, they may also obtain financing in Philippine pesos from authorized agent banks without prior Central Bank approval.

Although growing, the PSE (with fewer than 270 listed firms as of the end of 2017) lags behind many of its neighbors in size, product offerings, and trading activity.  The securities market is growing but remains dominated by government bills and bonds. Hostile takeovers are uncommon because most companies’ shares are not publicly listed and controlling interest tends to remain with a small group of parties.  Cross-ownership and interlocking directorates among listed companies also decrease the likelihood of hostile takeovers.

In September 1995, the Philippines accepted International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII obligations to refrain from imposing restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.  The IMF staff did not raise/report any issues involving restrictions on current international payments and transfers following its most recent annual consultations with the Philippines in 2017.

Credit is generally granted on market terms and foreign investors are able to obtain credit from the liquid domestic market.  However, some laws require financial institutions to set aside loans for preferred sectors (e.g. agriculture, agrarian reform, and MSMEs).  To help promote lending at competitive rates to MSMEs, the government is working to fully operationalize a centralized credit information system that collects and disseminates information about the track record of borrowers and credit activities of entities in the financial system.

Money and Banking System

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP, the Central Bank) is a highly respected institution.  The banking system is stable. The Central Bank has pursued regulatory reforms promoting good governance and aligning/adapting risk management regulations and the risk-based capital framework with international standards.  Capital adequacy ratios are well above the 8 percent international standard and the central bank’s 10 percent regulatory requirement. The non-performing loan ratio was at 1.7 percent as of the end of 2018. There is ample liquidity, with the liquid assets-to-deposits ratio estimated at about 48 percent.  Commercial banks constitute more than 90 percent of the total assets of the Philippine banking industry. The five largest commercial banks represented about 60 percent of the total resources of the commercial banking sector as of 2018. Twenty-two of the 44 commercial banks operating in the country are foreign branches, including three U.S. banks (Citibank, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase).  Citibank has the largest presence among the foreign bank branches and currently ranks 12th overall in terms of assets.

Foreign residents and non-residents may open foreign and local currency bank accounts.  Although non-residents may open local currency deposit accounts, they are limited to the funding sources specified under central bank regulations.  Non-residents’ foreign currency accounts cannot be funded from foreign exchange purchases from banks and banks’ subsidiary/affiliate foreign exchange corporations.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange Policies

The Central Bank has actively pursued reforms since the 1990s to liberalize and simplify foreign exchange regulations.  As a general rule, the Central Bank allows residents and non-residents to purchase foreign exchange from banks, banks’ subsidiary/affiliate foreign exchange corporations, and other non-bank entities operating as foreign exchange dealers and/or money changers and remittance agents to fund legitimate foreign exchange obligations, subject to provision of information and/or supporting documents on underlying obligations.  No mandatory foreign exchange surrender requirement is imposed on exporters, overseas workers’ incomes, or other foreign currency earners; these foreign exchange receipts may be sold for pesos or retained in foreign exchange in local and/or offshore accounts. The Central Bank follows a market-determined exchange rate policy, with scope for intervention to smooth excessive foreign exchange volatility.

Remittance Policies

The Central Bank does not restrict payments and transfers for current international transactions, including payments for imports, subject to submission of a duly accomplished foreign exchange purchase application form if the foreign exchange is sourced from banks and/or their subsidiary/affiliate foreign exchange corporations within specified thresholds (currently USD 500,000 for individuals and USD 1 million for corporates/other entities).  Purchases above the thresholds are also subject to the submission of minimum documentary requirements but do not require prior Central Bank approval.

Foreign exchange policies do not require approval of inward foreign direct and portfolio investments.  Registration of foreign investments with the Central Bank or custodian banks is generally optional. Duly registered foreign investments are entitled to full and immediate repatriation of capital and remittance of dividends, profits, and earnings.

As a general policy, current regulations require prior Central Bank approval of government-guaranteed foreign loans/borrowings (including those in the form of notes, bonds, and similar instruments) by the private sector.  Although there are exceptions, private sector loan agreements should also be registered with the Central Bank if serviced through the purchase of foreign exchange from the banking system.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed the Philippines from its gray list of countries with strategic deficiencies in countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism in 2013.  Although a high reporting threshold and exclusion of junket operators and non-cash transactions are weaknesses, a law signed in July 2017 to include casinos as covered institutions in the Philippine anti-money laundering regime has allowed the Philippines to stave off a return to the FATF gray list thus far.  Although not a systemic issue, some local banks and money service businesses have been affected by the “de-risking” phenomenon reported by various jurisdictions in recent years, driven in part by risk aversion of foreign banks due to anti-money laundering/terrorism financing compliance costs. The Philippines has a restrictive regime for accessing bank accounts to detect or prosecute financial crimes, which is a significant impediment to enforcing laws against corruption, tax evasion, smuggling, laundering, and other economic crimes.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

The Philippines does not presently have sovereign wealth funds.

State-owned enterprises, known in the Philippines as government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC), are predominant in the power, transport, infrastructure, communications, land and water resources, social services, housing, and support services sectors.  There were 103 operational and functioning GOCCs as of April 2019 (a list is available on the Governance Commission for GOCC [GCG] website  ).  GOCCs are required to remit at least 50 percent of their annual net earnings (e.g. cash, stock, or property dividends) to the national government.

Private and state-owned enterprises generally compete equally.  The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS  ) is the only agency, with limited exceptions, allowed to provide coverage for the government’s insurance risks and interests, including those in BOT projects and privatized government corporations.  Since the national government acts as the main guarantor of loans, stakeholders report GOCCs often have an advantage in getting financing from government financial institutions and some private banks.  Most GOCCs are not statutorily independent, but attached to cabinet departments, and, therefore, subject to political interference.

OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs

The Philippines is not an OECD member country.  The 2011 GOCC Governance Act addresses problems experienced by GOCCs, including poor financial performance, weak governance structures, and unauthorized allowances.  The law allows unrestricted access to GOCC account books and requires strict compliance with accounting and financial disclosure standards; establishes the power to privatize, abolish, or restructure GOCCs without legislative action; and sets performance standards and limits on compensation and allowances.  The GCG   formulates and implements GOCC policies.  GOCC board members are limited to one-year term, subject to reappointment based on a performance rating set by GCG, with final approval by the Philippine President.

Privatization Program

The Philippine Government’s privatization program is managed by the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance (DOF).  The privatization of government assets undergoes a public bidding process. Apart from restrictions stipulated in FINL, no regulations discriminate against foreign buyers and the bidding process appears to be transparent.  Additional information is available on the PMO website (http://www.pmo.gov.ph/index.htm )

Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) is regularly practiced in the Philippines, although no domestic laws require it.  The Philippine Tax Code provides RBC-related incentives to corporations, such as tax exemptions and deductions. Various non-government organizations and business associations also promote RBC.  The Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP  ) is the largest corporate-led social development foundation involved in advocating corporate citizenship practice in the Philippines.  U.S. companies report strong and favorable responses to RBC programs among employees and within local communities.

OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises

The Philippines is not an OECD member country.  The Philippine government strongly supports RBC practices among the business community but has not yet endorsed the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to stakeholders.

Corruption is a pervasive and long-standing problem in both the public and private sectors.  The country’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index declined from 101 in 2016 to 111 in 2017 of 176 countries worldwide yet rebounded to 99 out of 180 in 2018.   The World Economic Forum’s 2017-2018 Global Competitiveness Report ranked corruption among the top problematic factors for doing business in the Philippines. The Bureau of Customs is still considered to be one of the most corrupt agencies in the country, having fired and replaced five customs commissioners in as many years.

The Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022 outlines strategies to reduce corruption by streamlining government transactions, modernizing regulatory processes, and establishing mechanisms for citizens to report complaints.  A front line desk in the Office of the President, the Presidential Complaint Center, or PCC (https://op-proper.gov.ph/contact-us/  ), receives and acts on corruption complaints from the general public.  The PCC can be reached through its complaint hotline, text services (SMS), and social media sites.

The Philippine Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the Code of Ethical Conduct for Public Officials all aim to combat corruption and related anti-competitive business practices.  The Office of the Ombudsman investigates and prosecutes cases of alleged graft and corruption involving public officials, with more information available on its website  .  Cases against high-ranking officials are brought before a special anti-corruption court, the Sandiganbayan, while cases against low-ranking officials are filed before regional trial courts.

The Office of the President can directly investigate and hear administrative cases involving presidential appointees in the executive branch and government-owned and controlled corporations.  Soliciting, accepting, and/or offering/giving a bribe are criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment, a fine, and/or disqualification from public office or business dealings with the government.  Government anti-corruption agencies routinely investigate public officials, but convictions by courts are limited, often appealed, and can be overturned. Recent positive steps include the creation of an investors’ desk at the Ombudsman’s Office, and corporate governance reforms of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery

The Philippines ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2003.  It is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies are responsible for combating corruption:

Office of the Ombudsman
Ombudsman Building, Agham Road, North Triangle
Diliman, Quezon City
Hotline:  (+632) 926.2662
Telephone:  (+632) 479.7300
Email/Website: pab@ombudsman.gov.ph / http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph  /

Presidential Complaint Center
Gama Bldg., Minerva St. corner Jose Laurel St.
San Miguel, Manila
Telephone: (+632) 736.8645, 736.8603, 736.8606
Email: pcc@malacanang.gov.ph / https://op-proper.gov.ph/presidential-action-center/ 

Contact Center ng Bayan
Text:  (+63) 908 881.6565
Call:  1-6565
Email/Website: email@contactcenterngbayan.gov.ph / contactcenterngbayan.gov.ph  

Terrorist groups and criminal gangs operate in some regions.  The Department of State publishes a consular information sheet and advises all Americans living in or visiting the Philippines to review the information periodically.  A travel advisory is in place for those U.S. citizens contemplating travel to the Philippines.

Terrorist groups, including the ISIS-Philippines affiliated Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Maute Group, Ansar al-Khalifa Philippines (AKP) and elements of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), periodically attack civilian targets, kidnap civilians – including foreigners – for ransom, and engage in armed attacks against government security forces.  These groups have mostly carried out their activities in the western and central regions of Mindanao, including the Sulu Archipelago and Sulu Sea. They are also capable of operating in some areas outside Sulu, as evidenced by the 2015 kidnapping of four hostages from Samal Island, just outside Davao City.

ISIS-affiliated groups in Mindanao occupied and held siege to Marawi City for five months in 2017, prompting President Duterte to declare martial law over the entire Mindanao region – approximately one-third of the country’s territory.  Congress granted multiple extensions of martial law, which will remain in place until the end of 2019. Security forces ultimately cleared the city and eliminated much of the terrorist leadership, but suffered many casualties during the siege.

The New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), is responsible in some parts of the country, mostly Mindanao, for civil disturbances through assassinations of public officials, sporadic attacks on military and police forces, bombings, and attacks on infrastructure, such as power generators and telecommunications towers.  The NPA relies on extortionist revolutionary taxes from local and some foreign businesses to fund its operations. The Philippine government ended a unilateral ceasefire with the CPP/NPA in 2017 and initiated a process for designating the group as a terrorist organization under domestic law.

The Philippines’ most significant human rights problems were killings allegedly undertaken by vigilantes, security forces, and insurgents; cases of apparent governmental disregard for human rights and due process; official corruption; and a weak and overburdened criminal justice system notable for slow court procedures, weak prosecutions, and poor cooperation between police and investigators.

President Duterte’s administration continued a nationwide campaign, led primarily by the Philippine National Police (PNP), to eliminate illegal narcotics.  The ongoing operation received worldwide attention for its harsh tactics.

Managers of U.S. companies in the Philippines report that local labor costs are relatively low and workers are highly motivated, with generally strong English language skills.  In 2018, the Philippine labor force reached 43 million workers, with an employment rate of 94.6 percent and an unemployment rate of 5.4 percent. These figures include employment in the informal sector and do not capture the substantial rates of underemployment in the country.  Youths between the ages of 15 and 24 made up nearly 50 percent of the unemployed. More than half of all employment was in the services sector, with 23.1 percent and 19.4 percent in agriculture and industry sectors, respectively.

Compensation packages in the Philippines tend to be comparable with those in neighboring countries.  Regional Wage and Productivity Boards meet periodically in each of the country’s 16 administrative regions to determine minimum wages.  The non-agricultural daily minimum wage in Metro Manila is approximately USD 9.86, although some private sector workers receive less. Most regions set their minimum wage significantly lower than Metro Manila.  Violation of minimum wage standards is common, especially non-payment of social security contributions, bonuses, and overtime. Philippine law also provides for a comprehensive set of occupational safety and health standards.  The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) has responsibility for safety inspection, but a shortage of inspectors has made enforcement difficult.

The Philippines Constitution enshrines the right of workers to form and join trade unions.  The trend among firms using temporary contract labor to lower employment costs continues despite government efforts to regulate the practice.  The DOLE Secretary has the authority to end strikes and mandate a settlement between parties in cases involving national interest. DOLE amended its rules concerning disputes in 2013, specifying industries vital to national interest:  hospitals, the electric power industry, water supply services (excluding small bottle suppliers), air traffic control, and other industries as recommended by the National Tripartite Industrial Peace Council (NTIPC). Economic zones often offer on-site labor centers to assist investors with recruitment.  Although labor laws apply equally to economic zones, unions have noted some difficulty organizing inside the zones.

The Philippines is signatory to all International Labor Organization (ILO) core conventions, but has faced challenges with enforcement.  Unions allege that companies or local officials use illegal tactics to prevent workers from organizing. The quasi-judicial National Labor Relations Commission reviews allegations of intimidation and discrimination in connection with union activities.  Meanwhile, the NTIPC monitors the application of international labor standards.

Reports of forced labor in the Philippines continue, particularly in connection with human trafficking in the commercial sex, domestic service, agriculture, and fishing industries.

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) provides debt financing, political risk insurance, and private equity capital to support U.S. investors and their investments.  It does so under a bilateral agreement with the Philippines. Going forward, the BUILD Act will consolidate OPIC and USAID’s Development Credit Authority program into one organization, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, allowing it to use tools such as loans, guarantees, and political risk insurance to facilitate private-sector investment in the region.

Previously, OPIC has provided debt financing in the form of direct loans and loan guarantees of up to USD 350 million per project for business investments with U.S. private sector participation in the Philippines.  Past OPIC programs in the Philippines include projects with the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), the Asia Foundation for economic development activities, and a cloud-based technology program for the local cargo and courier industry.

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

*Host Country Statistical Sources:
Philippine Statistical Authority (http://psa.gov.ph/nap-press-release/data-charts  )
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/efs_ext2.asp#FCDU  )

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

The Philippine Central Bank does not publish or post inward and outward FDI stock broken down by country.  Total stock figures are reported under the “International Investment Position” data that the Central Bank publishes and submits to the International Monetary Fund’s Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB).  As of the 4th quarter of 2018, inward direct investment (i.e. liabilities) is USD 83 billion, while outward direct investment (i.e. assets) is USD 51.9 billion.

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

The Philippine Central Bank disaggregates data into equity and debt securities but does not publish or post the stock of portfolio investments assets broken down by country.  Total foreign portfolio investment stock figures are reported under the “International Investment Position” data that Central Bank publishes and submits to the International Monetary Fund’s Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB).  As of 2018, outward portfolio investment (i.e. assets) was USD 19.5 billion, of which USD 1.9 billion was in equity investments and USD 17.7 billion was in debt securities.

Douglas Fowler
Economic Officer
U.S. Embassy Manila
1201 Roxas Boulevard, Manila, Philippines
Telephone: (+632) 301.2000
Email: ManilaEcon@state.gov

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

Thailand continues to welcome investment from all countries and seeks to avoid dependence on any one country as a source of investment. The FBA prescribes a wide range of business that may not be conducted by foreigners unless a relevant license has been obtained or an exemption applies. The term “foreigner” includes Thai-registered companies in which half or more of the capital is held by non-Thai individuals, foreign-registered companies, and Thai-registered companies that are themselves majority foreign-owned.  BOI, Thailand’s investment promotion agency, assists Thai and foreign investors to start and conduct businesses in targeted economic sectors by offering both tax and non-tax incentives.

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Various Thai laws set forth foreign-ownership restrictions in certain sectors, primarily in services such as banking, insurance, and telecommunications. The FBA details the types of business activities reserved for Thai nationals. Foreign investment in those businesses must comprise less than 50 percent of share capital, unless specially permitted or otherwise exempt.

The following three lists detail restricted businesses for foreigners:

List 1. This contains activities non-nationals are prohibited from engaging in, including:  newspaper and radio broadcasting stations and businesses; rice and livestock farming; forestry and timber processing from a natural forest; fishery in Thai territorial waters and specific economic zones; extraction of Thai medicinal herbs; trading and auctioning of antique objects or objects of historical value from Thailand; making or casting of Buddha images and monk alms bowls; and land trading.

List 2. This contains activities related to national safety or security, arts and culture, traditional industries, folk handicrafts, natural resources, and the environment. Restrictions apply to the production, sale and maintenance of firearms and armaments; domestic transportation by land, water, and air; trading of Thai antiques or art objects; mining, including rock blasting and rock crushing; and timber processing for production of furniture and utensils. A foreign majority-owned company can engage in List 2 activities if Thai nationals or legal persons hold not less than 40 percent of the total shares and the number of Thai directors is not less than two-fifths of the total number of directors.

List 3. Restricted businesses in this list include:  accounting, legal, architectural, and engineering services; retail and wholesale; advertising businesses; hotels; guided touring; selling food and beverages; and other service-sector businesses. A foreign company can engage in List 3 activities if a majority of the limited company’s shares are held by Thai nationals. Any company with a majority of foreign shareholders (more than 50 percent) cannot engage in List 3 activities unless it receives an exception from the Ministry of Commerce under its Foreign Business License (FBL) application.

Thailand does not maintain an investment screening mechanism, but investors can receive additional incentives/privileges if they invest in priority areas, such as high-technology industries. Investors should contact the Board of Investment [https://www.boi.go.th/index.php?page=index  ] for the latest information on specific investment incentives.

The U.S. Commercial Service, U.S. Embassy Bangkok, is responsible for issuing a certification letter to confirm that a U.S. company is qualified to apply for benefits under the Treaty of Amity. The applicant must first obtain documents verifying that the company has been registered in compliance with Thai law. Upon receipt of the required documents, the U.S. Commercial Service office will then certify to the Foreign Administration Division, Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce (MOC) that the applicant is seeking to register an American-owned and managed company or that the applicant is an American citizen and is therefore entitled to national treatment under the provisions of the Treaty. For more information on how to apply for benefits under the Treaty of Amity, please e-mail: ktantisa@trade.gov.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

The World Trade Organization conducted a Trade Policy Review of Thailand in November 2015. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp426_e.htm  . The next review is scheduled for October 2020.

Business Facilitation

The MOC’s Department of Business Development (DBD) is generally responsible for business registration, which can be performed online or manually. A legal requirement that documentation must be submitted in Thai language has caused foreign entities to spend three to six months to complete the process, as they typically have to hire a law firm or consulting firm to handle their applications. Firms engaging in production activities also must register with the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Labor and Social Development.

To operate restricted businesses as defined by the FBA’s List 2 and 3, non-Thai entities must obtain a foreign business license, approved by the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and/or Director-General of the MOC’s Department of Business Development, depending on the business category.

Effective June 9, 2017, the MOC removed certain business categories from FBA’s Annex 3 list. Businesses no longer subject to restrictions include regional office services and contractual services provided to government bodies and state-owned enterprises.

American investors who wish to take majority shares or wholly own businesses under FBA’s Annex 3 list may apply for protection under the U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity. https://2016.export.gov/thailand/treaty/index.asp#P5_233  

Americans planning to invest in Thailand are advised to obtain qualified legal advice, especially considering Thai business regulations are governed predominantly by criminal, not civil, law. Foreigners are rarely jailed for improper business activities, but violations of business regulations can carry heavy criminal penalties. Thailand has an independent judiciary and government authorities are generally not permitted to interfere in the court system once a case is in process.

In March 2019, the MOC’s Department of Business Development completed an annual report on suggestions for FBA changes, particularly the possible removal of certain service businesses from FBA’s List 3.  The report is pending the Cabinet’s review, which is expected to take place after a new government assumes office.

A company is required to have registered capital of two million Thai baht per foreign employee in order to obtain work permits. Foreign employees must enter the country on a non-immigrant visa and then submit work permit applications directly to the Department of Labor. Application processing takes approximately one week. For more information on Thailand visas, please refer to http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/services/4908/15388-Non-Immigrant-Visa- percent22B percent22-for-Business-and.html  .

In February 2018, the Thai government launched a Smart Visa program for foreigners with expertise in specialized technologies in ten targeted industries. Under this program, foreigners can be granted a maximum four-year visa to work in Thailand without having to obtain a work permit and can enjoy relaxed immigration rules for their spouses and children. More information is available at https://www.boi.go.th/index.php?page=detail_smart_visa&language=en.

Outward Investment

Thai companies are expanding and investing overseas, especially in neighboring ASEAN countries to take advantage of lower production costs, but also in the United States, Europe and Asia. A stronger domestic currency, rising cash holdings, and subdued domestic growth are helping to drive outward investment. Food, agro-industry, and chemical sectors account for the main share of outward flows. Thai corporate laws allow outbound investments in the form of an independent affiliate (foreign company), as a branch of a Thai legal entity, or by a financial investment abroad from a Thai company. BOI and the MOC’s Department of International Trade Promotion (DITP) share responsibility for promoting outward investment, with BOI focused on outward investment in leading economies and DITP covering smaller markets.

The 1966 iteration of the U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations allows U.S. citizens, and U.S. majority-owned businesses incorporated in the United States or Thailand, to engage in business on the same basis as Thai companies (national treatment). However, the FBA applies restrictions to U.S. investment in the following sectors:  communications; transportation; exploitation of land and other natural resources; and domestic trade in agricultural products.

In October 2002, the United States and Thailand signed a bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), which established a forum to discuss bilateral trade and investment issues, such as intellectual property rights, customs, market-access barriers, and other areas of mutual concern.

Thailand has bilateral investment treaties with Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation (signed, not in force), Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tajikistan (signed, not in force), Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe (signed, not in force). Thailand is a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), currently under negotiation.  Thailand is also preparing its application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which entered into force on December 30, 2018.

Thailand belongs to the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional free-trade and economic bloc comprising a total population of 600 million. ASEAN has free trade agreements with Australia, New Zealand, China, India, Korea, and Hong Kong. ASEAN also has a comprehensive economic partnership with Japan and is pursuing FTA negotiations with the EU, Pakistan, and Canada.

Thailand and the United States concluded a bilateral tax treaty in 1996. Thailand signed the U.S.-Thailand Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on March 4, 2016. Implementing legislation for FATCA, the Act on the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, BE 2560, went into effect in October 2017.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

On March 24, Thailand held its first election since a military-led coup in May 2014. Election results are expected on or before May 9, with formation of a government to follow.

Under the military junta government, also known as the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), line ministries have drafted laws with little or no input from stakeholders, particularly international investors. In some cases, laws were passed quickly through the National Legislative Assembly, largely viewed as a “rubber stamp” legislature; in other cases, ministries have issued sudden notifications relying on the Prime Minister’s authority under Article 44 of the interim constitution, which empowers the NCPO leader to issue any order “for the sake of the reforms in any field, the promotion of love and harmony amongst the people in the nation, or the prevention, abatement or suppression of any act detrimental to national order or security, royal throne, national economy or public administration, whether the act occurs inside or outside the kingdom.” Such orders are deemed “lawful, constitutional and final.”

Foreign investors have, on occasion, expressed frustration that draft regulations are not made public until they are finalized, and that comments they submit on draft regulations they do see are not taken into consideration. Non-governmental organizations report, however, they are actively consulted by the government on policy, especially within the health sector, for example on policies related to pharmaceuticals, alcohol, infant formula, and meat imports, as well as on intellectual property policies. In other areas, such as digital and cybersecurity laws, there have been instances in which public outcry over leaked government documents has led to withdrawal and review of proposed legislation.

U.S. businesses have repeatedly expressed concern about the lack of transparency of the Thai customs regime, the significant discretionary authority exercised by Customs Department officials, and a system of giving rewards to officials and non-officials for seized goods based on a percentage of their sales price. The U.S. government and private sector have expressed concern about the inconsistent application of Thailand’s transaction valuation methodology and repeated use of arbitrary values by the Customs Department. Thailand’s new Customs Act, which entered into force on November 13, 2017, is a moderate step forward. The Act removed the Customs Department Director General’s authority and discretion to increase the Customs value of imports, and reduced the percentage of remuneration awarded to officials and non-officials from 55 percent to 40 percent of the sale price of seized goods (or of the fine amount). While a welcome development, reduction of this remuneration is insufficient to remove the personal incentives given Customs officials to seize goods and to address the conflicts of interest the system entails.

Consistent and predictable enforcement of government regulations remains problematic for investment in Thailand.   In 2017, the Thai government initiated a policy to cut down on red tape, licenses, and permits in order to encourage economic growth. The policy focused on reducing and amending certain outdated regulations in order to improve Thailand’s ranking on the World Bank “Ease of Doing Business” report. The policy reviewed national license and permit requirements, with the aim of eliminating redundant licenses and streamlining complex procedures for starting new businesses.

Gratuity payments to civil servants responsible for regulatory oversight and enforcement remain a common practice. Firms that refuse to make such payments can be placed at a competitive disadvantage when compared to other firms in the same field that do engage in such practices.

The Royal Thai Government Gazette (www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th  ) is Thailand’s public journal of the country’s centralized online location of laws, as well as regulation notifications.

International Regulatory Considerations

While Thailand is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and notifies most draft technical regulations to the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee and the Sanitary and Phytosantitary Measures Committee, the country does not always follow WTO or other international standard-setting norms or guidance, preferring to set its own standards in many cases. In October 2015, the country ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, which came into effect in February 2017. On March 7, 2018, the Thai Ambassador to the WTO was elected unanimously by 164 WTO members to serve as Chair of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.

Legal System and Judicial Independence

Thailand has a civil code, commercial code, and a bankruptcy law. Monetary judgments are calculated at the market exchange rate. Decisions of foreign courts are not accepted or enforceable in Thai courts. Disputes such as the enforcement of property or contract rights have generally been resolved in Thai courts. Thailand has an independent judiciary that is generally effective in enforcing property and contractual rights. The legal process is slow in practice, and litigants or third parties sometimes influence judgments through extra-legal means.

There are three levels to the judicial system in Thailand:  the Court of First Instance, which handles most matters at inception; the Court of Appeals; and the Supreme Court. There are also specialized courts, such as the Labor Court, Family Court, Tax Court, the Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, and the Bankruptcy Court.

The Specialized Appeal Courts handles appeals from specialized courts. The Supreme Court has discretion whether to take a case that has been decided by the Specialized Appeal Court. If the Supreme Court decides not to take up a case, the Specialized Appeal Court decision stands.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

The Foreign Business Act (FBA) governs most investment activity by non-Thai nationals. Foreign investment in most service sectors is limited to 49 percent ownership. Other key laws governing foreign investment are the Alien Employment Act (1978) and the Investment Promotion Act (1977). Many U.S. businesses enjoy investment benefits through the U.S.-Thailand Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations.

The 2007 Financial Institutions Business Act unified the legal framework and strengthened the Bank of Thailand’s (the country’s central bank) supervisory and enforcement powers. The Act allows the Bank of Thailand to raise foreign ownership limits for existing local banks from 25 percent to 49 percent on a case-by-case basis. The Minister of Finance can authorize foreign ownership exceeding 49 percent if recommended by the central bank. Details are available at: https://www.bot.or.th/English/AboutBOT/LawsAndRegulations/
SiteAssets/Law_E24_Institution_Sep2011.pdf .

Apart from acquiring shares of existing local banks, foreign banks can enter the Thai banking system by obtaining new licenses, issued by the central bank and the Ministry of Finance. The 2008 Life Insurance Act and the 2008 Non-Life Insurance Act apply a 25 percent cap on foreign ownership of insurance companies and on foreign boards of directors. However, in January 2016 the Office of the Insurance Commission (OIC), the primary insurance industry regulator, notified that any Thai life or non-life insurance company wishing to have one or more foreigners hold more than 25 percent (but no more than 49 percent) of its total voting shares, or to have foreigners comprise more than a quarter (but less than half) of its total directors, may apply to the OIC for approval. Any foreign national wishing to hold more than 10 percent of the voting shares in an insurance company must seek OIC approval. With approval, a foreign national can acquire up to 49 percent of the voting shares.

Any foreign shareholder holding more than ten percent of the voting shares prior to the effective date of the notification is grandfathered in and may maintain the current shareholding, but must obtain OIC approval to increase it.  Finally, the Finance Minister, with OIC’s positive recommendation, has discretion to permit greater than 49 percent foreign ownership and/or a majority of foreign directors, when the operation of the insurance company may cause loss to insured parties or to the public.

For information on Thailand’s “One Start One Stop” investment center, please visit: http://osos.boi.go.th  . Investors in Thailand can visit the physical office, located on the 18th floor of Chamchuri Square on Rama 4/Phayathai Road in Bangkok.

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

Thailand enacted an updated version of the Trade Competition Act on October 5, 2017. The updated Act covers all business activities, except:  state-owned enterprises exempted by law; government policies related to national security, public benefit, common interest and public utility; cooperatives, agricultural and cooperative groups, government agencies, and other enterprises exempted by the law.

The Office of Trade Competition Commission (OTCC) is an independent agency and the main enforcer of the Trade Competition Act. The OTCC, comprised of seven members nominated by a selection committee and endorsed by the Cabinet, advises the government on issuance of relevant regulations, ensures fair and free trade practices, investigates cases and complaints of unfair trade, and pursues criminal and disciplinary actions against those found guilty of unfair trade practices stipulated in the law. The law focuses on unlawful exercise of market dominance; mergers or collusion that could lead to monopoly, unfair competition and restricting competition; and unfair trade practices. Merger control thresholds and additional details will be provided in notifications and regulations to be issued at a later date.

The Act broadens the definition of a business operator to include affiliates and group companies, and broadens the liability of directors and management, subjecting them to criminal and administrative sanctions if their actions (or omissions) resulted in violations. The Act also provides more details about penalties in cases involving administrative court or criminal court actions. The amended Act has been noted as an improvement over the prior legislation and a step towards Thailand’s adoption of international standards in this area.

The government has authority to control the price of specific products under the Price of Goods and Services Act. The MOC’s Department of Internal Trade administers the law and interacts with affected companies, though the Committee on Prices of Goods and Services makes final decisions on products to add or remove from price controls. As of January 2019, the MOC increased the number of controlled commodities and services to 54 from 53 the previous year. Aside from these controlled commodities, raising prices of consumer products is prohibited without first notifying the Committee. The government uses its controlling stakes in major suppliers of products and services, such as Thai Airways and PTT Public Company Limited, to influence prices in the market. Thailand has extensive environmental-protection legislation, including the National Environmental Quality Act, the Hazardous Substances Act, and the Factories Act. Food purity and drug efficacy are controlled and regulated by the Thai Food and Drug Administration (with authority similar to its U.S. counterpart). The Ministry of Labor sets and administers labor and employment standards.

Expropriation and Compensation

Private property can be expropriated for public purposes in accordance with Thai law, which provides for due process and compensation. This process is seldom invoked and has been principally confined to real estate owned by Thai nationals and required for public works projects. In the past year, U.S. firms have not reported problems with property appropriation in Thailand.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Thailand is a signatory to the New York Convention and enacted its own rules governing conciliation and arbitration procedures in the Arbitration Act of 2002. Thailand signed the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in 1985, but has not yet ratified it.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

There have been several notable cases of investor-state disputes in the last fifteen years, but none involved U.S. companies. Currently, Thailand is engaged in a dispute with Australian firm Kingsgate Consolidated Limited over the government’s invocation of special powers to shut down a gold mine in early 2017 because of environmental damage and conflicts with the local population. Kingsgate, a major shareholder of the operator of the disputed mine, claimed the Thai government violated the Australia-Thailand Free Trade Agreement and commenced international arbitration proceedings against the country to recover losses incurred from the closure. The process is still continuing as of May 2019.

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Thailand’s Arbitration Act of 2002, modeled in part after the UNCITRAL Model Law, governs domestic and international arbitration proceedings. The Act states that “in cases where an arbitral award was made in a foreign country, the award shall be enforced by the competent court only if it is subject to an international convention, treaty, or agreement to which Thailand is a party.” The Thai Arbitration Institute (TAI) of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Office, Office of the Judiciary, and the Office of the Arbitration Tribunal of the Board of Trade of Thailand provide arbitration services for proceedings held in Thailand. In 2017, TAI adopted new rules aimed at addressing weaknesses in Thailand’s arbitration process. The new rules:  empower TAI to appoint arbitrators when any of the parties in dispute fails to do so; establish a 180-day duration for arbitration procedures; and mandate issuance of a final award within 30 days of the closure of pleadings.

An amendment to the Arbitration Act, which aims to allow foreign arbitrators to take part in cases involving foreign parties, was approved by the National Legislative Assembly in January 2019. As of May 2019, the new version of this Act is awaiting royal endorsement, after which it will be published in the Royal Gazette; both steps must occur before it enters into force. In addition, the semi-public Thailand Arbitration Center offers mediation and arbitration for civil and commercial disputes. Under very limited circumstances, a court can set aside an arbitration award. Thailand does not have a bilateral investment treaty or a free trade agreement with the United States.

Bankruptcy Regulations

Thailand’s bankruptcy law allows for corporate restructuring similar to U.S. Chapter 11 and does not criminalize bankruptcy. While bankruptcy is under consideration, creditors can request the following ex parte applications from the Bankruptcy Court:  an examination by the receiver of all the debtor’s assets and/or that the debtor attend questioning on the existence of assets; a requirement that the debtor provide satisfactory security to the court; and immediate seizure of the debtor’s assets and/or evidence in order to prevent the loss or destruction of such items.

The law stipulates that all applications for repayment must be made within one month after the Bankruptcy Court publishes the appointment of an official receiver. If a creditor eligible for repayment does not apply within this period, he forfeits his right to receive payment or the court may cancel the order to reorganize the business. If any person opposes a filing, the receiver shall investigate the matter and approve, partially approve, or dismiss the application. Any objections to the orders issued by the receiver may be filed with the court within 14 days after learning of the issued order.

The National Credit Bureau of Thailand (NCB) provides the financial services industry with information on consumers and businesses. In May 2018, the World Bank’s Doing Business Report ranked Thailand 24th out of 190 countries on resolving insolvency.

Investment Incentives

The Board of Investment is Thailand’s central investment promotion authority. BOI offers investment incentives to qualified domestic and foreign investors based on clear application procedures. To upgrade the country’s technological capacity, the BOI presently gives more weight to applications in high-tech, innovative, and sustainable industries, such as digital technology, “smart agriculture” and biotechnology, aviation and logistics, medical and wellness tourism, and other high-value services.

Two of the most significant privileges offered by the BOI for promoted projects are:

• Tax privileges, such as corporate income tax exemptions, and tariff reductions or exemptions on the import of machinery and/or imported raw materials used in the investment.
• Nontax privileges, such as permission to own land, permission to bring foreign experts to work on the promoted projects, exemptions on foreign ownership limitations of companies, and exemptions from work permit and visa rules.

Thailand’s flagship investment zone, the “Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC),” spans the provinces of Chachoengsao, Chonburi, and Rayong with a combined area of 5,129 square miles. The EEC leverages the adjacent Eastern Seaboard industrial area that has been an investment destination for more than 30 years. The Thai government aims to establish the EEC as a primary investment and infrastructure hub in ASEAN, serving as a central gateway to east and south Asia. Among the EEC development projects are:  smart cities; an innovation district (EECi); a digital park (EECd); an aerotropolis (EEC-A); and other state-of-the-art facilities to help promote EEC’s following targeted industries:

• Next-generation automotives
• Intelligent electronics
• Advanced agriculture and biotechnology
• Food processing
• Tourism

• Advance robotics and automation
• Integrated aviation industry
• Medical hub and total healthcare services
• Biofuels and biochemicals
• Digital technology
• Defense industry
• Human resource development

The EEC Act provides investment incentives and privileges. Investors will be able to obtain long-term land leases of 99 years (with an initial lease of up to 50 years and a renewal of up to 49 years). The public-private partnership approval process is shortened to approximately nine months. The BOI will offer corporate income tax exemptions of up to 13 years for strategic projects in the EEC area. Foreign experts who work in the EEC will be subject to a maximum personal income tax rate of 17 percent; a 15 percent personal income tax rate will apply to executives whose companies have International Business Centers in the EEC. Investment projects with a significant R&D, innovation, or human resource development component may be eligible for additional grants and incentives. Moreover, grants will be provided to support targeted technology development under the Competitive Enhancement Act. There will be a one-stop service to expedite multiple business processes for investors.

On March 26, 2019, the Thai Cabinet approved Royal Decrees cancelling grandfathered tax incentives under former incentive regimes for foreign investors who establish:  regional operating headquarters; international headquarters (including a treasury center); and international trading centers. The repeal will become effective June 1, 2019 for corporate income tax incentives and effective January 1, 2020 for individual income tax incentives.  The Ministry of Finance (MOF) asserts this measure is in response to a 2017 OECD report (2017 Progress Report on Preferential Regimes (Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 2: Action 5); the report labelled Thailand’s regional/international headquarters and trading and treasury hub regimes as harmful tax practices. MOF also indicated its  actions will ensure Thailand will not be classified as ”Potentially Harmful” or ”Actually Harmful” by the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) and BEPS. The Thai government has announced current beneficiaries of the suspended regimes will be able to transition into a new scheme, the “International Business Center” (IBC) investment incentive program, provided the applicant meets the IBC regime’s to-be-announced conditions.

For additional information, contact the Thai Board of Investment, 555 Vibhavadi-Rangsit Road, Chatuchak, Bangkok 10900. Tel: 0-2553-8111. Website: www.boi.go.th  .

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

The Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT), a state-enterprise under the Ministry of Industry, has established a network of industrial estates in Thailand, including Laem Chabang Industrial Estate in Chonburi Province (eastern) and Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate in Rayong Province (eastern). Foreign-owned firms generally have the same investment opportunities in the industrial zones as Thai entities, but the IEAT Act requires that in the case of foreign-owned firms, the IEAT Committee must consider and approve the amount of space/land that such firms plan to buy or lease in industrial estates. In practice, there is no record of disapproval for requested land. Private developers are heavily involved in the development of these estates. The IEAT currently operates 9 estates, plus 41 more in conjunction with the private sector, in 15 provinces nationwide. Private-sector developers operate over 50 industrial estates, most of which have received promotion privileges from the Board of Investment.

The IEAT has established 12 special IEAT Free Zones reserved for industries manufacturing for export only. Businesses may import raw materials into and export finished products from these zones free of duty (including value added tax). These zones are located within industrial estates and many have customs facilities to speed processing. The free trade zones are located in Chonburi, Lampun, Pichit, Songkhla, Samut Prakarn, Bangkok (at Lad Krabang), Ayuddhya, and Chachoengsao. In addition to these zones, factory owners may apply for permission to establish a bonded warehouse within their premises to which raw materials, used exclusively in the production of products for export, may be imported duty free.

Thailand is focusing on improving trade and investment with neighboring countries. It is therefore establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in ten provinces bordering neighboring countries e.g., Tak, Nong Khai, Mukdahan, Sa Kaeo, Trad, Narathiwat, Chiang Rai, Nakhon Phanom, and Kanchanaburi. Business sectors and industries that might benefit from tax and non-tax incentives offered in the SEZs include logistics, warehouses near border areas, distribution, services, tourism, labor-intensive factories, and manufacturers using raw materials from neighboring countries.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

In 2018, Thailand enacted a Royal Decree on Foreign Worker Management (no.2), which replaced the Foreign Employment Act and the Royal Decree on the Management of Migrant Employment, to manage the employment of foreigners, regardless of industry, in a more systematic fashion. The new decree eliminates mandatory prison time for undocumented workers. It also narrows the range of penalties from a minimum of USD 157 to a maximum of USD 1,571 (THB 5,000-50,000) (compared to USD 63 to USD 3,142 (THB 2,000-100,000) under the prior law). The new decree also bans sub-contract employers from hiring migrant workers and requires employers to provide to migrant workers a copy of their employment contracts.

The decree prohibits employers and employment agencies from charging workers fees other than “personal expenses,” defined as passport fees, medical checks, and work permit fees. Employers may only deduct the actual cost of these personal expenses, and these deductions may not exceed 10 percent of any worker’s monthly salary. The law makes retention of worker documents illegal and prescribes mandatory penalties of between USD 12,517 to USD 25,142 (THB 400,000 to THB 800,000) and/or imprisonment of up to six months to employers who violate these rules. The decree also increases the grace period for migrant workers to change employers from 15 to 30 days. Employers and employment agencies are required by law to bear the cost of repatriating migrant workers back to their home country when workers resign or when their employment contract ends.

Thai law requires foreign workers to have a work permit issued by the Ministry of Labor in order to work legally in Thailand. The Ministry of Labor considers the following factors when deciding whether to issue a work permit:

•  whether a Thai employee could perform the job;
•  whether the foreigner is qualified for the job; and
•  whether the job fits the present economic needs of the Kingdom.

Thai law also reserves 39 occupations for Thai workers; the Ministry of Labor will not grant work permits for foreigners to engage in these occupations, which include lawyers, architects, and civil engineers. Generally, employers must hire four Thai nationals for every one foreign employee.

Different requirements apply to companies promoted by the BOI, which typically result in greater flexibility and ease in obtaining work permits for foreign nationals. Such schemes apply equally to senior management and boards of directors. According to the Foreign Business Act, if a foreigner is the firm’s managing partner or the manager, the company is subject to the restrictions applicable to foreign businesses and the Foreign Business License application.

While the employment of foreigners in some sectors is subject to the foreign equity restrictions of the Foreign Business Act, exceptions can be granted as promotional privileges by BOI or IEAT, or, as a temporary measure, in the form of government approval issued by the Thai government. Exceptions can also be provided based on international treaties to which Thailand is a party. Under the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between Thailand and the United States, U.S. companies or nationals can be eligible for national treatment, allowing them, with some exceptions, to obtain the same treatment in their business dealings as Thai nationals.

The Thai government does not currently have any specific law governing “forced localization” policy, under which foreign investors must use domestic content in goods or technology, but it has encouraged such an approach through domestic preferences in procurement. While there are currently no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to surveillance, the Thai government in February 2019 passed new laws and regulations on cybersecurity and personal data protection that raise concerns over Thai authorities’ broad power to demand confidential and sensitive information without sufficient legal protections or a company’s ability to appeal or limit such access. IT providers have expressed concern that the new laws might place unreasonable burdens on them and have introduced new uncertainties in the technology sector. Thailand has implemented a requirement that all debit transactions processed by a domestic debit card network must use a proprietary chip. Regarding Thailand’s import permitting process for several agricultural products, such as soybean and milk, the government imposes separate domestic absorption rate requirements to purchase local products at fixed prices.

Real Property

Property rights are guaranteed by the Constitution against being condemned or nationalized without fair compensation. Thai government policy generally does not permit foreigners to own land, but there have been cases of granting official permission under certain laws or ministerial regulations for residential, business or even religious purposes. Foreigners can freely lease land, as the governing Civil and Commercial Code does not distinguish between foreign and Thai nationals in the exercise of lease rights. Foreign ownership of condominiums and buildings is also permitted under certain laws. Secured interests in property, such as mortgage and pledge, are recognized and enforced. Under Thai law, unoccupied property legally owned by foreigners or Thais may be subject to adverse possession by squatters or people who stay on that property for at least 10 years. According to the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business report, Thailand’s Registering Property ranking rose to 66 from 68 in 2018.

Intellectual Property Rights

Thailand’s efforts to clamp down on widespread commercial IP counterfeiting and piracy have been enhanced by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha’s strong political commitment to IPR enforcement. The Prime Minister ordered the establishment of a 12-agency IPR Cabinet sub-committee and the development of a 20-year IP Roadmap as well as closer coordination among the country’s Internal Security Operations Command, law enforcement agencies, and IP rights holders. In December 2018, the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC), the country’s telecom regulator, the Royal Thai Police, and the Department of the Intellectual Property (DIP) at the Ministry of Commerce combined to set up a new “Center of Operational Policing for Thailand against Intellectual Property Violations and Crimes on the Internet Suppression” to expedite efforts to tackle online IPR violations.

Patents and Trademarks

Thailand’s patent regime generally provides protection for most inventions. The examination of patent applications through issuance of patents takes on an average of six to eight years. Patent issuance may take longer in certain technology sectors. In order to address the backlog problem, DIP hired 88 additional patent and trademark examiners over the last few years.  Additional examiners helped decrease the patent application backlog by 20 percent in 2018. As of September 2018, approximately 16,000 patent applications were pending for examination, according to DIP. With regard to trademarks, DIP takes on average 10-14 months for trademark approvals.

The Thai government is in the process of adopting an amendment to the Patent Act that would streamline the patent registration process and implement its international obligations under the Amendment of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) related to patent and public health, which Thailand ratified in January 2016.  The draft amendment is pending the legislature’s approval.

Starting in September 2017, rights owners can file for sound trademark registration, a development enabled by a July 2016 amendment of Thailand’s Trademark Act. Thailand acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (Madrid Protocol) in August 2017, and the agreement entered into effect in November 2017. The Thai government is also working on an amendment to the Patent Act to prepare Thailand for accession to the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs.

Copyrights

Thailand’s amended Copyright Act came into effect on March 11, 2019. Thailand is a member of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled. Thailand deposited the instrument of accession to the Marrakesh Treaty with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on January 28, 2019.  

In addition, Thailand is in the process of a two-phase amendment of the Copyright Act. The first phase would enhance mechanisms to protect copyrights in the digital environment and prepare Thailand for accession to the WIPO Copyright Treaty; the second phase would prepare Thailand for accession to the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. The first-phase draft is under review by the Council of State, while the second phase amendment is in the drafting process.  

The Thai government amended the Computer Crime Act in 2017 to add IPR infringement as a predicate offense under Section 20, enabling IP right holders to file requests to either DIP or the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society for removal of IPR-infringing content from online computer systems or disabling of access to it. Online video providers and human rights advocates continue to voice serious concerns regarding use of the Computer Crimes Act to limit free speech and to compel internet service providers (ISP) to comply with Thai government requests to remove content or else face penalties.

Geographical Indications

Thailand’s Geographical Indications (GI) Act has been in force since April 2004. Thailand protects GIs, which identify goods by their specific geographical origins. The geographical origins identified by a GI must attribute to the reputation, qualities, or characteristics of the good. In Thailand, a registered trademark does not prevent a similar geographical name to be registered as a GI.

IP Enforcement

Thailand has provided ex-officio authority for border enforcement officials with respect to in-transit goods; set enforcement benchmarks; began monthly publishing of enforcement statistics online; and stepped up efforts to investigate IP cases. Thailand has a Court of Appeal for Specialized Cases, which hears appeals from the Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, including administrative appeals from DIP that already received a first instance decision from the Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court.

In late 2017, Thailand was upgraded from the USTR Special 301 Priority Watch List, where it had been placed since 2007, to the Watch List. Currently, there are no Thai markets listed in the USTR Notorious Markets Report.

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/  .

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

The Thai government maintains a regulatory framework that broadly encourages and facilitates portfolio investment and largely avoids market-distorting support for specific sectors. The Stock Exchange of Thailand, the country’s national stock market, was set up under the Securities Exchange of Thailand Act B.E. 2535 in 1992. There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to allow investors to enter and exit sizeable positions. Government policies generally do not restrict the free flow of financial resources to support product and factor markets. The Bank of Thailand, the country’s central bank, has respected IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

Credit is generally allocated on market terms rather than by “direct lending.” Foreign investors are not restricted from borrowing on the local market. In theory, the private sector has access to a wide variety of credit instruments, ranging from fixed term lending to overdraft protection to bills of exchange and bonds. However, the private debt market is not well developed; most corporate financing, whether for short-term working capital needs, trade financing, or project financing, requires borrowing from commercial banks or other financial institutions.

Money and Banking System

In general, a commercial bank in Thailand provides services of accepting deposits from the public, granting credit, buying and selling foreign currencies, buying and selling bills of exchange (including discounting or re-discounting, accepting, and guaranteeing bills of exchange).  Commercial banks also provide credit guarantees, payment, remittance and financial instruments for risk management, such as interest-rate derivatives and foreign-exchange derivatives. Additional business to support capital market development, such as debt and equity instruments, is allowed. A commercial bank may also provide other services, such as bank assurance and e-banking, which enhance its efficiency.

Thailand’s banking sector, with 14 domestic commercial banks, is sound and well-capitalized. As of December 2018, non-performing loan rates were low (around 2.93 percent) and the ratio of capital funds/risk assets (capital adequacy) was high (17.6 percent). Thailand’s largest commercial bank is Bangkok Bank, with assets totaling USD 96.5 billion as of December 2018. The combined assets of the five largest commercial banks totaled USD 413 billion, or 77 percent of the total assets of the Thai banking system, at the end of 2018.

Thailand’s central bank is the Bank of Thailand (BOT), which is headed by a Governor appointed for a five-year term. The BOT prints and issues banknotes and other security documents, promotes monetary stability and formulates monetary policies, manages the BOT’s assets, provides banking facilities to the government, acts as the registrar of government bonds, and provides banking facilities for financial institutions.

There are currently 11 registered foreign bank branches and four foreign bank subsidiaries operating in Thailand, including Citibank, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase. Foreign commercial banks can set up a branch in Thailand, once the applicant obtains a recommendation from the Bank of Thailand and a license from the Ministry of Finance. Foreign commercial bank branches are limited to three branches/ATMs and foreign commercial bank subsidiaries are limited to 20 branches and 20 off-premise ATMs per subsidiary. Foreign banks must maintain minimum capital funds of 125 million baht (USD 3.86 million at end of 2018 exchange rates) invested in government or state enterprise securities, or directly deposited in the Bank of Thailand. The number of expatriate management personnel is limited to six people at full branches, although Thai authorities frequently grant exceptions on the basis of need. There are no records of losses among banks in the past three years.

Non-residents can open and maintain foreign currency accounts without deposit and withdrawal ceilings. Any deposits in Thai Baht currency must be derived from one of the following sources:  conversion of foreign currencies; payment of goods and services; or capital transfers. Withdrawals are freely permitted, except the withdrawal of funds for credit to another non-resident person or purchase of foreign currency involving an overdraft.

Since mid-2017, the BOT has approved Thai domestic banks’ requests to develop financial innovations based on blockchain technology, but the system is being closely monitored under the BOT’s “Regulatory Sandbox guidelines.”

Thailand’s alternative financial services include cooperatives, micro-saving groups, the state village funds, and informal money lenders, who provide basic but expensive financial services to households, mostly in rural areas. These alternative financial services, with the exception of informal money lenders, are regulated by the government.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange

There are no limitations placed on foreign investors for converting, transferring, or repatriating funds associated with an investment; however, supporting documentation is required. Any person who brings Thai Baht currency or foreign currency in or out of Thailand with aggregate amount exceeding USD 15,000 or the equivalent must declare the currency at a Customs checkpoint. Investment funds are allowed to be freely converted into any currency.

The exchange rate is generally determined by market fundamentals but is carefully scrutinized by the BOT under a managed float system. During periods of excessive capital inflows/outflows (i.e., exchange rate speculation), the central bank has stepped in to prevent extreme movements in the currency and to reduce the duration and extent of the exchange rate’s deviation from a targeted equilibrium.

Remittance Policies

Thailand imposes no limitations on the inflow or outflow of funds for remittances of profits or revenue for direct and portfolio investments. There are no time limitations on remittances.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Thailand does not have a sovereign wealth fund and the Bank of Thailand is not pursuing the creation of such a fund. However, the International Monetary Fund has urged Thailand to create a sovereign wealth fund due to its large accumulated foreign exchange reserves (USD 205.6 billion as of December 2018.

Thailand’s 56 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have total assets of USD 422 billion and a combined net income of USD 8.3 billion (end of 2018 figures). They employ around 270,000 people, or 0.7 percent of the Thai labor force. Thailand’s SOEs operate primarily in service delivery, in particular in the energy, telecommunications, transportation, and financial sectors. The full list of SOEs is available at the website of the State Enterprise Policy Office under the Ministry of Finance: (www.sepo.go.th  ).

The Thai government generally defines SOEs as special agencies established by law for a particular purpose that are 100 percent owned by the government (through the Ministry of Finance as a primary shareholder). The government recognizes a second category of “limited liability companies/public companies” in which the government owns 50 percent or more of the shares. Of the 56 total SOEs, 43 are wholly-owned and 13 are majority-owned. Twelve of these companies are classed as limited liability companies. Five are publicly listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand:  Thai Airways International Public Company Limited; Airports of Thailand Public Company Limited; PTT Public Company Limited; MCOT Public Company Limited; and Krung Thai Bank Public Company Limited. By regulation, at least one-third of SOE boards must be comprised of independent directors.

Private enterprises can compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products/services, and incentives in most sectors, but there are some exceptions, such as fixed-line operations in the telecommunications sector.

According to officials at the State Enterprise Policy Committee (SEPO), Thai SOEs adhere to OECD guidelines on corporate governance, including guidelines relating to the state acting as an owner. Nevertheless, adherence to the OECD guidelines is not sufficient in Thailand to ensure a level playing field between SOEs and private sector enterprises, which are often disadvantaged in competing with Thai SOEs for contracts.

Generally, SOE senior management reports directly to a line minister and to SEPO. Corporate board seats are typically allocated to senior government officials or politically-affiliated individuals. The SEPO Committee purportedly tries to limit political interference in board appointments.

Privatization Program

The 1999 State Enterprise Corporatization Act provides a framework for conversion of SOEs into stock companies, and corporatization is viewed as an intermediate step toward eventual privatization. (Note: “corporatization” describes the process by which an SOE adjusts its internal structure to resemble a publicly-traded enterprise; “privatization” denotes that a majority of the SOE’s shares is sold to the public; and “partial privatization” refers to a situation in which less than half of a company’s shares are sold to the public.) Foreign investors are allowed to participate in privatizations, but restrictions are applied in certain sectors, as regulated by the FBA and the Act on Standards Qualifications for Directors and Employees of State Enterprises of 1975, as amended. However, privatizations have been on hold since 2006 largely due to strong opposition from labor unions.

A 15-member State Enterprises Policy Commission, or “superboard,” oversees reform of the country’s 56 SOEs. In March 2015, the superboard approved, in principle, the establishment of a holding firm to supervise 12 SOEs, which have been partially equitized and listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The reform plan calls for SEPO to retain supervisory authority over SOEs that have been established by specific laws, including the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, the Metropolitan Electricity Authority, and the Provincial Electricity Authority. As of the end of 2018, the superboard is still in the process of advancing a new law that would reform SOEs and ensure transparent management decisions; however, privatization is not part of this process.

In 2018, the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights visited Thailand and commended the Thai government’s 2017 commitment to implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP). Thailand does not have a National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct (RBC), nor does it maintain a National Contact Point (NCP) for OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Various line ministries have taken steps to encourage RBC through integrated sustainable business practices focused on respecting human rights, environmental protection, labor relations, and financial accountability. The Ministry of Justice is currently drafting a National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights (NAP).

The Ministry of Industry’s Department of Industrial Works encourages the private sector to implement its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR-DIW) standards as a precursor to achieving ISO 26000 standards (an international standard on CSR). In 2017, the Ministry of Industry joined the National Human Rights Committee, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the Federation of Thai Industries, the Thai Bankers Association, the Thai Chamber of Commerce, and the Global Computing Network of Thailand in signing a memorandum of cooperation to advance implementation of the UNGP.

There are several local NGOs that promote and monitor RBC. Most such NGOs operate without hindrance, though a few have experienced intimidation as a result of their work monitoring civil rights issues. International NGOs continue to call on the Thai government and Thai companies with transboundary investments to act more responsibly with respect to human and labor rights.

Thailand has a legal framework and a range of institutions to counter corruption. The Organic Law to Counter Corruption criminalizes corrupt practices of public officials and corporations, including active and passive bribery of public officials. The anti-corruption laws extend to family members of officials and to political parties.

Thai Procurement Regulations prohibit collusion amongst bidders. If an examination confirms allegations or suspicions of collusion among bidders, the names of those applicants must be removed from the list of competitors.

Thailand adopted its first national government procurement law in December 2016. Based on UNCITRAL model laws and the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, the law applies to all government agencies, local authorities, and state-owned enterprises, and aims to improve transparency. Officials who violate the law are subject to 1-10 years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to USD 11,000.

Since 2010, the Thai Institute of Directors has built an anti-corruption coalition of Thailand’s largest businesses. Coalition members sign a Collective Action Against Corruption Declaration and pledge to take tangible, measurable steps to reduce corruption-related risks identified by third party certification. The Center for International Private Enterprise equipped the Thai Institute of Directors and its coalition partners with an array of tools for training and collective action.

Established in 2011, the Anti-Corruption Organization of Thailand (ACT) aims to encourage the government to create laws to reduce corruption. ACT has 51 member organizations drawn from the private, public and academic sectors. Their signature program is the “integrity pact.” Drafted by ACT and the Finance Ministry and based on a tool promoted by Transparency International, the pact forbids bribes from signatory members in bidding for government contacts. Member agencies and companies must adhere to strict transparency rules by disclosing and making easily available to the public all relevant bidding information such as the terms of reference and the cost of the project.

Thailand is a party to the UN Anti-Corruption Convention, but not the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

Thailand’s Witness Protection Act offers protection (to include police protection) to witnesses, including NGO employees, who are eligible for special protection measures in anti-corruption cases.

Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Thailand 99th out of 180 countries in 2018. According to some studies, a cultural propensity to forgive bribes as a normal part of doing business and to equate cash payments with finders’ fees or consultants’ charges, coupled with the low salaries of civil servants, encourages officials to accept illegal inducements. U.S. executives with experience in Thailand often advise new-to market companies that it is far easier to avoid corrupt transactions from the beginning than to stop such practices once a company has been identified as willing to operate in this fashion. American firms that comply with the strict guidelines of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) are able to compete successfully in Thailand. U.S. businessmen say that publicly affirming the need to comply with the FCPA helps to shield their companies from pressure to pay bribes.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency or agencies responsible for combating corruption:

International Affairs Strategy Specialist
Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission
361 Nonthaburi Road, Thasaai District, Amphur Muang Nonthaburi 11000, Thailand
Tel: +662-528-4800
Email: TACC@nacc.go.th

Contact at “watchdog” organization:

Dr. Mana Nimitmongkol
Secretary General
Anti-Corruption Organization of Thailand
44 Srijulsup Tower, 16th floor, Phatumwan, Bangkok 10330
Tel: +662-613-8863
Email: mana2020@yahoo.com

On March 24, 2019, Thailand held its first national election since the 2014 military coup that ousted democratically elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. On June 5, the newly-seated Parliament elected coup leader General Prayut Chan-o-cha to continue on in his role as Prime Minister. However, stark political divisions remain in the country.

Violence related to an ongoing Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces has claimed more than 7,000 lives since 2004. Although the number of deaths and violent incidents has decreased year-over-year, efforts to end the ethno-nationalist insurgency have so far been unsuccessful. The government is currently engaged in peace talks with an insurgent umbrella group, but the principal insurgent faction refuses to participate. Almost all attacks have occurred in the three southernmost provinces of the country.

In 2018, 38.4 million people were in Thailand’s formal labor pool, comprising 58 percent of the total population. Thailand’s official unemployment rates stood at 1.1 percent at the end of 2018, slightly less than 1.2 percent the previous year. Unemployment among youth (15-24 years old) is around 4.8 percent, while the rate is only 0.5 percent for adults over 25 years old. Well over half the labor force (55.3 percent) earns income in the informal sector, including through self-employment and family labor, which limits their access to social welfare programs.

Low fertility rates and an aging population, as well as a skills mismatch, is exacerbating labor shortages in many sectors. Despite provision of 15 years of universal, free education, Thailand continues to suffer from a skills mismatch that impedes innovation and economic growth. Manufacturing firms in Thailand consider the lack of skilled workers a top constraint for further investment and growth. However, as the second-largest economy in ASEAN, Thailand has an agile business sector and a large cohort of educated individuals who could increase productivity in the future. Regional income inequality and labor shortages, particularly in labor-intensive manufacturing, construction, hospitality and service sectors, have attracted millions of migrant workers, mostly from Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. In 2019, the International Organization for Migration estimated Thailand hosts 4.9 million migrant workers, or 13 percent of country’s labor force. Flows of documented migrant workers entering the country through formal work agreements, or “MOUs,” increased by 40 percent over the previous year to 442,726 in 2018. However, about two-thirds of registered migrant workers currently in Thailand initially entered the country through unauthorized channels, often without any primary identity documents from their countries of origin.

In 2018, the Thai government sought to strengthen labor migration management and increase protections for migrant workers by, first, working with neighboring source countries to make it easier for migrant workers to obtain primary identity documents and, second, registering 1.2 million previously undocumented migrant workers. Thailand is the first country in ASEAN to accede to the ILO Forced Labor Protocol (P29) and ILO Work in Fishing Convention (C188). Additional information on migrant workers issues and rights can be found in the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report, as well as the Labor Rights chapter of the U.S. Human Rights report.

Under an agreement with the Thai government, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) provides debt financing, political risk insurance, and private equity capital to support U.S. investors and their investments. OPIC can provide debt financing, in the form of direct loans and loan guarantees, of up to USD 350 million per project for business investments with U.S. private sector participation, covering sectors as diverse as tourism, transportation, manufacturing, franchising, power, infrastructure, and others. OPIC political risk insurance for currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence for U.S. investments including equity, loans and loan guarantees, technical assistance, leases, and consigned inventory or equipment is also available for business investments in Thailand. In addition, OPIC supports five private equity funds that are eligible to invest in projects in Thailand. In all cases OPIC support is available only where sufficient or appropriate investment support is unavailable from local or other private sector financial institutions.

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment: https://www.bot.or.th/English/Statistics/EconomicAndFinancial/
Pages/StatInternationalInvestmentPosition.aspx  

U.S. Embassy Bangkok
Economic Section
BangkokEconSection@state.gov

Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

Vietnam continues to welcome FDI and foreign companies play an important role in the economy. According to the Government Statistics Office (GSO), FDI exports of USD 175 billion accounted for 72 percent of total exports in 2018 (compared to 47 percent in 2000).

Despite improvements in the business environment, including economic reforms intended to enhance competitiveness and productivity, Vietnam has benefited from global investors’ efforts to diversify their supply chains. Vietnam’s rankings fell in the most recent World Economic Forum Competitiveness Index (from 74/135 in 2017 to 77/140 in 2018) and World Bank Doing Business Index (from 68 in 2018 to 69 in 2019), but its raw scores improved compared to prior years. According to the 2018 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Investment Policy Review, Vietnam has an “average” level of openness compared to other OECD countries, though it is second to only Singapore within ASEAN. The OECD ranked Vietnam’s openness to FDI as higher than that of South Korea, Australia, and Mexico.

Vietnam seeks to move up the global value chain by attracting FDI in sectors that will facilitate technology transfer, increase skill sets in the labor market, and improve labor productivity, specifically targeting high-tech, high value-added industries with good environmental safeguards. Assisted by the World Bank, the government is drafting a new FDI Attraction Strategy for 2030. This new strategy is intended to facilitate technology transfer and environmental protection, and will supposedly move away from tax reductions to other incentives, such as using accelerated depreciation and more flexible loss carry-forward provisions and focusing on value-added qualities instead of on sectoral categories.

Since the Prime Minister included the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) as a target for improving national business competitiveness in Resolution 19 in 2014, PCI has become a major measurement for provincial economic governance policy reform. In January 2019, a new Resolution 02 also included PCI targets as a means to improve the business and investment environment in Vietnam.

Although there are foreign ownership limits (FOL), the government does not have investment laws discriminating against foreign investors; however, the government continues to favor domestic companies through various incentives. According to the OECD 2018 Investment Policy Review, SOEs account for one third of Vietnam’s gross domestic product and receive preferential treatment, including favorable access to credit and land. Regulations are often written to avoid overt conflicts and violations of bilateral or international agreements, but in reality, U.S. investors feel there is not always a level playing field in all sectors. In the 2018 Perceptions of the Business Environment Report, the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) stated: “Foreign investors need a level playing field, not only to attract more investment in the future, but also to maintain the investment that is already here. Frequent and retroactive changes of laws and regulations – including tax rates and policies – are significant risks for foreign investors in Vietnam.”

The Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) oversees an Investment Promotion Department to facilitate all foreign investments, and most of provinces and cities have investment promotion agencies. The agencies provide information, explain regulations, and offer support to investors when requested.

The semiannual Vietnam Business Forum allows for a direct dialogue between the foreign business community and government officials. The U.S.-ASEAN Business Council (USABC) also hosts multiple missions for its U.S. company members enabling direct engagement with senior government officials through frequent dialogues to try to resolve issues. In addition, the 2018 PCI noted 68.5 percent of surveyed companies stated that dialogues and business meetings with provincial authorities helped address obstacles and that they were satisfied with the way provincial regulators dealt with their concerns.  

Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Foreign and domestic private entities can establish and own businesses in Vietnam, except in six prohibited areas (illicit drugs, wildlife trading, prostitution, human trafficking, human cloning, and chemical trading). If a domestic or foreign company wants to operate in 243 provisional sectors, it must satisfy conditions in accordance with the 2014 Investment Law. Future amendments to the law are likely to narrow this list further, allowing firms to engage in more business areas. Foreign investors must negotiate on a case-by-case basis for market access in sectors that are not explicitly open under existing signed trade agreements. The government occasionally issues investment licenses on a pilot basis with time limits, or to specifically targeted investors.

Vietnam allows foreign investors to acquire full ownership of local companies, except when mentioned otherwise in international and bilateral commitments, including equity caps, mandatory domestic joint-venture partner, and investment prohibitions. For example, as specified in the Vietnam’s World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments, highly specialized and sensitive sectors (such as banking, telecommunication, and transportation) still maintain FOL, but the Prime Minister can waive these restrictions on a case-by-case basis. Vietnam also limits foreign ownership of SOEs and prohibits importation of old equipment and technologies more than 10 years old. No mechanisms disadvantage or single out U.S. investors.

Merger and acquisition (M&A) activities can be complicated if the target domestic company is operating in a restricted or prohibited sector. For example, when a foreign investor buys into a local company through an M&A transaction, it is difficult to determine which business lines the acquiring foreign company is allowed to maintain and, in many cases, the targeted company may be forced to reduce its business lines.

The 2017 Law on Technology Transfer came into effect in July 2018, along with its implementing documents Decree 76/2018/ND-CP and Circular 02/2018/TT-BKHCN. These require mandatory registration of technology transfers from a foreign country to Vietnam. This registration is separate from registration of intellectual property rights and licenses.  

Vietnam allows for five years of regulatory data protection (RDP) as part of its U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement obligations.  However, Vietnamese law requires companies to apply separately for RDP within the 12 months following receipt of market authorization for any country in the world. Specifically, decree No. 169/2018/ND-CP, effective from February 2018, tightened the regulatory process for the registration of medical devices and no longer accepted foreign classification results in Vietnam, lengthening procedural time and increasing expenses for foreign manufacturers.

Vietnamese authorities screen investment-license applications using a number of criteria, including: 1) the investor’s legal status and financial capabilities; 2) the project’s compatibility with the government’s “Master Plan” for economic and social development and projected revenue; 3) technology and expertise; 4) environmental protection; 5) plans for land-use and land-clearance compensation; 6) project incentives including tax rates, and 7) land, water, and sea surface rental fees. The decentralization of licensing authority to provincial authorities has, in some cases, streamlined the licensing process and reduced processing times. However, it has also caused considerable regional differences in procedures and interpretations of investment laws and regulations. Insufficient guidelines and unclear regulations can prompt local authorities to consult national authorities, resulting in additional delays. Furthermore, the approval process is often much longer than the timeframe mandated by laws. Many U.S. firms have successfully navigated the investment process, though a lack of transparency in the procedure for obtaining a business license can make investing riskier.

Provincial People’s Committees approve all investment projects, except the following:

• The National Assembly must approve investment projects that:
  • have a significant environmental impact;
  • change land usage in national parks;
  • are located in protected forests larger than 50 hectares; or
  • require relocating 20,000 people or more in remote areas such as mountainous regions.
• The Prime Minister must approve the following types of investment project proposals:
  • building airports, seaports, or casinos;
  • exploring, producing and processing oil and gas;  
  • producing tobacco;
  • possessing investment capital of more than VND 5,000 billion (USD 233 million);
  • including foreign investors in sea transportation, telecommunication or network infrastructure, forest plantation, publishing, or press; and
  • involving fully foreign-owned scientific and technology companies or organizations.

Other Investment Policy Reviews

Vietnam went through an OECD Investment Policy Review in 2018. The WTO reviewed Vietnam’s trade policy and the report is online. (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp387_e.htm  ).

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) conducted an investment policy review in 2009. (https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=521  )

Business Facilitation

Vietnam’s business environment continues to improve due to new laws that have streamlined the business registration processes.

The 2018 PCI report found that 75 percent of companies rated paperwork and procedures as simple, compared to 51 percent in 2015. Vietnam decreased duplicate and overlapping inspections with only 10 percent of companies reporting such cases in 2018, compared to 25 percent in 2015. However, many firms still felt the entry costs remain too high and 16 percent reported waiting over one month to complete all required paperwork (aside from getting a business license) to become fully legal. In addition, a 2018 AmCham position paper cited very frequent and largely unnecessary post-import audits as creating burdens for companies. Multiple U.S. companies report facing recurring and unpredictable tax audits based on assumptions or calculations not in alignment with international standards.

Vietnam’s nationwide business registration site is http://dangkykinhdoanh.gov.vn  . In addition, as a member of the UNCTAD international network of transparent investment procedures, information on Vietnam’s investment regulations can be found online (http://vietnam.eregulations.org/  ). The website provides information for foreign and national investors on administrative procedures applicable to investment and income generating operations, including the number of steps, name and contact details of the entities and persons in charge of procedures, required documents and conditions, costs, processing time, and legal and regulatory citations for seven major provinces. The 2019 World Bank’s Doing Business Report stated it took on average 17 days to start a business compared to 22 days in 2018. Vietnam is one of the few countries to receive a 10-star rating from UNCTAD in business registration procedures.

Outward Investment

The government does not have a clear mechanism to promote or incentivize outward investments. The majority of companies engaged in overseas investments are large SOEs, which have strong government-backed financial resources. The government does not implicitly restrict domestic investors from investing abroad. Vietnamese companies have increased investments in the oil, gas, and telecommunication sectors in various developing countries and countries with which Vietnam has close political relationships. According to a government’s most recent report, between 2011-2016, SOE PetroVietnam made USD 7 billion in outbound investments out of a total of USD 12.6 billion from all SOEs.

Vietnam maintains trade relations with more than 200 countries, and has 66 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 26 treaties with investment provisions. It is a party to five free trade agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN, Chile, the Eurasian Customs Union, Japan, and South Korea. As a member of ASEAN, Vietnam also is party to ASEAN FTAs with Australia, New Zealand, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong.   

In addition, CPTPP entered into force January 14, 2019, in Vietnam. Once fully implemented, CPTPP will form a trading bloc representing 495 million consumers and 13.5 percent of global GDP – worth a total of USD 10.6 trillion.  

In July 2018, the EU and Vietnam agreed on the final text of the EV FTA and the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (EV IPA), which are due to be voted upon by the European Parliament in 2019.

Vietnam is a participant in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations, which include the 10 ASEAN countries and Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand, and it is negotiating FTAs with other countries, including Israel. A full list of signed agreements to which Vietnam is a party is on the UNCTAD website:  http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/229#iiaInnerMenu  .

Vietnam has signed double taxation avoidance agreements with 80 countries, listed at http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/Vietnam-Individual-Foreign-tax-relief-and-tax-treaties  . The United States and Vietnam concluded and signed a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTA) in 2016, but it is still awaiting ratification by the U.S. Congress.

There are no systematic tax disputes between the government and foreign investors. However, an increasing number of U.S. companies disputed tax audits, which resulted in retroactive tax assessments. U.S. businesses generally attribute these cases to unclear, conflicting, and amended language in investment and tax laws and the government’s desire for revenue to reduce chronic budget deficits. These retroactive tax cases against U.S. companies can obscure the true risks of operating in Vietnam and give some U.S. investors pause when deciding whether to expand operations.

Decree 20/2017/ND-CP, effective since May 2017, introduced many new transfer-pricing reporting and documentation requirements, as well as new guidance on the tax deductibility of service and interest expenses. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is drafting revisions to its Law on Tax Administration and expects to submit the draft law to the National Assembly for review and approval in 2019.

Transparency of the Regulatory System

U.S. companies often report that they face significant challenges with inconsistent regulatory interpretation, irregular enforcement, and unclear laws. A 2017 survey of AmCham members in the ASEAN region found that, more than in any other ASEAN country, American companies perceive a lack of fair law enforcement in Vietnam, which heavily affects their ability to do business in the country. The 2018 PCI report found that access to land, taxes, and social insurance were the most burdensome administrative procedures. However, the report also found improvements in the area of post-entry regulations (regulations businesses face after they start operations), and the burden of administrative procedures was declining. In addition, according to that report, corruption has become less prevalent in certain areas for foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs).

In Vietnam, the National Assembly passes laws, which serve as the highest form of legal direction, but which often lack specifics. The central government, with the Prime Minister’s approval, issues decrees, which provide guidance on a law’s implementation. Individual ministries issue circulars, which provide guidance as to how that ministry will administer a law or a decree. Ministries draft laws and circulate for review among related ministries. Once the law is cleared through the various ministries, the government will post the law for a 60-day comment period. During the comment period or ministry review, if there are major issues with the law, the law will go back to the ministry that drafted the law for further revisions. Once the law is ready, it is submitted to the Office of Government (OOG) for approval, and then submitted to the National Assembly for a series of committee and plenary-level reviews. During this review, the National Assembly can send the law back to the drafting ministry for further changes. For some special or controversial laws, the Communist Party’s Politburo will review via a separate process.

Drafting agencies often lack the resources needed to conduct adequate scientific or data-driven assessments. In principle, before issuing regulations, agencies are required to conduct policy impact assessments that consider economic, social, gender, administrative, and legal factors. The quality of these assessments varies, however.

Regulatory authority exists in both the central and provincial governments, and foreign companies are bound by both central and provincial government regulations. Vietnam has its own accounting standards to which publicly listed companies are required to adhere.

The MOF updates the Vietnam Accounting Standards to match IFRS from time to time. In 2013, it set out a road map for public companies to apply 10 to 20 simple IFRS standards by 2020, 30 standards by 2023, and fully comply with IFRS by 2025. However, some companies already prepare financial statements in line with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the interest of reporting to foreign investors.

The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) is in charge of ensuring that government ministries and agencies follow administrative processes. The Ministry has a Regulatory Management Department, which oversees and reviews legal documents after they are issued to ensure compliance with the legal system. The Law on the Promulgation of Legal Normative Documents requires all legal documents and agreements be published online for comments for 60 days, and published in the Official Gazette before implementation. Business associations and various chambers of commerce regularly comment on draft laws and regulations. However, when issuing more detailed implementing guidelines, government entities sometimes issue circulars with little advance warning and without public notification, resulting in little opportunity for comment by affected parties. In several cases, authorities receive comments for the first draft only and make subsequent draft versions unavailable to the public. The centralized location where key regulatory actions are published can be found at http://vbpl.vn/  .

While Vietnam’s legal framework might comply with international norms in some areas, the biggest issue continues to be enforcement. For example, while anti-money laundering (AML) statutes comply with international standards, Vietnam has prosecuted very few AML cases so far. Therefore, while all state agencies participate in reviewing the regulatory enforcement under their legal mandates, regulatory review and enforcement mechanisms remain weak.

While general information is publically available, Vietnam’s public finances and debt obligations (including explicit and contingent liabilities) are not transparent. The National Assembly set a statutory limit for public debt at 65 percent of nominal GDP, and, according to official figures, Vietnam’s public debt to GDP ratio in late 2018 reached 61 percent, down 0.3 percent from 2017. However, the official public-debt figures exclude the debt of certain SOEs. This poses a risk to its public finances, as the state is ultimately liable for the debts of these companies. Vietnam could improve its fiscal transparency by making its executive budget proposal widely and easily accessible to the general public long before the National Assembly enacted the budget; including budgetary and debt expenses in the budget; ensuring greater transparency of off-budget accounts; and publicizing the criteria by which the government awards contracts and licenses for natural resource extraction.

International Regulatory Considerations

Vietnam is a member of ASEAN, a 10-member regional organization working to advance economic integration through cooperation in economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields. Within ASEAN, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC  ) has the goal of establishing a single market across ASEAN nations (similar to the EU), but that goal appears to be long term in nature. To date, the greatest success of the AEC has been tariff reductions. As a result, more than 97 percent of intra-ASEAN trade is tariff-free, and less than 5 percent is subject to tariffs above 10 percent.

Vietnam is a party to the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and has been implementing the TFA’s Category A provisions. Vietnam submitted its Category B and Category C implementation timelines on August 2, 2018. According to these timelines, Vietnam will fully implement the Category B and C provisions by the end of 2023 and 2024, respectively. 

Legal System and Judicial Independence

The legal system is a mix of customary, French, and Soviet civil legal traditions. Vietnam generally follows an operational understanding of the rule of law that is consistent with its top-down, one-party political structure and traditionally inquisitorial judicial system. Various laws and regulations regulate contracts, with each type of contract subject to specific regulations.

If a contract does not contain a dispute-resolution clause, courts will have jurisdiction over a possible dispute. Vietnamese law allows dispute-resolution clauses in commercial contracts explicitly through the Law on Commercial Arbitration. The law follows the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model law as an international standard for procedural rules, and the lawmakers’ intention is indeed arbitration-friendly.

Under the revised 2015 Civil Code, all contracts are “civil contracts” subject to uniform rules. In foreign civil contracts, parties may choose foreign laws as a reference for their agreement, if the application of the law does not violate the basic principles of Vietnamese law. When the parties to a contract are unable to agree on an arbitration award, they can bring the dispute to court.

The 2005 Commercial Law regulates commercial contracts between businesses. Specific regulations provide specific forms of contracts, depending on the nature of the deals. The hierarchy of the country’s courts is: (1) the Supreme People’s Court; (2) the High People’s Court; (3) Provincial People’s Courts; and (4) District People’s Courts. The People’s Courts operate in five divisions: criminal, civil, administrative, economic, and labor. The People’s Procuracy is responsible for prosecuting criminal activities as well as supervising judicial activities.

Vietnamese courts will only consider recognition of civil judgments issued by courts in countries that have entered into agreements on recognition of judgments with Vietnam or on a reciprocal basis. However, with the exception of France, these treaties only cover non-commercial judgments.

Vietnam lacks an independent judiciary, and there is a lack of separation of powers among Vietnam’s branches of government. For example, Vietnam’s Chief Justice is also a member of the Communist Party’s Central Committee. According to Transparency International, the risk of corruption in judicial rulings is significant, as nearly one-fifth of surveyed Vietnamese households that have been to court declared that they had paid bribes at least once. Many businesses therefore avoid Vietnamese courts.

Along with corruption, the judicial system continues to face additional problems. For example, many judges and arbitrators lack adequate legal training and are appointed through personal or political contacts with party leaders or based on their political views. In addition, extremely low judicial salaries engender corruption.

Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable, and appeals are adjudicated in the national court system. Through a separate legal mechanism, individuals and companies can file complaints against enforcement actions under the Law on Complaints.

Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

The 2014 Investment Law aimed to improve the investment environment. Previously, Vietnam used a “positive list” approach, meaning that foreign businesses were only allowed to operate in a list of specific sectors outlined by law. Starting in July 2015, Vietnam implemented a “negative list” approach, meaning that foreign businesses are allowed to operate in all areas except for six prohibited sectors or business lines. In November 2016, the National Assembly amended the Investment Law to reduce the list of 267 provisional business lines to 243; subsequent amendments will likely further narrow this list, allowing firms to engage in more business areas.

The law also requires foreign and domestic investors to be treated the same in cases of nationalization and confiscation. However, foreign investors are subject to different business-licensing processes and restrictions, and Vietnamese companies that have a majority foreign investment are subject to foreign-investor business-license procedures. Since June 2017, foreign investors can choose to apply for ERC and Investment Registration Certificate (IRC) separately or through a “one-stop-shop” process, which saves time and cost. However, large-scale projects still require a high-level approval before receiving an IRC. This is often a lengthy process. Investment procedures for the seven major provinces of Binh Dinh, Danang, Hai Phuong, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), Phu Yen, and Vinh Phuc can be found at https://vietnam.eregulations.org/  .

Competition and Anti-Trust Laws

In 2018, Vietnam passed a new Law on Competition, which will come into effect on July 1, 2019. While the 2014 Law on Competition only applied to activities, transactions, and agreements originating inside Vietnam, the new law applies to those originating inside and outside Vietnam that negatively affect competitiveness in Vietnam. The revised law included punishments to minimize impediments to competition created by government agencies and introduced leniency towards firms and individuals, as an incentive to align with international practices and improve the effectiveness of the law.

Unlike the 2014 Law on Competition, which specified that a firm was exercising market power if it had 30 percent or more of market share, the revised law contains more criteria to determine market power, including firm size, financial ability, advantages on technology and infrastructure, etc. The new law does not forbid market concentration for firms with combined market share over 50 percent unless the market concentration significantly constrains competition.

The law charges the National Competition Commission under the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) with competition management. The Commission will support the Trade Minister on competition management, conduct investigations, and review requests for exemptions.

Expropriation and Compensation

Under Vietnamese law, the government can only expropriate investors’ property in cases of emergency, disaster, defense, or national interest, and the government is required to compensate investors if it expropriates property. Under the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, Vietnam must apply international standards of treatment in any case of expropriation or nationalization of U.S. investor assets, which includes acting in a non-discriminatory manner with due process of law and with prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.

Dispute Settlement

ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Vietnam has not yet acceded to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention. MPI has submitted a proposal to the government to join the ICSID, but this is still under consideration.

Vietnam is a party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, meaning that foreign arbitral awards rendered by a recognized international arbitration institution should be respected by Vietnamese courts without a review of cases’ merits. Only a limited number of foreign awards have been submitted to the MOJ and local courts for enforcement so far, and almost none have successfully made it through the appeals process to full enforcement. As a signatory to the New York Convention, Vietnam is required to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards within its jurisdiction, with very few exceptions. However, in practice, this is not always the case.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The government is not a signatory to a treaty or investment agreement in which binding international arbitration of investment disputes is recognized, and has yet to sign a BIT or FTA with the United States. Although the law states that the court should recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards, Vietnamese courts may reject these judgements if the award is contrary to the basic principles of Vietnamese laws.

According to UNCTAD, over the last 10 years there were two dispute cases against the Vietnamese government involving U.S. companies. The courts decided in favor of the government in one case, and the parties decided to discontinue the other case. The Vietnam government was a respondent state in seven disputes. More details are available at https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/229?partyRole=2  

International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Vietnam’s legal system remains underdeveloped and is often ineffective in settling commercial disputes. Negotiation between concerned parties is the most common means of dispute resolution. Since the Law on Arbitration does not allow a foreign investor to refer an investment dispute to a court in a foreign jurisdiction, Vietnamese judges cannot apply foreign laws to a case before them, and foreign lawyers cannot represent plaintiffs in a court of law.

In February 2017, the government issued Decree No. 22/2017/ND-CP (Decree 22) on commercial mediation, which came into effect in April 2017. Decree 22 spells out in detail the principle procedures for commercial mediation. More information on Decree 22 can be found at http://eng.viac.vn/decree-no-.-22/2017/nd-cp-on-commercial-mediation-a487.html  .

The Law on Commercial Arbitration took effect in 2011. Currently there are no foreign arbitration centers in Vietnam, although the Arbitration Law permits foreign arbitration centers to establish branches or representative offices. Foreign and domestic arbitral awards are legally enforceable in Vietnam; however, in practice it can be very difficult.

As a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Vietnam is required to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards within its jurisdiction, with very few exceptions.

There are no readily available statistics on how often domestic courts rule in favor of SOEs. In general, the court system in Vietnam works slowly. International arbitration awards, when enforced, may take years from original judgment to payment. According to the 2018 PCI report, 20 percent of surveyed foreign companies had a contract dispute. Only 39 percent of private domestic companies and two percent of foreign firms were willing to use the courts to resolve ongoing disputes in 2018, due to concerns related to time, costs, and potential bribery during the process. Companies turned to other methods such as arbitration or using influential individuals trusted by both parties.

Bankruptcy Regulations

In 2014, Vietnam revised its Bankruptcy Law to make it easier for companies to declare bankruptcy. The law clarified the definition of insolvency as an enterprise that is more than three months overdue in meeting its payment obligations. The law also provided provisions allowing creditors to commence bankruptcy proceedings against an enterprise, and created procedures for credit institutions to file for bankruptcy. Despite these changes, according to the World Bank’s 2019 Ease of Doing Business Report, Vietnam ranked 133 out of 190 for resolving insolvency. The report noted that it still takes on average five years to conclude a bankruptcy case in Vietnam, and the recovery rate on average is only 21 percent. The courts have not improved bankruptcy case processing speed.  

The Credit Information Center of the State Bank of Vietnam provides credit information services.

Investment Incentives

Foreign investors are exempt from import duties on goods imported for their own use that cannot be procured locally, including machinery, vehicles, components and spare parts for machinery and equipment, raw materials, inputs for manufacturing, and construction materials. Remote and mountainous provinces are allowed to provide additional tax breaks and other incentives to prospective investors.

In addition, projects in the following areas are entitled to investment incentives such as lower corporate income tax, exemption of import tariffs, or favorable land rental rates: high-tech; research and development; new materials; energy; clean energy; renewable energy; energy saving products; automobiles; software; waste treatment and management; primary or vocational education; and those located in remote areas or in industrial zones.

According to the OECD’s 2018 Investment Policy Review, Vietnam has an expansionary tax policy aimed at stimulating investment. Vietnam’s corporate income tax rate is highly competitive regionally at 20 percent.

Vietnam has also offered non-tax incentives, including exemption or reduction of infrastructure-use fees and land-use fees; assistance with recruitment and training of skilled labor; and assistance with immigration and residence procedures.

Vietnam promotes foreign investment in certain priority sectors, and in geographic regions that are remote or underdeveloped. The government encourages investment in the following areas: production of new materials, new energy sources, metallurgy and chemical industries; manufacturing of high-tech products, biotechnology, information technology, mechanical engineering; agricultural, fishery and forestry production; salt production; generation of new plant varieties and animal species; ecology and environmental protection; research and development; knowledge-based services; processing and manufacturing; labor-intensive projects (using 5,000 or more full-time laborers); infrastructure projects; education and training; and health and sports development.

Although Vietnam seeks FDI in infrastructure, including the energy sector, it has been reluctant to give government guarantees that investors often seek, due to its concerns about reaching its public-debt ceiling of 65 percent of GDP.  (In 2018, its public debt was 61 percent of GDP.) This has delayed some approvals of large-scale projects.

Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

In recent years, Vietnam has prioritized efforts to establish free trade zones (FTZs). Vietnam currently has more than 350 industrial zones (IZs) and export processing zones (EPZs). Many foreign investors report that it is easier to implement projects in industrial zones because they do not have to be involved in site clearance and infrastructure construction. Enterprises pay no duties when importing raw materials if they export the finished products. Customs warehouse keepers in FTZs can provide transportation services and act as distributors for the goods deposited. Additional services relating to customs declaration, appraisal, insurance, reprocessing, or packaging, require the approval of the provincial customs office. In practice, the time involved for clearance and delivery of goods by provincial custom officials can be lengthy and unpredictable.

Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Vietnam does not mandate that businesses hire local workers, including for senior management roles or the board of directors. However, companies must prove their efforts to hire suitable local employees were unsuccessful before recruiting foreigners. This does not apply to board members elected by shareholders or capital contributors. In February 2016, the government issued Decree No.11/2016/ND-CP, guiding a number of articles of the Labor Code on foreigners working in Vietnam, which entered into force in April 2016. Decree 11 included positive changes, including changes to the conditions, paperwork, and timeline for work-permit applications and exemptions, and clarification that the work-permit and exemption-certificate requirements did not apply to foreigners coming to work for less than 30 days with less than 90 days of cumulative working time in one year.

In October 2018, the government issued Decree No. 140/2018/ND-CP (Decree 140), which amends various decrees on investment, business conditions, and administration procedures, and Decree No. 143/2018/ND-CP (Decree 143) on compulsory social insurance for foreigners working in Vietnam. Decree 140 streamlines the work-permit process for foreigners working in Vietnam. Decree 143 requires foreign individuals with a work permit, practicing certificate, or practicing license, and working under a labor contract with an indefinite term or a definite term of one year or more with a company in Vietnam, to participate in a mandatory social insurance scheme, which previously was applicable to Vietnamese workers only.  

The government has been increasingly adopting policies to encourage or require foreign investors to use domestic content in goods and technology. For example, Circular 14/2015/TT-BKHDT applied high tariffs to imported automotive parts to protect domestic production and encourage foreign auto manufacturers to source component parts locally. Another example is Decree 54/2017/ND-CP, which stipulates foreign invested entities can import drugs into Vietnam, but are not permitted to transport, store, or distribute drugs.

In June 2018, the National Assembly approved a Law on Cybersecurity, effective January 1 2019, which requires cross-border services to store data of Vietnamese users in Vietnam, despite sustained international and domestic opposition to the regulation.  The law’s data-localization provisions are broad and vague, with subsequent draft guidance implying the data-localization requirements will only apply to firms that do not comply with strict online content removal requests from the government. Foreign firms and legal experts await implementing decrees expected in mid-2019 to clarify how the government intends to implement the law. In 2015, the National Assembly issued the Law on Network Information Security, effective July 1, 2016, which included obligations to disclose proprietary information as a condition to enter the market, overly broad definitions of personal information, overly broad provisions requiring “cooperation with the Government” regarding access to data, and requirements to decrypt encrypted information held by third parties. MOF is also proposing draft legislation in 2019 to request cross-border service providers via internet protocols to have a representative office in Vietnam, citing the necessity of local office requirements for taxation purposes.

There are currently no measures preventing or unduly impeding companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside of Vietnam. The most important regulation is Decree 72/2013/ND-CP, on the management, provision, and use of internet services and online information. While Decree 72 technically requires organizations establishing “general websites,” or social networks and companies providing online gaming services or services across mobile networks to maintain at least one server in Vietnam, in practice the regulation is only applied to domestic firms, and then only sporadically. It also establishes requirements for storing certain types of data (personally identifiable information of users, user activity logs, etc.), but it is unclear if that information must be stored on a local server. In 2016, the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) issued Circular 38/2016/TT-BTTT, one of the implementing circulars of Decree 72. The circular does not require localization of servers, though it does require offshore service providers with a large number of users in Vietnam to comply with local content restrictions. Specific requirements under Circular 38 apply to offshore entities that provide cross-border public information into Vietnam (including websites, social networks, online applications, search engines and other similar forms of services) that (a) have more than one million hits from Vietnam per month or (b) lease a data center to store digital information in Vietnam in order to provide its services.

Provisions of the new cybersecurity law require firms to hand over unencrypted user information upon request by law enforcement. However, application of this requirement hinges on issuance of implementing decrees, expected in mid-2019. Vietnam has no international commitments in this area and does not permit cross-border online gaming. Therefore, gaming providers tend to establish a joint venture with a Vietnamese company and locate one server in Vietnam. Regarding financial data localization, Circular 31 requires backup information, but does not impede cross-border data flows.

When Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007, it established minimum commitments on market access for U.S. goods and services, as well as equal treatment for Vietnamese and foreign companies. Vietnam undertook commitments on goods (tariffs, quotas, and ceilings on agricultural subsidies) and services (provisions of access to foreign-service providers and related conditions). It has also committed to implementing agreements on intellectual property (the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement), customs valuation, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, import licensing provisions, anti-dumping and countervailing measures, and rules of origin. As part of its WTO accession, Vietnam also committed to remove performance requirements that are inconsistent with the agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The 2014 Investment Law specifically prohibits the following: giving priority to domestic goods or services; compulsory purchases from a specific domestic firm; export of goods or services at a fixed percentage; restricting the quantity, value, or type of goods or services exported or sourced domestically; fixing import goods at the same quantity and value as goods exported; requirements to achieve certain local content ratios in manufacturing goods; stipulated levels or values on research and development activities; supplying goods or services in a particular location; and mandating the establishment of head offices in a particular location.

The government updates, on an ad hoc basis, the list of investment priority high-tech products and companies investing in research and development for items that are entitled to the highest tax incentives and may be eligible for funding from the National High-Tech Development Program. Companies that develop infrastructure for high-tech parks will also receive land incentives.

Real Property

The State collectively owns and manages all land in Vietnam, and therefore neither foreigners nor Vietnamese nationals can own land. However, the government grants land-use and building rights, often to individuals.  According to the Ministry of National Resources and Environment (MONRE), as of September 2018, the government has issued land-use rights certificates for 96.9 percent of land in Vietnam. If land is not used, according to the land-use rights certificate or if it is unoccupied, it reverts to the government. Vietnam is building a national land-registration database, and some localities have already digitized their land records.

The MONRE is drafting amendments to the 2013 Land Law, which would focus on several major issues, including eradicating the farmland acquisition quota, increasing cases of land recovery by the State, assigning district-level administrators rather than provincial-level administrators to accurately set land prices, and allowing foreigners to own homes in Vietnam. MONRE expects to submit the draft law to the National Assembly for review and approval in 2020.    

State protection of property rights is still evolving, as the State can expropriate land for socio-economic development. Under the Housing Law and Real Estate Business Law passed by the National Assembly in November 2014, the government can take land if it deems it necessary for socio-economic development in the public or national interest and the Prime Minister, the National Assembly, or the Provincial People’s Council approves such action. However, the law loosely defined “socio-economic” development, and there are many outstanding legal disputes between landowners and local authorities. Disputes over land rights continue to be a significant driver of social protest in Vietnam. Foreign investors also may be exposed to land disputes through merger and acquisition activities when they buy into a local company.

In addition to land, the State’s collective property includes “forests, rivers and lakes, water supplies, wealth lying underground or coming from the sea, the continental shelf and the air, the funds and property invested by the government in enterprises, and works in all branches and fields – the economy, culture, society, science, technology, external relations, national defense, security – and all other property determined by law as belonging to the State.”

The Housing Law and Real Estate Business Law extended “land-use rights” to foreign investors, allowing titleholders to conduct property transactions, including mortgages. Foreign investors can lease land for renewable periods of 50 years, and up to 70 years in some poor areas of the country.

In June 2018, the National Assembly decided to delay indefinitely the debate on and adoption of the controversial draft Law on Special Administrative and Economic Zones. The law aimed to loosen regulations on foreign investors, permitting them to lease land in the Van Don, Bac Van Phong, and Phu Quoc Special Administrative and Economic Zones for up to 99 years. The National Assembly’s decision followed widespread protests against the proposed law.  

Some investors have encountered difficulties amending investment licenses to expand operations onto land adjoining existing facilities. Investors also note that local authorities may intend to increase requirements for land-use rights when current rights must be renewed, particularly in instances when the investment in question competes with Vietnamese companies.

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)

The legal basis for IPR includes the 2005 Civil Code, the 2005 Intellectual Property (IP) Law as amended in 2009, the 2015 Penal Code, and implementing regulations and decrees. Vietnam has joined the Paris Convention on Industrial Property and the Berne Convention on Copyright; the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations; the Patent Cooperation Treaty; the Madrid Protocol; and the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. It has worked to meet its commitments under these international treaties. The Vietnamese government has ratified the revised Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights protocol, which took effect on January 23, 2017.  On January 1, 2018, the 2015 Penal Code entered into force with clearer guidelines on the application of criminal penalties for certain acts of IPR infringement or piracy. For the first time, commercial entities can be liable for violations. On June 12, 2018, the National Assembly passed a new Law on Competition, eliminating outdated IP-related unfair competition provisions and bringing guidelines in line with Vietnam’s other IP laws. The government also issued Decree No. 22/2018/ND-CP, which replaced a 2006 regulation and updated copyright guidelines under the Civil Code and Law on IP. However, enforcement agencies still lack clarity and experience in how to impose criminal penalties on IPR violators and continue to wait for further implementing guidelines. On June 19, 2018, the Prime Minister issued Directive No. 17/CT-TTg to strengthen the fight against smuggling, commercial fraud, and the production and trade of low-quality foods and fake goods, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics.

Circular No. 16/2016/TT-BKHCN, which amends and supplements a number of articles of Circular No. 01/2007/TT-BKHCN, one of the core regulations in the Vietnam IP system, came into force on January 15, 2018. IP attorneys expect the circular will have a significant, positive impact on patent and trademark examination procedures, but also expect further revisions in 2019 and in the IP Law revision. The National Assembly ratified the CPTPP on November 2, 2018, and Vietnam intends to amend laws, including the Law on Intellectual Property, to align with the international treaty by 2021. With technical support from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Vietnam in 2017 also completed a National Strategy for Intellectual Property to create a roadmap for promoting innovation and a more effective IP framework by 2030.

Although Vietnam has made progress in establishing a legal framework for IPR protection, significant problems remain and new challenges are emerging. The country remains on the Special 301 Watch List. The rate of unlicensed software in Vietnam is still high, at 74 percent, according to the Software Alliance’s latest data, representing a commercial value of USD 492 million. In 2018, Vietnam had mixed results in its efforts to protect IPR. Vietnam’s continued integration into the global economic community, as well as increasing domestic pressure for IP protections, may stimulate positive change. Nevertheless, infringement and piracy remained commonplace, and the impact of digital piracy and the increasing prevalence of counterfeit goods sold online continued to undermine the IPR environment. The increasingly sophisticated capabilities of domestic counterfeiters, coupled with developing smuggling routes through Vietnam’s porous borders, were also worrisome trends. There are ten ministries sharing some level of responsibility for IPR enforcement and protection, which often leads to duplication or confusion. Additionally, the roles and power of these ministries and agencies varies widely. In October 2018, the MOIT upgraded the Market Surveillance Agency, the country’s leading IP enforcement agency, to the Directorate of Market Surveillance (DMS). The move requires all 63 provincial-level market surveillance departments to report directly to the national agency rather than to local provincial governments, improving coordination and efficiency among enforcement agencies.

In 2018, the Intellectual Property Office of Vietnam (IP Vietnam) reported receiving 108,375 IP applications of all types (an increase of 5.9 percent compared to 2017), of which 63,617 were registered for industrial property rights (up 8.7 percent compared to 2017). IP Vietnam reported granting 2,212 patents in 2018 (up 27 percent from 2017). Industrial designs registrations reached 2,360 in 2018 (up 4.1 percent from 2017). In total, IP Vietnam granted more than 29,040 protection titles for industrial property, out of more than 63,617 applications in 2018 (up 8.1 percent from 2017). The DMS processed 6,149 counterfeit and IP infringement cases and collected USD 5,500 in fines.  The most infringed products were agricultural materials, agricultural and pharmaceutical products, and spare automobile parts.  

The Copyright Office of Vietnam received and settled seven copyright petitions, and received and settled 12 requests for copyright assessment in 2018. In 2018, the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism Inspectorate carried out inspections for software licensing compliance and discovered 46 violations that resulted in fines of USD 58,000, a 15 percent decrease in fines from 2017.

For more information, please see the following reports from the U.S. Trade Representative:

Special 301 Report:

https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/intellectual-property/special-301/2018-special-301-review  

Notorious Markets Report: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2017 percent20Notorious percent20Markets percent20List percent201.11.18.pdf 

For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/  .

Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

While the government has acknowledged the need to strengthen both the capital and debt markets, there has been little progress, leaving the banking sector as the primary capital source for Vietnamese companies. Challenges to raising capital domestically include insufficient transparency in Vietnam’s financial markets and non-compliance with internationally accepted accounting standards.

Vietnam welcomes foreign portfolio investment; however, Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) continues to classify Vietnam as a Frontier Market, which precludes some of the world’s biggest asset managers from investing in its stock markets. Vietnam is improving its legal framework in an effort to reach its goal of meeting the “emerging market” criteria in 2020 and attracting more foreign capital. The UK-based FTSE Russell’s decision to place Vietnam on its watch list for possible reclassification as a “Secondary Emerging Market” in September 2018 could also encourage faster reforms.  

The government is drafting amendments to the Securities Law (revised in 2010) along with decrees, circulars, and guiding documents, and is targeting submission to the National Assembly for approval late in 2019. These will likely include comprehensive changes on securities trading, corporate governance, share issuance, and most notably foreign ownership limits (FOL), to help move Vietnam toward emerging market status.

The State Securities Commission (SSC) under the MOF regulates Vietnam’s two stock exchanges, the HCMC Stock Exchange (HOSE), which lists larger companies, and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX), which has smaller companies, bonds, and derivatives. Vietnam also has a market for unlisted public companies (UPCOM) at the Hanoi Securities Center, where many equitized SOEs first list their shares (due to lower transparency requirements) before moving to the HOSE or HNX. In January 2019, the Prime Minister approved a plan to establish the Vietnam Stock Exchange (VSE) as a MOF wholly state-owned company, which would own both the HOSE and HNX.

There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and maintain sizable positions.  Stock and fund certificate liquidity increased in 2018, reaching an average trading value per session of around USD 280 million, up 30 percent from 2017. Combined market capitalization at the end of 2018 was approximately USD 169 billion, equal to 80 percent of Vietnam’s GDP, with the HOSE accounting for USD 124 billion, the HNX USD 8 billion, and the UPCOM USD 37 billion. Bond market capitalization reached over USD 50 billion in 2018, the majority of which were government bonds, largely held by domestic commercial banks. Insurance firms also were noticeably more active government bond investors in 2018.  

Vietnam complies with International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII. The government notified the IMF that it accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4, effective November 8, 2005.

Local banks charge relatively high interest rates for new loans because they must continue to service existing non-performing loans (NPLs). Domestic companies, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs), often have difficulty accessing credit. Foreign investors are generally able to obtain local financing.

Money and Banking System

Since recovering from the 2008 global downturn, Vietnam’s banking sector has been stable. However, despite various banking reforms, the sector continues to be concentrated at the top and fragmented at the bottom. Based on its 2018 survey, the central bank, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), estimated that 50 percent of Vietnam’s population is underbanked or does not have bank accounts, due to an inherent distrust of the banking sector; the ingrained habit of holding assets in cash, foreign currency, and gold; and the limited use of financial technology tools. However, this SBV estimate appears significantly understated, with the likely percentage being closer to 70 percent.  The World Bank’s The Global Findex Database 2017 (the most recent available) estimated that only 31 percent of Vietnamese over the age of 15 had an account at a financial institution or through a mobile money provider.

The banking sector’s estimated total assets in 2018 were USD 481 billion, of which USD 207 billion belonged to seven state-owned and majority state-controlled commercial banks, accounting for 44 percent of total assets. Though grouped under joint-stock (private) commercial banks, the Bank of Investment and Development Bank (BIDV), Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Industry and Trade (VietinBank), and Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (Vietcombank) all are majority-controlled by SBV. In addition, the SBV holds 100 percent of Agribank, Global Petro Commercial Bank (GPBank), Construction Bank (CBBank), and Oceanbank.  

In addition, there were nine foreign-owned banks (HSBC, Standard Chartered, Shinhan, Hong Leong, Woori Bank, Public Bank, CIMB Bank, ANZ, and United Overseas Bank), 49 branches of foreign banks, 52 representatives of foreign credit institutions, and two joint-venture banks (Vietnam-Russia Bank and Indovina Bank).

Vietnam has made progress in recent years to reduce its NPLs, but most domestic banks remain under-capitalized with high NPL levels that continue to drag on economic growth. Accurate NPL data is not available and the central bank frequently underreports the level of NPLs. In 2018, the NPL ratio on the banks’ balance sheets reportedly went down to 2.4 percent, from 2.5 percent in 2017, while the off-balance sheet NPL ratio remain unpublished. The SBV attributes the declining NPL level to the uptrend of the property markets and its application of the National Assembly’s 2017 Resolution 42 which helps credit institutions and the Vietnam Asset Management Company (VAMC) to repossess collateral and better manage bad loans. Under its Development Strategy of the Vietnam Banking Sector to 2025, the SBV aims to reduce the NPL ratio at the banks and the VAMC to below 3 percent by 2020 (excluding poorly performing banks under a separate structure.)

Other issues in the banking sector include state-directed lending by state-owned commercial banks, cross-ownership, related-party lending under non-commercial criteria, and preferential loans to SOEs that crowd out credit to SMEs. By law, banks must maintain a minimum-chartered capital of VND 3 trillion (roughly USD 134 million); however, Vietnam is moving towards adoption of Basel II standards in 2020.

Currently, the total FOL in a Vietnamese bank is 30 percent, with a 5 percent limit for non-strategic individual investors, a 15 percent limit for non-strategic institutional investors, and a 20 percent limit for strategic institutional partners. Prudential measures and regulations apply the same to domestic and foreign banks. To meet the capital adequacy ratio required by Basel II, many banks are seeking overseas capital, and calling for relaxation of the FOL.

We are unaware of any lost correspondent-banking relationships in the past three years. However, after the SBV took over three failing banks (Ocean Bank, Construction Bank, and GP Bank), and placed Dong A Bank under special supervision in 2015, correspondent-banking relationships with those banks may have been limited.

The government is trying to leverage Vietnam’s high adoption rate of mobile and smart phones to promote financial inclusion, increase use of electronic payments, and shift Vietnam towards a cashless society. Although the SBV announced plans to implement a “regulatory sandbox” for financial technology (fintech) activities to inform its future updates to the legal framework, it has not yet published details and has licensed only 26 organizations to provide cashless services. Fintech is rapidly gaining market acceptance as many banks have implemented QR code payments and others have deployed online payment services. Nearly 100 fintech startups have reportedly launched in Vietnam, operating mainly in the e-payments space. However, these startups must overcome many legal mechanisms and policies, such as obtaining licenses.  No foreign e-payments fintech companies have such licenses yet.

Cryptocurrencies remain prohibited as legal tender, preventing the issuance, supply, and use of Bitcoin and other similar virtual currency as a means of payment. Failure to comply can result in criminal prosecution. However, in 2018, the MOJ reportedly submitted to the Prime Minister’s office for approval a crypto-assets proposal, though it has yet to make public any details.

Foreign Exchange and Remittances

Foreign Exchange Policies

There are no restrictions on foreign investors converting and repatriating earnings or investment capital from Vietnam. However, funds associated with any form of investment cannot be freely converted into any world currency.

The SBV has a mechanism to determine the interbank reference exchange rate. In order to provide flexibility in responding to exchange rate volatility, the SBV announces a daily interbank reference exchange rate. The rate is determined based on the previous day’s average interbank exchange rates, taking into account movements in the currencies of Vietnam’s major trading and investment partners.

Remittance Policies

Vietnam mandates all monetary transactions must be in Vietnamese Dong (VND), and allows foreign businesses to remit lawful profits, capital contributions, and other legal investment activity revenues in foreign currency authorized credit institutions. There are no time constraints on remittances or limitations on outflow; however, outward foreign currency transactions require supporting documents (such as audited financial statements, import/foreign-service procurement contracts and proof of tax obligation fulfillment, and approval of the SBV on loan contracts etc.). Foreign investors are also required to submit notification of profit remittance abroad to tax authorities at least seven working days prior to the remittance.

The inflow of foreign currency to Vietnam is less constrained.  There are no recent changes or plans to change investment remittance policies that either tighten or relax access to foreign exchange for investment remittances.

Sovereign Wealth Funds

The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) technically qualifies as a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), as its mandate includes investing dividends and proceeds from privatization.  The Ministry of Finance transferred oversight of SCIC and 18 other large SOEs to the Committee for Management of State Capital at Enterprises (CMSC) in November 2018, following the CMSC’s launch in September 2018 and the issuance of the Prime Minister’s Decree 131 defining its functions, tasks, powers, and organizational structure.

As of August 31, 2018, the SCIC had invested in 139 businesses, with nearly USD 866.3 million in state capital (book value). The SCIC does not manage or invest balance-of-payment surpluses, official foreign currency operations, government transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, or surpluses from resource exports. SCIC’s primary mandate is to manage the non-privatized portion of SOEs. The SCIC invests 100 percent of its portfolio in Vietnam, and the SCIC’s investment of dividends and divestment proceeds does not appear to have any ramifications for U.S. investors. The SCIC budget is reasonably transparent, audited, and can be found at http://www.scic.vn/  .

According to the World Bank, SOEs would benefit from a “modern corporate governance system that separates state ownership rights from regulatory functions and implements an objective and transparent mechanism for the selection of CEOs and board members.” The government framework for wholly owned SOEs is fragmented, incoherent, and the management of SOEs is not in line with sound corporate governance. To improve corporate governance and SOE efficiency, the government established the CMSC in 2018. The government’s aim was to separate state ownership from regulatory oversight of 19 large centrally owned SOEs by moving their supervision away from the line ministries to CMSC.

Vietnam currently has over 500 wholly owned SOEs – including seven groups, 57 corporations, and 441 other enterprises managed by ministries and localities, according to the Ministry of Finance. Vietnam does not publish a full list of SOEs and they operate in nearly every industrial sector. However, in 2016, the government issued Decision 58/2016/QD-TTg (Decision 58) specifying the industries and areas in which the government will have wholly owned and majority-owned enterprises, including electricity distribution, airport management and operation, large-scale mineral mining, production of basic chemicals, and telecommunications services with network infrastructure, among others.

While SOEs have boards of directors, these boards are not independent. After CMSC’s establishment, it took over the oversight of the 19 largest SOEs. Aside from the CMSC’s supervision of the 19 largest SOEs, ministries govern the remaining centrally owned SOEs, while provincial governments run local SOEs. CMSC, ministries, and local governments all can appoint their staff to the boards. For SOEs with majority shares owned by government, the government ministries, and provincial governments still have the right to appoint executive staff of the companies. SOE senior officials do not typically retain their government positions, but they still retain links to the government, and may return to government service once they terminate their employment with the SOE.

SOEs do not operate on a level playing field with domestic companies and continue to benefit from preferential access to resources such as land, capital, and political largesse. However, in the 2018 PCI report, the percentage of surveyed firms that believe provincial authorities favored SOEs declined from 41 percent in 2017 to 32 percent in 2018.

In 2015, the government issued Decree 81/2015/ND-CP to require SOEs to implement strict information disclosure procedures in accordance with listed company requirements. However, because there is no clear punishment for violations, SOEs have little incentive to follow the decree. Although over 40 percent of SOEs disclose the required information, MPI confirmed the quality of reporting was insufficient to assess the SOEs’ transparency. Although there are penalties for insufficient disclosure and non-disclosure, these penalties are not significant enough to improve information disclosure.

Privatization Program

Vietnam has been working to reform the SOE sector for over 15 years. Because SOE share sales have historically only transferred a nominal interest (2 to 3 percent) to the private sector, the process of privatization (also known as equitization) has been slow. Inadequate regulations specifying equitization procedures and pressure from vested interests present the biggest obstacles. Decree 58 specified sectors targeted for equitization, including airport management and related services, mineral mining and extraction, financial service and banking, chemical manufacturing, rice wholesale, petro and oil importation, telecommunications, rubber and coffee processors, and electricity distribution. It appears the government plans to sell or partially privatize the best, most efficient SOEs first to quickly raise cash, but has been slow to address inefficiencies in the rest.

Although the government appears more committed to privatization due to fiscal budget pressures and the necessity of expanding the private sector for continued economic growth, it has yet to meet its annual SOE equitization targets. After some notable large deals (Vinamilk in 2016 and Sabeco in 2017), the government released decision 1232/2017/QD-TTg in 2017, which listed 406 additional SOEs it would divest in the period 2017-2020, along with specific target divestment percentages. The decision aimed to reduce the number of wholly owned SOEs to about 150 by 2020. However, only 12 SOEs were equitized in 2018 against a target of 85 and share proceeds totaled less than USD 1 billion and divestments USD 880 million. The MOF expects the process to speed up in 2019 with equitization and divestment proceeds of over USD 2 billion. 

Foreign investors can invest in SOEs. SOE share bidding process information can be found at https://www.hsx.vn/Modules/Auction/Web/AucInfoList?fid=271f94f836a14eb0a7d2207c05f7a39e  , https://www.hnx.vn/en-gb/dau-gia/lich-dau-gia.html  , and http://www.scic.vn/english/index.php/investment.html  . SOE financial information is available on http://business.gov.vn/C percentC3 percentB4ngb percentE1 percentBB percent91Th percentC3 percentB4ngtin/Th percentC3 percentB4ngtindoanhnghi percentE1 percentBB percent87p.aspx  .

The government has issued regulations intended to protect the public from adverse business practices in relation to labor rights, consumer protection, and environmental protection. However, the enforcement of these laws is weak. The Enterprise Law allows shareholders to take court action against the management of a company and can nullify fully, or partly, a resolution of a shareholder general meeting through a court order or an arbitration decision. Companies are required to publish their corporate social responsibility activities, corporate governance work, information of related parties and transactions, and compensation of the management. Companies must also announce extraordinary circumstances, such as changes to management, dissolution, or establishment of subsidiaries, within 36 hours of the event.

Most multinational companies implement Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs that contribute to improving the business environment, and awareness of CSR programs is increasing among large domestic companies. The Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) conducts CSR training and highlights corporate engagement on a dedicated website (http://www.csr-vietnam.eu/  ) in partnership with the UN. In addition, AmCham also has a CSR group that organizes events and activities to raise awareness of social issues. Non-governmental organizations collaborate with government bodies, such as the VCCI and the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA), to promote business practices in Vietnam in line with international norms and standards. Discussions on ethical business standards during negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the CPTPP – in addition to the gradual introduction of CSR practices by some multinational corporations over the years – have helped to shift social expectations around business responsibilities in Vietnam.

Overall, the government has not defined responsible business conduct (RBC), nor has it established a national plan or agenda for RBC. The government has yet to establish a national contact point or ombudsman for stakeholders to get information or raise concerns about RBC. Vietnam may make additional strides in labor rights and ethical business practices in its revised Labor Code, due for discussion by the National Assembly in 2019.  

The 2005 Law on Enterprises in theory regulates corporate governance in line with OECD corporate governance principles. However, corporate governance standards are relatively weak in Vietnam, which ranks lower than Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, according to the most recent Asia Development Bank (ADB) 2017 report on ASEAN listed companies.

The government does not have regulations encouraging companies to adhere to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Afflicted and High-Risk Areas, but many multinational companies already comply. In 2016, the Prime Minister called on the MOIT to implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in order to improve the efficiency of the minerals extraction industry. However, to date, Vietnam has not agreed to do so. Vietnam remains only an observer in EITI. Decree 158/2016/ND-CP came into effect in January 2017 and provides guidelines for implementing the Mineral Law, which may improve transparency in the mining sector.

For labor rights regulations, see Section 11 on Labor Policies and Practices, and for a detailed description of regulations on worker/labor rights in Vietnam, see the Department of State’s Human Rights Report (https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/vietnam/).

Environmental Protection

Vietnam’s current legal framework for environmental protection is fragmented and often confusing, while enforcement of environmental crimes and violations is weak and ineffective.  The government has issued many legal documents regulating the environment, including the revision of the Environmental Protection Law of 2014, the Constitution of 2013, the Law on Water Resources of 2012, the Law on Fisheries of 2017, as well as hundreds of decrees and circulars that guide the implementation of these laws. While these legal documents specify civil penalties for environmental crimes, the penalties are rarely high enough to have a deterrent effect. There are virtually no criminal penalties in the law. Additionally, some industry sectors have little regulation. For example, government and industry contacts note that inspections of pollution emission testing devices rarely occur. When they do, it is often following advance notice that enables the firm being inspected to show compliance, regardless of how non-compliant its normal operations may be.  

Historically, Vietnam has prioritized economic growth over environmental protection. In 2016, after a massive fish kill gained nationwide attention, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources embarked on an ambitious plan to update Vietnam’s environmental laws and regulations.  This effort is ongoing and will likely result in newer, and moderately stronger, environmental protections.

While Vietnam’s legal framework is marginal, enforcement of environmental laws is weak and ineffective. For example, the Law on Environmental Protection requires that entities, individuals, and households that discharge waste must classify the waste for recycling and reuse. However, violations of this provision are rampant and rarely punished. The 2017 Law on Fisheries stipulates that fishing organizations and individuals must follow set standards when catching fish, specifies significant financial penalties for individuals and organizations engaged in illegal fishing, and prohibits the use of explosives for fishing. However, in practice, violations of these regulations are quite common.

Vietnam is a party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, and enacted new penalties in its 2015 Penal Code, which took effect on January 1, 2018. However, Vietnam rarely investigates or arrests wildlife traffickers. Although the lack of official statistics makes an official accounting impossible, according to an analysis by members of civil society groups, the number of arrests and prosecutions has actually decreased since the new stricter law went into effect.

Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) determined Vietnam had taken positive steps to improve some areas of its anti-corruption legal framework and policies. However, Vietnam’s 2018 rank of 117 out of 180 in the CPI global index reflects the country’s continuing challenges. Also according to the 2018 PCI report, corruption declined, with 55 percent of enterprises reporting paying informal charges (bribes), which equaled up to 10 percent of their revenue. The CPI report recommends more sustained effort by government agencies and cooperation from businesses. Firms need to improve management controls, strengthen legal understanding and compliance, and strive to operate with integrity.

Corruption is due, in large part, to low levels of transparency, accountability, and media freedom, as well as poor remuneration for government officials and inadequate systems for holding officials accountable. Competition among agencies for control over business and investments has created overlapping jurisdictions and bureaucratic procedures that, in turn, create opportunities for corruption.

In November 2018, Vietnam’s legislature revised its 2005 anti-corruption law to strengthen asset-reporting requirements for government officials and set strict penalties for corrupt practices. However, many officials lamented the law does not provide sufficient oversight authorities to Vietnam’s legislature or government agencies to ensure its full implementation. Furthermore, the law does not recognize the role of civil society or an independent mechanism to promote government accountability and transparency.

The Government has tasked various agencies to deal with corruption, including the Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption (chaired by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary Nguyen), the Government Inspectorate, and line ministries and agencies. Formed in 2007, the Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption, since February 2013, has been under the CPV Central Commission of Internal Affairs. The National Assembly provides oversight to the operations of government ministries. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have encouraged the government to establish a single independent agency with oversight and enforcement authority, and to ensure enforcement.

A new Penal Code came into effect in January 2018, which introduced a number of provisions relating to corporate criminal liability and corruption, increased the risks for businesses in the country. While the previous Vietnamese criminal code only provided for criminal liability for individuals, now corporate entities can face criminal sanctions too. The new Penal Code also criminalizes private-sector corruption—something that was absent from Vietnam’s previous anti-corruption regime.

Vietnam signed the UN Anticorruption Convention in December 2003 and ratified it in August 2009. The law does not cover family members of officials, but does cover ranking members of the Communist Party.

The government increased its scrutiny of conflict-of-interest concerns in public procurement since late 2016. To signal the government’s seriousness about reforming government procurement, the Prime Minister approved in July 2016 a 10-year master plan for procurement, including developing the national e-Government Procurement Application to promote online tendering and increase transparency and reduce corruption opportunities. In January 2019, with help from the ADB and the World Bank, the government implemented an e-bidding public procurement site, which will supplement its existing e-procurement portal.

There are laws prohibiting companies from bribing public officials. While some private companies have internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials, the government does not require companies to establish such internal codes of conduct.

Since 2016, the government has embarked on a large anti-corruption initiative. As a result, perceptions of corruption, and the burden of administrative procedures, are both declining. While high-profile arrests have grabbed the focus of the news media, there has been less attention paid to institutional changes meant to prevent corrupt activities, including greater transparency and civil-service reforms to encourage accountability.

According to the 2018 PCI, there were statistically significant declines in three core indicators of corruption: 1) the share of firms believing informal charges are common; 2) the estimated bribe payments by firms as a share of revenue; and 3) whether commissions are necessary to win government procurement contracts. Although the 2018 PCI results indicate signs of declining corruption, surveyed companies reported that it took more than a month to complete necessary paperwork to start their business and obtain certificates for technical regulatory conformity and certificates of qualification for doing conditional business lines. The report concluded that government authorities were more cautious to approve big projects due to fear of being swept up and implicated in the ongoing, widespread anti-corruption campaign.

The 2018 PCI findings are consistent with the results of UN Development Program’s 2018 annual Provincial Administrative Performance Index (PAPI) survey.

Resources to Report Corruption

Contact at government agency responsible for combating corruption:

Mr. Phan Dinh Trac
Chairman, Communist Party Central Committee Internal Affairs
4 Nguyen Canh Chan
+84 0804-3557

Contact at NGO:

Ms. Nguyen Thi Kieu Vien
Executive Director, Towards Transparency
Transparency International National Contact in Vietnam
Floor 4, No 37 Lane 35, Cat Linh street, Dong Da, Hanoi, Vietnam
Phone: +84-24-37153532
Fax: +84-24-37153443
kieuvien@towardstransparency.vn  

Vietnam is a unitary single-party state, and its political and security environment is largely stable. Protests and civil unrest are rare, though there are occasional demonstrations against perceived social, environmental, and labor injustices. There have been anti-China protests on multiple occasions since 2008. In May 2014, Vietnam experienced large protests against China’s movement of its Haiyang Shiyou Oil Rig 981 into Vietnam’s territorial waters. Anti-China protests resulted in at least one death and dozens of injuries among the plant’s Chinese workers; protesters separately destroyed and looted multiple foreign-owned factories.

In April 2016, after the Formosa Steel plant discharged toxic pollutants into the ocean and caused a massive fish death, the affected fishermen and residents in central Vietnam began a series of regular protests against the company and the government’s lack of response to the disaster. Protests continued into 2017 in multiple cities until security forces largely suppressed the unrest. Many activists who helped organize or document these protests were subsequently arrested and imprisoned, including influential blogger Nguyen Ngoc Nhu Quynh (aka “Mother Mushroom,” who was released in 2018 and now resides in the United States), labor activist Hoang Duc Binh, and videographer Nguyen Van Hoa.

Nationwide protests erupted in June 2018 in response to the proposed Special Administrative Economic Zone Law. The protests, reportedly the largest since 1975, drew tens of thousands of Vietnamese citizens in Ho Chi Minh City and six other provinces who objected to the law’s tax and lease benefits for companies investing in three Economic Zones. Many believed Chinese investors were the primary beneficiaries of this bill, leading to widespread fears of growing Chinese investment and economic influence in Vietnam. Responding to the protests and other pushback against the law, the government ultimately decided to delay its passage indefinitely.

The protests had little effect on the operations of U.S. companies.

The government increased its anti-corruption efforts in 2016, resulting in a number of arrests and convictions of senior officials across the public and private sector. In January 2018, the party stripped former Politburo member and Ho Chi Minh Secretary Dinh La Thang of his party membership and he was sentenced to 20 years in prison for mismanagement of state assets during his tenure as Chairman of state-owned PetroVietnam (PVN) between 2009 and 2011. Thang was tried with 22 other defendants for their alleged roles in corrupt practices at PVN and its subsidiaries.

According to official government statistics, in 2018 there were 55 million people participating in the formal labor force in Vietnam out of over 72 million people aged 15 and above.  The labor force is relatively young, with 15-to-39 year olds currently accounting for about half of the total labor force. This demographic structure represents Vietnam’s best opportunity to make significant economic strides in the coming decades. Despite the strong shift towards urbanization, the majority of workers are still located in rural areas, making up over 68 percent of the total labor force.  

The official labor participation rate was over 78 percent of the total population, based on the most recent data available in 2017. The official unemployment and underemployment rates hover around 2 percent; however, this figure is likely underreported by counting people who have multiple, low-paying informal jobs, along with those with one formal job. The official unemployment rate among youth, defined as those between the ages of 15 and 24 years, was 7 percent in 2018.  Wages have grown 9 percent since 2017 to an average of USD 2,160 per year.

Despite relatively high literacy rates, enrollment, and graduation rates for primary and secondary education, less than 20 percent of the employed population have ever attended college or received vocational training or mid-term professional training. Those who complete a post-secondary degree are often unprepared with the types of skills necessary to enter a highly skilled workforce. Many Vietnamese companies report a shortage of workers with adequate skills.  While there is a shortage of educated and skilled labor, Vietnam is a labor surplus country, with a un- and under-employed labor force that serves as an abundant source of migrant labor regionally as well as globally.

Shortages or Surpluses of Specialized Labor Skills

According to World Economic Forum’s 2017 Global Human Capital Index (the most recent available), Vietnam ranked 64th overall (after fellow ASEAN countries Singapore (11), Malaysia (33), and Thailand (40)). Many businesses reported it is difficult to find skilled labor in Vietnam. The government is aware of the deficiencies in higher education and vocational training, and admits the need for reform in order to increase the skills of its labor force. To this end, the Law on Vocational Education took effect in 2015, which stressed the importance of vocational training in human resource development, as well as the government’s strategy for vocation education through 2020. In addition, the national employment fund, managed by the MOLISA, will sponsor targeted vocational training programs for poor households, youth, members of the military, and entrepreneurs.  

Foreign nationals are restricted to employment in high-skilled professions, such as managers, executives, and consultants. The government relatively readily grants work-permits for high-skilled foreign workers, especially those at multinational corporations and NGOs.

Nearly 84,000 foreigners were working in Vietnam in 2017 (the most recent year available) compared to 12,600 in 2004, and the country was developing policies and methods to collect social insurance payments from these workers.  

Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance

An employer is permitted to lay off employees because of technological changes or changes in organizational structure (in cases of a merger, consolidation, or cessation of operation of one or several departments), or where the employer faces economic difficulties. If these changes lead to the termination of two or more employees, the employer, in conjunction with the local trade union, is required to form and implement a “labor usage plan.” Companies can terminate two or more employees only after consultation with the local trade union and after a 30-day notice to the provincial labor authority.

The employer must pay a job-loss allowance for a laid-off employee who had regularly worked for the employer for at least 12 full months. The job-loss allowance is equal to one month’s salary for each year of service with the employer. After layoffs, workers will receive unemployment benefits if they contributed to the unemployment fund for at least 12 months.  

There are no waivers made to labor requirements to attract foreign investment.

Collective Bargaining

The constitution affords the right of association and the right to demonstrate, but limits the exercise of these rights, including preventing workers from organizing or joining independent unions of their choice. While workers may choose whether to join a union and at which level (local or “grassroots,” provincial, or national), the law requires every union to be under the legal purview and control of the country’s only trade union confederation, the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL), an organization run by the CPV.

The law gives the VGCL exclusive authority to recognize unions and confers on VGCL upper-level trade unions the responsibility to establish workplace unions. The law also limits freedom of association by not allowing trade unions full autonomy in administering their affairs. The law confers on the VGCL ownership of all trade-union property and gives it the right to represent lower-level unions.  Union members do not elect trade union leaders and officials; the CPV appoints them.

Chapter 5 of the Labor Code provides conditions for collective bargaining. Although collective bargaining is not a new concept in Vietnam, the quality of collective bargaining agreements (CBA) is limited. Vietnam had approximately 27,866 CBAs accounting for 68 percent of unionized enterprises, according to 2017 figures. While CBAs are weakly enforced, VGCL in recent years has collaborated with the International Labor Organization (ILO) to pilot multi-employer CBAs in some industrial zones and sectoral CBAs in the textile sector.

Labor Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

The 2012 revised Labor Code introduced a process of mediation and arbitration for labor disputes. The law allows trade unions and employer organizations to facilitate and support collective bargaining, and requires companies to establish a mechanism to enable management, and the workforce to exchange information, and to consult on subjects that affect working conditions. Regulations require conducting workplace dialogues every three months. The Labor Code stipulates that trade unions have the right and responsibility to organize and lead strikes and establishes certain substantive and procedural restrictions on strikes. Strikes that do not arise from a collective labor dispute, or do not adhere to the process outlined by law, are illegal. The law makes a distinction between “interest-based” disputes (“a dispute arising out of the request of the workers’ collective on the establishment of a new working condition … in the negotiation process between the workers’ collective and the employers”) and “rights-based” disputes (“a dispute between the workers’ collective with the employer arising out of different interpretation and implementation of provisions of labor laws, collective bargaining agreements, internal working regulations, other lawful regulations and agreements.”) In contravention of international standards, the law forbids strikes over “rights-based” disputes. This includes strikes arising out of economic and social policy measures that are not a part of a collective negotiation process, as they are both outside the law’s definition of protected “interest-based” strikes.

The Labor Code prescribes an extensive and cumbersome process of mediation and arbitration before a lawful strike over an interest-based collective dispute can occur. Before workers may hold a strike, they must submit their claims through a process involving a conciliation council (or a district-level labor conciliator where no union is present). If the two parties do not reach a resolution, unions must submit claims to a provincial arbitration council. Unions (or workers’ representatives where no union is present) have the right either to appeal decisions of provincial arbitration councils to provincial people’s courts, or to strike. Individual workers may take cases directly to the people’s court system, but in most cases they may do so only after conciliation has been attempted and failed.  

If a workplace trade union does not exist, the law requires that an “immediate upper-level trade union” must perform the tasks of a grassroots union, even where workers have not so requested or have voluntarily elected not to organize. For non-unionized workers to organize a strike, they must request that the strike “be organized and led by the upper-level trade union,” and if non-unionized workers wish to bargain collectively, the upper-level VGCL union must represent them.

The law prohibits strikes by workers in businesses that serve the public or that the government considers essential to the national economy, defense, public health, and public order. “Essential services” include electricity production, post and telecommunications, maritime and air transportation, navigation, public works, and oil and gas production. The law stipulates strikers may not be paid wages while they are not at work. By law, individuals participating in strikes declared illegal by a people’s court and found to have caused damage to their employer are liable for damages. The law also grants the prime minister the right to suspend a strike considered detrimental to the national economy or public safety.

Strikes in Vietnam

According to VGCL, there have been 6,000 strikes in Vietnam since 1990, though most were not VGCL-led.  More than 73 percent of the 189 strikes in the first eight months of 2018 occurred at foreign direct-investment companies (mainly Korean, Taiwanese, Japanese, and Chinese companies), and nearly 40 percent occurred in the southern economic zone area in Binh Duong, Dong Nai, and Ba Ria-Vung Tau provinces and HCMC, according to the VGCL. None of the strikes followed the authorized conciliation and arbitration process, and thus authorities considered them illegal “wildcat” strikes. The government, however, took no action against the strikers and, on occasion, actively mediated agreements in the workers’ favor. For example, in 2018 the Prime Minister had dialogues with 1,000 workers in the northern region, and with 3,000 workers in the south, and 2,000 workers in the central region during 2016-2017. In some cases of government mediation, the government imposed heavy fines on employers, especially of foreign-owned companies, that engaged in illegal practices that led to strikes.

Gaps in Compliance in Law or Practice with International Labor Standards

Vietnam has been a member of the ILO since 1992, and has ratified five of the core ILO labor conventions (Conventions 100 and 111 on discrimination, Conventions 138 and 182 on child labor, and Convention 29 on forced labor). While the constitution and law prohibit forced or compulsory labor, Vietnam has not ratified Convention 105 dealing with forced labor as a means of political coercion and discrimination, or Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining, although the government is currently taking steps toward ratification.  Under the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, however, all ILO members, including Vietnam, have pledged to respect and promote core ILO labor standards, including those regarding association, the right to organize, and collective bargaining.

Vietnam’s legal framework on child labor appears generally in accordance with international standards, however, the Labor Code allows children under age 13 to work in “specific work regulated by the MOLISA.” Since 2012, the U.S. Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor has included Vietnamese garments, produced with child labor and forced labor, and bricks, produced with child labor, in violation of international standards.  Vietnamese garments are also included in a list of products produced by forced or indentured child labor under Executive Order 13126: Prohibition of Acquisition of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor. Based on the results of Vietnam’s National Child Labor Survey, in 2016, the U.S. Department of Labor included 14 additional goods produced by child labor in Vietnam to the List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor: cashews, coffee, fish, footwear, furniture, leather, pepper, rice, rubber, sugarcane, tea, textiles, timber, and tobacco.

The government has increasingly acknowledged the issue of child labor in recent years and is a participant in a five-year, USD 8 million project implemented by the ILO to enhance national capacity to reduce and prevent child labor. The government is also in the process of enhancing its policy and regulatory framework for occupational safety and health (OSH).  The OSH law, passed in June 2015, extends OSH protections to all workers, including the informal economy, and includes the establishment of an injury compensation system for workers in the informal economy, which constitutes more than 60 percent of the workforce. The ILO is assisting the government with the drafting of implementing regulations for the law and finalizing a national OSH program for 2016-2020.

In January 2018, Penal Code amendments entered into effect, criminalizing all forms of labor trafficking of adults and prescribing penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment and fines of approximately USD 860 to USD 4,300 (VND 20-100 million). The amendments also criminalized labor trafficking of children under the age of 16 and prescribed penalties of seven to 12 years imprisonment and fines of USD 2,150 to USD 8,620 (VND 50-200 million). NGOs continued to report occurrences of forced labor of men, women, and children within the country. Labor recruitment firms, most of which were affiliated with SOEs, and unlicensed brokers reportedly charged workers seeking international employment higher fees than the law allows, doing so with impunity. Those workers incurred high debts and were thus more vulnerable to forced labor, including debt bondage.

As part of the government’s 2016-20 National Plan of Action for Children and National Program for Child Protection, the government continued efforts to prevent child labor and specifically targeted children in rural areas, disadvantaged children, and children at risk of exposure to hazardous work conditions. The Vietnam National Child Labor Survey 2012 report (the most recent data available) categorized 1.75 million working children as “child laborers,” accounting for 9.6 percent of the national child population or 62 percent of children engaged in economic activities. Of child laborers, 40 percent were girls, nearly 85 percent lived in rural areas, and 60 percent belonged to the 15-17 age group. Some children started work as young as age 12 and nearly 55 percent did not attend school (5 percent of whom would never attend school). Agriculture was the most common sector for child laborers, accounting for 67 percent of all child labor, while 15.7 percent worked in construction/manufacturing and 16.7 percent in services. There were reports of children between ages 10 and 18, and some as young as six, producing garments under forced-labor conditions. International and domestic NGOs noted successful partnerships with provincial governments to implement national-level policies combating child labor.  

It is illegal to establish independent labor unions and therefore, no government-sanctioned domestic labor NGOs can organize workers. Independent labor activists seeking to form unions separate from the Communist Party-run VGCL or inform workers of their labor rights sometimes suffer government harassment. However, government-sanctioned local labor NGOs have supported VGCL’s efforts to raise awareness of worker rights and occupational safety and health issues and to support internal and external migrant workers. Multiple international labor NGOs collaborated with the VGCL to provide training to VGCL-affiliated union representatives on labor organizing, collective bargaining, and other trade union issues. The ILO-International Finance Corporation (IFC) Better Work project reported that management interference in the activities of the trade union was one of the most significant issues in garment factories in the country.  

Credible reports, including from the ILO-IFC Better Work 2017 Annual Report, indicated that factories exceeded legal overtime thresholds and did not meet legal requirements for rest days. The ILO-IFC report stated that, while a majority of factories in the program complied with the daily limit of four hours of overtime, 77 percent exceeded monthly limits (30 hours) and 72 percent exceeded annual limits (300 hours). In addition, and because of the high prevalence of Sunday work, 44 percent of factories failed to provide at least four days of rest per month to all workers.

MOLISA is the principal labor authority, and it oversees the enforcement of the labor law, administers labor relations policy, and promotes job creation. The Labor Inspections Department is responsible for workplace inspections to confirm compliance with labor laws and occupational safety and health standards. Inspectors may use sanctions, fines, withdrawal of operating licenses or registrations, closures of enterprises, and mandatory training. Inspectors may take immediate measures when they have reason to believe there is an imminent and serious danger to the health or safety of workers, including temporarily suspending operations, although such measures were rare. MOLISA acknowledged shortcomings in its labor inspection system and emphasized the number of labor inspectors countrywide, fewer than 1,000 for a country of 96 million people, was insufficient.

New Labor Related Laws or Regulations

Planned amendments to Vietnam’s Labor Code were delayed until 2019. According to current plans, the government will make public the draft Labor Code for public comment in April-May 2019 and will submit the draft to the National Assembly for discussion in October 2019. The National Assembly will likely not pass a labor law until 2020, at the earliest. Lack of consensus about increasing the retirement age (from 60 to 62 to men and from 55 to 60 for women), among other issues, has delayed the process. Although progress has been slow, recent shifts within MOLISA leadership may signal more progress and reforms on labor issues in comparison with previous years, including on challenging issues such as industrial relations.  

The CPTPP and EV FTA, if passed, may help advance labor reform in Vietnam.  In particular, the EV FTA would require Vietnam to publish a timeline for ratifying the three remaining core ILO conventions: Convention 98 (on the right to collective bargaining) in 2019; Convention 105 (abolition of forced labor) in 2020; and Convention 87 (freedom of association and protection of the right to organize) in 2023. The most important of these are Convention 98 and 87 as they would allow trade unions, currently dominated by the VGCL, to better represent workers’ interests. Even with new momentum on labor issues, enactment of legal and regulatory changes to improve working conditions in Vietnam will still take years to fully develop and implement.  

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) signed a bilateral agreement with Vietnam in 1998, and Vietnam joined the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 1995.

In October 2018, OPIC became the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC) under the 2018 Build Act. The USIDFC will help support developing countries move through the transitory stage from non-market to market economies with an emphasis toward U.S. assistance and foreign policy objectives. The U.S. Congress authorized the USIDFC to make loans or loan guarantees (including in local currency) and to acquire equity or financial interests as a minority investor. It also will provide insurance or reinsurance to private-sector entities and qualifying sovereign entities. Moreover, the USIDFC will provide technical assistance, administer special projects, establish enterprise funds, issue obligations, and charge and collect service fees.

In October 2016, the then-OPIC President visited Vietnam to develop private-sector investment opportunities. In January 2017, former Secretary of State John Kerry along with OPIC presented a letter of intent to Fulbright University Vietnam (FUV) to support the design and construction of the university’s main campus in HCMC, which will bolster the university’s academic programs as well as expand enrollment up to 7,000 students. In June 2017, FUV recruited students for its 2018 school year. In November 2017, the then-OPIC President presented a letter of intent to Virginia-based energy company AES to support its construction of a LNG terminal and 2,250 megawatt combined cycle power plant in Vietnam which would provide around 5 percent of the country’s power generation capacity, but the project has yet to be approved.

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI

*No IMF Data Available; Vietnam’s Foreign Investment Agency under the Ministry of Planning and Investment (fia.mpi.gov.vn)

**No local data available

Table 4: Sources of Portfolio Investment

*No IMF Data Available; Vietnam’s Foreign Investment Agency under the Ministry of Planning and Investment (fia.mpi.gov.vn)
**No local data available

Economic Section
U.S. Embassy
7 Lang Ha, Ba Dinh, Hanoi, Vietnam
+84-24-3850-5000
InvestmentClimateVN@state.gov