HomeReportsInvestment Climate Statements...Custom Report - 9737c43a98 hide Investment Climate Statements Custom Report Excerpts: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia +167 more Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs Sort by Country Sort by Section In this section / Albania Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Algeria Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Andorra Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Angola Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Antigua and Barbuda Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Argentina Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Armenia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Australia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Austria Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Azerbaijan Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Bahrain Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Bangladesh Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Barbados Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Belarus 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Belgium Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Belize Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Benin Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Bolivia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Bosnia and Herzegovina Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Botswana Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Brazil Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Brunei Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Bulgaria Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Burkina Faso Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Burma Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Burundi Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Cabo Verde Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Cambodia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Cameroon Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Canada Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Chad Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Chile Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises China Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Colombia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Costa Rica Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Côte d’Ivoire Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Croatia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Cyprus Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Czechia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Democratic Republic of the Congo Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Denmark Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Djibouti Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Dominica Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Dominica Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Dominican Republic Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Ecuador Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Egypt Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises El Salvador Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Equatorial Guinea Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Eritrea Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Estonia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Eswatini Executive Summary Ethiopia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Fiji Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Finland Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector France and Monaco Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Gabon Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Georgia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Germany Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Ghana Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Greece Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Grenada Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Guatemala Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Guinea Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Guyana Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Haiti Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Honduras Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Hong Kong Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Hungary Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Iceland Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises India Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Indonesia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Iraq Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Ireland Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Israel Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Italy Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Jamaica Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Japan Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Jordan Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Kazakhstan Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Kenya Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Kosovo Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Kuwait Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Kyrgyz Republic Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Laos Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Latvia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Lebanon Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Lesotho Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Liberia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Libya Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Lithuania Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Luxembourg Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Macau Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Malawi Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Maldives Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Mali Executive Summary Title 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Malta Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Mauritania Executive Summary Mauritius Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Mexico Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Micronesia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Moldova Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Mongolia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Montenegro Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Morocco Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Mozambique Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Namibia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Nepal Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises New Zealand Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Nicaragua Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Niger Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Nigeria Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises North Macedonia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Norway Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Oman Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Pakistan Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Palau Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Panama Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Papua New Guinea Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Paraguay Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Peru Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Poland Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Portugal Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Qatar Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Republic of the Congo Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Romania Executive Summary Title 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Rwanda Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Saint Kitts and Nevis Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Saint Lucia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Samoa Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Sao Tome and Principe Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Saudi Arabia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Senegal Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Serbia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Seychelles Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Sierra Leone Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Singapore Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Slovakia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Slovenia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Somalia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises South Africa Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises South Korea Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises South Sudan Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Spain Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Sri Lanka Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Sudan Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Suriname Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Sweden Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Switzerland and Liechtenstein Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Taiwan Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Tajikistan Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Tanzania Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Thailand Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Bahamas Executive Summary Title 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Gambia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Netherlands Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Philippines Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Timor-Leste Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Togo Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Trinidad and Tobago Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Tunisia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Turkey Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector Turkmenistan Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Uganda Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises United Arab Emirates Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises United Kingdom Executive Summary Uruguay Executive Summary Title 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Uzbekistan Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Vietnam Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises West Bank and Gaza Executive Summary Title 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Zambia Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Zimbabwe Executive Summary 6. Financial Sector 7. State-Owned Enterprises Albania Executive Summary Albania is an upper middle-income country with a gross domestic product (GDP) of USD 16.77 billion (2021 IMF estimate) and a population of approximately 2.9 million people. In 2020, the economy contracted by 4 percent in the height of COVID-19 and in 2021 re-bounded with a growth rate of 8.7 percent. The increase was fueled by construction, easing of pandemic related restrictions, recovery of tourism sector, increase in the real estate sector, record domestic electricity production, and continued budgetary, monetary, and fiscal policy support, including IMF and EU pandemic and earthquake related support. The initial growth projection for 2022 was 4.1 percent, despite uncertainties related to the pandemic, elevated fiscal deficits and public debt, and external and internal inflationary pressures. However, uncertainties due to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, surging energy prices, and inflationary pressures, coupled with limited room for fiscal maneuvering due to high public debt that exceeded 80 percent at the end of 2021, present challenges to the Albanian economy. Albania joined NATO in 2009 and has been a member of WTO since 2000. The country signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union in 2006, received the status of the EU candidate country in 2014, and began accession negotiations with the EU in July 2022. Albania’s legal framework is in line with international standards in protecting and encouraging foreign investments and does not discriminate against foreign investors. The Law on Foreign Investments of 1993 outlines specific protections for foreign investors and allows 100 percent foreign ownership of companies in all but a few sectors. The U.S.-Albanian Bilateral Investment Treaty, which entered into force in 1998, ensures that U.S. investors receive national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment. Albania and the United States signed a Memorandum of Economic Cooperation in October 2020 with an aim of increasing trade and investment between the two countries. Since the signing multiple U.S. companies have signed agreements for major projects in the country. As a developing country, Albania offers large untapped potential for foreign investments across many sectors including energy, tourism, healthcare, agriculture, oil and mining, and information and communications technology (ICT). In the last decade, Albania has been able to attract greater levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the UNCTAD data, during 2010-2020, the flow of FDI has averaged USD 1.1 billion and stock FDI at the end of 2020 reached USD 10 billion or triple the amount of 2010. According to preliminary data of the Bank of Albania the FDI flow in 2021 is expected to reach USD 1 billion. Investments are concentrated in extractive industries and processing, real estate, the energy sector, banking and insurance, and information and communication technology. Switzerland, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, Turkey, Austria, Bulgaria, and France are the largest sources of FDI. The stock FDI from United States accounts for a small, but rapidly growing share. At the end of Q3 2021, the United States stock FDI in Albania reached USD168 million, up from USD 99 million at the end of 2020, nearly a 70 percent increase. Despite a sound legal framework, foreign investors perceive Albania as a difficult place to do business. They cite endemic corruption, including in the judiciary and public procurements, unfair competition, informal economy, frequent changes of the fiscal legislation, and poor enforcement of contracts as continuing challenges for investment and business in Albania. Reports of corruption in government procurement are commonplace. The continued use of public private partnership (PPP) contracts has reduced opportunities for competition, including by foreign investors, in infrastructure and other sectors. Poor cost-benefit analyses and a lack of technical expertise in drafting and monitoring PPP contracts are ongoing concerns. U.S. investors are challenged by corruption and the perpetuation of informal business practices. Several U.S. investors have faced contentious commercial disputes with both public and private entities, including some that went to international arbitration. In 2019 and 2020, a U.S. company’s attempted investment was allegedly thwarted by several judicial decisions and questionable actions of stakeholders involved in a dispute over the investment. The case is now in international arbitration. Property rights continue to be a challenge in Albania because clear title is difficult to obtain. There have been instances of individuals allegedly manipulating the court system to obtain illegal land titles. Overlapping property titles is a serious and common issue. The compensation process for land confiscated by the former communist regime continues to be cumbersome, inefficient, and inadequate. Nevertheless, parliament passed a law on registering property claims on April 16, 2020, which will provide some relief for title holders. In an attempt to limit opportunities for corruption, the GoA embarked on a comprehensive reform to digitalize all public services. As of March 2021, 1,200 services or 95 percent of all public services to citizens and businesses were available online through the E-Albania Portal . However, Albania continues to score poorly on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2021, Albania declined to 110th out of 180 countries, a fall of six places from 2020. Albania continues to rank low in the Global Innovation Index, ranking 84 out of 132 countries. To address endemic corruption, the GOA passed sweeping constitutional amendments to reform the country’s judicial system and improve the rule of law in 2016. The implementation of judicial reform is underway, heavily supported by the United States and the EU, including the vetting of judges and prosecutors for unexplained wealth. More than half the judges and prosecutors who have undergone vetting have been dismissed for unexplained wealth or ties to organized crime. The EU expects Albania to show progress on prosecuting judges and prosecutors whose vetting revealed possible criminal conduct. The implementation of judicial reform is ongoing, and its completion is expected to improve the investment climate in the country. The Albanian parliament voted overwhelmingly and unopposed to extend this vetting mandate in February 2022. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 110 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 84 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2018 $35 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $ 5,210 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The government has adopted policies to promote the free flow of financial resources and foreign investment in Albania. The Law on “Strategic Investments” is based on the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination, and protection of foreign investments. Foreign investors have the right to expatriate all funds and contributions of their investment. In accordance with IMF Article VIII, the government and Central Bank do not impose any restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions. Despite Albania’s shallow foreign exchange market, banks enjoy enough liquidity to support sizeable positions. Portfolio investments continue to be a challenge because they remain limited mostly to company shares, government bonds, and real estate as the Tirana stock market remains non-operational In recent years, the constant reduction of non-performing loans has allowed commercial banks to loosen lending standards and increase overall lending especially as the economy has recovering from the severe COVID-19 economic disruption in 2020. Non-performing loans (NPL) at the end of 2021 dropped to 5.65 percent compared to 8.1 percent one year ago. Overall lending has steadily increased since 2019 and at the end of 2021 reached about USD 6 billion marking a 10 percent increase compared to 2020. The credit market is competitive, but interest rates in domestic currency can be high. Most mortgage and commercial loans are denominated in euros because rate differentials between local and foreign currency average 1.5 percent. Commercial banks operating in Albania have improved the quality and quantity of services they provide, including a large variety of credit instruments, traditional lines of credit, and bank drafts, etc. In the absence of an effective stock market, the country’s banking sector is the main channel for business financing. The sector is sound, profitable, and well capitalized. The Bank of Albania, the country’s Central Bank, is responsible for the licensing and supervision of the banking sector in Albania. The banking sector is 100 percent privately owned and its total assets have steadily increased over the years reaching USD 17 billion at the end of 2021 mostly based on customers deposits. The banking sector has continued the consolidation process as the number of banks decreased from 16 in 2018 to 11 at the end of 2021 when the Greek Alpha Bank was purchased by OTP Bank. As of December 2021, the Turkish National Commercial Bank (BKT) was the largest bank in the market with 26 percent market share, followed by Albanian Credins Bank with 15.8 percent, and Austrian Raiffeisen Bank third with 15.3 percent. The American Investment Bank is the only bank with U.S. shareholders and ranks sixth with 5.5 percent percent of the banking sector’s total assets. The number of bank outlets has also decreased over the recent years also due to the consolidation. In December 2021, Albania had 417 bank outlets, down from 446 from 2019 and the peak of 552 in 2016. Capital adequacy, at 18 percent in December 2021, remains above Basel requirements and indicates sufficient assets. At the end of 2021, the return on assets increased to 1.42 percent compared to 1.2 percent one year ago. As part of its strategy to stimulate business activity, the Bank of Albania has adopted a plan to ease monetary policy by continuing to persistently keep low interest rates. However, due to the recent inflationary pressure in March 2021, Bank of Albania increased the base interest rate to 1 percent, up from a historical low rate of 0.5 percent which was in place since June 2018. Many of the banks operating in Albania are subsidiaries of foreign banks. Only three banks have an ownership structure whose majority shareholders are Albanian. However, the share of total assets of the banks with majority Albanian shareholders has increased because of the sector’s ongoing consolidation. There are no restrictions for foreigners who wish to establish a bank account. They are not required to prove residency status. However, U.S. citizens must complete a form allowing for the disclosure of their banking data to the IRS as required under the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. Parliament approved a law in October 2019 to establish the Albanian Investment Corporation (AIC). The law entered in force in January 2020. The AIC would develop, manage, and administer state-owned property and assets, invest across all sectors by mobilizing state owned and private domestic and foreign capital, and promote economic and social development by investing in line with government-approved development policies. The GoA plans to transfer state-owned assets, including state-owned land, to the AIC and provide initial capital to launch the corporation. In December 2021, the GoA transferred to the AIC close to USD 20 million. There is no publicly available information about the activities of the AIC for 2020 or 2021. The IMF https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/11/26/mcs11262019-albania-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2019-article-iv-mission Staff Concluding Statement of November 26, 2019, warned that the law would allow the government to direct individual investment decisions, which could make the AIC an off-budget spending tool that risks eroding fiscal discipline and circumventing public investment management processes. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are defined as legal entities that are entirely state-owned or state-controlled and operate as commercial companies in compliance with the Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies. SOEs operate mostly in the generation, distribution, and transmission of electricity, oil and gas, railways, postal services, ports, and water supply. There is no published list of SOEs. The law does not discriminate between public and private companies operating in the same sector. The government requires SOEs to submit annual reports and undergo independent audits. SOEs are subject to the same tax levels and procedures and the same domestic accounting and international financial reporting standards as other commercial companies. The High State Audit audits SOE activities. SOEs are also subject to public procurement law. Albania is yet to become party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the WTO but has obtained observer status and is negotiating full accession (see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm ). Private companies can compete openly and under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products and services, and incentives. SOE operation in Albania is regulated by the Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies, the Law on State Owned Enterprises, and the Law on the Transformation of State-Owned Enterprises into Commercial Companies. The Ministry of Economy and Finance and other relevant ministries, depending on the sector, represent the state as the owner of the SOEs. SOEs are not obligated by law to adhere to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines explicitly. However, basic principles of corporate governance are stipulated in the relevant laws and generally accord with OECD guidelines. The corporate governance structure of SOEs includes the supervisory board and the general director (administrator) in the case of joint stock companies. The supervisory board comprises three to nine members, who are not employed by the SOE. Two-thirds of board members are appointed by the representative of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and one-third by the line ministry, local government unit, or institution to which the company reports. The Supervisory Board is the highest decision-making authority and appoints and dismisses the administrator of the SOE through a two-thirds vote. The privatization process in Albania is nearing conclusion, with just a few major privatizations remaining. Entities to be privatized include OSHEE, the state-run electricity distributor; 16 percent of ALBtelecom, the fixed-line telephone and mobile company; and state-owned oil company Albpetrol. Other sectors might provide opportunities for privatization in the future. The bidding process for privatizations is public, and relevant information is published by the Public Procurement Agency at www.app.gov.al . Foreign investors may participate in the privatization program. The Agency has not published timelines for future privatizations. Algeria Executive Summary Algeria’s state enterprise-dominated economy is challenging for U.S. businesses, but multiple sectors offer opportunities for long-term growth. The government is prioritizing investment in agriculture, information and communications technology, mining, hydrocarbons (both upstream and downstream), renewable energy, and healthcare. Following his December 2019 election, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune launched a series of political reforms, which led to the adoption of a new constitution in December 2020 and the election of a new parliament in June 2021. Tebboune has declared his intention to focus on economic issues in 2022 and beyond. In 2020, the government eliminated the so-called “51/49” restriction that required majority Algerian ownership of all new businesses, though it retained the requirement for “strategic sectors,” identified as energy, mining, defense, transportation infrastructure, and pharmaceuticals manufacturing (with the exception of innovative products). In the 2021 Finance Law, the government reinstated the 51/49 ownership requirement for any company importing items into Algeria with an intent to resell. The government passed a new hydrocarbons law in 2019, improving fiscal terms and contract flexibility in order to attract new international investors. The new law encourages major international oil companies to sign memorandums of understanding with the national hydrocarbons company, Sonatrach. Though the 43 regulatory texts enacting the legislation have not been formally finalized, the government is using the new law as the basis for negotiating new contracts with international oil companies. In recent years, the Algerian government took several steps, including establishing a standalone ministry dedicated to the pharmaceutical industry and issuing regulations to resolve several long-standing issues, to improve market access for U.S. pharmaceutical companies. The government is in the process of drafting and finalizing a new investment law. Algeria has established ambitious renewable energy adoption targets to reduce carbon emissions and reduce domestic consumption of natural gas. Algeria’s economy is driven by hydrocarbons production, which historically accounts for 95 percent of export revenues and approximately 40 percent of government income. Following the significant drop in oil prices at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the government cut budgeted expenditures by 50 percent and significantly reduced investment in the energy sector. The implementation of broad-based import reductions coupled with a recovery in hydrocarbon prices in 2021 led to Algeria’s first trade surplus since 2014. Though successive government budgets have boosted state spending, Algeria continues to run a persistent budget deficit, which is projected to reach 20 percent of GDP in 2022. Despite a significant reduction in revenues, the historically debt-averse government continues to resist seeking foreign financing, preferring to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to boost employment and replace imports with local production. Traditionally, Algeria has pursued protectionist policies to encourage the development of local industries. The import substitution policies it employs tend to generate regulatory uncertainty, supply shortages, increased prices, and a limited selection for consumer goods. The government depreciated the Algerian dinar approximately 5% in 2021 after a 10% depreciation in 2020 to conserve its foreign exchange reserves, contributing to significant food inflation. The government has taken measures to minimize the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, including delaying tax payments for small businesses, extending credit and restructuring loan payments, and decreasing banks’ reserve requirements. Though the government has lifted domestic COVID_19 related confinement measures, continued restrictions on international flight volumes complicate travel to Algeria for international investors. Economic operators deal with a range of challenges, including complicated customs procedures, cumbersome bureaucracy, difficulties in monetary transfers, and price competition from international rivals particularly the People’s Republic of China, France, and Turkey. International firms operating in Algeria complain that laws and regulations are constantly shifting and applied unevenly, raising commercial risk for foreign investors. An ongoing anti-corruption campaign has increased weariness regarding large-scale investment projects and put a chill on bureaucratic decision making. Business contracts are subject to changing interpretation and revision of regulations, which has proved challenging to U.S. and international firms. Other drawbacks include limited regional integration, which hampers opportunities to rely on international supply chains. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 117 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 120 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 20xx USD Amount https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,570 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The Algiers Stock Exchange has five stocks listed – each at no more than 35 percent equity. There is a small and medium enterprise exchange with one listed company. The exchange has a total market capitalization representing less than 0.1 percent of Algeria’s GDP. Daily trading volume on the exchange averages around USD 2,000. Despite the lack of tangible activity, the market is regulated by an independent oversight commission that enforces compliance requirements on listed companies and traders. Government officials have previously expressed their desire to reach a capitalization of USD 7.8 billion and enlist up to 50 new companies. Attempts to list additional companies have been stymied by a lack both of public awareness and appetite for portfolio investment, as well as by private and public companies’ unpreparedness to satisfy due diligence requirements that would attract investors. Proposed privatizations of state-owned companies have also been opposed by the public. Algerian society generally prefers material investment vehicles for savings, namely cash. Public banks, which dominate the banking sector (see below), are required to purchase government securities when offered, meaning they have little leftover liquidity to make other investments. Foreign portfolio investment is prohibited – the purchase of any investment product in Algeria, whether a government or corporate bond or equity stock, is limited to Algerian residents only. The banking sector is roughly 85 percent public and 15 percent private as measured by value of assets held and is regulated by an independent central bank. Publicly available data from private institutions and U.S. Federal Reserve Economic Data show estimated total assets in the commercial banking sector in 2017 were roughly 13.9 trillion dinars (USD 116.7 billion) against 9.2 trillion dinars (USD 77.2 billion) in liabilities. In response to liquidity concerns caused by the oil price decline and COVID-19 crisis, the bank progressively decreased the reserve requirement from 12 percent to 3 percent between March and September 2020. The IMF and Bank of Algeria have noted moderate growth in non-performing assets since 2015, currently estimated between 12 and 13 percent of total assets. The quality of service in public banks is generally considered low as generations of public banking executives and workers trained to operate in a statist economy lack familiarity with modern banking practices. Most transactions are materialized (non-electronic). Many areas of the country suffer from a dearth of branches, leaving large amounts of the population without access to banking services. ATMs are not widespread, especially outside the major cities, and few accept foreign bankcards. Outside of major hotels with international clientele, hardly any retail establishments accept credit cards. Algerian banks do issue debit cards, but the system is distinct from any international payment system. The Minister of Commerce has announced multiple plans to require businesses to use electronic payments for all commercial and service transactions, though the most recent government deadline for all stores to deploy electronic payment terminals by the end of 2021 was indefinitely delayed. In addition, analysts estimate that between one-third and one-half of the money supply circulates in the informal economy. Foreigners can open foreign currency accounts without restriction, but proof of a work permit or residency is required to open an account in Algerian dinars. Foreign banks are permitted to establish operations in the country, but they must be legally distinct entities from their overseas home offices. In 2015, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Algeria from its Public Statement, and in 2016 it removed Algeria from the “gray list.” The FATF recognized Algeria’s significant progress and the improvement in its anti-money laundering/counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime. The FATF also indicated Algeria has substantially addressed its action plan since strategic deficiencies were identified in 2011. Algeria’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF) is the “Fonds de Regulation des Recettes (FRR).” The Finance Ministry’s website shows the fund decreased from 4408.2 billion dinars (USD 37.36 billion) in 2014 to 784.5 billion dinars (USD 6.65 billion) in 2016. The data has not been updated since 2016. Algerian media reported the FRR was spent down to zero as of February 2017. Algeria is not known to have participated in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) comprise more than half of the formal Algerian economy. SOEs are amalgamated into a single line of the state budget and are listed in the official business registry. To be defined as an SOE, a company must be at least 51 percent owned by the state. Algerian SOEs are bureaucratic and may be subject to political influence. There are competing lines of authority at the mid-levels, and contacts report mid- and upper-level managers are reluctant to make decisions because internal accusations of favoritism or corruption are often used to settle political and personal scores. Senior management teams at SOEs report to their relevant ministry; CEOs of the larger companies such as national hydrocarbons company Sonatrach, national electric utility Sonelgaz, and airline Air Algerie report directly to ministers. Boards of directors are appointed by the state, and the allocation of these seats is considered political. SOEs are not known to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. Legally, public and private companies compete under the same terms with respect to market share, products and services, and incentives. In reality, private enterprises assert that public companies sometimes receive more favorable treatment. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, but they work with private banks, and they are less bureaucratic than their public counterparts. Public companies generally refrain from doing business with private banks and a 2008 government directive ordered public companies to work only with public banks. The directive was later officially rescinded, but public companies continued the practice. However, the heads of Algeria’s two largest state enterprises, Sonatrach and Sonelgaz, both indicated in 2020 that given current budget pressures they are investigating recourse to foreign financing, including from private banks. SOEs are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors, but business contacts report that the government favors SOEs over private sector companies in terms of access to land. SOEs are subject to budget constraints. Audits of public companies can be conducted by the Court of Auditors, a financially autonomous institution. The constitution explicitly charges it with “ex post inspection of the finances of the state, collectivities, public services, and commercial capital of the state,” as well as preparing and submitting an annual report to the President, heads of both chambers of Parliament, and Prime Minister. The Court makes its audits public on its website, for free, but with a time delay, which does not conform to international norms. The Court conducts audits simultaneously but independently from the Ministry of Finance’s year-end reports. The Court makes its reports available online once finalized and delivered to the Parliament, whereas the Ministry withholds publishing year-end reports until after the Parliament and President have approved them. The Court’s audit reports cover the entire implemented national budget by fiscal year and examine each annual planning budget that is passed by Parliament. The General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF), the public auditing body under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance, can conduct “no-notice” audits of public companies. The results of these audits are sent directly to the Minister of Finance, and the offices of the President and Prime Minister. They are not made available publicly. The Court of Auditors and IGF previously had joint responsibility for auditing certain accounts, but they are in the process of eliminating this redundancy. Further legislation clarifying whether the delineation of responsibility for particular accounts which could rest with the Court of Auditors or the Ministry of Finance’s General Inspection of Finance (IGF) unit has yet to be issued. There has been limited privatization of certain projects previously managed by SOEs, and so far restricted to the water sector and possibly a few other sectors. However, the privatization of SOEs remains publicly sensitive and has been largely halted. Andorra Executive Summary Andorra is an independent principality with a population of about 79,000 and area of 181 square miles situated between France and Spain in the Pyrenees mountains. It uses the euro as its national currency. Andorra is a popular tourist destination visited by over 8 million people each year (pre-pandemic) who are drawn by outdoor activities like hiking and cycling in the summer and skiing and snowshoeing in the winter, as well as by its duty-free shopping of luxury products. Andorra’s economy is based on an interdependent network of trade, commerce, and tourism, which represent nearly 60% of the economy, followed by the financial sector. Andorra has also become a wealthy international commercial center because of its integrated banking sector and low taxes. As part of its effort to modernize its economy, Andorra has opened to foreign investment and engaged in other reforms, including advancing tax initiatives. Andorra is actively seeking to attract foreign investment and to become a center for entrepreneurs, talent, innovation, and knowledge. The Andorran economy is undergoing a process of digitalization and diversification that accelerated due to the impact pandemic-related border closures had on its dominant tourist sector. In 2006, the Government began sweeping economic reforms. The Parliament approved three main regulations to complement the first phase of economic openness: the law of Companies (October 2007), the Law of Business Accounting (December 2007), and the Law of Foreign Investment (April 2008 and June 2012). From 2011 to 2017, the Parliament approved direct taxes in the form of a corporate tax, tax on economic activities, tax on income of non-residents, tax on capital gains, and personal income tax. Andorra joined the IMF in October 2020, providing it access to additional resources for managing its economy. Also, as part of the post-pandemic economic recovery plan, Andorra passed Horizon 23, a comprehensive roadmap backed by 80 million euros of public funds to accelerate economic diversification into sectors like fintech, sports tech, esports, and biotech. These regulations aim to establish a transparent, modern, and internationally comparable regulatory framework. These reforms aim to attract investment and businesses that have the potential to boost Andorra’s economic development and diversification. Prior to 2008, Andorra limited foreign investment, worried that large foreign firms would have an oversized impact on its small economy. For example, previous regulations allowed non-citizens with less than 20 years residence in Andorra to own no more than 33 percent of a company. While foreigners may now own 100 percent of a trading enterprise or a holding company, the Government must approve the establishment of any private enterprise. The approval can take up to one month, which can be rejected if the proposal is found to negatively impact the environment, the public order, or the general interests of the principality. Andorra is a microstate that accounts for .001 percent of global emissions and has demonstrated its ambition to the fight against climate change by establishing a national strategy that commits to reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by a minimum of 37 percent by 2030 and pursuing carbon neutrality by 2050. In addition to implementing an energy transition law, Andorra approved the Green Fund and a hydrocarbon tax to promote climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives. Andorra’s per capita income is above the European average and above the level of its neighbors. The country has developed a sophisticated infrastructure including a one-of-a-kind micro-fiber-optic network for the entire country that provides universal access for all households and companies. Andorra’s retail tradition is well known around Europe, thanks to more than 1,400 shops, the quality of their products, and competitive prices. Products taken out of the Principality are tax-free up to certain limits; the purchaser must declare those that exceed the allowance. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Data not available 6. Financial Sector The Andorran financial sector is efficient and is one of the main pillars of the Andorran economy, representing 20 percent of the country’s GDP and over 5 percent of the workforce. Created in 1989, and redefined with more responsibilities in 2003, the Andorran Financial Authority (AFA; www.afa.ad ) is the supervisory and regulatory body of the Andorran financial system and the insurance sector. The AFA is a public entity with its own legal status, functionally independent from the Government. AFA has the power to carry out all necessary actions to ensure the correct development of its supervision and control functions, disciplinary and punitive powers, treasury and public debt management services, financial agency, international relations, advice, and studies. The Andorran Financial Intelligence Unit (UIFAND) was created in 2000 as an independent organ to deal with the tasks of promoting and coordinating measures to combat money laundering, terror financing, and the proliferation of weapons ( www.uifand.ad ). The State Agency for the Resolution of Banking Institutions (AREB) is a public-legal institution created by Law 8/2015 to take urgent measures to introduce mechanisms for the recovery and resolution of banking institutions ( www.areb.ad ). Andorra adopted the use of the Euro in 2002 and in 2011 signed a Monetary Agreement with the EU making the Euro the official currency. Since July 1, 2013, Andorra has had the right to mint Euro coins. The Andorra banking system is sound and considered the most important part of the financial sector. It represents 20 percent of the country’s GDP. The Andorran banks offer a variety of services at market rates. The main lines of business in the banking sector are retail banking, private banking, and asset management and insurance. The country also has a sizeable and growing market for portfolio investments. The country does not have a central bank. The sector is regulated and supervised by the Andorran Financial Authority (AFA). The U.S. Internal Revenue Service has certified all the Andorran banks as qualified intermediaries. Founded in 1960, the Association of Andorran Banks (ABA; https://www.andorranba nking.ad/) represents Andorran banks. Among its tasks are representing and defending interests of its members, watching over the development and competitiveness of Andorran banking at national and international levels, improving sector technical standards, cooperation with public administrations, and promoting professional training, particularly dealing with money laundering prevention. At present, all five Andorran banking groups are ABA members, totaling an estimated 51.7 billion Euros in combined assets for 2021. Foreign Exchange Andorra adopted the Euro in 2002 and in 2011 signed a Monetary Agreement with the EU making the Euro the official currency. Since 2013, Andorra has the authority to mint Euro coins. Remittance Policies There are no limits or restrictions on remittances provided that they correspond to a company’s official earning records. Andorra has no Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). Angola Executive Summary The Angolan economy emerged from five straight years of recession with slight GDP growth of 0.7 percent in 2021, thanks primarily to growth in the non-oil sector. The government forecasts more substantial growth of 2.4 percent in 2022. The oil and gas sector remains the key source of government revenue despite declining oil production and the government should benefit from higher than budgeted oil prices in 2022. The growth in non-oil sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture, transportation will be bolstered by increased demand from the lifting of COVID restrictions in late 2021 and early 2022. The Angolan government has maintained a reform agenda since the 2017 election of President Joao Lourenço. His administration has adopted measures to improve the business environment and make Angola more attractive for investment. Angola completed the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility in December 2021, demonstrating an ability to commit to and carry out difficult fiscal and macroeconomic reforms, despite the COVID-19 pandemic. The government received three credit rating upgrades between September 2021 and early 2022. In addition to the Privatization Program (PROPRIV), revision of the Private Investment Law, and updated Public Procurement law, the government has taken steps to recover misappropriated state assets – the Attorney General’s Office claims just under $13 billion since 2018 – and to uproot corruption. Through the Private Investment and Export Promotion Agency (AIPEX), Angola seeks to connect foreign investors with opportunities across the private sector, with PROPRIV, and a wide range of available state-owned enterprises and other assets. The public procurement process has also become more transparent. Angola plans to present its candidacy to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in 2022 to increase transparency in the oil, gas, and mineral resource sectors. Despite the government’s efforts to address corruption, its prevalence remains a key issue of concern for investors. Angola’s infrastructure requires substantial improvement; which the government is seeking to address by attracting investment public-private partnerships to improve and manage of ports, railroads, and key energy infrastructure. The justice system and other administrative processes remains bureaucratic and time-consuming. Unemployment (32.9 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021) and inflation (which reached 27 percent in 2021) remain high. There is limited technical training, English-speaking skills are generally low. Skilled labor levels are also low, though the government has attempted to address the issue through training and apprenticeship programs. Overall FDI increased by $2.59 billion in 2020, the last full year of reporting, from 2019. The government has committed to reaching 70 percent installed renewable energy by 2025 and has recognized the risks of climate change for Angola. To reach its renewable energy goal, the government has signed deals with U.S. companies on the installation of solar and hydro capacity worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 136 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 132 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $-578 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $2140 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Foreign portfolio investment is still new in Angola, but the government is seeking to increase it. The National Bank of Angola (BNA) abolished the licensing previously required to import capital from foreign investors allocated to the private sector and export income associated with such investments. This measure compliments the need to improve the capture of FDI and portfolio investment and it is in line with the privatization program for public companies (PROPRIV) announced through Presidential Decree No. 250/19 of August 5, 2019, which encourages foreign companies to purchase state-owned assets the government is liquidating. BNA has also stopped requiring a license to export capital resulting from the sale of investments in securities traded on a regulated market and the sale of any investment, in which the buyer is also not – foreign exchange resident, pursuant to Notice No. 15/2019. The BNA is increasingly removing restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Angola’s Debt and Securities Stock Exchange (BODIVA), planned to be privatized by 2022, trades an equivalent in local currency (kwanzas) of USD 2 billion a year. In view of policies adopted by the institution, BODIVA predicts an increase in the volume of trades. The stock exchange has 23 commercial banks and two brokerages as members, which operate mainly in government denominated Treasury Bonds. BODIVA allows the trading of different types of financial instruments through an electronic auction platform to investors with rules (self-regulation), systems (platforms), and procedures that assure market fairness and integrity to facilitate portfolio investment. The Capital Markets Commission, the regulator, is updating its own supervisory framework while looking to provide new services and attract more individual investors to the capital markets. Presently, only local commercial banks can list on the nascent stock exchange. According to the Capital Markets Commissioner, portfolio investment by individuals only represents 16 percent of BODIVA’s equity. Through the ongoing privatization program, the government announced in February its intent to sell 30 percent of the stocks it has invested in BODIVA by the end of 2022, with plans to sell the rest in phases in 2023 and 2024. Credit is partially allocated on market terms. Since the revision of the PIL in 2021, domestic credit is accessible to foreign investors and companies that are majority foreign held (this was previously only possible after implementation of the investment project). For Angolan investors, credit access remains limited. In 2020, however the BNA directed commercial banks to increase the minimum amount of subsidized credit that they must make available to borrowers 2 percent of their assets to 2.5 percent by the end of 2020 to accelerate the diversification of domestic production. The private sector has access to a variety of conventional credit instruments provided by commercial banks. Forty-seven percent of Angola’s income-earners utilize banking services, with 80 percent being from the urban areas. Angola is over-banked for the size of its economy. Although four banks have been closed since 2018, 26 banks still operate in Angola. The banking market remains marked by concentration and limited financial inclusion. The top six banks control nearly 80 percent of sector assets, loans and deposits, but the rest of the sector includes many banks with minimal scale and weak franchises. The total number of customers in the six largest banks is 9.9 million. Angola’s largest bank Banco Angolano de Investimentos has an asset value of approximately USD 5.5 billion. Angola has a central banking system. The banking sector largely depends on monetary policies established by Angola’s central bank, the National Bank of Angola (BNA). Thanks to the ongoing IMF economic and financial reform agenda, the BNA is adopting international best practices and slowly becoming more autonomous. On February 13, 2021, President Joao Lourenco issued a decree granting autonomy to the BNA in line with IMF recommendations. Since that time, the bank has made decision on monetary, financial, credit, and foreign exchange policies without political influence, while also maintaining its oversight, regulatory, and supervisory role of the institutions in the financial system. The reforms taken under the Lourenco administration have lessened the political influence over the BNA and allowed it to more freely adopt strategies to build resilience from external shocks on the economy. As Angola’s economy depends heavily on oil to fuel its economy, so does the banking sector. The BNA periodically monitors minimum capital requirements for all banks and orders the closure of non-compliant banks. Credit availability is limited and often supports government-supported programs. The GRA obliges banks to grant credit more liberally in the economy, notably by implementing a Credit Support Program (PAC). For instance, the BNA first issued a notice obliging Angolan commercial banks to grant credit to national production equivalent at a minimum to 2.5 percent of their net assets in 2020 and extended the notice through the end of 2022. Although the RECREDIT Agency purchased non-performing loans (NPLs) of the state’s parastatal BPC bank, NPLs remain high at 23 percent, a decrease of 9 percent since 2017. The country has not lost any additional correspondent banking relationships since 2015. At the time of issuing this report no correspondent banking relationships were in jeopardy. The Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group is evaluating Angola’s anti-money laundering regime. A positive result could lead private foreign banking institutions to reestablish correspondent banking relationships. Most transactions go via third party correspondent banking services in Portugal banks, a costly option for all commercial banks. Foreign banking institutions are allowed to operate in Angola and are subject to BNA oversight. The Angolan Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSDEA) was established in 2012 with $5 billion USD in support from the petroleum sector. The fund was established in accordance with international governance standards and best practices as outlined in the Santiago Principles. As of March 2021, the FSDEA reported $2.97 billion USD. Angola is a full member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are currently 81 public enterprises listed on the State Institute of Asset and Shares Management website; 70 are wholly owned by the state, 8 with majority-ownership for the state and 3 with minority stakes for the government. A list of all of Angola’s SOEs can be found at the following link: https://igape.minfin.gov.ao/PortalIGAPE/#!/sector-empresarial-publico/universo-do-sep . Based on the IMF definition of government owning at least 50 percent equity and revenue being greater than 1 percent of GDP, SONANGOL, the state oil company, and Sodiam, the state diamond company qualify as SOEs. There is no law mandating preferential treatment to SOEs, but in practice they have access to inside information and credit. Currently, SOEs are not subject to budgetary constraints and quite often exceed their capital limits. All SOEs in Angola are required to have boards of directors, and most board members are affiliated with the government. Other public enterprises operate in the agribusiness, oil and gas, financial services, and construction sectors as well as others. The GRA considers SOE debt as indirect public debt, and only accounts in its state budget for direct government debt, thus effectively not reflecting some substantial obligations in fact owed by the government. President Lourenço has launched various reforms to improve financial sector transparency, enhance efficiency in the country’s SOEs as part of the National Development plan 2018-2022 and Macroeconomic Stability Plan Angola is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Angola does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate governance for SOEs. Angola began its privatization program (PROPRIV) in 2019, with an aim to privatize 195 assets by 2022. By January, the government had privatized 73 assets and raised $1.7 billion in revenue through the program despite COVID-19 pandemic-imposed hurdles. The program is supervised by State Institute of Asset and Shares Management (IGAPE) and will implemented through the Angolan Debt and Securities Exchange Market (BODIVA). The government plans to partially privatize the state-owned telecommunications company and the national oil company Sonangol, as well as the national airline TAAG, and companies in the extractives sector, health, manufacturing, and agriculture. The privatization process is open to interested foreign investors and the government has improved the transparency of the bidding process. The government has an “electronic auction” site where investors can submit their bids for the various tenders: https://leilaoigape.minfin.gov.ao/ . Antigua and Barbuda Executive Summary Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). According to Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) statistics, Antigua and Barbuda’s 2021 estimated gross domestic product (GDP) was $1.47 billion (3.97 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars). This represents an approximate 5.3 percent growth from 2020. The ECCB forecasts 2022 growth at 4.7 percent. Unanticipated spending on pandemic response measures, coupled with sharp declines in government revenues, forced the government to increase borrowing in 2020. As of December 2021, Antigua and Barbuda reported total public sector debt of $1.3 billion representing 89 percent of GDP. Unlike other Eastern Caribbean (EC) countries, Antigua and Barbuda did not have the resources to significantly increase spending on social support payments to vulnerable populations. Following several years of operating losses, the government became the sole source of financing for regional airline Leeward Islands Air Transport (LIAT) in mid-2020. Based in Antigua and Barbuda, LIAT was heavily overstaffed and therefore a major employer, but is now under the supervision of a bankruptcy trustee. Antigua and Barbuda ranks 113th out of 190 countries rated in the 2020 World Bank Doing Business Report. The scores remain relatively unchanged from the 2019 report, though some improvements in the ease of starting a business were highlighted. Through the Antigua and Barbuda Investment Authority (ABIA), the government encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs and earn foreign exchange. The ABIA facilitates and supports foreign direct investment in the country and maintains an open dialogue with current and potential investors. All potential investors are afforded the same level of business facilitation services. While the government welcomes all foreign direct investment, tourism and related services, manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries, information and communication technologies, business process outsourcing, financial services, health and wellness services, creative industries, education, yachting and marine services, real estate, and renewable energy have been identified by the government as priority investment areas. There are no limits on foreign control of investment and ownership in Antigua and Barbuda. Foreign investors may hold up to 100 percent of an investment. Antigua and Barbuda’s legal system is based on British common law. There is currently an unresolved dispute regarding the alleged expropriation of an American-owned property. For this reason, the U.S. government recommends continued caution when investing in real estate in Antigua and Barbuda. In 2017, the government signed an intergovernmental agreement in observance of the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Antigua and Barbuda to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index N/A N/A http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 7.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2019 16,420 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector As a member of the ECCU, Antigua and Barbuda is also a member of the Eastern Caribbean Stock Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing securities market activities. As of March 2021, there were 164 securities listed on the ECSE, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $703 million (1.9 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars), representing a 6.9 percent increase from 2020. Antigua and Barbuda is open to portfolio investment. Antigua and Barbuda accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund Agreement Sections 2, 3, and 4, and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making international payments and transfers. The government normally does not grant foreign tax credits except in cases where taxes are paid in a Commonwealth country that grants similar relief for Antigua and Barbuda taxes, or where an applicable tax treaty provides a credit. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity services, and trade credits, as well as other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. Antigua and Barbuda is a signatory to the 1983 agreement establishing the ECCB. The ECCB controls Antigua and Barbuda’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act (2015) is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU member states. The ECCB and the Ministers of Finance of member states jointly carry out banking supervision under the act. The Minsters of Finance usually act in consultation with the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Antigua and Barbuda. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector as stable. Assessments including effects of the pandemic are not yet available. Assets of commercial banks totaled $2.07 billion (5.6 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of December 2019 and remained relatively consistent during the previous year. The reserve requirement for commercial banks was 6 percent of deposit liabilities. Antigua and Barbuda is well-served by bank and non-bank financial institutions. There are minimal alternative financial services offered. Some people still participate in informal community group lending, but the practice is declining. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S., Canadian, and European banks due to risk management concerns. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to continue to monitor the issue. Antigua and Barbuda’s Digital Assets Business Bill 2020 created a comprehensive regulatory framework for digital asset businesses, clients, and customers. The bill states that all digital asset businesses in the country must obtain a license for issuing, selling, or redeeming virtual coins, operating as a payment service or electronic exchange, providing custodial wallet services, among other activities. The government aspires to develop Antigua and Barbuda into a regional center for blockchain and cryptocurrency. At the end of 2020, over 40 major businesses accepted bitcoin cash. Bitt, a Barbadian company, developed digital currency DCash in partnership with the ECCB. The first successful DCash retail central bank digital currency (CDBC) consumer-to-merchant transaction took place in Grenada in February 2021 following a multi-year development process. The CBB and the FSC established a regulatory sandbox in 2018 where financial technology entities can do live testing of their products and services. This allowed regulators to gain a better understanding of the product or service and to determine what, if any, regulation is necessary to protect consumers. Bitt completed its participation and formally exited the sandbox in 2019. Bitt launched DCash in Antigua and Barbuda in March 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. Neither the government of Antigua and Barbuda nor the ECCB, of which Antigua and Barbuda is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Antigua and Barbuda are governed by their respective legislation and do not generally pose a threat to investors, as they are not designed for competition. The government established many SOEs to create economic activity in areas where the private sector is perceived to have little interest. SOEs are headed by boards of directors to which senior managers report. In 2016, Parliament passed the Statutory Corporations (General Provisions) Act, which specifies ministerial responsibilities in the appointment and termination of board members, decisions of the board, and employment in these SOEs. To promote diversity and independence on SOE boards, professional associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society may nominate directors for boards. Antigua and Barbuda does not have a targeted privatization program. Argentina Executive Summary Argentina presents investment and trade opportunities, particularly in agriculture, energy, health, infrastructure, information technology, and mining. However, economic uncertainty, interventionist policies, high inflation, and persistent economic stagnation have prevented the country from maximizing its potential. The economy fell into recession in 2018, the same year then-President Mauricio Macri signed a three-year $57 billion Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). President Alberto Fernandez and Vice President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s (CFK) took office on December 10, 2019, and reversed fiscal austerity measures, suspended the IMF program, and declared public debt levels unsustainable. In September 2020, Argentina restructured $100 billion in foreign and locally issued sovereign debt owed to international and local private creditors. Together, these transactions provide short-term financial relief by clearing principal payments until 2024. Unable to access international capital markets, the government relied on Central Bank money printing to finance the deficit, further fueling inflation. Although Argentina’s economy rebounded 10.3 percent in 2021, offsetting a 10 percent decline in 2020, the economy remains below pre-recession levels. In 2021, the Argentine peso (official rate) depreciated 17 percent, inflation reached 50.9 percent, and the poverty rate reached 37.3 percent. Even as the pandemic receded and economic activity rebounded, the government cited increased poverty and high inflation as reasons to continue, and even expand, price controls, capital controls, and foreign trade controls. Agricultural and food exports such as beef, soy, and flour were frequent targets for government intervention. Beginning in May 2021, the government introduced bans and other limits on beef exports to address increasing domestic prices. However, the government also implemented incentives for exporters and investors in other industries. It eliminated export taxes for specific businesses and industries, including small and medium sized enterprises; auto and automotive parts exports over 2020 volumes; and information technology service exports from companies enrolled in the knowledge-based economy promotion regime. There were also investment promotion incentives in key export sectors such as agriculture, forestry, hydrocarbons, manufacturing, and mining. The high cost of capital affected the level of investments in developing renewable energy projects, despite the potential for both wind and solar power. In an effort to expand production of oil and natural gas, the current administration provides benefits to the fossil fuel industry that impact the cost-competitiveness of renewable energy technologies. The government has encouraged the use of biofuels and electric vehicles. A proposed Law for the Promotion of Sustainable Mobility includes incentives and 20-year timelines to promote the use of technologies with less environmental impact in transportation. After the first COVID-19 case was confirmed in Argentina in March 2020, the country imposed a strict nationwide quarantine that became one of the longest in the world. Argentina reopened its borders to tourists and non-residents on November 21, 2021. Hotel and lodging, travel and tourism, and entertainment activities have reopened, although many businesses went bankrupt during the shutdown. Most of the pandemic-related economic relief measures were phased out during 2021. Both domestic and foreign companies frequently point to a high and unpredictable tax burden and rigid labor laws as obstacles to further investment in Argentina. In 2021, Argentina ranked 73 out of 132 countries evaluated in the Global Innovation Index, which is an indicator of a country’s ability to innovate, based on the premise that innovation is a driver of a nation’s economic growth and prosperity. In the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Argentina ranked 96 out of 180 countries in 2021, dropping 18 places compared to 2020. As a Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) member, Argentina signed a free trade and investment agreement with the European Union (EU) in June 2019. Argentina has not yet ratified the agreement. During 2021 there was little progress on trade negotiations with South Korea, Singapore, and Canada. Argentina ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement on January 22, 2018. Argentina and the United States continue to expand bilateral commercial and economic cooperation to improve and facilitate public-private ties and communication on trade, investment, energy, and infrastructure issues, including market access and intellectual property rights. More than 265 U.S. companies operate in Argentina, and the United States continues to be the top investor in Argentina with more than USD $8.7 billion (stock) of foreign direct investment as of 2020. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 96 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 73 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $8.7 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $9,070 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The Argentine Constitution sets as a general principle that foreign investors have the same status and the same rights as local investors. Foreign investors have free access to domestic and international financing. After a three-year recession (2018-2020), the economy rebounded with 10.3 percent growth in 2021. However, the government did not ease the capital controls introduced in September 2019 to slow the outflow of dollars. Central Bank capital controls prohibiting transfers and payments are likely in conflict with IMF Article VIII. The government has maintained trade restrictions, price controls, distortive taxes, and high spending. Unable to access international capital markets (despite restructuring private debt in 2020) and with a shallow domestic market, the government relied on Central Bank money printing to finance the deficit. The excessive liquidity resulted in high inflation (50.9 percent in 2021) and deteriorating social conditions, with the poverty rate exceeding 40 percent. In August 2020, the government of Argentina formally notified the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of its intent to renegotiate $45 billion due to the Fund from the 2018 Stand-By Arrangement. On March 3, 2022, IMF Staff and Argentine authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the economic and financial policies required for an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement. In broad terms, the key objectives of the new EFF include a reduction in the fiscal deficit and monetary financing, tackling inflation, and the accumulation of foreign reserves. The IMF Executive Board approved the EFF on March 25, after the Argentine National Congress approved the measure. The Argentine Securities and Exchange Commission (CNV or Comisión Nacional de Valores) is the federal agency that regulates securities markets offerings. Securities and accounting standards are transparent and consistent with international norms. Foreign investors have access to a variety of options on the local market to obtain credit. Nevertheless, the domestic credit market is small – credit is 11 percent of GDP. Private sector credit gained some momentum in 2021, driven by the reopening of the economy after the pandemic and government support measures such as subsidized credit lines for businesses. Nevertheless, the stock of credit shrank in real terms as the nominal credit growth increased by 41 percent in 2021, below the inflation rate of 50.7 percent. The Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is the organization responsible for the operation of Argentina’s primary stock exchange, located in Buenos Aires city. The most important index of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is the MERVAL (Mercado de Valores). U.S. banks, securities firms, and investment funds are well-represented in Argentina and are dynamic players in local capital markets. In 2003, the government began requiring foreign banks to disclose to the public the nature and extent to which their foreign parent banks guarantee their branches or subsidiaries in Argentina. Argentina has a relatively sound banking sector based on diversified revenues, well-contained operating costs, and a high liquidity level. Argentina’s banking sector has been resilient in the face of a multi-year economic recession (2018-2020). Limited financial intermediation combined with high inflation and interventionist interest rate regulations (mainly for small businesses) dented bank profitability in 2021. Banks compensated for this by controlling expenses and increasing digitalization of the sector. Non-performing private sector loans constitute 4.4 percent of banks’ portfolios. During 2021, financial entities maintained adequate solvency indicators. The banking sector is well positioned due to macro and micro-prudential policies introduced since 2002 that have helped to reduce asset-liability mismatches. The sector is highly liquid and its exposure to the public sector is modest, while its provisions for bad debts are adequate. Private banks have total assets of approximately ARS 8.4 trillion (USD $83.3 billion). Total financial system assets are approximately ARS 13.7 trillion (USD $135.7 billion). The Central Bank of Argentina acts as the country’s financial agent and is the main regulatory body for the banking system. Foreign banks and branches can establish operations in Argentina. They are subject to the same regulation as local banks. Argentina’s Central Bank has many correspondent banking relationships, none of which are known to have been lost in the past three years. In November 2020, the Central Bank launched a new payment system, “Transfers 3.0,” seeking to reduce the use of cash. This system will boost digital payments and further financial inclusion in Argentina, expanding the reach of instant transfers to build an open and universal digital payment ecosystem. The government has expressed support for the process of digitization of payments to improve efficiency, reduce costs, and safeguard financial stability. The Central Bank has enacted a resolution recognizing cryptocurrencies and requiring that they comply with local banking and tax laws. No implementing regulations have been adopted. Block chain developers report that several companies in the financial services sector are exploring or considering using block chain-based programs externally and are using some such programs internally. Foreign Exchange Beginning in September 2019, the Argentine government and Central Bank issued a series of decrees and norms to extend or amend the government’s ability to regulate and restrict access to foreign exchange markets. As of October 2019, the Central Bank (Notice A6815) limits cash withdrawals made abroad with local debit cards to foreign currency bank accounts owned by the client in Argentina. Pursuant to Notice A6823, cash advances made abroad using local credit cards are limited to a maximum of USD $50 per transaction. As of September 2020, and pursuant to Notice A7106, Argentine individuals must limit purchases of foreign currency (or of goods and services denominated in foreign currency) to no more than USD $200 per month on a rolling monthly basis. Individuals must receive Central Bank approval to purchase foreign currency in excess of the $200 quota. Purchases of goods and services abroad with credit and debit cards issued by Argentine banks count against the USD $200 per month quota. Although no limit on credit or debit card purchases is imposed, if monthly expenditures surpass the USD $200 limit, the card owner will be prevented from purchasing foreign currency in Argentina for the number of months needed to cover the amount of excess spending. Also, the regulation prohibits individuals who receive government assistance and high-ranking federal government officials from purchasing foreign exchange. Pursuant to Public Emergency Law 27,541, issued December 23, 2019, all dollar purchases and individual expenses incurred abroad, in person or online, including international online purchases from Argentina, paid with credit or with debit cards will be subject to a 30 percent tax. Pursuant to AFIP Resolution 4815 a 35 percent withholding tax in advance of the payment of income and/or wealth tax is also applied. Non-Argentine residents are required to obtain prior Central Bank approval to purchase more than USD $100 per month, except for certain bilateral or international organizations, institutions and agencies, diplomatic representation, and foreign tribunals. Companies and individuals need to obtain prior clearance from the Central Bank before transferring funds abroad. In the case of individuals, if transfers are made from their own foreign currency accounts in Argentina to their own accounts abroad, they do not need to obtain Central Bank approval. Per Notice A6869 issued by the Central Bank in January 2020, companies will be able to repatriate dividends without Central Bank authorization equivalent to a maximum of 30 percent of new foreign direct investment made by the company in the country. To promote foreign direct investment the Central Bank announced in October 2020 (Notice A7123) that it will allow free access to the official foreign exchange market to repatriate investments as long as the capital contribution was transferred and sold in Argentine Pesos through the foreign exchange market as of October 2, 2020, and the repatriation takes place at least two years after the transfer and settlement of those funds. Exporters of goods are required to transfer the proceeds from exports to Argentina and settle in pesos in the foreign currency market. Exporters must settle according to the following terms: exporters with affiliates (irrespective of the type of good exported) and exporters of certain goods (including cereals, seeds, minerals, and precious metals, among others) must convert their foreign currency proceeds to pesos within 15 days (or 30 days for some products) after the issuance of the permit for shipment; other exporters have 180 days to settle in pesos. Despite these deadlines, exporters must transfer the funds to Argentina and settle in pesos within five business days from the actual collection of funds. Argentine residents are required to transfer to Argentina and settle in pesos the proceeds from services exports rendered to non-Argentine residents that are paid in foreign currency either in Argentina or abroad, within five business days from collection of funds. Payment of imports of goods and services from third parties and affiliates require Central Bank approval if the company needs to purchase foreign currency. Since May 2020, the Central Bank requires importers to submit an affidavit stating that the total amount of payments associated with the import of goods made during the year (including the payment that is being requested). The total amount of payments for importation of goods should also include the payments for amortizations of lines of credit and/or commercial guarantees. In September 2020, the Central Bank limited companies’ ability to purchase foreign currency to cancel any external financial debt (including other intercompany debt) and dollar denominated local securities offerings. Companies were granted access to foreign currency for up to 40 percent of the principal amount coming due from October 15, 2020, to December 31, 2020. For the remaining 60 percent of the debt, companies had to file a refinancing plan with the Central Bank. In February 2021, the Central Bank extended the regulation through 2021, and in March 2022 extended it again to include maturities through December 31, 2022. Indebtedness with international organizations or their associated agencies or guaranteed by them and indebtedness granted by official credit agencies or guaranteed by them are exempted from this restriction. The Central Bank (Notice A7001) prohibited access to the foreign exchange market to pay for external indebtedness, imports of goods and services, and saving purposes for individuals and companies that have made sales of securities with settlement in foreign currency or transfers of these to foreign depositary entities within the last 90 days. They also should not make any of these transactions for the following 90 days. Pre-cancellation of debt coming due abroad in more than three business days requires Central Bank approval to purchase dollars. Per Resolution 36,162 of October 2011, locally registered insurance companies are mandated to maintain all investments and cash equivalents in the country. The Central Bank limits banks’ dollar-denominated asset holdings to 5 percent of their net worth. In December 2021, the Central Bank presented its monetary, financial, lending, and foreign exchange program. On monetary policy, the Central Bank committed to I) manage liquidity to prevent any imbalances that may directly or indirectly affect the disinflation process; II) set the path of the policy interest rate to obtain positive real returns on investments in domestic currency and preserve monetary and foreign exchange stability; and III) contribute to the development of the capital market and adjust minimum reserve requirements to strengthen the channel of monetary policy transmission. On foreign exchange, the Central Bank will maintain the gradual crawling peg of the exchange rate consistent with the pace of inflation. With the goal of strengthening international reserves, the Central Bank will manage capital control regulations to ensure monetary and foreign exchange stability. The credit policy objectives include encouraging financial intermediation and promoting the growth of the peso credit market to boost lending to micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and to the sectors most affected by the pandemic. Remittance Policies In response to the economic crisis in Argentina, the government introduced capital controls in September 2019 and tightened them in 2020. Under these restrictions, companies in Argentina (including local affiliates of foreign parent companies) must obtain prior approval from the Central Bank to access the foreign exchange market to purchase foreign currency and to transfer funds abroad for the payment of dividends and profits. In January 2020, the Central Bank amended the regime for the payment of dividends abroad to non-residents. The new regime allows companies to access the foreign exchange market to transfer profits and dividends abroad without prior authorization of the Central Bank, provided the following conditions are met: (1) Profits and dividends are to be declared in closed and audited financial statements. (2) The dividends in foreign currency should not exceed the dividends determined by the shareholders’ meeting in local currency. (3) The total amount of dividends to be transferred cannot exceed 30 percent of the amount of new capital contributions made by non-residents into local companies since January 2020. (4) The resident entity must be in compliance with filing the Central Bank Survey of External Assets and Liabilities. The Argentine government does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Armenia Executive Summary Over the past several years, Armenia has received consistently respectable rankings in international indices that review country business environments and investment climates. Projects representing significant U.S. investment are present in Armenia, most notably ContourGlobal’s Vorotan Hydroelectric Cascade and Lydian’s efforts to develop a major gold mine. U.S. investors in the banking, energy, pharmaceutical, information technology, and mining sectors, among others, have entered or acquired assets in Armenia. Armenia presents a variety of opportunities for investors, and the country’s legal framework and government policy aim to attract investment, but the investment climate is not without challenges. Obstacles include Armenia’s small market size, relative geographic isolation due to closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, weaknesses in the rule of law and judiciary, and a legacy of corruption. Net foreign direct investment inflows are low. Armenia had commenced a robust recovery from a deep 2020 recession prior to the introduction of new sanctions against Russia. GDP growth reached five percent in 2021 and had been expected to continue to grow in 2022 by at least five percent. As a result of the war and sanctions imposed on Russia, Armenia’s 2022 GDP growth forecast is now just above one percent. In May 2015, Armenia signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the United States. This agreement established a United States-Armenia Council on Trade and Investment to discuss bilateral trade and investment and related issues. Since 2015, Armenia has been a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, a customs union that brings Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia into a single integrated market. In November 2017, Armenia signed a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the European Union, which aimed in part to improve Armenia’s investment climate and business environment. Armenia imposes few restrictions on foreign control and rights to private ownership and establishment. There are no restrictions on the rights of foreign nationals to acquire, establish, or dispose of business interests in Armenia. Business registration procedures are generally straightforward. According to foreign companies, otherwise sound regulations, policies, and laws are sometimes undermined by problems such as the lack of independence, capacity, or professionalism in key institutions, most critically the judiciary. Armenia does not limit the conversion and transfer of money or the repatriation of capital and earnings. The banking system in Armenia is sound and well-regulated, but investors note that the financial sector is not highly developed. The U.S.-Armenia Bilateral Investment Treaty provides U.S. investors with a variety of protections. Although Armenian legislation offers protection for intellectual property rights, enforcement efforts and recourse through the courts are in need of improvement. Armenia experienced a dramatic change of government in 2018, when a democratically elected leader came to power on an anti-corruption platform after street protests toppled the old regime. Following the 2020 NK hostilities, in June 2021, the incumbent retained power in snap parliamentary election that met most international democracy standards. The government continues to push forth with economic and anti-corruption reforms that have improved the business climate. Overall, the competitive environment in Armenia is improving, but several businesses have reported that broader reforms across judicial, tax, customs, health, education, military, and law enforcement institutions will be necessary to shore up these gains. Despite improvements in some areas that raise Armenia’s attractiveness as an investment destination, investors claim that numerous issues remain and must be addressed to ensure a transparent, fair, and predictable business climate. A number of investors have raised concerns about the quality of dialogue between the private sector and government. Investors have also flagged issues regarding government officials’ ability to resolve problems they face in an expeditious manner. An investment dispute in the country’s mining sector has attracted significant international attention and remains outstanding after several years. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 58 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 69 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 6 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,220 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The banking system in Armenia is sound and well-regulated, but the financial sector is not highly developed, according to investors. Banking sector assets account for over 80 percent of total financial sector assets. Financial intermediation tends to be poor. Nearly all banks require collateral located in Armenia, and large collateral requirements often prevent potential borrowers from entering the market. U.S. businesses have noted that this creates a significant barrier for small- and medium-sized enterprises and start-up companies. The Armenian government welcomes foreign portfolio investment and there is a supporting system and legal framework in place. Armenia’s securities market is not well developed and has only minimal trading activity through the Armenia Securities Exchange, though efforts to grow capital markets are underway. Liquidity sufficient for the entry and exit of sizeable positions is often difficult to achieve due to the small size of the Armenian market. The Armenian government hopes that as a result of pension reforms in 2014, which brought two international asset managers to Armenia, capital markets will play a more prominent role in the country’s financial sector. Armenia adheres to its IMF Article VIII commitments by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms and foreign investors are able to access credit locally. Since 2020, the banking sector has withstood the twin shocks created by COVID-19 and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Indicators of financial soundness, including capital adequacy and non-performing loan ratios, have remained broadly strong. The sector is well capitalized and liquid. Non-performing loans have ticked upward slightly from rates of around five percent of all loans. Dollarization, historically high for deposits and lending, has been falling in recent years. Seventeen commercial banks operate in Armenia. In 2021, all commercial banks in Armenia generated net profits and all had a positive return on average equity (the financial ratio that measures the performance of a bank based on its average shareholders’ equity outstanding). Total bank assets in Armenia at the end of 2021 were $14 billion; Armenia’s 2021 GDP was approximately $13.6 billion. As such, the ratio of banks’ total assets to GDP – approximately one-to-one – is average compared to peer countries. Concentration of banks’ assets is considered to be very low, with the three largest banks holding less than fifty percent of total banking sector assets. Market share of the largest five banks was 56 percent in 2021. Overall, Armenia’s banking sector is viewed by international financial institutions (IFIs) as relatively healthy. The minimum capital requirement for banks is 30 billion AMD (around $59 million). There are no restrictions on foreigners to open bank accounts. Residents and foreign nationals can hold foreign currency accounts and import, export, and exchange foreign currency relatively freely in accordance with the Law on Currency Regulation and Currency Control. Foreign banks may establish a subsidiary, branch, or representative office, and subsidiaries of foreign banks are allowed to provide the same types of services as domestically owned banks. The CBA is responsible for the regulation and supervision of the financial sector. The authority and responsibilities of the CBA are established under the Law on the Central Bank of Armenia. Numerous other articles of legislation and supporting regulations provide for financial sector oversight and supervision. Armenia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Most of Armenia’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were privatized in the 1990s and early 2000s, but SOEs are still active in a number of sectors. SOEs in Armenia operate as state-owned closed joint stock companies that are managed by the Department of State Property Management and state non-commercial organizations. There are no laws or rules that ensure a primary or leading role for SOEs in any specific industry. Armenia is party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, and SOEs are covered under that agreement. SOEs in Armenia are subject to the same tax regime as their private competitors, and private enterprises in Armenia can compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions. The Department of State Property Management maintains a public list of state-owned closed joint stock companies on its website. Most of Armenia’s SOEs were privatized in the 1990s and early 2000s. Many of the privatization processes for Armenia’s large assets were reported to be neither competitive nor transparent, and political considerations in some instances prevailed over fair tender processes. The most recent law on privatization, the fifth, is the Law on the 2017-2020 Program for State Property Privatization, which lists 48 entities for privatization. The Department of State Property Management oversees the management of the state’s shares in entities slated for privatization. Details of the privatization program are available on the Department of State Property Management website. Australia Executive Summary Australia is generally welcoming to foreign investment, which is widely considered to be an essential contributor to Australia’s economic growth and productivity. The United States is by far the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) for Australia. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the stock of U.S. FDI totaled USD 170 billion in January 2020. The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force in 2005, establishes higher thresholds for screening U.S. investment for most classes of direct investment. While welcoming toward FDI, Australia does apply a “national interest” test to qualifying investment through its Foreign Investment Review Board screening process. Various changes to Australia’s foreign investment rules, primarily aimed at strengthening national security, have been made in recent years. This continued in 2020 with the passage of the Foreign Investment Reform (Protecting Australia’s National Security) Act 2020, which broadens the classes of foreign investments that require screening, with a particular focus on defense and national security supply chains. All foreign investments in these industries now require screening, regardless of their value or national origin. The Foreign Investment Reform legislation commenced in January 2021. Despite the increased focus on foreign investment screening, the rejection rate for proposed investments has remained low and there have been no cases of investment from the United States having been rejected in recent years, although some U.S. companies have reported greater scrutiny of their investments in Australia. In response to a perceived lack of fairness, the Australian government has tightened anti-tax avoidance legislation targeting multi-national corporations with operations in multiple tax jurisdictions. While some laws have been complementary to international efforts to address tax avoidance schemes and the use of low-tax countries or tax havens, Australia has also gone further than the international community in some areas. Australia has increased funding for clean technology projects and both local and international companies can apply for grants to implement emission-saving equipment to their operations. Australia adopted a net-zero emissions target at the national level in November 2021 although made no change to its short-term goal of a 26-28 percent emission reduction by 2030 on 2005 levels. Australia’s eight states and territories have adopted both net-zero targets and a range of interim emission reduction targets set above the federal target. Various state incentive schemes may also be available to U.S. investors. The Australian government is strongly focused on economic recovery from the COVID-driven recession Australia experienced in 2020, the country’s first in three decades. In addition to direct stimulus and business investment incentives, it has announced investment attraction incentives across a range of priority industries, including food and beverage manufacturing, medical products, clean energy, defense, space, and critical minerals processing. U.S. involvement and investment in these fields is welcomed. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 18 of 179 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 25 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 170 billion https://www.bea.gov/data/ intl-trade-investment/direct-investment- country-and-industry World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 53,690 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The Australian Government takes a favorable stance towards foreign portfolio investment with no restrictions on inward flows of debt or equity. Indeed, access to foreign capital markets is crucial to the Australian economy given its relatively small domestic savings. Australian capital markets are generally efficient and able to provide financing options to businesses. While the Australian equity market is one of the largest and most liquid in the world, non-financial firms face a number of barriers in accessing the corporate bond market. Large firms are more likely to use public equity, and smaller firms are more likely to use retained earnings and debt from banks and intermediaries. Australia’s corporate bond market is relatively small, driving many Australian companies to issue debt instruments in the U.S. market. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit from domestic institutions on market terms. Australia’s stock market is the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Australia’s banking system is robust, highly evolved, and international in focus. Bank profitability is strong and has been supported by further improvements in asset performance. Total assets of Australian banks at the end of 2020 was USD4.2 trillion and the sector has delivered an annual average return on equity of around 10 percent (only falling to six percent in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, before rebounding to 11 percent in 2021). According to Australia’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), the ratio of non-performing assets to total loans was approximately one percent at the end of 2021, having remained at around that level for the last five years after falling from highs of nearly two percent following the Global Financial Crisis. The RBA is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the stability of the financial sector, while the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) monitors individual institutions. The RBA is also responsible for monitoring and regulating payments systems in Australia. Further details on the size and performance of Australia’s banking sector are available on the websites of the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) and the RBA: https://www.apra.gov.au/statistics https://www.rba.gov.au/chart-pack/banking-indicators.html Foreign banks are allowed to operate as a branch or a subsidiary in Australia. Australia has generally taken an open approach to allowing foreign companies to operate in the financial sector, largely to ensure sufficient competition in an otherwise small domestic market. Australia’s main sovereign wealth fund, the Future Fund, is a financial asset investment fund owned by the Australian Government. The Fund’s objective is to enhance the ability of future Australian Governments to discharge unfunded superannuation (pension) liabilities. As a founding member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF), the Future Fund’s structure, governance, and investment approach is in full alignment with the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Sovereign Wealth Funds (the “Santiago principles”). The Future Fund’s investment mandate is to achieve a long-term return of at least inflation plus 4-5 percent per annum. As of December 2021, the Fund’s portfolio consists of: 23 percent global equities, 8 percent Australian equities, 25 percent private equity (including 8 percent in infrastructure and 7 percent in property), and the remaining 37 percent in debt, cash, and alternative investments. In addition to the Future Fund, the Australian Government manages five other specific-purpose funds: the DisabilityCare Australia Fund; the Medical Research Future Fund; the Emergency Response Fund; the Future Drought Fund; and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future Fund. In total, these five funds have assets of AUD 50 billion (USD 37 billion), while the main Future Fund has assets of AUD 204 billion (USD 150 billion) as of December 31, 2021. Further details of these funds are available at: https://www.futurefund.gov.au/ 7. State-Owned Enterprises In Australia, the term used for a Commonwealth Government State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) is “government business enterprise” (GBE). According to the Department of Finance, there are nine GBEs: two corporate Commonwealth entities and seven Commonwealth companies. (See: https://www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/governance/gbe/ ) Private enterprises are generally allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to markets, credit, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies. Public enterprises are not generally accorded material advantages in Australia. Remaining GBEs do not exercise power in a manner that discriminates against or unfairly burdens foreign investors or foreign-owned enterprises. Australia does not have a formal and explicit national privatization program. Individual state and territory governments may have their own privatization programs. Foreign investors are welcome to participate in any privatization programs subject to the rules and approvals governing foreign investment. Austria Executive Summary Austria has a well-developed market economy that welcomes foreign direct investment, particularly in technology and R&D. The country benefits from a skilled labor force, and a high standard of living, with its capital, Vienna, consistently placing at the top of global quality-of-life rankings. With more than 50 percent of its GDP derived from exports, Austria’s economy is closely tied to other EU economies, especially that of Germany, its largest trading partner. The United States is one of Austria’s top two-way trading partners, ranking fifth in overall trade according to provisional data from 2021. The economy features a large service sector and an advanced industrial sector specialized in high-quality component parts, especially for vehicles. The agricultural sector is small but highly developed. The COVID-19 crisis deeply affected Austria’s economy, contributing to a GDP decrease of 6.7% in 2020 with the unemployment rate increasing to a peak of 5.4% at the end of 2020. Austria’s economy rebounded with 4.5% GDP growth in 2021 and unemployment lower than before the onset of the pandemic, but forecasters recently lowered expectations to 3.8% growth for 2022 due to instability stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, Austria is experiencing a record number of vacancies, largely stemming from a shortage of skilled labor. The country’s location between Western European industrialized nations and growth markets in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) has led to a high degree of economic, social, and political integration with fellow European Union (EU) member states and the CESEE. Some 220 U.S. companies have investments in Austria, represented by around 300 subsidiaries, and many have expanded their original investment over time. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment into Austria totaled approximately EUR 11.6 billion (USD 13.7 billion) in 2020, according to the Austrian National Bank, and U.S. companies support over 16,500 jobs in Austria. Austria offers a stable and attractive climate for foreign investors. The most positive aspects of Austria’s investment climate include: Relatively high political stability; Harmonious labor-management relations and low incidence of labor unrest; Highly skilled workforce; High levels of productivity and international competitiveness; Excellent quality of life for employees and high-quality health, telecommunications, and energy infrastructure. Negative aspects of Austria’s investment climate include: A high overall tax burden; A large public sector and a complex regulatory system with extensive bureaucracy; Low-to-moderate innovation dynamics; Low levels of digitalization; Low levels of private venture capital. Key sectors that have historically attracted significant investment in Austria: Automotive; Pharmaceuticals; ICT and Electronics; Financial. Key issues to watch: Due to a strong reliance on Russian natural gas and the third-highest banking exposure to Russia among EU Member States, Austria could be one of the hardest countries hit by sanctions against Russia. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and sanctions are expected to cause a 0.4-0.5% decrease in Austria’s GDP. However, the impact is likely to be greater if natural gas supplies are disrupted. Austria relies on Russian imports for approximately 80% of its natural gas demand. At the same time, Austria’s export-oriented economy makes it particularly sensitive to events affecting trade, which could include potential setbacks in the pandemic, particularly during the winter months. The tourism sector, which, together with hotels and restaurants, accounts for 15 percent of the country’s GDP is still struggling, currently operating at two-thirds of its pre-crisis output levels. Many companies are also struggling to find skilled labor, which is hindering the economy from reaching its full output potential. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 13 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 18 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 4.95 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 48,350 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Austria has sophisticated financial markets that allow foreign investors access without restrictions. The government welcomes foreign portfolio investment. The Austrian National Bank (OeNB) regulates portfolio investments effectively. Austria has a national stock exchange that currently includes 64 companies on its regulated market and several others on its multilateral trading facility (MTF). The Austrian Traded Index (ATX) is a price index consisting of the 20 largest stocks on the market and forms the most important index of Austria’s stock market. The size of the companies listed on the ATX is roughly equivalent to those listed on the MDAX in Germany. The market capitalization of Austrian listed companies is small compared to the country’s western European counterparts, accounting for 31 percent of Austria’s GDP, compared to 59 percent in Germany or 194 percent in the United States. Unlike the other market segments in the stock exchange, the Direct Market and Direct Market Plus segments, targeted at SMEs and young, developing companies, are subject only to the Vienna Stock Exchange’s general terms of business, not more stringent EU regulations. These segments have lower reporting requirements but also greater risk for investors, as prices are more likely to fluctuate, due to the respective companies’ low level of market capitalization and lower trading volumes. Austria has robust financing for product markets, but the free flow of resources into factor markets (capital, raw materials) could be improved. Overall, financing is primarily available through banks and government-sponsored funding organizations with very little private venture capital available. The Austrian government is aware of this issue but has taken few tangible steps to improve the availability of private venture capital. Austria is fully compliant with IMF Article VIII, all financial instruments are available, and there are no restrictions on payments. Credit is available to foreign investors at market-determined rates. Austria has one of the most fragmented banking networks in Europe with more than 3,800 branch offices registered in 2021. The banking system is highly developed, with worldwide correspondent banks and representative offices and branches in the United States and other major financial centers. Large Austrian banks also have extensive networks in Central and Southeast European (CESEE) countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Total assets of the banking sector amounted to EUR 1.0 trillion (USD 1.2 trillion) in 2020 (approximately 2.5 times the country’s GDP). Approximately EUR 460 billion (USD 543 billion) of banking sector assets are held by Austria’s two largest banks, Erste Group and Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI). The Austrian banking sector is considered one of the most stable in the world. Austria’s banking sector is managed and overseen by the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) and the Financial Market Authority (FMA). Four Austrian banks with assets in excess of EUR 30 billion (USD 34 billion) are subject to the Eurozone’s Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as is Sberbank Europe AG, a Russian bank subsidiary headquartered in Austria (which was declared insolvent in March 2022, and its operations are now being wound down in a bankruptcy proceeding), and Addiko Bank AG due to their significant cross-border assets, as well as Volksbank Wien AG, due to its importance for the economy. All other Austrian banks continue to be subject to the country’s dual-oversight banking supervisory system with roles for the OeNB and the FMA, both of which are also responsible for policing irregularities on the stock exchange and for supervising insurance companies, securities markets, and pension funds. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country with no legal restrictions that place them at a disadvantage compared to local banks. Due to U.S. government financial reporting requirements, Austrian banks are very cautious in committing the time and expense required to accept U.S. clients and U.S. investors without established U.S. corporate headquarters. Austria has no sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Austria has two major wholly state-owned enterprises (SOEs): The OeBB (Austrian Federal Railways) and Asfinag (highway financing, building, maintenance, and administration). Other government industry holding companies are bundled in the government holding company OeBAG (http://www.oebag.gv.at) The government has direct representation in the supervisory boards of its companies (commensurate with its ownership stake), and OeBAG has the authority to buy and sell company shares, as well as purchase minority stakes in strategically relevant companies. Such purchases are subject to approval from an audit committee consisting of government-nominated independent economic experts. OeBAG holds a 53 percent stake in the Post Office, 51 percent in energy company Verbund, 33 percent in the gambling group Casinos Austria, 31.5 percent in the energy company OMV, 28 percent in the Telekom Austria Group, as well as a handful of smaller ventures. Local governments own most utilities, the Vienna International Airport, and more than half of Austria’s 270 hospitals and clinics. Private enterprises in Austria can generally compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to market access, credit, and other such business operations as licenses and supplies. While most SOEs must finance themselves under terms similar to private enterprises, some large SOEs (such as OeBB) benefit from state-subsidized pension systems. As a member of the EU, Austria is also a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the WTO, which indirectly also covers the SOEs (since they are entities monitored by the Austrian Court of Auditors). The five major OeBAG-controlled companies (Postal Service, Verbund AG, Casinos Austria, OMV, Telekom Austria), are listed on the Vienna Stock Exchange. Senior managers in these companies do not directly report to a minister, but to an oversight board. However, the government often appoints management and board members, who usually have strong political affiliations. The government has not privatized any public enterprises since 2007. Austrian public opinion is skeptical regarding further privatization, and there are no indications of any government privatizations on the horizon. In prior privatizations, foreign and domestic investors received equal treatment. Despite a historical government preference for maintaining blocking minority rights for domestic shareholders, foreign investors have successfully gained full control of enterprises in several strategic sectors of the Austrian economy, including in telecommunications, banking, steel, and infrastructure. Azerbaijan Executive Summary The overall investment climate in Azerbaijan continues to improve, although significant challenges remain. Azerbaijan’s government has sought to attract foreign investment, undertake reforms to diversify its economy, and stimulate private sector-led growth. The Azerbaijani economy, however, remains heavily dependent on oil and gas output, which account for roughly 88 percent of export revenue and over half of the state budget. The economy of Azerbaijan grew 5.6% year-on-year in 2021, compared to a 4.3% contraction in the previous year. Both oil and gas (1.7%) and the non-oil and gas (7.2%) sectors of the economy expanded as the economy continued to recover from the pandemic. While the oil and gas sector has historically attracted the largest share of foreign investment, the Azerbaijani government has targeted four non-oil sectors to diversify the economy: agriculture, tourism, information and communications technology (ICT), and transportation/logistics. Measures taken in recent years to improve the business climate and reform the overall economy include eliminating redundant business license categories, empowering the popular “Azerbaijan Service and Assessment Network (ASAN)” government service centers with licensing authority, simplifying customs procedures, suspending certain business inspections, and reforming the tax regime. Community spread of COVID-19 is occurring in Azerbaijan, and COVID-19 infections are present in all regions the country. The special quarantine regime was extended until May 1, 2022, according to a February 2022 decision by Azerbaijan’s Cabinet of Ministers. Masks are no longer required in outdoor spaces but remain obligatory indoors. In 2021, Azerbaijan allocated AZN 800.8 million (USD 471 million) from the state budget to support COVID-19 mitigation measures, including vaccine purchases, bonus payments to healthcare workers, and the operation of modular hospitals. Despite substantial efforts to open the business environment, progress remains slow on structural reforms required to create a diversified and competitive private sector, and corruption remains a major challenge for firms operating in Azerbaijan. A small group of government-connected holding companies dominates the economy, intellectual property rights enforcement is improving but remains insufficient, and judicial transparency is lacking. Under Azerbaijani law, foreign investments enjoy complete and unreserved legal protection and may not be nationalized or appropriated, except under specific circumstances. Private entities may freely establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises. Foreign citizens, organizations, and enterprises may lease, but not own, land. Azerbaijan’s government has not shown any pattern of discriminating against U.S. persons or entities through illegal expropriation. The Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between the United States and Azerbaijan provides U.S. investors with recourse to settle investment disputes using the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The average time needed to resolve international business disputes through domestic courts or alternative dispute resolution varies widely. Following the release in November of a tripartite ceasefire declaration by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia, which brought an end to the fall 2020 intensive fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Azerbaijani government is seeking new investments in the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh that were previously under the control of Armenian-backed separatists. Azerbaijan’s 2022 budget includes an allocation of AZN 2.2 billion (USD 1.3 billion) for the restoration and reconstruction of these territories. These funds will be reportedly used to restore road infrastructure, electricity, gas, water, communications infrastructure, and the education and healthcare sectors, along with the restoration of cultural and historical monuments. The government is also pursuing green energy projects in this region. Reconstruction is expected to continue over the coming years, along with continued special budget allocations provided for rebuilding and resettling these territories. Demining these territories as part of reconstruction efforts remains a priority of the Azerbaijani government. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 130 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 80 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2021 N/A http://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $4,480 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Access to capital is a critical impediment to business development in Azerbaijan. An effective regulatory system that encourages and facilitates portfolio investment, foreign or domestic, is not fully in place. Though the Baku Stock Exchange opened in 2000, there is insufficient liquidity in the market to enter or exit sizeable positions. The Central Bank assumed control over all financial regulation in January 2020, following disbandment of a formerly independent regulator. Non-bank financial sector staples such as capital markets, insurance, and private equity are in the early stages of development. The Capital Market Modernization Project is an attempt by the government to build the foundation for a modern financial capital market, including developing market infrastructure and automation systems, and strengthening the legal and market frameworks for capital transactions. One major hindrance to the stock market’s growth is the difficulty in encouraging established Azerbaijani businesses to adapt to standard investor-friendly disclosure practices, which are generally required for publicly listed companies. Azerbaijan’s government and Central Bank do not restrict payments and transfers for international transactions. Foreign investors are permitted to obtain credit on the local market, but smaller companies and firms without an established credit history often struggle to obtain loans on reasonable commercial terms. Limited access to capital remains a barrier to development, particularly for small and medium enterprises. The country’s financial services sector – of which banking comprises more than 90 percent – is underdeveloped, which constrains economic growth and diversification. The drop in world oil prices in 2014-2015 and the resulting strain on Azerbaijan’s foreign currency earnings and the state budget exacerbated existing problems in the country’s banking sector and led to rising non-performing loans (NPLs) and high dollarization. Subsequent reforms have improved overall sector stability. President Aliyev signed a decree in February 2019 to provide partial relief to retail borrowers on foreign-currency denominated loans that meet certain criteria. As of January 1, 2022, 26 banks were registered in Azerbaijan, including 12 banks with foreign capital and two state-owned banks. These banks employ 20,601 people and have a combined 480 branches and 2,920 ATMs nationwide. Total banking sector assets stood at approximately USD 22.3 billion as of January 2022, with the top five banks holding almost 60 percent of this amount. In December 2019, Azerbaijan carried out a banking management reform that gave the Central Bank of Azerbaijan control over banks and credit institutions, closing the Chamber for Control over Financial Markets, which had held regulatory powers following Azerbaijan’s 2014/2015 economic crisis and resulting currency devaluations. Concurrently, the Central Bank announced “recovery of the banking sector” would be one of the main challenges it would tackle in 2020. The Central Bank closed four insolvent banks (Atabank, AGBank, NBCBank, and Amrah Bank) in April/May 2020, bringing the number of banks in the country down from 30 to 26. Only six banks are able to conduct correspondent banking transactions with the United States. Foreign banks are permitted in Azerbaijan and may take the form of representative offices, branches, joint ventures, and wholly owned subsidiaries. These banks are subject to the same regulations as domestic banks, with certain additional restrictions. Foreign individuals and entities are also permitted to open accounts with domestic or foreign banks in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s sovereign wealth fund is the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ). Its mission is to transform hydrocarbon reserves into financial assets generating perpetual income for current and future generations and to finance strategically important infrastructure and social projects of national scale. While its main statutory focus is investing in assets outside of the country, since it was established in 1999 SOFAZ has financed several socially beneficial projects in Azerbaijan related to infrastructure, housing, energy, and education. The government’s newly adopted fiscal rule places limits on pro-cyclical spending, with the aim of increasing hydrocarbon revenue savings. SOFAZ publishes an annual report which it submits for independent audit. The fund’s assets totaled USD 45 billion as of January 1, 2022. 7. State-Owned Enterprises In Azerbaijan, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in the oil and gas, power generation, communications, water supply, railway, and air passenger and cargo sectors, among others. There is no published list of SOEs. While there are no SOEs that officially have been delegated governmental powers, companies such as the SOCAR, Azerenerji (the national electricity utility), and Azersu (the national water utility) – all of which are closed joint-stock companies with majority state ownership and limited private investment – enjoy quasi-governmental or near-monopoly status in their respective sectors. SOCAR is wholly owned by the government of Azerbaijan and takes part in all oil and gas activities in the country. It publishes regular reports on production volumes, the value of its exports, estimates of investments in exploration and development, production costs, the names of foreign companies operating in the country, production data by company, quasi-fiscal activities, and the government’s portion of production-sharing contracts. SOCAR is also responsible for negotiating PSAs with all foreign partners for hydrocarbon development. SOCAR’s annual financial reports are audited by an independent external auditor and include the consolidated accounts of all SOCAR’s subsidiaries, although revenue data is incomplete. There have been instances where state-owned enterprises have used their regulatory authority to block new entrants into the market. SOEs are, in principle, subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors. However, in sectors that are open to both private and foreign competition, SOEs generally receive a larger percentage of government contracts or business than their private sector competitors. While SOEs regularly purchase or supply goods or services from private sector firms, domestic and foreign private enterprises have reported problems competing with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, information, products and services, and incentives. Private enterprises do not have the same access (including terms) to financing as SOEs. SOEs are also afforded material advantages such as preferential access to land and raw materials – advantages that are not available to private enterprises. There is little information available on Azerbaijani SOEs’ budget constraints, due to the limited transparency in their financial accounts. A renewed privatization process started with the May 2016 presidential decree implementing additional measures to improve the process of state property privatization and the July 2016 decree on measures to accelerate privatization and improve the management efficiency of state property. The State Committee on Property Issues launched a portal to provide privatization information in July 2016. The portal contains information about the properties, their addresses, location, and initial costs with the aim of facilitating privatization. Azerbaijan’s current privatization efforts focus on smaller state-owned properties. While there are no immediate plans to privatize large SOEs, Azerbaijan is moving 21 major government-owned companies to a new state holding company tasked to improve efficiency and corporate governance as well as prepare them for possible privatization. However, the government has no plans to sell stakes in state companies in 2022, including in state oil company SOCAR. Bahrain Executive Summary The investment climate in the Kingdom of Bahrain is positive and relatively stable. Bahrain maintains a business-friendly attitude and liberal approach to attracting foreign investment and business. In an economy dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOE), Bahrain aims to foster a greater role for the private sector to promote economic growth. Government of Bahrain (GOB) efforts focus on encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) in the manufacturing, logistics, information and communications technology (ICT), financial services, tourism, health, and education sectors. Bahrain’s total FDI stock reached BD 11.537 billion ($30.683 billion) in 2020. Annual FDI inflows dropped from BD 603 million ($1.6 billion) in 2018 to BD 355 million ($942 million) in 2019 and BD 333 million ($885 million) in 2020. The financial services, manufacturing, logistics, education, healthcare, real estate, tourism, and ICT sectors have attracted the majority of Bahrain’s FDI. Bahrain’s economy saw a major recovery in 2021, following the slowdown of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the rise in global oil prices. In addition, the continuity of some key provisions from the BD 4.3 billion ($11.4 billion) financial relief package, that was launched in 2020 to help support businesses and individuals, helped boost Bahrain’s revenues and economic growth. In November 2021, the government announced a new economic recovery plan focused on five pillars: (1) creating quality jobs for citizens; (2) streamlining commercial procedures to attract $2.5 billion in yearly FDI by 2025; (3) launching $30 billion in major strategic projects; (4) developing strategic priority sectors; and (5) achieving fiscal sustainability and economic stability, including by extending Bahrain’s Fiscal Balance Program to 2024. Since then, the government has released detailed development strategies for the industrial, tourism, financial services, oil and gas, telecommunications and logistics sectors and identified 22 signature infrastructure projects, including the creation of five new island cities, that will stimulate post-pandemic growth and drive the economic recovery plan. The government has not identified funding sources to finance these projects or its sector modernization strategies. Bahrain’s Vision 2030 outlines measures to protect the natural environment, reduce carbon emissions, minimize pollution, and promote sustainable energy. Bahrain’s Sustainable Energy Authority (SEA), within the Ministry of Electricity and Water Affairs, designs energy efficiency policies and promotes renewable energy technologies that support Bahrain’s long-term climate action and environmental protection ambitions. Endorsed by Bahrain’s Cabinet and monitored by SEA, the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) and the National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) set national energy efficiency and national renewable energy 2025 targets of 6 and 5 percent, respectively, with the NREAP target increasing to 10 percent by 2035. To strengthen Bahrain’s position as a regional startup hub and to enhance its investment ecosystem, the GOB launched Bahrain FinTech Bay in 2018; issued new pro-business laws; and established several funds to encourage start-up investments including the $100 million Al Waha Fund of Funds and the Hope Fund to support startup growth. Since 2017, the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) has operated a financial technology regulatory sandbox to enable startups in Bahrain, including cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies, and regulate conventional and Sharia-compliant businesses. The U.S.-Bahrain Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) entered into force in 2001 and protects U.S. investors in Bahrain by providing most-favored nation treatment and national treatment, the right to make financial transfers freely and without delay, international law standards for expropriation and compensation cases, and access to international arbitration. Bahrain permits 100 percent foreign ownership of new industrial entities and the establishment of representative offices or branches of foreign companies without Bahraini sponsors or local partners. In 2017, the GOB expanded the number of sectors in which foreigners are permitted to maintain 100 percent ownership in companies to include tourism services, sporting events production, mining and quarrying, real estate, water distribution, water transport operations, and crop cultivation and propagation. In May 2019, the GOB loosened foreign ownership restrictions in the oil and gas sector, allowing 100 percent foreign ownership in oil and gas extraction projects under certain conditions. The U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (FTA) entered into force in 2006. Under the FTA, Bahrain committed to world-class Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection. Despite the GOB’s transparent, rules-based government procurement system, U.S. companies sometimes report operating at a disadvantage compared with other firms. Many ministries require firms to maintain a local commercial registration or pre-qualify prior to bidding on a local tender, often rendering firms with little or no prior experience in Bahrain ineligible to bid on major tenders. In February 2022, Bahrain’s Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Tourism broke ground on the United States Trade Zone (USTZ) to incentivize U.S. companies to build out full turnkey industrial manufacturing, logistics, and distribution facilities in Bahrain to access the wider GCC market. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 78 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 78 of 129 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $571 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $19,900 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Consistent with the GOB’s liberal approach to foreign investment, government policies facilitate the free flow of financial transactions and portfolio investments. Expatriates and Bahraini nationals have ready access to credit on market terms. Generally, credit terms are variable, but often are limited to 10 years for loans under $50 million. For major infrastructure investments, banks often offer to assume a part of the risk, and Bahrain’s wholesale and retail banks have shown extensive cooperation in syndicating loans for larger risks. Commercial credit is available to private organizations in Bahrain but has been increasingly crowded out by the government’s local bond issuances. In 2016, the GOB launched a new fund designed to inject greater liquidity in the Bahrain Bourse, worth $100 million. The Bahrain Liquidity Fund is supported by several market participants and acts as a market maker, providing two-way quotes on most of the listed stocks with a reasonable spread to allow investors to actively trade their stocks. Despite these efforts, the market remains small in comparison to others in the region. In October 2019, the GOB established a BD 130 million ($344 million) Liquidity Fund to assist distressed companies in restructuring financial obligations, which was expanded in March 2020 to BD 200 million ($530 million) in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The GOB and the CBB are members of the IMF and fully compliant with Article VIII. The CBB is the single regulator of the entire financial sector, with an integrated regulatory framework covering all financial services provided by conventional and Islamic financial institutions. Bahrain’s banking sector remained healthy despite sustained lower global oil prices. Bahrain’s banks are well capitalized, and there is sufficient liquidity to ensure a healthy rate of investment. Bahrain remains a financial center for the GCC region, though many financial firms moved their regional headquarters to Dubai over the last decade. The GOB continues to drive innovation and expansion in the Islamic finance sector. In 2021, Bahrain ranked as the second in the MENA Islamic finance market and placed fourth globally, according to the ICD-Thomson Reuters Islamic Finance Development Indicator (IFDI). Bahrain has an effective regulatory system that encourages portfolio investment. The CBB has fully implemented Basel II standards and is attempting to bring Bahraini banks into compliance with Basel III standards. Bahrain’s banking sector includes 89 banks, of which 30 are retail banks, 59 are wholesale banks, 17 are branches of foreign banks, and 13 are locally incorporated. Of these, nine are representative offices, and 16 are Islamic banks. There are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts or corporate accounts. Bahrain is home to many prominent financial institutions, among them Citibank, American Express, and JP Morgan Chase. Ahli United Bank is Bahrain’s largest bank with total assets estimated at $41.9 billion as of December 2021. Bahrain implemented the Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System and the Scripless Securities Settlement (SSS) System in 2007 to enable banks to carry out their payment and securities-related transactions securely on a real time basis. In 2017, Bahrain became the first in the GCC to introduce fintech “sandbox” regulations that enabled the launch of cryptocurrency and blockchain startups. The same year, the CBB released additional regulations for conventional and Sharia-compliant financing-based crowdfunding businesses. Any firm operating electronic financing/lending platforms must be licensed in Bahrain under the CBB Rulebook Volume 5 – Financing Based Crowdfunding Platform Operator. In February 2019, the CBB issued cryptocurrency regulations. Foreign Exchange Bahrain has no restrictions on the repatriation of profits or capital and no exchange controls. Bahrain’s currency, the Bahraini Dinar (BD), is fully and freely convertible at the fixed rate of USD 1.00 = BD 0.377 (1 BD = USD 2.659). There is no black market or parallel exchange rate. There are no restrictions on converting or transferring funds, regardless of whether they are associated with an investment. Remittance Policies The CBB is responsible for regulating remittances, and its regulations are based on the Central Bank Law ratified in 2006. Foreign workers comprise most of the labor force in Bahrain and many remit significant quantities of funds to their countries of origin. Commercial banks and currency exchange houses are licensed to provide remittances services. Commercial banks and currency exchange houses require two forms of identification before processing a routine remittance request, and any transaction exceeding $10,000 must include a documented source of the income. Bahrain enables foreign investors to remit funds through a legal parallel market, with no limitations on the inflow or outflow of funds for remittances of profits or revenue. The GOB does not engage in currency manipulation tactics. The GCC is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Bahrain is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) which is headquartered in Bahrain. Participating countries commit to combat the financing of terrorist groups and activities in all its forms and to implement FATF recommendations. Bahrain established a sovereign wealth fund, Mumtalakat, in 2006. Mumtalakat, which maintains an investment portfolio valued at roughly BD 6.6 billion ($17.6 billion) as of 2020, issues an annual report online. The annual report follows international financial reporting standards and is audited by external auditing firms. By law, subsidiaries of Mumtalakat are audited and monitored by the National Audit Office. In 2020, Mumtalakat received the highest-possible ranking in the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index for the seventh consecutive year, which specializes in ranking the transparency of sovereign wealth funds. However, Bahrain’s sovereign wealth fund does not follow the Santiago Principles. Mumtalakat holds majority stakes in several firms. Mumtalakat invests 62 percent of its funds in the Middle East, 30 percent in Europe, and eight percent in the United States. The fund is diversified across a variety of business sectors including real estate and tourism, financial services, food and agriculture, and industrial manufacturing. Mumtalakat acts more like an active asset management company than a sovereign wealth fund, including by taking an active role in managing SOEs. Most notably, Mumtalakat has been instrumental in helping Gulf Air, Bahrain’s state-owned airline, restructure and contain losses. A significant portion of Mumtalakat’s portfolio is invested in 29 Bahrain-based SOEs. Mumtalakat did not directly contribute to the State Budget through 2016. However, beginning in September 2017, Mumtalakat annually contributed $53 million to the State Budget, which was increased to $106 million in the 2021-2022 State Budget. Bangladesh Executive Summary Bangladesh is the most densely populated non-city-state country in the world, with the eighth largest population (over 165 million) within a territory the size of Iowa. Bangladesh is situated in the northeastern corner of the Indian subcontinent, sharing a 4,100 km border with India and a 247-kilometer border with Burma. With sustained economic growth over the past decade, a large, young, and hard-working workforce, strategic location between the large South and Southeast Asian markets, and vibrant private sector, Bangladesh will likely continue to attract increasing investment, despite severe economic headwinds created by the global outbreak of COVID-19. Buoyed by a young workforce and a growing consumer base, Bangladesh has enjoyed consistent annual GDP growth of more than six percent over the past decade, with the exception of the COVID-induced economic slowdown in 2020. Much of this growth continues to be driven by the ready-made garment (RMG) industry, which exported $35.81 billion of apparel products in fiscal year (FY) 2021, second only to China, and continued remittance inflows, reaching a record $24.77 billion in FY 2021. (Note: The Bangladeshi fiscal year is from July 1 to June 30; fiscal year 2021 ended on June 30, 2021.) The country’s RMG exports increased more than 30 percent year-over-year in FY 2021 as the global demand for apparel products accelerated after the COVID shock. The Government of Bangladesh (GOB) actively seeks foreign investment. Sectors with active investments from overseas include agribusiness, garment/textiles, leather/leather goods, light manufacturing, power and energy, electronics, light engineering, information and communications technology (ICT), plastic, healthcare, medical equipment, pharmaceutical, ship building, and infrastructure. The GOB offers a range of investment incentives under its industrial policy and export-oriented growth strategy with few formal distinctions between foreign and domestic private investors. Bangladesh’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock was $20.87 billion through the end of September 2021, with the United States being the top investing country with $4.1 billion in accumulated investments. Bangladesh received $2.56 billion FDI in 2020, according to data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The rate of FDI inflows was only 0.77 percent of GDP, one of the lowest of rates in Asia. Bangladesh has made gradual progress in reducing some constraints on investment, including taking steps to better ensure reliable electricity, but inadequate infrastructure, limited financing instruments, bureaucratic delays, lax enforcement of labor laws, and corruption continue to hinder foreign investment. Government efforts to improve the business environment in recent years show promise but implementation has yet to materialize. Slow adoption of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and sluggish judicial processes impede the enforcement of contracts and the resolution of business disputes. As a traditionally moderate, secular, peaceful, and stable country, Bangladesh experienced a decrease in terrorist activity in recent years, accompanied by an increase in terrorism-related investigations and arrests following the Holey Artisan Bakery terrorist attack in 2016. A December 2018 national election marred by irregularities, violence, and intimidation consolidated the power of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her ruling party, the Awami League. This allowed the government to adopt legislation and policies diminishing space for the political opposition, undermining judicial independence, and threatening freedom of the media and NGOs. Bangladesh continues to host one of the world’s largest refugee populations. According to UN High Commission for Refugees, more than 923,000 Rohingya from Burma were in Bangladesh as of February 2022. This humanitarian crisis will likely require notable financial and political support until a return to Burma in a voluntary and sustainable manner is possible. International retail brands selling Bangladesh-made products and the international community continue to press the Government of Bangladesh to meaningfully address worker rights and factory safety problems in Bangladesh. With unprecedented support from the international community and the private sector, the Bangladesh garment sector has made significant progress on fire and structural safety. Critical work remains on safeguarding workers’ rights to freely associate and bargain collectively, including in Export Processing Zones (EPZs). The Bangladeshi government has limited resources devoted to intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and counterfeit goods are readily available in Bangladesh. Government policies in the ICT sector are still under development. Current policies grant the government broad powers to intervene in that sector. Capital markets in Bangladesh are still developing, and the financial sector is still highly dependent on banks. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 147 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 116 of 129 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 723 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 2,030 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Capital markets in Bangladesh are still developing, and the financial sector remains highly dependent on bank lending. Current regulatory infrastructure inhibits the development of a tradeable bond market. Bangladesh is home to the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and the Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE), both of which are regulated by the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC), a statutory body formed in 1993 and attached to the Ministry of Finance. The DSE market capitalization stood at $64.8 billion at the end of January 2022, rising 16.3 percent year-over-year as stock prices rose amid speculative behavior and increased liquidity due to relaxed monetary policy. Although the Bangladeshi government has a positive attitude toward foreign portfolio investors, participation in the exchanges remains low due to what is still limited liquidity for shares and the lack of publicly available and reliable company information. The DSE has attracted some foreign portfolio investors to the country’s capital market. However, the volume of foreign investment in Bangladesh remains a small fraction of total market capitalization. As a result, foreign portfolio investment has had limited influence on market trends and Bangladesh’s capital markets have been largely insulated from the volatility of international financial markets. Bangladeshi markets continue to rely primarily on domestic investors. In 2019, BSEC undertook a number of initiatives to launch derivatives products, allow short selling, and invigorate the bond market. To this end, BSEC introduced three rules: Exchange Traded Derivatives Rules 2019, Short-Sale Rules 2019, and Investment Sukuk Rules 2019. Other recent, notable BSEC initiatives include forming a central clearing and settlement company – the Central Counterparty Bangladesh Limited (CCBL) – and promoting private equity and venture capital firms under the 2015 Alternative Investment Rules. In 2013, BSEC became a full signatory of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Memorandum of Understanding. BSEC has taken steps to improve regulatory oversight, including installing a modern surveillance system, the “Instant Market Watch,” providing real time connectivity with exchanges and depository institutions. As a result, the market abuse detection capabilities of BSEC have improved significantly. A mandatory Corporate Governance Code for listed companies was introduced in 2012 but the overall quality of corporate governance remains substandard. Demutualization of both the DSE and CSE was completed in 2013 to separate ownership of the exchanges from trading rights. A majority of the members of the Demutualization Board, including the Chairman, are independent directors. Apart from this, a separate tribunal has been established to resolve capital market-related criminal cases expeditiously. However, both domestic and foreign investor confidence on the stock exchanges’ governance standards remains low. The Demutualization Act 2013 also directed DSE to pursue a strategic investor who would acquire a 25 percent stake in the bourse. Through a bidding process DSE selected a consortium of the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges in China as its strategic partner, with the consortium buying the 25 percent share of DSE for taka 9.47 billion ($112.7 million). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bangladesh is an Article VIII member and maintains restrictions on the unapproved exchange, conversion, and/or transfer of proceeds of international transactions into non-resident taka-denominated accounts. Since 2015, authorities have relaxed restrictions by allowing some debits of balances in such accounts for outward remittances, but there is currently no established timetable for the complete removal of the restrictions. The Bangladesh Bank (BB) acts as the central bank of Bangladesh. It was established through the enactment of the Bangladesh Bank Order of 1972. General supervision and strategic direction of the BB has been entrusted to a nine-member Board of Directors, which is headed by the BB Governor. A list of the bank’s departments and branches is on its website: https://www.bb.org.bd/aboutus/dept/depts.php . According to the BB, four types of banks operate in the formal financial system: State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), Specialized Banks, Private Commercial Banks (PCBs), and Foreign Commercial Banks (FCBs). Some 61 “scheduled” banks in Bangladesh operate under the control and supervision of the central bank as per the Bangladesh Bank Order of 1972. The scheduled banks, include six SOCBs, three specialized government banks established for specific objectives such as agricultural or industrial development or expatriates’ welfare, 43 PCBs, and nine FCBs as of February 2021. The scheduled banks are licensed to operate under the Bank Company Act of 1991 (Amended 2013). There are also five non-scheduled banks in Bangladesh, including Nobel Prize recipient Grameen Bank, established for special and definite objectives and operating under legislation enacted to meet those objectives. Currently, 34 non-bank financial institutions (FIs) are operating in Bangladesh. They are regulated under the Financial Institution Act, 1993 and controlled by the BB. Of these, two are fully government-owned, one is a subsidiary of a state-owned commercial bank, and the rest are private financial institutions. Major sources of funds for these financial institutions are term deposits (at least three months’ tenure), credit facilities from banks and other financial institutions, and call money, as well as bonds and securitization. Unlike banks, FIs are prohibited from: Issuing checks, pay-orders, or demand drafts. Receiving demand deposits. Involvement in foreign exchange financing. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) remain the dominant players in rural financial markets. The Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA), the primary regulator of this sector, oversees 746 licensed microfinance institutions as of October 2021, excluding Grameen Bank which is governed under a separate law. In 2020, the MRA-listed microfinance institutions had 33.3 million members while Grameen Bank had an additional 9.3 million members. The banking sector has had a mixed record of performance over the past several years. Industry experts have reported a rise in risky assets because of poor governance as well as the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Total domestic credit stood at 50.4 percent of gross domestic product at end of November 2021. The state-owned Sonali Bank is the largest bank in the country while Islami Bank Bangladesh and Standard Chartered Bangladesh are the largest local private and foreign banks respectively. The gross non-performing loan (NPL) ratio was 8.1 percent at the end of September 2021, down from 8.9 percent in September 2020. However, the decline in the NPLs was primarily caused by regulatory forbearance rather than actual reduction of stressed loans. At 20.1 percent SCBs had the highest NPL ratio, followed by 11.4 percent of Specialized Banks, 5.5 percent of PCBs, and4.1 percent of FCBs as of September 2021. In 2017, the BB issued a circular warning citizens and financial institutions about the risks associated with cryptocurrencies. The circular noted that using cryptocurrencies may violate existing money laundering and terrorist financing regulations and cautioned users may incur financial losses. The BB issued similar warnings against cryptocurrencies in 2014. Foreign investors may open temporary bank accounts called Non-Resident Taka Accounts (NRTA) in the proposed company name without prior approval from the BB to receive incoming capital remittances and encashment certificates. Once the proposed company is registered, it can open a new account to transfer capital from the NRTA account. Branch, representative, or liaison offices of foreign companies can open bank accounts to receive initial suspense payments from headquarters without opening NRTA accounts. In 2019, the BB relaxed regulations on the types of bank branches foreigners could use to open NRTAs, removing a previous requirement limiting use of NRTA’s solely to Authorized Dealers (ADs). In 2015, the Bangladesh Finance Ministry announced it was exploring establishing a sovereign wealth fund in which to invest a portion of Bangladesh’s foreign currency reserves. In 2017, the Cabinet initially approved a $10 billion “Bangladesh Sovereign Wealth Fund,” (BSWF) to be created with funds from excess foreign exchange reserves but the plan was subsequently scrapped by the Finance Ministry. Barbados Executive Summary With a $4.4 billion economy, Barbados is the largest economy in the Eastern Caribbean. The shutdown of the tourism sector in 2020 due to the pandemic led to an 18 percent GDP contraction. The economy began to recover in 2021 with 1.4 percent growth, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts 2022 growth at 8.5 percent. Unemployment was estimated at approximately 40 percent in the first quarter of 2021, representing a 30 percent increase from the same period last year. The Government of Barbados entered a standby arrangement with the IMF in late 2018. The $290 million ($580 million Barbados dollars) Barbados Economic Recovery and Transformation (BERT) program aims to decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio, strengthen the balance of payments, and stimulate growth. While the government was on track to meet its IMF targets pre-pandemic, the program dampened income and spending power due to public sector layoffs, the introduction of new indirect taxes, and a decline in the construction sector. The impact of the pandemic required the IMF to adjust the program targets downwards several times. The IMF also approved additional lending into the program twice in 2020. The country’s services sector continues to hold the largest growth potential, especially in the areas of international financial services, information technology, global education services, health, and cultural services. The gradual decline of the sugar industry has opened land for other agricultural uses. Investment opportunities exist in the areas of agricultural processing and alternative and renewable energy. Uncertainty about the trajectory of economic recovery of the tourism, commercial aviation, and cruise industries impacts the potential for projects in those sectors. The government has identified renewable energy and climate resilience projects as top priorities. In 2021, Barbados joined the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) framework seeking to harmonize global corporate minimum tax rates at 15 percent. Barbados bases its legal system on the British common law system. It does not have a bilateral investment agreement with the United States, but it does have a double-taxation treaty and a tax information exchange agreement. In 2015, Barbados signed an intergovernmental agreement in observance of the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Barbados to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1 Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 29 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 14,350 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Barbados has a small stock exchange, an active banking sector, and opportunities for portfolio investment. Local policies seek to facilitate the free flow of financial resources, although some restrictions may be imposed during exceptional periods of low liquidity. The CBB independently raises or lowers interest rates without government intervention. There are a variety of credit instruments in the commercial and public sectors that local and foreign investors may access. Barbados continues to review legislation in the financial sector to strengthen and improve the regulatory regime and attract and facilitate retention of foreign portfolio investments. The government continues to improve its legal, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks to strengthen the banking system. The Anti-Money Laundering Authority and its operating arm, the government’s Financial Intelligence Unit, review anti-money laundering policy documents and analyze prudential returns. The Securities Exchange Act of 1982 established the Securities Exchange of Barbados, which was reincorporated as the Barbados Stock Exchange (BSE) in 2001. The BSE operates a two-tier electronic trading system comprised of a regular market and an innovation and growth market (formerly the junior market). Companies applying for listing on the regular market must observe and comply with certain requirements. Specifically, they must have assets of at least $500,000 (1 million Barbados dollars) and adequate working capital based on the last three years of their financial performance, as well as three-year performance projections. Companies must also demonstrate competent management and be incorporated under the laws of Barbados or another regulated jurisdiction approved by the Financial Services Commission. Applications for listing on the innovation and growth market are less onerous, requiring minimum equity of one million shares at a stated minimum value of $100,000 (200,000 Barbados dollars). Reporting and disclosure requirements for all listed companies include interim financial statements and an annual report and questionnaire. Non-nationals must obtain exchange control approval from the CBB to trade securities on the BSE. The BSE has computerized clearance and settlement of share certificates through the Barbados Central Securities Depository Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the BSE. Under the Property Transfer Tax Act, the FSC can accommodate investors requiring a traditional certificate for a small fee. The FSC also regulates mutual funds in accordance with the Mutual Funds Act. The BSE adheres to rules in accordance with International Organization of Securities Commissions guidelines designed to protect investors; ensure a fair, efficient, and transparent market; and reduce systemic risk. Public companies must file audited financial statements with the BSE no later than 90 days after the close of their financial year. The authorities may impose a fine not exceeding $5,000 (10,000 Barbados dollars) for any person under the jurisdiction of the BSE who contravenes or is not in compliance with any regulatory requirements. The BSE launched the International Securities Market (ISM) in 2016. It is designed to operate as a separate market, allowing issuers from Barbados and other international markets. To date, the ISM has four listing sponsors. The BSE collaborates with its regional partners, the Jamaica Stock Exchange and the Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchange, through shared trading software. The capacity for this inter-exchange connectivity provides a wealth of potential investment opportunities for local and regional investors. The BSE obtained designated recognized stock exchange status from the UK in 2019. It is also a member of the World Federation of Exchanges. Barbados has accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF Articles of Agreement and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on current account transactions. The government established the CBB in 1972. The CBB manages Barbados’ currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Barbados Deposit Insurance Corporation (BDIC) provides protection for depositors. Oversight of the entire financial system is conducted by the Financial Oversight Management Committee, which consists of the CBB, the BDIC, and the FSC. The private sector has access to financing on the local market through short-term borrowing and credit, asset financing, project financing, and mortgage financing. Commercial banks and other deposit-taking institutions set their own interest rates. The CBB requires banks to hold 17.5 percent of their domestic deposits in stipulated securities. Bitt, a Barbadian company, developed digital currency DCash in partnership with the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. The first successful DCash retail central bank digital currency consumer-to-merchant transaction took place in Grenada in 2021 following a multi-year development process. The CBB and the FSC established a regulatory sandbox in 2018 where financial technology entities could do live testing of their products and services. This allowed regulators to gain a better understanding of the product or service and to determine what, if any, regulation is necessary to protect consumers. Bitt completed its participation and formally exited the sandbox in 2019. According to Bitt, it has no immediate plans to launch DCash in Barbados and focused first on Barbados’ Eastern Caribbean neighbors. Bitt also offers a digital access exchange, remittance channel, and merchant-processing gateway available via mMoney, a mobile application. In early 2022, the DCash platform crashed for almost two months, raising questions about the initiative’s long-term prospects. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S., Canadian, and European banks in recent years due to concerns that the region is high-risk. Currently, the CBB does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund. In the past, the government announced plans to create a sovereign wealth fund to ensure national wealth is available for present and future generations of Barbados. Barbadians 18 years and older are expected to gain a stake in the fund after it is established. It is envisioned that the fund will hold governmental assets, including on- and offshore real property, revenues from oil and gas products, and non-tangible assets such as trademarks, patents, and intellectual property. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Barbados work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit, and carry out certain ministerial responsibilities. There are 33 SOEs in Barbados operating in areas such as travel and tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, sanitation services, sports, and culture. Pre-pandemic total net income was estimated at $60 million (120 million Barbados dollars). SOEs in Barbados are not found in the key areas earmarked for investment. They are all wholly owned government entities. They are headed by boards of directors to which their senior management reports. As part of the ongoing IMF BERT program, the Government of Barbados is addressing the expenditure position of the SOEs by defining clear objectives for SOE reforms, reducing the wage bill of these entities, and implementing other necessary reform measures. Barbados does not currently have a targeted privatization program. The government has announced plans for public-private partnerships in airport management and broadcasting services, which will still see the government retaining ownership of these entities. The process remains open to foreign investors and is transparent. More information can be obtained at http://www.gisbarbados.gov.bb . Belarus 6. Financial Sector The Belarusian government officially claims to welcome portfolio investment. There have been no reports in 2021 on any impediments to such investment. In 2019 and 2020, Belarus received $500 million and $1.34 billion worth of portfolio investments, respectively. The Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange is open to foreign investors, but it is still largely undeveloped because the government only allows companies to trade stocks if they meet certain and often burdensome criteria. Private companies must be profitable and have net assets of at least EUR 1 million. In addition, any income from resulting operations is taxed at 24 percent. Finally, the state owns more than 70 percent of all stocks in the country, and the government appears hesitant and unwilling to trade in them freely. Bonds are the predominant financial instrument on Belarus’ corporate securities market. In 2001, Belarus joined Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, undertaking to refrain from restrictions on payments and transfers under current international transactions. Loans are allocated on market terms and are available to foreign investors. However, the discount rate of 12 percent established in March, 2022 makes credit too expensive for many private businesses, which, unlike many SOEs, do not receive subsidized or reduced-interest loans. Belarus’ National Bank had predicted a rate of 9-10 percent in 2022 but the war in Ukraine, which prompted the fall of the Belarusian ruble against major foreign currencies, combined with a year-on-year inflation rate of 10 percent in January-February forced the National Bank to revise its outlook. Businesses buy and sell foreign exchange at the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange through their banks. Belarus used to require businesses to sell 10-20 percent of foreign currency revenues through the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange; however, in late 2018 the National Bank abolished the mandatory sale rule. The Belarus Affairs Unit at U.S. Embassy Vilnius Economic Section telephone: +370 (5) 266-5500; e-mail: usembassyminsk@state.gov Sanctions imposed by the United States have prohibited any commercial activity with some Belarusian banks, including Dabrabyt Bank and Belinvestbank. Belarusian subsidiaries of sanctioned Russian banks are also under sanctions and include Bel/VEB, VTB Bank Belarus, and Sberbank Belarus. Potential investors should review the Department of Treasury website at https://home.treasury.gov/ for updates as trade restrictions on Belarusian banks continue to develop. Sanctions introduced by the EU prohibit contact with the National Bank of Belarus and have blocked access to the SWIFT secure messaging system for a number of banks, including Dabrabyt Bank, the Development Bank of Belarus, and Belagroprombank. Potential investors should review the website of the European Commission for updates and further details at https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en . Belarus has a central banking system led by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, which represents the interest of the state and is the main regulator of the country’s banking system. The president of Belarus appoints the chair and members of the Board of the National Bank, designates auditing organizations to examine its activities, and approves its annual report. Although the National Bank officially operates independently from the government, there is a history of government interference in monetary and exchange rate policies. In February 2021, the banking system of Belarus included 23 commercial banks and three non-banking credit and finance organizations. According to the National Bank, the share of non-performing loans in the banking sector was 5.3 percent as of January 1, 2022. At the beginning of 2022, the country’s six largest commercial banks of systemic importance, all of which have some government share, accounted for 85 percent of the approximately 92.3 billion Belarusian rubles in total assets across the country’s banking sector. There are five representative offices of foreign banks in Belarus, with China’s Development Bank opening most recently in 2018. Regular banking services are widely available to customers regardless of national origin. Belarusian law does not allow foreign banks to establish branches in Belarus. Subsidiaries of foreign banks are allowed to operate in Belarus and are subject to prudential measures and other regulations like any Belarusian bank. The U.S. Embassy is not aware of Belarus losing any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years. Foreign nationals are allowed to establish a bank account in Belarus without establishing residency status. According to the IMF, Belarus’ state-dominated financial sector faces deep domestic structural problems and external sector challenges. Domestic structural problems include heavy state involvement in the banking and corporate sector, the lack of hard budget constraints for SOEs given state support, and high dollarization. Externally, Belarus’ economy remains exposed to spillovers from the Russian economy and Belarus’ foreign currency reserves offer a limited buffer to potential external shocks. The banking sector remains vulnerable to external shocks, given the high level of dollarization and the exposure to government and SOE debt. In March 2022, S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s ratings services all downgraded Belarus’ debt rating to CCC or Ca “highly vulnerable to defaults.” Belarus does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. The GOB manages the State Budget Fund of National Development, which supports major economic and social projects in the country. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Although SOEs are outnumbered by private businesses, SOEs dominate the economy in terms of value. According to the Belarusian ministry of taxes and duties, the share of small and medium-sized private enterprises in the revenues of the country’s consolidated budget was 35 percent in 2021, the same as in 2020. Belarus does not consider joint stock companies, even those with 100 percent government ownership of the stocks, to be state-owned and generally refers to them as part of the non-state sector, rendering official government statistics regarding the role of SOEs in the economy misleading. According to media reports, SOEs receive preferential access to government contracts, subsidized credits, and debt forgiveness. While SOEs are generally subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors, private enterprises do not have the same preferential access to land and raw materials. Since Belarus is not a WTO member, it is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The GOB officially claims to welcome “strategic investors,” including foreign investors, and says that any state-owned or state-controlled enterprise can be privatized. However, Belarus’ privatization program is extremely limited in practice as the government only sells enterprises which operate at a loss and in which the state holds a minority share of less than 25 percent. Lukashenka has expressed skepticism of privatization and during the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly in February 2021 claimed privatization in Belarus was only in the interests of his political opposition. Notably, in April 2020, the government sold its controlling share in Belarus’ fifteenth-largest bank, Paritetbank. Otherwise, there was no privatization of state-controlled companies from 2018 to 2020. The State Property Committee occasionally organizes and holds privatization auctions. Many of the auctions organized by the State Property Committee have low demand as the government often places strict requirements on privitizations, including preserving or creating jobs, continuing in the same line of work or production, or launching a successful business project within a limited timeframe. In 2016, Belarusian joint stocks were allowed trans-border placement via issuing depositary receipts, but to date this instrument of attracting investments has not been used in Belarus. Belgium Executive Summary According to its most recent report, the Belgian central bank expects gross domestic product (GDP) to grow 2.6% in 2022 despite economic headwinds linked to global supply chain bottlenecks, spiking energy costs, and uncertainty related to COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Experts project that Belgium’s growth rate will slow but remain above potential, dipping slightly to 2.4% in 2023 and further to 1.6% in 2024. The labor market remains strong as overall job numbers continue to increase, and analysts anticipate that the unemployment rate will decline steadily to 5.7% by 2024. The inflation rate will likely continue to increase, largely driven by rising energy prices. The Belgian central bank expects the rate to peak in 2022 at 4.9% and then decline as energy markets stabilize. Belgium’s budget deficit is projected to reach 6.3% of GDP for 2021 – down from a high of 9.1% in 2020 – and will likely remain above 4% of GDP through 2024. The level of government debt will hold steady, with most experts projecting 108.9% of GDP in 2021, 106.3% in 2022 and 107.5% in 2023. Belgium is a major logistical hub and gateway to Europe, a position that helps drives its economic growth. Since June 2015, the Belgian government has undertaken a series of measures to reduce the tax burden on labor and to increase Belgium’s economic competitiveness and attractiveness to foreign investment. A July 2017 decision to lower the corporate tax rate from 35% to 25% further improved the investment climate. The current coalition government has not signaled any intention to revise this tax rate. Belgium boasts an open market well connected to the major economies of the world. As a logistical gateway to Europe, host to major EU institutions, and a central location closely tied to the major European economies, Belgium is an attractive market and location for U.S. investors. Belgium is a highly developed, long-time economic partner of the United States that benefits from an extremely well-educated workforce, world-renowned research centers, and the infrastructure to support a broad range of economic activities Belgium has a dynamic economy and attracts significant levels of investment in chemicals, petrochemicals, plastics and composites; environmental technologies; food processing and packaging; health technologies; information and communication; and textiles, apparel and sporting goods, among other sectors. In 2021, Belgian exports to the U.S. market totaled $27.7 billion, registering the United States as Belgium’s fourth largest export destination. Key exports included chemicals (37.6%), machinery and equipment (10.9%), and precious metals and stones (5.9%). In terms of imports, the United States ranked as Belgium’s fourth largest supplier of imports, with the value of imported goods totaling $27.6 billion in 2021. Key imports from the United States included chemicals (38.8%), machinery and equipment (11%), and plastics (10.7%). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 18 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 22 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A USD Amount https://apps.bea.gov/ international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 45,750USD https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Belgium has policies in place to facilitate the free flow of financial resources. Credit is allocated at market rates and is available to foreign and domestic investors without discrimination. Belgium is fully served by the international banking community and is implementing all relevant EU financial directives. Bruges established the world’s first stock market almost 600 years ago, and the Belgian stock exchange is well-established today. On Euronext, a company may increase its capital either by capitalizing reserves or by issuing new shares. An increase in capital requires a legal registration procedure, and new shares may be offered either to the public or to existing shareholders. A public notice is not required if the offer is to existing shareholders, who may subscribe to the new shares directly. An issue of bonds to the public is subject to the same requirements as a public issue of shares: the company’s capital must be entirely paid up, and existing shareholders must be given preferential subscription rights. In 2016, the Belgian government passed legislation to improve entrepreneurial financing through crowdfunding and more flexible capital venture rules. Because the Belgian economy is directed toward international trade, more than half of its banking activities involve foreign countries. Belgium’s major banks are represented in the financial and commercial centers of dozens of countries by subsidiaries, branch offices, and representative offices. The country does have a central bank, the National Bank of Belgium (NBB), whose governor is also a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB). Being a Eurozone member state, the NBB is part of the Euro system, meaning that it has transferred the sovereignty over monetary policy to the ECB. Since 2017, the supervision of systemically important Belgian banks lies with the ECB. The country has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years, nor are there any correspondent banking relationships currently in jeopardy. The Belgian non-performing Loan Ratio stood at 0.7% in 2021. Total bank assets amount to about 90% of GDP. Opening a bank account in the country is linked to residency status. The U.S. FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act) requires Belgian banks to report information on U.S. account holders directly to the Belgian tax authorities, who then release the information to the IRS. Belgium implemented a basic banking service law in 2021 which aims to give entrepreneurs otherwise unable to open a bank account the right to do so. For example, companies that have been refused the ability to open a bank account by three credit institutions are entitled to a basic banking service. According to the law, a basic banking service room – administered by the government – will confirm evidence of three refusals, and designate a credit institution in Belgium that must offer the basic banking service to the company. Even though the law is still not fully implemented, authorities anticipate nationwide implementation in 2022. Belgium has a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in the form of the Federal Holding and Investment Company (FPIM-SFPI), a quasi-independent entity created in 2006 and now mainly used as a vehicle to manage the banking assets which were taken on board during the 2008 banking crisis. The SWF has a board whose members reflect the composition of the governing coalition and are regularly audited by the “Cour des Comptes” or national auditor. At the end of 2020, its total assets amounted to €1.96 billion. Most of the funds are invested domestically. Its role is to allow public entities to recoup their investments and support Belgian banks. The SWF is required by law to publish an annual report and is subject to the same domestic and international accounting standards and rules. The SWF routinely fulfills all legal obligations. However, it is not a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Belgium has around 80,000 employees working in SOEs, mainly in the railways, telecoms and general utility sectors. There are also several regional-owned enterprises where the regions often have a controlling majority. Private enterprises are allowed to compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions, but since the EU started to liberalize network industries such as electricity, gas, water, telecoms and railways, there have been regular complaints in Belgium about unfair competition from the former state monopolists. Complaints have ranged from lower salaries (railways) to lower VAT rates (gas and electricity) to regulators with a conflict of interest (telecom). Although these complaints have now largely subsided, many of these former monopolies are now market leaders in their sector, due mainly to their ability to charge high access costs to legacy networks that were fully amortized years ago. Belgium currently has no scheduled privatizations. There are no indications that foreign investors would be excluded from eventual privatizations. Belize Executive Summary Belize has the smallest economy in Central America, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of US $1.3 billion in 2021, a 12.5 percent expansion over the previous year. Due to mounting fiscal pressures and a need to diversify and expand its economy, the Government of Belize (GoB) is open to, and actively seeks, foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the small population of the country (2021 estimate – 432,516 persons), high cost of doing business, high public debt, bureaucratic delays, often insufficient infrastructure, and corruption constitute investment challenges. The Central Bank of Belize projects the country’s GDP will likely expand 6.0 percent in 2022 while the IMF’s projects 6.5 percent growth, led by a rebound of activity in the construction, retail and wholesale trade, transport and communication, and tourism sectors. Public debt declined from 133 percent of GDP in 2020 to 108 percent in 2021. This was in large part due to the Blue Bond Agreement, a successful marine protection and conservation-driven financial transaction. International reserves increased from US $348 million (3.8 months of imports) in 2020 to US $420 million (3.9 months of imports) in 2021, partly due to the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 25.6 million allocation, which the authorities are keeping as reserve. Belize’s government encourages FDI to relieve fiscal pressure and transform the economy. The Central Bank of Belize recorded increased inflows of FDI at US $152.25 million in 2021 and outflows at US $24.4 million in the same period. FDI inflows were concentrated primarily in real estate, construction, financial intermediation, and the hotel and restaurant industries. Generally, Belize has no restrictions on foreign ownership and control of companies; however, foreign investments must be registered with the Central Bank of Belize and adhere to the Exchange Control Act and related regulations. The Government of Belize (GoB) made progress on the ease of doing business through trade license, stamp duty, exchange control, and land reforms to streamline business applications and related processes. The banking system remains stable but fragile. Since January 2020, a domestic bank and an international bank each lost a correspondent banking relationship, a significant portion of the sector. In March 2022, the GoB lowered the business tax on the net interest income charged to banks and financial institutions to encourage lending in strategic foreign exchange earning sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) sectors. There were incidents of property destruction at two American companies involved in sugar cane industry in the last year. In response, a prominent agro-productive organization wrote to the Government in January 2022 expressing concerns that the Belizean government’s failure to protect and support private sector investors in these instances led to damaging the investment climate and the Belizean economy. Belize is categorized as a small island developing state (SIDS) that is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change and is a relatively minor contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions. Belize’s updated National Determined Contributions (NDC) is nonetheless committed to developing a long-term strategy aligned with achieving net zero global emissions by 2050. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 N/A http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 64 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 4,110 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Belize’s financial system is small with little to no foreign portfolio investment transactions. It does not have a stock exchange and capital market operations are rudimentary. In 2021, Belize passed the Securities Industry Act for the modernization of the laws on securities and capital markets. The Central Bank of Belize must approve capital transactions, such as the purchase and sale of land, company shares, financial assets, and other investments that the transfer of assets between foreign and local entities. The Central Bank advised that, effective April 2022, it would only accept electronic applications for the approval of portfolio and capital investments and land transfers. Belize accepted the obligations of Article VIII, and the exchange regime is free of restrictions or multiple currency practices. Credit is made available on market terms with interest rates largely set by prevailing local market conditions within the commercial banks. The credit instruments accessible to the private sector include loans, overdrafts, lines of credit, credit cards, and bank guarantees. Foreign investors can access credit on the local market. Under the International Banking Act, foreign investors/nonresidents may access credit from international banks registered and licensed in Belize. However, permission to access credit from the domestic banks requires Central Bank approval. The Belize Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a state-owned development bank, offers loan financing services in various sectors. To qualify for a loan from DFC, an individual must be a Belizean resident or citizen, while a company must be majority 51 percent Belizean owned. The National Bank of Belize is a state-owned bank that provides concessionary credit primarily to public officers, teachers, and low-income Belizeans. A financial inclusion survey undertaken by the Central Bank of Belize in 2019 showed that approximately 65.5 percent of adult Belizeans had access to a financial account. In response, the banking sector has begun introducing digital wallet solutions to reach “unbanked” segments of the population. Belize’s financial system remains underdeveloped with a banking sector that may be characterized as stable but fragile. International reserves increased from US $348 million (3.8 months of imports) in 2020 to US $420 million (3.9 months of imports) in 2021, partly due to the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 25.6 million allocation, which Belizean authorities are keeping as reserve. Regulatory capital is still well above minimum requirements, while the gross non-performing loan (NPL) ratio at the end of February 2022 stood at 5.58 percent of loans. However, the Central Bank is reviewing domestic banks and credit unions self-assessments as the expired forbearance measures from 2020 could represent a risk as a fraction of their loan portfolio could turn into NPLs. The Central Bank of Belize (CBB) ( https://www.centralbank.org.bz ) is responsible for formulating and implementing monetary policy focusing on the stability of the exchange rate and economic growth. Generally, there are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts in Belize. Regulations differ based on residency status and whether the individual is seeking to establish a local bank account or a foreign currency account. Foreign banks and branches are allowed to operate in the country with all banks subject to Central Bank measures and regulations. Since January 2020 to present, a domestic bank and an international bank each lost a correspondent bank. Belize’s financial system comprises five domestic banks, three international banks, and ten credit unions. Correspondent banks discontinued offered correspondent banking relationships (CBR) to Scotiabank (Belize) Limited following the acquisition of the Scotiabank (Belize) Limited by the Caribbean International Holdings Limited. As of February 2022, the estimated total assets of the country’s largest bank were US $1.09 billion. In the last few years, Belize continues reforms to strengthen the anti-money laundering and counterterrorism-financing regime, including conducting an interagency national money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risk assessment. Belize does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) exist largely in the utilities sectors, generally as a result of nationalization. The government is the majority shareholder in the Belize Water Services Limited, the country’s sole provider of water services, the Belize Electricity Limited, the sole distributor of electricity, and the Belize Telemedia Limited, the largest telecommunications provider in the country. The Public Utilities Commission regulates all utilities. SOEs usually select senior government officials, members of local business bureaus and chambers of commerce, labor organizations, and quasi-governmental agencies to staff these companies’ boards of directors. The board serves to direct policy and shape business decisions of the ostensibly independent SOE. Current and previous administrations have been accused of nepotism and cronyism and criticized for having conflicts of interest when board members or directors are also represented in organizations that do business with the SOEs. There is no published list of SOEs. The following are the major SOEs operating in the country. Information relating to their operations is available on their websites: Belize Electricity Limited http://www.bel.com.bz ; Belize Telemedia Limited at https://www.livedigi.com ; Belize Water Services Limited http://www.bws.bz There is no public third-party market analysis that evaluate whether SOEs receive non-market advantages by the government. The Belize Electricity Limited and the Belize Water Services Limited are the only service providers in their respective sectors. The Belize Telemedia Limited, on the other hand, competes with one other provider for mobile connectivity and there are multiple players that provide internet and data services. U.S. firms have identified challenges in participating and competing in areas related to the bidding, procurement and dispute settlement processes, particular to SOEs. The Government of Belize does not currently have a privatization program. Benin Executive Summary Benin transitioned to a democracy in 1990, enjoying a reputation for regular, peaceful, and, until recently, inclusive elections. In 2019 and 2021, the government held legislative and presidential elections, respectively, which were not fully inclusive nor competitive. Elections-related unrest in 2019 and 2021 resulted in several deaths. In April 2021, President Patrice Talon was re-elected for a second, and pursuant to Benin’s constitution, final five-year term. Benin’s overall macroeconomic conditions were positive in 2020, though growth declined compared to previous years. According to the World Bank, GDP growth slowed from 6.9 percent in 2019 to 3.8 percent in 2020. Most of the slowdown in 2019 and 2020 was driven by the COVID-19 pandemic and Nigeria’s partial closure of its borders that lasted from August 2019 to December 2020. In December 2021, Benin’s National Assembly unanimously passed the Government of Benin (GOB) 2022 budget, which projects economic growth to accelerate to seven percent in 2022, higher than estimates from multilateral institutions. The IMF projection for growth in 2022 is 6.5 percent, and the African Development Bank projects a growth rate recovery from 4.8 in 2021 to 6.5 percent in 2022 if Covid-19 is brought under control. Port activity and the cotton sector are the largest drivers of economic growth. Telecommunications, agriculture, energy, cement production, and construction are other significant components of the economy. Benin also has a large informal sector. The country’s GDP is roughly 51 percent services, 26 percent agriculture, and 23 percent manufacturing. In January 2022, the Talon administration released its second government action plan (French acronym-PAG) estimated at $20.6 billion. The PAG lists 342 projects (half of which are carried forward from the Talon administration’s first PAG covering 2016-2021) across 23 sectors. With the goals of strengthening the administration of justice, fostering a structural transformation of the economy, and improving living conditions, the projects are concentrated in infrastructure, agriculture and agribusiness, tourism, health, energy, telecomuncation, and education. The government estimates that full implementation of the PAG will result in the creation of 500,000 new jobs and a leap in national economic and social conditions. The government intended that 48 percent of the PAG be funded through public funds and the remainder through public-private partnerships (PPPs). Through the end of 2021 a limited number of public-private partnerships had been secured. Government critics allege that the Talon administration is using the PAG in part to channel resources and contracts to administration insiders. Benin continues efforts to attract private investment in support of economic growth amidst reports of high-level corruption among government insiders and occasional failure to respect foreign investment contracts. The Investment and Exports Promotion Agency (APIEX) is a one-stop-shop for promoting new investments, business startups, and foreign trade. In 2020, APIEX worked with foreign companies to facilitate new investments, though some companies reported that the agency was under-resourced and hamstrung by bureaucratic red tape in other agencies and ministries. APIEX reported that business creation increased to 40,000 in 2020 from 13,000 in 2015. The construction of a Special Economic Zone, located at Glo-Djigbé, is also a major component of the second PAG. Located 30 miles north of Benin’s capital Cotonou, the Glo-Djigbé Industrial Zone (GDIZ) is currently in the works under the direction of Benin’s Industry Promotion and Investment Company (SIPI), a public private partnership. The GDIZ is structured such that the GOB owns a 35 percent stake in it with the the Mauritanian-Singaporean firm Arise Integrated International Platfoms (Arise-IIP) owning 65 percent. Glo-Djigbé seeks to transform numerous locally produced agricultural products and high-tech goods for export. Though no businesses have started operating in GDIZ yet, approximately 25 have signed contracts to begin operations there, including Oryx and JNP (both petroleum services); NKS (cashew processing), Groupe Aigle (cotton processing), and SIDDIH (pharmaceuticals). The GDIZ is expected to increase Benin’s GDP by $7 billion over the next decade and boost export revenues. The primary target markets will be the United States, the European Union, and other African countries. The GDIZ covers 1,640 hectares with 400 hectares being developed currently. Benin’s second MCC power compact, valued at $391million entered into force in June 2017. This compact aims to strengthen the national power utility, attract private sector investment into solar power generation, and fund infrastructure investments in electricity distribution as well as off-grid electrification for poor and unserved households. It is also advancing policy reforms to bolster financing for the electricity sector and strengthen regulation and utility management. Through the compact MCC is expanding the capacity and increasing the reliability of Benin’s power grid in southern and northern Benin. As two thirds of Benin’s population does not have access to electricity, the compact also includes a significant off-grid electrification project via a clean energy grant facility that supports private sector investment in off-grid power systems. Benin’s second MCC compact follows its first compact (2006-2011) which modernized the Port of Cotonou and improved land administration, the justice sector, and access to credit. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 78 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 96 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 2 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 1,280 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Government policy supports free financial markets, subject to oversight by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). Foreign investors may seek credit from Benin’s private financial institutions and the WAEMU Regional Stock Exchange (Bureau Regional des Valeurs Mobilieres – BRVM) headquartered in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, with local branches in each WAEMU member country. There are no restrictions for foreign investors to establish a bank account in Benin and obtain loans on the local market. However, proof of residency or evidence of company registration is required to open a bank account. The banking sector is generally reliable. Twelve private commercial banks operate in Benin in addition to the BCEAO; planning is under way to open a subsidiary of the African Development Bank. Taking into account microfinance institutions, roughly 31.2 percent of the population had access to banking services in 2020, the latest year for which data is available. In recent years, non-performing loans have been growing; 15 percent of total banking sector assets are estimated to be non-performing. The BCEAO regulates Beninese banks. Foreign banks are required to obtain a banking license before operating branches in Benin. They are subject to the same prudential regulations as local or regional banks. Benin has lost no correspondent banking relationships during the last three years. There is no known current correspondent banking relationship in jeopardy. Foreigners are required to present proof of residency to open bank accounts. Benin does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund. Bolivia Executive Summary In general, Bolivia is open to foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2021, gross FDI flows received reached USD 440 million, higher than in 2020 when Bolivia registered a significant divestment of USD 1,018 million. FDI flows were greatest in the sectors of hydrocarbons, manufacturing, industry, and commerce, together representing over 80 percent of the total. Additional sectors receiving some FDI included the transport sector, storage and communications, insurance companies, and real estate services. The year 2021 was economically characterized as a rebound after the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, in which Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 8.9 percent, the largest contraction in over 50 years. The leading sectors were mining, construction, and transport, registering double digit growth rates. International financial institutions estimated GDP growth between 5-5.5 percent for 2021. Bolivia was the fastest growing economy in the continent from 2014-2016 and in the top three until the start of the pandemic. Bolivia abrogated the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) it had with the United States and several other countries in 2012. The Bolivian government claimed the abrogation was necessary for Bolivia to comply with the 2009 Constitution. Companies that invested under the U.S. – Bolivia BIT will be covered by its terms until June 10, 2022, but investments made after June 10, 2012, are not covered. Notwithstanding the uncertain political situation, Bolivia’s investment climate has remained relatively steady over the past several years. Lack of legal security, corruption allegations, and unclear investment incentives are all impediments to investment in Bolivia. There is no significant FDI from the United States in Bolivia, and there are no initiatives designed to encourage U.S. investment specifically. Bolivia’s current macroeconomic stability, abundant natural resources, and strategic location in the heart of South America make it a prospective country for investment. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bolivian government took several economic measures to support families, such as authorizing postponement in the payment of basic services (water, electricity, natural gas, telecommunications) and credit payment deferral for the private sector. These measures ended in 2021. Bolivia’s Mother Earth Law stipulates climate change mitigation and adaptation. Bolivia last updated its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) for implementing the Paris Agreement in 2015. Bolivia does not have any regulatory “green” incentives for investment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 128/ 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 104/ 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 USD 432 https://www.bea.gov/data/economic-accounts/international World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 3,180 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD In 2021, the investment rate as a percentage of GDP (18 percent) was in line with regional averages. There has also been a shift from private to public investment. In recent years, private investment was particularly low because of the deterioration of the business environment. From 2006 to 2021, private investment, including local and foreign investment, averaged 7 percent of GDP. During the same period, public investment grew significantly, reaching an annual average of 12 percent of GDP. FDI is highly concentrated in natural resources, especially hydrocarbons and mining, which account for nearly two-thirds of FDI in Bolivia. Since 2006, the net flow of FDI averaged 1.6 percent of GDP. Before 2006, it averaged around 6.7 percent of GDP. 6. Financial Sector The government’s general attitude toward foreign portfolio investment is neutral. Established Bolivian firms may issue short or medium-term debt in local capital markets, which act primarily as secondary markets for fixed-return securities. Bolivian capital markets have sought to expand their handling of local corporate bond issues and equity instruments. Over the last few years, several Bolivian companies and some foreign firms have been able to raise funds through local capital markets. However, the stock exchange is small and is highly concentrated in bonds and debt instruments (more than 95 percent of transactions). The number of total transactions in 2021 was around 28 percent of GDP. From 2008-2019, the financial markets experienced high liquidity, which led to historically low interest rates. However, liquidity has been more limited in recent years, and there are some pressures to increase interest rates. The Bolivian financial system is not well integrated with the international system and there is only one foreign bank among the top ten banks of Bolivia. In October 2012, Bolivia returned to global credit markets for the first time in nearly a century. In 2017, Bolivia sold USD 1 billion at 4.5 percent for ten years, with U.S. financial institutions managing the deal. The resources gained from the sales were largely used to finance infrastructure projects. A sovereign bond issuance of up to $2 billion was approved by the National Assembly for 2022 but had not yet occurred as of April 2022. The Bolivian government’s attempt to refinance $2 billion in sovereign debt in February 2022 fell short, with only $850 million sold. The government had also hoped the new issuance would be for a 10-year term but had to settle for eight years (a 2030 maturity) for all the resold bonds. The interest rate for the new bonds is 7.5%, compared to interest rates of approximately 5% for the original bonds. The government and central bank respect their obligations under IMF Article VIII, as the exchange system is free of restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions. Foreign investors legally established in Bolivia can get credits on the local market. However, due to the size of the market, large credits are rare and may require operations involving several banks. Credit access through other financial instruments is limited to bond issuances in the capital market. The 2013 Financial Services Law directs credit towards the productive sectors and caps interest rates. The Bolivian banking system is small, composed of 16 consumer banks, six banks specialized in mortgage lending, three private financial funds, 30 savings and credit cooperatives, and eight institutions specialized in microcredit. Of the total number of personal deposits made in Bolivia through December 2021 (USD 30 billion), the banking sector accounted for 80 percent of the total financial system. Similarly, of the total loans and credits made to private individuals (USD 29 billion) through December 2021, 80 percent were made by the banking sector, while private financial funds and the savings and credit cooperatives accounted for the other 20 percent. Bolivian banks have developed the capacity to adjudicate credit risk and evaluate expected rates of return in line with international norms. The banking sector was stable and healthy with delinquency rates at 1.6 percent in 2021. In 2021, delinquency rates rose after the government permitted clients to defer bank loan payments until June 2021 and to reprogram their debt through 2022 without penalty as a mitigating measure for the COVID-19 pandemic. While delinquency rates remain relatively low, there are concerns this measure could potentially harm the banking sector’s stability. In 2013, a new Financial Services Law entered into force. This new law enacted major changes to the banking sector, including deposit rate floors and lending rate ceilings, mandatory lending allocations to certain sectors of the economy and an upgrade of banks’ solvency requirements in line with the international Basel standards. The law also requires banks to spend more on improving consumer protection, as well as providing increased access to financing in rural parts of the country. Credit is now allocated on government-established rates for productive activities, but foreign investors may find it difficult to qualify for loans from local banks due to the requirement that domestic loans be issued exclusively against domestic collateral. Since commercial credit is generally extended on a short-term basis, most foreign investors prefer to obtain credit abroad. Most Bolivian borrowers are small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In 2007, the government created a Productive Development Bank to boost the production of small, medium-sized, and family-run businesses. The bank was created to provide loans to credit institutions which meet specific development conditions and goals, for example by giving out loans to farmers, small businesses, and other development focused investors. The loans are long term and have lower interest rates than private banks can offer to allow for growth of investments and poverty reduction. In September 2010, the Bolivian government bought the local private bank Banco Union as part of a plan to gain partial control of the financial sector. Banco Union is one of the largest banks, with a share of 10.8 percent of total national credits and 12.7 percent of the total deposits; one of its principal activities is managing public sector accounts. Bolivian government ownership of Banco Union was illegal until December 2012, when the government enacted the State Bank Law, allowing for state participation in the banking sector. There is no strong evidence of “cross-shareholding” and “stable-shareholding” arrangements used by private firms to restrict foreign investment, and the 2009 Constitution forbids monopolies and supports antitrust measures. In addition, there is no evidence of hostile takeovers (other than government nationalizations that took place from 2006-14). The financial sector is regulated by ASFI (Supervising Authority of Financial Institutions), a decentralized institution that is under the Ministry of Economy. The Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB) oversees all financial institutions, provides liquidity when necessary, and acts as lender of last resort. The BCB is the only monetary authority and oversees managing the payment system, international reserves, and the exchange rate. Foreigners can establish bank accounts only with residency status in Bolivia. Blockchain technologies in Bolivia are still in the early stages. Currently, the banking sector is analyzing blockchain technologies and the sector intends to propose a regulatory framework in coordination with ASFI in the future. Three different settlement mechanisms are available in Bolivia: (1) the high-value payment system administered by the Central Bank for inter-bank operations; (2) a system of low value payments utilizing checks and credit and debit cards administered by the local association of private banks (ASOBAN); and (3) the deferred settlement payment system designed for small financial institutions such as credit cooperatives. This mechanism is also administered by the Central Bank. Neither the Bolivian government nor any government-affiliated entity maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Bolivian government has set up companies in sectors it considers strategic to the national interest and social well-being. It has also stated that it plans to do so in every sector it considers strategic or where there is either a monopoly or oligopoly. The Bolivian government owns and operates more than 60 businesses, including energy and mining companies, a telecommunications company, a satellite company, a bank, a sugar factory, an airline, a packaging plant, paper and cardboard factories, and milk and Brazil nut processing factories, among others. In 2005, income from SOEs in Bolivia other than gas exports represented only a fraction of a percent of GDP. As of 2019, public sector contribution to GDP (including SOEs, investments, and consumption of goods and services) has risen to over 40 percent of GDP. The largest SOEs can acquire credit from the Central Bank at very low interest rates and convenient terms. Some private companies complain that it is impossible for them to compete with this financial subsidy. Moreover, SOEs appear to benefit from easier access to licenses, supplies, materials, and land; however, there is no law specifically providing SOEs with preferential treatment in this regard. In many cases, government entities are directed to do business with SOEs, placing other private companies and investors at a competitive disadvantage. The government registered budget surpluses from 2006 until 2013 but began experiencing budget deficits in 2014. The 2009 Constitution requires all SOEs to publish an annual report and makes them subject to financial audits. Additionally, SOEs are required to present an annual testimony in front of civil society and social movements, a practice known as social control. There are currently no privatization programs in Bolivia. Bosnia and Herzegovina Executive Summary Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is open to foreign investment, but to succeed, investors must overcome endemic corruption, complex legal/regulatory frameworks and government structures, non-transparent business procedures, insufficient protection of property rights, and a weak judicial system under the indue influence of ethno-nationalist parties and their patronage networks. Economic reforms to complete the transition from a socialist past to a market-oriented future have proceeded slowly and the country has a low level of foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the BiH Central Bank preliminary data, in the first nine months of 2021 FDI in BiH was USD 617 million, a 65% increase from the same period in 2020. In the World Bank’s 2020 Ease of Doing Business Report, BiH was among the least attractive business environments in Southeast Europe, with a ranking of 90 out of 190 global economies. (Note: Beginning in 2021, the World Bank discontinued the worldwide assessment in the Doing Business Report.) The World Bank 2020 report ranked BiH particularly low for its lengthy and arduous processes to start a new business and obtain construction permits. According to the World Bank estimates, real GDP is expected to grow 4 percent in 2021 after contracting 3.2 percent in 2020. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) expects BiH’s GDP to grow by 4.5% in 2021. EBRD announced that BiH’s economic recovery has been stronger than expected mostly due to the recovery in external markets and strong expansion of domestic private consumption, backed by higher exports of goods and services. BiH is tied closely to global value chains as it primarily exports goods rather than services. U.S. investment in BiH is low due to its small market size, relatively low income levels, distance from the United States, challenging business climate, and the lack of investment opportunities. Most U.S. companies in BiH are represented by small sales offices that are concentrated on selling U.S. goods and services, with minimal longer-term investments. U.S. companies with offices in BiH include major multinational companies and market leaders in their respective sectors, such as Coca-Cola, Microsoft, Cisco, Oracle, Pfizer, McDonalds, Marriott, Caterpillar, Johnson & Johnson, FedEx, UPS, Philip Morris, KPMG, PwC and others. Nonetheless, BiH offers business opportunities to well-prepared and persistent exporters and investors. Companies that overcome the challenges of establishing a presence in BiH often make a return on their investment over time. A major U.S. investment fund was able to enter the market with a regional investment in the telecom/cable sector in 2014 and exit its majority position in 2019 with a good return. There is an active international community, but lack of political will has stalled the many reform efforts that would improve the business climate as BiH pursues eventual European Union membership. The country is open to foreign investment and offers a liberal trade regime and its simplified tax structure is one of the lowest in the region (17 percent VAT and 10 percent flat income tax). The complex institutional and territorial structure of BiH complicates the economic landscape of the country and may lead to further disruptions in Foreign Direct Investment. In July 2021, the Republika Srpska (RS) entity began a blockade of state institutions and in October 2021 began to take unconstitutional steps to return competencies to the entity-level government. This near-virtual decision-making blockade and attempts to withdraw the RS from state institutions and agencies have created questionsfor many investors and businesses. The duplicative nature of the proposed RS-based parallel institutions and agencies will complicate the investment landscape and create regulatory and legal confusion. While no new parallel RS agencies are yet operational, the RS has taken concrete legislative and regulatory steps to lay the groundwork for their full implementation in the near to mid-term. Investors should exercise all due diligence and take into account ongoing and potential Constitutional Court challenges and the fact these RS moves violate the Dayton Peace Agreement when deciding whether to conduct business with these nascent agencies or operate under constitutionally questionable legal frameworks established by the RS. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity also has functionality issues, with 2018 election results yet unimplemented, and a legislative body that struggles to pass basic economic reforms. Potential investors are urged to read the legal reviews and statements of the High Representative to BiH. BiH is pursuing World Trade Organization membership and hopes to join in the future. It is also richly endowed with natural resources, providing potential opportunities in energy (hydro, wind, solar, along with traditional thermal), agriculture, timber, and tourism. The best business opportunities for U.S. exporters to BiH include energy generation and transmission equipment, telecommunication and IT equipment and services, transport infrastructure and equipment, engineering and construction services, medical equipment, agricultural products, and raw materials and chemicals for industrial processing. In 2021, U.S. exports to BiH totaled USD 322 million, a 37 percent increase from 2020, and held around 3 percent share of total BiH imports. BiH exports to the United States in 2021 totaled USD 94 million, an increase of 135 percent from 2020. U.S. exports to BiH are primarily in the areas of raw materials for industrial processing, food and agricultural products, machinery and transport equipment, and mineral fuels. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 110 of 180 www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 75 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/home U.S. FDI in partner country 2021 $9 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $6,080 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Capital markets remain underdeveloped in BiH. Both entities have created their own modern stock market infrastructure with separate stock exchanges in Sarajevo (SASE) and Banja Luka (BLSE), both of which started trading in 2002. The small size of the markets, lack of privatization, weak shareholder protection, and public mistrust of previous privatization programs has impeded the development of the capital market. Both the RS and Federation issued government securities for the first time during 2011, as part of their plans to raise capital in support of their budget deficits during this period of economic stress. Both entity governments continue to issue government securities in order to fill budget gaps. These securities are also available for secondary market trading on the stock exchanges. In February 2022, the international rating agency Standard and Poor’s (S&P) affirmed the credit rating of Bosnia and Herzegovina as “B” with a stable outlook. The agency stated that “the stable outlook balances the risks stemming from BiH’s complex and confrontational political dynamics over the next 12 months against some comparatively strong economic fundamentals, such as contained net general government debt, an improving external position, and a resilient banking sector. The outlook is based on the expectation that the ongoing political crisis between RS on one side and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the central government on the other will ultimately deescalate, with RS remaining in BiH on largely the same terms as previously. The ratings on BiH are supported by the modest level and favorable structure of public debt.” The banking and financial system has been stable with the most significant investments coming from Austria. As of March 2022, there are 20 commercial banks operating in BiH: 13 with headquarters in the Federation and 7 in the Republika Srpska. Twenty-one commercial banks are members of a deposit insurance program, which provides for deposit insurance of KM 50,000 (USD 28,000). The banking sector is divided between the two entities, with entity banking agencies responsible for banking supervision. The BiH Central Bank maintains monetary stability through its currency board arrangement and supports and maintains payment and settlement systems. It also coordinates the activities of the entity Banking Agencies, which are in charge of bank licensing and supervision. Reforms of the banking sector, mandated by the IMF and performed in conjunction with the IMF and World Bank, are in progress. BiH passed a state-level framework law in 2010 mandating the use of international accounting standards, and both entities passed legislation that eliminated differences in standards between the entities and Brčko District. All governments have implemented accounting practices that are fully in line with international norms. BiH does not have a government-affiliated Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises In BiH, subnational governments (the two entities and ten cantons) own the vast majority of government-owned companies. Private enterprises can compete with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products/services, and incentives. In practice, however, SOEs have the advantage over private enterprises, especially in sectors such as telecommunications and electricity, where government-owned enterprises have traditionally held near-monopolies and are able to influence regulators and courts in their favor. Generally, government-owned companies are controlled by political parties, increasing the possibilities for corruption and inefficient company management. With the exception of SOEs in the telecom, electricity, and defense sectors, many of the remaining public companies are bankrupt or on the verge of insolvency, and represent a growing liability to the government. The country is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO. There have been no significant privatizations in the past few years. Privatization offerings are scarce and often require unfavorable terms. Some formerly successful state-owned enterprises have accrued significant debts from unpaid health and pension contributions, and potential investors are required to assume these debts and maintain the existing workforce. Under the state-level FDI Law, foreign investors may bid on privatization tenders. International financial organizations, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), are seeking to be engaged on privatization and restructuring efforts across the remaining portfolio of state owned enterprises. Historically, the privatization process in BiH has resulted in economic loss due to corruption. Since 1999 more than 1,000 companies have been fully privatized, while around 100 have been partially privatized. Some privatizations led to the loss of value of state property and many of the privatized companies were weakened or ruined in the privatization process. The history of corrupt privatizations has raised concerns that further privatization would only lead to additional unemployment and the enrichment of a few politically-connected individuals. Successful privatizations and restructurings that improve service delivery, business productivity, and employment would be very beneficial for the BiH economy, could help the image of privatization, and would build support for a long overdue shift away from a government-led economy. The Federation government is focused on privatizing or restructuring some SOEs based on the Federation Agency for Privatization’s 2019 privatization plan. The privatization plan includes the fuel retailer Energopetrol dd. Sarajevo, the engineering company Energoinvest, and the insurer Sarajevo-Osiguranje. The remaining companies listed in the privatization plan have posted losses and suffered significant declines in their value, while others have only a small amount of government ownership. The Federation government rejected media speculation that it plans to privatize the two majority entity government-owned telecom companies, BH Telecom (90 percent stake) and HT Mostar (50.1 percent stake). At the same time, it has completed due diligence on the two telecom companies as part of its arrangement with the IMF. The privatization process in the RS is carried out by the RS Investment Development Bank (IRBRS). Many prospective companies have been already privatized, and out of 163 not yet privatized companies, many are being liquidated or undergoing bankruptcy. In 2016, the RS government announced plans to sell its capital in 22 companies but the plan has not been implemented. The plan envisions the privatizations to take place via the sale of government shares on the stock exchange. Although the RS National Assembly passed a decision that the entity has no plans to privatize the energy sector, the RS government maintains the possibility of joint ventures in the energy sector. Botswana Executive Summary Botswana is a small country with a population of about 2.35 million (World Bank, 2020) and nestled between South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Its central location in southern Africa enables it to serve as a gateway to the region. Botswana has historically enjoyed high economic growth rates and its export-driven economy is highly correlated with global economic trends. Development has been driven mainly by revenue from diamond mining, which has enabled Botswana to develop infrastructure and provide social welfare programs for vulnerable members of the population, and these programs will be maintained despite financial challenges in the current financial year, which runs from April 2022 to March 2023. The economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was significant as evidenced by an economic growth of negative 8.5 percent in 2020; economic growth was estimated to reach 9.7 percent in 2021. Unemployment also rose from 22.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2019 (prior to the pandemic) to 26 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021. The fiscal impact of the pandemic has also been significant, resulting in large budget deficits of $1.4 billion in 2020 and $0.87 billion in 2021 compared to the $0.68 billion surplus that the government had forecasted for 2021 in its National Development Plan (NDP). In the first quarter of 2021, diamond revenues recovered, but international tourism revenues did not. In recent years, inflation has remained at the bottom end of the central bank’s three to six percent acceptable range; however, since the COVID-19 pandemic, inflation rose to a 13-year high of 10.6 percent in January 2022 and stayed at that level in February 2022. The World Bank classifies Botswana as an upper middle-income country based on its per capita income of $6,405 in 2020, although it declined from $7,203 in 2019. Botswana is a stable, democratic country with an independent judiciary system. It maintains a sound macroeconomic environment, fiscal discipline, a well-capitalized banking system, and a crawling peg exchange rate system. In March 2021, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) maintained Botswana’s sovereign credit rating for long and short-term foreign and domestic currency bonds at “BBB+/A-2” with a negative outlook, which reflects the risks COVID-19 will continue to pose on Botswana’s economic and fiscal performance over the next 12 months. In November 2021, Moody’s revised its credit rating for Botswana from A2 to A3 with a stable outlook. These agencies’ ratings are highly influenced by Botswana’s continued dependence on diamonds, which contribute to at least a quarter of Botswana’s GDP and are susceptible to external shocks which places the country at a much higher risk. The diamond industry has however been experiencing a recovery, setting Botswana on a positive trajectory. Botswana has minimal labor strife. The country has been cited in the 2020 Global Competitiveness Report as one of 30 countries out of 141 in which hiring of foreign labor has become significantly harder than it was in 2008. Botswana is a member state to both the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention and the 1958 New York Convention. Corruption in Botswana remains less pervasive than in other parts of Africa; nevertheless, foreign and national companies have noted increasing tender-related corruption. The Government of Botswana (GoB) created the Botswana Investment and Trade Centre (BITC) to assist foreign investors. Botswana offers low tax rates and has no foreign exchange controls. The BITC’s topline economic goals are to promote export-led growth, ensure efficient government spending and financing, build human capital, and to ensure the provision of appropriate infrastructure. GoB entities, including BITC, use these criteria to determine the level of support to give foreign investors. The GoB has committed to streamline business-related procedures, and remove bureaucratic impediments based on World Bank recommendations in a business reform roadmap. Under this framework, the GoB introduced electronic tax and customs processes in 2016 and 2017. The Companies and Intellectual Property Authority (CIPA) built and successfully integrated the Online Business Registration System (OBRS) with Botswana Unified Revenue Services (BURS) and the Immigration Office. OBRS is designed to reduce the business registration process by more than 10 days. On March 2022, Parliament passed the Intellectual Property Policy to leverage Botswana’s IP potential for inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development. The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB) will from April 1, 2022, be transitioned to Public Procurement and Regulatory Authority (PPRA) and no longer adjudicate on government tenders. The GoB also established the Special Economic Zones Authority (SEZA) to streamline sector-targeted investment in Botswana’s different geographic areas. The Ministry of Investment, Trade & Industry (MITI) is developing a Trading Service Strategy to facilitate economic diversification and is also working on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Implementation Strategy. Due to COVID-19-related economic shortfalls, Botswana drew down heavily on its foreign exchange reserves and government savings. Sectors such as mining, tourism, trade, hotels and restaurants, construction, and manufacturing suffered significantly; however, rough diamond sales recovered somewhat in the second half of 2020. In April 2021, the government put in place several interventions to raise revenues including a Value Added Tax (VAT) increase from 12 percent to 14 percent, an increase on Withholding Tax on dividend income from 7.5 percent to 10 percent and increases in several fees and levies charged for government services (source: 2021, Budget Speech). The government moved swiftly to implement relevant statutory instruments to curb the likelihood of companies exploiting COVID-19 to collude to set exorbitant prices. The 2020 statutory instrument 61 regulated the prices of essential supplies and basic food commodities for the duration of the 18-month COVID-19 related state of emergency. Interventions like the Economic Recovery and Transformation Plan (ERTP) and the Reset Agenda augmented the short-term economic relief package that included wage subsidies, tax amnesties, waivers of certain levies due to government, loan guarantee schemes to support firms’ access to bank credit, and provision of food relief. The president’s Reset Agenda seeks to adjust some priorities in light of new and unexpected challenges and to find smarter ways to implement projects in a timely manner and within stipulated budgets. The ERTP aims to reinforce support already given to affected businesses and also to take advantage of opportunities that have emerged because of the pandemic such as digital services and e-commerce. Botswana is committed to reducing greenhouse emissions to 15 percent by 2030 through renewable energy projects already underway and listed in the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP). Botswana also adopted a Climate Change Policy in 2021 which seeks to promote access to carbon markets, climate finance, and clean technologies. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 57 of 173 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 21.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 6,640 USD https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The government encourages foreign portfolio investment, although there are limits on foreign ownership in certain sectors. It also embraces the establishment of new and diverse financial institutions to support increased foreign and domestic investment and to fill existing gaps where finance is not commercially available. There are nine commercial banks, one merchant bank, one offshore bank, three statutory deposit-taking institutions, and one credit union operating in Botswana. All have corresponding relationships with U.S. banks. Additional financial institutions include various pension funds, insurance companies, microfinance institutions, stock brokerage companies, asset management companies, statutory finance institutions, collective investment undertakings, and statutory funds. Historically, commercial banks have accounted for 93.7 percent of total deposits and 93.5 percent of total loans in Botswana. Access to banking services measured by the number of depositors on adult population improved from 72 percent in 2019 to 76.6 percent in 2020. Additionally, banks introduced new products and services that included enhancement of transactional accounts, introduction of cross border payment services, collaborative arrangements with money-transfer service providers to widen the financial inclusion efforts for the unbanked population. The central bank, the Bank of Botswana, acts as banker and financial advisor to the GoB and is responsible for the management of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, the administration of monetary and exchange rate policies, and the regulation and supervision of financial institutions in the country. Monetary policy in Botswana is widely regarded as prudent, and the GoB has historically managed to maintain a sensible exchange rate and a stable inflation rate, generally within the target of three to six percent. But the COVID-19 pandemic pushed inflation to new heights, reaching 10.6 percent in January and February 2022, the highest level on record in over a decade. Banks may lend to non-resident-controlled companies without seeking approval from the Bank of Botswana. Foreign investors usually enjoy better access to credit than local firms do. In July 2014, USAID’s Development Credit Authority (now DFC – U.S. International Development Finance Corporation), in collaboration with ABSA (formerly Barclays Bank of Botswana), implemented a seven-year program to allow small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) to access up to US$ 15 million in loans in an effort to diversify the economy. So far, the program that was initially scheduled to come to an end in June 2021 is at 83 percent utilization and has been extended to July 2024. To date ABSA has disbursed US$ 12.5 million and has up to June 2023 to disburse the remaining US$ 2.5 million. At the end of 2020, there were 24 companies on the Domestic Board and eight companies on the Foreign Equities Board of the Botswana Stock Exchange (BSE). In addition, there were 46 listed bonds and three exchange traded funds listed on the Exchange. The Domestic Company Index (DCI) declined by 8.2 percent in 2020, while it declined by 4.6 percent in 2019, reflecting how the pandemic affected the economy. According to the BSE 2020 Annual Report, all sectors in the domestic equity board experienced a decline which contributed a negative 8.4 percent points to the DCI’s depreciation of 8.2 percent except for one sector, Retail & Wholesale. The total market capitalization for listed companies at year-end 2020 was US$ 33.5 billion, with domestic companies’ capitalization standing at US$ 3 billion while foreign companies’ capitalization stood at US$ 30.5 billion. The Mining and Minerals sector continued to dominate the foreign equity board as it contributed 94.7 percent of the foreign companies’ market capitalization in 2020 and contributed 0.97 percentage points to the Foreign Company Index (FCI) depreciation of 1 percent. The BSE is still highly illiquid compared to larger African markets and is dominated by mining companies which adds to index volatility. Laws prohibiting insider trading and securities fraud are clearly stipulated under Section 35 – 37 of the Securities Act, 2014 and charges for contravening these laws are listed under Section 54 of the same Act. The government has legitimized offshore capital investments and allows foreign investors, individuals and corporate bodies, and companies incorporated in Botswana, to open foreign currency accounts in specified currencies. The designated currencies are U.S. Dollar, British Pound sterling, Euro, and the South African Rand. There are no known practices by private firms to restrict foreign investment participation or control in domestic enterprises. Private firms are not permitted to adopt articles of incorporation or association which limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. In general, Botswana exercises careful control over credit expansion, the pula exchange rate, interest rates, and foreign and domestic borrowing. Banking legislation is largely in line with industry norms for regulation, supervision, and payments. However, Botswana failed to meet the compliance requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), resulting in a grey listing in October 2018. Botswana worked to implement the necessary regulatory legislations to address the identified technical compliance deficiencies and was subsequently removed from the FATF grey list in October 2021, and then in February 2022, removed from the EU blacklist of high risk third countries with regard to AML/CFT. The government continues to work on its regulatory environment to avoid falling back into the grey list. The Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA) was established in 2008 and provides regulatory oversight for the non-banking sector. It extends know-your-customer practices to non-banking financial institutions to help deter money laundering and terrorist financing. NBFIRA is also responsible for regulating the International Financial Services Centre, a hub charged with promoting the financial services industry in Botswana. The Bank of Botswana maintains a long-term sovereign wealth fund, known as the Pula Fund, in addition to a regular foreign reserve account providing basic import cover. The Pula Fund was established under the Bank of Botswana Act and forms part of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, which are primarily funded by diamond revenues. The Pula Fund is wholly invested in foreign currency-denominated assets and is managed by the Bank of Botswana Board with input from recognized international financial management and investment firms. All realized market and currency gains, or losses are reported in the Bank of Botswana’s income statement. The Fund has been affected severely by the COVID-19 pandemic, with the GoB making withdrawals to address significant COVID-19-related revenue shortfalls. As a result, the Pula Fund, which provides long fiscal cushion against economic shocks, is significantly depleted from 20 percent of GDP in 2011 to seven percent of GDP as of mid-2020 – from $1.69 billion to $510 million – a decline of more than 70 percent. Botswana is a founding member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Fund and was one of the architects of the Santiago Principles in 2008. More information is available at: https://www.bankofbotswana.bw/sites/default/files/BOTSWANA-PULA-FUND-SANTIAGO-PRINCIPLES.pdf 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs), known as “parastatals,” are majority or 100 percent owned by the GoB. There is a published list of SOEs at the GoB portal ( www.gov.bw ), with profiles of financial and development SOEs. Some SOEs are state-sanctioned monopolies, including the Botswana Meat Commission, the Water Utilities Corporation, Botswana Railways, and the Botswana Power Corporation. The same business registration and licensing laws govern private and government-owned enterprises. No law or regulation prohibits or restricts private enterprises from competing with SOEs. Botswana law requires SOEs to publish annual reports, and private sector accountants or the Auditor General audits SOEs depending on how they are constituted. GoB ministries together with their respective SOEs are compelled on an annual basis to appear before the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee to provide reports and answer questions regarding their performance. Some SOEs are not performing well and have been embroiled in scandals involving alleged fraud and mismanagement. Botswana is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO. The GOB has committed to privatization on paper. It established a task force in 1997 to privatize all its state-owned companies and formed a Public Enterprises Evaluation and Privatization Agency (PEEPA) to oversee this process. Implementation of its privatization commitments has been limited to the January 2016 sale offer of 49 percent of the stock of the state-owned Botswana Telecommunications Corporation to Botswana citizens only. In February 2017, the GoB issued an Expressions of Interest for the privatization of its national airline, but progress stopped due to the decision to re-fleet the airline before privatization. In 2019, President Masisi announced the Botswana Meat Commission would be placed in the hands of a private management company prior to privatization, but this has yet to occur. Conversely, the GoB has created new SOEs such as the Okavango Diamond Company, the Mineral Development Company, and Botswana Oil Limited in recent years. A Rationalization Strategy covering all parastatals has been developed and its implementation will address issues such as duplication of activities, overlapping mandates and issues of corporate governance. This may finally result in some SOEs being privatized or merged while some may be closed. Brazil Executive Summary Brazil is the second largest economy in the Western Hemisphere behind the United States, and the twelfth largest economy in the world (in nominal terms) according to the World Bank. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) named Brazil the seventh largest destination for global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in 2021 with inflows of $58 billion, an increase of 133percent in comparison to 2020 but still below pre-pandemic levels (in 2019, inflows totaled $65.8 billion). In recent years, Brazil has received more than half of South America’s total amount of incoming FDI, and the United States is a major foreign investor in Brazil. According to Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) measurements, U.S. stock was 24 percent ($123.9 billion) of all FDI in Brazil as of the end of 2020, the largest single-country stock by ultimate beneficial owner (UBO), while International Monetary Fund (IMF) measurements assessed the United States had the second largest single-country stock of FDI by UBO, representing 18.7 percent of all FDI in Brazil ($105 billion) and second only to the Netherlands’ 19.9 percent ($112.5 billion). The Government of Brazil (GoB) prioritized attracting private investment in its infrastructure and energy sectors during 2018 and 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 delayed planned privatization efforts and despite government efforts to resume in 2021, economic and political conditions hampered the process. The Brazilian economy resumed growth in 2017, ending the deepest and longest recession in Brazil’s modern history. However, after three years of modest recovery, Brazil entered a recession following the onset of the global coronavirus pandemic in 2020. The country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased 4.6 percent in 2021, in comparison to a 4.1 percent contraction in 2020. As of February 2022, analysts had forecasted 0.3 percent 2022 GDP growth. The unemployment rate was 11.1 percent at the end of 2021, with over one-quarter of the labor force unemployed or underutilized. The nominal budget deficit stood at 4.4 percent of GDP ($72.4 billion) in 2021, and is projected to rise to 6.8 percent by the end of 2022 according to Brazilian government estimates. Brazil’s debt-to-GDP ratio reached 89.4 percent in 2020 and fell to around 82 percent by the end of 2021. The National Treasury projections show the debt-to-GDP ratio rising to 86.7 percent by the end of 2022, while the Independent Financial Institution (IFI) of Brazil’s Senate projects an 84.8 percent debt-to-GDP ratio. The BCB increased its target for the benchmark Selic interest rate from 2 percent at the end of 2020 to 9.25 percent at the end of 2021, and 11.75 percent in March 2022. The BCB’s Monetary Committee (COPOM) anticipates raising the Selic rate to 12.25 percent before the end of 2022. President Bolsonaro took office on January 1, 2019, and in that same year signed a much-needed pension system reform into law and made additional economic reforms a top priority. Bolsonaro and his economic team outlined an agenda of further reforms to simplify Brazil’s complex tax system and complicated code of labor laws in the country, but the legislative agenda in 2020 was largely consumed by the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, the Brazilian government passed a major forex regulatory framework and strengthened the Central Bank’s autonomy in executing its mandate. The government also passed a variety of new regulatory frameworks in transportation and energy sectors, including a major reform of the natural gas market. In addition, the government passed a law seeking to improve the ease of doing business as well as advance the privatization of its major state-owned enterprise Electrobras. Brazil’s official investment promotion strategy prioritizes the automobile manufacturing, renewable energy, life sciences, oil and gas, and infrastructure sectors. Foreign investors in Brazil receive the same legal treatment as local investors in most economic sectors; however, there are foreign investment restrictions in the health, mass media, telecommunications, aerospace, rural property, and maritime sectors. The Brazilian congress is considering legislation to liberalize restrictions on foreign ownership of rural property. Analysts contend that high transportation and labor costs, low domestic productivity, and ongoing political uncertainties hamper investment in Brazil. Foreign investors also cite concerns over poor existing infrastructure, rigid labor laws, and complex tax, local content, and regulatory requirements; all part of the extra costs of doing business in Brazil. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 96 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 57 of 129 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $70,742 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $7,850 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The Brazil Central Bank (BCB) in October 2016 implemented a sustained monetary easing cycle, lowering the Special Settlement and Custody System (Selic) baseline reference rate from a high of 14 percent in October 2016 to a record-low 2 percent by the end of 2020. The downward trend was reversed by an increase to 2.75 percent in March 2021 and reached 10.75 percent in February 2022. Brazil’s banking sector projects that the Selic will reach 12.25 percent by the end of 2022. Inflation for 2021 ended at an annualized 10.06 percent, above the target of 4 percent plus/minus 1.5 percent. The BCB’s Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) set the BCB’s inflation target at 3.5 percent for 2022 and .25 percent in 2023 (plus/minus 1.5 percent), but as of February 2022 the BCB estimates that inflation will reach 5.4 percent in 2022, above the target again. As of mid-March 2022, Brazil’s annual inflation rate is at 10.75 percent. Brazil’s muddled fiscal policy and heavy public debt burden factor into most analysts’ forecasts that the “neutral” policy rate will remain higher than target rates among Brazil’s emerging-market peers (around five percent) over the reporting period. According to the BCB, in 2021 the ratio of public debt to GDP reached 81.1 percent, compared to a record 89.4 percent in 2020. Analysts project that the debt/GDP ratio may rise to around 85 percent by the end of 2023. The role of the state in credit markets grew steadily beginning in 2008, but showed a reduction in 2020 due to the pandemic. As of January 2022, public banks accounted for about 50 percent of total loans to the private sector (compared to 48.9 percent in 2018). Directed lending (that is, to meet mandated sectoral targets) also rose, and accounts for almost half of total lending. Brazil is paring back public bank lending and trying to expand a market for long-term private capital. While local private sector banks are beginning to offer longer credit terms, state-owned development bank BNDES is a traditional source of long-term credit in Brazil. BNDES also offers export financing. Approvals of new financing by BNDES decreased 4 percent in 2021 from 2020, with the infrastructure sector receiving the majority of new capital. The sole stock market in Brazil is B3 (Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão), created through the 2008 merger of the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) with the Brazilian Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&F), forming the fourth-largest exchange in the Western hemisphere, after the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Canadian TSX Group exchanges. In 2020, there were 463 companies traded on the B3 exchange. The B3’s broadest index, the Ibovespa, decreased 11.93 percent in valuation during 2021, due to economic uncertainties related to rising and persistent inflation, particularly in the second half of the year. Foreign investors, both institutional and individuals, can directly invest in equities, securities, and derivatives; however, they are limited to trading those investments only on established markets. Wholly-owned subsidiaries of multinational accounting firms, including the major U.S. firms, are present in Brazil. Auditors are personally liable for the accuracy of accounting statements prepared for banks. The Brazilian financial sector is large and sophisticated. Banks lend at market rates that remain relatively high compared to other emerging economies. Reasons cited by industry observers include high taxation, repayment risk, concern over inconsistent judicial enforcement of contracts, high mandatory reserve requirements, and administrative overhead, as well as persistently high real (net of inflation) interest rates. According to BCB data collected for 2020, the average rate offered by Brazilian banks to non-financial corporations was 11.7 percent. The banking sector in Brazil is highly concentrated, with BCB data indicating that the five largest commercial banks (excluding brokerages) account for approximately 82 percent of the commercial banking credit market totaling $800 billion by the end of 2020. Three of the five largest banks by assets in the country, Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica Federal, and BNDES, are partially or completely federally-owned. Large private banking institutions focus their lending on Brazil’s largest firms, while small- and medium-sized banks primarily serve small- and medium-sized companies. Citibank sold its consumer business to Itaú Bank in 2016, but maintains its commercial banking interests in Brazil. It is currently the only U.S. bank operating in the country. Increasing competitiveness in the financial sector, including in the emerging fintech space, is a vital part of the Brazilian government’s strategy to improve access to and the affordability of financial services in Brazil. On November 16, 2020, the BCB launched its instant payment system called “PIX”. PIX is a 24/7 system that offers transfers of any value for people-people (P2P), people-business (P2B), business-people (B2P), business-business (B2B), and government-government (G2G). Brazilian customers in 2021 overwhelmingly embraced PIX, particularly for P2P transfers (which are free), replacing both cash payments and legacy bank electronic transfers which charged relatively high fees and could only take place during business hours. In February 2021, the BCB implemented the first two of four phases of its Open Banking Initiative in an effort to open Brazil’s insulated banking system dominated by relatively few players. The first phase required Brazilian financial institutions to facilitate digitized access to their customer service channels, products, and services related to demand deposit or savings accounts, payment accounts, and credit operations. The second phase of the initiative expanded sharing customer data across a widening scope of bank products including loans. The other two phases, which are scheduled to go into effect in 2022, seek to include sharing customer data on foreign exchange, investments, and pension funds. The BCB expects that increased access to customer information will allow other financial institutions, including competitor banks and fintechs, to offer better and cheaper banking services to incumbent banks’ clients, thereby breaking up the dominance of the six large, incumbent banking institutions. In recent years, the BCB has strengthened bank audits, implemented more stringent internal control requirements, and tightened capital adequacy rules to reflect risk more accurately. It also established loan classification and provisioning requirements. These measures apply to private and publicly owned banks alike. In December 2020, Moody’s upgraded a collection of 28 Brazilian banks and their affiliates to stable from negative after the agency had lowered the outlook on the Brazilian system in April 2020 due to economic difficulties. As of March 2021, the rating remained as stable. The Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) independently regulates the stock exchanges, brokers, distributors, pension funds, mutual funds, and leasing companies, assessing penalties in instances of insider trading. To open an account with a Brazilian bank, foreign account holders must present a permanent or temporary resident visa, a national tax identification number (CPF) issued by the Brazilian government, either a valid passport or identity card for foreigners (CIE), proof of domicile, and proof of income. On average, this process from application to account opening can take more than three months. Foreign Exchange Brazil’s foreign exchange market remains small. The latest Triennial Survey by the Bank for International Settlements conducted in December 2019 showed that the net daily turnover on Brazil’s market for OTC foreign exchange transactions (spot transactions, outright forwards, foreign-exchange swaps, currency swaps, and currency options) was $18.8 billion, down from $19.7 billion in 2016. This was equivalent to around 0.22 percent of the global market in 2019, down from 0.3 percent in 2016. On December 29, 2021, Brazil approved a new Foreign Exchange Regulatory framework, to go into effect in December 2022, which replaces more than 40 separate regulations with a single law and eases foreign investments in the Brazilian market incentivizing increased foreign investment and assisting Brazilian businesses in integrating into global value chains. The new law aims to streamline currency exchange operations and authorizes more enterprises, including fintechs and small businesses, to conduct operations in foreign currencies bypassing retail banks and increasing their competitiveness. In addition, the law expands the list of qualifying activities transacted in foreign-currency denominated accounts (previously restricted only to import/export firms and for loans in which the debtor or creditor was based outside Brazil). Brazil’s banking system has adequate capitalization and has traditionally been highly profitable, reflecting high interest rate spreads and fees. According to an October 2021 Central Bank Financial Stability Report, the banking system remains solid, with growing capitalization indices, and continues to rebuild its capital base. All institutions are able to meet the minimum prudential requirements, and solvency does not pose a risk to financial stability. Stress testing demonstrated that the banking system has adequate loss-absorption capacity in all simulated scenarios. There are few restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with a foreign investment in Brazil. Foreign investors may freely convert Brazilian currency in the unified foreign exchange market, where buy-sell rates are determined by market forces. All foreign exchange transactions, including identifying data, must be reported to the BCB. Foreign exchange transactions on the current account are fully liberalized. The BCB must approve all incoming foreign loans. In most cases, loans are automatically approved unless loan costs are determined to be “incompatible with normal market conditions and practices.” In such cases, the BCB may request additional information regarding the transaction. Loans obtained abroad do not require advance approval by the BCB, provided the Brazilian recipient is not a government entity. Loans to government entities require prior approval from the Brazilian senate as well as from the Economic Ministry’s Treasury Secretariat, and must be registered with the BCB. Interest and amortization payments specified in a loan contract can be made without additional approval from the BCB. Early payments can also be made without additional approvals if the contract includes a provision for them. Otherwise, early payment requires notification to the BCB to ensure accurate records of Brazil’s stock of debt. Remittance Policies Brazilian Federal Revenue Service regulates withholding taxes (IRRF) applicable to earnings and capital gains realized by individuals and legal entities residing or domiciled outside Brazil. Upon registering investments with the BCB, foreign investors are able to remit dividends, capital (including capital gains), and, if applicable, royalties. Investors must register remittances with the BCB. Dividends cannot exceed corporate profits. Investors may carry out remittance transactions at any bank by documenting the source of the transaction (evidence of profit or sale of assets) and showing payment of applicable taxes. Under Law 13.259/2016 passed in March 2016, capital gain remittances are subject to a 15 to 22.5 percent income withholding tax, with the exception of capital gains and interest payments on tax-exempt domestically issued Brazilian bonds. The capital gains marginal tax rates are 15 percent for up to $1,000,000 in gains; 17.5 percent for $1,000,000 to $10,000,000 in gains; 20 percent for $10,000,000 to $60,000,000 in gains; and 22.5 percent for more than $60,000,000 in gains. Repatriation of a foreign investor’s initial investment is also exempt from income tax under Law 4131/1962. Lease payments are assessed a 15 percent withholding tax. Remittances related to technology transfers are not subject to the tax on credit, foreign exchange, and insurance, although they are subject to a 15 percent withholding tax and an extra 10 percent Contribution for Intervening in Economic Domain (CIDE) tax. Brazil had a sovereign fund from 2008 – 2018, when it was abolished, and the money was used to repay foreign debt. Brunei Executive Summary Brunei is a small, energy-rich sultanate on the northern coast of Borneo in Southeast Asia. Brunei boasts a well-educated, largely English-speaking population, excellent infrastructure, and a government intent on attracting foreign investment and projects. In parallel with Brunei’s efforts to attract foreign investment and create an open and transparent investment regime, the country has taken steps to streamline the process for entrepreneurs and investors to establish businesses and has improved its protections for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Despite ambitions to diversify, Brunei’s economy remains dependent on the income derived from sales of oil and gas, contributing about 50 percent to the country’s GDP. Substantial revenue from overseas investment supplements income from domestic hydrocarbon production. These two revenue streams provide a comfortable quality of life for Bruneians by regional standards. Citizens are not required to pay taxes and have access to free education through the university level, free medical care, and subsidized housing and car fuel. Brunei has a stable political climate and is generally sheltered from natural disasters. Its central location in Southeast Asia, with good telecommunications and airline connections, business tax credits in specified sectors, and no income, sales, or export taxes, offers a welcoming climate for potential investors. Sectors offering U.S. business opportunities in Brunei include aerospace and defense, agribusiness, construction, petrochemicals, energy and mining, environmental technologies, food processing and packaging, franchising, health technologies, information and communication, digital finance, and services. Brunei has ambitious climate change goals, aspiring to lower greenhouse gas emissions by more than 50 percent and increase its share of renewable energy to 30 percent of total capacity by 2035. Brunei continues to take a cautious approach against the COVID-19 pandemic despite having fully immunized 95 percent of the population. As of March 2022, although the country is not under lockdown, Brunei has not fully opened its borders to non-essential travel. Travelers entering the country are required to obtain permission from the Prime Minister’s Office. In 2014, Brunei began implementing sections of its Sharia Penal Code (SPC) that expanded preexisting restrictions on activities such as alcohol consumption, eating in public during the fasting hours in the month of Ramadan, and indecent behavior, with possible punishments including fines and imprisonment. The SPC functions in parallel with Brunei’s common law-based civil penal code. The government commenced full implementation of the SPC in 2019, introducing the possibility of corporal and capital punishments including, under certain evidentiary circumstances, amputation for theft and death by stoning for offenses including sodomy, adultery, and blasphemy. Government officials emphasize that sentencing to the most severe punishments is highly improbable due to the very high standard of proof required for conviction under the SPC. While the SPC does not specifically address business-related matters, potential investors should be aware that the SPC generated global controversy when it was implemented due to its draconian punishments and inherent discrimination toward LGBT communities. The sultan declared a moratorium on the death penalty for sharia crimes in response to the outcry and there have been no recorded incidents of U.S. citizens or U.S. investments directly affected by sharia law. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 35 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 82 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD $11.0 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD $31,510 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector In March 2021, the Minister of Finance and Economy II renewed its annual budget of USD292 million to fund infrastructure, technology, and socio-economic studies related to the implementation of Brunei’s own stock exchange, which is expected to launch in the next few years. In 2013, Brunei signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Securities Commission Malaysia (SCM) designed to strengthen collaboration in the development of fair and efficient capital markets in the two countries. It also provided a framework to facilitate greater cross-border capital market activities and cooperation in the areas of regulation as well as capacity building and human capital development, particularly in Islamic capital markets. The capital market industry in Brunei is primarily governed by the Securities Markets Order, 2013 and the Securities Markets Regulations, 2015 which are both administered by Brunei Darussalam Central Bank. In addition, securities with any Shariah or Islamic component would be additionally governed by the Syariah Financial Supervisory Board Order, 2006. Brunei has accepted the obligations under IMF Article VIII, Sections 2(a), 3 and 4, and maintains an exchange system that is free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions and multiple currency practices. Brunei has a small banking sector which includes both conventional and Islamic banking. The Brunei Darussalam Central Bank (BDCB) is the sole central authority for the banking sector, in addition to its role as the country’s central bank. Banks have high levels of liquidity, good capital adequacy ratios, and well-managed levels of non-performing loans. Several foreign banks such as Standard Chartered Bank and Bank of China (Hong Kong) have established operations in Brunei. In March 2018, HSBC officially ended its operations in Brunei after announcing its planned departure from Brunei in late 2016. All banks fall under the supervision of BDCB, which has also established a credit bureau that centralizes information on applicants’ credit worthiness. The Brunei dollar (BND) is pegged to the Singapore dollar, and each currency is accepted in both countries. The Brunei Investment Agency (BIA) manages Brunei’s General Reserve Fund and their external assets. Established in 1983, BIA’s assets are estimated to be USD60-75 billion. BIA’s activities are not publicly disclosed and are ranked the lowest in transparency ratings by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Brunei’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), managed by Darussalam Assets under the Ministry of Finance and Economy, lead key sectors of the economy including oil and gas, telecommunications, transport, and energy generation and distribution. These enterprises also receive preferential treatment when responding to government tenders. Some of the largest SOEs include the following: The telecommunications industry is dominated by government-linked companies. The service providers are Datastream Digital, Imagine, and Progresif. In 2019, the government consolidated the infrastructure of all three companies under a state-owned wholesale network operator called Unified National Networks (UNN). Royal Brunei Technical Services (RBTS), established in 1988 as a government owned corporation, is responsible for managing the acquisition of a wide range of systems and equipment. Brunei Energy Services and Trading (BEST) is the national oil company owned by the Brunei government. The company was granted all mineral rights in eight prime onshore and offshore petroleum blocks totaling 20,552 sq. km. PB manages contracts with Shell and Petronas, which are exploring Brunei’s onshore and deep-water offshore blocks. The government continues to modify BEST’s role in the oil and gas industry. In 2019, the government established Petroleum Authority as the oil and gas sector’s regulatory body, a function which had been filled by BEST. Royal Brunei Airlines started operations in 1974 and is the country’s national carrier. The airline flies a combination of Boeing and Airbus aircraft. Brunei’s Ministry of Transportation and Info-Communication has made corporatization and privatization part of its strategic plan, which calls for the Ministry to shift its role from a service provider to a regulatory body with policy-setting responsibilities. The Ministry is studying initiatives to privatize a few state-owned agencies, including the Postal Services Department and public transportation services. These services are not yet completely privatized and there is no timeline for privatization. Guidelines regarding the role of foreign investors and the bidding process are not yet available. Bulgaria Executive Summary Bulgaria is seen by many investors as an attractive low-cost investment destination, with government incentives for new investment. The country offers some of the least expensive labor in the European Union (EU) and low and flat corporate and income taxes. However, Bulgaria has the lowest labor productivity rate in the EU, and a rapidly shrinking population could exacerbate the trend. In 2021 Bulgaria continued to suffer from the COVID-19 pandemic and related shutdowns, although the impact on the economy was less severe than in many other European countries. In 2021 the government updated the budget to include more public funding of COVID-related measures, such as increased pensions. Tourism, logistics, the service industries, and the automotive sector were particularly hard hit by the pandemic. The Bulgarian economy declined 4.4 percent in 2020, rebounded to 4.2 percent growth in 2021, and is projected to grow by 4.8 percent in 2022. This recovery is being driven by higher consumption and public investment funds. The war in Ukraine and rising energy and food prices, however, threaten these growth expectations. Bulgaria is expected to receive EUR 6.2 billion over a six-year period (2021-2026) from the EU’s post-COVID recovery grant funds to improve its economy in areas such as green energy, digitalization, and private sector development. The government expects to adopt the Euro in early 2024, after having joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) in July 2020 and the EU’s Banking Union in October 2020. The adoption of the euro will eliminate currency risk and help reduce transaction costs with some of the country’s key European trading partners. There are no legal limits on foreign ownership or control of firms. With some exceptions, foreign entities are given the same treatment as national firms and their investments are not screened or otherwise restricted. There is strong growth in software development, technical support, and business process outsourcing. The Information Technology (IT) and back-office outsourcing sectors have attracted a number of U.S. and European companies to Bulgaria, and many have established global and regional service centers in the country. The automotive sector has also attracted U.S. and foreign investors in recent years. Foreign investors remain concerned about rule of law in Bulgaria. Along with endemic corruption, investors cite other problems impeding investment including difficulty obtaining needed permits, unpredictability due to frequent regulatory and legislative changes, sporadic attempts to negate long-term government contracts, and an inefficient judicial system. The new government coalition which came to power in December 2021 cited rule of law reform as its highest priority. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 78 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 35 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 USD 608 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 9,630 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE), the only securities-trading venue in Bulgaria, operates under license from the Financial Supervision Commission and is majority owned by the Ministry of Finance. The 1999 Law on Public Offering of Securities regulates the issuance of securities, securities transactions, stock exchanges, and investment intermediaries. The law is aimed at providing investor protection and at developing a transparent local capital market. In 2004 BSE performed its first IPO transaction. In 2018 BSE acquired 100 percent of the Independent Bulgarian Energy Exchange (IBEX), Bulgaria’s first independent electricity platform trader. Since its 2007 entry into the EU, Bulgaria has aligned its regulation of securities markets with EU standards under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). The BSE is a full member of the Federation of European Stock Exchanges (FESE) and operates under the Deutsche Boerse’s trading platform Xetra. The BSE’s total market capitalization comprised 23 percent of Bulgaria’s GDP in 2021, down slightly from 2020. Bulgarian companies strongly prefer to obtain financing from local banks instead of drawing from the local financial markets. At the end of 2018, the Financial Supervision Commission approved the ‘SME beam market,’ a special market that provides small and medium-sized businesses the opportunity to raise new capital more easily. Bulgaria’s first “unicorn” company Payhawk, a technological start-up, raised USD 1 billion of capital in 2022. Foreign investors can access credit on the local market. The Bulgarian bank system is well capitalized and liquid. As of the end of September 2021, the total capital adequacy ratio was 22.4 percent, above the EU average and adequately shielding domestic banks against potential macroeconomic risks. In 2020 the Bulgarian National Bank imposed a temporary payment deferral of existing loans as an anti-COVID-19 measure. As of September 2021, there were 25 banks (including 7 branches), with total assets of BGN 132.7 billion (USD 76 billion), equivalent to 100 percent of GDP. The market share of the five significant banks (directly supervised by the ECB) was 66.1 percent, the share of less significant banks was 30.6 percent, and the share of foreign bank branches was 3.3 percent. Non-performing loans were equal to 5.01 percent of the total loan portfolio of the banking system. The Bulgarian government has raised funds by issuing both Euro-denominated and Leva- denominated bonds. Commercial banks and private pension funds and insurance companies are the primary purchasers of these instruments. EU-based banks are eligible to be primary dealers of Bulgarian government bonds. Bulgaria does not have a sovereign wealth fund. The government maintains a multiannual fiscal savings reserve, a farmer subsidy fund, and an electricity price premium fund. Their annual budgeting is compliant with the government’s budget plans. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Upon EU accession, Bulgaria was recognized as a market economy, in which the majority of the companies are private. Significant state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain, however, such as railways and the postal service. SOEs also predominate in the healthcare, infrastructure, and energy sectors; many of these are collectively managed by holding companies, which are also SOEs. Some of the SOEs receive annual government subsidies for current and capital expenditures, regardless of their actual performance. SOEs’ budgets and audit reports are posted on the website of the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control. The list of all SOEs can be found here: reports.appk.government.bg/public/pubic/organizations . According to the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (NSI), there is a sizeable state-owned sector consisting of approximately 350 SOEs held by the central government and 580 by subnational governments. In 2020, SOEs accounted for 10.6 percent of the overall economy. Cross-subsidization is common within some government holding companies. In the energy sector, for example, the debts of some energy producers are covered by more lucrative entities within the holding structure. In 2019 Parliament approved the State Enterprise Act, introducing updated corporate standards and management practices. The law lists timeline and criteria for SOE senior management approval. SOEs are typically run by government elected boards. Public and private sector companies are in theory equally treated vis-à-vis bidding on concessions, taxation, or other government-controlled processes. Bulgaria became party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) upon its entry into the EU in 2007. No major privatizations are currently planned in Bulgaria. Parliament must approve government proposals to privatize any company with over 50 percent government ownership. All majority or minority state-owned properties are eligible for privatization, with the exception of those included in a specific list, including water management companies, state hospitals, and state sports facilities. The sale of specific parts of such companies follows a Council of Ministers decision or a decision of the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control, after a proposal made by the government-owned majority holder of the company. State-owned military manufacturers can be privatized with Parliamentary approval. Municipally owned property can be privatized upon decision by a municipal council or authorized body, and upon publication of the municipal privatization list in the national gazette. The 2010 Privatization and Post-Privatization Act created a single Privatization and Post-Privatization Agency responsible for privatization oversight. The new State Enterprise Act in 2019 reshuffled and renamed the agency into the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control ( www.appk.government.bg/bg/17 ). Foreign investors can participate in privatization programs. Burkina Faso Executive Summary On January 24, 2022, the Burkinabé military officers deposed the democratically-elected government of former President Roch Marc Christian Kabore, dissolved the government and national assembly, and suspended the constitution. The coup leader Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba assumed the role of president of Burkina Faso’s Transition Government. In February 2022, a transitional charter was signed by Transition President LTC Damiba laying out a three-year transition period before democratic elections could be held. Since then, a Transitional government and a Transition Legislative Assembly have been installed. Burkina Faso is a landlocked country and the world’s seventh poorest country according to the 2020 UN Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index, ranked at 182 out of 189 countries. Burkina Faso has an estimated population of 22 million inhabitants (as of June 2022) according to the United Nations, and the IMF estimates its growth domestic product (GDP) at US$ 19.62 billion. Burkina Faso’s economy rebounded in 2021 and grew at an estimated 8.5 percent, attributable to increases in gold exports and the services sector, according to the World Bank. The economy is forecasted to grow at 5.6 percent in 2022. The fiscal deficit stood at 5.5 percent of GDP in 2022, but could reach 6.6 percent of GDP in 2022 as a result of the multitude of challenges Burkina Faso faces, including security, humanitarian, food, and social, etc. Over 40 percent of the Burkinabe population live below the poverty line, and the country ranks 144th out of 157 countries in the World Bank’s Human Capital Index. Some 80 percent of the country’s population is engaged in agriculture—mostly subsistence—with only a small fraction directly involved in agribusiness. In 2020, as a response to the COVID-19 crisis, the Burkinabe government announced a series of socio-economic measures ranging from tax breaks to subsidies and food support to low-income families. The overall cost of the measures was estimated at US$656 million. Overall, Burkina Faso welcomes foreign investment and actively seeks to attract foreign partners to aid in its development. It has partially put in place the legal and regulatory framework necessary to ensure that foreign investors are treated fairly, including setting up a venue for commercial disputes and streamlining the issuance of permits and company registration requirements. More progress is needed to diminish the dominance of state-owned firms in certain sectors and to enforce intellectual property protections. Burkina Faso ranks 100th of 177 countries in the Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom report 2022 Economic Freedom Index. Among the 51 African countries in the report, Burkina Faso ranked 14th, improving its 21st position in the 2021 economic freedom report. Burkina Faso’s corruption perception score improved slightly from 40 in 2020 to 42 in 2021 and improved the country’s ranking from 86th to 78th of 180 countries. The gold mining industry has boomed in the last decade, and the bulk of foreign investment is in the mining sector, mostly from Canadian firms. Moroccan, French and UAE companies control local subsidiaries in the telecommunications industry, while foreign investors are also active in sectors such as agriculture, transport and logistics, energy, and financial technology. There is a growing foreign investment interest in the security sector. In June 2015, a new mining code was approved to standardize contract terms and better regulate the sector. In 2018, the parliament adopted a new investment code that offers many advantages to foreign investors. This code offers a range of tax breaks and incentives to lure foreign investors, including exemptions from value-added tax (VAT) on certain equipment. Effective tax rates as a result are lower than the regional average, though the tax system is complex, and compliance can be burdensome. Opportunities for U.S. firms exist in many sectors, but including in agriculture and manufacturing Burkina Faso remains committed to a market-based economy without barriers to trade. Over the last 15 years, the national power utility’s Société Nationale de l’Eléctricité du Burkina (SONABEL) customer base and energy demand ballooned. Between 2015 and 2021, SONABEL customer base grew by 64%. However, supply can only meet the demand in non-peak periods. Burkina Faso imports nearly 70 percent of its electricity from neighboring Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire and faces electricity reliability and affordability challenges. It also imports other energy products such as gasoline and gas through a network of foreign companies to meet local demand. the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) suspended the US$ 500 million compact with the Government of Burkina Faso. The Compact aimed to unlock economic growth by strengthening electricity sector effectiveness, energy reliability cost-effectiveness, and grid development and access, creating a more favorable investment environment for firms in the energy sector and the wider economy and spurring further foreign direct investment in Burkina Faso. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 78 of 180 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index – Explore the… – Transparency.org Global Innovation Index 2020 115 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 NA https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $770 GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) | Data (worldbank.org) 6. Financial Sector The government of Burkina Faso is more focused on attracting FDI and concessionary lending for development than it is on developing its capital markets. Net portfolio inflows were estimated at US$ 148.6 million ( 0.83 percent of GDP) in 2020, per the World Bank. While the government does issue some sovereign bonds to raise capital in the WAEMU regional bond market, in general the availability of different kinds of investment instruments is extremely limited. As part of its mechanism to fund its fiscal budget, the Burkina Faso government regularly issues 182-day maturity treasury bills (BAT) on the regional financial market of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, or UEMOA in French). The banking system is sound, relatively profitable, and well capitalized, but credit is highly concentrated to a small number of clients and a few sectors of the economy, according to the IMF. Only an estimated 15 percent of the population are believed to have checking accounts. Like all member states of WAEMU, Burkina Faso is a member of the Central Bank of West African States. Many foreign banks have branches in the country. The traditional banking sector is composed of twelve commercial banks and five specialized credit institutions called “établissements financiers.” In Burkina, the national strategy for inclusive finance was adopted on April 23, 2019. The use of mobile money is becoming more prevalent. In addition to two of the three main mobile carriers offering mobile money services, in 2021 other companies, both foreign and local have launched mobile money service operations and are conquering an important client base. This trend has forced traditional banks to install own mobile transfer planforms. Burkina Faso does not have a sovereign wealth fund. However, in 2017, the government created the Deposit and Consignment Fund (CDC-BF), an autonomous legal and financial entity whose mandate is to receive and manage assets of various funds and entities, in particular funds from dormant accounts transferred to the Public Treasury (National Social Security Fund, Autonomous Retirement Fund for Civil Servants, National Post Office). Its mandate is to invest the funds locally. The CDC-BF is not yet fully rolled out. 7. State-Owned Enterprises GoBF announcements for privatization bids are widely distributed, targeting both local and foreign investors. Bids are published in local papers, international magazines, mailed to different diplomatic missions, e-mailed to interested foreign investors, and published on the Internet on sites such as http://www.dgmarket.com . Burma Executive Summary On February 1, 2021, the Burmese military seized power in a coup d’état that reversed much of the economic progress of recent years. The military’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protests destabilized the country, prompted widespread opposition, and created a sharp deterioration in the investment climate. Burma’s economy shrank by 18 percent in 2021, with a forecast for one percent growth in 2022, according to the World Bank. The regime’s ongoing violence, repression, and economic mismanagement have significantly reduced Burma’s commercial activity, compounded by the pro-democracy Civil Disobedience Movement that emerged in response to the coup. Many routine business services like customs, ports, and banks are not fully operational as of April 2022. Immediately after the coup, the military detained the civilian leadership of economic and other ministries as well as the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) and replaced them with appointees who are beholden to the regime. The CBM has imposed severe foreign exchange restrictions that limit commercial activity, and the regime severely limits access to U.S. dollars. Frequent power outages and reliance on generators have dramatically raised costs for business. The regime’s suspensions of internet and other telecommunications have restricted access to information and seriously hindered business operations. Due to COVID-19 concerns, commercial international flights resumed only on April 17, 2022. Many foreign companies have suspended operations, invoked force majeure to exit investments, and evacuated foreign national staff. The rule of law is absent, regime security forces engage in random violence, there are attacks in response by pro-democracy People’s Defense Forces, and arbitrary detentions of perceived regime opponents including labor organizers and journalists. Companies invested in the market face a heightened reputational risk. There is also the potential for the regime to expropriate property or nationalize private companies. In response to the coup, the U.S. government has imposed targeted sanctions, including on members of the regime’s so-called State Administration Council (SAC), ministers, and other authorities. The U.S. has also suspended our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and instituted more stringent export controls. In the 2022 Business Advisory for Burma, the United States reaffirmed that it does not seek to curtail legitimate business and responsible investment in Burma. Nevertheless, investors should exercise extreme caution, avoid joint ventures with regime-affiliated businesses, and conduct heightened due diligence when considering new investments in this market. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 140 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/mmr Global Innovation Index 2021 127 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 -6.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,350 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The military regime’s attitude towards foreign portfolio investment is unknown. Previously, the Burmese government had gradually opened to foreign portfolio investment, but both the stock and bond markets are small and lack sufficient liquidity to enter and exit sizeable positions. Burma has a small stock market with infrequent trading. In July 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that foreign individuals and entities are permitted to hold up to 35 percent of the equity in Burmese companies listed on the Yangon Stock Exchange. Burma also has a very small publicly traded debt market. Banks have been the primary buyers of government bonds issued by the CBM, which has established a nascent bond market auction system. The Central Bank issues government treasury bonds with maturities of two, three, and five years. The CBM sets commercial loan interest rates and saving deposit rates that banks can offer, so banks cannot conduct risk-based pricing for credit. Consequently, credit is not strictly allocated on market terms. Foreign investors generally seek financing outside of Burma because of the lack of sophisticated credit instruments offered by Burmese financial institutions and lack of risk-based pricing. There is limited penetration of banking services in the country, but the usage of mobile payments had grown rapidly prior to the coup. A government 2020 census found 14 percent of the population has access to a savings account through a traditional bank. The banking system is fragile with a high volume of non-performing loans (NPLs). Financial analysts estimate that NPLs at some local banks account for 40 to 50 percent of outstanding credit but accurate calculations are hard because of accounting inconsistencies about what constitutes a non-performing loan. According to Central Bank of Myanmar’s report for FY 2020-2021, total assets in Burma’s banking system were 75 trillion kyat (USD 40.5 billion). The CBM is responsible for the country’s monetary and exchange rate policies as well as regulating and supervising the banking sector. Prior to the coup, the government had gradually opened the banking sector to foreign investors. The government began awarding limited banking licenses to foreign banks in October 2014. In November 2018, the CBM published guidelines that permit foreign banks with local licenses to offer “any financing services and other banking services” to local corporations. Previously, foreign banks were only allowed to offer export financing and related banking services to foreign corporations. No U.S. banks have a correspondent relationship with Burmese banks. Following the military coup and the imposition of U.S. sanctions on Burma, including on two large military holding companies, some non-U.S. international banks are considering whether to terminate their correspondent banking relationship with Burmese banks. Foreigners are allowed to open a bank account in Burma in either U.S. dollars or Burmese kyat. In April 2022, the CBM issued rules requiring most accounts with foreign currency holdings to be converted into Myanmar kyat at a fixed rate within one business day excluding foreign investment businesses, diplomatic missions, UN missions and international development partners. To open a bank account, foreigners must provide proof of a valid visa along with proof of income or a letter from their employer. The Germany development agency GIZ published the fifth edition the GIZ Banking Report in January 2021. According to Chapter 15 of the Myanmar Investment Law, foreign investors can convert, transfer, and repatriate profits, dividends, royalties, patent fees, license fees, technical assistance and management fees, shares and other current income resulting from any investment made under this law. Nevertheless, in practice, the transfer of money in or out of Burma has been difficult, as many international banks have internal prohibitions on conducting business in Burma given the long history of sanctions and significant money-laundering risks. The intermittent closure of banks following the coup, shortage of U.S. dollars, and low cash withdrawal limits, and CBM restrictions on holding foreign currency have further limited investors’ ability to conduct foreign exchange transactions and other necessary business operations. Under the Foreign Exchange Management Law, transfer of funds can be made only through licensed foreign exchange dealers, using freely usable currencies. The CBM grants final approval on any new loans or loan transfers by foreign investors. According to a new regulation in the Foreign Exchange Management Law, foreign investors applying for an offshore loan must get approval from the CBM. Applications are submitted through the MIC by providing a company profile, audited financial statements, draft loan agreement, and a recent bank credit statement. In April 2022, the Central Bank fixed the exchange rate at 1850 kyat/1 USD. In April 2022, the black-market exchange rate was roughly 2010 kyat/1 USD. According to the Myanmar Investment Law, foreign investors can remit foreign currency through authorized banks. Nevertheless, in practice, the transfer of money in or out of Burma has been difficult, as many international banks have internal prohibitions on conducting business in Burma given the long history of sanctions and significant money-laundering risks. The military coup and the regime’s economic policies, including restrictions placed on holding and transferring foreign currencies, has further exacerbated these investment remittance challenges. The challenge of repatriating remittances through the formal banking system are also reflected in the continued use of informal remittance services (such as the “hundi system”) by both the public and businesses. On November 15, 2019, the CBM adopted the Remittance Business Regulation in order to bring these informal networks into the official financial system. The regulations require remittance business licenses to conduct inward and outward remittance businesses from the Central Bank. It is unclear how the military regime will proceed with this regulation and the training of businesses to grant them a license to conduct remittances. Burma does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Burma are active in various sectors, including natural resource extraction, print news, energy production and distribution, banking, mobile telecommunications, and transportation. SOEs employ approximately 145,000 people, according to a 2018 report by the Natural Resource Governance Institute. The 1989 State-Owned Economic Enterprises Law does not establish a system of monitoring enterprise operations, hence detailed information on Burmese SOEs is difficult to obtain. However, according to commercial statements, the total net income of all SOEs during fiscal year 2020`21 was approximately USD 828 million. The top profit-making SOEs are found in the natural resource sector, namely the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, Myanma Gems Enterprise, and Myanma Timber Enterprise. Within Burma, there are 32 SOEs managed directly by six ministries without independent boards. SOEs enjoy several advantages including serving in some cases as the market regulator, preferential land access, and access to low-interest credit. According to the State-Owned Economic Enterprises Law, SOEs wield regulatory powers that provide SOEs a significant market advantage, including through an ability to recommend specific tax exemptions to the MIC on behalf of private sector joint-venture partners and to monitor private sector companies’ compliance with contracts. In addition, the law stipulates that SOE managers have sole discretion in awarding contracts and licenses to private sector partners with limited oversight. SOEs can secure loans at low interest rates from state-owned banks, with approval from the cabinet. Private enterprises, unlike SOEs, are forced to provide land or other real estate as collateral in order to be considered for a loan. SOEs have historically had an advantage over private entities in land access because under the Constitution the State owns all the land. In April 2021, the U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned three Burmese SOEs for their roles in financing the military regime: the Myanma Gems Enterprise, the Myanma Timber Enterprise; and the Myanmar Pearl Enterprise. In March 2021, the U.S. Department of Treasury also sanctioned two Myanmar military holding companies: Myanmar Economic Corporation and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, and those sanctions also apply to entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked entities or persons. Investors should conduct careful due diligence, including by consulting the Special Designated National list, to identify which entities are subject to U.S. sanctions given the broad scope of these firms and their privileged position in the economy. The military regime has not publicly announced any plans or timeline for privatization and in the past has preferred nationalization and supporting state-owned enterprises. Prior to the coup, the civilian government had been implementing a privatization plan, which permitted foreign investment. Burundi Executive Summary Located in Central Africa, Burundi is one of the seven member states of the East African Community (EAC). Burundi is one of the world’s most impoverished countries, with 87 percent of the population living below the World Bank’s poverty measure of $1.90 per day, 80-90 percent of the population reliant on agriculture (mostly subsistence farming) and a youth unemployment rate of about 65 percent. Economic growth is insufficient to create employment for Burundi’s rapidly growing population and President Ndayishimiye, in power since June 2020, has actively promoted good political and economic governance to improve the business environment by fighting corruption and promoting fiscal transparency. His administration is actively seeking to increase existing value chains to find new sources of employment and revenue and to find new revenue streams. The Government of Burundi (GoB) is also seeking to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI). Since taking office President Ndayishimiye has made or hosted multiple state visits with potential trade and development partners. Given the importance of agriculture, the GoB is promoting initiatives to modernize and diversify agricultural production, seeking to increase production of crops beyond coffee and tea. To attract FDI, the GoB must address an array of longstanding challenges, including: poor governance and weak institutional capacity; pervasive corruption; an exchange rate gap between the official and parallel market rates that fluctuates between 50-70 percent; financial restrictions and capital controls that limit access to and expatriation of foreign exchange; a low-skilled workforce; only 12 percent electrification nationwide; poor internet connectivity; and limited availability of reliable economic statistics. The GoB is working to develop infrastructure, including photovoltaic and hydroelectric power plants, roads construction, rehabilitation of Bujumbura Port and the construction of a railway joining Burundi, DRC and Tanzania to improve access to the country, reduce transportation costs and boost regional trade. The demand for electricity and water significantly exceeds capacity, and the transmission system is old and poorly maintained, leading to rolling blackouts and outages. In the mining sector, the GoB is introducing a new mining code and industry-wide regulations it says will promote greater transparency. As of March 2022, all foreign mining companies’ operations remain pending revision and renegotiation of new contracts/agreements based on a “win-win” principle and implementation of the new mining code. The COVID-19 pandemic and associated border closures resulted in a sharp economic slowdown in 2020, and the IMF estimates GDP shrank by around 1 percent, before rebounding by 3.6 percent in 2021. Testing capacity is low and vaccination rates remain among the lowest in the world. Burundian authorities have prepared a COVID-19 response plan to limit the disease spread and cushion its macroeconomic and social impacts; however, its implementation has been constrained by limited financing and domestic resistance, including from some at high levels of government. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 169 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 230 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Although there are no regulatory restrictions on foreign portfolio investment, Burundi does not have capital markets that would enable it. Capital allocation within Burundi is entirely dependent on commercial banks. The country does not have its own stock market. There is no regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Existing policies do not actively facilitate nor impede the free flow of financial resources into product and factor markets. There is no regulation restricting international transactions. In practice, however, the government restricts payments and transfers for international transactions due to a shortage of foreign currency, which impedes doing business in a number of ways. In theory, foreign investors have access to all existing credit instruments and on market terms. In practice, available credit is extremely limited. The financial sector includes 15 credit institutions, 40 microfinance institutions, 16 insurance companies, three social security institutions and three payment institutions. All these institutions aim at reducing unemployment by creating job opportunities, particularly small and medium-scale entrepreneurship. The banking market is dominated by the three largest and systemically important banks: Credit Bank of Bujumbura (BCB), Burundi Commercial Bank (BANCOBU), and Interbank Burundi (IBB). Burundi’s population has very limited access to banking services, according to the most recent national survey on financial inclusion conducted by the central bank. In this 2016 survey, the Bank of the Republic of Burundi (BRB) found a penetration level of approximately 22 percent, although the government opened two banks, one for youth entrepreneurs and one for women, over the last 1.5 years in an effort to address this challenge. The government is a minority shareholder in six banks, including the country’s three largest banks and is the main shareholders in the two new banks BIJE (Banque d’Investissement des Jeunes/Youth Investment Bank) and BIDF (Banque d’Investissement et de Développement pour les Femmes/Investment and Development Bank for Women). Several local commercial banks have branches in urban centers and micro-finance institutions mostly serve rural areas. Foreign banks can establish operations in the country. Foreign banks operating in the country include ECOBANK (Pan African Bank-West Africa), CRDB (Tanzanian Bank), DTB and KCB (both Kenyan Banks). The central bank directs banking regulatory policy, including prudential measures for the banking system. Foreigners and locals are subject to the same conditions when opening a bank account; the only requirement is the presentation of identification. Burundi does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises There are five SOEs in Burundi with 100 percent government ownership: REGIDESO (public utility company), ONATEL (telecom), SOSUMO (sugar), OTB (tea), COGERCO (cotton) and ODECA (Coffee). No statistics on assets are available for these companies as their reports are not available to the public. Board members for SOEs are appointed by the GoB and report to its ministries. The GoB also has a minority (40 percent) share in Brarudi brewing company, a branch of the Heineken Group, the country’s largest taxpayer. There is no published list of SOEs. SOEs have no market-based advantages and compete with other investors under the same terms and conditions; however, Burundi does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate governance for SOEs. In 2002, Burundi entered an active phase of political stabilization, national reconciliation, and economic reform. In 2004, it received an emergency post-conflict program from the IMF and the World Bank, paving the way for the development of the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Alleviation (PRSP). After the 2005 elections, the GoB made the decision to open several state-owned enterprises in different sectors of the economy to private investment, including foreign investment. The Burundian government, considering coffee a strategic sector of its economy, decided to opt for the privatization of the coffee sector first in an effort to modernize it. However, following the crisis of 2015, the GoB decided to suspend the privatization program. At that time, it had not yet privatized other sectors such as tea or sugar. In late 2019, the GoB regained control of the coffee sector, citing as its rationale perceived mismanagement on the part of the privatized companies during 2015-2019. It is unclear if or when the privatization program will continue. Cabo Verde Executive Summary The Government of Cabo Verde welcomes international investment, provides prospective investors “one-stop shop” assistance through its investment promotion agency Cabo Verde TradeInvest, and offers incentives and tax breaks for investments in multiple sectors, most notably tourism and information and communication technology. Growth is projected to slowly accelerate in 2022 as tourism inflows from Europe increase and the COVID-19 pandemic recedes, helped by an efficient vaccination rollout throughout the country. However, increases in food and energy costs stemming from the Ukraine crisis could hinder economic recovery. Cabo Verde’s political stability, democratic institutions, and economic freedom lend predictability to its business environment. Free and fair elections, good governance, prudent macroeconomic management, openness to trade, increasing integration into the global economy, and the adoption of effective social development policies all contribute to a favorable climate for investment. Cabo Verde receives high marks on international indicators for transparency and lack of corruption. There are few regulatory barriers to foreign investment in Cabo Verde, and foreign investors receive the same treatment as Cabo Verdean nationals regarding taxes, licenses and registration, and access to foreign exchange. The country’s strategic location and growing connectivity with other West African nations make it a potential gateway for investors interested in a foothold from which to expand to the continent. As Cabo Verde’s low proportion of arable land, scant rainfall, lack of natural resources, territorial discontinuity, and small population make it a high-cost economy with few economies of scale, the country relies on foreign investment, imports, development aid, and remittances. Despite the challenges, in 2007 the country became one of the first to graduate from least developed country status, and it met most of its Millennium Development Goals by 2015. As the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, the economy’s dependence on tourism, which accounted directly for 25 percent of GDP and more than 40 percent indirectly pre-pandemic, makes it vulnerable to external shocks. In addition, the pandemic caused the government to put plans to privatize state-owned enterprises on hold, though privatization of ports and airports management and water and electricity could move forward later. While the business and investment climates continue to improve, there remain bureaucratic, linguistic (relatively few English or French speakers), and cultural challenges to overcome. The government’s new Cabo Verde Ambition 2030 plan builds on its Strategic Plan for Sustainable Development and promises to open opportunities in sustainable tourism, renewable energy, blue and digital economies, and the transformation of Cabo Verde into a transportation and logistics platform. Cabo Verde aims to generate 50 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030 and 100 percent by 2040. Diversification of the economy remains a priority, but high public debt levels, which reached a record estimated 158.4 percent of GDP in 2021, limit government funding capacity. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 39 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 89 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,060 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Limited capital market and portfolio investment opportunities exist in Cabo Verde. The Cabo Verdean stock market, Bolsa de Valores de Cabo Verde (BVC), is fully operational. It has been most active in the issuance of bonds. Foreign investors must open an account with a bank in Cabo Verde before buying stocks or bonds from BVC. Foreign interests may access credit under the same market conditions as Cabo Verdeans. The IMF’s April 2021 country report on Cabo Verde noted that “the government did not impose or intensify restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions nor introduce multiple currency practices. Similarly, it did not conclude bilateral payment agreements inconsistent with Article VIII nor impose or intensify import restrictions for balance of payments purposes.” Cabo Verde has a small financial sector supervised and regulated by the Central Bank of Cabo Verde (BCV). According to 2020 data from BCV, 82.8 percent of Cabo Verde’s adult population has a bank account. Internet-based tools and services in the banking sector continue to grow in Cabo Verde, particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic, changing the model of the client-bank relationship. New information and communications technology products allow customers online alternatives to in-person support. Banking represents more than 80 percent of the assets of the entire Cabo Verdean financial system. Two banks – Banco Comercial do Atlantico (BCA) and Caixa Economica de Cabo Verde (CECV) – together held 57.7 percent of market share in 2020, according to BCV data. Legislation approved in January 2020 terminated the issuance of restricted licenses for offshore banking operations, calling for generic licenses and operations with resident clients. BCV subsequently announced that banks with a restricted license (offshore) serving non-residents would have to adjust to the new requirements or face revocation of their license and enforced administrative liquidation. Offshore banks operating in Cabo Verde had until December 2021 to complete the transition. One did, two opted for liquidation, and BCV revoked the license of a fourth. Currently there are no offshore banks operating in Cabo Verde. To establish a bank account, clients must provide proper identification and obtain a taxpayer number from the Commercial Registry Department (Casa do Cidadao), a process that takes approximately 10 minutes. Bank credit is available to foreign investors under the same conditions as for domestic investors. The private sector has access to credit instruments such as loans, letters of credit, and lines of credit. Cambodia Executive Summary The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant adverse impact on Cambodia’s economy. Despite a surge of cases in 2021, Cambodia’s economy demonstrated resilience in some sectors (agriculture, manufacturing) and showed signs of gradual recovery from the previous year’s economic disruptions, achieving 2.2 percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth. This follows a 3.1 percent contraction of its GDP in 2020. Having adopted a “living with COVID” stance to reopen its economy and attract international tourists, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) in March 2022 dropped all quarantine and testing requirements for fully vaccinated travelers. The World Bank predicts Cambodia’s GDP growth to rebound to 4.5 percent in 2022. The RGC has made attracting investment from abroad a top priority, and in October 2021 passed a new Law on Investment. Foreign direct investment (FDI) incentives available to investors include 100 percent foreign ownership of companies, corporate tax holidays, reduced corporate tax rates, duty-free import of capital goods, and no restrictions on capital repatriation. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government enacted economic recovery measures to boost competitiveness and support the economy, including a long-awaited Competition Law, a Public-Private Partnership Law, and provided tax breaks to the hardest hit businesses, such as those in the tourism and restaurant sectors. The government also delayed the implementation of a capital gains tax to 2024 and established an SME Bank of Cambodia to support small- and medium-sized enterprises. Despite these incentives, Cambodia has not attracted significant U.S. investment. Apart from the country’s relatively small market size, other factors dissuading U.S. investors include: systemic corruption, a limited supply of skilled labor, inadequate infrastructure (including high energy costs), a lack of transparency in some government approval processes, and preferential treatment given to local or other foreign companies that engage in acts of corruption or tax evasion or take advantage of Cambodia’s weak regulatory environment. Foreign and local investors alike lament the government’s failure to adequately consult the business community on new economic policies and regulations. In light of these concerns, on November 10, 2021, the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce issued a business advisory to caution U.S. businesses currently operating in, or considering operating, in Cambodia to be mindful of interactions with entities involved in corrupt business practices, criminal activities, and human rights abuses. Notwithstanding these challenges, several large American companies maintain investments in the country, for example, Coca-Cola’s $100 million bottling plant and a $21 million Ford vehicle assembly plant slated to open in 2022. In recent years, Chinese FDI — largely from state-run or associated firms — has surged and has become a significant driver of growth in Cambodia. Chinese businesses, many of which are state-owned enterprises, may not assess the challenges in Cambodia’s business environment in the same manner as U.S. businesses. In 2021, Cambodia recorded FDI inflows of $655 million, with approximately 52 percent reportedly coming from the PRC. Physical infrastructure projects, including commercial and residential real estate developments, continue to attract the bulk of FDI. However, there has been some increased investments in manufacturing, including garment and travel goods factories, as well as agro-processing. In 2022, both the Cambodia-China Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement entered into force. Climate change remains a critical issue in Cambodia due to its vulnerability to extreme weather occurrences, high rates of deforestation, and low environmental accountability. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 157 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 109 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 1994-2021 $1.58 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,500 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector To address the need for capital markets in Cambodia, the Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX) was founded in 2011 and started trading in 2012. Though the CSX is one of the world’s smallest securities markets, with nine listed companies, it has taken steps to increase the number of listed companies, including attracting SMEs. In 2021, market capitalization stood at $2.4 billion, and the daily trading value averaged $246,000. In September 2017, the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) adopted a regulation on the Conditions for Banking and Financial Institutions to be listed on CSX. The regulation sets additional requirements for banks and financial institutions that intend to issue securities to the public. This includes prior approval from the NBC and minimum equity of KHR 60 billion (approximately $15 million). Cambodia’s bond market is at the beginning stages of development. The regulatory framework for corporate bonds was bolstered in 2017 through the publication of several regulations covering public offering of debt securities, the accreditation of bondholders’ representatives, and the accreditation of credit rating agencies. The country’s first corporate bond was issued in 2018, and there are currently eight corporate bonds listed on the CSX. There is currently no sovereign bond market, but the government has stated its intention of making government securities available to investors in 2022. The NBC regulates the operations of Cambodia’s banks. Foreign banks and branches are freely allowed to register and operate in the country. There are 54 commercial banks, 10 specialized banks (set up to finance specific turn-key projects such as real estate development), 79 licensed microfinance institutions (MFIs), and five licensed microfinance deposit taking institutions in Cambodia. The NBC has also granted licenses to 17 financial leasing companies and one credit bureau company to improve transparency and credit risk management and encourage lending to small- and medium-sized enterprise customers. The banking sector’s assets, including those of MFIs, rose 16 percent year-over-year in 2020 to KHR 241 trillion ($59.4 billion) and customer loans increased 15 percent to KHR 151 trillion ($37.3 billion). In 2020, the number of deposit accounts reached 8.9 million (out of a population of roughly 17 million), while credit accounts reached 3.2 million. The government does not use the regulation of capital markets to restrict foreign investment. Banks have been free to set their own interest rates since 1995, and increased competition between local institutions has led to a gradual lowering of interest rates from year to year. However, in April 2017, at the direction of Prime Minister Hun Sen, the NBC capped interest rates on loans offered by MFIs at 18 percent per annum. The move was designed to protect borrowers, many of whom are poor and uneducated, from excessive interest rates. In March 2016, the NBC doubled the minimum capital reserve requirement for banks to $75 million for commercial banks and $15 million for specialized banks. Based on the new regulations, deposit-taking microfinance institutions now have a $30 million reserve requirement, while traditional microfinance institutions have a $1.5 million reserve requirement. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the NBC adopted measures to maintain financial stability and ensure liquidity in the banking system. These measures included allowing banks to maintain their capital conservation buffer at 50 percent, reducing the reserve requirement rate, and allowing banks to restructure loans for clients impacted by COVID. Financial technology (Fintech) in Cambodia is developing rapidly. Available technologies include mobile payments, QR codes, and e-wallet accounts for domestic and cross-border payments and transfers. In 2012, the NBC launched retail payments for checks and credit remittances. A “Fast and Secure Transfer” (FAST) payment system was introduced in 2016 to facilitate instant fund transfers. The Cambodian Shared Switch (CSS) system was launched in October 2017 to facilitate the access to network automated teller machines (ATMs) and point of sale (POS) machines. In February 2019, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) cited Cambodia for being “deficient” with regard to its anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) controls and policies and included Cambodia on its “grey list.” The RGC committed to working with FATF to address these deficiencies through a joint action plan, although Cambodia remains on the grey list as of 2022. Should Cambodia not take appropriate action, FATF could move it to the “black list,” which could negatively impact the cost of capital as well as the banking sector’s ability to access international capital markets. In addition to Cambodia’s weak AML/CFT regime, vulnerabilities include a largely cash-based, dollarized economy and porous borders. Both legal and illicit transactions, regardless of size, are frequently conducted outside of regulated financial institutions. Cash proceeds from crime are readily channeled into land, housing, luxury goods and vehicles, and other forms of property, without passing through the banking sector. Moreover, a lack of judicial independence and transparency constrains effective enforcement of laws against financial crimes. The judicial branch lacks efficiency and cannot assure impartiality, and judicial officials, up to and including the chief of the Supreme Court, have simultaneously held positions in the political ruling party. Refer to Section II: “Illicit Finance and Corrupt Activities in Cambodia” of the U.S. government’s Cambodia Business Advisory on High-Risk Investments and Interactions released on November 10, 2021, for more information. Cambodia does not have a sovereign wealth fund. Cameroon Executive Summary Cameroon, the largest economy in the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC), continues to face the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic; however, growth has started to recover from a 2020 recession. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects Cameroon’s gross domestic product (GDP) to increase by 4.6 percent in 2022. Cameroon’s current account balance also improved in 2021 and early 2022. The government continues to implement its 2020-2030 National Development Strategy and development projects, especially in road infrastructure, transport, energy, and health, albeit with delays. Cameroon utilized its hosting of the Africa Cup of Nations soccer tournament in early 2022 to hasten the completion of some long-awaited projects and promote Cameroon to investors. Cameroon maintains strong competitive advantages because of a bilingual population, a relatively diversified economy, and its location as a gateway to the Central African region. It offers immense investment potential in infrastructure, extractive industries, consumer markets, and modern communication technology (for example, internet broadband, fiber optic cable, and data centers). However, Cameroon’s telecommunication infrastructure is overutilized and in need of upgrades, which often results in network outages. Agricultural processing and transport infrastructure, such as seaports, airports, and rail, need investments, especially for modernization and maintenance. More investment opportunities exist in the financial sector as only 15 percent of Cameroonians have access to formal banking services. Corruption and weak governance structures continue to hamper Cameroon’s business climate. The IMF approved a three-year, $689.5 million hybrid Extended Credit Facility-Extended Fund Facility arrangement in July 2021 to advance structural fiscal reforms, improve governance, and continue mitigating the health, economic, and social consequences of the pandemic while ensuring domestic and external sustainability. Cameroon’s 2022 budget aligns with its National Development Strategy and IMF program and sets a target to reduce the budget deficit from -3.2 percent in 2021 to -2 percent in 2022. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 144 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 123 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $-19 million https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $1,520 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The Cameroonian government is open to portfolio investment. With the encouragement of the IMF and BEAC, Cameroon and other members of the CEMAC region have designed policies that facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. The Financial Markets Commission of Cameroon merged operations with the Libreville-based Central African Financial Market Supervisory Board in February 2019. The merger has led to the establishment of a unique regional stock exchange called the Central African Stock Exchange (CASE). Cameroon’s financial sector is underdeveloped, and government policies have limited bearing on the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. Foreign investors can get credit on the local market and the private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. In 2016, Cameroon sought to encourage the development of capital markets through Law No 2016/010 of July 12, 2016, governing undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities in Cameroon. Cameroon is connected to the international banking payment system. The country is a CEMAC member, which maintains a central bank, BEAC. CEMAC’s central bank works with the IMF on monetary policies and public finance reform. BEAC respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Despite generally respecting Article VIII, BEAC has instituted several restrictions on payments to boost foreign exchange reserves. Financial institutions and importers complain of a backlog of requests for foreign exchange. BEAC is currently negotiating with several international oil companies on repatriation of revenues before external payments. Investors should be aware that timely repatriation of profits may be a stumbling block. In 2020, with the support of the IMF, BEAC took steps to address the economic impact of COVID-19 in the region. The central bank eased monetary policy and introduced accommodative measures to ensure adequate liquidity in the banking system to supporting internal and external stability. Concomitantly, the regional banking sector controller (Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale or COBAC) eased prudential regulations to help banks delay pandemic-related losses. Less than 20 percent of Cameroonians have access to formal banking services. The Cameroonian government has often spoken of increasing access, but no coherent policy or action has been taken to alleviate the problem. Mobile money, introduced by local and international telecom providers, is the closest tool to banking services that most Cameroonians can access. In its 2022 finance law, the government introduced a tax on electronic payment transfers, including the ubiquitously used “Mobile Money.” The banking sector is generally healthy. Large, international commercial banks do most of the lending. One local bank, Afriland, operates in Cameroon and multiple other countries. Most smaller banks deal in small loans of short duration. Retail banking is not common. According to the World Bank, non-performing loans were 10.31 percent of total bank loans in 2016. The Cameroonian government does not keep statistics on non-performing assets. According to Cameroon’s National Credit Council, Afriland First Bank, Societe General Cameroun (SGC), Banque Internationale du Cameroun pour l’Epargne et le Credit (BICEC), and Societe Commerciale de Banque Cameroun (SCB) are the most important banks in the national banking system, accounting for 52 percent of the banking system’s total consolidated balance sheet, 54 percent of total loans, and 54 percent of customer deposits in 2020. Foreign banks can establish operations in Cameroon. Most notably, Citibank and Standard Chartered Bank have operated in Cameroon for more than 20 years. They are subject to the same regulations as local banks. U.S. Embassy Yaoundé officials are unaware of any lost correspondent banking relationships within the past three years. There are no restrictions on foreigners establishing bank accounts, credit instruments, business financing, or other such transactions. The country has 412 registered microfinance institutions, 19 insurance companies, four electronic money institutions, and one Post Office bank. Two major money transfer operators are also present, essentially offering over-the-counter services. The Cameroon market is at the startup stage for its digital financial system. This emerging market segment is currently provided by banks in partnership with telecom operators. According to a 2021 BEAC report on the state of electronic payments in the CEMAC zone, electronic money payments in the CEMAC region increased 21.8 percent from 2019 to 2020, totaling approximately $51 million in 2020 compared to $42 million in 2019. Cameroon represented the largest amount of electronic payment transfers, accounting for 73 percent of all CEMAC transactions and totaling over $20 million in 2020. Financial inclusion is low despite some progress brought about by mobile telephony. The World Bank estimates there were 25 million mobile cellular subscriptions in Cameroon in 2020. Putting aside the multi-SIM effect, the penetration rate in terms of unique subscribers was about 50 percent at the end of 2019, which puts Cameroon in the lower end in the Central African region. Cameroon does not have a sovereign wealth fund. Canada Executive Summary Canada and the United States have one of the largest and most comprehensive investment relationships in the world. U.S. investors are attracted to Canada’s strong economic fundamentals, proximity to the U.S. market, highly skilled work force, and abundant resources. Canada encourages foreign direct investment (FDI) by promoting stability, global market access, and infrastructure. The United States is Canada’s largest investor, accounting for 44 percent of total FDI. As of 2020, the amount of U.S. FDI totaled USD 422 billion, a 5 percent increase from the previous year. Canada’s FDI stock in the United States totaled USD 570 billion, a 15 percent increase from the previous year. Canada attracted USD 61 billion inward FDI flows in 2021 (the highest since 2007), a rebound from COVID-19-related decreases in 2020 according to Canada’s national statistical office. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) came into force on July 1, 2020, replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The USMCA supports a strong investment framework beneficial to U.S. investors. Foreign investment in Canada is regulated by the Investment Canada Act (ICA). The purpose of the ICA is to review significant foreign investments to ensure they provide an economic net benefit and do not harm national security. In March 2021, the Canadian government announced revised ICA foreign investment screening guidelines that include additional national security considerations such as sensitive technology areas, critical minerals, and sensitive personal data. The guidelines followed an April 2020 ICA update, which provides for greater scrutiny of foreign investments by state-owned investors, as well as investments involving the supply of critical goods and services. Despite a generally welcoming foreign investment environment, Canada maintains investment stifling prohibitions in the telecommunication, airline, banking, and cultural sectors. The 2022 budget proposal included language that could limit foreign ownership of real estate for a two-year period (to cool an overheated market and lack of housing for Canadians). Ownership and corporate board restrictions prevent significant foreign telecommunication and aviation investment, and there are deposit acceptance limitations for foreign banks. Investments in cultural industries such as book publishing are required to be compatible with national cultural policies and be of net benefit to Canada. In addition, non-tariff barriers to trade across provinces and territories contribute to structural issues that have held back the productivity and competitiveness of Canada’s business sector. Canada has taken steps to address the climate crisis by establishing the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act that enshrines in law the Government of Canada’s commitment to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and issuing the 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan that describes the measures Canada is undertaking to reduce emissions to 40 to 45 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 and achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 13 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2020 16 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 USD 402,255 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 43,580 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Canada’s capital markets are open, accessible, and regulated. Credit is allocated on market terms, the private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments, and foreign investors can get credit on the local market. Canada has several securities markets, the largest of which is the Toronto Stock Exchange, and there is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. The Canadian government and Bank of Canada do not place restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. The Canadian banking system is composed of 35 domestic banks and 16 foreign bank subsidiaries. Six major domestic banks are dominant players in the market and manage close to USD 5.4 trillion in assets. Many large international banks have a presence in Canada through a subsidiary, representative office, or branch. Ninety-nine percent of Canadians have an account with a financial institution. The Canadian banking system is viewed as very stable due to high capitalization rates that are well above the norms set by the Bank for International Settlements. The OSFI, Canada’s primary banking regulator, announced in January 2022 revised capital, leverage, liquidity, and disclosure rules that incorporate the final Basel III banking reforms with additional adjustments to make them suitable for federally regulated deposit-taking institutions. Most of the revised rules will take effect in the second fiscal quarter of 2023, with those related to market risk and credit valuation adjustment risk taking effect in early 2024. Foreign financial firms interested in investing submit their applications to the OSFI for approval by the Minister of Finance. U.S. and other foreign banks can establish banking subsidiaries in Canada. Several U.S. financial institutions maintain commercially focused operations, principally in the areas of lending, investment banking, and credit card issuance. Foreigners can open bank accounts in Canada with proper identification and residency information. The Bank of Canada is the nation’s central bank. Its principal role is “to promote the economic and financial welfare of Canada,” as defined in the Bank of Canada Act. The Bank’s four main areas of responsibility are: monetary policy; promoting a safe, sound, and efficient financial system; issuing and distributing currency; and being the fiscal agent for Canada. Canada does not have a federal sovereign wealth fund. The province of Alberta maintains the Heritage Savings Trust Fund to manage the province’s share of non-renewable resource revenue. The fund’s net financial assets were valued at USD 14 billion as of December 31, 2021. The Fund invests in a globally diversified portfolio of public and private equity, fixed income, and real assets. The Fund follows the voluntary code of good practices known as the “Santiago Principles” and participates in the IMF-hosted International Working Group of SWFs. The Heritage Fund holds approximately 50 percent of its value in equity investments, seventeen percent of which are domestic. Chad Executive Summary Chad is Africa’s fifth largest country by surface area, encompassing three bioclimatic zones. Chad is landlocked, bordering Libya to the north, Sudan to the east, Central African Republic (CAR) to the south, and Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger to the west (with which it shares Lake Chad). The nearest port — Douala, Cameroon — is 1,700 km from the capital, N’Djamena. Chad is one of six countries that constitute the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), a common market. Chad’s human development is one of the lowest in the world according to the UN Human Development Index (HDI). Poverty afflicts a large proportion of the population. The Government of Chad (GOC) actively solicits foreign investment, especially from North America. Opportunities for foreign investment exist in Agribusiness; Agricultural, Construction, Building & Heavy Equipment; Automotive & Ground Transportation; Education; Energy & Mining; Environmental Technologies; Food Processing & Packaging; Health Technologies; Information Technology; Industrial Equipment & Supplies; Information & Communication; and Services. Since oil production began in 2003, the petroleum sector has dominated economic activity and been the largest target of foreign investment, including from U.S. companies. Agriculture and livestock breeding are also important economic activities, employing most of the population. In recent years, the GOC has prioritized agriculture, solar energy production, gold mining, livestock breeding and processing, and information technology to diversify the economy and lessen fiscal dependence on volatile global energy markets. Chad’s investment climate is challenging. Private sector development suffers from a lack of transport infrastructure, GDP growth, skilled labor, reliable electricity, adequate contract enforcement, good governance, and attractive tax rates. Frequent border closures with neighboring countries complicate trade. The COVID-19 pandemic, and associated restrictions, halted Chad’s modest 2019 economic recovery following several years of recession caused by low global oil prices and disruptive debt payments to Glencore. Overall vaccination rates remain low. Existing IMF and World Bank programs aim to improve governance, increase transparency, and reduce internal arrears. Private sector financing is limited, and low GDP growth constrains government investment. Corruption and historically frequent replacement of senior level government figures present further roadblocks, as does cumbersome French-based labor law. The GOC’s interest in maintaining a stake in investment projects, while facilitating access to key decision makers, also introduces financial and operational risks. Despite these challenges, the success of several foreign investments into Chad illustrates opportunities for experienced, dedicated, and patient investors. Successful investors typically operate with trusted local partners. The oil sector will mark 20 years of operations in 2023. Singapore-based Olam International entered Chad’s cotton market in 2018. Mindful of the imperative to enact reforms, the GOC operationalized a Presidential Council to Improve the Business Climate in January 2021. With rich natural resources, minimally developed agriculture and meat processing sectors, ample sunshine, increasing telecommunications coverage, and a rapidly growing population, Chad presents an opportunity for targeted investment in key sectors. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 164 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $630 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Chad’s financial system is underdeveloped. There are no capital markets or money markets in Chad. A limited number of financial instruments are available to the private sector, including letters of credit, short- and medium-term loans, foreign exchange services, and long-term savings instruments. Chad maintains an exchange system that is free from restrictions and multiple currency practices on payments and transfers for current international transactions. This includes due to any actions delegated to BEAC. Commercial banks offer credit on market terms, often at rates of 12 to 25 percent for short-term loans. Access to credit is available but is prohibitively expensive for most Chadians in the private sector. Medium-term loans are difficult to obtain, as lending criteria are rigid. Most large businesses maintain accounts with foreign banks and borrow money outside of Chad. There are ATMs in some major hotels, most neighborhoods of N’Djamena, the N’Djamena airport, and in major cities. Chad does not have a stock market and has no effective regulatory system to encourage or facilitate portfolio investments. A small regional stock exchange, known as the Central African Stock Exchange, in Libreville, Gabon, was established by CEMAC countries in 2006. Cameroon, a CEMAC member, launched its own market in 2005. Both exchanges are poorly capitalized. Chad’s banking sector is small and continues to streamline lending practices and reduce the volume of bad debt accumulated before and during the 2016-2017 economic crisis. While Chad’s banking rate remains low due to low aggregate savings and limited trust in and exposure to banks, according to the World Bank it increased from nine to 22 percent between 2009 and 2017. Chad’s four largest banks have been privatized. The former Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique au Tchad (BIAT) became a part of Togo-based Ecobank; the former Banque Tchadienne de Credit et de Depôt was re-organized as the Societe Generale Tchad; the former Financial Bank became part of Togo-based Orabank; and the former Banque de Developpement du Tchad (BDT) was reorganized as Commercial Bank Tchad (CBT), in partnership with Cameroon-based Commercial Bank of Cameroon. There are two Libyan banks in Chad, BCC (formerly Banque Libyenne) and BSCIC (Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour l’Investissement et le Commerce), along with one Nigerian bank — United Bank for Africa (UBA). In 2018, the GOC funded a new bank Banque de l’Habitat du Tchad (BHT) with the GOC as majority shareholder with 50 percent of the shares and two public companies, the National Social Insurance Fund (Caisse Nationale de Prevoyance Sociale, CNPS) and the Chadian Petroleum Company (Societe des Hydrocarbures du Tchad, SHT), each holding 25 percent. Chad, as a CEMAC member, shares a central bank with Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon — the Central African Economic Bank (BEAC, Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale), headquartered in Yaounde, Cameroon. Foreigners must establish legal residency in order to establish a bank account. The GOC does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises All Chadian SOEs operate under the umbrella of government ministries. SOE senior management reports to the minister responsible for the relevant sector, as well as a board of directors and an executive board. Historically, the president appointed members of SOE boards of directors, executive boards, and CEOs though no new appointments have happened since the April 2021 establishment of the Transitional Military Council. The boards of directors give general directives over the year, while the executive boards manage general guidelines set by the boards of directors. Some executive directors consult with their respective ministries before making business decisions. The GOC operates SOEs in several sectors, including Energy and Environmental Industries; Agribusiness; Construction, Building and Heavy Equipment; and Information and Communication. The percentage of their annual budget that SOEs allocate to research and development (R&D) is unpublished. There were no reports of discriminatory action taken by SOEs against the interests of foreign investors in 2021. Some foreign companies operated in direct competition with SOEs. Chad’s Public Tender Code (PTC) provides preferential treatment for domestic competitors, including SOEs. SOEs are not subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors and are often afforded material advantages such as preferential access to land and raw materials. SOEs receive government subsidies under the national budget, which the government does not publish. SOEs often comingle government and SOE funds, which complicates their financial picture. Chad is not a party to the Agreement on Government Procurement within the framework of the WTO. Chadian practices are not consistent with the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. (Please use DOC key words for industries in this section; list available at https://www.export.gov/industries ). Foreign investors are permitted and encouraged to participate in the privatization process. There is a public, non-discriminatory bidding process. Having a local contact in Chad to assist with the bidding process is important. To combat corruption, the GOC has recently hired private international companies to oversee the bidding process for government tenders. The Chamber of Commerce submitted a ‘white paper’ (livre blanc) in 2018 with recommendations for the GOC to facilitate and simplify private sector operations, including establishing a Business Observatory and a Presidential Council, which would implement over 70 recommendations to improve the investment climate in Chad. The Presidential Council became operational in January 2021. The GOC has expressed general willingness to privatize its generally unprofitable SOEs, including to foreign investors. As an example, in 2018, it sold a majority stake in cotton export company CotonTchad Société Nouvelle (CotonTchad SN) to the Singaporean Olam International. Qatari investors recently purchased a slaughterhouse in Moundou as well. Investors from the UAE are under talks to purchase a slaughterhouse in Farcha, though their progress has stalled. Chad is considering privatization in the following industries: Information & Communication (SOTEL Tchad) Food Processing & Packaging (the Société Tchadienne de Jus de Fruit (STJF), which produces fruit juice in Doba Agricultural Products (Société Moderne de Abbatoires (SMA), a slaughterhouse and meat packaging company in Farcha) In addition, a 2019 law opened the market for power generation to private companies, though involvement in transmission remains under the control of the state-owned Societe Nationale d’Electricite du Tchad (SNE), which is reportedly unprofitable. Chile Executive Summary With the second highest GDP per capita in Latin America (behind Uruguay), Chile has historically enjoyed among the highest levels of stability and prosperity in the region. However, widespread civil unrest broke out throughout the country in 2019 in protest of the government’s handling of the economy and perceived systemic inequality. Pursuant to a political accord, Chile held a plebiscite in October 2020 in which citizens chose to redraft the constitution. Uncertainty about the outcome of the redrafting process may impact investment. Due to Chile’s solid macroeconomic policy framework, the country boasts one of the strongest sovereign bond ratings in Latin America, which has provided fiscal space for the Chilean government to respond to the economic contraction resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic through stimulus packages and other measures. As a result, Chile’s economic growth in 2021 was, according to the Central Bank’s latest estimation, between 11.5 percent and 12 percent. The same institution forecasts Chile’s economic growth in 2022 will be in the range of 1 to 2 percent due largely to the gradual elimination of COVID-19 economic stimulus programs. Chile has successfully attracted large amounts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) despite its relatively small domestic market. The country’s market-oriented policies have created significant opportunities for foreign investors to participate in the country’s economic growth. Chile has a sound legal framework and there is general respect for private property rights. Sectors that attract significant FDI include mining, finance/insurance, energy, telecommunications, chemical manufacturing, and wholesale trade. Mineral, hydrocarbon, and fossil fuel deposits within Chilean territory are restricted from foreign ownership, but companies may enter into contracts with the government to extract these resources. Corruption exists in Chile but on a much smaller scale than in most Latin American countries, ranking 27 – along with the United States – out of 180 countries worldwide and second in Latin America in Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. Although Chile is an attractive destination for foreign investment, challenges remain. Legislative and constitutional reforms proposed in response to the social unrest and the pandemic have generated concerns about the future government policies on property rights, rule of law, tax structure, the role of government in the economy, and many other issues. Importantly, the legislation enabling the constitutional reform process requires that the new constitution must respect Chile’s character as a democratic republic, its judicial sentences, and its international treaties (including the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement). Despite a general respect for intellectual property (IP) rights, Chile has not fully complied with its IP obligations set forth in the U.S.-Chile FTA and remains on the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report for not adequately enforcing IP rights. Environmental permitting processes, indigenous consultation requirements, and cumbersome court proceedings have made large project approvals increasingly time consuming and unpredictable, especially in cases with political sensitivities. The current administration has stated its willingness to continue attracting foreign investment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 27 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 53 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country (US$ billion, historical stock positions) 2020 23.0 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita (US$) 2020 13,470 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Chile’s authorities are committed to developing capital markets and keeping them open to foreign portfolio investors. Foreign firms offer services in Chile in areas such as financial information, data processing, financial advisory services, portfolio management, voluntary saving plans and pension funds. Under the U.S.-Chile FTA, Chile opened up significantly its insurance sector, with very limited exceptions. The Santiago Stock Exchange is Chile’s dominant stock exchange, and the third largest in Latin America. However, when compared to other OECD countries, it has lower market liquidity. Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources into Chile’s product and factor markets and adjustment to external shocks in a commodity export-dependent economy. Chile accepted the obligations of Article VIII (sections 2, 3 and 4) and maintains a free-floating exchange rate system, free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms and its various instruments are available to foreigners. The Central Bank reserves the right to restrict foreign investors’ access to internal credit if a credit shortage exists. To date, this authority has not been exercised. Nearly one fourth of Chileans have a credit card from a bank and nearly one third have a non-bank credit card, but less than 20 percent have a checking account. However, financial inclusion is higher than banking penetration: a large number of lower-income Chilean residents have a CuentaRut, which is a commission-free card with an electronic account available for all, launched by the state-owned Banco Estado, also the largest provider of microcredit in Chile. The Chilean banking system is healthy and competitive, and many Chilean banks already meet Basel III standards. The new General Banking Act (LGB), published in January 2019, defined general guidelines for establishing a capital adequacy system in line with Basel standards, and gave the CMF the authority to establish the capital framework. All Basel III regulations were published in December 2020, and the CMF started the implementation process of Basel III requirements to last to December 1, 2025. The system’s liquidity position (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) remains above regulatory limits (70%). Capital adequacy ratio of the system equaled 14.9 percent as of December 2021 and remains robust even when including discounts due to market and/or operational risks. Non-performing loans decreased after August 2020 due to government relief measures for households, including legislation authorizing two rounds of withdrawals from pension accounts. As of January 2022, non-performing loans equaled 1.26 percent compared to 1.54 percent as of January 2021) when measured by the standard 90 days past due criterion. As of November 2021, the total assets of the Chilean banking system amounted to US$ 428.6 billion, according to the Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions. The largest six banks (Banco de Crédito e Inversiones, Banco Santander-Chile, Banco Estado, Banco de Chile, Scotiabank Chile and Itaú-Corpbanca) accounted for 88 percent of the system’s assets. Chile’s Central Bank conducts the country’s monetary policy, is constitutionally autonomous from the government, and is not subject to regulation by the Superintendence of Banks. Foreign banks have an important presence in Chile, comprising three out of the six largest banks of the system. Out of 17 banks currently in Chile, five are foreign-owned but legally established banks in Chile and four are branches of foreign banks. Both categories are subject to the requirements set out under the Chilean banking law. There are also 21 representative offices of foreign banks in Chile. There are no reports of correspondent banking relationships withdrawal in Chile. In order to open a bank account in Chile, a foreigner must present his/her Chilean ID Card or passport, Chilean tax ID number, proof of address, proof of income/solvency, photo, and fingerprints. The Government of Chile maintains two sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) built with savings from years with fiscal surpluses. The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (FEES) was established in 2007 and was valued at US$ 6.4 billion as of January 2022. The purpose of the FEES is to fund public debt payments and temporary deficit spending, in order to keep a countercyclical fiscal policy. The Pensions Reserve Fund (FRP) was built up in 2006 and amounted to US$ 7.2 billion as of January 2022. The purpose of the FRP is to anticipate future needs of payments to those eligible to receive pensions, but whose contributions to the private pension system fall below a minimum threshold. Chile is a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) and adheres to the Santiago Principles. Chile’s government policy is to invest SWFs entirely abroad into instruments denominated in foreign currencies, including sovereign bonds and related instruments, corporate and high-yield bonds, mortgage-backed securities from U.S. agencies, and stocks. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Chile had 28 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in operation as of 2020. Twenty-seven SOEs are commercial companies and the newest one (FOINSA) is an infrastructure fund that was created to facilitate public-private partnership projects. 25 SOEs are not listed and are fully owned by the government, while the remaining three are majority government owned. Ten Chilean SOEs operate in the port management sector, six in the services sector, three in the defense sector, three in the mining sector (including CODELCO, the world’s largest copper producer, and ENAP, an oil and gas company), two in transportation, one in the water sector, one is a TV station, and one is a state-owned bank (Banco Estado). The state holds a minority stake in four water companies as a result of a privatization process. In 2020, total assets of Chilean SOEs amounted to US$ 89.3 billion, while their total net income was US$ 833.7 million. SOEs employed 47,225 people in 2020. Twenty SOEs in Chile fall under the supervision of the Public Enterprises System (SEP), a state holding in charge of overseeing SOE governance. The rest – including the largest SOEs such as CODELCO, ENAP and Banco Estado – have their own governance and report to government ministries. Allocation of seats on the boards of Chilean SOEs is determined by the SEP, as described above, or outlined by the laws that regulate them. In CODELCO’s corporate governance, there is a mix between seats appointed by recommendation from an independent high-level civil service committee, and seats allocated by political authorities in the government. A list of SOEs made by the Budget Directorate, including their financial management information, is available in the following link: http://www.dipres.gob.cl/599/w3-propertyvalue-20890.html. In general, Chilean SOEs work under hard budget constraints and compete under the same regulatory and tax frameworks as private firms. The exception is ENAP, which is the only company allowed to refine oil in Chile. As an OECD member, Chile adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. Chile does not have a privatization program. China Executive Summary In 2021, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was the number two global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) destination, behind the United States. As the world’s second-largest economy, with a large consumer base and integrated supply chains, China’s economic recovery following COVID-19 reassured investors and contributed to high FDI and portfolio investments. The PRC implemented major legislation in 2021, including the Data Security Law in September and the Personal Information Protection Law in November. China remains a relatively restrictive investment environment for foreign investors due to restrictions in key sectors and regulatory uncertainties. Obstacles include ownership caps and requirements to form joint venture (JV) partnerships with local firms, industrial policies to develop indigenous capacity or technological self-sufficiency, and pressures to transfer technology as a prerequisite to gaining market access. New data and financial rules announced in 2021 also created significant uncertainty surrounding the financial regulatory environment. The PRC’s pandemic-related visa and travel restrictions significantly affected foreign businesses operations, increasing labor and input costs. An assertive Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and emphasis on national companies and self-reliance has heightened foreign investors’ concerns about the pace of economic reforms. Key developments in 2021 included: The Rules for Security Reviews on Foreign Investments came into effect January 18, expanding PRC vetting of foreign investment that may affect national security. The National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law on June 10. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) issued draft revisions to its Cybersecurity Review Measures to broaden PRC approval authority over PRC companies’ overseas listings on July 10. China formally applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on September 16. On November 1, the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) went into effect and China formally applied to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA). On December 23, President Biden signed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. The law prohibits importing goods into the United States that are mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part with forced labor in the PRC, especially from Xinjiang. On December 27, the National Reform and Development Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) updated its foreign FDI investment “negative lists.” While PRC pronouncements of greater market access and fair treatment of foreign investment are welcome, details and effective implementation are needed to ensure equitable treatment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 66 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 12 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 123.8 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 10,550 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector China’s leadership has stated that it seeks to build a modern, highly developed, and multi-tiered capital market. Since their founding over three decades ago, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges, combined, are ranked the third largest stock market in the world with over USD 12.2 trillion in assets. China’s bond market has similarly expanded significantly to become the second largest worldwide, totaling approximately USD 18.6 trillion. In 2021, China took steps to open certain financial sectors such as mutual funds, securities, and asset management, but multinational companies still report barriers to entering the PRC insurance markets. As an example, in September, Black Rock was the first firm given approval to sell mutual funds to PRC nationals as the first wholly foreign owned mutual fund. Direct investment by private equity and venture capital firms increased but also faced setbacks due to China’s capital controls, which obfuscate the repatriation of returns. Though the PRC is taking steps to liberalize its capital markets, PRC companies that seek overseas investment have historically tended to list in the United States or Hong Kong; PRC and U.S. regulations on exchanges and geopolitics may begin to impact this trend. As of 2021, 24 sovereign entities and private sector firms, including the Asian Development Bank, Hungary, and BMW, have since issued RMB 106.5 billion yuan, roughly USD 16.7 billion, in 72 “Panda Bonds,” Chinese renminbi (RMB)-denominated debt issued by foreign entities in China. China’s private sector can also access credit via bank loans, bond issuance, trust products, and wealth management products. However, most bank credit flows to state-owned firms, largely due to distortions in China’s banking sector that have incentivized lending to state-affiliated entities over their private sector counterparts. China has been an IMF Article VIII member since 1996 and generally refrains from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. However, the government has used administrative and preferential policies to encourage credit allocation towards national priorities, such as infrastructure investments and industrial policy. The PRC’s monetary policy is run by the PBOC, the PRC’s central bank. The PBOC has traditionally deployed various policy tools, such as open market operations, reserve requirement ratios, benchmark rates and medium-term lending facilities, to control credit growth. The PBOC had previously also set quotas on how much banks could lend but ended the practice in 1998. As part of its efforts to shift towards a more market-based system, the PBOC announced in 2019 that it will reform its one-year loan prime rate (LPR), which would serve as an anchor reference for other loans. The one-year LPR is based on the interest rate that 18 banks offer to their best customers and serves as the benchmark for rates provided for other loans. In 2020, the PBOC requested financial institutions to shift towards use of the one-year LPR for their outstanding floating-rate loan contracts from March to August. Despite these measures to move towards more market-based lending, the PRC’s financial regulators still influence the volume and destination of PRC bank loans through “window guidance” – unofficial directives delivered verbally – as well as through mandated lending targets for key economic groups, such as small and medium sized enterprises. In 2020, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) also began issuing laws to regulate online lending by banks including internet companies such as Ant Financial and Tencent, which had previously not been subject to banking regulations. In 2021, PBOC and CBIRC issued circulars emphasizing the need to emphasize and encourage financial stability among real estate developers. The CBIRC oversees the PRC’s 4,607 lending institutions, about USD 54 trillion in total assets. China’s “Big Five” – Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, China Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China – dominate the sector and are largely stable, but has experienced regional banking stress, especially among smaller lenders. Reflecting the level of weakness among these banks, in September 2021, the PBOC announced in “China Financial Stability Report 2020” that 422 or 9.6 percent of the 4,400 banking financial institutions received a “fail” rating (high risk) following an industry-wide review in in the second quarter of 2021. The assessment deemed 393 firms, all small and medium sized rural financial institutions, “extremely risky.” The official rate of non-performing loans among China’s banks is relatively low: 1.7 percent as of the end of 2021. However, analysts believed the actual figure may be significantly higher. Bank loans continue to provide most credit options (reportedly around 63.6 percent in 2021) for Chinese companies, although other sources of capital, such as corporate bonds, equity financing, and private equity are quickly expanding in scope, reach, and sophistication in China. As part of a broad campaign to reduce debt and financial risk, Chinese regulators have implemented measures to rein in the rapid growth of China’s “shadow banking” sector, which includes wealth management and trust products. These measures have achieved positive results. In December 2020, CBIRC published the first “Shadow Banking Report,” and claimed that the size of China’s shadow banking had shrunk sharply since 2017 when China started tightening the sector. By the end of 2019, the size of China’s shadow banking by broad measurement dropped to 84.8 trillion yuan from the peak of 100.4 trillion yuan in early 2017. PBOC estimated in January 2021 that the outstanding balance of China’s shadow banking was around RMB 32 trillion yuan at the end of 2020. Alternatively, Moody’s estimated that China’s shadow banking by broad measurement dropped to RMB 57.8 trillion yuan in the first half of 2021 and shadow banking to GDP ratio dropped to 52.9 percent from 58.3 percent at the end of 2020. Foreign owned banks can now establish wholly owned banks and branches in China, however, onerous licensing requirements and an industry dominated by local players, have limited foreign banks market penetration. Foreigners are eligible to open a bank account in China but are required to present a passport and/or Chinese government issued identification. China officially has only one sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the China Investment Corporation (CIC), which was launched in 2007 to help diversify China’s foreign exchange reserves. Overall, information and updates on CIC and other funds that function like SWFs was difficult to procure. CIC is ranked the second largest SWF by total assets by Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI). With USD 200 billion in initial registered capital, CIC manages over USD 1.2 trillion in assets as of 2021 and invests on a 10-year time horizon. In 2021, CIC reported that during the 2020 period it increased its information technology-related holdings while cutting holdings of overseas equities and bonds. CIC has two overseas branches, CIC International (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd. and CIC Representative Office in New York. CIC has since evolved into three subsidiaries: CIC International was established in September 2011 with a mandate to invest in and manage overseas assets. It conducts public market equity and bond investments, hedge fund, real estate, private equity, and minority investments as a financial investor. CIC Capital was incorporated in January 2015 with a mandate to specialize in making direct investments to enhance CIC’s investments in long-term assets. Central Huijin makes equity investments in China’s state-owned financial institutions. China also operates other funds that function in part like sovereign wealth funds, including: China’s National Social Security Fund, with an estimated USD 450 billion in assets in 2021; the China-Africa Development Fund (solely funded by the China Development Bank), with an estimated USD 10 billion in assets (2020); the SAFE Investment Company, with an estimated USD 417.8 billion in assets; and China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund, established in December 2014 with USD 40 billion in assets to foster investment in BRI countries. China’s state-run funds do not report the percentage of assets invested domestically. However, China’s state-run funds follow the voluntary code of good practices known as the Santiago Principles and participate in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs. While CIC affirms they do not have formal government guidance to invest funds consistent with industrial policies or designated projects, CIC is expected to pursue government objectives. 7. State-Owned Enterprises China has approximately 150,000 wholly-owned SOEs, of which 50,000 are owned by the central government, and the remainder by local or provincial governments. SOEs account for 30 to 40 percent of total gross domestic product (GDP) and about 20 percent of China’s total employment. Non-financial SOE assets totaled roughly USD 30 trillion. SOEs can be found in all sectors of the economy, from tourism to heavy industries. State funds are spread throughout the economy and the state may also be the majority or controlling shareholder in an ostensibly private enterprise. China’s leading SOEs benefit from preferential government policies aimed at developing bigger and stronger “national champions.” SOEs enjoy preferential access to essential economic inputs (land, hydrocarbons, finance, telecoms, and electricity) and exercise considerable power in markets like steel and minerals. SOEs also have long enjoyed preferential access to credit and the ability to issue publicly traded equity and debt. A comprehensive, published list of all PRC SOEs does not exist. PRC officials have indicated China intends to utilize OECD guidelines to improve the SOEs independence and professionalism, including relying on Boards of Directors that are free from political influence. However, analysts believe minor reforms will be ineffective if SOE administration and government policy remain intertwined, and PRC officials make minimal progress in primarily changing the regulation and business conduct of SOEs. SOEs continue to hold dominant shares in their respective industries, regardless of whether they are strategic, which may further restrain private investment in the economy. Among central SOEs managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), senior management positions are mainly filled by senior party members who report directly to the CCP, and double as the company’s party secretary. SOE executives often outrank regulators in the CCP rank structure, which minimizes the effectiveness of regulators in implementing reforms. While SOEs typically pursue commercial objectives, the lack of management independence and the controlling ownership interest of the state make SOEs de facto arms of the government, subject to government direction and interference. SOEs are rarely the defendant in legal disputes, and when they are, they almost always prevail. U.S. companies often complain about the lack of transparency and objectivity in commercial disputes with SOEs. Since 2013, the PRC government has periodically announced reforms to SOEs that included selling SOE shares to outside investors or a mixed ownership model, in which private companies invest in SOEs and outside managers are hired. The government has tried these approaches to improve SOE management structures, emphasize the use of financial benchmarks, and gradually infuse private capital into some sectors traditionally monopolized by SOEs like energy, finance, and telecommunications. For instance, during an August 25 press conference, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) officials announced that in the second half of the year central SOE reform would focus on the advanced manufacturing and technology innovation sectors. As part of these efforts, they claimed SASAC would ensure mergers and acquisitions removed redundancies, stabilize industrial supply chains, withdraw from non-competitive businesses, and streamline management structures. In practice, however, reforms have been gradual, as the PRC government has struggled to implement its SOE reform vision and often preferred to utilize a SOE consolidation approach. Recently, Xi and other senior leaders have increasingly focused reform efforts on strengthening the role of the state as an investor or owner of capital, instead of the old SOE model in which the state was more directly involved in managing operations. SASAC issued a circular on November 20, 2020, directing tighter control over central SOEs overseas properties held by individuals on behalf of SOEs. The circular aims to prevent leakage of SOE assets held by individuals and SOE overseas variable interest entities (VIEs). According to the circular, properties held by individuals should be approved by central SOEs and filed with SASAC. In Northeast China, privatization efforts at provincial and municipal SEOs remains low, as private capital makes cautious decisions in making investment to local debt-ridden and inefficient SOEs. On the other hand, local SOEs prefer to pursue mergers and acquisitions with central SOEs to avoid being accused of losing state assets. There is no available information on whether foreign investors could participate in privatization programs. Colombia Executive Summary With improving security conditions in metropolitan areas, a market of 50 million people, an abundance of natural resources, and an educated and growing middle-class, Colombia continues to be an attractive destination for foreign investment in Latin America. Colombia ranked 67 out of 190 countries in the “Ease of Doing Business” index of the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report (most recent report). The Colombian economy grew by 10.6 percent in 2021, the largest increase in gross domestic product (GDP) since the statistical authority started keeping records in 1975. This followed a 6.8 percent collapse in 2020 due to the negative effects of the pandemic and lower oil prices, the first economic contraction in more than two decades. In July 2021, rating agencies Fitch and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) downgraded Colombia below investment grade status, citing the increasing fiscal deficit (7.1 percent of GDP for 2021) as the main reason for the downgrade. The Colombian Government passed a tax reform that entered into effect in January 2022, the Social Investment Law, that seeks to reactivate the economy, generate employment, and contribute to the fiscal stability of the country. Colombia’s legal and regulatory systems are generally transparent and consistent with international norms. The country has a comprehensive legal framework for business and foreign direct investment (FDI). The 2012 U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) has strengthened bilateral trade and investment. Colombia’s dispute settlement mechanisms have improved through the CTPA and several international conventions and treaties. Weaknesses include protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), as Colombia has yet to implement certain IPR-related provisions of the CTPA. Colombia became the 37th member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2020, bringing the obligation to adhere to OECD norms and standards in economic operations. The Colombian government has made a concerted effort to develop efficient capital markets, attract investment, and create jobs. Restrictions on foreign ownership in specific sectors still exist. FDI inflows increased 4.8 percent from 2020 to 2021, with 67 percent of the 2021 inflow dedicated to the extractives sector. Roughly half of the Colombian workforce in metropolitan areas is employed in the informal economy, a share that increases to four-fifths in rural areas. In 2021, the unemployment rate was 13.7 percent with 3.4 million people unemployed. The employed population reached 21.6 million, an increase of 0.9 percent compared to 2020. Since the 2016 peace agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia has experienced a significant decrease in terrorist activity. Several powerful narco-criminal operations still pose threats to commercial activity and investment, especially in rural zones outside of government control. Corruption remains a significant challenge. The Colombian government continues to work on improving its business climate, but U.S. and other foreign investors continue to voice complaints about non-tariff, regulatory, and bureaucratic barriers to trade, investment, and market access at the national, regional, and municipal levels. Stakeholders express concern that some regulatory rulings in Colombia target specific companies, resulting in an uneven playing field. Investors generally have access at all levels of the Colombian government, but cite a lack of effective and timely consultation with regulatory agencies in decisions that affect them. Investors also note concern regarding the national competition and regulatory authority’s (Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio, SIC) differing rulings for different companies on similar issues, and slow processing at some regulatory agencies, such as at food and drug regulator INVIMA. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 87 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 67 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $7,767 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,790 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The Colombian Securities Exchange (BVC after its acronym in Spanish) is the main forum for trading and securities transactions in Colombia. The BVC is a private company listed on the stock market. The BVC, as a multi-product and multi-market exchange, offers trading platforms for the stock market, along with fixed income and standard derivatives. The BVC also provides listing services for issuers. Foreign investors can participate in capital markets by negotiating and acquiring shares, bonds, and other securities listed by the Foreign Investment Statute. These activities must be conducted by a local administrator, such as trust companies or Financial Superintendence-authorized stock brokerage firms. Direct and portfolio foreign investments must be registered with the Central Bank. Foreigners can establish a bank account in Colombia as long as they have a valid visa and Colombian government identification. The market has sufficient liquidity for investors to enter and exit sizeable positions. The central bank respects IMF Article VIII and does not restrict payments and transfers for current international transactions. The financial sector in Colombia offers credit to nationals and foreigners that comply with the requisite legal requirements. In 2005, Colombia consolidated supervision of all aspects of the banking, financial, securities, and insurance sectors under the Financial Superintendence. Colombia has an effective regulatory system that encourages portfolio investment, and the country’s financial system is strong by regional standards. Commercial banks are the principal source of long-term corporate and project finance in Colombia. Loans rarely have a maturity in excess of five years. Unofficial private lenders play a major role in meeting the working capital needs of small and medium-sized companies. Only the largest of Colombia’s companies participate in the local stock or bond markets, with the majority meeting their financing needs either through the banking system, by reinvesting their profits, or through credit from suppliers. Colombia’s central bank is charged with managing inflation and unemployment through monetary policy. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country and must set up a Colombian subsidiary in order to do so. The Colombian central bank has a variety of correspondent banks abroad. In 2012, Colombia began operating a sovereign wealth fund called the Savings and Stabilization Fund (FAE), which is administered by the central bank with the objective of promoting savings and economic stability in the country. Colombia is not a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The fund can administer up to 30 percent of annual royalties from the extractives industry. Its primary investments are in fixed securities, sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt (both domestic and international), and corporate securities, with just eight percent invested in stocks. The government transfers royalties not dedicated to the fund to other internal funds to boost national economic productivity through strategic projects, technological investments, and innovation. In 2020, the government authorized up to 80 percent of the FAE’s USD 3.9 billion in assets to be lent to the Fund for the Mitigation of Emergencies (FOME) created in response to the pandemic. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Since 2015, the Government of Colombia has concentrated its industrial and commercial enterprises under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. According to Ministry’s 2019 annual report, there are 105 state-owned companies, with a combined value of USD 20 billion. The government is the majority shareholder of 39 companies and a minority shareholder in the remaining 66. Among the most notable companies with a government stake are Ecopetrol (Colombia’s majority state-owned and privately-run oil company), ISA (electricity distribution), Banco Agrario de Colombia, Bancoldex, and Satena (regional airline). SOEs competing in the Colombian market do not receive non-market-based advantages from the government. The Ministry of Finance normally updates their annual report on SOEs every June. Decree 2111 of 2019, formalized the creation of financial holding company Grupo Bicenterario. The holding company seeks to optimize the administration of Colombia’s state-owned enterprises, centralize property rights, and incorporate recommendations from the OECD regarding the composition of their boards of directors. Colombia has privatized state-owned enterprises under article 60 of the Constitution and Law Number 226 of 1995. This law stipulates that the sale of government holdings in an enterprise should be offered to two groups: first to cooperatives and workers’ associations of the enterprise, then to the general public. During the first phase, special terms and credits must be granted, and in the second phase, foreign investors may participate along with the general public. A series of privatizations planned for 2020 were postponed to 2021 due to the pandemic. The government views stimulating private-sector investment in roads, ports, electricity, and gas infrastructure as a high priority. The government is increasingly turning to concessions and using public-private partnerships (PPPs) to secure and incentivize infrastructure development. In order to attract investment and promote PPPs, Colombian modified infrastructure regulations to clarify provisions for frequently-cited obstacles to participation, including environmental licensing, land acquisition, and the displacement of public utilities. The law puts in place a civil procedure that facilitates land expropriation during court cases, allows for expedited environmental licensing, and clarifies that the cost to move or replace public utilities affected by infrastructure projects falls on private companies. However, infrastructure development companies considering bidding on tenders have raised concerns about unacceptable levels of risk that result from a law (Ley 80) establishing the framework for public works projects. They interpret Ley 80 as not establishing liability caps on potential judgments, and that it views company officials equivalent to those with fiscal oversight authority when it comes to criminal liability for misfeasance. Municipal enterprises operate many public utilities and infrastructure services. These municipal enterprises have engaged private sector investment through concessions. There are several successful concessions involving roads. These partnerships have helped promote reforms and create a more attractive environment for private, national, and foreign investment. Costa Rica Executive Summary Costa Rica is the oldest continuous democracy in Latin America and the newest member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with an established government institutional framework, stable society, and a diversified upper-middle-income economy. The country’s well-educated labor force, relatively low levels of corruption, geographic location, living conditions, dynamic investment promotion board, and attractive free trade zone incentives all appeal to investors. Foreign direct investment inflow in 2020 was USD 1.76 billion, or 2.8 percent of GDP, with the United States accounting for USD 1.2 billion. Costa Rica recorded 7.6 percent GDP growth in 2021 (the highest level since 2008) as it recovered from a 4.5 percent contraction in 2020 largely due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Costa Rica has had remarkable success in the last two decades in establishing and promoting an ecosystem of export-oriented technology companies, suppliers of input goods and services, associated public institutions and universities, and a trained and experienced workforce. A similar transformation took place in the tourism sector, with a plethora of smaller enterprises handling a steadily increasing flow of tourists eager to visit despite Costa Rica’s relatively high prices. Costa Rica is doubly fortunate in that these two sectors positively reinforce each other as they both require and encourage English language fluency, openness to the global community, and Costa Rican government efficiency and effectiveness. A 2019 study of the free trade zone (FTZ) economy commissioned by the Costa Rican Investment and Development Board (CINDE) shows an annual 9 percent growth from 2014 to 2018, with the net benefit of that sector reaching 7.9 percent of GDP in 2018. This sector continued to expand during the pandemic. The value of exports increased by 24 percent in 2021, representing the highest growth in 15 years. The Costa Rican investment climate is threatened by a high and persistent government fiscal deficit, underperformance in some key areas of government service provision, including health care and education, high energy costs, and deterioration of basic infrastructure. The Covid-19 world recession damaged the Costa Rican tourism industry, although it is recovering. Furthermore, the government has very little budget flexibility to address the economic fallout and is struggling to find ways to achieve debt relief, unemployment response, and the longer-term policy solutions necessary to continue compliance under the current stabilizing agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). On the plus side, the Costa Rican government has competently managed the crisis despite its tight budget and Costa Rican exports are proving resilient; the portion of the export sector that manufactures medical devices, for example, is facing relatively good economic prospects and companies providing services exports are specialized in virtual support for their clients in a world that is forced to move in that direction. Moreover, Costa Rica’s accession in 2021 to the Organization for Co-operation and Development (OECD) has exerted a positive influence by pushing the country to address its economic weaknesses through executive decrees and legislative reforms in a process that began in 2015. Also in the plus column, the export and investment promotion agencies CINDE and the Costa Rican Foreign Trade Promoter (PROCOMER) have done an excellent job of protecting the Free Trade Zones (FTZs) from new taxes by highlighting the benefits of the regime, promoting local supply chains, and using the FTZs as examples for other sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, Costa Rica’s political and economic leadership faces a difficult balancing act over the coming years as the country must simultaneously exercise budget discipline and respond to demands for improved government-provided infrastructure and services. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 39 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/ index/cri Global Innovation Index 2021 56 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis- indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 2.0bill https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 11,530 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP. PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The Costa Rican government’s general attitude towards foreign portfolio investment is prudently welcoming, seeking to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the economy while minimizing the instability that might be caused by the sudden entry or exit of funds. The securities exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores) is small and is dominated by trading in bonds. Stock trading is of limited significance and involves less than 10 of the country’s larger companies, resulting in an illiquid secondary market. There is a small secondary market in commercial paper and repurchase agreements. The Costa Rican government has in recent years explicitly welcomed foreign institutional investors purchasing significant volumes of Costa Rican dollar-denominated government debt in the local market. The securities exchange regulator (SUGEVAL) is generally perceived to be effective. Costa Rica accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII, agreeing not to impose restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions or engage in discriminatory currency arrangements, except with IMF approval. There are no controls on capital flows in or out of Costa Rica or on portfolio investment in publicly traded companies. Some capital flows are subject to a withholding tax (see section on Foreign Exchange and Remittances). Within Costa Rica, credit is largely allocated on market terms, although long-term capital is scarce. Favorable lending terms for USD-denominated loans compared to colon-denominated loans have made USD-denominated mortgage financing popular and common. Foreign investors are able to borrow in the local market; they are also free to borrow from abroad, although a 15% withholding tax on interest paid will apply when the creditor is a non-tax resident in the country, under the reasoning that the interest payment constitutes income from a Costa Rican source. Potential overseas borrowers must also consider Costa Rica’s limitation on the deductibility of financial expenses by the debtor when the creditor is not an entity regulated in its country of origin by a body like the Costa Rican financial supervisory authority (SUGEF). In such cases, deductible interest for the current fiscal year is around 30% of EBITDA -Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization. Costa Rica’s financial system boasts a relatively high financial inclusion rate, estimated by the Central Bank through August 2020 at 81.5 percent (the percentage of adults over the age of 15 holding a bank account). Non-resident foreigners may open what are termed “simplified accounts” in Costa Rican financial institutions, while resident foreigners have full access to all banking services. The banking sector is healthy and well-regulated, although the 2020 non-performing loan ratio of 2.4 percent of active loans as of December 2021 (2.8 percent in state-owned banks) would be significantly higher if not for Covid-19 temporary regulatory measures allowing banks to readjust loans. The country hosts a large number of smaller private banks, credit unions, and factoring houses, although the four state-owned banks (two commercial, one mortgage and one workers’) are still dominant, accounting for 46 percent of the country’s financial system assets. Consolidated total assets of those state-owned banks were USD 29.6 billion, while combined assets of the regulated financial sector (public banks, private banks, savings-and-loans and others) were almost USD 64 billion as of December 2021. Costa Rica’s Central Bank performs the functions of a central bank while also providing support to the four autonomous financial superintendencies (Banking, Securities, Pensions and Insurance) under the supervision of the national council for the supervision of the financial system (CONASSIF). The Central Bank developed and operates the financial system’s transaction settlement and direct transfer mechanism “SINPE” through which clients transfer money to and from accounts with any other account in the financial system. The Central Bank’s governance structure is strong, with a significant degree of autonomy from the Executive Branch. Foreign banks may establish both full operations and branch operations in the country under the supervision of the banking regulator SUGEF. The Central Bank has a good reputation and has had no problem maintaining sufficient correspondent relationships. Costa Rica is steadily improving its ability to ensure the efficacy of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism finance. The Costa Rican financial sector in broad terms appears to be satisfied to date with the available correspondent banking services. The OECD 2020 report “review of the financial system” for Costa Rica is an excellent resource for those seeking more detail on the current state of Costa Rica’s financial system: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/Costa-Rica-Review-of-Financial-System-2020.pdf . Costa Rica does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Costa Rica’s total of 28 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are commonly known by their abbreviated names. They include monopolies in petroleum-derived fuels (RECOPE), lottery (JPS), railroads (INCOFER), local production of ethanol (CNP/FANAL), water distribution (AyA), and electrical distribution (ICE, CNFL, JASEC, ESPH). SOEs have market dominance in insurance (INS), telecommunications (ICE, RACSA, JASEC, ESPH) and finance (BNCR, BCR, Banco Popular, BANHVI, INVU, INFOCOOP). They have significant market participation in parcel and mail delivery (Correos) and ports operation (INCOP and JAPDEVA). Six of those SOEs hold significant economic power with revenues exceeding 1 percent of GDP: ICE, RECOPE, INS, BNCR, BCR and Banco Popular. The 2020 OECD report “Corporate Governance in Costa Rica” reports that Costa Rican SOE employment is 1.9% of total employment, somewhat below the OECD average of 2.5%. Audited returns for each SOE may be found on each company’s website, while basic revenue and costs for each SOE are available on the General Controller’s Office (CGR) “Sistema de Planes y Presupuestos” https://www.cgr.go.cr/02-consultas/consulta-pp.html . The Costa Rican government does not currently hold minority stakes in commercial enterprises. Costa Rican state-owned enterprises have not in recent decades required continuous and substantial state subsidy to survive. Several (notably ICE, AyA and RECOPE) registered major losses in pandemic year 2020, while others (INS, BCR, BNCR) registered substantial profits, which are allocated as dictated by law and boards of directors. Financial allocations to and earnings from SOEs may be found in the CGR “Sistema de Informacion de Planes y Presupuestos (SIPP)”. U.S. investors and their advocates cite some of the following ways in which Costa Rican SOEs competing in the domestic market receive non-market-based advantages because of their status as state-owned entities. According to Law 7200, electricity generated privately must be purchased by public entities and the installed capacity of the private sector is limited to 30 percent of total electrical installed capacity in the country: 15 percent to small privately-owned renewable energy plants and 15 percent to larger “buildoperatetransfer” (BOT) operations. Telecoms and technology sector companies have called attention to the fact that government agencies often choose SOEs as their telecom services providers despite a full assortment of private-sector telecom companies. The Information and Telecommunications Business Chamber (CAMTIC) has long protested against what its members feel to be unfair use by government entities of a provision (Article 2) in the public contracting law that allows noncompetitive award of contracts to public entities (also termed “direct purchase”) when functionaries of the awarding entity certify the award to be an efficient use of public funds. CAMTIC has compiled detailed statistics showing that while the yearly total dollar value of Costa Rican government direct purchases in the IT sector under Article 2 has dropped considerably from USD 226 million in 2017, to USD 72.5 million in 2018, USD 27.5 million in 2019, USD 54 million in 2020, and USD 5 million in 2021, the number of purchases has actually increased from 56 purchases in both 2017 and 2018 to 86 in 2019, 104 in 2020, and 115 in 2021. The state-owned insurance provider National Insurance Institute (INS) has been adjusting to private sector competition since 2009 but in 2021 still registered 66 percent of total insurance premiums paid; 13 insurers are now registered with insurance regulator SUGESE: ( https://www.sugese.fi.cr/SitePages/index.aspx ). Competitors point to unfair advantages enjoyed by the stateowned insurer INS, including a strong tendency among SOE’s to contract their insurance with INS. Costa Rica is not a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) although it is registered as an observer. Costa Rica is working to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs ( www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecdguidelinesoncorporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises.htm ). For more information on Costa Rica’s SOE’s, see the OECD Accession report “Corporate Governance in Costa Rica”, dated October 2020: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/corporate-governance-in-costa-rica-b313ec37-en.htm . Costa Rica does not have a privatization program and the markets that have been opened to competition in recent decades – banking, telecommunications, insurance and Atlantic Coast container port operations – were opened without privatizing the corresponding state-owned enterprises (SOs). Two relatively minor SOEs, the state liquor company (Fanal) and the International Bank of Costa Rica (Bicsa), are the most likely targets for privatization if such political sentiment grows. Côte d’Ivoire Executive Summary Côte d’Ivoire (CDI) offers a welcoming environment for U.S. investment. The Ivoirian government wants to deepen commercial cooperation with the U.S. The Ivoirian and foreign business community in CDI considers the 2018 investment code generous with welcome incentives and few restrictions on foreign investors. Côte d’Ivoire’s resiliency to the COVID-19 crisis led to quick economic recovery. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth stayed positive at two percent in 2020 and rebounded to 6.5 percent in 2021, with government of CDI projecting average growth at 7.65 percent during the period 2021-2025. International credit rating agency Fitch upgraded the country’s political risk rating in July 2021 from B+ to BB-, while the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) assessment confirms CDI’s economic resilience, despite the Omicron variant of COVID. However, possible repetition of 2021 energy shortages, poor transparency, and delays in reforms could dampen confidence. U.S. businesses operate successfully in several Ivoirian sectors including oil and gas exploration and production; agriculture and value-added agribusiness processing; power generation and renewable energy; IT services; the digital economy; banking; insurance; and infrastructure. The competitiveness of U.S. companies in IT services is exemplified by one company that altered the local payment system by introducing a digital payment system that rapidly increased its market share, forcing competitors to lower prices. Côte d’Ivoire is well poised to attract increased Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) based on the government’s strong response to the pandemic, the buoyancy of the economy, high-level support for private sector investment, and clear priorities set forth in the new 2021-2025 National Development Plan (PND – Plan National de Développement). An important factor is Côte d’Ivoire’s resurgence as a regional economic and transportation hub. Government authorities are continuing to implement structural reforms to improve the business environment, modernize public administration, increase human capital, and boost productivity and private sector development. However, this will not come without challenges and uncertainties in the medium term, particularly regarding the evolution of the pandemic and global recovery as well as regulatory and transparency concerns. Government authorities underscore their commitment to strengthening peace and security systems in the northern zone of the country, while striving for inclusive growth in the context of post-pandemic recovery. Finally, recent political instability in northern and western neighboring countries Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea, could impede investor confidence in the region, especially when it comes to security. Doing business with the Ivoirian government remains a significant challenge in some areas such as procurement, taxation, and regulatory processes. Some new public procurement procedures adopted in 2019 were only implemented in 2021, including implementation of an e-procurement module, and improved evaluation, prioritization, selection, and monitoring procedures. This is a work in process, and concerns remain that these procedures are not consistently and transparently applied. Similar concerns circulate about tax procedures, especially retroactive assessments based on changes in tax formulas. An overly complicated tax system and slow, opaque government decision-making processes hinder investment. Government has identified VAT (Value Added Tax), mining, digitalization, and property taxes as key areas for broadening the tax base and improving state revenues. Other challenges include low levels of literacy and income, weak access to credit for small businesses, corruption, and the need to broaden the tax base to relieve some of the tax-paying burden on businesses. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2020 110 of 190 http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings Global Innovation Index 2021 114 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2019 -$495 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $2,280 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Government policies generally encourage foreign portfolio investment. The Regional Stock Exchange (BRVM) is in Abidjan and the BRVM lists companies from the eight countries of the WAEMU. The existing regulatory system effectively facilitates portfolio investment through the West African Central Bank (BCEAO). The Regional Council for Savings Investments (CREPMF) sets the rules and regulations regarding the market participants and market structure. There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. However, the market follows a limit-order mechanism. Besides traditional foreign trade risk management tools offered by commercial banks (i.e., export credits, trade bills), the stock exchange does not provide markets for forwards, futures, or options derivative instruments. Market volatility is low. The market benchmark BRVM Composite rose to 6.63 percent in 2021. Government policies allow the free flow of financial resources into investing in financial assets. The BCEAO respects IMF Article VIII on payment and transfers for current international transactions. Credit allocation is based on market terms and has increased to support the private sector and economic growth, specifically for large businesses. The Central Bank monitors inflation, money supply, and business cycles to ensure efficient monetary policy. The average interbank interest rate was 2.61 percent compared to 3.01 percent in 2021, demonstrating the will of WAEMU nations to boost commercial banks’ liquidity and support private sector investment. Foreign investors can acquire credit on the local market. This year the government facilitated access to capital, lowering borrowing interest rates for real estate companies. As of December 2021, there were 29 commercial banks and two credit institutions in Côte d’Ivoire. Banks are expanding their national networks, especially in the secondary cities outside Abidjan, as domestic investment has increased up-country. The total number of bank branches has more than doubled from 324 in 2010 to 725 branches in 2019 (latest data available). According to the World Bank, in 2017 (latest data available) 41 percent of the population over the age of 15 have a bank account. Alternative financial services available include mobile money and microfinance for bill payments and transfers. Many Ivoirians prefer mobile money over banking, but mobile money does not yet offer the same breadth of financial services as banks. Most Ivoirian banks are compliant with the BCEAO’s minimum capital requirements. The government facilitated mortgages for foreign investors in housing in Côte d’Ivoire. Foreign banks are allowed to operate in Côte d’Ivoire; at least one has been in Côte d’Ivoire for decades. They are subject to the WAEMU Banking Commission’s prudential measures and regulations. There have been no reports of Côte d’Ivoire losing any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years. No correspondent banking relationships are known to be in jeopardy. Côte d’Ivoire does not have a sovereign wealth fund. Rothschild Bank was reported in the press to have been awarded the contract to create one. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Companies owned or controlled by the state are subject to national laws and the tax code. The Ivoirian government still holds substantial interests in many firms, including the refinery SIR (49 percent), the public transport firm (60 percent), the national television station RTI (98 percent), the national lottery (80 percent), the national airline Air Côte d’Ivoire (58 percent), and the land management agency Agence de Gestion Foncière AGEF (35 percent). Total assets of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were $796 million and total net income of SOEs was $116 million in 2018 (latest figures). Of the 82 SOEs, 28 are wholly government-owned and 12 are majority government-owned, the government owns a blocking minority in seven and holds minority shares in 35. Each SOE has an independent board. The government has begun the process of divestiture for some SOEs (see next section). There are active SOEs in the banking, agri-business, mining, and telecom industries. The published list of SOEs is available at https://dgpe.gouv.ci/ind ex.php?p=portefeuille_etat SOEs competing in the domestic market do not receive non-market-based advantages from the government. They are subject to the same tax burdens and policies as private companies. Côte d’Ivoire does not adhere to OECD guidelines for SOE corporate governance (it is not a member of OECD). In 2021, audits of several SOEs highlighted serious irregularities (alleged embezzlement estimated at several tens or even hundreds of billions of FCFA, i.e. up to hundreds of millions of dollars. The SOEs include FER, FDFP, ARTCI, and ANSUT, whose leaders have been removed and replaced. The government has been pursuing SOE privatization for decades the most recent of which was in 2018. That year, the government sold 51 percent of the Housing Bank of Côte d’Ivoire (BHCI – Banque d’Habitat de Côte d’Ivoire). See previous Investment Climate Statements for past privatization efforts. Contracts for participation in SOE privatization are competed through a French-language public tendering process, for which foreign investors are encouraged to submit bids. The Privatization Committee, which reports to the Prime Minister, maintains a website. The 2019 (latest) report is available at: http://privatisation.gouv.ci. Croatia Executive Summary Croatia’s EU membership has enhanced its economic stability and provided new opportunities for trade and investment. Characteristics that make Croatia an attractive destination for foreign investment include a geostrategic location with diverse topography and temperate climate, well-developed infrastructure, and a well-educated multilingual workforce. The Croatian government settled a longstanding investment dispute with a U.S. investor in December 2021. Historically, the most promising sectors for investment in Croatia have been tourism, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, and banking. Investment opportunities are growing in Croatia’s robust IT sector, and the coming years will offer new opportunities related to the energy transition. Croatia also offers visas for so-called “digital nomads” to work in Croatia for up to one year without having to pay local taxes. Despite the ongoing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the economy experienced a robust rebound of 10.4 percent growth in 2021. Tourism in 2021 exceeded all expectations, and the sector, which accounts for as much as 20 percent of GDP, achieved 88 percent of record-breaking 2019 revenues. Throughout the pandemic, the government distributed more than $1.5 billion in job-retention and economic stabilization measures that significantly helped maintain employment. Unemployment in January 2022 was at 7.8 percent. In early 2022, the government announced nearly $800 million worth of measures to help citizens and businesses cope with rising energy costs. The European Commission estimates the Croatian economy will grow 4.8 percent in 2022 and 3.0 percent in 2023. Croatia will receive more than $30 billion in EU funding through 2030, including approximately $7 billion through the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which has the potential to provide a significant boost to the economy if the government directs the funds to productive activities that stimulate job creation and economic growth. The government intends to spend approximately 40 percent of RRF funds in support of climate-related and clean energy objectives, including initiatives to improve energy efficiency in public and private buildings, accelerate development of renewable sources of energy, modernize the electricity distribution and transmission grid to facilitate the integration of renewable energy sources, and promote greater investments in geothermal energy. Croatia joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) in July 2020, and the government expects to enter the eurozone on January 1, 2023. Croatia also received an invitation from the OECD in early 2022 to begin the accession process. The Croatian government has taken some positive steps to improve the business climate, but it has been slow to reform the judiciary, which is most often mentioned as one of the greatest barriers to investment. In addition, the economy is burdened by a large government bureaucracy, underperforming state-owned enterprises, and low regulatory transparency. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated digitalization efforts, which has helped decrease excessive bureaucratic procedures for both citizens and companies. Government reforms also seek to liberalize the services market, diversify capital markets and improve access to alternative financing, and reform tax incentives for research and development. Croatia’s labor laws provide strong protections to workers and there are no risks to doing business responsibly in terms of labor laws and human rights. The government is willing to meet at senior levels with interested investors and to assist in resolving problems. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 63 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/hrv Global Innovation Index 2021 48 of 128 https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2021.pdf U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 $295 million https://www.hnb.hr/en/statistics/statistical-data/rest-of-the-world/foreign-direct-investments World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $27,185 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.KD 6. Financial Sector Croatia’s securities and financial markets are open equally to domestic and foreign investment. Foreign residents may open non-resident accounts and may do business both domestically and abroad. Specifically, Article 24 of the Foreign Currency Act states that non-residents may subscribe, pay in, purchase, or sell securities in Croatia in accordance with regulations governing securities transactions. Non-residents and residents are afforded the same treatment in spending and borrowing. These and other non-resident financial activities regarding securities are covered by the Foreign Currency Act, available on the central bank website (www.hnb.hr). Securities are traded on the Zagreb Stock Exchange (ZSE). Regulations that govern activity and participation in the ZSE can be found (in English) at: https://zse.hr/en/legal-regulations/234 . There are three tiers of securities traded on the ZSE. The Capital Markets Act regulates all aspects of securities and investment services and defines the responsibilities of the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA). More information can be found (in English) at: http://www.hanfa.hr/regulations/capital-market/ . There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. There are no policies that hinder the free flow of financial resources. There are no restrictions on international payments or transfers, in accordance with IMF Article VIII. The private sector, both domestic and foreign-owned, enjoys open access to credit and a variety of credit instruments on the local market, available on market terms. The banking sector is mostly privatized and is highly developed, competitive, resilient, and increasingly offering a diversity of products to businesses (foreign and domestic) and consumers. According to conclusions from an IMF Virtual Visit with Croatia in November 2020, the banking sector is one of the strongest sectors of the Croatian economy. French, German, Italian, and Austrian companies own over 90 percent of Croatia’s banks. As of December 31, 2021, there were 20 commercial banks and three savings banks, with assets totaling $78.75 billion. The largest bank in Croatia is Italian-owned Zagrebacka Banka, with assets of $20.82 billion and a market share of 26.5 percent. The second largest bank is Italian-owned Privredna Banka Zagreb, with assets totaling $16.46 billion and 20.9 percent market share. The third largest is Austrian Erste Bank, with assets totaling $13.01 billion and a 16.52 percent market share. According to Croatian National Bank statistics, the non-performing loans (NPL) rate for Croatia was 4.3 in 2021, down from 5.4 percent in 2020. The country has a central bank system and all information regarding the Croatian National Bank can be found at https://www.hnb.hr/en/ . In an extraordinary move facilitated by the Croatian National Bank, state-owned Croatian Postal Bank (HPB) bought Sberbank Croatia, a subsidiary of Sberbank Europe, on March 1, reportedly paying $11 million for Sberbank’s assets. The sale saved Sberbank Croatia from bankruptcy following the collapse of Sberbank Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to the sale, Sberbank Croatia had roughly 60,000 clients and represented 2.21 percent of total bank assets in Croatia. Non-residents are able to open bank accounts without restrictions or delays. The Croatian government has not introduced or announced any intention to introduce block chain technologies in banking transactions. The Croatian Constitution guarantees the free transfer, conversion, and repatriation of profits and invested capital for foreign investments. Article VI of the U.S.-Croatia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) establishes protection for American investors from government exchange controls. The BIT obliges both countries to permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of each other’s territory. Transfers of currency are additionally protected by Article VII of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement (http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/AA/index.htm#art7 ). The Croatian Foreign Exchange Act permits foreigners to maintain foreign currency accounts and to make external payments. The Foreign Exchange Act also defines foreign direct investment (FDI) in a manner that includes use of retained earnings for new investments/acquisitions, but excludes financial investments made by institutional investors such as insurance, pension, and investment funds. The law also allows Croatian entities and individuals to invest abroad. Funds associated with any form of investment can be freely converted into any world currency. On July 10, 2020 the European Central Bank and European Commission announced that Croatia had fulfilled its commitments and the Croatian kuna (HRK) was admitted into the Banking Union and European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II), with the exchange rate between the kuna and the euro (EUR) pegged at EUR 1 to 7.5345 HRK. Any risk of currency devaluation or significant depreciation is generally low. The Croatian government intends to adopt the euro on January 1, 2023. Remittance Policies No limitations exist, either temporal or by volume, on remittances. The U.S. Embassy in Zagreb has not received any complaints from American companies regarding transfers and remittances. Croatia does not own any sovereign wealth funds. Cyprus Executive Summary Cyprus is the eastern-most member of the European Union (EU), situated at the crossroads of three continents – Europe, Africa, and Asia – and thus occupies a strategic place in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The Republic of Cyprus (ROC) eagerly welcomes foreign direct investment (FDI). The ROC is a member of the eurozone. English is widely spoken. The legal system is based on UK common law. Legal and accounting services for foreign investors are highly developed. Invest Cyprus, an independent, government-funded entity, aggressively promotes investment in the traditional sectors of shipping, tourism, banking, and financial and professional services. Newer sectors for FDI include energy, film production, investment funds, education, research & development, information technology, and regional headquartering. The discovery of significant hydrocarbon deposits in Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone (and in the surrounding Eastern Mediterranean region) has driven major new FDI by multinational companies in recent years. The ROC has generally handled the pandemic effectively, mitigating its impact on investment to the greatest extent possible. As of March 2022, around 85 percent of the adult population was double-vaccinated, with many people having received a third dose. COVID case loads generally follow trends in continental Europe. COVID cases are again rising, consistent with what we are seeing elsewhere in Europe, the government has a highly effective testing regime in place and has demonstrated competence in managing the local epidemic. The ROC has also demonstrated commitment to promoting green investments, with significant funding allocated to securing a green transition (see Section 8). Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 52 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/ research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 28 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 4,900 https://apps.bea.gov/ international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 26,440 https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is the only internationally recognized government on the island, but since 1974 the northern third of Cyprus has been administered by Turkish Cypriots. This area proclaimed itself the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) in 1983. The United States does not recognize the “TRNC” as a government, nor does any country other than Turkey. A substantial number of Turkish troops remain in the northern part of the island. A buffer zone, or “green line,” patrolled by the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), separates the two parts. The Republic of Cyprus and the area administered by Turkish Cypriots are addressed separately below. U.S. citizens can travel to the north / Turkish Cypriot area, however, additional COVID-19 measures may apply when crossing. U.S. companies can invest in the north but should be aware of legal complications and risks due to the lack of international recognition, tensions between the two communities, and isolation of the north from the eurozone. Turkish Cypriot businesses are interested in working with American companies in the fields of agriculture, hospitality, renewable energy, and retail franchising. Significant Turkish aid and investment flows to the “TRNC.” A political settlement between the communities would be a powerful catalyst for island-wide Cypriot economic growth and prosperity. 6. Financial Sector REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE), launched in 1996, is one of the EU’s smallest stock exchanges, with a capitalization of USD 3.7 billion (EUR 3.4 billion) as of March 2022. The CSE and the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) have operated from a joint trading platform since 2006, allowing capital to move more freely from one exchange to the other, even though both exchanges retain their autonomy and independence. The joint platform has increased capital available to Cypriot firms and improved the CSE’s liquidity, although its small size remains a constraint. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments, which has been enhanced through the operation of private venture capital firms. Credit is allocated on market terms to foreign and local investors alike. Foreign investors may acquire up to 100 percent of the share capital of Cypriot companies listed on the CSE with the notable exception of companies in the banking sector. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS There is no stock exchange in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots and no foreign portfolio investment. Foreign investors are able to get credit from the local market, provided they have established domestic legal presence, majority-owned (at least 51 percent) by domestic companies or persons. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS At the end of November 2021, the value of total deposits in ROC banks was USD 56.3 billion (EUR 51.2 billion), and the value of total loans was USD 32.6 billion (EUR 29.6 billion). Currently, there are seven local banks in Cyprus offering a full range of retail and corporate banking services – the largest two of which are the Bank of Cyprus and Hellenic Bank – plus another two dozen or so subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks offering more specialized services. The full list of authorized credit institutions in Cyprus is available on the Central bank of Cyprus website: https://www.centralbank.cy/en/licensing-supervision/banks/register-of-credit-institutions-operating-in-cyprus . The banking sector has made significant progress since the 2013 financial crisis resulted in a “haircut” of uninsured deposits, followed by numerous bankruptcies and consolidation. The island’s two largest banks – Bank of Cyprus and Hellenic – are now adequately capitalized and have returned to profitability. However, the profitability of the banking sector as a whole is challenged by low interest margins, a high level of liquidity, and a still-elevated volume of NPLs. NPLs in Cyprus are the second-highest in the EU at 15.1 percent of total loans at the end of November 2021, compared to 19.1 percent a year earlier, albeit considerably lower than in 2014, when they reached 47.8 percent. Banks continue striving to reduce NPLs further, either by selling off portfolios of NPLs or using recently amended insolvency and foreclosure frameworks. The economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and political pressure to protect citizens under the current extraordinary circumstances makes reducing NPLs difficult. Aggregate banking sector data is available here: https://www.centralbank.cy/en/licensing-supervision/banks/aggregate-cyprus-banking-sector-data . Cyprus has a central bank – the Central Bank of Cyprus – which forms part of the European Central Bank. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in Cyprus. They are subject to Central Bank of Cyprus supervision, just like domestic banks. JPMorgan, Citibank, Bank of New York Mellon, and HSBC currently provide U.S. dollar correspondent banking services to ROC banks. Opening a personal or corporate bank account in Cyprus is straightforward, requiring routine documents. But because of a history of money-laundering concerns, banks now carefully scrutinize these documents and can conduct extensive due diligence checks on sources of wealth and income. A local bank account is not necessary for personal household expenses. Opening a corporate bank account is mandatory when registering a company in Cyprus. Since 2018, Cyprus has taken steps to address recognized regulatory shortcomings in combatting illicit finance in its international banking and financial services sector, tightening controls over non-resident shell companies and bank accounts. Cyprus’ first National Risk Assessment (NRA) of money laundering and terrorist financing, released in November 2018, is available at: http://mof.gov.cy/en/press-office/announcements/national-risk-assessment-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-cyprus . Cyprus is a member of the Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a FATF-style regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation report of the Cypriot banking sector, released December 2021, can be found at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/moneyval/jurisdictions/cyprus . AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS The “Central Bank” oversees and regulates local, foreign, and private banks. In addition to the “Central Bank” and the “Development Bank”, there are 21 banks in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, of which 16 are Turkish Cypriot-owned banks, and five are branch banks from Turkey. Banks are required to follow “know-your-customer” (KYC) and AML “laws,” which are regulated by the “Ministry of Economy and Energy,” and supervised by the “Central Bank,” but AML practices do not meet international standards. Due to non-recognition issues, Turkish Cypriot banks do not qualify for a SWIFT number to facilitate international transactions. All international transfers depend on routing through Turkish banks. In the third quarter of 2021, total deposits, which have the largest share in the sector’s total liabilities, reached 48,8 billion TL (USD 3.3 billion). As of the end of the third quarter of 2021 , NPLs reached 1.5 Billion Turkish Lira (USD 10 million). REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The Parliament passed legislation in March 2019 providing for the establishment of a National Investment Fund (NIF) to manage future offshore hydrocarbons and other natural resources revenue. Section 29 of the NIF Law specifies that the Corporation to be set up shall invest the Fund in a diversified manner with a view to maximizing risk-adjusted financial returns and in a manner consistent with the portfolio management by a prudent institutional investor. The Fund is precluded from investing in securities issued by a Cypriot issuer (including the state) or in real estate located in Cyprus. This provision safeguards against the possibility of speculative development catering to the Fund and political interference favoring domestic investments for purposes other than the best interests of the Fund and the Cypriot people as a whole. Additionally, Section 30 of the law provides that the fund cannot invest, directly or indirectly, to acquire more than five percent of any one company or legal entity. The fund is not yet operational. Regulations for the NIF are being drafted and will require legislative approval, and it will be several years before there are any revenues generated from the ROC’s hydrocarbon assets. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS There is no established sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC maintains exclusive or majority-owned stakes in more than 40 SOEs and is making slow progress towards privatizing some of them (see sections on Privatization and OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs). There is no comprehensive list of all SOEs available but the most significant are the following: Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC); Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CyTA); Cyprus Sports Organization; Cyprus Ports Authority; Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC); Cyprus Theatrical Organization; and Cyprus Agricultural Payments Organization. These SOEs operate in a competitive environment (domestically and internationally) and are increasingly responsive to market conditions. The state-owned EAC monopoly on electricity generation and distribution ended in 2014, although competition remains difficult given the small market size and delays in implementing new market rules. As an EU Member State, Cyprus is a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance are not mandatory for ROC SOEs, although some of the larger SOEs have started adopting elements of corporate governance best practices in their operating procedures. Each of the SOEs is subject to dedicated legislation. Most are governed by a board of directors, typically appointed by the government at the start of its term, and for the duration of its term in office. SOE board chairs are typically technocrats, affiliated with the ruling party. Representatives of labor unions and minority shareholders contribute to decision making. Although they enjoy a fair amount of independence, they report to the relevant minister. SOEs are required by law to publish annual reports and submit their books to the Auditor General. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS In the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, there are several “state-owned enterprises” and “semi-state-owned enterprises,” usually common utilities and essential services. In the Turkish Cypriot administered area, the below-listed institutions are known as “public economic enterprises” (POEs), “semi-public enterprises” and “public institutions,” which aim to provide common utilities and essential services. Some of these organizations include: Turkish Cypriot Electricity Board (KIBTEK); BRTK – State Television and Radio Broadcasting Corporation; Cyprus Turkish News Agency; Turkish Cypriot Milk Industry; Cypruvex Ltd. – Citrus Facility; EMU – Eastern Mediterranean Foundation Board; Agricultural Products Corporation; Turkish Cypriot Tobacco Products Corporation; Turkish Cypriot Alcoholic Products LTD; Coastal Safety and Salvage Services LTD; and Turkish Cypriot Development Bank. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS The ROC has made limited progress towards privatizations, despite earlier commitments to international creditors in 2013 to raise USD 1.6 billion (EUR 1.4 billion) from privatizations by 2018. In 2017, opposition parties passed legislation abolishing the Privatizations Unit, an independent body established March 2014. A bill providing the transfer of Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CyTA) commercial activities to a private legal entity, with the government retaining majority ownership, has been pending since March 2018. In December 2015, under the threat of strikes, the government reversed earlier plans to privatize the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC). However, in recent years, the EAC has been forced to unbundle its operations in line with Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA) recommendations and EU regulations. The EAC has created independent units for its core regulated activities, namely Transmission, Distribution, Generation, and Supply. Private firms have been offering renewable energy generation since 2003 and electricity supply since January 1, 2021. Despite slow progress in electricity and telecommunications, the current administration continues pursuing privatizations in other areas. In August 2020, the government assigned the Larnaca marina and port privatization project to a Cyprus-Israeli consortium, based on a 40-year lease agreement. The project, starting in April 2022, will be completed in four phases by 2037. It provides for port infrastructure, a marina, land redevelopment, a road network, green areas, parks and pedestrian areas as well as residential units and catering and recreation establishments. At a cost of about EUR1.2 billion, this project will be the biggest investment in Cyprus so far. The government also continues efforts to sell the state lottery, find long-term investors to lease state-owned properties in the Troodos area, and forge a strategic plan on how to handle the Cyprus Stock Exchange. AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS The airport at Ercan and K-Pet Petroleum Corporation have been converted into public-private partnerships. The concept of privatization continues to be controversial in the Turkish Cypriot community. In March 2015, Turkish Cypriot authorities signed a public-private partnership agreement with Turkey regarding the management and operation of the water obtained from an underwater pipeline funded by Turkey. Within the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, there has also been discussion about privatizing the electricity authority “KIBTEK”, Turkish Cypriot telecommunications operations, and the seaports. Czechia Executive Summary The Czech Republic is a medium-sized, open economy with 71 percent of its GDP based on exports, mostly from the automotive and engineering industries. According to the Czech Statistical Office, most of the country’s exports go to the European Union (EU), with 32.4 percent going to Germany alone. The United States is the Czech Republic’s second largest non-EU export destination, following the United Kingdom. While the Czech GDP dropped by 5.6 percent due to the economic impact of COVID-19 in 2020, it rebounded in 2021 to 3.3 percent according to the Czech Statistical Office. The Ministry of Finance forecasts 3.1 percent growth for 2022. The “Bill on Screening of Foreign Investments” entered into force May 1, 2021. The law gives the government the ability to screen greenfield investments and acquisitions by non-EU investors. The Czech Republic has taken strides to diversify its traditional investments in engineering into new fields of research and development (R&D) and innovative technologies. EU structural funding has enabled the country to open a number of world-class scientific and high-tech centers. EU member states are the largest investors in the Czech Republic. The United States announced on February 15, 2020 plans to provide up to USD 1 billion in financing through the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, the dedicated investment vehicle for the Three Seas Initiative and its participating Central and Eastern European countries. The Three Seas Initiative seeks to reinforce security and economic growth in the region through the development of energy, transportation, and digital infrastructure. In December 2020 the DFC approved the first tranche of U.S. financial support for the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund amounting to USD 300 million. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) agreed March 24, 2021, to a request from the Czech cabinet to return as an investor to the Czech Republic after a 13-year pause to help mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy. The EBRD’s investments in the Czech Republic primarily focus on private sector assistance and should reach EUR 100 – 200 million annually (USD109-218 million). The EBRD plans to be involved in investment projects in the Czech Republic temporarily (maximum five years). The continued economic fallout from COVID-19 resulted in the Czech Republic’s highest historic state budget deficit of 419.7 billion crowns (USD 18.2 billion) in 2021. In 2021, the Czech Republic appropriated approximately USD17 billion for the COVID-19 response, including USD7.7 billion in direct support, USD 6.7 billion in healthcare and social services expenses, and USD2.3 billion in loan guarantees. The Czech Republic has adopted environmental strategies and policies to address the climate crisis. Public procurement policies include environmental considerations, and the government provides subsidies to companies for using modern low-carbon technologies, renewables, and resource-effective processes. There are no significant risks to doing business responsibly in areas such as labor and human rights in the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic fully complies with EU and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) standards for labor laws and equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors. Wages continue to trail those in neighboring Western European countries (Czech wages are roughly one-third of comparable German wages). While wage growth slowed in 2020 following the coronavirus pandemic, resulting in a 3.1 percent year-on-year increase, wages rose by 6.1 percent in 2021, according to the Czech Statistical Office. As of the fourth quarter of 2021, wages grew primarily in the real estate, accommodation, and hospitality sectors. As of January 2022, the unemployment rate remained the lowest in the EU, at only 2.3 percent. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 49 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 24 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 5,629 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 22,070 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The Czech Republic is open to portfolio investment. There are 54 companies listed on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE). The overall trade volume of stocks increased from CZK108.78 billion (USD4.7 billion) in 2019 to CZK125.31 (USD5.4 billion) in 2020, with an average daily trading volume of CZK501.23 million (USD21.7 million). In March 2007, the PSE created the Prague Energy Exchange (PXE), which was later re-named to Power Exchange Central Europe, to trade electricity in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and, later, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. PXE’s goal is to increase liquidity in the electricity market and create a standardized platform for trading energy. In 2016, the German power exchange EEX acquired two thirds of PXE shares. Following the acquisition, the PXE benefited from both an increased number of traders and increased trade volume. The Czech National Bank, as the financial market supervisory authority, sets rules to safeguard the stability of the banking sector, capital markets, and insurance and pension scheme industries, and systematically regulates, supervises and, where appropriate, issues penalties for non-compliance with these rules. The Central Credit Register (CCR) is an information system that pools information on the credit commitments of individual entrepreneurs and legal entities, facilitating the efficient exchange of information between CCR participants. CCR participants consist of all banks and branches of foreign banks operating in the Czech Republic, as well as other individuals included in a special law. As an EU member country, the local market provides credits and credit instruments on market terms that are available to foreign investors. The Czech Republic respects IMF Article VIII. Large domestic banks belong to European banking groups. Most operate conservatively and concentrate almost exclusively on the domestic Czech market. Despite the COVID-19 crisis, Czech banks remain healthy. Results of regular banking sector stress tests, as conducted by the Czech National Bank, repeatedly confirm the strong state of the Czech banking sector which is deemed resistant to potential shocks. Results of the most recent stress test conducted by the Czech National Bank are available at: https://www.cnb.cz/en/financial-stability/stress-testing/banking-sector/. As of January 31, 2022, the total assets of commercial banks stood at CZK9,405 billion (approximately USD409 billion). Foreign investors have access to bank credit on the local market, and credit is generally allocated on market terms. The Czech National Bank has 10 correspondent banking relationships, including JP Morgan Chase Bank in New York and the Royal Bank of Canada in Toronto. The Czech Republic has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years, and there are no relationships in jeopardy. The Czech Republic does not currently regulate cryptocurrencies. The Czech government does not operate a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The Ministry of Finance administers state ownership policies. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are structured as joint-stock companies, state enterprises, national enterprises, limited liability companies, and limited partnerships. SOEs are owned by the individual ministries but are managed according to their business organizational structure as defined by law and are required to publish an annual report, disclose their accounting books, and submit to an independent audit. Potential conflicts of interest are covered by existing Act No. 159/2006 on Conflicts of Interest, and Act No. 14/2017 on Amendments to the Act on Conflict of Interest. Legislation on the civil service, which took effect January 1, 2015, established measures to prevent political influence over public administration, including operation of SOEs. Private enterprises are generally allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, government contracts and other business operations. SOEs purchase or supply goods and services from private sector and foreign firms. SOEs are subject to the same domestic accounting standards, rules, and taxation policies as their private competitors, and are not given any material advantages compared to private entities. State-owned or majority state-owned companies are present in several (strategic) sectors, including the energy, postal service, information and communication, and transport sectors. The Czech Republic has 52 wholly owned SOEs and three majority owned SOEs (excluding those in liquidation). Wholly owned SOEs employ roughly 78,000 people and own more than CZK487 billion (approximately USD21.1 billion) in assets. A list of all companies with a percentage of state ownership is available in Czech at: https://www.komora.cz/legislation/167-19-strategie-vlastnicke-politiky-statu-t-20-12-2019/. As an OECD member, the Czech Republic promotes the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the affiliated Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs. SOEs are subject to the same legislation as private enterprises regarding their commercial activities. As a result of several waves of privatization, the vast majority of the Czech economy is now in private hands. Privatizations have generally been open to foreign investors. In fact, most major SOEs were privatized with foreign participation. The government evaluates all investment offers for SOEs. Many competitors have alleged non-transparent or unfair practices in connection with past privatizations. Democratic Republic of the Congo Executive Summary The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa and one of the richest in the world in terms of natural resources. With 80 million hectares (197 million acres) of arable land and 1,100 minerals and precious metals, the DRC has the resources to achieve prosperity for its people. Despite its potential, the DRC often cannot provide adequate food, security, infrastructure, and health care to its estimated 100 million inhabitants, of which 75 percent live on less than two dollars a day. The ascension of Felix Tshisekedi to the presidency in 2019 and his government’s commitment to attracting international, and particularly U.S. investment, have raised the hopes of the business community for greater openness and transparency. In January 2021, the DRC government (GDRC) became eligible for preferential trade preferences under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), reflecting progress made on human rights, anti-corruption, and labor. Tshisekedi created a presidential unit to address business climate issues. In late 2020 Tshisekedi ejected former President Joseph Kabila’s party from the ruling coalition and in April 2021 he appointed a new cabinet. Overall investment is on the rise, fueled by multilateral donor financing and private domestic and international finance. The natural resource sector has historically attracted the most foreign investment and continues to attract investors’ attention as global demand for the DRC’s minerals grows. The primary minerals sector is the country’s main source of revenue, as exports of copper, cobalt, gold, coltan, diamond, tin, and tungsten provide over 95 percent of the DRC’s export revenue. The highly competitive telecommunications industry has also experienced significant investment, as has the energy sector through green sources such as hydroelectric and solar power generation. Several breweries and bottlers, some large construction firms, and limited textiles production are active. Given the vast needs, there are commercial opportunities in aviation, road, rail, border security, water transport, and the ports. The agricultural and forestry sectors present opportunities for sustainable economic diversification in the DRC, and companies are expressing interest in developing carbon credit markets to fund investment. Overall, businesses in the DRC face numerous challenges, including poor infrastructure, a predatory taxation system, and corruption. The COVID-19 pandemic slowed economic growth and worsened the country’s food security, and the Russia’s attacks on Ukraine have raised global prices on imported foods and gasoline. Armed groups remain active in the eastern part of the country, making for a fragile security situation that negatively affects the business environment. Reform of a non-transparent and often corrupt legal system is underway. While laws protecting investors are in effect, the court system is often very slow to make decisions or follow the law, allowing numerous investment disputes to last for years Concerns over the use of child labor in the artisanal mining of copper and cobalt have served to discourage potential purchasers. USG assistance programs to build capacity for labor inspections and enforcement are helping to address these concerns. The government’s announced priorities include greater efforts to address corruption, election reform, a review of mining contracts signed under the Kabila regime, and improvements to mining sector revenue collection. The economy experienced increased growth in 2021 based on renewed demand for its minerals. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 169 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2021 $25 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita (USD) 2020 $550 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The government welcomes investment including by foreign portfolio investors. A small number of private equity firms are actively investing in the mining industry. The institutional investor base is not well developed, with only an insurance company and a state pension fund as participants. There is no market for derivatives in the country. Cross-shareholding and stable shareholding arrangements are also not common. Credit is allocated on market terms, but there are occasional complaints about unfair privileges extended to certain investors in profitable sectors such as mining and telecommunications. There is no domestic stock market. Although reforms have been initiated, the Congolese financial system remains small, heavily dollarized, characterized by fragile balance sheets, and difficult to use. Further reforms are needed to strengthen the financial system, sustain its expansion, and stimulate economic growth. Inadequate risk-based controls, weak regulatory enforcement, low profitability, and over-reliance on demand deposits undermine the resilience of the financial system. The DRC’s capital market remains underdeveloped and consists primarily of the issuance of Treasury bonds. The Central Bank refrains from making restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. It is possible for foreign companies to borrow from local banks, but their options are limited. Loan terms are generally limited to 3-6 months, and interest rates are typically 16-21 percent. The inconsistent legal system, the often-burdensome business climate, and the difficulty of obtaining interbank financing discourage banks from making long-term loans. Opportunities for financing large projects in the national currency, the Congolese franc (CDF), are limited. The Congolese financial system is comprised of 15 licensed banks, a national insurance company (SONAS), the National Social Security Institute (INSS), one development bank, SOFIDE (Société Financière de Development), a savings fund (CADECO), roughly 21 microfinance institutions and 72 cooperatives, 81 money transfer institutions which are concentrated in Kinshasa, Kongo Central, former Bandundu, North and South Kivu and the former Katanga provinces, 4 electronic money institutions, and 48 foreign exchange offices. While the financial system is improving, it is fragmented and dominated by so-called “local” banks. With very different profiles (international, local, pan-African, networked, corporate, etc.) and approaches that diverge fundamentally in terms of management, governance, and terms of management and risk appetite, the so-called “local” commercial banks continue to dominate the banking sector. Pan-African banks are increasing their share, especially with the recent acquisition of the Banque Commerciale du Congo by the Kenyan Equity Group. The Central Bank controls monetary policy and regulates the banking system. Banks are mainly concentrated in the provinces of Kinshasa, Kongo Central, North and South Kivu, and Haut Katanga. The banking penetration rate is about 7.6 percent, or about 5.3 million accounts, which places the country among the least banked nations in the world. Mobile banking has the potential to significantly increase the banking customer base, as an estimated 35 million Congolese use cell phones. In the last five years, there has been an evolution and consolidation of prudential ratios or risk indicators of the banking sector and the introduction of alternative channels for financial service delivery and inclusion, such as Agency Banking and Mobile Banking. Mobile money continues to play an increasingly important role in financial inclusion in the DRC, as mobile money is a lever for economic and social inclusion. Over the past ten years, mobile money subscriptions in the DRC have increased by 20 percent per year. There is no debt market. The financial health of DRC banks is fragile, reflecting high operating costs and exchange rates. In 2021 asset quality measures taken by the Central Bank allowed banks to absorb the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Fees charged by banks are a major source of revenue. Statistics on non-performing loans are not available because many banks only record the balance due and not the total amount of their non-performing loans. The financial system is primarily based on the banking sector, with total assets estimated at US$ 5.2 billion. Of the five largest banks, four are local and one is controlled by foreign holding companies. The five largest banks hold nearly 65 percent of bank deposits and more than 60 percent of total bank assets, or about $ 3.1 billion. The country has an operating central banking system with Citigroup as the only correspondent bank. All foreign banks or branches need to be accredited by the Central Bank, are considered Congolese banks with foreign capital, and fall under the provisions and regulations covering the credit institutions’ activities in the DRC. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account in the DRC. The DRC has no declared Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), although the 2018 Mining Code refers to creating a future fund “FOMIN” that will be capitalized by a percentage of mining revenues. In October 2021, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Technical Secretariat organized a workshop to develop the FOMIN decree as well as tools for managing the shares of mining royalties accruing to the provinces and local entities. Denmark Executive Summary Denmark is regarded by many independent observers as one of the world’s most attractive business environments and ranks highly in indices measuring political, economic, and regulatory stability. It is a member of the European Union (EU), and Danish legislation and regulations conform to EU standards on virtually all issues. It maintains a fixed exchange rate policy, with the Danish Krone linked closely to the Euro. Denmark is a social welfare state with a thoroughly modern market economy heavily driven by trade in goods and services. Given that exports account for about 60 percent of GDP, the economic conditions of its major trading partners – the United States, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom – have a substantial impact on Danish national accounts. Denmark is a world leader in “green technology” industries, such as offshore wind and energy efficiency, and in sectors such as shipping and life sciences. Denmark is a net exporter of food. Its manufacturing sector depends on raw material imports. Within the EU, Denmark is among the strongest supporters of liberal trade policy. Transparency International regularly ranks Denmark as being perceived as the least corrupt nation in the world. Denmark is strategically situated to link continental Europe with the Nordic and Baltic countries. Transport and communications infrastructures are efficient. The Danish economy experienced a contraction of 2.1 percent of GDP in 2020 due to COVID-19 followed by a 4.7 percent rebound in 2021, thereby weathering the pandemic with among the lowest declines in GDP in the EU. Denmark’s economic activity and employment have surpassed their pre-pandemic levels and trends, but companies across sectors cite labor shortages as a key challenge. In May 2022, the Ministry of Finance revised its GDP growth projections, forecasting 3.5 percent GDP growth in 2022, decelerating to 2 percent annual GDP growth in 2023. The Ministry projects the Danish economy will weather headwinds from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and surging energy prices, as well as elevated levels of inflation, due to its robust foundation, although economic activity will be at a slightly lower level. The Ministry anticipates the impact will mainly be through increased inflation and disruption of trade. Denmark’s underlying macroeconomic conditions, however, are healthy, and the investment climate is sound. The entrepreneurial climate, including female-led entrepreneurship, is robust. New legislation establishing a foreign investment screening mechanism to prevent threats to national security and public order came into effect on July 1, 2021. The mechanism requires mandatory notification for investments in the following five sectors: defense, IT security and processing of classified information, companies producing dual-use items, critical technology, and critical infrastructure. It allows for voluntary notification for all sectors. The legislation does not apply to Greenland or to the Faroe Islands, though both are looking into potential legislation. In 2020, the Danish parliament passed the Danish Climate Act, which established a statutory target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 70 percent from 1990 levels in 2030 and achieving net zero by 2050. In April 2022, the government presented a reform proposal on Danish energy policy to move towards the above goals and simultaneously achieve independence from Russian natural gas. The proposal includes plans for increased domestic production of biogas as well as natural gas from the North Sea, a quadrupling of combined onshore wind and solar power production capacity by 2030, and an expansion of district heating. The government also proposed green taxation to finance the transition with a differentiated carbon emission tax in addition to the EU carbon trading system. Note: Additional information on the investment climates in the constituent parts of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, can be found at the end of this report. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 1 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 9 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 9.9 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 63,010 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Denmark has fully liberalized foreign exchange flows, including those for direct and portfolio investment purposes. Credit is allocated on market terms and is freely available. Denmark adheres to its IMF Article VIII obligations. The Danish banking system is under the regulatory oversight of the Financial Supervisory Authority. Differentiated voting rights – A and B stocks – are used to some extent, and several Danish companies are controlled by foundations, which can restrict potential hostile takeovers, including foreign takeovers. The Danish stock market functions efficiently. In 2005, the Copenhagen Stock Exchange became part of the integrated Nordic and Baltic marketplace, OMX Exchanges, which is headquartered in Stockholm. Besides Stockholm and Copenhagen, OMX also includes the stock exchanges in Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. To increase the access to capital for primarily small companies, the OMX in December 2005 opened a Nordic alternative marketplace – “First North” – in Denmark. In February 2008, the NASDAQ-OMX Group acquired the exchanges. In the World Economic Forum 2019 report, Denmark ranked 11th out of 141 on the metric “Financial System.” The Danish stock market is divided into four different branches/indexes. The C25 index contains the 25 most valuable companies in Denmark. Other large companies with a market value exceeding $1.05 billion (EUR 1 billion) are in the group of “Large Cap,” companies with a market value between $158 million (EU 150 million) and $1.05 billion (EUR 1 billion) belong to the “Mid Cap” segment, while companies with a market value smaller than $158 million (EU 150 million) belong to the “Small Cap” group. The major Danish banks are rated by international agencies, and their creditworthiness is rated as high by international standards. The European Central Bank and the Danish National Bank reported that Denmark’s major banks have passed stress tests by considerable margins. Denmark’s banking sector is relatively large; based on the ratio of consolidated banking assets to GDP, the sector is three times bigger than the national economy. By January 2022, the total of Danish shares valued $673.4 billion (DKK 4.24 trillion) and were owned 55.1 percent by foreign owners and 44.9 percent by Danish owners, including 13.5 percent held by households and 3.9 percent by the government. The three largest Danish banks – Danske Bank, Nordea Bank Danmark, and Jyske Bank – hold approximately 75 percent of the total assets in the Danish banking sector. The primary goal of the Central Bank (Nationalbanken) is to maintain the peg of the Danish currency to the Euro – with allowed fluctuations of 2.25 percent. It also functions as the general lender to Danish commercial banks and controls the money supply in the economy. As occurred in many countries, Danish banks experienced significant turbulence in 2008 – 2009. The Danish parliament subsequently passed a series of measures to establish a “safety net” program, provide government lending to financial institutions in need of capital to uphold their solvency requirements, and ensure the orderly winding down of failed banks. The parliament passed an additional measure, named Bank Package 4, in August 2011, which sought to identify systemically important financial institutions, ensure the liquidity of banks that assume control of a troubled bank, support banks acquiring troubled banks by allowing them to write off obligations of the troubled bank to the government, and change the funding mechanism for the sector-funded guarantee fund to a premiums-based, pay-as-you-go system. According to the Danish government, Bank Package 4 provides mechanisms for a sector solution to troubled banks without senior debt holder losses but does not supersede earlier legislation. As such, senior debt holder losses are still a possibility in the event of a bank failure. On October 10, 2013, the Danish Minister for Business and Growth concluded a political agreement with broad political support which, based on the most recent financial statements, identified specific financial institutions as “systemically important” (SIFI). The SIFIs in Denmark as of June 2021, the most recent designation, are Danske Bank A/S, Nykredit Realkredit A/S, Nordea Kredit Realkreditaktieselskab, Jyske Bank A/S, Sydbank A/S, DLR Kredit A/S, Spar Nord Bank A/S and A/S Arbejdernes Landsbank. The government identified these institutions based on three quantitative measures: 1) a balance sheet to GDP ratio above 6.5 percent; 2) market share of lending in Denmark above 5 percent; or 3) market share of deposits in Denmark above 3 percent. If an institution is above the requirement of any one of the three measures, it will be considered systemically important and must adhere to the stricter requirements on capitalization, liquidity, and resolution. The Faroese SIFIs are P/F BankNordik, and Betri Banki P/F, while Grønlandsbanken is the only SIFI in Greenland. The Danish government projected in May 2022 that Denmark’s debt to GDP ratio will decrease from approximately 42 percent at the end of 2020 to 33 percent by the end of 2023. The Ministry of Finance announced in May 2022 that Denmark ran a 2.3 percent budget surplus in 2021, and projects budget surpluses of 0.6 percent and 0.2 percent in 2022 and 2023, respectively. Denmark maintains no sovereign wealth funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Denmark is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) hold dominant positions in rail, energy, utilities, and broadcast media in Denmark. Large-scale public procurement must go through public tender in accordance with EU legislation. Competition from SOEs is not considered a barrier to foreign investment in Denmark. As an OECD member, Denmark promotes and upholds the OECD Corporate Governance Principles and subsidiary SOE Guidelines. Denmark has no current plans to privatize its SOEs. Djibouti Executive Summary Djibouti, a country with few resources, recognizes the crucial need for foreign direct investment (FDI) to stimulate economic development. The country’s assets include a strategic geographic location, free zones, an open trade regime, and a stable currency. Djibouti has identified a number of priority sectors for investment, including transport and logistics, real estate, energy, agriculture, and tourism. Djibouti’s investment climate has improved in recent years, which has led to interest by U.S. and other foreign firms. There are, however, a number of reforms still needed to promote investment. In 2020, according to the UN Conference of Trade and Development, FDI stock represented 58.53% of GDP, up from 52.5% in 2018. Real GDP growth has remained between 5% and a little over 8% per year for the last five years. Inflation decreased to 0.1 % in 2018 then peaked at an estimated 3.3% in 2019 and decreased to 2.9% in 2020. In recent years, Djibouti undertook a surge of foreign-backed infrastructure loans to posture themselves as the “Singapore of Africa.” Major projects have included a new gas terminal and pipeline to Ethiopia, a new port, free zones, improved road systems, a railroad connecting Djibouti and Addis Ababa, and a water pipeline from Ethiopia. Djibouti launched the first phase of an ambitious port and free zone project, Djibouti Damerjog Industrial Development (DDID) free-trade zone, scheduled to be built in three phases of five years each. The project includes a multipurpose port, a liquefied natural gas terminal, a livestock terminal, dry docks and a ship repair area, a power plant and a factory that will produce construction materials. DDID, which is expected to attract foreign investors, will offer all the preferential policies guaranteed by the free zone authority, such as tax exemption, minimized restrictions on foreign labor and competitive water and electricity rates. In April 2018, the Government of Djibouti enacted tax, labor, and financial reforms to improve its investment climate. Various business climate reforms were introduced in 2020 with the objectives of improving competitiveness both regionally and internationally. These reforms included starting online registration for companies and the creation of the Djibouti Port Community System platform which is a portal that provides a comprehensive set of online services to the business community. Economic development and foreign investment are hindered by high electricity costs, high unemployment, an unskilled workforce, a large informal sector, regional instability, opaque business practices, compliance risks, corruption, and a weak financial sector. The World Bank estimated the government’s public debt-to-GDP ratio was 66.7% in 2019 with a projection of 69.9% in 2020 which will gradually decrease over the years. The majority of the debt is owed to Chinese entities. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 128 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021 Global Innovation N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $3,310 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Djibouti is open to and receptive of foreign investors. Djibouti does not have its own stock market, but some multinational companies with investments in Djibouti are publicly traded. Portfolio investment in Djibouti is primarily done through private equity investments in a given sector, rather than through purchase of securities. Investments in Djibouti are inherently illiquid for that reason, and the purchase or sale of any sizeable investment in Djibouti affects the market accordingly. Existing policies respect IMF Article VIII and allow the free flow of funds for international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign companies do not face discrimination in obtaining it. Generally, however, only well-established businesses obtain bank credit, as the cost of credit is high. Credit is available to the private sector, whether foreign or domestic. Where credit is not available, it is primarily due to the associated risk and not structural factors. Three large banks, Bank of Africa, Bank for Commerce and Industry – Mer Rouge, and CAC bank dominate Djibouti’s banking sector. While these three banks account for the majority share of deposits in-country, there are 13 total banks, all established in the last 14 years. The 2011 banking law fixed the minimum capital requirement for financial institutions at DJF 1 billion (USD 5,651,250) and also covers financial auxiliaries, such as money transfer agencies and Islamic financial institutions. In addition to the three names banks above, foreign banks include Silkroad Bank, Bank of China, and the Burkina Faso-based International Business Bank. The banking sector suffers from a lack of consistent supervision, but it has been improving. Non-performing loans decreased from 16.26% in 2019 to 13.31% in 2020 and to 9.8% in 2021. The total assets of all the banks were estimated to be USD 3.1 billion in 2020, of which 80% were held by the four largest banks. The country has a Central Bank, which is in charge of delivering licenses to banks and supervising them. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in the country. They are subject to the same regulations as local banks. Djibouti has not announced that it intends to implement or allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in its banking transactions. Some banks have begun to provide mobile and e-banking services. In June 2020, Djibouti Telecom launched D-Money, a Digital Mobile Money service which allows users to make digital money transfers and payments directly from mobile phones. Foreign Exchange Djibouti has no foreign exchange restrictions. Businesses are free to repatriate profits. There are no limitations on converting or transferring funds, or on the inflow and outflow of cash. The Djiboutian franc, which has been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1949, is stable. The fixed exchange rate is 177.71 Djiboutian francs to the U.S. dollar. Funds can be transferred by using banks or international money transfer companies such as Western Union, all monitored by the Central Bank. Remittance Policies There are no recent changes or plans to change investment remittance policies. There are no time limitations on remittances. The government does not issue bonds on the open market, and cash-like instruments are not in common use in Djibouti, so direct currency transfers are the only practical method of remitting profits. In mid-2020 the Djiboutian government announced the creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund. According to a government statement, the state-owned fund targets investments locally and in neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa. It focuses on industries including telecommunications, technology, energy, and logistics. The fund acts as a long-term investor and is required to reinvest the entire net profits of its activity. The government aims to fund it to $1.5 billion within ten years. Article 12 of Law N° 75/AN/20/8th L, creating the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti, states the fund will adopt and implement best practice in terms of transparency and performance reporting in accordance with the Santiago Principles. As of late 2021, the fund was ramping up operations. Law No. 75/AN/20/8th L establishing the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti – https://www.presidence.dj/texte/75-an-20-8eme-l-10332 Decree No. 2020-127/PRE approving the statutes and determining certain initial resources of the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti – https://www.presidence.dj/texte/2020-127-pre-10361 Decree No. 2020-111/PRE appointing the members of the Board of Directors and the Director General of the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti – https://www.presidence.dj/texte/2020-111-pre-10360 Dominica Executive Summary The Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica) is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). The Government of Dominica strongly encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on its citizens. Dominica remains vulnerable to external shocks such as climate change impacts, natural hazards, and global economic downturns. According to Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) figures, the economy of Dominica had an estimated GDP of $409.9 million USD (1,107.78 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) in 2021, which signified a slight recovery from a 15.4 percent contraction in 2020 due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting stagnation of the tourism sector. The IMF forecasts real GDP growth of 7.9 percent in 2022 and expects GDP to reach pre-pandemic levels by 2023. The economy also continues to recover from the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria in 2017. Losses from Hurricane Maria were estimated at $1.37 billion or 226 percent of GDP. Prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government was primarily focused on reconstruction efforts, with support from the international community. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Dominica has received financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to provide fiscal assistance and macro-economic stability and support in health-related expenditures, loss of household income, food security, and the agricultural sector. Through its economic policies, the government is seeking to stimulate sustainable and climate-resilient economic growth by implementing a revised macroeconomic framework that includes strengthening the nation’s fiscal framework. The government states it is committed to creating a vibrant business climate to attract more foreign investment. Dominica remains a small emerging market in the Eastern Caribbean, with investment opportunities mainly in the service sector, particularly in eco-tourism, information and communication technologies, and education. Other opportunities exist in alternative energy, including geothermal energy, and capital works due to reconstruction and new tourism projects. The government provides some investment incentives for businesses that are considering establishing operations in Dominica, encouraging both domestic and foreign private investment. Foreign investors can repatriate all profits and dividends and can import capital. Dominica’s legal system is based on British common law. It does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States, though it does have bilateral investment treaties with the UK and Germany. In 2018, the Government of Dominica signed an Intergovernmental Agreement to implement the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Dominica to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 7,270 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Dominica is a member of the ECCU. As such, it is a member of the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing the buying and selling of financial products for the eight member territories. In 2021, the ECSE listed 164 securities, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $1.9 billion. Dominica is open to portfolio investment. Dominica has accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement, Sections 2, 3, and 4 and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions. Dominica does not normally grant foreign tax credits except in the case of taxes paid in a British Commonwealth country that grants similar relief for Dominica taxes or where an applicable tax treaty provides a credit. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. The eight participating governments of the ECCU have passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act. The act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. Dominica is a signatory to this agreement and the ECCB controls Dominica’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU. The Minister of Finance usually acts in consultation with, and on the recommendation of, the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Dominica. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed in order to conduct any banking business. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of ongoing supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in Dominica as stable. Assets of commercial banks totaled $781.8 million (2.1 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of 2019. Dominica is well served by bank and non-financial institutions. There are minimal alternative financial services. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S. and European banks. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to monitor the issue. In 2019, the ECCB launched an 18-month financial technology pilot to launch a Digital Eastern Caribbean dollar (DXCD) with its partner, Barbados-based Bitt Inc. An accompanying mobile application, DCash was officially launched in March 2021 in four pilot countries, adding Dominica to the pilot in December 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. The digital Eastern Caribbean currency operates alongside physical Eastern Caribbean currency. Dominica does not have any specific legislation to regulate cryptocurrencies. Neither the Government of Dominica, nor the ECCB, of which Dominica is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Dominica work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit to carry out certain specific ministerial responsibilities. The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown is aware of 20 SOEs currently operating in areas such as tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, solid waste management, and agriculture. There is no published list of these SOEs. They are all wholly owned government entities. Each is headed by a board of directors to which senior management reports. The SOE sector is affected by financial sustainability challenges, with resources insufficient to cover capital replacement. Dominica does not currently have a targeted privatization program. Dominica Executive Summary The Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica) is a member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). The Government of Dominica strongly encourages foreign direct investment, particularly in industries that create jobs, earn foreign currency, and have a positive impact on its citizens. Dominica remains vulnerable to external shocks such as climate change impacts, natural hazards, and global economic downturns. According to Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) figures, the economy of Dominica had an estimated GDP of $409.9 million USD (1,107.78 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) in 2021, which signified a slight recovery from a 15.4 percent contraction in 2020 due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting stagnation of the tourism sector. The IMF forecasts real GDP growth of 7.9 percent in 2022 and expects GDP to reach pre-pandemic levels by 2023. The economy also continues to recover from the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria in 2017. Losses from Hurricane Maria were estimated at $1.37 billion or 226 percent of GDP. Prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government was primarily focused on reconstruction efforts, with support from the international community. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Dominica has received financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to provide fiscal assistance and macro-economic stability and support in health-related expenditures, loss of household income, food security, and the agricultural sector. Through its economic policies, the government is seeking to stimulate sustainable and climate-resilient economic growth by implementing a revised macroeconomic framework that includes strengthening the nation’s fiscal framework. The government states it is committed to creating a vibrant business climate to attract more foreign investment. Dominica remains a small emerging market in the Eastern Caribbean, with investment opportunities mainly in the service sector, particularly in eco-tourism, information and communication technologies, and education. Other opportunities exist in alternative energy, including geothermal energy, and capital works due to reconstruction and new tourism projects. The government provides some investment incentives for businesses that are considering establishing operations in Dominica, encouraging both domestic and foreign private investment. Foreign investors can repatriate all profits and dividends and can import capital. Dominica’s legal system is based on British common law. It does not have a bilateral investment treaty with the United States, though it does have bilateral investment treaties with the UK and Germany. In 2018, the Government of Dominica signed an Intergovernmental Agreement to implement the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), making it mandatory for banks in Dominica to report the banking information of U.S. citizens. Table 1 Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 45 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) N/A N/A https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 7,270 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector Dominica is a member of the ECCU. As such, it is a member of the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing the buying and selling of financial products for the eight member territories. In 2021, the ECSE listed 164 securities, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $1.9 billion. Dominica is open to portfolio investment. Dominica has accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement, Sections 2, 3, and 4 and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions. Dominica does not normally grant foreign tax credits except in the case of taxes paid in a British Commonwealth country that grants similar relief for Dominica taxes or where an applicable tax treaty provides a credit. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. The eight participating governments of the ECCU have passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act. The act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. Dominica is a signatory to this agreement and the ECCB controls Dominica’s currency and regulates its domestic banks. The Banking Act is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU. The Minister of Finance usually acts in consultation with, and on the recommendation of, the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio. Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Dominica. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed in order to conduct any banking business. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of ongoing supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in Dominica as stable. Assets of commercial banks totaled $781.8 million (2.1 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of 2019. Dominica is well served by bank and non-financial institutions. There are minimal alternative financial services. The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S. and European banks. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to monitor the issue. In 2019, the ECCB launched an 18-month financial technology pilot to launch a Digital Eastern Caribbean dollar (DXCD) with its partner, Barbados-based Bitt Inc. An accompanying mobile application, DCash was officially launched in March 2021 in four pilot countries, adding Dominica to the pilot in December 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. The digital Eastern Caribbean currency operates alongside physical Eastern Caribbean currency. Dominica does not have any specific legislation to regulate cryptocurrencies. Neither the Government of Dominica, nor the ECCB, of which Dominica is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Dominica work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit to carry out certain specific ministerial responsibilities. The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown is aware of 20 SOEs currently operating in areas such as tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, solid waste management, and agriculture. There is no published list of these SOEs. They are all wholly owned government entities. Each is headed by a board of directors to which senior management reports. The SOE sector is affected by financial sustainability challenges, with resources insufficient to cover capital replacement. Dominica does not currently have a targeted privatization program. Dominican Republic Executive Summary Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role for the Dominican economy, and the Dominican Republic is one of the main recipients of FDI in the Caribbean and Central America. The government actively courts FDI with generous tax exemptions and other incentives to attract businesses to the country. Historically, the tourism, real estate, telecommunications, free trade zones, mining, and financing sectors are the largest FDI recipients. Besides financial incentives, the country’s membership in the Central America Free Trade Agreement-Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) is one of the greatest advantages for foreign investors. Observers credit the agreement with increasing competition, strengthening rule of law, and expanding access to quality products in the Dominican Republic. The United States remains the single largest investor in the Dominican Republic. CAFTA-DR includes protections for member state foreign investors, including mechanisms for dispute resolution. Foreign investors report numerous systemic problems in the Dominican Republic and cite a lack of clear, standardized rules by which to compete and a lack of enforcement of existing rules. Complaints include perceptions of widespread corruption at both national and local levels of government; delays in government payments; weak intellectual property rights enforcement; bureaucratic hurdles; slow and sometimes locally biased judicial and administrative processes, and non-standard procedures in customs valuation and classification of imports. Weak land tenure laws and interference with private property rights continue to be a problem. The public perceives administrative and judicial decision-making to be inconsistent, opaque, and overly time-consuming. A lack of transparency and poor implementation of existing laws are widely discussed as key investor grievances. U.S. businesses operating in the Dominican Republic often need to take extensive measures to ensure compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Many U.S. firms and investors have expressed concerns that corruption in the government, including in the judiciary, continues to constrain successful investment in the Dominican Republic. The current government, led by President Luis Abinader, made a concerted effort in its first full year of government to address issues of corruption and transparency that are a core issue for social, economic, and political prosperity, including prosecutorial independence, long-awaited electricity sector reform, and the empowerment of the supreme audit institution, the Chamber of Accounts. More work has repeatedly been promised, but passage remains uncertain as each measure is still subject to administrative or legislative processes, including approval of new public procurement legislation, passage of draft civil asset forfeiture legislation, the law for reform of the management of government assets, and a modern foreign investment law. The Dominican Republic, an upper middle-income country, has been the fastest growing economy in Latin America over the past 50 years, according to World Bank data. It grew by 12.3 percent in 2021, 4.7 percent when compared with 2019 (pre-pandemic). Tax revenues were 12.7 percent higher than what was stipulated in the Initial Budget for 2021; coupled with budgetary discipline, the government closed its deficit to 2.7 percent of GDP. However, inflation at the end of 2021 was 8.50 percent, double the target of 4.0 percent ±1.0. Despite the government efforts to reduce public spending and increase revenues, absent meaningful fiscal reform, public debt continued to grow in 2021, reaching $47.7 billion at the end of November 2021 (if debt to the Central Bank is added, the public debt reached $62.04 billion), and a total service of debt of $5.9 billion – resulting in decrease in the debt to GDP ratio, but an increase in the total value of government debt. The government continues to apply large subsidies to different sectors of the economy such as the electricity sector and hydrocarbons. In 2021, the government allocated $1.03 billion to the subsidy for Electricity Distribution Companies (EDE’s) and $266.9 million directly to fuel. According to the 2022 Climate Change Performance Index, the Dominican Republic is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to the effects of climate change, though it represents only 0.06% of global greenhouse gas emissions. As a small island developing state, the Dominican Republic is particularly vulnerable to the effects of extreme climate events, such as storms, floods, droughts, and rising sea levels. Combined with rapid economic growth (over 5 percent until 2020) and urbanization (more than 50 percent of population in cities, 30 percent in Santo Domingo), climate change could strain key socio-economic sectors such as water, agriculture and food security, human health, biodiversity, forests, marine coastal resources, infrastructure, and energy. The National Constitution calls for the efficient and sustainable use of the nation’s natural resources in accordance with the need to adapt to climate change. The government is acting, both domestically and in coordination with the international community, to mitigate the effects of climate change. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 128 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 93 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $2,806 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $7,260 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The Dominican Stock Market (BVRD by its Spanish acronym) is the only stock exchange in the Dominican Republic. It began operations in 1991 and is viewed as a cornerstone of the country’s integration into the global economy and domestic development. It is regulated by the Securities Market Law No. 249-17 and supervised by the Superintendency of Securities, which approves all public securities offerings. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the local market but tend to prefer less expensive offshore sources. The Central Bank regularly issues certificates of deposit using an auction process to determine interest rates and maturities. In recent years, the local stock market has continued to expand, in terms of the securities traded on the BVRD. There are very few publicly traded companies on the exchange, as credit from financial institutions is widely available and many of the large Dominican companies are family-owned enterprises. Most of the securities traded in the BVRD are fixed-income securities issued by the Dominican State. On August 6, 2021, the Law 163-21 for the Promotion of the Placement and Marketing of Publicly Offered Securities in the Stock Market of the Dominican Republic was enacted as a complement to Law 249-17, to promote the issuance of shares by private and public companies. This law declares of national interest the promotion and development of the public offering of securities as a financing mechanism for the revitalization of the national economy, with special emphasis on the issuance of shares of private and public companies in the stock market of the Dominican Republic. Among the incentives proposed by Law 163-21, is the exemption of listed companies from the 1% tax for capital increase when they issue new shares during their first three years of validity. Likewise, during that same 3-year period, the Law reduces to 15% the rate of Income Tax applicable to Capital gains generated by the seller of a share listed on the stock exchange. Dominican Republic’s financial sector is relatively stable, and the IMF declared the financial system satisfactory during 2021 Article IV consultations, however, directors agreed that while financial system remains resilient and well monitored, it would benefit from moving closer to international standards for supervision and regulation and enhancing the macroprudential and crisis management toolkit. According to the first National Financial Inclusion Survey from the Central Bank, published on March 22, 2020, only 46.3 percent of Dominicans have a bank account. Financial depth is relatively constrained. Private lending to GDP (around 30.5 percent, according to the IMF) is low by international and regional standards, representing around half the average for Latin America. Real interest rates, driven in part by large interest rate spreads, are also relatively high. The country’s relatively shallow financial markets can be attributed to a number of factors, including high fiscal deficits crowding out private investment; complicated and lengthy regulatory procedures for issuing securities in primary markets; and high levels of consolidation in the banking sector. Dominican banking consists of 112 entities, as follows: 47 financial intermediation entities (including large commercial banks, savings and loans associations, financial intermediation public entities, credit corporations), 41 foreign exchange and remittance agents (specifically, 35 exchange brokers and 6 remittances and foreign exchange agents), and 24 trustees. According to the latest available information (January 2022), total bank assets were $47.7 billion. The three largest banks hold 69.7 percent of the total assets – Banreservas 32.6 percent, Banco Popular 21.9 percent, and BHD Leon 16.4 percent. While full-service bank branches tend to be in urban areas, several banks employ sub-agents to extend services in more rural areas. Technology has also helped extend banking services throughout the country. The Monetary and Banking system is regulated by the Monetary and Financial Law No. 183-02, and is overseen by the Monetary Board, the Central Bank, and the Superintendency of Banks. The mission of the Central Bank is to maintain the stability of prices, promote the strength and stability of the financial system, and ensure the proper functioning of payment systems. The Superintendency of Banks carries out the supervision of financial intermediation entities, in order to verify compliance by said entities with the provisions of the law. Foreign banks may establish operations in the Dominican Republic, although it may require a special decree for the foreign financial institution to establish domicile in the country. Foreign banks not domiciled in the Dominican Republic may establish representative offices in accordance with current regulations. To operate, both local and foreign banks must obtain the prior authorization of the Monetary Board and the Superintendency of Banks. Major U.S. banks have a commercial presence in the country, but most focus on corporate banking services as opposed to retail banking. Some other foreign banks offer retail banking. There are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts, although identification requirements do apply. The Dominican government does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises The legacy of autocratic rule in the mid-twentieth century and the practice of distributing social services as political patronage have resulted in a relatively larger role for state-actors in the Dominican economy when compared with the United States. Since 1997, by means of the approval of the General Law of Reform of Public Companies No. 141-97, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have been on the decline and do not have as significant a presence in the economy as they once did, with most functions now performed by privately held firms. Notable exceptions are in the electricity, banking, mining, and refining sectors. The Dominican Corporation of State Enterprises (CORDE) was established by Law No. 289 of June 30, 1966, with the purpose of managing, directing, and developing all the productive and commercial companies, goods, and rights ceded by the Dominican State as a result of the death of the dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo. Among the state-owned companies that came to be managed by CORDE are the salt, gypsum, marble, and pozzolana mines. In 2017, the dissolution of CORDE was entrusted to a Commission chaired by the Legal Consultancy of the Executive Power, which assumed the operational, administrative, and financial management of this entity until the dissolution process was definitively completed. Within the framework of the dissolution process of CORDE, the ownership of the mining concessions of the Dominican State was transferred to the Patrimonial Fund of Reformed Companies (FONPER) through the Mining Concessions Transfer Agreement between CORDE and FONPER dated July 2, 2020. Shortly after being sworn into office, in August 2020, President Abinader issued Decree 422-20 forming the Commission for the Liquidation of State Organs (CLOE) under the charge of the Ministry of the Presidency. Since then, the CLOE has been in the process of dissolution and liquidation of CORDE, and on December 8, 2020, CLOE requested the FONPER Board of Directors revoke the Concessions Transfer Agreement. FONPER’s Board of Directors approved the revocation through Minutes No. 02-2021 of March 11, 2021, authorizing the president of FONPER to sign an agreement with CLOE that revokes and nullifies the Transfer Agreement. It is not clear whether this revocation has been completed. In 2021, the Office of the President proposed a bill to regulate government business assets, government participation in public trusts, and to create the National Center for Companies and Public Trusts (CENEFIP). The bill’s intent is to reform the management of state assets and replace the disgraced Patrimonial Fund of Reformed State Enterprises (FONPER), which is being investigated for alleged irregularities that may have personally benefited politically affiliated persons. The CENEFIP bill is under review in the legislature. Also in 2021, the executive branch transferred the functions and properties of the State Sugar Council [Consejo Estatal del Azúcar] to the Directorate General of National Assests [Dirección General de Bienes Nacionales]. The State Sugar Council maintains one remaining sugar mill, Porvenir. In the partially privatized electricity sector, private companies mainly provide electricity generation, while the government handles the transmission and distribution phases via the Dominican Electric Transmission Company (ETED) and the Dominican Corporation of State Electrical Companies (CDEEE). This sector is undergoing additional reforms, including the dissolution of the CDEEE and privatization of the management and operation of the distribution companies. The CDEEE and the distribution companies have traditionally been the largest SOEs in terms of government expenditures. The government also participates in the generation phase, too (most notably in hydroelectric power), and one of the distribution companies is partially privatized. The Dominican financial sector consists of 112 entities, as follows: 47 financial intermediation entities (including large commercial banks, savings and loans associations, financial intermediation public entities, credit corporations), 41 foreign exchange and remittance agents (specifically, 35 exchange brokers and 6 remittances and foreign exchange agents), and 24 trustees. According to the latest available information (January 2022), total bank assets were $47.7 billion. The three largest banks hold 69.7 percent of the total assets – Banreservas 32.6 percent, Banco Popular 21.9 percent, and BHD Leon 16.4 percent. The state-owned, but autonomously operated BanReservas is the largest bank in the country and is a market leader in lending and deposits. Part of this success is due to a requirement for government employees to open accounts with BanReservas in order to receive salary payments. BanReservas was also utilized to distribute government social support payments during the pandemic. Roughly a third of the bank’s lending portfolio is to government institutions. In the refining sector, the government is now the exclusive shareholder of the country’s only oil refinery; Refinery Dominicana (Refidomsa), after having extricated Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) in August 2021. Refidomsa operates and manages the refinery, is the only importer of crude oil in the country, and is also the largest importer of refined fuels, with a 60 percent market share. The price for fuel products is set by the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and SMEs. Fuel prices are heavily subsidized. Law No. 10-04 requires the Chamber of Accounts to audit SOEs. Audits should be published at https://www.camaradecuentas.gob.do/index.php/auditorias-publicadas . While audits have not always been publicly available, the new President of the Chamber is making a concerted effort to conduct and publish all audits required by law. Partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the late 1990s and early 2000s resulted in foreign investors obtaining management control of former SOEs engaged in activities such as electricity generation, airport management, and sugarcane processing. In the electricity sector, these reforms were reversed between 2003 and 2009, but have largely remained in place for other sectors. Major reforms for the electricity sector, as outlined in the National Pact for Energy Reform signed February 2021, are ongoing. Plans for dissolving the CDEEE are in process, with the organization functional in name only, and the Ministry of Energy and Mines having assumed many of the authorities conferred to the CDEEE upon its founding in 2001 and across its 20-year life span. Complete dissolution and final distribution of authorities remains a legal question, which is currently being reviewed by the President’s legal advisor and the Ministry of Energy and Mines. The DGAPP has taken the first step to improve the governance and performance of electricity distribution companies through the introduction of private sector participation. On November 29, 2021, the DGAPP publicly accepted for detailed evaluation an application submitted by the Board of the Electricity Distribution Companies (Consejo Unificado de las Empresas Distribuidoras de Electricidad) for a Public Private Partnership (PPP) covering the three state-owned distribution companies. The DGAPP Resolution No. 89/2021 follows the process in the PPP Law (Law No. 47-20), whereby any public or private entity wishing to propose a PPP must submit a formal proposal and justification to the DGAPP. Government officials expect the process to privatize the management and operation of the electricity distribution companies to begin in earnest in the summer of 2022 with the release of tender documents. All indications are that foreign firms will be invited to participate in these tenders. Questions should be directed toward the Ministry of Energy and Mines ( https://mem.gob.do/ ) or DGAPP ( https://dgapp.gob.do/en/home/ ). Ecuador Executive Summary The government of Ecuador under President Guillermo Lasso has adopted an ambitious economic reform agenda to drive investment. Private sector leaders in Ecuador emphasize the “Lasso Effect” in investment given the surge of optimism following the April 2021 election of the region’s most pro-business president in decades. “More Ecuador in the world and more of the world in Ecuador” – President Lasso’s key message for his presidency – includes the administration’s drive to attract $30 billion in investment over his four-year administration. Indeed, investment is growing – with both international and domestic companies searching for opportunities in this traditionally protectionist market that once garnered little attention compared to neighbors Colombia and Peru. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are the cornerstone of the administration’s investment drive, including the establishment of a PPP Secretariat and the consolidation of PPP-related tax rules and regulations. The Ecuadorian government is taking positive steps to improving fiscal stability. In September 2020, the International Monetary Fund approved a $6.5 billion, 27-month Extended Fund Facility for Ecuador and has already disbursed $4.8 billion to aid in economic stabilization and reform. The IMF program is in line with the government’s efforts to correct fiscal imbalances and to improve transparency and efficiency in public finance. The Ecuadorian Central Bank reported solid GDP growth of 4.2 percent in 2021 and projects 2.8 percent GDP growth in 2022. The Ecuadorian government remains committed to the sustainability of public finances and to continue a fiscal consolidation path. The fiscal deficit narrowed to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2021 (from over 7 percent of GDP in 2020) and is expected to narrow further to a little over 2 percent of GDP in 2022 due to improved tax collection, prudent public spending, and high oil prices. Still, the Lasso administration faces major challenges to its investment agenda given the country’s long-term reputation as a high-risk country for investment. A challenging relationship with the National Assembly complicates the passage of needed economic reform legislation. While the administration’s November 2021 tax reform passed into law, the National Assembly soundly defeated President Lasso’s proposed investment promotion bill March 24. Serious budget deficits and the COVID-induced economic recession force the government to employ cost cutting measures and limit public investment. Ecuador has traditionally struggled to structure tenders and PPPs that are bankable, transparent, and competitive. This has discouraged private investment and attracted companies that lack a commitment to quality construction, accountability and transparency, environmental sustainability, and social inclusion. Corruption remains widespread, and Ecuador is ranked in the bottom half of countries surveyed for Transparency International’s Perceptions of Corruption Index. In addition, economic, commercial, and investment policies are subject to frequent changes and can increase the risks and costs of doing business in Ecuador. Ecuador is a dollarized economy that has few limits on foreign investment or repatriation of profits, with the exception of a currency exit tax. It has a population that generally views the United States positively, and the Lasso Administration has expanded bilateral ties and significantly increased cooperation with the United States on a broad range of economic, security, political, and cultural issues. Sectors of Interest to Foreign Investors Petroleum and Gas: Per the 2008 Constitution, all subsurface resources belong to the state, and the petroleum sector is dominated by one state-owned enterprise (SOE) that cannot be privatized. Presidential Decree 95 published July 2021 opened private sector participation in oil exploration and production, with a goal to double oil production to 1 million barrels per day by 2028. The government can offer concessions of its refineries, sell off SOE gasoline stations, issue production-sharing contracts for oil exploration and exploitation, and prepare the SOE to be listed publicly on the stock market. The government maintained its consumer fuel subsidies since May 2020. The Ecuadorian government plans three oil field tenders in 2022 including concessions for Intracampos II and III and Block 60–Sacha. Given its declining and underdeveloped gas fields, the government plans to launch a tender for its Amistad offshore gas field. Additionally, the government announced potential tenders for a South-East concession, a private operator for the Esmeraldas refinery, and another to build and operate a new Euro 5 quality refinery. Mining: The Ecuadorian government plans to accelerate mining development to increase revenues and diversify its economy. Presidential Decree 151, published August 2021, seeks to promote private sector participation in mining exploration and production. The decree allows for private sector investment, joint ventures with the state-owned mining enterprise (SOE); seeks to combat illegal mining; and establishes an Advisory Board to guide the government on best practices for responsible mining. The government announced plans to relaunch its mining cadastre in 2022, which was closed in 2018 due to irregularities in granting concessions. Ecuador has two operating mines — a gold mine operated by a Canadian company and a copper mine operated by a PRC-affiliated company. In 2021 the government issued two new mining concessions and announced plans to issue concessions for 12 additional strategic mining projects. Electricity: Hydroelectric electricity accounts for 80 percent of Ecuador’s electricity generation. The PRC-built 1500 MW Coca Codo Sinclair (CCS) hydro power plant designed to provide 30 percent of Ecuador’s electricity has never generated its total installed power capacity and has been undergoing repairs since it began operating in 2016. CCS is also at risk from regressive erosion from the adjacent Coca River. The government contracted U.S. Army Corp of Engineers engineering services December 2021 to develop a solution to mitigate the river erosion. The government plans to develop wind, solar, hydro, biomass, biogas, geothermal, biofuel, combined cycle, and gas-fired electrical generation plants to diversify the energy matrix. It awarded a 200 MW solar tender and a 110 MW wind tender to private operators in 2020. It launched tenders for a 500 MW renewable energy block, a 400 MW combined cycle power plant, and a Northeast Interconnection transmission line in December 2021. The government imported its first LNG cargo December 2021 followed by a second shipment in February 2022. Telecommunications: The Lasso administration is prioritizing rural connectivity as its major telecommunications policy. In mid-2021, the Ministry of Telecommunications (MINTEL) received from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) the valuation report for the 2.5 GHz (gigahertz) and 700 MHz (megahertz) bands. The cost set is reserved. Likewise, MINTEL asked the ITU for the valuation of the 3.5 GHz, 850, 900 AWS and 1900 bands, which in turn will allow new players in the market and the future deployment of the fifth generation of technologies (5G). Three 5G technology connectivity tests have taken place in Ecuador, though there is no target date for the beginning of 5G commercial operations. Ecuador is due to renegotiate the concession contracts with the mobile network operators, which expire in 2023. New terms and conditions of the concession rights and use of frequencies are currently in the works including technical, legal, and regulatory requirements. The current negotiations do not include the frequency bands for the 5G network and are instead focused on the frequencies currently assigned to operators. E–Commerce: In 2020, E-Commerce sales reached $2.3 billion record sales, an overnight digital transformation due to the pandemic. In 2021, according to Ecuador´s Electronic Commerce Chamber, E-Commerce sales grew 20 to 40 percent ($460 to $920 million, approximately). While many Ecuadorians are interested in purchasing online, they are limited in their ability to receive international shipments due to logistics and customs problems upon arrival in Ecuador. The Ministry of Production launched the National E-Commerce Strategy in 2021, establishing a framework for facilitating the digital transformation in the country. The strategy focuses on strengthening the current legal framework, capacity building for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and improving logistics and payment gateway capabilities. Since the issuance of the National E-Commerce Strategy, no new regulations have entered into force to facilitate its application and the objectives set forth therein. The government is also promoting the development of the Andean Digital Agenda together with the other Andean Community countries, whose update will be promulgated in the first half of this year. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 105 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 91 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $29 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.cfm World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,530 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The 2014 Law to Strengthen and Optimize Business Partnerships and Stock Markets created the Securities Market Regulation Board to oversee the stock markets. Investment options on the Quito and Guayaquil stock exchanges are very limited. Sufficient liquidity to enter and exit sizeable positions does not exist in the local markets. The five percent capital exit tax also inhibits free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. Ecuador is a small market that has relied almost exclusively on the financial sector to undertake medium and short-term financing operations. Foreigners can access credit on the local market. In 2021, the Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE) designed a new methodology to set interest rates aimed at increasing financial inclusion and including technical factors for better determination. Despite these changes, the Government continues setting interest rate ceilings and controls. Ecuador is a dollarized economy, and its banking sector is healthy. According to the Ecuadorian Central Bank’s Access to the Financial System Report, as of September 2020, 75 percent of the adult (over 15 years old) population (8.5 million people) has access to financial products and services. As of December 2021, Ecuador’s banks hold in total USD 51.9 billion in assets, with the largest banks being Banco Pichincha with USD 13.3 billion in assets, Banco del Pacifico with USD 6.9 billion, Banco de Guayaquil with USD 6.3 billion, and Produbanco with USD 6.1 billion. The Banking Association (ASOBANCA) estimates 2.3 percent of loans are non-performing. Foreigners require residency to open checking accounts in Ecuador. Ecuador’s Superintendence of Banks regulates the financial sector. Between 2012 and 2013, the financial sector was the target of numerous new restrictions. By 2012, most banks had sold off their brokerage firms, mutual funds, and insurance companies to comply with Constitutional changes following a May 2010 referendum. The amendment to Article 312 of the Constitution required banks and their senior managers and shareholders with more than six percent equity in financial entities to divest entirely from any interest in all non-financial companies by July 2012. These provisions were incorporated into the Anti-Monopoly Law passed in September 2011. The 2021 Law for the Defense of Dollarization established that the Monetary and Financial Policy and Regulation Board be divided into a Monetary Policy and Regulation Board and a Financial Policy and Regulation Board. The latter should oversee the interest rate system jointly with the BCE as the technical entity. The law gives the Financial Policy and Regulation Board the ability to prioritize certain sectors for lending from private banks. There are 24 private banks in Ecuador as of December 2021. A 2018 BCE resolution that ordered electronic money accounts closure effectively eliminated electronic currency. However, banks handle transactions by electronic or digital means for transferences and/or payments to transfer resources and/or payments according to the authorization of the Superintendence of Banks. BCE resolutions were integrated into the Codification of Monetary, Financial, Insurance, and Securities Resolutions. This regulatory body requires all financial transfers (inflows and outflows) to be channeled through the BCE’s accounts. In principle, the regulation increases monetary authorities’ oversight and prevents banks from netting their inflows and outflows to avoid paying the five percent currency exit tax. The Government of Ecuador does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). Approved in July 2020, Ecuador’s Public Finance Law (COPLAFIP) established a Fiscal Stabilization Fund to invest excess revenues from extractive industries and hedge against oil and metal price fluctuations. 7. State-Owned Enterprises Ecuador has a total of 17 SOEs. The major SOEs include those for petroleum (Petroecuador), electricity (Electricity Corporation of Ecuador – CELEC – and the National Corporation for Electricity – CNEL), and telecommunications (National Corporation of Telecommunications – CNT). The 17 SOEs combined have approximately 30,000 employees. As part of the government’s austerity measures to deal with the COVID-19-related economic crisis, the Lasso administration continued with the SOE liquidation processes started in May 2020. As of September 2021, there were three liquidated SOEs (Manufacture Ecuador, Pharmaceutical Public Company, Public Cement Company) and eight in the process of liquidation, including the state-owned airline (TAME), railroad company (Ecuadorian Railways Company), a social development firm using profits from natural resource revenues (Strategic Ecuador), training centers for athletes (High Performance Training Centers), an agricultural storage company (National Storage Units), the public media company, and a science and technology research firm (Siembra EP, formerly Yachay City of Knowledge). In February 2021, the government announced that Ecuador Post Office will be replaced by Ecuador Postal Services (SPE). Ecuador’s Coordinator of Public Companies maintains a list of SOEs at: https://www.emco.gob.ec/Emco2/empresas-publicas-2/ . The 2009 Organic Law of Public Enterprises regulates SOEs. SOEs are most active in areas designated by the 2008 Constitution as strategic sectors. SOEs follow a special procurement regime with greater flexibility and limited oversight. The Law of Public Enterprises requires SOEs to follow generally accepted accounting principles. Still, SOEs are not required to follow the same accounting practices as the central government, nor do they have to participate in the electronic financial management system used in most of the public sector for budget and accounting management. SOEs are eligible for government guarantees and face lower tax burdens than private companies. SOEs generally do not have professionally audited financial statements. The Ministry of Economy and Finance approves SOEs’ annual budgets and often slows distribution of funds to SOEs to compensate for other government expenditures. Ecuador is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization. The Ecuadorian Constitution prohibits privatization of state-owned enterprises. Still, the Ecuadorian government is seeking to offer long-term concessions and joint-venture agreements with its SOEs to operate some of its assets in strategic sectors including oil and gas exploration and production, electricity generation, and mining. In addition, MPCEIP is considering projects to be developed as potential PPPs. Egypt Executive Summary The Egyptian government continues to make progress on economic reforms, and while many challenges remain, Egypt’s investment climate is improving. Thanks in part to the macroeconomic reforms it completed as part of a three-year, $12-billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) program from 2016 to 2019, Egypt was one of the fastest-growing emerging markets prior to the COVID-19 outbreak. Egypt was also the only economy in the Middle East and North Africa to record positive economic growth in 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic and thanks in part to IMF assistance totaling $8 billion. Increased investor confidence and high real interest rates have attracted foreign portfolio investment and increased foreign reserves. In 2021, the Government of Egypt (GoE) announced plans to launch a second round of economic reforms aimed at increasing the role of the private sector in the economy, addressing long-standing customs and trade policy challenges, modernizing its industrial base, and increasing exports. The GoE increasingly understands that attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is key to addressing many of its economic challenges and has stated its intention to create a more conducive environment for FDI. FDI inflows grew 11 percent between 2018 and 2019, from $8.1 to $9 billion, before falling 39 percent to $5.5 billion in 2020 amid sharp global declines in FDI due to the pandemic, according to data from the Central Bank of Egypt and the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). UNCTAD ranked Egypt as the top FDI destination in Africa between 2016 and 2020. Egypt has passed several regulatory reform laws, including a new investment law in 2017; a “new company” law and a bankruptcy law in 2018; and a new customs law in 2020. These laws aim to improve Egypt’s investment and business climate and help the economy realize its full potential. The 2017 Investment Law is designed to attract new investment and provides a framework for the government to offer investors more incentives, consolidate investment-related rules, and streamline procedures. The 2020 Customs Law is likewise meant to streamline aspects of import and export procedures, including through a single-window system, electronic payments, and expedited clearances for authorized companies. Egypt will host the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP 27, in November 2022. Recognizing the immense challenges the country faces from the impacts of climate change, government officials announced that the Cabinet will appropriate 30 percent of government investments in the 2022/2023 budget to green investments, up from 15 percent in the current fiscal year 2021/2022, and that by 2030 all new public sector investment spending would be green. The GoE accelerated plans to generate 42 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by five years, from 2035 to 2030, and is prioritizing investments in solar and wind power, green hydrogen, water desalination, sustainable transportation, electric vehicles, smart cities and grids, and sustainable construction materials. The government continues to seek investment in several mega projects, including the construction of smart cities, and to promote mineral extraction opportunities. Egypt intends to capitalize on its location bridging the Middle East, Africa, and Europe to become a regional trade and investment gateway and energy hub and hopes to attract information and communications technology (ICT) sector investments for its digital transformation program. Egypt is a party to more than 100 bilateral investment treaties, including with the United States. It is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). In many sectors, there is no legal difference between foreign and domestic investors. Special requirements exist for foreign investment in certain sectors, such as upstream oil and gas as well as real estate, where joint ventures are required. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 117 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 94 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, on a historical-cost basis 2020 USD 11,206 http://www.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 3,000 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector To date, high returns on Egyptian government debt have crowded out Egyptian investment in productive capacity. As of February 2022, loans to the government and government-related entities accounted for 67 percent of banks’ assets, and Egypt’s debt-to-GDP ratio was 91.4 percent at the end of 2021. Meanwhile, consistently positive and relatively high real interest rates have attracted large foreign capital inflows since 2017, most of which has been volatile portfolio capital. Foreign investors sold $1.19 billion of Egyptian treasury bonds following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) is Egypt’s registered securities exchange. Some 246 companies were listed on the EGX, including Nilex, as of February 2022. There were more than 3.3 million investors registered to trade on the exchange in July 2021. Stock ownership is open to foreign and domestic individuals and entities. The Government of Egypt issues dollar-denominated and Egyptian Pound-denominated debt instruments, for which ownership is open to foreign and domestic individuals and entities. Foreign investors conducted 18.3 percent of sales on the EGX in 2021. In September 2020, the GoE issued the region’s first sovereign green bonds with a value of $750 million. The GoE issued Eurobonds worth $11.75 billion in 2020 and 2021, and issued its first $500 million Japanese Yen-dominated bond in March 2022. The government has announced its intention to issue its first sovereign sukuk bonds and additional green bonds during the remainder of 2022. The Capital Market Law 95 of 1992, along with Banking Law 94 that President Sisi ratified in September 2020, constitute the primary regulatory frameworks for the financial sector. The law grants foreigners full access to capital markets, and authorizes establishment of Egyptian and foreign companies to provide underwriting of subscriptions, brokerage services, securities and mutual funds management, clearance and settlement of security transactions, and venture capital activities. The law specifies mechanisms for arbitration and legal dispute resolution and prohibits unfair market practices. Law 10 of 2009 created the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) and brought the regulation of all non-banking financial services under its authority. In 2017, EFSA became the Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA). Settlement of transactions takes one day for treasury bonds and two days for stocks. Although Egyptian law and regulations allow companies to adopt bylaws limiting or prohibiting foreign ownership of shares, virtually no listed stocks have such restrictions. A significant number of the companies listed on the exchange are family-owned or -dominated conglomerates, and free trading of shares in many of these ventures, while increasing, remains limited. Companies are de-listed from the exchange if not traded for six months. Prior to November 2020, foreign companies listing on the EGX had to possess minimum capital of $100 million. With the FRA’s passage of new rules, foreign companies joining the EGX must now meet lesser requirements matching those for Egyptian companies: $6.4 million (100 million EGP) for large companies and between $63,000 and $6.4 million (1-100 million EGP) for smaller companies, depending on their size. Foreign businesses are only eligible for these lower minimum capital requirements if the EGX is their first exchange and if they attribute more than 50 percent of their shareholders’ equites, revenues, and assets to Egyptian subsidiary companies. A capital gains tax of 10 percent on Egyptian tax residents came into force in January 2022 after more than 6 years of suspension, then it was decreased in March to 5 percent for two years. The rate will rise to 7.5 percent once this period ends. Capital increases and share-swaps between listed and unlisted companies will not be taxed. Non-tax residents and foreigners are permanently tax-exempt. The government also set the stamp tax on stock market transactions by non-tax residents at 0.125 percent and at 0.05 percent for tax residents on unlisted securities. Tax residents are exempted from stamp tax on listed securities. Foreign investors can access Egypt’s banking system by opening accounts with local banks and buying and selling all marketable securities with brokerages. The government has repeatedly emphasized its commitment to maintaining the profit repatriation system to encourage foreign investment in Egypt, especially since the pound flotation and implementation of the IMF loan program in November 2016. The current system for profit repatriation by foreign firms requires sub-custodian banks to open foreign and local currency accounts for foreign investors (global custodians), which are exclusively maintained for stock exchange transactions. The two accounts serve as a channel through which foreign investors process their sales, purchases, dividend collections, and profit repatriation transactions using the bank’s posted daily exchange rates. The system is designed to allow for settlement of transactions in fewer than two days, though in practice some firms have reported significant delays in repatriating profits due to problems with availability. Foreign firms and individuals continue to report delays in repatriating funds and problems accessing hard currency for the purpose of repatriating profits. The Egyptian credit market, open to foreigners, is vibrant and active. Repatriation of investment profits has become much easier, as there is enough available hard currency to execute foreign exchange (FX) trades. Since the flotation of the Egyptian Pound in November 2016, FX trading is considered straightforward, given the re-establishment of the interbank foreign currency trading system. There have been no reports of difficulties executing FX transactions following the CBE’s interest rate hike and currency devaluation in March, 2022. Thirty-eight banks operate in Egypt, including several foreign banks. The CBE has not issued a new commercial banking license since 1979. The only way for a new commercial bank, whether foreign or domestic, to enter the market (except as a representative office) is to purchase shares in an existing bank. According to the CBE, banks operating in Egypt held nearly $448 billion (8.6 trillion EGP) in total assets as of December 2021, generating a total profit of $6.8 billion with the five largest banks generating 74 percent, or $5 billion (79 billion EGP). Egypt’s banking sector is generally regarded as well-capitalized, due in part to its deposit-based funding structure and ample liquidity, especially since the flotation and restoration of the interbank market. The CBE declared that 3.5 percent of the banking sector’s loans were non-performing by December 2021. However, since 2011, a high level of exposure to government debt, accounting for two-thirds of banks’ assets as of February 2022, has reduced the diversity of bank balance sheets and crowded out domestic investment. Moody’s and S&P consider Egypt’s banking system to be stable, although S&P classifies it as facing high levels of economic and financial system risk due to its high exposure to sovereign debt and the government’s external funding vulnerabilities. In February 2022, S&P affirmed Egypt’s government issuer rating of B stable due to the government’s relatively low issuance of foreign currency loans and relatively low external government debt. Benefitting from the nation’s increasing economic stability, Egypt’s banks have enjoyed both ratings upgrades and continued profitability. Banking competition is serving a largely untapped retail segment and the nation’s challenging, but potentially rewarding, small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) segment. The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) requires that banks direct 25 percent of their lending to SMEs. Over the past two years, the Central Bank has launched a subsidized loan program worth $16 billion (253 billion EGP) to spur domestic manufacturing, agriculture, and real state development. Also, with only one-third of Egypt’s adult population owning or sharing an account at a formal financial institution (according press and comments from contacts), the banking sector has potential for growth and higher inclusion, which the government and banks discuss frequently. A low median income plays a part in modest banking penetration. The CBE has taken steps to work with banks and technology companies to expand financial inclusion. The employees of the government, one of the largest employers, must now have bank accounts because salary payment is through direct deposit. The CBE approved new procedures in October 2020 to allow deposits and the opening of new bank accounts with only a government-issued ID, rather than additional documents. The maximum limits for withdrawals and account balances also increased. In July 2020, President Sisi ratified a new Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) Development Law (Law 152 of 2020) that will provide incentives, tax breaks, and discounts for small, informal businesses willing to register their businesses and begin paying taxes. As an attempt to keep pace with best practices and international norms, President Sisi ratified a new Banking Law, Law 94 of 2020, in September 2020. The law establishes a National Payment Council headed by the President to move Egypt away from cash and toward electronic payments; establishes a committee headed by the Prime Minister to resolve disputes between the CBE and the Ministry of Finance; establishes a CBE unit to handle complaints of monopolistic behaviors; requires banks to increase their cash holdings to $320 million (5 billion EGP), up from the prior minimum of $32 million (500 million EGP); and requires banks to report deficiencies in their own audits to the CBE. The chairman of the EGX stated that Egypt is exploring the use of blockchain technologies across the banking community. The FRA will regulate how the banking system adopts the fast-developing blockchain systems into banks’ back-end and customer-facing processing and transactions. The Central Bank developed a national fintech and innovation strategy in March 2019, and the government has issued regulations to incentivize mobile and electronic payments. The Central Bank launched in March 2022 a new mobile application, InstaPay, which allows Egyptian banking customers to perform instant bank and payments transactions. At the end of 2021 Egypt was among the top four African countries for fintech investment, with investments in fintech startups quadrupling between 2020 and 2021, reaching $159 million. According to research firm Magnitt, Egyptian startups received $509 million in venture capital investments in 2021, with a 100 percent year-on-year compound annual growth rate between 2017 and 2021. Since 2020, the Central Bank has prohibited all dealings with cryptocurrencies: the issuance of them, trading in them, promoting them, and establishing or operating platforms for their trading. Alternative financial services in Egypt are extensive, given the large informal economy, estimated to account for between 30 and 50 percent of GDP. Informal lending is prevalent, but the total capitalization, number of loans, and types of terms in private finance is less well known. The 1992 U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty provides for free transfer of dividends, royalties, compensation for expropriation, payments arising out of an investment dispute, contract payments, and proceeds from sales. Prior to reform implementation throughout 2016 and 2017, large corporations had been unable to repatriate local earnings for months at a time, but repatriation of funds is no longer restricted. The Investment Incentives Law (Law 72 of 2017) stipulates that non-Egyptian employees hired by projects established under the law are entitled to transfer their earnings abroad. Conversion and transfer of royalty payments are permitted when a patent, trademark, or other licensing agreement has been approved under the Investment Law. Banking Law 94 of 2020 regulates the repatriation of profits and capital. The current system for profit repatriation by foreign firms requires sub-custodian banks to open foreign and local currency accounts for foreign investors (global custodians), which are exclusively maintained for stock-exchange transactions. The two accounts serve as a channel through which foreign investors process their sales, purchases, dividend collections, and profit-repatriation transactions using the bank’s posted daily exchange rates. The system is designed to allow for settlement of transactions in less than two days, though in practice some firms have reported short delays in repatriating profits due to the steps involved in processing. Egypt’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF), approved by the Cabinet and launched in late 2018, holds 200 billion EGP ($12.5 billion) in authorized capital as of July 2021. The SWF aims to invest state funds locally and abroad across asset classes and manage underutilized government assets. The sovereign wealth fund focuses on sectors considered vital to the Egyptian economy, particularly industry, energy, and tourism, and has established four new sub-funds covering healthcare, financial services, real estate, and infrastructure while plans to establish another two sub-funds for education and technology. The SWF participates in the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 7. State-Owned Enterprises State and military-owned companies compete directly with private companies in many sectors of the Egyptian economy. Although Public Sector Law 203 of 1991 states that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should not receive preferential treatment from the government or be accorded exemptions from legal requirements applicable to private companies, in practice SOEs and military-owned companies enjoy significant advantages, including relief from regulatory requirements. IMF reports show that Egyptian SOEs have an average return on assets of just two percent and are only one-fourth as productive as private companies. Some 40 percent of SOEs are loss-making, despite access to subsidized capital and owning assets worth more than 50 percent of GDP. Profitable SOEs, meanwhile, tend to exploit a natural monopoly or hold exclusive rights to public assets. Few of Egypt’s 300 state-owned companies, 645 joint ventures, and 53 economic authorities release regular financial statements. SOEs in Egypt are structured as individual companies controlled by boards of directors and grouped under government holding companies that are arranged by industry, including Petroleum Products & Gas, Spinning & Weaving; Metallurgical Industries; Chemical Industries; Pharmaceuticals; Food Industries; Building & Construction; Tourism, Hotels, & Cinema; Maritime & Inland Transport; Aviation; and Insurance. The holding companies are headed by boards of directors appointed by the Prime Minister with input from the relevant Minister. The Egyptian government has announced plans to privatize shares of SOEs several times since 2018, but has only carried out a small number of sales. It sold a minority stake in the Eastern Tobacco Company in March 2018, a 26 percent share of state-owned e-payment firm E-Finance in October 2021, and a 10 percent share of Abu Qir Fertilizers in December 2021. In December 2020 the government announced plans to sell stakes in two military-owned companies and in February 2022 added a handful of other SOEs to the list, but scaled back those plans following Russia’s war against Ukraine. The government has indefinitely delayed plans for privatizing stakes in 20 other SOEs, including up to 30 percent of the shares of Banque du Caire, due to adverse market conditions and increased global volatility. Egypt’s privatization program is based on Public Enterprise Law 203/1991, which permits the sale of SOEs to foreign entities. Law 32 of 2014 limits the ability of third parties to challenge privatization contracts between the Egyptian government and investors. The law was intended to reassure investors concerned by legal challenges brought against privatization deals and land sales dating back to the pre-2008 period. Court cases at the time Parliament passed the law had put many of these now-private firms, many of which are foreign-owned, in legal limbo over concerns that they may be returned to state ownership. El Salvador Executive Summary El Salvador’s location and natural attributes make it an attractive investment destination. The macroeconomic context and declining rule of law present some challenges. El Salvador’s economy has registered the lowest levels of growth in the region for many years, with average annual GDP growth of 2.5 percent from 2016 to 2019. After a deep pandemic-related contraction (7.9 percent) in 2020, the Central Bank estimates GDP rebounded to 10.3 percent growth in 2021. The IMF expects the economy to grow 3.2 percent in 2022, with growth rates declining to 2 percent in the medium-term. Economic underperformance is mainly driven by fiscal constraints. Persistent budget deficits and increased government spending – exacerbated by the pandemic – have contributed to a heavy debt burden. With public debt at an estimated 88.5 percent of GDP in 2021, the Government of El Salvador (GOES) has limited capacity for public investment and job creation initiatives. Large financing needs are projected for 2022. The Bukele administration continues to make efforts to attract foreign investment and has taken measures to reduce cumbersome bureaucracy and improve security conditions. However, the implementation of the reforms has been slow, and laws and regulations are occasionally passed and implemented quickly without consulting with the private sector or assessing the impact on the business climate. After being announced in June 2021, Bitcoin became a legal tender in El Salvador on September 7, 2021, alongside the U.S. dollar. The Bitcoin Law mandates that all businesses must accept Bitcoin, with limited exceptions for those who do not have the technology to carry out transactions. Prices do not need to be expressed in Bitcoin and the U.S. dollar is the reference currency for accounting purposes. The GOES created a $150 million trust fund managed by El Salvador’s Development Bank to guarantee automatic convertibility and subsidize exchange fees. The rapid implementation caused uncertainty in the investment climate and added costs to businesses. Government of El Salvador actions have eroded separation of powers and independence of the judiciary over the past year. In May 2021, the Legislative Assembly dismissed the Attorney General and all five justices of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber and immediately replaced them with officials loyal to President Bukele. Furthermore, in August 2021, the legislature amended the Judicial Career Organic Law to force into retirement judges ages 60 or above and those with at least 30 years of service. The move was justified by the ruling party as an effort to root out corruption in the judiciary from past administrations. A September 2021 ruling from the newly appointed Constitutional Chamber allows for immediate presidential re-election, despite the Constitution prohibiting presidential incumbents from re-election to a consecutive term. Legal analysts believe these measures were unconstitutional and have enabled the Legislative Assembly and the Bukele administration to exert control over the judiciary. The Legislative Assembly is not required to publish draft legislation and opportunities for public engagement are limited. With the Nuevas Ideas ruling party holding a supermajority, legislation is often passed quickly with minimal analysis and debate in parliamentary committees and plenary sessions, contributing to an overall climate of regulatory uncertainty. Commonly cited challenges to doing business in El Salvador include the discretionary application of laws and regulations, lengthy and unpredictable permitting procedures, as well as customs delays. El Salvador has lagged its regional peers in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). The sectors with the largest investment have historically been textiles and retail establishments, though investment in energy has increased in recent years. The Bukele administration has proposed several large infrastructure projects which could provide opportunities for U.S. investment. Project proposals include enhancing road connectivity and logistics, expanding airport capacity and improving access to water and energy, as well as sanitation. Given limited fiscal capacity for public investment, the Bukele administration has begun pursuing Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to execute infrastructure projects. In August 2021, El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly approved the contract award of the first PPP project to expand the cargo terminal at the international airport. As a small energy-dependent country with no Atlantic coast, El Salvador heavily relies on trade. It is a member of the Central American Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR); the United States is El Salvador’s top trading partner. Proximity to the U.S. market is a competitive advantage for El Salvador. As most Salvadoran exports travel by land to Guatemalan and Honduran ports, regional integration is crucial for competitiveness. Although El Salvador officially joined the Customs Union established by Guatemala and Honduras in 2018, implementation stalled following the Bukele administration’s decision to prioritize bilateral trade facilitation with Guatemala. In October 2021, however, the GOES announced it would proceed with Customs Union implementation. El Salvador rejoined technical level working group discussions and resumed testing of system interconnectivity. The Bukele administration has taken initial steps to facilitate trade. In 2019, the government of El Salvador (GOES) relaunched the National Trade Facilitation Committee (NTFC), which produced the first jointly developed private-public action plan to reduce trade barriers. The plan contained 60 strategic measures focused on simplifying procedures, reducing trade costs, and improving connectivity and border infrastructure. Measures were not fully implemented in 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic. In 2021, the NTFC revised the action plan to adjust measures under implementation and finalized drafting the national trade facilitation strategy, which will be launched in March 2022. In January 2022, the NFTC met to evaluate progress on the action plan. The NFTC released the action plan for 2022 on February 17th. The 2022 action plan has 29 measures to facilitate cross-border trade and improve road and border infrastructure. Table 1 Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 115 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index 2021 96 of 132 http://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 3,4133 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/factsheet.html#209 World Bank GNI per capita 2020 3,630 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector The Superintendent of the Financial System ( https://www.ssf.gob.sv/ ) supervises individual and consolidated activities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, financial conglomerates, stock market participants, insurance companies, and pension fund administrators. Foreign investors may obtain credit in the local financial market under the same conditions as local investors. Interest rates are determined by market forces, with the interest rate for credit cards and loans capped at 1.6 times the weighted average effective rate established by the Central Bank. The maximum interest rate varies according to the loan amount and type of loan (consumption, credit cards, mortgages, home repair/remodeling, business, and microcredits). In January 2019, El Salvador eliminated a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT), which was enacted in 2014 and greatly opposed by banks. The Securities Market Law establishes the framework for the Salvadoran securities exchange. Stocks, government and private bonds, and other financial instruments are traded on the exchange, which is regulated by the Superintendent of the Financial System. Foreigners may buy stocks, bonds, and other instruments sold on the exchange and may have their own securities listed, once approved by the Superintendent. Companies interested in listing must first register with the National Registry Center’s Registry of Commerce. In 2021, the exchange traded $3.7 billion, with average daily volumes between $12 million and $30 million. Government-regulated private pension funds, Salvadoran insurance companies, and local banks are the largest buyers on the Salvadoran securities exchange. For more information, visit: https://www.bolsadevalores.com.sv/ All but two of the major banks operating in El Salvador are regional banks owned by foreign financial institutions. Given the high level of informality, measuring the penetration of financial services is difficult; however, it remains relatively low, between 30 percent – according to the Salvadoran Banking Association (ABANSA) – and 37 percent – reported by the Superintendence of the Financial System (SSF). The banking system is sound and generally well-managed and supervised. El Salvador’s Central Bank is responsible for regulating the banking system, monitoring compliance of liquidity reserve requirements, and managing the payment systems. No bank has lost its correspondent banking relationship in recent years. There are no correspondent banking relationships known to be in jeopardy. The banking system’s total assets as of December 2021 were $21.1 billion. Under Salvadoran banking law, there is no difference in regulations between foreign and domestic banks and foreign banks can offer all the same services as domestic banks. The Cooperative Banks and Savings and Credit Associations Law regulates the organization, operation, and activities of financial institutions such as cooperative banks, credit unions, savings and credit associations, and other microfinance institutions. The Money Laundering Law requires financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to the Attorney General. Despite having regulatory scheme in place to supervise the filing of reports by cooperative banks and savings and credit associations, these entities rarely file suspicious activity reports. The Insurance Companies Law regulates the operation of both local and foreign insurance firms. Foreign firms, including U.S., Colombian, Dominican, Honduran, Panamanian, Mexican, and Spanish companies, have invested in Salvadoran insurers. El Salvador does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 7. State-Owned Enterprises El Salvador has successfully liberalized many sectors, though it maintains state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in energy generation and transmission, water supply and sanitation, ports and airports, and the national lottery (see chart below). SOE 2022 Budgeted Revenue Number of Employees National Lottery $51,553,600 148 State-run Electricity Company (CEL) $403,309,045 795 Water Authority (ANDA) $255,939,465 4,281 Port Authority (CEPA) $186,895,990 2,551 Although the GOES privatized energy distribution in 1999, it maintains significant energy production facilities through state-owned Rio Lempa Executive Hydroelectric Commission (CEL), a significant producer of hydroelectric and geothermal energy. In October 2021, El Salvador’s legislature enacted the Creation Law of the Power, Hydrocarbons, and Mines General Directorate. The new General Directorate will be responsible for dictating the national energy policy and proposing amendments to energy legislation and by-laws, as well as implementing the energy policy. The law allows the President of the state-owned power company (CEL) to serve as the Director General of the new entity. The law will enter into force in November 2022. Industry stakeholders are concerned about the potential conflict of interest that would result from CEL making energy policy and participating in the sector as SOE. The primary water service provider is the National Water and Sewer Administration (ANDA), which provides services to 96.6 percent of urban areas and 77 percent of rural areas in El Salvador. The Autonomous Executive Port Commission (CEPA) operates both the seaports and the airports. CEL, ANDA, and CEPA Board Chairs hold Minister-level rank and report directly to the President. The Law on Public Administration Procurement and Contracting (LACAP) covers all procurement of goods and services by all Salvadoran public institutions, including the municipalities. Exceptions to LACAP include: procurement and contracting financed with funds coming from other countries (bilateral agreements) or international bodies; agreements between state institutions; and the contracting of personal services by public institutions under the provisions of the Law on Salaries, Contracts and Day Work. Additionally, LACAP allows government agencies to use the auction system of the Salvadoran Goods and Services Market (BOLPROS) for procurement. Although BOLPROS is intended for use in purchasing standardized goods (e.g., office supplies, cleaning products, and basic grains), the GOES uses BOLPROS to procure a variety of goods and services, including high-value technology equipment and sensitive security equipment. As of October 2021, public procurement using BOLPROS totaled $157.1 million. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also support government agencies in the procurement of a wide range of infrastructure projects. Procurement for municipal infrastructure works is governed by the Simplified Procurement Law for Municipal Works in force since November 2021 and centralized in the National Directorate of Municipal works created by the Bukele administration to oversee investment in infrastructure and social projects in municipalities. The GOES has created a dedicated procurement website to publish tenders by government institutions. https://www.comprasal.gob.sv/comprasal_web/ ). In August 2020, President Bukele signed an executive order allowing the submission of bids for contractual services via email and eliminating bidders’ obligation to register online with the public procurement system (Comprasal), as well as lifting the responsibility of procurement officers to keep a record of companies and individuals who receive tender documents. Transparency advocates and legal experts have noted that the order would decrease potential bidders’ ability to access and compete fairly for government tenders. The order is pending review in the Supreme Court of Justice, but without injunctive effect. Alba Petroleos is a joint venture between a consortium of mayors from the FMLN party and a subsidiary of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA. As majority PDVSA owned, Alba Petroleos has been subject to Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions since January 2019. Alba Petroleos operates a reduced number of gasoline service stations and businesses in other industries, including energy production, food production, convenience stores, and bus transportation. Alba Petroleos has been surrounded by allegations of mismanagement, corruption, and money laundering. Critics charged that the conglomerate received preferential treatment during FMLN governments and that its commercial practices, including financial reporting, are non-transparent. In May 2019, the Attorney General’s Office initiated an investigation against Alba Petroleos and its affiliates for money laundering. Alba Petroleos’ assets are frozen by court order and some of its gasoline service stations are being managed by the National Council for Asset Administration (CONAB). El Salvador is not engaged in a privatization program and has not announced plans to privatize. Equatorial Guinea Executive Summary Equatorial Guinea’s rise to become a country with one of the highest GDPs per capita in sub-Saharan Africa has been driven almost entirely by U.S. companies’ foreign direct investment (FDI) in the oil and gas sector. In the mid-2010s, the decline in both oil prices and the country’s hydrocarbon reserves caused an economic recession that has continued for six years and has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. While it still ranks among the top five richest sub-Saharan countries, the country’s gross national income (GNI) per capita plummeted from $14,030 in 2013 to $5,810 in 2021. Despite its economy’s dependence on FDI, the country presents a complex, challenging environment for foreign investors. Equatorial Guinea ranks near the bottom of the list for various global indices, including those for corruption, transparency, and ease of doing business, and the government suffers from a lack of technical expertise and capacity to implement many of the reforms it proposes. Freedom of the press is limited, and public information on laws and regulations is not readily accessible, creating an opaque operating environment that many outside investors have difficulty navigating. Furthermore, both senior leaders of the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) and members of the president’s extended family own a significant number of businesses in diverse industries, dominating the private sector and creating major conflicts of interest in a country known for pervasive corruption. On January 1, 2022, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), of which Equatorial Guinea is a member, began enforcing new foreign currency regulations on companies operating in extractive industries. While there continue to be negotiations on the final implementation of these regulations, they are likely to impact foreign firms’ willingness to invest in the hydrocarbon sector in Equatorial Guinea and other CEMAC countries. Finally, as a small country with an estimated population of 1.2 million residents and an underdeveloped education system, Equatorial Guinea suffers from a shortage of both skilled and unskilled labor, which affects many businesses’ abilities to operate competitively. In the face of the country’s growing economic and fiscal challenges, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a $282.8 million, three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement in December 2019, which required the government to implement reforms to improve transparency, good governance, and the business environment. Between 2019 and 2021, the government passed laws, issued decrees, and established institutions to comply with these requirements. It implemented a new anti-corruption law, created an Investment Promotion Center (IPC), passed an updated labor law, announced the privatization of its main state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and launched its Single Business Window to simplify the process of registering a business. Some of these initiatives have had modest success, while most exist on paper only. On the surface, Equatorial Guinea appears to provide opportunities for foreign investment. In addition to its hydrocarbon reserves, the country has rich soils, abundant fishing waters, vast forests, eye-catching landscapes, relatively developed road infrastructure, and a strategic location for maritime trade. Before investing in Equatorial Guinea, however, potential investors should conduct extensive research and carefully consider both the potential benefits and pitfalls of establishing operations in the country’s opaque and challenging environment. Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 172 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index N/A N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $690 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $5,810 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 6. Financial Sector