The government has adopted policies to promote the free flow of financial resources and foreign investment in Albania. The Law on “Strategic Investments” is based on the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination, and protection of foreign investments. Foreign investors have the right to expatriate all funds and contributions of their investment.  In accordance with IMF Article VIII, the government and Central Bank do not impose any restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions. Despite Albania’s shallow foreign exchange market, banks enjoy enough liquidity to support sizeable positions.  Portfolio investments continue to be a challenge because they remain limited mostly to company shares, government bonds, and real estate as the Tirana stock market remains non-operational

In recent years, the constant reduction of non-performing loans has allowed commercial banks to loosen lending standards and increase overall lending especially as the economy has recovering from the severe COVID-19 economic disruption in 2020. Non-performing loans (NPL) at the end of 2021 dropped to 5.65 percent compared to 8.1 percent one year ago. Overall lending has steadily increased since 2019 and at the end of 2021 reached about USD 6 billion marking a 10 percent increase compared to 2020. The credit market is competitive, but interest rates in domestic currency can be high. Most mortgage and commercial loans are denominated in euros because rate differentials between local and foreign currency average 1.5 percent. Commercial banks operating in Albania have improved the quality and quantity of services they provide, including a large variety of credit instruments, traditional lines of credit, and bank drafts, etc.

In the absence of an effective stock market, the country’s banking sector is the main channel for business financing.  The sector is sound, profitable, and well capitalized. The Bank of Albania, the country’s Central Bank, is responsible for the licensing and supervision of the banking sector in Albania. The banking sector is 100 percent privately owned and its total assets have steadily increased over the years reaching USD 17 billion at the end of 2021 mostly based on customers deposits.  The banking sector has continued the consolidation process as the number of banks decreased from 16 in 2018 to 11 at the end of 2021 when the Greek Alpha Bank was purchased by OTP Bank. As of December 2021, the Turkish National Commercial Bank (BKT) was the largest bank in the market with 26 percent market share, followed by Albanian Credins Bank with 15.8 percent, and Austrian Raiffeisen Bank third with 15.3 percent.  The American Investment Bank is the only bank with U.S. shareholders and ranks sixth with 5.5 percent percent of the banking sector’s total assets.

The number of bank outlets has also decreased over the recent years also due to the consolidation. In December 2021, Albania had 417 bank outlets, down from 446 from 2019 and the peak of 552 in 2016. Capital adequacy, at 18 percent in December 2021, remains above Basel requirements and indicates sufficient assets.  At the end of 2021, the return on assets increased to 1.42 percent compared to 1.2 percent one year ago. As part of its strategy to stimulate business activity, the Bank of Albania has adopted a plan to ease monetary policy by continuing to persistently keep low interest rates. However, due to the recent inflationary pressure in March 2021, Bank of Albania increased the base interest rate to 1 percent, up from a historical low rate of 0.5 percent which was in place since June 2018.

Many of the banks operating in Albania are subsidiaries of foreign banks. Only three banks have an ownership structure whose majority shareholders are Albanian. However, the share of total assets of the banks with majority Albanian shareholders has increased because of the sector’s ongoing consolidation. There are no restrictions for foreigners who wish to establish a bank account. They are not required to prove residency status. However, U.S. citizens must complete a form allowing for the disclosure of their banking data to the IRS as required under the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.

Parliament approved a law in October 2019 to establish the Albanian Investment Corporation (AIC). The law entered in force in January 2020. The AIC would develop, manage, and administer state-owned property and assets, invest across all sectors by mobilizing state owned and private domestic and foreign capital, and promote economic and social development by investing in line with government-approved development policies.

The GoA plans to transfer state-owned assets, including state-owned land, to the AIC and provide initial capital to launch the corporation. In December 2021, the GoA transferred to the AIC close to USD 20 million. There is no publicly available information about the activities of the AIC for 2020 or 2021.

The IMF https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/11/26/mcs11262019-albania-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2019-article-iv-mission Staff Concluding Statement  of November 26, 2019, warned that the law would allow the government to direct individual investment decisions, which could make the AIC an off-budget spending tool that risks eroding fiscal discipline and circumventing public investment management processes.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are defined as legal entities that are entirely state-owned or state-controlled and operate as commercial companies in compliance with the Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies. SOEs operate mostly in the generation, distribution, and transmission of electricity, oil and gas, railways, postal services, ports, and water supply. There is no published list of SOEs.

The law does not discriminate between public and private companies operating in the same sector. The government requires SOEs to submit annual reports and undergo independent audits. SOEs are subject to the same tax levels and procedures and the same domestic accounting and international financial reporting standards as other commercial companies. The High State Audit audits SOE activities. SOEs are also subject to public procurement law.

Albania is yet to become party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the WTO but has obtained observer status and is negotiating full accession (see  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm  ).  Private companies can compete openly and under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products and services, and incentives.

SOE operation in Albania is regulated by the Law on Entrepreneurs and Commercial Companies, the Law on State Owned Enterprises, and the Law on the Transformation of State-Owned Enterprises into Commercial Companies. The Ministry of Economy and Finance and other relevant ministries, depending on the sector, represent the state as the owner of the SOEs. SOEs are not obligated by law to adhere to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines explicitly. However, basic principles of corporate governance are stipulated in the relevant laws and generally accord with OECD guidelines. The corporate governance structure of SOEs includes the supervisory board and the general director (administrator) in the case of joint stock companies. The supervisory board comprises three to nine members, who are not employed by the SOE. Two-thirds of board members are appointed by the representative of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and one-third by the line ministry, local government unit, or institution to which the company reports. The Supervisory Board is the highest decision-making authority and appoints and dismisses the administrator of the SOE through a two-thirds vote.

The privatization process in Albania is nearing conclusion, with just a few major privatizations remaining. Entities to be privatized include OSHEE, the state-run electricity distributor; 16 percent of ALBtelecom, the fixed-line telephone and mobile company; and state-owned oil company Albpetrol. Other sectors might provide opportunities for privatization in the future.

The bidding process for privatizations is public, and relevant information is published by the Public Procurement Agency at   www.app.gov.al  . Foreign investors may participate in the privatization program. The Agency has not published timelines for future privatizations.

The Algiers Stock Exchange has five stocks listed – each at no more than 35 percent equity. There is a small and medium enterprise exchange with one listed company. The exchange has a total market capitalization representing less than 0.1 percent of Algeria’s GDP. Daily trading volume on the exchange averages around USD 2,000. Despite the lack of tangible activity, the market is regulated by an independent oversight commission that enforces compliance requirements on listed companies and traders.

Government officials have previously expressed their desire to reach a capitalization of USD 7.8 billion and enlist up to 50 new companies. Attempts to list additional companies have been stymied by a lack both of public awareness and appetite for portfolio investment, as well as by private and public companies’ unpreparedness to satisfy due diligence requirements that would attract investors. Proposed privatizations of state-owned companies have also been opposed by the public. Algerian society generally prefers material investment vehicles for savings, namely cash. Public banks, which dominate the banking sector (see below), are required to purchase government securities when offered, meaning they have little leftover liquidity to make other investments. Foreign portfolio investment is prohibited – the purchase of any investment product in Algeria, whether a government or corporate bond or equity stock, is limited to Algerian residents only.

The banking sector is roughly 85 percent public and 15 percent private as measured by value of assets held and is regulated by an independent central bank. Publicly available data from private institutions and U.S. Federal Reserve Economic Data show estimated total assets in the commercial banking sector in 2017 were roughly 13.9 trillion dinars (USD 116.7 billion) against 9.2 trillion dinars (USD 77.2 billion) in liabilities. In response to liquidity concerns caused by the oil price decline and COVID-19 crisis, the bank progressively decreased the reserve requirement from 12 percent to 3 percent between March and September 2020.

The IMF and Bank of Algeria have noted moderate growth in non-performing assets since 2015, currently estimated between 12 and 13 percent of total assets. The quality of service in public banks is generally considered low as generations of public banking executives and workers trained to operate in a statist economy lack familiarity with modern banking practices. Most transactions are materialized (non-electronic). Many areas of the country suffer from a dearth of branches, leaving large amounts of the population without access to banking services. ATMs are not widespread, especially outside the major cities, and few accept foreign bankcards. Outside of major hotels with international clientele, hardly any retail establishments accept credit cards. Algerian banks do issue debit cards, but the system is distinct from any international payment system. The Minister of Commerce has announced multiple plans to require businesses to use electronic payments for all commercial and service transactions, though the most recent government deadline for all stores to deploy electronic payment terminals by the end of 2021 was indefinitely delayed. In addition, analysts estimate that between one-third and one-half  of the money supply circulates in the informal economy.

Foreigners can open foreign currency accounts without restriction, but proof of a work permit or residency is required to open an account in Algerian dinars. Foreign banks are permitted to establish operations in the country, but they must be legally distinct entities from their overseas home offices.

In 2015, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Algeria from its Public Statement, and in 2016 it removed Algeria from the “gray list.” The FATF recognized Algeria’s significant progress and the improvement in its anti-money laundering/counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime. The FATF also indicated Algeria has substantially addressed its action plan since strategic deficiencies were identified in 2011.

Algeria’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF) is the “Fonds de Regulation des Recettes (FRR).” The Finance Ministry’s website shows the fund decreased from 4408.2 billion dinars (USD 37.36 billion) in 2014 to 784.5 billion dinars (USD 6.65 billion) in 2016. The data has not been updated since 2016. Algerian media reported the FRR was spent down to zero as of February 2017. Algeria is not known to have participated in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) comprise more than half of the formal Algerian economy. SOEs are amalgamated into a single line of the state budget and are listed in the official business registry. To be defined as an SOE, a company must be at least 51 percent owned by the state.

Algerian SOEs are bureaucratic and may be subject to political influence. There are competing lines of authority at the mid-levels, and contacts report mid- and upper-level managers are reluctant to make decisions because internal accusations of favoritism or corruption are often used to settle political and personal scores. Senior management teams at SOEs report to their relevant ministry; CEOs of the larger companies such as national hydrocarbons company Sonatrach, national electric utility Sonelgaz, and airline Air Algerie report directly to ministers. Boards of directors are appointed by the state, and the allocation of these seats is considered political. SOEs are not known to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance.

Legally, public and private companies compete under the same terms with respect to market share, products and services, and incentives. In reality, private enterprises assert that public companies sometimes receive more favorable treatment. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, but they work with private banks, and they are less bureaucratic than their public counterparts. Public companies generally refrain from doing business with private banks and a 2008 government directive ordered public companies to work only with public banks. The directive was later officially rescinded, but public companies continued the practice. However, the heads of Algeria’s two largest state enterprises, Sonatrach and Sonelgaz, both indicated in 2020 that given current budget pressures they are investigating recourse to foreign financing, including from private banks. SOEs are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors, but business contacts report that the government favors SOEs over private sector companies in terms of access to land.

SOEs are subject to budget constraints. Audits of public companies can be conducted by the Court of Auditors, a financially autonomous institution. The constitution explicitly charges it with “ex post inspection of the finances of the state, collectivities, public services, and commercial capital of the state,” as well as preparing and submitting an annual report to the President, heads of both chambers of Parliament, and Prime Minister. The Court makes its audits public on its website, for free, but with a time delay, which does not conform to international norms.

The Court conducts audits simultaneously but independently from the Ministry of Finance’s year-end reports. The Court makes its reports available online once finalized and delivered to the Parliament, whereas the Ministry withholds publishing year-end reports until after the Parliament and President have approved them. The Court’s audit reports cover the entire implemented national budget by fiscal year and examine each annual planning budget that is passed by Parliament.

The General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF), the public auditing body under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance, can conduct “no-notice” audits of public companies. The results of these audits are sent directly to the Minister of Finance, and the offices of the President and Prime Minister. They are not made available publicly. The Court of Auditors and IGF previously had joint responsibility for auditing certain accounts, but they are in the process of eliminating this redundancy. Further legislation clarifying whether the delineation of responsibility for particular accounts which could rest with the Court of Auditors or the Ministry of Finance’s General Inspection of Finance (IGF) unit has yet to be issued.

There has been limited privatization of certain projects previously managed by SOEs, and so far restricted to the water sector and possibly a few other sectors. However, the privatization of SOEs remains publicly sensitive and has been largely halted.

The Andorran financial sector is efficient and is one of the main pillars of the Andorran economy, representing 20 percent of the country’s GDP and over 5 percent of the workforce.

Created in 1989, and redefined with more responsibilities in 2003, the Andorran Financial Authority (AFA; www.afa.ad ) is the supervisory and regulatory body of the Andorran

financial system and the insurance sector. The AFA is a public entity with its own legal status, functionally independent from the Government. AFA has the power to carry out all necessary actions to ensure the correct development of its supervision and control functions, disciplinary and punitive powers, treasury and public debt management services, financial agency, international relations, advice, and studies.

The Andorran Financial Intelligence Unit (UIFAND) was created in 2000 as an independent organ to deal with the tasks of promoting and coordinating measures to combat money laundering, terror financing, and the proliferation of weapons ( www.uifand.ad ).

The State Agency for the Resolution of Banking Institutions (AREB) is a public-legal institution created by Law 8/2015 to take urgent measures to introduce mechanisms for the recovery and resolution of banking institutions ( www.areb.ad ).

Andorra adopted the use of the Euro in 2002 and in 2011 signed a Monetary Agreement with the EU making the Euro the official currency. Since July 1, 2013, Andorra has had the right to mint Euro coins.

The Andorra banking system is sound and considered the most important part of the financial sector. It represents 20 percent of the country’s GDP. The Andorran banks offer a variety of services at market rates. The main lines of business in the banking sector are retail banking, private banking, and asset management and insurance. The country also has a sizeable and growing market for portfolio investments. The country does not have a central bank. The sector is regulated and supervised by the Andorran Financial Authority (AFA).

The U.S. Internal Revenue Service has certified all the Andorran banks as qualified intermediaries.

Founded in 1960, the Association of Andorran Banks (ABA; https://www.andorranba nking.ad/) represents Andorran banks. Among its tasks are representing and defending interests of its members, watching over the development and competitiveness of Andorran banking at national and international levels, improving sector technical standards, cooperation with public administrations, and promoting professional training, particularly dealing with money laundering prevention. At present, all five Andorran banking groups are ABA members, totaling an estimated 51.7 billion Euros in combined assets for 2021.

Foreign Exchange

Andorra adopted the Euro in 2002 and in 2011 signed a Monetary Agreement with the EU making the Euro the official currency. Since 2013, Andorra has the authority to mint Euro coins.

Remittance Policies

There are no limits or restrictions on remittances provided that they correspond to a company’s official earning records.

Andorra has no Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF).

Foreign portfolio investment is still new in Angola, but the government is seeking to increase it. The National Bank of Angola (BNA) abolished the licensing previously required to import capital from foreign investors allocated to the private sector and export income associated with such investments. This measure compliments the need to improve the capture of FDI and portfolio investment and it is in line with the privatization program for public companies (PROPRIV) announced through Presidential Decree No. 250/19 of August 5, 2019, which encourages foreign companies to purchase state-owned assets the government is liquidating. BNA has also stopped requiring a license to export capital resulting from the sale of investments in securities traded on a regulated market and the sale of any investment, in which the buyer is also not – foreign exchange resident, pursuant to Notice No. 15/2019. The BNA is increasingly removing restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

Angola’s Debt and Securities Stock Exchange (BODIVA), planned to be privatized by 2022, trades an equivalent in local currency (kwanzas) of USD 2 billion a year. In view of policies adopted by the institution, BODIVA predicts an increase in the volume of trades. The stock exchange has 23 commercial banks and two brokerages as members, which operate mainly in government denominated Treasury Bonds. BODIVA allows the trading of different types of financial instruments through an electronic auction platform to investors with rules (self-regulation), systems (platforms), and procedures that assure market fairness and integrity to facilitate portfolio investment. The Capital Markets Commission, the regulator, is updating its own supervisory framework while looking to provide new services and attract more individual investors to the capital markets. Presently, only local commercial banks can list on the nascent stock exchange. According to the Capital Markets Commissioner, portfolio investment by individuals only represents 16 percent of BODIVA’s equity.

Through the ongoing privatization program, the government announced in February its intent to sell 30 percent of the stocks it has invested in BODIVA by the end of 2022, with plans to sell the rest in phases in 2023 and 2024.

Credit is partially allocated on market terms. Since the revision of the PIL in 2021, domestic credit is accessible to foreign investors and companies that are majority foreign held (this was previously only possible after implementation of the investment project). For Angolan investors, credit access remains limited. In 2020, however the BNA directed commercial banks to increase the minimum amount of subsidized credit that they must make available to borrowers 2 percent of their assets to 2.5 percent by the end of 2020 to accelerate the diversification of domestic production. The private sector has access to a variety of conventional credit instruments provided by commercial banks.

Forty-seven percent of Angola’s income-earners utilize banking services, with 80 percent being from the urban areas. Angola is over-banked for the size of its economy. Although four banks have been closed since 2018, 26 banks still operate in Angola. The banking market remains marked by concentration and limited financial inclusion. The top six banks control nearly 80 percent of sector assets, loans and deposits, but the rest of the sector includes many banks with minimal scale and weak franchises. The total number of customers in the six largest banks is 9.9 million. Angola’s largest bank Banco Angolano de Investimentos has an asset value of approximately USD 5.5 billion.

Angola has a central banking system. The banking sector largely depends on monetary policies established by Angola’s central bank, the National Bank of Angola (BNA). Thanks to the ongoing IMF economic and financial reform agenda, the BNA is adopting international best practices and slowly becoming more autonomous. On February 13, 2021, President Joao Lourenco issued a decree granting autonomy to the BNA in line with IMF recommendations. Since that time, the bank has made decision on monetary, financial, credit, and foreign exchange policies without political influence, while also maintaining its oversight, regulatory, and supervisory role of the institutions in the financial system. The reforms taken under the Lourenco administration have lessened the political influence over the BNA and allowed it to more freely adopt strategies to build resilience from external shocks on the economy. As Angola’s economy depends heavily on oil to fuel its economy, so does the banking sector. The BNA periodically monitors minimum capital requirements for all banks and orders the closure of non-compliant banks.

Credit availability is limited and often supports government-supported programs. The GRA obliges banks to grant credit more liberally in the economy, notably by implementing a Credit Support Program (PAC). For instance, the BNA first issued a notice obliging Angolan commercial banks to grant credit to national production equivalent at a minimum to 2.5 percent of their net assets in 2020 and extended the notice through the end of 2022. Although the RECREDIT Agency purchased non-performing loans (NPLs) of the state’s parastatal BPC bank, NPLs remain high at 23 percent, a decrease of 9 percent since 2017.

The country has not lost any additional correspondent banking relationships since 2015. At the time of issuing this report no correspondent banking relationships were in jeopardy. The Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group is evaluating Angola’s anti-money laundering regime. A positive result could lead private foreign banking institutions to reestablish correspondent banking relationships. Most transactions go via third party correspondent banking services in Portugal banks, a costly option for all commercial banks.

Foreign banking institutions are allowed to operate in Angola and are subject to BNA oversight.

The Angolan Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSDEA) was established in 2012 with $5 billion USD in support from the petroleum sector. The fund was established in accordance with international governance standards and best practices as outlined in the Santiago Principles. As of March 2021, the FSDEA reported $2.97 billion USD. Angola is a full member  of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds

There are currently 81 public enterprises listed on the State Institute of Asset and Shares Management website; 70 are wholly owned by the state, 8 with majority-ownership for the state and 3 with minority stakes for the government. A list of all of Angola’s SOEs can be found at the following link: https://igape.minfin.gov.ao/PortalIGAPE/#!/sector-empresarial-publico/universo-do-sep . Based on the IMF definition of government owning at least 50 percent equity and revenue being greater than 1 percent of GDP, SONANGOL, the state oil company, and Sodiam, the state diamond company qualify as SOEs.

There is no law mandating preferential treatment to SOEs, but in practice they have access to inside information and credit. Currently, SOEs are not subject to budgetary constraints and quite often exceed their capital limits. All SOEs in Angola are required to have boards of directors, and most board members are affiliated with the government.

Other public enterprises operate in the agribusiness, oil and gas, financial services, and construction sectors as well as others.

The GRA considers SOE debt as indirect public debt, and only accounts in its state budget for direct government debt, thus effectively not reflecting some substantial obligations in fact owed by the government. President Lourenço has launched various reforms to improve financial sector transparency, enhance efficiency in the country’s SOEs as part of the National Development plan 2018-2022 and Macroeconomic Stability Plan

Angola is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Angola does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate governance for SOEs.

Angola began its privatization program (PROPRIV) in 2019, with an aim to privatize 195 assets by 2022. By January, the government had privatized 73 assets and raised $1.7 billion in revenue through the program despite COVID-19 pandemic-imposed hurdles. The program is supervised by State Institute of Asset and Shares Management (IGAPE) and will implemented through the Angolan Debt and Securities Exchange Market (BODIVA). The government plans to partially privatize the state-owned telecommunications company and the national oil company Sonangol, as well as the national airline TAAG, and companies in the extractives sector, health, manufacturing, and agriculture.

The privatization process is open to interested foreign investors and the government has improved the transparency of the bidding process. The government has an “electronic auction” site where investors can submit their bids for the various tenders: https://leilaoigape.minfin.gov.ao/ .

As a member of the ECCU, Antigua and Barbuda is also a member of the Eastern Caribbean Stock Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market. The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing securities market activities. As of March 2021, there were 164 securities listed on the ECSE, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities. Market capitalization stood at $703 million (1.9 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars), representing a 6.9 percent increase from 2020. Antigua and Barbuda is open to portfolio investment.

Antigua and Barbuda accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund Agreement Sections 2, 3, and 4, and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making international payments and transfers. The government normally does not grant foreign tax credits except in cases where taxes are paid in a Commonwealth country that grants similar relief for Antigua and Barbuda taxes, or where an applicable tax treaty provides a credit. The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity services, and trade credits, as well as other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.

Antigua and Barbuda is a signatory to the 1983 agreement establishing the ECCB. The ECCB controls Antigua and Barbuda’s currency and regulates its domestic banks.

The Banking Act (2015) is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU member states. The ECCB and the Ministers of Finance of member states jointly carry out banking supervision under the act. The Minsters of Finance usually act in consultation with the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio.

Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Antigua and Barbuda. The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed. The ECCB regulates financial institutions. As part of supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB. In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector as stable. Assessments including effects of the pandemic are not yet available. Assets of commercial banks totaled $2.07 billion (5.6 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of December 2019 and remained relatively consistent during the previous year. The reserve requirement for commercial banks was 6 percent of deposit liabilities.

Antigua and Barbuda is well-served by bank and non-bank financial institutions. There are minimal alternative financial services offered. Some people still participate in informal community group lending, but the practice is declining.

The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S., Canadian, and European banks due to risk management concerns. CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to continue to monitor the issue.

Antigua and Barbuda’s Digital Assets Business Bill 2020 created a comprehensive regulatory framework for digital asset businesses, clients, and customers. The bill states that all digital asset businesses in the country must obtain a license for issuing, selling, or redeeming virtual coins, operating as a payment service or electronic exchange, providing custodial wallet services, among other activities. The government aspires to develop Antigua and Barbuda into a regional center for blockchain and cryptocurrency. At the end of 2020, over 40 major businesses accepted bitcoin cash.

Bitt, a Barbadian company, developed digital currency DCash in partnership with the ECCB. The first successful DCash retail central bank digital currency (CDBC) consumer-to-merchant transaction took place in Grenada in February 2021 following a multi-year development process. The CBB and the FSC established a regulatory sandbox in 2018 where financial technology entities can do live testing of their products and services. This allowed regulators to gain a better understanding of the product or service and to determine what, if any, regulation is necessary to protect consumers. Bitt completed its participation and formally exited the sandbox in 2019. Bitt launched DCash in Antigua and Barbuda in March 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades.

Neither the government of Antigua and Barbuda nor the ECCB, of which Antigua and Barbuda is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Antigua and Barbuda are governed by their respective legislation and do not generally pose a threat to investors, as they are not designed for competition. The government established many SOEs to create economic activity in areas where the private sector is perceived to have little interest.

SOEs are headed by boards of directors to which senior managers report. In 2016, Parliament passed the Statutory Corporations (General Provisions) Act, which specifies ministerial responsibilities in the appointment and termination of board members, decisions of the board, and employment in these SOEs. To promote diversity and independence on SOE boards, professional associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society may nominate directors for boards.

Antigua and Barbuda does not have a targeted privatization program.

The Argentine Constitution sets as a general principle that foreign investors have the same status and the same rights as local investors. Foreign investors have free access to domestic and international financing.

After a three-year recession (2018-2020), the economy rebounded with 10.3 percent growth in 2021. However, the government did not ease the capital controls introduced in September 2019 to slow the outflow of dollars. Central Bank capital controls prohibiting transfers and payments are likely in conflict with IMF Article VIII. The government has maintained trade restrictions, price controls, distortive taxes, and high spending. Unable to access international capital markets (despite restructuring private debt in 2020) and with a shallow domestic market, the government relied on Central Bank money printing to finance the deficit. The excessive liquidity resulted in high inflation (50.9 percent in 2021) and deteriorating social conditions, with the poverty rate exceeding 40 percent.

In August 2020, the government of Argentina formally notified the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of its intent to renegotiate $45 billion due to the Fund from the 2018 Stand-By Arrangement. On March 3, 2022, IMF Staff and Argentine authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the economic and financial policies required for an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement. In broad terms, the key objectives of the new EFF include a reduction in the fiscal deficit and monetary financing, tackling inflation, and the accumulation of foreign reserves. The IMF Executive Board approved the EFF on March 25, after the Argentine National Congress approved the measure.

The Argentine Securities and Exchange Commission (CNV or Comisión Nacional de Valores) is the federal agency that regulates securities markets offerings. Securities and accounting standards are transparent and consistent with international norms. Foreign investors have access to a variety of options on the local market to obtain credit. Nevertheless, the domestic credit market is small – credit is 11 percent of GDP. Private sector credit gained some momentum in 2021, driven by the reopening of the economy after the pandemic and government support measures such as subsidized credit lines for businesses. Nevertheless, the stock of credit shrank in real terms as the nominal credit growth increased by 41 percent in 2021, below the inflation rate of 50.7 percent. The Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is the organization responsible for the operation of Argentina’s primary stock exchange, located in Buenos Aires city. The most important index of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange is the MERVAL (Mercado de Valores).

U.S. banks, securities firms, and investment funds are well-represented in Argentina and are dynamic players in local capital markets. In 2003, the government began requiring foreign banks to disclose to the public the nature and extent to which their foreign parent banks guarantee their branches or subsidiaries in Argentina.

Argentina has a relatively sound banking sector based on diversified revenues, well-contained operating costs, and a high liquidity level. Argentina’s banking sector has been resilient in the face of a multi-year economic recession (2018-2020). Limited financial intermediation combined with high inflation and interventionist interest rate regulations (mainly for small businesses) dented bank profitability in 2021. Banks compensated for this by controlling expenses and increasing digitalization of the sector. Non-performing private sector loans constitute 4.4 percent of banks’ portfolios. During 2021, financial entities maintained adequate solvency indicators. The banking sector is well positioned due to macro and micro-prudential policies introduced since 2002 that have helped to reduce asset-liability mismatches. The sector is highly liquid and its exposure to the public sector is modest, while its provisions for bad debts are adequate.

Private banks have total assets of approximately ARS 8.4 trillion (USD $83.3 billion). Total financial system assets are approximately ARS 13.7 trillion (USD $135.7 billion). The Central Bank of Argentina acts as the country’s financial agent and is the main regulatory body for the banking system.

Foreign banks and branches can establish operations in Argentina. They are subject to the same regulation as local banks. Argentina’s Central Bank has many correspondent banking relationships, none of which are known to have been lost in the past three years.

In November 2020, the Central Bank launched a new payment system, “Transfers 3.0,” seeking to reduce the use of cash. This system will boost digital payments and further financial inclusion in Argentina, expanding the reach of instant transfers to build an open and universal digital payment ecosystem. The government has expressed support for the process of digitization of payments to improve efficiency, reduce costs, and safeguard financial stability.

The Central Bank has enacted a resolution recognizing cryptocurrencies and requiring that they comply with local banking and tax laws. No implementing regulations have been adopted. Block chain developers report that several companies in the financial services sector are exploring or considering using block chain-based programs externally and are using some such programs internally.

Foreign Exchange

Beginning in September 2019, the Argentine government and Central Bank issued a series of decrees and norms to extend or amend the government’s ability to regulate and restrict access to foreign exchange markets.

As of October 2019, the Central Bank (Notice A6815) limits cash withdrawals made abroad with local debit cards to foreign currency bank accounts owned by the client in Argentina. Pursuant to Notice A6823, cash advances made abroad using local credit cards are limited to a maximum of USD $50 per transaction.

As of September 2020, and pursuant to Notice A7106, Argentine individuals must limit purchases of foreign currency (or of goods and services denominated in foreign currency) to no more than USD $200 per month on a rolling monthly basis. Individuals must receive Central Bank approval to purchase foreign currency in excess of the $200 quota. Purchases of goods and services abroad with credit and debit cards issued by Argentine banks count against the USD $200 per month quota. Although no limit on credit or debit card purchases is imposed, if monthly expenditures surpass the USD $200 limit, the card owner will be prevented from purchasing foreign currency in Argentina for the number of months needed to cover the amount of excess spending. Also, the regulation prohibits individuals who receive government assistance and high-ranking federal government officials from purchasing foreign exchange.

Pursuant to Public Emergency Law 27,541, issued December 23, 2019, all dollar purchases and individual expenses incurred abroad, in person or online, including international online purchases from Argentina, paid with credit or with debit cards will be subject to a 30 percent tax. Pursuant to AFIP Resolution 4815 a 35 percent withholding tax in advance of the payment of income and/or wealth tax is also applied.

Non-Argentine residents are required to obtain prior Central Bank approval to purchase more than USD $100 per month, except for certain bilateral or international organizations, institutions and agencies, diplomatic representation, and foreign tribunals.

Companies and individuals need to obtain prior clearance from the Central Bank before transferring funds abroad. In the case of individuals, if transfers are made from their own foreign currency accounts in Argentina to their own accounts abroad, they do not need to obtain Central Bank approval.

Per Notice A6869 issued by the Central Bank in January 2020, companies will be able to repatriate dividends without Central Bank authorization equivalent to a maximum of 30 percent of new foreign direct investment made by the company in the country. To promote foreign direct investment the Central Bank announced in October 2020 (Notice A7123) that it will allow free access to the official foreign exchange market to repatriate investments as long as the capital contribution was transferred and sold in Argentine Pesos through the foreign exchange market as of October 2, 2020, and the repatriation takes place at least two years after the transfer and settlement of those funds.

Exporters of goods are required to transfer the proceeds from exports to Argentina and settle in pesos in the foreign currency market. Exporters must settle according to the following terms: exporters with affiliates (irrespective of the type of good exported) and exporters of certain goods (including cereals, seeds, minerals, and precious metals, among others) must convert their foreign currency proceeds to pesos within 15 days (or 30 days for some products) after the issuance of the permit for shipment; other exporters have 180 days to settle in pesos. Despite these deadlines, exporters must transfer the funds to Argentina and settle in pesos within five business days from the actual collection of funds. Argentine residents are required to transfer to Argentina and settle in pesos the proceeds from services exports rendered to non-Argentine residents that are paid in foreign currency either in Argentina or abroad, within five business days from collection of funds.

Payment of imports of goods and services from third parties and affiliates require Central Bank approval if the company needs to purchase foreign currency. Since May 2020, the Central Bank requires importers to submit an affidavit stating that the total amount of payments associated with the import of goods made during the year (including the payment that is being requested). The total amount of payments for importation of goods should also include the payments for amortizations of lines of credit and/or commercial guarantees.

In September 2020, the Central Bank limited companies’ ability to purchase foreign currency to cancel any external financial debt (including other intercompany debt) and dollar denominated local securities offerings. Companies were granted access to foreign currency for up to 40 percent of the principal amount coming due from October 15, 2020, to December 31, 2020. For the remaining 60 percent of the debt, companies had to file a refinancing plan with the Central Bank. In February 2021, the Central Bank extended the regulation through 2021, and in March 2022 extended it again to include maturities through December 31, 2022. Indebtedness with international organizations or their associated agencies or guaranteed by them and indebtedness granted by official credit agencies or guaranteed by them are exempted from this restriction.

The Central Bank (Notice A7001) prohibited access to the foreign exchange market to pay for external indebtedness, imports of goods and services, and saving purposes for individuals and companies that have made sales of securities with settlement in foreign currency or transfers of these to foreign depositary entities within the last 90 days. They also should not make any of these transactions for the following 90 days.

Pre-cancellation of debt coming due abroad in more than three business days requires Central Bank approval to purchase dollars.

Per Resolution 36,162 of October 2011, locally registered insurance companies are mandated to maintain all investments and cash equivalents in the country. The Central Bank limits banks’ dollar-denominated asset holdings to 5 percent of their net worth.

In December 2021, the Central Bank presented its monetary, financial, lending, and foreign exchange program. On monetary policy, the Central Bank committed to I) manage liquidity to prevent any imbalances that may directly or indirectly affect the disinflation process; II) set the path of the policy interest rate to obtain positive real returns on investments in domestic currency and preserve monetary and foreign exchange stability; and III) contribute to the development of the capital market and adjust minimum reserve requirements to strengthen the channel of monetary policy transmission. On foreign exchange, the Central Bank will maintain the gradual crawling peg of the exchange rate consistent with the pace of inflation. With the goal of strengthening international reserves, the Central Bank will manage capital control regulations to ensure monetary and foreign exchange stability. The credit policy objectives include encouraging financial intermediation and promoting the growth of the peso credit market to boost lending to micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and to the sectors most affected by the pandemic.

Remittance Policies

In response to the economic crisis in Argentina, the government introduced capital controls in September 2019 and tightened them in 2020.  Under these restrictions, companies in Argentina (including local affiliates of foreign parent companies) must obtain prior approval from the Central Bank to access the foreign exchange market to purchase foreign currency and to transfer funds abroad for the payment of dividends and profits.  In January 2020, the Central Bank amended the regime for the payment of dividends abroad to non-residents. The new regime allows companies to access the foreign exchange market to transfer profits and dividends abroad without prior authorization of the Central Bank, provided the following conditions are met:

(1) Profits and dividends are to be declared in closed and audited financial statements.

(2) The dividends in foreign currency should not exceed the dividends determined by the shareholders’ meeting in local currency.

(3) The total amount of dividends to be transferred cannot exceed 30 percent of the amount of new capital contributions made by non-residents into local companies since January 2020.

(4) The resident entity must be in compliance with filing the Central Bank Survey of External Assets and Liabilities.

The Argentine government does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund.

The banking system in Armenia is sound and well-regulated, but the financial sector is not highly developed, according to investors. Banking sector assets account for over 80 percent of total financial sector assets. Financial intermediation tends to be poor. Nearly all banks require collateral located in Armenia, and large collateral requirements often prevent potential borrowers from entering the market. U.S. businesses have noted that this creates a significant barrier for small- and medium-sized enterprises and start-up companies.

The Armenian government welcomes foreign portfolio investment and there is a supporting system and legal framework in place. Armenia’s securities market is not well developed and has only minimal trading activity through the Armenia Securities Exchange, though efforts to grow capital markets are underway. Liquidity sufficient for the entry and exit of sizeable positions is often difficult to achieve due to the small size of the Armenian market. The Armenian government hopes that as a result of pension reforms in 2014, which brought two international asset managers to Armenia, capital markets will play a more prominent role in the country’s financial sector. Armenia adheres to its IMF Article VIII commitments by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms and foreign investors are able to access credit locally.

Since 2020, the banking sector has withstood the twin shocks created by COVID-19 and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Indicators of financial soundness, including capital adequacy and non-performing loan ratios, have remained broadly strong. The sector is well capitalized and liquid. Non-performing loans have ticked upward slightly from rates of around five percent of all loans. Dollarization, historically high for deposits and lending, has been falling in recent years. Seventeen commercial banks operate in Armenia.  In 2021, all commercial banks in Armenia generated net profits and all had a positive return on average equity (the financial ratio that measures the performance of a bank based on its average shareholders’ equity outstanding).  Total bank assets in Armenia at the end of 2021 were $14 billion; Armenia’s 2021 GDP was approximately $13.6 billion.  As such, the ratio of banks’ total assets to GDP – approximately one-to-one – is average compared to peer countries.  Concentration of banks’ assets is considered to be very low, with the three largest banks holding less than fifty percent of total banking sector assets.  Market share of the largest five banks was 56 percent in 2021.  Overall, Armenia’s banking sector is viewed by international financial institutions (IFIs) as relatively healthy. 

The minimum capital requirement for banks is 30 billion AMD (around $59 million). There are no restrictions on foreigners to open bank accounts. Residents and foreign nationals can hold foreign currency accounts and import, export, and exchange foreign currency relatively freely in accordance with the Law on Currency Regulation and Currency Control. Foreign banks may establish a subsidiary, branch, or representative office, and subsidiaries of foreign banks are allowed to provide the same types of services as domestically owned banks.

The CBA is responsible for the regulation and supervision of the financial sector. The authority and responsibilities of the CBA are established under the Law on the Central Bank of Armenia. Numerous other articles of legislation and supporting regulations provide for financial sector oversight and supervision.

Armenia does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

Most of Armenia’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were privatized in the 1990s and early 2000s, but SOEs are still active in a number of sectors. SOEs in Armenia operate as state-owned closed joint stock companies that are managed by the Department of State Property Management and state non-commercial organizations. There are no laws or rules that ensure a primary or leading role for SOEs in any specific industry. Armenia is party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, and SOEs are covered under that agreement. SOEs in Armenia are subject to the same tax regime as their private competitors, and private enterprises in Armenia can compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions. The Department of State Property Management maintains a public list of state-owned closed joint stock companies on its website.

Most of Armenia’s SOEs were privatized in the 1990s and early 2000s. Many of the privatization processes for Armenia’s large assets were reported to be neither competitive nor transparent, and political considerations in some instances prevailed over fair tender processes. The most recent law on privatization, the fifth, is the Law on the 2017-2020 Program for State Property Privatization, which lists 48 entities for privatization. The Department of State Property Management oversees the management of the state’s shares in entities slated for privatization. Details of the privatization program are available on the Department of State Property Management website.

The Australian Government takes a favorable stance towards foreign portfolio investment with no restrictions on inward flows of debt or equity. Indeed, access to foreign capital markets is crucial to the Australian economy given its relatively small domestic savings. Australian capital markets are generally efficient and able to provide financing options to businesses. While the Australian equity market is one of the largest and most liquid in the world, non-financial firms face a number of barriers in accessing the corporate bond market. Large firms are more likely to use public equity, and smaller firms are more likely to use retained earnings and debt from banks and intermediaries. Australia’s corporate bond market is relatively small, driving many Australian companies to issue debt instruments in the U.S. market. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit from domestic institutions on market terms. Australia’s stock market is the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX).

Australia’s banking system is robust, highly evolved, and international in focus. Bank profitability is strong and has been supported by further improvements in asset performance. Total assets of Australian banks at the end of 2020 was USD4.2 trillion and the sector has delivered an annual average return on equity of around 10 percent (only falling to six percent in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, before rebounding to 11 percent in 2021).

According to Australia’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), the ratio of non-performing assets to total loans was approximately one percent at the end of 2021, having remained at around that level for the last five years after falling from highs of nearly two percent following the Global Financial Crisis. The RBA is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the stability of the financial sector, while the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) monitors individual institutions. The RBA is also responsible for monitoring and regulating payments systems in Australia.

Further details on the size and performance of Australia’s banking sector are available on the websites of the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) and the RBA:
https://www.apra.gov.au/statistics 
https://www.rba.gov.au/chart-pack/banking-indicators.html 

Foreign banks are allowed to operate as a branch or a subsidiary in Australia. Australia has generally taken an open approach to allowing foreign companies to operate in the financial sector, largely to ensure sufficient competition in an otherwise small domestic market.

Australia’s main sovereign wealth fund, the Future Fund, is a financial asset investment fund owned by the Australian Government. The Fund’s objective is to enhance the ability of future Australian Governments to discharge unfunded superannuation (pension) liabilities. As a founding member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF), the Future Fund’s structure, governance, and investment approach is in full alignment with the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Sovereign Wealth Funds (the “Santiago principles”).

The Future Fund’s investment mandate is to achieve a long-term return of at least inflation plus 4-5 percent per annum. As of December 2021, the Fund’s portfolio consists of: 23 percent global equities, 8 percent Australian equities, 25 percent private equity (including 8 percent in infrastructure and 7 percent in property), and the remaining 37 percent in debt, cash, and alternative investments.

In addition to the Future Fund, the Australian Government manages five other specific-purpose funds: the DisabilityCare Australia Fund; the Medical Research Future Fund; the Emergency Response Fund; the Future Drought Fund; and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future Fund. In total, these five funds have assets of AUD 50 billion (USD 37 billion), while the main Future Fund has assets of AUD 204 billion (USD 150 billion) as of December 31, 2021.

Further details of these funds are available at: https://www.futurefund.gov.au/ 

In Australia, the term used for a Commonwealth Government State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) is “government business enterprise” (GBE). According to the Department of Finance, there are nine GBEs: two corporate Commonwealth entities and seven Commonwealth companies. (See: https://www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/governance/gbe/ ) Private enterprises are generally allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to markets, credit, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies. Public enterprises are not generally accorded material advantages in Australia. Remaining GBEs do not exercise power in a manner that discriminates against or unfairly burdens foreign investors or foreign-owned enterprises.

Australia does not have a formal and explicit national privatization program. Individual state and territory governments may have their own privatization programs. Foreign investors are welcome to participate in any privatization programs subject to the rules and approvals governing foreign investment.

Austria has sophisticated financial markets that allow foreign investors access without restrictions. The government welcomes foreign portfolio investment. The Austrian National Bank (OeNB) regulates portfolio investments effectively.

Austria has a national stock exchange that currently includes 64 companies on its regulated market and several others on its multilateral trading facility (MTF). The Austrian Traded Index (ATX) is a price index consisting of the 20 largest stocks on the market and forms the most important index of Austria’s stock market. The size of the companies listed on the ATX is roughly equivalent to those listed on the MDAX in Germany. The market capitalization of Austrian listed companies is small compared to the country’s western European counterparts, accounting for 31 percent of Austria’s GDP, compared to 59 percent in Germany or 194 percent in the United States.

Unlike the other market segments in the stock exchange, the Direct Market and Direct Market Plus segments, targeted at SMEs and young, developing companies, are subject only to the Vienna Stock Exchange’s general terms of business, not more stringent EU regulations. These segments have lower reporting requirements but also greater risk for investors, as prices are more likely to fluctuate, due to the respective companies’ low level of market capitalization and lower trading volumes.

Austria has robust financing for product markets, but the free flow of resources into factor markets (capital, raw materials) could be improved. Overall, financing is primarily available through banks and government-sponsored funding organizations with very little private venture capital available. The Austrian government is aware of this issue but has taken few tangible steps to improve the availability of private venture capital.

Austria is fully compliant with IMF Article VIII, all financial instruments are available, and there are no restrictions on payments. Credit is available to foreign investors at market-determined rates.

Austria has one of the most fragmented banking networks in Europe with more than 3,800 branch offices registered in 2021. The banking system is highly developed, with worldwide correspondent banks and representative offices and branches in the United States and other major financial centers. Large Austrian banks also have extensive networks in Central and Southeast European (CESEE) countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Total assets of the banking sector amounted to EUR 1.0 trillion (USD 1.2 trillion) in 2020 (approximately 2.5 times the country’s GDP). Approximately EUR 460 billion (USD 543 billion) of banking sector assets are held by Austria’s two largest banks, Erste Group and Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI). The Austrian banking sector is considered one of the most stable in the world. Austria’s banking sector is managed and overseen by the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) and the Financial Market Authority (FMA). Four Austrian banks with assets in excess of EUR 30 billion (USD 34 billion) are subject to the Eurozone’s Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as is Sberbank Europe AG, a Russian bank subsidiary headquartered in Austria (which was declared insolvent in March 2022, and its operations are now being wound down in a bankruptcy proceeding), and Addiko Bank AG due to their significant cross-border assets, as well as Volksbank Wien AG, due to its importance for the economy. All other Austrian banks continue to be subject to the country’s dual-oversight banking supervisory system with roles for the OeNB and the FMA, both of which are also responsible for policing irregularities on the stock exchange and for supervising insurance companies, securities markets, and pension funds. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country with no legal restrictions that place them at a disadvantage compared to local banks.

Due to U.S. government financial reporting requirements, Austrian banks are very cautious in committing the time and expense required to accept U.S. clients and U.S. investors without established U.S. corporate headquarters.

Austria has no sovereign wealth funds.

Austria has two major wholly state-owned enterprises (SOEs): The OeBB (Austrian Federal Railways) and Asfinag (highway financing, building, maintenance, and administration). Other government industry holding companies are bundled in the government holding company OeBAG (http://www.oebag.gv.at)

The government has direct representation in the supervisory boards of its companies (commensurate with its ownership stake), and OeBAG has the authority to buy and sell company shares, as well as purchase minority stakes in strategically relevant companies. Such purchases are subject to approval from an audit committee consisting of government-nominated independent economic experts.

OeBAG holds a 53 percent stake in the Post Office, 51 percent in energy company Verbund, 33 percent in the gambling group Casinos Austria, 31.5 percent in the energy company OMV, 28 percent in the Telekom Austria Group, as well as a handful of smaller ventures. Local governments own most utilities, the Vienna International Airport, and more than half of Austria’s 270 hospitals and clinics.

Private enterprises in Austria can generally compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to market access, credit, and other such business operations as licenses and supplies. While most SOEs must finance themselves under terms similar to private enterprises, some large SOEs (such as OeBB) benefit from state-subsidized pension systems. As a member of the EU, Austria is also a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the WTO, which indirectly also covers the SOEs (since they are entities monitored by the Austrian Court of Auditors).

The five major OeBAG-controlled companies (Postal Service, Verbund AG, Casinos Austria, OMV, Telekom Austria), are listed on the Vienna Stock Exchange. Senior managers in these companies do not directly report to a minister, but to an oversight board. However, the government often appoints management and board members, who usually have strong political affiliations.

The government has not privatized any public enterprises since 2007. Austrian public opinion is skeptical regarding further privatization, and there are no indications of any government privatizations on the horizon. In prior privatizations, foreign and domestic investors received equal treatment. Despite a historical government preference for maintaining blocking minority rights for domestic shareholders, foreign investors have successfully gained full control of enterprises in several strategic sectors of the Austrian economy, including in telecommunications, banking, steel, and infrastructure.

Access to capital is a critical impediment to business development in Azerbaijan.  An effective regulatory system that encourages and facilitates portfolio investment, foreign or domestic, is not fully in place.  Though the Baku Stock Exchange opened in 2000, there is insufficient liquidity in the market to enter or exit sizeable positions.  The Central Bank assumed control over all financial regulation in January 2020, following disbandment of a formerly independent regulator.  Non-bank financial sector staples such as capital markets, insurance, and private equity are in the early stages of development.  The Capital Market Modernization Project is an attempt by the government to build the foundation for a modern financial capital market, including developing market infrastructure and automation systems, and strengthening the legal and market frameworks for capital transactions.  One major hindrance to the stock market’s growth is the difficulty in encouraging established Azerbaijani businesses to adapt to standard investor-friendly disclosure practices, which are generally required for publicly listed companies.

Azerbaijan’s government and Central Bank do not restrict payments and transfers for international transactions.  Foreign investors are permitted to obtain credit on the local market, but smaller companies and firms without an established credit history often struggle to obtain loans on reasonable commercial terms.  Limited access to capital remains a barrier to development, particularly for small and medium enterprises.

The country’s financial services sector – of which banking comprises more than 90 percent – is underdeveloped, which constrains economic growth and diversification.  The drop in world oil prices in 2014-2015 and the resulting strain on Azerbaijan’s foreign currency earnings and the state budget exacerbated existing problems in the country’s banking sector and led to rising non-performing loans (NPLs) and high dollarization.  Subsequent reforms have improved overall sector stability.  President Aliyev signed a decree in February 2019 to provide partial relief to retail borrowers on foreign-currency denominated loans that meet certain criteria.

As of January 1, 2022, 26 banks were registered in Azerbaijan, including 12 banks with foreign capital and two state-owned banks.  These banks employ 20,601 people and have a combined 480 branches and 2,920 ATMs nationwide.  Total banking sector assets stood at approximately USD 22.3 billion as of January 2022, with the top five banks holding almost 60 percent of this amount.

In December 2019, Azerbaijan carried out a banking management reform that gave the Central Bank of Azerbaijan control over banks and credit institutions, closing the Chamber for Control over Financial Markets, which had held regulatory powers following Azerbaijan’s 2014/2015 economic crisis and resulting currency devaluations.  Concurrently, the Central Bank announced “recovery of the banking sector” would be one of the main challenges it would tackle in 2020.  The Central Bank closed four insolvent banks (Atabank, AGBank, NBCBank, and Amrah Bank) in April/May 2020, bringing the number of banks in the country down from 30 to 26.  Only six banks are able to conduct correspondent banking transactions with the United States.

Foreign banks are permitted in Azerbaijan and may take the form of representative offices, branches, joint ventures, and wholly owned subsidiaries.  These banks are subject to the same regulations as domestic banks, with certain additional restrictions.  Foreign individuals and entities are also permitted to open accounts with domestic or foreign banks in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan’s sovereign wealth fund is the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ).  Its mission is to transform hydrocarbon reserves into financial assets generating perpetual income for current and future generations and to finance strategically important infrastructure and social projects of national scale.  While its main statutory focus is investing in assets outside of the country, since it was established in 1999 SOFAZ has financed several socially beneficial projects in Azerbaijan related to infrastructure, housing, energy, and education.  The government’s newly adopted fiscal rule places limits on pro-cyclical spending, with the aim of increasing hydrocarbon revenue savings.  SOFAZ publishes an annual report which it submits for independent audit.  The fund’s assets totaled USD 45 billion as of January 1, 2022. 

In Azerbaijan, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in the oil and gas, power generation, communications, water supply, railway, and air passenger and cargo sectors, among others.  There is no published list of SOEs.  While there are no SOEs that officially have been delegated governmental powers, companies such as the SOCAR, Azerenerji (the national electricity utility), and Azersu (the national water utility) – all of which are closed joint-stock companies with majority state ownership and limited private investment – enjoy quasi-governmental or near-monopoly status in their respective sectors.

SOCAR is wholly owned by the government of Azerbaijan and takes part in all oil and gas activities in the country.  It publishes regular reports on production volumes, the value of its exports, estimates of investments in exploration and development, production costs, the names of foreign companies operating in the country, production data by company, quasi-fiscal activities, and the government’s portion of production-sharing contracts.  SOCAR is also responsible for negotiating PSAs with all foreign partners for hydrocarbon development.  SOCAR’s annual financial reports are audited by an independent external auditor and include the consolidated accounts of all SOCAR’s subsidiaries, although revenue data is incomplete.

There have been instances where state-owned enterprises have used their regulatory authority to block new entrants into the market.  SOEs are, in principle, subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors.  However, in sectors that are open to both private and foreign competition, SOEs generally receive a larger percentage of government contracts or business than their private sector competitors.  While SOEs regularly purchase or supply goods or services from private sector firms, domestic and foreign private enterprises have reported problems competing with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, information, products and services, and incentives.  Private enterprises do not have the same access (including terms) to financing as SOEs.  SOEs are also afforded material advantages such as preferential access to land and raw materials – advantages that are not available to private enterprises.  There is little information available on Azerbaijani SOEs’ budget constraints, due to the limited transparency in their financial accounts.

A renewed privatization process started with the May 2016 presidential decree implementing additional measures to improve the process of state property privatization and the July 2016 decree on measures to accelerate privatization and improve the management efficiency of state property.  The State Committee on Property Issues launched a portal to provide privatization information in July 2016.  The portal contains information about the properties, their addresses, location, and initial costs with the aim of facilitating privatization.  Azerbaijan’s current privatization efforts focus on smaller state-owned properties.  While there are no immediate plans to privatize large SOEs, Azerbaijan is moving 21 major government-owned companies to a new state holding company tasked to improve efficiency and corporate governance as well as prepare them for possible privatization.  However, the government has no plans to sell stakes in state companies in 2022, including in state oil company SOCAR.

Consistent with the GOB’s liberal approach to foreign investment, government policies facilitate the free flow of financial transactions and portfolio investments. Expatriates and Bahraini nationals have ready access to credit on market terms. Generally, credit terms are variable, but often are limited to 10 years for loans under $50 million. For major infrastructure investments, banks often offer to assume a part of the risk, and Bahrain’s wholesale and retail banks have shown extensive cooperation in syndicating loans for larger risks. Commercial credit is available to private organizations in Bahrain but has been increasingly crowded out by the government’s local bond issuances.

In 2016, the GOB launched a new fund designed to inject greater liquidity in the Bahrain Bourse, worth $100 million. The Bahrain Liquidity Fund is supported by several market participants and acts as a market maker, providing two-way quotes on most of the listed stocks with a reasonable spread to allow investors to actively trade their stocks. Despite these efforts, the market remains small in comparison to others in the region.

In October 2019, the GOB established a BD 130 million ($344 million) Liquidity Fund to assist distressed companies in restructuring financial obligations, which was expanded in March 2020 to BD 200 million ($530 million) in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The GOB and the CBB are members of the IMF and fully compliant with Article VIII.

The CBB is the single regulator of the entire financial sector, with an integrated regulatory framework covering all financial services provided by conventional and Islamic financial institutions. Bahrain’s banking sector remained healthy despite sustained lower global oil prices. Bahrain’s banks are well capitalized, and there is sufficient liquidity to ensure a healthy rate of investment. Bahrain remains a financial center for the GCC region, though many financial firms moved their regional headquarters to Dubai over the last decade. The GOB continues to drive innovation and expansion in the Islamic finance sector. In 2021, Bahrain ranked as the second in the MENA Islamic finance market and placed fourth globally, according to the ICD-Thomson Reuters Islamic Finance Development Indicator (IFDI).

Bahrain has an effective regulatory system that encourages portfolio investment. The CBB has fully implemented Basel II standards and is attempting to bring Bahraini banks into compliance with Basel III standards. Bahrain’s banking sector includes 89 banks, of which 30 are retail banks, 59 are wholesale banks, 17 are branches of foreign banks, and 13 are locally incorporated. Of these, nine are representative offices, and 16 are Islamic banks.

There are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts or corporate accounts. Bahrain is home to many prominent financial institutions, among them Citibank, American Express, and JP Morgan Chase. Ahli United Bank is Bahrain’s largest bank with total assets estimated at $41.9 billion as of December 2021.

Bahrain implemented the Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System and the Scripless Securities Settlement (SSS) System in 2007 to enable banks to carry out their payment and securities-related transactions securely on a real time basis.

In 2017, Bahrain became the first in the GCC to introduce fintech “sandbox” regulations that enabled the launch of cryptocurrency and blockchain startups. The same year, the CBB released additional regulations for conventional and Sharia-compliant financing-based crowdfunding businesses.  Any firm operating electronic financing/lending platforms must be licensed in Bahrain under the CBB Rulebook Volume 5 – Financing Based Crowdfunding Platform Operator.  In February 2019, the CBB issued cryptocurrency regulations.

Foreign Exchange

Bahrain has no restrictions on the repatriation of profits or capital and no exchange controls. Bahrain’s currency, the Bahraini Dinar (BD), is fully and freely convertible at the fixed rate of USD 1.00 = BD 0.377 (1 BD = USD 2.659). There is no black market or parallel exchange rate. There are no restrictions on converting or transferring funds, regardless of whether they are associated with an investment.

Remittance Policies

The CBB is responsible for regulating remittances, and its regulations are based on the Central Bank Law ratified in 2006. Foreign workers comprise most of the labor force in Bahrain and many remit significant quantities of funds to their countries of origin. Commercial banks and currency exchange houses are licensed to provide remittances services.

Commercial banks and currency exchange houses require two forms of identification before processing a routine remittance request, and any transaction exceeding $10,000 must include a documented source of the income. Bahrain enables foreign investors to remit funds through a legal parallel market, with no limitations on the inflow or outflow of funds for remittances of profits or revenue. The GOB does not engage in currency manipulation tactics.

The GCC is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Bahrain is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) which is headquartered in Bahrain. Participating countries commit to combat the financing of terrorist groups and activities in all its forms and to implement FATF recommendations.

Bahrain established a sovereign wealth fund, Mumtalakat, in 2006. Mumtalakat, which maintains an investment portfolio valued at roughly BD 6.6 billion ($17.6 billion) as of 2020, issues an annual report online. The annual report follows international financial reporting standards and is audited by external auditing firms. By law, subsidiaries of Mumtalakat are audited and monitored by the National Audit Office. In 2020, Mumtalakat received the highest-possible ranking in the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index for the seventh consecutive year, which specializes in ranking the transparency of sovereign wealth funds. However, Bahrain’s sovereign wealth fund does not follow the Santiago Principles.

Mumtalakat holds majority stakes in several firms. Mumtalakat invests 62 percent of its funds in the Middle East, 30 percent in Europe, and eight percent in the United States. The fund is diversified across a variety of business sectors including real estate and tourism, financial services, food and agriculture, and industrial manufacturing.

Mumtalakat acts more like an active asset management company than a sovereign wealth fund, including by taking an active role in managing SOEs. Most notably, Mumtalakat has been instrumental in helping Gulf Air, Bahrain’s state-owned airline, restructure and contain losses. A significant portion of Mumtalakat’s portfolio is invested in 29 Bahrain-based SOEs.

Mumtalakat did not directly contribute to the State Budget through 2016. However, beginning in September 2017, Mumtalakat annually contributed $53 million to the State Budget, which was increased to $106 million in the 2021-2022 State Budget.

Capital markets in Bangladesh are still developing, and the financial sector remains highly dependent on bank lending. Current regulatory infrastructure inhibits the development of a tradeable bond market.

Bangladesh is home to the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and the Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE), both of which are regulated by the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC), a statutory body formed in 1993 and attached to the Ministry of Finance. The DSE market capitalization stood at $64.8 billion at the end of January 2022, rising 16.3 percent year-over-year as stock prices rose amid speculative behavior and increased liquidity due to relaxed monetary policy.

Although the Bangladeshi government has a positive attitude toward foreign portfolio investors, participation in the exchanges remains low due to what is still limited liquidity for shares and the lack of publicly available and reliable company information. The DSE has attracted some foreign portfolio investors to the country’s capital market. However, the volume of foreign investment in Bangladesh remains a small fraction of total market capitalization. As a result, foreign portfolio investment has had limited influence on market trends and Bangladesh’s capital markets have been largely insulated from the volatility of international financial markets. Bangladeshi markets continue to rely primarily on domestic investors.

In 2019, BSEC undertook a number of initiatives to launch derivatives products, allow short selling, and invigorate the bond market. To this end, BSEC introduced three rules: Exchange Traded Derivatives Rules 2019, Short-Sale Rules 2019, and Investment Sukuk Rules 2019. Other recent, notable BSEC initiatives include forming a central clearing and settlement company – the Central Counterparty Bangladesh Limited (CCBL) – and promoting private equity and venture capital firms under the 2015 Alternative Investment Rules. In 2013, BSEC became a full signatory of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Memorandum of Understanding.

BSEC has taken steps to improve regulatory oversight, including installing a modern surveillance system, the “Instant Market Watch,” providing real time connectivity with exchanges and depository institutions. As a result, the market abuse detection capabilities of BSEC have improved significantly. A mandatory Corporate Governance Code for listed companies was introduced in 2012 but the overall quality of corporate governance remains substandard. Demutualization of both the DSE and CSE was completed in 2013 to separate ownership of the exchanges from trading rights. A majority of the members of the Demutualization Board, including the Chairman, are independent directors. Apart from this, a separate tribunal has been established to resolve capital market-related criminal cases expeditiously. However, both domestic and foreign investor confidence on the stock exchanges’ governance standards remains low.

The Demutualization Act 2013 also directed DSE to pursue a strategic investor who would acquire a 25 percent stake in the bourse. Through a bidding process DSE selected a consortium of the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges in China as its strategic partner, with the consortium buying the 25 percent share of DSE for taka 9.47 billion ($112.7 million).

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bangladesh is an Article VIII member and maintains restrictions on the unapproved exchange, conversion, and/or transfer of proceeds of international transactions into non-resident taka-denominated accounts. Since 2015, authorities have relaxed restrictions by allowing some debits of balances in such accounts for outward remittances, but there is currently no established timetable for the complete removal of the restrictions.

The Bangladesh Bank (BB) acts as the central bank of Bangladesh. It was established through the enactment of the Bangladesh Bank Order of 1972. General supervision and strategic direction of the BB has been entrusted to a nine-member Board of Directors, which is headed by the BB Governor. A list of the bank’s departments and branches is on its website: https://www.bb.org.bd/aboutus/dept/depts.php .

According to the BB, four types of banks operate in the formal financial system: State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), Specialized Banks, Private Commercial Banks (PCBs), and Foreign Commercial Banks (FCBs). Some 61 “scheduled” banks in Bangladesh operate under the control and supervision of the central bank as per the Bangladesh Bank Order of 1972. The scheduled banks, include six SOCBs, three specialized government banks established for specific objectives such as agricultural or industrial development or expatriates’ welfare, 43 PCBs, and nine FCBs as of February 2021. The scheduled banks are licensed to operate under the Bank Company Act of 1991 (Amended 2013). There are also five non-scheduled banks in Bangladesh, including Nobel Prize recipient Grameen Bank, established for special and definite objectives and operating under legislation enacted to meet those objectives.

Currently, 34 non-bank financial institutions (FIs) are operating in Bangladesh. They are regulated under the Financial Institution Act, 1993 and controlled by the BB. Of these, two are fully government-owned, one is a subsidiary of a state-owned commercial bank, and the rest are private financial institutions. Major sources of funds for these financial institutions are term deposits (at least three months’ tenure), credit facilities from banks and other financial institutions, and call money, as well as bonds and securitization.

Unlike banks, FIs are prohibited from:

• Issuing checks, pay-orders, or demand drafts.
• Receiving demand deposits.
• Involvement in foreign exchange financing.

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) remain the dominant players in rural financial markets. The Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA), the primary regulator of this sector, oversees 746 licensed microfinance institutions as of October 2021, excluding Grameen Bank which is governed under a separate law. In 2020, the MRA-listed microfinance institutions had 33.3 million members while Grameen Bank had an additional 9.3 million members.

The banking sector has had a mixed record of performance over the past several years. Industry experts have reported a rise in risky assets because of poor governance as well as the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Total domestic credit stood at 50.4 percent of gross domestic product at end of November 2021. The state-owned Sonali Bank is the largest bank in the country while Islami Bank Bangladesh and Standard Chartered Bangladesh are the largest local private and foreign banks respectively. The gross non-performing loan (NPL) ratio was 8.1 percent at the end of September 2021, down from 8.9 percent in September 2020. However, the decline in the NPLs was primarily caused by regulatory forbearance rather than actual reduction of stressed loans. At 20.1 percent SCBs had the highest NPL ratio, followed by 11.4 percent of Specialized Banks, 5.5 percent of PCBs, and4.1 percent of FCBs as of September 2021.

In 2017, the BB issued a circular warning citizens and financial institutions about the risks associated with cryptocurrencies. The circular noted that using cryptocurrencies may violate existing money laundering and terrorist financing regulations and cautioned users may incur financial losses. The BB issued similar warnings against cryptocurrencies in 2014.

Foreign investors may open temporary bank accounts called Non-Resident Taka Accounts (NRTA) in the proposed company name without prior approval from the BB to receive incoming capital remittances and encashment certificates. Once the proposed company is registered, it can open a new account to transfer capital from the NRTA account. Branch, representative, or liaison offices of foreign companies can open bank accounts to receive initial suspense payments from headquarters without opening NRTA accounts. In 2019, the BB relaxed regulations on the types of bank branches foreigners could use to open NRTAs, removing a previous requirement limiting use of NRTA’s solely to Authorized Dealers (ADs).

In 2015, the Bangladesh Finance Ministry announced it was exploring establishing a sovereign wealth fund in which to invest a portion of Bangladesh’s foreign currency reserves. In 2017, the Cabinet initially approved a $10 billion “Bangladesh Sovereign Wealth Fund,” (BSWF) to be created with funds from excess foreign exchange reserves but the plan was subsequently scrapped by the Finance Ministry.

Barbados has a small stock exchange, an active banking sector, and opportunities for portfolio investment. Local policies seek to facilitate the free flow of financial resources, although some restrictions may be imposed during exceptional periods of low liquidity. The CBB independently raises or lowers interest rates without government intervention. There are a variety of credit instruments in the commercial and public sectors that local and foreign investors may access.

Barbados continues to review legislation in the financial sector to strengthen and improve the regulatory regime and attract and facilitate retention of foreign portfolio investments. The government continues to improve its legal, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks to strengthen the banking system. The Anti-Money Laundering Authority and its operating arm, the government’s Financial Intelligence Unit, review anti-money laundering policy documents and analyze prudential returns.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1982 established the Securities Exchange of Barbados, which was reincorporated as the Barbados Stock Exchange (BSE) in 2001. The BSE operates a two-tier electronic trading system comprised of a regular market and an innovation and growth market (formerly the junior market). Companies applying for listing on the regular market must observe and comply with certain requirements. Specifically, they must have assets of at least $500,000 (1 million Barbados dollars) and adequate working capital based on the last three years of their financial performance, as well as three-year performance projections. Companies must also demonstrate competent management and be incorporated under the laws of Barbados or another regulated jurisdiction approved by the Financial Services Commission. Applications for listing on the innovation and growth market are less onerous, requiring minimum equity of one million shares at a stated minimum value of $100,000 (200,000 Barbados dollars). Reporting and disclosure requirements for all listed companies include interim financial statements and an annual report and questionnaire. Non-nationals must obtain exchange control approval from the CBB to trade securities on the BSE.

The BSE has computerized clearance and settlement of share certificates through the Barbados Central Securities Depository Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the BSE. Under the Property Transfer Tax Act, the FSC can accommodate investors requiring a traditional certificate for a small fee. The FSC also regulates mutual funds in accordance with the Mutual Funds Act.

The BSE adheres to rules in accordance with International Organization of Securities Commissions guidelines designed to protect investors; ensure a fair, efficient, and transparent market; and reduce systemic risk. Public companies must file audited financial statements with the BSE no later than 90 days after the close of their financial year. The authorities may impose a fine not exceeding $5,000 (10,000 Barbados dollars) for any person under the jurisdiction of the BSE who contravenes or is not in compliance with any regulatory requirements.

The BSE launched the International Securities Market (ISM) in 2016. It is designed to operate as a separate market, allowing issuers from Barbados and other international markets. To date, the ISM has four listing sponsors.

The BSE collaborates with its regional partners, the Jamaica Stock Exchange and the Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchange, through shared trading software. The capacity for this inter-exchange connectivity provides a wealth of potential investment opportunities for local and regional investors. The BSE obtained designated recognized stock exchange status from the UK in 2019. It is also a member of the World Federation of Exchanges.

Barbados has accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF Articles of Agreement and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on current account transactions.

The government established the CBB in 1972. The CBB manages Barbados’ currency and regulates its domestic banks.

The Barbados Deposit Insurance Corporation (BDIC) provides protection for depositors. Oversight of the entire financial system is conducted by the Financial Oversight Management Committee, which consists of the CBB, the BDIC, and the FSC. The private sector has access to financing on the local market through short-term borrowing and credit, asset financing, project financing, and mortgage financing.

Commercial banks and other deposit-taking institutions set their own interest rates. The CBB requires banks to hold 17.5 percent of their domestic deposits in stipulated securities.

Bitt, a Barbadian company, developed digital currency DCash in partnership with the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. The first successful DCash retail central bank digital currency consumer-to-merchant transaction took place in Grenada in 2021 following a multi-year development process. The CBB and the FSC established a regulatory sandbox in 2018 where financial technology entities could do live testing of their products and services. This allowed regulators to gain a better understanding of the product or service and to determine what, if any, regulation is necessary to protect consumers. Bitt completed its participation and formally exited the sandbox in 2019. According to Bitt, it has no immediate plans to launch DCash in Barbados and focused first on Barbados’ Eastern Caribbean neighbors. Bitt also offers a digital access exchange, remittance channel, and merchant-processing gateway available via mMoney, a mobile application. In early 2022, the DCash platform crashed for almost two months, raising questions about the initiative’s long-term prospects.

The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S., Canadian, and European banks in recent years due to concerns that the region is high-risk.

Currently, the CBB does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund. In the past, the government announced plans to create a sovereign wealth fund to ensure national wealth is available for present and future generations of Barbados. Barbadians 18 years and older are expected to gain a stake in the fund after it is established. It is envisioned that the fund will hold governmental assets, including on- and offshore real property, revenues from oil and gas products, and non-tangible assets such as trademarks, patents, and intellectual property.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Barbados work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit, and carry out certain ministerial responsibilities. There are 33 SOEs in Barbados operating in areas such as travel and tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, sanitation services, sports, and culture. Pre-pandemic total net income was estimated at $60 million (120 million Barbados dollars).

SOEs in Barbados are not found in the key areas earmarked for investment. They are all wholly owned government entities. They are headed by boards of directors to which their senior management reports.

As part of the ongoing IMF BERT program, the Government of Barbados is addressing the expenditure position of the SOEs by defining clear objectives for SOE reforms, reducing the wage bill of these entities, and implementing other necessary reform measures.

Barbados does not currently have a targeted privatization program. The government has announced plans for public-private partnerships in airport management and broadcasting services, which will still see the government retaining ownership of these entities. The process remains open to foreign investors and is transparent. More information can be obtained at  http://www.gisbarbados.gov.bb  .

The Belarusian government officially claims to welcome portfolio investment. There have been no reports in 2021 on any impediments to such investment. In 2019 and 2020, Belarus received $500 million and $1.34 billion worth of portfolio investments, respectively. The Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange is open to foreign investors, but it is still largely undeveloped because the government only allows companies to trade stocks if they meet certain and often burdensome criteria. Private companies must be profitable and have net assets of at least EUR 1 million. In addition, any income from resulting operations is taxed at 24 percent. Finally, the state owns more than 70 percent of all stocks in the country, and the government appears hesitant and unwilling to trade in them freely. Bonds are the predominant financial instrument on Belarus’ corporate securities market.

In 2001, Belarus joined Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, undertaking to refrain from restrictions on payments and transfers under current international transactions. Loans are allocated on market terms and are available to foreign investors. However, the discount rate of 12 percent established in March, 2022 makes credit too expensive for many private businesses, which, unlike many SOEs, do not receive subsidized or reduced-interest loans. Belarus’ National Bank had predicted a rate of 9-10 percent in 2022 but the war in Ukraine, which prompted the fall of the Belarusian ruble against major foreign currencies, combined with a year-on-year inflation rate of 10 percent in January-February forced the National Bank to revise its outlook.

Businesses buy and sell foreign exchange at the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange through their banks. Belarus used to require businesses to sell 10-20 percent of foreign currency revenues through the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange; however, in late 2018 the National Bank abolished the mandatory sale rule.

The Belarus Affairs Unit at U.S. Embassy Vilnius
Economic Section
telephone: +370 (5) 266-5500;
e-mail:   usembassyminsk@state.gov  

Sanctions imposed by the United States have prohibited any commercial activity with some Belarusian banks, including Dabrabyt Bank and Belinvestbank. Belarusian subsidiaries of sanctioned Russian banks are also under sanctions and include Bel/VEB, VTB Bank Belarus, and Sberbank Belarus. Potential investors should review the Department of Treasury website at https://home.treasury.gov/  for updates as trade restrictions on Belarusian banks continue to develop.

Sanctions introduced by the EU prohibit contact with the National Bank of Belarus and have blocked access to the SWIFT secure messaging system for a number of banks, including Dabrabyt Bank, the Development Bank of Belarus, and Belagroprombank. Potential investors should review the website of the European Commission for updates and further details at https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en .

Belarus has a central banking system led by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, which represents the interest of the state and is the main regulator of the country’s banking system. The president of Belarus appoints the chair and members of the Board of the National Bank, designates auditing organizations to examine its activities, and approves its annual report. Although the National Bank officially operates independently from the government, there is a history of government interference in monetary and exchange rate policies.

In February 2021, the banking system of Belarus included 23 commercial banks and three non-banking credit and finance organizations. According to the National Bank, the share of non-performing loans in the banking sector was 5.3 percent as of January 1, 2022. At the beginning of 2022, the country’s six largest commercial banks of systemic importance, all of which have some government share, accounted for 85 percent of the approximately 92.3 billion Belarusian rubles in total assets across the country’s banking sector. There are five representative offices of foreign banks in Belarus, with China’s Development Bank opening most recently in 2018. Regular banking services are widely available to customers regardless of national origin.

Belarusian law does not allow foreign banks to establish branches in Belarus. Subsidiaries of foreign banks are allowed to operate in Belarus and are subject to prudential measures and other regulations like any Belarusian bank. The U.S. Embassy is not aware of Belarus losing any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years. Foreign nationals are allowed to establish a bank account in Belarus without establishing residency status.

According to the IMF, Belarus’ state-dominated financial sector faces deep domestic structural problems and external sector challenges. Domestic structural problems include heavy state involvement in the banking and corporate sector, the lack of hard budget constraints for SOEs given state support, and high dollarization. Externally, Belarus’ economy remains exposed to spillovers from the Russian economy and Belarus’ foreign currency reserves offer a limited buffer to potential external shocks. The banking sector remains vulnerable to external shocks, given the high level of dollarization and the exposure to government and SOE debt. In March 2022, S&P, Fitch, and Moody’s ratings services all downgraded Belarus’ debt rating to CCC or Ca “highly vulnerable to defaults.”

Belarus does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund. The GOB manages the State Budget Fund of National Development, which supports major economic and social projects in the country.

Although SOEs are outnumbered by private businesses, SOEs dominate the economy in terms of value. According to the Belarusian ministry of taxes and duties, the share of small and medium-sized private enterprises in the revenues of the country’s consolidated budget was 35 percent in 2021, the same as in 2020. Belarus does not consider joint stock companies, even those with 100 percent government ownership of the stocks, to be state-owned and generally refers to them as part of the non-state sector, rendering official government statistics regarding the role of SOEs in the economy misleading. According to media reports, SOEs receive preferential access to government contracts, subsidized credits, and debt forgiveness. While SOEs are generally subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors, private enterprises do not have the same preferential access to land and raw materials. Since Belarus is not a WTO member, it is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA).

The GOB officially claims to welcome “strategic investors,” including foreign investors, and says that any state-owned or state-controlled enterprise can be privatized. However, Belarus’ privatization program is extremely limited in practice as the government only sells enterprises which operate at a loss and in which the state holds a minority share of less than 25 percent. Lukashenka has expressed skepticism of privatization and during the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly in February 2021 claimed privatization in Belarus was only in the interests of his political opposition.

Notably, in April 2020, the government sold its controlling share in Belarus’ fifteenth-largest bank, Paritetbank. Otherwise, there was no privatization of state-controlled companies from 2018 to 2020.

The State Property Committee occasionally organizes and holds privatization auctions. Many of the auctions organized by the State Property Committee have low demand as the government often places strict requirements on privitizations, including preserving or creating jobs, continuing in the same line of work or production, or launching a successful business project within a limited timeframe.

In 2016, Belarusian joint stocks were allowed trans-border placement via issuing depositary receipts, but to date this instrument of attracting investments has not been used in Belarus.

Belgium has policies in place to facilitate the free flow of financial resources. Credit is allocated at market rates and is available to foreign and domestic investors without discrimination. Belgium is fully served by the international banking community and is implementing all relevant EU financial directives.

Bruges established the world’s first stock market almost 600 years ago, and the Belgian stock exchange is well-established today. On Euronext, a company may increase its capital either by capitalizing reserves or by issuing new shares. An increase in capital requires a legal registration procedure, and new shares may be offered either to the public or to existing shareholders. A public notice is not required if the offer is to existing shareholders, who may subscribe to the new shares directly. An issue of bonds to the public is subject to the same requirements as a public issue of shares: the company’s capital must be entirely paid up, and existing shareholders must be given preferential subscription rights.

In 2016, the Belgian government passed legislation to improve entrepreneurial financing through crowdfunding and more flexible capital venture rules.

Because the Belgian economy is directed toward international trade, more than half of its banking activities involve foreign countries. Belgium’s major banks are represented in the financial and commercial centers of dozens of countries by subsidiaries, branch offices, and representative offices. The country does have a central bank, the National Bank of Belgium (NBB), whose governor is also a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB).  Being a Eurozone member state, the NBB is part of the Euro system, meaning that it has transferred the sovereignty over monetary policy to the ECB.

Since 2017, the supervision of systemically important Belgian banks lies with the ECB. The country has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years, nor are there any correspondent banking relationships currently in jeopardy. The Belgian non-performing Loan Ratio stood at 0.7% in 2021. Total bank assets amount to about 90% of GDP.

Opening a bank account in the country is linked to residency status.  The U.S. FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act) requires Belgian banks to report information on U.S. account holders directly to the Belgian tax authorities, who then release the information to the IRS.  Belgium implemented a basic banking service law in 2021 which aims to give entrepreneurs otherwise unable to open a bank account the right to do so. For example, companies that have been refused the ability to open a bank account by three credit institutions are entitled to a basic banking service. According to the law, a basic banking service room – administered by the government – will confirm evidence of three refusals, and designate a credit institution in Belgium that must offer the basic banking service to the company.  Even though the law is still not fully implemented, authorities anticipate nationwide implementation in 2022.

Belgium has a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in the form of the Federal Holding and Investment Company (FPIM-SFPI), a quasi-independent entity created in 2006 and now mainly used as a vehicle to manage the banking assets which were taken on board during the 2008 banking crisis. The SWF has a board whose members reflect the composition of the governing coalition and are regularly audited by the “Cour des Comptes” or national auditor. At the end of 2020, its total assets amounted to €1.96 billion. Most of the funds are invested domestically. Its role is to allow public entities to recoup their investments and support Belgian banks. The SWF is required by law to publish an annual report and is subject to the same domestic and international accounting standards and rules. The SWF routinely fulfills all legal obligations. However, it is not a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds.

Belgium has around 80,000 employees working in SOEs, mainly in the railways, telecoms and general utility sectors. There are also several regional-owned enterprises where the regions often have a controlling majority.  Private enterprises are allowed to compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions, but since the EU started to liberalize network industries such as electricity, gas, water, telecoms and railways, there have been regular complaints in Belgium about unfair competition from the former state monopolists. Complaints have ranged from lower salaries (railways) to lower VAT rates (gas and electricity) to regulators with a conflict of interest (telecom). Although these complaints have now largely subsided, many of these former monopolies are now market leaders in their sector, due mainly to their ability to charge high access costs to legacy networks that were fully amortized years ago.

Belgium currently has no scheduled privatizations. There are no indications that foreign investors would be excluded from eventual privatizations.

Belize’s financial system is small with little to no foreign portfolio investment transactions.  It does not have a stock exchange and capital market operations are rudimentary.  In 2021, Belize passed the Securities Industry Act for the modernization of the laws on securities and capital markets. The Central Bank of Belize must approve capital transactions, such as the purchase and sale of land, company shares, financial assets, and other investments that the transfer of assets between foreign and local entities. The Central Bank advised that, effective April 2022, it would only accept electronic applications for the approval of portfolio and capital investments and land transfers.

Belize accepted the obligations of Article VIII, and the exchange regime is free of restrictions or multiple currency practices.

Credit is made available on market terms with interest rates largely set by prevailing local market conditions within the commercial banks.  The credit instruments accessible to the private sector include loans, overdrafts, lines of credit, credit cards, and bank guarantees.  Foreign investors can access credit on the local market.  Under the International Banking Act, foreign investors/nonresidents may access credit from international banks registered and licensed in Belize. However, permission to access credit from the domestic banks requires Central Bank approval. The Belize Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a state-owned development bank, offers loan financing services in various sectors.  To qualify for a loan from DFC, an individual must be a Belizean resident or citizen, while a company must be majority 51 percent Belizean owned.  The National Bank of Belize is a state-owned bank that provides concessionary credit primarily to public officers, teachers, and low-income Belizeans.

A financial inclusion survey undertaken by the Central Bank of Belize in 2019 showed that approximately 65.5 percent of adult Belizeans had access to a financial account. In response, the banking sector has begun introducing digital wallet solutions to reach “unbanked” segments of the population.

Belize’s financial system remains underdeveloped with a banking sector that may be characterized as stable but fragile. International reserves increased from US $348 million (3.8 months of imports) in 2020 to US $420 million (3.9 months of imports) in 2021, partly due to the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 25.6 million allocation, which Belizean authorities are keeping as reserve.

Regulatory capital is still well above minimum requirements, while the gross non-performing loan (NPL) ratio at the end of February 2022 stood at 5.58 percent of loans. However, the Central Bank is reviewing domestic banks and credit unions self-assessments as the expired forbearance measures from 2020 could represent a risk as a fraction of their loan portfolio could turn into NPLs.

The Central Bank of Belize (CBB) ( https://www.centralbank.org.bz ) is responsible for formulating and implementing monetary policy focusing on the stability of the exchange rate and economic growth.

Generally, there are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts in Belize. Regulations differ based on residency status and whether the individual is seeking to establish a local bank account or a foreign currency account.   Foreign banks and branches are allowed to operate in the country with all banks subject to Central Bank measures and regulations.

Since January 2020 to present, a domestic bank and an international bank each lost a correspondent bank. Belize’s financial system comprises five domestic banks, three international banks, and ten credit unions. Correspondent banks discontinued offered correspondent banking relationships (CBR) to Scotiabank (Belize) Limited following the acquisition of the Scotiabank (Belize) Limited by the Caribbean International Holdings Limited. As of February 2022, the estimated total assets of the country’s largest bank were US $1.09 billion.

In the last few years, Belize continues reforms to strengthen the anti-money laundering and counterterrorism-financing regime, including conducting an interagency national money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risk assessment.

Belize does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) exist largely in the utilities sectors, generally as a result of nationalization.  The government is the majority shareholder in the Belize Water Services Limited, the country’s sole provider of water services, the Belize Electricity Limited, the sole distributor of electricity, and the Belize Telemedia Limited, the largest telecommunications provider in the country. The Public Utilities Commission regulates all utilities.

SOEs usually select senior government officials, members of local business bureaus and chambers of commerce, labor organizations, and quasi-governmental agencies to staff these companies’ boards of directors.  The board serves to direct policy and shape business decisions of the ostensibly independent SOE.  Current and previous administrations have been accused of nepotism and cronyism and criticized for having conflicts of interest when board members or directors are also represented in organizations that do business with the SOEs.

There is no published list of SOEs.  The following are the major SOEs operating in the country.  Information relating to their operations is available on their websites:  Belize Electricity Limited http://www.bel.com.bz ; Belize Telemedia Limited at https://www.livedigi.com ;  Belize Water Services Limited http://www.bws.bz 

There is no public third-party market analysis that evaluate whether SOEs receive non-market advantages by the government.  The Belize Electricity Limited and the Belize Water Services Limited are the only service providers in their respective sectors.  The Belize Telemedia Limited, on the other hand, competes with one other provider for mobile connectivity and there are multiple players that provide internet and data services.  U.S. firms have identified challenges in participating and competing in areas related to the bidding, procurement and dispute settlement processes, particular to SOEs.

The Government of Belize does not currently have a privatization program.

Government policy supports free financial markets, subject to oversight by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). Foreign investors may seek credit from Benin’s private financial institutions and the WAEMU Regional Stock Exchange (Bureau Regional des Valeurs Mobilieres – BRVM) headquartered in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, with local branches in each WAEMU member country. There are no restrictions for foreign investors to establish a bank account in Benin and obtain loans on the local market. However, proof of residency or evidence of company registration is required to open a bank account.

The banking sector is generally reliable. Twelve private commercial banks operate in Benin in addition to the BCEAO; planning is under way to open a subsidiary of the African Development Bank. Taking into account microfinance institutions, roughly 31.2 percent of the population had access to banking services in 2020, the latest year for which data is available. In recent years, non-performing loans have been growing; 15 percent of total banking sector assets are estimated to be non-performing. The BCEAO regulates Beninese banks. Foreign banks are required to obtain a banking license before operating branches in Benin. They are subject to the same prudential regulations as local or regional banks. Benin has lost no correspondent banking relationships during the last three years. There is no known current correspondent banking relationship in jeopardy. Foreigners are required to present proof of residency to open bank accounts.

Benin does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund.

The government’s general attitude toward foreign portfolio investment is neutral.  Established Bolivian firms may issue short or medium-term debt in local capital markets, which act primarily as secondary markets for fixed-return securities.  Bolivian capital markets have sought to expand their handling of local corporate bond issues and equity instruments.  Over the last few years, several Bolivian companies and some foreign firms have been able to raise funds through local capital markets.  However, the stock exchange is small and is highly concentrated in bonds and debt instruments (more than 95 percent of transactions).  The number of total transactions in 2021 was around 28 percent of GDP.

From 2008-2019, the financial markets experienced high liquidity, which led to historically low interest rates.  However, liquidity has been more limited in recent years, and there are some pressures to increase interest rates.  The Bolivian financial system is not well integrated with the international system and there is only one foreign bank among the top ten banks of Bolivia.

In October 2012, Bolivia returned to global credit markets for the first time in nearly a century.  In 2017, Bolivia sold USD 1 billion at 4.5 percent for ten years, with U.S. financial institutions managing the deal.  The resources gained from the sales were largely used to finance infrastructure projects. A sovereign bond issuance of up to $2 billion was approved by the National Assembly for 2022 but had not yet occurred as of April 2022. The Bolivian government’s attempt to refinance $2 billion in sovereign debt in February 2022 fell short, with only $850 million sold. The government had also hoped the new issuance would be for a 10-year term but had to settle for eight years (a 2030 maturity) for all the resold bonds. The interest rate for the new bonds is 7.5%, compared to interest rates of approximately 5% for the original bonds.

The government and central bank respect their obligations under IMF Article VIII, as the exchange system is free of restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions.

Foreign investors legally established in Bolivia can get credits on the local market.  However, due to the size of the market, large credits are rare and may require operations involving several banks.  Credit access through other financial instruments is limited to bond issuances in the capital market.  The 2013 Financial Services Law directs credit towards the productive sectors and caps interest rates.

The Bolivian banking system is small, composed of 16 consumer banks, six banks specialized in mortgage lending, three private financial funds, 30 savings and credit cooperatives, and eight institutions specialized in microcredit.  Of the total number of personal deposits made in Bolivia through December 2021 (USD 30 billion), the banking sector accounted for 80 percent of the total financial system.  Similarly, of the total loans and credits made to private individuals (USD 29 billion) through December 2021, 80 percent were made by the banking sector, while private financial funds and the savings and credit cooperatives accounted for the other 20 percent.

Bolivian banks have developed the capacity to adjudicate credit risk and evaluate expected rates of return in line with international norms.  The banking sector was stable and healthy with delinquency rates at 1.6 percent in 2021. In 2021, delinquency rates rose after the government permitted clients to defer bank loan payments until June 2021 and to reprogram their debt through 2022 without penalty as a mitigating measure for the COVID-19 pandemic. While delinquency rates remain relatively low, there are concerns this measure could potentially harm the banking sector’s stability.

In 2013, a new Financial Services Law entered into force.  This new law enacted major changes to the banking sector, including deposit rate floors and lending rate ceilings, mandatory lending allocations to certain sectors of the economy and an upgrade of banks’ solvency requirements in line with the international Basel standards.  The law also requires banks to spend more on improving consumer protection, as well as providing increased access to financing in rural parts of the country.

Credit is now allocated on government-established rates for productive activities, but foreign investors may find it difficult to qualify for loans from local banks due to the requirement that domestic loans be issued exclusively against domestic collateral.  Since commercial credit is generally extended on a short-term basis, most foreign investors prefer to obtain credit abroad.  Most Bolivian borrowers are small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

In 2007, the government created a Productive Development Bank to boost the production of small, medium-sized, and family-run businesses.  The bank was created to provide loans to credit institutions which meet specific development conditions and goals, for example by giving out loans to farmers, small businesses, and other development focused investors.  The loans are long term and have lower interest rates than private banks can offer to allow for growth of investments and poverty reduction.

In September 2010, the Bolivian government bought the local private bank Banco Union as part of a plan to gain partial control of the financial sector.  Banco Union is one of the largest banks, with a share of 10.8 percent of total national credits and 12.7 percent of the total deposits; one of its principal activities is managing public sector accounts.  Bolivian government ownership of Banco Union was illegal until December 2012, when the government enacted the State Bank Law, allowing for state participation in the banking sector.

There is no strong evidence of “cross-shareholding” and “stable-shareholding” arrangements used by private firms to restrict foreign investment, and the 2009 Constitution forbids monopolies and supports antitrust measures.  In addition, there is no evidence of hostile takeovers (other than government nationalizations that took place from 2006-14).

The financial sector is regulated by ASFI (Supervising Authority of Financial Institutions), a decentralized institution that is under the Ministry of Economy.  The Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB) oversees all financial institutions, provides liquidity when necessary, and acts as lender of last resort.  The BCB is the only monetary authority and oversees managing the payment system, international reserves, and the exchange rate.

Foreigners can establish bank accounts only with residency status in Bolivia.

Blockchain technologies in Bolivia are still in the early stages.  Currently, the banking sector is analyzing blockchain technologies and the sector intends to propose a regulatory framework in coordination with ASFI in the future.

Three different settlement mechanisms are available in Bolivia: (1) the high-value payment system administered by the Central Bank for inter-bank operations; (2) a system of low value payments utilizing checks and credit and debit cards administered by the local association of private banks (ASOBAN); and (3) the deferred settlement payment system designed for small financial institutions such as credit cooperatives.  This mechanism is also administered by the Central Bank.

Neither the Bolivian government nor any government-affiliated entity maintains a sovereign wealth fund.

The Bolivian government has set up companies in sectors it considers strategic to the national interest and social well-being. It has also stated that it plans to do so in every sector it considers strategic or where there is either a monopoly or oligopoly.

The Bolivian government owns and operates more than 60 businesses, including energy and mining companies, a telecommunications company, a satellite company, a bank, a sugar factory, an airline, a packaging plant, paper and cardboard factories, and milk and Brazil nut processing factories, among others.  In 2005, income from SOEs in Bolivia other than gas exports represented only a fraction of a percent of GDP.  As of 2019, public sector contribution to GDP (including SOEs, investments, and consumption of goods and services) has risen to over 40 percent of GDP.

The largest SOEs can acquire credit from the Central Bank at very low interest rates and convenient terms.  Some private companies complain that it is impossible for them to compete with this financial subsidy.  Moreover, SOEs appear to benefit from easier access to licenses, supplies, materials, and land; however, there is no law specifically providing SOEs with preferential treatment in this regard.  In many cases, government entities are directed to do business with SOEs, placing other private companies and investors at a competitive disadvantage.

The government registered budget surpluses from 2006 until 2013 but began experiencing budget deficits in 2014. The 2009 Constitution requires all SOEs to publish an annual report and makes them subject to financial audits.  Additionally, SOEs are required to present an annual testimony in front of civil society and social movements, a practice known as social control.

There are currently no privatization programs in Bolivia.

Capital markets remain underdeveloped in BiH. Both entities have created their own modern stock market infrastructure with separate stock exchanges in Sarajevo (SASE) and Banja Luka (BLSE), both of which started trading in 2002. The small size of the markets, lack of privatization, weak shareholder protection, and public mistrust of previous privatization programs has impeded the development of the capital market.

Both the RS and Federation issued government securities for the first time during 2011, as part of their plans to raise capital in support of their budget deficits during this period of economic stress. Both entity governments continue to issue government securities in order to fill budget gaps. These securities are also available for secondary market trading on the stock exchanges.

In February 2022, the international rating agency Standard and Poor’s (S&P) affirmed the credit rating of Bosnia and Herzegovina as “B” with a stable outlook. The agency stated that “the stable outlook balances the risks stemming from BiH’s complex and confrontational political dynamics over the next 12 months against some comparatively strong economic fundamentals, such as contained net general government debt, an improving external position, and a resilient banking sector. The outlook is based on the expectation that the ongoing political crisis between RS on one side and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the central government on the other will ultimately deescalate, with RS remaining in BiH on largely the same terms as previously. The ratings on BiH are supported by the modest level and favorable structure of public debt.”

The banking and financial system has been stable with the most significant investments coming from Austria.  As of March 2022, there are 20 commercial banks operating in BiH: 13 with headquarters in the Federation and 7 in the Republika Srpska.  Twenty-one commercial banks are members of a deposit insurance program, which provides for deposit insurance of KM 50,000 (USD 28,000). The banking sector is divided between the two entities, with entity banking agencies responsible for banking supervision. The BiH Central Bank maintains monetary stability through its currency board arrangement and supports and maintains payment and settlement systems. It also coordinates the activities of the entity Banking Agencies, which are in charge of bank licensing and supervision. Reforms of the banking sector, mandated by the IMF and performed in conjunction with the IMF and World Bank, are in progress.

BiH passed a state-level framework law in 2010 mandating the use of international accounting standards, and both entities passed legislation that eliminated differences in standards between the entities and Brčko District.  All governments have implemented accounting practices that are fully in line with international norms.

BiH does not have a government-affiliated Sovereign Wealth Fund.

In BiH, subnational governments (the two entities and ten cantons) own the vast majority of government-owned companies. Private enterprises can compete with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the same terms and conditions with respect to market share, products/services, and incentives. In practice, however, SOEs have the advantage over private enterprises, especially in sectors such as telecommunications and electricity, where government-owned enterprises have traditionally held near-monopolies and are able to influence regulators and courts in their favor. Generally, government-owned companies are controlled by political parties, increasing the possibilities for corruption and inefficient company management. With the exception of SOEs in the telecom, electricity, and defense sectors, many of the remaining public companies are bankrupt or on the verge of insolvency, and represent a growing liability to the government.

The country is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO.

There have been no significant privatizations in the past few years. Privatization offerings are scarce and often require unfavorable terms. Some formerly successful state-owned enterprises have accrued significant debts from unpaid health and pension contributions, and potential investors are required to assume these debts and maintain the existing workforce. Under the state-level FDI Law, foreign investors may bid on privatization tenders. International financial organizations, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), are seeking to be engaged on privatization and restructuring efforts across the remaining portfolio of state owned enterprises. Historically, the privatization process in BiH has resulted in economic loss due to corruption. Since 1999 more than 1,000 companies have been fully privatized, while around 100 have been partially privatized. Some privatizations led to the loss of value of state property and many of the privatized companies were weakened or ruined in the privatization process. The history of corrupt privatizations has raised concerns that further privatization would only lead to additional unemployment and the enrichment of a few politically-connected individuals. Successful privatizations and restructurings that improve service delivery, business productivity, and employment would be very beneficial for the BiH economy, could help the image of privatization, and would build support for a long overdue shift away from a government-led economy.

The Federation government is focused on privatizing or restructuring some SOEs based on the Federation Agency for Privatization’s 2019 privatization plan. The privatization plan includes the fuel retailer Energopetrol dd. Sarajevo, the engineering company Energoinvest, and the insurer Sarajevo-Osiguranje. The remaining companies listed in the privatization plan have posted losses and suffered significant declines in their value, while others have only a small amount of government ownership. The Federation government rejected media speculation that it plans to privatize the two majority entity government-owned telecom companies, BH Telecom (90 percent stake) and HT Mostar (50.1 percent stake). At the same time, it has completed due diligence on the two telecom companies as part of its arrangement with the IMF.

The privatization process in the RS is carried out by the RS Investment Development Bank (IRBRS). Many prospective companies have been already privatized, and out of 163 not yet privatized companies, many are being liquidated or undergoing bankruptcy. In 2016, the RS government announced plans to sell its capital in 22 companies but the plan has not been implemented. The plan envisions the privatizations to take place via the sale of government shares on the stock exchange. Although the RS National Assembly passed a decision that the entity has no plans to privatize the energy sector, the RS government maintains the possibility of joint ventures in the energy sector.

The government encourages foreign portfolio investment, although there are limits on foreign ownership in certain sectors.  It also embraces the establishment of new and diverse financial institutions to support increased foreign and domestic investment and to fill existing gaps where finance is not commercially available.  There are nine commercial banks, one merchant bank, one offshore bank, three statutory deposit-taking institutions, and one credit union operating in Botswana.  All have corresponding relationships with U.S. banks.  Additional financial institutions include various pension funds, insurance companies, microfinance institutions, stock brokerage companies, asset management companies, statutory finance institutions, collective investment undertakings, and statutory funds.  Historically, commercial banks have accounted for 93.7 percent of total deposits and 93.5 percent of total loans in Botswana.  Access to banking services measured by the number of depositors on adult population improved from 72 percent in 2019 to 76.6 percent in 2020.  Additionally, banks introduced new products and services that included enhancement of transactional accounts, introduction of cross border payment services, collaborative arrangements with money-transfer service providers to widen the financial inclusion efforts for the unbanked population.

The central bank, the Bank of Botswana, acts as banker and financial advisor to the GoB and is responsible for the management of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, the administration of monetary and exchange rate policies, and the regulation and supervision of financial institutions in the country.  Monetary policy in Botswana is widely regarded as prudent, and the GoB has historically managed to maintain a sensible exchange rate and a stable inflation rate, generally within the target of three to six percent.  But the COVID-19 pandemic pushed inflation to new heights, reaching 10.6 percent in January and February 2022, the highest level on record in over a decade.

Banks may lend to non-resident-controlled companies without seeking approval from the Bank of Botswana.  Foreign investors usually enjoy better access to credit than local firms do.  In July 2014, USAID’s Development Credit Authority (now DFC – U.S. International Development Finance Corporation), in collaboration with ABSA (formerly Barclays Bank of Botswana), implemented a seven-year program to allow small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) to access up to US$ 15 million in loans in an effort to diversify the economy.  So far, the program that was initially scheduled to come to an end in June 2021 is at 83 percent utilization and has been extended to July 2024. To date ABSA has disbursed US$ 12.5 million and has up to June 2023 to disburse the remaining US$ 2.5 million.

At the end of 2020, there were 24 companies on the Domestic Board and eight companies on the Foreign Equities Board of the Botswana Stock Exchange (BSE).  In addition, there were 46 listed bonds and three exchange traded funds listed on the Exchange.  The Domestic Company Index (DCI) declined by 8.2 percent in 2020, while it declined by 4.6 percent in 2019, reflecting how the pandemic affected the economy.  According to the BSE 2020 Annual Report, all sectors in the domestic equity board experienced a decline which contributed a negative 8.4 percent points to the DCI’s depreciation of 8.2 percent except for one sector, Retail & Wholesale.  The total market capitalization for listed companies at year-end 2020 was US$ 33.5 billion, with domestic companies’ capitalization standing at US$ 3 billion while foreign companies’ capitalization stood at US$ 30.5 billion.  The Mining and Minerals sector continued to dominate the foreign equity board as it contributed 94.7 percent of the foreign companies’ market capitalization in 2020 and contributed 0.97 percentage points to the Foreign Company Index (FCI) depreciation of 1 percent.  The BSE is still highly illiquid compared to larger African markets and is dominated by mining companies which adds to index volatility.  Laws prohibiting insider trading and securities fraud are clearly stipulated under Section 35 – 37 of the Securities Act, 2014 and charges for contravening these laws are listed under Section 54 of the same Act.

The government has legitimized offshore capital investments and allows foreign investors, individuals and corporate bodies, and companies incorporated in Botswana, to open foreign currency accounts in specified currencies.  The designated currencies are U.S. Dollar, British Pound sterling, Euro, and the South African Rand.  There are no known practices by private firms to restrict foreign investment participation or control in domestic enterprises.  Private firms are not permitted to adopt articles of incorporation or association which limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control.

In general, Botswana exercises careful control over credit expansion, the pula exchange rate, interest rates, and foreign and domestic borrowing.  Banking legislation is largely in line with industry norms for regulation, supervision, and payments.  However, Botswana failed to meet the compliance requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), resulting in a grey listing in October 2018.  Botswana worked to implement the necessary regulatory legislations to address the identified technical compliance deficiencies and was subsequently removed from the FATF grey list in October 2021, and then in February 2022, removed from the EU blacklist of high risk third countries with regard to AML/CFT.  The government continues to work on its regulatory environment to avoid falling back into the grey list.   The Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA) was established in 2008 and provides regulatory oversight for the non-banking sector.  It extends know-your-customer practices to non-banking financial institutions to help deter money laundering and terrorist financing. NBFIRA is also responsible for regulating the International Financial Services Centre, a hub charged with promoting the financial services industry in Botswana.

The Bank of Botswana maintains a long-term sovereign wealth fund, known as the Pula Fund, in addition to a regular foreign reserve account providing basic import cover.  The Pula Fund was established under the Bank of Botswana Act and forms part of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, which are primarily funded by diamond revenues.  The Pula Fund is wholly invested in foreign currency-denominated assets and is managed by the Bank of Botswana Board with input from recognized international financial management and investment firms.  All realized market and currency gains, or losses are reported in the Bank of Botswana’s income statement.  The Fund has been affected severely by the COVID-19 pandemic, with the GoB making withdrawals to address significant COVID-19-related revenue shortfalls.  As a result, the Pula Fund, which provides long fiscal cushion against economic shocks, is significantly depleted from 20 percent of GDP in 2011 to seven percent of GDP as of mid-2020 – from $1.69 billion to $510 million – a decline of more than 70 percent.  Botswana is a founding member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Fund and was one of the architects of the Santiago Principles in 2008.  More information is available at: https://www.bankofbotswana.bw/sites/default/files/BOTSWANA-PULA-FUND-SANTIAGO-PRINCIPLES.pdf

State-owned enterprises (SOEs), known as “parastatals,” are majority or 100 percent owned by the GoB.  There is a published list of SOEs at the GoB portal ( www.gov.bw ), with profiles of financial and development SOEs.  Some SOEs are state-sanctioned monopolies, including the Botswana Meat Commission, the Water Utilities Corporation, Botswana Railways, and the Botswana Power Corporation.

The same business registration and licensing laws govern private and government-owned enterprises.  No law or regulation prohibits or restricts private enterprises from competing with SOEs.  Botswana law requires SOEs to publish annual reports, and private sector accountants or the Auditor General audits SOEs depending on how they are constituted.  GoB ministries together with their respective SOEs are compelled on an annual basis to appear before the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee to provide reports and answer questions regarding their performance.  Some SOEs are not performing well and have been embroiled in scandals involving alleged fraud and mismanagement. Botswana is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO.

The GOB has committed to privatization on paper.  It established a task force in 1997 to privatize all its state-owned companies and formed a Public Enterprises Evaluation and Privatization Agency (PEEPA) to oversee this process.  Implementation of its privatization commitments has been limited to the January 2016 sale offer of 49 percent of the stock of the state-owned Botswana Telecommunications Corporation to Botswana citizens only.  In February 2017, the GoB issued an Expressions of Interest for the privatization of its national airline, but progress stopped due to the decision to re-fleet the airline before privatization.  In 2019, President Masisi announced the Botswana Meat Commission would be placed in the hands of a private management company prior to privatization, but this has yet to occur.  Conversely, the GoB has created new SOEs such as the Okavango Diamond Company, the Mineral Development Company, and Botswana Oil Limited in recent years.   A Rationalization Strategy covering all parastatals has been developed and its implementation will address issues such as duplication of activities, overlapping mandates and issues of corporate governance.  This may finally result in some SOEs being privatized or merged while some may be closed.

The Brazil Central Bank (BCB) in October 2016 implemented a sustained monetary easing cycle, lowering the Special Settlement and Custody System (Selic) baseline reference rate from a high of 14 percent in October 2016 to a record-low 2 percent by the end of 2020. The downward trend was reversed by an increase to 2.75 percent in March 2021 and reached 10.75 percent in February 2022. Brazil’s banking sector projects that the Selic will reach 12.25 percent by the end of 2022. Inflation for 2021 ended at an annualized 10.06 percent, above the target of 4 percent plus/minus 1.5 percent. The BCB’s Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) set the BCB’s inflation target at 3.5 percent for 2022 and .25 percent in 2023 (plus/minus 1.5 percent), but as of February 2022 the BCB estimates that inflation will reach 5.4 percent in 2022, above the target again. As of mid-March 2022, Brazil’s annual inflation rate is at 10.75 percent. Brazil’s muddled fiscal policy and heavy public debt burden factor into most analysts’ forecasts that the “neutral” policy rate will remain higher than target rates among Brazil’s emerging-market peers (around five percent) over the reporting period.

According to the BCB, in 2021 the ratio of public debt to GDP reached 81.1 percent, compared to a record 89.4 percent in 2020. Analysts project that the debt/GDP ratio may rise to around 85 percent by the end of 2023.

The role of the state in credit markets grew steadily beginning in 2008, but showed a reduction in 2020 due to the pandemic. As of January 2022, public banks accounted for about 50 percent of total loans to the private sector (compared to 48.9 percent in 2018). Directed lending (that is, to meet mandated sectoral targets) also rose, and accounts for almost half of total lending. Brazil is paring back public bank lending and trying to expand a market for long-term private capital.

While local private sector banks are beginning to offer longer credit terms, state-owned development bank BNDES is a traditional source of long-term credit in Brazil. BNDES also offers export financing. Approvals of new financing by BNDES decreased 4 percent in 2021 from 2020, with the infrastructure sector receiving the majority of new capital.

The sole stock market in Brazil is B3 (Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão), created through the 2008 merger of the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) with the Brazilian Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&F), forming the fourth-largest exchange in the Western hemisphere, after the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Canadian TSX Group exchanges. In 2020, there were 463 companies traded on the B3 exchange. The B3’s broadest index, the Ibovespa, decreased 11.93 percent in valuation during 2021, due to economic uncertainties related to rising and persistent inflation, particularly in the second half of the year. Foreign investors, both institutional and individuals, can directly invest in equities, securities, and derivatives; however, they are limited to trading those investments only on established markets.

Wholly-owned subsidiaries of multinational accounting firms, including the major U.S. firms, are present in Brazil. Auditors are personally liable for the accuracy of accounting statements prepared for banks.

The Brazilian financial sector is large and sophisticated. Banks lend at market rates that remain relatively high compared to other emerging economies. Reasons cited by industry observers include high taxation, repayment risk, concern over inconsistent judicial enforcement of contracts, high mandatory reserve requirements, and administrative overhead, as well as persistently high real (net of inflation) interest rates. According to BCB data collected for 2020, the average rate offered by Brazilian banks to non-financial corporations was 11.7 percent.

The banking sector in Brazil is highly concentrated, with BCB data indicating that the five largest commercial banks (excluding brokerages) account for approximately 82 percent of the commercial banking credit market totaling $800 billion by the end of 2020. Three of the five largest banks by assets in the country, Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica Federal, and BNDES, are partially or completely federally-owned. Large private banking institutions focus their lending on Brazil’s largest firms, while small- and medium-sized banks primarily serve small- and medium-sized companies. Citibank sold its consumer business to Itaú Bank in 2016, but maintains its commercial banking interests in Brazil. It is currently the only U.S. bank operating in the country. Increasing competitiveness in the financial sector, including in the emerging fintech space, is a vital part of the Brazilian government’s strategy to improve access to and the affordability of financial services in Brazil.

On November 16, 2020, the BCB launched its instant payment system called “PIX”. PIX is a 24/7 system that offers transfers of any value for people-people (P2P), people-business (P2B), business-people (B2P), business-business (B2B), and government-government (G2G). Brazilian customers in 2021 overwhelmingly embraced PIX, particularly for P2P transfers (which are free), replacing both cash payments and legacy bank electronic transfers which charged relatively high fees and could only take place during business hours.

In February 2021, the BCB implemented the first two of four phases of its Open Banking Initiative in an effort to open Brazil’s insulated banking system dominated by relatively few players. The first phase required Brazilian financial institutions to facilitate digitized access to their customer service channels, products, and services related to demand deposit or savings accounts, payment accounts, and credit operations. The second phase of the initiative expanded sharing customer data across a widening scope of bank products including loans. The other two phases, which are scheduled to go into effect in 2022, seek to include sharing customer data on foreign exchange, investments, and pension funds. The BCB expects that increased access to customer information will allow other financial institutions, including competitor banks and fintechs, to offer better and cheaper banking services to incumbent banks’ clients, thereby breaking up the dominance of the six large, incumbent banking institutions.

In recent years, the BCB has strengthened bank audits, implemented more stringent internal control requirements, and tightened capital adequacy rules to reflect risk more accurately. It also established loan classification and provisioning requirements. These measures apply to private and publicly owned banks alike. In December 2020, Moody’s upgraded a collection of 28 Brazilian banks and their affiliates to stable from negative after the agency had lowered the outlook on the Brazilian system in April 2020 due to economic difficulties. As of March 2021, the rating remained as stable. The Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) independently regulates the stock exchanges, brokers, distributors, pension funds, mutual funds, and leasing companies, assessing penalties in instances of insider trading.

To open an account with a Brazilian bank, foreign account holders must present a permanent or temporary resident visa, a national tax identification number (CPF) issued by the Brazilian government, either a valid passport or identity card for foreigners (CIE), proof of domicile, and proof of income. On average, this process from application to account opening can take more than three months.

Foreign Exchange

Brazil’s foreign exchange market remains small. The latest Triennial Survey by the Bank for International Settlements conducted in December 2019 showed that the net daily turnover on Brazil’s market for OTC foreign exchange transactions (spot transactions, outright forwards, foreign-exchange swaps, currency swaps, and currency options) was $18.8 billion, down from $19.7 billion in 2016. This was equivalent to around 0.22 percent of the global market in 2019, down from 0.3 percent in 2016.

On December 29, 2021, Brazil approved a new Foreign Exchange Regulatory framework, to go into effect in December 2022, which replaces more than 40 separate regulations with a single law and eases foreign investments in the Brazilian market incentivizing increased foreign investment and assisting Brazilian businesses in integrating into global value chains. The new law aims to streamline currency exchange operations and authorizes more enterprises, including fintechs and small businesses, to conduct operations in foreign currencies bypassing retail banks and increasing their competitiveness. In addition, the law expands the list of qualifying activities transacted in foreign-currency denominated accounts (previously restricted only to import/export firms and for loans in which the debtor or creditor was based outside Brazil).

Brazil’s banking system has adequate capitalization and has traditionally been highly profitable, reflecting high interest rate spreads and fees. According to an October 2021 Central Bank Financial Stability Report, the banking system remains solid, with growing capitalization indices, and continues to rebuild its capital base. All institutions are able to meet the minimum prudential requirements, and solvency does not pose a risk to financial stability. Stress testing demonstrated that the banking system has adequate loss-absorption capacity in all simulated scenarios.

There are few restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with a foreign investment in Brazil. Foreign investors may freely convert Brazilian currency in the unified foreign exchange market, where buy-sell rates are determined by market forces. All foreign exchange transactions, including identifying data, must be reported to the BCB. Foreign exchange transactions on the current account are fully liberalized.

The BCB must approve all incoming foreign loans. In most cases, loans are automatically approved unless loan costs are determined to be “incompatible with normal market conditions and practices.” In such cases, the BCB may request additional information regarding the transaction. Loans obtained abroad do not require advance approval by the BCB, provided the Brazilian recipient is not a government entity. Loans to government entities require prior approval from the Brazilian senate as well as from the Economic Ministry’s Treasury Secretariat, and must be registered with the BCB.

Interest and amortization payments specified in a loan contract can be made without additional approval from the BCB. Early payments can also be made without additional approvals if the contract includes a provision for them. Otherwise, early payment requires notification to the BCB to ensure accurate records of Brazil’s stock of debt.

Remittance Policies

Brazilian Federal Revenue Service regulates withholding taxes (IRRF) applicable to earnings and capital gains realized by individuals and legal entities residing or domiciled outside Brazil. Upon registering investments with the BCB, foreign investors are able to remit dividends, capital (including capital gains), and, if applicable, royalties. Investors must register remittances with the BCB. Dividends cannot exceed corporate profits. Investors may carry out remittance transactions at any bank by documenting the source of the transaction (evidence of profit or sale of assets) and showing payment of applicable taxes.

Under Law 13.259/2016 passed in March 2016, capital gain remittances are subject to a 15 to 22.5 percent income withholding tax, with the exception of capital gains and interest payments on tax-exempt domestically issued Brazilian bonds. The capital gains marginal tax rates are 15 percent for up to $1,000,000 in gains; 17.5 percent for $1,000,000 to $10,000,000 in gains; 20 percent for $10,000,000 to $60,000,000 in gains; and 22.5 percent for more than $60,000,000 in gains.

Repatriation of a foreign investor’s initial investment is also exempt from income tax under Law 4131/1962. Lease payments are assessed a 15 percent withholding tax. Remittances related to technology transfers are not subject to the tax on credit, foreign exchange, and insurance, although they are subject to a 15 percent withholding tax and an extra 10 percent Contribution for Intervening in Economic Domain (CIDE) tax.

Brazil had a sovereign fund from 2008 – 2018, when it was abolished, and the money was used to repay foreign debt.

In March 2021, the Minister of Finance and Economy II renewed its annual budget of USD292 million to fund infrastructure, technology, and socio-economic studies related to the implementation of Brunei’s own stock exchange, which is expected to launch in the next few years.

In 2013, Brunei signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Securities

Commission Malaysia (SCM) designed to strengthen collaboration in the development of fair and efficient capital markets in the two countries. It also provided a framework to facilitate greater cross-border capital market activities and cooperation in the areas of regulation as well as capacity building and human capital development, particularly in Islamic capital markets.

The capital market industry in Brunei is primarily governed by the Securities Markets Order, 2013 and the Securities Markets Regulations, 2015 which are both administered by Brunei Darussalam Central Bank. In addition, securities with any Shariah or Islamic component would be additionally governed by the Syariah Financial Supervisory Board Order, 2006.

Brunei has accepted the obligations under IMF Article VIII, Sections 2(a), 3 and 4, and maintains an exchange system that is free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions and multiple currency practices.

Brunei has a small banking sector which includes both conventional and Islamic banking. The Brunei Darussalam Central Bank (BDCB) is the sole central authority for the banking sector, in addition to its role as the country’s central bank. Banks have high levels of liquidity, good capital adequacy ratios, and well-managed levels of non-performing loans. Several foreign banks such as Standard Chartered Bank and Bank of China (Hong Kong) have established operations in Brunei. In March 2018, HSBC officially ended its operations in Brunei after announcing its planned departure from Brunei in late 2016. All banks fall under the supervision of BDCB, which has also established a credit bureau that centralizes information on applicants’ credit worthiness.

The Brunei dollar (BND) is pegged to the Singapore dollar, and each currency is accepted in both countries.

The Brunei Investment Agency (BIA) manages Brunei’s General Reserve Fund and their external assets. Established in 1983, BIA’s assets are estimated to be USD60-75 billion. BIA’s activities are not publicly disclosed and are ranked the lowest in transparency ratings by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.

Brunei’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), managed by Darussalam Assets under the Ministry of Finance and Economy, lead key sectors of the economy including oil and gas, telecommunications, transport, and energy generation and distribution. These enterprises also receive preferential treatment when responding to government tenders. Some of the largest SOEs include the following:

The telecommunications industry is dominated by government-linked companies. The service providers are Datastream Digital, Imagine, and Progresif. In 2019, the government consolidated the infrastructure of all three companies under a state-owned wholesale network operator called Unified National Networks (UNN).

Royal Brunei Technical Services (RBTS), established in 1988 as a government owned corporation, is responsible for managing the acquisition of a wide range of systems and equipment.

Brunei Energy Services and Trading (BEST) is the national oil company owned by the Brunei government. The company was granted all mineral rights in eight prime onshore and offshore petroleum blocks totaling 20,552 sq. km. PB manages contracts with Shell and Petronas, which are exploring Brunei’s onshore and deep-water offshore blocks. The government continues to modify BEST’s role in the oil and gas industry. In 2019, the government established Petroleum Authority as the oil and gas sector’s regulatory body, a function which had been filled by BEST.

Royal Brunei Airlines started operations in 1974 and is the country’s national carrier. The airline flies a combination of Boeing and Airbus aircraft.

Brunei’s Ministry of Transportation and Info-Communication has made corporatization and privatization part of its strategic plan, which calls for the Ministry to shift its role from a service provider to a regulatory body with policy-setting responsibilities. The Ministry is studying initiatives to privatize a few state-owned agencies, including the Postal Services Department and public transportation services. These services are not yet completely privatized and there is no timeline for privatization. Guidelines regarding the role of foreign investors and the bidding process are not yet available.

The Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE), the only securities-trading venue in Bulgaria, operates under license from the Financial Supervision Commission and is majority owned by the Ministry of Finance. The 1999 Law on Public Offering of Securities regulates the issuance of securities, securities transactions, stock exchanges, and investment intermediaries.  The law is aimed at providing investor protection and at developing a transparent local capital market. In 2004 BSE performed its first IPO transaction. In 2018 BSE acquired 100 percent of the Independent Bulgarian Energy Exchange (IBEX), Bulgaria’s first independent electricity platform trader.

Since its 2007 entry into the EU, Bulgaria has aligned its regulation of securities markets with EU standards under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).  The BSE is a full member of the Federation of European Stock Exchanges (FESE) and operates under the Deutsche Boerse’s trading platform Xetra.  The BSE’s total market capitalization comprised 23 percent of Bulgaria’s GDP in 2021, down slightly from 2020.

Bulgarian companies strongly prefer to obtain financing from local banks instead of drawing from the local financial markets. At the end of 2018, the Financial Supervision Commission approved the ‘SME beam market,’ a special market that provides small and medium-sized businesses the opportunity to raise new capital more easily.

Bulgaria’s first “unicorn” company Payhawk, a technological start-up, raised USD 1 billion of capital in 2022.

Foreign investors can access credit on the local market.

The Bulgarian bank system is well capitalized and liquid. As of the end of September 2021, the total capital adequacy ratio was 22.4 percent, above the EU average and adequately shielding domestic banks against potential macroeconomic risks. In 2020 the Bulgarian National Bank imposed a temporary payment deferral of existing loans as an anti-COVID-19 measure. As of September 2021, there were 25 banks (including 7 branches), with total assets of BGN 132.7 billion (USD 76 billion), equivalent to 100 percent of GDP. The market share of the five significant banks (directly supervised by the ECB) was 66.1 percent, the share of less significant banks was 30.6 percent, and the share of foreign bank branches was 3.3 percent.  Non-performing loans were equal to 5.01 percent of the total loan portfolio of the banking system.

The Bulgarian government has raised funds by issuing both Euro-denominated and Leva- denominated bonds.  Commercial banks and private pension funds and insurance companies are the primary purchasers of these instruments. EU-based banks are eligible to be primary dealers of Bulgarian government bonds.

Bulgaria does not have a sovereign wealth fund. The government maintains a multiannual fiscal savings reserve, a farmer subsidy fund, and an electricity price premium fund. Their annual budgeting is compliant with the government’s budget plans.

Upon EU accession, Bulgaria was recognized as a market economy, in which the majority of the companies are private. Significant state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain, however, such as railways and the postal service. SOEs also predominate in the healthcare, infrastructure, and energy sectors; many of these are collectively managed by holding companies, which are also SOEs. Some of the SOEs receive annual government subsidies for current and capital expenditures, regardless of their actual performance. SOEs’ budgets and audit reports are posted on the website of the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control. The list of all SOEs can be found here: reports.appk.government.bg/public/pubic/organizations . According to the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (NSI), there is a sizeable state-owned sector consisting of approximately 350 SOEs held by the central government and 580 by subnational governments. In 2020, SOEs accounted for 10.6 percent of the overall economy.

Cross-subsidization is common within some government holding companies. In the energy sector, for example, the debts of some energy producers are covered by more lucrative entities within the holding structure.

In 2019 Parliament approved the State Enterprise Act, introducing updated corporate standards and management practices. The law lists timeline and criteria for SOE senior management approval. SOEs are typically run by government elected boards. Public and private sector companies are in theory equally treated vis-à-vis bidding on concessions, taxation, or other government-controlled processes.  Bulgaria became party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) upon its entry into the EU in 2007.

No major privatizations are currently planned in Bulgaria. Parliament must approve government proposals to privatize any company with over 50 percent government ownership. All majority or minority state-owned properties are eligible for privatization, with the exception of those included in a specific list, including water management companies, state hospitals, and state sports facilities. The sale of specific parts of such companies follows a Council of Ministers decision or a decision of the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control, after a proposal made by the government-owned majority holder of the company. State-owned military manufacturers can be privatized with Parliamentary approval.

Municipally owned property can be privatized upon decision by a municipal council or authorized body, and upon publication of the municipal privatization list in the national gazette.

The 2010 Privatization and Post-Privatization Act created a single Privatization and Post-Privatization Agency responsible for privatization oversight. The new State Enterprise Act in 2019 reshuffled and renamed the agency into the Agency for Public Enterprises and Control ( www.appk.government.bg/bg/17 ).

Foreign investors can participate in privatization programs.

The government of Burkina Faso is more focused on attracting FDI and concessionary lending for development than it is on developing its capital markets. Net portfolio inflows were estimated at US$ 148.6 million ( 0.83 percent of GDP) in 2020, per the World Bank. While the government does issue some sovereign bonds to raise capital in the WAEMU regional bond market, in general the availability of different kinds of investment instruments is extremely limited. As part of its mechanism to fund its fiscal budget, the Burkina Faso government regularly issues 182-day maturity treasury bills (BAT) on the regional financial market of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, or UEMOA in French).

The banking system is sound, relatively profitable, and well capitalized, but credit is highly concentrated to a small number of clients and a few sectors of the economy, according to the IMF. Only an estimated 15 percent of the population are believed to have checking accounts. Like all member states of WAEMU, Burkina Faso is a member of the Central Bank of West African States. Many foreign banks have branches in the country. The traditional banking sector is composed of twelve commercial banks and five specialized credit institutions called “établissements financiers.” In Burkina, the national strategy for inclusive finance was adopted on April 23, 2019. The use of mobile money is becoming more prevalent. In addition to two of the three main mobile carriers offering mobile money services, in 2021 other companies, both foreign and local have launched mobile money service operations and are conquering an important client base. This trend has forced traditional banks to install own mobile transfer planforms.

Burkina Faso does not have a sovereign wealth fund. However, in 2017, the government created the Deposit and Consignment Fund (CDC-BF), an autonomous legal and financial entity whose mandate is to receive and manage assets of various funds and entities, in particular funds from dormant accounts transferred to the Public Treasury (National Social Security Fund, Autonomous Retirement Fund for Civil Servants, National Post Office). Its mandate is to invest the funds locally. The CDC-BF is not yet fully rolled out.

GoBF announcements for privatization bids are widely distributed, targeting both local and foreign investors. Bids are published in local papers, international magazines, mailed to different diplomatic missions, e-mailed to interested foreign investors, and published on the Internet on sites such as http://www.dgmarket.com .

The military regime’s attitude towards foreign portfolio investment is unknown. Previously, the Burmese government had gradually opened to foreign portfolio investment, but both the stock and bond markets are small and lack sufficient liquidity to enter and exit sizeable positions.

Burma has a small stock market with infrequent trading. In July 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced that foreign individuals and entities are permitted to hold up to 35 percent of the equity in Burmese companies listed on the Yangon Stock Exchange.

Burma also has a very small publicly traded debt market. Banks have been the primary buyers of government bonds issued by the CBM, which has established a nascent bond market auction system. The Central Bank issues government treasury bonds with maturities of two, three, and five years.

The CBM sets commercial loan interest rates and saving deposit rates that banks can offer, so banks cannot conduct risk-based pricing for credit. Consequently, credit is not strictly allocated on market terms. Foreign investors generally seek financing outside of Burma because of the lack of sophisticated credit instruments offered by Burmese financial institutions and lack of risk-based pricing.

There is limited penetration of banking services in the country, but the usage of mobile payments had grown rapidly prior to the coup. A government 2020 census found 14 percent of the population has access to a savings account through a traditional bank. The banking system is fragile with a high volume of non-performing loans (NPLs). Financial analysts estimate that NPLs at some local banks account for 40 to 50 percent of outstanding credit but accurate calculations are hard because of accounting inconsistencies about what constitutes a non-performing loan.

According to Central Bank of Myanmar’s report for FY 2020-2021, total assets in Burma’s banking system were 75 trillion kyat (USD 40.5 billion).

The CBM is responsible for the country’s monetary and exchange rate policies as well as regulating and supervising the banking sector.

Prior to the coup, the government had gradually opened the banking sector to foreign investors. The government began awarding limited banking licenses to foreign banks in October 2014. In November 2018, the CBM published guidelines that permit foreign banks with local licenses to offer “any financing services and other banking services” to local corporations. Previously, foreign banks were only allowed to offer export financing and related banking services to foreign corporations.

No U.S. banks have a correspondent relationship with Burmese banks. Following the military coup and the imposition of U.S. sanctions on Burma, including on two large military holding companies, some non-U.S. international banks are considering whether to terminate their correspondent banking relationship with Burmese banks.

Foreigners are allowed to open a bank account in Burma in either U.S. dollars or Burmese kyat. In April 2022, the CBM issued rules requiring most accounts with foreign currency holdings to be converted into Myanmar kyat at a fixed rate within one business day excluding foreign investment businesses, diplomatic missions, UN missions and international development partners. To open a bank account, foreigners must provide proof of a valid visa along with proof of income or a letter from their employer.

The Germany development agency GIZ published the fifth edition the GIZ Banking Report in January 2021.

According to Chapter 15 of the Myanmar Investment Law, foreign investors can convert, transfer, and repatriate profits, dividends, royalties, patent fees, license fees, technical assistance and management fees, shares and other current income resulting from any investment made under this law. Nevertheless, in practice, the transfer of money in or out of Burma has been difficult, as many international banks have internal prohibitions on conducting business in Burma given the long history of sanctions and significant money-laundering risks. The intermittent closure of banks following the coup, shortage of U.S. dollars, and low cash withdrawal limits, and CBM restrictions on holding foreign currency have further limited investors’ ability to conduct foreign exchange transactions and other necessary business operations.

Under the Foreign Exchange Management Law, transfer of funds can be made only through licensed foreign exchange dealers, using freely usable currencies. The CBM grants final approval on any new loans or loan transfers by foreign investors. According to a new regulation in the Foreign Exchange Management Law, foreign investors applying for an offshore loan must get approval from the CBM. Applications are submitted through the MIC by providing a company profile, audited financial statements, draft loan agreement, and a recent bank credit statement.

In April 2022, the Central Bank fixed the exchange rate at 1850 kyat/1 USD. In April 2022, the black-market exchange rate was roughly 2010 kyat/1 USD.

According to the Myanmar Investment Law, foreign investors can remit foreign currency through authorized banks. Nevertheless, in practice, the transfer of money in or out of Burma has been difficult, as many international banks have internal prohibitions on conducting business in Burma given the long history of sanctions and significant money-laundering risks. The military coup and the regime’s economic policies, including restrictions placed on holding and transferring foreign currencies, has further exacerbated these investment remittance challenges.

The challenge of repatriating remittances through the formal banking system are also reflected in the continued use of informal remittance services (such as the “hundi system”) by both the public and businesses. On November 15, 2019, the CBM adopted the Remittance Business Regulation in order to bring these informal networks into the official financial system. The regulations require remittance business licenses to conduct inward and outward remittance businesses from the Central Bank. It is unclear how the military regime will proceed with this regulation and the training of businesses to grant them a license to conduct remittances.

Burma does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Burma are active in various sectors, including natural resource extraction, print news, energy production and distribution, banking, mobile telecommunications, and transportation. SOEs employ approximately 145,000 people, according to a 2018 report by the Natural Resource Governance Institute. The 1989 State-Owned Economic Enterprises Law does not establish a system of monitoring enterprise operations, hence detailed information on Burmese SOEs is difficult to obtain. However, according to commercial statements, the total net income of all SOEs during fiscal year 2020`21 was approximately USD 828 million. The top profit-making SOEs are found in the natural resource sector, namely the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, Myanma Gems Enterprise, and Myanma Timber Enterprise. Within Burma, there are 32 SOEs managed directly by six ministries without independent boards.

SOEs enjoy several advantages including serving in some cases as the market regulator, preferential land access, and access to low-interest credit. According to the State-Owned Economic Enterprises Law, SOEs wield regulatory powers that provide SOEs a significant market advantage, including through an ability to recommend specific tax exemptions to the MIC on behalf of private sector joint-venture partners and to monitor private sector companies’ compliance with contracts. In addition, the law stipulates that SOE managers have sole discretion in awarding contracts and licenses to private sector partners with limited oversight. SOEs can secure loans at low interest rates from state-owned banks, with approval from the cabinet. Private enterprises, unlike SOEs, are forced to provide land or other real estate as collateral in order to be considered for a loan. SOEs have historically had an advantage over private entities in land access because under the Constitution the State owns all the land.

In April 2021, the U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned three Burmese SOEs for their roles in financing the military regime: the Myanma Gems Enterprise, the Myanma Timber Enterprise; and the Myanmar Pearl Enterprise. In March 2021, the U.S. Department of Treasury also sanctioned two Myanmar military holding companies: Myanmar Economic Corporation and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, and those sanctions also apply to entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked entities or persons. Investors should conduct careful due diligence, including by consulting the Special Designated National list, to identify which entities are subject to U.S. sanctions given the broad scope of these firms and their privileged position in the economy.

The military regime has not publicly announced any plans or timeline for privatization and in the past has preferred nationalization and supporting state-owned enterprises. Prior to the coup, the civilian government had been implementing a privatization plan, which permitted foreign investment.

Although there are no regulatory restrictions on foreign portfolio investment, Burundi does not have capital markets that would enable it.  Capital allocation within Burundi is entirely dependent on commercial banks.

The country does not have its own stock market.  There is no regulatory system to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment.  Existing policies do not actively facilitate nor impede the free flow of financial resources into product and factor markets.

There is no regulation restricting international transactions.  In practice, however, the government restricts payments and transfers for international transactions due to a shortage of foreign currency, which impedes doing business in a number of ways.

In theory, foreign investors have access to all existing credit instruments and on market terms.  In practice, available credit is extremely limited.

The financial sector includes 15 credit institutions, 40 microfinance institutions, 16 insurance companies, three social security institutions and three payment institutions.  All these institutions aim at reducing unemployment by creating job opportunities, particularly small and medium-scale entrepreneurship.  The banking market is dominated by the three largest and systemically important banks: Credit Bank of Bujumbura (BCB), Burundi Commercial Bank (BANCOBU), and Interbank Burundi (IBB).

Burundi’s population has very limited access to banking services, according to the most recent national survey on financial inclusion conducted by the central bank.  In this 2016 survey, the Bank of the Republic of Burundi (BRB) found a penetration level of approximately 22 percent, although the government opened two banks, one for youth entrepreneurs and one for women, over the last 1.5 years in an effort to address this challenge.

The government is a minority shareholder in six banks, including the country’s three largest banks and is the main shareholders in the two new banks BIJE (Banque d’Investissement des Jeunes/Youth Investment Bank) and BIDF (Banque d’Investissement et de Développement pour les Femmes/Investment and Development Bank for Women).  Several local commercial banks have branches in urban centers and micro-finance institutions mostly serve rural areas.

Foreign banks can establish operations in the country.  Foreign banks operating in the country include ECOBANK (Pan African Bank-West Africa), CRDB (Tanzanian Bank), DTB and KCB (both Kenyan Banks).  The central bank directs banking regulatory policy, including prudential measures for the banking system.  Foreigners and locals are subject to the same conditions when opening a bank account; the only requirement is the presentation of identification.

Burundi does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

There are five SOEs in Burundi with 100 percent government ownership: REGIDESO (public utility company), ONATEL (telecom), SOSUMO (sugar), OTB (tea), COGERCO (cotton) and ODECA (Coffee).  No statistics on assets are available for these companies as their reports are not available to the public.  Board members for SOEs are appointed by the GoB and report to its ministries.  The GoB also has a minority (40 percent) share in Brarudi brewing company, a branch of the Heineken Group, the country’s largest taxpayer.

There is no published list of SOEs.

SOEs have no market-based advantages and compete with other investors under the same terms and conditions; however, Burundi does not adhere to the OECD guidelines on corporate governance for SOEs.

In 2002, Burundi entered an active phase of political stabilization, national reconciliation, and economic reform.  In 2004, it received an emergency post-conflict program from the IMF and the World Bank, paving the way for the development of the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Alleviation (PRSP).  After the 2005 elections, the GoB made the decision to open several state-owned enterprises in different sectors of the economy to private investment, including foreign investment.  The Burundian government, considering coffee a strategic sector of its economy, decided to opt for the privatization of the coffee sector first in an effort to modernize it.  However, following the crisis of 2015, the GoB decided to suspend the privatization program.  At that time, it had not yet privatized other sectors such as tea or sugar.  In late 2019, the GoB regained control of the coffee sector, citing as its rationale perceived mismanagement on the part of the privatized companies during 2015-2019.  It is unclear if or when the privatization program will continue.

Limited capital market and portfolio investment opportunities exist in Cabo Verde. The Cabo Verdean stock market, Bolsa de Valores de Cabo Verde (BVC), is fully operational. It has been most active in the issuance of bonds. Foreign investors must open an account with a bank in Cabo Verde before buying stocks or bonds from BVC.

Foreign interests may access credit under the same market conditions as Cabo Verdeans.

The IMF’s April 2021 country report on Cabo Verde noted that “the government did not impose or intensify restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions nor introduce multiple currency practices. Similarly, it did not conclude bilateral payment agreements inconsistent with Article VIII nor impose or intensify import restrictions for balance of payments purposes.”

Cabo Verde has a small financial sector supervised and regulated by the Central Bank of Cabo Verde (BCV). According to 2020 data from BCV, 82.8 percent of Cabo Verde’s adult population has a bank account. Internet-based tools and services in the banking sector continue to grow in Cabo Verde, particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic, changing the model of the client-bank relationship. New information and communications technology products allow customers online alternatives to in-person support.

Banking represents more than 80 percent of the assets of the entire Cabo Verdean financial system. Two banks – Banco Comercial do Atlantico (BCA) and Caixa Economica de Cabo Verde (CECV) – together held 57.7 percent of market share in 2020, according to BCV data.

Legislation approved in January 2020 terminated the issuance of restricted licenses for offshore banking operations, calling for generic licenses and operations with resident clients. BCV subsequently announced that banks with a restricted license (offshore) serving non-residents would have to adjust to the new requirements or face revocation of their license and enforced administrative liquidation. Offshore banks operating in Cabo Verde had until December 2021 to complete the transition. One did, two opted for liquidation, and BCV revoked the license of a fourth. Currently there are no offshore banks operating in Cabo Verde.

To establish a bank account, clients must provide proper identification and obtain a taxpayer number from the Commercial Registry Department (Casa do Cidadao), a process that takes approximately 10 minutes. Bank credit is available to foreign investors under the same conditions as for domestic investors. The private sector has access to credit instruments such as loans, letters of credit, and lines of credit.

To address the need for capital markets in Cambodia, the Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX) was founded in 2011 and started trading in 2012. Though the CSX is one of the world’s smallest securities markets, with nine listed companies, it has taken steps to increase the number of listed companies, including attracting SMEs. In 2021, market capitalization stood at $2.4 billion, and the daily trading value averaged $246,000.

In September 2017, the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) adopted a regulation on the Conditions for Banking and Financial Institutions to be listed on CSX. The regulation sets additional requirements for banks and financial institutions that intend to issue securities to the public. This includes prior approval from the NBC and minimum equity of KHR 60 billion (approximately $15 million).

Cambodia’s bond market is at the beginning stages of development. The regulatory framework for corporate bonds was bolstered in 2017 through the publication of several regulations covering public offering of debt securities, the accreditation of bondholders’ representatives, and the accreditation of credit rating agencies. The country’s first corporate bond was issued in 2018, and there are currently eight corporate bonds listed on the CSX.  There is currently no sovereign bond market, but the government has stated its intention of making government securities available to investors in 2022.

The NBC regulates the operations of Cambodia’s banks. Foreign banks and branches are freely allowed to register and operate in the country. There are 54 commercial banks, 10 specialized banks (set up to finance specific turn-key projects such as real estate development), 79 licensed microfinance institutions (MFIs), and five licensed microfinance deposit taking institutions in Cambodia. The NBC has also granted licenses to 17 financial leasing companies and one credit bureau company to improve transparency and credit risk management and encourage lending to small- and medium-sized enterprise customers.

The banking sector’s assets, including those of MFIs, rose 16 percent year-over-year in 2020 to KHR 241 trillion ($59.4 billion) and customer loans increased 15 percent to KHR 151 trillion ($37.3 billion). In 2020, the number of deposit accounts reached 8.9 million (out of a population of roughly 17 million), while credit accounts reached 3.2 million.

The government does not use the regulation of capital markets to restrict foreign investment. Banks have been free to set their own interest rates since 1995, and increased competition

between local institutions has led to a gradual lowering of interest rates from year to year.  However, in April 2017, at the direction of Prime Minister Hun Sen, the NBC capped interest rates on loans offered by MFIs at 18 percent per annum. The move was designed to protect borrowers, many of whom are poor and uneducated, from excessive interest rates.

In March 2016, the NBC doubled the minimum capital reserve requirement for banks to $75 million for commercial banks and $15 million for specialized banks. Based on the new regulations, deposit-taking microfinance institutions now have a $30 million reserve requirement, while traditional microfinance institutions have a $1.5 million reserve requirement.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the NBC adopted measures to maintain financial stability and ensure liquidity in the banking system. These measures included allowing banks to maintain their capital conservation buffer at 50 percent, reducing the reserve requirement rate, and allowing banks to restructure loans for clients impacted by COVID.

Financial technology (Fintech) in Cambodia is developing rapidly. Available technologies include mobile payments, QR codes, and e-wallet accounts for domestic and cross-border payments and transfers. In 2012, the NBC launched retail payments for checks and credit remittances. A “Fast and Secure Transfer” (FAST) payment system was introduced in 2016 to facilitate instant fund transfers. The Cambodian Shared Switch (CSS) system was launched in October 2017 to facilitate the access to network automated teller machines (ATMs) and point of sale (POS) machines.

In February 2019, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) cited Cambodia for being “deficient” with regard to its anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) controls and policies and included Cambodia on its “grey list.”  The RGC committed to working with FATF to address these deficiencies through a joint action plan, although Cambodia remains on the grey list as of 2022. Should Cambodia not take appropriate action, FATF could move it to the “black list,” which could negatively impact the cost of capital as well as the banking sector’s ability to access international capital markets.

In addition to Cambodia’s weak AML/CFT regime, vulnerabilities include a largely cash-based, dollarized economy and porous borders. Both legal and illicit transactions, regardless of size, are frequently conducted outside of regulated financial institutions. Cash proceeds from crime are readily channeled into land, housing, luxury goods and vehicles, and other forms of property, without passing through the banking sector. Moreover, a lack of judicial independence and transparency constrains effective enforcement of laws against financial crimes. The judicial branch lacks efficiency and cannot assure impartiality, and judicial officials, up to and including the chief of the Supreme Court, have simultaneously held positions in the political ruling party. Refer to Section II: “Illicit Finance and Corrupt Activities in Cambodia” of the U.S. government’s Cambodia Business Advisory on High-Risk Investments and Interactions released on November 10, 2021, for more information.

Cambodia does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

The Cameroonian government is open to portfolio investment. With the encouragement of the IMF and BEAC, Cameroon and other members of the CEMAC region have designed policies that facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets.

The Financial Markets Commission of Cameroon merged operations with the Libreville-based Central African Financial Market Supervisory Board in February 2019.  The merger has led to the establishment of a unique regional stock exchange called the Central African Stock Exchange (CASE). Cameroon’s financial sector is underdeveloped, and government policies have limited bearing on the free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. Foreign investors can get credit on the local market and the private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. In 2016, Cameroon sought to encourage the development of capital markets through Law No 2016/010 of July 12, 2016, governing undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities in Cameroon.

Cameroon is connected to the international banking payment system. The country is a CEMAC member, which maintains a central bank, BEAC.  CEMAC’s central bank works with the IMF on monetary policies and public finance reform.  BEAC respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.  Despite generally respecting Article VIII, BEAC has instituted several restrictions on payments to boost foreign exchange reserves. Financial institutions and importers complain of a backlog of requests for foreign exchange. BEAC is currently negotiating with several international oil companies on repatriation of revenues before external payments. Investors should be aware that timely repatriation of profits may be a stumbling block.

In 2020, with the support of the IMF, BEAC took steps to address the economic impact of COVID-19 in the region. The central bank eased monetary policy and introduced accommodative measures to ensure adequate liquidity in the banking system to supporting internal and external stability. Concomitantly, the regional banking sector controller (Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale or COBAC) eased prudential regulations to help banks delay pandemic-related losses.

Less than 20 percent of Cameroonians have access to formal banking services. The Cameroonian government has often spoken of increasing access, but no coherent policy or action has been taken to alleviate the problem. Mobile money, introduced by local and international telecom providers, is the closest tool to banking services that most Cameroonians can access. In its 2022 finance law, the government introduced a tax on electronic payment transfers, including the ubiquitously used “Mobile Money.”

The banking sector is generally healthy.  Large, international commercial banks do most of the lending.  One local bank, Afriland, operates in Cameroon and multiple other countries. Most smaller banks deal in small loans of short duration. Retail banking is not common. According to the World Bank, non-performing loans were 10.31 percent of total bank loans in 2016. The Cameroonian government does not keep statistics on non-performing assets. According to Cameroon’s National Credit Council, Afriland First Bank, Societe General Cameroun (SGC), Banque Internationale du Cameroun pour l’Epargne et le Credit (BICEC), and Societe Commerciale de Banque Cameroun (SCB) are the most important banks in the national banking system, accounting for 52 percent of the banking system’s total consolidated balance sheet, 54 percent of total loans, and 54 percent of customer deposits in 2020.

Foreign banks can establish operations in Cameroon.  Most notably, Citibank and Standard Chartered Bank have operated in Cameroon for more than 20 years. They are subject to the same regulations as local banks. U.S. Embassy Yaoundé officials are unaware of any lost correspondent banking relationships within the past three years. There are no restrictions on foreigners establishing bank accounts, credit instruments, business financing, or other such transactions.

The country has 412 registered microfinance institutions, 19 insurance companies, four electronic money institutions, and one Post Office bank. Two major money transfer operators are also present, essentially offering over-the-counter services. The Cameroon market is at the startup stage for its digital financial system. This emerging market segment is currently provided by banks in partnership with telecom operators. According to a 2021 BEAC report on the state of electronic payments in the CEMAC zone, electronic money payments in the CEMAC region increased 21.8 percent from 2019 to 2020, totaling approximately $51 million in 2020 compared to $42 million in 2019.  Cameroon represented the largest amount of electronic payment transfers, accounting for 73 percent of all CEMAC transactions and totaling over $20 million in 2020.

Financial inclusion is low despite some progress brought about by mobile telephony. The World Bank estimates there were 25 million mobile cellular subscriptions in Cameroon in 2020. Putting aside the multi-SIM effect, the penetration rate in terms of unique subscribers was about 50 percent at the end of 2019, which puts Cameroon in the lower end in the Central African region.

Cameroon does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

Canada’s capital markets are open, accessible, and regulated. Credit is allocated on market terms, the private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments, and foreign investors can get credit on the local market. Canada has several securities markets, the largest of which is the Toronto Stock Exchange, and there is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. The Canadian government and Bank of Canada do not place restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

The Canadian banking system is composed of 35 domestic banks and 16 foreign bank subsidiaries. Six major domestic banks are dominant players in the market and manage close to USD 5.4 trillion in assets. Many large international banks have a presence in Canada through a subsidiary, representative office, or branch. Ninety-nine percent of Canadians have an account with a financial institution. The Canadian banking system is viewed as very stable due to high capitalization rates that are well above the norms set by the Bank for International Settlements. The OSFI, Canada’s primary banking regulator, announced in January 2022 revised capital, leverage, liquidity, and disclosure rules that incorporate the final Basel III banking reforms with additional adjustments to make them suitable for federally regulated deposit-taking institutions. Most of the revised rules will take effect in the second fiscal quarter of 2023, with those related to market risk and credit valuation adjustment risk taking effect in early 2024.

Foreign financial firms interested in investing submit their applications to the OSFI for approval by the Minister of Finance. U.S. and other foreign banks can establish banking subsidiaries in Canada. Several U.S. financial institutions maintain commercially focused operations, principally in the areas of lending, investment banking, and credit card issuance. Foreigners can open bank accounts in Canada with proper identification and residency information.

The Bank of Canada is the nation’s central bank. Its principal role is “to promote the economic and financial welfare of Canada,” as defined in the Bank of Canada Act. The Bank’s four main areas of responsibility are: monetary policy; promoting a safe, sound, and efficient financial system; issuing and distributing currency; and being the fiscal agent for Canada.

Canada does not have a federal sovereign wealth fund. The province of Alberta maintains the Heritage Savings Trust Fund to manage the province’s share of non-renewable resource revenue. The fund’s net financial assets were valued at USD 14 billion as of December 31, 2021. The Fund invests in a globally diversified portfolio of public and private equity, fixed income, and real assets. The Fund follows the voluntary code of good practices known as the “Santiago Principles” and participates in the IMF-hosted International Working Group of SWFs. The Heritage Fund holds approximately 50 percent of its value in equity investments, seventeen percent of which are domestic.

Chad’s financial system is underdeveloped. There are no capital markets or money markets in Chad. A limited number of financial instruments are available to the private sector, including letters of credit, short- and medium-term loans, foreign exchange services, and long-term savings instruments. Chad maintains an exchange system that is free from restrictions and multiple currency practices on payments and transfers for current international transactions. This includes due to any actions delegated to BEAC.

Commercial banks offer credit on market terms, often at rates of 12 to 25 percent for short-term loans. Access to credit is available but is prohibitively expensive for most Chadians in the private sector. Medium-term loans are difficult to obtain, as lending criteria are rigid. Most large businesses maintain accounts with foreign banks and borrow money outside of Chad. There are ATMs in some major hotels, most neighborhoods of N’Djamena, the N’Djamena airport, and in major cities.

Chad does not have a stock market and has no effective regulatory system to encourage or facilitate portfolio investments. A small regional stock exchange, known as the Central African Stock Exchange, in Libreville, Gabon, was established by CEMAC countries in 2006. Cameroon, a CEMAC member, launched its own market in 2005. Both exchanges are poorly capitalized.

Chad’s banking sector is small and continues to streamline lending practices and reduce the volume of bad debt accumulated before and during the 2016-2017 economic crisis. While Chad’s banking rate remains low due to low aggregate savings and limited trust in and exposure to banks, according to the World Bank it increased from nine to 22 percent between 2009 and 2017.

Chad’s four largest banks have been privatized. The former Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique au Tchad (BIAT) became a part of Togo-based Ecobank; the former Banque Tchadienne de Credit et de Depôt was re-organized as the Societe Generale Tchad; the former Financial Bank became part of Togo-based Orabank; and the former Banque de Developpement du Tchad (BDT) was reorganized as Commercial Bank Tchad (CBT), in partnership with Cameroon-based Commercial Bank of Cameroon. There are two Libyan banks in Chad, BCC (formerly Banque Libyenne) and BSCIC (Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour l’Investissement et le Commerce), along with one Nigerian bank — United Bank for Africa (UBA). In 2018, the GOC funded a new bank Banque de l’Habitat du Tchad (BHT) with the GOC as majority shareholder with 50 percent of the shares and two public companies, the National Social Insurance Fund (Caisse Nationale de Prevoyance Sociale, CNPS) and the Chadian Petroleum Company (Societe des Hydrocarbures du Tchad, SHT), each holding 25 percent.

Chad, as a CEMAC member, shares a central bank with Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon — the Central African Economic Bank (BEAC, Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale), headquartered in Yaounde, Cameroon.

Foreigners must establish legal residency in order to establish a bank account.

The GOC does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund.

All Chadian SOEs operate under the umbrella of government ministries. SOE senior management reports to the minister responsible for the relevant sector, as well as a board of directors and an executive board. Historically, the president appointed members of SOE boards of directors, executive boards, and CEOs though no new appointments have happened since the April 2021 establishment of the Transitional Military Council. The boards of directors give general directives over the year, while the executive boards manage general guidelines set by the boards of directors. Some executive directors consult with their respective ministries before making business decisions.

The GOC operates SOEs in several sectors, including Energy and Environmental Industries; Agribusiness; Construction, Building and Heavy Equipment; and Information and Communication. The percentage of their annual budget that SOEs allocate to research and development (R&D) is unpublished.

There were no reports of discriminatory action taken by SOEs against the interests of foreign investors in 2021. Some foreign companies operated in direct competition with SOEs. Chad’s Public Tender Code (PTC) provides preferential treatment for domestic competitors, including SOEs.

SOEs are not subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors and are often afforded material advantages such as preferential access to land and raw materials. SOEs receive government subsidies under the national budget, which the government does not publish. SOEs often comingle government and SOE funds, which complicates their financial picture.

Chad is not a party to the Agreement on Government Procurement within the framework of the WTO. Chadian practices are not consistent with the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs.

(Please use DOC key words for industries in this section; list available at https://www.export.gov/industries ).

Foreign investors are permitted and encouraged to participate in the privatization process. There is a public, non-discriminatory bidding process. Having a local contact in Chad to assist with the bidding process is important. To combat corruption, the GOC has recently hired private international companies to oversee the bidding process for government tenders. The Chamber of Commerce submitted a ‘white paper’ (livre blanc) in 2018 with recommendations for the GOC to facilitate and simplify private sector operations, including establishing a Business Observatory and a Presidential Council, which would implement over 70 recommendations to improve the investment climate in Chad. The Presidential Council became operational in January 2021.

The GOC has expressed general willingness to privatize its generally unprofitable SOEs, including to foreign investors. As an example, in 2018, it sold a majority stake in cotton export company CotonTchad Société Nouvelle (CotonTchad SN) to the Singaporean Olam International. Qatari investors recently purchased a slaughterhouse in Moundou as well. Investors from the UAE are under talks to purchase a slaughterhouse in Farcha, though their progress has stalled.

Chad is considering privatization in the following industries:

• Information & Communication (SOTEL Tchad)
• Food Processing & Packaging (the Société Tchadienne de Jus de Fruit (STJF), which produces fruit juice in Doba
• Agricultural Products (Société Moderne de Abbatoires (SMA), a slaughterhouse and meat packaging company in Farcha)

In addition, a 2019 law opened the market for power generation to private companies, though involvement in transmission remains under the control of the state-owned Societe Nationale d’Electricite du Tchad (SNE), which is reportedly unprofitable.

Chile’s authorities are committed to developing capital markets and keeping them open to foreign portfolio investors. Foreign firms offer services in Chile in areas such as financial information, data processing, financial advisory services, portfolio management, voluntary saving plans and pension funds. Under the U.S.-Chile FTA, Chile opened up significantly its insurance sector, with very limited exceptions. The Santiago Stock Exchange is Chile’s dominant stock exchange, and the third largest in Latin America. However, when compared to other OECD countries, it has lower market liquidity.

Existing policies facilitate the free flow of financial resources into Chile’s product and factor markets and adjustment to external shocks in a commodity export-dependent economy. Chile accepted the obligations of Article VIII (sections 2, 3 and 4) and maintains a free-floating exchange rate system, free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. Credit is allocated on market terms and its various instruments are available to foreigners. The Central Bank reserves the right to restrict foreign investors’ access to internal credit if a credit shortage exists. To date, this authority has not been exercised.

Nearly one fourth of Chileans have a credit card from a bank and nearly one third have a non-bank credit card, but less than 20 percent have a checking account. However, financial inclusion is higher than banking penetration: a large number of lower-income Chilean residents have a CuentaRut, which is a commission-free card with an electronic account available for all, launched by the state-owned Banco Estado, also the largest provider of microcredit in Chile.

The Chilean banking system is healthy and competitive, and many Chilean banks already meet Basel III standards. The new General Banking Act (LGB), published in January 2019, defined general guidelines for establishing a capital adequacy system in line with Basel standards, and gave the CMF the authority to establish the capital framework. All Basel III regulations were published in December 2020, and the CMF started the implementation process of Basel III requirements to last to December 1, 2025. The system’s liquidity position (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) remains above regulatory limits (70%). Capital adequacy ratio of the system equaled 14.9 percent as of December 2021 and remains robust even when including discounts due to market and/or operational risks. Non-performing loans decreased after August 2020 due to government relief measures for households, including legislation authorizing two rounds of withdrawals from pension accounts. As of January 2022, non-performing loans equaled 1.26 percent compared to 1.54 percent as of January 2021) when measured by the standard 90 days past due criterion.

As of November 2021, the total assets of the Chilean banking system amounted to US$ 428.6 billion, according to the Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions. The largest six banks (Banco de Crédito e Inversiones, Banco Santander-Chile, Banco Estado, Banco de Chile, Scotiabank Chile and Itaú-Corpbanca) accounted for 88 percent of the system’s assets. Chile’s Central Bank conducts the country’s monetary policy, is constitutionally autonomous from the government, and is not subject to regulation by the Superintendence of Banks.

Foreign banks have an important presence in Chile, comprising three out of the six largest banks of the system. Out of 17 banks currently in Chile, five are foreign-owned but legally established banks in Chile and four are branches of foreign banks. Both categories are subject to the requirements set out under the Chilean banking law. There are also 21 representative offices of foreign banks in Chile. There are no reports of correspondent banking relationships withdrawal in Chile.

In order to open a bank account in Chile, a foreigner must present his/her Chilean ID Card or passport, Chilean tax ID number, proof of address, proof of income/solvency, photo, and fingerprints.

The Government of Chile maintains two sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) built with savings from years with fiscal surpluses. The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (FEES) was established in 2007 and was valued at US$ 6.4 billion as of January 2022. The purpose of the FEES is to fund public debt payments and temporary deficit spending, in order to keep a countercyclical fiscal policy. The Pensions Reserve Fund (FRP) was built up in 2006 and amounted to US$ 7.2 billion as of January 2022. The purpose of the FRP is to anticipate future needs of payments to those eligible to receive pensions, but whose contributions to the private pension system fall below a minimum threshold.

Chile is a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) and adheres to the Santiago Principles.

Chile’s government policy is to invest SWFs entirely abroad into instruments denominated in foreign currencies, including sovereign bonds and related instruments, corporate and high-yield bonds, mortgage-backed securities from U.S. agencies, and stocks.

Chile had 28 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in operation as of 2020. Twenty-seven SOEs are commercial companies and the newest one (FOINSA) is an infrastructure fund that was created to facilitate public-private partnership projects. 25 SOEs are not listed and are fully owned by the government, while the remaining three are majority government owned. Ten Chilean SOEs operate in the port management sector, six in the services sector, three in the defense sector, three in the mining sector (including CODELCO, the world’s largest copper producer, and ENAP, an oil and gas company), two in transportation, one in the water sector, one is a TV station, and one is a state-owned bank (Banco Estado). The state holds a minority stake in four water companies as a result of a privatization process. In 2020, total assets of Chilean SOEs amounted to US$ 89.3 billion, while their total net income was US$ 833.7 million. SOEs employed 47,225 people in 2020.

Twenty SOEs in Chile fall under the supervision of the Public Enterprises System (SEP), a state holding in charge of overseeing SOE governance. The rest – including the largest SOEs such as CODELCO, ENAP and Banco Estado – have their own governance and report to government ministries. Allocation of seats on the boards of Chilean SOEs is determined by the SEP, as described above, or outlined by the laws that regulate them. In CODELCO’s corporate governance, there is a mix between seats appointed by recommendation from an independent high-level civil service committee, and seats allocated by political authorities in the government.

A list of SOEs made by the Budget Directorate, including their financial management information, is available in the following link: http://www.dipres.gob.cl/599/w3-propertyvalue-20890.html.

In general, Chilean SOEs work under hard budget constraints and compete under the same regulatory and tax frameworks as private firms. The exception is ENAP, which is the only company allowed to refine oil in Chile. As an OECD member, Chile adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs.

Chile does not have a privatization program.

China’s leadership has stated that it seeks to build a modern, highly developed, and multi-tiered capital market. Since their founding over three decades ago, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges, combined, are ranked the third largest stock market in the world with over USD 12.2 trillion in assets. China’s bond market has similarly expanded significantly to become the second largest worldwide, totaling approximately USD 18.6 trillion. In 2021, China took steps to open certain financial sectors such as mutual funds, securities, and asset management, but multinational companies still report barriers to entering the PRC insurance markets. As an example, in September, Black Rock was the first firm given approval to sell mutual funds to PRC nationals as the first wholly foreign owned mutual fund. Direct investment by private equity and venture capital firms increased but also faced setbacks due to China’s capital controls, which obfuscate the repatriation of returns. Though the PRC is taking steps to liberalize its capital markets, PRC companies that seek overseas investment have historically tended to list in the United States or Hong Kong; PRC and U.S. regulations on exchanges and geopolitics may begin to impact this trend. As of 2021, 24 sovereign entities and private sector firms, including the Asian Development Bank, Hungary, and BMW, have since issued RMB 106.5 billion yuan, roughly USD 16.7 billion, in 72 “Panda Bonds,” Chinese renminbi (RMB)-denominated debt issued by foreign entities in China. China’s private sector can also access credit via bank loans, bond issuance, trust products, and wealth management products. However, most bank credit flows to state-owned firms, largely due to distortions in China’s banking sector that have incentivized lending to state-affiliated entities over their private sector counterparts.  China has been an IMF Article VIII member since 1996 and generally refrains from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions. However, the government has used administrative and preferential policies to encourage credit allocation towards national priorities, such as infrastructure investments and industrial policy.

The PRC’s monetary policy is run by the PBOC, the PRC’s central bank. The PBOC has traditionally deployed various policy tools, such as open market operations, reserve requirement ratios, benchmark rates and medium-term lending facilities, to control credit growth. The PBOC had previously also set quotas on how much banks could lend but ended the practice in 1998. As part of its efforts to shift towards a more market-based system, the PBOC announced in 2019 that it will reform its one-year loan prime rate (LPR), which would serve as an anchor reference for other loans. The one-year LPR is based on the interest rate that 18 banks offer to their best customers and serves as the benchmark for rates provided for other loans. In 2020, the PBOC requested financial institutions to shift towards use of the one-year LPR for their outstanding floating-rate loan contracts from March to August. Despite these measures to move towards more market-based lending, the PRC’s financial regulators still influence the volume and destination of PRC bank loans through “window guidance” – unofficial directives delivered verbally – as well as through mandated lending targets for key economic groups, such as small and medium sized enterprises. In 2020, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) also began issuing laws to regulate online lending by banks including internet companies such as Ant Financial and Tencent, which had previously not been subject to banking regulations. In 2021, PBOC and CBIRC issued circulars emphasizing the need to emphasize and encourage financial stability among real estate developers.

The CBIRC oversees the PRC’s 4,607 lending institutions, about USD 54 trillion in total assets. China’s “Big Five” – Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, China Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China – dominate the sector and are largely stable, but has experienced regional banking stress, especially among smaller lenders. Reflecting the level of weakness among these banks, in September 2021, the PBOC announced in “China Financial Stability Report 2020” that 422 or 9.6 percent of the 4,400 banking financial institutions received a “fail” rating (high risk) following an industry-wide review in in the second quarter of 2021. The assessment deemed 393 firms, all small and medium sized rural financial institutions, “extremely risky.” The official rate of non-performing loans among China’s banks is relatively low: 1.7 percent as of the end of 2021. However, analysts believed the actual figure may be significantly higher. Bank loans continue to provide most credit options (reportedly around 63.6 percent in 2021) for Chinese companies, although other sources of capital, such as corporate bonds, equity financing, and private equity are quickly expanding in scope, reach, and sophistication in China.

As part of a broad campaign to reduce debt and financial risk, Chinese regulators have implemented measures to rein in the rapid growth of China’s “shadow banking” sector, which includes wealth management and trust products. These measures have achieved positive results. In December 2020, CBIRC published the first “Shadow Banking Report,” and claimed that the size of China’s shadow banking had shrunk sharply since 2017 when China started tightening the sector. By the end of 2019, the size of China’s shadow banking by broad measurement dropped to 84.8 trillion yuan from the peak of 100.4 trillion yuan in early 2017. PBOC estimated in January 2021 that the outstanding balance of China’s shadow banking was around RMB 32 trillion yuan at the end of 2020. Alternatively, Moody’s estimated that China’s shadow banking by broad measurement dropped to RMB 57.8 trillion yuan in the first half of 2021 and shadow banking to GDP ratio dropped to 52.9 percent from 58.3 percent at the end of 2020. Foreign owned banks can now establish wholly owned banks and branches in China, however, onerous licensing requirements and an industry dominated by local players, have limited foreign banks market penetration. Foreigners are eligible to open a bank account in China but are required to present a passport and/or Chinese government issued identification.

China officially has only one sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the China Investment Corporation (CIC), which was launched in 2007 to help diversify China’s foreign exchange reserves. Overall, information and updates on CIC and other funds that function like SWFs was difficult to procure. CIC is ranked the second largest SWF by total assets by Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI). With USD 200 billion in initial registered capital, CIC manages over USD 1.2 trillion in assets as of 2021 and invests on a 10-year time horizon. In 2021, CIC reported that during the 2020 period it increased its information technology-related holdings while cutting holdings of overseas equities and bonds. CIC has two overseas branches, CIC International (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd. and CIC Representative Office in New York. CIC has since evolved into three subsidiaries:

• CIC International was established in September 2011 with a mandate to invest in and manage overseas assets.  It conducts public market equity and bond investments, hedge fund, real estate, private equity, and minority investments as a financial investor.
• CIC Capital was incorporated in January 2015 with a mandate to specialize in making direct investments to enhance CIC’s investments in long-term assets.
• Central Huijin makes equity investments in China’s state-owned financial institutions.

China also operates other funds that function in part like sovereign wealth funds, including: China’s National Social Security Fund, with an estimated USD 450 billion in assets in 2021; the China-Africa Development Fund (solely funded by the China Development Bank), with an estimated USD 10 billion in assets (2020); the SAFE Investment Company, with an estimated USD 417.8 billion in assets; and China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund, established in December 2014 with USD 40 billion in assets to foster investment in BRI countries. China’s state-run funds do not report the percentage of assets invested domestically. However, China’s state-run funds follow the voluntary code of good practices known as the Santiago Principles and participate in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs. While CIC affirms they do not have formal government guidance to invest funds consistent with industrial policies or designated projects, CIC is expected to pursue government objectives.

China has approximately 150,000 wholly-owned SOEs, of which 50,000 are owned by the central government, and the remainder by local or provincial governments.  SOEs account for 30 to 40 percent of total gross domestic product (GDP) and about 20 percent of China’s total employment. Non-financial SOE assets totaled roughly USD 30 trillion. SOEs can be found in all sectors of the economy, from tourism to heavy industries.  State funds are spread throughout the economy and the state may also be the majority or controlling shareholder in an ostensibly private enterprise. China’s leading SOEs benefit from preferential government policies aimed at developing bigger and stronger “national champions.” SOEs enjoy preferential access to essential economic inputs (land, hydrocarbons, finance, telecoms, and electricity) and exercise considerable power in markets like steel and minerals.  SOEs also have long enjoyed preferential access to credit and the ability to issue publicly traded equity and debt.  A comprehensive, published list of all PRC SOEs does not exist.

PRC officials have indicated China intends to utilize OECD guidelines to improve the SOEs independence and professionalism, including relying on Boards of Directors that are free from political influence.  However, analysts believe minor reforms will be ineffective if SOE administration and government policy remain intertwined, and PRC officials make minimal progress in primarily changing the regulation and business conduct of SOEs.  SOEs continue to hold dominant shares in their respective industries, regardless of whether they are strategic, which may further restrain private investment in the economy.  Among central SOEs managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), senior management positions are mainly filled by senior party members who report directly to the CCP, and double as the company’s party secretary.  SOE executives often outrank regulators in the CCP rank structure, which minimizes the effectiveness of regulators in implementing reforms.  While SOEs typically pursue commercial objectives, the lack of management independence and the controlling ownership interest of the state make SOEs de facto arms of the government, subject to government direction and interference.  SOEs are rarely the defendant in legal disputes, and when they are, they almost always prevail.  U.S. companies often complain about the lack of transparency and objectivity in commercial disputes with SOEs.

Since 2013, the PRC government has periodically announced reforms to SOEs that included selling SOE shares to outside investors or a mixed ownership model, in which private companies invest in SOEs and outside managers are hired.  The government has tried these approaches to improve SOE management structures, emphasize the use of financial benchmarks, and gradually infuse private capital into some sectors traditionally monopolized by SOEs like energy, finance, and telecommunications. For instance, during an August 25 press conference, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) officials announced that in the second half of the year central SOE reform would focus on the advanced manufacturing and technology innovation sectors. As part of these efforts, they claimed SASAC would ensure mergers and acquisitions removed redundancies, stabilize industrial supply chains, withdraw from non-competitive businesses, and streamline management structures. In practice, however, reforms have been gradual, as the PRC government has struggled to implement its SOE reform vision and often preferred to utilize a SOE consolidation approach.  Recently, Xi and other senior leaders have increasingly focused reform efforts on strengthening the role of the state as an investor or owner of capital, instead of the old SOE model in which the state was more directly involved in managing operations.

SASAC issued a circular on November 20, 2020, directing tighter control over central SOEs overseas properties held by individuals on behalf of SOEs. The circular aims to prevent leakage of SOE assets held by individuals and SOE overseas variable interest entities (VIEs). According to the circular, properties held by individuals should be approved by central SOEs and filed with SASAC.

In Northeast China, privatization efforts at provincial and municipal SEOs remains low, as private capital makes cautious decisions in making investment to local debt-ridden and inefficient SOEs. On the other hand, local SOEs prefer to pursue mergers and acquisitions with central SOEs to avoid being accused of losing state assets. There is no available information on whether foreign investors could participate in privatization programs.

The Colombian Securities Exchange (BVC after its acronym in Spanish) is the main forum for trading and securities transactions in Colombia. The BVC is a private company listed on the stock market. The BVC, as a multi-product and multi-market exchange, offers trading platforms for the stock market, along with fixed income and standard derivatives. The BVC also provides listing services for issuers.

Foreign investors can participate in capital markets by negotiating and acquiring shares, bonds, and other securities listed by the Foreign Investment Statute. These activities must be conducted by a local administrator, such as trust companies or Financial Superintendence-authorized stock brokerage firms. Direct and portfolio foreign investments must be registered with the Central Bank. Foreigners can establish a bank account in Colombia as long as they have a valid visa and Colombian government identification.

The market has sufficient liquidity for investors to enter and exit sizeable positions. The central bank respects IMF Article VIII and does not restrict payments and transfers for current international transactions. The financial sector in Colombia offers credit to nationals and foreigners that comply with the requisite legal requirements.

In 2005, Colombia consolidated supervision of all aspects of the banking, financial, securities, and insurance sectors under the Financial Superintendence. Colombia has an effective regulatory system that encourages portfolio investment, and the country’s financial system is strong by regional standards. Commercial banks are the principal source of long-term corporate and project finance in Colombia. Loans rarely have a maturity in excess of five years. Unofficial private lenders play a major role in meeting the working capital needs of small and medium-sized companies. Only the largest of Colombia’s companies participate in the local stock or bond markets, with the majority meeting their financing needs either through the banking system, by reinvesting their profits, or through credit from suppliers.

Colombia’s central bank is charged with managing inflation and unemployment through monetary policy. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country and must set up a Colombian subsidiary in order to do so. The Colombian central bank has a variety of correspondent banks abroad.

In 2012, Colombia began operating a sovereign wealth fund called the Savings and Stabilization Fund (FAE), which is administered by the central bank with the objective of promoting savings and economic stability in the country. Colombia is not a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The fund can administer up to 30 percent of annual royalties from the extractives industry. Its primary investments are in fixed securities, sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt (both domestic and international), and corporate securities, with just eight percent invested in stocks. The government transfers royalties not dedicated to the fund to other internal funds to boost national economic productivity through strategic projects, technological investments, and innovation. In 2020, the government authorized up to 80 percent of the FAE’s USD 3.9 billion in assets to be lent to the Fund for the Mitigation of Emergencies (FOME) created in response to the pandemic.

Since 2015, the Government of Colombia has concentrated its industrial and commercial enterprises under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. According to Ministry’s 2019 annual report, there are 105 state-owned companies, with a combined value of USD 20 billion. The government is the majority shareholder of 39 companies and a minority shareholder in the remaining 66. Among the most notable companies with a government stake are Ecopetrol (Colombia’s majority state-owned and privately-run oil company), ISA (electricity distribution), Banco Agrario de Colombia, Bancoldex, and Satena (regional airline). SOEs competing in the Colombian market do not receive non-market-based advantages from the government. The Ministry of Finance normally updates their annual report on SOEs every June. Decree 2111 of 2019, formalized the creation of financial holding company Grupo Bicenterario. The holding company seeks to optimize the administration of Colombia’s state-owned enterprises, centralize property rights, and incorporate recommendations from the OECD regarding the composition of their boards of directors.

Colombia has privatized state-owned enterprises under article 60 of the Constitution and Law Number 226 of 1995. This law stipulates that the sale of government holdings in an enterprise should be offered to two groups: first to cooperatives and workers’ associations of the enterprise, then to the general public. During the first phase, special terms and credits must be granted, and in the second phase, foreign investors may participate along with the general public. A series of privatizations planned for 2020 were postponed to 2021 due to the pandemic. The government views stimulating private-sector investment in roads, ports, electricity, and gas infrastructure as a high priority. The government is increasingly turning to concessions and using public-private partnerships (PPPs) to secure and incentivize infrastructure development.

In order to attract investment and promote PPPs, Colombian modified infrastructure regulations to clarify provisions for frequently-cited obstacles to participation, including environmental licensing, land acquisition, and the displacement of public utilities. The law puts in place a civil procedure that facilitates land expropriation during court cases, allows for expedited environmental licensing, and clarifies that the cost to move or replace public utilities affected by infrastructure projects falls on private companies. However, infrastructure development companies considering bidding on tenders have raised concerns about unacceptable levels of risk that result from a law (Ley 80) establishing the framework for public works projects. They interpret Ley 80 as not establishing liability caps on potential judgments, and that it views company officials equivalent to those with fiscal oversight authority when it comes to criminal liability for misfeasance.

Municipal enterprises operate many public utilities and infrastructure services. These municipal enterprises have engaged private sector investment through concessions. There are several successful concessions involving roads. These partnerships have helped promote reforms and create a more attractive environment for private, national, and foreign investment.

The Costa Rican government’s general attitude towards foreign portfolio investment is prudently welcoming, seeking to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the economy while minimizing the instability that might be caused by the sudden entry or exit of funds. The securities exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores) is small and is dominated by trading in bonds. Stock trading is of limited significance and involves less than 10 of the country’s larger companies, resulting in an illiquid secondary market. There is a small secondary market in commercial paper and repurchase agreements. The Costa Rican government has in recent years explicitly welcomed foreign institutional investors purchasing significant volumes of Costa Rican dollar-denominated government debt in the local market. The securities exchange regulator (SUGEVAL) is generally perceived to be effective.

Costa Rica accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII, agreeing not to impose restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions or engage in discriminatory currency arrangements, except with IMF approval. There are no controls on capital flows in or out of Costa Rica or on portfolio investment in publicly traded companies. Some capital flows are subject to a withholding tax (see section on Foreign Exchange and Remittances). Within Costa Rica, credit is largely allocated on market terms, although long-term capital is scarce. Favorable lending terms for USD-denominated loans compared to colon-denominated loans have made USD-denominated mortgage financing popular and common. Foreign investors are able to borrow in the local market; they are also free to borrow from abroad, although a 15% withholding tax on interest paid will apply when the creditor is a non-tax resident in the country, under the reasoning that the interest payment constitutes income from a Costa Rican source. Potential overseas borrowers must also consider Costa Rica’s limitation on the deductibility of financial expenses by the debtor when the creditor is not an entity regulated in its country of origin by a body like the Costa Rican financial supervisory authority (SUGEF). In such cases, deductible interest for the current fiscal year is around 30% of EBITDA -Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization.

Costa Rica’s financial system boasts a relatively high financial inclusion rate, estimated by the Central Bank through August 2020 at 81.5 percent (the percentage of adults over the age of 15 holding a bank account). Non-resident foreigners may open what are termed “simplified accounts” in Costa Rican financial institutions, while resident foreigners have full access to all banking services.

The banking sector is healthy and well-regulated, although the 2020 non-performing loan ratio of 2.4 percent of active loans as of December 2021 (2.8 percent in state-owned banks) would be significantly higher if not for Covid-19 temporary regulatory measures allowing banks to readjust loans. The country hosts a large number of smaller private banks, credit unions, and factoring houses, although the four state-owned banks (two commercial, one mortgage and one workers’) are still dominant, accounting for 46 percent of the country’s financial system assets. Consolidated total assets of those state-owned banks were USD 29.6 billion, while combined assets of the regulated financial sector (public banks, private banks, savings-and-loans and others) were almost USD 64 billion as of December 2021.

Costa Rica’s Central Bank performs the functions of a central bank while also providing support to the four autonomous financial superintendencies (Banking, Securities, Pensions and Insurance) under the supervision of the national council for the supervision of the financial system (CONASSIF). The Central Bank developed and operates the financial system’s transaction settlement and direct transfer mechanism “SINPE” through which clients transfer money to and from accounts with any other account in the financial system. The Central Bank’s governance structure is strong, with a significant degree of autonomy from the Executive Branch.

Foreign banks may establish both full operations and branch operations in the country under the supervision of the banking regulator SUGEF. The Central Bank has a good reputation and has had no problem maintaining sufficient correspondent relationships. Costa Rica is steadily improving its ability to ensure the efficacy of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism finance. The Costa Rican financial sector in broad terms appears to be satisfied to date with the available correspondent banking services.

The OECD 2020 report “review of the financial system” for Costa Rica is an excellent resource for those seeking more detail on the current state of Costa Rica’s financial system: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/Costa-Rica-Review-of-Financial-System-2020.pdf .

Costa Rica does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund.

Costa Rica’s total of 28 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are commonly known by their abbreviated names. They include monopolies in petroleum-derived fuels (RECOPE), lottery (JPS), railroads (INCOFER), local production of ethanol (CNP/FANAL), water distribution (AyA), and electrical distribution (ICE, CNFL, JASEC, ESPH). SOEs have market dominance in insurance (INS), telecommunications (ICE, RACSA, JASEC, ESPH) and finance (BNCR, BCR, Banco Popular, BANHVI, INVU, INFOCOOP). They have significant market participation in parcel and mail delivery (Correos) and ports operation (INCOP and JAPDEVA). Six of those SOEs hold significant economic power with revenues exceeding 1 percent of GDP: ICE, RECOPE, INS, BNCR, BCR and Banco Popular. The 2020 OECD report “Corporate Governance in Costa Rica” reports that Costa Rican SOE employment is 1.9% of total employment, somewhat below the OECD average of 2.5%. Audited returns for each SOE may be found on each company’s website, while basic revenue and costs for each SOE are available on the General Controller’s Office (CGR) “Sistema de Planes y Presupuestos” https://www.cgr.go.cr/02-consultas/consulta-pp.html . The Costa Rican government does not currently hold minority stakes in commercial enterprises.

Costa Rican state-owned enterprises have not in recent decades required continuous and substantial state subsidy to survive. Several (notably ICE, AyA and RECOPE) registered major losses in pandemic year 2020, while others (INS, BCR, BNCR) registered substantial profits, which are allocated as dictated by law and boards of directors. Financial allocations to and earnings from SOEs may be found in the CGR “Sistema de Informacion de Planes y Presupuestos (SIPP)”.

U.S. investors and their advocates cite some of the following ways in which Costa Rican SOEs competing in the domestic market receive non-market-based advantages because of their status as state-owned entities.

• According to Law 7200, electricity generated privately must be purchased by public entities and the installed capacity of the private sector is limited to 30 percent of total electrical installed capacity in the country: 15 percent to small privately-owned renewable energy plants and 15 percent to larger “buildoperatetransfer” (BOT) operations.
• Telecoms and technology sector companies have called attention to the fact that government agencies often choose SOEs as their telecom services providers despite a full assortment of private-sector telecom companies. The Information and Telecommunications Business Chamber (CAMTIC) has long protested against what its members feel to be unfair use by government entities of a provision (Article 2) in the public contracting law that allows noncompetitive award of contracts to public entities (also termed “direct purchase”) when functionaries of the awarding entity certify the award to be an efficient use of public funds. CAMTIC has compiled detailed statistics showing that while the yearly total dollar value of Costa Rican government direct purchases in the IT sector under Article 2 has dropped considerably from USD 226 million in 2017, to USD 72.5 million in 2018, USD 27.5 million in 2019, USD 54 million in 2020, and USD 5 million in 2021, the number of purchases has actually increased from 56 purchases in both 2017 and 2018 to 86 in 2019, 104 in 2020, and 115 in 2021.
• The state-owned insurance provider National Insurance Institute (INS) has been adjusting to private sector competition since 2009 but in 2021 still registered 66 percent of total insurance premiums paid; 13 insurers are now registered with insurance regulator SUGESE: ( https://www.sugese.fi.cr/SitePages/index.aspx ). Competitors point to unfair advantages enjoyed by the stateowned insurer INS, including a strong tendency among SOE’s to contract their insurance with INS.

Costa Rica is not a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) although it is registered as an observer. Costa Rica is working to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs ( www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecdguidelinesoncorporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises.htm ). For more information on Costa Rica’s SOE’s, see the OECD Accession report “Corporate Governance in Costa Rica”, dated October 2020: https://www.oecd.org/countries/costarica/corporate-governance-in-costa-rica-b313ec37-en.htm  .

Costa Rica does not have a privatization program and the markets that have been opened to competition in recent decades – banking, telecommunications, insurance and Atlantic Coast container port operations – were opened without privatizing the corresponding state-owned enterprises (SOs). Two relatively minor SOEs, the state liquor company (Fanal) and the International Bank of Costa Rica (Bicsa), are the most likely targets for privatization if such political sentiment grows.

Government policies generally encourage foreign portfolio investment.

The Regional Stock Exchange (BRVM) is in Abidjan and the BRVM lists companies from the eight countries of the WAEMU.  The existing regulatory system effectively facilitates portfolio investment through the West African Central Bank (BCEAO).  The Regional Council for Savings Investments (CREPMF) sets the rules and regulations regarding the market participants and market structure.  There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions. However, the market follows a limit-order mechanism.  Besides traditional foreign trade risk management tools offered by commercial banks (i.e., export credits, trade bills), the stock exchange does not provide markets for forwards, futures, or options derivative instruments.  Market volatility is low.  The market benchmark BRVM Composite rose to 6.63 percent in 2021.

Government policies allow the free flow of financial resources into investing in financial assets.

The BCEAO respects IMF Article VIII on payment and transfers for current international transactions.

Credit allocation is based on market terms and has increased to support the private sector and economic growth, specifically for large businesses.  The Central Bank monitors inflation, money supply, and business cycles to ensure efficient monetary policy.  The average interbank interest rate was 2.61 percent compared to 3.01 percent in 2021, demonstrating the will of WAEMU nations to boost commercial banks’ liquidity and support private sector investment.  Foreign investors can acquire credit on the local market. This year the government facilitated access to capital, lowering borrowing interest rates for real estate companies.

As of December 2021, there were 29 commercial banks and two credit institutions in Côte d’Ivoire.  Banks are expanding their national networks, especially in the secondary cities outside Abidjan, as domestic investment has increased up-country.  The total number of bank branches has more than doubled from 324 in 2010 to 725 branches in 2019 (latest data available).  According to the World Bank, in 2017 (latest data available) 41 percent of the population over the age of 15 have a bank account.  Alternative financial services available include mobile money and microfinance for bill payments and transfers.  Many Ivoirians prefer mobile money over banking, but mobile money does not yet offer the same breadth of financial services as banks.

Most Ivoirian banks are compliant with the BCEAO’s minimum capital requirements. The government facilitated mortgages for foreign investors in housing in Côte d’Ivoire.

Foreign banks are allowed to operate in Côte d’Ivoire; at least one has been in Côte d’Ivoire for decades.  They are subject to the WAEMU Banking Commission’s prudential measures and regulations.  There have been no reports of Côte d’Ivoire losing any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years.  No correspondent banking relationships are known to be in jeopardy.

Côte d’Ivoire does not have a sovereign wealth fund.  Rothschild Bank was reported in the press to have been awarded the contract to create one.

Companies owned or controlled by the state are subject to national laws and the tax code.  The Ivoirian government still holds substantial interests in many firms, including the refinery SIR (49 percent), the public transport firm (60 percent), the national television station RTI (98 percent), the national lottery (80 percent), the national airline Air Côte d’Ivoire (58 percent), and the land management agency Agence de Gestion Foncière AGEF (35 percent).  Total assets of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were $796 million and total net income of SOEs was $116 million in 2018 (latest figures).  Of the 82 SOEs, 28 are wholly government-owned and 12 are majority government-owned, the government owns a blocking minority in seven and holds minority shares in 35.  Each SOE has an independent board.  The government has begun the process of divestiture for some SOEs (see next section).  There are active SOEs in the banking, agri-business, mining, and telecom industries.

The published list of SOEs is available at https://dgpe.gouv.ci/ind ex.php?p=portefeuille_etat

SOEs competing in the domestic market do not receive non-market-based advantages from the government.  They are subject to the same tax burdens and policies as private companies.

Côte d’Ivoire does not adhere to OECD guidelines for SOE corporate governance (it is not a member of OECD).

In 2021, audits of several SOEs highlighted serious irregularities (alleged embezzlement estimated at several tens or even hundreds of billions of FCFA, i.e. up to hundreds of millions of dollars.  The SOEs include FER, FDFP, ARTCI, and ANSUT, whose leaders have been removed and replaced.

The government has been pursuing SOE privatization for decades the most recent of which was in 2018.  That year, the government sold 51 percent of the Housing Bank of Côte d’Ivoire (BHCI – Banque d’Habitat de Côte d’Ivoire).  See previous Investment Climate Statements for past privatization efforts.

Contracts for participation in SOE privatization are competed through a French-language public tendering process, for which foreign investors are encouraged to submit bids.  The Privatization Committee, which reports to the Prime Minister, maintains a website.  The 2019 (latest) report is available at: http://privatisation.gouv.ci.

Croatia’s securities and financial markets are open equally to domestic and foreign investment. Foreign residents may open non-resident accounts and may do business both domestically and abroad.  Specifically, Article 24 of the Foreign Currency Act states that non-residents may subscribe, pay in, purchase, or sell securities in Croatia in accordance with regulations governing securities transactions.  Non-residents and residents are afforded the same treatment in spending and borrowing.  These and other non-resident financial activities regarding securities are covered by the Foreign Currency Act, available on the central bank website (www.hnb.hr).

Securities are traded on the Zagreb Stock Exchange (ZSE).  Regulations that govern activity and participation in the ZSE can be found (in English) at: https://zse.hr/en/legal-regulations/234 .  There are three tiers of securities traded on the ZSE.  The Capital Markets Act regulates all aspects of securities and investment services and defines the responsibilities of the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA). More information can be found (in English) at:  http://www.hanfa.hr/regulations/capital-market/ .

There is sufficient liquidity in the markets to enter and exit sizeable positions.  There are no policies that hinder the free flow of financial resources.  There are no restrictions on international payments or transfers, in accordance with IMF Article VIII.  The private sector, both domestic and foreign-owned, enjoys open access to credit and a variety of credit instruments on the local market, available on market terms.

The banking sector is mostly privatized and is highly developed, competitive, resilient, and increasingly offering a diversity of products to businesses (foreign and domestic) and consumers.  According to conclusions from an IMF Virtual Visit with Croatia in November 2020, the banking sector is one of the strongest sectors of the Croatian economy.  French, German, Italian, and Austrian companies own over 90 percent of Croatia’s banks. As of December 31, 2021, there were 20 commercial banks and three savings banks, with assets totaling $78.75 billion.  The largest bank in Croatia is Italian-owned Zagrebacka Banka, with assets of $20.82 billion and a market share of 26.5 percent. The second largest bank is Italian-owned Privredna Banka Zagreb, with assets totaling $16.46 billion and 20.9 percent market share.  The third largest is Austrian Erste Bank, with assets totaling $13.01 billion and a 16.52 percent market share.  According to Croatian National Bank statistics, the non-performing loans (NPL) rate for Croatia was 4.3 in 2021, down from 5.4 percent in 2020. The country has a central bank system and all information regarding the Croatian National Bank can be found at  https://www.hnb.hr/en/ .

In an extraordinary move facilitated by the Croatian National Bank, state-owned Croatian Postal Bank (HPB) bought Sberbank Croatia, a subsidiary of Sberbank Europe, on March 1, reportedly paying $11 million for Sberbank’s assets. The sale saved Sberbank Croatia from bankruptcy following the collapse of Sberbank Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to the sale, Sberbank Croatia had roughly 60,000 clients and represented 2.21 percent of total bank assets in Croatia.

Non-residents are able to open bank accounts without restrictions or delays.  The Croatian government has not introduced or announced any intention to introduce block chain technologies in banking transactions.

The Croatian Constitution guarantees the free transfer, conversion, and repatriation of profits and invested capital for foreign investments. Article VI of the U.S.-Croatia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) establishes protection for American investors from government exchange controls. The BIT obliges both countries to permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of each other’s territory.  Transfers of currency are additionally protected by Article VII of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement (http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/AA/index.htm#art7 ).

The Croatian Foreign Exchange Act permits foreigners to maintain foreign currency accounts and to make external payments.  The Foreign Exchange Act also defines foreign direct investment (FDI) in a manner that includes use of retained earnings for new investments/acquisitions, but excludes financial investments made by institutional investors such as insurance, pension, and investment funds.  The law also allows Croatian entities and individuals to invest abroad.  Funds associated with any form of investment can be freely converted into any world currency.

On July 10, 2020 the European Central Bank and European Commission announced that Croatia had fulfilled its commitments and the Croatian kuna (HRK) was admitted into the Banking Union and European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II), with the exchange rate between the kuna and the euro (EUR) pegged at EUR 1 to 7.5345 HRK. Any risk of currency devaluation or significant depreciation is generally low. The Croatian government intends to adopt the euro on January 1, 2023.

Remittance Policies

No limitations exist, either temporal or by volume, on remittances.  The U.S. Embassy in Zagreb has not received any complaints from American companies regarding transfers and remittances.

Croatia does not own any sovereign wealth funds.

REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

The Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE), launched in 1996, is one of the EU’s smallest stock exchanges, with a capitalization of USD 3.7 billion (EUR 3.4 billion) as of March 2022. The CSE and the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) have operated from a joint trading platform since 2006, allowing capital to move more freely from one exchange to the other, even though both exchanges retain their autonomy and independence. The joint platform has increased capital available to Cypriot firms and improved the CSE’s liquidity, although its small size remains a constraint. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments, which has been enhanced through the operation of private venture capital firms. Credit is allocated on market terms to foreign and local investors alike. Foreign investors may acquire up to 100 percent of the share capital of Cypriot companies listed on the CSE with the notable exception of companies in the banking sector.

AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS

There is no stock exchange in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots and no foreign portfolio investment. Foreign investors are able to get credit from the local market, provided they have established domestic legal presence, majority-owned (at least 51 percent) by domestic companies or persons.

REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

At the end of November 2021, the value of total deposits in ROC banks was USD 56.3 billion (EUR 51.2 billion), and the value of total loans was USD 32.6 billion (EUR 29.6 billion). Currently, there are seven local banks in Cyprus offering a full range of retail and corporate banking services – the largest two of which are the Bank of Cyprus and Hellenic Bank – plus another two dozen or so subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks offering more specialized services. The full list of authorized credit institutions in Cyprus is available on the Central bank of Cyprus website: https://www.centralbank.cy/en/licensing-supervision/banks/register-of-credit-institutions-operating-in-cyprus .

The banking sector has made significant progress since the 2013 financial crisis resulted in a “haircut” of uninsured deposits, followed by numerous bankruptcies and consolidation. The island’s two largest banks – Bank of Cyprus and Hellenic – are now adequately capitalized and have returned to profitability. However, the profitability of the banking sector as a whole is challenged by low interest margins, a high level of liquidity, and a still-elevated volume of NPLs. NPLs in Cyprus are the second-highest in the EU at 15.1 percent of total loans at the end of November 2021, compared to 19.1 percent a year earlier, albeit considerably lower than in 2014, when they reached 47.8 percent. Banks continue striving to reduce NPLs further, either by selling off portfolios of NPLs or using recently amended insolvency and foreclosure frameworks. The economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and political pressure to protect citizens under the current extraordinary circumstances makes reducing NPLs difficult. Aggregate banking sector data is available here: https://www.centralbank.cy/en/licensing-supervision/banks/aggregate-cyprus-banking-sector-data .

Cyprus has a central bank – the Central Bank of Cyprus – which forms part of the European Central Bank. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in Cyprus. They are subject to Central Bank of Cyprus supervision, just like domestic banks. JPMorgan, Citibank, Bank of New York Mellon, and HSBC currently provide U.S. dollar correspondent banking services to ROC banks.

Opening a personal or corporate bank account in Cyprus is straightforward, requiring routine documents. But because of a history of money-laundering concerns, banks now carefully scrutinize these documents and can conduct extensive due diligence checks on sources of wealth and income. A local bank account is not necessary for personal household expenses. Opening a corporate bank account is mandatory when registering a company in Cyprus.

Since 2018, Cyprus has taken steps to address recognized regulatory shortcomings in combatting illicit finance in its international banking and financial services sector, tightening controls over non-resident shell companies and bank accounts. Cyprus’ first National Risk Assessment (NRA) of money laundering and terrorist financing, released in November 2018, is available at: http://mof.gov.cy/en/press-office/announcements/national-risk-assessment-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risks-cyprus . Cyprus is a member of the Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a FATF-style regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation report of the Cypriot banking sector, released December 2021, can be found at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/moneyval/jurisdictions/cyprus .

AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS

The “Central Bank” oversees and regulates local, foreign, and private banks. In addition to the “Central Bank” and the “Development Bank”, there are 21 banks in the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, of which 16 are Turkish Cypriot-owned banks, and five are branch banks from Turkey. Banks are required to follow “know-your-customer” (KYC) and AML “laws,” which are regulated by the “Ministry of Economy and Energy,” and supervised by the “Central Bank,” but AML practices do not meet international standards. Due to non-recognition issues, Turkish Cypriot banks do not qualify for a SWIFT number to facilitate international transactions. All international transfers depend on routing through Turkish banks.

In the third quarter of 2021, total deposits, which have the largest share in the sector’s total liabilities, reached 48,8 billion TL (USD 3.3 billion).

As of the end of the third quarter of 2021 , NPLs reached 1.5 Billion Turkish Lira (USD 10 million).

REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

The Parliament passed legislation in March 2019 providing for the establishment of a National Investment Fund (NIF) to manage future offshore hydrocarbons and other natural resources revenue. Section 29 of the NIF Law specifies that the Corporation to be set up shall invest the Fund in a diversified manner with a view to maximizing risk-adjusted financial returns and in a manner consistent with the portfolio management by a prudent institutional investor. The Fund is precluded from investing in securities issued by a Cypriot issuer (including the state) or in real estate located in Cyprus. This provision safeguards against the possibility of speculative development catering to the Fund and political interference favoring domestic investments for purposes other than the best interests of the Fund and the Cypriot people as a whole. Additionally, Section 30 of the law provides that the fund cannot invest, directly or indirectly, to acquire more than five percent of any one company or legal entity. The fund is not yet operational. Regulations for the NIF are being drafted and will require legislative approval, and it will be several years before there are any revenues generated from the ROC’s hydrocarbon assets.

AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS

There is no established sovereign wealth fund.

REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

The ROC maintains exclusive or majority-owned stakes in more than 40 SOEs and is making slow progress towards privatizing some of them (see sections on Privatization and OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs). There is no comprehensive list of all SOEs available but the most significant are the following:

• Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC);
• Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CyTA);
• Cyprus Sports Organization;
• Cyprus Ports Authority;
• Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC);
• Cyprus Theatrical Organization; and
• Cyprus Agricultural Payments Organization.

These SOEs operate in a competitive environment (domestically and internationally) and are increasingly responsive to market conditions. The state-owned EAC monopoly on electricity generation and distribution ended in 2014, although competition remains difficult given the small market size and delays in implementing new market rules. As an EU Member State, Cyprus is a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA).

OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance are not mandatory for ROC SOEs, although some of the larger SOEs have started adopting elements of corporate governance best practices in their operating procedures. Each of the SOEs is subject to dedicated legislation. Most are governed by a board of directors, typically appointed by the government at the start of its term, and for the duration of its term in office. SOE board chairs are typically technocrats, affiliated with the ruling party. Representatives of labor unions and minority shareholders contribute to decision making. Although they enjoy a fair amount of independence, they report to the relevant minister. SOEs are required by law to publish annual reports and submit their books to the Auditor General.

AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS

In the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, there are several “state-owned enterprises” and “semi-state-owned enterprises,” usually common utilities and essential services.

In the Turkish Cypriot administered area, the below-listed institutions are known as “public economic enterprises” (POEs), “semi-public enterprises” and “public institutions,” which aim to provide common utilities and essential services.

Some of these organizations include:

• Turkish Cypriot Electricity Board (KIBTEK);
• BRTK – State Television and Radio Broadcasting Corporation;
• Cyprus Turkish News Agency;
• Turkish Cypriot Milk Industry;
• Cypruvex Ltd. – Citrus Facility;
• EMU – Eastern Mediterranean Foundation Board;
• Agricultural Products Corporation;
• Turkish Cypriot Tobacco Products Corporation;
• Turkish Cypriot Alcoholic Products LTD;
• Coastal Safety and Salvage Services LTD; and
• Turkish Cypriot Development Bank.

REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

The ROC has made limited progress towards privatizations, despite earlier commitments to international creditors in 2013 to raise USD 1.6 billion (EUR 1.4 billion) from privatizations by 2018. In 2017, opposition parties passed legislation abolishing the Privatizations Unit, an independent body established March 2014. A bill providing the transfer of Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CyTA) commercial activities to a private legal entity, with the government retaining majority ownership, has been pending since March 2018. In December 2015, under the threat of strikes, the government reversed earlier plans to privatize the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC). However, in recent years, the EAC has been forced to unbundle its operations in line with Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA) recommendations and EU regulations. The EAC has created independent units for its core regulated activities, namely Transmission, Distribution, Generation, and Supply. Private firms have been offering renewable energy generation since 2003 and electricity supply since January 1, 2021.

Despite slow progress in electricity and telecommunications, the current administration continues pursuing privatizations in other areas. In August 2020, the government assigned the Larnaca marina and port privatization project to a Cyprus-Israeli consortium, based on a 40-year lease agreement. The project, starting in April 2022, will be completed in four phases by 2037. It provides for port infrastructure, a marina, land redevelopment, a road network, green areas, parks and pedestrian areas as well as residential units and catering and recreation establishments. At a cost of about EUR1.2 billion, this project will be the biggest investment in Cyprus so far.

The government also continues efforts to sell the state lottery, find long-term investors to lease state-owned properties in the Troodos area, and forge a strategic plan on how to handle the Cyprus Stock Exchange.

AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS

The airport at Ercan and K-Pet Petroleum Corporation have been converted into public-private partnerships. The concept of privatization continues to be controversial in the Turkish Cypriot community.

In March 2015, Turkish Cypriot authorities signed a public-private partnership agreement with Turkey regarding the management and operation of the water obtained from an underwater pipeline funded by Turkey. Within the area administrated by Turkish Cypriots, there has also been discussion about privatizing the electricity authority “KIBTEK”, Turkish Cypriot telecommunications operations, and the seaports.

The Czech Republic is open to portfolio investment.  There are 54 companies listed on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE).  The overall trade volume of stocks increased from CZK108.78 billion (USD4.7 billion) in 2019 to CZK125.31 (USD5.4 billion) in 2020, with an average daily trading volume of CZK501.23 million (USD21.7 million).

In March 2007, the PSE created the Prague Energy Exchange (PXE), which was later re-named to Power Exchange Central Europe, to trade electricity in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and, later, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.  PXE’s goal is to increase liquidity in the electricity market and create a standardized platform for trading energy.  In 2016, the German power exchange EEX acquired two thirds of PXE shares.  Following the acquisition, the PXE benefited from both an increased number of traders and increased trade volume.

The Czech National Bank, as the financial market supervisory authority, sets rules to safeguard the stability of the banking sector, capital markets, and insurance and pension scheme industries, and systematically regulates, supervises and, where appropriate, issues penalties for non-compliance with these rules.

The Central Credit Register (CCR) is an information system that pools information on the credit commitments of individual entrepreneurs and legal entities, facilitating the efficient exchange of information between CCR participants.  CCR participants consist of all banks and branches of foreign banks operating in the Czech Republic, as well as other individuals included in a special law.

As an EU member country, the local market provides credits and credit instruments on market terms that are available to foreign investors.

The Czech Republic respects IMF Article VIII.

Large domestic banks belong to European banking groups.  Most operate conservatively and concentrate almost exclusively on the domestic Czech market.  Despite the COVID-19 crisis, Czech banks remain healthy.  Results of regular banking sector stress tests, as conducted by the Czech National Bank, repeatedly confirm the strong state of the Czech banking sector which is deemed resistant to potential shocks.  Results of the most recent stress test conducted by the Czech National Bank are available at: https://www.cnb.cz/en/financial-stability/stress-testing/banking-sector/.  As of January 31, 2022, the total assets of commercial banks stood at CZK9,405 billion (approximately USD409 billion).  Foreign investors have access to bank credit on the local market, and credit is generally allocated on market terms.

The Czech National Bank has 10 correspondent banking relationships, including JP Morgan Chase Bank in New York and the Royal Bank of Canada in Toronto.  The Czech Republic has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years, and there are no relationships in jeopardy.

The Czech Republic does not currently regulate cryptocurrencies.

The Czech government does not operate a sovereign wealth fund.

The Ministry of Finance administers state ownership policies.  State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are structured as joint-stock companies, state enterprises, national enterprises, limited liability companies, and limited partnerships.  SOEs are owned by the individual ministries but are managed according to their business organizational structure as defined by law and are required to publish an annual report, disclose their accounting books, and submit to an independent audit.  Potential conflicts of interest are covered by existing Act No. 159/2006 on Conflicts of Interest, and Act No. 14/2017 on Amendments to the Act on Conflict of Interest.  Legislation on the civil service, which took effect January 1, 2015, established measures to prevent political influence over public administration, including operation of SOEs.

Private enterprises are generally allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, government contracts and other business operations.  SOEs purchase or supply goods and services from private sector and foreign firms.  SOEs are subject to the same domestic accounting standards, rules, and taxation policies as their private competitors, and are not given any material advantages compared to private entities.  State-owned or majority state-owned companies are present in several (strategic) sectors, including the energy, postal service, information and communication, and transport sectors.

The Czech Republic has 52 wholly owned SOEs and three majority owned SOEs (excluding those in liquidation).  Wholly owned SOEs employ roughly 78,000 people and own more than CZK487 billion (approximately USD21.1 billion) in assets.  A list of all companies with a percentage of state ownership is available in Czech at:  https://www.komora.cz/legislation/167-19-strategie-vlastnicke-politiky-statu-t-20-12-2019/.

As an OECD member, the Czech Republic promotes the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the affiliated Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs.  SOEs are subject to the same legislation as private enterprises regarding their commercial activities.

As a result of several waves of privatization, the vast majority of the Czech economy is now in private hands.  Privatizations have generally been open to foreign investors.  In fact, most major SOEs were privatized with foreign participation.  The government evaluates all investment offers for SOEs.  Many competitors have alleged non-transparent or unfair practices in connection with past privatizations.

The government welcomes investment including by foreign portfolio investors. A small number of private equity firms are actively investing in the mining industry. The institutional investor base is not well developed, with only an insurance company and a state pension fund as participants. There is no market for derivatives in the country. Cross-shareholding and stable shareholding arrangements are also not common. Credit is allocated on market terms, but there are occasional complaints about unfair privileges extended to certain investors in profitable sectors such as mining and telecommunications.

There is no domestic stock market. Although reforms have been initiated, the Congolese financial system remains small, heavily dollarized, characterized by fragile balance sheets, and difficult to use. Further reforms are needed to strengthen the financial system, sustain its expansion, and stimulate economic growth. Inadequate risk-based controls, weak regulatory enforcement, low profitability, and over-reliance on demand deposits undermine the resilience of the financial system. The DRC’s capital market remains underdeveloped and consists primarily of the issuance of Treasury bonds.

The Central Bank refrains from making restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

It is possible for foreign companies to borrow from local banks, but their options are limited. Loan terms are generally limited to 3-6 months, and interest rates are typically 16-21 percent. The inconsistent legal system, the often-burdensome business climate, and the difficulty of obtaining interbank financing discourage banks from making long-term loans. Opportunities for financing large projects in the national currency, the Congolese franc (CDF), are limited.

The Congolese financial system is comprised of 15 licensed banks, a national insurance company (SONAS), the National Social Security Institute (INSS), one development bank, SOFIDE (Société Financière de Development), a savings fund (CADECO), roughly 21 microfinance institutions and 72 cooperatives, 81 money transfer institutions which are concentrated in Kinshasa, Kongo Central, former Bandundu, North and South Kivu and the former Katanga provinces, 4 electronic money institutions, and 48 foreign exchange offices.

While the financial system is improving, it is fragmented and dominated by so-called “local” banks. With very different profiles (international, local, pan-African, networked, corporate, etc.) and approaches that diverge fundamentally in terms of management, governance, and terms of management and risk appetite, the so-called “local” commercial banks continue to dominate the banking sector. Pan-African banks are increasing their share, especially with the recent acquisition of the Banque Commerciale du Congo by the Kenyan Equity Group.

The Central Bank controls monetary policy and regulates the banking system. Banks are mainly concentrated in the provinces of Kinshasa, Kongo Central, North and South Kivu, and Haut Katanga. The banking penetration rate is about 7.6 percent, or about 5.3 million accounts, which places the country among the least banked nations in the world.

Mobile banking has the potential to significantly increase the banking customer base, as an estimated 35 million Congolese use cell phones. In the last five years, there has been an evolution and consolidation of prudential ratios or risk indicators of the banking sector and the introduction of alternative channels for financial service delivery and inclusion, such as Agency Banking and Mobile Banking. Mobile money continues to play an increasingly important role in financial inclusion in the DRC, as mobile money is a lever for economic and social inclusion. Over the past ten years, mobile money subscriptions in the DRC have increased by 20 percent per year.

There is no debt market. The financial health of DRC banks is fragile, reflecting high operating costs and exchange rates. In 2021 asset quality measures taken by the Central Bank allowed banks to absorb the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Fees charged by banks are a major source of revenue.

Statistics on non-performing loans are not available because many banks only record the balance due and not the total amount of their non-performing loans.

The financial system is primarily based on the banking sector, with total assets estimated at US$ 5.2 billion. Of the five largest banks, four are local and one is controlled by foreign holding companies. The five largest banks hold nearly 65 percent of bank deposits and more than 60 percent of total bank assets, or about $ 3.1 billion.

The country has an operating central banking system with Citigroup as the only correspondent bank.

All foreign banks or branches need to be accredited by the Central Bank, are considered Congolese banks with foreign capital, and fall under the provisions and regulations covering the credit institutions’ activities in the DRC.

There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account in the DRC.

The DRC has no declared Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), although the 2018 Mining Code refers to creating a future fund “FOMIN” that will be capitalized by a percentage of mining revenues. In October 2021, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Technical Secretariat organized a workshop to develop the FOMIN decree as well as tools for managing the shares of mining royalties accruing to the provinces and local entities.

Denmark has fully liberalized foreign exchange flows, including those for direct and portfolio investment purposes. Credit is allocated on market terms and is freely available. Denmark adheres to its IMF Article VIII obligations. The Danish banking system is under the regulatory oversight of the Financial Supervisory Authority. Differentiated voting rights – A and B stocks – are used to some extent, and several Danish companies are controlled by foundations, which can restrict potential hostile takeovers, including foreign takeovers.

The Danish stock market functions efficiently. In 2005, the Copenhagen Stock Exchange became part of the integrated Nordic and Baltic marketplace, OMX Exchanges, which is headquartered in Stockholm. Besides Stockholm and Copenhagen, OMX also includes the stock exchanges in Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. To increase the access to capital for primarily small companies, the OMX in December 2005 opened a Nordic alternative marketplace – “First North” – in Denmark. In February 2008, the NASDAQ-OMX Group acquired the exchanges. In the World Economic Forum 2019 report, Denmark ranked 11th out of 141 on the metric “Financial System.”

The Danish stock market is divided into four different branches/indexes. The C25 index contains the 25 most valuable companies in Denmark. Other large companies with a market value exceeding $1.05 billion (EUR 1 billion) are in the group of “Large Cap,” companies with a market value between $158 million (EU 150 million) and $1.05 billion (EUR 1 billion) belong to the “Mid Cap” segment, while companies with a market value smaller than $158 million (EU 150 million) belong to the “Small Cap” group.

The major Danish banks are rated by international agencies, and their creditworthiness is rated as high by international standards. The European Central Bank and the Danish National Bank reported that Denmark’s major banks have passed stress tests by considerable margins.

Denmark’s banking sector is relatively large; based on the ratio of consolidated banking assets to GDP, the sector is three times bigger than the national economy. By January 2022, the total of Danish shares valued $673.4 billion (DKK 4.24 trillion) and were owned 55.1 percent by foreign owners and 44.9 percent by Danish owners, including 13.5 percent held by households and 3.9 percent by the government. The three largest Danish banks – Danske Bank, Nordea Bank Danmark, and Jyske Bank – hold approximately 75 percent of the total assets in the Danish banking sector.

The primary goal of the Central Bank (Nationalbanken) is to maintain the peg of the Danish currency to the Euro – with allowed fluctuations of 2.25 percent. It also functions as the general lender to Danish commercial banks and controls the money supply in the economy.

As occurred in many countries, Danish banks experienced significant turbulence in 2008 – 2009. The Danish parliament subsequently passed a series of measures to establish a “safety net” program, provide government lending to financial institutions in need of capital to uphold their solvency requirements, and ensure the orderly winding down of failed banks. The parliament passed an additional measure, named Bank Package 4, in August 2011, which sought to identify systemically important financial institutions, ensure the liquidity of banks that assume control of a troubled bank, support banks acquiring troubled banks by allowing them to write off obligations of the troubled bank to the government, and change the funding mechanism for the sector-funded guarantee fund to a premiums-based, pay-as-you-go system. According to the Danish government, Bank Package 4 provides mechanisms for a sector solution to troubled banks without senior debt holder losses but does not supersede earlier legislation. As such, senior debt holder losses are still a possibility in the event of a bank failure.

On October 10, 2013, the Danish Minister for Business and Growth concluded a political agreement with broad political support which, based on the most recent financial statements, identified specific financial institutions as “systemically important” (SIFI). The SIFIs in Denmark as of June 2021, the most recent designation, are Danske Bank A/S, Nykredit Realkredit A/S, Nordea Kredit Realkreditaktieselskab, Jyske Bank A/S, Sydbank A/S, DLR Kredit A/S, Spar Nord Bank A/S and A/S Arbejdernes Landsbank. The government identified these institutions based on three quantitative measures: 1) a balance sheet to GDP ratio above 6.5 percent; 2) market share of lending in Denmark above 5 percent; or 3) market share of deposits in Denmark above 3 percent. If an institution is above the requirement of any one of the three measures, it will be considered systemically important and must adhere to the stricter requirements on capitalization, liquidity, and resolution. The Faroese SIFIs are P/F BankNordik, and Betri Banki P/F, while Grønlandsbanken is the only SIFI in Greenland.

The Danish government projected in May 2022 that Denmark’s debt to GDP ratio will decrease from approximately 42 percent at the end of 2020 to 33 percent by the end of 2023. The Ministry of Finance announced in May 2022 that Denmark ran a 2.3 percent budget surplus in 2021, and projects budget surpluses of 0.6 percent and 0.2 percent in 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Denmark maintains no sovereign wealth funds.

Denmark is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the WTO. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) hold dominant positions in rail, energy, utilities, and broadcast media in Denmark. Large-scale public procurement must go through public tender in accordance with EU legislation. Competition from SOEs is not considered a barrier to foreign investment in Denmark. As an OECD member, Denmark promotes and upholds the OECD Corporate Governance Principles and subsidiary SOE Guidelines.

Denmark has no current plans to privatize its SOEs.

Djibouti is open to and receptive of foreign investors. Djibouti does not have its own stock market, but some multinational companies with investments in Djibouti are publicly traded. Portfolio investment in Djibouti is primarily done through private equity investments in a given sector, rather than through purchase of securities. Investments in Djibouti are inherently illiquid for that reason, and the purchase or sale of any sizeable investment in Djibouti affects the market accordingly. Existing policies respect IMF Article VIII and allow the free flow of funds for international transactions.

Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign companies do not face discrimination in obtaining it. Generally, however, only well-established businesses obtain bank credit, as the cost of credit is high. Credit is available to the private sector, whether foreign or domestic. Where credit is not available, it is primarily due to the associated risk and not structural factors.

Three large banks, Bank of Africa, Bank for Commerce and Industry – Mer Rouge, and CAC bank dominate Djibouti’s banking sector. While these three banks account for the majority share of deposits in-country, there are 13 total banks, all established in the last 14 years. The 2011 banking law fixed the minimum capital requirement for financial institutions at DJF 1 billion (USD 5,651,250) and also covers financial auxiliaries, such as money transfer agencies and Islamic financial institutions. In addition to the three names banks above, foreign banks include Silkroad Bank, Bank of China, and the Burkina Faso-based International Business Bank.

The banking sector suffers from a lack of consistent supervision, but it has been improving. Non-performing loans decreased from 16.26% in 2019 to 13.31% in 2020 and to 9.8% in 2021. The total assets of all the banks were estimated to be USD 3.1 billion in 2020, of which 80% were held by the four largest banks. The country has a Central Bank, which is in charge of delivering licenses to banks and supervising them. Foreign banks or branches are allowed to establish operations in the country. They are subject to the same regulations as local banks. Djibouti has not announced that it intends to implement or allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in its banking transactions. Some banks have begun to provide mobile and e-banking services. In June 2020, Djibouti Telecom launched D-Money, a Digital Mobile Money service which allows users to make digital money transfers and payments directly from mobile phones.

Foreign Exchange

Djibouti has no foreign exchange restrictions. Businesses are free to repatriate profits. There are no limitations on converting or transferring funds, or on the inflow and outflow of cash. The Djiboutian franc, which has been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1949, is stable. The fixed exchange rate is 177.71 Djiboutian francs to the U.S. dollar. Funds can be transferred by using banks or international money transfer companies such as Western Union, all monitored by the Central Bank.

Remittance Policies

There are no recent changes or plans to change investment remittance policies. There are no time limitations on remittances. The government does not issue bonds on the open market, and cash-like instruments are not in common use in Djibouti, so direct currency transfers are the only practical method of remitting profits.

In mid-2020 the Djiboutian government announced the creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund. According to a government statement, the state-owned fund targets investments locally and in neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa. It focuses on industries including telecommunications, technology, energy, and logistics. The fund acts as a long-term investor and is required to reinvest the entire net profits of its activity. The government aims to fund it to $1.5 billion within ten years. Article 12 of Law N° 75/AN/20/8th L, creating the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti, states the fund will adopt and implement best practice in terms of transparency and performance reporting in accordance with the Santiago Principles. As of late 2021, the fund was ramping up operations.

Law No. 75/AN/20/8th L establishing the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti – https://www.presidence.dj/texte/75-an-20-8eme-l-10332 

Decree No. 2020-127/PRE approving the statutes and determining certain initial resources of the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti – https://www.presidence.dj/texte/2020-127-pre-10361 

Decree No. 2020-111/PRE appointing the members of the Board of Directors and the Director General of the Sovereign Fund of Djibouti – https://www.presidence.dj/texte/2020-111-pre-10360 

Dominica is a member of the ECCU.  As such, it is a member of the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market.  The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing the buying and selling of financial products for the eight member territories.  In 2021, the ECSE listed 164 securities, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities.  Market capitalization stood at $1.9 billion. Dominica is open to portfolio investment.

Dominica has accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement, Sections 2, 3, and 4 and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions.  Dominica does not normally grant foreign tax credits except in the case of taxes paid in a British Commonwealth country that grants similar relief for Dominica taxes or where an applicable tax treaty provides a credit.  The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.

The eight participating governments of the ECCU have passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act.  The act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. Dominica is a signatory to this agreement and the ECCB controls Dominica’s currency and regulates its domestic banks.

The Banking Act is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU.  The Minister of Finance usually acts in consultation with, and on the recommendation of, the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio.

Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Dominica.  The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed in order to conduct any banking business.  The ECCB regulates financial institutions.  As part of ongoing supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB.  In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in Dominica as stable.  Assets of commercial banks totaled $781.8 million (2.1 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of 2019. Dominica is well served by bank and non-financial institutions.  There are minimal alternative financial services.

The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S. and European banks.  CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to monitor the issue.

In 2019, the ECCB launched an 18-month financial technology pilot to launch a Digital Eastern Caribbean dollar (DXCD) with its partner, Barbados-based Bitt Inc.  An accompanying mobile application, DCash was officially launched in March 2021 in four pilot countries, adding Dominica to the pilot in December 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. The digital Eastern Caribbean currency operates alongside physical Eastern Caribbean currency.  Dominica does not have any specific legislation to regulate cryptocurrencies.

Neither the Government of Dominica, nor the ECCB, of which Dominica is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Dominica work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit to carry out certain specific ministerial responsibilities.  The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown is aware of 20 SOEs currently operating in areas such as tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, solid waste management, and agriculture.  There is no published list of these SOEs.  They are all wholly owned government entities.  Each is headed by a board of directors to which senior management reports.  The SOE sector is affected by financial sustainability challenges, with resources insufficient to cover capital replacement.

Dominica does not currently have a targeted privatization program.

Dominica is a member of the ECCU.  As such, it is a member of the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE) and the Regional Government Securities Market.  The ECSE is a regional securities market established by the ECCB and licensed under the Securities Act of 2001, a uniform regional body of legislation governing the buying and selling of financial products for the eight member territories.  In 2021, the ECSE listed 164 securities, comprising 140 sovereign debt instruments, 13 equities, and 11 corporate debt securities.  Market capitalization stood at $1.9 billion. Dominica is open to portfolio investment.

Dominica has accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement, Sections 2, 3, and 4 and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions.  Dominica does not normally grant foreign tax credits except in the case of taxes paid in a British Commonwealth country that grants similar relief for Dominica taxes or where an applicable tax treaty provides a credit.  The private sector has access to credit on the local market through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits, and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.

The eight participating governments of the ECCU have passed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act.  The act provides for the establishment of the ECCB, its management and administration, its currency, relations with financial institutions, relations with the participating governments, foreign exchange operations, external reserves, and other related matters. Dominica is a signatory to this agreement and the ECCB controls Dominica’s currency and regulates its domestic banks.

The Banking Act is a harmonized piece of legislation across the ECCU.  The Minister of Finance usually acts in consultation with, and on the recommendation of, the ECCB with respect to those areas of responsibility within the Minister of Finance’s portfolio.

Domestic and foreign banks can establish operations in Dominica.  The Banking Act requires all commercial banks and other institutions to be licensed in order to conduct any banking business.  The ECCB regulates financial institutions.  As part of ongoing supervision, licensed financial institutions are required to submit monthly, quarterly, and annual performance reports to the ECCB.  In its latest annual report, the ECCB listed the commercial banking sector in Dominica as stable.  Assets of commercial banks totaled $781.8 million (2.1 billion Eastern Caribbean dollars) at the end of 2019. Dominica is well served by bank and non-financial institutions.  There are minimal alternative financial services.

The Caribbean region has witnessed a withdrawal of correspondent banking services by U.S. and European banks.  CARICOM remains committed to engaging with key stakeholders on the issue and appointed a Committee of Ministers of Finance on Correspondent Banking to monitor the issue.

In 2019, the ECCB launched an 18-month financial technology pilot to launch a Digital Eastern Caribbean dollar (DXCD) with its partner, Barbados-based Bitt Inc.  An accompanying mobile application, DCash was officially launched in March 2021 in four pilot countries, adding Dominica to the pilot in December 2021. In January 2022, the platform experienced a system interruption, and its operation was suspended. The platform regained full functionality at the end of March 2022 following system upgrades. The digital Eastern Caribbean currency operates alongside physical Eastern Caribbean currency.  Dominica does not have any specific legislation to regulate cryptocurrencies.

Neither the Government of Dominica, nor the ECCB, of which Dominica is a member, maintains a sovereign wealth fund.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Dominica work in partnership with ministries, or under their remit to carry out certain specific ministerial responsibilities.  The U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown is aware of 20 SOEs currently operating in areas such as tourism, investment services, broadcasting and media, solid waste management, and agriculture.  There is no published list of these SOEs.  They are all wholly owned government entities.  Each is headed by a board of directors to which senior management reports.  The SOE sector is affected by financial sustainability challenges, with resources insufficient to cover capital replacement.

Dominica does not currently have a targeted privatization program.

The Dominican Stock Market (BVRD by its Spanish acronym) is the only stock exchange in the Dominican Republic. It began operations in 1991 and is viewed as a cornerstone of the country’s integration into the global economy and domestic development. It is regulated by the Securities Market Law No. 249-17 and supervised by the Superintendency of Securities, which approves all public securities offerings.

The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. Foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the local market but tend to prefer less expensive offshore sources. The Central Bank regularly issues certificates of deposit using an auction process to determine interest rates and maturities.

In recent years, the local stock market has continued to expand, in terms of the securities traded on the BVRD. There are very few publicly traded companies on the exchange, as credit from financial institutions is widely available and many of the large Dominican companies are family-owned enterprises. Most of the securities traded in the BVRD are fixed-income securities issued by the Dominican State.

On August 6, 2021, the Law 163-21 for the Promotion of the Placement and Marketing of Publicly Offered Securities in the Stock Market of the Dominican Republic was enacted as a complement to Law 249-17, to promote the issuance of shares by private and public companies. This law declares of national interest the promotion and development of the public offering of securities as a financing mechanism for the revitalization of the national economy, with special emphasis on the issuance of shares of private and public companies in the stock market of the Dominican Republic. Among the incentives proposed by Law 163-21, is the exemption of listed companies from the 1% tax for capital increase when they issue new shares during their first three years of validity. Likewise, during that same 3-year period, the Law reduces to 15% the rate of Income Tax applicable to Capital gains generated by the seller of a share listed on the stock exchange.

Dominican Republic’s financial sector is relatively stable, and the IMF declared the financial system satisfactory during 2021 Article IV consultations, however, directors agreed that while financial system remains resilient and well monitored, it would benefit from moving closer to international standards for supervision and regulation and enhancing the macroprudential and crisis management toolkit.

According to the first National Financial Inclusion Survey from the Central Bank, published on March 22, 2020, only 46.3 percent of Dominicans have a bank account. Financial depth is relatively constrained. Private lending to GDP (around 30.5 percent, according to the IMF) is low by international and regional standards, representing around half the average for Latin America. Real interest rates, driven in part by large interest rate spreads, are also relatively high. The country’s relatively shallow financial markets can be attributed to a number of factors, including high fiscal deficits crowding out private investment; complicated and lengthy regulatory procedures for issuing securities in primary markets; and high levels of consolidation in the banking sector.

Dominican banking consists of 112 entities, as follows: 47 financial intermediation entities (including large commercial banks, savings and loans associations, financial intermediation public entities, credit corporations), 41 foreign exchange and remittance agents (specifically, 35 exchange brokers and 6 remittances and foreign exchange agents), and 24 trustees. According to the latest available information (January 2022), total bank assets were $47.7 billion. The three largest banks hold 69.7 percent of the total assets – Banreservas 32.6 percent, Banco Popular 21.9 percent, and BHD Leon 16.4 percent. While full-service bank branches tend to be in urban areas, several banks employ sub-agents to extend services in more rural areas. Technology has also helped extend banking services throughout the country.

The Monetary and Banking system is regulated by the Monetary and Financial Law No. 183-02, and is overseen by the Monetary Board, the Central Bank, and the Superintendency of Banks. The mission of the Central Bank is to maintain the stability of prices, promote the strength and stability of the financial system, and ensure the proper functioning of payment systems. The Superintendency of Banks carries out the supervision of financial intermediation entities, in order to verify compliance by said entities with the provisions of the law.

Foreign banks may establish operations in the Dominican Republic, although it may require a special decree for the foreign financial institution to establish domicile in the country. Foreign banks not domiciled in the Dominican Republic may establish representative offices in accordance with current regulations. To operate, both local and foreign banks must obtain the prior authorization of the Monetary Board and the Superintendency of Banks. Major U.S. banks have a commercial presence in the country, but most focus on corporate banking services as opposed to retail banking. Some other foreign banks offer retail banking. There are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts, although identification requirements do apply.

The Dominican government does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund.

The legacy of autocratic rule in the mid-twentieth century and the practice of distributing social services as political patronage have resulted in a relatively larger role for state-actors in the Dominican economy when compared with the United States. Since 1997, by means of the approval of the General Law of Reform of Public Companies No. 141-97, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have been on the decline and do not have as significant a presence in the economy as they once did, with most functions now performed by privately held firms. Notable exceptions are in the electricity, banking, mining, and refining sectors.

The Dominican Corporation of State Enterprises (CORDE) was established by Law No. 289 of June 30, 1966, with the purpose of managing, directing, and developing all the productive and commercial companies, goods, and rights ceded by the Dominican State as a result of the death of the dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo. Among the state-owned companies that came to be managed by CORDE are the salt, gypsum, marble, and pozzolana mines. In 2017, the dissolution of CORDE was entrusted to a Commission chaired by the Legal Consultancy of the Executive Power, which assumed the operational, administrative, and financial management of this entity until the dissolution process was definitively completed. Within the framework of the dissolution process of CORDE, the ownership of the mining concessions of the Dominican State was transferred to the Patrimonial Fund of Reformed Companies (FONPER) through the Mining Concessions Transfer Agreement between CORDE and FONPER dated July 2, 2020.

Shortly after being sworn into office, in August 2020, President Abinader issued Decree 422-20 forming the Commission for the Liquidation of State Organs (CLOE) under the charge of the Ministry of the Presidency. Since then, the CLOE has been in the process of dissolution and liquidation of CORDE, and on December 8, 2020, CLOE requested the FONPER Board of Directors revoke the Concessions Transfer Agreement. FONPER’s Board of Directors approved the revocation through Minutes No. 02-2021 of March 11, 2021, authorizing the president of FONPER to sign an agreement with CLOE that revokes and nullifies the Transfer Agreement. It is not clear whether this revocation has been completed.

In 2021, the Office of the President proposed a bill to regulate government business assets, government participation in public trusts, and to create the National Center for Companies and Public Trusts (CENEFIP). The bill’s intent is to reform the management of state assets and replace the disgraced Patrimonial Fund of Reformed State Enterprises (FONPER), which is being investigated for alleged irregularities that may have personally benefited politically affiliated persons. The CENEFIP bill is under review in the legislature.

Also in 2021, the executive branch transferred the functions and properties of the State Sugar Council [Consejo Estatal del Azúcar] to the Directorate General of National Assests [Dirección General de Bienes Nacionales]. The State Sugar Council maintains one remaining sugar mill, Porvenir.

In the partially privatized electricity sector, private companies mainly provide electricity generation, while the government handles the transmission and distribution phases via the Dominican Electric Transmission Company (ETED) and the Dominican Corporation of State Electrical Companies (CDEEE). This sector is undergoing additional reforms, including the dissolution of the CDEEE and privatization of the management and operation of the distribution companies. The CDEEE and the distribution companies have traditionally been the largest SOEs in terms of government expenditures. The government also participates in the generation phase, too (most notably in hydroelectric power), and one of the distribution companies is partially privatized.

The Dominican financial sector consists of 112 entities, as follows: 47 financial intermediation entities (including large commercial banks, savings and loans associations, financial intermediation public entities, credit corporations), 41 foreign exchange and remittance agents (specifically, 35 exchange brokers and 6 remittances and foreign exchange agents), and 24 trustees. According to the latest available information (January 2022), total bank assets were $47.7 billion. The three largest banks hold 69.7 percent of the total assets – Banreservas 32.6 percent, Banco Popular 21.9 percent, and BHD Leon 16.4 percent. The state-owned, but autonomously operated BanReservas is the largest bank in the country and is a market leader in lending and deposits. Part of this success is due to a requirement for government employees to open accounts with BanReservas in order to receive salary payments. BanReservas was also utilized to distribute government social support payments during the pandemic. Roughly a third of the bank’s lending portfolio is to government institutions.

In the refining sector, the government is now the exclusive shareholder of the country’s only oil refinery; Refinery Dominicana (Refidomsa), after having extricated Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) in August 2021. Refidomsa operates and manages the refinery, is the only importer of crude oil in the country, and is also the largest importer of refined fuels, with a 60 percent market share. The price for fuel products is set by the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and SMEs. Fuel prices are heavily subsidized.

Law No. 10-04 requires the Chamber of Accounts to audit SOEs. Audits should be published at https://www.camaradecuentas.gob.do/index.php/auditorias-publicadas . While audits have not always been publicly available, the new President of the Chamber is making a concerted effort to conduct and publish all audits required by law.

Partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the late 1990s and early 2000s resulted in foreign investors obtaining management control of former SOEs engaged in activities such as electricity generation, airport management, and sugarcane processing. In the electricity sector, these reforms were reversed between 2003 and 2009, but have largely remained in place for other sectors.

Major reforms for the electricity sector, as outlined in the National Pact for Energy Reform signed February 2021, are ongoing. Plans for dissolving the CDEEE are in process, with the organization functional in name only, and the Ministry of Energy and Mines having assumed many of the authorities conferred to the CDEEE upon its founding in 2001 and across its 20-year life span. Complete dissolution and final distribution of authorities remains a legal question, which is currently being reviewed by the President’s legal advisor and the Ministry of Energy and Mines.

The DGAPP has taken the first step to improve the governance and performance of electricity distribution companies through the introduction of private sector participation. On November 29, 2021, the DGAPP publicly accepted for detailed evaluation an application submitted by the Board of the Electricity Distribution Companies (Consejo Unificado de las Empresas Distribuidoras de Electricidad) for a Public Private Partnership (PPP) covering the three state-owned distribution companies. The DGAPP Resolution No. 89/2021 follows the process in the PPP Law (Law No. 47-20), whereby any public or private entity wishing to propose a PPP must submit a formal proposal and justification to the DGAPP. Government officials expect the process to privatize the management and operation of the electricity distribution companies to begin in earnest in the summer of 2022 with the release of tender documents. All indications are that foreign firms will be invited to participate in these tenders. Questions should be directed toward the Ministry of Energy and Mines ( https://mem.gob.do/ ) or DGAPP ( https://dgapp.gob.do/en/home/ ).

The 2014 Law to Strengthen and Optimize Business Partnerships and Stock Markets created the Securities Market Regulation Board to oversee the stock markets. Investment options on the Quito and Guayaquil stock exchanges are very limited. Sufficient liquidity to enter and exit sizeable positions does not exist in the local markets. The five percent capital exit tax also inhibits free flow of financial resources into the product and factor markets. Ecuador is a small market that has relied almost exclusively on the financial sector to undertake medium and short-term financing operations. Foreigners can access credit on the local market. In 2021, the Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE) designed a new methodology to set interest rates aimed at increasing financial inclusion and including technical factors for better determination. Despite these changes, the Government continues setting interest rate ceilings and controls.

Ecuador is a dollarized economy, and its banking sector is healthy. According to the Ecuadorian Central Bank’s Access to the Financial System Report, as of September 2020, 75 percent of the adult (over 15 years old) population (8.5 million people) has access to financial products and services. As of December 2021, Ecuador’s banks hold in total USD 51.9 billion in assets, with the largest banks being Banco Pichincha with USD 13.3 billion in assets, Banco del Pacifico with USD 6.9 billion, Banco de Guayaquil with USD 6.3 billion, and Produbanco with USD 6.1 billion. The Banking Association (ASOBANCA) estimates 2.3 percent of loans are non-performing. Foreigners require residency to open checking accounts in Ecuador.

Ecuador’s Superintendence of Banks regulates the financial sector. Between 2012 and 2013, the financial sector was the target of numerous new restrictions. By 2012, most banks had sold off their brokerage firms, mutual funds, and insurance companies to comply with Constitutional changes following a May 2010 referendum. The amendment to Article 312 of the Constitution required banks and their senior managers and shareholders with more than six percent equity in financial entities to divest entirely from any interest in all non-financial companies by July 2012. These provisions were incorporated into the Anti-Monopoly Law passed in September 2011.

The 2021 Law for the Defense of Dollarization established that the Monetary and Financial Policy and Regulation Board be divided into a Monetary Policy and Regulation Board and a Financial Policy and Regulation Board. The latter should oversee the interest rate system jointly with the BCE as the technical entity. The law gives the Financial Policy and Regulation Board the ability to prioritize certain sectors for lending from private banks. There are 24 private banks in Ecuador as of December 2021.

A 2018 BCE resolution that ordered electronic money accounts closure effectively eliminated electronic currency. However, banks handle transactions by electronic or digital means for transferences and/or payments to transfer resources and/or payments according to the authorization of the Superintendence of Banks. BCE resolutions were integrated into the Codification of Monetary, Financial, Insurance, and Securities Resolutions. This regulatory body requires all financial transfers (inflows and outflows) to be channeled through the BCE’s accounts. In principle, the regulation increases monetary authorities’ oversight and prevents banks from netting their inflows and outflows to avoid paying the five percent currency exit tax.

The Government of Ecuador does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). Approved in July 2020, Ecuador’s Public Finance Law (COPLAFIP) established a Fiscal Stabilization Fund to invest excess revenues from extractive industries and hedge against oil and metal price fluctuations.

Ecuador has a total of 17 SOEs. The major SOEs include those for petroleum (Petroecuador), electricity (Electricity Corporation of Ecuador – CELEC – and the National Corporation for Electricity – CNEL), and telecommunications (National Corporation of Telecommunications – CNT). The 17 SOEs combined have approximately 30,000 employees. As part of the government’s austerity measures to deal with the COVID-19-related economic crisis, the Lasso administration continued with the SOE liquidation processes started in May 2020. As of September 2021, there were three liquidated SOEs (Manufacture Ecuador, Pharmaceutical Public Company, Public Cement Company) and eight in the process of liquidation, including the state-owned airline (TAME), railroad company (Ecuadorian Railways Company), a social development firm using profits from natural resource revenues (Strategic Ecuador), training centers for athletes (High Performance Training Centers), an agricultural storage company (National Storage Units), the public media company, and a science and technology research firm (Siembra EP, formerly Yachay City of Knowledge). In February 2021, the government announced that Ecuador Post Office will be replaced by Ecuador Postal Services (SPE). Ecuador’s Coordinator of Public Companies maintains a list of SOEs at: https://www.emco.gob.ec/Emco2/empresas-publicas-2/ .

The 2009 Organic Law of Public Enterprises regulates SOEs. SOEs are most active in areas designated by the 2008 Constitution as strategic sectors. SOEs follow a special procurement regime with greater flexibility and limited oversight. The Law of Public Enterprises requires SOEs to follow generally accepted accounting principles. Still, SOEs are not required to follow the same accounting practices as the central government, nor do they have to participate in the electronic financial management system used in most of the public sector for budget and accounting management. SOEs are eligible for government guarantees and face lower tax burdens than private companies. SOEs generally do not have professionally audited financial statements. The Ministry of Economy and Finance approves SOEs’ annual budgets and often slows distribution of funds to SOEs to compensate for other government expenditures.

Ecuador is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization.

The Ecuadorian Constitution prohibits privatization of state-owned enterprises. Still, the Ecuadorian government is seeking to offer long-term concessions and joint-venture agreements with its SOEs to operate some of its assets in strategic sectors including oil and gas exploration and production, electricity generation, and mining. In addition, MPCEIP is considering projects to be developed as potential PPPs.

To date, high returns on Egyptian government debt have crowded out Egyptian investment in productive capacity.  As of February 2022, loans to the government and government-related entities accounted for 67 percent of banks’ assets, and Egypt’s debt-to-GDP ratio was 91.4 percent at the end of 2021. Meanwhile, consistently positive and relatively high real interest rates have attracted large foreign capital inflows since 2017, most of which has been volatile portfolio capital.  Foreign investors sold $1.19 billion of Egyptian treasury bonds following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) is Egypt’s registered securities exchange. Some 246 companies were listed on the EGX, including Nilex, as of February 2022. There were more than 3.3 million investors registered to trade on the exchange in July 2021.  Stock ownership is open to foreign and domestic individuals and entities.  The Government of Egypt issues dollar-denominated and Egyptian Pound-denominated debt instruments, for which ownership is open to foreign and domestic individuals and entities.  Foreign investors conducted 18.3 percent of sales on the EGX in 2021. In September 2020, the GoE issued the region’s first sovereign green bonds with a value of $750 million. The GoE issued Eurobonds worth $11.75 billion in 2020 and 2021, and issued its first $500 million Japanese Yen-dominated bond in March 2022. The government has announced its intention to issue its first sovereign sukuk bonds and additional green bonds during the remainder of 2022.

The Capital Market Law 95 of 1992, along with Banking Law 94 that President Sisi ratified in September 2020, constitute the primary regulatory frameworks for the financial sector.  The law grants foreigners full access to capital markets, and authorizes establishment of Egyptian and foreign companies to provide underwriting of subscriptions, brokerage services, securities and mutual funds management, clearance and settlement of security transactions, and venture capital activities.  The law specifies mechanisms for arbitration and legal dispute resolution and prohibits unfair market practices.  Law 10 of 2009 created the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) and brought the regulation of all non-banking financial services under its authority.  In 2017, EFSA became the Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA).

Settlement of transactions takes one day for treasury bonds and two days for stocks.  Although Egyptian law and regulations allow companies to adopt bylaws limiting or prohibiting foreign ownership of shares, virtually no listed stocks have such restrictions.  A significant number of the companies listed on the exchange are family-owned or -dominated conglomerates, and free trading of shares in many of these ventures, while increasing, remains limited.  Companies are de-listed from the exchange if not traded for six months.

Prior to November 2020, foreign companies listing on the EGX had to possess minimum capital of $100 million. With the FRA’s passage of new rules, foreign companies joining the EGX must now meet lesser requirements matching those for Egyptian companies: $6.4 million (100 million EGP) for large companies and between $63,000 and $6.4 million (1-100 million EGP) for smaller companies, depending on their size. Foreign businesses are only eligible for these lower minimum capital requirements if the EGX is their first exchange and if they attribute more than 50 percent of their shareholders’ equites, revenues, and assets to Egyptian subsidiary companies.

A capital gains tax of 10 percent on Egyptian tax residents came into force in January 2022 after more than 6 years of suspension, then it was decreased in March to 5 percent for two years. The rate will rise to 7.5 percent once this period ends. Capital increases and share-swaps between listed and unlisted companies will not be taxed. Non-tax residents and foreigners are permanently tax-exempt. The government also set the stamp tax on stock market transactions by non-tax residents at 0.125 percent and at 0.05 percent for tax residents on unlisted securities. Tax residents are exempted from stamp tax on listed securities.

Foreign investors can access Egypt’s banking system by opening accounts with local banks and buying and selling all marketable securities with brokerages.  The government has repeatedly emphasized its commitment to maintaining the profit repatriation system to encourage foreign investment in Egypt, especially since the pound flotation and implementation of the IMF loan program in November 2016.  The current system for profit repatriation by foreign firms requires sub-custodian banks to open foreign and local currency accounts for foreign investors (global custodians), which are exclusively maintained for stock exchange transactions.  The two accounts serve as a channel through which foreign investors process their sales, purchases, dividend collections, and profit repatriation transactions using the bank’s posted daily exchange rates.  The system is designed to allow for settlement of transactions in fewer than two days, though in practice some firms have reported significant delays in repatriating profits due to problems with availability.  Foreign firms and individuals continue to report delays in repatriating funds and problems accessing hard currency for the purpose of repatriating profits.

The Egyptian credit market, open to foreigners, is vibrant and active. Repatriation of investment profits has become much easier, as there is enough available hard currency to execute foreign exchange (FX) trades. Since the flotation of the Egyptian Pound in November 2016, FX trading is considered straightforward, given the re-establishment of the interbank foreign currency trading system.  There have been no reports of difficulties executing FX transactions following the CBE’s interest rate hike and currency devaluation in March, 2022.

Thirty-eight banks operate in Egypt, including several foreign banks. The CBE has not issued a new commercial banking license since 1979. The only way for a new commercial bank, whether foreign or domestic, to enter the market (except as a representative office) is to purchase shares in an existing bank. According to the CBE, banks operating in Egypt held nearly $448 billion (8.6 trillion EGP) in total assets as of December 2021, generating a total profit of $6.8 billion with the five largest banks generating 74 percent, or $5 billion (79 billion EGP).

Egypt’s banking sector is generally regarded as well-capitalized, due in part to its deposit-based funding structure and ample liquidity, especially since the flotation and restoration of the interbank market.  The CBE declared that 3.5 percent of the banking sector’s loans were non-performing by December 2021. However, since 2011, a high level of exposure to government debt, accounting for two-thirds of banks’ assets as of February 2022, has reduced the diversity of bank balance sheets and crowded out domestic investment. Moody’s and S&P consider Egypt’s banking system to be stable, although S&P classifies it as facing high levels of economic and financial system risk due to its high exposure to sovereign debt and the government’s external funding vulnerabilities. In February 2022, S&P affirmed Egypt’s government issuer rating of B stable due to the government’s relatively low issuance of foreign currency loans and relatively low external government debt.

Benefitting from the nation’s increasing economic stability, Egypt’s banks have enjoyed both ratings upgrades and continued profitability. Banking competition is serving a largely untapped retail segment and the nation’s challenging, but potentially rewarding, small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) segment.

The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) requires that banks direct 25 percent of their lending to SMEs.  Over the past two years, the Central Bank has launched a subsidized loan program worth $16 billion (253 billion EGP) to spur domestic manufacturing, agriculture, and real state development. Also, with only one-third of Egypt’s adult population owning or sharing an account at a formal financial institution (according press and comments from contacts), the banking sector has potential for growth and higher inclusion, which the government and banks discuss frequently. A low median income plays a part in modest banking penetration.

The CBE has taken steps to work with banks and technology companies to expand financial inclusion.  The employees of the government, one of the largest employers, must now have bank accounts because salary payment is through direct deposit. The CBE approved new procedures in October 2020 to allow deposits and the opening of new bank accounts with only a government-issued ID, rather than additional documents. The maximum limits for withdrawals and account balances also increased. In July 2020, President Sisi ratified a new Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) Development Law (Law 152 of 2020) that will provide incentives, tax breaks, and discounts for small, informal businesses willing to register their businesses and begin paying taxes.

As an attempt to keep pace with best practices and international norms, President Sisi ratified a new Banking Law, Law 94 of 2020, in September 2020. The law establishes a National Payment Council headed by the President to move Egypt away from cash and toward electronic payments; establishes a committee headed by the Prime Minister to resolve disputes between the CBE and the Ministry of Finance; establishes a CBE unit to handle complaints of monopolistic behaviors; requires banks to increase their cash holdings to $320 million (5 billion EGP), up from the prior minimum of $32 million (500 million EGP); and requires banks to report deficiencies in their own audits to the CBE.

The chairman of the EGX stated that Egypt is exploring the use of blockchain technologies across the banking community. The FRA will regulate how the banking system adopts the fast-developing blockchain systems into banks’ back-end and customer-facing processing and transactions. The Central Bank developed a national fintech and innovation strategy in March 2019, and the government has issued regulations to incentivize mobile and electronic payments. The Central Bank launched in March 2022 a new mobile application, InstaPay, which allows Egyptian banking customers to perform instant bank and payments transactions. At the end of 2021 Egypt was among the top four African countries for fintech investment, with investments in fintech startups quadrupling between 2020 and 2021, reaching $159 million. According to research firm Magnitt, Egyptian startups received $509 million in venture capital investments in 2021, with a 100 percent year-on-year compound annual growth rate between 2017 and 2021.

Since 2020, the Central Bank has prohibited all dealings with cryptocurrencies: the issuance of them, trading in them, promoting them, and establishing or operating platforms for their trading.

Alternative financial services in Egypt are extensive, given the large informal economy, estimated to account for between 30 and 50 percent of GDP. Informal lending is prevalent, but the total capitalization, number of loans, and types of terms in private finance is less well known.

The 1992 U.S.-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty provides for free transfer of dividends, royalties, compensation for expropriation, payments arising out of an investment dispute, contract payments, and proceeds from sales. Prior to reform implementation throughout 2016 and 2017, large corporations had been unable to repatriate local earnings for months at a time, but repatriation of funds is no longer restricted.

The Investment Incentives Law (Law 72 of 2017) stipulates that non-Egyptian employees hired by projects established under the law are entitled to transfer their earnings abroad. Conversion and transfer of royalty payments are permitted when a patent, trademark, or other licensing agreement has been approved under the Investment Law.

Banking Law 94 of 2020 regulates the repatriation of profits and capital. The current system for profit repatriation by foreign firms requires sub-custodian banks to open foreign and local currency accounts for foreign investors (global custodians), which are exclusively maintained for stock-exchange transactions. The two accounts serve as a channel through which foreign investors process their sales, purchases, dividend collections, and profit-repatriation transactions using the bank’s posted daily exchange rates. The system is designed to allow for settlement of transactions in less than two days, though in practice some firms have reported short delays in repatriating profits due to the steps involved in processing.

Egypt’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF), approved by the Cabinet and launched in late 2018, holds 200 billion EGP ($12.5 billion) in authorized capital as of July 2021.  The SWF aims to invest state funds locally and abroad across asset classes and manage underutilized government assets. The sovereign wealth fund focuses on sectors considered vital to the Egyptian economy, particularly industry, energy, and tourism, and has established four new sub-funds covering healthcare, financial services, real estate, and infrastructure while plans to establish another two sub-funds for education and technology. The SWF participates in the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds.

State and military-owned companies compete directly with private companies in many sectors of the Egyptian economy. Although Public Sector Law 203 of 1991 states that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should not receive preferential treatment from the government or be accorded exemptions from legal requirements applicable to private companies, in practice SOEs and military-owned companies enjoy significant advantages, including relief from regulatory requirements. IMF reports show that Egyptian SOEs have an average return on assets of just two percent and are only one-fourth as productive as private companies. Some 40 percent of SOEs are loss-making, despite access to subsidized capital and owning assets worth more than 50 percent of GDP. Profitable SOEs, meanwhile, tend to exploit a natural monopoly or hold exclusive rights to public assets. Few of Egypt’s 300 state-owned companies, 645 joint ventures, and 53 economic authorities release regular financial statements.

SOEs in Egypt are structured as individual companies controlled by boards of directors and grouped under government holding companies that are arranged by industry, including Petroleum Products & Gas, Spinning & Weaving; Metallurgical Industries; Chemical Industries; Pharmaceuticals; Food Industries; Building & Construction; Tourism, Hotels, & Cinema; Maritime & Inland Transport; Aviation; and Insurance. The holding companies are headed by boards of directors appointed by the Prime Minister with input from the relevant Minister.

The Egyptian government has announced plans to privatize shares of SOEs several times since 2018, but has only carried out a small number of sales. It sold a minority stake in the Eastern Tobacco Company in March 2018, a 26 percent share of state-owned e-payment firm E-Finance in October 2021, and a 10 percent share of Abu Qir Fertilizers in December 2021. In December 2020 the government announced plans to sell stakes in two military-owned companies and in February 2022 added a handful of other SOEs to the list, but scaled back those plans following Russia’s war against Ukraine. The government has indefinitely delayed plans for privatizing stakes in 20 other SOEs, including up to 30 percent of the shares of Banque du Caire, due to adverse market conditions and increased global volatility. Egypt’s privatization program is based on Public Enterprise Law 203/1991, which permits the sale of SOEs to foreign entities.

Law 32 of 2014 limits the ability of third parties to challenge privatization contracts between the Egyptian government and investors. The law was intended to reassure investors concerned by legal challenges brought against privatization deals and land sales dating back to the pre-2008 period. Court cases at the time Parliament passed the law had put many of these now-private firms, many of which are foreign-owned, in legal limbo over concerns that they may be returned to state ownership.

The Superintendent of the Financial System ( https://www.ssf.gob.sv/ ) supervises individual and consolidated activities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, financial conglomerates, stock market participants, insurance companies, and pension fund administrators. Foreign investors may obtain credit in the local financial market under the same conditions as local investors. Interest rates are determined by market forces, with the interest rate for credit cards and loans capped at 1.6 times the weighted average effective rate established by the Central Bank. The maximum interest rate varies according to the loan amount and type of loan (consumption, credit cards, mortgages, home repair/remodeling, business, and microcredits).

In January 2019, El Salvador eliminated a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT), which was enacted in 2014 and greatly opposed by banks.

The Securities Market Law establishes the framework for the Salvadoran securities exchange. Stocks, government and private bonds, and other financial instruments are traded on the exchange, which is regulated by the Superintendent of the Financial System.

Foreigners may buy stocks, bonds, and other instruments sold on the exchange and may have their own securities listed, once approved by the Superintendent. Companies interested in listing must first register with the National Registry Center’s Registry of Commerce. In 2021, the exchange traded $3.7 billion, with average daily volumes between $12 million and $30 million. Government-regulated private pension funds, Salvadoran insurance companies, and local banks are the largest buyers on the Salvadoran securities exchange. For more information, visit: https://www.bolsadevalores.com.sv/ 

All but two of the major banks operating in El Salvador are regional banks owned by foreign financial institutions. Given the high level of informality, measuring the penetration of financial services is difficult; however, it remains relatively low, between 30 percent – according to the Salvadoran Banking Association (ABANSA) – and 37 percent – reported by the Superintendence of the Financial System (SSF). The banking system is sound and generally well-managed and supervised. El Salvador’s Central Bank is responsible for regulating the banking system, monitoring compliance of liquidity reserve requirements, and managing the payment systems. No bank has lost its correspondent banking relationship in recent years. There are no correspondent banking relationships known to be in jeopardy.

The banking system’s total assets as of December 2021 were $21.1 billion. Under Salvadoran banking law, there is no difference in regulations between foreign and domestic banks and foreign banks can offer all the same services as domestic banks.

The Cooperative Banks and Savings and Credit Associations Law regulates the organization, operation, and activities of financial institutions such as cooperative banks, credit unions, savings and credit associations, and other microfinance institutions. The Money Laundering Law requires financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to the Attorney General. Despite having regulatory scheme in place to supervise the filing of reports by cooperative banks and savings and credit associations, these entities rarely file suspicious activity reports.

The Insurance Companies Law regulates the operation of both local and foreign insurance firms. Foreign firms, including U.S., Colombian, Dominican, Honduran, Panamanian, Mexican, and Spanish companies, have invested in Salvadoran insurers.

El Salvador does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

El Salvador has successfully liberalized many sectors, though it maintains state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in energy generation and transmission, water supply and sanitation, ports and airports, and the national lottery (see chart below).

Although the GOES privatized energy distribution in 1999, it maintains significant energy production facilities through state-owned Rio Lempa Executive Hydroelectric Commission (CEL), a significant producer of hydroelectric and geothermal energy.

In October 2021, El Salvador’s legislature enacted the Creation Law of the Power, Hydrocarbons, and Mines General Directorate. The new General Directorate will be responsible for dictating the national energy policy and proposing amendments to energy legislation and by-laws, as well as implementing the energy policy. The law allows the President of the state-owned power company (CEL) to serve as the Director General of the new entity. The law will enter into force in November 2022. Industry stakeholders are concerned about the potential conflict of interest that would result from CEL making energy policy and participating in the sector as SOE.

The primary water service provider is the National Water and Sewer Administration (ANDA), which provides services to 96.6 percent of urban areas and 77 percent of rural areas in El Salvador.

The Autonomous Executive Port Commission (CEPA) operates both the seaports and the airports. CEL, ANDA, and CEPA Board Chairs hold Minister-level rank and report directly to the President.

The Law on Public Administration Procurement and Contracting (LACAP) covers all procurement of goods and services by all Salvadoran public institutions, including the municipalities. Exceptions to LACAP include: procurement and contracting financed with funds coming from other countries (bilateral agreements) or international bodies; agreements between state institutions; and the contracting of personal services by public institutions under the provisions of the Law on Salaries, Contracts and Day Work. Additionally, LACAP allows government agencies to use the auction system of the Salvadoran Goods and Services Market (BOLPROS) for procurement. Although BOLPROS is intended for use in purchasing standardized goods (e.g., office supplies, cleaning products, and basic grains), the GOES uses BOLPROS to procure a variety of goods and services, including high-value technology equipment and sensitive security equipment. As of October 2021, public procurement using BOLPROS totaled $157.1 million. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also support government agencies in the procurement of a wide range of infrastructure projects. Procurement for municipal infrastructure works is governed by the Simplified Procurement Law for Municipal Works in force since November 2021 and centralized in the National Directorate of Municipal works created by the Bukele administration to oversee investment in infrastructure and social projects in municipalities. The GOES has created a dedicated procurement website to publish tenders by government institutions. https://www.comprasal.gob.sv/comprasal_web/ ).

In August 2020, President Bukele signed an executive order allowing the submission of bids for contractual services via email and eliminating bidders’ obligation to register online with the public procurement system (Comprasal), as well as lifting the responsibility of procurement officers to keep a record of companies and individuals who receive tender documents. Transparency advocates and legal experts have noted that the order would decrease potential bidders’ ability to access and compete fairly for government tenders. The order is pending review in the Supreme Court of Justice, but without injunctive effect.

Alba Petroleos is a joint venture between a consortium of mayors from the FMLN party and a subsidiary of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA. As majority PDVSA owned, Alba Petroleos has been subject to Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions since January 2019. Alba Petroleos operates a reduced number of gasoline service stations and businesses in other industries, including energy production, food production, convenience stores, and bus transportation. Alba Petroleos has been surrounded by allegations of mismanagement, corruption, and money laundering. Critics charged that the conglomerate received preferential treatment during FMLN governments and that its commercial practices, including financial reporting, are non-transparent. In May 2019, the Attorney General’s Office initiated an investigation against Alba Petroleos and its affiliates for money laundering. Alba Petroleos’ assets are frozen by court order and some of its gasoline service stations are being managed by the National Council for Asset Administration (CONAB).

El Salvador is not engaged in a privatization program and has not announced plans to privatize.

Equatorial Guinea does not have its own stock market, but CEMAC operates a common stock market for all member states known as the Central Africa Stock Exchange (BVMAC). In August 2021, the Financial Market Supervisory Commission of Central Africa provided authorization for the National Bank of Equatorial Guinea’s (BANGE) new brokerage division, the BANGE Securities Company, to operate in the BVMAC and individual stock markets accredited within the CEMAC subregion. The BANGE Securities Company offers financial advising, portfolio management, brokerage services, and bond issuance.

The government owns a 51 percent stake in BANGE, and bank shares were made available to domestic institutional investors through an initial public offering in November 2020, followed by secondary offering valued at $75 million in April 2021, which was opened to individual and foreign investors. In March 2022, BANGE advised the government to issue treasury bonds on the subregional market as one means of financing the country’s rising debt.

CEMAC’s Bank of Central African States (BEAC) regulates interest rates in member countries by setting the discount rate. However, due to the high prevalence of default on loan repayment in Equatorial Guinea, local commercial banks set high interest rates for private borrowers, ranging from 12 to 18 percent for mortgages and approximately 15 percent for personal loans. Business loans generally require significant collateral, limiting opportunities for entrepreneurs, and may have rates of 20 percent or greater. There is no evidence of foreign investors obtaining credit on the local market.

Equatorial Guinea’s banking system remains relatively underdeveloped, and little public information is available about the assets and health of the financial sector. The government’s National Economic and Financial Committee creates a semi-annual report on the country’s banking sector, but the report is not always made public.

While banks have branches throughout the country, they are concentrated in urban centers. BANGE has the most branches (31), while CCEI/CCIW Bank de Guinea Ecuatorial, which has been wholly owned by the government since 2021, is the largest bank in the country in terms of total assets under management. BGFI Bank Guinée Equatoriale operates as a subsidiary of BGFI Holding Corporation (Gabon). Pan-African EcoBank (Togo) and Societe Générale (France) also operate in Equatorial Guinea. The construction of new bank branches is typically a result of government efforts to project an image of Equatorial Guinea as a financial center, rather than a reflection of the actual demand in the country. A small number of ATMs are located in urban centers. Banks are increasingly offering online banking services, though such services remain limited. BANGE estimates that 60 percent of the population has accessed formal financial services.

CEMAC members do not have their own central banks, but instead host national BEAC branches. Three BEAC branches are located in Equatorial Guinea in Ebibeyin, Bata, and Malabo. BEAC’s Central Africa Banking Commission (COBAC) regulates the region’s banking systems and provides authorization for commercial banks to operate in each member country. The Ministry of Finance provides information on establishing a financial institution within the CEMAC region on its website at https://minhacienda-gob.com/condiciones-para-la-solicitud-de-una-acreditacion-de-actividades-financieras-en-la-cemac/ .

Equatorial Guinea’s banking sector has been weighed down by a high prevalence of nonperforming loans (NPLs), as well as undercapitalization and low liquidity. At end of 2020, NPLs accounted for approximately 53 percent of all loans, driven mainly by government nonpayment of arrears on construction projects. A significant portion of the NPLs is concentrated in BANGE. Due to the continued economic recession and widespread property damage caused by explosions at a military barracks in the mainland city of Bata in March 2021, NPL rates are expected to increase in 2022. To address the NPL crisis, the government established a Partial Guarantee Fund over a decade ago to insure non-performing loans through the National Institute for Businesses Promotion, but the fund only covers small loans and so has had a limited effect on the larger problem.

While the country’s economy is almost entirely cash-based, customers have reported that cash is not always available for withdrawal, a liquidity problem exacerbated by lengthy bureaucratic procedures and minimal digital record keeping. Foreigners must provide proof of residency to establish a bank account.

The government established the Fund for Future Generations as its sovereign wealth fund in 2002. The fund receives 0.5% of all oil revenues and is governed and managed by BEAC. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute estimates that the fund has approximately $165.5 million USD under management, although there is no publicly available information on its allocations or the regulations directing its maintenance and management.

The government controls at least eight state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the energy, housing, fishing, aerospace and defense, and information and communication sectors. These include Sonagas (natural gas), GEPetrol (oil), SEGESA (electricity), GECOMSA and GETESA (telecommunications), SONAPESCA (fishing), ENPIGE (low-income housing), and Ceiba Intercontinental (national airline). The government’s annual budget includes allocations to and earnings from SOEs, but other details – such as total assets and number of employees – are not made available. SOEs also lack publicly available audited financial statements. In 2017, the government contracted Deloitte and Ernst & Young to conduct a detailed report on its SOEs, which provided a comprehensive list of these entities. The report and other information regarding SOEs can be found on the Ministry of Finance’s website at https://minhacienda-gob.com/empresas-publicas-y-entidades-autonomas/ .

Following the recommendations of the IMF’s 2018 staff-monitored program, the government began efforts to improve governance of its SOEs. It established a committee for the restructuring of public entities and appointed new governing boards for each one. The IMF also required the government to contract an internationally reputable firm to audit the accounts of the state-owned oil (GEPetrol) and gas (Sonagas) companies, which the government hired at the start of 2019. As of April 2022, however, the audits had not been completed.

To comply with the IMF’s recommendations, the government also committed to the privatization several of its SOEs. In April 2022, it announced that it would be privatizing GETESA, SEGESA, GITGE, and Ceiba Intercontinental, as well as its mail delivery service (GECOTEL) and vehicle inspection service (ITV). The government also stated that it will undertake privatization of undefined assets in the hospitality, health, and education sectors, as well as at the airports and ports. The government did not provide any details on the timeline or process for the privatization process, but it instructed the Ministry of Finance to establish the relevant procedures, including a transparent public bidding process that is open to international investors.

There is no functioning public market for capital in Eritrea, nor is there an established stock market.

The GSE fully controls the banking and financial sectors; there are no transparent mechanisms to facilitate the free flow of financial resources into portfolio investments.  There is no transparency in decisions regarding credit allocation.  Transfers of foreign currency are heavily restricted due, in part, to government concerns about foreign terrorist financing and maintaining adequate foreign currency reserves.

The GSE does not respect the International Monetary Fund’s (IMP) Article VIII, regarding restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions.

Due to restrictions on the use and hoarding of cash, most Eritreans now have bank accounts and use banking services.  However, there are excessive regulation on banking accounts (including low monthly limits on withdrawals and restrictions on sending foreign currency abroad) and obsolete technology at the banks, which are frequently subjected to extended power cuts, forcing them to cease or limit services.  There are no automated teller machines in Eritrea and there is no infrastructure to allow the use of credit or debit cards.

It is unclear what the estimated total assets of the country’s largest banks are.  The Bank of Eritrea is the country’s central bank.  Foreign banks are not allowed to open branches or establish operations in Eritrea.  Foreigners are able to establish bank accounts but are subject to the same monthly Nakfa withdrawal limits as Eritreans.

Eritrea does not currently have any correspondent banking relationships.  Per a 1994 regulation, locally based entities are forbidden from maintaining foreign bank accounts.

Eritrea has no sovereign wealth fund.

Estonia is a member of the Euro zone. Estonia’s financial sector is modern and efficient. Credit is allocated on market terms and foreign investors are able to obtain credit on the local market. The private sector has access to an expanding range of credit instruments similar in variety to those offered by banks in Estonia’s Nordic neighbors, Finland and Sweden.

Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms.

The Security Market Law complies with EU requirements and enables EU securities brokerage firms to deal in the market without establishing a local subsidiary. The NASDAQ OMX stock exchanges in Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius form the Baltic Market, which facilitates cross-border trading and attracting more investments to the region. This includes sharing the same trading system and harmonizing rules and market practices, all with the aim of reducing the costs of cross-border trading in the Baltic region.

Certain investment services and products may be limited to U.S. persons in Estonia due to financial institutions’ response to the U.S. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).

Estonian financial services market overview: https://www.fi.ee/en?id=12737 

IMF report on Estonia: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/07/20/Republic-of-Estonia-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-462375 

Estonia’s banking system has consolidated rapidly. The banking sector is dominated by two major commercial banks, Swedbank and SEB, both owned by Swedish banking groups. These two banks control approximately 62 percent of the financial services market. The third largest bank is a local LHV bank with 14 percent of market share. There are no state-owned commercial banks or other credit institutions.

More information on banks’ assets is available at: http://statistika.eestipank.ee/#/en/p/FINANTSSEKTOR/147/645 

The Scandinavian-dominated Estonian banking system is modern and efficient. Local and international banks in Estonia provide both domestic and international services (including internet and mobile banking) at competitive rates, as well as a full range of financial, insurance, accounting, and legal services. Estonia has a highly-advanced internet banking system: currently 98 percent of banking transactions are conducted via the internet.

The Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank) is Estonia’s independent central bank. As Estonia is part of the Euro zone, the core tasks of the Bank are to help to define the monetary policy of the European Community and to implement the monetary policy of the European Central Bank, including the circulation of cash in Estonia. Eesti Pank is also responsible for holding and managing Estonian official foreign exchange reserves as well as supervising overall financial stability and maintaining reliable and well-functioning payment systems. Neither the Central Bank nor the government hold shares in the banking sector.

EU legislation requires Estonia to make its AML regime compliant with EU directives. Estonia has passed legislation that makes its AML regime compliant with EU legislation. After large-scale money laundering cases through Estonian branches of Nordic banks came to light in Estonia, regulatory and government officials are taking steps to improve the AML oversight regime. The recent changes included transformation of supervisory structures and roles as well as amendment of laws governing them. Due to strict anti-money laundering (AML) regulations and bank compliance practices, it can be difficult for non-residents to open a bank account.

More information on opening a bank account for non-resident investors:

https://www.lhv.ee/en/non-residents 

https://wise.com/gb/blog/opening-a-bank-account-in-estonia 

There are no sovereign wealth funds or state-owned investment funds in Estonia.

Ethiopia has a limited and undeveloped financial sector, and investment is largely closed off to foreign firms. Liquidity at many banks is limited, and commercial banks often require 100 percent collateral, making access to credit one of the greatest hindrances to growth in the country. Ethiopia is the largest economy in Africa without a securities market, and sales/purchases of debt are heavily regulated.

Ethiopia’s concessional IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program expired in September 2021. The program aimed to reduce public sector borrowing, rein in inflation, reform the exchange rate regime, and ensure external debt sustainability. The GOE has not yet launched formal talks with the IMF on a new program.

The GOE has announced, as part of its overall economic reform effort, its intention to liberalize the financial sector. The government has already made good progress by allowing non-financial Ethiopian firms to participate in mobile money activities, introducing Treasury-bill auctions with market pricing, and reducing forced lending to the government on the part of the commercial banks. The parliament approved the establishment of a capital market in June 2021, and activities are underway to set up a capital market regulatory body and the stock market.

The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE, the central bank) began offering a limited number of 28-day and 91-day Treasury bills at market-determined interest rates in December 2019. Since then, more bond offerings of longer tenures have been included in the auctions. The move was part of an effort to expand the NBE’s monetary policy tools and finance the government in a more sustainable way. Previously, the NBE had only sold Treasury bills at below-market interest rates, and the only buyers were public sector enterprises, primarily the Public Social Security Agency and the Development Bank of Ethiopia.

Ethiopia issued its first 10-year Eurobond in December of 2014, raising 1 billion U.S. dollars at a rate of 6.625 percent. According to the Ministry of Finance, the bond proceeds are being used to finance industrial parks, the sugar industry, and power transmission infrastructure. Due to its increasing external debt load, the Ethiopian government has committed to refrain from non-concessional financing for new projects and to shift ongoing projects to concessional financing when possible. As Ethiopia’s ability to service its external debts declined in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ethiopia participated in the World Bank Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), which suspended external debt payments from May 2020 through June of 2021. Ethiopia is seeking further debt treatment under the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments Beyond the DSSI.

Ethiopia has 23 commercial banks, two of which are state-owned. The Development Bank of Ethiopia, a state-owned bank, provides loans to investors in priority sectors, notably agriculture and manufacturing. By regional standards, the 21 private commercial banks are not large (either by total assets or total lending), and their service offerings are not sophisticated. Mobile money and digital finance, for instance, remain limited in Ethiopia. Foreign banks are not permitted to provide financial services in Ethiopia; however, since April 2007, Ethiopia has allowed some foreign banks to open liaison offices in Addis Ababa to facilitate credit to companies from their countries of origins. Chinese, German, Kenyan, Turkish, and South African banks have opened liaison offices in Ethiopia, but the market remains completely closed to foreign retail banks. Foreigners of Ethiopian origin are now allowed to both establish their own banks and hold shares in financial institutions.

The state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia accounts for more than 50 percent of total bank deposits, bank loans, and foreign exchange in Ethiopia. The NBE controls banks’ minimum deposit rate, which now stands at 7 percent, while loan interest rates are allowed to float. Real deposit interest rates have been negative in recent years, mainly due to double digit annual inflation. Non-performing loans account for less than 3 percent of all loans.

Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers approved in December 2021 the creation of Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH) – Ethiopia’s Sovereign Wealth Fund. EIH is currently under formation and expects to manage assets worth about $2 billion across several sectors, including telecoms, mining, banking, aviation, and logistics.

Ethiopia’s roughly 40 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate major sectors of the economy. There is a state monopoly or state dominance in telecommunications, power, banking, insurance, air transport, shipping, railway, industrial parks, and petroleum importing. SOEs have considerable advantages over private firms, including priority access to credit, foreign exchange, land, and quick customs clearances. While there are no conclusive reports of credit preference for these entities, there are indications that they receive incentives, such as priority foreign exchange allocation, preferences in government tenders, and marketing assistance. Ethiopia does not publish financial data for most state-owned enterprises, but Ethiopian Airlines and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia have transparent accounts

Ethiopia is not a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and does not adhere to the guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs. Corporate governance of SOEs is structured and monitored by a board of directors composed of senior government officials and politically affiliated individuals, but there is a lack of transparency in the structure of SOEs.

In July 2018, the GOE announced plans to fully or partially privatize several state-owned enterprises and sectors. In 2020, Ethiopia enacted Public Enterprises Privatization Proclamation number 1206/2020 regulate and encourage transparency and private sector participation in privatization processes. The GOE will implement privatizations through public tenders open to local and foreign investors. In September 2021, the GOE tendered a 40 percent stake of state-owned Ethio telecom but later postponed the process indefinitely due in part to muted investor interest. The government has sold more than 370 public enterprises since 1995, mainly small companies in the trade and service sectors, most of which were nationalized by the Derg military regime in the 1970s.

The capital market is regulated and supervised by the Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF). Twenty companies were listed on the Suva-based South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE). At the end of September 2021, market capitalization was $1.52 billion (FJD$3.212 billion), an annual decline of 5.9 percent compared to September 2020. To promote greater activity in the capital market, the government lowered corporate tax rates for listed companies to ten percent and exempted income earned from the trading of shares in the SPSE from income tax and capital gains tax. The RBF issued the Companies (Wholesale Corporate Bonds) Regulations 2021 to develop the domestic corporate bond market by providing a simplified process for the issuance of corporate bonds to eligible wholesale investors only.

Foreign investors are allowed to get credit from authorized banks and other lending institutions without the approval of the RBF for loans up to $4.7 million (FJD$10 million), provided the debt-to-equity ratio of 3:1 is satisfied.

Fiji has a well-developed banking system supervised by the Reserve Bank of Fiji. The RBF regulates the Fiji monetary and banking systems, manages the issuance of currency notes, administers exchange controls, and provides banking and other services to the government. In addition, it provides lender-of-last-resort facilities and regulates trading bank liquidity.

There are six commercial banks with established operations in Fiji: ANZ Bank, Bank of Baroda, Bank of South Pacific, Bred Bank, Home Finance Corporation (HFC), and Westpac Banking Corporation, with the HFC the only locally owned bank. Non-banking financial institutions also provide financial assistance and borrowing facilities to the commercial community and to consumers. These institutions include the Fiji Development Bank, Credit Corporation, Kontiki Finance, Merchant Finance, and insurance companies. As of December 2021, total assets of commercial banks amounted to $5.77 billion (FJD$12.223 billion). The RBF reported that liquidity reached $0.94 billion (FJD$1.99 billion) in December 2021 and were sufficient and did not pose a risk to bank solvency. However, the RBF also noted that existing levels of non-performing loans could rise, with the ending of moratoriums offered by financial institutions to COVID-19 affected customers. To open a bank account, foreign investors need to provide a copy of the Foreign Investment Registration Certificate (FIRC) issued by Investment Fiji.

The Fiji government does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund or asset management bureau in Fiji. The country’s pension fund scheme, the Fiji National Provident Fund, which manages and invests members’ retirement savings, accounts for a third of Fiji’s financial sector assets. The fund invests in equities, bonds, commercial paper, mortgages, real estate, and various offshore investments.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Fiji are concentrated in utilities and key services and industries including aerospace (Fiji Airways, Airports Fiji Limited); agribusiness (Fiji Pine Ltd); energy (Energy Fiji Limited); food processing (Fiji Sugar Corporation, Pacific Fishing Company); information and communication (Amalgamated Telecom Holdings); and media (Fiji Broadcasting Corporation Ltd). There are 25 SOEs with combined assets valued at $3.87 billion (FJD $8.2 billion) in 2019. The SOEs include 10 Government Commercial Companies which operate commercially and are fully owned by the government, five Commercial Statutory Authorities (CSA) which have regulatory functions and charge nominal fees for their services, seven Majority Owned Companies, and two Minority Owned Companies with some government equity. The SOEs that provide essential utilities, such as energy and water, also have social responsibility and non-commercial obligations. A list of SOEs is published in government’s annual budget documentation.

Aside from the CSAs, SOEs do not exercise delegated governmental powers. SOEs benefit from economies of scale and may be favored in certain sectors. The Fiji Broadcasting Company Ltd (FBCL) is exempt from the Media Decree, which governs private media organizations and exposes private media to criminal libel lawsuits. The government has pursued a policy of opening or deregulating various sectors of the economy.

The government is pursuing public private partnership (PPP) models in energy, aviation infrastructure, and public housing, often seeking technical assistance from development partners including the International Finance Corporation to implement these arrangements and to encourage more private sector participation. In 2021, a Japanese consortium acquired 44 percent shareholding in state utility company Energy Fiji Limited. Foreign investors are already partnering in public-private partnership arrangements in the health and maritime port sectors. In 2018, the government signed the first public private partnership agreement in the medical sector with Fiji’s pension fund and an Australian company to develop, upgrade, and operate the Ba and Lautoka hospitals, the country’s two major hospitals in the western region. The PPP arrangements were finalized and in April 2022, and the new Ba hospital opened. The Ministry of Economy publishes these opportunities as Tenders or Expressions of Interest ( http://www.economy.gov.fj/ ).

Finland is open to foreign portfolio investment and has an effective regulatory system. According to the Bank of Finland, in end December 2021 Finland had USD 17.5 billion worth of official reserve assets, mainly in foreign currency reserves and securities. Credit is allocated on market terms and is made available to foreign investors in a non-discriminatory manner, and private sector companies have access to a variety of credit instruments. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms.

The Helsinki Stock Exchange is part of OMX, referred to as NASDAQ OMX Helsinki (OMXH). NASDAQ OMX Helsinki is part of the NASDAQ OMX Nordic division, together with the Stockholm, Copenhagen, Iceland, and Baltic (Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius) stock exchanges.

Finland accepts the obligations under IMF Article VIII, Sections 2(a), 3, and 4 of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement. It maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions, except for those measures imposed for security reasons in accordance with Regulations of the Council of the European Union.

Banking is open to foreign competition. Due to in-group mergers, the number of credit institutions operating in Finland dropped by 18 to 228 in 2020. Total assets of the domestic banking groups and branches of foreign banks operating in Finland amounted to USD 951 billion in Q3 2021 . For more information see: https://www.finanssiala.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/FA-Julkaisu-Finnish_Banking_2020.pdf

In October 2021, Handelsbanken, Finland’s fifth biggest banking group with a 5 percent market share, announced decision to divest its businesses in Finland.

Foreign nationals can in principle open bank accounts in the same manner as Finns. However, banks must identify customers and this may prove more difficult for foreign nationals. In addition to personal and address data, the bank often needs to know the person’s identifier code (i.e. social security number), and a number of banks require a work permit, a certificate of studies, or a letter of recommendation from a trustworthy bank, and details regarding the nature of transactions to be made with the account. All authorized deposit-taking banks are members of the Deposit Guarantee Fund, which guarantees customers’ deposits to a maximum of EUR 100,000 per depositor.

In 2020 the capital adequacy ratio of the Finnish banking sector was 21.2 percent, above the EU average. Measured in Core Tier 1 Capital, the ratio was 18.1 percent. The capital adequacy of the Finnish banking sector remains well above the EU average. The Finnish banking sector’s return on equity (ROE) was 6.4 percent, well above the average ROE for all EU banking sectors (2.3 percent). Standard & Poor’s in March 2022 reaffirmed Finland’s AA+ long term credit rating and stable outlook while Fitch kept Finland’s credit rating at AA+ in November 2021. The Finnish banking sector is dominated by four major banks (OP Financial Group, Nordea, Municipality Finance and Danske Bank), which together hold 80 percent of the market.

Nordea, which relocated its headquarters from Sweden to Finland in 2018, has the leading market position among household and corporate customers in Finland. The relocation increased the Finnish banking sector to over three times the size of Finland’s GDP. Nordea’s balance sheet is approximately twice the size of the GDP of any of the Nordic economies. Consequently, Finland’s banking sector is one of Europe’s largest relative to the size of the national economy.

Nordea became a member of the “we.trade” consortium in November 2017, a blockchain based trade platform for customers of the European wide consortium of banks signed up for the platform. “we.trade” makes domestic and cross-border commerce easier for European companies by harnessing the power of distributed ledger and block chain technology. Commercially launched in January 2019, the we.trade’s technology is currently licensed by 17 banks across 15 countries.

The Act on Virtual Currency providers (572/2019) entered into force in May, 2019. The Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA) acts as the registration authority for virtual currency providers. The primary objective of the Act is to introduce virtual currency providers into the scope of anti-money laundering regulation. Only virtual currency providers meeting statutory requirements are able to carry on their activities in Finland, and only a FIN-FSA registered virtual currency provider may market its currency and services in Finland

The Finnish Tax Administration released guidelines on the taxation of cryptocurrency in May 2018, updates were made in October 2019, and new guidelines were released in January 2020 : https://www.vero.fi/en/detailed-guidance/guidance/48411/taxation-of-virtual-currencies3/

Foreign Exchange

Finland adopted the Euro as its official currency in January 1999. Finland maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for international transactions, except for those measures imposed for security reasons.

Remittance Policies

There are no legal obstacles to direct foreign investment in Finnish securities or exchange controls regarding payments into and out of Finland. Banks must identify their customers and report suspected cases of money laundering or the financing of terrorism. Banks and credit institutions must also report single payments or transfers of EUR 15,000 or more. If the origin of funds is suspect, banks must immediately inform the National Bureau of Investigation. There are no restrictions on current transfers or repatriation of profits. Residents and non-residents may hold foreign exchange accounts. There is no limit on dividend distributions as long as they correspond to a company’s official earnings records.

Travelers carrying more than EUR 10,000 must make a declaration upon entering or leaving the EU.

As a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) member, Finland observes most of FATF’s 40 recommendations. In its Mutual Evaluation Report of Finland, released October 5, 2021, FATF concluded that Finland’s measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing are delivering good results, but that deficiencies on the lack of specific requirements for risk-based supervision and monitoring of non-profit organizations (NPOs) at risk of terrorist financing (TF) abuse and sharing information promptly with competent authorities remain unaddressed. Finland passed new legislation (the Act on Money Collection 2020), completed its National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (NRA 2021) in March 2021 and developed an Action Plan for National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 2021– 2023. Finland’s AML/CFT legislation was amended in 2019 to introduce the Finnish Trade Register of beneficial owners of legal entities and foreign trusts. The National AML/CFT Coordination Group has also developed a public AML/CFT website to improve the understanding of ML/TF risks and provide guidance on reporting suspicious transactions for obliged entities. FATF’s Mutual Evaluation Report of Finland, October 2021: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/fur-finland-2021.html

In Finland, the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive was implemented, among other things, by means of the Act on the Bank and Payment Accounts Control System, which entered into force on May 1, 2019. In accordance with the Act, Customs has established a bank and payment accounts register and issue a regulation on a data retrieval system, which entered into force on September 1, 2020. Finland is in the process of amending the Act on the Bank and Payment Accounts Control System and the Act on the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to implement the EU Directive on access to financial information.

Solidium is a holding company that is fully owned by the State of Finland. Although it is not explicitly a sovereign wealth fund, Solidium’s mission is to manage and increase the long-term value of the listed shareholdings of the Finnish State. Solidium is a minority owner in 12 listed companies; the market value of Solidium’s equity holdings is approximately USD 9.2 billion (March 2022), https://www.solidium.fi/en/holdings/holdings/

There are no administrative restrictions on portfolio investment in France, and there is an effective regulatory system in place to facilitate portfolio investment. France’s open financial market allows foreign firms easy access to a variety of financial products, both in France and internationally. France continues to modernize its marketplace; as markets expand, foreign and domestic portfolio investment has become increasingly important. As in most EU countries, France’s listed companies are required to meet international accounting standards. Some aspects of French legal, regulatory, and accounting regimes are less transparent than U.S. systems, but they are consistent with international norms. Foreign banks are allowed to establish branches and operations in France and are subject to international prudential measures. Under IMF Article VIII, France may not impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions without the (prior) approval of the Fund.

Foreign investors have access to all classic financing instruments, including short-, medium-, and long-term loans, short- and medium-term credit facilities, and secured and non-secured overdrafts offered by commercial banks. These assist in public offerings of shares and corporate debt, as well as mergers, acquisitions and takeovers, and offer hedging services against interest rate and currency fluctuations. Foreign companies have access to all banking services. Most loans are provided at market rates, although subsidies are available for home mortgages and small business financing.

Euronext Paris (also known as Paris Bourse) is part of a regulated cross-border stock exchange located in six European countries. Euronext Growth is an alternative exchange for medium-sized companies to list on a less regulated market (based on the legal definition of the European investment services directive), with more consumer protection than the Marché Libre still used by a couple hundred small businesses for their first stock listing. A company seeking a listing on Euronext Growth must have a sponsor with status granted by Euronext and prepare a French language prospectus for a permit from the Financial Markets Authority (Autorité des Marchés Financiers or AMF), the French equivalent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) may also list on Enternext, a subsidiary of the Euronext Group created in 2013. The bourse in Paris also offers Euronext Access, an unregulated exchange for start-ups.

France’s banking system recovered gradually from the 2008-2009 global financial crises and passed the 2018 stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority. In the context of the COVID-19 outbreak, the European Banking Authority (EBA) launched an EU-wide stress test exercise in January 2021 and published its results in July 2021. The results of the stress tests confirmed the resilience of the French banking system over the entire time horizon of the exercise (2021-2023), despite using a particularly severe macroeconomic and financial scenario, which envisages a prolongation of the crisis between 2021 and 2023. A new EBA EU-wide stress test will be carried out in 2023.

Four French banks were ranked among the world’s 20 largest as of the end of 2020 (BNP Paribas SA; Crédit Agricole Group, Société Générale SA, Groupe BPCE). The assets of France’s top five banks totaled $7.7 trillion in 2020. Acting on a proposal from France’s central bank, Banque de France, in March 2020, the High Council for Financial Stability (HCSF) instructed the country’s largest banks to decrease the “countercyclical capital buffer” from 0.25 percent to zero percent of their bank’s risk-weighted assets, thereby increasing liquidity to help mitigate the impact of the pandemic-induced recession. As of January 2022, HCSF maintained the zero percent countercyclical capital buffer but with the intention of normalizing it to its pre-crisis level at its next meeting.

Banque de France is a member of the Eurosystem, which groups together the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks of all countries that have adopted the euro. Banque de France is a public entity governed by the French Monetary and Financial Code. The conditions whereby it conducts its missions on national territory are set out in its Public Service Contract. The three main missions are monetary strategy; financial stability, together with the High Council of Financial Stability (HCSF) which implements macroprudential policy; and the provision of economic services to the community. In addition, it participates in the preparation and implementation of decisions taken centrally by the ECB Governing Council.

Foreign banks can operate in France either as subsidiaries or branches but need to obtain a license. Credit institutions’ licenses are generally issued by France’s Prudential Authority (Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution or ACPR) which reviews whether certain conditions are met (e.g. minimum capital requirement, sound and prudent management of the bank, compliance with balance sheet requirements, etc.). Both EU law and French legislation apply to foreign banks. Foreign banks or branches are additionally subject to prudential measures and must provide periodic reports to the ACPR regarding operations in France, including detailed reports on their financial situation. At the EU level, the ‘passporting right’ allows a foreign bank settled in any EU country to provide their services across the EU, including France. There are about 944 credit institutions authorized to carry on banking activities in France; the list of foreign banks is available on this website:  https://www.regafi.fr/spip.php?page=results&type=advanced&id_secteur=3&lang=en&denomination=&siren=&cib=&bic=&nom=&siren_agent=&num=&cat=01-TBR07&retrait=0 

France has no sovereign wealth fund per se (none that use that nomenclature) but does operate funds with similar intents. The Public Investment Bank (Bpifrance) supports small and medium enterprises (SMEs), larger enterprises (Entreprises de Taille Intermedaire), and innovating businesses with over €36 billion ($39.6 billion) assets under management. The government strategy is defined at the national level and aims to fit with local strategies.  Bpifrance may hold direct stakes in companies, hold indirect stakes via generalist or sectorial funds, venture capital, development or transfer capital.  In November 2020, Bpifrance became a member of the One Planet Sovereign Wealth Funds (OPSWF) international initiative, which federates international sovereign wealth funds mobilized to contribute to the transition towards a more sustainable economy. Bpifrance stepped up its support for the ecological and energy transition, aiming to reach nearly €6 billion ($6.6 billion) per year by 2023.

The 11 listed entities in which the French State maintains stakes at the federal level are Aeroports de Paris (50.63 percent); Airbus Group (10.92 percent); Air France-KLM (28.6 percent); EDF (83.88 percent), ENGIE (23.64 percent), Eramet (27.13 percent), La Française des Jeux (FDJ) (20.46 percent), Orange (a direct 13.39 percent stake and a 9.60 percent stake through Bpifrance), Renault (15.01 percent), Safran (11.23 percent), and Thales (25.67 percent). Unlisted companies owned by the State include SNCF (rail), RATP (public transport), CDC (Caisse des depots et consignations) and La Banque Postale (bank). In all, the government maintains majority and minority stakes in 88 firms in a variety of sectors.

Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, including from state-owned banks or other state-owned investment vehicles. SOEs are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors. SOEs may get subsidies and other financial resources from the government.

France, as a member of the European Union, is party to the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization. Companies owned or controlled by the state behave largely like other companies in France and are subject to the same laws and tax code. The Boards of SOEs operate according to accepted French corporate governance principles as set out in the (private sector) AFEP-MEDEF Code of Corporate Governance. SOEs are required by law to publish an annual report, and the French Court of Audit conducts financial audits on all entities in which the state holds a majority interest. The French government appoints representatives to the Boards of Directors of all companies in which it holds significant numbers of shares, and manages its portfolio through a special unit attached to the Ministry for the Economy and Finance Ministry, the shareholding agency APE (Agence de Participations de l’Etat). The State as a shareholder must set an example in terms of respect for the environment, gender equality and social responsibility. The report also highlighted that the State must protect its strategic assets and remain a shareholder in areas where the general interest is at stake.

In 2021, the French Government increased to 29.9 percent its existing 14.3 percent stake in the Air France-KLM group in a deal that injected €4 billion ($4.5 billion) into Air France and its Holding Company under the European State aid Temporary Framework. This recapitalization, through a mix of new shares and hybrid debt, constrains the group from taking more than a 10 percent stake in any competitor until three-quarters of that aid is repaid. It follows a €7 billion ($7.7 billion) bailout the government provided earlier in 2020. The French Government has pledged to reduce its stake to the pre-crisis level of 14.3 percent by the end of 2026.

The government was due to privatize many large companies in 2019, including ADP and ENGIE in order to create a €10 billion ($11 billion) fund for innovation and research. However, the program was delayed because of political opposition to the privatization of airport manager ADP, regarded as a strategic asset to be protected from foreign shareholders. The government succeeded in selling in November 2019 a 52 percent stake in gambling firm FDJ. The government continues to maintain a strong presence in some sectors, particularly power, public transport, and defense industries.

There is no law prohibiting or limiting foreign investment in Gabon. Aside from the preference in employment given to Gabonese workers, from a general corporate law perspective, there are no specific legislative requirements. Regardless of the type of company, there must be one resident representative on the management board of all Gabonese companies. However, this resident representative can be a non-Gabonese citizen.

The Government of Gabon automatically owns a 20 percent stake in all petroleum development in the nation, with Gabon Oil able to purchase up to an additional 15 percent. The standard practice is for the Gabonese President to review foreign investment contracts following the completion of ministerial-level negotiations.

The contracting company can assign its rights and obligations under any hydrocarbon’s contracts to a third party, subject to the prior approval of the Ministry of Oil and Hydrocarbons and the Ministry of Economy. The state is entitled to the right of first refusal on application to assign these rights to a third party, excluding assignments between the contracting company and its affiliates. The Gabonese government encourages and supports foreign portfolio investment, but Gabon’s capital markets are poorly developed. Gabon is the home to the Central Africa Regional Stock Exchange, which began operation in August 2008. Additionally, the Bank of Central African States is in the process of consolidating the Libreville Stock Exchange into a single CEMAC zone stock exchange to be based in Douala, Cameroon; this process began in July 2019.

On June 25, 1996, Gabon formally notified the IMF that they accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF Articles of Agreement. These sections provide that members shall not impose or engage in certain measures, namely restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions, discriminatory currency arrangements, or multiple currency practices, without the approval of the IMF.

Foreign investors are authorized to obtain credit on the local market and have access to a variety of credit instruments offered by local banks without restriction.

The banking sector is composed of seven commercial banks and is open to foreign institutions. The industry is highly concentrated, with three of the largest banks accounting for 77 percent of all loans and deposits. The lack of diversification in the economy has constrained bank growth in the country, given that the financing of the oil sector is largely undertaken by foreign international banks. Access to banking services outside major cities is limited.

According to data from the Gabonese General Directorate for the Economy and Fiscal Policy, the term resources of the banking sector fell by 8% in the first half of 2020, due in particular to the negative impact of COVID-19 on economic activity. These resources stood at 552.1 billion FCFA at the end of June 2020, compared to 600 billion a year earlier.

The Gabonese banking sector remains weak due to its difficulty in financing the private sector as a result of unreliable and often incomplete documentation presented by new companies. In addition, interest rates offered by banks are very high – around 15 percent – discouraging individuals and businesses.

BGFI Bank Gabon is the largest Gabonese bank in both deposits and loans with approximatively 45 percent of the market share and a balance sheet total of over 3,000 billion FCFA, according to the Professional Association of Gabon Credit Institutions (APEC). The Bloomfield Investment Corporation financial rating agency gave the BGFI Bank a mark of A+ in recognition for its financial strength and management system.

Gabon shares a common Central Bank (Bank of Central African States) and a common currency, the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) Franc, with the other countries of CEMAC. The CFA is pegged to the euro.

Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country. There is one U.S. bank (Citigroup) present in Gabon. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account in the local economy.

Gabon’s financial system is shallow and financial intermediation levels remain low. Basic documents are required for applying for a residency permit in Gabon.

Gabon created a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) in 2008. Initially called the Fund for Future Generations (Fonds des Génerations Futures) and later changed to the Sovereign Funds of the Gabonese Republic (Fonds Souverains de la République Gabonaise), the current iteration of Gabon’s SWF is referred to as Gabon’s Strategic Investment Funds (Fonds Gabonaises d’Investissements Stratégiques, or FGIS). As of September 2013, the most recent FGIS report, the FGIS had USD 2.4 billion in assets and was actively making investments. Further details are not available.

Gabon’s SWF accepted the Santiago principles and joined the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs on January 2022.

Government-appointed civil servants manage Gabonese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which operate primarily in energy, extractive industries, and public utilities. SOEs generally follow OECD guidelines on corporate governance, which usually consists of a board of directors under the authority of the related ministry. That ministry determines the board members, who may be government officials or members of the general public. The SOEs often consult with their ministry before undertaking any important business decisions. The corresponding ministry in each sector prepares and submits the budget of each SOE each year. Independent auditors examine the SOEs’ activities each year, conducting audits according to international standards. Auditors do not publish their reports, but rather submit them to the relevant ministry.

There is no published list of SOEs.

There are no specific laws or rules that offer preferential treatment to SOEs. Although private enterprises may compete with public enterprises under open market access conditions, SOEs often have a competitive advantage in the industries in which they operate.

Gabon does not have an active privatization program. However, when there is a privatization program foreign investors are usually invited to participate. The bidding process for these programs is easy to understand, non-discriminatory, and transparent.

The National Bank of Georgia regulates the securities market. All market participants submit their reports in line with international standards. All listed companies must make public filings, which are then uploaded to the National Bank’s website, allowing investors to evaluate a company’s financial standing. The Georgian securities market includes the following licensed participants: two Stock Exchanges, a Central Securities Depository, eight brokerage companies, and three independent securities registrars. ( https://www.nbg.gov.ge/index.php?m=487&lng=eng )

The Georgian Stock Exchange (GSE, https://gse.ge/en/ ) is the only organized securities market in Georgia. Designed and established with the help of USAID and operating under a legal framework drafted with the assistance of U.S. experts, the GSE complies with global best practices in securities trading and offers an efficient investment facility to both local and foreign investors. The GSE’s automated trading system can accommodate thousands of securities that can be traded by brokers from workstations on the GSE floor or remotely from their offices.

No law or regulation authorizes private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. Cross-shareholder or stable-shareholder arrangements are not used by private firms in Georgia. Georgian legislation does not protect private firms from takeovers. There are no regulations authorizing private firms to restrict the investment activity of foreign partners or to limit the ability of foreign partners to gain control over domestic enterprises.

The government and Central Bank (National Bank of Georgia) follow IMF Article VIII and do not impose any restrictions on payments and transfers in current international transactions.

Credit from commercial banks is available to foreign investors as well as domestic clients, although interest rates are high. Banks offer business, consumer, and mortgage loans.

The government adopted a new law in 2018 that introduced an accumulative pension scheme, which became effective on January 1, 2019. The pension scheme is mandatory for legally employed people under 40. For the self-employed and those above the age of 40, enrolment in the program is voluntary. The pension savings system applies to Georgian citizens, foreign citizens living in Georgia with permanent residency in the country, and stateless persons who are employed or self-employed and receive an income.

Banking is one of the fastest growing sectors in the Georgian economy. As of March 1, 2022, Georgia’s banking sector consists of 14 commercial banks, including 13 foreign-controlled banks, with 154 commercial bank branches and 756 service centers throughout the country. In March 2022, Georgian commercial banks held GEL 61.7 billion (around $19.6 billion) in total assets. The private sector Credit-to-GDP ratio reached 78%, one of the highest among regional peers. As of early 2022, there were 18 insurance companies and 38 microfinance (MFI) organizations operating in Georgia. MFIs held GEL 1.6 billion ($528 million) in total assets as of January 1, 2022. The two largest Georgian banks are listed on the London Stock Exchange: TBC Bank (listed in 2014) and the Bank of Georgia (2006).

The banking system is stable, well capitalized, liquid, and profitable. The financial sector maintains solid capital and liquidity buffers against potential threats. The share of non-performing loans (5.2% as of January 1, 2022) is declining. As outlined by the 2021 IMF Financial System Stability Assessment (https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/09/17/Georgia-Financial-System-Stability-Assessment-465911), Georgia’s banking supervision practices and regulations have significantly progressed and are in line with Basel/EU directives. Despite substantial progress, dollarization remains the main challenge for the system, given that around half of the credit portfolio is disbursed in foreign currency, largely to unhedged borrowers.

The National Bank of Georgia  (NBG, www.nbg.gov.ge ) is Georgia’s central bank, as defined by the Constitution. The rights and obligations of the NBG as the central bank, the principles of its activity, and the guarantee of its independence are defined in the Organic Law of Georgia on the National Bank of Georgia. The National Bank supervises the financial sector to facilitate the financial stability and transparency of the financial system, as well as to protect the rights of the sector’s consumers and investors. Through the Financial Monitoring Service of Georgia, a separate legal entity, the NBG undertakes measures against illicit income legalization and terrorism financing. In addition, the NBG is the government’s banker and fiscal agent.

The IMF, credit rating agencies, and other international organizations positively assess the NBG’s macroeconomic framework and inflation targeting regime. In June 2021, the NBG was awarded the Transparency Award by the international publisher Central Banking. The award highlighted the improved communications on monetary policy, financial stability, consumer protection and financial education. The NBG also was nominated for the Risk Manager Award of 2021 by the same group. In 2021, Global Finance named Koba Gvenetadze, Governor of the NBG, among the Best Central Bankers for the fourth time.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the Asian Development Bank (ABD), and other international development agencies have a variety of lending programs making credit available to large and small businesses in Georgia. Georgia’s two largest banks – TBC and Bank of Georgia – have correspondent banking relationships with the United States through Citibank, and some other banks have a relationship with JP Morgan. However, correspondent banking remains a major challenge for small and medium size banks.

Georgia does not restrict foreigners from establishing a bank account in Georgia. Several local banks are subsidiaries of international banking groups and subject to the same regulations.

The NBG and Georgian financial institutions act fully in accordance with the financial sanctions imposed by the United States and others on the Russian Federation. Compliance with international financial sanctions is systematically checked during the onsite inspections of financial institutions.

In 2020, the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MoneyVal) approved the Fifth Round Evaluation Report of Georgia. The report assessed the NBG’s supervisory process and practices as having effective outcomes. The report also notes that financial institutions generally have a good understanding of risks and are part of large banking or other financial groups that have put in place sophisticated internal systems and controls which effectively mitigate money laundering and terrorism financing risks.

Georgia does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Georgian government privatized most state-owned enterprises (SOEs). At the end of 2013, Georgian Railways (GRW), Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC), Georgian State Electrosystem (GSE), Electricity System Commercial Operator (ESCO), and Enguri Hydropower plant were the major remaining SOEs. The energy-related companies largely implement the government’s energy policies and help manage the electricity market. There are also a number of Legal Entities of Public Law (LEPLs), independent bodies that carry out government functions, such as the Public Service Halls.

During 2012, Georgian Railways, GOGC, GSE, and ESCO’s assets were placed under the Partnership Fund ( fund.ge ), a state-run fund to facilitate foreign investment into new projects. The fund also controlled 25 percent of shares in the TELASI Electricity Distribution Company, which it sold to private investors in 2020.

Despite state ownership, SOEs act under the general terms of the Entrepreneurial Law. Georgian Railways and GOGC have supervisory boards, while GSE and ESCO do not. The SOEs’ individual charters describe their procedures and policies. Georgia encourages its SOEs to adhere to the OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate Governance for SOEs.

The senior management of SOEs report to Supervisory Boards, where they exist (e.g., GRW, GOGC); in other cases, they report to line ministries. Governmental officials can be on the supervisory board of the SOEs, and the Partnership Fund has five key governmental officials on its board. SOEs explicitly are not obligated to consult with government officials before making business decisions, but informal consultations take place depending on the scale and importance of the issue.

To ensure the transparency and accountability of state business decisions and operations, SOEs have regular outside audits and publish annual reports. SOEs with more than 50 percent state ownership are obliged to follow the State Procurement Law and make procurements via public tender. The Partnership Fund, GRW, and GOGC are subject to valuation by international rating agencies. There is no legal requirement for SOEs to publish annual report or to submit their books for independent audit, but this is done in practice. In addition, GRW and GOGC are Eurobond issuer companies and therefore are required to publish reports. SOEs are subject to the same domestic accounting standards and rules. These standards are comparable to international financial reporting standards. No SOEs exercise delegated governmental powers.

In early 2021, the government announced it would start reforming state-owned enterprises and create a new council to develop a strategy to be implemented in 2021-2024. The goal of the reform is to bring the management of SOEs closer to higher standards of corporate governance. The first state-owned enterprise to undergo reforms will be the Georgian State Electrosystem (GSE), an electricity transmission system operator.

According to a December 20, 2021 IMF report  on Georgia ( https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2021/English/1GEOEA2021009.ashx ), auditing, reporting, and disclosure practice in Georgia is largely consistent with international good practice. The IMF report contains concrete recommendations for further improving the financial accountability system of SOEs.

Georgia’s government has privatized most large SOEs. Successful privatization projects include major assets in energy generation and distribution, telecommunications, water utilities, port facilities, and real estate sectors. A list of entities available to be privatized can be found at eauction.ge . Foreign investors are welcome to participate in privatization programs. Additional information is also available the American Chamber of Commerce in Georgia website: www.amcham.ge .

In 2019, the government offered mining deposits for privatization in addition to other state-owned assets through the 100 Investment Offers for Business  initiative. Within the initiative, the government selected mineral resource deposits from various regions to sell at e-auctions . The mineral deposits include gold and copper-polymetallic, ore, bentonite clay, volcanic slag, peat, diatomite, tuff breccia, zeolite-containing tuff, basalt, marble, limestone, underground fresh water, and carbonated mineral water. Mining license prices vary and depend on the type of mineral resource and its price.

National Agency of State Property, a Legal Entity of Public Law under the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development, manages the privatization of state property, the transfer of the right of use, and the management of SOEs. The agency’s website ( http://nasp.gov.ge/ ) contains links to electronic auctions, proposals for investments, and other relevant information.

As an EU member state with a well-developed financial sector, Germany welcomes foreign portfolio investment and has an effective regulatory system. Capital markets and portfolio investments operate freely with no discrimination between German and foreign firms. Germany has a very open economy, routinely ranking among the top countries in the world for exports and inward and outward foreign direct investment. As a member of the Eurozone, Germany does not have sole national authority over international payments, which are a shared task of the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the 19 member states, including the German Central Bank (Bundesbank). A European framework for national security screening of foreign investments, which entered into force in April 2019, provides a basis under European law to restrict capital movements into Germany because of threats to national security. Global investors see Germany as a safe place to invest. German sovereign bonds continue to retain their “safe haven” status.

Listed companies and market participants in Germany must comply with the Securities Trading Act, which bans insider trading and market manipulation. Compliance is monitored by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) while oversight of stock exchanges is the responsibility of the state governments in Germany (with BaFin taking on any international responsibility). Investment fund management in Germany is regulated by the Capital Investment Code (KAGB), which entered into force on July 22, 2013. The KAGB represents the implementation of additional financial market regulatory reforms, committed to in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The law went beyond the minimum requirements of the relevant EU directives and represents a comprehensive overhaul of all existing investment-related regulations in Germany with the aim of creating a system of rules to protect investors while also maintaining systemic financial stability.

Although corporate financing via capital markets is on the rise, Germany’s financial system remains mostly bank-based. Bank loans are still the predominant form of funding for firms, particularly the small- and medium-sized enterprises that comprise Germany’s “Mittelstand,” or mid-sized industrial market leaders. Credit is available at market-determined rates to both domestic and foreign investors, and a variety of credit instruments are available. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are generally transparent and consistent with international banking norms. Germany has a universal banking system regulated by federal authorities; there have been no reports of a shortage of credit in the German economy. After 2010, Germany banned some forms of speculative trading, most importantly “naked short selling.” In 2013, Germany passed a law requiring banks to separate riskier activities such as proprietary trading into a legally separate, fully- capitalized unit that has no guarantee or access to financing from the deposit-taking part of the bank. Since the creation of the European single supervisory mechanism (SSM) in November 2014, the European Central Bank directly supervises 21 banks located in Germany (as of January 2022), among them four subsidiaries of foreign banks.

Germany has a modern and open banking sector characterized by a highly diversified and decentralized, small-scale structure. As a result, it is extremely competitive, profit margins notably in the retail sector are low, and the banking sector is considered “over-banked” and in need of consolidation. The country’s “three-pillar” banking system consists of private commercial banks, cooperative banks, and public banks (savings banks/Sparkassen and the regional state-owned banks/Landesbanken). This structure has remained unchanged despite marked consolidation within each “pillar” since the financial crisis in 2009. By the end of 2020 the number of state banks (Landesbanken) had dropped from 12 to 6, savings banks from 446 in 2007 to 377, and cooperative banks from 1,234 to 818. Two of the five large private-sector banks have exited the market (Dresdner, Postbank). The balance sheet total of German banks dropped from 304 percent of GDP in 2007 to 192 percent of year-end 2020 GDP with banking sector assets worth €9.1 trillion. Market shares in corporate finance of the banking groups remained largely unchanged (all figures for end of 2021): commercial banks 25.5 percent (domestic 16.2 percent, foreign banks 9.3 percent), savings banks 31.2 percent, credit cooperative banks 22 percent, regional Landesbanken 9.3 percent, and development banks/building and loan associations/mortgage banks 12 percent.

Germany’s retail banking sector is healthy and well capitalized in line with ECB rules on bank capitalizations. The sector is dominated by globally active banks, Deutsche Bank (Germany’s largest bank by balance sheet total) and Commerzbank (fourth largest bank), with balance sheets of €1.32 trillion and €507 billion respectively (2020 figures). Commerzbank received €18 billion in financial assistance from the federal government in 2009, for which the government took a 25 percent stake in the bank (now reduced to 15.6 percent). Merger talks between Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank failed in 2019. The second largest of the top ten German banks with €595 billion of assets per year-end 2020 is DZ Bank, the central institution of the Cooperative Finance Group (after its merger with WGZ Bank in July 2016), followed by German branches of large international banks (UniCredit Bank, ING-Diba), development banks (KfW Group, NRW Bank), and state banks (LBBW, Bayern LB, Helaba, NordLB).

German credit institutions’ operating business proved robust in 2020 despite the prolonged low interest rate environment and the coronavirus pandemic. Operating income rose by €1.8 billion (+1.5 percent) on the year to €120.5 billion. In 2020 German credit institutions reported however a pre-tax profit of only €14.3 billion, coming in below the long-term average of €17.6 billion and significantly lower than the average of the post-financial crisis years (2010 to 2018) of €25.4 billion. Their 2020 net interest income of €81.1 billion remained below the long-term average of €87.2 billion. Credit risk provisioning rose significantly due to the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on economic activity, reaching €5.3 billion or 0.8 percent of big banks’ annual average lending portfolio. The banking sector’s average return on equity before tax in 2020 slipped to 2.71 percent (after tax: 1.12 percent) (with savings banks and credit cooperatives generating a higher return, and big banks a negative return).

The German government does not currently have a sovereign wealth fund or an asset management bureau.

The formal term for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Germany translates as “public funds, institutions, or companies,” and refers to entities whose budget and administration are separate from those of the government, but in which the government has more than 50 percent of the capital shares or voting rights. Appropriations for SOEs are included in public budgets, and SOEs can take two forms, either public or private law entities. Public law entities are recognized as legal personalities whose goal, tasks, and organization are established and defined via specific acts of legislation, with the best-known example being the publicly-owned promotional bank KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau). KfW’s mandate is to promote global development. The government can also resort to ownership or participation in an entity governed by private law if the following conditions are met: doing so fulfills an important state interest, there is no better or more economical alternative, the financial responsibility of the federal government is limited, the government has appropriate supervisory influence, and yearly reports are published.

Government oversight of SOEs is decentralized and handled by the ministry with the appropriate technical area of expertise. The primary goal of such involvement is promoting public interests rather than generating profits. The government is required to close its ownership stake in a private entity if tasks change or technological progress provides more effective alternatives, though certain areas, particularly science and culture, remain permanent core government obligations. German SOEs are subject to the same taxes and the same value added tax rebate policies as their private- sector competitors. There are no laws or rules that seek to ensure a primary or leading role for SOEs in certain sectors or industries. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, including access to state-owned banks such as KfW.

The Federal Statistics Office maintains a database of SOEs from all three levels of government (federal, state, and municipal) listing a total of 19,009 entities for 2019, or 0.58 percent of the total 3.35 million companies in Germany. SOEs in 2019 had €646 billion in revenue and €632 billion in expenditures. Forty-one percent of SOEs’ revenue was generated by water and energy suppliers, 12 percent by health and social services, and 11 percent by transportation-related entities. Measured by number of companies rather than size, 88 percent of SOEs are owned by municipalities, 10 percent are owned by Germany’s 16 states, and two percent are owned by the federal government.

The Federal Ministry of Finance is required to publish a detailed annual report on public funds, institutions, and companies in which the federal government has direct participation (including a minority share) or an indirect participation greater than 25 percent and with a nominal capital share worth more than €50,000. The federal government held a direct participation in 106 companies and an indirect participation in 401 companies at the end of 2019 (per the Ministry’s April 2021 publication of full-year 2019 figures), most prominently Deutsche Bahn (100 percent share), Deutsche Telekom (32 percent share), and Deutsche Post (21 percent share). Federal government ownership is concentrated in the areas of infrastructure, economic development, science, administration/increasing efficiency, defense, development policy, and culture. As the result of federal financial assistance packages from the federally-controlled Financial Market Stability Fund during the global financial crisis of 2008/9, the federal government still has a partial stake in several commercial banks, including a 15.6 percent share in Commerzbank, Germany’s second largest commercial bank. In 2020, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the German government acquired shares of several large German companies, including CureVac, TUI, and Lufthansa in an attempt to prevent companies from filing for insolvency or, in the case of CureVac, to support vaccine research in Germany.

The 2021 annual report (with 2019 data) can be found here:

https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/publikationen/beteiligungsbericht-des-bundes-2021-2016812 

Publicly-owned banks constitute one of the three pillars of Germany’s banking system (cooperative and commercial banks are the other two). Germany’s savings banks are mainly owned by the municipalities, while the so-called Landesbanken are typically owned by regional savings bank associations and the state governments. Given their joint market share, about 40 percent of the German banking sector is thus publicly owned. There are also many state-owned promotional/development banks which have taken on larger governmental roles in financing infrastructure. This increased role removes expenditures from public budgets, particularly helpful considering Germany’s balanced budget rules, which took effect for the states in 2020.

Germany does not have any privatization programs currently. German authorities treat foreigners equally in privatizations of state-owned enterprises.

Private sector growth in Ghana is constrained by financing challenges.  Businesses continue to face difficulty raising capital on the local market.  While credit to the private sector has increased in nominal terms, levels as percentage of GDP have remained stagnant over the last decade, and high government borrowing has brought interest rates above 20 percent and crowded out private investment.

Capital markets and portfolio investment are gradually evolving.  The longest-term domestic bonds are 20 years, with Eurobonds ranging up to 41-year maturities.  Foreign investors are permitted to participate in auctions of bonds only with maturities of two years or longer.  In January 2022, foreign investors held about 16.6 percent (valued at USD 5 billion) of the total outstanding domestic securities.  In 2015, the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) added the Ghana Fixed-Income Market (GFIM) – https://gfim.com.gh/, a specialized platform for secondary trading in debt instruments to improve liquidity.

The rapid accumulation of debt over the last decade, and particularly the past three years, has raised debt sustainability concerns.  Ghana received debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative in 2004, and began issuing Eurobonds in 2007.  In February 2020, Ghana sold sub-Saharan Africa’s longest-ever Eurobond as part of a $3 billion deal with a tenor of 41 years.  At the end of December 2021, total public debt, roughly evenly split between external and domestic, stood at 80 percent of GDP, according to the Bank of Ghana, partly as a result of the economic shock of COVID-19 as revenue declined and expenditures spiked.

The Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) has 36 listed companies.  Both foreign and local companies are allowed to list on the GSE.  The Securities and Exchange Commission regulates activities on the Exchange.  There is an eight percent tax on dividend income.  Foreigners are permitted to trade stocks listed on the GSE without restriction.  There are no capital controls on the flow of retained earnings, capital gains, dividends, or interest payments.  The GSE composite index (GGSECI) has exhibited mixed performance.

Banks in Ghana are relatively small, with the largest in the country in terms of operating assets, Ecobank Ghana Ltd., holding assets of about USD 2.3 billion in 2020.  The Central Bank’s minimum capital requirement for commercial banks is 400 million (USD 57 million), effective December 2018.  As a result of the reforms and subsequent closures and mergers of some banks from 2017 to 2019, the number of commercial banks dropped from 36 to 23.  Eight are domestically controlled, and the remaining 15 are foreign controlled.  In total, there are over 1,500 branches distributed across the sixteen regions of the country.

Overall, the banking industry in Ghana is well capitalized with a capital adequacy ratio of 19.6 percent as of December 2021, above the 11.5 percent prudential and statutory requirement.  The non-performing loans ratio increased from 14.8 percent in December 2020 to 15.2 percent as of December 2021.  Lending in foreign currencies to unhedged borrowers poses a risk, and widely varying standards in loan classification and provisioning may be masking weaknesses in bank balance sheets.  The BoG has almost completed actions to address weaknesses in the non-bank deposit-taking institutions sector (e.g., microfinance, savings and loan, and rural banks) and has also issued new guidelines to strengthen corporate governance regulations in the banks.

Recent developments in the non-banking financial sector indicate increased diversification, including new rules and regulations governing the trading of Exchange Traded Funds.  Non-banking financial institutions such as leasing companies, building societies, and village savings and loan associations have increased access to finance for underserved populations, as have rural and mobile banking.  Currently, Ghana has no “cross-shareholding” or “stable shareholder” arrangements used by private firms to restrict foreign investment through mergers and acquisitions, although, as noted above, the Payments Systems and Services Act, 2019 (Act 987), does require a 30 percent Ghanaian company or Ghanaian holding by any electronic payments service provider, including banks or special deposit-taking institutions.

Ghana’s main sovereign wealth fund is the Ghana Petroleum Fund (GPF), which is funded by oil profits and flows to the Ghana Heritage Fund and Ghana Stabilization Fund.  The Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), 2011 (Act 815), spells out how revenues from oil and gas should be spent and includes transparency provisions for reporting by government agencies, as well as an independent oversight group, the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC).  Section 48 of the PRMA requires the Fund to publish an audited annual report by the Ghana Audit Service.  The Fund’s management meets the legal obligations. Management of the Ghana Petroleum Fund is a joint responsibility between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Ghana.  The minister develops the investment policy for the GPF, and is responsible for the overall management of GPF funds, consults regularly with the Investment Advisory Committee and Bank of Ghana Governor before making any decisions related to investment strategy or management of GPF funds.  The minister is also in charge of establishing a management agreement with the Bank of Ghana for the oversight of the funds.  The Bank of Ghana is responsible for the day-to-day operational management of the Petroleum Reserve Accounts (PRAs) under the terms of Operation Management Agreement.

For additional information regarding Ghana Petroleum Fund, please visit the 2020 Petroleum Annual Report at: https://mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/petroleum/2020-Annual-Petroleum-Report.pdf .

Ghana has 94 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 51 of which are wholly owned, while 43 are partially owned.  While the president appoints the CEO and full boards of most of the wholly owned SOEs, they are under the supervision of line ministries.  Most of the partially owned investments are in the financial, mining, and oil and gas sectors.  To improve the efficiency of SOEs and reduce fiscal risks they pose to the budget, in 2019 the government embarked on an exercise to tackle weak corporate governance in the SOEs as well as created the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA), a single institution, to monitor all SOEs, replacing both the State Enterprises Commission and the Divestiture Implementation Committee.

As of December 2021, only a handful of large SOEs remain, mainly in the transportation, water, banking, power, and extractive sectors.  The largest SOEs are Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), Volta River Authority (VRA), Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), Ghana Ports and Harbor Authority (GPHA), Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), Ghana National Gas Company Limited (GNGC), Ghana Airport Company Limited (GACL), Consolidated Bank Ghana Limited (CBG), Bui Power Authority (BPA), and Ghana Grid Company Limited (GRIDCo).  Many of these receive subsidies and assistance from the government.  The list of SOEs can be found at: https://siga.gov.gh/state-interest/ .

While the Government of Ghana does not actively promote adherence to the OECD Guidelines, SIGA oversees corporate governance of SOEs and encourages them to be managed like Limited Liability Companies to be profit making.  In addition, beginning in 2014, most SOEs were required to contract and service direct and government-guaranteed loans on their own balance sheet.  The government’s goal is to stop adding these loans to “pure public” debt, paid by taxpayers directly through the budget.

Ghana has no formal privatization program.  The government has announced its intention, however, to prioritize the creation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to restructure and privatize non-performing SOEs, although progress to implement this goal has been slow.  Procuring PPPs is allowed under the National Policy on Public Private Partnerships in Ghana, which was adopted in June 2011.  The Public Private Partnership Act, 2020 (Act 1039) was passed in December 2020.

Following EU regulations, Greece is open to foreign portfolio investment.  Law 3371/2005 sets an effective legal framework to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment.  Law 3283/2004 incorporates the European Council’s Directive 2001/107, setting the legal framework for the operation of mutual funds.  The Bank of Greece complies with its IMF Article VIII obligations and does not generally impose restrictions on payments.  Transfers for current international transactions are allowed but are subject to specific conditions for approval.  The lack of liquidity in the Athens Stock Exchange along with the challenging economic environment have hindered the allocation of credit but is accessible to foreign investors on the local market, who also have access to a variety of credit instruments.

Greece’s banking system is recovering from a decade-long economic crisis that created a large stock of nonperforming loans (NPLs).  In previous years, Greek banks cleared their balance sheets though the sale of their NPLs to several international funds.  The strong economic recovery in Greece in 2021, coupled with accommodative monetary and fiscal policies to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, contributed to improved liquidity conditions.  Banks successfully continued their efforts to clean up their loan portfolios.  This laid the groundwork for banks to resume their financial intermediation role and thus contribute to sustainable economic growth.  However, banks continue to face challenges including the legacy stock of non-performing loans still on bank balance sheets; the low quality of Greek banks’ prudential own funds, given the large share of deferred tax assets; and low operating profitability.  Currently, banks enjoy adequate liquidity and capital buffers that allow them to provide lending to the economy.

In November 2015, following an Asset Quality Review and Stress Test conducted by the ECB as a requirement of the 2015 ESM agreement, a third recapitalization of Greece’s four systemic banks (National Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank, Alpha Bank, and Eurobank) took place.  The recapitalization concluded with the banks remaining in private hands, after raising €6.5 billion from foreign investors, mostly hedge funds.  In September 2020, the ratio of NPLs decreased to 35.8 percent, down from 40.6 percent in December 2019.  Banks estimate that about 20 percent of non-performing exposures (NPEs) are owned by so-called “strategic defaulters” – borrowers who refrain from paying their debts to lenders to take advantage of the laws enacted during the financial crisis to protect borrowers from foreclosure or creditors’ collection even though they are able to pay their obligations.

Developing an effective NPL reduction strategy has been among the most difficult challenges for the Greek economy.  According to the Bank of Greece, Greek banks’ NPL ratio, at 15 percent in June 2021, remains the highest in the eurozone, well over the European average of around three percent.  Under the terms of the ESM agreement, Greece remains obliged to create an NPL market through which the loans could, over time, be sold or transferred for servicing purposes to foreign investors.  The Bank of Greece has licensed more than ten servicers, and the sale and securitization environment for non-performing loans continues to mature, with all of Greece’s systemic banks having conducted portfolio sales of secured and unsecured loan tranches since mid-2017.  The potential sale and/or transfer of Greek NPLs continues to receive interest by many Greek and foreign companies and funds, signaling a viable market.  The Greek state operates an auction platform for collateral and foreclosed assets, although the bulk of auctions still conclude with the selling bank as the purchaser of the assets.  The government introduced its “Hercules” asset protection scheme in late 2019, providing guarantees to banks as an incentive to securitize €30 billion more in NPLs.  The plan offloads bad debt by wrapping it into asset backed securities via special purpose vehicles that will purchase the NPLs.  The sales are financed by notes issued by the special purpose vehicles with a government guarantee for senior tranches, thereby limiting the risk to the Greek state.  Since all four systemic banks have availed themselves of the plan, the Greek government submitted an official request for an extension of the Hercules scheme on March 16, 2021, that will permit banks to further reduce non-performing loans (NPLs) in 2021 and 2022.

Poor asset quality inhibits banks’ ability to provide systemic financing, although the situation is slowly improving.  The annual growth rate of total deposits increased to 8.5 percent in 2020.Deposits increased by roughly €9 billion over 2019, up from around €200 billion in early 2019, a significant improvement from the crisis years, when deposits shrunk from their highest level of €237 billion in September 2009 to around €123 billion in September 2017.  Greece’s systemic banks held the following assets at the end of 2020:  Piraeus Bank, €71.6 billion; National Bank of Greece, €64.3 billion; Alpha Bank, €70 billion; and Eurobank, €67.7 billion.

Few U.S. financial institutions have a retail presence in Greece.  In September 2014, Alpha Bank acquired the retail operations of Citibank, including Diners Club.  Bank of America serves only companies and some special classes of pensioners.

There are a limited number of cross-shareholding arrangements among Greek businesses.  To date, the objective of such arrangements has not been to restrict foreign investment.  The same applies to hostile takeovers, a practice which has been recently introduced in the Greek market.  The government actively encourages foreign portfolio investment.

Greece has a reasonably efficient capital market that offers the private sector a wide variety of credit instruments.  Credit is allocated on market terms prevailing in the eurozone and credit is equally accessible by Greek and foreign investors.  An independent regulatory body, the Hellenic Capital Market Commission, supervises brokerage firms, investment firms, mutual fund management companies, portfolio investment companies, real estate investment trusts, financial intermediation firms, clearing houses and their administrators (e.g. the Athens Stock Exchange), and investor indemnity and transaction security schemes (e.g. the Common Guarantee Fund and the Supplementary Fund), and also encourages and facilitates portfolio investments.

Owner-registered bonds and shares are traded on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE).  It is mandatory in Greece for the shares of banking, insurance, and public utility companies to be registered.  Greek corporations listed on the ASE that are also state contractors are required to have all their shares registered.

Greece has not announced that it intends to implement or allow the implementation of blockchain technologies in its banking transactions.

There are no sovereign wealth funds in Greece. Public pension funds may invest up to 20 percent of their reserves in state or corporate bonds.

Greek state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in utilities, transportation, energy, media, health, and the defense industry.  There is no official website with a list of SOEs.

Bank of Greece: partially owned (Greek state shares cannot exceed 35 percent); over 1,800 employees; governed by a Governor appointed by the government.

Public Gas Corporation of Greece (DEPA): majority-owned by Greek state (65 percent); Net income €131 million in 2016; Total assets €3.1 billion in 2016; governed by Ministry of Development; Government is in the process of splitting the company and privatizing its infrastructure and commercial operations.

Hellenic Aerospace Industry: wholly owned; Total assets €932.5 million in 2014; Net income €13.7 million in 2014; over 1,300 employees.

Hellenic Financial Stability Fund: governed by General Council and Executive Board

Hellenic Post: majority-owned (90 percent by Greek state); Net income €15.5 million in 2017.

Hellenic Vehicle Organization: majority-owned (51 percent owned by Greek state); around 400 employees; Total assets around €69 million; governed by Board of Directors.

Water Supply and Sewerage Company (EYDAP): majority-owned (34 percent by Greek state); governed by Board of Directors.

Public Power Corporation: majority-owned (51 percent by Greek state); Total assets €14.1 billion in 2018; over 16,700 employees.

Most Greek SOEs are structured under the auspices of the Hellenic Corporation for Assets and Participations (HCAP), an independent holding company for state assets mandated by Greece’s 2015 bailout and formally launched in 2016.  HCAP’s supervisory board is independent from the Greek state and is appointed in part by Greece’s creditor institutions.  Some SOEs are still supervised by the Finance Ministry’s Special Secretariat for Public Enterprises and Organizations, established by Law 3429/2005.  Private companies previously were not allowed to enter the market in sectors where the SOE functioned as a monopoly, such as water, sewage, or urban transportation.  However, several of these SOEs are planned for privatization as a requirement of the country’s bailout programs, intended to liberalize markets and raise revenues for the state.

Official government statements on privatization since 2015 have sometimes led to confusion among investors.  Some senior officials have declared their opposition to previously approved privatization projects, while other officials have maintained the stance that the government remains committed to the sale of SOEs.  The current government has expressed its commitment and is moving forward with privatizations, including DEPA and some of the port assets.  Under the bailout agreement, Greece has moved forward with the deregulation of the electricity market, adopting the Target Model in November 2020.  In sectors opened to private investment, such as the telecommunications market, private enterprises compete with public enterprises under the same nominal terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations, such as licenses and supplies.  Some private sector competitors to SOEs report the government has provided preferential treatment to SOEs in obtaining licenses and leases.  The government actively seeks to end many of these state monopolies and introduce private competition as part of its overall reform of the Greek economy.  Greece – as a member of the EU – participates in the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO.  SOEs purchase goods and services from private sector and foreign firms through public tenders.  SOEs are subject to budget constraints, with salary cuts imposed in the past few years on public sector jobs.

The Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF, or TAIPED in Greek), an independent non-governmental privatization fund, was established in 2011 under Greece’s bailout program to manage the sale or concession of major government assets, to raise substantial state revenue, and to bring in new technology and expertise for the commercial development of these assets.  These include listed and unlisted state-owned companies, infrastructure, and commercially valuable buildings and land.  Foreign and domestic investor participation in the privatization program has generally not been subject to restrictions, although the economic environment during the crisis and subsequent pandemic has challenged the domestic private sector’s ability to raise funds to purchase firms slated for privatization.

The August 2015 ESM bailout agreement required Greece to consolidate the HRADF, the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF), the Public Properties Company (ETAD), and a new entity that will manage other state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into the Hellenic Corporation of Assets and Participations (or HCAP), formed by Law 4389/2016.  In March 2017, HCAP received short- and long-term guidelines from the Minister of Finance, and in September 2017, it received strategic guidelines from the Greek state (HCAP’s sole shareholder).

Privatizations are subject to a public bidding process, which is easy to understand, non-discriminatory, and transparent.  Notable privatizations recently completed include the transfer of the 66 percent of Greece’s gas transmission system operator DESFA to Senfluga Energy Infrastructure Holdings, the sale of 67 percent of the shares of Thessaloniki Port Authority, the sale of the remaining 5 percent of the largest telecommunications provider shares to Deutsche Telecom and rolling stock maintenance and railroad availability services company Rosco.

In February 2019, the government concluded the 20-year extension of the concession agreement of the Athens International Airport, worth €1.4 billion euros, and received nine expressions of interest in January 2020 for a 30 percent stake.  The extension allowed for launch of the tender for the sale of the 30 percent stake in the airport. In January 2020, the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF) shortlisted nine parties (from 10 that have originally expressed interest) that were qualified for the next phase of the tender; the binding offers. However, with the arrival of the pandemic in Greece (February-March 2020), and the dramatic drop in the airport operations/revenues, the HRADF has decided to freeze the whole process indefinitely.  In January 2020, the government of Greece launched the legal procedures necessary for privatization of ten regional ports, including Heraklion, Elefsina, and Alexandroupolis, which will be privatized through either partial concession deals or full management schemes.  In January 2021, the European Commission gave the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation the approval to proceed with the construction of a road network linking the town of Trikala with the main Egnatia Motorway.  In July 2020, the HRDF proceeded with two tenders for the privatization of the ports of Alexandroupoli and Kavala, that were deemed as more mature projects. In October of the same year six parties (in total) have expressed interest for both ports. In March 2021, the HRADF announced that four parties have been qualified for the binding offers phase of the tenders including two US companies (Quintana Infrastructure & Development, and Black Summit Financial Group).  The project is budgeted at €442 million and is expected to promote the energy, economic and tourism development of Central Greece, Thessaly, and Western Macedonia. In March 2020, the commercial operations of DEPA received nine non-binding bids for its sale of a 65 percent stake.  Hellenic Petroleum maintains the other 35 percent.  The Public Power Corporation continues to consider the partial privatization of its power distribution operator.

Grenada possesses a robust legislative and policy framework that facilitates the free flow of financial resources. Its currency, the Eastern Caribbean dollar, has a fixed exchange rate established by the regional Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). Foreign employees of investment enterprises and their families may repatriate their earnings after paying personal income tax and all other taxes due. The government of Grenada encourages foreign investors to seek investment capital from financial institutions chartered outside Grenada due to the short domestic supply of capital. Foreign investors are more likely to tap local financial markets for working capital. The government, local banks, and the ECCB respect IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

The private sector has access to the limited number of credit instruments. Grenadian stocks are traded on the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange, whose limited liquidity may pose difficulties in conducting transactions.

The financial industry in Grenada is regulated by two entities: The ECCB and the Grenada Authority for Regulation of the Financial Industry (GARFIN). The ECCB regulates the banking system. GARFIN oversees non-banking financial institutions through a regulatory system that encourages and facilitates portfolio investment. The estimated total assets of the largest banks are USD $1.03 billion. Information on the percentage of non-performing assets is not available. Grenada has not experienced cross-shareholding or hostile takeovers. As of November 30, 2020, commercial banks in Grenada deferred debt service on 4,069 commercial bank loans due to job losses and a reduction in salaries caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This was the second highest number of deferrals in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU).

Foreign banks or branches can establish operations in Grenada subject to prudential measures and regulations governed by the ECCB. For the requirements and procedures, foreign banks can refer to the following website: https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/p/grenada-1 

There is correspondent banking available with all licensed commercial banks. No correspondent banking relationships have been lost in the past three years. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account.

In addition to the banking sector, there are alternative financial services provided through credit unions. GARFIN regulates credit unions.

Grenada does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

Grenadian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are legislatively established by acts of Parliament. These enterprises all have boards of directors appointed by the government and answerable to the relevant ministries. Twenty-five of the 28 authorized SOEs are operational. They secure credit on commercial terms from commercial banks. SOEs submit annual reports to the Government Audit Department and are subject to audits shared with their parent ministries. SOEs manage transportation infrastructure (ports and airports), housing, education, hospitals, cement production, investment promotion, and small business development, among other functions. Generally, where they compete with the private sector, they do so on an equal basis.

Grenada, like its neighbors, acknowledges the OECD guidelines. Corporate governance of SOEs is established and regulated by founding statutes. Local courts show no favoritism toward SOEs in the adjudication of investment disputes.

For additional information on SOEs in Grenada see:http://www.oecd.org/countries/grenada/

Grenada does not have a privatization program.

Guatemala’s capital markets lack a securities regulator. The local stock exchange (Bolsa Nacional de Valores) deals almost exclusively in commercial paper, repurchase agreements (repos), and government bonds. The Guatemalan Central Bank (Banguat),the Superintendency of Banks (SIB), and the Ministry of Economy were drafting an updated capital markets bill that included a chapter on securitization companies and the securitization process as of March 2022. Notwithstanding the lack of a modern capital markets law, the government debt market continues to develop. Domestic treasury bonds represented 58.1 percent of total public debt as of December 2021.

Guatemala lacks a market for publicly traded equities, which raises the cost of capital and complicates mergers and acquisitions. As of December 2021, borrowers faced a weighted average annual interest rate of 15.4 percent in local currency and 6.1 percent in foreign currency, with some banks charging over 40 percent on consumer or micro-credit loans. Commercial loans to large businesses offered the lowest rates and were on average 5.5 percent in local currency as of December 2021. Dollar-denominated loans typically are some percentage points lower than those issued in local currency. Foreigners rarely rely on the local credit market to finance investments.

Overall, the banking system remains stable. The Monetary Board, Banguat, and SIB approved various temporary measures during 2020 to increase liquidity of the banking system during the first months of the pandemic and to allow banks to approve restructuring of loans or deferral of loans to businesses and individuals affected by the pandemic. About 5.8 percent of the total number of loans remained subject to the temporary measures approved in 2020 as of December 2021. Non-performing loans represented 1.8 percent of total loans as of January 2022. According to information from the SIB, Guatemala’s 17 commercial banks had an estimated $56 billion in assets in December 2021. The six largest banks control 88 percent of total assets. In addition, Guatemala has 11 non-bank financial institutions, which perform primarily investment banking and medium- and long-term lending, and three exchange houses. Access to financial services is very high in Guatemala City, as well as in major regional cities. Guatemala had 23.7 access points per 10,000 adults at the national level and 29.1 access points per 10,000 adults in the capital area as of December 2021. There were 12,446 banking accounts per 10,000 adults at the national level and 24,915 banking accounts per 10,000 adults in the capital area as of December 2021. Most banks offer a variety of online banking services.

Foreigners are normally able to open a bank account by presenting their passport and a utility bill or some other proof of residence. However, requirements vary by bank.

In April 2002, the Guatemalan congress passed a package of financial sector regulatory reforms that increased the regulatory and supervisory authority of the SIB, which is responsible for regulating the financial services industry. The reforms brought local practices more in line with international standards and spurred a round of bank consolidations and restructurings. The 2002 reforms required that non-performing assets held offshore be included in loan-loss-provision and capital-adequacy ratios. As a result, a number of smaller banks sought new capital, buyers, or mergers with stronger banks, reducing the number of banks from 27 in 2005 to 17 in 2021.

Guatemalan banking and supervisory authorities and the Guatemalan congress actively work on new laws in the business and financial sectors. In August 2012, the Guatemalan congress approved reforms to the Banking and Financial Groups Law and to the Central Bank Organic Law that strengthened supervision and prudential regulation of the financial sector and resolution mechanisms for failed or failing banks. The Guatemalan government submitted to congress proposed amendments to the Banking and Financial Groups Law in November 2016 and an anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing draft law in August 2020. Both proposed laws were pending congressional approval as of March 2022.

Foreign banks may open branches or subsidiaries in Guatemala subject to Guatemalan financial controls and regulations. These include a rule requiring local subsidiaries of foreign banks and financial institutions operating in Guatemala to meet Guatemalan capital and lending requirements as if they were stand-alone operations. Groups of affiliated credit card, insurance, financial, commercial banking, leasing, and related companies must issue consolidated financial statements prepared in accordance with uniform, generally accepted accounting practices. The groups are audited and supervised on a consolidated basis.

The total number of correspondent banking relationships with Guatemala’s financial sector showed a slight decline in 2016, but the changes in the relationships were similar to those seen throughout the region and reflected a trend of de-risking. The situation stabilized in 2017. The number of correspondent banking relationships remained stable in 2021.

Alternative financial services in Guatemala include credit and savings unions and microfinance institutions.

Guatemala does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

Guatemala has three main state-owned enterprises: The National Electricity Institute (INDE) and two state-owned ports, Santo Tomas on the Caribbean coast, and Port Quetzal on the Pacific coast. INDE is a state-owned electricity company responsible for expanding the provision of electricity to rural communities. INDE owns approximately 14 percent of the country’s installed effective generation capacity, and it participates in the wholesale market under the same rules as its competitors. It also provides a subsidy to consumers of up to 88 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per month. Its board of directors comprises representatives from the government, municipalities, business associations, and labor unions. The board of directors appoints the general manager. The Guatemalan President appoints Santo Tomas Ports’ board of directors, and the board of directors appoints the general manager. The Guatemalan President also appoints the president of Port Quetzal’s board, and the president of the board appoints the general manager. The Guatemalan government also appoints the manager of state-owned telephone company GUATEL, which split off from the fixed-line telephone company during the 1998 privatization program. GUATEL’s operations are small, and it continuously fails to generate sufficient revenue to cover expenses. The GUATEL director reports to the Guatemalan President and to the board of directors.

The Guatemalan government currently owns 16 percent of the shares of the Rural Development Bank (Banrural), the second largest bank in Guatemala, and holds 3 out of 10 seats on its board of directors. Banrural is a mixed capital company and operates under the same laws and regulations as other commercial banks.

The Guatemalan government privatized a number of state-owned assets in industries and utilities in the late 1990s including power distribution, telephone services, and grain storage. Guatemala does not currently have a privatization program.

Commercial credit for private enterprises is difficult and expensive to obtain in Guinea. The FY 2022 Millennium Challenge Corporation score for Access to Credit in Guinea reached 30 percent, increasing from 21 percent in FY 2021.

Guinea adopted a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) law in 1998, but the law was never fully implemented as the government failed to adopt the decree necessary for its implementation.  An October 2017 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) law replaced the earlier BOT law, providing a clearer, updated, and more secure legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for PPP projects, including through partnership agreements, BOT schemes, concessions, public leasing, and delegated public service.  PPP procurement tender processes also have been clarified and updated.  The PPP law seeks to increase infrastructure development in Guinea.  Under the new law, Parliament no longer needs to approve Guinean government contracts with private companies, as was required under BOT, apart from mining contracts. Obligations to conduct feasibility studies and to precisely define public needs also have been increased in this new law.  Guinea’s investment promotion agency has a website (www.invest.gov.gn) to increase transparency and streamline investment procedures.  However, in practice businesses often wait months or years to receive final approvals from one ministry or another or the President, depending on the sector.  Guinea’s capacity to enforce its more investor-friendly laws is compromised by a weak and unreliable legal system.  Some especially large-scale enterprises or extractives industry firms must wait for final permission from the President himself to begin operations.  These facts make personal relationships with high-ranking officials desirable and indeed generally essential, though as mentioned above, this brings the risk of a project’s becoming associated with specific individuals or administrations, and thus subject to subsequent rescission.

Guinea updated its Investment Code in 2015 and renewed efforts to attract international investors.  The Investment Code allows income derived from investment in Guinea, the proceeds of liquidating that investment, and the compensation paid in the event of nationalization, to be transferred to any country in convertible currency.  The legal and regulatory procedures, based on French civil law, are not always applied uniformly or transparently.

Individuals or legal entities making foreign investments in Guinea are guaranteed the freedom to transfer the original foreign capital, profits resulting from investment, capital gains on disposal of investment, and fair compensation paid in the case of nationalization or expropriation of the investment to any country of their choice.  The Guinean franc is subject to a managed floating exchange rate.  The few commercial banks in Guinea are dependent on the Central Bank (BCRG) for foreign exchange liquidity, making large transfers of foreign currency difficult.

Laws governing takeovers, mergers, acquisitions, and cross-shareholding are limited to rules for documenting financial transactions and filing any change of status documents with the economic register.  There are no laws or regulations that specifically authorize private firms to adopt articles of incorporation that limit or prohibit investment.

Guinea’s financial system is small and dominated by the banking sector. It comprises 19 active banks, 19 insurance companies and 19 microfinance institutions.  Guinea’s banking sector is overseen by the Central Bank (BCRG), which also serves as the agent of the government treasury for overseeing banking and credit operations in Guinea and abroad. The BCRG manages foreign exchange reserves on behalf of the State.  The Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the Treasury assesses that Guinea does not properly manage debt and that its treasury is too involved in the process, although improvements made in 2017-2018 point to a better future.  Further information on the BCRG can be found in French at http://www.bcrg-guinee.org.

Due to the difficulty of accessing funding from commercial banks, small commercial and agricultural enterprises have increasingly turned to microfinance, which has been growing rapidly with a net increase in deposits and loans.  The quality of products in the microfinance sector remains mediocre, with bad debt accounting for five percent of loans with approximately 17 percent of gross loans outstanding.

Guinea plans to broaden the country’s SME base through investment climate reform, improved access to finance, and the establishment of SME growth corridors.  Severely limited access to finance (especially for SMEs), inadequate infrastructure, deficiencies in logistics and trade facilitation, corruption and the diminished capacity of the government, inflation, and poor education of the workforce has seriously undermined investor confidence in Guinean institutions.  Guinea’s weak enabling environment for business, its history of poor governance, erratic policy, and inconsistent regulatory enforcement exacerbate the country’s poor reputation as an investment destination.  As a result, private participation in the economy remains low and firms’ productivity measured by value added is one of the lowest in Africa. Firms’ links with the financial sector are weak:  only 3.9 percent of firms surveyed in the 2016 World Bank Enterprise survey had a bank loan.

Credit to the private sector is low, at around 8.6 percent of GDP in 2021.  Commercial banks are reluctant to extend loans due to the lack of credit history reporting for potential borrowers. Through the Central Bank, Guinea is in the process of establishing a credit information bureau to overcome this asymmetry of credit information.  Despite the pandemic and September 2021 coup, the banking sector remains liquid and solvent with limited credit available to the private sector.  Heavy government borrowing drained the excess liquidity and crowded out private sector credit in 2021.  Despite the COVID-19 slowdown and political instability, private sector credit grew by 7.36 percent from January 2021 to January 2022.

Guinea is a cash-based society driven by trade, agriculture, and the informal sector, which all function outside the banking sector.  The banking sector is highly concentrated in Conakry and is technologically behind.  Banks in Guinea tend to favor short-term lending at high interest rates.  In collaboration with the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance, the Central Bank began planning to implement a bank deposit insurance scheme.  The deposit coverage limit has not been set yet, but the Central Bank began to collect premiums from commercial banks in 2019.

While the microfinance sector grew strongly from a small base, it was hit hard during the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis.  Currently it is not generally profitable and needs capacity and technology upgrades.  Furthermore, many microfinance institutions struggle to meet higher minimum capital requirements imposed by the Central Bank since 2019.  This heightened financial hurdle will likely lead to a consolidation of the microfinance sector.  The efficiency and use of payment services by all potential users needs to be improved, with an emphasis on greater financial inclusion.

The penetration of digital cellphone fund transfers is increasing.  Four foreign e-money (or mobile banking) institutions lead the effort to digitize payments and improve access to financial services in underserved and rural segments of the population.  However, the vast majority of operations processed by these e-money institutions remain cash-in cash-out transactions within a single network.  In an effort to modernize payment methods, the transition government is continuing an initiative of former President Conde’s administration to implement a national switch — a nationwide platform that will interface all electronic payment systems and facilitate payment processing between service providers.  This service was still under development in 2022, and the Central Bank is in the process of selecting a service provider.

Generally, there are no restrictions on foreigners’ ability to establish bank accounts in Guinea. EcoBank is the preferred bank for most U.S. dealings with Foreign Account Tax Compliant Act (FACTA) reporting requirements. With the acquisition of a majority stake in BICIGUI (Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie de la Guinee) in July 2021, Vista Bank became the largest bank in Guinea, a first on the African continent for a U.S.-owned financial institution.

Guinea does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

While all Guinea’s public utilities (water and electricity) are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the former Conde administration proposed permitting private enterprises to operate in this sphere.  In 2015, the French firm Veolia was contracted to manage the state-owned electric utility Electricité de Guinée (EDG) – a contract which ended in October 2019.  Several private projects aimed at harnessing Guinea’s solar energy potential and gas-powered thermal plants are being implemented with the goal of producing and selling energy throughout Guinea and possibly to neighboring countries.  Other SOEs are found in the telecommunications, road construction, lottery, and transportation sectors.  There are several other mixed companies where the state owns a significant or majority share, that are typically related to the extractives industry.

The hydroelectricity sector could support Guinea’s modernization, and possibly even supply regional markets.  Guinea’s hydropower potential is estimated at over 6,000MW, making it a potential exporter of power to neighboring countries.  The largest energy sector investment in Guinea is the 450MW Souapiti dam project (valued at USD 2.1 billion), begun in late 2015 with Chinese investment.  A Chinese firm likewise completed the 240MW Kaleta Dam (valued at USD 526 million) in May 2015. Kaleta more than doubled Guinea’s electricity supply, and for the first-time furnished Conakry with more reliable, albeit seasonal, electricity (May-November). Souapiti began producing electricity in 2021.  A third hydroelectric dam on the same river, dubbed Amaria, began construction in January 2019 and is expected to be operational in 2024. The Chinese mining firm TBEA is providing financing for the Amaria power plant (300 MW, USD 1.2 billion investment).  If corresponding distribution infrastructure is built, and pricing enables it, these projects could make Guinea an energy exporter in West Africa.

Plans for improving the distribution network to enable electricity export are in process with the development of the Gambia River Basin Development (OMVG) (Organization pour la Mise en Oeuvre de Fleuve Gambie, in French) transmission project connecting Guinea, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, and The Gambia.  The OMVG project involves the construction of 1,677 kilometers of 225-volt transmission network capable of handling 800MW to provide electricity for over two million people.  At the same time, Guinea is moving forward with the Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, (CLSG) transmission interconnector project, which will integrate Guinea into the West African Power Pool (WAPP) and allow for energy import-export across the region.  While neither former President Conde’s administration nor the transition government have published significant information concerning the financial stability of SOEs, EDG’s balance sheet is understood to be in the red. The IMF reported that as recently as 2017, up to 28 percent of Guinea’s budget went towards subsidizing electricity, and the IMF urged that EDG improve tariff collection since large numbers of its users do not pay. Former Prime Minister Ibrahima Kassory Fofana announced in March 2021 that EDG subsidies cost Guinea’s government USD 350 million annually.

The amount of research and development (R&D) expenditures is not known, but it would be highly unlikely that any of Guinea’s SOEs would devote significant funding to R&D.  Guinean SOEs are entitled to subsidized fuel, which EDG uses to run thermal generator stations in Conakry.  Guinea is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement.

Corporate governance of SOEs is determined by the government. Guinean SOEs do not adhere to the OECD guidelines.  SOEs are supposed to report to the Office of the President, however, typically they report to a ministry.  Seats on the board of governance for SOEs are usually allocated by presidential decree.

The transition government is continuing the former Conde administration’s initiative to privatize the energy sector.  In April 2015, the government tendered a management contract to run the state-owned electrical utility EDG.  French company Veolia won the tender and attempted to manage and rehabilitate the insolvent utility until the end of 2019.  In February 2020, EDG became a public limited company with its own board of directors.  The new directors were appointed by former President Conde through decree, replaced with a new Board of Directors with a decree from Transition President COL Doumbouya in February 2022.  Bidding processes are clearly spelled out for potential bidders; however, Guinea gives weight to competence in the French language and experience working on similar projects in West Africa.  In spring 2015, a U.S. company lost a fiber optics tender largely due to its lack of native French speakers on the project and lack of regional experience.

The GoG is indifferent to foreign portfolio investment. Guyana has its own stock market, which is supervised by the Guyana Association of Securities Companies and Intermediaries (GASCI).  GASCI is a self- regulated organization. Dividends earned from the local stock exchange are tax free. Guyana’s stock market outpaced GDP growth in 2021 with a 46.1 percent increase in its market capitalization.  Despite growing interest in the local stock market, however, Guyana has not seen a new company listed for over a decade. Foreign investors can access credit on the local market if they satisfy local banking requirements. Credit is allocated based on risk profile and creditworthiness. Credit is available on market terms. The private sector has access to credit instruments though limited on the local market. The Central Bank respects IMF Article VIII with regard to payments and transfers for international transactions.

Guyana relies heavily on cash payments for most financial transactions, but credit cards and mobile payment options are increasingly common. The GoG’s monetary policy remains accommodative, aimed at achieving price stability and controlling liquidity within the economy. The financial sector is regulated by the Bank of Guyana (BoG), the country’s central bank.  The financial sector is regulated by the Bank of Guyana (BOG), the country’s central bank.  The BOG is empowered under the 1995 Financial Institutions Act and the Bank of Guyana Act to regulate the financial sector.  Under these regulations a bank operating in Guyana must maintain high levels of liquidity and a strong deposit and asset base. Approval from the BOG is required before operating in Guyana.

The BoG regularly performs stress tests to determine the vulnerability of licensed depository financial institutions (LDFIs). Guyanese LDFI’s ratio of reserves against non-performing loans increased by 1.9 percentage points to 37.2 percent as of mid-year 2021. Guyana’s banking system remains adequate with capital adequacy ratios (CAR) well above the prudential benchmark of 8 percent. Guyana’s banking stability index improved from 0.15 to 0.38 at the end of June 2021, reflecting improved performances in asset quality, profitability, and liquidity indicators. Non–bank financial institutions’ total assets, which includes depository and non-depository licenses and unlicensed financial institutions, grew by 8 percent.

Guyana has six commercial banks.  Foreign banks can provide domestic services or enter the market with a license from the BoG.  There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account. The GoG recognizes a need to improve access to finance for both the private sector and private citizens, with the current financial institutions seen as slow, overly cautious, and full of bureaucratic red tape.

Guyana established a sovereign wealth fund, the Natural Resource Fund (NRF), in 2019, with the passage of the 2019 Natural Resources Act. While the NRF broadly conformed to the Santiago principles, President Irfaan Ali’s administration vowed to repeal and replace the 2019 NRF with a version that decentralized control over the fund and established a simpler withdrawal schedule. In December 2021, the Ali administration used its veto proof majority in parliament to unilaterally repeal and replace the existing law with the NRF 2021. While the revised law includes some improvements, like the creation of a board of directors and more intuitive withdraw schedule, it still affords the President broad reaching powers to appoint all the NRF’s key leadership positions, provides few limits on the investment or usage of the fund, and while a former member of the opposition was proposed for the board, the current opposition’s nominees were not accepted by the government. This prompted more concerns about transparent management of the fund moving forward. As of January 2022, the NRF holds $607.5 million, which under the revised law the GoG will be able to withdraw in its entirety in the coming year to meet 2022 budget allocations.

Guyana has ten state-owned enterprises (SOEs) including: National Industrial and Commercial Investments Ltd. (NICIL), Guyana Sugar Corporation (GUYSUCO), MARDS Rice Complex Ltd., National Insurance Scheme (NIS), Guyana Power and Light (GPL), Guyana Rice Development Board (GRDB), Guyana National Newspapers Ltd. (GNNL), Guyana National Shipping Corporation (GNSC) and Guyana National Printers Ltd. (GNPL).

The private sector competes with SOEs for market share, credit, and business opportunities. It is common for SOEs in Guyana to experience political interventions, driven by boards of directors filled with political appointees. Procurement on behalf of SOEs may be passed through the National Procurement and Tender Administration or handled directly by the SOE.

The Public Corporation Act requires public corporations to publish an annual report no later than six months after the end of the calendar year. These reports must be audited by an independent auditor.

In the 1990s, Guyana underwent significant privatization with the divestment of many sectors.  In 1993, the Privatization Policy Framework Paper known as the “Privatisation White Paper” was tabled in Parliament and led to the creation of the Privatization Unit (PU). Its function was to co-ordinate the implementation of the GoG’s privatization program and was tasked with:

• Combining the functions of the Public Corporations Secretariat (PCS) and the National Industrial & Commercial Investments Limited (NICIL);
• Preparing for the program strategy and annual program targets for privatization or liquidation Cabinet’s approval;
• Implementing the privatization of SOEs and assets selected for inclusion in the program;
• Participating in negotiations for the privatization of SOEs;
• Reviewing offers and making recommendations to Cabinet on the terms and conditions for the sale of SOEs;
• Preparing financial and administrative audits of SOEs not selected for privatization;
• Developing a strategy to build public understanding and support for privatization;
• Ensuring that transparency of the privatization program is strictly respected and followed;
• Monitoring operations of privatized entities in accordance with the terms and conditions of each respective contract;
• Preparing for Cabinet, broad guidelines on operating policies for privatization, develop action plans for implementation, conduct a public relations campaign and help to build national consensus in support of government’s program.

Foreign investors have equal access to privatization opportunities. However, there are many reports that the process is opaque and favors politically connected local businesses. Currently, the GoG is interested in privatizing at least a portion of GUYSUCO.

U.S. firms are generally given equal access to these projects through a public bidding process. However, many bidders continue to complain about the criteria and question their unsuccessful attempt at securing a contract.  In cases where international financial institution (IFI) funding has been involved in the project, such allegations have been credibly addressed. In cases where the project relied solely on GoG funds, redress has been more problematic to achieve.

The scale of financial services remains modest in Haiti. The banking sector is well capitalized and profitable. In principle, there are no limitations to foreigners’ access to the Haitian credit market, but limited credit is available through commercial banks. The free and efficient flow of capital, however, is hindered by Haitian accounting practices, which are below international standards. While there are no restrictions on foreign investment through mergers or acquisitions, there is no Haitian stock market, so there is no way for investors to purchase shares in a company outside of direct transactions. As summarized in the most recent (2020) IMF Article IV consultation for Haiti, however, the country has accepted the obligations of Article VIII and maintains an exchange system free of restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions.

The standards that govern the Haitian legal, regulatory, and accounting systems do not comply with international norms. Haitian laws do not require external audits of domestic companies. Local firms calculate taxes, obtain credit or insurance, prepare for regulatory review, and assess real profit and loss. Accountants use basic accounting standards set by the Organization of Certified Professional Accountants in Haiti.

Administrative oversight in the banking sector is superior to oversight in other sectors. Under Haitian law, however, banks are not required to comply with internationally recognized accounting standards, and they are often not audited by internationally recognized accounting firms. Nevertheless, Haiti’s Central Bank requires that banks apply internal audit procedures. As part of their corporate governance all private banks also have in-house audit functions. Most private banks follow international accounting norms and use consolidated reporting principles. The Central Bank is generally viewed as one of the best-functioning Haitian government institutions.

While there are companies that issue shares and corporate bonds through financial intermediaries, these activities are often done in informal settings and through small groups in the primary market. The Central Bank is looking to expand the financial market in Haiti by creating two sub-committees for the development of financial markets and for the implementation of financial market infrastructure. Such platforms are expected to promote the mobilization and allocation of capital, long-term growth, and a solid legal, regulatory and institutional framework.

The banking sector has concentrated on credit for trade financing and in the expansion of bank branches to capture deposits and remittances. Telebanking has expanded access to banking services for Haitians. Foreign banks are free to establish operations in Haiti. Three major banking institutions (Unibank, Sogebank and Banque Nationale de Credit) hold roughly 81 percent, or 421.72 billion gourdes (approximately $3.9 billion), of total banking sector assets. With its acquisition of the Haitian operations of Scotiabank in 2017, Unibank became Haiti’s largest banking company, with a market share of 35 percent of deposits. As part of this deal, Scotiabank remains one of Unibank’s international correspondent banks. U.S.-based Citibank also has a correspondent banking relationship with Unibank. The bank also manages one of the only two privatization operations in Haiti, that of the flour mill “Les Moulins d’Haiti SEM” in which it is a partner of two U.S. companies: Continental Grain/Contigroup (New York) and Seaboard Corporation (Kansas City).

The three major commercial banks also hold 76 percent of the country’s total loan portfolio, while 70 percent of total loans are monopolized by 10 percent of borrowers. The concentration of holdings and limited number of borrowers increases the Haitian banking system’s vulnerability to systemic credit risk and restricts the availability of capital. The quality of loan portfolios in the banking system has slightly improved. Per the Haitian Central Bank, the ratio of nonperforming loans over total loans was 6.34 percent in December 2021, compared to 5.37 percent in December 2020. The Central Bank conducts regular inspections to ensure that financial institutions are in compliance with minimum capital requirements, asset quality, currency, and credit risk management.

The Central Bank’s main challenge is maintaining sound monetary policy in the context of a larger-than-expected government deficit and a depreciating local currency. The exchange rate suffers from continued pressure on the foreign exchange market. The Central Bank has made a series of interventions with the objective of supporting the value of the gourde by increasing the dollar supply in the foreign exchange market. Selling U.S. dollars in the foreign exchange market has also allowed the Central Bank to dry up the excess liquidity of the gourde in the market with the potential effect of tempering the inflation rate. Annual inflation accelerated to 25.2 percent as of February 2022, remaining on an upward trend since August 2021. As of the end of March 2022, Haiti’s stock of net international reserves was approximately $520 million.

There are no legal limitations on foreigners’ access to the domestic credit market. However, banks demand collateral of real property to grant loans. Given the lack of effective cadastral and civil registries, loan applicants face numerous challenges in obtaining credit. The banking sector is extremely conservative in its lending practices. Banks typically lend exclusively to their most trusted and credit-worthy clients. Based on a 2018 study by FinScope Haiti, only one percent of the adult population has access to a bank loan. The high concentration of assets does not allow for product innovation at major banks.

To provide greater access to financial services for individuals and prospective investors, the Haitian government’s banking laws recognize tangible movable property (such as portable machinery, furniture, and tangible personal property) as collateral for loans. These laws allow individuals to buy condominiums, and banks to accept personal property, such as cars, bank accounts, etc., as collateral for loans. USAID has a loan portfolio guarantee program with a diversified group of financial institutions to encourage them to expand credit to productive small and medium enterprises, and rural micro-enterprises. Haiti has a credit rating registry in effect for users of the banking sector but does not have the relevant legislation in place to establish a credit rating bureau.

Haiti’s Central Bank issued a series of monetary policy measures to alleviate the potential impact of COVID-19 on the financial system and the economy in March 2020. These measures included a reduction in the Central Bank’s policy rate to help lower interest rates on loans; the decrease of reserve requirement ratios to reduce the cost for banks to capture resources and grant loans; a reduction in the Central Bank’s refinancing rate to lower the cost of access to liquidity; the alleviation of loan repayment conditions for customers over a three-month period; the waiver of the Central Bank’s fees on interbank transfers to reduce transaction costs for customers; and the increase of limits on transactions through mobile payment services.

On July 2020, a decree was issued reorganizing the National Bank for Agricultural Development (BNDA). The bank is tasked with developing the agricultural sector through the financing of the entire value chain (production, breeding, processing, marketing, and equipment) through access to basic financial services for the greatest number of people, targeting those living in semi-urban and rural areas. The bank is installed in municipal agricultural offices, attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR). The bank is in partnership with the National Bank of Credit (BNC) with 63.8 million gourdes (approximately $584,623) in its portfolio and 700 million gourdes (approximately $6.4 million) out of a capital of 1 billion (approximately $9 million) planned for its launch. It uses its network for cash operations, such as disbursement and reimbursement.

The Haitian government published a decree dated August 2020 regulating micro-finance, with institutions granting small loans to entrepreneurs or retailers who operate according to the regulations of the Central Bank of Haiti. This decision is part of the framework of financial inclusion. Micro-finance institutions have access to the Central Bank programs and microcredits are more accessible to entrepreneurs and small traders than large financial corporations.

To date Haiti does not have a Sovereign Wealth Fund.

Per information released by the Central Bank in September 2018, since 2011 Haiti has levied a tax of $1.50 on all transfers into and out of the country, with the proceeds designated for the National Fund for Education. According to a Central Bank report in September 2019, more than $150 million has been collected since July 2011 on taxes from remittances from the diaspora.

Many Haitians mistrust the government because of high levels of corruption and criticize the government’s slow and ineffective response to natural disasters and social crises. Donors and critics have called for guarantees of oversight and accountability in the rebuilding process following the 2021 earthquake in the south.

The Haitian government owns and operates, either wholly or in part, several State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). The Haitian commercial code governs the operations of these SOEs. The sectors include food processing and packaging (a flourmill), construction and heavy equipment (a cement factory); information and communications (a telecommunications company); energy (the state electricity company, EDH); finance (two commercial banks, the Banque Nationale de Crédit and the Banque Populaire Haïtienne); and the national port authority and the airport authority. The law defines SOEs as autonomous enterprises that are legally authorized to be involved in commercial, financial, and industrial activities. All SOEs operate under the supervision of their respective sectorial ministry and are expected to create economic and social return. Today, some SOEs are fully owned by the state, while others are jointly owned commercial enterprises. The Haitian parliament, when it is functioning, has full authority to liquidate state enterprises that are underperforming. The majority of SOEs are financially sound. However, EDH receives substantial annual subsidies from the government to stay in business.

In response to the economic difficulties of the late 1990s and mismanagement of the SOEs, the government liberalized the market and allows foreign firms to invest in the management and/or ownership of some Haitian state-owned enterprises. To accompany the initiative, the government established the Commission for the Modernization of Public Enterprises in 1996 to facilitate the privatization process.

In 1998, two U.S. companies, Seaboard and Continental Grain, purchased shares of the state-owned flourmill. Each partner currently owns a third of the company, known today as Les Moulins d’Haiti. In 1999, a consortium of Colombian, Swiss, and Haitian investors purchased a majority stake in the national cement factory. In 2010, a state-owned Vietnamese corporation, Viettel, officially acquired 60 percent of the state telecommunications company Teleco (now operating as Natcom), with the Haitian government retaining 40 percent ownership. The government has allowed limited private sector investment in selected seaports. Competition is generally not distorted in favor of state-owned enterprises to the detriment of private companies.

The Haitian government has allowed private sector investment in electricity generation to compensate for EDH’s inability to generate sufficient power, though it has had contractual disputes with multiple independent power producers. Only one independent power producer, partially U.S.-owned E-Power, currently generates electricity for EDH in Port au Prince as of 2021. In 2019, the Haitian energy sector regulatory authority, ANARSE, issued a series of prequalification rounds for concessionaires to take over and expand electricity production, transmission, and distribution for several of the country’s regional grids, including the grid serving the Caracol Industrial Park. ANARSE launched a call for proposals for its “Improvement of Access to Electricity in Haiti” program. It aims to strengthen the regulatory and planning capacities of the electricity sector. ANARSE plans to establish a shortlist of firms or groups of firms for the development of a national plan for the development of the electricity sector. The plan will:

• Consult all stakeholders working in the energy sector to collect data;
• Collect and process the data collected and share the most relevant information with ANARSE and the Energy Cell of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications (MTPTC) in electronic format;
• Develop the national plan for the development of the electricity sector in Haiti over a period of 10 years;
• Organize public consultations; and
• Revise the development plan to take into account the comments made during the public consultations carried out to produce a complete and final version.

The Government of Haiti created the National Commission for Public Procurement (CNMP) to ensure that government contracts are awarded through competitive bidding and to establish effective procurement controls in public administration. The CNMP publishes lists of awarded government of Haiti contracts. The procurement law of 2009 requires contracts to be routed through CNMP. In 2012, however, a presidential decree substantially raised the threshold at which public procurements must be managed by the CNMP, resulting in what companies have identified as a decrease in transparency for many smaller government contracts. Moreover, the government frequently enters into no-bid contracts, sometimes issued using “emergency” authority derived from natural disasters, even when there is no apparent connection between the alleged emergency and the government contract, according to foreign investors.

There are no government restrictions on foreign investors’ access to local credit markets, though the local banking system generally extends only limited amounts of credit. Investors should not consider local banks a significant capital resource for new foreign ventures unless they use specific business development credit lines made available by bilateral or multilateral financial institutions such as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration.

A limited number of credit instruments are available in the local market. The only security exchange operating in the country is the Central American Securities Exchange (BCV) in Tegucigalpa, but investors should exercise caution before buying securities listed on it. Supervised by the National Banking and Insurance Commission (CNBS), the BCV theoretically offers instruments to trade bankers’ acceptances, repurchase agreements, short-term promissory notes, Honduran government private debt conversion bonds, and land reform repayment bonds. In practice, however, the BCV is almost entirely composed of short- and medium-term government securities and no formal secondary market for these bonds exists.

A few banks have offered fixed rate and floating rate notes with maturities of up to three years, but outside of the banks’ issuances, the private sector does not sell debt or corporate stock on the exchange. Any private business is eligible to trade its financial instruments on the BCV, and firms that participate are subject to a rigorous screening process, including public disclosure and ratings by a recognized rating agency. Historically, most traded firms have had economic ties to the other business and financial groups represented as shareholders of the exchange. As a result, risk management practices are lax and public confidence in the institution is limited.

The Honduran financial system is comprised of commercial banks, state-owned banks, savings and loans institutions, and financial companies. There are currently 15 commercial banks, and 10 financial groups operating in Honduras. There is no offshore banking or homegrown blockchain technology in Honduras. Honduras has a highly professional, independent Central Bank and an effective banking regulator, the Comisión Nacional de Bancos y Seguros. While access to credit remains limited in Honduras, especially for historically underserved populations, the financial sector is a source of economic stability in the country.

Honduras does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

Most state-owned enterprises are in telecommunications, electricity, water utilities, banking, and commercial ports. The main state-owned Honduran telephone company, Hondutel, has private contracts with eight foreign and domestic carriers. The GOH has yet to establish a legal framework for foreign companies to obtain licenses and concessions to provide long distance and international calling. As a result, investors remain unsure if they can become fully independent telecommunication service providers.

The state-owned National Electric Energy Company (ENEE) is the single largest contributor to the country’s fiscal deficit. Due to years of mismanagement and corruption, ENEE loses over $30 million every month and its debt amounts to more than 10 percent of Honduran GDP. With the May 2022 energy law, the government has reversed energy reform legislation that called for the separation of ENEE into three independent units for distribution, transmission, and generation. The law also weakened the electricity regulator and eliminated the independent systems operator. Electricity subsector experts say that dispatch decisions have become much less transparent since the elimination of the systems operator, a disincentive for new investment. The electrical subsector faces serious structural problems, including high electricity system losses, a transmission system in need of upgrades, vulnerability of generation costs to volatile international oil prices, an electricity tariff that does not reflect actual costs, and the high costs of long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs), which have often been awarded directly to companies with political connections instead of via a fair and transparent tendering and procurement process. Many businesses have installed on-site power generation systems to supplement or substitute for power from ENEE due to frequent blackouts and high tariffs.

Honduran law grants municipalities the right to manage water distribution and to grant concessions to private enterprises. Major cities with public-private concessions include San Pedro Sula, Puerto Cortes, and Choloma. The state water authority National Autonomous Aqueduct and Sewer Service (SANAA) manages Tegucigalpa’s water distribution. Persistent water shortages are another constraint on private enterprise in Honduras, especially during the spring dry season. The Honduran National Port Company (ENP) is the state-owned organization that oversees management of the country’s government-operated maritime ports, including Puerto Cortes, La Ceiba, Puerto Castilla, and San Lorenzo. Private companies Central American Port Operators and Maritime Ports of Honduras have 30-year concessions to operate container and bulk shipping facilities at Honduras’ principal port Puerto Cortes.

The Honduran government is not seeking to privatize state-owned enterprises. The May 2022 energy law aims to increase government control over the electricity sector.

There are no impediments to the free flow of financial resources. Non-interventionist economic policies, complete freedom of capital movement, and a well-understood regulatory and legal environment make Hong Kong a regional and international financial center. It has one of the most active foreign exchange markets in Asia.

Assets and wealth managed in Hong Kong amounted to USD 4.5 trillion in 2020 (the latest figure available), with almost two-thirds of that coming from overseas investors. To enhance the competitiveness of Hong Kong’s fund industry, OFCs as well as onshore and offshore funds are offered a profits tax exemption.

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s (HKMA) Infrastructure Financing Facilitation Office (IFFO) provides a platform for pooling the efforts of investors, banks, and the financial sector to offer comprehensive financial services for infrastructure projects in emerging markets. IFFO is an advisory partner of the World Bank Group’s Global Infrastructure Facility.

Under the Insurance Companies Ordinance, insurance companies are authorized by the Insurance Authority to transact business in Hong Kong. As of January 2022, there were 163 authorized insurance companies in Hong Kong; 67 of them were foreign or mainland Chinese companies.

The Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s total market capitalization dropped by eleven percent to USD 5.4 trillion in 2021, with 2,572 listed firms at year-end. Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, a listed company, operates the stock and futures exchanges. The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), an independent statutory body outside the civil service, has licensing and supervisory powers to ensure the integrity of markets and protection of investors.

No discriminatory legal constraints exist for foreign securities firms establishing operations in Hong Kong via branching, acquisition, or subsidiaries. Rules governing operations are the same for all firms. No laws or regulations specifically authorize private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association that limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control.

In 2021, 1,368 mainland companies were listed in Hong Kong, including a total of 296 “H” share listings on the stock exchange, with total market capitalization of around USD 4.3 trillion, or 79 percent of the market total. The Shanghai-Hong Kong and Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connects allow individual investors to cross trade Hong Kong and mainland stocks.

Cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect launched in September 2021 in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA), which aims to integrate Hong Kong, Macau, and nine cities in the Mainland’s Guangdong Province together. The GBA, which still lacks major details, faces many challenges that are likely to stall its success, including coordinating three disparate legal systems, three different currencies, and removing barriers to the movement of capital and people. The Wealth Connect scheme will enable residents in GBA to carry out cross-boundary investment in wealth management products distributed by banks in the area.

Under the Mainland-Hong Kong Mutual Recognition of Funds scheme, eligible mainland and Hong Kong mutual funds were allowed to be distributed in each other’s market. Hong Kong also has mutual recognition of funds programs with Switzerland, Thailand, Ireland, France, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg.

Hong Kong has developed its debt market with the Exchange Fund bills and notes program. Outstanding Hong Kong Dollar debt stood at USD 155 billion by the end of 2021. The Bond Connect, a mutual market access scheme, allows investors from mainland China and overseas to trade in each other’s respective bond markets through a financial infrastructure linkage in Hong Kong. As of December 2021, northbound trading under Bond Connect has attracted 78 out of the top 100 global asset management companies, and 3,233 international investors from 35 jurisdictions. Southbound trading under Bond Connect was launched in September 2021 to enable mainland institutional investors to invest in offshore bonds through the Hong Kong bond market.

In September 2021, the SFC revised its anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-financing of terrorism guidelines. The updated guidelines require financial institutions to apply additional due diligence and risk mitigation measures for cross-border correspondent relationships in the securities sector, such as determining through publicly available information whether the respondent institution has been subject to targeted financial sanctions or regulatory actions and obtaining senior management’s approval before establishing cross-border correspondent relationships. The guidelines also prohibit financial institutions from establishing or continuing a cross-border correspondent relationship with a shell financial institution.

In February 2021, the HKG announced it would issue green bonds regularly and expand the scale of the Government Green Bond Program to USD 22.5 billion within the next five years. In November 2021, the HKG issued USD 3 billion worth of U.S.- and euro- denominated green bonds and its inaugural offering of renminbi-denominated bonds. In February 2022, the HKG also announced that it would issue about USD 800 million worth of retail green bonds for the first time, with proceeds from the sale used for sustainable projects in the city.

The HKG requires workers and employers to contribute to retirement funds under the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) scheme. Contributions are expected to channel roughly USD five billion annually into various investment vehicles. By December of 2021, the net asset values of MPF funds amounted to USD 152 billion.

A new listing regime for special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) took effect on January 1, 2022 to provide an alternative to the traditional initial public offering (IPO) route. Under the city’s listing regime, a SPAC is required to raise IPO funds of a minimum of USD 130 million, and the trading of SPAC securities is restricted to professional and institutional investors only. Aquila Acquisition Corp, a SPAC backed by the asset management arm of mainland Chinese brokerage CMB International, made its trading debut on March 18, 2022. As of March 2022, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange has accepted a total of eleven SPAC applications.

Hong Kong has a three-tier system of deposit-taking institutions: licensed banks (159), restricted license banks (15), and deposit-taking companies (12). HSBC is Hong Kong’s largest banking group. With its majority-owned subsidiary Hang Seng Bank, HSBC controls more than 52.9 percent of total assets of banks in Hong Kong, followed by the Bank of China (Hong Kong), with 14.9 percent of total assets throughout 190 branches. In total, the five largest banks in Hong Kong had more than USD 2 trillion in total assets at the end of 2020. Full implementation of the Basel III capital, liquidity, and disclosure requirements was completed in 2019.

Hong Kong is a burgeoning cryptocurrency and digital asset hub in Asia. Cryptocurrency exchanges remain minimally regulated, despite a largescale crackdown in the Mainland. HKMA has announced plans to increase oversight of the market in an effort to combat scams and reduce volatility. In January 2022, HKMA announced plans for new crypto regulations, including guidelines for payment with stablecoins, investor protection policies, and digital asset authorities for licensed financial institutions.

Credit in Hong Kong is allocated on market terms and is available to foreign investors on a non-discriminatory basis. The private sector has access to the full spectrum of credit instruments as provided by Hong Kong’s banking and financial system. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms. The HKMA, the de facto central bank, is responsible for maintaining the stability of the banking system and managing the Exchange Fund that backs Hong Kong’s currency. Real Time Gross Settlement helps minimize risks in the payment system and brings Hong Kong in line with international standards.

Banks in Hong Kong have in recent years strengthened anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing controls, including the adoption of more stringent customer due diligence (CDD) process for existing and new customers. The HKMA stressed that “CDD measures adopted by banks must be proportionate to the risk level and banks are not required to implement overly stringent CDD processes.”

In May 2021, the HKG concluded a three-month consultation on legislative proposals to enhance Hong Kong’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regime through the introduction of a licensing requirement for virtual asset services providers and a registration system for dealers in precious metals and stones. The government has yet to introduce a bill into the Legislative Council, as of end February 2022.

The NSL granted police the authority to freeze assets related to national security-related crimes. In June 2021 Hong Kong authorities froze the assets of flagship pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily, which was subsequently forced to close. The HKMA advised banks in Hong Kong to report any transactions suspected of violating the NSL, following the same procedures as for money laundering. Hong Kong authorities reportedly asked financial institutions to freeze the bank accounts of media companies, former lawmakers, civil society groups, and other political targets who appear to be under investigation for their pro-democracy activities. Banks are also advised to disclose related property of clients who are found in breach of the NSL, according to the October 2021 guideline developed by the Hong Kong Association of Banks.

The HKMA welcomes the establishment of virtual banks, which are subject to the same set of supervisory principles and requirements applicable to conventional banks. The HKMA granted eight virtual banking licenses by the end of February 2022.

The HKMA’s Fintech Facilitation Office (FFO) aims to promote Hong Kong as a fintech hub in Asia. FFO has launched the faster payment system to enable bank customers to make cross-bank/e-wallet payments easily and created a blockchain-based trade finance platform to reduce errors and risks of fraud. The HKMA has signed nine fintech co-operation agreements with the regulatory authorities of Brazil, France, Poland, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.

The Future Fund, Hong Kong’s wealth fund, was established in 2016 with an endowment of USD 28.2 billion. The fund seeks higher returns through long-term investments and adopts a “passive” role as a portfolio investor. About half of the Future Fund has been deployed in alternative assets, mainly global private equity and overseas real estate, over a three-year period. The rest is placed with the Exchange Fund’s Investment Portfolio, which follows the Santiago Principles, for an initial ten-year period. In February 2020, the HKG announced that it will deploy 10 percent of the Future Fund to establish a new portfolio, which is called the Hong Kong Growth Portfolio (HKGP), focusing on domestic investments to lift the city’s competitiveness in financial services, commerce, aviation, logistics and innovation. Announced in February 2022, the HKG will inject HK$10 billion (USD 1.3 billion) to the HKGP, of which half will be used to set up the Strategic Tech Fund, and the other half will be used to set up a GBA Investment Fund.

Hong Kong has several major HKG-owned enterprises classified as “statutory bodies.” Hong Kong is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the WTO framework. Annex 3 of the GPA lists as statutory bodies the Housing Authority, the Hospital Authority, the Airport Authority, the Mass Transit Railway Corporation Limited, and the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation, which procure in accordance with the agreement.

The HKG provides more than half the population with subsidized housing, along with most hospital and education services from childhood through the university level. The government also owns major business enterprises, including the stock exchange, railway, and airport.

Conflicts occasionally arise between the government’s roles as owner and policymaker. Industry observers have recommended that the government establish a separate entity to coordinate its ownership of government-held enterprises and initiate a transparent process of nomination to the boards of government-affiliated entities. Other recommendations from the private sector include establishing a clear separation between industrial policy and the government’s ownership function and minimizing exemptions of government-affiliated enterprises from general laws.

The Competition Law exempts all but six of the statutory bodies from the law’s purview. While the government’s private sector ownership interests do not materially impede competition in Hong Kong’s most important economic sectors, industry representatives have encouraged the government to adhere more closely to the Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

All major utilities in Hong Kong, except water, are owned and operated by private enterprises, usually under an agreement framework by which the HKG regulates each utility’s management.

The Hungarian financial system offers a full range of financial services with an advanced information technology infrastructure.  The Hungarian Forint (HUF) has been fully convertible since 2001, and both Hungarian financial market and capital market transactions are fully liberalized.  The Capital Markets Act of 2001 sets out rules on securities issues, including the conversion and marketing of securities. As of 2007, separate regulations were passed on the activities of investment service providers and commodities brokers (2007), on Investment Fund Managing Companies (2011), as well as on Collective Investments (2014), providing more sophisticated legislation than those in the Capital Markets Act.  These changes aimed to create a regulatory environment where free and available equity easily matches with the best investment opportunities. The 2016 modification of the Civil Code removed remaining obstacles to promote collection of public investments in the course of establishing a public limited company.

The   Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE)   re-opened in 1990 as the first post-communist stock exchange in the Central and Eastern European region.  Since 2010, the BSE has been a member of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Stock Exchange Group. In 2013, the internationally recognized trading platform Xetra replaced the previous trading system.  In 2021, the BSE has 23 members and 139 issuers. The issued securities are typically shares, investment notes, certificates, corporate bonds, mortgage bonds, government bonds, treasury bills, and derivatives.  In December 2021, the BSE had a market capitalization of $30.2 billion, and the average monthly equity turnover volume amounted to $2.1 billion. The most traded shares are OTP Bank, pharmaceutical company Richter, MOL, Magyar Telekom, and 4iG.

Financial resources flow freely into the product and factor markets.  In line with IMF rules, international currency transactions are not limited and are accessible both in domestic and foreign currencies. Individuals can hold bank accounts in either domestic or foreign currencies and conduct transactions in foreign currency. Since March 2020, commercial banks introduced real time bank transfers for domestic currency transactions.

Commercial banks provide credit to both Hungarian and foreign investors at market terms.  Credit instruments include long-term and short-term liquidity loans. All banks publish total credit costs, which includes interest rates as well as other costs or fees.

There are no rules preventing a foreigner or foreign firm from opening a bank account in Hungary.  Valid personal documents (i.e., a passport) are needed and as of 2015, when the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) came into force, also a declaration of whether the individual is a U.S. citizen.  Banks have not discriminated against U.S. citizens in opening bank accounts based on FATCA.

The Hungarian banking system has strengthened over the past few years, and the capital position of banks is generally adequate even in the challenging economic environment created by COVID-19.  Following several years of deleveraging after the 2008 crisis, the banking system is mainly deposit funded. The penetration of the banking system decreased slightly in 2019 due to a relatively high GDP growth rate. The sector’s total assets amounted to 92.6 percent of GDP.

The Hungarian banking system is healthy, and banks have a stable capital position.  The loan-to-deposit ratio has been gradually decreasing from its 160 percent peak in 2009 after the financial crisis to 85 percent in 2015 and has been fluctuating between this value and a 92.4 percent peak in 2019. In spring 2020, during the first wave of the COVID-19 in Hungary, it reached 91.6 percent but decreased to 81.7 percent by the end of the year. The liquidity cover ratio was 160 percent in the first wave of COVID-19, then climbed to 220.8 percent by the end of the year. In response to the COVID-19 crisis, the Central Bank restructured and expanded its monetary policy tools to provide liquidity to the financial sector through currency swaps, fixed-rate loans, and exemptions from minimum reserve requirements. The Central Bank also introduced instruments to influence short- and long-term term yields. It offered low-interest loans through commercial banks to the SME sector and launched a government securities purchase program on the secondary market.

The ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) decreased from a high of 18 percent in 2013 to 3.3 percent in 2021 as a result of portfolio cleaning, the improving economic environment, and increased lending.  The banking sector became profitable after several years of losses between 2010 and 2015, reaching a return on equity (ROE) record high of 16.8 percent in 2017. Since then, ROE has decreased close to zero in 2020 as a result of the pandemic but recovered to 11.6 percent by the end of 2021. The banking sector’s total assets exceeded 112 percent of GDP in 2021, of which 73 percent were held by five banks. The largest bank in Hungary is OTP Bank, which is mostly Hungarian-owned and controls about 25 percent of the market.

Hungary has a modern two-tier financial system and a developed financial sector.  Between 2000 and 2013, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (PSZAF) served as a consolidated financial supervisor, regulating all financial and securities markets. PSZAF, in conjunction with the MNB, managed a strong two-pillar system of control over the financial sector, producing stability in the market, effective regulation, and a system of checks and balances.  In 2013, the MNB absorbed the PSZAF and over the past few years has efficiently strengthened its supervisory role over the financial sector and established a customer protection system.

In accordance with the GOH’s stated goal of reducing foreign ownership in the financial sector, the proportion of foreign banks’ total assets in the financial sector decreased to about 40 percent in 2019, down from a peak of 70 percent before the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Following the sale of Budapest Bank and merge with the other Hungarian-owned banks and the Hungarian Savings’ Bank network, it has fallen to about 40 percent by 2021. Foreign banks are subject to central bank uniform regulations and prudential measures, which are applied to Hungary’s entire financial market without discrimination. On March 2, 2020, MNB launched an immediate e-transfer system up to a maximum of HUF 10 million (about $32,000) for domestic transactions in HUF. Commercial banks have extensive direct correspondent banking relationships and are capable of transferring domestic or foreign currencies to most banks outside of Hungary.  Since 2018, however, the cashing of U.S. checks is no longer possible. No loss or jeopardy of correspondent banking relations has been reported.

Recent regulations restrict foreign currency loans to only those that earn income in foreign currency, an effort to eliminate the risk of exchange rate fluctuations.  Foreign investors continue to have equal – if not better – access to credit on the global market, apart from special GOH credit concessions such as small business loans.

Foreign Exchange

The Hungarian forint (HUF) has been convertible for essentially all business transactions since January 1, 1996, and foreign currencies are freely available in all banks and exchange booths.  Act 93 of 2001 on Foreign Exchange Liberalization lifted all remaining foreign exchange restrictions and allowed free movement of capital in line with EU regulations. Hungary complies with all OECD convertibility requirements and IMF Article VIII.

Hungary’s EU accession agreement dictates that Hungary must adopt the Euro once it meets the relevant criteria. The GOH has not set a specific target date even though Hungary meets most of the necessary fiscal and financial criteria.  According to the Ministry of Finance, Hungary’s economic performance should mirror the Eurozone average more closely before adapting the Euro.

Short-term portfolio transactions, hedging, short, and long-term credit transactions, financial securities, assignments and acknowledgment of debt may be carried out without any limitation or declaration.  While the Forint remains the legal tender in Hungary, parties may settle financial obligations in a foreign currency. Many Hungarians took out mortgages denominated in foreign currency prior to the global financial crisis and suffered when the Forint depreciated against the Swiss Franc and the Euro.  Despite strong pressure, the Hungarian Supreme Court ruled that there is nothing inherently illegal or unconstitutional in loan agreements that are foreign currency denominated, upholding existing contract law. New consumer loans, however, are denominated in Forints only, unless the debtor receives regular income in a foreign currency.

Market forces determine the value of the Hungarian Forint. Analysts note that the MNB’s consistently low interest rates have contributed to a nearly 30 percent decline in the value of the of the Forint against the Euro since 2010.

Remittance Policies

Sovereign Wealth Funds

Hungary does not maintain a sovereign wealth fund.

Capital controls were lifted in March 2017 after more than eight years of restricting the free movement of capital. New foreign currency inflows fall under the Rules on Special Reserve Requirements for new Currency Inflows, no. 223/2019 which took effect on March 6, 2019, and replaced the older Rules no. 490/2016 on the same subject. The rules contain provisions on the implementation of special reserve requirements for new foreign currency inflows, including the special reserve base, holding period, special reserve ratio, settlement currency, and interest rates on deposit institutions’ capital flow accounts with the Central Bank of Iceland and Central Bank certificates of deposit. For more information see the Central Bank of Iceland’s website ( https://www.cb.is ).

Foreign portfolio investment has increased significantly over the past few years in Iceland after being dormant in the years following the economic crash. U.S. investment funds have been particularly active on the Icelandic stock exchange. The Icelandic stock exchange operates under the name Nasdaq Iceland. Companies listed on Nasdaq Iceland are reported on its website ( http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/hlutabref/Skrad-fyrirtaeki/iceland ). The private sector has access to financing through the commercial banks and pensions funds.

The IMF 2019 Article IV Consultation report states that “the de jure exchange rate arrangement is free floating, and the de facto exchange rate arrangement under the IMF classification system is floating. In the period from November 2018 to October 31, 2019, the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) intervened in the foreign exchange market on 14 of the 248 working days. The CBI publishes daily data on its foreign exchange intervention with a lag. Iceland has accepted the obligations under Article VIII, Sections 2(a), 3, and 4 and maintains no exchange restrictions subject to Fund jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 2(a). Iceland continues to maintain certain measures that constitute exchange restrictions imposed for security reasons based on UN Security Council Resolutions.” ( https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/12/19/Iceland-2019-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-48891 ).

The Central Bank of Iceland is an independent institution owned by the State and operates under the auspices of the Prime Minister. Its objective is to promote price stability, financial stability, and sound and secure financial activities. The bank also maintains international reserves and promotes a safe, effective financial system, including domestic and cross-border payment intermediation.

The Icelandic banking sector is generally healthy. The Central Bank of Iceland has since the financial collapse of 2008 introduced stringent measures to ensure that the financial system remains “safe, stable, and effective.” For more information see the Central Bank webpage ( https://www.cb.is/financial-stability/ ). There are three commercial banks in Iceland, Landsbankinn, Islandsbanki, and Arion Bank. The Government of Iceland took over operations of the banks during the financial collapse in September and October 2008. Landsbankinn (formerly known as Landsbanki Islands) is still government-owned, while the Government of Iceland is in the process of privatizing Islandsbanki (formerly known as Glitnir). Arion Bank (formerly known as Kaupthing Bank) has been privatized and is listed on the Icelandic stock exchange Nasdaq Iceland. There is one investment bank in Iceland, Kvika, which is listed on Nasdaq Iceland. Icelandic pension funds offer loans and mortgages and are active investors in Icelandic companies. There are no foreign banks operating in Iceland.

All companies have access to regular commercial banking services in Iceland. Establishing a bank account in Iceland requires a local personal identification number known as a “kennitala.” Foreign nationals should contact Registers Iceland for more information on how to register in Iceland ( https://www.skra.is/english/ ).

The Government of Iceland has proposed establishing a sovereign wealth fund, called the National Fund of Iceland. The bill to establish the fund has not passed through Parliament. The stated purpose of the fund is “to serve as a sort of disaster relief reserve for the nation, when the Treasury suffers a financial blow in connection with severe, unforeseen shocks to the national economy, either due to a plunge in revenues or the cost of relief measures that the government has considered unavoidable to undertake.”

The Icelandic Government owns wholly or majority shares in 40 companies, including systematically important companies such as energy companies, the Icelandic National Broadcasting Service (RUV) and Iceland Post. Other notable SOEs are Landsbankinn (one of three commercial banks in Iceland), Isavia (public company that operates Keflavik International Airport), and ATVR (the only company allowed to sell alcohol to the general public). Here you can find a list of SOEs ( https://www.stjornarradid.is/verkefni/rekstur-og-eignir-rikisins/felog-i-eigu-rikisins/ ). Total assets of SOEs in 2020 amounted to 5,735 billion ISK (approx. $44.3 billion) and SOEs employed around 5,100 people that same year. In terms of assets and equity, Landsbankinn (one of three commercial banks in Iceland) is the largest SOE in Iceland, and Isavia employs the most people.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) generally compete under the same terms and conditions as private enterprises, except in the energy production and distribution sector. Private enterprises have similar access to financing as SOEs through the banking system.

As an OECD member, Iceland adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. The Iceland Chamber of Commerce in Iceland, NASDAQ OMX Iceland and the Confederation of Icelandic Employers have issued guidelines that mirror the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. Iceland is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

For SOEs operating within the private sector in a competitive environment, the general guideline from the Icelandic government is that all decisions of the board of the SOE should ensure a level playing field and spur competition in the market.

In the midst of the banking crisis, the state, through the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME), took over Iceland’s three largest commercial banks, which collapsed in October 2008, and subsequently took over several savings banks to allow for uninterrupted banking services in the country. The government has started the privatization process of Islandsbanki, and currently owns 42.5 percent shares in the bank. The Bank Shares Management Company, established by the state in 2009, manages state-owned shares in financial companies.

The government of Iceland has acquired stakes in many companies through its ownership of shares in the banks; however, it is the policy of the government not to interfere with internal or day-to-day management decisions of these companies. Instead, in 2009, the state established the Bank Shares Management Company to manage the state-owned shares in financial companies. The board of this entity, consisting of individuals appointed by the Minister of Finance, appoints a selection committee, which in turn chooses the State representative to sit on the boards of the various companies.

While most energy producers are either owned by the state or municipalities, there is free competition in the energy market. That said, potential foreign investment in critical sectors like energy is likely to be met by demands for Icelandic ownership, either formally or from the public. For example, a Canadian company, Magma Energy, acquired a 95 percent stake in the energy production company HS Orka in 2010, but later sold a 33.4 percent stake to the Icelandic pension funds in the face of intense public pressure.

Iceland’s universal healthcare system is mainly state-operated. However, few legal restrictions to private medical practice exist; private clinics are required to maintain an agreement regarding payment for services with the Icelandic state, a foreign state, or an insurance company.

Icelandic authorities are currently in the process of privatizing Islandsbanki, one of Iceland’s three commercial banks. Authorities sold 35 percent shares in Islandsbanki in 2021, and 22.5 percent earlier this year. The government currently owns 42.5 percent in the bank. The government of Iceland currently owns 99.8 percent in Landsbankinn and has no immediate plans to privatize it. The government took ownership of the banks when the Icelandic banking system collapsed in 2008. Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, Bjarni Benediktsson, has publicly declared his intentions to sell all government of Iceland shares in Islandsbanki, but wants the government to remain a large shareholder in Landsbankinn, with around 40 percent of shares.

Indian stocks experienced significant losses at the start of 2021, stemming from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy. By midyear, markets began to recover, with India’s stock benchmarks reaching record highs and becoming among the top performers globally. Indian companies raised a combined $15.57 billion through 121 IPOs in 2021, the highest amount ever raised in a single calendar year compared with the previous high of $8.4 billion in 2017.

Foreign investment inflows drove markets higher through February 2021. However, these investments began exiting the market when faced with the potential for faster-than-expected withdrawal of monetary stimulus and the Delta variant of COVID-19. Domestic institutional investors compensated outflows of foreign investment through significant investment in Indian stocks. Foreign investors’ net investment in 2021 was about $7 billion, significantly lower than the $14.5 billion in 2020 and $19 billion in 2019. Domestic investors put about $12.5 billion in 2021 into Indian domestic equity markets. Indian investors opened 27.4 million new stock trading accounts in 2021, up from 10.5 million accounts opened in 2020.

The SEBI is considered one of the most progressive and well-run of India’s regulatory bodies.  The SEBI regulates India’s securities markets, including enforcement activities and is India’s direct counterpart to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  The Board oversees seven exchanges: BSE Ltd. (formerly the Bombay Stock Exchange), the National Stock Exchange (NSE), the Metropolitan Stock Exchange, the Calcutta Stock Exchange, the Multi Commodity Exchange (MCX), the National Commodity & Derivatives Exchange Limited, and the Indian Commodity Exchange.

Foreign venture capital investors (FVCIs) must register with the SEBI to invest in Indian firms. They can also set up domestic asset management companies to manage funds. All such investments are allowed under the automatic route, subject to SEBI and RBI regulations, as well as FDI policy. FVCIs can invest in many sectors, including software, information technology, pharmaceuticals and drugs, biotechnology, nanotechnology, biofuels, agriculture, and infrastructure.

Companies incorporated outside India can raise capital in India’s capital markets through the issuance of Indian Depository Receipts (IDRs) based on SEBI guidelines. Standard Chartered Bank, a British bank was the only foreign entity to list in India but delisted in June 2020. Experts attribute the lack of interest in IDRs to initial entry barriers, lack of clarity on conversion of the IDRs holdings into overseas shares, lack of tax clarity, and the regulator’s failure to popularize the product.

External commercial borrowing (ECB), or direct lending to Indian entities by foreign institutions, is allowed if it conforms to parameters such as minimum maturity; permitted and non-permitted end-uses; maximum all-in-cost ceiling as prescribed by the RBI; funds are used for outward FDI or for domestic investment in industry, infrastructure, hotels, hospitals, software, self-help groups or microfinance activities, or to buy shares in the disinvestment of public sector entities. The rules are published by the RBI: https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasDirections.aspx?id=11510 

According to RBI data, ECB by corporations and non-banking financial companies reached $38.8 billion in 2021. Companies have been increasingly tapping overseas markets for funds to take advantage of low interest rates in global markets. On December 8, 2021, the RBI announced a switch in calculation of interest rates for ECB and trade credits from the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to alternative reference rates (ARRs).

The RBI has taken several steps in the past few years to bring the activities of the offshore Indian rupee (INR) market in Non-Deliverable Forwards (NDF) onshore, with the goal of deepening domestic markets, enhancing downstream benefits, and obviating the need for an NDF market. FPIs with access to currency futures or the exchange-traded currency options market can hedge onshore currency risks in India and may directly trade in corporate bonds.

The RBI allowed banks to freely offer foreign exchange quotes to non-resident Indians. The RBI has stated that trading on INR derivatives would be allowed and settled in foreign currencies in International Financial Services Centers (IFSCs). In June 2020, the RBI allowed foreign branches of Indian banks and branches located in IFSCs to participate in the NDF. With the INR trading volume in the offshore market higher than the onshore market, the RBI felt the need to limit the impact of the NDF market and curb volatility in the movement of the INR. In August 2021, the RBI released a working paper  discussing the influence of offshore markets on onshore markets.

The International Financial Services Centre at Gujarat International Financial Tech-City (GIFT City) is being developed to compete with global financial hubs. In January 2016, BSE Ltd. was the first exchange to start operations there. The NSE, domestic banks, and foreign banks have also started IFSC banking units in GIFT city. As part of its FY 2021-22 budget proposal, the government recommended establishing an international arbitration center in GIFT City to help facilitate faster resolution of commercial disputes, akin to the operation of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) or London Commercial Arbitration Centre (LCAC).

The public sector remains predominant in the banking sector, with public sector banks (PSBs) accounting for about 66 percent of total banking sector assets. However, the share of public banks in total loans and advances has fallen sharply in the last five years (from 70.84 percent in FY 2015-16 to 58.68 percent in FY 2021-22), primarily driven by stressed balance sheets and non-performing loans. In recent years, several new licenses were granted to private financial entities, including two new universal bank licenses and 10 small finance bank licenses. The government announced plans in 2021 to privatize two PSBs. This followed Indian authorities consolidating 10 public sector banks into four in 2019, which reduced the total number of PSBs from 18 to 12. However, the government has yet to introduce the necessary legislation needed to privatize PSBs. Although most large PSBs are listed on exchanges, the government’s stakes in these banks often exceeds the 51 percent legal minimum. Aside from the large number of state-owned banks, directed lending and mandatory holdings of government paper are key facets of the banking sector. The RBI requires commercial banks and foreign banks with more than 20 branches to allocate 40 percent of their loans to priority sectors which include agriculture, small and medium enterprises, export-oriented companies, and social infrastructure. Additionally, all banks are required to invest 18 percent of their net demand and time liabilities in government securities.

PSBs continue to face two significant hurdles: capital constraints and poor asset quality. As of September 2021, gross non-performing loans represented 6.9 percent of total loans in the banking system, with the PSBs having a larger share of 8.8 percent of their loan portfolio. The government announced its intention to set up the NARCL and India Debt Resolution Company Limited (IDRCL) to take over legacy stressed assets from bank balance sheets. With the IBC in place, banks are making progress in non-performing asset recognition and resolution.

To address asset quality challenges faced by public sector banks, the government has injected $32 billion into public sector banks in recent years. The capitalization largely aimed to address the capital inadequacy of public sector banks and marginally provide for growth capital. Bank mergers and capital raising from the market, improved public sector banks’ total capital adequacy ratio (CAR) from 13.5 percent in September 2020 to 16.6 percent in September 2021.

Women’s lack of sufficient access to finance remained a major impediment to women’s entrepreneurship and participation in the workforce. According to experts, women are more likely than men to lack financial awareness, confidence to approach a financial institution, or possess adequate collateral, often leaving them vulnerable to poor terms of finance. Despite legal protections against discrimination, some banks reportedly remained unwelcoming toward women as customers. International Finance Corporation (IFC) analysts have described Indian women-led Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSME) as a large but untapped market that has a total finance requirement of $29 billion (72 percent for working capital). However, 70 percent of this demand remained unmet, creating a shortfall of $20 billion.

The government-affiliated think tank NITI-Aayog provides information on networking, mentorship, and financing to more than 25,000 members via its Women Entrepreneurship Platform (WEP), launched in March 2018. The government’s financial inclusion scheme Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) provides universal access to banking facilities with at least one basic banking account for every adult, financial literacy, access to credit, insurance, and pension. As of March 2, 2022, 249 million women comprised 55 percent of the program’s 448 million beneficiaries. In 2015, the government started the Micro Units Development and Refinance Agency Ltd. (MUDRA), which supports the development of micro-enterprises. The initiative encourages women’s participation and offers collateral-free loans of around $15,000 to non-corporate, non-farm small and micro enterprises. As of October 29, 2021, 215 million loans have been extended to women borrowers.

In FY 2016, the Indian government established the National Infrastructure Investment Fund (NIIF), India’s first sovereign wealth fund, to promote investments in the infrastructure sector. The government agreed to contribute $3 billion to the fund, with an additional $3 billion raised from the private sector primarily from foreign sovereign wealth funds, multilateral agencies, endowment funds, pension funds, insurers, and foreign central banks. Currently, the NIIF manages over $4.3 billion in assets through its funds: Master Fund, Fund of Funds, and Strategic Opportunities Fund. The NIIF Master Fund is focused on investing in core infrastructure sectors including transportation, energy, and urban infrastructure.

The government owns or controls interests in key sectors with significant economic impact, including infrastructure, oil, gas, mining, and manufacturing. The Department of Public Enterprises ( http://dpe.gov.in ) controls and formulates all the policies pertaining to SOEs, and is headed by a minister to whom the senior management reports. The Comptroller and Auditor General audits the SOEs. The government has taken several steps to improve the performance of SOEs, also called Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs), including improvements to corporate governance. This was necessary as the government planned to disinvest its stake from these entities.

According to the Public Enterprise Survey 2019-20, as of March 2020 there were 366 CPSEs, of which 256 are operational with a total turnover of $328 billion. The report revealed that 96 CPSEs were incurring losses and 14 units are under liquidation.

Foreign investment is allowed in CPSEs in all sectors. The Master List of CPSEs can be accessed at http://www.bsepsu.com/list-cpse.asp . While the CPSEs face the same tax burden as the private sector, they receive streamlined licensing that private sector enterprises do not on issues such as procurement of land.

The government has not generally privatized its assets but instead adopted a gradual disinvestment policy that dilutes government stakes in SOEs without sacrificing control. However as announced in the FY 2021-22 budget, the government has recommitted to the process of privatization of loss-making SOEs with an ambitious disinvestment target of $24 billion. In addition to completing the privatization of national carrier Air India in early 2022, the government has prioritized privatizing the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and reducing its shares in the state-owned Life Insurance Corporation (LIC). Details about the privatization program can be accessed at the Ministry of Finance site for Disinvestment ( https://dipam.gov.in/ ).

FIIs can participate in these disinvestment programs. Earlier limits for foreign investors were 24 percent of the paid-up capital of the Indian company and 10 percent for non-resident Indians and persons of Indian origin. The limit is 20 percent of the paid-up capital in the case of public sector banks. There is no bidding process. The shares of the SOEs being disinvested are sold in the open market.

The Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) index has 766 listed companies as of December 2021 with a daily trading volume of USD 922.2 million and market capitalization of USD 571 billion (IDR 8,284 trillion). Over the past six years, there has been a 45.9 percent increase in the number listed companies, but the IDX is dominated by its top 50 listed companies, which represent 69.2 percent of the market cap. There were 54 initial public offerings in 2021 – three more than in 2020. During the fourth quarter of 2021, domestic entities conducted 75 percent of total IDX stock trades.

Government treasury bonds are the most liquid bonds offered by Indonesia. Corporate bonds are less liquid due to less public knowledge of the product and the shallowness of the market. The government issues sukuk (Islamic treasury notes) as part of its effort to diversify Islamic debt instruments and increase their liquidity and issued the first in Southeast Asia Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) bond to fund projects that benefit communities and the environment. This SDG bond was issued in the global capital market, denominated in Euros, and listed in the Singapore and Frankfurt Stock Exchanges. Indonesia’s sovereign debt as of February 2022 was rated as BBB by Standard and Poor’s, BBB by Fitch Ratings and Baa2 by Moody’s. Foreigners held 19 percent of government bonds in January 2022

OJK began overseeing capital markets and non-banking institutions in 2013, replacing the Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Board. In 2014, OJK also assumed BI’s supervisory role over commercial banks. Foreigners have access to the Indonesian capital markets and are a major source of portfolio investment. Indonesia respects International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

Although there is some concern regarding the operations of the many small and medium sized family-owned banks, the banking system is generally considered sound, with banks enjoying some of the widest net interest margins in the region. As of December 2021, commercial banks had IDR 9,913.6 trillion (USD 683 billion) in total assets, with a capital adequacy ratio of 25.67 percent. Outstanding loans grew by 4.4 percent in 2021, a significant improvement from the 2,4 percent contraction in 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Gross non-performing loans (NPL) in December 2021 decreased to 3 percent from 3.06 percent the previous year. NPL rates were partly mitigated through a loan restructuring program implemented by OJK as part of the COVID-19 recovery efforts.

The Financial Services Authority (OJK) issued a regulation on credit restructuring in 2020 to support businesses hit by the pandemic and maintain financial stability, which was extended until March 2023 to prepare banks and debtors for a “soft landing” and give banks time to adequately provision for potential loan losses. The amount of credit restructured under this policy declined from IDR 830.5 trillion (USD 57.2 billion) in 2020 to IDR 693.6 trillion (USD 47.8 billion) in 2021. Most of the loans were restructured by extending the maturity, delaying payments, or reducing the interest rate, which provided borrowers with temporary liquidity relief. Loans at risk, a broader measure of potential troubled loans than the NPL ratio, decreased from 23.4 percent at the end of 2020 to 19.5 percent in December 2021.

OJK Regulation No. 56/03/2016 limits bank ownership to no more than 40 percent by any single shareholder, applicable to foreign and domestic shareholders. This does not apply to foreign bank branches in Indonesia. Foreign banks may establish branches if the foreign bank is ranked among the top 200 global banks by assets. A special operating license is required from OJK to establish a foreign branch. The OJK granted an exception in 2015 for foreign banks buying two small banks and merging them. To establish a representative office, a foreign bank must be ranked in the top 300 global banks by assets. OJK regulation No. 12/POJK.03/2021, issued in August 2021, increased the foreign equity cap for commercial banks to 99 percent, subject to OJK evaluation and approval.

On March 16, 2020, OJK issued Regulation No. 12/POJK.03/2020 on commercial bank consolidation. The regulation aimed to strengthen the structure and competitiveness of the national banking industry by increasing bank capital and encouraging consolidation of banks in Indonesia. This regulation increased minimum core capital requirements for commercial banks and Capital Equivalency Maintained Asset requirements for foreign banks with branch offices by least IDR 3 trillion (USD 209 million), by December 31, 2022.

In 2015, OJK eased rules for foreigners to open a bank account in Indonesia. Foreigners can open a bank account with a balance between USD 2,000-50,000 with just their passport. For accounts greater than USD 50,000, foreigners must show a supporting document such as a reference letter from a bank in the foreigner’s country of origin, a local domicile address, a spousal identity document, copies of a contract for a local residence, and/or credit/debit statements.

Growing digitalization of banking services, spurred on by innovative payment technologies in the financial technology (fintech) sector, complements the conventional banking sector. Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending companies and e-payment services have grown rapidly over the past decade. Indonesian policymakers are hopeful that these fintech services can reach underserved or unbanked populations and micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). In October 2021, OJK launched a Digital Banking transformation blueprint providing the agency’s policy vision for digital banking that consist of 5 elements: 1) data protection, transfer, and governance, 2) technology governance, architecture, emerging technology, 3) IT risk management, outsourcing, and cybersecurity, 4) platform sharing and cooperation of financial/non-financial institutions, and 5) institutional capacity, culture, leadership, and talent management.

OJK Regulation 77/2016 on peer-to-peer (P2P) lending introduces various guidelines, obligations, and restrictions for P2P lending services, and the organization of P2P lending service providers. This regulation caps foreign ownership of P2P services at 85 percent and mandates data localization. Nonbank financial service suppliers may do business in Indonesia as a joint venture or be partially owned by foreign investors but cannot operate in Indonesia as a branch or subsidiary of a foreign entity. Indonesia issued a moratorium on October 2021 for peer-to-peer (P2P) lending licenses to combat illegal platforms. Under OJK Regulation 13/2018, financial technology companies must register with OJK and implement a regulatory sandbox to test new services and business models. As of December 2021, total fintech lending reached USD 20.4 billion in loan disbursements, with USD 2 billion outstanding, while payment transactions using e-money in 2021 grew by 49.06 percent y-o-y to USD 21.06 billion. The value of digital banking transactions increased by 45.6 percent y-o-y to USD 2.7 trillion. According to OJK data, only 39 percent of the population currently use digital banking, therefore significant growth potential remains.

The government places no restrictions or time limitations on investment remittances. However, certain reporting requirements exist. Banks should adopt Know Your Customer (KYC) principles to carefully identify customers’ profile to match transactions. Indonesia does not engage in currency manipulation.

As of 2015, Indonesia is no longer subject to the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) monitoring process under its on-going global Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) compliance process. It continues to work with the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) to further strengthen its AML/CTF regime. In 2018, Indonesia was granted observer status by FATF, a necessary milestone toward becoming a full FATF member.

The Indonesian Investment Authority (INA), also known as the sovereign wealth fund, was legally established by the 2020 Omnibus Law on Job Creation. INA’s supervisory board and board of directors were selected through competitive processes and announced in January and February 2021. The government initially capitalized INA with USD 2 billion through injections from the state budget and added another USD 4.04 billion from the state budget in October 2021. INA aims to attract foreign equity and invest that capital in long-term Indonesian assets to improve the value of the assets through enhanced management. According to Indonesian government officials, the fund will consist of a master portfolio with sector-specific sub-funds, such as infrastructure, oil and gas, health, tourism, and digital technologies.

INA reportedly inked MoUs with several parties such as with Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ), APG Asset Management (APG), and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) on May 2021, to establish Indonesia’s first infrastructure investment platform; with state-owed energy/oil company Pertamina on May 19, to carry out investment cooperation in the energy sector; and with BP Jamsostek on May 24, to carry out investment activity cooperation. INA partnered with state-owned airport operator Angkasa Pura II to accelerate Jakarta’s Soekarno-Hatta airport expansion on October 28; partnered with Dubai Ports (DP) World on October 29 to invest USD 7.5 billion into Indonesian seaport facilities; and made an agreement with the Abu Dhabi growth fund (ADG) on November 25, to invest up to USD 10 billion in Indonesia.

Indonesia had 114 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 28 subsidiaries divided into 12 sectors, as of December 2019. By February 2022 that number had been reduced to 41 SOEs divided into 12 sectors mainly through consolidation or merger, although a small number of SOEs have also been liquidated due to ineffectiveness. As of December 2021, 28 were listed on the Indonesian stock exchange. Two SOEs plan IPOs in 2022, namely PT Pertamina Geothermal Energy and PT ASDP Indonesia Ferry (Persero). SOEs make up 55 percent of the economy.

In 2017, Indonesia announced the creation of a mining holding company, PT Inalum. In 2020, three state owned sharia banks were merged. In January 2022, Minister of SOEs, Erick Thohir, stated that in total, nine SOE holding companies will be formed by 2024, including pharmaceutical, insurance, survey services, food industry, manufacturing industry, defense state-owned holdings, the media industry, port services, and transportation and tourism services holding.

Several of this holding companies have already been formed, including pharmaceutical holding (Lead by PT Bio Farma, formed in early 2020), Indonesia battery holding (formed on March 26, 2021), Port Service Holding (a merger of PT Pelindo I to Pelindo IV, formed on October 1, 2021), Indonesia Financial Group (IFG) as an insurance holding formed in October 2020, Holding of SOE hotels (Wika as the lead of the holding, formed in December 2020), Ultra Micro Holding (BRI, Pegadaian and PNM, formed Sept 13, 2021), ID Food or Holding of food SOEs (lead by PT Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia, formed on January 7), Injourney as a tourism holding company (PT Aviasi Pariwisata Indonesia, formed on January 13), and Defend ID as the defense industry holding (with Len Industry as the lead of the holding, formed on March 2).

Since his appointment by President Jokowi in November 2019, Minister of SOEs Erick Thohir has underscored the need to reform SOEs in line with President Jokowi’s second-term economic agenda. Thohir has noted the need to liquidate underperforming SOEs, ensure that SOEs improve their efficiency by focusing on core business operations, and introduce better corporate governance principles. Thohir has spoken publicly about his intent to push SOEs to undertake initial public offerings (IPOs) on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. He also encourages SOEs to increase outbound investment to support Indonesia’s supply chain in strategic markets, including through acquisition of cattle farms, phosphate mines, and salt mines.

Information regarding SOEs can be found at the SOE Ministry website ( http://www.bumn.go.id/  ) (Indonesian language only).

There are also an unknown number of SOEs owned by regional or local governments. SOEs are present in almost all sectors/industries including banking (finance), tourism (travel), agriculture, forestry, mining, construction, fishing, energy, and telecommunications (information and communications).

Indonesia is not a party to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement. Private enterprises can compete with SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. However, many sectors report that SOEs receive strong preference for government projects. SOEs purchase some goods and services from the private sector and foreign firms. SOEs publish an annual report and are audited by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP), and external and internal auditors.

While some state-owned enterprises have offered shares on the stock market, Indonesia does not have an active privatization program. The government capitalized Indonesia Investment Authority (INA) with USD 4 billion in state-owned assets to attract equity investments in those assets, which may eventually be sold to investors or listed on the stock market.

Iraq remains one of the most under-banked countries in the Middle East.  The Iraqi banking system includes around 70 private banks and seven state-owned banks.  As of early 2022, 20 foreign banks have licensed branches in Iraq and several others have strategic investments in Iraqi banks.  The three largest banks in Iraq are Rafidain Bank, Rasheed Bank, and the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI), which account for roughly 85 percent of Iraq’s banking sector assets.  Iraq’s economy remains primarily cash based, with many banks acting as little more than ATMs in a heavily U.S. dollarized economy.  Rafidain and Rasheed offer standard banking products but primarily provide pension and government salary payments to individual Iraqis.

Credit is difficult to obtain and expensive.  Iraq ranked 186 out of 190 in terms of ease of getting credit in the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report.  Although the lending volume of by privately-owned banks is growing, most privately-owned banks do more wire transfers and other fee-based exchange services.  Businesses are largely self-financed or “between individuals” private transactions.  State-owned banks mainly make financial transfers from the government to provincial authorities or individuals, rather than business loans.

The CBI introduced a small and medium enterprise lending program in 2015, in which 47 private banks have reportedly participated.  In early 2020, the CBI launched a real estate lending initiative and an Islamic finance consolidation program.  The initiative received an enthusiastic response from private banks, as it increased their liquidity.

The main purpose of the Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI) is to provide financial and related services to facilitate trade, particularly through letters of credit.  Although CBI granted private banks permission to issue letters of credit below $50 million, TBI continues to process nearly all government letters of credit.

Although banking sector reform was a priority of Iraq’s IMF Stand-By Arrangement, the GOI has had only incremental success reforming its two largest state-owned banks, Rafidain and Rasheed.  Private banks are mostly active in currency exchanges and wire transfers.  CBI is headquartered in Baghdad, with branches in Basrah and Erbil.  CBI’s Erbil branch, and the IKR’s state-owned banking system, are now electronically linked to the CBI system.  The CBI now has full supervisory authority over the financial sector in the IKR, including the banks and non-bank financial institutions.

The Finance Action Task Force (FATF) recognized Iraqi’s anti-money laundering and counter finance terrorism progress towards best practice standards in June 2018, removing Iraq from FATF’s monitoring process.

Iraq does not have a sovereign wealth fund. 

SOEs are active across all sectors in Iraq.  GOI ministries currently own and operate over 192 SOEs, a legacy of the state planning system.  The GOI’s continued support of unprofitable entities places a substantial fiscal burden on Iraq, as many SOEs are unproductive.  These firms employ over half a million Iraqis, many of whom are underemployed.  The degree to which SOEs compete with private companies varies by sector; SOEs face the most competition in the market for consumer goods.  The GOI had expressed a commitment to reforming the SOEs and taking steps toward privatization as part of its previous international financing programs.

Iraqi law permits SOEs to partner with foreign companies.  When parent ministries wish to initiate a partnership for an SOE under their purview, they generally advertise the tender on their ministry’s website.  Partnerships are negotiated on a case-by-case basis and require the respective minister’s approval.  Iraq does not have a centralized ownership entity that exercises ownership rights for each of the SOEs.  SOEs are required to seek their parent ministry’s approval for certain categories of financial decisions and operation expansions. However, in practice, SOEs defer to the parent ministry for most decisions.  SOEs submit financial reports to their parent ministry’s audit departments and the Board of Supreme Audit.  These reports are not published and sometimes exclude salary expenses.

The Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM), which oversees the largest number of Iraq’s SOEs, established the following requirements for partnerships:  minimum duration of three years, the foreign company must register a company office in Iraq, and the foreign company must participate in the production of goods.  Foreign companies have faced challenges in partnerships because the GOI has, at times, cut subsidies to SOEs after partnerships were formed and due to conflicts between the parent ministry and the GOI’s official policy.  In addition, the MIM has often required that the foreign investor pay all SOE employees’ salaries regardless of whether they are working on the agreed project.

GOI entities are required to give preferential treatment to SOEs, under multiple laws.  A 2009 COM decision requires all Iraqi government agencies to procure goods from SOEs unless SOEs cannot fulfill the quality and quantity requirements of the tender.  A Board of Supreme Audit decision requires government agencies to award SOEs tenders if their bids are no more than 10 percent higher than other bids.  Furthermore, some GOI entities, including the MIM, have also issued their own internal regulations requiring tenders to select Iraqi SOEs, unless Iraqi SOEs state that they cannot fulfill the order.  Sometimes a foreign firm must form a partnership with an Iraqi firm to fulfill SOE-promulgated tenders.  Further, SOEs are exempt from the bid bond and performance bond requirements that private businesses are subject to.

Iraq is not a party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the WTO.  SOEs do not adhere to OECD guidelines.

Iraqi law supports a degree of autonomy in the selection process of an SOE’s board of directors.  For example, it requires that a minister’s sole appointment to a board of directors receive the approval of an “opinion board.”  Nevertheless, in practice, most board members have close personal and political connections to their parent ministry’s leadership.

The GOI has repeatedly announced that it plans to reorganize failing SOEs across multiple sectors.  Additionally, the GOI is eager to modernize Iraq’s financial and banking institutions.  There are, however, no concrete timelines for these initiatives, and entrenched patronage networks tying SOEs to ministries remain a stumbling block. 

Capital markets and portfolio investments operate freely with no discrimination between Irish and foreign firms. In some instances, development authorities and commercial banks facilitate loan packages to foreign firms with favorable credit terms. All loans are offered on market terms. There was limited credit available, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), after the financial crisis of 2008. Bank balance sheets have since improved with lending levels increasing as the health of the economy improved. The government established the Strategic Banking Corporation of Ireland (SBCI) to ensure SMEs had access to credit available at market terms. Irish legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and consistent with international norms and provide a secure environment for portfolio investment. The current capital gains tax rate is 33 percent (since December 2012).

Euronext, an EU-based grouping of stock exchange operators in 2018 acquired and operates the Irish Stock Exchange (ISE), now known as Euronext Dublin.

The Irish banking sector, like many worldwide, came under intense pressure in 2007 and 2008 following the collapse of Ireland’s construction industry and the end of Ireland’s property boom. A number of Ireland’s financial lenders were severely under-capitalized and required government bailouts to survive. The government, fearing a flight of private investments, introduced temporary guarantees (still in operation) to personal depositors in 2008 to ensure that deposits remained in Ireland. Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo), a bank heavily involved in construction and property lending, failed and was resolved by the government. The government subsequently took majority stakes in several other lenders, effectively nationalized two banks and acquired a significant proportion of a third. The National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), established in 2009, acquired most of the property-related loan books of the Irish banks (including Anglo) at a fraction of their book value.

The government, with its increased exposure to bank debts and a rising budget deficit, had difficulty in placing sovereign debt on international bond markets following the economic crash of 2008. Ireland sought and got assistance from the Troika (International Monetary Fund (IMF), EU and European Central Bank (ECB)) in November 2010. A rescue package of $110 (€85) billion, with $88 (€67.5) billion of this provided by the Troika, was agreed to cover government deficits and costs related to the bank recapitalizations.

The government then took effective control of Allied Irish Bank (AIB), following a further recapitalization by the end of 2010. The government took into state control, and then resolved, two building societies, Irish Nationwide Building Society and Educational Building Society. The government helped re-capitalize Irish Life and Permanent (the banking portion of which was spun off and now operates under the name Permanent TSB) and the Bank of Ireland (BOI).

Irish banks were forced to deleverage their non-core assets in line with Troika bailout program recommendations and were effectively limited to service domestic banking demand. BOI succeeded in remaining non-nationalized by realizing capital from the sale of non-essential portfolios and by imposing some targeted burden sharing with some of its bondholders. The government has been actively selling down its stake in BOI since 2021 and its holding has declined to below 6 percent. The government also signaled its to fully sell off its AIB shareholding by mid-2022.

Soon after it exited the Troika program in 2013, Ireland re-entered sovereign debt markets. International financing rates continued to fall to record lows for Irish debt, and Ireland was able to fully repay all of its IMF loans by securing bond sales at less expensive rates. Ireland also paid off some bilateral loans extended to it by Denmark and Sweden ahead of schedule in 2017. Currently, Ireland is placing its sovereign debt at very low interest rates in line with other nations.

Ireland’s retail banking sector rebounded from the crisis and is now healthy and well capitalized in line with ECB rules on bank capitalizations. The stock of non-performing loans on bank balance sheets remains high; and banks continue to divest themselves of these loans through bundle sales to investors. Ulster Bank, part of the UK-based NatWest Banking group and Ireland’s third largest retail bank, announced its withdrawal from retail banking in Ireland.

KBC Bank also announced its withdrawal of services in Ireland in late 2022/early 2023. The move by the two banks is expected to create an unprecedented demand for new accounts with the remaining banks. The two banks are actively selling off portfolios of loan books and mortgages, but up to a million customers will need to find an alternative bank for daily business and credit card facilities.

The Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) is responsible for both central banking and financial regulation. The CBI is a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), whose primary objective is to maintain price stability in the euro area.

There are a large number of U.S. banks with operations in Ireland, many of whom are located in Dublin’s International Financial Services Center (IFSC) Dublin. The IFSC originally functioned somewhat like a business park for financial services firms. U.S. banks located in Ireland provide a range of financial services to clients in Europe and worldwide. These firms include State Street, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan, and Northern Trust. The regulation of the international banks operating throughout Ireland falls under the jurisdiction of the CBI.

Ireland is part of the Eurozone, and therefore does not have an independent monetary policy. The ECB formulates and implements monetary policy for the Eurozone and the CBI implements that policy at the national level. The Governor of the CBI is a member of the ECB’s Governing Council and has an equal say as other ECB governors in the formulation of Eurozone monetary and interest rate policy. The CBI also issues euro currency in Ireland, acts as manager of the official external reserves of gold and foreign currency, conducts research and analysis on economic and financial matters, oversees the domestic payment and settlement systems, and manages investment assets on behalf of the State.

Foreign Exchange

Ireland uses the euro as its national currency and enjoys full current and capital account liberalization. Foreign exchange is easily available at market rates. Ireland is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Remittance Policies

There are no restrictions or significant reported delays in the conversion or repatriation of investment capital, earnings, interest, or royalties, nor are there any announced plans to change remittance policies. Likewise, there are no limitations on the import of capital into Ireland.

The National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) is the asset management bureau of the government. NTMA is responsible for day-to-day funding for government operations normally through the sale of sovereign debt worldwide. NTMA is also responsible for investing Irish government funds, such as the national pension funds, in financial instruments worldwide.

Ireland suspended issuing sovereign debt upon entering the Troika bailout program in 2010 but has been successfully placing Irish debt since Ireland’s 2013 exit from the Troika program,

The NTMA also has oversight of the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), the agency established to take on, and dispose of, the property-related loan books of Ireland’s bailed-out banks.

The Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF) established in 2014 has the statutory mandate to invest on a commercial basis to support economic activity and employment in Ireland. The dual objective mandate of the ISIF – investment return and economic impact – requires all its investments to generate returns as well as having a positive (i.e., job-creating) economic impact in Ireland. The ISIF has assisted some small and medium sized enterprises during Ireland’s economic revival.

The Israeli government is supportive of foreign portfolio investment. The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) is Israel’s only public stock exchange.

Financial institutions in Israel allocate credit on market terms. Various credit instruments are available to the private sector and foreign investors can receive credit on the local market. Legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are transparent and conform to international norms, although the prevalence of inflation-adjusted accounting means there are differences from U.S. accounting principles.

In the case of publicly traded firms where ownership is widely dispersed, the practice of “cross-shareholding” and “stable shareholder” arrangements to prevent mergers and acquisitions is common, but not directed at preventing foreign investment. Israeli law prevents foreign investment by individuals or businesses from “enemy states,” currently limited to Iran, Syria, and Lebanon.

The Bank of Israel (BOI) is Israel’s central bank and regulates all banking activity and monetary policy. In general, Israel has a healthy banking system that offers most of the same services as the U.S. banking system. Fees for normal banking transactions are significantly higher in Israel than in the United States and some services do not meet U.S. standards. There are 12 commercial banks and four foreign banks operating in Israel, according to the BOI. Bank Leumi and Bank Hapoalim, the two largest banks, dominate Israel’s banking sector, collectively controlling nearly 60 percent of Israel’s credit market. The State of Israel holds 6 percent of Bank Leumi’s shares; all of Israel’s other banks are fully private.

Israel passed legislation to establish the Israel Citizens’ Fund, a sovereign wealth fund managed by the BOI, in 2014. The law establishing the fund states that it will begin operating a month after the state’s tax revenues from natural gas exceed USD 307 million (1 billion NIS), which the Ministry of Finance expects will occur in late 2022.

Israel established the Government Companies Authority (GCA) as an auxiliary unit of the Ministry of Finance following the passage of the 1975 Government Companies Law. It is the administrative agency for state-owned companies in charge of supervision, privatization, and implementation of structural changes. The Israeli state only provides support for commercial SOEs in exceptional cases. The GCA leads the recruitment process for SOE board members. Board appointments are subject to the approval of a committee, which confirms whether candidates meet the minimum board member criteria set forth by law.

The GCA oversees some 100 commercial and noncommercial companies, government subsidiaries, and companies under mixed government-private ownership. Among these companies are some of the biggest and most complex in the Israeli economy, such as the Israel Electric Corporation, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Israel Postal Company, Mekorot Israel National Water Company, Israel Natural Gas Lines, the Ashdod, Haifa, and Eilat Port Companies, Israel Railways, Petroleum and Energy Infrastructures and the Israel National Roads Company. The GCA does not publish a publicly available list of SOEs.

Israel is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the World Trade Organization.

Israel’s inter-ministerial privatization committee approved plans in January 2020 to sell off the Port of Haifa, Israel’s largest shipping hub. The privatization process is underway now. The incoming owner will be required to invest approximately USD 280 million (1 billion NIS) in the port, including the cost of upgrading infrastructure and financing the layoff of an estimated 200 workers. The government of Israel has ongoing plans to fully privatize Israel Post, which currently has 20 percent of its shares publicly listed.

The GOI welcomes foreign portfolio investments, which are generally subject to the same reporting and disclosure requirements as domestic transactions.  Financial resources flow relatively freely in Italian financial markets and capital is allocated mostly on market terms.  Foreign participation in Italian capital markets is not restricted.  In practice, many of Italy’s largest publicly traded companies have foreign owners among their primary shareholders.  While foreign investors may obtain capital in local markets and have access to a variety of credit instruments, gaining access to equity capital is difficult.  Italy has a relatively underdeveloped capital market and businesses have a long-standing preference for credit financing.  The limited venture capital available is usually provided by established commercial banks and a handful of venture capital funds.

In 2021 the Netherlands-based Euronext acquired Italy’s stock exchange, the Milan Stock Exchange (Borsa Italiana), from the London Stock Exchange. Euronext’s primary data center is being transferred from London to Bergamo in northern Italy. Borsa Italiana is relatively small, with 407 listed companies and a market capitalization of 43 percent of GDP at the end of 2021, up from 37 percent at the end of 2020.  Although the exchange remains primarily a source of capital for larger Italian firms, Borsa Italiana created “AIM Italia” in 2012 as an alternative exchange with streamlined filing and reporting requirements to encourage SMEs to seek equity financing.  The GOI recognizes that Italian firms remain overly reliant on bank financing and has initiated some programs to encourage alternative forms of financing, including venture capital and corporate bonds.  Financial experts have held that slow CONSOB (the Italian Companies and Stock Exchange Commission) processes and cultural biases against private equity have limited equity financing in Italy. The Italian Association of Private Equity, Venture Capital, and Private Debt (AIFI) estimates investment by venture capital and private equity funds in Italy increased by 142% in the first half of 2021 compared to the first half of 2020 (and by 81.5% over the first half of 2019) and totals around €4.5 billion – a low figure given the size of Italy’s economy.

Italy’s financial markets are regulated by the Italian securities regulator CONSOB, Italy’s central bank (the Bank of Italy), and the Institute for the Supervision of Insurance (IVASS).  CONSOB supervises and regulates Italy’s securities markets (e.g., the Milan Stock Exchange).  As of January 2022, the European Central Bank directly supervised 13 of Italy’s largest banks and indirectly supervised less significant Italian banks through the Bank of Italy.  IVASS supervises and regulates insurance companies.  Liquidity in the primary markets is sufficient to enter and exit sizeable positions, though Italian capital markets are small by international standards.  Liquidity may be limited for certain less-frequently traded investments (e.g., bonds traded on the secondary and OTC markets).

Italian policies generally facilitate the flow of financial resources to markets.  Dividends and royalties paid to non-Italians may be subject to a withholding tax, unless covered by a tax treaty.  Dividends paid to permanent establishments of non-resident corporations in Italy are not subject to the withholding tax.

Italy imposed a financial transactions tax (FTT, or Tobin Tax) beginning in 2013.  Financial trading is taxed at 0.1 percent in regulated markets and 0.2 percent in unregulated markets.  The FTT applies to daily balances rather than to each transaction.  The FTT applies to trade in derivatives as well, with fees ranging from €0.025 to €200.  High-frequency trading is also subject to a 0.02 percent tax on trades occurring every 0.5 seconds or faster (e.g., automated trading).  The FTT does not apply to “market makers,” pension and small-cap funds, transactions involving donations or inheritances, purchases of derivatives to cover exchange/interest-rate/raw-materials (commodity market) risks, government and other bonds, or financial instruments for companies with a capitalization of less than €500 million. The FTT has been criticized for discouraging small savers from investing in publicly traded companies on the Milan stock market.

There are no restrictions on foreigners engaging in portfolio investment in Italy.  Financial services companies incorporated in another EU member state may offer investment services and products in Italy without establishing a local presence.

Since April 2020, investors, Italian or foreign, acquiring a stake of more than one percent of a publicly traded Italian firm must inform CONSOB but do not need its approval.  Earlier the limit was three percent for non-SMEs and five percent for SMEs.

Any Italian or foreign investor seeking to acquire or increase its stake in an Italian bank equal to or greater than ten percent must receive prior authorization from the BOI.  Acquisitions of holdings that would change the controlling interest of a banking group must be communicated to the BOI at least 30 days in advance of the closing of the transactions.  Approval and advance authorization by the Italian Insurance Supervisory Authority are required for any significant acquisition in ownership, portfolio transfer, or merger of insurers or reinsurers.  Regulators retain the discretion to reject proposed acquisitions on prudential grounds (e.g., insufficient capital in the merged entity).

Italy has sought to curb widespread tax evasion by improving enforcement and changing attitudes.  GOI actions include a public communications effort to reduce tolerance of tax evasion; increased and visible financial police controls on businesses (e.g., raids on businesses in vacation spots at peak holiday periods); and audits requiring individuals to document their income.  Tax reforms implemented in 2015 institutionalized some OECD best practices to encourage taxpayer compliance, including by reducing the administrative burden for taxpayers through the increased use of technology such as e-filing, pre-completed tax returns, and automated screenings of tax returns for errors and omissions prior to a formal audit.  The reforms also offer additional certainty for taxpayers through programs such as cooperative compliance and advance tax rulings (i.e., binding opinions on tax treatment of transactions in advance) for prospective investors.  In July 2021, the Draghi-led government approved overarching guidelines of a general tax reform to simplify Italy’s tax system, which remains complex and has relatively high tax rates on labor income. The tax reform, however, which is part of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) must still be finalized and then implemented through a series of decrees.

The GOI and the BOI have accepted and respect IMF obligations, including Article VIII.

Despite isolated problems at individual Italian banks, the banking system remains sound and capital ratios exceed regulatory thresholds.  However, Italian banks’ profit margins have suffered since 2011.  The BOI said the profitability of Italian banks in 2020 declined significantly during the pandemic, with the annualized rate of return on equity (ROE) falling from 5.0 percent to 1.9 percent (net of extraordinary components). Government support measures for households and firms and the economy’s recovery in 2021 contributed to mitigating the effects of the pandemic on the quality banks’ assets. The capitalization of large banks (the ratio between common tier 1 equity and risk weighted assets) stood at 15.5 percent at the end of 2020, an increase of 150 basis points compared to the end of 2019. While the BOI has not yet released ROE data for 2021, major Italian banks reported significant improvements in their profitability compared to 2020. For example, even troubled Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) recorded a €310 million profit, its best result since 2015.

While the financial crisis brought a pronounced worsening of the quality of banks’ assets, the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total outstanding loans has decreased significantly since its height in November 2015, as banks continue to offload NPLs and unlikely-to-pay loans.  As of December 2021, net NPLs decreased to €15.1 billion, the lowest since March 2009 and down from €20.9 billion in December 2020. ABI, the Italian banking association, reported the NPL ratio was 0.86% (net of provisions) in December 2021, compared to 1.21% in December 2020 and 4.89% in November 2015 when NPLs reached record level of €88.8 billion.  The GOI has also taken steps to facilitate acquisitions of NPLs by outside investors.  In 2016, the GOI created a €20 billion bank rescue fund to assist struggling Italian banks in need of liquidity or capital support.  Italy’s fourth-largest bank, MPS, became the first bank to avail itself of this fund in January 2019.  The government currently owns 64 percent of MPS but failed to exit the bank by the beginning of 2022, as agreed with EU authorities. The GOI also facilitated the sale of two struggling “Veneto banks” (Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca) to Intesa Sanpaolo in 2017.  Italy’s Interbank Deposit Guarantee Fund (FITD) now owns 80 percent of Banca Carige after an industry-financed rescue in 2019. (Carige had been the smallest Italian bank under ECB supervision.) In February 2022, the board of Modena-based Bper bank approved a binding offer to acquire Carige for the symbolic price of €1 and a €530-million capital injection provided by FTID.  The merger requires ECB approval and would create Italy’s fourth largest banking group with about €155 billion in assets.

Government loan guarantees (to large companies via SACE, Italy’s export credit agency, and to SMEs via the Central Guarantee Fund, or Fondo Centrale di Garanzia) and repayment moratoriums also helped lead to an 8.5 percent increase in credit to firms in 2020, the fastest rate of growth since 2008. The guarantee on SMEs and large companies (though SACE) is set expire in June 2022, though it may be extended. The repayment moratorium expired in December 2021. Despite some banking-sector M&A activity in the past several years, the ECB, OECD, and Italian government continue to encourage additional consolidation to improve efficiency. In 2020, Italy had 59 (up from 55 in 2019) banking groups and 90 stand-alone banks (of which 39 were cooperative banks), as well as 81 subsidiaries of foreign banks. As of January 2022, there were 13 groups classified as “significant” under the EU’s Single Supervisory Mechanism. These systemically significant banks accounted for around 80 percent of banking groups’ total assets.

The Italian banking sector remains overly concentrated on physical bank branches for delivering services, contributing to sector-wide inefficiency and low profitability.  Electronic banking is available in Italy, but adoption remains below euro-zone averages. Cash remains widely used for transactions. The limit for cash transactions is €2000 but will be decreased to €1,000 beginning in 2023.

Credit is allocated on market terms, with foreign investors eligible to receive credit in Italy.  Credit in Italy remains largely bank driven.  In practice, foreigners may encounter limited access to finance, as Italian banks may be reluctant to lend to prospective borrowers (even Italians) absent a preexisting relationship.

The Ministry of Economy and Finance and BOI have indicated interest in blockchain technologies to transform the banking sector.  Beginning in March 2021, the Italian Banking Association (ABI) implemented a Distributed Ledger Technology-based system across the Italian banking sector. The process aims to reconcile material (and not digitalized) products that are exchanged between banks, such as commercial paper or promissory notes.

State-owned investment bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) launched a strategic wealth fund in 2011, now called CDP Equity (formerly Fondo Strategico Italiano – FSI).  CDP Equity has €4.9 billion in invested capital and fourteen companies in its portfolio, holding both majority and minority participations.  CDP Equity invests in companies of relevant national interest and on its website ( http://en.cdpequity.it/ ) provides information on its funding, investment policies, criteria, and procedures.  CDP Equity is open to capital investments from outside institutional investors, including foreign investors.  CDP Equity is a member of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds and follows the Santiago Principles.

Credit is available at market terms, and foreigners are allowed to borrow freely on the local market at market-determined rates of interest.  A relatively effective regulatory system was established to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment.  Jamaica has had its own stock exchange, the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE), since 1969.  The JSE was the top performing capital market indices in 2018 and was among the top five performers in 2019.  The Financial Services Commission (FSC) and the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ), the central bank, regulate these activities.  Jamaica adheres to IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

At the end of 2021 there were 11 deposit-taking institutions (DTIs) consisting of eight commercial banks, one merchant bank (Licensed under the Financial Institutions Act) and two building societies.  The number of credit unions shrank from 47 at the end of 2009 to 25 at the end of 2021.  Commercial banks held assets of approximately $14 billion at the end of 2021.  Non-performing loans (NPL) of $200 million at end December 2020, were 3 percent of total loans.  Five of the country’s eight commercial banks are foreign owned.  After a financial sector crisis in the mid-1990s led to consolidations, the sector has remained largely stable.  

In October 2018, the GOJ took legislative steps to modernize and make the central bank operationally independent through the tabling of amendments to the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) Act. The modernization program includes, inter alia, the institutionalization of the central bank independence, improved governance, and the transitioning of monetary policy towards inflation targeting.  The modernization efforts continued in 2020 with the passage of the Bank of Jamaica Amendment Act to allow for, among other things: (1) full-fledged inflation targeting; (2) improved capitalization, governance, transparency, and accountability; (3) monetary policy decisions to be devolved to a monetary policy committee; and (4) the central bank Governor to account to Parliament.  The Act will therefore remove the power of the government to give monetary policy direction to the central bank.  These changes will move Jamaica’s financial governance framework closer in line with international standards.   

In May of 2020, the BOJ, as a part of their ongoing retail payments reform, ventured into the digital innovation that is fast becoming a feature of global central banks, central bank digital currency (CBDC).  CBDC is a digital form of central bank issued currency and is therefore legal tender.  It is not to be confused with cryptocurrency, which is privately issued and not backed by a central authority.  CBDC is fully backed by the Central Bank, the sole issuer.  The Bank of Jamaica will roll out the digital Jamaican dollar in 2022 after a successful pilot during 2021.

Jamaica does not have a sovereign wealth fund or an asset management bureau.

Jamaican SOEs are most prominent in the agriculture, mining, energy, and transport sectors of the economy.  Of 149 public bodies, 54 are self-financing and are therefore considered SOEs as either limited liability entities established under the Companies Act of Jamaica or statutory bodies created by individual enabling legislation.  SOEs generally do not receive preferential access to government contracts.  SOEs must adhere to the provisions of the GOJ (Revised) Handbook of Public Sector Procurement Procedures and are expected to participate in a bidding process to provide goods and services to the government.  SOEs also provide services to private sector firms.  SOEs must report quarterly on all contracts above a prescribed limit to the Integrity Commission.  Since 2002, SOEs have been subject to the same tax requirements as private enterprises and are required to purchase government-owned land and raw material and execute these transactions on similar terms as private entities. 

Jamaica’s Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act (PBMA) requires SOEs to prepare annual corporate plans and budgets, which must be debated and approved by Parliament.  As part of the GOJ’s economic reform agenda, SOE performance is monitored against agreed targets and goals, with oversight provided by stakeholders including representatives of civil society.  The GOJ prioritized divestment of SOEs, particularly the most inefficient, as part of its IMF reform commitments.  Private firms compete with SOEs on fair terms and SOEs generally lack the same profitability motives as private enterprises, leading to the GOJ’s absorbing the debt of loss-making public sector enterprises. 

Jamaica’s public bodies report to their respective Board of Directors appointed by the responsible portfolio minister and while no general rules guide the allocation of SOE board positions, some entities allocate seats to specific stakeholders.  In 2012, the GOJ approved a Corporate Governance Framework (CGF) under which persons appointed to boards should possess the skills and competencies required for the effective functioning of the entity.  With some board members being selected on the basis of their political affiliation, the government is in the process of developing new board policy guidelines.  The Jamaican court system, while slow, is respected for being fair and balanced and in many cases has ruled against the GOJ and its agents.   

As part of its economic reform program, the GOJ identified a number of public assets to be privatized from various sectors.  Jamaica actively courts foreign investors as part of its divestment strategy.  In certain instances, the government encourages local participation.  Restrictions may be placed on certain assets due to national security considerations.  Privatization can occur through sale, lease, or concession.  Transactions are generally executed through public tenders, but the GOJ reserves the right to accept unsolicited proposals for projects deemed to be strategic.  The Development Bank of Jamaica, which oversees the privatization program, is mandated to ensure that the process is fair and transparent.  When some entities are being privatized, advertisements are placed locally and through international publications, such as the Financial Times, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal, to attract foreign investors.  Foreign investors won most of the privatization bids in the last decade.

While the time taken to divest assets depends on state of readiness and complexity, on average transactions take between 18 and 24 months.  The process involves pre-feasibility and due diligence assessments; feasibility studies; pre-qualification of bidders; and a public tender.  In 2019 the GOJ divested two of its major assets through initial public offerings (IPOs): a 62-megawatt wind farm, which raised almost $40 million, and a toll highway, which raised almost $90 million.  The GOJ is in planning to divest the Jamaica Mortgage Bank and its minority interest in the electricity provider, the Jamaica Public Service, through public offerings.  In 2018, the GOJ signed a 25-year concession for the management and development of the Norman Manley International Airport in Kingston.  Other large privatizations include the 2003 privatization of Sangster International Airport in Montego Bay and the 2015 privatization of the Kingston Container Terminal port facility.    

A list of current privatization transactions can be found at http://dbankjm.com/current-transactions/.

Japan maintains no formal restrictions on inward portfolio investment except for certain provisions covering national security. Foreign capital plays an important role in Japan’s financial markets, with foreign investors accounting for the majority of trading shares in the country’s stock market. Historically, many company managers and directors have resisted the actions of activist shareholders, especially foreign private equity funds, potentially limiting the attractiveness of Japan’s equity market to large-scale foreign portfolio investment, although there are signs of change. Some firms have taken steps to facilitate the exercise of shareholder rights by foreign investors, including the use of electronic proxy voting. The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) maintains an Electronic Voting Platform for Foreign and Institutional Investors. All holdings of TSE-listed stocks are required to transfer paper stock certificates into electronic form.

The Japan Exchange Group (JPX) operates Japan’s two largest stock exchanges – in Tokyo and Osaka – with cash equity trading consolidated on the TSE since July 2013 and derivatives trading consolidated on the Osaka Exchange since March 2014.

In January 2014, the TSE and Nikkei launched the JPX Nikkei 400 Index. The index puts a premium on company performance, particularly return on equity (ROE). Companies included are determined by such factors as three-year average returns on equity, three-year accumulated operating profits and market capitalization, along with others such as the number of external board members. Inclusion in the index has become an unofficial “seal of approval” in corporate Japan, and many companies have taken steps, including undertaking share buybacks, to improve their ROE. The Bank of Japan has purchased JPX-Nikkei 400 exchange traded funds (ETFs) as part of its monetary operations, and Japan’s massive Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) has also invested in JPX-Nikkei 400 ETFs, putting an additional premium on membership in the index. The TSE and FSA revised the Corporate Governance Code in 2021 to reflect the realignment of TSE segmentations to be implemented in 2022. The revised guidelines require companies, to be listed in the “Prime Section,” a top-tier TSE section, to have more than one-third external directors.

Japan does not restrict financial flows and accepts obligations under IMF Article VIII.

Credit is available via multiple instruments, both public and private, although access by foreigners often depends upon visa status and the type of investment.

Banking services are easily accessible throughout Japan; it is home to many of the world’s largest private commercial banks as well as an extensive network of regional and local banks. Most major international commercial banks are also present in Japan, and other quasi-governmental and non-governmental entities, such as the postal service and cooperative industry associations, also offer banking services. For example, the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Associations offers services through its bank (Norinchukin Bank) to members of the organization. Japan’s financial sector is generally acknowledged to be sound and resilient, with good capitalization and with a declining ratio of non-performing loans. While still healthy, most banks have experienced pressure on interest margins and profitability as a result of an extended period of low interest rates capped by the Bank of Japan’s introduction of a negative interest rate policy in 2016, especially some of the regional banks.

The country’s three largest private commercial banks, often collectively referred to as the “megabanks,” are MUFG Bank (a banking subsidiary of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group), Mizuho Bank (Mizuho Financial Group), and SMBC (Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group). Collectively, they hold assets reaching USD 6.0 trillion at September end of 2021. Japan’s second largest bank by assets – with more than USD 2.0 trillion – is Japan Post Bank, a financial subsidiary of the Japan Post Holdings(which holds 88.99 percent of the bank’s shares as of September 2021). Japan Post Bank offers services via 23,815 Japan Post office branches, at which Japan Post Bank services can be conducted, as well as Japan Post’s network of 31,901 ATMs nationwide, as of the end of March 2021.

Many foreign banks operate in Japan offering both banking and other financial services. Like their domestic counterparts, foreign banks are regulated by the Japan Financial Services Agency (FSA). According to the IMF, there have been no observations of reduced or lost correspondent banking relationships in Japan. There are 518 correspondent financial institutions that have current accounts at the country’s central bank (including 123 main banks; 11 trust banks; 50 foreign banks; and 247 credit unions).

Foreigners wishing to establish bank accounts must show a passport, visa, and foreigner residence card; temporary visitors may not open bank accounts in Japan. Other requirements (e.g., evidence of utility registration and payment, Japanese-style signature seal, etc.) may vary according to institution. Language may be a barrier to obtaining services at some institutions; foreigners who do not speak Japanese should research in advance which banks are more likely to offer bilingual services.

Japanese regulators are encouraging “open banking” interactions between financial institutions and third-party developers of financial technology applications through application programming interfaces (“APIs”) when customers “opt-in” to share their information.  As a result of the government having set a target to have 80 banks adopt API standards by 2020, more than 100 subject banks reportedly have done so.  Many of the largest banks are participating in various proofs of concept using blockchain technology.  While commercial banks have not yet formally adopted blockchain-powered systems for fund settlement, they are actively exploring options, and the largest banks have announced intentions to produce their own virtual currencies at some point.  The Bank of Japan is researching blockchain and its applications for national accounts and established a “Fintech Center” to lead this effort.  The main banking regulator, the Japan Financial Services Agency also encourages innovation with financial technologies, including sponsoring an annual conference on “fintech” in Japan.  In April 2017, amendments to the Act on Settlements of Funds went into effect, permitting the use of virtual currencies as a form of payment in Japan, but virtual currency is still not considered legal tender (e.g., commercial vendors may opt to accept virtual currencies for transactional payments, though virtual currency cannot be used as payment for taxes owed to the government).  The law also requires the registration of virtual currency exchange businesses.  There are currently 30 registered virtual currency exchanges in Japan, as of January 2022.

Japan does not operate a sovereign wealth fund.

Japan has privatized most former state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Under the Postal Privatization Law, privatization of Japan Post group started in October 2007 by turning the public corporation into stock companies. The stock sale of the Japan Post Holdings Co. and its two financial subsidiaries, Japan Post Insurance (JPI) and Japan Post Bank (JPB), began in November 2015 with an IPO that sold 11 percent of available shares in each of the three entities. The postal service subsidiary, Japan Post Co., remains a wholly owned subsidiary of JPH. The Japanese government conducted additional public offerings of stock in September 2017 and October 2021, reducing the government ownership in the holding company to a little over one third. There were offerings in the insurance subsidiary in April 2019 and June 2021. JPH currently owns 88.99 percent of the banking subsidiary and 49.9 percent of the insurance subsidiary. Follow-on sales of shares in the two subsidiary companies will take place over time, but the government’s sale of JPH stocks in October 2021 is considered to be the last. The Postal Privatization Law requires the government to sell a majority share so that the government ownership would be “a little over one third” of all shares in JPH (which was completed in 2021), and JPH to sell all shares of JPB and JPI, as soon as possible.

These offerings mark the final stage of Japan Post privatization begun under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) and respond to long-standing criticism from commercial banks and insurers—both foreign and Japanese—that their government-owned Japan Post rivals have an unfair advantage.

While there has been significant progress since 2013 on private suppliers’ access to the postal insurance network, the U.S. government has continued to raise concerns about the preferential treatment given to Japan Post and some quasi-governmental entities compared to private sector competitors and the impact of these advantages on the ability of private companies to compete on a level playing field. A full description of U.S. government concerns regarding the insurance sector and efforts to address these concerns is available in the annual United States Trade Representative’s National Trade Estimate on Foreign Trade Barriers report for Japan.

In sectors previously dominated by state-owned enterprises but now privatized, such as transportation, telecommunications, and package delivery, U.S. businesses report that Japanese firms sometimes receive favorable treatment in the form of improved market access and government cooperation.

Deregulation of Japan’s power sector took a step forward in April 2016 with the full liberalization of retail electricity supply, allowing all consumers to choose their electricity provider. This change has led to increased competition from, and rapid growth in the number of, new entrants; as of March 2022, there were almost 750 registered electricity retailers nationwide. While the generation and transmission of electricity remain mostly in the hands of the legacy power utilities, new electricity retailers reached a 21-percent market share of the total volume of electricity sold as of November 2021. Japan implemented the third phase of its power sector reforms in April 2020 by requiring vertically integrated regional monopolies to “legally unbundle” the electricity transmission and distribution portions of their businesses from the power generation and retailing portions. The transmission and distribution businesses retain ownership of, and operational control over, the power grid in their regional service territories. In addition, many of the former vertically integrated regional monopolies created electricity retailers to compete in the fully deregulated retail market.

American energy companies have reported increased opportunities in this sector, but also report that the regional power utilities have advantages over new entrants with regard to understanding the regulatory regime, securing sufficient low-cost generation in the wholesale market, and accessing infrastructure. For example, while the wholesale market allows new retailers to buy electricity for sale to customers, legacy utilities, which control most of the generation, sell relatively little power into that market. This limits the supply and increases the cost of electricity that new retailers can sell to consumers. While the liquidity of the wholesale electricity market has increased in recent years, new entrants — including American companies — report that they have few other options for cost-effectively securing the electricity they need to meet their supply obligations. In addition, as the large power utilities still control transmission and distribution lines, new entrants in power generation are not able to compete due to limited access to power grids.

More information on the power sector from the Japanese Government can be obtained at: http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/electricity_and_gas/electric/electricity_liberalization/what/ 

There are three key capital market institutions: the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), and the Securities Depository Center (SDC). The ASE launched an Internet Trading Service in 2010, providing an opportunity for investors to engage in securities trading independent of geographic location.

Jordan’s stock market is one of the most open among its regional competitors, with no cap on foreign ownership.  As of end of February 2022, non-Jordanian ownership in companies listed on the ASE represented 48.3 percent of the total market value. The foreign ownership includes governments, institutional investors, and individuals. Non-Jordanian ownership in the financial sector was 52.2 percent, 21.5 percent in the services sector and 53.7 percent in the industrial sector.

Despite recent reforms and technological advances, the ASE suffers from intermittent liquidity problems and low trading activity. No new listings have been added since 2008. Market capitalization at end of 2021 reached $21.8 billion, up by almost 20 percent from 2020 levels.

The government respects IMF Article VIII by refraining from restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

Credit is allocated on market terms. The private sector has access to a limited variety of credit instruments relative to countries with more developed capital markets.

Jordan has 24 banks, including commercial banks, Islamic banks, and foreign bank branches.  Jordan does not distinguish between investment banks and commercial banks.  Concentration in the banking sector has decreased over the past decade, the assets of the largest five banks accounted for 50.3 percent of licensed banks’ total assets at the end of 2020.  The banking system is capably supervised by the CBJ, which publishes an annual Financial Stability Report. JFSR2020 Final 28-11-2021.pdf (cbj.gov.jo)

Banks continue to be profitable and well-capitalized with deposits being the primary funding base.  Liquidity and capital adequacy indicators remain strong largely due to the banks’ conservative and risk averse approach, and due to strict regulations on lending, particularly mortgage lending.  The non-performing loan ratio reached 5.45 percent at the end of 2020. The rate of non-performing loans is expected to increase in 2022 as the CBJ rescinded in December 2021 measures to defer loan payments for pandemic-affected businesses.

Jordan has historically had low banking penetration, which the CBJ has worked to improve through its 2018 Financial Inclusion Strategy. As of end of 2020, 50 percent of people and 29 percent of women in Jordan above the age of 15 had bank accounts.

Banking Law No. 28 of 2000 does not discriminate between local and foreign banks, however capital requirements differ. The minimum capital requirements for foreign banks are JD 50 million ($70.6 million), and JD 100 million ($141 million) for local banks, although the CBJ has the authority to amend and increase the minimum capital requirement.  The law also protects depositors’ interests, diminishes money market risk, guards against the concentration of lending, and includes articles on electronic banking practices and anti-money laundering. The CBJ set up an independent Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) in 2000 that insures deposits up to JOD 50,000 ($71,000). The DIC also acts as the liquidator of banks as directed by the CBJ.

Foreigners are allowed to open bank accounts with a valid passport and a Jordanian residence permit.

In January 2017, the CBJ established the Jordan Payments and Clearing Company, with an aim to establish and develop digital retail and micro payments along with the investment in innovative technology and digital financial services.  The CBJ actively supports technology and is running JoMoPay, a mobile payment system and provides regulatory support to a privately-operated electronic bill payment service eFAWATEER.com.

In October 2021, The Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) started a process soliciting comments from local banks over the potential introduction and licensing of digital banks, which aims to automate all front-end, back-end and middle-end operations. The CBJ is also exploring the possibility of launching the central bank digital currency (CBDC) would be linked to the Jordanian dinar and have legal standing. Full adoption and implementation could take five years.

Jordan does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

Jordan has twenty-two SOEs of different sizes and mandates that are fully owned by the government.  Wholly-owned SOEs employ around 11,000 people and have assets exceeding $8 billion. The government has more than 50 percent ownership in six companies, employing around 4,000 individuals, with total assets of $1.3 billion.

Most SOEs are small in terms of operations, assets, number of employees, and income. The largest SOEs are: National Electrical Power Company (NEPCO), Samra Electric Power Company, the Yarmouk Water Company, and Aqaba Development Corporation (ADC).

On average, since 2010, the private sector has maintained its share in the Jordanian economy’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The proportion remains around the 84% to 86% of GDP.  SOEs in Jordan exercise delegated governmental powers and operate in fields not yet open for private investment, such as managing the transmission and distribution of electrical power and water.  Other SOE activities include logistics, mining, storage and inventory management of strategic products, and some economic development activities such as Aqaba Port Company, Jordan National Petroleum Company, and Jordan Silos and Supply General Company.  The government supports these companies as necessary, for example, the government has issued and guaranteed Treasury bonds for NEPCO since 2011 to ensure continuous power supply for the country.

SOEs generally compete on equal terms with private enterprises with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations.  The law does not provide preferential treatment to SOEs, and they are held accountable by their Board of Directors, typically chaired by the sector-relevant Minister and the Audit Bureau.

Jordan is not a party to the World Trade Agreement (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement.

In year 2012, Jordan completed a multi-year privatization program, in the telecom, energy, and transportation sectors. There government has no further plans for additional privatizations.

In year 2020, Jordan adopted a new Public Private Partnership Law (PPP) to support the government’s commitment to broadening the utilization of public-private sector partnerships (PPPs) and encouraging the private sector to play a larger role in the economy.  The law does not limit PPPs to certain sectors or nationalities.

A PPP unit housed at the Ministry of Investment supports the government in identifying and prioritizing projects, provides funding resources to cover pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, and oversees tendering processes. The PPP unit interacts with private sector and potential investors through promotional activities, market sounding exercises, and to discuss proposals. Communication during the bidding phase is strictly governed by the PPPs bylaw in line with international best practices.

Once a contract is awarded, line ministries or entities will take over as main POCs for projects and their implementation. The PPP Higher Council will handle investors’ grievances throughout the project’s lifecycle. The unit has already identified a list of potential PPP projects in several sectors: water, energy, transport, tourism, education, health, environment, and ICT. PPPs related regulations and current investment opportunities are listed on the Ministry of Investment website (In Arabic) مشاريع الشراكة بين القطاع العام و الخاص – وزارة الاستثمار الاردنية (moin.gov.jo) 

Capital markets remain underdeveloped and illiquid, with small equity and debt markets dominated by SOEs and lacking in retail investors. Most domestic borrowers obtain credit from Kazakhstani banks, although foreign investors often find interest rates and collateral requirements onerous, and it is often cheaper and easier for foreign investors to use retained earnings or borrow from their home country. The government actively seeks to attract portfolio investment. Foreign clients may only trade via local brokerage companies or after registering at KASE or at the AIFC.

KASE, with 233 listed companies, trades a variety of instruments, including equities and funds, corporate bonds, sovereign debt, international development institutions’ debt, foreign currencies, repurchase agreements (REPO), and derivatives. KASE launched a new global platform on November 15, which currently trades over 40 U.S. securities listed on NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange.

The AIFC has its own stock exchange (AIX), that has partnered with the Shanghai Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, Goldman Sachs International, the Silk Road Fund, and others.  AIX currently has 134 listings in its Official List, including 99 traded on its platform.

Kazakhstan is bound by Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement which prohibits government restrictions on currency conversions or the repatriation of investment profits. Money transfers associated with foreign investments are unrestricted; however, Kazakhstan’s currency legislation requires that a currency contract must be presented to the servicing bank if the transfer exceeds $10,000. Money transfers over $50,000 require the servicing bank to notify the transaction to the authorities.

President Tokayev signed a decree banning the export of foreign currency cash exceeding $10,000 or its equivalent starting March 14.

Kazakhstan had 22 commercial banks as of January 1. The five largest banks (Halyk, Sberbank-Kazakhstan, Kaspi, Otbasy, and First Heartland Jusan) held assets of approximately $57.6 billion, accounting for 66.1 percent of the total banking sector.

The banking system has been impaired by legacy non-performing loans, poor risk management, weak corporate governance practices, and significant related-party exposures.  The GOK has undertaken measures to strengthen the sector, including capital injections, enhanced oversight, and expanded regulatory authorities. As of January, the ratio of non-performing loans to banking assets was 3.4 percent, down from 8.6 percent in April 2019, while the number of commercial banks decreased to 22 from 28 in April 2019 as a result of mergers and liquidation of financially struggling entities.

The United States and other countries have imposed sanctions on multiple Russian financial institutions, some of which have subsidiaries in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan has a central bank system led by the NBK and the Agency for Regulation and Development of the Financial Market (ARDFM). ARDFM is the main financial regulator overseeing banks, insurance companies, the stock market, microcredit organizations, debt collection agencies, and credit bureaus, while the NBK performs core central bank functions, as well as management of the country’s sovereign wealth fund and pension system assets. The NBK and ARDFM are committed to the incremental introduction of the Basel III regulatory standard. Kazakhstan allows foreign banks to operate in the country via branches.  Foreigners may open bank accounts in local banks if they have a local tax registration number.

The National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan was established to support the country’s social and economic development, as well as to reduce the country’s dependence on the oil sector and external shocks. The National Fund’s assets are generated from direct taxes and other payments from oil companies, public property privatization, sale of public farmlands, and investment income. As of January 1, the National Fund’s assets were $55.3 billion or around 30 percent of GDP.  The government receives regular transfers from the National Fund for general state budget support, as well as special purpose transfers ordered by the President. The National Fund is required to retain a minimum balance of no less than 30 percent of GDP.

Kazakhstan is not a member of the IMF-hosted International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds.

According to the National Statistical Bureau, as of January 1, there are 25,201 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 617 enterprises where the state has some stake, including all types of enterprises, from small veterinary inspection offices, kindergartens, and regional hospitals, to airlines, mining companies, and the national oil and gas company.  A full list of SOEs is available at: https://gr5.gosreestr.kz/p/en/gr-search/search-objects .

SOEs play a leading role in the country’s economy.  According to the 2017 OECD Investment Policy Review, SOE assets amount to $48-64 billion, approximately 30-40 percent of GDP; net income was approximately $2 billion.  In January, President Tokayev enabled the Agency for Development and Protection of Competition to endorse the creation of new state-owned enterprises and to review enlargement of existing ones. Parastatal companies benefit from greater access to subsidies and other government support.

The National Welfare Fund Samruk-Kazyna (SK) is the largest national holding company, managing key SOEs in the oil and gas, energy, mining, transportation, and communication sectors.  The IMF reports that, as of 2019, SK held assets equivalent to 38 percent of GDP and generated revenues of 15 percent of GDP, which was equivalent to three-quarters of total government revenue.  In 2020, SK reported $54 billion in assets and $1.4 billion in consolidated net profit.

Political influence continues to dominate SK.  SK has special rights to conclude large transactions among members of its holdings without public notification, a pre-emptive right to buy strategic facilities and assets and is exempt from government procurement procedures. More information is available at http://sk.kz/.  

Two other major SOEs are the national managing holding company Baiterek and national information holding company Zerde. More information about both companies is available on their web-sites: https://www.baiterek.gov.kz/en  and http://zerde.gov.kz/.  

Officially, private enterprises compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions.  In some cases, SOEs enjoy better access to natural resources, credit, and licenses than private entities.

The government enacted a new comprehensive privatization program in 2020. More information is available at: https://privatization.gosreestr.kz/ .

As of March 31, the government has sold 938 organizations for $1.7 billion out of 1,747 organizations subject to privatization. The government sells small, state owned and municipal enterprises through electronic auctions. Foreign investors may participate in privatization projects.  However, they may experience challenges in navigating the process.

Though relatively small by Western standards, Kenya’s capital markets are the deepest and most sophisticated in East Africa.  The 2021 Morgan Stanley Capital International Emerging and Frontier Markets Index, which assesses equity opportunity in 27 emerging economies, ranked the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) as the best performing exchange in sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade.  The NSE operates under the jurisdiction of the Capital Markets Authority of Kenya.  It is a full member of the World Federation of Exchanges, a founding member of the African Securities Exchanges Association (ASEA) and the East African Securities Exchanges Association (EASEA).  The NSE is a member of the Association of Futures Markets and is a partner exchange in the United Nations-led Sustainable Stock Exchanges initiative.  Reflecting international confidence in the NSE, it has always had significant foreign investor participation.  In July 2019, the NSE launched a derivatives market that facilitates trading in future contracts on the Kenyan market.  The bond market is underdeveloped and dominated by trading in government debt securities.  The government’s domestic debt market, however, is deep and liquid.  Long-term corporate bond issuances are uncommon, limiting long-term investment capital.

In November 2019, Kenya repealed the interest rate capping law passed in 2016, which had slowed private sector credit growth.  There are no restrictions on foreign investors seeking credit in the domestic financial market.  Kenya’s legal, regulatory, and accounting systems generally align with international norms.  In 2017, the Kenya National Treasury launched the world’s first mobile phone-based retail government bond, locally dubbed M-Akiba.  M-Akiba has generated over 500,000 accounts for the Central Depository and Settlement Corporation, and The National Treasury has made initial dividend payments to bond holders.

The African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (AVCA) 2014-2019 report on venture capital performance in Africa ranked Kenya as having the second most developed venture capitalist ecosystem in sub-Saharan Africa.  The report also noted that over 20 percent of the venture capital deals in Kenya, from 2014-2019, were initiated by companies headquartered outside Africa.

The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) is working with regulators in EAC member states through the Capital Market Development Committee (CMDC) and East African Securities Regulatory Authorities (EASRA) on a regional integration initiative and has successfully introduced cross-listing of equity shares.  The combined use of both the Central Depository and Settlement Corporation (CDSC) and an automated trading system has aligned the Kenyan securities market with globally accepted standards.  Kenya is a full (ordinary) member of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Money and Banking System.

Kenya has accepted the International Monetary Fund’s Article VIII obligation and does not provide restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions.

In 2021, the Kenyan banking sector included 42 commercial banks, one mortgage finance company, 14 microfinance banks, nine representative offices of foreign banks, eight non-operating bank holdings, 69 foreign exchange bureaus, 19 money remittance providers, and three credit reference bureaus, which are licensed and regulated by the CBK.  Fifteen of Kenya’s commercial banks are foreign owned.  Major international banks operating in Kenya include Citibank, Absa Bank (formerly Barclays Bank Africa), Bank of India, Standard Bank, and Standard Chartered.  The 12 commercial banks listed banks on the Nairobi Securities Exchange owned 89 percent of the country’s banking assets in 2019.

The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly affected Kenya’s banking sector.  According to the CBK, in 2020, 32 out of 41 commercial banks restructured loans to accommodate affected borrowers.  Non-performing loans (NPLs) reached 14.6 percent by the end of 2021 – a three percent year-on-year increase.

In March 2017, following the collapse of Imperial Bank and Dubai Bank, the CBK lifted its 2015 moratorium on licensing new banks.  The CBK’s decision to restart licensing signaled a return of stability in the Kenyan banking sector.  In 2018, Societé Generale (France) also set up a representative office in Nairobi.  Foreign banks can apply for license to set up operations in Kenya and are guided by the CBK’s 2013 Prudential Guidelines.

In November 2019, the GOK repealed the interest rate capping law through an amendment to the Banking Act.  This amendment has enabled financial institutions to use market-based pricing for their credit products.  While this change has slightly increased the cost of borrowing for some clients, it effectively ensures the private sector uninterrupted access to credit.

The percentage of Kenya’s total population with access to financial services through conventional or mobile banking platforms is approximately 80 percent.  According to the World Bank, M-Pesa, Kenya’s largest mobile banking platform, processes more transactions within Kenya each year than Western Union does globally.  The 2017 National ICT Masterplan envisages the sector contributing at least 10 percent of GDP, up from 4.7 percent in 2015.  Several mobile money platforms have achieved international interoperability, allowing the Kenyan diaspora to conduct financial transactions in Kenya from abroad.

In 2019, the National Treasury published the Kenya Sovereign Wealth Fund policy and the draft Kenya Sovereign Wealth Fund Bill (2019), both of which remain pending.  The fund would receive income from any future privatization proceeds, dividends from state corporations, oil and gas, and minerals revenues due to the national government, revenue from other natural resources, and funds from any other source.  The Kenya Information and Communications Act (2009) provides for the establishment of a Universal Service Fund (USF).  The purpose of the USF is to fund national projects that have significant impact on the availability and accessibility of ICT services in rural, remote, and poor urban areas.

In 2013, the Presidential Task Force on Parastatal Reforms (PTFPR) published a list of all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and recommended proposals to reduce the number of State Corporations from 262 to 187 to eliminate redundant functions between parastatals; close or dispose of non-performing organizations; consolidate functions wherever possible; and reduce the workforce — however, progress is slow (https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BytnSZLruS3GQmxHc1VtZkhVVW8/edit).  SOEs’ boards are independently appointed and published in Kenya Gazette notices by the Cabinet Secretary of the ministry responsible for the respective SOE.  The State Corporations Act (2015) mandated the State Corporations Advisory Committee to advise the GOK on matters related to SOEs.  Despite being public entities, only SOEs listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange publish their financial positions, as required by Capital Markets Authority guidelines.  SOEs’ corporate governance is guided by the constitution’s chapter 6 on Leadership and Integrity, the Leadership and Integrity Act (2012) (L&I) and the Public Officer Ethics Act (2003), which establish integrity and ethics requirements governing the conduct of public officials.

In general, competitive equality is the standard applied to private enterprises in competition with public enterprises.  Certain parastatals, however, have enjoyed preferential access to markets. Examples include Kenya Reinsurance, which enjoys a guaranteed market share; Kenya Seed Company, which has fewer marketing barriers than its foreign competitors; and the National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK), which benefits from retail market outlets developed with government funds.  Some state corporations have also benefited from easier access to government guarantees, subsidies, or credit at favorable interest rates.  In addition, “partial listings” on the Nairobi Securities Exchange offer parastatals the benefit of accessing equity financing and GOK loans (or guarantees) without being completely privatized.

In August 2020, the executive reorganized the management of SOEs in the cargo transportation sector and mandated the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) to oversee rail, pipeline and port operations through a holding company called Kenya Transport and Logistics Network (KTLN).  ICDC assumes a coordinating role over the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC), and Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC).  KTLN focuses on lowering the cost of doing business in the country through the provision of cost effective and efficient transportation and logistics infrastructure.

SOE procurement from the private sector is guided by the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (2015) and the published Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Regulations (2020) which introduced exemptions from the Act for procurement on bilateral or multilateral basis, commonly referred to as government-to-government procurement; introduced E-procurement procedures; and preferences and reservations, which gives preferences to the “Buy Kenya Build Kenya” strategy (http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/LegalNotices/2020/LN69_2020.pdf).

Kenya is neither party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) nor an Observer Government.

The Privatization Act (2003) establishes the Privatization Commission (PC) that is mandated to formulate, manage, and implement Kenya’s Privatization Program.  GOK has been committed to implementing a comprehensive public enterprises reform program to increase private sector participation in the economy.  The privatization commission (https://www.pc.go.ke/) is fully constituted with a board responsible for the privatization program.  The PC has 26 approved privatization programs (https://www.pc.go.ke/sites/default/files/2019-06/APPROVED%20PRIVATIZATION%20PROGRAMME.pdf ).  In 2020, the GOK began the process of privatizing some state-owned sugar firms through a public bidding process, including foreign investors.

Kosovo has an open-market economy, and the market determines interest rates. Individual banks conduct risk analysis and determine credit allocation. Foreign and domestic investors can get credit on the local market. Access to credit for the private sector and financial products are limited but gradually improving.

The country generally has a positive attitude towards foreign portfolio investment. Kosovo does not have a stock exchange. The regulatory system conforms with EU directives and international standards. There are no restrictions beyond normal regulatory requirements related to capital sourcing, fit, and properness of the investors. The Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK) has taken all required measures to improve policies for the free flow of financial resources. Requirements under the SAA with the EU oblige the free flow of capital. The government respects the IMF’s Article VIII conditions on the flow of capital.

In early 2006, Kosovo created a credit registry managed by the Central Bank of Kosovo. It serves as a database for customers’ credit history and aims to help commercial banks and non-banking institutions assess customers’ credit worthiness. Banks and non-banking institutions are required to report to the Credit Registry of Kosovo, but only authorized banking and non-banking institution personnel can access it. In addition to the Credit Registry of Kosovo, the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade offers a Pledge Registry Sector, a mechanism that records data for collateral pledges.

Kosovo has 11 commercial banks (of which nine are foreign) and 30 micro-finance institutions (of which 13 are foreign). The official currency of Kosovo is the Euro, although the country is not a member of the Eurozone. In the absence of an independent monetary policy, prices are highly responsive to market trends in the larger Eurozone.

Kosovo’s private banking sector remains stable, well capitalized, and profitable despite the COVID-19 pandemic’s negative economic shock to the economy. Difficult economic conditions, weak contract enforcement, and a risk-averse posture have traditionally limited banks’ lending activities. However, financial services and bank lending have steadily improved over the years, albeit from a low baseline. In March 2022, the rate of non-performing loans was 2.3 percent, which stands slightly lower than the pre-pandemic February 2020 rate of 2.5 percent. The concentration of the three largest banks’ assets have decreased slightly to 53 percent in March 2022 compared to 56.2 percent in March 2021. The assets of the entire banking sector total 5.9 billion euros; foreign-owned banks have 85.6 percent of the market share. Relatively little lending is directed toward long-term investment activities, although this trend has been changing slowly. Interest rates have dropped significantly in the past decade, from an average of about 12.7 percent in 2012 to an average of 5.7 percent in March 2022. Slower lending is notable in the northern part of Kosovo due to a weak judiciary, informal business activities, and fewer qualified borrowers.

The Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK) is an independent government body responsible for fostering the development of competitive, sound, and transparent practices in the banking and financial sectors. It supervises and regulates Kosovo’s banking sector, insurance industry, pension funds, and micro-finance institutions. The CBK also performs other standard central bank tasks, including cash management, transfers, clearing, management of funds deposited by the Ministry of Finance, Labor and Transfers and other public institutions, collection of financial data, and management of a credit register. Although the financial sector remains stable, a prolonged period without a governing board and allegations of mismanagement have caused concern over CBK’s institutional development.

Foreign banks and branches can establish operations in the country. They are subject to the same licensing requirements and regulations as local banks. The country has not lost any correspondent banking relationships in the past three years and no such relationship is currently in jeopardy. There are no restrictions on foreigners opening bank accounts; they can do so upon submission of valid identification documentation.

Kosovo is a signatory country to the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), aimed at addressing tax evasion by U.S. citizens or permanent residents with foreign bank accounts. For more information, visit the FATCA website: https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-FATCA .

Kosovo does not have any sovereign wealth funds.

Kosovo has 63 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 44 of which are municipality managed. These enterprises are typically utilities, such as water treatment and supply, waste management, energy generation and transmission, but also include SOEs involved in telecommunications, mining, and transportation. SOEs are generally governed by government-appointed boards. The Ministry of Economy monitors SOE operations with a light hand.

Private companies can compete with SOEs in terms of market share and other incentives in relevant sectors. State-owned enterprises are subject to the same tax laws as private companies. There are no state-owned banks, development banks, or sovereign funds in Kosovo.

The majority of Kosovo’s SOEs are either regulated or operate in the free market but incur losses and depend on government subsidies for their survival. SOEs do not receive a larger percentage of government contracts in sectors that are open to foreign competition. However, the government interprets procurement law in a way that considers SOEs to be public authorities and prevents contracting authorities from procuring goods from other sources if SOEs offer such goods and/or services. SOEs purchase goods and services from the private sector, including international firms.

The privatization process has essentially slowed to a halt. Kosovo had been progressively privatizing SOE assets since the early 2000s, but there are few assets left to privatize, and the current governing coalition has traditionally opposed the privatization process. The Privatization Agency of Kosovo (PAK), an independent agency, is still responsible for the disposition of Kosovo’s SOE assets. The Government of Kosovo is currently working on a concept note for the establishment of a Sovereign Fund. As currently written, the Kosovo Government plans to transfer some of the most valuable assets currently under PAK authority to the Sovereign Fund. For those assets put on sale, the privatization process is open to foreign investors. PAK provides a live feed of bidding day procedures on its website ( http://www.pak-ks.org/ ). The website also includes bidding information, the results of sales, and other information.

Foreign financial investment firms operating in Kuwait characterize the government’s attitude toward foreign portfolio investment as welcoming.  An effective regulatory system exists to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment. Existing policies and infrastructure facilitate the free flow of financial resources into the capital market.  Government bodies comply with guidelines outlined by IMF Article VIII and refrain from restricting payments and transfers on current international transactions. In November 2015, the Capital Markets Authority issued a regulation covering portfolio management, but it does not apply to foreign investors.

The privatized stock exchange, named the Boursa, currently lists 166 companies.  In February 2019, a consortium led by Kuwait National Investment Company that included the Athens Stock Exchange won a tender to acquire 44 percent of the Kuwaiti Boursa.  In December 2019, the Capital Markets Authority sold its 50 percent stake in the Kuwaiti Boursa as part of an Initial Public Offering. The offering was oversubscribed by more than 8.5 times. Kuwait’s Public Institution for Social Security owns the remaining six percent of shares. The Boursa is the only stock exchange owned by the private sector in the Middle East.

FTSE Russell upgraded the status of the Boursa to Secondary Emerging Market in 2017. On December 1, 2020, Boursa Kuwait completed the Kuwaiti capital market’s inclusion into the MSCI Emerging Markets Indexes with the successful implementation of the first tranche of index inclusion.

While the debt market is not well developed, local banks have the capacity to meet domestic demand.  Credit is allocated on market terms. Foreign investors can obtain local credit on terms that correspond to collateral provided and intended use of financing.  The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. The Central Bank restricts commercial banks’ use of structured and complex derivatives but permits routine hedging and trading for non-speculative purposes.  In March 2017, the government issued USD 8 billion in five- and ten-year notes but was unable to secure approval from the National Assembly for issuance of 30-year notes.

The Central Bank of Kuwait reported that banking sector assets totaled USD 251 billion in September 2021, an increase by 0.6 percent.

Twenty-two banks operate in Kuwait: five conventional local banks, five Islamic banks, 11 foreign banks, and one specialized bank.  Conventional banks include National Bank of Kuwait, Commercial Bank of Kuwait, Gulf Bank, Al-Ahli Bank of Kuwait, and Burgan Bank. Sharia-compliant banks include Kuwait Finance House, which is the second largest bank in Kuwait, Boubyan Bank, Kuwait International Bank, Al-Ahli United Bank, and Warba Bank.  Foreign banks include BNP Paribas, HSBC, Citibank, Qatar National Bank, Doha Bank, Dubai-based Mashreq Bank, the Bank of Muscat, Riyadh-based Al Rajhi Bank (the largest Sharia-compliant bank in the world), the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait (BBK), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and Union National Bank.  The government-owned Industrial Bank of Kuwait provides medium- and long-term financing to industrial companies and Kuwaiti citizens through customized financing packages. In December 2018, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry began permitting more than 49 percent foreign ownership in local banks with the approval of the Central Bank of Kuwait.

Following the global financial crisis in 2008 when large losses reduced confidence in the local banking sector, the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly passed legislation to guarantee deposits at local banks to rebuild confidence.

Foreign banks can offer retail services.  In 2013, the Central Bank announced that foreign banks could open multiple branches on a case-by-case basis.  In 2017, the Al-Rajhi Bank opened its second branch. Qatar National Bank received CBK’s approval in 2014 and opened its second branch in 2018.  Kuwaiti law restricts foreign banks from offering investment banking services. Foreign banks are subject to a maximum credit concentration equivalent to less than half the limit of the largest local bank and are prohibited from directing clients to borrow from external branches of their bank.  Foreign banks may also open representative offices.

The Central Bank of Kuwait announced initial guidelines for digital banking in early 2022. Concurrently, they opened applications for licensing for digital banking and will remain open until June 30, 2022. It is expected many of the existing large banks will apply for a digital license—further crowding the sector.

The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) manages the Kuwait General Reserve Fund and the Kuwait Fund for Future Generations.  By law, ten percent of oil revenues can be deposited each annually into the Fund for Future Generations in year of budget surplus. Despite rising oil prices, a surplus has not been formally announced and thus the ten percent policy has not been reinstated as of March 2022. KIA management reports to a Board of Directors appointed by the Council of Ministers.  The Minister of Finance chairs the board; other members include the Minister of Oil, the Central Bank Governor, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance, and five representatives from Kuwait’s private sector (three of whom must not hold any other public office).  An internal audit office reports directly to the Board of Directors and an external auditor. This information is provided to the State Audit Bureau, which audits KIA continuously and reports annually to the National Assembly.

The 1982 law establishing the KIA prohibits the public disclosure of the size of sovereign wealth holdings and asset allocations.  KIA conducts closed-door presentations for the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly on the full details of all funds under its management, including its strategic asset allocation, benchmarks, and rates of return.  The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute estimated that KIA manages one of the world’s largest sovereign funds with more than USD 670 billion in assets as of March 2021.

Economic stress and budget deficits since 2016 due to diminishing oil revenues and, as of March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had led to the near depletion of the General Reserve Fund. Authorization to issue debt has stalled in the National Assembly.

The energy sector is dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as law precludes private participation in most sector activities.  Outside the energy sector, Kuwait has few fully SOEs. One notable exception is Kuwait Airways.  No published list of SOEs exists. The government owns shares in various Kuwaiti companies through the Fund for Future Generations managed by the KIA or the Social Security Fund managed by Kuwait’s Public Institution for Social Security.  SOEs are permitted to control their own budgets.

The National Assembly has passed several privatization laws since 2008. The Supreme Council for Privatization was established under a Privatization Law to increase the role of the private sector in Kuwait’s national economy. The council is chaired by the prime minister and consists of five ministers and three experts from different sectors.

The Privatization Law was developed to address all the major issues related to privatization, especially the processes of transferring public projects into joint stock companies, protecting the rights of national manpower, and controlling prices and the controls which govern revenues arising from the privatization process. The Supreme Council and then the Council of Ministers must approve any privatization initiative.

Kuwaiti employees have the right to retain their jobs in a privatized company for at least five years with the same salary and benefits.  Privatized shares of any public company must be offered as follows:

• 40 percent of shares reserved for Kuwaiti citizens;
• 20 percent of shares retained by the government;
• five percent of shares distributed to Kuwaiti employees, both former and current; and
• the remaining 35 percent of shares sold at auction to a local or foreign investor.

Telecommunications is the largest service sector in Kuwait.  The Ministry of Communications owns and operates landlines and owns a fiber optic network.  Internet providers may access both landlines and fiber optic networks. Three private mobile telephone companies provide cellular telephone and data services to the country.  The government owns a significant minority interest in each, but foreign companies own majority interests in two of them. In 2014, the National Assembly passed legislation creating the independent Communication and Information Technology Regulatory Authority (CITRA), in part to prepare for the liberalization of mobile communications and Internet markets.  Officially opened in 2016, CITRA serves as the primary national telecom regulator and cybersecurity agency. In March 2022, Kuwait announced the creation of a cybersecurity center that will eventually assume CITRA’s cybersecurity role, although details have not yet been finalized. CITRA also has a mandate to attract high-tech investment.

The Kyrgyz government is generally open toward foreign portfolio investment, though experts from international financial institutions (IFIs) have noted that capital markets in the Kyrgyz Republic remain underdeveloped. The economy of the Kyrgyz Republic is primarily cash-based, although non-cash consumer transactions, such as debit cards and transaction machines, are increasing every year. The number of bank payment cards in use increased by 2 times and e-wallets 3 times in the last five years.  In January 2022, Moody’s downgraded the Kyrgyz Republic’s sovereign credit rating to B3, and dropped its outlook from stable to negative, citing weak institutions and governance. The government debt market is small and limited to short maturities, though Kyrgyz bonds are available for foreign ownership.  Broadly, credit is allocated on market terms, but experts have noted that the subsidized credit from the Russian-Kyrgyz Development Fund subsidized has led to market distortions. Bank loans remain the primary source of private sector credit, and local portfolio investors often highlight the need to develop additional financial instruments in the Kyrgyz Republic. There are two stock exchanges in the Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyz Stock Exchange and Stock Exchange of the Kyrgyz Republic), but all transactions are conducted through the Kyrgyz Stock Exchange.  In 2021, the total value of transactions amounted to 9.7 billion Kyrgyz som (approximately USD 115 million).  The small market lacks sufficient liquidity to enter and exit sizeable positions. Since 1995, the Kyrgyz Republic has accepted IMF Article VIII obligations. Foreign investors are able to acquire loans on the local market if the business is operating on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic and collateral meets the requirements of local banks. The average interest rate for loans in USD is 7-15 percent.

USAID has assisted small and medium enterprises (SME) through locally registered private equity funds to develop equity and mezzanine financing, which have invested $14.3 million into local SMEs in the past 2 years.

The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR) is a nominally independent body whose mandate is to achieve and maintain price stability through monetary policy. The Bank is also tasked with maintaining the safety and reliability of the banking and payment systems. The NBKR licenses, regulates, and supervises credit institutions. The penetration level of the banking sector is 49.9 percent

According to the IMF, the Kyrgyz banking system at present remains well capitalized with still sizeable, non-performing loans (NPLs). NPLs increased from 10.5 percent to 11.1 percent in 2021. Net capital adequacy ratio decreased from 24.9 percent to 22.2 percent in 2021. Total assets in the Kyrgyz banking system in 2021 equaled approximately USD 4.2 billion. As of February 2021, the Kyrgyz Republic’s three largest banks by total assets were Optima Bank (approximately USD 846 million), Aiyl Bank (approximately USD 476 million), and Kyrgyz Investment and Credit Bank (KICB; approximately USD 475 million).

There are currently 23 commercial banks in the Kyrgyz Republic, with 312 operating branches throughout the country; the five largest banks comprise more than 50 percent of the total market. No U.S. bank operates in the Kyrgyz Republic and Kyrgyz banks do not maintain correspondent accounts from U.S. financial institutions, following widespread de-risking in 2018. There are ten foreign banks operating in the Kyrgyz Republic: Demir Bank, National Bank of Pakistan, Halyk Bank, Optima Bank, Finca Bank, Bai-Tushum Bank, Amanbank, Kyrgyz-Swiss Bank, Chang An Bank, and Kompanion Bank are entirely foreign held. Other banks are partially foreign held, including KICB and BTA Bank. KICB has multinational organizations as shareholders including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Economic Finance Corporation, the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development, and others.

The micro-finance sector in the Kyrgyz Republic is robust, representing nearly 10 percent the market size of the banking sector. Trade accounted for 28 percent of the total loan portfolio of the banking sector, followed by agriculture (18 percent) and consumer loans (12 percent). The microfinance sector in the Kyrgyz Republic is rapidly growing, with total assets of microfinance companies growing by 17 percent in 2021 compared to 2020. The three largest microfinance companies (Bai-Tushum, FINCA, and Kompanion) have transformed into banks with full banking licenses.

The Kyrgyz Republic has no official Sovereign Wealth Fund, though previously an informal sovereign fund originated from proceeds of the Kumtor gold mine and was comprised of shares in the parent company of the gold mine operator, Centerra Gold.

There are approximately 94 SOEs in the Kyrgyz Republic that play a significant role in the local economy. According to 2021 data, 65 of the 94 SOEs were not profitable.  Still, SOE income managed to double only for the first nine months of 2021 to $76.4 million dollars. The State Property Management Fund of the Kyrgyz Republic (www.fgi.gov/kg) is the public executive authority representing the interests of the state. The purpose of the Fund is to ensure the efficiency of the use, management, and privatization of state property. Information on allocations to and earnings from SOEs is included in budget execution reports and is published (in Russian) by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (www.minfin.kg).

Information on SOE assets, earnings, profitability, working capital, and other financial indicators is available on the State Property Management Fund’s website (http://finance.page.kg/index.php?act=svod_profit), though the website is not actively maintained. The State Property Management Fund also reviews the budgets for the largest SOEs, while the Accounting Chamber reviews the accounts of all SOEs and publishes audit reports on their website (www.esep.kg).

The Kyrgyz Republic does not fully adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs.  Cronyism and corruption within SOEs are a major obstacle to the Kyrgyz Republic’s economic development. The Heritage Foundation’s 2017 Index of Economic Freedom report noted, elected officials appoint company board members based on political loyalty rather than professional skills and corporate governance knowledge. Positions on boards of directors are frequently used as rewards for political support, and the dynamic has reinforced the patronage system and resulted in poor economic performance and public service delivery. As of February 2021, the presidential decree on “State Personnel Hiring Policy” authorizes the State Personnel Service to direct all state agencies and SOEs to verify the qualifications of all candidates, including education and professional experience, as the basis for personnel appointments.

The government has attempted to improve transparency on contracts and bidding processes. Due to widespread corruption, there are common complaints that only individual government officials have access to government contracts and bidding processes. SOEs purchase goods and services from the private firms and usually place the calls for bids either on their websites or in public newspapers, as required. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs and are subject to the same tax burden.  In some cases, SOEs have preferential access to land and raw materials.

The Kyrgyz government periodically auctions rights to subsoil usage and broadcasts tender announcements, including disseminating information to diplomatic missions, in order to attract foreign investors. There are no restrictions on foreign investors participating in privatization programs. The privatization process is not well defined and is subject to change. There is ongoing deliberation on the privatization of other state-owned assets, such as the postal service and the capital’s international airport, but lack of interest by private partners has stalled any potential moves.

The Kyrgyz government is no longer actively pursuing sale of its 100 percent stake in Megacom, the country’s largest telecommunications company. In December 2021 the Ministry of Finance announced plans to fully or partially sell 25 SOEs in 2022, including the Eurasian Savings Bank and Bakai Bank, among others.

Foreign investors – both companies and individuals – are generally able to participate in public auctions of state-owned properties unless specifically prohibited in the terms and conditions. There are, however, some land legislation restrictions concerning the property rights of foreigners.  Information about terms and conditions of SOE sales are posted on the State Property Management Fund’s website (www.fgi.gov.kg).

Laos does not have a well-developed capital market, although government policies increasingly support the formation of capital and free flow of financial resources. The Lao Securities Exchange (LSX) began operations in 2011 with two stocks listed, both state-owned – the Banque Pour l’CommerceExterieur (BCEL), and the power generation arm of the electrical utility, Electricite du Laos – Generation (EDL-Gen). In 2012, the Lao government increased the proportion of shares that foreigners can hold on the LSX from 10 to 20 percent. As of March 2021, there are eleven companies listed on the LSX: BCEL, EDL-Gen, Petroleum Trading Laos (fuel stations), Lao World (property development and management), Souvanny Home Center (home goods retail), Phousy Construction and Development (Construction and real estate development), Lao Cement (LCC), Mahathuen Leasing (leasing), Lao Agrotech (palm oil plantation and extraction factory), Vientiane Center (property development and management), and Lao ASEAN Leasing (LALCO) (financing and leasing). News and information about the LSX are available at http://www.lsx.com.la/ .

Businesses report that they are often unable to exchange kip into foreign currencies through central or local banks, particularly at times when the kip is depreciating against international currencies. Analysts suggest that concerns about dollar reserves may have led to temporary problems in the convertibility of the national currency. Private banks allege that the Bank of Lao PDR (BOL) withholds dollar reserves. The Bank of Lao PDR alleges that private banks already hold sizable reserves and have been reluctant to give foreign exchange to their customers to maintain unreasonably high reserves. Lao and foreign companies alike, and especially small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), note the lack of long-term credit in the domestic market. Loans repayable over more than five years are very rare, and the choice of credit instruments in the local market is limited. The Credit Information Bureau, developed to help inject more credit into markets, still has very little information and has not yet succeeded in mitigating lender concerns about risk.

The banking system is under the supervision of the Bank of Lao PDR, the nation’s central bank, and includes 42 banks, most of them commercial. Private foreign banks can establish branches in all provinces of Laos. ATMs have become ubiquitous in urban centers. Technical assistance to Laos’ financial sector has led to some reforms and significant improvements to Laos’ regulatory regime on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, but overall capacity within the financial governance structure remains poor.

The banking system is dominated by large, government-owned banks. The health of the banking sector is difficult to determine given the lack of reliable data, though banks are widely believed to be poorly regulated and there is broad concern about bad debts and non-performing loans that have yet to be fully reconciled by the state-run banks. The IMF and others have encouraged the Bank of Lao PDR to facilitate recapitalization of state-owned banks to improve the resilience of the sector. Several banks operate digital payment services, which has facilitated domestic transactions, but also introduced new digital crime risks.

While publicly available data is difficult to find, non-performing loans are widely believed to be a major concern in the financial sector, fueled in part by years of rapid growth in private lending. The government’s fiscal difficulties in 2013 and 2014 led to non-payment on government infrastructure projects. The construction companies implementing the projects in turn could not pay back loans for capital used in construction. Many analysts believe the full effects of the government’s fiscal difficulties have not yet worked their way through the economy. In 2021, Laos’ fiscal deficit was estimated to decrease by 4.7 percent as a result of lower spending and improved revenue collection. Total public and publicly guaranteed debt were estimated to reach 72 percent of GDP which adds to concerns about Laos’ fiscal outlook and macroeconomic stability.In 2018 Laos passed a new law on Public Debt Management aimed at reducing Laos’ debt-to-GDP ratio but most economic analysts anticipate Laos’s debt-to-GDP ratio will likely increase as the country navigates an economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Foreign Exchange

There are no published, formal restrictions on foreign exchange conversion, though restrictions have previously been reported, and because the market for Lao kip is relatively small, the currency is rarely convertible outside the immediate region. Laos persistently maintains low levels of foreign reserves, which are estimated to cover approximately two months’ worth of total imports. The reserve buffer is expected to remain relatively low due to structurally weak export growth in the non-resource sector and to debt service payments. The decline in reserves was due to a drawdown of government deposits primarily for external debt service payments, some intervention in the foreign exchange market to manage the volatility of the currency and financing the continuing current account deficit. The Bank of the Lao PDR (BOL) occasionally imposes daily limits on converting funds from the Lao kip into U.S. dollars and Thai baht or restricts the sectors able to convert Lao kip into dollars. This can sometimes result in difficulties obtaining foreign exchange in Laos. The BOL issued Notice no.758/MPD in July 2021 to mandate independent exchange bureaus to link with commercial banks in response to the Lao kip’s depreciation against foreign currencies. Such effort reduces the gap between official and gray-market currency rates. However, the Lao kip rapidly depreciated in early 2022 reaching new lows against the dollar and Thai baht.

To facilitate business transactions, foreign investors generally open commercial bank accounts in both local and foreign convertible currency at domestic and foreign banks in Laos. The Enterprise Accounting Law places no limitations on foreign investors transferring after-tax profits, income from technology transfer, initial capital, interest, wages and salaries, or other remittances to the company’s home country or third countries if they request approval from the Lao government. Foreign enterprises must report on their performance annually and submit annual financial statements to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI).

According to a recent report from Laos’ National Institute for Socio-Economic Research (NSER), the increasing demand for USD and Thai baht for the import of capital equipment for projects and consumer goods, coupled with growing demand for foreign currency to pay off foreign debts has resulted in a continued depreciation of the exchange rate in 2022. The official nominal kip/U.S. dollar reference rate depreciated by 13.84 percent year-on-year in February 2022, while the kip/baht exchange rate depreciated by 5.62 percent.

Remittance Policies

There have been no recent changes to remittance law or policy in Laos. Formally, all remittances abroad, transfers into Laos, foreign loans, and payments not denominated in Lao kip must be approved by the BOL. In practice, many remittances are understood to flow into Laos informally, and relatively easily, from a sizeable Lao workforce based in Thailand. Remittance-related rules can be vague and official practice is reportedly inconsistent.

There are no known sovereign wealth funds in Laos.

Latvian government policies do not interfere with the free flow of financial resources or the allocation of credit. Local bank loans are available to foreign investors. The NASDAQ/OMX Riga Stock Exchange (RSE) (www.nasdaqomxbaltic.com ) operates in Latvia, and the securities market is based on the continental European model. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have agreed to create a pan-Baltic capital market by creating a single index classification for the entire Baltic region. Latvia is currently rated by various index providers as a frontier market due to its small size and limited liquidity. https://www.fm.gov.lv/en/article/latvia-passes-ebrd-supported-covered-bond-law 

Latvia’s retail banking sector, which is composed primarily of Scandinavian retail banks, generally maintains a positive reputation. Latvian banks servicing non-resident clients, however, have come under increased scrutiny for inadequate compliance with anti-money laundering standards. In 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) identified Latvia’s third-largest bank as a “foreign bank of primary money laundering concern” and issued a proposed rule prohibiting U.S. banks from doing business with or on behalf of the bank. The Latvian bank regulator has also levied fines against several non-resident banks for AML violations in recent years.

Latvia is a member of the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. On August 23, 2018, MONEYVAL issued a report finding that Latvia’s AML regime was in substantial compliance with only one out of eleven assessment categories, was in moderate compliance with eight areas, but in low compliance with two areas. In late 2019 and early 2020, MONEYVAL and the FATF concluded that Latvia has developed and implemented strong enough reforms for combating financial crimes to avoid increased monitoring via the so-called “grey list.” With this decision, Latvia became the first member state under the MONEYVAL review to successfully implement all 40 FATF recommendations. The most recent MONEYVAL report can be found at: https://rm.coe.int/anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-financing-measures-latvia-/16809988c1 .

According to Latvian banking regulators, Latvia’s regulatory framework for commercial banking incorporates all principal requirements of EU directives, including a unified capital and financial markets regulator. Existing banking legislation includes provisions on accounting and financial statements (including adherence to international accounting), minimum initial capital requirements, capital adequacy requirements, large exposures, restrictions on insider lending, open foreign exchange positions, and loan-loss provisions. An Anti-Money Laundering Law and Deposit Guarantee Law have been adopted. An independent Financial Intelligence unit (FIU) operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. Some of the banking regulations, such as capital adequacy and loan-loss provisions, reportedly exceed EU requirements.

According to the Finance Latvia Association, total assets of the country’s banks at the end of 2021 stood at 25.34 billion euros. More information is available at: https://www.financelatvia.eu/en/industry-data/ .

Securities markets are regulated by the Law on the Consolidated Capital Markets Regulator, the Law on the Financial Instrument Market, and several other laws and regulations.

Latvia does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are active in the energy and mining, aerospace and defense, services, information and communication, automotive and ground transportation, and forestry sectors. Private enterprises may compete with public enterprises on the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations such as licenses and supplies.

The Latvian government has implemented the requirements of the EU’s Third Energy Package with respect to the electricity sector, including opening the electricity market to private power producers and allowing them to compete on an equal footing with Latvenergo, the state-owned power company. The country’s natural gas market has also been liberalized, creating competition among privately owned gas suppliers.

Latvia, as an EU member, is a party to the Government Procurement Agreement within the framework of the World Trade Organization, and SOEs are covered under the agreement.

In 2015, the OECD published a review of the corporate governance of Latvia’s SOE and found that Latvia’s SOE sector relative to the size of the national economy was larger than the OECD average. The full report is available here: http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecd-review-corporate-governance-soe-latvia.htm .

Senior managers of major SOEs in Latvia report to independent boards of directors, which in turn report to line ministries. SOEs operate under the Law on Public Persons Enterprises and Capital Shares Governance. The law also establishes an entity that coordinates state enterprise ownership and requires annual aggregate reporting. Detailed information on Latvian SOEs is available here: http://www.valstskapitals.gov.lv/en/  .

For additional information please see here: http://www.oecd.org/latvia/corporate-governance-in-latvia-9789264268180-en.htm .

The Law on Privatization of State and Municipal Property governs the privatization process in Latvia. State joint stock company “Possessor” (https://www.possessor.gov.lv/ ) uses a case-by-case approach to determine the method of privatization for each state enterprise. The three allowable methods are: public offering, auction for selected bidders, and international tender. For some of the largest privatized companies, a percentage of shares may be sold publicly on the NASDAQ OMX Riga Stock Exchange. The government may maintain shares in companies deemed important to the state’s strategic interests. Privatization of small and medium-sized state enterprises is considered to be largely complete.

Latvian law designates six State Joint Stock Companies that cannot be privatized: Latvenergo (Energy and Mining), Latvijas Pasts (Postal Services), Riga International Airport, Latvijas Dzelzcels (Automotive and Ground Transportation), Latvijas Gaisa Satiksme (Aerospace and Defense), and Latvijas Valsts Mezi (Forestry). Other large companies in which the Latvian government holds a controlling interest include airBaltic (Travel), TET (Information and Communication), Latvian Mobile Telephone (Information and Communication), and Conexus Baltic Grid (Energy). Due to the pandemic, the government invested EUR 250 million into airBaltic equity, thus increasing its stake in the airline to 96.14%. The airline plans to return the investment to the state, via an initial public offering, potentially in 2023-2024.

There are no restrictions on portfolio investment, and foreign investors may invest in Lebanese equities and fixed income certificates.  While legally Lebanon is a free-market economy and does not restrict the movement of capital into or out of the country, the country’s banks have imposed informal capital controls on dollar withdrawals and financial outflows from Lebanon since October 2019. There are de facto restrictions on outbound payments and transfers for current international transactions, but these have yet to be codified into law. Lebanon’s Parliament has debated but never passed, several versions of a capital controls law.

Lebanon’s stock market is the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE). Currently, the BSE lists six commercial banks, four companies including Solidere – one of the largest publicly held companies in the region – and eight sovereign Eurobond issues.  However, the BSE suffers from a lack of liquidity and low trading volumes in the absence of significant institutional and foreign investors. It had an annual trading volume of only 3.3 percent of market capitalization in 2021. Weak market turnover discourages investors from committing funds to the market and discourages issuers from seeking listings on the BSE.  The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) regulates Lebanon’s capital markets. The Governor of Lebanon’s Central Bank oversees the CMA. Politicization of the CMA’s board and frequent vacancies have distracted the CMA from encouraging the development of Lebanon’s capital markets.

The Capital Markets Law calls for the corporatization and subsequent privatization of the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) within a two-year period from the date that the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) is appointed. The Cabinet appointed the CMA in June 2012, and in September 2017 issued a decree to corporatize the BSE. The corporatization has yet to occur.

Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors may obtain credit facilities on the local market.  However, as Lebanon entered its economic crisis in the fall of 2019 and defaulted on its dollar-denominated debt in March 2020, local and international credit is virtually nonexistent. Banks have substantially reduced retail loans, such as housing, consumer, or personal loans, as well as have reduced heavily international limits of credit and debit cards, and maintains commercial loans mainly to agriculture, industrial and trade sectors for SMEs and large corporates.

The Lebanese banking sector covers the entire country with 959 operating commercial and investment bank branches as of September 2021.  There are 5,214 residents per branch in Lebanon (assuming five million inhabitants), which compares favorably to regional and emerging markets.  According to World Bank Development indicators, there are 493 depositors with commercial banks per 1,000 adults, 177 borrowers from commercial banks per 1,000 adults, and 37 ATMs per 100,000 adults.  The total domestic assets of Lebanon’s fifteen largest commercial banks reached approximately US$ 150 billion as of the end of 2021 (about 85.3 percent of total banking assets), according to Central Bank data.

Lebanon’s banks are insolvent. The government announced in February 2022 that it estimated banks accumulated $69 billion in losses and suggested a plan for distributing those losses, primarily through converting USD deposits into local currency. Banks are no longer serving their core functions: making productive loans or allowing those with dollar deposits to withdraw them. Clients cannot transfer money deposited prior to October 2019 overseas. Lebanon has yet to adopt formal capital controls legislation, but most economic analysts believe such a law is necessary to preserve what limited foreign currency is left in the country, provide a legal framework for banks to limit withdrawals, and provide a level playing field to all Lebanese. At the behest of the Central Bank, in April 2020, banks began providing LBP at rates higher than the official pegged rate to customers with dollar-denominated accounts, but less than 60 percent of the market value of USD banknotes. In December 2021, the Central Bank announced new measures to stabilize the local currency, including allowing banks to provide USD banknotes to clients sourced from the Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves. Banks are acting as de facto foreign exchange houses, providing clients with scarce USD banknotes in exchange for LBP at rates slightly below the actual market rate. This intervention has stemmed the local currency’s fall, but most analysts believe it is only a temporary solution.

Lebanon relied on dollar inflows from abroad to finance imports and public spending and to maintain the LBP-to-USD peg, in place since 1997. Those dollars were deposited in Lebanese banks, which in turn lent them to the state in the form of deposits at the Central Bank or Lebanese debt instruments. Nearly 70 percent of bank assets are tied to the sovereign in those two forms. In 2019, as dollar inflows dried up and banking sector assets were tied to long-term deposits at the Central Bank and illiquid debt instruments, banks had trouble meeting their dollar obligations to clients, planting the seeds of the current crisis.

Lebanon’s default on its dollar-denominated debt in March 2020 – Lebanese banks at the time held $12.7 billion in Lebanon’s dollar bonds – further eroded the balance sheets of Lebanese banks. Financial experts estimated that 40 percent of loans from Lebanese banks were non-performing in December 2020. Bankers reported that correspondent banks overseas have stopped providing them with lines of credits – or only provide facilities with onerous conditions because of increasing country risk– further hampering bank efficacy in Lebanon. Correspondent banks remain but likely place high levels of due diligence on banks because of the incomplete implementation of anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards. The government’s February 2022 draft financial sector recovery plan hinted at the conversion of dollar denominated deposits into local currency and a potential “haircut” on dollar deposits, in which wealthy account holders could lose some of their deposits to help recapitalize banks after shareholders “bail-in” (convert their deposits into bank shares) their financial institutions. The government has not implemented that plan, however.

Lebanon’s Central Bank was established in 1963. Lebanon’s Central Bank imposes strict compliance with regulations on banks and financial institutions, and commercial banks, in turn, maintain strict compliance regimes.  However, the United States designated Jammal Trust Bank in August 2019 as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for its role in financing Foreign Terrorist Organization Hizballah. Foreign banks and branches need the Central Bank’s approval to establish operations in Lebanon.  Moreover, any shareholder with more than five percent of a bank’s share capital must obtain prior approval from the Central Bank to acquire additional shares in that bank and must inform the Central Bank when selling shares.  In addition, any shareholder needs to obtain prior approval from the Central Bank if he/she wants to become a board member.  The use of cryptocurrencies is prohibited in Lebanon by the Central Bank.  The Central Bank announced that it is developing a digital currency that it plans to issue for domestic use only.

There are no legal restrictions in Lebanon on a foreigner or non-resident’s ability to open a bank account in local or foreign currency, provided they abide by Lebanese compliance rules and regulations.  Currently, however, most banks are not taking on new clients or new accounts. Banks claim they have stringent inquiry mechanisms to ensure compliance with international and domestic regulations and implement Lebanon’s anti-money laundering and counter-terror finance laws. Banks inform customers of Know-Your-Customer requirements and ask them about the purpose of opening new accounts and about the sources of funds to be deposited. Lebanese banks note they are compliant with the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).  Lebanon adopted the OECD Common Reporting Standards since January 1, 2018.

Foreign Exchange

Commercial banks in late 2019 introduced informal capital controls on Lebanese depositors to stem the outflow of foreign currency; these controls have persisted today, and banks have barred virtually all overseas transfers. Lebanon’s Parliament has debated but never passed, several versions of a capital controls law. In April 2020, Lebanon’s Central Bank required money transfer services such as Western Union and MoneyGram to disburse inbound transfers in local currency, the Central Bank later allowed them to disburse in U.S. dollars in August 2020, ostensibly to attract remittance inflows. In February 2022, the Central Bank allowed money transfer organizations to sell USD at an exchange rate close to the market rate.

As of March 2022, Lebanon had several different exchange rates in use: the official, pegged rate; the actual market rate; the Central Bank’s “Sayrafa” rate; and the rate used by money transfer organizations to convert incoming remittances. Since 1997, the LBP has been pegged to the U.S. dollar at 1,507.5 LBP/1 USD. However, as Lebanese continue to demand scarce dollars in the Lebanese financial system, the currency depreciated on the market, the only source of USD banknotes for most Lebanese. The actual market rate reached a peak of 33,000 LBP/USD in January 2022; as of March 2022, the rate was closer to 23,000 LBP/USD. In December 2021, Lebanon’s Central Bank announced banks could convert LBP into USD – sourced from the Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves – using the Central Bank’s “Sayrafa” platform. This intervention stabilized the local currency temporarily; the “Sayrafa rate” and market rate tracked closely for most of February and March 2022 at 20,000 LBP/USD. However, the Sayrafa platform could not satiate local demand for USD banknotes, and the market rate once again increased from the Sayrafa rate. Money transfer organizations such as Western Union or Money Gram can also convert incoming USD to LBP using a separate rate that is usually higher than the Sayrafa rate but below the market rate.

While capital controls curtailed the ability of those holding dollar-denominated bank accounts in Lebanon to withdraw or transfer their currencies overseas, those in Lebanon with access to “fresh dollars” (i.e., new dollar bills from abroad or not within the local financial system) were able to access, withdraw, and transfer overseas dollars. For the vast majority of Lebanese and businesses in Lebanon, remitting any money overseas, including investment returns, remained nearly impossible. Most economists believe capital controls must continue for the foreseeable future to prevent a bank run and preserve the limited foreign currency remaining in Lebanon, although they prefer formal and legal capital controls passed by Lebanon’s Parliament.

Lebanon does not have a sovereign wealth fund. Lebanon’s Offshore Petroleum Resource Law states that proceeds generated from oil and gas exploration must be deposited in a Sovereign Wealth Fund.  Creating the fund requires a separate law, which the government has yet to adopt.  Lebanon currently receives no proceeds from natural resources that could flow into a sovereign wealth fund.

Through the Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL), the GOKL promotes the development of financial markets in Lesotho. Lesotho’s capital market is relatively underdeveloped, with no secondary market for capital market transactions.  The Maseru Securities Market launched in 2016 under the wing of the CBL listed the first company on its stock exchange. The trading of government bonds; corporate bonds and company shares is strictly electronic— there is no physical building.  For now, bond trading is operated by the Central Bank of Lesotho. For the 2021/22 fiscal year, the government financed a fiscal deficit of approximately USD 326 million through external borrowing.

The government accepted the obligations of IMF Article VIII in 1997 and has removed restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions.  However, the government has put a limit of USD 81,632 for international transactions. Foreign participation in government securities is allowed as long as foreign investors can open accounts with local banks through which funds can be collected.  Lesotho is part of the Common Monetary Area (CMA). The current account has been fully liberalized for all inward and outward cross-border transactions.  Transactions, however, over USD 272,108 for individuals and USD 34.0 million for businesses still need approval from the Central Bank.  A Central Bank Report reflected that private sector credit from the banking sector increased by 0.7 percent in November 2020 while a decline of 0.02 percent was registered in December 2020. On a year-to-year basis, credit rose by 0.01 percent.

Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors are able to get credit on the local market.  Interest rates are quite high by global standards. LNDC does not provide credit to foreign investors but can acquire equity in foreign companies investing in strategic economic sectors.  The private sector has access to a limited number of credit instruments, such as credit cards, loans, overdrafts, checks, and letters of credit. In January 2016, Lesotho’s first credit bureau was launched and has been functional. In July 2020, the parliament passed the Secured Interest in Movable Property Act to allow movable property to be considered as collateral in requesting for credit from commercial banks.

Lesotho has a central bank and four commercial banks, including subsidiaries of South African banks (subject to measures and regulations under the Institutions Act of 2012) and the government-owned Lesotho Post Bank. Commercial banks in Lesotho are well-capitalized, liquid, and compliant with international banking standards; however, interest rates are high by global standards.  Three South African banks account for almost 92.5 percent of the country’s banking assets, which totaled over M21.6 billion (USD 1.5billion) by December 2021.  The share of bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans was approximately 4 percent in December 2021.  Foreigners are allowed to establish a bank account and may hold foreign currency accounts in local banks; however, they are required to provide a residence permit as a precondition for opening a bank account to comply with the “know your customer” requirements. The country did not lose correspondent banking relationships in the past three years.  Currently there are no banking relationships in jeopardy.

Foreign Exchange

The Lesotho loti is pegged to the South African rand. The currency fluctuates according to market forces. There are restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with an investment into a freely usable currency and at a legal market-clearing rate.  Funds can only be converted into the world’s widely recognized currencies such as the U.S. dollar, British Pound, and the Euro. Incoming funds can be converted into the local currency if the investor does not have the Customer Foreign Currency (CFC) account. If the investor has a CFC account, such funds can remain foreign in that account without any obligation to convert to Maloti.

Remittance Policies

According to the CBL, there are no plans to change remittance policies.  The current average delay period for remitting investment returns such as dividends, return of capital, interest and principal on private foreign debt, lease payments, royalties, and management fees through normal legal channels is 30 days, provided the investor has submitted all the necessary documentation related to the remittance. There has never been a case of blockage of such transfers, and shortages of forex that could lead to blockage are unlikely given that the CBL maintains net international reserves at a target of 4.3 months of import cover.

Payments of royalties should seek approval from the Central Bank. Export proceeds should be repatriated into the country within the period of six months (180 days).

There is no sovereign wealth fund or asset management bureau in Lesotho.

The government welcomes foreign investment, but Liberia’s capital market is highly underdeveloped. Private investors have limited credit and investment options. The country does not have a domestic stock market and does not have an effective system to encourage portfolio investments. In 2019, Liberia committed to non-discriminatory foreign exchange auctions consistent with its obligations under IMF Article VIII  , and the country does not restrict international payments and transfers. Commercial credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors can get credit on the local market. Many foreign investors prefer to obtain credit from foreign banks.

The country’s financial sector regulatory authority is the Central Bank of Liberia . Foreign banks or branches can establish operations in Liberia subject to the CBL’s regulations. There are 10 commercial banks. Most are foreign-owned with branch outlets in the country. Non-bank financial institutions also provide diverse financial services. These include a development finance company, a deposit-taking microfinance institution, numerous non-deposit-taking microfinance institutions, rural community finance institutions, money remittance entities, foreign exchange bureaus, credit unions, and village savings and loans associations. However, chronic liquidity shortages, especially of Liberian dollars in recent years, have undermined confidence in banks. The CBL’s 2021 third-quarter report described the banking industry as “relatively stable” based on indicators such as total assets, deposits, loans, and total capital. As of November 2021, the capital adequacy ratio of 27.47 was well above the 10% regulatory minimum, and the liquidity ratio was 44.17, above the 15% regulatory minimum. Although the banking sector is sufficiently capitalized, it is not well positioned to withstand shocks. The sector’s primary weaknesses include a high number of non-performing loans (21% in November 2021), low profitability due to high operating expenses, periodic cash shortages for depositors, low public confidence, and inadequate policing and prosecution of money laundering and other financial crimes. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account.

The Government of Liberia does not maintain a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) or similar entity.

Liberia has approximately 20 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are governed by boards of directors and management teams overseen by government ministries. All are wholly government-owned and semi-autonomous. The president of Liberia appoints board members and directors or managers to govern and run SOEs. The Public Financial Management (PFM) Act defines the requirements for SOEs.

SOEs employ more than 10,000 people in sea and airport services, electricity supply, oil and gas, water and sewage, agriculture, forestry, maritime, petroleum importation and storage, and information and communication technology services. Not all SOEs are profitable, and some citizens and advocacy groups have called for SOEs to be dissolved or privatized. Liberia does not have a clearly defined corporate code for SOEs. Reportedly, high-level officials, including some who sit on SOE boards, influence government-owned enterprises to conduct business in ways not consistent with standard corporate governance. Not all SOEs pay taxes, or do so transparently, and SOE revenue is not always transparently reported or adequately reflected in national budgets.

In 2016 Liberia’s Ministry of Education initiated a school privatization program that, as of the 2021-22 school year, had privatized 525 schools. Operation of the schools was outsourced to domestic and foreign for-profit and nonprofit education providers and NGOs. There have been numerous calls from political leaders and government officials to privatize government-owned enterprises, including the Liberia Electricity Corporation, the Liberia Water & Sewer Corporation, and Liberia Petroleum Refining Company, but the government does not have an official privatization program.

The Libyan government passed a law in 2007 to establish a stock market, primarily to support privatization of SMEs, but it is not well-capitalized, has few listings, and does not have a high volume of trading. Capital markets in Libya are underdeveloped, and the absence of a venture capital industry limits opportunities for SMEs with growth potential and innovative start-ups to access risk financing for their ventures.

Libya has been attempting to modernize its banking sector since before the revolution, including through a privatization program that has opened state-owned banks to private shareholders. The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) owns the Libyan Foreign Bank, which operates as an offshore bank, with responsibility for satisfying Libya’s international banking needs (apart from foreign investment). The banking system is governed by Law No. 1 of 2005, as amended by Law No. 46 of 2012 on Islamic banking. In accordance with that amendment, Law No. 1 of 2013 prohibits interest in all civil and commercial transactions. The banking modernization program has also been seeking, among other components, to establish electronic payment systems and expand private foreign exchange facilities.

The CBL is responsible for the receipt of all of Libya’s oil revenues, prints Libyan dinars, and controls the country’s foreign exchange reserves. After being effectively divided since 2014 between its eastern and western branches as a result of the civil conflict, the CBL officially began the process of reunification in January 2022. Based on UN-sponsored audit report conducted by an international accounting firm and completed in July 2021, the CBL is seven work streams to incorporate top-level recommendations such as: strengthen financial accountability and transparency, assess process for letters of credit, adopt widely accepted accounting standards for financial reporting, establish effective governance and internal controls, reconcile the two branches’ balance sheets, unify the ledger system of the two branches, and unify organizational structure, operations, resource needs, and plans. The CBL has put in place seven work streams aimed at incorporating these recommendations.

The CBL in Tripoli controls access to all foreign currency in Libya, and it provides Libyans access to hard currency by issuing letters of credit (LCs). Access to LCs in Libya has historically been an issue, but in January 2021, the CBL set a single, unified foreign exchange rate (described in the next section). This has increased importers’ access to hard currency at stable levels.

The availability of financing on the local market is weak. Libyan banks can only offer limited financial products, loans are often made on the basis of personal connections (rather than business plans), and public bank managers lack clear incentives to expand their portfolios. Lack of financing acts as a brake on Libya’s development, hampering both the completion of existing projects and the start of new ones. This has been particularly damaging in the housing sector, where small-scale projects often languish for lack of steady funding streams. Libya tied for last on the ease of getting credit in most recent edition of the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index.

Libya boasts 19 commercial banks, the largest of which are majority-owned by the CBL, and four specialized banks. The six largest banks hold 90 percent of the system’s assets and loans, whereas it is estimated that 30 percent of all cash in Libya is not within the formal banking system. In total, the banking system employs 20,000 persons.

Libya maintains a sovereign wealth fund called the Libya Investment Authority (LIA). UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) froze many of the LIA’s assets outside Libya. The freeze on the LIA’s assets is intended to preserve Libya’s assets through its post-revolutionary transition for the benefit of all Libyans. An evaluation of the LIA’s assets in 2019 put their value at USD 69 billion. The international community and private consultancies continue to provide technical assistance to the LIA to help it improve its governance, including adherence to the Santiago Principles, a set of 24 widely accepted best practices for the operation of sovereign wealth funds: the LIA is now compliant with 17 of the 24 best practices. The LIA is also currently undergoing an audit by an international auditing firm. The LIA comes under sporadic political pressure to make administrative and human resources changes to favor certain political actors.

The Libyan state is responsible for approximately 85 percent of economic activity in the country. On the periphery of the governmental apparatus, state-owned enterprises (SOE) dominate economic life. The largest are the National Oil Company (NOC), the Libyan Post, Telecommunication, and Information Technology Company (LPTIC), and the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL). The state is also involved in the following sectors: commercial banks, cement, transportation, airlines, construction, and oil and gas.

The PIB is responsible for matters related to privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). All enterprises in Libya were previously state-owned. Except for the upstream oil and gas sector, no state-owned enterprise is considered to be efficient. The state is deeply involved in utilities, oil and gas, agriculture, construction, real estate development and manufacturing, and the corporate economy.

Libya has gone through three previous phases of privatization, the latest between 2003 and 2008 during which 360 SOEs ranging from small to large in various sectors were either fully or partially privatized or brought in private partners through public-private partnerships. However, restrictions to individual shares and foreign ownership – individual investors’ share of the capital was restricted to 15 percent and local ownership had to be 30 percent – limited interest in the privatization program. Accusations of fraud further discouraged investments. Nonetheless, the food industry, healthcare, construction materials, downstream oil and gas, and education sectors are now partially or fully privatized. Fragile governments and lack of security since 2011 have impeded implementation of further privatization programs.

Government policies do not interfere with the free flow of financial resources or the allocation of credit. In 1994, Lithuania accepted the requirements of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund to liberalize all current payments and to establish non-discriminatory currency agreements. Lithuania ensures the free movement of capital and does not plan to impose any restrictions. The government imposes no restrictions on credits related to commercial transactions or the provision of services, or on financial loans and credits. Non-residents may open accounts with commercial banks.

The banking system is stable, well-regulated, and conforms to EU standards. Currently there are 12 commercial banks holding a license from the Bank of Lithuania, six foreign bank branches, two foreign bank representative offices, the Central Credit Union of Lithuania and 65 credit unions. Two hundred-eighty EU banks provide cross-border services in Lithuania without a branch operating in the country, and three financial institutions controlled by EU licensed foreign banks provide services without a branch. Nearly all foreign banks are headquartered in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. By the end of 2021 the total assets of major Lithuanian banks were $45.4 billion:

Swedbank – 37.7% (www.swedbank.lt )
SEB – 26.7% (www.seb.lt )
Luminor 20.8% (www.luminor.lt )
Siauliu Bankas – 9.1% (www.sb.lt )

Other smaller banks:

Citadele ( www.citadele.lt )
Siaulius Bankas (www.sb.lt )
Medicinos Bankas (www.medbank.lt )
Finasta (http://finasta.com/lit/lt )
Revolut ( www.revolut.com  )
European Merchants Bank ( www.europeanmerchantbank.com )
Mano Bankas (www.mano.bank )

Effective January 1, 2015, all of the banks are controlled by the European Central Bank and the Bank of Lithuania. There is no restriction on portfolio investment. The right of ownership to shares acquired through automatically matched trades is transferred on the third working day following the conclusion of the transaction. The Vilnius Stock Exchange is part of the OMX group of exchanges and offers access to 80 percent of all securities trading in the Nordic and Baltic marketplace. OMX is owned by the U.S. firm NASDAQ and the Dubai Bourse. The supervisory service at the Bank of Lithuania oversees commercial banks and credit unions, securities market, and insurance companies. Lithuanian law does not regulate hostile takeovers.

Like much of the rest of the world, rising inflation driven by high global energy prices is a concern in Lithuania. Lithuania experienced 12.4% year-over-year inflation in January 2022, the highest in the EU.

Lithuania does not maintain any Sovereign Wealth Funds.

At the beginning of 2021, the Lithuanian government was majority or full owner of 46 enterprises. Throughout 2017, the government consolidated many duplicative state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in response to OECD recommendations reducing the number of its companies from 130. The SOE sector is valued at approximately $5.8 billion and employs just over 42,000 people. The greatest number of SOEs by value are found in the electricity and gas sector (38%), followed by transportation (36%) and extractive industries including fishing, farming, and mining (21%). The transportation sector (which in Lithuania’s definition includes the postal service) accounts for over half of all SOE employment, followed by the electricity and gas sectors, which accounts for about one fifth. The largest SOE employers are Lithuanian Railways, Ignitis Group, and Lithuanian Post, which collectively employ over 23,000 people.

A list of SOEs is available at the Governance Coordination Center site: https://vkc.sipa.lt/apie-imones/vvi-sarasas/ 

In response to OECD recommendations issued during Lithuania’s accession process, the government passed several laws to reform SOE governance, addressing such issues as the hiring, firing, and oversight of top management, the introduction of independent board members to professionalize and depoliticize SOE boards and strengthen independent and pragmatic decision making, and a requirement for SOE CEOs to certify financial statements.

The government has privatized most state enterprises and property, with foreign investors purchasing the majority of state assets privatized since 1990. These include companies in the banking and transportation sectors. Some foreign companies have complained about a lack of transparency or discrimination in certain privatization transactions. Major assets still under government control include the railway company (Lietuvos Gelezinkeliai), Lithuania’s three international airports (Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipeda), Lithuanian post (Lietuvos Pastas), as well as energy companies controlled by Ignitis Group holding company.

Luxembourg government policies, which reflect the European Union’s free movement of capital framework, facilitate the free flow of financial resources to support the product and factor markets. Credit is allocated on market terms, and foreign investors can get credit on the local market, thanks to the sophisticated and extremely developed international financial sector, depending on the banks’ individual lending policies.

Since the financial crisis and tighter regulation through EU central banking authority and stability mechanisms, banks had become more selective in their lending practices pre-COVID. The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments, including those issued by the National Public Investment Agency (SNCI), and there is an effective regulatory system established to encourage and facilitate portfolio investment.

Luxembourg continues to be recognized as a model of fighting money-laundering activities within its banking system through the enactment of strict regulations and monitoring of fund sources. Indeed, the number of enforcements reflects the degree to which the government remains committed to fighting money-laundering. The country has its own stock market, a sub-set of which was rebranded in 2016 as a “green exchange” (LGX) to promote securities (primarily bonds in Luxembourg) reflecting ecologically sound investments. To this day, LGX has become the largest ESG and Green Bond market in the world.

Luxembourg’s banking system is sound and strong, having been shored up following the global financial crisis by emergency investments by the Government of Luxembourg in BGL BNP Paribas (formerly Banque Generale du Luxembourg and then Fortis) and in Banque Internationale a Luxembourg (BIL), formerly Dexia, in 2008.

At the end of 2021, 125 credit institutions were operating, with total assets under management by private banking of EUR 508 billion during the first quarter of 2022 (USD 560 bn), and approximately 26,000 employees.

Luxembourg has a central bank, Banque Centrale de Luxembourg. Foreign banks can establish operations, subject to the same regulations as Luxembourgish banks.

Due to the U.S. FATCA law, local retail bank Raiffeisen bank still refuses U.S. citizens as clients. However, two banks have offered to serve U.S. citizen customers: BIL and the State Bank and Savings Bank (Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat).

On February 21, 2018, the Luxembourg House of Financial Technology (LHoFT) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the European FinTech platform, B-Hive, based in Brussels, and the Dutch Blockchain Coalition, that will favor collaboration in the field of distributed ledger technology, otherwise known as blockchain. The MoU confirms mutual interest and defines the fields of collaboration, among other things, on how blockchain technology can benefit society and business in general or on how they can help define international and/or European standards for distributed ledger technology.

The Ministry of Finance is tracking developments very closely in the field of virtual currencies and has said it will adapt its legislation in accordance with the results of ongoing European and international studies. Luxembourg places virtual currencies under the legal regime of payment companies. The CSSF continues close supervision and oversight of virtual currencies.

Luxembourg created a sovereign wealth fund in 2014. The fund is under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance and operates with 234 million euros of assets. Until the fund reaches 250 million euros of assets, it operates a conservative investment policy, with a portfolio of 57% of bonds, 40% of stocks and 3% of liquidities. The sovereign wealth fund only invests outside of Luxembourg and is audited by an independent audit company.

The most prominent state-owned enterprise (SOE) in Luxembourg is POST (formerly P&T, postal and telecommunications), whose sole shareholder is the government of Luxembourg and whose board of directors is composed of civil servants. POST responded to the competition created by new players in the market (Orange, Proximus) by transforming itself from a passive utility company into a commercial enterprise, recruiting from the corporate sector, and improving consumer products and services. POST also publishes an annual report and communicates in a similar manner to a private company.

Another sector in which SOEs have been very active is the energy sector (electric and gas utilities), which is now liberalized as well. Anyone can become a provider or distributor (via networks) of electricity and gas. The former state electricity utility, Cegedel, was absorbed into a private company, Encevo, along with a nearby German utility and the former state gas utility, with an independent board of directors. Creos, the new distribution network for energy, is jointly held by the government and private shareholders.

Finally, an important market which appears to have barriers to entry is freight air transport, due to the dominance of the majority state-owned Cargolux. It is the largest consumer of U.S. exports to Luxembourg in terms of value, owing to their all-Boeing fleet of 30 747-freighter aircraft (including 14 of the new-generation 747-8F, of which Cargolux was a launch customer). It received a capital increase from the Luxembourg government in return for a larger share ownership of the company.

China has invested in Cargolux, with a Chinese regional fund currently holding approximately one-third of the shares. Cargolux has aggressively expanded in China.

Private enterprises can compete with public enterprises in Luxembourg under the same terms and conditions in all respects. All markets are now open or have been liberalized via EU directives to encourage market competition over monopolistic entities. There is a national regulator (National Institute of Regulation), which sets forth regulations and standards for economic sectors, mostly derived from EU directives transposed into local law. While markets continue to open, the government has maintained a large enough stake in critical sectors such as energy, to ensure national security.

Luxembourg is an OECD member with established practices consistent with OECD guidelines as far as SOEs are concerned. There is no centralized ownership entity that exercises ownership rights for each of the SOEs.

In general, if the government has a share in an enterprise, they will receive board of directors’ seats on a comparable basis to other shareholders and in proportion to their share, with no formal management reporting directly to a line minister.

The court processes are transparent and non-discriminatory.

Foreign investors can participate equally in ongoing privatization programs, and the bidding process is transparent with no barriers erected against foreign investors at the time of the initial investment or after the investment is made. Moreover, there are no laws or regulations specifically authorizing private firms to adopt articles of incorporation or association, which limit or prohibit foreign investment, participation, or control. There are no other practices by private firms to force local ownership or restrict foreign investment, participation in, or control of domestic enterprises. There has been no evidence to suggest that potential conflicts of interest exist. Government officials sitting on boards of directors do not appear to have impacted freedom of investment in the private sector.

Macau allows free flows of financial resources. Foreign investors can obtain credit in the local financial market. The GOM is stepping up its efforts to develop finance leasing businesses and exploring opportunities to establish a system for trade credit insurance to take a greater role in promoting cooperation between companies from Portuguese-speaking countries.

Since 2010, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has provided cross-border settlement of funds for Macau residents and institutions involved in transactions for RMB bonds issued in Hong Kong. Macau residents and institutions can purchase or sell, through Macau RMB participating banks, RMB bonds issued in Hong Kong and Macau. The Macau RMB Real Time Gross Settlements (RMB RTGS) System came into operation in March 2016 to provide real-time settlement services for RMB remittances and interbank transfer of RMB funds. The RMB RTGS System is intended to improve risk management and clearing efficiency of RMB funds and foster Macau’s development into an RMB clearing platform for trade settlement between China and Portuguese-speaking countries. In December 2019, the PBoC canceled an existing quota of RMB 20,000 (USD 3,057) exchanged in Macau for each individual transaction.

Macau has no stock market, but Macau companies can seek a listing in Hong Kong’s stock market. Macau and Hong Kong financial regulatory authorities cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Under the Macau Insurance Ordinance, the MMA authorizes and monitors insurance companies. There are 12 life insurance companies and 13 non-life insurance companies in Macau. In 2021, total net profit from insurance services including life insurance and general insurance amounted to MOP 22.3 billion (USD 2.8 billion). USD.

In October 2018, the Legislative Assembly took steps to tackle cross-border tax evasion. Offshore institutions in Macau and their tax benefits, including credit institutions, insurers, underwriters, and offshore trust management companies, were thoroughly abolished starting from January 1, 2021. Decree 9/2012, in effect since October 2012, stipulates that banks must compensate depositors up to a maximum of MOP 500,000 (USD 62,500) in case of a bank failure. To finance the deposit protection scheme, the GOM has injected MOP 150 million (USD 18.75 million) into the deposit protection fund in 2013, with banks paying an annual contribution of 0.05 percent of the amount of protected deposits held. The deposit protection fund had MOP 486 million (USD 60.75 million) available by the end of 2018, according to the MMA.

The MMA functions as a de facto central bank. It is responsible for maintaining the stability of Macau’s financial system and for managing its currency reserves and foreign assets. At present, there are thirty-one financial institutions in Macau, including 12 local banks and 19 branches of banks incorporated outside Macau. There is also a finance company with restrictive banking activities, two financial leasing companies and a non-bank credit institution dedicated to the issuance and management of electronic money stored value card services. In addition, there are 11 moneychangers, two cash remittance companies, two financial intermediaries, six exchange counters, two payment service institutions, and two other financial institutions (one is a representative office). The Bank of China (Macau) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) are the two largest banks in Macau, with total assets of USD 79.8 billion and USD 33.9 billion, respectively. Total deposits amounted to USD 83.5 billion by the end of 2021. As of December 2021, total international assets of banks in Macau increased to MOP 2,311.4 billion (USD 287.8 billion). In the third quarter of 2021, banks in Macau maintained a capital adequacy ratio of 14.9 percent, well above the minimum eight percent recommended by the Bank for International Settlements. Accounting systems in Macau are consistent with international norms.

The MMA prohibits the city’s financial institutions, banks, and payment services from providing services to businesses issuing virtual currencies or tokens. In December 2020, the MMA said it is communicating with the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) about the feasibility of issuing digital currency in Macau. In a Legislative Assembly plenary meeting in April 2021, Chief Executive Ho Iat-seng continued to reiterate that the GOM is closely following the trend of digital currency development around the world and maintains close communication with the PBoC regarding the implementation of the digital renminbi in Macau. However, no specific timetable or update was given since his remarks in 2021.

Foreign Exchange

Profits and other funds associated with an investment, including investment capital, earnings, loan repayments, lease payments, and capital gains, can be freely converted and remitted. The domestic currency, Macau Official Pataca (MOP), is pegged to the Hong Kong Dollar at 1.03 and indirectly to the U.S. Dollar at an exchange rate of approximately MOP 7.99 = USD 1. The MMA is committed to exchange rate stability through maintenance of the peg to the Hong Kong Dollar.