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France and Monaco

Executive Summary

France welcomes foreign investment and has a stable business climate that attracts investors from around the world. The French government devotes significant resources to attracting foreign investment through policy incentives, marketing, overseas trade promotion offices, and investor support mechanisms. France has an educated population, first-rate universities, and a talented workforce. It has a modern business culture, sophisticated financial markets, a strong intellectual property rights regime, and innovative business leaders. The country is known for its world-class infrastructure, including high-speed passenger rail, maritime ports, extensive roadway networks, a dense network of public transportation, and efficient intermodal connections. High-speed (3G/4G) telephony is nearly ubiquitous, and France has begun its 5G roll-out in key metropolitan cities.

In 2021, the United States was the leading foreign investor in France in terms of new jobs created (10,118) and second in terms of new projects invested (247). The total stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in France reached $91 billion. More than 4,500 U.S. firms operate in France, supporting over 500,000 jobs, making the United States the top foreign investor overall in terms of job creation.

Following the election of French President Emmanuel Macron in May 2017, the French government implemented significant labor market and tax reforms. By relaxing the rules on companies to hire and fire employees, the government cut production taxes by 15 percent in 2021, and corporate tax will fall to 25 percent in 2022. Surveys of U.S. investors in 2021 showed the greatest optimism about the business operating environment in France since 2008. Macron’s reform agenda for pensions was derailed in 2018, however, when France’s Yellow Vest protests—a populist, grassroots movement for economic justice—rekindled class warfare and highlighted wealth and, to a lesser extent, income inequality.

The onset of the pandemic in 2020 shifted Macron’s focus to mitigating France’s most severe economic crisis in the post-war era. The economy shrank 8.3 percent in 2020 compared to the year prior, but with the help of unprecedented government support for businesses and households, economic growth reached seven percent in 2021. The government’s centerpiece fiscal package was the €100 billion ($110 billion) France Relance plan, of which over half was dedicated to supporting businesses. Most of the support was accessible to U.S. firms operating in France as well. The government launched a follow-on investment package in late 2021 called “France 2030” to bolster competitiveness, increase productivity, and accelerate the ecological transition.

Also in 2020, France increased its protection against foreign direct investment that poses a threat to national security. In the wake of the health crisis, France’s investment screening body expanded the scope of sensitive sectors to include biotechnology companies and lowered the threshold to review an acquisition from a 25 percent ownership stake by the acquiring firm to 10 percent, a temporary provision set to expire at the end of 2022. In 2020, the government blocked at least one transaction, which included the attempted acquisition of a French firm by a U.S. company in the defense sector. In early 2021, the French government threated to block the acquisition of French supermarket chain Carrefour by Canada’s Alimentation Couche-Tard, which eventually scuttled the deal.

Key issues to watch in 2022 are: 1) the impact of the war in Ukraine and measures by the EU and French government to mitigate the fallout; 2) the degree to which COVID-19 and resulting supply chain disruptions continue to agitate the macroeconomic environment in France and across Europe, and the extent of the government’s continued support for the economic recovery; and 3) the creation of winners and losers resulting from the green transition, the degree to which will be largely determined by firms’ operating models and exposure to fossil fuels.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 22 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
Global Innovation Index 2021 11 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator 
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 91.153 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ 
World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 39.480 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

3. Legal Regime

4. Industrial Policies

5. Protection of Property Rights

6. Financial Sector

7. State-Owned Enterprises

The 11 listed entities in which the French State maintains stakes at the federal level are Aeroports de Paris (50.63 percent); Airbus Group (10.92 percent); Air France-KLM (28.6 percent); EDF (83.88 percent), ENGIE (23.64 percent), Eramet (27.13 percent), La Française des Jeux (FDJ) (20.46 percent), Orange (a direct 13.39 percent stake and a 9.60 percent stake through Bpifrance), Renault (15.01 percent), Safran (11.23 percent), and Thales (25.67 percent). Unlisted companies owned by the State include SNCF (rail), RATP (public transport), CDC (Caisse des depots et consignations) and La Banque Postale (bank). In all, the government maintains majority and minority stakes in 88 firms in a variety of sectors.

Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, including from state-owned banks or other state-owned investment vehicles. SOEs are subject to the same tax burden and tax rebate policies as their private sector competitors. SOEs may get subsidies and other financial resources from the government.

France, as a member of the European Union, is party to the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization. Companies owned or controlled by the state behave largely like other companies in France and are subject to the same laws and tax code. The Boards of SOEs operate according to accepted French corporate governance principles as set out in the (private sector) AFEP-MEDEF Code of Corporate Governance. SOEs are required by law to publish an annual report, and the French Court of Audit conducts financial audits on all entities in which the state holds a majority interest. The French government appoints representatives to the Boards of Directors of all companies in which it holds significant numbers of shares, and manages its portfolio through a special unit attached to the Ministry for the Economy and Finance Ministry, the shareholding agency APE (Agence de Participations de l’Etat). The State as a shareholder must set an example in terms of respect for the environment, gender equality and social responsibility. The report also highlighted that the State must protect its strategic assets and remain a shareholder in areas where the general interest is at stake.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

The business community has general awareness of standards for responsible business conduct (RBC) in France. The country has established a National Contact Point (NCP) for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, coordinated and chaired by the Directorate General of the Treasury in the Ministry for the Economy and Finance. Its members represent State Administrations (Ministries in charge of Economy and Finance, Labor and Employment, Foreign Affairs, Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy), six French Trade Unions (CFDT, CGT, FO, CFE-CGC, CFTC, UNSA) and one employers’ organization, MEDEF.

The NCP promotes the OECD Guidelines in a manner that is relevant to specific sectors. When specific instances are raised, the NCP offers its good offices to the parties (discussion, exchange of information) and may act as a mediator in disputes, if appropriate.  This can involve conducting fact-finding to assist parties in resolving disputes, and posting final statements on any recommendations for future action with regard to the Guidelines. The NCP may also monitor how its recommendations are implemented by the business in question. In April 2017, the French NCP signed a two-year partnership with Global Compact France to increase sharing of information and activity between the two organizations.

In France, corporate governance standards for publicly traded companies are the product of a combination of legislative provisions and the recommendations of the AFEP-MEDEF code (two employers’ organizations). The code, which defines principles of corporate governance by outlining rules for corporate officers, controls and transparency, meets the expectations of shareholders and various stakeholders, as well as of the European Commission. First introduced in September 2002, it is regularly updated, adding new principles for the determination of remuneration and independence of directors, and now includes corporate social and environmental responsibility standards. The latest amendments in February 2019 tackle the remuneration and post-employment benefits of Chief Executive Officers and Executive Officers: 60 percent variable remuneration based on quantitative objectives and 40 percent on quality objectives, including efforts in the corporate social responsibility.

Also relating to transparency, the EU passed a new regulation in May 2017 to stem the trade in conflict minerals and, in particular, to stop conflict minerals and metals from being exported to the EU; to prevent global and EU smelters and refiners from using conflict minerals; and to protect mine workers from being abused. The regulation goes into effect January 1, 2021, and will then apply directly to French law.

France has played an active role in negotiating the ISO 26000 standards, the International Finance Corporation Performance Standards, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. France has signed on to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), although, it has not yet been fully implemented. Since 2017, large companies based in France and having at least 5,000 employees are now required to establish and implement a corporate plan to identify and assess any risks to human rights, fundamental freedoms, workers’ health, safety, and risk to the environment from activities of their company and its affiliates.

The February 2017 “Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law” requires large companies to set up, implement, and publish a “vigilance plan” to identify risks and prevent “serious violations” of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and serious environmental damage.

In 2021, France enacted a Climate and Resilience Law covering consumption and food, economy and industry, transportation, housing, and strengthening sanctions against environmental violations. The production and work chapter aligns France’s national research strategy with its national low carbon and national biodiversity strategies. All public procurement must consider environmental criteria. To protect ecosystems, the law amends several mining code provisions, including the requirement to develop a responsible extractive model. The law translates France’s multi-year energy program into regional renewable energy development objectives, creates the development of citizen renewable energy communities, and requires installation of solar panels or green roofs on commercial surfaces, offices, and parking lots. The consumption chapter requires an environmental sticker and inscription to better inform consumers of a product or service’s impact on climate. The law bans advertising of fossil fuels by 2022 and advertising of the most carbon-emitting cars (i.e., those that emit more than 123 grams of carbon dioxide per kilometer) by 2028. The law also empowered local authorities with mechanisms to reduce paper advertisements and regulate electronic advertising screens in shop windows. Large- and medium-sized stores (i.e., those with over 400 square meters of sales area) must devote 20 percent of their sales area to bulk sales by 2030. In the agriculture sector, the law sets annual emissions reduction levels concerning nitrogen fertilizers; failure to meet these objectives will trigger a tax beginning in 2024. The law’s transportation chapter extends France’s 2019 Mobility law by creating 33 low-emission zones in urban areas that have more than 150,000 inhabitants by the end of 2024, and bans cars manufactured before 1996 in these large cities. In the top 10 cities that regularly exceed air quality limits on particulates, the law will ban vehicles that have air quality certification stickers of above a certain level. The law requires regions to offer attractive fares on regional trains, bans domestic flights when there is train transportation of less than 2.5 hours, requires airlines to conduct carbon offsetting for domestic flights beginning in 2022, and creates carpool lanes. The law creates a road ecotax starting in 2024, prohibits the sale of new cars that emit more than 95 gram of carbon dioxide per kilometer by 2030 and of new trucks, buses, and coaches with 95 gCO2/km emissions by 2040, and provides incentives to develop bicycle paths, parking areas, and rail and waterway transport.

The Climate and Resilience Law’s housing chapter seeks to accelerate the environmental renovation of buildings. Starting in 2023, owners of poorly insulated housing must undertake energy renovation work if they want to increase rent rates. The law forbids leasing non-insulated housing beginning in 2025 and bans leasing any type of poorly insulated housing beginning in 2028. It also provides information, incentives, and control mechanisms empowering tenants to demand landlords conduct energy renovation work. Beginning in 2022, the law requires an energy audit, including proposals, when selling poorly insulated housing. All households will have access to a financing mechanism to pay the remaining costs of their renovation work via government-guaranteed loans. The law regulates the laying of concrete, mandates a 50 percent reduction in the rate of land use by 2030, requires net zero land reclamation by 2050, and prohibits the construction of new shopping centers that lead to modifying natural environment. The law aims to protect 30 percent of France’s sensitive natural areas and supports local authorities in adapting their coastal territories against receding coastlines. The law’s final chapter focuses on environmental violations and reinforces sanctions for environmental damage, such as long-term degradation to fauna and flora (up to three years in prison and a €250,000 ($273,000) fine), as well as for the general offense of environmental pollution and “ecocide” (up to 10 years in prison and a €4.5 million ($4.9 million) fine or up to 10 times the profit obtained by the individual committing the environmental damage). The chapter uses the term “ecocide” to refer to the most serious cases of environmental damage, although the term is not defined in the law. Even if pollution has not occurred, these penalties apply as long as the individual’s behavior is considered to have put the environment in “danger.”

9. Corruption

In line with President Macron’s campaign promise to clean up French politics, the French parliament adopted in September 2017 the law on “Restoring Confidence in Public Life.” The new law bans elected officials from employing family members, or working as a lobbyist or consultant while in office. It also bans lobbyists from paying parliamentary, ministerial, or presidential staff and requires parliamentarians to submit receipts for expenses.

France’s “Transparency, Anti-corruption, and Economic Modernization Law,” also known as the “Loi Sapin II,” came into effect on June 1, 2017. It brought France’s legislation in line with European and international standards. Key aspects of the law include: creating a new anti-corruption agency; establishing “deferred prosecution” for defendants in corruption cases and prosecuting companies (French or foreign) suspected of bribing foreign public officials abroad; requiring lobbyists to register with national institutions; and expanding legal protections for whistleblowers. The Sapin II law also established a High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (HATVP). The HATVP promotes transparency in public life by publishing the declarations of assets and interests it is legally authorized to share publicly. After review, declarations of assets and statements of interests of members of the government are published on the High Authority’s website under open license. The declarations of interests of members of Parliament and mayors of big cities and towns, but also of regions are also available on the website. In addition, the declarations of assets of parliamentarians can be accessed in certain governmental buildings, though not published on the internet.

France is a signatory to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The U.S. Embassy in Paris has received no specific complaints from U.S. firms of unfair competition in France in recent years. France ranked 22rd of 180 countries on Transparency International’s (TI) 2021 corruption perceptions index. See  https://www.transparency.org/country/FRA .

10. Political and Security Environment

France is a politically stable country. Large demonstrations and protests occur regularly (sometimes organized to occur simultaneously in multiple French cities); these can result in violence. When faced with imminent business closures, on rare occasions French trade unions have resorted to confrontational techniques such as setting plants on fire, planting bombs, or kidnapping executives or managers.

From mid-November 2018 through 2019, Paris and other cities in France faced regular protests and disruptions, including “Gilets Jaunes” (Yellow Vest) demonstrations that turned violent, initiated by discontent over high cost of living, gas, taxes, and social exclusion. In the second half of 2019, most demonstrations were in response to President Macron’s proposed unemployment and pension reform. Authorities permitted peaceful protests. During some demonstrations, damage to property, including looting and arson, in popular tourist areas occurred with reckless disregard for public safety.  Police response included water cannons, rubber bullets and tear gas.

Between 2012 and 2021, 271 people have been killed in terrorist attacks in France, including the January 2015 assault on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, the November 2015 coordinated attacks at the Bataclan concert hall, national stadium, and streets of Paris, and the 2016 Bastille Day truck attack in Nice. While the terrorist threat remains high, the threat is lower than its peak in 2015. Terrorist attacks have since been smaller in scale. Security services remained concerned with lone-wolf attacks, carried out by individuals already in France, inspired by or affiliated with ISIS.  French security agencies continue to disrupt plots and cells effectively. Despite the spate of recent small-scale attacks, France remains a strong, stable, democratic country with a vibrant economy and culture. Americans and investors from all over the world continue to invest heavily in France.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

France’s has one of the lowest unionized work forces in the developed world (between 8-11 percent of the total work force). However, unions have strong statutory protections under French law that give them the power to engage in sector- and industry-wide negotiations on behalf of all workers. As a result, an estimated 98 percent of French workers are covered by union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements. Any organizational change in the workplace must usually be presented to the unions for a formal consultation as part of the collective bargaining process.

The number of apprenticeships in France peaked in 2021, at 718,000 (+37 percent compared with 2020), including 698,000 in the private sector, according to February 2, 2022 Labor Ministry figures. Apprenticeships, like vocational training, have been placed under the direct management of the government via a newly created agency called France Compétences. The government claims growth of apprenticeship and reform of vocational training help to explain the drop to from eight percent in 2020 to 7.4 percent in 2021.

During the COVID-19 crisis, France’s partial unemployment scheme, which allows firms to retain their employees while the government continues to pay a portion of their wages, expanded dramatically in scope and size and kept unemployment at pre-crisis levels (between eight and nine percent). The reform of unemployment insurance was launched in stages in November 2017 and twice postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Labor Minister Elizabeth Borne presented on March 2, 2021, the last measures of the government’s final decree on unemployment insurance. These final measures include a new method for calculating the daily reference wage and the introduction of a tax on short-term contracts. In spite of strong labor union opposition, the government was able to enforce its reform in November 2021. Earlier measures of the reform, in place since January 1, 2021, cover a 30 percent cut in benefits of higher wage earners and an increase from one to four months of the threshold for recharging rights to unemployment benefits once they have ended. This reform is designed to tackle two issues: 1) ensuring that the jobless do not make more money from unemployment benefits than by working; and 2) reducing the deficit of France’s unemployment insurance system UNEDIC. The deficit is expected to turn to surplus by the end of 2022, according to an October 22, 2021 report by UNEDIC, due to the end of the government COVID-19 partial unemployment scheme and as a consequence of the unemployment insurance reform. Pension reform has been delayed until after the April 2022 presidential elections.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
French Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount  
France’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 $2,542,370 2020 $ 2,630,317 www.worldbank.org/en/country 
Foreign Direct Investment French Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in France ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $67,195 2020 $91,153 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ 
France’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $213,390 2020 $314,979 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data 
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 34.1% 2019 37.2% UNCTAD data available at

https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/
EconomicTrends/Fdi.html
 

* French Source : INSEE database for GDP figures and French Central Bank (Banque de France) for FDI figures. Accessed on March 21, 2022.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Direct Investment from/in France Economy Data 2020
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (U/S. Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward 897,115 100% Total Outward 1,440,715 100%
Luxembourg 164,501 18% The Netherlands 221,098 15%
Switzerland 119,020 13%  United States 213,390 15%
United Kingdom 115,093 12% Belgium 166,713 11%
 The Netherlands 107,709 12% United Kingdom 137,138 9%
Germany 98,303 10% Italy 76,091 5%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.

Source: Bank of France.

Note: These figures represent the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI), not the annual flow of FDI. The United States was the second top investor by number of projects recorded in 2021 but remained in first place for jobs generated (10,118).

Germany

Executive Summary

As Europe’s largest economy, Germany is a major destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) and has accumulated a vast stock of FDI over time.  Germany is consistently ranked as one of the most attractive investment destinations based on its stable legal environment, reliable infrastructure, highly skilled workforce, and world-class research and development.

An EU member state with a well-developed financial sector, Germany welcomes foreign portfolio investment and has an effective regulatory system. Capital markets and portfolio investments operate freely with no discrimination between German and foreign firms. Germany has a very open economy, routinely ranking among the top countries in the world for exports and inward and outward foreign direct investment.

Foreign investment in Germany mainly originates from other European countries, the United States, and Japan, although FDI from emerging economies (and China) has grown in recent years. The United States is the leading source of non-European FDI in Germany. In 2020, total U.S. FDI in Germany was $162 billion. The key U.S. FDI sectors include chemicals ($8.7 billion), machinery ($6.5 billion), finance ($13.2 billion), and professional, scientific, and technical services ($10.1 billion). From 2019 to 2020, the industry sector “chemicals” grew significantly from $4.8 billion to $8.7 billion. Historically, machinery, information technology, finance, holding companies (nonbank), and professional, scientific, and technical services have dominated U.S. FDI in Germany.

German legal, regulatory, and accounting systems can be complex but are generally transparent and consistent with developed-market norms.  Businesses operate within a well-regulated, albeit relatively high-cost, environment. Foreign and domestic investors are treated equally when it comes to investment incentives or the establishment and protection of real and intellectual property.  Germany’s well-established enforcement laws and official enforcement services ensure investors can assert their rights.  German courts are fully available to foreign investors in an investment dispute. New investors should ensure they have the necessary legal expertise, either in-house or outside counsel, to meet all national and EU regulations.

The German government continues to strengthen provisions for national security screening of inward investment in reaction to an increasing number of high-risk acquisitions of German companies by foreign investors, particularly from China, in recent years.  German authorities screen acquisitions by foreign entities acquiring more than 10 percent of voting rights of German companies in critical sectors, including health care, artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, specialized robots, semiconductors, additive manufacturing, and quantum technology, among others. Foreign investors who seek to acquire at least 10 percent of voting rights of a German company in one of those fields are required to notify the government and potentially become subject to an investment review. Furthermore, acquisitions by foreign government-owned or -funded entities will now trigger a review.

German authorities are committed to fighting money laundering and corruption.  The government promotes responsible business conduct and German SMEs are aware of the need for due diligence.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 9 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
Global Innovation Index 2020 9 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator 
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 162,387 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ 
World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 47,470 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

3. Legal Regime

4. Industrial Policies

5. Protection of Property Rights

6. Financial Sector

7. State-Owned Enterprises

The formal term for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Germany translates as “public funds, institutions, or companies,” and refers to entities whose budget and administration are separate from those of the government, but in which the government has more than 50 percent of the capital shares or voting rights. Appropriations for SOEs are included in public budgets, and SOEs can take two forms, either public or private law entities. Public law entities are recognized as legal personalities whose goal, tasks, and organization are established and defined via specific acts of legislation, with the best-known example being the publicly-owned promotional bank KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau). KfW’s mandate is to promote global development. The government can also resort to ownership or participation in an entity governed by private law if the following conditions are met: doing so fulfills an important state interest, there is no better or more economical alternative, the financial responsibility of the federal government is limited, the government has appropriate supervisory influence, and yearly reports are published.

Government oversight of SOEs is decentralized and handled by the ministry with the appropriate technical area of expertise. The primary goal of such involvement is promoting public interests rather than generating profits. The government is required to close its ownership stake in a private entity if tasks change or technological progress provides more effective alternatives, though certain areas, particularly science and culture, remain permanent core government obligations. German SOEs are subject to the same taxes and the same value added tax rebate policies as their private- sector competitors. There are no laws or rules that seek to ensure a primary or leading role for SOEs in certain sectors or industries. Private enterprises have the same access to financing as SOEs, including access to state-owned banks such as KfW.

The Federal Statistics Office maintains a database of SOEs from all three levels of government (federal, state, and municipal) listing a total of 19,009 entities for 2019, or 0.58 percent of the total 3.35 million companies in Germany. SOEs in 2019 had €646 billion in revenue and €632 billion in expenditures. Forty-one percent of SOEs’ revenue was generated by water and energy suppliers, 12 percent by health and social services, and 11 percent by transportation-related entities. Measured by number of companies rather than size, 88 percent of SOEs are owned by municipalities, 10 percent are owned by Germany’s 16 states, and two percent are owned by the federal government.

The Federal Ministry of Finance is required to publish a detailed annual report on public funds, institutions, and companies in which the federal government has direct participation (including a minority share) or an indirect participation greater than 25 percent and with a nominal capital share worth more than €50,000. The federal government held a direct participation in 106 companies and an indirect participation in 401 companies at the end of 2019 (per the Ministry’s April 2021 publication of full-year 2019 figures), most prominently Deutsche Bahn (100 percent share), Deutsche Telekom (32 percent share), and Deutsche Post (21 percent share). Federal government ownership is concentrated in the areas of infrastructure, economic development, science, administration/increasing efficiency, defense, development policy, and culture. As the result of federal financial assistance packages from the federally-controlled Financial Market Stability Fund during the global financial crisis of 2008/9, the federal government still has a partial stake in several commercial banks, including a 15.6 percent share in Commerzbank, Germany’s second largest commercial bank. In 2020, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the German government acquired shares of several large German companies, including CureVac, TUI, and Lufthansa in an attempt to prevent companies from filing for insolvency or, in the case of CureVac, to support vaccine research in Germany.

The 2021 annual report (with 2019 data) can be found here:

https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/publikationen/beteiligungsbericht-des-bundes-2021-2016812 

Publicly-owned banks constitute one of the three pillars of Germany’s banking system (cooperative and commercial banks are the other two). Germany’s savings banks are mainly owned by the municipalities, while the so-called Landesbanken are typically owned by regional savings bank associations and the state governments. Given their joint market share, about 40 percent of the German banking sector is thus publicly owned. There are also many state-owned promotional/development banks which have taken on larger governmental roles in financing infrastructure. This increased role removes expenditures from public budgets, particularly helpful considering Germany’s balanced budget rules, which took effect for the states in 2020.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

In December 2016, the Federal Government passed the National Action Plan for Business and Human Rights (NAP), applying the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights to the activities of German companies though largely voluntary measures. A 2020 review found most companies did not sufficiently fulfill due diligence measures and in 2021 Germany passed the legally binding Human Rights Due Diligence in Supply Chains Act. From 2023, the act will apply to companies with at least 3,000 employees with their central administration, principal place of business, administrative headquarters, a statutory seat, or a branch office in Germany. From 2024 it will apply to companies with at least 1000 employees. The 2021 coalition agreement between the SPD, the Greens party, and the Free Democrats Party (FDP) committed to revising the NAP in line with the Supply Chains Act. Germany promoted EU-level legislation during its 2020 Council of the European Union presidency and the EU Commission published a legislative proposal in 2022.

Germany adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; the National Contact Point (NCP) is housed in the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action. The NCP is supported by an advisory board composed of several ministries, business organizations, trade unions, and NGOs. This working group usually meets once a year to discuss all Guidelines-related issues. The German NCP can be contacted through the Ministry’s website: https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Textsammlungen/Foreign-Trade/national-contact-point-ncp.html .

There is general awareness of environmental, social, and governance issues among both producers and consumers in Germany, and surveys suggest that consumers increasingly care about the ecological and social impacts of the products they purchase. In order to encourage businesses to factor environmental, social, and governance impacts into their decision-making, the government provides information online and in hard copy. The federal government encourages corporate social responsibility (CSR) through awards and prizes, business fairs, and reports and newsletters. The government also organizes so-called “sector dialogues” to connect companies and facilitate the exchange of best practices and offers practice days to help nationally as well as internationally operating small- and medium-sized companies discern and implement their entrepreneurial due diligence under the NAP. To this end it has created a website on CSR in Germany ( http://www.csr-in-deutschland.de/EN/Home/home.html  in English). The German government maintains and enforces domestic laws with respect to labor and employment rights, consumer protections, and environmental protections. The German government does not waive labor and environmental laws to attract investment.

Social reporting is currently voluntary, but publicly listed companies frequently include information on their CSR policies in annual shareholder reports and on their websites.

Civil society groups that work on CSR include Amnesty International Germany, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e. V. (BUND), CorA Corporate Accountability – Netzwerk Unternehmensverantwortung, Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), Germanwatch, Greenpeace Germany, Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU), Sneep (Studentisches Netzwerk zu Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik), Stiftung Warentest, Südwind – Institut für Ökonomie und Ökumene, TransFair – Verein zur Förderung des Fairen Handels mit der „Dritten Welt“ e. V., Transparency International, Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V., Bundesverband Die Verbraucher Initiative e.V., and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF, known as the “World Wildlife Fund” in the United States).

9. Corruption

Among industrialized countries, Germany ranks 10th out of 180, according to Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index. Some sectors including the automotive industry, construction sector, and public contracting, exert political influence and political party finance remains only partially transparent. Nevertheless, U.S. firms have not identified corruption as an impediment to investment in Germany. Germany is a signatory of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and a participating member of the OECD Working Group on Bribery.

Over the last two decades, Germany has increased penalties for the bribery of German officials, corrupt practices between companies, and price-fixing by companies competing for public contracts. It has also strengthened anti-corruption provisions on financial support extended by the official export credit agency and has tightened the rules for public tenders. Government officials are forbidden from accepting gifts linked to their jobs. Most state governments and local authorities have contact points for whistleblowing and provisions for rotating personnel in areas prone to corruption. There are serious penalties for bribing officials and price fixing by companies competing for public contracts.

To prevent corruption, Germany relies on the existing legal and regulatory framework consisting of various provisions under criminal law, public service law, and other rules for the administration at both federal and state levels. The framework covers internal corruption prevention, accounting standards, capital market disclosure requirements, and transparency rules, among other measures.

According to the Federal Criminal Office, in 2020, 50.6 percent of all corruption cases were directed towards the public administration (down from 73 percent in 2018), 33.2 percent towards the business sector (down from 39 percent in 2019), 13.4 percent towards law enforcement and judicial authorities (up from 9 percent in 2019), and 2 percent to political officials (unchanged compared to 2018).

Parliamentarians are subject to financial disclosure laws that require them to publish earnings from outside employment. Disclosures are available to the public via the Bundestag website (next to the parliamentarians’ biographies) and in the Official Handbook of the Bundestag. Penalties for noncompliance can range from an administrative fine to as much as half of a parliamentarian’s annual salary. In early 2021, several parliamentarians stepped down due to inappropriate financial gains made through personal relationships to businesses involved in the procurement of face masks during the initial stages of the pandemic.

Donations by private persons or entities to political parties are legally permitted. However, if they exceed €50,000, they must be reported to the President of the Bundestag, who is required to immediately publish the name of the party, the amount of the donation, the name of the donor, the date of the donation, and the date the recipient reported the donation. Donations of €10,000 or more must be included in the party’s annual accountability report to the President of the Bundestag.

State prosecutors are generally responsible for investigating corruption cases, but not all state governments have prosecutors specializing in corruption. Germany has successfully prosecuted hundreds of domestic corruption cases over the years, including large– scale cases against major companies.

Media reports in past years about bribery investigations against Siemens, Daimler, Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Bank, and Ferrostaal have increased awareness of the problem of corruption. As a result, listed companies and multinationals have expanded compliance departments, tightened internal codes of conduct, and offered more training to employees.

10. Political and Security Environment

Overall, political acts of violence against either foreign or domestic business enterprises are extremely rare. Most protests and demonstrations, whether political acts of violence against either foreign or domestic business enterprises or any other cause or focus, remain peaceful. However, minor attacks by left-wing extremists on commercial enterprises occur. These extremists justify their attacks as a means to combat the “capitalist system” as the “source of all evil.” In the foreground, however, concrete connections such as “anti-militarism” (in the case of armament companies), “anti-repression” (in the case of companies for prison logistics or surveillance technology), or the supposed commitment to climate protection (companies from the raw materials and energy sector) are usually cited. In several key instances in larger cities with a strained housing market (low availability of affordable housing options), left-wing extremists target real estate companies in connection with the defense of autonomous “free spaces” and the fight against “anti-social urban structures.” Isolated cases of violence directed at certain minorities and asylum seekers have not targeted U.S. investments or investors.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

The German labor force is generally highly skilled, well-educated, and productive. Before the economic downturn caused by COVID-19, employment in Germany had risen for 13 consecutive years and reached an all-time high of 45.3 million workers in 2019. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, employment fell to 44.8 million in 2020 and remained stagnant in 2021 at 44.79 million workers. The pandemic had a disproportionate impact on female workers, who comprise most employees in the tourism, restaurant, retail, and beauty industries.

Unemployment has fallen by more than half since 2005, and, in 2019, reached the lowest average annual value since German reunification. In 2019, around 2.34 million people were registered as unemployed, corresponding to an unemployment rate of 5.2 percent, according to German Federal Employment Agency calculations. Using internationally comparable data from the European Union’s statistical office Eurostat, Germany had an average annual unemployment rate of 3.2 percent in 2019, the second lowest rate in the European Union. For the pandemic year 2020, the Federal Employment Agency reported an average unemployment rate of 5.9 percent and an average 2.7 million unemployed. In 2021, employment recovered despite the persistent pandemic, with the unemployment rate falling to 5.7 percent and the total number of unemployed dropping by 82,000. However, long-term effects on the labor market and the overall economy due to COVID-19 are not yet fully observable. All employees are by law covered by federal unemployment insurance that compensates for lack of income for up to 24 months. A government-funded temporary furlough program (“Kurzarbeit”) allows companies to decrease their workforce and labor costs with layoffs and has helped mitigate a negative labor market impact in the short term. At its peak in April 2020, the program covered more than six million employees. By December 2021 the number had decreased considerably to 790,000 but remained a key government tool to cope with the impact of COVID-19 on the labor market. The government, through the national employment agency, has spent more than €22 billion on this program, which it considers the main tool to keep unemployment low during the COVID-19 economic crisis. The government extended the program for all companies already meeting its conditions in March 2022 until the end of June 2022.

Germany’s average national youth unemployment rate was 6.9 percent in 2020, the lowest in the EU. The German vocational training system has garnered international interest as a key contributor to Germany’s highly skilled workforce and its sustainably low youth unemployment rate. Germany’s so-called “dual vocational training,” a combination of theoretical courses taught at schools and practical application in the workplace, teaches and develops many of the skills employers need. Each year there are more than 500,000 apprenticeship positions available in more than 340 recognized training professions, in all sectors of the economy and public administration. Approximately 50 percent of students choose to start an apprenticeship. The government promotes apprenticeship opportunities, in partnership with industry, through the “National Pact to Promote Training and Young Skilled Workers.”

An element of growing concern for German business is the country’s decreasing population, which (absent large-scale immigration) will likely shrink considerably over the next few decades. Official forecasts at the behest of the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs predict the current working-age population will shrink by almost three million between 2010 and 2030, resulting in an overall shortage of workforce and skilled labor. Labor bottlenecks already constrain activity in many industries, occupations, and regions. The government has begun to enhance its efforts to ensure an adequate labor supply by improving programs to integrate women, elderly, young people, and foreign nationals into the labor market. The government has also facilitated the immigration of qualified workers.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2020 €3.332,230 2020 $3.846,414 Federal Statistical Office,
www.worldbank.org/en/country 
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 €88,748 2020 $162,387 Bundesbank, BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ 
Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 €324,992 2020 $564,294 Bundesbank, BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data 
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 29.7% 2020 27.9% Federal Statistical Office, Bundesbank, UNCTAD data available at
https://hbs.unctad.org/foreign-direct-investment/     

* Source for Host Country Data: Federal Statistical Office, www.destatis.de ; Bundesbank, www.bundesbank.de 

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward $1,129,900 100% Total Outward $1,955,383 100%
Luxembourg $220,284 19% United States $336,475 17%
The Netherlands $206,592 18% Luxembourg $291,412 15%
United States $115,320 10% The Netherlands $228,609 12%
Switzerland $91,434 8% United Kingdom $132,019 7%
United Kingdom $748,964 7% France $99,582 5%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.

Hungary

Executive Summary

Hungary continues to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and now faces rising inflation and economic uncertainty due to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Despite a growing deficit and energy prices, as well as a continued skilled labor shortage and corruption concerns, ratings agencies in 2021 maintained Hungary’s sovereign debt at BBB, two notches above investment grade, with a stable outlook. In December 2021, the Finance Ministry forecasted 5.9 percent economic growth and a 4.9 percent budget deficit for 2022. Analysts since then have revised their forecasts and project 2 percentage points lower economic growth for this year.

Hungary, an EU member since 2004, currently has a population of 9.7 million and a GDP of $155 billion. Fellow EU member states and the United States are Hungary’s most important trade and investment partners, although Asian influence is growing; foreign direct investment (FDI) from Asian sources was five percent of total FDI in 2019 and now accounts for over 30 percent of new foreign direct investment in 2020.

Macroeconomic indicators were generally strong before the COVID-19 pandemic, with GDP growing by 4.9 percent in 2019. Following a 5.1 percent pandemic-induced contraction in 2020, Hungary’s GDP increased by 6.4 percent in 2021. As the Government of Hungary (GOH) increased spending to support the economy and other priorities, the 2021 budget deficit reached approximately 7.5 percent of GDP, which pushed up public debt close to 80 percent of GDP.

Hungary’s central location in Europe and high-quality infrastructure have traditionally made it an attractive destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  Between 1989 and 2019, Hungary received approximately $97.8 billion in FDI, mainly in the banking, automotive, software development, and life sciences sectors.  The EU accounts for 89 percent of all in-bound FDI. The United States is the largest non-EU investor, whereas in terms of annual investment, South Korea was the largest investor overall in 2021. The GOH actively encourages investments in manufacturing and other sectors promising high added value and/or employment, such as research and development, defense, and service centers.

Despite these advantages, Hungary’s regional economic competitiveness has declined in recent years.  Since early 2016, multinationals have identified shortages of qualified labor, specifically technicians and engineers, as the largest obstacle to investment in Hungary.  In certain industries, such as finance, energy, telecommunication, pharmaceuticals, and retail, unpredictable sector-specific tax and regulatory policies have favored national and government-linked companies.  Additionally, persistent corruption and cronyism continue to plague the public procurement sector. According to Transparency International’s (TI) 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, Hungary placed 73rd worldwide and ranked 26th out of the 27 EU member states, outperforming only Bulgaria.

Analysts remain concerned that the GOH may intervene in certain priority sectors to unfairly promote domestic ownership at the expense of foreign investors.  In September 2016, Prime Minister (PM) Viktor Orban announced that at least half of the banking, media, energy, and retail sectors should be in Hungarian hands. Since then, observers note that through various tax changes the GOH has pushed several foreign-owned banks out of Hungary. GOH efforts have helped increase Hungarian ownership in the banking sector to close to 60 percent, up from 40 percent in 2010.  In the energy sector, foreign-owned companies’ share of total revenue fell from 70 percent in 2010 to below 50 percent by 2022. Foreign media ownership has decreased drastically as GOH-aligned businesses have consolidated control of Hungary’s media landscape: the number of media outlets owned by GOH allies increased from around 30 in 2015 to nearly 500 in 2018.  In November 2018, the owners of 476 pro-GOH media outlets, constituting between 80 and 90 percent of all media, donated those outlets to the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA) run by individuals with ties to the ruling Fidesz party.

Ostensibly in response to the COVID crisis, the Hungarian government has had uninterrupted state-of-emergency (SOE) powers since November 2020 with authority to bypass Parliament and govern by decree. Parliament passed the first SOE legislation in March 2020 as part of its COVID-19 pandemic response; this legislation did not have a sunset clause, and the government repealed it in June 2020. The GOH passed a second SOE law in November 2020, this time for a 90-day period. Following the expiration of the first 90-day term, the Parliament extended the SOE in February, May, September and most recently in December 2021 – until June 2022 – without any support from opposition parties. As part of the emergency measures, the GOH extended measures for national security screening of foreign investments from December 31, 2020, until December 31, 2022, and may extend this deadline further.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perception Index 2021

    73 of 180

http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
Global Innovation Index 2021    34 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020      $13,295  https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2020     $15,890 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

 

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

3. Legal Regime

4. Industrial Policies

5. Protection of Property Rights

6. Financial Sector

8. Responsible Business Conduct

Hungary encourages multinational firms to follow the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which promotes a due diligence approach to responsible business conduct (RBC).  The government has established a National Contact Point (NCP) in the Ministry of Finance for stakeholders to obtain information or raise concerns in the context of RBC. The Hungarian NCP has organized events to promote OECD guidelines among the business community, trade unions, government agencies, and NGOs.  Members of the Hungarian NCP include representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Innovation and Technology, and Agriculture. The Hungarian NCP submits annual reports to the OECD Investment Commission, except for 2020 when its activity was strongly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. For more information, see:   http://oecd.kormany.hu/a-magyar-nemzeti-kapcsolattarto-pont  .

In recent years, the Hungarian NCP has organized several conferences, the last one in January 2020, to promote RBC and OECD guidelines. It announced in 2017 its intention to formulate a new National Action Plan on Businesses and Human Rights.  According to the first National Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Action Plan formulated in 2015, key RBC priorities of the GOH included the employment of discriminated, disadvantaged, and disabled groups, environmental protection, and the expansion of sustainable economy.  Hungary’s NCP peer review is scheduled in 2023. The Hungarian Public Relations Association, CSR Hungary, and other NGOs are involved in elaborating the second National Action Plan. The Hungarian NCP reviews complaints from trade unions against multinational companies’ subsidiaries operating in Hungary and coordinates with relevant NPCs of the multinational company’s home country. RBC does not typically play a role in GOH procurement decisions, although the 2015 Public Procurement Act integrates concepts of CSR, responsible business conduct, and good practice.

Several NGOs and business associations promote RBC and CSR.  The one with the most members, CSR Hungary Forum, created in 2006, established an annual award and trademark in 2008 to recognize business CSR efforts; others include the Hungarian Public Relations Association, “Kovet.”

According to a 2018 survey conducted by CSR Hungary, 60 percent of businesses have a CSR policy and 44 percent of businesses attribute a CSR orientation to increased competitiveness.  However, only about 34 percent of multinational and SOEs and 9 percent of SMEs report formally formulating a CSR action plan. According to a 2021 study on corporate social responsibility in Hungary, stakeholder pressure is weak, and they expect increased state-level intervention in CSR issues.

In 2017, Hungary’s independent agencies for labor rights protection, consumer protection, cultural heritage protection, and environment protection were merged into relevant ministries and county-level government offices.  Environmental NGOs criticized the transformation of the system and warned about the lack of independent agencies.

Climate Issues

In January 2020, the GOH approved and published its new long-term energy strategy and an EU-required National Energy and Climate Plan – both of which focused heavily on decarbonization and sustainable climate policy. According to the documents, Hungary aims to reduce its carbon emissions by at least 40 percent by 2030 (compared to the 1990 level), an additional 10 percent by 2040, and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050.  Given that Hungary emits 33 percent less CO2 than it did in 1990, the real cut would be seven percent in the next eight years and 17 percent in the next 20 years. The seven percent cut would be easily achieved with the phase-out of the lignite coal fired Matra Power Plant by 2025. Experts have noted that the plan to have Hungary cut the remaining 50 percent (to achieve carbon neutrality) in the 2040-2050 period is an ambitious goal. Although in December 2020, the GOH committed itself to the new EU goal (“Fit for 55”) of reducing carbon emissions by 55 percent by 2030, the details of achieving the more ambitious goal are to be worked out. The GOH estimates the total costs of Hungary achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at $145 billion.

Private sector contributions to reach the climate goals include increasing Hungary’s solar power capacity from the currently available more than 2000 MW to 6000 MW by 2030 and to 10,000 MW by 2040. In energy efficiency, the GOH’s aim is to limit Hungary’s total final energy demand on the 2005 level by 2030. To reach this goal, the GOH introduced a tax incentive for businesses investing into energy efficiency. Although the GOH strategies stress the great potential in decreasing the energy demand of households, so far there have been only limited efforts.

Despite the February 2021 ruling of the European Court of Justice saying that Hungary had “systematically and persistently” breached legal limits on air pollution, the GOH still has failed to take any efficient measures to deal with the problem. Although the GOH maintains an extensive system of national parks and nature reserves, there are no other government policies, or regulatory incentives helping to preserve biodiversity. The second National Climate Change Strategy adopted in 2018 contains the National Adaptation Strategy which is based on the climate vulnerability assessment of ecosystem and industrial sectors.

Although Hungary’s Public Procurement Act of 2015 allows the government to consider environmental and green growth aspects, the GOH has not yet issued a decree governing the detailed rules of green procurements. Hungary is one of the five EU member states without a national action plan on green public procurements according to the State Audit Office. In April 2021, Hungary’s Public Procurement Authority launched a sustainability working group and in September 2021 issued a Green Codex to provide some guidelines on green procurements.

9. Corruption

The Hungarian Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior are responsible for combating corruption.  Although a legal framework exists to support their efforts, critics have asserted that the government has done little to combat grand corruption and rarely investigates cases involving politically connected individuals, even when recommended to do so by the European Antifraud Office (OLAF). Hungary is a party to the UN Anticorruption Convention and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and has incorporated their provisions into the penal code, as well as subsequent OECD and EU requirements on the prevention of bribery.  Parliament passed the Strasbourg Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 2002 and the Strasbourg Civil Code Convention on Corruption of 2004. Hungary is a member of GRECO (Group of States against Corruption), an organization established by members of Council of Europe to monitor the observance of their standards for fighting corruption.  GRECO’s reports on evaluation and compliance are confidential unless the Member State authorizes the publication of its report.  For several years, the GOH has kept confidential GRECO’s most recent compliance reports on prevention of corruption with respect to members of parliament, judges, and prosecutors, and a report on transparency of party financing.

Following calls from the opposition, NGOs, and other GRECO Member States, and a March 2019 visit by senior GRECO officials to Budapest, the GOH agreed to publish the reports in August 2019. The reports revealed that Hungary failed to meet 13 out of 18 recommendations issued by GRECO in 2015; assessed that Hungary’s level of compliance with the recommendations was “globally unsatisfactory,” and concluded that the country would therefore remain subject to GRECO’s non-compliance procedure. The compliance report on transparency of party financing noted some progress but added that “the overall picture is disappointing.” A November 2020 GRECO report came to the same conclusion, adding that Hungary had made no progress since the prior year on implementing anticorruption recommendations for MPs, judges, and prosecutors.

In December 2016, the GOH withdrew its membership in the international anti-corruption organization the Open Government Partnership (OGP).  Following a letter of concern by transparency watchdogs to OGP’s Steering Committee in summer 2015, OGP launched an investigation into Hungary and issued a critical report.  The OGP admonished the GOH for its harassment of NGOs and urged it to take steps to restore transparency and to ensure a positive operating environment for civil society. The GOH, only the second Member State to be reprimanded by the organization, rejected the OGP report conclusions and withdrew from the organization.

In recent years, the GOH has amplified its attacks on NGOs including transparency watchdogs, accusing them of acting as foreign agents and criticizing them for allegedly working against Hungarian interests.  Observers assess that this anti-NGO rhetoric endangered the continued operation of anti-corruption NGOs crucial to promoting transparency and good governance in Hungary. In 2017 and 2018, Parliament passed legislations that many civil society activists criticized for placing undue restrictions on NGOs. In its June 2018 and November 2021 rulings, the European Court of Justice found both legislations in conflict with EU law.

Transparency International (TI) is active in Hungary.  TI’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index rated Hungary 73 out of 180 countries.  Out of the 27 EU member states, Hungary ranked 26th, outperforming only Bulgaria. TI has noted that state institutions responsible for supervising public organizations were headed by people loyal to the ruling party, limiting their ability to serve as a check on the actions of the GOH.  TI and other watchdogs note that data on public spending remains difficult to access since the GOH amended the Act on Freedom of Information in 2013 and 2015. Moreover, according to watchdogs and investigative journalists, the GOH, state agencies, and SOEs are increasingly reluctant to answer questions related to public spending, resulting in lengthy court procedures to receive answers to questions.  Even if the court orders the release of data, by the time it happens, the data has lost significance and has a weaker impact, watchdogs warn. In some cases, even when ordered to provide information, state agencies and SOEs release data in nearly unusable or undecipherable formats.

U.S. firms – along with other investors – identify corruption as a significant problem in Hungary.  According to the World Economic Forum’s 2017 Global Competitiveness Report, businesses considered corruption as the second most important obstacle to making a successful business in Hungary.

State corruption is also high on the list of EC concerns with Hungary.  The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) has found high levels of fraud in EU-funded projects in Hungary and has levied fines and withheld development funds on several occasions.  Over the past few years, the EC has suspended payments of EU funds several times due to irregularities in Hungary’s procurement system.

TI and other anti-corruption watchdogs have highlighted EU-funded development projects as the largest source of corruption in Hungary.  A TI study found indications of corruption and overpricing in up to 90 percent of EU-funded projects. Reports by Corruption Research Center (CRCB) from April and May 2020 found – after analyzing more than 240,000 public procurement contracts from 2005-2020 – that companies owned by individuals with links to senior government officials enjoy preferential treatment in public tenders and face less competition than other companies. The studies also revealed that the share of single-bidder public procurement contracts was over 40 percent in 2020, and that the corruption risk reached its highest level since 2005. In a March 2022 report CRCB found that in the 2011-2021 period, more than 20 percent of the EU-funded public contracts were won by 42 companies owned by 12 entrepreneurs closely affiliated with the government. In 2020, a year which was particularly difficult for many businesses because of the Covid-crisis, this small group of entrepreneurs won almost one-third of the EU-funded public tenders.

Hungary has legislation in place to combat corruption.  Giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal offense, as is an official’s failure to report such an incident.  Penalties can include confiscation of assets, imprisonment, or both. Since Hungary’s entry into the EU, legal entities can also be prosecuted.  Legislation prohibits members of parliament from serving as executives of state-owned enterprises. An extensive list of public officials and many of their family members are required to make annual declarations of assets, but there is no specified penalty for making an incomplete or inaccurate declaration.  It is common for prominent politicians to be forced to amend declarations of assets following revelations in the press of omission of ownership or part-ownership of real estate and other assets in asset declarations. Politicians are not penalized for these omissions.

Transparency advocates claim that Hungarian law enforcement authorities are often reluctant to prosecute cases with links to high-level politicians.  For example, they reported that, in November 2018, Hungarian authorities dropped the investigation into $50 million in EU-funded public lighting tenders won by a firm co-owned by a relative of the prime minister, despite concerns raised by OLAF about evidence of conflict of interest and irregularities involving the deal. According to media reports, OLAF concluded that several of the tenders were won due to what it considered organized criminal activity. In December 2021, the Prosecutor General’s Office charged a senior government politician for accepting bribes to influence cases at the request of the president of the Court Bailiff Chamber. The senior government official resigned immediately but kept his position as an MP and was left at large for the time of the investigation.

Annual asset declarations for the family members of public officials are not public and only parliamentary committees can investigate them if there is a specified suspicion of fraud.  Transparency watchdogs warn that this makes the system of asset declarations inefficient and easy to circumvent as politicians can hide assets and revenues in their family members’ names.

The Public Procurement Act of 2015 initially included broad conflict of interest rules on excluding family members of GOH officials from participating in public tenders, but Parliament later amended the law to exclude only family members living in the same household.  While considered in line with the overarching EU directive, the law still leaves room for subjective evaluations of bid proposals and tender specifications to be tailored to favored companies.

While public procurement legislation is in place and complies with EU requirements, private companies and watchdog NGOs expressed concerns about pervasive corruption and favoritism in public procurements in Hungary.  According to their criticism, public procurements in practice lack transparency and accountability and are characterized by uneven implementation of anti-corruption laws.  Additionally, transparency NGOs calculate that government-allied firms have won a disproportionate percentage of public procurement awards.  The business community and foreign governments share many of these concerns.  Multinational firms have complained that competing in public procurements presents unacceptable levels of corruption and compliance risk.  A 2019 European Commission study found that Hungary had the second-highest rate (40 percent) of one-bidder EU funded procurement contracts in the European Union.  In addition, observers have raised concerns about the appointments of Fidesz party loyalists to head quasi-independent institutions such as the Competition Authority, the Media Council, and the State Audit Office. Because it is generally understood that companies without political connections are unlikely to win public procurement contracts, many firms lacking such connections do not bid or compete against politically connected companies.

The GOH does not require private companies to establish internal codes of conduct.

Generally, larger private companies and multinationals operating in Hungary have internal codes of ethics, compliance programs, or other controls, but their efficacy is not uniform.

Resources to Report Corruption

GOH Office Responsible for Combatting Corruption:

National Protective Service
General Director Zoltan Bolcsik
Phone: +36 1 433 9711
Fax: +36 1 433 9751
E-mail: nvsz@nvsz.police.hu  

Transparency International Hungary
1055 Budapest
Falk Miksa utca 30. 4/2
Phone: +36 1 269 9534
Fax: +36 1 269 9535
E-mail: info@transparency.hu  

10. Political and Security Environment

The security environment is relatively stable.  Politically motivated violence or civil disturbance is rare.  Violent crime is low, with street crimes the most frequently reported crimes in the country. Political violence is not common in Hungary.  The transition from communist authoritarianism to capitalist democracy was negotiated and peaceful, and free elections have been held consistently since 1990.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

Hungary’s civilian labor force of 4.7 million is highly educated and skilled.  Literacy exceeds 98 percent and about two-thirds of the work force has completed secondary, technical, or vocational education.  Hungary’s record low 3.3 percent unemployment rate at the end of 2019 increased to 3.8 percent in December 2021 as a result of the pandemic, but it is lower than the EU average of 7.3 percent.  Hungary’s employment rate for the population aged 15-64 years was 73.9 percent in 2021, higher than the EU average of 68.3 percent. Hungary is particularly strong in engineering, medicine, economics, and science training, although emigration of Hungarians from these sectors to other EU member states has increased in recent years. In the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, out-migration temporarily declined but resumed during the second half of 2020.

Multinationals increasingly cite a skilled labor shortage as their biggest challenge in Hungary and note that Hungarian vocational institutions and universities need to adapt more quickly to changes in the marketplace.  An increasing number of young people are attending U.S.- and European-affiliated business schools in Hungary. Foreign language skills, especially in English and German, are becoming more widespread, yet Hungary still has the lowest level of foreign language proficiency in the EU.  According to 2018 data, only 37 percent of working-age Hungarians speak at least one foreign language, while the EU average is 66 percent.

As the unemployment rate has declined, certain sectors have begun to face shortages of skilled and highly educated employees.  As Hungarians increasingly seek work abroad, shortages of highly educated and skilled labor are negatively affecting growth in certain regions and industries.  In addition, declining OECD Program of International Student Assessment (PISA) scores may signal that the workforce is losing its ability to learn new skills and adapt to changing market conditions. The government is attempting to address labor shortage by increasing the minimum wage, offering retraining programs, incentivizing employment of young mothers and pensioners by lowering employer-paid welfare contributions, and reforming the education and vocational training system.  Shortages of skilled workers, particularly in the IT, financial, and manufacturing sectors, are more acute in the northwest and central regions of the country. In the eastern half of the country, unemployment levels are above average, even though the cost of labor is lower. Wages in Hungary are still significantly lower than those in Western Europe, despite the recent increase in minimum wage. Average Hungarian labor productivity is lower than the EU average but exceeds that of other Central and Eastern European economies.

In 2016, the government, trade unions, and employer representatives signed a three-year agreement to increase the minimum wage for unskilled and skilled workers. The deal also included a more than 50-percent cut in the business tax for large companies from 19 percent to 9 percent as of 2017, as well as gradually lowering the payroll tax from 21.5 percent in 2016 by 2 percent each year, down to 15.5 percent as of July 2020, to offset increasing labor costs. In subsequent years the parties signed annual minimum wage agreements which increased the minimum wage by 8 percent in 2020, by 3.6 percent in 2021, and as of January 2022, by 20 percent. The GOH also facilitates the employment of workers from neighboring countries, primarily ethnic Hungarian minority communities in those countries. The GOH requires hiring of nationals in certain strategic sectors and some areas of public administration.

Labor law stipulates a severance payment in case of lay-off, as well as under certain conditions for an employee terminating a work contract.  The government pays unemployment benefits for three months and offers the services of local employment offices. The GOH did not extend this benefit beyond the normal three months during the pandemic. Labor laws are uniform and there are no waivers available to attract or retain investment.  Collective bargaining is increasingly common in large companies, education, public transport, retail, and medical services.

The 2012 changes to the Labor Law transferred some collective bargaining rights from trade unions to work councils (Although work councils have a similar mission to those of labor unions, each firm has its own work council, and thus lacks the collective reach of an industry-wide trade union).  Hungary’s trade union membership rate is below 10 percent, while the EU average is 25 percent. About 20 percent of businesses have a collective bargaining agreement on labor conditions and benefits, well below the EU average of about 80 percent. During the COVID-19 pandemic the government passed regulations that allow businesses to unilaterally terminate collective bargaining agreements, which led to a few strikes, which have been resolved by negotiations. Beginning in 2021, the GOH decreased state support to trade unions and implemented budget changes to allow discretional funding to each trade union, which replaced the previously uniform system. Hungary has ratified all eight International Labor Organization (ILO) core conventions.

Labor dispute resolution includes mediation as well as court procedures.  Employees, however, typically agree with employers outside court or mediation procedures. In 2019, a six-day strike at Audi Hungary was resolved with an agreement between employers and employees for a 15- to 20-percent wage increase.  The success of this high-profile strike has led to a series of short-term strikes, or threats of strikes, at other companies. Most of these strikes have been resolved quickly with wage increase concessions from management and changes in overtime payment and conditions.  All recent strikes have been peaceful and complied with Hungarian labor laws.

Hungary has been a member of the ILO since 1955.  Hungary’s labor law and practice are in line with international labor standards.  Discussions between the ILO and the GOH are ongoing on certain provisions of the 2012 modification of Hungary’s labor law, including the freedom of expression, registration of trade unions, and minimum level of public service in case of strike.

Hungary passed amendments to its Labor Code in December 2018 that increased the amount of overtime an employer can request and gives employers up to three years to reconcile and pay for overtime.  These highly unpopular changes led to a series of large protests throughout Hungary and currently are being reviewed by the European Commission. As a part of its COVID-19 economic response plan, the government decreed in 2020 that employers can implement flexible working hours and a 24-month working time frame to calculate overtime without prior agreement from the employee or union. Local labor organizations complained that the move rolled back hard-won concessions from the 2018 labor reform and that certain businesses abuse overtime possibilities to compensate for shutdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The constitution and laws prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, gender, disability, language, sexual orientation and gender identity, infection with HIV or other communicable diseases, or social status. The labor code provides for the principles of equal treatment. The government failed to enforce these regulations effectively. Penalties were not commensurate with those under laws related to civil rights.

Observers asserted that discrimination in employment and occupation occurred with respect to Roma, women, persons with disabilities, and LGBTQI+ persons. According to NGOs, there was economic discrimination against women in the workplace, particularly against job seekers older than 50 and those who were pregnant or had returned from maternity leave. The country does not mandate equal pay for equal work. A government decree requires companies with more than 25 employees to reserve 5 percent of their work positions for persons with physical or mental disabilities. While the decree provides fines for noncompliance, many employers generally paid the fines rather than employ persons with disabilities. The National Tax and Customs Authority issued “rehabilitation cards” to persons with disabilities, which granted tax benefits for employers employing such individuals.

Roma were the country’s largest ethnic minority. According to the 2011 census, approximately 315,000 persons (3 percent of the population) identified themselves as Roma. A University of Debrecen study published in 2018, however, estimated there were 876,000 Roma in the country, or approximately 9 percent of the country’s population. There were approximately 1,300 de facto segregated settlements in the country where Roma constituted the majority of the population. Romani communities are not socially integrated with broader Hungarian society and are characterized by considerably lower indicators on most socioeconomic measures than the majority population. Conditions for the community deteriorated since the collapse of communism in 1989-90 but were rooted in centuries of social exclusion. Lacking advanced education and employment skills, many Roma occupied the margins of society and experienced long-term unemployment, which bred a cycle of poverty and welfare dependence.

Iceland

Executive Summary

Iceland is an island country located between North America and Europe in the Atlantic Ocean, near the Arctic Circle with an advanced economy that centers around three primary sectors: fisheries, tourism, and aluminum production. Until recently, U.S. investment in Iceland has mostly been concentrated in the aluminum sector, with Alcoa and Century Aluminum operating plants in Iceland. However, U.S. portfolio investments in Iceland have been steadily increasing in recent years. Iceland’s convenient location between the United States and Europe, its high levels of education, connectivity, and English proficiency, and a general appreciation for U.S. products make Iceland a promising market for U.S. companies. Furthermore, Americans made up a third of the tourist population that visited Iceland in 2021.

There is broad recognition within the Icelandic government that foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key contributor to the country’s economic revival after the 2008 financial collapse. As part of its investment promotion strategy, the Icelandic government operates a public-private agency called “Invest in Iceland” that facilitates foreign investment by providing information to potential investors and promoting investment incentives. Iceland has identified the following “key sectors” in Iceland; tourism; algae culture; data centers; and life sciences. Iceland offers incentives to foreign investors in certain industries.

Tourism has been a growing force behind Iceland’s economy in the past decade, with opportunities for investors in high-end tourism, including luxury resorts and hotels. The number of tourists in Iceland grew by more than 400 percent between 2010 and 2018, reaching more than 2.3 million in 2018. However, tourism in Iceland contracted in 2019, and the COVID-19 pandemic has had drastic effects on tourism, and the overall economy. The government implemented measures to bolster the tourism economy, thus avoiding mass bankruptcies in the sector, and has committed to building out tourism-related infrastructure.

The startup and innovation communities in Iceland are flourishing, with the IT and biotech sectors growing fast, particularly pharmaceuticals and wellness, gaming, and aquaculture. Iceland’s IT sector spans all areas of the digital economy. The Icelandic energy grid derives 99 percent of its power from renewable resources, making it uniquely attractive for energy-dependent industries. For instance, the data center industry in Iceland is expanding.

Iceland is working by the 2018 Climate Acton Plan, which was updated in 2020, and is designed to achieve Iceland’s national climate goals of making the country carbon neutral by 2040 and to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent by 2030 under the Paris Agreement.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 13 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
Global Innovation Index 2021 17 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $796 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $62,420 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

3. Legal Regime

4. Industrial Policies

5. Protection of Property Rights

6. Financial Sector

7. State-Owned Enterprises

The Icelandic Government owns wholly or majority shares in 40 companies, including systematically important companies such as energy companies, the Icelandic National Broadcasting Service (RUV) and Iceland Post. Other notable SOEs are Landsbankinn (one of three commercial banks in Iceland), Isavia (public company that operates Keflavik International Airport), and ATVR (the only company allowed to sell alcohol to the general public). Here you can find a list of SOEs ( https://www.stjornarradid.is/verkefni/rekstur-og-eignir-rikisins/felog-i-eigu-rikisins/ ). Total assets of SOEs in 2020 amounted to 5,735 billion ISK (approx. $44.3 billion) and SOEs employed around 5,100 people that same year. In terms of assets and equity, Landsbankinn (one of three commercial banks in Iceland) is the largest SOE in Iceland, and Isavia employs the most people.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) generally compete under the same terms and conditions as private enterprises, except in the energy production and distribution sector. Private enterprises have similar access to financing as SOEs through the banking system.

As an OECD member, Iceland adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. The Iceland Chamber of Commerce in Iceland, NASDAQ OMX Iceland and the Confederation of Icelandic Employers have issued guidelines that mirror the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance. Iceland is party to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

For SOEs operating within the private sector in a competitive environment, the general guideline from the Icelandic government is that all decisions of the board of the SOE should ensure a level playing field and spur competition in the market.

In the midst of the banking crisis, the state, through the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME), took over Iceland’s three largest commercial banks, which collapsed in October 2008, and subsequently took over several savings banks to allow for uninterrupted banking services in the country. The government has started the privatization process of Islandsbanki, and currently owns 42.5 percent shares in the bank. The Bank Shares Management Company, established by the state in 2009, manages state-owned shares in financial companies.

The government of Iceland has acquired stakes in many companies through its ownership of shares in the banks; however, it is the policy of the government not to interfere with internal or day-to-day management decisions of these companies. Instead, in 2009, the state established the Bank Shares Management Company to manage the state-owned shares in financial companies. The board of this entity, consisting of individuals appointed by the Minister of Finance, appoints a selection committee, which in turn chooses the State representative to sit on the boards of the various companies.

While most energy producers are either owned by the state or municipalities, there is free competition in the energy market. That said, potential foreign investment in critical sectors like energy is likely to be met by demands for Icelandic ownership, either formally or from the public. For example, a Canadian company, Magma Energy, acquired a 95 percent stake in the energy production company HS Orka in 2010, but later sold a 33.4 percent stake to the Icelandic pension funds in the face of intense public pressure.

Iceland’s universal healthcare system is mainly state-operated. However, few legal restrictions to private medical practice exist; private clinics are required to maintain an agreement regarding payment for services with the Icelandic state, a foreign state, or an insurance company.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

As an OECD member, Iceland adheres to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The Ministry for Culture and Business Affairs houses Iceland’s National Contact Point for the Guidelines, charged with promoting the due diligence approach of the Guidelines to the business community and to facilitate the resolution of any disputes arising in the context of the Guidelines ( https://www.stjornarradid.is/verkefni/atvinnuvegir/vidskipti/almenn-vidskiptamal/ ).

Business Iceland (formerly Promote Iceland), which is a public-private agency responsible for promoting Iceland’s export sectors abroad, has signed the United Nations’ Global Compact (GC) and raises awareness of corporate social responsibility in Iceland. Festa, a non-profit organization which promotes sustainable development and corporate social responsibility, has over 120 associated members, including some of Iceland’s largest companies, public organizations, universities, and municipalities ( www.samfelagsabyrgd.is/festa ). Gagnsaei, an NGO affiliated with Transparency International, is active in Iceland and is a voice against corruption ( www.transparency.is ). There is a general awareness of corporate social responsibility among producers, companies, and consumers.

There was a high-profile case in 2018 and 2019 surrounding a private employment agency which has now been declared bankrupt, that allegedly mistreated migrant Romanian workers by failing to pay salaries and provide housing as per agreement. This case caused outrage in Iceland and many union and workers’ association leaders voiced their concerns in the media and stated that mistreatment of workers would not be tolerated. The Directorate of Labor fined the company in 2019 for failing to register workers adequately.

As an OECD member state, Iceland adheres to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance recommendations to help companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral purchasing decisions and practices. The Icelandic economy does not have a mining industry, other than extracting rocks and gravel for construction purposes. In 2013, former Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson issued a joint statement with the other Nordic Prime Ministers to reaffirm their support to the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI).

Department of State

Department of the Treasury

Department of Labor

9. Corruption

Isolated cases of corruption have been known to occur but are not an obstacle to foreign investment in Iceland or a recognized issue of concern in the government. In 2021 Iceland ranked 13 out of 180 economies on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Iceland has signed the UN Convention against Corruption. Iceland is a member of the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery.

The Council of Europe body Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) published its fifth evaluation report on Iceland on April 12, 2018. GRECO found that Iceland had no dedicated government-wide policy plan on anti-corruption and that its agency and institution-specific codes of conduct were not sufficiently detailed and were often implemented in an ad hoc manner. For more information, see the GRECO report ( https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/16807b8218 ). The Icelandic Parliament introduced a new law in 2020 on measures against conflict of interests for ministers, assistance to ministers, director generals at ministries, and ambassadors, concerning receiving gifts, additional job positions, and supervision of the aforementioned law.

In the wake of the financial collapse in Iceland in 2008, a Code of Conduct for Staff in the Government Offices of Iceland was established in 2012, “with the purpose of promoting professional methods and of confidence in public administration.” The code of conduct addresses workplace relations and procedures; behavior and conduct; conflicts of interest and shared interests; communication with the media, public and surveillance bodies; and responsibility and monitoring for Government Offices staff. For more information see the Government of Iceland’s website ( https://www.government.is/ministries/prime-ministers-office/code-of-conduct-for-staff/ ). The code does not extend to family members of officials or political parties.

10. Political and Security Environment

Politically motivated violence in Iceland is rare, and Iceland consistently ranks among the world’s safest countries. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator on Political Stability and Absence of Violence placed Iceland in the top 97th percentile rank of all countries worldwide in 2020 ( http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports ). In early 2014, frustration among voters regarding the then-governing Progressive Party-Independence Party coalition government’s withdrawal of Iceland’s accession bid to the European Union led to the largest protests since the financial collapse; these protests did not include violence. Non-violent protests led to a governmental reorganization and early elections following the 2016 “Panama Papers” scandal. A subsequent government, composed of the Independence Party, Bright Future, and the Reform Party, took office in early 2017 and collapsed within a year. The current coalition government, composed of the Independence Party, Progressive Party, and the Left-Green Movement, assumed power in November 2017 and began its second term November 28, 2021.

There have been individual cases of politically motivated vandalism of foreign holdings in recent years, directed primarily at the aluminum industry.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

The labor force in Iceland is highly skilled and educated. The labor force consisted of 208,900 people aged between 16 and 74 years old at the end of 2021 according to Statistics Iceland. Of them, 199,700 people were employed and 9,200 unemployed at the end of 2021. According to Statistics Iceland, the unemployment rate was 4.4 percent in December 2021, while the Directorate of Labor reported 4.9 percent unemployment for the same month. Foreign labor plays a large role in unskilled and semi-skilled sectors such as tourism and construction. In December 2021, 38,000 immigrants were employed in Iceland, according to Statistics Iceland. Women in Iceland are almost on par with men when it comes to labor participation, with 77.2 percent of women being active on the job market, compared to 79 percent of men, according to Statistics Iceland. The Icelandic population is highly educated, with 33.3 percent of 16-to-74-year old’s having tertiary/university education.

Icelandic Labor Laws are taken seriously in Iceland, and there are no waivers to attract or retain investment. The labor unions and Directorate of Labor conduct spot inspections on worksites to monitor legal compliance. The labor market is highly unionized, with 91.9 percent of the workforce members of trade unions in 2020, according to Statistics Iceland.

Icelandic labor unions are decentralized and not politically affiliated. Collective bargaining power, in both the public and the private sectors, rests with individual labor unions. The law does not establish a minimum wage, but the minimum wages negotiated in collective bargaining agreements apply automatically to all employees in those occupations, including foreign workers, regardless of union membership. While the agreements can be either industry-wide, sector-wide, or in some cases firm-specific, the type of position defines the negotiated wage levels. The government has sometimes imposed mandatory mediation to avert or end strikes in key economic sectors such as healthcare or fisheries.

According to collective bargaining agreements, the standard work week is 37.5 hours, or 7.5 hours a day. Employees have the right to take a 15-minute paid break within the standard workday. Lunch, either 30 or 60 minutes, is then added to the standard workday. The law requires that employers compensate work exceeding eight hours per day as overtime. Collective bargaining agreements determine the terms of overtime pay, but they do not vary significantly across unions. The law limits the total hours a worker may work, including overtime, to 48 hours a week on average during each four-month period. Typical holiday and shift-work rates are 40 percent above the standard shift rate and may be up to 45 percent more if total work hours exceed full-time employment. The law entitles workers to 11 hours of rest in each 24-hour period and one full day off each week. Under specially defined circumstances, employers may reduce the 11-hour rest period to no fewer than eight hours, but they must then compensate workers with corresponding rest time later. They may also postpone a worker’s day off, but the worker must receive the corresponding rest time within 14 days.

Outside terminating an employee, employers are by law prohibited from making unilateral amendments to hiring contracts. Companies are mandated to report mass layoffs to the Directorate of Labor. Terminated employees retain the same rights to severance benefits regardless of whether they were part of a mass layoff or fired. For further information, see the Directorate of Labor website ( https://vinnumalastofnun.is/en ).

Ireland

Executive Summary

The COVID-19 crisis had a massive impact on Ireland’s economy and its effects will continue in 2022. The Irish government implemented varying degrees of lockdown measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic from the onset in March 2020, including restrictions to close non-essential businesses and services for extended periods of time. Unemployment (including COVID-19 related temporary unemployment) peaked at 28.1 percent in April 2020. Ireland’s official unemployment rate remained around 5 percent (currently at 5.2 percent as of February 2022) due to the unprecedented pandemic related government assistance programs to businesses and workers furloughed due to COVID-19. Over the past two years, the government sustained a level of unprecedented deficit spending to combat the pandemic. Despite the prolonged difficulties caused by COVID-19, Ireland’s economy performed extremely well with GDP growth of 13.5 percent recorded in 2021 following growth of 5.9 percent in 2020. Most of this growth can be attributed to export focused industries (technology, pharmaceutical, and other large multinational companies headquartered in Ireland) while the domestic economy struggled with temporary business closures due to the restrictions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exasperated Ireland’s growing inflation concerns with fuel and gas price rises leading to price increases across all sectors, which could dampen consumer spending and confidence and could result in lower-than-expected growth for 2022.

The Irish government actively promotes foreign direct investment (FDI) and has had considerable success in attracting investment, particularly from the United States. There are over 950 U.S. subsidiaries in Ireland operating primarily in the following sectors: chemicals, biosciences, pharmaceutical and medical devices; computer hardware and software; internet and digital media; electronics, and financial services.

One of Ireland’s many attractive features as an FDI destination is its favorable 12.5 percent corporate tax (in place since 2003), the second lowest in the European Union (EU). Ireland signed the OECD Inclusive Framework Agreement, which institutes minimum corporate tax rate of 15 percent when implemented. Firms routinely note that they come to Ireland primarily for the high quality and flexibility of the English-speaking workforce; the availability of a multilingual labor force; cooperative labor relations; political stability; and pro-business government policies and regulators. Additional positive features include a transparent judicial system; transportation links; proximity to the United States and Europe; and Ireland’s geographic location making it well placed in time zones to support investment in Asia and the Americas. Ireland benefits from its membership of the EU and a barrier-free access to a market of almost 500 million consumers. In addition, the clustering of existing successful industries has created an ecosystem attractive to new firms. The United Kingdom’s (UK) departure from the EU, or Brexit, on January 1, 2021, leaves Ireland as the only remaining English-speaking country in the EU and may make Ireland even more attractive as a destination for FDI.

The Irish government treats all firms incorporated in Ireland on an equal basis. Ireland’s judicial system is transparent and upholds the sanctity of contracts, as well as laws affecting foreign investment. Conversely, Ireland’s ability to attract investment are often marred by relatively high labor and operating costs (such as for energy); skilled-labor shortages; licensing and permitting challenges (e.g., for zoning, rezoning, project permissions, etc.) Eurozone-risk; infrastructure in need of investment (such as in transportation, affordable housing, energy and broadband internet); high income tax rates; uncertainty in EU policies on some regulatory matters; and absolute price levels among the highest in Europe.

New data centers must meet new requirements regarding location, energy consumption and energy storage as Ireland’s electricity system struggles to meet demand for energy.

A formal national security screening process for foreign investment in line with the EU framework is expected to be in place by late 2022, though the original date was 2020 but delayed due to the pandemic. At present, investors looking to receive government grants or assistance through one of the four state agencies responsible for promoting foreign investment in Ireland are often required to meet certain employment and investment criteria.

Ireland uses the euro as its national currency and enjoys full current and capital account liberalization.

The government recognizes and enforces secured interests in property, both chattel and real estate. Ireland is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and a party to the International Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property.

Several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operate in Ireland in the energy, broadcasting, and transportation sectors. All of Ireland’s SOEs are open to competition for market share.

While Ireland has no bilateral investment treaties, the United States and Ireland have shared a Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty since 1950 that provides for national treatment of U.S. investors. The two countries have also shared a Tax Treaty since 1998, supplemented in December 2012 with an agreement to improve international tax compliance and to implement the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perception Index 2021 13 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
Global Innovation Index 2021 19 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $390,274 https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $65,620 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

 

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

3. Legal Regime

4. Industrial Policies

5. Protection of Property Rights

6. Financial Sector

8. Responsible Business Conduct

A growing awareness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Ireland is mainly driven by independent organizations and multinational corporations. According to “Business in the Community–Ireland,” an organization at the forefront of promoting CSR in Ireland, many of the participant firms believe CSR-oriented policies can play a major role in rebuilding Ireland’s corporate reputation. Companies advertise their participation in such programs as the Fairtrade Certification Mark. The American Chamber of Commerce in Ireland has also released its own report documenting the widespread CSR efforts of American affiliate firms in the country.

The government promotes responsible business conduct in Ireland. Its national action plan “Towards Responsible Business – Ireland’s National Plan on Corporate Social Responsibility 2017- 2020″ aims to support businesses in Ireland to create sustainable jobs; embed responsible practices in the marketplace; embrace diversity and promote responsible workplaces; and encourage enterprises to consider their businesses’ impacts on the environment. It gives effect to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and sets out the Irish government’s commitments to promoting responsible business practice at home and overseas. DETE maintains a web page www.csrhub.ie  for information on all aspects of CSR in Ireland.

Ireland, as an adherent to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, established a National Contact Point (NCP) responsible for promoting CSR/RBC and facilitating mediation when complaints arise regarding a company not observing the Guidelines. Contact information for the NCP is: https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/What-We-Do/Trade-Investment/OECD-Guidelines-NCP/ 

Additional Resources

Department of State

Department of the Treasury

Department of Labor

Climate Issues

In November 2021, the government released its Climate Action Plan which detailed the actions required to achieve a 51 percent emissions reduction target by 2030 and a goal of net-zero emissions by 2050, as set out in the Climate Act 2021. The plan will be updated annually to ensure alignment with Ireland’s legally binding economy-wide carbon budgets and sectoral ceilings.  The Climate Action Plan lays out sector specific targets to achieve these goals, with the largest reduction slated to come from the energy sector (62-81 percent reduction).  Some of the actions outlined in the action plan to meet the energy decarbonization targets include a review of policy for large energy users, such as data centers, incentivizing demand side flexibility, and developing supportive policies for wind, solar, and micro generation.

Security of energy supply continues to be an issue in Ireland which has been further complicated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ireland is highly dependent on imports of oil and natural gas. While renewable energy, mainly from onshore wind turbines, is growing, Ireland must still import gas, through interconnectors from the UK. Eirgrid, the national grid operator, said Ireland could face electricity shortages over the next five winters unless base load production (from gas or coal) is increased to ensure that intermittent supply from renewables is supplemented.

The Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and the IDA have highlighted the importance of Ireland’s green credentials and climate improvement plans in attracting future investment from international financial services firms.  The IDA said Ireland aims to be a global leader in the area of green or sustainable finance.  Taoiseach Micheál Martin said sustainable finance remains “a top priority” within the government’s financial services agenda, and Ireland was “uniquely positioned” to benefit from significant global investment in fintech due to the country’s track record for foreign direct investment, entrepreneurial culture and existing number of international financial services firms.

9. Corruption

Corruption is not a serious problem for foreign investors in Ireland. The principal Irish legislation relating to anti-bribery and corruption is the Criminal Justice (Corruption Offences) Act of 2018. The Act consolidates all previous legislation for the prevention of corruption. The legislation makes it illegal for Irish public servants to accept bribes. The Ethics in Public Office Act, 1995, provides for the written annual disclosure of interests of people holding public office or employment.

The law on corruption in Ireland gives effect in domestic law to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and other conventions concerning criminal corruption and corruption involving officials of the European Union and officials of EU member states. Irish legislation ensures there are strong penalties in place with prison terms of up to ten years and an ‘unlimited’ fine, for those found guilty of offenses under the Act, including convictions of bribery of foreign public officials by Irish nationals and companies that takes place outside of Ireland.

Irish police (An Garda Siochana, or Garda) investigate all allegations of corruption. The Director of Public Prosecutions is responsible for preparing files for prosecution, on detection of sufficient evidence of criminal activity. The government has, in the past, convicted a small number of public officials for corruption and/or bribery. In 1996, Ireland established the Criminal Asset Bureau (CAB), an independent body responsible for seizing illegally acquired assets. CAB has the powers to focus on the illegally acquired assets of criminals involved in organized crime by identifying criminally acquired assets of persons and taking the appropriate action to deny such people of these assets. Any CAB action is primarily taken through the application of the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996 legislation. Ireland is a member of the Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network (CARIN).

UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery

Ireland signed the UN Convention on Corruption in December 2003 and ratified it in 2011. Ireland is also a participating member of the OECD Working Group on Bribery.

Resources to Report Corruption
Government agency responsible for combating corruption:

Department of Justice and Equality, Crime and Security Directorate
94 St. Stephen’s Green
Dublin 2
Telephone: + 353 1 602-8202
E-mail: info@justice.ie 
Website: www.justice.ie 

Contact at Transparency International:

John Devitt
Chief Executive

Transparency International
Floor 2
69 Middle Abbey St
Dublin 2
Telephone: +353 1 554 3938
E-mail: Admin@transparency.ie 

 

10. Political and Security Environment

There has been no significant spillover of violence from Northern Ireland since the ceasefires of 1994 and the signing and implementation of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 1998. The cessation of violence in Northern Ireland led to increased business investment and confidence in Northern Ireland which also benefited Ireland. The GFA designated funding to develop cross-border cooperation on R&D collaboration, create energy and transportation infrastructure linkages, and for participation in joint trade missions. No violence related to the situation in Northern Ireland has been specifically directed at U.S. citizens or firms located in Ireland.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

Ireland’s population reached 5.01 million in April 2021 an increase of 34,000 on 2020 levels. Net migration in the year to April 2021 was 11,200 persons. The total number of persons employed at the end of 2020 was 2.28 million, but this increased to 2.51 million by the end of 2021 as COVID-19 restrictions relaxed and employers began hiring. Employment opportunities continue to attract inward migrations particularly for employees with language skills.

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic brought with it three lockdowns of the economy (in April, October and December 2020) with maximum restrictions on movements and a sharp rise in the numbers receiving temporary government employment supports. Temporary government unemployment supports (pandemic unemployment payments) were put in place to keep employees linked to their employers to assist in a rapid return to operations following the lockdowns. The COVID-19 adjusted unemployment rate for Ireland stood at 27.0 percent (with an underlying unemployment rate of 7.2 percent) in February 2021. In the year since, most of those claiming temporary unemployment payments have returned to work and by February 2022 the traditional unemployment rate stood at 5.2 percent with the COVID-adjusted rate at 7.0 percent. The Central Bank of Ireland forecasts Ireland’s unemployment rate will average of 5.8 percent in 2022 before declining to 5.3 percent in 2023.

Average hourly labor costs in Ireland increased by 2.0 percent in 2020. During

2021, average industrial earnings increased by 2.1 percent to 989 euro (USD 1,170) per week. The government mandated minimum wage rate was increased by 0.30 euro to 10.50 euro ($12.40) per hour from January 2022, with lower rates set for younger and less experienced workers.

The government regulates the Irish labor force less than governments in most continental EU countries. The 2.633 million workforce has a high degree of flexibility, mobility, and education. There is relative gender balance in the workforce, with 1,328,100 males and 1,177,900 females employed in 2021. The gender balance reflects a societal change and government support that facilitated a surge in female employment from the mid-1980s. There are no restrictions on the hiring of non-national labor, and many firms, especially in the technology sector, hire young professionals with a diverse range of language and technology skills.

Ireland, since the mid-1990’s, is an attractive destination for foreign investment due to the availability of a young, highly educated workforce. The removal of tuition fees for third level (university) education in 1995 resulted in a rapid increase of third-level qualified graduates. While tuition fees are paid by the government, students must still pay registration fees, currently capped at 3,000 euro ($ 3,600) per academic year. The availability of highly educated and qualified potential employees in Ireland is an attractive feature for employers looking to locate in the EU and has been a significant factor in attracting the already large number of multinational companies located in Ireland. Over 60 percent of new third-level students in Ireland undertake business, engineering, computer science, or science courses. The focus of government strategy has shifted to upgrading skills and increasing the number of workers in technology-intensive, high-value sectors to ensure the availability of an educated workforce.

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic introduced mass teleworking to Ireland. The huge change in work practice came almost overnight and despite the immense change, workers and their employers seem to have adapted well. Key to Ireland’s teleworking success was the access to good broadband services. Adequate broadband is already available in most urban areas while the government’s national broadband plan to bring high speed broadband to all areas is still rolling out. It is likely that these plans may be accelerated to get earlier delivery of broadband services in more rural parts of the island. The government is expected to enact legislation giving rights to employees to seek remote working opportunities from their employers.

The Irish system of industrial relations is voluntary. Employers and employees generally agree on pay levels and conditions of employment through collective bargaining. There are generally good industrial relationships and very few industrial disputes. There were just three labor disputes in 2021 down from seven in 2020. (Note: Pandemic measures are likely to have affected the number of disputes in 2020 and 2021. End note). A series of agreements between the government and public service labor unions in place since 2010 have in general reduced public service labor disputes.

Employers typically resist trade union demands for mandatory trade/labor union recognition in the workplace. While the Irish Constitution guarantees the right of citizens to form associations and unions, Irish law also affirms the right of employers to withhold union recognition and to deal with employees on an individual basis. One quarter of all workers are unionized but there is much higher participation by public sector workers in unions. The government estimates up to 80 percent of workers in foreign-owned firms do not belong to unions. This may reflect more attractive pay, benefits, and conditions by these employers compared with domestic firms. DETE explicitly addressed the country’s collective bargaining rights through an amendment of existing legislation in the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015.

Portugal

Executive Summary

The Portuguese economy bounced back from the pandemic, expanding by 4.9 percent in 2021 after an 8.4 percent contraction the prior year, benefitting from EU fiscal and monetary stimulus and a very high vaccination rate. The labor market has shown remarkable resiliency, with unemployment at 6 percent in January 2022, down from 7 percent a year before. GDP is expected to grow again by an estimated 5 percent in 2022, despite the economic shocks from the Russian war against Ukraine

The country will have a chance to boost its economic recovery, deploying more than €16 billion in EU grants and credit expected to fund state coffers between 2021 and 2026. It is expected these funds will be allocated in support of energy and digital transitions.

Increased flows of fossil fuels contributed to a 40 percent jump in trade in goods and services between Portugal and the United States to a record $10 billion in 2021. However, bilateral trade remains lop-sided with a large U.S. trade deficit of around $2.2 billion. Many U.S. companies nvest in business/service delivery centers in Portugal, taking advantage of Portugal’s relatively low-cost, talented, and multilingual labor force.

The country continues to push to improve market attractiveness. Portugal’s export and FDI promotion agency (AICEP) celebrated a record €2.7 billion of contracted FDI in 2021, double that locked-in during the last (2019) high mark. Portugal’s metalworking, auto component, and machinery industries predominate the recent FDI trends, accounting for about 30 percent of the contracted flows, according to the Government .

Portugal’s tech startup scene is thriving, featuring at least six fast-growing firms with ‘Portuguese-U.S. DNA’ that achieved ‘unicorn’ status with valuations above $1 billion– Outsystems, Talkdesk, Feedzai, Remote, SwordHealth and Anchorage. These high-tempo firms are flourishing after tapping into opportunities in the U.S. startup ecosystem that provides not only funding but also knowhow, networks, and customers, ultimately producing jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.

Established in 2012, Portugal’s “Golden Visa” program gives fast-track residence permits to foreign investors who meet certain conditions, such as making substantial capital transfers or certain real estate acquisitions. Between 2012 and February 2022, Portugal issued 10,442 ‘Golden Visas’, representing €6.2 billion of investment, of which more than €5.6 billion went to real estate. Chinese nationals have been the main beneficiaries of the special program for residence permits, accounting for almost 50 percent (5,066) of the 10,442 total, followed by Brazilians with 1,072. Russian citizens were assigned 431 Golden visas since 2012. As of January 2022, Portugal modified the “Golden Visa” program to restrict the purchase of real estate to regions outside urban hotspots such as Lisbon, Porto, and overbuilt areas of the popular Algarve with the aim of boosting rural investment. Loopholes in the program appear to be enabling urban purchases in any event. On March 28, the European Commission urged member states to immediately repeal existing investor citizenship schemes, which the Commission claimed pose inherent risks.

In terms of risks, the independent Portuguese data protection agency (CNPD) has targeted U.S. companies by issuing a succession of judicial opinions warning against the use of U.S. technology firms – including Cloudflare, Respondus, and Amazon Web Services (AWS), arguing that as they are headquartered in the United States and therefore subject to U.S. law, by definition, they have inadequate data privacy standards. CNPD has not found any specific wrongdoing by any U.S. technology firm but bases its rulings on the grounds that a target company is headquartered in the United States. On March 25, President Biden and EU Commission President von der Leyen announced a deal in principle on the Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework, which will supplement the U.S.-EU Privacy Shield Framework (Privacy Shield). However, it remains to be seen how this new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework will affect EU-U.S. data flows in Portugal.

Portugal ranks second highest in terms of PRC investments in Europe (in relation to GDP). These investments are predominantly in the premier Portuguese companies, which the PRC leverages to reach other markets in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. Portugal’s investment screening regime was established in 2014, but the Government of Portugal has never strictly enforced it.

Despite the security risks, the Government continues to allow investments by and collaboration with untrusted vendors in 5G and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Huawei is using its educational and gender-equity programs to increase influence with high achieving students and access to key technology policymakers in the Government and private sector. The PRC is also attempting to gain a foothold in Portuguese 5G, AI, solar, and related infrastructure industries.

Portugal’s public debt, estimated at 127percent of GDP at the end of 2021, remains an issue, particularly if there is a shift in the benign monetary and sovereign risk sentiment that enabled Lisbon to enjoy issuing debt at record low prices in the last few years. The pace of corporate and household indebtedness has also increased.

Portugal’s primary trading partners are Spain, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Portugal suffers an acute brain drain, with high emigration rates among professionals leaving for higher paying careers in Switzerland, France, the UK, and elsewhere.

Beyond Europe, Portugal maintains significant links with Portuguese-speaking countries including Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau. Portugal has one of the lowest fertility rates in Europe and net immigration (from Ukraine, Brazil, and other Portuguese-speaking countries) has prevented a fall in population.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will impact the Portuguese growth curve. Except for grain imports from Ukraine, energy intermediate goods, and liquified natural gas (LNG) imports from Russia, the country’s trade and investment relationship with both countries is limited. In LNG specifically, Russia accounted for 15 percent of imports, well below the 45 percent EU average. However, Portugal is a net importer of energy products, fully dependent on outside supply of crude and refined fossil fuels. It also imports natural gas for energy and generation, which acts as a key complement to the fast-growing renewable energy footprint of its solar, wind and hydro power assets. The country’s commercial balance will be negatively impacted by a long period of high global energy prices.

Portugal’s low installed solar capacity of about 7 percent of the energy mix is expected to reach 8 GW of solar capacity, or 27 percent of the mix by 2030. The Government is promoting significant investments in wind and solar energy development to meet its target of 47 percent energy from renewables by 2030. By 2021 the country reduced its external energy dependence by 9 percentage points (from 2005), seeking greater supply security by increasing domestic energy generation and reducing the consumption of primary energy by 17 percent. The Government has also talked about plans to launch a 2-5 GW offshore wind auction this summer (without providing details), in hopes of speeding up the deployment of large-scale offshore wind capacity to reduce energy dependence on Russia.

Portugal’s path to a carbon neutral economy includes incentives for energy efficiency; promoting diversification of energy sources; increasing electrification; reinforcing and modernizing infrastructure; developing more interconnections; market stability for investors; reconfiguring and digitalizing the market; incentives for research and innovation, promoting low-carbon processes, products and services; and improving energy services and information for consumers.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 32 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
Global Innovation Index 2021 31 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 2.54 billion https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 21,790 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

3. Legal Regime

4. Industrial Policies

5. Protection of Property Rights

6. Financial Sector

7. State-Owned Enterprises

There are currently over 40 major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in Portugal in the banking, health care, transportation, water, and agriculture sectors. Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD) has revenues greater than one percent of GDP. The bank has the largest market share in customer deposits, commercial loans, mortgages, and many other banking services in the Portuguese market.

Parpublica is a government holding company for several smaller SOEs, providing audits and reports on these. More information can be found at: http://www.parpublica.pt/ . The activities and accounts of Parpublica are fully disclosed in budget documents and audited annual reports. In addition, the Ministry of Finance publishes an annual report on SOEs through a specialized monitoring unit (UTAM) that presents annual performance data by company and sector: In 2020, Parpublica  managed assets totaling €11 billion, employs 4,400 workers and the net income of the holding was €80 million.

When SOEs are wholly owned, the government appoints the board, although when SOEs are majority-owned the board of executives and non-executives’ nomination depends on the negotiations between government and the remaining shareholders, and in some cases on negotiations with EU authorities as well.

According to Law No. 133/2013, SOEs must compete under the same terms and conditions as private enterprises, subject to Portuguese and EU competition laws. Still, SOEs often receive preferential financing terms from private banks.

In 2008 Portugal’s Council of Ministers approved resolution no. 49/2007, which defined the Principles of Good Governance for SOEs according to OECD guidelines. The resolution requires SOEs to have a governance model that ensures the segregation of executive management and supervisory roles, to have their accounts audited by independent entities, to observe the same standards as those for companies publicly listed on stock markets, and to establish an ethics code for employees, customers, suppliers, and the public. The resolution also requires the Ministry of Finance’s Directorate General of the Treasury and Finances to publish annual reports on SOEs’ compliance with the Principles of Good Governance. Credit and equity analysts generally tend to criticize SOEs’ over-indebtedness and inefficiency, rather than any poor governance or ties to government.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

There is strong awareness of responsible business conduct in Portugal and broad acceptance of the need to consider the community among the key stakeholders of any company. The Group of Reflection and Support for Business Citizenship (GRACE) was founded in 2000 by a group of companies, primarily multinational enterprises, to expand the role of the Portuguese business community in social development.

The Ministry of Economy and AICEP encourage foreign and local enterprises to observe the due diligence approach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and both agencies jointly comprise the National Contact Point (NCP) to provide support for mediating disputes that may arise regarding the Guidelines. The Portuguese Business Ethics Association (APEE) is dedicated to promoting corporate social responsibility and works in collaboration with the Ministry of Economy’s Directorate-General of Economic Activities. It promotes events like Social Responsibility Week and celebrates protocols and agreements with companies to ensure they follow responsible business conduct principles incorporated into the labor code.

Portugal’s Competition Authority both encourages and enforces competition rules, including ethical business practices. The Competition Authority operates a leniency program for companies that self-identify lapses. There have not been any high profile, controversial instances of private sector impact on human rights. The Portuguese government enforces domestic laws effectively and fairly through the domestic courts system, and through the supra-national European Court of Human Rights. Within its constitution, Portugal states that constitutional precepts concerning fundamental rights must be interpreted and observed in harmony with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Portuguese legal and regulatory framework on corporate governance includes not only regulations and recommendations from the Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM), but also specific legal provisions from the Portuguese Companies Code and the Portuguese Securities Code. CMVM promotes sound corporate governance for listed companies by setting out a group of recommendations and regulations on the standards of corporate governance. CMVM regulations are binding for listed companies.

Non-governmental organizations also promote awareness of environmental and good governance issues in business. These include Quercus Portugal, which publishes guidelines and organizes events to promote environmental responsibility in business practices, and Transparencia e Integridade Associacao Civica (TIAC), which produces reports on corruption on everything from soccer match-fixing to conflicts of interest in public and private enterprise. TIAC also allows whistle-blowers to anonymously submit reports of corruption through their website.

Portugal represents a success story in fighting child labor from its supply chain, as the public and private sector came together decisively to eradicate child labor issues from the 1990’s. However, Portugal remains a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor trafficking. In 2019, a series of large COVID-19 outbreaks unveiled how groups of migrant workers at berry farms were subject to poor housing and sanitary conditions.

Portugal does not participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) or the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. The country’s two main umbrella unions, CGTP-Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses and UGT-União Geral dos Trabalhadores, also regularly denounce and combat non-compliant business practices, particularly related to labor rights violations.

Portugal potentially holds some of the largest lithium reserves in Europe and is preparing to advance with battery-grade ore mining. While some recognize the role of lithium for energy transition, several NGOs issued negative opinions of planned mine projects, warning about open-pit methods that will provoke dust, noise, and detonations around the clock, damaging the lifestyle and health of local population. Environmentalists also warn about the risks to local species such as water moles, the Iberian wolf and river mussels. In January 2020, 14 civil society and environmental associations signed a national manifest against Portugal’s mining plans

Department of State

Department of the Treasury

Department of Labor

Portugal’s national climate strategy aims to reach net zero emissions by 2050. In its 2021-2030 National Energy and Climate plan, Portugal sets out goals for decarbonization, energy efficiency, energy security, internal energy markets and research, innovation, and competitiveness. Portugal’s installed solar capacity is now about 7 percent of the energy mix and is expected to reach 8 GW of solar capacity, or 27 percent of the energy mix by 2030.  The Government is promoting significant investments in wind and solar energy development to meet its target of 47 percent energy from renewables by 2030. Portugal reduced its external energy dependence by 9.1 percentage points in 2021 versus 2005, increasing domestic energy generation and reducing the consumption of primary energy by 17 percent, ensuring greater supply security. Portugal’s path to a carbon neutral economy includes: incentives for energy efficiency; promoting diversification of energy sources; increasing electrification; reinforcement and modernization of infrastructure; development of interconnections; market stability for investors; reconfiguration and digitalization of the market; incentives for research and innovation, promotion of low-carbon processes, products and services; and improved energy services and information for consumers.

When it comes to public procurement and instruments for the State to accelerate the climate transition, Portugal has a ‘once-in-a-generation chance’ to boost its efforts. The country can use around €16.6 billion in European Union (EU) pandemic response funds expected to flow to state coffers between 2021 and 2026 to support its Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP), of which the government will allocate 47 percent to efforts that help climate objectives. Public procurement and investment policies dictate that large infrastructure, industrial, mining, and other environmentally sensitive initiatives require the approval of impact assessment studies, supervised and assessed by the Portuguese Agency for the Environment (APA), before moving forward.

9. Corruption

U.S. firms do not identify corruption as an obstacle to foreign direct investment. Portugal has made legislative strides toward further criminalizing corruption. The government’s Council for the Prevention of Corruption, formed in 2008, is an independent administrative body that works closely with the Court of Auditors to prevent corruption in public and private organizations that use public funds. Transparencia e Integridade Associacao Civica, the local affiliate of Transparency International, also actively publishes reports on corruption and supports would-be whistleblowers in Portugal.

In 2010, the country adopted a law criminalizing violation of urban planning rules and increasing transparency in political party funding. In 2015, Parliament unanimously approved a revision to existing anti-corruption laws that extended the statute of limitations for the crime of trading in influence to 15 years, and criminalized embezzlement by employees of state-owned enterprises with a prison term of up to eight years. The laws extend to family members of officials and to political parties.

Despite being seen as generally aligned with the best international practices in terms of preventing and combating corruption, a June 2019 interim report by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) concluded that only one of the fifteen recommendations contained in GRECO´s Fourth Round Evaluation Report had been implemented satisfactorily or dealt in a satisfactory manner by Portugal at end-2019 in terms of compliance with GRECO anti-corruption recommendations addressed to lawmakers, judges and prosecutors.

Portugal ranked 32nd out of 180 countries in Transparency International (TI)’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), an improvement of one position from the previous year.

Portugal approved a national anti-corruption strategy in December 2021. This legislative package includes a working group that prepares a national report, revises the whistle-blower protection framework, fraud-proofs legislation, improves public procurement processes, reinforces the transparency of political party financing, and ensures that companies have corruption prevention plans in place.

Portugal has laws and regulations to counter conflict-of-interest in awarding contracts or government procurement. Parliamentarians are required to declare their income, assets, and interests to the Authority for Transparency attached the Constitutional Court.

The Portuguese government encourages (and in some cases requires) private companies to establish internal codes of conduct that, among other things, prohibit bribery of public officials. Most private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials. As described above, the Competition Authority operates a leniency program for companies that self-identify infringements of competition rules, including ethical lapses.

Portugal has ratified and complies with both the UN Convention against Corruption and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

10. Political and Security Environment

Since the 1974 Carnation Revolution, Portugal has had a long history of peaceful social protest. Portugal experienced its largest political rally since its revolution in response to proposed budgetary measures in 2012. Public workers, including nurses, doctors, teachers, aviation professionals, and public transportation workers organized peaceful demonstrations periodically in protest of insufficient economic support, low salary levels, and other measures.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

Numerous labor reform packages aimed at improving productivity were implemented after the 2011 bailout, but overall labor productivity remains a challenge. The annualized monthly minimum wage increased stands at €823.

After the difficulties of the eurozone debt crisis, when many Portuguese migrated out of the country along with some resident migrants, net-migration became positive again in 2017 and has strengthened since. The largest communities of workers come from Brazil, Cape Verde, Romania, Ukraine, UK, China, France, Italy, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal and India. In the Southern Algarve region, the tourism sector employs most of the migrant workers. Alentejo and the coastal regions of central Portugal, with their intensive agriculture sectors, host substantial Asian workers’ communities, especially from Bangladesh.

Employers are allowed to conduct collective dismissals linked to adverse market or economic conditions, or due to technological advancement, but must provide advance notice and severance pay. Depending on the seniority of each employee, an employer must provide between 15 to 75 days of advance notice, and pay severance ranging from 12 days’ to one month’s salary per year worked. Employees may challenge termination decisions before a Labor Court. Labor laws are uniformly applicable and enforced, including in Portugal’s foreign trade zone/free port in the Autonomous Region of Madeira.

Collective bargaining is common in Portugal’s banking, insurance, and public administration sectors. More information is available at the Directorate General for Labor Relations site.

Portugal has labor dispute resolution mechanisms in place through Labor Courts and Arbitration Centers. Labor strikes are not violent and of short duration. Labor laws are not waived in order to attract or retain investment.

Portugal is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO), and has ratified all eight Fundamental Conventions as well as all four Governance (Priority) Conventions.

The Labor Code caps the work schedule at eight hours per day, and 40 hours per week. The public sector employee workweek, with certain exclusions, was capped at 35 hours in July 2016. Employees are entitled to at least 22 days of annual leave per year. Employers must pay employees a Christmas and vacation bonus, both equivalent to one month’s salary.

Gender pay gap inequality in Portugal worsened from 10.9 percent in 2019 to 11.4 percent in 2020, which is still better than the average EU difference (13 percent), according to Eurostat data . Portugal has shown progress in developing gender equality and gender mainstreaming policies, according to European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). The 2030 National Strategy on Gender Equality, aligned with the UN Sustainable Development Goals, established a plan to: promote gender equality; tackle violence against women and domestic violence; and, combat discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity and sexual characteristics.

Portugal’s Fraud Management and Economics Observatory estimates that the informal economy is worth about 27 percent of GDP, according to its last available analysis in 2015. The President of the Observatory said  in 2020 that the weight of the informal economy has likely “increased significantly” with the onset of the pandemic.

Spain

Executive Summary

Spain is open to foreign investment and actively seeks additional investment as a key component of its COVID-19 recovery. After six years of growth (2014-2019), Spain’s GDP fell 11 percent in 2020 – the worst performance in the Eurozone – due in large part to high COVID-19 infection rates, a strict three-month lockdown, border closures, and pandemic-related restrictions that decimated its tourism and hospitality sectors. By building on healthy fundamentals and fueled by up to 140 billion euros in Next Generation EU recovery funds, Spain rebounded with 5.1 percent GDP growth in 2021, and unemployment improved to 13.3 percent. Economic activity is expected to return to its pre-crisis level in 2023, though Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine could threaten the recovery by pushing up energy prices, compounding supply chain disruptions, and stoking inflation. Service-based industries, particularly those related to tourism, and energy-intensive industries remain most vulnerable to the economic shock. Spain’s key economic risks are high public debt levels and ballooning pension costs for its aging population, though these areas are targets for government reforms.

Despite COVID-19’s economic shock, Spain’s excellent infrastructure, well-educated workforce, large domestic market, access to the European Common Market, and leadership on renewable energy make it an appealing foreign investment destination. Spanish law permits up to 100 percent foreign ownership in companies, and capital movements are completely liberalized. According to Spanish data, in 2021, foreign direct investment flow into Spain was EUR 28.8 billion, 17.7 percent more than in 2020. Of this total, EUR 1.6 billion came from the United States, the fifth largest investor in Spain in new foreign direct investment. Foreign investment is concentrated in the energy, real estate, financial services, engineering, and construction sectors.

Spain aims to use its Next Generation EU recovery funds to transform the Spanish economy, especially through digitalization and greening of the economy, to achieve long-term increases in productivity and growth. Full financing is contingent on additional economic reforms beyond labor reform. Spain’s credit ratings remain stable, and issuances of public debt – especially for green bonds – have been oversubscribed, reflecting strong investor appetite for investment in Spain. However, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which account for more than 99 percent of Spanish businesses and have been acutely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, still have some difficulty accessing credit and rely heavily on bank financing. Small firms also experience more challenges accessing EU recovery funds.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 34 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/
research/cpi/overview
Global Innovation Index 2021 30 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/
analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $38,500 https://apps.bea.gov/international/
factsheet/
World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 27,360 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

3. Legal Regime

4. Industrial Policies

5. Protection of Property Rights

6. Financial Sector

7. State-Owned Enterprises

Spain’s public enterprise sector is relatively small, and the role and importance of state-owned enterprises (SOE) decreased since the privatization process started in the early 1980s. The reform of SOE oversight in the 1990s led the government to create the State Holding for Industrial Participations (SEPI) in 1995. SEPI has direct majority participation in 15 SOEs, which make up the SEPI Group, with a workforce of more than 78,000 employees. It is a direct minority shareholder in nine SOEs (five of them listed on stock exchanges) and participates indirectly in ownership of more than one hundred companies. Either legislative chamber and any parliamentary group may request the presence of SEPI and SOE representatives to discuss issues related to their performance. SEPI and the SOEs are required to submit economic and financial information to the legislature on a regular basis. The European Union, through specialized committees, also controls SOEs’ performance on issues concerning sector-specific policies and anti-competitive practices.

Companies with a majority interest: Agencia Efe, Cetarsa, Ensa, Grupo Cofivacasa, Grupo Correos, Grupo Enusa, Grupo Hunosa, Grupo Mercasa, Grupo Navantia, Grupo Sepides, GrupoTragsa, Hipodromodo la Zarzuela, Mayasa, Saeca, Defex (in liquidation)

Companies with a minority interest: Airbus Group, Alestis Aerospace, Enagas, Enresa, Hispasat, Indra, International Airlines Group, Red Electrica Corporacion, Ebro Foods

Attached companies: RTVE, Corporacion de Radio y Television Espanola

SEPI also has indirect participation in more than 100 subsidiaries and other investees of the majority companies, which make up the SEPI Group.

Corporate Governance of Spain’s SOEs uses criteria based on OECD principles and guidelines. These include the state ownership function and accountability, as well as issues related to performance monitoring, information disclosure, auditing mechanisms, and the role of the board in the companies.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

Although the visibility of responsible business conduct (RBC) efforts is still moderate by international standards, it has garnered growing interest over the last two decades. Today, almost all of Spain’s largest energy, telecommunications, infrastructure, transportation, financial services, and insurance companies, among many others, undertake RBC projects, and such practices are spreading throughout the economy.

Spain enforces domestic and EU laws and regulations to protect human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, and environmental protections. Spain endorsed the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and supports the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. The national point of contact is the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Tourism.

9. Corruption

Spain has a variety of laws, regulations, and penalties to address corruption. The legal regime has both civil and criminal sanctions for corruption, bribery, financial malfeasance, etc. Giving or accepting a bribe is a criminal act. Under Section 1255 of the Spanish civil code, corporations and individuals are prohibited from deducting bribes from domestic tax computations. There are laws against tax evasion and regulations for banks and financial institutions to fight money laundering terrorist financing. In addition, the Spanish Criminal Code provides for jail sentences and hefty fines for corporations’ (legal persons) administrators who receive illegal financing.

The Spanish government continues to build on its already strong measures to combat money laundering. After the European Commission threatened to sanction Spain for failing to bring its anti-money laundering regulations into full accordance with the EU’s Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, in 2018, Spain approved measures to modify its money laundering legislation to comply with the EU Directive. These measures establish new obligations for companies to license or register service providers, including identifying ultimate beneficial owners; institute harsher penalties for money laundering offenses; and create public and private whistleblower channels for alleged offenses.

The General State Prosecutor is authorized to investigate and prosecute corruption cases involving funds in excess of roughly USD 500,000. The Office of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor, a subordinate unit of the General State Prosecutor, investigates and prosecutes domestic and international bribery allegations. The Audiencia Nacional, a corps of magistrates has broad discretion to investigate and prosecute alleged instances of Spanish businesspeople bribing foreign officials.

Spain enforces anti-corruption laws on a generally uniform basis. Public officials are subjected to more scrutiny than private individuals, but several wealthy and well-connected business executives have been successfully prosecuted for corruption. In 2021, Spanish courts arraigned 344 defendants involved in 53 corruption cases. The courts issued 65 sentences, with 44 including a full or partial guilty verdict.

There is no obvious bias for or against foreign investors. U.S. firms rarely identify corruption as an obstacle to investment in Spain, although entrenched incumbents have frequently attempted and at times succeeded in blocking the growth of U.S. franchises and technology platforms in both Madrid and Barcelona.

Spain’s rank in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index fell slightly in 2021 to position 34; its overall score (61) is lower than that of many other Western European countries.

Spain is a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery and the UN Convention Against Corruption. It has also been a member of the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) since 1999. Spain has made progress addressing OECD concerns about the low level of foreign bribery enforcement in Spain and the lack of implementation of the enforcement-related recommendations. In a 2021 report, GRECO highlighted that of the group’s 11 recommendations to combat corruption from 2013, six had been fully implemented, four had been partly implemented, and one had not been implemented.

10. Political and Security Environment

There are periodic peaceful demonstrations calling for salary and pension increases and other social or economic reforms. Public sector employees and union members organize frequent small demonstrations in response to service cuts, privatization, and other government measures. Demonstrations and civil unrest in Catalonia have resulted in vandalism and damage to store fronts and buildings in Barcelona and other cities. Some regional business leaders have expressed concern that disturbances could negatively affect business operations and investments in the region.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

The COVID-19 pandemic and public health crisis derailed progress on reducing Spain’s stubbornly high unemployment rate, which peaked at 26.9 percent in 2013 after the European financial crisis. At the end of 2021, unemployment stood at 13.3 percent, among the highest unemployment rates in the EU. The figure, however, excludes about 100,000 workers who were enrolled in temporary government furlough schemes established to provide income support for workers who lost their jobs during the pandemic. The youth unemployment rate decreased to 30.7 percent in 2021, from the 40.1 percent in 2020, representing 452,000 unemployed people under the age of 25. Spain’s economically active population totaled 23.3 million people, of whom 20.2 million were employed and 3.1 million unemployed. Foreign nationals comprised 15.3 percent of Spain’s workforce (3,094,900 people) in 2021.

Spain approved a landmark labor reform law in 2022 that satisfies EU requirements to unlock subsequent tranches of European recovery funds. Key components include:

  • Elimination of temporary contracts except for periods of high demand and temporary substitution of workers: The reform allows for two types of temporary contracts: structural, to respond to temporary increases in demand for up to one year, and substitution, to cover workers’ absences due to medical and parental leave.
  • Permanent-intermittent contracts: The reform’s limitations on temporary contracts will push employers to use a permanent-intermittent contract, which provides firms flexibility to use seasonal workers and allows seasonal workers to earn seniority for the entire duration of the employment relationship – not just the time of services provided.
  • Limits on training contracts: The goal of this measure is to reduce the share of Spanish young people employed on temporary contracts. It defines two broad types of educational contracts, including for students under 30 who work part-time while studying for a period of up to two years, and for professional trainees who are seeking work experience toward specific certifications.
  • Workers sector-wide will receive the same benefits: Firms must now apply the appropriate sector-wide labor agreement to the service a subcontractor performs, such as cleaning, maintenance, or information support, rather than the firm-level labor agreement.
  • Restoration of indefinite agreements between firms and unions: Expired labor agreements will now stay in effect until they are replaced.
  • Establishment of permanent state-backed furloughs (ERTEs) and stronger fraud-fighting measures: The reform establishes a permanent furlough scheme to protect workers in firms or sectors facing significant structural economic changes that require workers to retrain and find new employment. The measures strengthen fines for firms “overusing” temporary contracts.

The labor market is mainly divided into permanent workers with full benefits and temporary workers with many fewer benefits. In the event of dismissal for an objective reason (e.g., economic reasons), severance pay is available to the worker and amounts to 20 days’ wages per year of service with a maximum of 12 months’ wages. A worker dismissed for disciplinary reasons is not entitled to severance pay. For termination of a fixed term contract (either its term expiration or completion of the work), the worker is entitled to a severance payment of 12 days per year of service. Under Spanish Labor law, an employee may bring a claim against the employer for unfair dismissal within 20 days of receiving a termination letter.

Mechanisms for preventing and resolving individual labor disputes in Spain are developed by labor laws and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems through collective bargaining agreements. Each of Spain’s 17 autonomous communities has a different ADR system at different levels generally dealing with collective disputes. Spanish law stipulates that, before taking individual labor disputes to court in search of a solution, parties must first attempt to reach agreement through conciliation or mediation.

The Spanish Public Employment Service (SEPE) under the Ministry of Labor and Social Economy administers unemployment benefits called the Contributory Unemployment Protection. This benefit protects those who can and wish to work but become unemployed temporarily or permanently, or those whose normal working day is reduced by a minimum of 10 percent and a maximum of 70 percent.

Collective bargaining is widespread in both the private and public sectors. A high percentage of the working population is covered by collective bargaining agreements, although only a minority (generally estimated to be about 10 percent) of those covered are union members. Large employers generally have individual collective bargaining agreements, while smaller companies use industry-wide or regional agreements. As a result of the recent labor reform, sectoral-level agreements currently hold primacy over business-level agreements.

The Constitution guarantees the right to strike, and this right has been interpreted to include the right to call general strikes to protest government policy.

The informal or underground economy costs Spain an estimated EUR 270 billion, or about 25 percent of GDP as of 2020. The informal economy is most common in sectors such as construction or retail that tend to use more cash in commercial transactions. In July 2021, the Spanish Parliament approved an anti-fraud law (Law 11/2021) to prevent and combat tax fraud, lower the limit for cash payments to EUR 1,000 between professionals and EUR 2,500 between individuals, and prohibit tax amnesties.

Sweden

Executive Summary

Sweden is generally considered a highly favorable investment destination. Sweden offers an extremely competitive, open economy with access to new products, technologies, skills, and innovations. Sweden also has a well-educated labor force, outstanding communication infrastructure, and a stable political environment, which makes it a choice destination for U.S. and foreign companies. Low levels of corporate tax, the absence of withholding tax on dividends, and a favorable holding company regime are additional incentives for doing business in Sweden.

Sweden’s attractiveness as an investment destination is tempered by a few structural business challenges. These include high personal and VAT taxes. In addition, the high cost of labor, rigid labor legislation and regulations, a persistent housing shortage, and the general high cost of living in Sweden can present challenges to attracting, hiring, and maintaining talent for new firms entering Sweden. Historically, the telecommunications, information technology, healthcare, energy, and public transport sectors have attracted the most foreign investment. However, manufacturing, wholesale, and retail trade have also recently attracted increased foreign funds.

Overall, investment conditions remain largely favorable. In the World Economic Forum’s 2019 Competitiveness Report, Sweden was ranked eight out of 138 countries in overall competitiveness and productivity. The report highlighted Sweden’s strengths: human capital (health, education level, and skills of the population), macroeconomic stability, and technical and physical infrastructure. Bloomberg’s 2021 Innovation Index ranked Sweden fifth among the most innovative nations on earth; a pattern reinforced by Sweden ranked second on the European Commission’s 2021 European Innovation Scoreboard and second on the World Intellectual Property Organization/INSEAD 2021 Global Innovation Index. Also in 2021, Transparency International ranked Sweden as one of the most corruption-free countries in the world – fourth out of 180. Sweden is perceived as a creative place with interesting research and technology. It is well equipped to embrace the Fourth Industrial Revolution with a superior IT infrastructure and is seen as a frontrunner in adopting new technologies and setting new consumer trends. U.S. and other exporters can take advantage of a test market full of demanding, highly sophisticated customers.

The COVID-19 pandemic considerably impacted the Swedish economy, but following several fiscal stimulus packages, a successful vaccination rollout, and a relaxation of pandemic-related restrictions, Sweden’ economy has recovered fully to pre-pandemic levels with no notable impact on the investment climate. Climate and the environment are a central concern for the Swedish government, political parties across the political spectrum, businesses, and the public at large. Successive Swedish governments have actively lobbied for ambitious action to protect the environment and to curb greenhouse gases within a multilateral, internationally binding framework and by welcoming research, innovation, and investment within the fields of climate and the environment.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 4 of 175 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
Global Innovation Index 2021 2 of 131 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $63,847 https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal
World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $54,050 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

3. Legal Regime

4. Industrial Policies

5. Protection of Property Rights

6. Financial Sector

8. Responsible Business Conduct

There is widespread awareness of responsible business conduct (RBC) among both producers and consumers in Sweden. All businesses are expected to comply with local laws and regulations, and to observe the international norms and principles for human rights, labor protection, sustainable development, and anti-corruption. Firms that pursue RBC are viewed favorably, often publicizing their adherence to generally accepted RBC principles such as those contained in OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Volvo Trucks, for example, has collaborated with USAID in pursuing RBC efforts outside of Sweden. The Swedish National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines can be found at: https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/handel-och-investeringsframjande/nationella-kontaktpunkten/ . The Government of Sweden has adopted a platform for sustainable business, the term it uses for efforts related to RBC/CSR (link to pdf): https://www.government.se/49b750/contentassets/539615aa3b334f3cbedb80a2b56a22cb/sustainable-business—a-platform-for-swedish-action .

Sweden effectively and fairly enforces domestic laws in relation to human rights, labor rights, consumer protection, environmental protections, and other laws/regulations intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. There are no alleged/reported human or labor rights concerns relating to RBC that foreign businesses should be aware of, as for example, alleged instances of forced and/or child labor in domestic supply chains, forced evictions of indigenous peoples, or arrests of and violence against environmental defenders.Sweden has put in place corporate governance, accounting, and executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. Sweden is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).Sweden is one of seventeen states that have finalized The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. It is a supporter of and participant in International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA).

Representatives of the Sámi people have repeatedly requested meaningful consultation on issues that relate to mining, wind, and other projects proposed for their areas.  One area of focus is the proposed Gállok (Kallak) iron ore mine in a traditional reindeer herding area.  UN Human Rights Council special rapporteurs urged against a license for the open pit mine, which they noted would create significant and irreversible risks to Sámi lands, resources, culture, and livelihoods.  The Sámi also express concern about the lack of good-faith consultations and the failure to obtain the free, prior, and informed consent of the Sámi.  Sweden adopted a new law in January 2022, which requires consultations with the Sámi on issues that affect their interests.  The law takes effect March 2022 at the national level, but local and regional consultations will not be required for another two years.  In 2020, Sweden’s supreme court ruled that Sámi hunting rights lost in 1993 should be restored to the Sámi village Girjas Sameby. The ruling has been interpreted as a move to restore lost land resource rights to the Sámi.

9. Corruption

Investors have an extremely low likelihood of encountering corruption in Sweden. While there have been cases of domestic corruption at the municipal level, most companies have high anti-corruption standards, and an investor would not typically be put in the position of having to pay a bribe to conduct business.

There are cases of Swedish companies operating overseas that have been charged with bribing foreign officials; however, these cases are relatively rare. Although Sweden has comprehensive laws against corruption, and ratified the 1997 OECD Anti-bribery Convention, in June of 2012, the OECD Anti-Bribery Working Group has given an unfavorable review of Swedish compliance to the dictates of that Convention. The group faulted Sweden for not having a single conviction of a Swedish company for bribery in the last eight years, for having unreasonably low fines, and for not re-framing their legal system so that a corporation could be charged with a crime. Swedish officials object to the review, claiming that lack of convictions is not proof of prosecutorial indifference, but rather indicative of high standards of ethics in Swedish companies. In 2019, the OECD Anti-Bribery Working Group repeated its recommendations and urged Sweden to follow them. Over the last five years, two high-profile cases have involved Swedish companies. Telia Company’s operations in Uzbekistan received considerable public attention and cost the CEO and other senior officials their jobs. Telia Company was in the process of divesting its operations in Uzbekistan following a probe by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) pertaining to illegal payments. In September 2017, Telia Company reached an agreement to pay $965.8 million to settle U.S. and European criminal and civil charges that the company had paid bribes to win business in Uzbekistan. In December 2019, Ericsson reached an agreement with the Department of Justice to pay more than $1 billion to resolve a foreign corrupt practices case which involved bribing government officials, falsifying books and records, and failing to implement reasonable internal accounting controls.  The resolutions covered criminal conduct in Djibouti, China, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Kuwait. Ericsson also entered into a three-year Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with the DOJ. As part of this resolution, Ericsson agreed to engage an independent compliance monitor for three years. The monitor’s main responsibilities include reviewing Ericsson’s compliance with the terms of the settlement and evaluating Ericsson’s progress in implementing and operating its enhanced compliance program and accompanying controls as well as providing recommendations for improvements.Sweden does not have a specific agency devoted exclusively to anti-corruption, but a number of agencies cooperate together. A list of Sweden’s Public and Private Anti-Corruption Initiatives can be found at https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/sweden .

UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery

Sweden has signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention (see list of signatories at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html ).

Sweden is party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (see list of signatories and their implementation reports at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm ).

10. Political and Security Environment

Sweden is politically stable, and no changes are expected.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

In 2021, there were 5,602,000 people aged 15–74 years in the labor force, not seasonally adjusted. There were 2,952,000 men and 2,650,000 women in the labor force. The relative labor force participation rate was 74.5 percent. This rate was 77.3 percent for men and 71.7 percent for women. Sweden’s labor force of 5.6 million is disciplined, well educated, and highly skilled. Approximately 68 percent of the Swedish labor force is unionized, although membership is declining. Swedish unions have helped to implement business restructuring to remain competitive, and strongly favor employee education and technical advancements. Management- labor cooperation is generally excellent and non-confrontational. The National Mediation Office, which mediates labor disputes in Sweden, reported in its summary findings for 2020 that no working day was lost due to a strike in Sweden in 2020.

Foreign/migrant workers are covered by Swedish and EU labor laws. Labor laws are not waived in order to attract or retain investment. In general, there is no government policy that requires the hiring of nationals.

Sweden has a Co-determination at Work Act, which provides for labor representation on the boards of corporate directors once a company has reached more than 25 employees. This law also requires management to negotiate with the appropriate union, or unions prior to implementing certain major changes in company activities. It calls for a company to furnish information on many aspects of its economic status to labor representatives. Labor and management usually find this system works to their mutual benefit. The Co-determination at Work Act and the Employment Protection Act together set the rules for the adjustment employment to respond to fluctuating market conditions. Severances and layoffs are based on seniority and are conducted in consultation with unions. Unemployment insurance and other social safety net programs are available for workers laid off for economic reasons. Government-sponsored training programs to facilitate the transition for unemployed persons into areas reporting labor shortages are available, but their scope is targeted.

The cost of doing business in Sweden is generally comparable to most OECD countries, though some country-specific cost advantages are present. Overall salary costs have become increasingly competitive due to relatively modest wage increases over the last decade and a favorable exchange rate. This development is even more pronounced for highly qualified personnel and researchers.

There is no fixed minimum wage by legislation. Instead, wages are set by collective bargaining by sector. The traditionally low-wage differential has increased in recent years as a result of increased wage setting flexibility at the company level. Still, Swedish unskilled employees are relatively well paid, while well-educated Swedish employees are relatively less well paid compared to those in competitor countries. The average increases in real wages in recent years have been high by historical standards, in large part due to price stability. Even so, nominal wages in recent years have been slightly above those in competitor countries, about 2 percent annually. Employers must pay social security fees of about 31.5 percent. The fee consists of statutory contributions for pensions, health insurance, and other social benefits.

Sweden has ratified most International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions dealing with worker’s rights, freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the major working conditions and occupational safety and health conventions. More information on Sweden’s labor agreements and legislation in English can be found on the Swedish Trade Union Confederation’s website at http://www.lo.se/english/startpage .

An amended Labor law was agreed upon in June 2021. The amendments to the law are proposed to enter into force on June 30, 2022. The amendments to the Labor law will give employers greater flexibility to manage their workforce based on the skills needed for their business and improve predictability at various stages in a dismissal process. Employees will in return get more predictability regarding different employment conditions and forms of employment. Employers may, among other things, have an increased opportunity to make exceptions from the order of ending employment contracts, as Swedish labor laws are based on seniority. The rules for dismissal for personal reasons are made clearer in the amended law and the employer does not bear the wage cost in the event of dismissal disputes. At the same time, there will be a better balance between employees with different employment conditions.

Sweden is a member of the European Union (EU). The EU impacts Sweden’s trade relationship with the United States in that the EU has a common trade policy for all member countries.

A study conducted by the Swedish Tax Authority in 2020 assessed the size of the informal economy in Sweden to be 2.3 percent as share of GDP (2006 figure) and the share had remained largely constant in the last thirteen years.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount  
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data:
BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $46,503 2020 $63,847 BEA data available at
https://www.bea.gov/international/
direct-investment-and-multinational-
enterprises-comprehensive-data
Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 $81,935 2020 $55,404 BEA data available at
https://www.bea.gov/international/
direct-investment-and-multinational-
enterprises-comprehensive-data
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2020 $73.5% 2020 76.1% UNCTAD data available at
https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/
EconomicTrends/Fdi.html
    

* Source for Host Country Data: Statistics Sweden (SCB).

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward 413,512 100% Total Outward 464,891 100%
Luxembourg 59,401 14.4% United States 85,939 18.5%
The Netherlands 58,890 14.2% The Netherlands 46,019 9.9%
United Kingdom 50,825 12.3% United Kingdom 33,311 7.2%
United States 48,767 11.8% Norway 32,700 7.0%
Germany 41,219 10.0% Finland 28,730 6.2%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.

Switzerland and Liechtenstein

Executive Summary

Switzerland is welcoming to international investors, with a positive overall investment climate. The Swiss federal government enacts laws and regulations governing corporate structure, the financial system, and immigration, and concludes international trade and investment treaties. However, Switzerland’s 26 cantons (analogous to U.S. states) and largest municipalities have significant independence to shape investment policies locally, including incentives to attract investment. This federal approach has helped the Swiss maintain long-term economic and political stability, a transparent legal system, extensive and reliable infrastructure, efficient capital markets, and an excellent quality of life for the country’s 8.6 million inhabitants. Many U.S. firms base their European or regional headquarters in Switzerland, drawn to the country’s modest corporate tax rates, productive and multilingual workforce, and well-maintained infrastructure and transportation networks. U.S. companies also choose Switzerland as a gateway to markets in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. Furthermore, U.S. companies select Switzerland because of favorable and less restrictive labor laws compared to other European locations as well as availability of a skilled workforce.

In 2019, the World Economic Forum rated Switzerland the world’s fifth most competitive economy. This high ranking reflects the country’s sound institutional environment and high levels of technological and scientific research and development. With very few exceptions, Switzerland welcomes foreign investment, accords national treatment, and does not impose, facilitate, or allow barriers to trade. According to the OECD, Swiss public administration ranks high globally in output efficiency and enjoys the highest public confidence of any national government in the OECD. The country’s competitive economy and openness to investment brought Switzerland’s cumulative inward direct investment to USD 1.4 trillion in 2020 (latest available figures) according to the Swiss National Bank, although nearly half of this amount is invested in regional hubs or headquarters that further invest in other countries.

In order to address international criticism of tax incentives provided by Swiss cantons, the Federal Act on Tax Reform and Swiss Pension System Financing (TRAF) entered into force on January 1, 2020. TRAF obliges cantons to offer the same corporate tax rates to both Swiss and foreign companies, while allowing cantons to continue to set their own cantonal tax rates and offer incentives for corporate investment. These can be deductions or preferential tax treatment for certain types of income (such as for patents), or expenses (such as for research and development). Switzerland joined the Statement of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (BEPS) in July 2021. It intends to implement the BEPS effective minimum corporate tax rate of 15 percent by January 2024, after a referendum to amend the Swiss constitution.

Personal income and corporate tax rates vary widely across Switzerland’s cantons. Effective corporate tax rates ranged between 11.85 and 21.04 percent in 2021, according to KPMG. In Zurich, for example, the combined effective corporate tax rate (including municipal, cantonal, and federal taxes),was 19.7 percent in 2021. The United States and Switzerland have a bilateral tax treaty.

Key sectors that have attracted significant investments in Switzerland include information technology, precision engineering, scientific instruments, pharmaceuticals, medical technology, and machine building. Switzerland hosts a significant number of startups. A new “blockchain act” came fully into force in August 2021, which is expected to benefit Switzerland’s already sizeable ecosystem for companies in blockchain and distributed ledger technologies.

There are no “forced localization” laws designed to require foreign investors to use domestic content in goods or technology (e.g., data storage within Switzerland). Switzerland follows strict privacy laws and certain personal data may not be collected in Switzerland.

Switzerland is a highly innovative economy with strong overall intellectual property protection. Switzerland enforces intellectual property rights linked to patents and trademarks effectively, and new amendments to the country’s Copyright Act to strengthen copyright enforcement on the internet came into force in April 2020.

There are some investment restrictions in areas under state monopolies, including certain types of public transportation, telecommunications, postal services, alcohol and spirits, aerospace and defense, certain types of insurance and banking services, and the trade in salt. The Swiss agricultural sector remains protected and heavily subsidized.

Liechtenstein

Liechtenstein’s investment conditions are identical in most key aspects to those in Switzerland, due to its integration into the Swiss economy. The two countries form a customs union, and Swiss authorities are responsible for implementing import and export regulations.

Both Liechtenstein and Switzerland are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA, which also includes Iceland and Norway). EFTA is an intergovernmental trade organization and  free trade area  that operates in parallel with the  European Union  (EU). Liechtenstein participates in the EU single market through the European Economic Area (EEA), unlike Switzerland, which has opted for a set of bilateral agreements with the EU instead.

Liechtenstein has a stable and open economy employing 40,328 people in 2020 (latest figures available), exceeding its domestic population of 39,055 and requiring a substantial number of foreign workers. In 2020, 70.6 percent of the Liechtenstein workforce were foreigners, mainly Swiss, Austrians and Germans, most of whom commute daily to Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein was granted an exception to the EU’s Free Movement of People Agreement, enabling the country not to grant residence permits to its workers.

Liechtenstein is one of the world’s wealthiest countries. Liechtenstein’s gross domestic product per capita amounted to USD 162,558 in 2019 (latest data available). According to the  Liechtenstein Statistical Yearbook , the services sector, particularly in finance, accounts for 63 percent of Liechtenstein’s jobs, followed by the manufacturing sector (particularly mechanical engineering, machine tools, precision instruments, and dental products), which employs 36 percent of the workforce. Agriculture accounts for less than one percent of the country’s employment.

Liechtenstein’s corporate tax rate, at 12.5 percent, is one of the lowest in Europe. Capital gains, inheritance, and gift taxes have been abolished. The Embassy has no recorded complaints from U.S. investors stemming from market restrictions in Liechtenstein. The United States and Liechtenstein do not have a bilateral income tax treaty.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings – Switzerland
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 7 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/
research/cpi/overview
Global Innovation Index 2021 1 of 129 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/
analysis-indicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 USD 211,936 https://apps.bea.gov/international/
factsheet
/
World Bank GNI per capita 2020 USD 82,620 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

3. Legal Regime

4. Industrial Policies

5. Protection of Property Rights

6. Financial Sector

7. State-Owned Enterprises

The Swiss Confederation is the largest or sole shareholder in Switzerland’s five state-owned enterprises (SOEs), active in the areas of ground transportation (SBB), information and communication (Swiss Post, Swisscom), defense (RUAG, which was divided into two companies in January 2020 – see below), and aviation / air traffic control (Skyguide). These companies are typically responsible for “public function mandates,” but may also cover commercial activities (e.g., Swisscom in the area of telecommunications).

These SOEs typically have commercial relationships with private industry. Private sector competitors can compete with the SOEs under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. Additional publicly owned enterprises are controlled by the cantons in the areas of energy, water supply, and a number of subsectors. SOEs and canton-owned companies may benefit from exclusive rights and privileges (some of which are listed in Table A 3.2 of the most recent WTO Trade Policy Review – https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp455_e.htm ).

Switzerland is a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Some areas are partly or fully exempted from the GPA, such as the management of drinking water, energy, transportation, telecommunications, and defense. Private companies may encounter difficulties gaining business in these exempted sectors.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

The Swiss Confederation and Swiss companies are generally aware of the importance of pursuing due diligence to responsible business conduct (RBC) and demonstrating corporate social responsibility (CSR). In response to criticism from civil society about the business practices of Swiss companies abroad, the Swiss government commissioned a series of reports on the government’s role in ensuring CSR, particularly in the commodities sector, and in December 2016 published a national action plan in conjunction with its commitments under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights ( https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-64884.html ). In June 2017, the Swiss government concluded that Switzerland promotes voluntary principles, such as the upholding of human rights standards, and also supports including mandatory CSR market incentives, such as minimum conditions for the protection of workers abroad, in forthcoming legislation. In January 2020, the Swiss government approved the CSR Action Plan 2020-2023 , which covers sixteen measures – particularly promoting sustainability reporting and due diligence by companies, stakeholder dialogue, and the alignment of private section CSR instruments with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

The latest updates on corporate social responsibility are available on https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/en/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/Gesellschaftliche_Verantwortung_der_Unternehmen.html 

In November 2020, a referendum known as the “Responsible Business Initiative,” which would have placed new obligations on Swiss companies to protect human rights and the environment internationally, was narrowly rejected by Swiss voters. Instead, a proposal of Parliament came into force in January 2022, obliging covered companies to report on environmental and labor issues, human rights and the fight against corruption and to exercise due diligence with regard to conflict minerals and child labor. After a one-year transition period, the new reporting obligations will apply as of 2023, and companies will submit their first reports in2024. Also, Swiss companies involved in minerals extraction abroad are required to source all minerals in compliance with international labor standards and applicable environmental laws, and must report on measures to ensure their international activities do not involve or support child labor.

In March 2021, Swiss voters approved a free trade agreement between Indonesia and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), of which Switzerland is a member. The agreement requires that any palm oil imported under preferential tariffs be produced sustainably. This is said to be the first-ever agreement of its type that links trade preferences to sustainable methods of production.

Switzerland ranked 3rd out of 180 countries in the 2020 Yale University-based Environmental Performance Index (EPI).

The Swiss government implements the OECD Due Diligence Guide for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict and High-Risk Areas. Switzerland is a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and supports the Better Gold Initiative, which promotes responsible gold mining in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. Switzerland’s Point of Contact for the OECD Guidelines at the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) may be contacted at: https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/switzerland.htm . Information about the Swiss Better Gold Association is available at:  https://www.swissbettergold.ch .

Switzerland has signed a number of nonbinding agreements outlining best practices for corporations, including the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The latter was the result of a multi-stakeholder initiative launched by Switzerland.

Switzerland is also a signatory state of the Montreux Document, a non-binding instrument on the obligations of states under international law with regard to the activities of private military and security companies.

9. Corruption

Switzerland is ranked 7th of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2021, reflecting low perceptions of corruption in society. Under Swiss law, officials are not to accept anything that would “challenge their independence and capacity to act.” In case of non-compliance the law foresees criminal penalties, including imprisonment for up to five years, for official corruption, and the government generally implements these laws effectively. The bribery of public officials is governed by the Swiss Criminal Code (Art. 322), while the bribery of private individuals is governed by the Federal Law Against Unfair Competition. The law defines as granting an “undue advantage” either in exchange for a specific act, or in some cases for future behavior not related to a specific act. Some officials may receive small gifts valued at no more than CHF 200 or CHF 300 for an entire year, which are not seen as “undue.” However, officials in some fields, such as financial regulators, may receive no advantages at all. Transparency International has recommended that a maximum sum should be set at the federal level.

Investigating and prosecuting government corruption is a federal responsibility. A majority of cantons require members of cantonal parliaments to disclose their interests. A joint working group comprising representatives of various federal government agencies works under the leadership of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs to combat corruption. Some multinational companies have set up internal hotlines to enable staff to report problems anonymously.

Switzerland ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2009. Swiss government experts believe this ratification did not result in significant domestic changes, since passive and active corruption of public servants was already considered a crime under the Swiss Criminal Code.

A review by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) in 2017 recommended the adoption of a code of ethics/conduct, together with awareness-raising measures, for members of the federal parliament, judges, and the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) to avoid conflict of interests. These measures needed to be accompanied by a reinforced monitoring of members of parliament’s compliance with their obligations. In March 2018, the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions recommended that Switzerland adopt an appropriate legal framework to protect private sector whistleblowers from discrimination and disciplinary action, to ensure that sanctions imposed for foreign bribery against natural and legal persons are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, and to ensure broader and more systematic publication of concluded foreign bribery cases. The OECD Working Group positively highlighted Switzerland’s proactive policy on seizure and confiscation, its active involvement in mutual legal assistance, and its role as a promoter of cooperation in field of foreign bribery. Regarding detection, the OECD Working Group commended the key role played by the Swiss Financial Intelligence Unit (MROS) in detecting foreign bribery.

A number of Swiss federal administrative authorities are involved in combating bribery. The Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) deals with issues relating to the OECD Convention. The Federal Office of Justice deals with those relating to the Council of Europe Convention, while the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (MFA) deals with the UN Convention. The power to prosecute and judge corruption offenses is shared between the relevant Swiss canton and the federal government. For the federal government, the competent authorities are the Office of the Attorney General, the Federal Criminal Court, and the Federal Police. In the cantons, the relevant actors are the cantonal judicial authorities and the cantonal police forces.

In 2001, Switzerland signed the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. In 1997, Switzerland signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which entered into force in 2000. Switzerland signed the UN Convention against Corruption in 2003. Switzerland ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2009.

In order to implement the Council of Europe convention, the Swiss parliament amended the Penal Code to make bribery of foreign public officials a federal offense (Title Nineteen “Bribery”); these amendments entered into force in 2000. In accordance with the revised 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the Swiss parliament amended legislation as of 2001 on direct taxes of the Confederation, cantons, and townships to prohibit the tax deductibility of bribes.

Switzerland maintains an effective legal and policy framework to combat domestic corruption. U.S. firms investing in Switzerland have not raised with the Embassy any corruption concerns in recent years.

10. Political and Security Environment

There is minimal risk from civil unrest in Switzerland. Protests do occur in Switzerland, but authorities carefully monitor protest activities. Urban areas regularly experience demonstrations, mostly on global trade and political issues, and some occasionally sparked by U.S. foreign policy. Protests held during the annual World Economic Forum (WEF) occasionally draw participants from several countries in Europe. Historically, demonstrations have been peaceful, with protestors registering for police permits. Protestors have blocked traffic; spray-painted areas with graffiti, and on rare occasions, clashed with police. Political extremist or anarchist groups sometimes instigate civil unrest. Right-wing activists have targeted refugees/asylum seekers/foreigners, and more recently have organized protests against COVID-19 restrictions. Meanwhile, left-wing activists (who historically have demonstrated a greater propensity toward violence) usually target organizations involved with globalization, alleged fascism, and alleged police repression. Swiss police have at their disposal tear gas and water cannons, which are rarely used.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

The Swiss labor force is highly educated and highly skilled. The Swiss economy is capital intensive and geared toward high value-added products and services. In 2021, 77.2 percent of the workforce was employed in services, 20.4 percent in manufacturing, and 2.4 percent in agriculture. Full-time work compared to part-time work is more prevalent among foreign workers than among Swiss workers: 40.4 percent of the Swiss population works part-time, compared to 27.8 percent of the foreign working population. Part-time work is three times more common among women than men. Wages in Switzerland are among the highest in the world. Switzerland continues to observe International Labor Organization (ILO) core conventions. Government regulations cover maximum work hours, minimum length of holidays, sick leave, compulsory military service, contract termination, and other requirements. There is no federal minimum wage law.

Foreigners fill not only low-skilled, low-wage jobs, but also highly technical positions in the manufacturing and service industries. In 2021, foreigners account for 26.4 percent of Switzerland’s labor force estimated at about 4.7 million people. Many foreign nationals are long-time Swiss residents who have not applied for or been granted Swiss citizenship. Foreign seasonal workers take many lower-wage jobs in agriculture. Switzerland has one of the smallest informal economies in Europe, accounting for approximately 6% of GDP since 2016.

In the wake of a 2014 referendum to impose limits on immigration, the government introduced a series of measures aimed at bringing traditionally underemployed groups into the labor market – women, older job seekers, refugees, and temporarily accepted asylum seekers. In 2018 the Federal Council implemented a parliamentary decision that companies in sectors with more than 5 percent unemployment provide information on job openings to government-run employment centers, which make the openings available to cross-border commuters and EU nationals as well.

Trade union density – the percentage of the workforce represented by trade unions – is on the decline in Switzerland, according to OECD data. From over 20 percent in 2000, trade union density had fallen to 14.4 percent by 2018, according to the OECD (latest data available). Labor-management relations are generally constructive, with a general willingness on both sides to settle disputes by negotiation rather than labor action. According to the Federal Office of Statistics, some 581 collective agreements were in force in Switzerland in March 2018 (latest data available). Of these, approximately 64 percent concern the services sector, 34 percent the manufacturing sector, and one percent the agricultural sector; these are usually renewed without major difficulties. Trade unions continue to promote a wider coverage of collective agreements for the Swiss labor force. Although the number of workdays lost to strikes in Switzerland is among the lowest in the OECD, Swiss trade unions have encouraged workers to strike on several occasions in recent years. A general prohibition on strikes by Swiss public servants was repealed in 2000, although restrictions remain in place in a few cantons. The Federal Council may now only restrict or prohibit the right to strike where it affects the security of the state, external relations, or the supply of vital goods to the country.

In difficult economic times, employers may temporarily shift full-time employees to part-time by registering with cantonal authorities and justifying reductions as necessary to business activities. This practice, known as Kurzarbeit (“short-time work”), allows for the government to make partial salary payments through the unemployment insurance fund. Employees can reject the shift to part-time work, but risk dismissal in that case. Kurzarbeit became widespread with the onset of the COVD-19 crisis and the temporary shutdown of wide segments of the Swiss economy in 2020. By October 2021 this was drastically reduced to 48,264 affected employees from 7,917 companies, compared to 1.91 million employees in May and 219,388 in October 2020. . The Swiss government has continued expanded financial support for the Kurzarbeit program throughout the pandemic.

Switzerland’s average unemployment rate was 4.8 percent in 2020 under ILO Labor Force Survey methodology, while according to Swiss authorities registered unemployment in 2021 was 3.0 percent. Cantons bordering EU countries experience higher unemployment rates than Switzerland as a whole.

The Netherlands

Executive Summary

The Netherlands consistently ranks among the world’s most competitive industrialized economies. It offers an attractive business and investment climate and remains a welcoming location for business investment from the United States and elsewhere.

Strengths of the Dutch economy include the Netherlands’ stable political and macroeconomic climate, a highly developed financial sector, strategic location, well-educated and productive labor force, and high-quality physical and communications infrastructure. Investors in the Netherlands take advantage of its highly competitive logistics, anchored by the largest seaport and fourth-largest airport in Europe. In telecommunications, the Netherlands has one of the highest levels of internet penetration in the European Union (EU) at 96 percent and hosts one of the largest data transport hubs in the world, the Amsterdam Internet Exchange.

The Netherlands is among the largest recipients and sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world and one of the largest historical recipients of direct investment from the United States. This can be attributed to the Netherlands’ competitive economy, historically business-friendly tax climate, and many investment treaties containing investor protections. The Dutch economy has significant foreign direct investment in a wide range of sectors including logistics, information technology, and manufacturing. Dutch tax policy continues to evolve in response to EU attempts to harmonize tax policy across member states.

Until the COVID-19 crisis, economic growth had placed the Dutch economy in a very healthy position, with successive years of a budget surplus, public debt that was well under 50 percent of GDP, and record-low unemployment of 3.5 percent. This allowed the Dutch government significant fiscal space to implement coronavirus relief measures. In response to COVID, the Dutch government implemented wide-ranging support for businesses affected by the COVID crisis, including support to cover employee wages, benefits to self-employed professions to bridge a loss of income, and compensation for fixed costs other than wages. The financial support measures added up to about $70.5 billion (€60 billion) in the first year of the crisis. These programs prevented a wave of bankruptcies – bankruptcy filings in 2020 and 2021 were the lowest in two decades.

The new coalition government announced in early 2022 plans to be climate neutral by 2050. The government said it would adjust domestic climate goals to at least 55 percent CO2 reduction by 2030 compared to 1990, with ambitions to aim higher for a 60 percent reduction.  The government has named a Minister for Climate and Energy Policy to work on domestic issues in addition to a Climate Envoy focused on international efforts.  The Netherlands joined the U.S.-EU Global Methane Pledge and promised to end all investment in new coal power generation domestically and internationally.  In April 2022, the government joined the AIM for Climate initiative.

The 2019 National Climate Agreement contains policy and measures to achieve climate goals through agreements with various economic sectors on specific actions.  The participating sectors include electricity, industry, “built environment,” traffic and transport, and agriculture.

The Netherlands business community suffered a two-pronged loss in the planned departure of two of its major national corporate champions. Energy leader Shell and food and household products conglomerate Unilever announced in 2021 a relocation of their corporate headquarters from The Hague and Rotterdam, respectively, to London. The companies cited concerns with Dutch tax law relative to dividend taxation and need for consolidated management structure. (Note: Both companies previously split their corporate governance between the Netherlands and the UK. End Note.)

In March 2022, the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) published its 2022 economic projections. Due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the outlook was marked by uncertainty and flagged “even higher” energy prices as the most important economic consequence. Because of increased energy prices and high inflation from the COVID pandemic, CPB estimates a 5.2% inflation rate for 2022 with a range of 6.0% and 3.0% depending on how long energy prices remain high. CPB estimated economic growth of 3.6% in 2022 and 1.7% in 2023. CPB predicted unemployment at 4 percent in 2022, down from 4.2% in 2021. The low unemployment rate reflects a similar challenge also faced by the United States – businesses are finding it difficult to recruit qualified staff. Government debt is expected to rise to 61 percent of GDP by 2025 due to increased spending under the new coalition government, including on defense, outlays to support an aging population, and support to low-income families to offset inflation in energy and food prices.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), when measured by country of foreign parent, the Netherlands is the second largest destination for U.S. FDI abroad in 2020 after the UK, holding $844 billion out of a total of $6.1 trillion total outbound U.S. investment – about 14 percent. Investment from the Netherlands contributed $484 billion FDI to the United States, making it the fourth largest investor at the end of 2020 of about $4.6 trillion total inbound FDI to the United States– about 10.5 percent. Measured by ultimate beneficial owner (UBO), the Netherlands was the seventh largest investor at $236 billion. For the Netherlands, outbound FDI to the United States represented 14 percent of all direct investment abroad.

Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings
Measure Year Index/Rank Website Address
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 8 of 180 https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021 
Global Innovation Index 2021 6 of 132 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysisindicator
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions) 2020 $844 million Bea: Netherlands – International Trade and Investment Country Facts
World Bank GNI per capita 2020 $ 51,060 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment

3. Legal Regime

4. Industrial Policies

5. Protection of Property Rights

6. Financial Sector

7. State-Owned Enterprises

The Dutch government maintains an equity stake in a small number of enterprises and some ownership in companies that play an important role in strategic sectors.  In particular, government-controlled entities retain dominant positions in gas and electricity distribution, rail transport, and the water management sector.  The Netherlands has an extensive public broadcasting network, which generates its own income through advertising revenues but also receives government subsidies. For a complete list of government-owned entities, please see:  https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/staatsdeelnemingen/vraag-en-antwoord/in-welke-ondernemingen-heeft-de-overheid-aandelen 

Private enterprises are allowed to compete with public enterprises with respect to market access, credits, and other business operations such as licenses and supplies.  Government-appointed supervisory boards oversee state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  In some instances involving large investment decisions, SOEs must consult with the cabinet ministry that oversees them.  As with any other firm in the Netherlands, SOEs must publish annual reports, and their financial accounts must be audited. The Netherlands fully adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs.

8. Responsible Business Conduct

The Netherlands is a global leader in corporate social responsibility (CSR).  Principles of CSR are promoted and prescribed through a range of corporate, governmental, and international guidelines.  In general, companies carefully guard their CSR reputation and consumers are increasingly opting for products and services that are produced in an ethical and sustainable manner. The Netherlands adheres to OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy houses the National Contact Point (NCP) that promotes OECD guidelines and helps mediate concerns that persons, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and enterprises may have regarding implementation by a specific company.  For more information, visit  http://www.oecdguidelines.nl.

The Dutch government strongly encourages foreign and local enterprises to follow UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which states that businesses have a social responsibility to respect the same human rights norms in other countries as they do in the Netherlands.

Under the law, there is no differentiation for men and women regarding equal access to investment.  Furthermore, no groups are excluded from participating in financial markets and the financial system.

The Netherlands has strong standards for corporate governance.  Publicly listed companies are required to publish audited financial reports.  As of 2017, the EU requires these companies to include a chapter on Responsible Business Conduct.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy established an independent networking organization on CSR called MVONederland in 2004.  MVONederland currently has over 2050 members, including SMEs, multinational corporations, and NGOs, as well as local and national administrative bodies.  See  https://www.mvonederland.nl/en/about-mvo-nederland/about-csr-corporate-sustainability-and-responsibility/  

The Dutch government also encourages companies to engage in CSR through incentive programs and by setting high standards.  Examples include:

  • The government reviews CSR activities of more than 500 corporations annually and presents an award to the company with the highest transparency score.
  • The government boosts the development of sustainable products through its own sustainable procurement policy.
  • Dutch companies can only join government trade missions if they have endorsed OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
  • Companies that observe the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are eligible for financial support for their international trade and investment activities.
  • The government supports the Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH), which helps companies make their international production chains more sustainable.
  • The government conducts sector-risk analyses to identify where problems are most likely to occur and target improvements.
  • The government has completed nine of 13 sector-wide Responsible Business Conduct Agreements it intends to make with the private sector in the area of international CSR.  The nine agreements cover garments and textiles, banking, pensions, insurance, food products, sustainable forestry, natural stone, metals, and gold. See https://www.government.nl/topics/responsible-business-conduct-rbc/responsible-business-conduct-rbc-agreements

9. Corruption

The Netherlands fully complies with international standards on combating corruption.  Transparency International ranked the Netherlands eighth in its 2020 Corruption Perception Index. Anti-bribery legislation to implement the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC) entered into effect in 2001.  The anti-bribery law reconciles the language of the ABC with the EU Fraud Directive and the Council of Europe Convention on Fraud.  Under the law, it is a criminal offense if one obtains foreign contracts through corruption.

At the national level, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and Ministry of Justice and Security have both taken steps to enhance regulations to combat bribery in the processes of public procurement and issuance of permits and subsidies.  Most companies have internal controls and/or codes of conduct that prohibit bribery.

Several agencies combat corruption.  The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority serves as a knowledge center, develops new instruments for tracking problems, and identifies trends on matters of integrity.  The Independent Commission for Integrity in Government is an appeals board for whistleblowers in government and law enforcement agencies.

The Netherlands signed and ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention and is party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.

10. Political and Security Environment

Although political violence rarely occurs in the highly stable and consensus-oriented Dutch society, public debate on issues such as immigration and integration policy has been contentious.  While rare, there have been some politically and religiously inspired acts of violence.

The Dutch economy derives much of its strength from a stable business climate that fosters partnerships among unions, business organizations, and the government.  Strikes are rarely used as a way to resolve labor disputes.

11. Labor Policies and Practices

The Netherlands has a strongly regulated labor market (over 75 percent of labor contracts fall under some form of collective labor agreement) that comprises a well-educated and multilingual workforce.  Labor/management relations in both the public and private sectors are generally good in a system that emphasizes the concept of social partnership between industry and labor.  Although wage bargaining in the Netherlands is increasingly decentralized, there still exists a central bargaining apparatus where labor contract guidelines are established.

The terms of collective labor agreements apply to all employees in a sector, not only union members.  To avoid surprises, potential investors are advised to consult with local trade unions prior to making an investment decision to determine which, if any, labor contracts apply to workers in their business sector.  Collective bargaining agreements negotiated in recent years have, by and large, been accepted without protest.

Every company in the Netherlands with at least 50 workers is required by law to institute a Works Council (“Ondernemingsraad”), through which management must consult on a range of issues, including investment decisions, pension packages, and wage structures.  The Social Economic Council has helpful programs on establishing employee participation that allow firms to comply with the law on Works Councils.  See https://www.ser.nl/en/SER/About-the-SER/What-does-the-SER-do.

The working population consists of 9 million persons.  Workers are sought through government-operated labor exchanges, private employment firms, or direct hiring.  At 50 percent, the Netherlands has the highest share of part-time workers in its workforce of all EU member states (in 2017, the EU average of part-time workers was 19 percent).  A rise in female participation in the workforce led to a 37 percent increase in the share of part-time workers in the total working population.  Three-quarters of women and one quarter of men work less than a 36-hour week.  Labor market participation, especially by older workers, is growing, and the number of independent contractors is rapidly increasing.

To ensure continued economic growth and address the impact of an aging population, increased labor market participation is critical.  The age to qualify for a state pension (AOW) will increase from age 66 to 67 by 2024.  Governmental labor market policies are targeted at increasing productivity of the labor force, including the expansion of working hours.  For example, access to daycare is improving in order to raise the average number of hours per week worked by women (28 hours), which is 11 hours below the average of hours worked by men.

Effective January 1, 2022, the minimum wage for employees older than 21 years is €1,725 ($1,850) per month.

13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics

Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/Economy
Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
Economic Data Year Amount Year Amount
Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD) 2021 $859,001 2020 $914,000 GDP (current US$) – Netherlands | Data (worldbank.org)
Foreign Direct Investment Host Country Statistical source* USG or international statistical source USG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, Other
U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions) 2019 $976,750 2020 $844,000 BEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/
Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions) 2020 $744,720 2020 $484,000 BEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-data
Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP 2019 170% (excluding SFI) 2020 318% UNCTAD data available at

https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.html     

* Source for Host Country Data: Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB): GDP, Dutch Central Bank (DNB): FDI.

Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDI
Direct Investment from/in Counterpart Economy Data
From Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)
Inward Direct Investment Outward Direct Investment
Total Inward 4,512,447 100% Total Outward 5,876,798 100%
United States 1,190,180 26% United Kingdom 801,255 14%
Luxemburg 435,166 10% United States 792,311 13%
United Kingdom 433,383 10% Switzerland 521,553 9%
Germany 332,293 7% Germany 418,576 7%
Switzerland 226,734 5% Luxembourg 330,020 6%
“0” reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.